



# **External Evaluation of the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF) (2014 – mid 2017)**

**Final Report  
Annexes  
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## **External Evaluation of the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund**

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*This document has been prepared for the European Commission. However, it reflects the views of the authors only. The Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.*

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## List of Acronyms

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
AAP	Annual Action Plan
ABAC	Accrual Based Accounting
ACP	Africa, Caribbean, Pacific
ACPs	ACP states
AD	Action Document
AfDB	African Development Bank
AfIF	African Investment Facility
APF	African Peace Facility
BS	Budget Support
CAR	Caribbean
CBSS	Country Based Support Scheme
CCM	Country Coordinating Mechanism (of GFATM)
CIF	Caribbean Investment Facility
CIR	Common Implementing Regulations
CoA	Court of Auditors
Concord	European NGO confederation for relief and development
CPA	Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CPF	Country Partnership Framework (of IDA)
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (rating) (of IDA)
CRIS	Common RELEX Information System
CRS	Common Reporting Standard
CS	Civil society
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DG	Directorate General
DG NEAR	DG for Neighbourhood countries
DMRO	Duly mandated regional organisations
DP	Development Partner
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRM	Domestic Revenue Mobilisation
DWH	Data warehouse
EAC	East African Community
EAMR	External Assistance Management Report
EC	European Commission
ECHO	Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department of the European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EFI	External Financing Instrument
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP-E	European Neighbourhood Policy East
ENP-S	European Neighbourhood Policy South
ENPI	European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument
EODF	The European Overseas Development Fund
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EQ	Evaluation Question
ENRTP	Thematic Programme for Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources including Energy



ERDF	European Regional Development Fund
ESA-IO	East and Southern Africa and Western Indian Ocean
EU	European Union
EU-AITF	EU Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund
EUD	European Union Delegation
GBS	General Budget Support
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GCCA	Global Climate Change Alliance
GD	Greenland Decision
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFATM	The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GNI	Gross National Income
GPGC	Global Public Goods and Challenges
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan (Ethiopia)
HDI	Human Development Index
HoD	Head of Delegation
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Rights / Human Resources
I	Indicator
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IDA	International Development Association
IFP	Investment Facility for the Pacific
IfS-RRM	Instrument for Stability and Rapid Reaction Mechanism
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IL	Intervention Logic
INSC	Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession
IR	Inception Report
ISC	Inter-Service Commission
ISG	Interservice Group
IW	Internal Workstream
JASZ	Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia
JC	Judgment Criterion
JP	Joint Programme
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LA	Local Authorities
LDC	Least developed country
LFA	Local Fund Agent (of GFATM)
LIC	Low income country
LMIC	Lower-middle income country
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
M&R	Monitoring and reporting
MAR	Multilateral Aid Review
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MIC	Middle income country
MIP	Multi-annual indicative programme
MN	Meeting Notes
MS	Member State
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NAO	National Authorising Officer
NDP	National Development Plan
NIP	National Indicative Programme

NSA	Non-State Actor
OAD	Overseas Association Decision
OCTA	Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories of the European Union
OCTs	Overseas Countries and Territories
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
OPC	Open Public Consultation
OPTIMUS	OPTimising Implementing Modalities and Use of DEVCO Staff in EU Delegations
PAF	Performance Assessment Framework
PALOP	Organisation of African Countries of Portuguese Official Language
PBS	Promotion of Basic Services (programme) (Ethiopia)
PC	Partner Country
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
PFM	Public Financial Management
PI	Partnership Instrument
PRAG	Practical guide on contracting procedures applying to all EU external actions financed from the EU General Budget and the EDF
PRBS	Poverty Reduction Budget Support
PSD	Private Sector Development
PSNP	Productive Safety Nets Programme (Ethiopia)
QE	Quality Expert
QSG	Quality Support Group
R&I	Research and Innovation
RAO	Regional Authorising Officer
RIP	Regional Indicative Programme
RO	Regional Office
ROM	Results-Oriented Monitoring
RSP	Regional Strategy Paper
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SBC	Stated Building Contract
SCD	Systematic Country Diagnostic (of IDA)
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SG	Steering Group
SPSP	Sector Policy Support Programme
SWG	Sector Working Group
TA	Technical assistance
TAO	Territorial Authorising Officer
TBL	Thematic Budget Line
TF	Trust Fund
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TOR	Terms of Reference
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WB	World Bank

## **Annex 1                      Terms of Reference**

### **1.        MANDATE**

Systematic and timely evaluation of its programmes, activities, instruments, legislation and non-spending activities is a priority<sup>1</sup> of the European Commission<sup>2</sup> in order to demonstrate accountability and to promote lesson learning to improve policy and practice<sup>3</sup>.

### **2.        EVALUATION RATIONALE and SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES**

The European Development Fund (EDF) evaluation, together with the other independent evaluations of each External Financing Instrument (EFI) and the Coherence Report, will be some of the sources of information to feed into the Mid Term Review Report (MTR) of the EFIs. The MTR of the EFIs is required by the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR) Article 17 and is due by end December 2017. The CIR does not apply to the EDF as such.

For the EDF, the COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund requires a so-called Performance Review (article 18.7) which corresponds in substance to the MTR of the EFIs. It has therefore been decided to align the timetable of the Performance Review to that of the MTR of the EFIs. For easiness, we will refer to the Performance Review as the EDF evaluation.

In addition to generating information for the EFI Mid Term Review Report the EDF evaluation will also provide information for:

- the impact assessment for the next generation of instruments.<sup>4</sup>
- the final evaluation of the external financing instruments 2014-2020.

The objectives of the EDF evaluation are:

- to provide the relevant external relations services of the European Union and the wider public with an independent assessment of the EDF, including potential and actual complementarities/synergies with each of the other EFIs.
- to inform the programming and implementation of the current EDF, as well as the next generation of the EFIs.

The main users of this evaluation include the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Council of the European Union, and the European Parliament. The evaluation may also be of interest to the wider international development community, such as partner countries and regions, EU Member States and their National Parliaments, EU expert groups, donors and international organisations, the ACP group of States, civil society organisations, and the general public interested in external assistance.

### **3.        BACKGROUND**

The multiannual financial framework (MFF) lays down the maximum annual amounts ('ceilings') which the EU may spend in different political fields ('headings') over a period of at least 5 years. The current MFF covers seven years: from 2014 to 2020.

As part of the 2014-2020 MFF, a package of External Financing Instruments (EFIs) was adopted in 2014. This package<sup>5</sup> includes the following mix:

- Development Cooperation Instrument<sup>6</sup> (DCI), €19 661,64 million,

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<sup>1</sup> EU Financial Regulation (Art 27); Regulation (EC) No 1905/2000; Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006; Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006; Regulation (EC) no 1717/2006; Regulation (EC) No 215/2008

<sup>2</sup> SEC (2007) 213 'Responding to Strategic Needs: Reinforcing the use of evaluation'; Better Regulation package

<sup>3</sup> COM (2011)637 'Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change'

<sup>4</sup> Which will look into the possible budgettisation of the EDF

<sup>5</sup> For more info: [http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/introduction/index\\_en.cfm#headings](http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/introduction/index_en.cfm#headings)

- **The European Development Fund<sup>7</sup> (EDF)** €30 506 million
- European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights<sup>8</sup> (EIDHR) €1 332,75 million,
- European Neighbourhood Instrument<sup>9</sup> (ENI) €15 432,63 million,
- Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace<sup>10</sup> (IcSP) €2 338,72 million,
- Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance<sup>11</sup> (IPA II) €11 698,67 million,
- Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries<sup>12</sup> (PI) €954,76 million,
- Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation<sup>13</sup> (INSC) €225,321 million and
- The Greenland Decision<sup>14</sup> (GD) €217,8 million.
- Common Implementing Regulation (CIR).<sup>15</sup>

Together, these cover a significant part of the EU's external action policies.

The primary objective of the EDF shall be the reduction, and in the long term the eradication of poverty, in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. It also contributes to the achievement of more specific objectives of EU external action. This includes: i) fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development; ii) consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and the relevant principles of international law; iii) implementing a rights-based approach encompassing all human rights<sup>16</sup>.

The EDF also provides funding for the EU's Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union<sup>17</sup> and the Overseas Association Decision<sup>18</sup>; the purpose of the OCT Decision is to support the OCTs' sustainable development as well as the promotion of the values and standards of the Union in the wider world.

Aiming at designing a future EU-ACP partnership after 2020, an evaluation and an impact assessment of post-Cotonou are being prepared. The issue of the budgetisation of the EDF is also being analysed.

**The EDF 2014-2020** covers the following:

The amount of €30 506 million shall be made available from the entry into force of the multiannual financial framework for the period 2014 to 2020, of which

(i) €29 089 million shall be allocated to the ACP States sub divided as follows :

- National Indicative Programmes/Regional Indicative Programmes for ACP (€24 365 million)
- Intra-ACP ( €3 590 million)
- ACP investment Facility (€1 134 million)

(ii) €364,5 million shall be allocated to the OCTs including a 5 million OCT investment facility

(iii) €1 052,5 million shall be allocated to the Commission for support expenditure as referred to in Article 6, linked to programming and implementation of the EDF<sup>11</sup>; of which at least €76,3 million is to be allocated to the Commission for measures to improve the impact of EDF programmes as referred to in Article 6(3);

<sup>6</sup> Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p 44

<sup>7</sup> Internal Agreement establishing the 11th EDF, OJ L 210, 6.8.2013, p. 1. For the purpose of this evaluation, EDF has been included in the EFl package but it is outside of the EU budget.

<sup>8</sup> Regulation (EU) No 235/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p 85

<sup>9</sup> Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p 27

<sup>10</sup> Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p 1

<sup>11</sup> Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p 11

<sup>12</sup> Regulation (EU) No 234/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p 77

<sup>13</sup> Regulation (EU) No 237/2014 of the Council of 13 December 2013, OJ L77, p 109

<sup>14</sup> Council Decision 2014/137/EU of 14 March 2014 on relations between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other, OJ L76, p 1

<sup>15</sup> Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p 95

<sup>16</sup> Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund

<sup>17</sup> C 326/47 of 26.10.2012

<sup>18</sup> Council Decision 2013/755/EU on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Union

- **National Indicative Programmes and Regional Indicative Programmes** : to support bilateral and regional cooperation in areas such as health, education, employment, infrastructure, human rights, democracy, good governance and sustainable development. These cover developing countries in Central, West, Eastern, Southern Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries as well as the Overseas Countries and Territories (€364,5 million)
- **The intra-ACP programme**: to complement national and regional programmes, addressing challenges shared by ACP States. It is based on the principle of subsidiarity – implemented when activities at national and/or regional levels would be less effective.
- **The ACP and OCTs Investment Facility** : The Investment Facility, managed by EIB, is a risk-bearing revolving fund supporting investments by private and commercially run public entities in the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States as well as the OCTs. It provides medium- to long-term financing through various financial instruments and thereby aims at delivering sustainable economic, social and environmental benefits.

The evaluation of the EDF is being undertaken at mid-point of its current implementation (2014-2020). It should be understood as part of a set of separate but interlinked evaluations of each EFI, which will be undertaken during 2016 and the first half of 2017.

- Evaluation roadmaps for each of the EFIs were published in November 2015 and are available via the following link: [http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/index_en.htm)  
The EDF Roadmap can be found at this link: [http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2017\\_devco\\_003\\_evaluation\\_edf\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2017_devco_003_evaluation_edf_en.pdf)

#### 4. **SCOPE of the EDF EVALUATION**

##### 4.1 **Legal scope**

The EDF is the Union's main financing instrument under the Cotonou Agreement<sup>19</sup> for providing development aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP). It supports the Union's development cooperation policy which has as its main objective the eradication of poverty in a context of sustainable development in accordance with Article 208 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Union's development policy is a cornerstone of the Union's relations with the outside world – alongside Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), trade and humanitarian aid (and external aspects of other policies like environment, migration, agriculture and fisheries). Providing over 50% of all global development aid, the EU and its Member States are the world's leading donor.

In addition to the respective treaty provisions (Article 21 TEU and Article 208 TFEU), the Union's action in the field of development cooperation is based on the 2005 European Consensus on Development<sup>20</sup>, which commits the European Parliament, Council, the Commission and the Member States to a common vision.

The Overseas Association Decision seeks to strengthen OCTs' sustainable development by enhancing OCTs' competitiveness, strengthening OCTs' resilience, reducing their economic and environmental vulnerability and promoting cooperation between them and other partners. In practice, programmes are to be established in each of the 16 overseas countries and territories which are eligible for territorial allocation, as well as for regional allocations, using the EDF11 funding. The potential intervention areas are set out within the Overseas Association Decision.

##### 4.2 **Thematic scope**

The EDF is the instrument within the overall package of instruments with the greatest budget (see section 3). It also engages with all other instruments to a greater or lesser extent.

**Focus:** The EDF evaluation will cover:

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<sup>19</sup> A joint staff working document on the evaluation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement is currently under preparation  
<sup>20</sup> OJ C46, 24.2.2006, p. 1

- the achievement of the objectives of the EDF, taking into account the evolving international context and EU priorities.
- the implementation of the principles, programming and operations of EDF.
- the complementarities/synergies of the EDF in relation to the other instruments.
- the contribution to achieving the objectives of the Overseas Association Decision for OCTs

This evaluation will not cover actions implemented under ERASMUS+ Regulation<sup>21</sup> which will be covered by the mid-term evaluation planned in article 21.1 of the ERASMUS+ Regulation.

### **Consistency of the EDF evaluation with the other EFI evaluations**

Whilst recognizing that each EFI has its own specificities, information pertaining to the collective set of EFIs is also needed for the EDF Evaluation. To facilitate comparison and overview of the EFI evaluations it is therefore important that the set of evaluations are broadly consistent with each other in terms of objectives, key evaluation questions, methods, evaluation process, and deliverables. Co-ordination across the evaluations, led by the Global ISG and the 'Chapeau'<sup>22</sup> EFI contract (see Annex Chapeau ToRs) is built into the evaluation process.

**Data sources:** core information/data sources, including policy frameworks are included in Annex 1.

**Temporal scope:** This evaluation will cover the period January 1<sup>st</sup> 2014 to June 1<sup>st</sup> 2017. However, in order to assess the outcomes and impact of the EDF, it will also be necessary to consider the previous EDF programming period (2007 – 2013) as a significant amount of available data refers to this period.

**Geographic scope:** countries eligible under the EDF Regulation (Article 1) and the OCTs.

## **5. EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

In line with the Better Regulation guidelines on evaluations introduced by the Commission in 2015, and the requirements of the CIR, the main assessment criteria are: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, EU added value, scope for simplification, coherence, complementarity and synergies, consistency, sustainability leverage, and impact.

Evaluation issues, and questions to be further developed at inception stage are set out below. Unless otherwise indicated, the questions apply to the current EDF 2014-2020:

In order to clearly address the OCTs, it is proposed that for each of the main evaluation questions a specific section of the report addresses the OCTs

### **Relevance**

1. To what extent do the overall objectives and principles as foreseen in Articles 1 and 2 of the Cotonou Agreement as well as in articles 1 and 2 of the EDF11 Implementation Regulation and the design<sup>23</sup> of the EDF respond to:

- (i) EU priorities and beneficiary needs identified at the time the instrument was adopted (2014)
- (ii) Current EU priorities and beneficiary needs, given the evolving challenges and priorities in the international context (2017)

Information sought in this area includes:

- A timeline showing congruence/divergence of the instrument against evolving context, including global challenges, and institutional policy changes e.g. to what extent does the EDF respond to the demands of Agenda 2030, including the need to co-operate with emerging countries on implementing the SDGs.

<sup>21</sup> Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013, OJ L347, 2012.2013, p.50

<sup>22</sup> The Chapeau contract is a single contract which covers DCI, GD, CIR (drawing from all the separate EFI evaluations) and a Coherence Report and co-ordination across all the EFI evaluations

<sup>23</sup> i.e. how it all fits together

## **Effectiveness, impact, sustainability**

2. To what extent does the EDF deliver results against the instrument's objectives, and specific EU priorities?<sup>24</sup>

Information sought in this area includes:

- To what extent do EDF programmes contribute towards poverty reduction, and more specifically towards:
- fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development;
- consolidating and supporting democracy, rule of law and good governance, human rights and relevant principles of international law (Cotonou agreement, EDF Implementation Regulation )
- implementing a rights-based approach encompassing all human rights with a focus on the poor and vulnerable groups (e.g. persons with disabilities, children, indigenous groups) (Cotonou agreement, EDF Implementation Regulation)
- To what extent has the EDF contributed to the European Union's priorities for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth?
- To what extent does the EDF mainstream EU policy priorities (e.g. gender, climate change) and other issues highlighted for mainstreaming in the instrument, and, where relevant, deliver on the commitments including the financial allocations (Cotonou Agreement, part 3, chapter 2, section 4)
- To what extent does the EDF promote principles of aid effectiveness, such as ownership and joint programming (Cotonou agreement, part1, title 1,chapter 1, art 2, Implementation Regulation)
- To what extent are the processes conducive to programming, identification/formulation of effective actions at national, regional and continental levels (Cotonou Agreement annex IV)? To what extent have the specific OCT guidelines facilitated the programming process?
- To what extent the process of differentiation has been effectively managed e.g. have countries most in need been given priority in the resource allocation process, have differentiated partnerships with new forms of strategic cooperation been developed as set out in Agenda for Change, have any negative effects been minimised (Cotonou Agreement, part 1, title 1, chapter 1, article 2) ?
- To what extent is the EDF flexible enough to respond to changing needs? (e.g. changed policy priorities,changed contexts) ( Cotonou Agreement, annex IV, chapter 1 articles 5, 11 and 14)
- To what extent does the EDF contribute to the aims and objectives of the Overseas Association Decision? To what extent does the split of financial resources between regional and territorial programmes contribute to the aims and objectives of the Overseas Association Decision?
- To what extent are the OCT programmes accompanied by national/territorial policies that support sustainable development?

## **Efficiency**

3. To what extent is the EDF delivering efficiently?<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Evaluators will need to look at both the current EDF 2014-2020 and the previous EDF 2007-2013 to respond to this question. Evaluators should distinguish the findings between the two periods.

<sup>25</sup> Evaluations will need to compare, where possible, information from the current EDF 2014-2020 with the previous EDF 2007-2013.

Information sought in this area includes:

- What is the ratio of support expenditure to EDF overall budget?
- How efficient is budget execution in terms of time taken from commitments to payments?
- Have the changes made to EDF 2014 – 2020 from the previous EDF 2007 – 2013 brought efficiency gains? E.g. Has the new regional programmes management brought positive change in terms of efficiency of delivery?
- Are there areas, such as administrative/management procedures, where the EDF can be simplified to eliminate unnecessary burden?
- To what extent is the EDF in line with its implementation Regulation? Specifically in terms of :
  - Objectives and general principles,
  - Programming and allocation of funds,
  - Implementation,
  - Decision-making procedures,
  - Final provisions
- To what extent are the following in place and functioning:
  - appropriate monitoring processes and indicators for measurement of the performance of the EDF instrument
  - relevant strategic and operational indicators to measure results achieved by the EDF?

#### **Added value**

4. To what extent do the EDF programmes add value compared to interventions by Member States or other key donors?

Information sought in this area includes:

- Where the EDF is operating in the same field as other donors, does it offer added value in terms of size of engagement, particular expertise, and/or particular weight in advocacy?

#### **Coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies**

5. To what extent does the EDF facilitate coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies both internally between its own set of objectives and programmes and vis-à-vis other EFIs?

Information sought in this area includes:

- To what extent are the different EDF programmes coherent/overlapping with one another?
- To what extent are the different EDF programmes aligned with EU development policy?
- To what extent are the programmes consistent with EU external action policies?
- To what extent do the programmes complement/overlap/stimulate synergies with other external action financing instruments?
- To what extent does the EDF complement/overlap with other EU instruments outside of development policy?
- To what extent does the EDF complement/overlap with interventions of other donors?

#### **Leverage**

6. To what extent has the EDF leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement?

7. How could the EDF be enhanced to achieve its policy objectives more effectively and efficiently?



8. How can programming and implementation of EDF assistance be enhanced to improve the impact and sustainability of financial assistance?

## **6. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION**

The DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit is responsible for the overall supervision of the EDF evaluation. Unit D3 (ACP coordination) is responsible for its direct management of the evaluation via its designated evaluation manager.

The relevant EU services have established a system of Interservice Groups to ensure appropriate oversight of the various EFI evaluations (process, content, co-ordination) related to the development of the MTR Report. The system comprises a Global EFI ISG with overall oversight, and then individual instrument ISGs. Core members of individual instrument ISGs are also members of the Global EFI ISG.

The principal tasks of the Global EFI ISG are to:

- brief the evaluators on the issues pertaining to the overall set of EFIs
- ensure coherence across all individual Terms of Reference
- ensure co-ordination of process across the EU stakeholders
- assist in setting a schedule/plan for co-ordination across the evaluations
- ensure a coherent approach to the work and implementation e.g.
  - coherent set of evaluation and impact assessment questions
  - common plan and schedule for Open Public Consultation
- provide criteria of assessment and required format for the synthesis of findings from all the evaluations.
- discuss and provide feedback on draft Coherence Report

The principal tasks of the individual instrument ISG – in this case the EDF ISG - is to :

- brief the external evaluators and ensure they have access to all information sources and documentation on activities undertaken
- discuss draft reports produced by the external evaluators during meetings in Brussels;
- assess and provide feedback on the quality of work done by the evaluators;
- provide feedback on the findings and conclusions.

To avoid duplication and consolidate communications between meetings the ISG members communicate with the evaluation team via the Evaluation Manager.

To promote robust understanding and discussion, participation of the evaluation team at EDF ISG meetings will be as follows: key parts of the initial briefing meeting (in Brussels) will be attended by the whole evaluation team. All other meetings with the EDF ISG will be attended at least by the evaluation team leader.

## **7. EVALUATION PROCESS AND DELIVERABLES**

The overall methodological guidance to be used is available on the Better Regulation website to be found here: [http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/toc\\_guide\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/toc_guide_en.htm)

The contractor may also find useful methodological guidance on the DG DEVCO website of the Evaluation Unit to be found here:

[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/methodology/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/methodology/index_en.htm)

## Methodological essentials for the evaluation

- The evaluation team should establish baselines against which change/progress will be measured. The policy frameworks relevant to the instrument should be included when establishing these baselines.
- The evaluation will be based on both quantitative and qualitative data. Where there is a lack of data, it may be necessary to devise a survey to obtain information from EU Delegations, Member States, specific beneficiaries and other stakeholder as appropriate, in line with the consultation strategy agreed upon. See also reference to co-ordination in Chapeau introduction.
- The reconstructed intervention logics will be further strengthened by the evaluation team. (See Annex 6)
- Findings, conclusions and recommendations should be presented in the Final Report.

## Co-ordination across the evaluations

- The Chapeau contract team leader will be assigned tasks relating to co-ordination of all the EFI evaluations involving the EDF performance review team (see Chapeau Contract in Annex).
- To fulfil this coordination role, evaluators responsible for each of the EFI evaluations must cooperate and work closely with the Chapeau Contract team leader, and the Global ISG.

## Evaluation Approach

The evaluation approach consists of three main phases, each of which encompass several stages. Deliverables in the form of reports<sup>26</sup> and slide presentations should be submitted at the end of the corresponding stages.

The table below summaries these phases:

<b><i>Evaluation phases:</i></b>	<b><i>Stages:</i></b>	<b><i>Deliverables<sup>27</sup>:</i></b>
<u>1. Desk phase</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Inception: setting out the detailed design of the evaluation, including all aspects of methodology, and consultation strategy</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➤ <i>Slide presentation</i></li><li>➤ <i>Inception Report, including the proposed consultation strategy</i></li></ul>
	Data collection Initial analysis Hypotheses for validation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Slide presentation</i></li><li>• <i>Desk Report</i></li></ul>
<u>2. Validation phase</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Data collection</li><li>• Validation of hypotheses (including through field visits)</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➤ <i>Slide presentation</i></li><li>➤ <i>Collated feedback</i></li></ul>

<sup>26</sup> For each Report a draft version is to be presented. For all reports, the contractor may either accept or reject through a response *sheet* the comments provided by the Evaluation manager. In case of rejection, the contractor must justify (in writing) the reasons for rejection. When the comment is accepted, a reference to the text in the report (where the relevant change has been made) has to be included in the response sheet.

<sup>27</sup> The contractors must provide, whenever requested and in any case at the end of the evaluation, the list of all documents reviewed, data collected and databases built.

<b><i>Evaluation phases:</i></b>	<b><i>Stages:</i></b>	<b><i>Deliverables<sup>27</sup>:</i></b>
<u>3. Synthesis phase</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis</li> <li>• Assessment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Slide presentation</li> <li>➤ Draft Final Report with executive summaries,</li> <li>➤ Brief to accompany Report during Open Public Consultation and questions to guide the Open Public Consultation</li> <li>➤ Summary report of issues raised in the Open Public Consultation</li> <li>➤ Slide presentation</li> <li>➤ Final Report with executive summaries, including annex summarising consultation process</li> </ul>

All reports will be written in English and submitted according to the timetable in annex 4 to the evaluation manager. The reports must be written in Arial or Times New Roman minimum 11 and 12 respectively, single spacing. Inception and Desk reports will be delivered only electronically. The Draft Final report and the Final report will also be delivered in hard copies. The Executive Summaries (1 page and 10 pages) will be delivered both electronically and in hard copy. The 10 page version of the summary will be available both integrated into the Final Report, and as a separate stand-alone document.

The electronic versions of all documents need to be delivered in both editable (Word) and non-editable format (PDF).

## **7.1 The Desk Phase**

### **7.1.1. Inception**

At the start of the evaluation process, a substantive set of **Briefing Meetings** (4-5 days) will be held in Brussels. The purpose of the briefing is for the evaluation team to meet and be briefed by the Evaluation manager, relevant ISG groups, and thereafter their members individually, and to meet any other key players. It will also be used by the evaluation team for at least initial discussion of the relevant intervention logics with the relevant ISG.

### **7.1.2. The Inception Report**

Taking into account the learning from the Briefing Meeting, the contractor will deliver an **Inception Report** which will contain the following elements:

- the proposed design of the evaluation – this includes identification of
  - data and information to be collected from which sources, how and when
  - methods to be used to analyse the data, with justification
  - limitations - including an assessment of the data and whether it will provide a sound basis for responding to the evaluation questions.
  - a consultation strategy – identification of the stakeholder groups and key stakeholders within each group. Identification of who will be consulted on what, when and why
  - provision of a detailed work plan and schedule for the overall evaluation process,

- the background and institutional context of the EDF, and the types of partners with whom it co-operates and the types of intended beneficiaries;
- a concise description and analysis of the evolution of the EDF since 2007;
- further defined intervention logics (see annex 6,);
- an inventory of the evidence base (e.g. programming documents 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 see annex 2 for further details);
- if appropriate, revised evaluation questions, and proposed judgement criteria per evaluation question and proposed quantitative and/or qualitative indicators related to each judgement criterion.

If necessary, the Inception Report will also include suggestions of modifications to the composition of the evaluation team.

The Inception Report will be discussed with the ISG prior to approval by the Contracting Authority. The Inception Report shall not exceed 30 pages. Additional material may be placed in annexes, as necessary. The Inception report is expected to be submitted to the evaluation manager within max 3 weeks of the briefing session. The first payment is subject the approval of the Inception report by the Contracting Authority (see annex 4).

### 7.1.3. The Desk Report

Upon approval of the Inception Report, the contractor will prepare and present a **Desk Report** which should include at least the following elements:

- a concise first analysis and first elements of response to each evaluation question which also concisely sets out the hypotheses and assumptions to be tested in the validation phase;
- progress in the gathering of data. Any complementary data required for analysis and for data collection during the validation phase must be identified;
- a comprehensive list of the evidence that has been analysed and a list of the documentation reviewed and the justification for their choice.
- further development of any methods to be used, in light of information up-dated since the Inception Report
- a work plan for the validation phase: a list with brief descriptions of people to interview for in-depth analysis of issues. Subject to approval of the Contracting Authority, the evaluators must explain the choice of 4 ACP in-country and 2 OCT visits, the value added of the visits, and the added value of the planned interviews.

During the inception and desk phase relevant stakeholders will be consulted via/phone/email/face-to-face/video-conference discussions. The use of interviews, surveys, design of questionnaires, and other tools should be considered and decided upon during the inception phase. In the case of a survey, these will be coordinated by the EFI Chapeau team leader in conjunction with the Global EFI ISG so that stakeholders only receive one set of questions. However, the questions asked for each instrument do not need to be the same.

The Contracting Authority expects the evaluation team to build in considerable time to look through documents and to have face-to-face discussions in Brussels throughout the evaluation process, particularly during inception and desk phases.

The external evaluators will make a slide presentation and discuss the Desk Report with the ISG in a half-day meeting in Brussels. The Desk report should not exceed 40 pages (further material can be placed in annexes) It will be finalised after consideration of the comments received from the ISG.

The Evaluation Manager will authorise the start of the validation phase prior approval of the desk report.

## 7.2 Validation phase

The validation phase enables the evaluators to check the hypotheses which they have developed during the Desk phase, through detailed interviews/discussion with key players and stakeholders.

The initial findings and recommendations, drawn together at the end of the validation phase, will be discussed with the ISG with the help of a short slide presentation.

The validation phase will involve discussions with:

- EU officials responsible for oversight of the overall EDF instrument and its different programmes, and those with experience in implementation (face-to-face or by phone in Brussels and Delegations). D3 will advise the contractor.
- Partner country stakeholders, Aid Co-ordination Ministries, especially National Authorising Officers and Territorial Authorising Officers for OCTs
- CSOs and LAs in country with experience of the EDF instrument programmes
- EU Member States and other donors – international NGOs, bi-laterals and multi-laterals

It will also entail six (6) short visits to countries as follows:

- countries in Africa,
- 1 country in the Caribbean region
- 1 country in the Pacific region.
- Visits to 2 OCTs will be associated to these visits.

The final selection of the particular countries to visit will be determined in the inception discussion; however, for budget preparation purpose, a list of indicative countries is provided : Mozambique, Central African Republic, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Aruba, New Caledonia<sup>28</sup>. The information gained from these visits is to provide some first-hand knowledge of the EDF on the ground.

## 7.3 Draft Final Report and Dissemination phases

### 7.3.1. The Draft Final Report

The contractor will submit the Draft Final Report as per the report structure set out in annex 2. The Draft Final Report shall not exceed 50 pages. Additional relevant material may be placed in annex.

This document should deliver the results of all tasks covered by these Terms of Reference, and must be written such that readers, who are not working in this area, can easily understand. OCT questions will be presented in stand-alone sections within each of the main headings of the report.

The Draft Final Report will be discussed with the ISG in Brussels. The Report will be revised, as the evaluation team considers necessary, in light of feedback from the ISG. The evaluation team will prepare a short brief to accompany the Report, for the purposes of the forthcoming Open Public Consultation (OPC)<sup>29</sup> which highlights some areas and questions where feedback would be particularly welcome. This brief and its accompanying questions will be translated by the evaluation team from English into the other main languages of the Open Public Consultation, namely French, Spanish and Portuguese. The Draft Final Report will subsequently be submitted for approval.

Subsequently, the Draft Final Report will be placed on the web by the appropriate authority in DG DEVCO, in order to feed into the 12 week OPC on the EFI evaluations scheduled February – April 2017. (See Annex 4). The Draft Final Reports of all the EFI evaluations will be synchronised to appear on the web.

The EDF evaluation team, and the Chapeau contract team leader will be present for the targeted face-to-face consultations on this evaluation, and other relevant EFI Draft Report consultations. The

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<sup>28</sup> As there is no per diem available for New Caledonia, the offer will prepare an estimate of the costs

<sup>29</sup> Mandatory 12 week OPC as per Better Regulation (2015).

face to face consultations will be chaired by DG DEVCO, and will be targeted at Member States, key EU officials, CSOs, and representatives of partner countries and the OCTs.

The face-to-face consultation costs related to the presence of the experts (travel cost, per diem etc.) must be covered by the offer. Costs for logistics (room rental, catering etc.) will be dealt with, as necessary, in a separate contract.

Following the Open Public Consultation, a summary of the contributions received regarding the EDF consultation on evaluation will be delivered by the evaluation team<sup>30</sup>. This summary shall not exceed 20 pages. The summary should include a concise summary of contributions received, including a specific section on contributions concerning OCTs, a statistical analysis of the contributions received, the evaluation team's response to each question, the evaluation team's conclusions for each section, and identification of the evidence/contributions which will be fed into the evaluation. The evaluation team will translate the summary from English into the other main languages of the Open Public Consultation, namely French, Spanish and Portuguese.

The second payment is subject the approval of the Draft Final report by the Contracting Authority (see annex 4).

### 7.3.2. The Final Report

The **Final Report** will be prepared, taking into account the feedback from the ISG and the Open Public Consultation. The Final Report will be submitted to the ISG. The length of the Report will not exceed 50 pages. Additional relevant material may be placed in annex.

Executive summaries – A 10 page maximum executive summary should be provided, and a 1 page synopsis should be provided. Both the summary and synopsis will also be provided in French. (See annex 2)

The Contracting Authority will publish the Final Report, the Executive Summaries, and the annexes on the Commission's central website.

Approval must be given by the Evaluation Manager before the Final Report is to be printed.

The offer will be based on delivery of 50 hard copies of the above reports in English of the **Final Main Report** (without annexes) and 20 copies of the annexes. A non-editable version of the above reports have to be delivered on a USB drive and each shall be added to each printed Final Main Report.

The final payment is subject the approval of the Final report by the Contracting Authority (see annex 4).

## 7.4 Dissemination

Dissemination activities may be requested. In case of financial implications on the total contractual amount, such requests will be formalised via a rider.

## 8. THE EVALUATION TEAM

The evaluation team shall have the following demonstrated experience and expertise:

- Working knowledge of EU external action policies, and the implementation modalities
- Working knowledge of the international aid and development effectiveness agenda and principles e.g. Global Partnership for effective development co-operation (Busan)
- EU external co-operation policy and development policy of Member States, and their aid modalities
- Implementation procedures of the EDF
- Compliance checking in the area of policy implementation

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<sup>30</sup> The evaluation team should note the data protection rules in the Better Regulation Guidelines (p.81)

- Evaluation methods and techniques in general and, preferably, of evaluation in the field of external relations and development cooperation; in particular the team needs to demonstrate experience in analytical methods which can evaluate change, and which can evaluate contribution
- Quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis
- The team leader should have excellent communication, team co-ordination, presentation and proven report writing and editing skills in English
- The evaluation team should have an excellent command of English – both spoken and written – and the ability to function at a high level command of French, and also a passive understanding of Spanish and Portuguese

Desirable: experience of corporate results reporting frameworks

It is expected that the team will comprise a minimum balance of experts<sup>31</sup> as follows –

2 senior category experts (all fluent in both English and French)

2 junior category experts

There will be four field visits: to the capital of two African countries of 7-10 days including travel, one to a capital in the Caribbean region of 7-10 days including travel, one to a capital in the Pacific region of 7-10 days including travel. Two trips to OCTs need to be factored in – associated to the ACP visits.

Considerable time will be required in Brussels for briefings, interservice group meetings, interviews with key staff, co-ordination with other instrument evaluators and the Global ISG. Time should also be built in to contribute to a questionnaire for a short survey around issues for which there is no available information.

The period February – April 2017 (i.e. the 12 week Open Public Consultation on the draft reports) is a period of specifically reduced level of inputs.

Much of the work involves information/data gathering and basic analysis from a significant amount of internal documentation and interviews with key EU and external stakeholders. The contractor should ensure time for this. It is expected that this team and the Chapeau contract team will develop shared knowledge of the base documentation. (See Chapeau contract ToRs in Annex.) The Chapeau contract leads co-ordination across the evaluations with the Global ISG – and delivers evaluations on DCI, Greenland, and the Coherence Report, and pulls together information from each of the the individual financing instrument evaluations on their interface with CIR, into a CIR evaluation report.

The team composition should be justified in the offer, stating the category of each team member and for which tasks the proposed team members will be responsible and how their qualifications and experience relate to the tasks. The team coordination and members' complementarity should be clearly described. A breakdown of working days per expert must be provided.

The team members must be independent from the work to be evaluated. Should a conflict of interest be identified in the course of the evaluation, it should be immediately reported to the Evaluation manager for further analysis and appropriate measures.

The contractor remains fully responsible for the quality of the report. Any report which does not meet the required quality will be rejected.

During the offers' evaluation process, the contracting authority reserves the right to interview by phone one or several members of the evaluation teams proposed.

The Framework contractor must make available appropriate logistical support for the experts, including their travel and accommodation arrangements for each assignment, the secretarial

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<sup>31</sup> Number of days for each expert may vary

support, appropriate software and communication means. The experts will be supplied with the standard equipment, such as an individual laptop, computer, mobile phones, etc. No additional cost for these items may be included in the offer.

### **8.1. Working Languages – contributions to consultations**

Contributions to any internal consultations/surveys are expected to be received in English, French, Spanish and Portuguese. The Commission will provide no translation into English of the contributions provided in French, Spanish and Portuguese.

Contributions to the Open Public Consultation (OPC) are expected to be received mainly in English, French, Spanish and Portuguese. Contributions received in any other languages will be translated by the European Commission into English. To that aim, a small budget will be made available, if required, to translate contributions received in any other EU language than English and French, Spanish and Portuguese. No translation into English will be provided for responses received in French, Spanish or Portuguese.

## **9. TIMING**

The evaluation is due to start early mid July. The expected duration is July 2016 to August 2017. As part of the technical offer, the framework contractor must adhere to the timetable in annex 4, and provide their proposed, more detailed schedule within that timetable in terms of "week 1" etc. The contracting authority underlines that the contractor should ensure that the evaluation team is available to meet the demands of this schedule.

## **10. OFFER FOR THE ASSIGNMENT**

The financial offer will be itemised to allow the verification of the fees compliance with the Framework contract terms. The maximum budget is €570 000.

The per diems will be based on the EU per diem in force when the Request for Services is launched. The EU per diem is the maximum not to be exceeded.

The contract is a global price contract.

Reimbursable costs include : per diems, international travel costs, local transportation costs, translation and printing costs, and security costs.

The total length of the technical offer (excluding annexes) may not exceed 10 pages; a CV may not exceed 4 pages. References and data relevant to the assignment must be highlighted in bold (font minimum Times New Roman 12 or Arial 11).

The **organisation and methodology** submitted shall not contain terms such as, "if time/budget allows," "if the data are available" etc.

Should it appear during the process of the evaluation that an activity envisaged in the methodology is impossible or inappropriate to be carried out for any reasons in the interest of the assignment, the change to the methodology as well as its financial impact must be agreed by the Evaluation Manager.

The offer is expected to demonstrate:

- the team's understanding of the ToR in their own words (i.e. their understanding of what is to be evaluated, and their understanding of the subject area as relevant to this ToR)<sup>32</sup>.
- the relevance of the team composition and competencies to the work to be undertaken.
- how the team proposes to undertake the evaluation: the evaluation design and challenges, data collection tools and methods of analysis, how the tasks will be organized.

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<sup>32</sup>

Should the offer contain quotations, these sections must be clearly identified and sources indicated



- The level of quality control (content/proof reading/copy editing) which will apply, at which points in the process, and who will undertake them.

## 11. **TECHNICAL OFFERS EVALUATION CRITERIA**

The offers evaluation criteria and their respective weights are:

	<b>Maximum</b>
<b>Total score for Organisation and methodology</b>	
Understanding of ToR	15
Organization of tasks (including timing, quality control mechanisms)	10
Evaluation approach, working method, analysis	15
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Experts/ Expertise</b>	
Senior Expert - Team Leader	25
Senior expert(s) – Non Team Leader	20
Junior experts	15
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>Overall total score</b>	<b>100</b>

## 12. **ANNEXES** *(not attached in this document)*

The contracting authority reserves the right to modify the annexes without prior notice.

Annex 1: Indicative documentation to be consulted for the purpose of the evaluation by the selected contractor, including EDF Policy Framework

Annex 2: Overall structure of the Final Report

Annex 3: Quality assessment grid (tbc revised grid under construction)

Annex 4 :Indicative timing and payment schedule

Annex 5: Terms of Reference ‘chapeau’ contract

Annex 6: EDF Intervention Logics

## Annex 2


## EDF history and evolution

### 1. Background and specificities of the EDF

The EDF is the oldest development cooperation instrument of the European Union (EU). The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, provided the legal basis for the 1st EDF, which was launched in 1959. A time-line for the EDF highlighting some of the main internal and external events that have shaped what the EDF is today is provided in section 7 below.

Over the years, the EDF has seen various reforms, to adapt to the changing European and global context. In 1973, the accession of the United Kingdom (UK) – which had ties with a large number of former colonies – greatly increased the number of countries covered by the EDF. The development role of the EDF was consolidated through the EU's legal commitments expressed first in the Lomé Convention of 1975 and its subsequent revisions. The ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 and revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 and Burkina Faso on 22 June 2010, helped to modernise the EDF as a development instrument by introducing key principles such as ownership, recognizing and promoting dialogue with non-state actors, linking development cooperation to results, promoting political dialogue or giving human rights a prominent role. Figure A.1 shows an overview of the EDF.

**Figure A.1 An Overview of the EDF**



Source: authors

The EDF is the largest of the External Financing Instruments (EFIs) and is one of a number of geographical instruments (see Table A.1 below). It is also a central feature of international aid architecture. The EU and its member states are the largest providers of Official Development Assistance (ODA); the EDF is the largest single instrument of EU and the world's largest and most advanced financial and political contract framework for North-South Cooperation.

**Table A.1 EFIs and funding 2014-2020**

<b>Geographical Instruments</b>				
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) € 15 433 million	European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) € 15 433 million	European Development Fund (EDF) € 30 500 million	Greenland Decision (GD) € 217 million	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) € 11 699 million
<b>Horizontal Instruments</b>				
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)			€ 1 333 million	
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)			€ 2 339 million	
Partnership Instrument (PI)			€ 955 million	
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)			€ 225 million	

The EDF has particularities that are the result of its history and its legal basis:


- The EDF **targets countries and territories** with a special tie with the EU member states, but the legal basis for targeting the ACPs and OCTs is different, with ACPs covered by the Cotonou Agreement and OCTs by the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and the Overseas Association Decision. This potentially creates a certain dichotomy within the EDF.
- The EDF results from an international agreement (Cotonou Agreement) and it is **not part of the EU budget**.<sup>33</sup> As a result, the EDF has its own financial and implementation regulations although these have through various reforms been closely aligned with the Common Implementing Regulations (CIR) of the other EFIs.<sup>34</sup> Also, because it is outside of the EU budget, the budget rule of annuality does not apply to the EDF. This makes multiannual commitments easier.
- The EDF **operates at three different levels: country, regional and intra-ACP**, and uses a **range of financing modalities** including project grants, budget support, loans and blending. This makes coordination and complementarity among these levels as well as choice of instruments important aspects for inquiry.
- There is a **geographical overlap between the EDF and other EFIs** (e.g. DCI, etc.) as well as a thematic overlap. This has implications for coordination and synergies.

In addition to the ACP beneficiary countries themselves and the European institutions (including the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament), EDF stakeholders include numerous other entities including development partners, member states, civil society organisations, regional organisations, donors, think tanks and academics. Figure A.2 below summarises the different stakeholders intervening at the various stages of the EDF.

<sup>33</sup> Making the EDF part of the EU budget has been on the political agenda for a long time (as indicated in the full timeline below it was proposed by the Commission already in 2003) but the decision has not been taken. The debate is currently open as part of the ongoing discussion on the post-Cotonou framework.

<sup>34</sup> See Annex 9.

Figure A.2 EDF Stakeholders



## 2. The shaping of the EDF 2000 to 2015

The EU support to ACPs and OCTs has been shaped over time by the international development agenda; the international context; the EU's evolving policy framework for development cooperation; and by internal developments within the EC.

At an overarching level the EDF is shaped by the **Cotonou Agreement**, signed in 2000, which marked an important shift in the EU's approach to development cooperation. The agreement was signed for 20 years, a much longer period than the "Lomé Conventions". The **Cotonou Agreement has been reviewed twice**, first in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 and then in Burkina Faso on 22 June 2010. The reviews **helped to bring the Agreement up to date** with a large number of institutional, policy and political developments.<sup>35</sup> The **reviews have also deepened and expanded several provisions** in key areas such as: interdependence between security and development; regional integration; simplification of management procedures; climate change as a development priority; and the relevance of national parliaments, local authorities, civil society and private sector in development; and policy coherence for development. The Cotonou agreement expires in 2020 and

<sup>35</sup> Including: entry into force of the Lisbon Treaties (EEAS), The European Consensus on Development (2005), the EU's Comprehensive Approach to fragility and conflict (2007), the EU Agenda for Change (2011), and internationally, the UN negotiations on the MDGs, the Aid Effectiveness Agenda (2005, 2008 and 2011), emerging security concerns, impact of climate change, etc.

a key issue for discussion is what comes next. This evaluation as well as the recently completed post-Cotonou evaluation will feed into the discussion process.

The international context has been framed by various commitments. These have influenced the design of the EDF, which has a strong accent on many of the principles that are embodied in the aid effectiveness agenda and the aforementioned agreements. At the global level, **the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)**, launched in 2000 crystallized global development ambitions around 8 realistic and easy to communicate objectives which all UN members committed to achieve by 2015. The MDGs set collective objectives and priorities and provided a framework to assess progress, which the EDF has sought to contribute to. A second set of international initiatives of great importance for the EDF is the **Aid Effectiveness Agenda** through various agreements reached in Paris (2005),<sup>36</sup> Accra (2008)<sup>37</sup> and Busan (2011).<sup>38</sup> The Aid Effectiveness Agenda aimed to increase the impact of development efforts by committing donors and recipient countries to implement a series of principles and by monitoring progress over time.

The EDF11 is shaped by the policy framework provided by the European Consensus on Development (Council of Europe, 2005), which emphasizes human rights and good governance as important objectives of EU cooperation. Its priorities and programming incorporate key principles that stem from EU policies and initiatives, such as the **EU Agenda for Change** (2011) (EC, 2011a), the revisions of the **Cotonou Agreement** (2005 and 2010) (EC, 2006, EU, 2010), the **EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour** (2007), etc. The **EU Agenda for Change** was adopted in 2011 and aimed to “increase the impact and effectiveness of EU development policy”. EU assistance targets (i) social protection, health, education and jobs, (ii) the business environment, regional integration and world markets, and (iii) sustainable agriculture and energy. The Agenda for Change put **greater emphasis on effectiveness-related principles** (differentiation, concentration, coordination and coherence with other policies) and proposed to **focus on two key policy areas** (human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance; and inclusive and sustainable growth for human development). In addition, the EU Agenda for Change also introduced **innovative financial instruments, such as blending**. Since the EDF11 was introduced in 2014, the EU has continued developing new development policies, for example: Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU External Relations 2016-2020 (2015); A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015 (2015); and A Decent Life for all: from vision to collective action (2014). It is likely that the pace of policy change will increase in the future as new steps are taken for the implementation of Agenda 2030 and in response to the multitude of global and regional challenges.

### 3. The new development challenges

The development and international context has evolved further more recently. In 2015 the UN launched **the Agenda 2030** or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Built on the MDGs, it incorporates the follow-up from the Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development. It **addresses both poverty eradication and the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development**. It also addresses issues which were reflected in the Millennium Declaration but not the MDGs, including issues such as effective institutions, good governance, the rule of law and peaceful societies.

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<sup>36</sup> **Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness:** A roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. It establishes a monitoring system to assess progress and ensure that donors and recipients hold each other accountable for their commitments. The Paris Declaration outlines the five principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results and mutual accountability.

<sup>37</sup> **Accra Agenda for Action:** Designed to strengthen and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration. It takes stock of progress and proposes the following four main areas for improvement: ownership, inclusive partnerships, delivering results, and capacity development.

<sup>38</sup> **Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation:** The agreement reached in Busan sets out principles, commitments and actions. It adopts a more comprehensive view of the development cooperation (donors, DPs, CSOs, private sector, local government, etc.) and puts forward common principles for all development actors: ownership, a focus on results, partnerships for development, transparency and shared responsibility.

Unlike the MDGs, the Agenda 2030 is “universal” meaning that it applies to all countries at all levels of development, taking into account their different capacities and circumstances. Implementation will be driven by a new Global Partnership characterised by shared responsibility, mutual accountability, and engagement by all. The means of implementation for the new Agenda are outlined in the SDGs and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development includes a stronger follow-up and review framework than existed for the MDGs to help ensure the Agenda is implemented for all, leaving no-one behind.

The **Addis Ababa Action Agenda** provides:

- a set of policy actions by Member States, with a package of over 100 concrete measures to finance sustainable development and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals; and
- a global framework for financing sustainable development that aligns all financing flows and policies with economic, social and environmental priorities and ensures that financing is stable and sustainable.

The Action Agenda draws upon all sources of finance (public, private, etc.), technology and innovation, promotes trade and debt sustainability, harnesses data and addresses systemic issues.

The **UNFCCC Paris Agreement** seeks to:

- keep global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius;
- strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change.

This requires:

- setting a new goal on the provision of finance from the USD 100 billion floor by 2025;
- enhanced capacity building framework, including an Initiative for Capacity Building in line with their own national objectives;
- a more robust transparency framework.

The agreement requires ratification by at least 55 Parties to the UNFCCC representing at least 55 percent of total global greenhouse gases before it will come into effect and be legally binding.

While the regulatory and policy framework surrounding the EDF11 does not reflect the Agenda 2030, the EDF11 will certainly need to be adapted to take account of these new commitments. Other important agreements reached in 2015 include the **Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction**. All of these have implications for the priority setting of the EDF. There is an assumption that the EDF has some degree of flexibility to adjust to these changes (given its accent on ownership, on being demand-led, and its multi-year character).

#### 4. The international context

A full understanding of the EU development policies and the priorities and objectives of the EDF11 also requires looking at the international context. When the EDF11 was being designed the following issues were high or gaining prominence in the international development agenda:<sup>39</sup>

- The impacts of the global financial and economic crisis were still being felt.
- The development landscape was changing with new donors gaining influence (emerging countries) and less dependence of many developing countries on aid.
- Increasing international relevance of non-governmental development actors: foundations, private sector, etc.
- Security concerns as a result of the terrorist threat and the instability and fragility of countries in several regions.

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<sup>39</sup> Many of these elements are already visible in the EU Agenda for Change or some of the changes introduced in the 11th EDF such as the Shock Absorbing Facility

- Growing impact and concerns about climate change.

Since the EDF11 was introduced the world has continued evolving and the challenges have been compounded. This is reflected in the EU Global Strategy which puts the accent on interlocking political, development and security concerns (EC, 2016a) and specifically highlights the role of development aid in complementing the various other areas of external action which include:

- security, including defence, terrorism, cyber-security and energy security;
- resilience to the East and South of the EU, in particular supporting the ability to withstand external and internal shocks through a focus on enlargement, migration policies and institution-building;
- an integrated approach to conflicts and crisis, with an emphasis on prevention, stabilisation, settlement, and humanitarian assistance;
- support of regional governance spaces in key regions: Europe, Mediterranean, Africa, trans-Atlantic and Asia;
- strong global institutions.

The EU Global Strategy also highlights the importance of looking specifically at the added value of different EU instruments vis-à-vis one another. Additionally, it is important to consider the implications of Brexit. While the exact consequences remain a matter of speculation they could have potentially significant consequences for the EDF, including in terms of its funding cycles.


## 5. The institutional framework

The institutional framework of the EU has also changed. The **Lisbon Treaty** resulted in a stronger focus on coordination and coherence among different policy areas for external action of the EU, including development cooperation. The new institutional set-up brought with it a profound review of programming and management processes of development assistance, including the creation of the **European External Action Service** as a coordinating body. It also had implications for staffing levels which – as highlighted in the Management Plan of DG DEVCO – are not easily reconciled with other processes, such as a stronger focus under EDF11 on consultation and stakeholder involvement which are by nature time-consuming. Finally, there are the **changes that apply directly to the EDF**. For example, in the EDF11 some procedures and rules have been simplified (simplified rules and procedures for individual and support measures and sub-granting). There have also been harmonisation efforts with other EFIs as illustrated by the amendment of the rules on eligibility and origin approved in June 2014.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Decision No 1/2014 of the ACP-EU Council Of Ministers of 20 June 2014 regarding the revision of Annex IV to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement

**Figure A.3 Architecture of the EDF and links to the evaluation questions**



## 6. Implications for the evaluation

The particularities, key features, and overarching international and development context of the EDF are relevant from an evaluation perspective. The co-existence of the EDF with other EFIs makes it important to look at complementarity and coordination questions. The range of financing modalities and the dichotomy between ACPs and OCTs also raise interesting questions in a number of areas that the evaluation would try to answer. Changes in the global context need to be taken into account in the evaluation if the EDF is to remain relevant throughout its lifespan (2014-2020). Moreover, changes of a more unpredictable and urgent nature can generate significant pressure on EFIs, included the EDF, when it comes to coordination, flexibility, efficiency, complementarity and sustainability. They also pose immediate questions around priorities and resourcing.

Changes in the policy environment are also relevant. The EDF11 included changes in priority sectors driven by the Agenda for Change and the principle of concentration. Additional changes are to be expected both as a result the evolving global context and international agendas (Agenda 2030) and at EU level. The capacity of the EDF to adapt and remain relevant and effective will also be tested. Institutional changes need to be considered because they can also influence the evaluation parameters. For example, some authors have already raised concerns relating to the existence of some confusion about the division of labour between DG DEVCO and the newly created EEAS (Herrero et al. 2015). Changes in management and implementation procedures and human resources are also relevant from an evaluation perspective.



## 7. Timeline of the EDF, EU and global events

Reading key:

Year	EDF specific	EU specific	Global
1957	<b>Treaty of Rome creates EDF</b>		
1959	<b>1st EDF (1959-1964)</b> Convention on OCTs annexed to the Treaty of Rome		
1964	<b>2nd EDF (1964-1970), 1st Yaoundé Convention</b> First partnership agreement. Agreement was founded on the recognition of national sovereignty of all participating countries. It was furthermore not only unprecedented in its form but also unique in its comprehensiveness, covering aspects from financial and technical assistance (through the EDF) to investment and capital movements (through the EIB) to trade preferences.		
1970	<b>3rd EDF (1970-1975), 2nd Yaoundé Convention</b>		
1975	<b>4th EDF (1975-1980) 1st Lomé Convention</b> New preferential trade agreement was negotiated. Negotiations also reflected the impact of the UK accession (large number of former colonies and territories).		
1980	<b>5th EDF (1980-1985) 2nd Lomé Convention</b>		
1985	<b>6th EDF (1985-1990) 3rd Lomé Convention</b>		
1990	<b>7th EDF (1990-1995) 4th Lomé Convention</b>		
1995	<b>8th EDF (1995-2000) 4th bis Lomé Convention</b>		
<b>2000</b>	<b>MDGs</b>		
2000	<b>9th EDF (2000-2007), Cotonou Agreement</b> The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000, marked an important shift in the EU's approach to development cooperation. The agreement was signed for 20 years, a much longer period than the "Lomé conventions". It also introduced a number of <b>changes and innovations to increase the impact of development cooperation in developing countries</b> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• poverty reduction as the main objective,</li> <li>• putting developing countries in the driver's seat (ownership)</li> <li>• recognizing and promoting dialogue with non-state actors</li> <li>• economic partnership agreements</li> <li>• promoting political dialogue and cooperation</li> <li>• linking funding to performance</li> <li>• human rights one of the pillars of the ACP-EU partnership.</li> </ul> Another significant change compared to the previous Lomé conventions is that the Cotonou Agreement was less prescriptive and more open to political negotiation, which in addition to facilitating dialogue among partners also made it more flexible. This was encouraged by the creation of <b>three ACP-EU institutions</b> for governance under part 2 of the Cotonou Agreement: Council of Ministers, Committee of Ambassadors and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, as well as <b>mechanisms to encourage dialogue</b> such as article 96.		
2003	<b>EC recommends budgetisation of the EDF</b> The EC issued the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – Towards the full integration of co-operation with ACP countries in the EU budget. The budgetisation debate remains open and it is part of the negotiations on the post-Cotonou framework. The Parliament is a strong supporter of budgetisation because it would increase its oversight powers over the EDF (see for example European Parliament, 2013).		
<b>2005</b>	<b>Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness</b>		
2005	<b>1st revision of Cotonou Agreement:</b> The review did not alter the foundations of the agreement, but introduced new angles and perspectives that reflected emerging priorities (see EC, 2006). The <b>review reinforced political dialogue around human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law</b> . It also introduced a number of <b>security-related provisions</b> in the following areas: non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and the International Criminal Court. The revision also <b>deepened</b>		

	<p><b>participatory approaches and recognized or reinforced the role of non-state actors and local authorities.</b> The <b>implementation and management systems were also reviewed to make procedures and cooperation more simple</b>, flexible and responsive to crisis or conflict situations. Finally, the review updated the development priorities and sectoral strategies to include issues such as the MDGs, <b>increase the relevance of the social sector</b>, reinforce regional cooperation and include specific provisions to support young people and promote information and communication technologies.</p>
2006	<p><b>European Consensus for Development</b></p> <p>The European Consensus on Development is a policy statement made jointly by the three main EU institutions (Commission, Parliament and Council). It commits the EU to eradicating poverty and building a fairer and more stable world.</p> <p><b>Principles:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• reducing poverty — particularly through the Millennium Development Goals. This will also impact sustainability, HIV/AIDS, security, conflict prevention, forced migration, etc.</li> <li>• democratic values — respect for human rights, democracy, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, good governance, gender equality, solidarity and social justice</li> <li>• nationally led development — by the beneficiary countries themselves, based on national strategies (developed in collaboration with non-government bodies) and domestic resources. EU aid will be aligned with national strategies and procedures.</li> </ul> <p><b>Commitments:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EU governments have agreed to increase their Official Development Assistance (link is external) to 0.7 % of GNI by 2015</li> <li>• half the additional aid will go to Africa — with special attention paid to fragile states</li> <li>• the EU and its member countries are committed to making the aid they provide more effective, including through better coordination on the ground.</li> </ul>
<b>2008</b>	<b>Accra Agenda for Action</b>
2008	<p><b>10th EDF (2008-2013)</b></p> <p>Compared to the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, there were significant changes in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Implementation:</b> enhanced focus by the EDF management committee on strategic issues, the establishment of a framework for co-financing, special management procedures for the Peace Facility, increased possibilities for regional co-operation including between the ACPs and outermost regions, the introduction of a programming of the intra-ACP envelope and the emphasis on the principle of coordination between the Member States and other donors; creation of a reserve and incentive amounts for each country</li> <li>• <b>Budget</b> of €22,682 million over 6 years. Of this amount, €21,966 million were allocated to the ACP countries, €286 million to the OCT and €430 million to the Commission as support expenditure. In comparison 9<sup>th</sup> EDF had a budget of €13.5 bn over 7 years</li> </ul>
2009	<p><b>Entry into force of certain provisions from the Lisbon Treaty</b></p> <p>New institutional set-up in order to increase the impact of external action and ensure coordination and coherence among different policy areas for external action, including development cooperation. The provisions entering into force in December 2009 resulted in the <b>creation of the European External Action Service</b>. The new institutional set-up required a thorough <b>revision of the programming and management processes</b> of development assistance.</p>
2009	<p><b>Launch of negotiations on the Treaty on the EU's relations with Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs)</b>, expiring in 2013.</p>


2010	<p><b>2nd revision of Cotonou Agreement</b></p> <p>The revision reflected the important institutional, policy and political developments since 2005 mentioned above. It deepened and expanded several provisions in the following areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>interdependence between security and development:</b> poverty as a root cause of conflict, and the acknowledgment of threats such as organized crime, piracy and trafficking of people, drugs and weapons.</li> <li>• <b>growing importance of regional integration in ACP countries and in ACP-EU.</b> In Africa, the continental dimension is also recognized, and the African Union becomes a partner of the EU-ACP relationship.</li> <li>• Recognition of <b>climate change</b> as a development concern and commitment to support ACP efforts in this area</li> <li>• Great emphasis on <b>sustainable development</b> and recognition of specific challenges in the path to the MDGs, such as food security, HIV-AIDS and sustainability of fisheries.</li> <li>• Reaffirming the role of <b>Economic Partnership Agreements</b>, the challenges of ACP countries in integration into global trade and aid for trade.</li> <li>• Continuing to promote and <b>deepen the role of national parliaments, local authorities, civil society and private sector in development.</b></li> <li>• Reflecting aid effectiveness commitments, in particular <b>donor coordination and aid untying.</b> It also contains an EU commitment to <b>enhance the coherence of all EU policies with development objectives.</b></li> </ul>
2011	<p><b>Busan: the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation</b></p>
2011	<p><b>10<sup>th</sup> EDF Performance Review</b></p> <p>Summary of findings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>EU clearly identified areas where it could offer the best added value</b> and focused its funds strongly on budget support, governance and infrastructure.</li> <li>• <b>Balance and hierarchy between national, regional and intra-ACP were relevant.</b></li> <li>• Room for improving the synergies between EU aid flows. <b>EU aid remains very fragmented.</b></li> <li>• <b>EU's responsiveness could be improved</b>, especially in relation to (1) aid programming in crisis and fragile situations, (2) a structural approach to build up the resilience of recipient countries to both natural hazards and economic shocks, and (3) broad and generic exogenous shocks mechanism.</li> </ul>
2011	<p><b>Agenda for Change</b></p> <p>Its main objective is to "increase the impact and effectiveness of EU development policy". In order to do so, it puts forward a number of principles and policy priorities. The principles reflect aid effectiveness commitments to a large extent and include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Differentiation</b> so that resources are allocated on the basis of need and impact. This means increasing support to fragile states and the poorest countries.</li> <li>• <b>Concentration in no more than three sectors</b> per country.</li> <li>• <b>Coordination</b> to avoid fragmentation through joint programming and common results-based monitoring frameworks.</li> <li>• <b>Coherence</b> with other policies.</li> </ul> <p>From a policy perspective, two key priority areas:</p> <p><b>Human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance.</b> This includes support for activities related to the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, gender equality, civil society and local authorities, public-sector management, corruption, tax policy and administration.</p> <p><b>Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development.</b> Captures a large number of actions in different sectors. Three sub-priorities: social protection, health, education and jobs; business environment, regional integration and world markets; and sustainable agriculture and energy.</p>
2012	<p><b>Programming guidelines of the 11th EDF are approved.</b></p> <p>The guidelines signal the start of the programming process under the 11th European Development Fund (EDF), which was expected to take place throughout 2013. The guidelines already <b>reflect the new programming framework and institutional framework (EEAS)</b> formally adopted in subsequent regulations.</p>

2013	<p><b>Overseas Association Decision</b></p> <p>COUNCIL DECISION 2013/755/EU of 25 November 2013 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Union, replaces the existing framework approved in 2001 (Decision 2001/822/EC) and expiring on 31 Dec 2013.</p>
2014	<p><b>10<sup>th</sup> EDF – 11<sup>th</sup> EDF Bridging facility</b></p> <p>Implementation of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF was delayed due to the negotiation of the Internal Agreement among EU MSs. EDF11 was supposed to started in January 2014, but the Internal Agreement entered into force in March 2015. The bridging facility was created to fill the gap.</p> <p>The delay meant that the <b>EDF only started to be implemented in March 2015</b>. Data from the Commission shows that at 31 Dec 2015, 22% of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF funds had been committed (approx. €6.5bn), but only 5% had been disbursed (approx. €1.6bn)</p> <p><b>11th EDF</b></p> <p>The changes introduced in the 11th EDF do not represent a rupture compared to the 10th EDF and should be seen as an evolution resulting from soft policy changes and lessons learnt during the implementation of the 10th EDF:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Greater emphasis on aid effectiveness principles</b> and other principles and policy priorities put forward in the EU Agenda for change. For example: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ further progress in <b>differentiation</b>. Under the 10th EDF, LDCs and LICs received 79% of the funding, in the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF programming, the share increased to 85%.<sup>41</sup></li> <li>◦ <b>greater sector concentration</b> (reduction to 3 sectors)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Adoption of a <b>methodology to estimate national indicative allocations based on needs and impact</b>, among other issues. The choice of these two elements reflects the principle of differentiation in the Agenda for Change.</li> <li>• New <b>programming and management procedures resulting from the entry into force of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty</b> in the area of external action (EEAS).</li> <li>• EU Member States' contributions to the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF budget were made using the same keys used in the EU budget.</li> <li>• Introduction of a shock-absorbing scheme to mitigate impact of exogenous shocks (e.g. an international financial crisis).</li> </ul>
2015	<p style="text-align: right;"><b>Agenda 2030</b> <b>Addis Ababa Action Agenda</b> <b>UNFCCC Paris Agreement</b></p>
2015	<p><b>EU results monitoring framework</b></p> <p>Launched in March 2015, the framework measures progress in three areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Wider development progress</b> made by partner countries, setting the context within which EU external assistance operates (based on data from international organisations);</li> <li>• <b>Partner country results</b> to which the EU contributed through EU-funded projects and programmes;</li> <li>• The <b>European Commission's own organisational performance</b> with respect to international cooperation and development.</li> </ul>
2016	<p><b>Evaluation of the Cotonou Agreement</b></p> <p>Strengths:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agreement has provided the <b>basis for what has become a structured political dialogue</b> at country level</li> <li>• <b>Increase in trade flows</b> to and from the ACP countries, the finally increasing number of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) concluded</li> <li>• Within the Cotonou Framework, the <b>EU has contributed significantly to the eradication of poverty</b>, and the improvement of food security</li> <li>• EU support has contributed to <b>improved and more equitable access to basic services</b>.</li> <li>• EU support has also contributed to <b>strengthening institutional capacity</b> in the areas of environmental and climate governance.</li> </ul> <p>Weaknesses:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In some cases, ACP partner countries have considered discussions on <b>human rights and</b></li> </ul>

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, op. cit 1

	<p>fundamental principles to be inconsistent with their own values and culture, resulting in a lack of political will to change or improve human rights.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Implementation of the peace and security provisions has mainly been concentrated at sub-regional and regional African level</b>, with a limited role for the ACP level.</li> <li>• The <b>expected results on increasing diversification and reducing commodity-dependency have not yet been achieved.</b></li> <li>• The <b>support provided in conflict situations has generally not been directed at tackling the root cause of conflict</b>, but rather at mitigating the consequences or providing 'classic' development support.</li> <li>• <b>Improvements to social infrastructures and services have, in some cases, stagnated</b>, or have even been reversed as a result of high population growth, low levels of funding from partner governments and conflict or natural disasters.</li> </ul>
2017	<p><b>New European Consensus on Development?</b></p> <p>The European Consensus on Development is currently being reviewed to adapt it to the policy and political changes since 2006. The Consensus is particularly relevant because it sets a common policy for the EC, Council and EU Parliament.</p>
2020	<p><b>Cotonou agreement expires</b></p> <p>Discussions are ongoing about whether it would need to be replaced by a new agreement and what form it should adopt. <b>Budgetisation</b> is an important aspect of the discussions.</p>

Figure A.4 EDF Evaluation Phases



**Table A.2 Detailed Work Plan/Timetable**

Evaluation Phases	Activity and deliverables	By whom	TOR Key Dates	Proposed dates (deadlines)
<b>Desk Phase</b>				
Inception	Contract awarded, team mobilised; document assembly/literature review and development of document 'inventory'	Full Team		July
	EC Briefing session, Brussels	Full Team	Mid-July 2016	1-4 August
	Preliminary team workshop/teleconference to discuss Inception Report (IR) and preparation of team processes/guidelines.	Full Team		5 August
	Preliminary discussions with EFI Chapeau team, including on coordinated survey design procedures.	TL/QE		w/c 8 August
	Drafting of IR (version 0); evaluation preparation and methodology design, including stakeholder analysis and consultation.	Full Team		
	Submission of Draft IR (version 0) to internal QE	TL+QE		w/c 22 August
	Revisions and incorporation of QE comments on IR (version 0) and internal editorial quality control (copy editing, proof reading)	TL+PM		
	Submission of Draft IR (version 1) to EC		August 2016	31 August
	<b>EDF ISG Meeting</b> and discussion of IR (version 1)			8 September
	Receipt of comments from EC, incorporate into final IR	TL		12 September
	<b>Submission of Final IR</b> (version 2).			16 September
	Consultation with EFI Chapeau team on survey design and finalisation of EDF inputs.	TL+QE		20 September
Desk Review	Data collection and initial analysis and development of survey (scope/timing)	Full Team		Starting 01 September
	Consultations in Brussels	TL + team members		w/c 19 September

Evaluation Phases	Activity and deliverables	By whom	TOR Key Dates	Proposed dates (deadlines)
	Drafting of desk report	Full Team		Ongoing
	Refinement of Chapeau survey questions	SE (+ JE)		w/c 26 Sept and w/c 03 Oct
	Submission of draft desk report (version 0) to internal QE	TL+QE		w/c 17 October
	Revisions and incorporation of QE comments on draft desk report (version 1) and internal editorial quality control (copy editing, proof reading)	TL+PM		
	Half day Brussels EDF ISG Meeting: slide presentation and discussion of the desk report (version 1). Receipt of comments from EC, incorporate into final report: <b>submission of final desk report</b> (version 2).	TL (+ <i>team members if necessary</i> )	October 2016	w/c 17 October
	Team workshop/teleconference to discuss validation phase and finalise country briefs.	Full Team		w/c 24 October
<b>Validation Phase</b>				
	In-depth data collection & analysis; Discussions with relevant stakeholders, including Brussels consultations.	Full Team		October- December 2017 On-going
	Implementation of Chapeau survey			Mid-October – end November
	<b>Field Visits (total eight countries – 6 ACP countries and 2 OCT)</b>	Selected team member/s	October- December 2017	October (pilot) December 2017
	Country follow-up interviews and document review	Full Team		Post-visits
	Analysis of Chapeau survey results survey findings	SE + JE		w/c 05 Dec
	Presentation of emerging messages to the ISG	Full Team		15 December
	Preparation of informal country lessons learnt summary	TL (+ inputs)		w/c 16 January
	Team debriefing to discuss findings ahead of ISG meeting.	Full Team		



Evaluation Phases	Activity and deliverables	By whom	TOR Key Dates	Proposed dates (deadlines)
	EDF ISG Meeting; <b>slide presentation and discussion of findings</b>	TL (+ <i>team members if necessary</i> )	February 2017	w/c 16 December
	Further consultation/feedback with EFI Chapeau team	TL+QE		
<b>Synthesis Phase</b>				
	Data analysis and synthesis. Drafting of final report.	Full Team		24 December 2016
	Submission of Draft Final Report (version 0) to internal QE	TL+QE		05 January 2017
	Revisions and incorporation of QE comments on Draft Final Report and internal editorial quality control (copy editing, proof reading)	TL+PM		
	Submission of draft Final Report	TL		09 January
	<b>Brussels EDF ISG Meeting</b>	Full Team	February 2017	16 January
	Incorporate EC feedback into Draft Final Report (version 1).	Full Team		w/c 16 January
	Preparation of short brief (including questions) to accompany the draft final report. Translation of the brief into French, Spanish and Portuguese. .	Full Team		23 January
	<b>Submit revised Draft Final Report</b> (version 2) for online publication and the Open Public Consultation with executive summaries and Brief.	TL	February 2017	23 January
	<b>Open Public Consultation</b> ; including a face-to-face EDF consultation with the EDF evaluation team and the Chapeau contract team leader.	Full Team	12 weeks as of February 2017	27 February – 19 May 2017
	Preparation of OPC summary including team response.	Full Team		w/c 22 May
	Translation of OPC contributions; team teleconference to discuss response.	Full Team +PM		
	Revision of Draft Final Report (version 2); incorporation of ISG and OPC feedback.	Full Team		w/c 29 May
	Submission of revised Draft Final Report (version 3) report to internal QE	TL, QE		

Evaluation Phases	Activity and deliverables	By whom	TOR Key Dates	Proposed dates (deadlines)
	Revisions and incorporation of QE comments on Draft Final Report (version 3). Drafting of executive summaries and a synopsis.	Full Team		
	Internal editorial quality control (copy editing, proof reading) of final outputs. Translation of executive summaries and synopsis to French.	TL, PM		
	<b>Submission Final Report (version 4) and executive summaries</b>	TL	1 June 2017	1 June 2017
	Printing of Final Evaluation Report	TL, PM	July 2017	w/c 3 July 2017
	Possible dissemination activities	TBC	TBC	TBC

**Table A.3 List of people met**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Position Title</b>	<b>Organisation / Country</b>
Ato Ababu	MoF In charge of customs programme	Ministry of Finance, Ethiopia
Vieux Abdoul Rachid Soulama	DGB	Government Burkina Faso
Mr Abdoulaye Traore	DEVUR	EUD Burkina Faso
Aliou Abdoullahi	National Coordinator CAON	NAO Cameroon
Patricia Abreu	Deputy Minister for International Cooperation and Affairs	Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources, Dominican Republic
Zoltan Agai	Programme Manager - E2	DEVCO
Guy Aho Tete Benissan	Coordonateur Régional REPAOC (Afrique de l'Ouest)	Concord
Eko'o Akoufane	SG Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Dev	MINADER Cameroon
Ana Alfredo	Governance Sector	EUD Timor Leste
Paul Antoine	Attaché de coopération	Ambassade de France Burkina Faso
Alice Audadou	Consultant	PASCAL Programme, Dominican Republic
Jonas Bako	CDO	EUD Burkina Faso
Annie Banda		World Vision, Zambia
Thierry Barbé	Head of Cooperation	EUD Burkina Faso
Ricard Bardia	Head of Cooperation	EUD Dominican Republic
Ricard Bardía	Head of Cooperation	EUD, Dominican Republic
Paolo Barduagni	Health and Nutrition Sector	EUD Timor Leste
Callewaert Bart	ECOSOC	EUD Burkina Faso
Sue Basset	Head of EU Programmes Team/Europe Department	DFID
Belachew Beleye	Deputy NAO	Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation, Ethiopia
Federico Berna	Director, Caribbean and Latin America	DEVCO
Sylvie Bernié	Trust Fund	EUD Ethiopia
François Bockel	Head of regional cooperation and external relations	Government, New Caledonia

Name	Position Title	Organisation / Country
Magdalena Bonal Turaud	Directrice de la Direction de l'Emploi et de l'insertion professionnelle	New Caledonia
Eric Bourgou	Chef des services	DMC, Government Burkina Faso
Clement Bourse	Contract and Finance	EUD New Caledonia
Clotilde BOUTROLLE	Chargée de mission	Agence Française de développement, New Caledonia
Mario Bruno	Head of Sector FCA	EUD Cameroon
Robert Buckland	MS Representative	Sweden MFA
Anna Burylo	Counsellor Head of Coopération	EUD Africa Union, Ethiopia
Laetitia Cadet	Head of Section, Finance, Contracts and Audit	EUD Zambia
Bart Callewaert	SocEco Chargé de programme	EUD Burkina Faso
Andrea Capurro	Finances Contrats,	EUD Burkina Faso
Stéphanie Carette	CSO	EUD Ethiopia
Douglas Carpenter	Afrique centrale	EEAS
Mercedes Carrasco	Advisor for the General Budget Directorate	Ministry of Treasury, Dominican Republic
Francisco Carreras Sequeros	Head of Cooperation	EUD Ethiopia
Fulgencio Carriso Ruiz	East Africa and Regional Cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa	DEVCO Unit D2
Dolores Castello	Health Policy Advisor	WHO, Timor Leste
Feliberto Ceriani Sebregondi	Head of Division Development Coordination	EEAS
Ann Charlotte Salmann	Economie, Commerce et Gouvernance	EUD Cameroon
Yagoub Cheikh	Planning and Budget	DG DEVCO
Manuel Chradus	Head of Human resources division	Parliament of Timor Leste
Emmanuel Cohet	French Ambassador	Embassy of France, Zambia
Françoise Collet	Head of Delegation	EUD Cameroon
Juliette Compaoré	Chargé de programme	SPONG, CSO Burkina Faso
Daniel Cornaille	Président	Conseil Economique, Social et

Name	Position Title	Organisation / Country
		Environmental de la NC
Dr. Coulibaly	Expert – Coopération pour le Financement du Développement	Intra-ACP Committee
Antonio Crespo-Moreno	Overseas Countries and territories	DEVCO
Kaliba D. Mukandu		Oxfam, Zambia
Joaquim Da Costa Freitas	Coordinator	Gabinete de Apoio à Sociedade Civil do Gabinete Primeiro-Ministro Timor Leste
Daniela de Almeida Pereira	MS Rep Timor Leste	Adida para a Cooperação, Portugal
Vincent de Paul Dabiré	Directeur Général de la Direction Générale des Infrastructures Routières	DG Routes, Burkina Faso
Mercede de Torres Llosa		EUD Dominican Republic
Homa Dean	DEVCO 01	DEVCO
Silvio Decurtins	MS Rep Timor Leste	GIZ in Timor Leste
Maria del Carmen Bueno Barriga	Evaluation Officer thematic Support, M&E	DG NEAR
Raúl del Río	Country Director	Oxfam, Dominican Republic
Mr Demeke	Fiscal Policy Director	Ministry of Finance and economic cooperation, Ethiopia
Rachel Deplaen	Senior Policy Officer	ActAlliance EU
Mr Deschamps	Expert principal, appui à l'Ordonnateur National	Ministère de l'économie, des finances et du développement, Burkina Faso
Francesca Di Mauro	Head of Unit	Development Coordination and Regional Cooperation, Central Africa
Cesar Diaz	Financial Advisor	DIGEPRES, Dominican Republic
César Díaz	Advisor to the General Budget Directorate	Ministry of Treasury
Leonel Díaz	Advisor	Ministry of Treasury, Dominican Republic
Leonel Díaz Asesor		Ministry of Finance, Dominican Republic
Maria Dijkhoff-Pita	Deputy Territorial Authorizing Officer for the EDF	Department of Economic Affairs, Commerce and Industry, Aruba

<b>Name</b>	<b>Position Title</b>	<b>Organisation / Country</b>
Bridget Dillon	Lead on chapeau contract	DEVCO
Saffia Diop	Development Cooperation Coordination Division	EEAS
Koen Doens	Director Eastern and Southern Africa	DEVCO
Richard Doffonsou	Economist	AfDB
Gaelle Doleans	Results and quality division	DEVCO
Maria Dolores	Economist	DIGEPRES, Dominican Republic
Oscar Domenella	Head of Technical Assistance	PASCAL Programme, Dominican Republic
Johanes Don Bosco	Health and Nutrition Sector	EUD Timor Leste
Jan Ebbing	Technical Advisor	TNO Aruba
Rebekka Edelman	Directrice du bureau de la KfW au BF	Ambassade Allemagne, Burkina Faso
Cyrille Edou	Ministère Finance, Conseiller Technique Ministre ex regisseur PARFIP	MINDIN Cameroon
Zogo Ekassi	Responsable de Projets	CEMAC Cameroon
Martin Ellegaard Hansen	International Aid/Coopération Officer	OCTs, Development Coordination Latin America and Caribbean
Arnault Emini	Assistant Resident Representative	UNDP Cameroon
Sachenka Encarnación	Programme Officer Regional Integration, Private Sector and Natural Resources	EUD Dominican Republic
Onur Erdem	Public Sector Specialist	World Bank, Dominican Republic
Maitre Eteme Eteme		Droits de l'Homme et Action Humanitaire
María Eugenia Manon	Programme Officer, Technical cooperation facility	EUD Dominican Republic
Mme Fanta Sedego	Unité Economique et Social	Délégation de l'UE au Burkina Faso
Giorgia Favero	Infrastructure	EUD Ethiopia
Gregorio Ferriera da Silva	National Liaison Officer and HR Supervisor	GIZ, Timor Leste
Annica Floren	Programme Manager - B4	DEVCO

<b>Name</b>	<b>Position Title</b>	<b>Organisation / Country</b>
Stephen Foster	Head of Section, Asia and Pacific Department	EEAS
Stephan Fox	infrastructure and energy	EUD Africa Union, Ethiopia
Stephen Fox	Programme Manager, Infrastructure and Energy	EUD to AU
Amalia Garcia Tharn	PCD Team member	DEVCO
Victoria Garcia-Guillen	Desk officer Ethiopia and Horn of Africa	EEAS
Bruno Gatta		Intra-ACP Cooperation
Tigist Gelaye	Country Director	Cordaid
Nicolas Gerard	Regional and Intra-ACP	EUD Zambia
Philippe Germain	President of New Caledonia	New Caledonia
Erica Gerretsen	Head of Unit – Budget Support and PFM	DEVCO
Catherine Geuguen	Desk officer, Asia & Pacific Department	EEAS
Antoine Gilbert	Desk Officer, West Africa Regional Cooperation	EEAS
Luis Gordinho	Political Officer	EUD Timor Leste
Paul Gosselink		EEAS
Serge Graziani	Attaché de Cooperation	Ambassade de France, Cameroon
Adam Grodzicki	Head of Infrastructure Section	EUD Zambia
Małgorzata GROMANN	Head of Unit for EU Development Policy and Multilateral Cooperation	Development Cooperation Department of Polish MFA
Idalina Guterres	Director	Parliament of Timor Leste
Juvita Guterres	Governance Sector	EUD Timor Leste
Birgitte Hagelund	Migration	EUD Ethiopia
George Hagerty	MS representative in EDF Committee	Irish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Magdalena Hanjan Costa Soares		TAO Timor Leste
Chantal Hebberecht	Head of Mission	EUD Ethiopia
George Hegarty		Ireland MFA

Name	Position Title	Organisation / Country
Leon Hemkemeyer	Programme Officer	European Partnership For Democracy (EPD)
Mark Henderson	Director, Office of Economic Growth	USAID, Timor Leste
Ron Hendrix	Program Manager, Migration, mobility	EUD Africa Union, Ethiopia
Peter Herzig	Intra-ACP Cooperation	DEVCO
Frank Hess	Deputy Head of Unit, DEVCO/H2	DEVCO
Ivo Hoefkens	Head of Unit (a.i) DEVCO Regional Programme COMESA, SADC & Fisheries	DEVCO
Frank Hofmann	Head of Development Cooperation	Germany in Zambia
Egon Hovnikar	Intra-ACP	DEVCO
Elisabeth Huybens	Director	World Bank Cameroon
Thomas Huyghebaert	Chef d'équipe gouvernance	EUD Burkina Faso
Tomalgo Hyacinthe	Directeur de suivi évaluation et capitalisation	MoF, Burkina Faso
Antonio Ilalio	Desk Manager for the French OCTs	DEVCO
Wim Impens	Chef section Développement Rural	EUD Burkina Faso
Jean Jacques Dissole		CAMFAIDS
Perrot-Minnot Jean Benoit	Chargé de mission régionalGouvernance	AFD Cameroon
Maria Joao Morais	Assessora	Gabinete de Apoio à Sociedade Civil do Gabinete Primeiro-Ministro Timor Leste
Eva Johansson	Development Coordination and Regional Cooperation, Central Africa	DEVCO E 1
Marie Joly	Head of Regional Programmes	AFD, Dominican Republic
Maria Jose Pallares	DEVCO	DEVCO
Prof Justine Dikko Tchankman		Coord. Nationale, Réseau More Women in PoliticsObservatoire Africain de la pratique d'affaires



Name	Position Title	Organisation / Country
Maurice K. Nyambe		ZGF Zambia
Ibrahim KABORE	Infrastructures	Délégation de l'UE Burkina Faso
Salam Kafando	Director of Multilateral Coopération	DMC, Government Burkina Faso
Wezi Kaira		World Vision, Zambia
Hope Kalabi Situmbeko	COMAid/RISM Coordinator	COMESA
Kalumiana	Director of Energy	Ministry of Energy, Zambia
Dr Kargougou	SG Ministère de la Santé	Government Burkina Faso
Chasiya Kazembe	Deputy NAO	Zambia NAO
Stephen Kearney	Country Director	World Food Programme, Timor Leste
Michal Kielar	Deputy-Head of Development Cooperation	Germany in Zambia
Amos Kienou	Directeur Général, Direction Générale des Etudes et des Statistiques Sectorielles	Ministère de l'Agriculture et des ressources animales, Government Burkina Faso
Apollin Koagne		CED, Centre pour l'Environnement et le développement
Ute Koch	Finance and contracts	Finance and contracts
Martin Kopers	Deputy Head of mission/Head of Development Cooperation	Netherlands in Ethiopia
Olivier Kowalyk	Finance Contrat, Acting HoS	EUD Ethiopia
Krista Kruft		Save the Children, Zambia
Wolfgang Kutschera	Head of Unit "Development Cooperation Instruments of the EU and Regional Organizations"	Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe
Helena Laasko	DG NEAR A 3 Thematic Support, Monitoring and Evaluation and Former head of sector for Central Africa	NEAR
Olivia Lake	RAO	RAO Caribbean
Jean Lamy	Chef de Délégation	EUD Burkina Faso
Dominic Langen		GIZ Timor Leste
Marc Laplasse	MS Representative at the EDF Committee	Belgium

<b>Name</b>	<b>Position Title</b>	<b>Organisation / Country</b>
Natalia Lazarewicz	GeoDesk Zambia	DEVCO D1
Simon le Grand	Head of Cooperation	EUD Timor Leste
Françoise Le Losq	CSO	EUD Burkina Faso
Yannick le Rouz	Premier secrétaire	Ambassade de France Burkina Faso
Alexandre Leitaó	Head of Mission	EUD Timor Leste
Adoración León Moruno	Head of Programmes	AECID, Dominican Republic
Andrea Leone	Infrastructure HoS	EUD Burkina Faso
Bruno Lestrada	Parliament Advisor	Parliament of Timor Leste
Mats Liljefelt	Prem. Conseiller, HoC	EUD Cameroon
Anita Lindqvist	Finance and contracts	DEVCO
Luca Lo Conte	Economic and Social Sector	EUD, Dominican Republic
Vivian Loopstok-Geerman	Policy Advisor	Department of Economic Affairs, Commerce and Industry, Aruba
Paula Lopes da Cruz		FAO Timor Leste
Mr Lupunga	Deputy NAO	Zambia NAO
Eloi M Kwete	RISP Coordinator	COMESA
Florence M. J.		NGOCC
Robert Mabala	Coordinateur Régional REPONGAC (Afrique Centrale)	Concord
Moussa Maiga	SG	Ministère de l'Agriculture et des ressources animales, Government Burkina Faso
Mme Maimouna Sanon	Unité Développement Rural	Délégation de l'UE au Burkina Faso
Carine Malardeau	Planning and Programme Officer (Secondment to DEVCO)	French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ms Małgorzata Gromann	Head of Unit for EU Development Policy and Multilateral Cooperation	Development Cooperation Department of Polish MFA
Jean Marc Gauthier	AT infrastructures	Ministry Public Transport, Cameroon
Elsa Marcesse	MS Rep Timor Leste	France
Ana Maria Valdes-Tellez	GeoDesk Burkina Faso	DEVCO
Alessandro Mariani	Ambassador and Head of Cooperation	EUD Zambia

Name	Position Title	Organisation / Country
Philippe Martin	Director of Vocational Training	New Caledonia
Antonio Martinez-Piqueras	Aid coordination ACP	DEVCO
Susan Marx	Asian Foundation Country Representative	Timor Leste
Patricia Maugin	West Africa relations	
Anne Mbewe Anamela	Programme Manager PFM	Irish Embassy, Zambia
Chikwe Mbweeda		CARE International, Zambia
Elizabeth McMillan	Senior Program Adviser	Ministry of Finance, Timor Leste
James McNulty		EUD Zambia
Hussain Mehdi	Unit for Quality and Results	DEVCO
Renato Mele		DEVCO
Luciana Mermet	Assistant Resident Representative	UNDP, Dominican Republic
Christian Meseth Bruno	DG Ex Pol, Secretariat of the Committee on Development	European Parliament
Joerg Meyer	Premier Secrétaire Ambassade Allemagne	Ambassade Allemagne, Burkina Faso
Adama Millogo	Chef section Développement Rural	EUD Burkina Faso
Tiruwork Moges	Assistant Head of Cooperation	EUD Ethiopia
David Mogollon	Résilience/devt rural	EUD Ethiopia
Enrico Mollica		EU Trust Fund – Western Africa window – DEVCO D2
Carla Montesi	Director West and Central Africa	DEVCO
Cyril Moree		Ministry of Finance
Luis Mota	Assesor da Câmara de Contas	Camoes Instituto, Timor Leste
Jean-Bertrand Mothes		MoFA and European Affairs directorate
Shigehiko Muramoto	Unit Head Project Administration	Asian Development Bank, Timor Leste
Ato Mussa	MoF In charge of PFM reform programme	Ministry of Finance, Ethiopia
Twaambo Mutinta		Oxfam, Zambia

Name	Position Title	Organisation / Country
Makani Mzyece	Civil Society and Accountability Advisor	Irish Embassy, Zambia
Jesus N. Del Barrio	Regional Cooperation, Caribbean	DEVCO
Souleymane Nabolle	DG	MoF, Burkina Faso
Joseph N'Guessan	Transport Head of Sector	AfDB
Nikilo Njovu		Marie Stopes, Zambia
Isabel Nolasco	Human Resources advisor	Parliament of Timor Leste
Carine Nsoudou	Policy Advisor on EU development policy	French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Margeaux Offlaville	Commission for External Relations at the Congress New Caledonia	New Caledonia
Sergio Oliete Josa	Deuxime Secr, Chef Infrastr	EUD Cameroon
Pierre Omer Ouedraogo	Chargé de programme	SPONG, CSO Burkina Faso
Abdoulaye Ouedraogo	Secrétaire Général MATDSI	MATDSI, Government Burkina Faso
Maria Ouedraogo	Infrastructure	EUD Burkina Faso
Noraogo Ousmane Sawadogo	DG Adjoint	DG Police, Govt Burkina Faso
Janice Panton	UK Representative for the Government of Montserrat	OCTA
Alina Parau	Results and quality division	DEVCO
Manuel Parras	Consultant	PASCAL Programme, Dominican Republic
Manuel Parras	Consultant	PASCAI, Dominican Republic
Jean Paul Keyleme	Directeur statistiques sectorielles	MoF, Burkina Faso
Angel Paula Gabriel	Social Sector Director	Directorate General for Multilateral Cooperation, Dominican Republic
Estratios Pegidis	Chief de Bureau	EUD New Caledonia
Michael Pennington	Deputy Head of Unit, Coordination of International Cooperation and Development in East and Southern Africa	DEVCO
Hubert Perr	Head of Sector - PFM & DRM	DEVCO
Jacques Perrot	CSO Roadmap coordinator DEVCO B2	DEVCO

<b>Name</b>	<b>Position Title</b>	<b>Organisation / Country</b>
Richard Phelps	Country representative	Asian Development Bank
Chiara Pierdicca	Geo-desk Namibia, Malawi	DEVCO
Essomba Pierre	Secrétaire Générale	MINAT Cameroon
Marzia Pietrelli	Deputy Head of Unit	Planning ACP and Horizontal Coordination
Eric Pitois	FFU Résilience	EUD Burkina Faso
Daniel Plas	GeoDesk Ethiopia	DEVCO
Malcom Ponton		Timor Leste
Fernando Ponz	EEAS Caribbean	EEAS
Sam Porter	Assistant	MCAE, Timor Leste
Michał Pszczółkowski	Chief SpecialistUnit for EU Development Policy and Multilateral Cooperation	Development Cooperation Department of Polish MFA
Michael Pulichino	Gouvernance macro economy	EUD Ethiopia
Fiona Quinn	Head of Development Cooperation	Irish Embassy, Zambia
Henning Reimann	Development Coordination and Regional Cooperation, Central Africa	DEVCO E 1
Eva Reka Vasas	Legal Officer	DEVCO
Roberto Rensi		EEAS, Dominican Republic
Cecilia Requena	Economic Adviser of the MECAE	MECAE, Timor Leste
Matthias Reusing	Programme Manager and Coordinator	Timor Leste / Pacific Region / Intra-ACP Programme
Matthias Reusing	Programm Manager and coordinator Timor Leste/ Pacific Region	DEVCO
Mario Ribeiro Nunes	Director Geral das Florestas	Government of Timor Leste
Cyrille Roland Bechon		NDH Nouveaux Droits de l'Homme
Evelyn Román	Head of International Relations	Dominican Republic
Domenico Rosa	Head of Unit D3 ACP coordination	DEVCO
Julia Ross		Marie Stopes, Zambia
Koen Rossel Cambier	Programme Manager, Regional Programmes, Sub-Saharan Africa	DEVCO

Name	Position Title	Organisation / Country
	and ACP wide	
Peggy Roudaut	Project Manager	INTEGRE, New Caledonia
Klaus Rudischhauser	Coordination Dir. A, B.D E	DDG DEVCO
Fulgencio Garrido Ruiz		EU Trust Fund – Eastern Africa window – DEVCO D2
Raineri Sabatucci	Head of Mission	EUD Africa Union, Ethiopia
Patricia Sachs Cornish	Conseiller Principal Bureau du Directeur General, Pacific Community	Pacific Community
Denis Salord	Head of OCT Unit	DEVCO
Bernard San Emeterio Cordero	Coordination C01 Unit	DEVCO
Víctor Sánchez	Deputy Minister of Planning	Dominican Republic
Mme Sanou	Régisseur des programmes UE responsable d'un projet d'appui	DGCOOP, Government Burkina Faso
Nicola Santini	EDF Committee Coordinator	
Oliver Santos	Planning and Development	DIGEPRES, Dominican Republic
Zakaria Sbitri	C5	DEVCO
Enrico Sborge	Civil Society	EUD Cameroon
Dramane Sebré	GFP, Macro	EUD Burkina Faso
Hemial Sharma	Chief Health and Nutrition	UNICEF, Timor Leste
Matteo Sirtori	Head of Section Economic, Rural Development and Regional Cooperation	EUD Zambia
Ron Smit	Team Leader Mineral Production Monitoring Support to MMMD	Consultant
Costa Soares	Territorial Authorizing Officer	Timor Leste
Karine Sohet	Senior Policy Officer	ActAlliance EU
Margherita Solca	EU Development Policy and Funding Officer	WWF
Mr Somda	Directeur Général Ouvrages spécifiques	DG Routes, Burkina Faso
Francesca Spadola	Programme Officer	EUD Dominican Republic
Vanessa Spencer	Advisor for Parliament Reform	Parliament of Timor Leste

Name	Position Title	Organisation / Country
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Cristof Stock	Head of Cooperation	EUD Guyana
Johanna Stratmann	Political Analyst	EUD Zambia
Trijntje Talen	Financial Manager	EUD Zambia
Maria Tekule	Deputy Head of Division, EU Development Policy	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany
Addys Then	Director	NGO Alliance, Dominican Republic
Sylvestre Tientoré	Coordonnateur	SPONG, CSO Burkina Faso
Cederick Tilma	Representative of the Government of Aruba at the EU	Government of Aruba
Mr Tionon	Directeur Général Transports routiers	DG Routes, Burkina Faso
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Eleftherios Tsiavos	Head of Section	DG DEVCO C3
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Fabienne Van Den Eede	Head of Sector, Governance and social sectors	EUD Zambia
Tijn van Winsen	Policy Officer Southern Africa Division	EEAS
Nerys Vanderhorst	Focal Point for Emergency Programmes	National Emergency Committee, Dominican Republic
Antonio Vargas	National Authorizing Officer	Directorate General for Multilateral Cooperation, Dominican Republic
Antonio Vargas		NAO Dominican Republic
Emerson Vegazo	Director for the Economic Sector	Directorate General for Multilateral Cooperation, Dominican Republic
Emerson Vegazo	Economic Sector Director	NAO Dominican Republic

<b>Name</b>	<b>Position Title</b>	<b>Organisation / Country</b>
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Cécile VERNANT	Head of EU Advocacy	DSW (Deutsche Stichtung Weltbevoelkerung)
Valéry Vicini	Director of Operations	AFD, Dominican Republic
José Villagra	Head of Finance and Contracts	EUD Dominican Republic
José Villagra Barrio	Head of Finance and Contracts	EUD Dominican Republic
Eric Vitale	Program Coordinator	WB, Timor Leste
Rebecca Von Schreeb	Desk Officer, New Caledonia	DEVCO
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Sandy Wade	Political Officer	EUD Ethiopia
Christophe Wagner	Head of Cooperation EUD Fiji	EUD Fiji
Soudaina Wala	F&C	DUE Timor Leste
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Emilie Wattellier	D3 – ACP Coordination	DEVCO
Astrid WEIN	Head of Cooperation	Austria in Ethiopia
Melanie Wilkinson		IDE Zambia
Dié Yacouba	Responsable de tous le AB	DGCOOP, Government Burkina Faso
Rashide Yusuf	Country Desk Dominican Republic	DEVCO
Pierre Yves Lucas	Governance Sector	EUD Timor Leste
Zoo Zame Philemon	Secretary general Min Public Transport	Ministry of Public Transport, Cameroon
Philippe Zané	Directeur de la formulation des politiques	MoF, Burkina Faso
Ana Rosa Latorre Zacaes		DG DEVCO C3
Mahama Zoungrana	Secrétariat Permanent de la Coordination des Politiques sectorielles Agricoles	Ministère de l'Agriculture et des ressources animales, Government Burkina Faso



## Annex 4 Evaluation methodology

### Introduction

This annex provides a summary of the evaluation methodology and processes. The full methodological design was set out in the Inception Report (Visser et al., 2016a). In some respects this was elaborated in the Desk Report (Visser et al., 2016b), which, for example, included a further review of evidence and development of hypotheses for testing, and provided more detail on plans for the country visits.

### Scope and timing

This is an instrument level evaluation which aims to assess whether the EDF is fit for purpose as an instrument for development cooperation in the ACP countries and OCTs. In line with the TOR, the evaluation also examined the role of the EDF in relation to the other EFIs and the broader EU, development aid and global context. The evaluation is, in effect, the mid-term Performance Review of the EDF11, which started in 2014 and runs until 2020. However, because it is in the suite of ten EC EFI evaluations taking place simultaneously between May 2016 and July 2017, it has been brought forward almost one and a half years. Synchronisation with the other EFI evaluations, which will share a common Open Public Consultation (OPC) beginning in February 2017, has also compressed the timetable, and this draft final report is being submitted to the Inter-Service Group (ISG) only five months after the start of the evaluation.

The EDF Performance Review started on the 1<sup>st</sup> of August 2016 and was the last of the EFI evaluations to be initiated. Formal deliverables which have so far been submitted are:

- **Inception Report** (approved on the 26 September)
- **Desk Report** (approved on the 11 November)
- **CIR Evaluation: contribution by the EDF Performance Review team** (approved 19th December) – incorporated in this report as Annex 9.

The overall evaluation process required submission of the draft final report in early 2017 so as to feed into a 12-week Open Public Consultation on all ten EFI evaluations from February, before submission of the final report in summer 2017. All products of the evaluation will be submitted to the European Parliament by December 2017.

### Evaluation process

The phasing (Figure A.4) and detailed timetable of the evaluation (Table A.2) are provided in Annex 3. The evaluation followed standard phases: inception phase, desk phase, and validation phase. These phases overlapped in practice because of the short time frame for this assignment. The evaluation kicked off with detailed briefings and an internal team workshop in Brussels in the first week of August.

Three **team workshops** were organised, in Paris (one day) and two workshops in Brussels (with a total of four days). These meetings were attended by all team members including the Quality Manager. The workshops were utilised to ensure a common understanding of the EDF and the MTR requirements; to discuss and fine-tune the evaluation methodology (including the formulation of the evaluation framework and intervention logic); and to discuss work phase planning and stakeholder mapping. The workshops were also used as part of the validation process to share and contrast findings, and involved extensive internal discussions which enabled the team to triangulate key findings and identify emerging conclusions and recommendations.

A **consultative approach** was followed. Throughout there has been regular liaison (facilitated by the EC Evaluation Manager) and periodic meetings with the ISG for this evaluation, as well as liaison and coordination with the wider EFI evaluation process (coordinated by the so-called Chapeau team, which will use all the EFI reports as inputs into an eventual Coherence Report. Prior to submission of the inception report, the desk report and this final draft report, the evaluation team presented key findings from each stage to the ISG in Brussels. This not only updated the ISG on

progress made throughout the evaluation phases, but also enabled immediate feedback, questions and guidance for future inquiry for the evaluation team.

Interviews were undertaken progressively throughout the evaluation phases, and were supplemented by a series of visits to case study countries and territories (Table A.4 below).

**Table A.4 Overview of country visits undertaken**

Region	Country	Dates	Team member	No. of interviews conducted
Africa	Zambia	14 to 18 November	Muriel Visser Javier Pereira	34
	Burkina Faso	14 to 18 November	Karolyn Thunnissen	45
	Ethiopia	28 November to 1 December	Karolyn Thunnissen	32
	Cameroon	9 to 16 November	Paolo Scalia	25
Pacific	Timor Leste	21 to 25 November	Ana Femenía	36
	New Caledonia	28 November to 2 December	Ana Femenía	26
Caribbean	Dominican Republic	5 to 9 December	Javier Pereira	29
	Aruba	21 to 25 November	Muriel Visser	10

### Evaluation design and key tools

**Intervention Logic and Evaluation Framework:** A mixed-methods, non-experimental design was chosen for this performance review. The complexity of the subject matter, the early stage of EDF11 implementation, and the short time-frame of the evaluation itself ruled out the adoption of an experimental design. From the outset a rigorous approach was ensured through the elucidation of the EDF's Intervention Logic (IL) and the evaluation sought to test the assumptions associated with the IL, which is reproduced in Annex 5.

A draft IL was shared with the ISG and the comments on it were used to refine the final version. The IL was used to develop an evaluation matrix which captured the links between the detailed EQs, judgement criteria and indicators.

The evaluation framework guided all phases of enquiry and was a key tool in mapping all the findings and triangulating the evidence. A completed evaluation framework, with summary answers to each of the EQs against Judgement Criteria (JCs) and indicators) with an assessment of the strength of the evidence is provided as Annex 6.

**Base-line and evaluation criteria:** The default baseline date for the evaluation is January 2014, the start date of EDF11. In line with the Better Regulations Guidelines (EC, 2015a) the nature of a performance review implies a particular focus on relevance, efficiency, EU added value, coherence and complementarity. Effectiveness, impact and sustainability are also covered in the TOR. Given the early stage at which this evaluation is taking place – where it was clearly too early to assess ex-post effectiveness, let alone impact of interventions financed under EDF11 – the focus of this evaluation is therefore on making a considered assessment of the likelihood of effectiveness, sustainability and impact over the remaining period, based on the assessment of the fitness for purpose of the instrument. For EQ2 (effectiveness) the evaluation therefore drew the base-line back to the start of EDF10. Likewise, under EQ3 (efficiency) improvements of EDF11 were measured against EDF10 performances (see . Table A.5 below

**Table A.5 Overview of Baselines for each of the Performance Review's Evaluation Questions**

EQ #	EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6
Base-line dates	EDF11 (2014)	EDF10 (2008)	EDF10 (2008)	EDF11 (2014)	EDF11 (2014)	EDF11 (2014)

**Data tools, collection and sampling:** The evaluation approach sought to **maximize the use of available secondary information**, drawing from a large body of documentation and data collected during the inception and desk phases, and to complement this by **primary data collection through interviews and country visits**, thereby minimizing the burden on the stakeholders.

Documents were systematically collected and filed in a Team Dropbox folder, which contains over two thousand documents and reports.

The strength of the evidence base was assessed at the inception phase and this guided the identification of additional indicators and sources. The evaluation also used before and after comparisons and, where possible, compared elements of EDF's working with benchmarks from other instruments or from earlier phases of the EDF itself. The design included an analysis of quantitative data for the full range of ACP countries and OCTs with structured analysis of the data bases of the EC and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)<sup>42</sup> (see Annex 13).

A deeper qualitative analysis was done for a sample of 25 countries for which recent evaluation evidence is available,<sup>43</sup> and included examining the findings of evaluations, an analysis of the External Action Monitoring Reports (EAMRs), a structured analysis of National Implementation Plans (NIPs), Regional Implementation Plans (RIPs), and other programme documents against regulations and for evidence of inclusion of specific priorities and principles, sector continuity, and alignment with country priorities. Gaps from the documentation and interviews at HQ level were used to identify priorities for the inquiry in the eight case study countries<sup>44</sup> which were selected according to specific criteria (Visser et al., 2016a).

The eight cases studies involved the preparation of country dossiers as internal documents summarizing the information from the desk phase against evaluation questions, and identifying gaps for follow up. Country visits involved an initial briefing as well as a debriefing for stakeholders. An overview of the type of analysis at each level is provided in Figure A.5 below). In addition to being a source of information on specific JCs, the country visits helped to validate the findings and fill data gaps for a more robust analysis.


Quantitative data analysis focused on responding to specific EQs. Documentation was analysed using a pre-designed rigorous mapping tool (Visser et al., 2016b), illustrated in Figure A.6 below. All interview notes were included in an interview compendium, coded, and analysed using a key word search. Qualitative data analysis focused on identifying patterns in the data. All qualitative data were triangulated using at least three sources.

<sup>42</sup> Including the EC's Accrual Based Accounting (ABAC) and Common RELEX Information System (CRIS), and the OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS) project database).

<sup>43</sup> Namely: Aruba, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo DRC, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, New Caledonia, Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Uganda, Zambia.

<sup>44</sup> Aruba, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, New Caledonia, Timor-Leste and Zambia.

**Figure A.5 Quantitative and qualitative data by type of source**



Source: authors

**Secondary analysis of documents and data:** A key evidence source for the performance review was the detailed identification, classification and analysis of secondary data sources.

*Quantitative:* the methodology design included an analysis of quantitative data for the full range of ACP countries and OCTs with structured analysis of the data bases of the EC and OECD (e.g. EC's Accrual Based Accounting (ABAC) and CRIS (Common RELEX Information System), and the OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS) project database).

*Qualitative:* An in-depth qualitative analysis was done for the sample of 25 countries for which recent evaluation evidence is available, and included examining the findings of evaluations, an analysis of the EAMRs, a structured analysis of NIPs, RIPs, and other programme documents against regulations and for evidence of inclusion of specific priorities and principles, sector continuity, and alignment with country priorities. Key documents were mapped against the evaluation framework, down to indicator level, using a pre-designed rigorous mapping tool template (illustrated in Figure A.6 below) which allowed for a uniform approach reading across a vast number of documents.

Figure A.6 Evaluation Mapping Tool

Document title: Location in dropbox: Authors Year: Publisher									
			Does the source provide evidence on the indicator? (yes or no)	Quality of the evidence (3-high, 2- med, 1-low)	Paragraph or page #	Relevant text, data	Please use this column if text is too long for the cell to the left	Other comments (e.g. quality, contradictions, ideas for further research, etc.)	
EQ1: To what extent did the overall objectives and principles of the 11th EDF respond to EU priorities and beneficiary needs in 2014? To what extent can they accommodate changed parameters since then?	JC.1.1 11th EDF design responded to EU priorities in 2014	I.1.1.1 Evidence that EDF objectives reflected the wider EU objectives for development cooperation							
		I.1.1.2 Evidence the EDF principles integrate the concerns of aid effectiveness principles as contained in the Agenda for Change							
		I.1.1.3 Evidence that EDF priority issues and sectors align to those of the EU's external policies							
	JC.1.2 11th EDF design responded to beneficiary needs in 2014	I.1.2.1 Evidence of consultations with PC (Government + CSO) and regional institutions during programming and their influence on 11th EDF programming							
		I.1.2.2 Evidence that the choice of sectors for EDF support is aligned to PC/OCT/regional priorities							
		I.1.2.3 Sector allocations translate EU and partner priorities							
		I.1.2.4 Evidence that the formula for territory, country, regional and intra-ACP allocations corresponds to needs and takes account of PC/regional absorption capacity							
	JC.1.3 The original objectives and priorities of the 11th EDF are still relevant in the emerging international context (priorities up to 2020)	I.1.3.1 11th EDF implementing rules can accommodate EU priorities after 2011 (such as: migration, security, ...)							
		I.1.3.2 Similarities between global challenges and priorities defined after 2012 (such as AAA, Sendai, SDGs...) with the 11th EDF objectives and priorities							
	JC.1.4 The 11th EDF has foreseen space for coping with unexpected needs	I.1.4.1 Flexibility mechanisms in place in CSP/MIP to reflect new PC (Government + CSO) needs if any							
		I.1.4.2 Rules for use of reserve allow rapid and flexible response to emerging needs							
		I.1.4.3 Alternative funding facilities exist and can be used by ACPs & OCTs for specific unforeseen needs							
EQ2: To what extent has EDF delivered results against objectives and specific EU priorities?	JC.2.1 Institutional structures and processes are in place for EDF 11 to deliver expected results	I.2.1.1 HR and organisational structures with clear management and organisation systems exist							
		I.2.1.2 Existence of clear guidelines on cross-cutting issues, aid modalities and management modes							
		I.2.1.3 Monitoring and reporting systems of development results linked to the MDGs/SDGs exist and are functional							
	JC.2.2 The 10th EDF contributed to the delivery of positive results at territory, country, regional and intra- ACP levels compared to its objectives and specific EU priorities	I.2.2.1 Evidence of positive results obtained in areas supported by EDF funded programmes							
		I.2.2.2 Synergies have been realised between the EU's territory, country, regional and intra-ACP programmes							
	JC.2.3 The 11th EDF takes account of impact and sustainability requirements	I.2.3.1 Evidence that the same sectors consistently receive EU support							
		I.2.3.2 Existence of EDF systems for monitoring and evaluation of results which take into account sustainability and impact							
		I.2.3.3 Government commitment to reforms I.2.3.4 Risk Management frameworks are kept up to date and used as management tools since 2014							



A key component of this was the meta-analysis of previous evaluations, both DEVCO EDF10 evaluations, and *fiches contradictoires*, as well as external evaluations mainly based on evaluations that were recently reviewed for the Evaluation of the Cotonou Agreement (Particip, 2016a).<sup>45</sup> All countries, regions and thematic evaluations conducted between 2011 and 2016 were reviewed. An overview of evaluations mapped is shown in Table A.6.

**Table A.6 Summary of evaluations mapped**

Year/type of evaluation	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Country level evaluation</b>	2 Mali, Malawi	6 Ethiopia, Zambia, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Jamaica	1 New Caledonia	8 Burundi, Cameroon, DRC, Togo, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Haiti	2 Lesotho, Timor Leste	2 Sierra Leone, Chad
<b>Regional evaluation</b>		2 Caribbean, OCTs	1 Intra-ACP		1 Pacific	
<b>Instrument evaluation</b>	(1 – 2008, ESA-IO)		1 Budget Support: Tanzania		2 Budget support: Burkina Faso, Uganda	
<b>Thematic evaluation</b>	2 Human rights, Peace building	4 Health, Agricultural commodities, Private sector, Decentralisation	2 Trade, Crime		4 Gender, Transport, Environment, R&I	

**Chapeau survey and CIR Review:** A responsibility of the Chapeau team was the formulation and dissemination of a single survey to EUDs. The EDF performance review team, along with the other EFI evaluation teams, was invited to submit specific questions relevant to our investigation. The EDF team also analysed the sections of the survey that were of relevance to the EDF and submitted a separate report on this, cf. Annex 11 and Annex 12.

As noted earlier, the EDF evaluation team also made a substantial contribution to a cross-EFI review of the CIR, incorporated in this report as Annex 9.

**Interviews:** The interviews were a critical source of evidence for the evaluation. Sampling techniques were applied to ensure a selective approach amongst each stakeholder group, given the many thousands of stakeholders directly involved with the EDF (see Table A.7 at the end of this annex for the detailed stakeholder analysis and consultation strategy). The team conducted over 170 semi-structured interviews with more than 300 informants, including over 120 interviews at country level with relevant EDF stakeholders, including DEVCO, EEAS, EUDs, ACP Secretariat, CONCORD, OCTA, regional organizations and RAOs, national governments, NAO/TAO, MS representatives, donors, private sector, CSOs and NGOs (see Annex 3, Table A.3). The Team Leader also attended the EDF committee meeting on the 20<sup>th</sup> September 2016 as an observer. All interview notes were systematically coded, recorded in a template and compiled into an interview compendium which allowed for analysis using a keyword search.

<sup>45</sup> The review covered 111 geographical (country and regional) and thematic and aid modality evaluations related to ACP countries.

**Country dossiers:** Prior to the country visits, the team produced eight country dossiers to map existing documents and summarise information at desk phase against the evaluation questions which was used to identify gaps to prioritise at country level. The dossiers also included a detailed stakeholder analysis and relevant country context including an overview of the support provided to the country under EDF10 and EDF11. The Desk Report included the country dossiers for Zambia and Ethiopia as examples, though it should be stressed that these were primarily for internal reference and were works in progress. A key section on information gathered from interviews could not be shared, in order to protect interviewee confidentiality.

**Country visits:** In order to assess the added value of the EDF as an instrument for development cooperation at country level, eight country visits were undertaken in ACP countries and OCTs. These visits were also used to address gaps identified in the documentation reviewed and in interviews. These visits were one week in duration and involved extensive interviews and meetings with a variety of stakeholders as well as a formal briefing and debriefing to the EUD (and in some cases to external stakeholders). Following the country visits, internal reports were produced of country level findings in response to the each EQ. Illustrative boxes have also been prepared to complement the main report findings with specific country level examples. Internal reports were prepared for the team on each of the country visits. These reports compiled the findings across the different sources of information (evidence from interviews, documentation, and data analysis) against the evaluation questions and sub-questions.

### Internal Workstreams

To inform our understanding and to ensure appropriate depth to key themes of the evaluation throughout the different phases, four **specific internal lines of inquiry – or Internal Workstreams (IW)** were developed. These workstreams were internal areas of work of the team, not formal deliverables of the evaluation. They ensured that one team member followed each of these issues throughout the inquiry and undertook the kind of in-depth analysis required for a full understanding of the themes. The four specific IWs were:

1. IW 1 – on the **governance, management and institutional structures and processes of the EDF**. This workstream was a key input into EQ2 and EQ3. As part of this study a comparison was undertaken with major funding instruments which are based on partnership principles to enhance the lesson learning dimension of the evaluation. The comparison with other instruments focused on **governance and involvement of stakeholders**.
2. IW 2 – on **complementarity and synergies of the EDF internally and externally (with other EFIs and policy/political processes)**. This study was a key input into the analysis around EQ5, and also provided information on EQ4 and EQ6. As part of this study, an analysis of complementarity within the Thematic Budget Line reports was undertaken and an analysis of the EDF project formulation process and the QSG process was conducted.
3. IW 3 – on the **regional and intra-ACP dimensions**. This area of investigation looked specifically at *decision-making and ownership, and also examined the relevance and appropriateness of the approaches and programmes funded at these levels*.
4. IW 4 – on the **OCTs**. The OCTs were considered as a separate line of work, to ensure that the specificities of the OCTs were taken into account. The OCT investigation reviewed *to what extent the EDF11 has taken into account the specific needs and characteristics of the OCTs and whether the regional and country/territory level interventions are complementary within the EDF and complementary to the other instruments*. A separate OCT mapping of findings against the EQs was conducted based on country visits, document analysis and interviews.

### Stakeholder Analysis

Table A.7 below summaries the stakeholder analysis and consultation strategy which, inter alia, guided the selection of interviewees (cf. Table A.3 in Annex 3 above).

**Table A.7 Stakeholder Analysis and Consultation Strategy**

Key Stakeholders	Stakes and role in EDF11	Consultation Strategy and timeline during evaluation	Link to EQs
<b>MACRO LEVEL</b>			
Member States	Allocation of financial resources Bilateral cooperation strategies and policies	Meetings and interviews with selected sample during desk phase. Main EDF contributors to be interviewed	1,2,4,5
EU Parliament	Democratic oversight of EDF management	Meetings with development cooperation committee; beginning desk and synthesis phases	All
Council of Ministers	Decision Making power	Meeting with representative; desk phase	All
EU Court of Auditors	Examines specific projects randomly each year and may refer specific cases to the European Anti-Fraud Office	Meeting with representative, desk phase	1,3
ACP Secretariat	Administrative management of the ACP Group, beneficiaries of EDF. It assists the Group's decision-making and advisory organs in carrying out their work	Meetings with representatives, desk phase and verification / synthesis phase	1,2,3,5
EDF Committee	Decision maker of EDF11 regulation on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund  multiannual indicative resource allocations of the EDF11  Opinion on Country and Regional Strategy Papers under the Cotonou Agreement, acting by qualified majority (with the weighting of votes linked to EU countries' contribution).	Possibly the evaluation team should join in one EDF committee session;  Interviews with members (during desk phase)	1,2,3,5
EU-ACP Joint Parliamentary Assembly	Advocating the empowerment of ACP national parliaments; 2) promoting democracy and human rights; 3) monitoring the implementation of the CPA	Meeting with representatives, during desk phase	1,2,3,5
Committee of Ambassadors	Assists in fulfilment of tasks. It is the second decision-making body of the ACP Group. It acts on behalf of the Council of Ministers between ministerial sessions.	Meeting with representatives, during desk phase	1,2,3,5
Overseas Countries and Territories Association	Promote cooperation within OCTs group through the promotion of common positions and partnerships	Meeting with representatives, during desk phase	1,2,3,5
<b>MESO LEVEL</b>			
EEAS	Coordination and strategy development Preparation of the Commission Decisions;  Country allocations,  Country and Regional Strategy Papers (CSPs/RSPs) and the National and Regional Indicative Programmes (NIPS/RIPs).	Map of key EEAS and DEVCO officials involved in EDF;  Interviews at all levels of the hierarchy;	All EQs
DG DEVCO	Responsible (with EEAS) for programming of external aid instruments.  In charge of implementing the EU's external	All evaluation phases (including inception)	



Key Stakeholders	Stakes and role in EDF11	Consultation Strategy and timeline during evaluation	Link to EQs
	aid instruments financed by the European Budget and the EDF. It implements cooperation policy through the EUDs.		
DG-DEVCO Thematic directorates	EU thematic policies  Responsible for the implementation of thematic programmes		
DG-DEVCO and EEAS Geographic directorates	Programming:  Provide indication of the allocation range for the NIP discussions and drafting  Ensure that the proposals developed by the EU Delegations are in line with the EU's overall external relations priorities, regional and thematic priorities and EU policy orientations  Ensure appropriate involvement of the other Commission services and the EIB		
EIB	Long-term private sector-led sustainable economic growth and reduce poverty through job creation and improved access to productive resources. The Bank also supports public sector	Interview with key officials, Desk phase	1,2,4,5 and 6
European Facility Commission	Monitors funds entrusted to the EIB	Interview with key officials, Desk phase	2 and 3
QSG	Quality Control	Possibly the evaluation team should join one QSG / EDF session  Interviews with members (these could be DEVCO and EEAS officials)  Desk phase	All questions
DG Region (for OCTs)	To support job creation, competitiveness, economic growth	Interview with selected officials (desk phase)	1,2,4,5
Other DGs (TRADE, NEAR, MARE, CLIMA, HOME, ECFIN, BUDG)	Relevant in the assessment of coherence, complementarity, coordination	Interview with selected officials (desk phase)	1,4,5
Regional organisations	To promote regional integration and cooperation at regional level	Skype interviews with selected key regional organisations  Interviews during validation work and visit to Regional HQs  Desk phase	1,2,4,5
RAOs	To ensure ownership of EU development cooperation at regional level  To represent the region concerned in all EC-supported programmes	Skype interviews with all 6 RAOs representatives.  2 Interviews during validation work and visit to Regional HQs	1,2,4,5

Key Stakeholders	Stakes and role in EDF11	Consultation Strategy and timeline during evaluation	Link to EQs
<b>LOCAL LEVEL</b>			
National Governments	Beneficiaries of 11 EDF Counterparts for political and policy dialogue	Interviews with selected officials in 6 Countries, validation phase	
EU Delegations	Diplomatic representation programming and implementing EDF Facilitate coordination among EU Member States and their development partners Policy dialogue	Skype interviews with representative sample (Head of Cooperation, head of sectors) Interviews to 6 Delegations during country visits Survey led by Chapeau Contract Desk phase and validation phase	All questions
NAOs and offices	National partner to ensure EDF ownership at national level Coordination, linkages with line Ministries, technical, financial and administrative follow up	Skype interviews with representative sample (Head of NAO office) Interviews to 6 NAOs during country visits The evaluation team will consider the possibility to organize a specific survey targeting NAOs in selected sample of ACPs Desk phase and validation phase	1,2,3,5
Member States (local level)	MSs are consulted in order to ensure complementarity, coherence and coordination between EDF and MS bilateral cooperation. In case of joint programming, EU MSs participate actively in programming of EDF.	Interviews during Country visits Skype interviews in representative sample of ACP countries Validation phase	1,2,4,5,6
Development Partners	Cooperation actors (Bilateral agencies, United Nations, Bretton Wood Institutions)	Interviews during Country visits validation phase	1,2,3,4,5,6,
Institutions	Implementing partners; Beneficiaries of institutional support actions	Interviews during Country visits Validation phase	2,3,5
Civil Society	Partners for 11 EDF Beneficiaries of actions for Civil Society Contributing to policy dialogue Sector oversight Human rights, environment, gender	Meetings in Brussels with INGOs Interviews during Country visits Focus group discussions Desk and validation phases	1,2,3,5
Private Sector	Stakeholders for sustainable economic growth Partner and beneficiaries of actions addressed to private sector	Meetings during Country visits	2,3
Project Management and TAs	Implementing EDF	Meetings during Country visits	1,2,3,5

Key Stakeholders	Stakes and role in EDF11	Consultation Strategy and timeline during evaluation	Link to EQs
Poor and vulnerable populations	End beneficiaries of EDF  Often weak, unstructured, isolated groups  Very limited power and access to the decision making process	The mission will try to meet during Country visits representatives of end beneficiaries	1
OCTs' end beneficiaries		Interviews of selected representatives during OCTs visits	1

## Limitations

Coordination with the other EFI studies was essential, not least to limit the transaction costs for key informants. This meant relying on a common survey, and limited the number of EDF-specific questions that could be included. Nevertheless the survey was a useful source of evidence, as reflected in Annex 11 and Annex 12.

Considerable evidence reported comes from existing evaluations. While this approach maximized the use of available evidence and allowed the performance review to cover substantial ground in a short time-frame, it contributed to an underrepresentation of fragile, conflict and post-conflict countries in the sample of the evaluation. In addition, a lot of the evidence pertaining to the period being evaluated (2014 and beyond) is based on internal documentation and internal (EC) sources. To the extent feasible, the evaluation team sought to triangulate these findings with external stakeholders. In this connection, the country studies took on a stronger role than was foreseen in the design. Feedback from ACP countries during the OPC was also used as an additional source of evidence.

A large number of documents were made available, including numerous internal EC documents and access to EU project data bases. The only significant documents not made available were those related to EDF Committee meetings. However, the team was given the opportunity to observe a meeting of the EDF Committee and used the documentation that was shared on the regulations and comitology, and interviews with MS and the Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), to understanding of the decision-making process.

The report focuses on the EDF and explores other EFIs when and where they overlap with the EDF (e.g. to explore questions on complementarity). This has some implications for the evaluation. Since other EFIs have not been explored in the same depth as the EDF, it is not always possible to ascertain whether some of the features highlighted in the report are exclusive to the EDF or not. This issue will come up again in the section on added value.

The evaluation faced two limitations with regard to the OCTs. Firstly, the limited documentary evidence available for the EDF11, in particular the lack of recent external reviews and evaluations, made it much more challenging than in the rest of the performance review exercise to draw from secondary sources. Secondly, while a substantial amount of field work resources were dedicated to the OCTs (two out of eight countries visited), the heterogeneity of the OCTs, combined with the limitations in data sources, makes it difficult to generalize from the two OCTs which were studied to the broader group. As a result, the strength of the evidence presented in Annex 8 is lower than for the mainstream EDF findings.


**The intervention logic of the EDF11 instrument**

1. The intervention logic (IL) of the EDF11 as at 2014 is discussed below, illustrated in Table A.8, which also provides all the references to the normative documents used in the elaboration of this IL. The presentation of the IL is focused on three aspects. Firstly, the IL identifies the logical steps (numbered in brackets), as interpreted by the consultants on the basis of normative texts, that lead from the EDF instrument to the EU's development cooperation objectives. Starting from the context of the EDF instrument in 2014 (1) and the type of engagement it facilitates (2), the steps lead from the three levels of EDF engagement at country and territory, regional and intra-ACP levels (3) to the inputs, processes and rules (4) mobilised to undertake activities (5) that shape the support funded by EDF (6). The IL then identifies the outcomes that are expected to be achieved in benefiting Partner Countries (PCs) through the contribution of bilateral, regional or intra-ACP EDF-funded assistance (7). Finally, these expected outcomes are expected to help achieving the overarching objective of 'reduction and eventually eradication of poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy'<sup>46</sup> (8).
2. Having identified these 8 steps, the IL secondly shows the explicit and implicit assumptions made, at the time of EDF finalisation in 2014, which underlie the progression dynamic from one step to the next.
3. Setting out these different logical steps and highlighting the hypotheses about how change is expected to happen and what assumptions are explicitly or implicitly underpinning these hypotheses helps to define the Evaluation Questions provided by the TOR: the assumptions suggest what sort of sub-questions need to be asked to understand whether the transmission mechanisms from one step to the next did – or did not – function and why.
4. Thirdly, the IL illustrates the feedback loops from one step to another, if any.

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<sup>46</sup> Cotonou Agreement, Title 1, Chapter 1, Article 1.

**Table A.8 Proposed reconstructed intervention logic of the EDF11**



## IL: from (1) the context to (2) the types of engagement

5. The EU's financial engagement with ACPs and OCTs stems from and is defined by the EU-ACP Partnership Agreement with the EDF as main financing instrument benefiting ACPs and managed by EUDs. Other European external financing instruments (EFIs), with thematic specificities and managed by the Commission's headquarter services (HQ), are expected to be implemented in coherence with the EDF funded projects and programmes at country, territorial, regional or intra-ACP levels.

6. Cooperation with PCs is also embodied in non-financial relationships such as EU-ACP trade agreements, political and policy discussions at national and regional levels, security cooperation, migration or foreign direct investment (FDI) from EU MSs. Important for EDF's feasibility, effectiveness and sustainability is the national and sector level policy dialogue, which is closely linked to the financial and technical support provided. Increasingly important since the Lisbon Treaty and the increasing focus on EU fundamental values in cooperation, is the political dialogue with ACPs and OCTs.

7. The co-existence of the different types of EU engagement and of the different EFIs benefiting the ACPs and OCTs implicitly relies on the following assumptions:

➤	<b>Assumptions</b>
1.1	The EDF is tailored specifically to the needs and constraints of the ACPs and OCTs and could not offer the type or range of funding offered by the other instruments and DCI (or conversely the other EFIs are offering funding that could not be accommodated under the EDF implementing rules).
1.2	Regrouping bilateral cooperation, regional cooperation, intra-ACP cooperation under the same instrument and regrouping cooperation with ACPs and OCTs under the same instrument makes sense from a commonality of objectives, purpose, priorities, challenges perspective or from an efficiency or effectiveness perspective.
1.3	Under this single EDF instrument, providing the allocation to the ACPs and that to the OCTs with separate implementing rules makes sense because the two groups have different characteristics and needs and their implementation procedures should thus be different.
1.4	Programmes funded by EDF and by other EFIs benefitting the ACPs and OCTs are complementary and their coherence is ensured.
1.5	The EDF is programmed and implemented in coherence with other forms of engagement and conversely (policy coherence for development is ensured (other forms of engagement are coherent with the fulfilment of EDF objectives).
➤	Information will inform EQ1, EQ4 and the Chapeau Contract (coherence report)

➤

## IL: from (2) the types of engagement to (3) EDF levels of engagement

8. The EDF finances projects and programmes at three levels: bilateral (country or territory), regional and intra-ACP. For the financial engagement to be allocated to the three levels of cooperation, and for this to be implemented in a coherent and complementary manner, the assumptions are:

	<b>Assumptions</b>
2.1	The MSs have reached an internal agreement on the functional allocation key for ACP countries, ACP regional and intra-ACP financial envelopes. In particular, the principle of differentiation as introduced by the Agenda for Change has been applied so that EU aid can be concentrated there where it is most needed and where it can deliver long-lasting change. EEAS, DG DEVCO and EUD have, where necessary, adjusted the country allocations to take account of absorption capacities and other relevant factors.
2.2	EDF11 financial resources have been available in a timely manner, i.e. at the closure of EDF10 in the 31 <sup>st</sup> of December 2014.
2.3	Challenges at the three levels (country, region and intra-ACP) are best served by interventions that

are funded by different financial envelopes within the EDF, are managed by different levels of the EU Commission organisation structure and are implemented by different teams within these structures.

- 2.4 There is perfect coherence and complementarity between the programming, planning and implementation of interventions at the three levels.

➤ Information will provide elements for EQ1 and EQ5



### **IL: from (3) EDF levels of engagement to (4) inputs and processes**

9. Inputs in the IL are considered as the factors provided by the EU, over which it has total control. The main inputs and processes that enable the EDF to be implemented can be seen as the financial and human resources, the policy and political dialogue with the PCs and the different aid modalities and management modes used to implement the EDF interventions. In addition, specific systems and procedures guide the overall EDF implementation.

10. All in all, the inputs, processes and rules used for the implementation of the EDF are complex, with different EU and PC structures involved, two possible modes of management and choices between three main aid modalities (and many more contractual modes not mentioned here) and different processes and rules for ACPs and OCTs. The assumptions for the three levels of engagement (country/territory, regional and intra-ACP) to be served adequately by these inputs and processes are seen as:

#### **Assumptions**

- 3.1 The OPTIMUS system has allocated human resources to the HQ & field offices that are appropriate in numbers and expertise to the requirements of programme implementation in each country and region.
- 3.2 DG DEVCO has produced clear guidelines with regards to the organisation of tasks between the different structures and has established clear supervision, support and control systems to assist in the EDF implementation.
- 3.3 The roles of DG DEVCO and EEAS in the political and policy dialogue are clear, capacities to carry out this dialogue exist and there is excellent cooperation between the two structures at HQ and field levels.
- 3.4 DG DEVCO has prepared clear guidelines on aid modalities (projects, BS, blending) and management modes (direct/indirect), have updated them regularly to take into account new issues of aid effectiveness and policy directions as may be developed in international forums and the EU Commission. It has ensured that staff have been trained in the aid modalities and management modes.
- 3.5 The differentiation of implementation rules between EDF and other EFI (CIR) and between ACPs and OCTs is justified and understood and applied by EU staff.

➤ Information will provide elements for EQ3

### **IL: from (4) inputs, processes and rules to (5) activities in the EU cycle of operations**

11. Activities are not necessarily part of an IL but have been defined here to illustrate the various aspects of the EU cycle of operations. This starts with programming at national/territorial, regional and inter-regional levels, then follows with implementation through the project/programme cycle and loops back into programming and possibly even into choices of EFIs and levels and types of engagement through the monitoring of results achieved by the cooperation portfolio (strategic country level or regional level evaluations). The project cycle itself includes the identification, formulation, implementation and monitoring and eventually evaluation of projects and programmes, whereby both the monitoring and the evaluation feed back again into the choice of interventions, their design and their modes of implementation.

12. To each activity in the EU cycle of operations corresponds a set of policy guidelines and administrative procedures underpinned by systems that ensure that these, as well as the key principles for aid effectiveness (see below), are respected.

13. In order for this cycle of operations to take place in an efficient and effective manner, the following assumptions are made:

#### Assumptions

- 4.1 EU organisational structures are in place and functional and there is good cooperation between DG DEVCO and EEAS and their staff in country.
- 4.2 Administrative systems and procedures exist, are understood by relevant staff and allow smooth management of the different steps of the cycle without causing undue burdens on staff.
- 4.3 Programming guidelines for bilateral and regional cooperation are available within an adequate timeframe (EDF11 programming was planned to take place in 2012).
- 4.4 PCs are involved in all cycles of the process and they share the set of EU values and EU cooperation objectives.

➤ Information will provide elements for EQ2

#### IL: from (5) activities in the EU cycle of operations to (6) the provision of support

14. The direct outputs of the inputs provided by the EU – via the activities described above – are the areas/sectors that the EU chooses to support with EDF funding. These areas/sectors are defined by the programming guidelines of the EDF11 of May 2012 for support to ACP countries, and separate guidelines for the OCT, by the Overseas Association Decision (AOD, Part 2, Chapters 1 to 7) for the OCTs and by the EDF11 Regional Programming Orientations of December 2013 for regional programming. No specific guidance other than the Cotonou Agreement is available for intra-ACP cooperation. The areas/sectors of cooperation are as follows:

- a. **Support to ACP states** should be concentrated on a limited number of sectors (2-3) in each country, to be chosen amongst the two following broad areas and fields:
  - HR, democracy & good governance, including the following fields: HR, democracy & the rule of law; gender; public sector management; tax policy & administration; fight against corruption; civil society and local authorities; sustainable and transparent management of natural resources; and, development-security nexus.
  - Inclusive and sustainable growth: business environment, productive capacities and investments; regional integration & international trade; education; health; employment & social protection; sustainable agriculture, fisheries & food security; and, sustainable energy.
- b. **Support to OCTs** should be focused on only one sector amongst the following: environmental issues, climate change and disaster risk reduction; accessibility, research and innovation; youth, education, health, employment and social policy; culture; fight against organised crime; and, tourism.
- c. **Axes of regional cooperation** should include programmes in any of the following areas: peace and stability, conflict prevention and resolution; economic cooperation and integration; and cooperation, coordination and harmonisation of regional sustainable development cooperation policies.
- d. **Intra-ACP's** strategy for 2014-2020 prioritised cooperation in basic needs, human and social development, contributing to a secure and sustainable environment; promoting the development of the private sector as an engine of growth; the African Peace Facility; and institutional support and capacity building.

15. In addition, key principles for aid effectiveness are applicable across all stages of the EU cycle of operations:

- a) synchronisation and flexibility in programming, coordination and joint programming, partnership and ownership for bilateral cooperation;



- b) partnership, ownership, alignment on territorial systems, complementarity and subsidiarity for cooperation with OCTs;
- c) comprehensiveness and coherence, simplification, differentiation, concentration and greater impact of EU assistance for bilateral and regional cooperation; and
- d) subsidiarity and complementarity with national, regional, Pan-African and thematic activities for intra-ACP cooperation.

16. The main assumptions made to lead from the activities linked to the EU cycle of operations' activities to a set of programming priorities within the CSP/MIP and Indicative programmes that correspond to the above set of principles include:

#### **Assumptions**

- 5.1 Appropriate EU capacities (HQ & field) are in place for programming, allowing the adequate application of guiding principles and the adequate application of the new templates, including in particular the inclusion of a Logical Framework and a results framework for EU operations.
- 5.2 Appropriate EU capacities (EUD) are in place to manage the programme's implementation and monitoring, including in particular for policy dialogue.
- 5.3 The new guiding principles of the Communication on the Agenda for Change (2011) and the various new policies and proposals on other key issues in development cooperation (such as the Communication on EU Human Rights and Democracy Policy, EU Gender Action Plan, EU policy framework to assist developing countries in addressing Food Security challenges, on Budget Support) are reflected in programming and design of external actions.
- 5.4 Programming proposals are in line with EU's overall external relations priorities, regional and thematic priorities and policy orientations.
- 5.5 The timetable of the EU EDF11 cycle is respected: programming 2012, identification and formulation of projects and programmes 2013, implementation 2014.

➤ Information will provide elements for EQ2 and EQ4

#### **IL: from (6) the provision of support to (7) EU's contribution to expected outcomes**

17. Expected outcomes include the expected improvements in public policy and public sector institutions that result in a better offer of public service delivery and in a greater use of those services by the population. Based on the main priority sectors of cooperation and taking into account the intervention logics provided in the TOR and in the DG DEVCO 2015 Management Plan, the following expected outcomes have been identified as results of public policy implementation where the EU external action is expected to make a contribution based on its areas of involvement:

- a) increased access and use of basic public services (mainly in health and education but could also include others such as water and sanitation);
- b) improved social protection;
- c) better food security;
- d) strengthened capacities of Local Authorities and CSOs to participate in the implementation and monitoring of public policies;
- e) enhanced government capacities to design, implement and monitor public policies and thus improve the quality of public policies (including in particular the mainstreaming of climate change, gender and environment in public policies).

18. For the support provided by the EU to have an effect on public policies and their implementation, there are a number of factors at play, many of which are within the grasp of the EU, but there are also others that are totally or mainly outside the EU's area of possible influence and that can thus be termed as external factors. There are thus two sets of assumptions at play: the ones directly linked to the EU's area of influence and those linked to external factors:

### Assumptions

- 6.1 The choice of sectors for EU support is aligned to PC priorities and the PC embraces reforms and implements policies and measures agreed in the MIP within the agreed public financial framework (medium-term expenditure framework).
- 6.2 Adequate PC absorption capacity: in line with the initial country allocations that need to take account of overall absorption capacities, the sector choices also need to be based on an assessment of sector needs and capacities.
- 6.3 Good PC–EU policy dialogue: a dynamic and continuous policy dialogue at sector and national levels is essential to monitor developments, take corrective action when/where needed and guide flexible responses to new developments.
- 6.4 EU management and organisation systems need to be in place for the timely implementation and monitoring of EU actions: the processes for feeding into the EU results based framework need to be in place and functioning, including country statistics.
- 6.5 Good coordination with the PCs and with other DPs, in particular MSs, need to be promoted in order to ensure coherence of actions and leverage for supplementary funding and/or policy support.
- 6.6 Satisfactory conditions for use of modalities need to be maintained, notably with regards to the use of budget support.
- 6.7 Flexibility of EU intervention framework to adjust to identified changes in the external environment (such as political changes in the country that affect policy orientations, natural disasters, regional crises, etc.)

➤ Information will provide elements for EQ2 and EQ6

### IL: from (7) expected outcomes to (8) expected impacts

19. The further the IL moves towards the expected global impacts, the less room the EU has for control of influential factors. Similarly, the PC government faces the challenge of external factors influencing to a variable extent the desired outcome of the implementation of its public policies. Provided economic, political and social stability is maintained, EDF is expected to contribute to poverty reduction, sustained and inclusive economic growth and the integration of ACP countries into the world economy.

20. In addition, Article 1 of the implementing regulations of the EDF11 states that the cooperation under this regulation will also contribute to:

- a) Sustainable and inclusive economic, social and environmental development
- b) Consolidation and support of democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and the relevant principles of international law
- c) Implementation of a rights-based approach encompassing all human rights.

21. As noted above, no assumptions with regards to the EU external action can be made at this stage as external factors have the greatest influencing role at this level. At this level, assumptions include:

### Assumptions

- 7.1 There is continued PC commitment to its development policies.
- 7.2 Public policy implementation yields the expected results and no external disturbances have come into play to affect the use by the citizens of the public services delivered.
- 7.3 Synergies have been realised between the EU's country, regional and intra-ACP programmes.
- 7.4 There have been no drastic changes to the external environment.
- 7.5 Political, social and regional stability prevail.

## **Conclusion on the IL**

22. The various logical steps and underlying assumptions of the EDF instrument's operationalization have been presented with the intention of focusing on particular aspects that could be investigated in this performance review to assess the instrument's relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, added value, coherence, consistency complementarity and synergies internally and vis-à-vis other EFIs, and lastly leverage. As indicated in Chapter 1 of the main report, the impact and sustainability (and to a large extent the effectiveness) of the instrument's implementation cannot yet be assessed as very few programmes funded under the EDF11 have been decided on and started implementation. Instead, an indirect approach will be used which is detailed further in the next chapter. The evaluation framework will thus be built on the premise of those assumptions identified in the IL that are most relevant to the issues highlighted in the TOR.

## Annex 6

### Evaluation matrix

EQs and judgment criteria in the evaluation matrix presented here are drawn directly from the intervention logic in the preceding annex. Successive columns: (a) show the judgment criteria for responding to each main evaluation question; (b) summarise the evaluation's findings at indicator level; (c) show the main sources of evidence for each indicator; and (d) assess the strength of the evidence, according to the following criteria.

Strength of Evidence	Explanation of ranking of quality of evidence
<b>Strong</b>	The finding is consistently supported by a range of evidence sources, including documentary sources, quantitative analysis and qualitative evidence (i.e. there is very good triangulation); or the evidence sources, while not comprehensive, are of high quality and reliable to draw a conclusion (e.g. strong quantitative evidence with adequate sample sizes and no major data quality or reliability issues; or a wide range of reliable qualitative sources, across which there is good triangulation).
<b>More than satisfactory</b>	There are at least two different sources of evidence with good triangulation, but the coverage of the evidence is not complete.
<b>Indicative but not conclusive</b>	There is only one evidence source of good quality, and no triangulation with their sources of evidence.
<b>Weak</b>	There is no triangulation and / or evidence is limited to a single source.

#### EQ1. To what extent did the overall objectives and principles of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF respond to EU priorities and beneficiary needs in 2014? To what extent can they accommodate changed parameters since then?

Judgment criteria	Indicator	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
JC.1.1 11th EDF design responded to EU priorities in 2014	I.1.1.1 Evidence that EDF objectives reflected the wider EU objectives for development cooperation  The EDF11 programming respected the priority objectives as expressed in the leading reference framework for EU development cooperation in 2012-2013.	Consensus (Council of Europe, 2005) Agenda for Change (EC, 2011a) Programming guidelines (EC, 2012c; EC, 2013a; EC, 2013b) NIPs, RIPS, MIPs EU aid allocation tables (EC, 2016l) Annex 2; Annex 10; Annex 14 Interviews 21, 788, 270, 47, 439, 15, 28, 18, 43.	Strong
	I.1.1.2 Evidence the EDF principles integrate the concerns of aid effectiveness principles as contained in the Agenda for Change	Agenda for change (EC, 2011a) EDF11 programming guidelines (EC, 2012c; EC, 2013a; EC, 2013b) NIPs, RIPS, MIPs OECD data on aid fragmentation	Strong

Judgment criteria	Indicator	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	The EDF11 programming respected the key aid effectiveness principles as expressed in the leading reference framework for EU development cooperation in 2012-2013 and as repeated in the EDF11 programming guidelines. However, this only contributed marginally to a reduction of aid fragmentation.	EU dashboard data Survey Part I, section 2 (Annex 13) Interviews 439, 455, 372, 300, 46, 483, 274, 74, 272, 394, 69, 203, 223, 375, 172, 162, 843, 614, 142, 177, 71, 85, 131, 114, 192, 422, 445, 303	
JC.1.2 11th EDF design responded to beneficiary needs in 2014	I.1.2.1 Evidence of consultations with PC (Government + CSO) during programming and their influence on 11 <sup>th</sup> EDF programming  Extensive consultations took place for EDF11 programming but PCs (Government and CSOs) were most often not involved in decision-making (HQ imposed a top-down approach to programming).	EDF10 Country strategy evaluations EDF11 NIPs, RIPs Annex 10; Annex 15; Annex 14 ECDPM, 2016; Interviews 372, 300, 46, 483, 274, 74, 272, 394, 69, 203, 223, 375, 172, 162, 843, 614, 142, 177, 71, 85, 131, 114, 192, 422, 445, 478, 486, 474, 876, 16, 45, 498, 220, 494, 439.	Strong
	I.1.2.2 Evidence that the choice of sectors for EDF support is aligned to PC/OCT/regional priorities  Choices of sectors for EDF11 were mostly aligned to country priorities since these are very wide, but several voices were raised about the EU's withdrawal from road infrastructure and the fact that budget support was imposed as a modality.	Number of CSP/MIPs EDF11 Interviews 498, 422, 63, 87, 101, 267, 303, 201, 372, 17, 401, 300, 186, 401, 495, 369, 74, 57, 148, 402, 444, 322, 107, 82, 500, 437, 230, 51, 120, 310, 375, 69, 440, 87, 54, 172, 121, 147, 163, 192, 354, 443, 451, 464, 462, 162, 673, 843, 613, 122, 142, 177, 71, 85, 131, 114, 192, 422, 445, 27	Strong
	I.1.2.3 Sector allocations translate EU and partner priorities	MIPs/CSPs/RIPs/NIPs Interviews in HQ, EUD, in country	Weak – no clear answers from NAOs on this issue.
	I.1.2.4 Evidence that the formula for territory, country, regional and intra-ACP allocations corresponds to needs and	Comparison formula and actual allocations Modifications of actual allocations	Strong

Judgment criteria	Indicator	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	<p>takes account of PC/regional absorption capacity</p> <p>The formula favours countries most in need even though the focus on poorest countries is less visible on a per capita basis.</p>	<p>after formula</p> <p>EC, 2013c; Herrero et al. 2015.</p> <p>Annex 12; Survey, 2016</p> <p>Interviews: 300, 1, 37, 48, 49, 5, 34.</p>	
JC.1.3 The original objectives and priorities of the 11th EDF are still relevant in the emerging international context (priorities up to 2020)	<p>I.1.3.1 11<sup>th</sup> EDF implementing rules can accommodate EU priorities after 2011 (such as migration, security, ...)</p> <p>Integration of these new priorities was possible to the extent that they fit within existing sector choices.</p>	<p>EDF11</p> <p>Annex 2; Annex 7; Annex 14</p> <p>Interviews 346, 118, 372, 74, 51, 69, 63, 223, 87, 381, 486, 354, 462, 162, 673, 613, 142, 177, 71, 85, 131, 114, 422, 445, 192</p>	More than satisfactory
	<p>I.1.3.2 Similarities between global challenges and priorities defined after 2012 (such as AAA, Sendai, SDGs...) with the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF objectives and priorities</p> <p>Many global challenges, which appeared after 2012, were already foreshadowed in the Agenda for Change of 2011 and integrated in the EDF11 principles and objectives.</p>	<p>EC, 2016a; EC, 2016j; EC, 2016l</p> <p>Annex 14</p>	Strong
JC.1.4 The 11th EDF has foreseen space for coping with unexpected needs	<p>I.1.4.1 Flexibility mechanisms in place in CSP/MIP to reflect new PC (Government + CSO) needs if any</p> <p>EDF11 introduced flexibility of programming and review cycle (not taken advantage of) and general reserve: EDF11 slightly more flexible than EDF10 because of non-definition of actions in programming document.</p>	<p>EDF11 Programming guidelines</p> <p>Survey, 2016</p> <p>Interviews 17, 372, 495, 346, 74, 51, 444, 167, 69, 61, 203, 440, 375, 193, 245, 162, 85, 142, 422, 236, 445, 400, 241</p>	
	<p>I.1.4.2 Rules for use of reserve allow rapid and flexible response to emerging</p>	<p>Annex 14</p> <p>Annex 11</p>	Strong

Judgment criteria	Indicator	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	needs The shock absorbing mechanisms had not yet been set up and rules for accessing the reserves for emergency needs were not clear.	Survey, 2016 Interviews 17, 372, 495, 346, 74, 51, 444, 167, 69, 61, 203, 440, 375, 193, 245, 162, 85, 142, 422, 236, 445, 400, 241	
	I.1.4.3 Alternative funding facilities exist and can be used by ACPs and OCTs for specific unforeseen needs  EDF-funded Trust Fund has been established for migration but is less transparent and potentially less effective and coherent than EDF funded projects; other EFIs fill gaps when possible on specific issues.	EC, 2016k; EC, 2016m; JOIN(2015)40: 2014 Annual CFSP report; EU Factsheet November 2015 (EC, 2015z); EC, 2014b; Financial regulations of the EU, Art, 187; EU TF Strategic Orientation Document, 16 February 2016 Annex 16 Interviews 34, 369, 40, 372, 50, 270, 657, 118, 57, 222, 300, 689, 74, 274, 57, 167, 495, 346, 321, 17, 346, 98, 46.	Strong

#### **EQ2. To what extent has EDF delivered results against objectives and specific EU priorities?**

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
JC.2.1 Institutional structures and processes are in place for EDF11 to deliver expected results	I.2.1.1 HR and organisational structures with clear management and organisation systems exist  HR situation is still perfectible but has improved: concerns mainly about finance and contract and regional programmes. Role of the NAO and intra-ACP Unit dismantling present big challenges.	Annex 17; Annex 7 DEVCO EEAS Organisation chart EDF country strategy evaluations EAMRs 2015 Optimus; EC, 2014t; EC, 2014d; EC, 2014b; DFID, 2016; MFA Netherlands, 2013; EC, 2016d Interviews 372, 75, 300, 470, 74, 204, 148, 107, 51, 82, 756, 72, 341, 71, 85, 131, 192, 422, 445, 27, 39, 400, 69, 61, 203, 440, 375, 101, 223, 394, 64, 54, 109, 121, 147, 152, 163, 172, 181, 193, 257, 368,	Strong

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
		443	
	<p>I.2.1.2 Existence of clear guidelines on cross-cutting issues, aid modalities and management modes</p> <p>Guidelines are mostly used by non-EC staff; internally, mechanisms are in place to ensure adequate coverage of cross-cutting issues in programming and design of operations.</p>	<p>Annex 17 Guidelines Council of Europe, 2013a; Council of Europe, 2015b; MFA Netherlands, 2013; DFID, 2011; Petrucci et al., 2011 EDF country strategy evaluations Interviews 372, 75, 300, 470, 74, 204, 148, 107, 51, 82, 756, 72, 341, 71, 85, 131, 192, 422, 445, 27, 39, 400, 69, 61, 203, 440, 375, 101, 223, 394, 64, 54, 109, 121, 147, 152, 163, 172, 181, 193, 257, 368, 443</p>	Strong
	<p>I.2.1.3 Monitoring and reporting systems of development results linked to the MDGs/SDGs exist and are functional</p> <p>Monitoring and reporting systems are found very weak at country, regional, project, and HQ levels despite recent efforts for improvement. There is a lack of results-orientation, consideration of theory of change and focus on outcomes and impacts.</p>	<p>Annex 17 EC, 2015x Use of SDG markers EDF country strategy evaluations Court of Auditors Reports Interviews 372, 75, 300, 470, 74, 204, 148, 107, 51, 82, 756, 72, 341, 71, 85, 131, 192, 422, 445, 27, 39, 400, 69, 61, 203, 440, 375, 101, 223, 394, 64, 54, 109, 121, 147, 152, 163, 172, 181, 193, 257, 368, 443</p>	Strong
JC.2.2 The 10th EDF contributed to the delivery of positive results at territory, country, regional and intra-ACP levels compared to its objectives and specific	<p>I.2.2.1 Evidence of positive results obtained in areas supported by EDF funded programmes</p> <p>Overall positive results of EDF10 implementation although variable from sector to sector, country to country. In general no</p>	<p>Annex 17, Annex 7 EDF country, regional, thematic and instrument strategic evaluations Court of Auditors Reports DFID, 2013; MFA Netherlands, 2013; EY, 2014; Fiscus, 2014.</p>	Strong



Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
EU priorities	attempt made to monitor outcomes or to link results to impacts, and thus limited information on achievement of contribution to poverty eradication.	EDF10 performance review, country Interviews 372, 428, 401, 186, 170, 154, 274, 82, 444, 322, 115, 107, 500, 51, 310, 896, 613, 843, 307, 34, 851, 445, 422, 192, 27, 69, 61, 63, 223, 440, 375, 35, 64, 54, 109, 147, 163, 172, 193, 443	
	I.2.2.2 Synergies have been realised between the EU's territory, country, regional and intra-ACP programmes  The evidence is reported under EQ5.		
JC.2.3 The 11th EDF takes account of impact and sustainability requirements	I.2.3.1 Existence of EDF systems for monitoring and evaluation of results which take into account sustainability and impact  The existing M&E systems are found very weak at country, regional, project, and HQ levels.	Annex 17, Annex 7 EDF country, regional, thematic and instrument strategic evaluations Court of Auditors Reports Results based management framework ECA, 2012a; ECA, 2012b. Interviews 372, 218, 167, 57, 74, 310, 162, 711, 896, 341, 142, 177, 71, 114, 445, 422, 400, 69, 440, 223, 54, 109, 121, 443, 451, 464	Strong
	I.2.3.2 Government commitment to reforms  Government commitment to reform is monitored but not translated into binding actions for EU EDF disbursements.	EDF country strategy evaluations Court of Auditors Reports Annex 17 Budget support eligibility criterion on policy commitment EAMRs Interviews 372, 218, 167, 57, 74, 310, 162, 711, 896, 341, 142, 177, 71, 114, 445, 422, 400, 69, 440,	Strong

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
		223, 54, 109, 121, 443, 451, 464	
	<p>I.2.3.3 Risk Management frameworks are kept up to date and used as management tools since 2014</p> <p>The RMFs are used to report to HQ but are not used as management tools.</p>	<p>Annex 17</p> <p>EDF country strategy evaluations</p> <p>Interviews 372, 218, 167, 57, 74, 310, 162, 711, 896, 341, 142, 177, 71, 114, 445, 422, 400, 69, 440, 223, 54, 109, 121, 443, 451, 464</p>	More than satisfactory

### EQ3. To what extent is the EDF delivering efficiently?

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
JC.3.1 The EDF has been implemented in a timely manner	<p>I.3.1.1 Timely availability of guidelines for programming, identification, formulation</p> <p>Guidelines for country programming were made available in a timely manner, while guidelines for regional programming were issued late. Nonetheless, the programming exercise started based on draft guidelines.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 7, Annex 11, Annex 18, Part A</li> <li>• EC, 2013b; EU, 2013; EU, 2015</li> <li>• MNs 327, 380, 38, 327 and 381</li> </ul>	Strong
	<p>I.3.1.2 Evidence of efficiency of the programming (project cycle): time between preparation and approval</p> <p>Programming took a long time to complete. Delays were due to HQ's involvement in the choice of sector and, at a later stage, to the EU elections. Negative impacts were avoided through the Bridging Facility</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 7, Annex 11, Annex 18, Part A</li> <li>• EC, 2013b; EU, 2013; EU, 2015</li> <li>• MNs 327, 380, 38, 327 and 381</li> </ul>	Strong
	<p>I.3.1.3 Efficiency of the identification and formulation (project cycle): time between identification and approval</p> <p>Identification and formulation is a long</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 18, Part B</li> <li>• EC, 2015f</li> </ul>	More than satisfactory

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	process, but the current structure is logical and helps to increase project quality.		
	<p>I.3.1.4 Efficiency of the budget/financial execution (decisions approved, commitments, disbursements, payments/planned)</p> <p>EDF11 execution has improved compared to EDF10. IT systems and internal procedures are often an obstacle, while the approach used to monitor budget execution focuses too much on financial aspects and sometimes fails to incentivise optimal behaviour from a developmental point of view.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 18, Part A</li> <li>• EC, 2016e</li> <li>• MNs 204 and 381</li> </ul>	More than satisfactory
JC.3.2 Implementation was facilitated by new EDF procedures	<p>I.3.2.1 The EDF implementation and decision-making procedures of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF have been aligned to the new EDF implementation regulations</p> <p>Minor changes were required and adjustments were made.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 10</li> <li>• OECD, 2012; MFA Netherlands, 2013; EC, 2016f; EC, 2015s</li> </ul>	More than satisfactory
	<p>I.3.2.2 The EDF implementation and decision-making procedures of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF have simplified and streamlined the process</p> <p>Efficiency gains have been achieved in certain areas, but there is not a clear perception of progress by stakeholders (difficult to evaluate the results until the process is over). Certain procedures could have negative consequences that do not seem to have been considered.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 15, Annex 17, Annex 13</li> <li>• OECD, 2012; MFA Netherlands, 2013; EC, 2016f; EC, 2015s; EC, 2015t; EC, no date (a); EC, 2016b; ADE, 2014b; ECO Consult, 2011c; ADE, 2014c</li> <li>• MNs 204, 381, 204, 274, 444, 148, 322, 401, 462, 468, 494, 239, 38, 477 209, 121, 172, 257, 6, 16, 29, 42, 203, 218</li> </ul>	Strong

EQ4. To what extent do the EDF programmes add value at country, regional and intra-regional levels?			
Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
JC.4.1 The EDF supports sectors and priorities at country, territorial, regional and intra-regional level not supported by other EU instruments, MSs and other donors	<p>I.4.1.1 Evidence of absence of overlap or duplication at sector and thematic level (country, territorial, regional and intra-ACP) between EU EFIs</p> <p>There is relatively little overlap between the EDF and other EFIs and the overlap decreased between 2010 and 2015. On the whole EFIs fund different priorities or support specific actions that the EDF cannot easily support. The exception is in the agriculture and governance sectors where two DCI thematic lines (GPGC and Panaf) are present</p>	Analysis of EU Dashboard data (Annex 13) Intra-ACP and regional analysis (Annex 7) with evidence of overlap with GPGC.	Strong
	<p>I.4.1.2 Evidence of absence of overlap or duplication at sector and thematic level (country, territorial, regional and intra-ACP) between EU and MSs</p> <p>There is a trend towards division of labour with other donors but in a large number of cases other MSs are also present in the same sectors that are supported by the EDF. The data make it difficult to conclude that the EDF adds value because it works in different sectors, although at times it supports orphan priorities (examples provided).</p>	Analysis of MSs and donor presence in six case study countries (Annex 19, Part E)	Strong
	<p>I.4.1.3 Evidence of absence of overlap or duplication at sector and thematic level (country, territorial, regional and intra-ACP) between EDF and other DPs</p>	Analysis of MSs and donor presence in six case study countries (Annex 19, Part E)	Strong

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	<p>EDF has a unique role vis-à-vis countries where it is the only donor, and at the regional and intra-ACP levels</p> <p>There is a trend towards division of labour with other donors but in a large number of cases other DPs are also present in the same sectors that are supported by the EDF. The data make it difficult to conclude that the EDF adds value because it works in different sectors, although at times it supports orphan priorities (examples provided).</p>		
JC.4.2 EDF offers a mix of particular expertise and implementation and financing modalities level that other EU instruments, MSs and other donors do not	<p>I.4.2.1 Evidence from MSs and other DPs that the EDF presents characteristics that have an added value (EU expertise, financing modalities, innovative cooperation modalities, implementing modalities, etc.)</p> <p>The EDF contributes through high volumes and predictable grant funding which makes a significant difference in sectors that require a critical mass and high investments. Its role in BS is particularly appreciated by MSs. It has a specific added value in promoting regional integration. The role of other donors and MSs is in complementing what the EDF does, for example through support to non-state actors, particular expertise, etc.</p>	<p>Evaluation evidence as reflected in Annex 19, Part A (OECD, 2012; MFA Netherlands, 2013; EY, 2014; ODI, 2012, EC, 2012b, Herrero et al. 2015, EC, 2016g, etc.).</p> <p>Responses to the CIR survey (Annex 19, Part B), Interviews (Annex 19, Part C), Intra-ACP and regional analysis (Annex 7)</p>	Strong
	<p>I.4.2.2 Evidence from partner Countries that the EDF presents characteristics that have an added value (EU expertise, financing modalities, innovative cooperation modalities, implementing</p>	<p>Evaluation evidence as reflected in Annex 19, Part A (OECD, 2012; MFA Netherlands, 2013; EY, 2014; ODI, 2012, EC, 2012b, Herrero et al. 2015; EC, 2016b, etc.)</p>	Strong

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	<p>modalities, etc.)</p> <p>For PCs the role of grant funding is gaining a new importance. The existence of the Reserve is also a perceived added value, although access can be challenging.</p> <p>The intra-ACP and regional dimensions have strong potential specific areas of added value through the APF, south-south mechanisms, and re-centring cultural values.</p>	Interviews (Annex 19, Part C). Country study Zambia, Ethiopia	
JC.4.3 EDF promotes and implements EU values and principles in its programming, design of programmes and projects	<p>I.4.3.1 Evidence that EU values and principles are reflected in programming documents and financing agreements, in particular the ownership and partnership principles of the Cotonou Agreement</p> <p>EDF11 took account of partnership and ownership principles in its programming.</p>	Analysis of NIPs (Annex 19, Part D)	More than satisfactory
	<p>I.4.3.2 Evidence that stakeholder consultations have been undertaken and have been taken account of at intervention design stages</p> <p>Stakeholder consultations were undertaken at the intervention design stages. However, insufficient account was taken of the contributions by stakeholders at the design stage and the process was tightly controlled by HQ</p>	Analysis of NIPs (Annex 19, Part D) Annex 15 on CSOs MN 88, 192, 395	<i>Strong</i>
	<p>I.4.3.3 Evidence that EU fundamental values (Human Rights, democracy, justice) were promoted in political and policy</p>	Analysis of NIPs (Annex 19, Part D) Annex 15 on CSOs Annex 9	Strong

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	<p>discussions and in cooperation support</p> <p>EDF11 has included attention to fundamental values in programming. EDF has a strong role in promoting these (with increased number of projects including commitments as a 'significant objective'), although success is context-specific and may be watered down by geopolitical and economic interests.</p>	Selected country study findings: Zambia, Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia.	
	<p>I.4.3.4 Evidence that regional integration is promoted as a priority by the EDF</p> <p>The capacity of MSs and other DPs to address regional integration and supra-national/global issues is limited and there is therefore little duplication with what the MSs and DPs do at these levels. Likewise, other EFIs do not have the capacity and the scope to address interventions at such a level. Under the EDF11, funding for regional integration has increased. It is too early to say whether this is making a difference under the EDF11.</p>	<p>Annex 7</p> <p>Annex 19, Part F</p>	More than satisfactory
JC.4.4 EDF enables the EU to have a weight in advocacy that is higher than MSs and other DP	<p>I.4.4.1 Advocacy is a specific priority of the EDF</p> <p>EDF programming included specific plans/provision for supporting advocacy.</p>	NIP analysis (Annex 19, Part D) Country studies, analysis of thematic budget line reports (Annex 20, Part E), EAMR analysis	
	<p>I.4.4.2 The EDF has more outreach (a broader range of stakeholders) than MSs or other DPs</p> <p>The evidence does not support a finding that</p>	Annex 9	Strong

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	the EDF has more outreach than other MSs and DPs		
	<p>I.4.4.3 The EDF actively supports advocacy organisations</p> <p>EDF usually consults with CSOs, but modalities are not conducive to ensuring many divergent voices are heard, and there is insufficient room for smaller/local organizations.</p>	Annex 9	Strong
	<p>I.4.4.4 Evidence that the EDF has facilitated more interaction with stakeholders than other MSs and DPs</p> <p>The evidence does not support a finding that the EDF has more outreach than other MSs and DPs</p>	Annex 9	Strong

**EQ5. To what extent does the EDF facilitate coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies both internally between its own set of objectives and programmes and vis-à-vis other EFIs?**

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
JC.5.1 The 11th EDF is equipped to ensure coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies between its own set of objectives and programmes	<p>I.5.1.1 Evidence that gaps identified in 10th EDF performance review and other source documents have been addressed in 11th EDF at country, territory, regional and intra-ACP levels</p> <p>There is a good level of coherence of sector choices at national level and this has been reinforced through sector concentration under EDF11.</p> <p>There is limited evidence of synergies between national and regional levels which</p>	<p>Annex 10 on programming guidelines</p> <p>Annex 20, Part A</p> <p>Country studies (Zambia, Burkina Faso)</p>	More than satisfactory



Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	continue to be affected by different programming cycles, and external constraints.  Complementarity between intra-ACP and regional and national priority setting continues to be vague.		
	I.5.1.2 Evidence that EU's human resources, management and organisational structures (incl. for decision-making) are set up to ensure coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies between all the programmes funded by different EFIs  EDF11 programming guidelines do not provide specific instructions on how to ensure complementarity. Structures and systems exist to avoid duplication, and have been reinforced under the EDF11. However, the existence of different management/ decisions centres for some EFIs and different programming cycles makes complementarity a priori more difficult. The majority of instances of duplication concern HQ-managed budget lines (especially Intra-ACP and GPGC (DCI) and create a heavy burden for the delegations.	Annex 10 Annex 15 Annex 12 Annex 20, Part C  Evidence from country studies in Aruba, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Zambia.  MN 422, 455, 44	Strong
	I.5.1.3 Evidence that 11th EDF programming and programme design always identify programmes funded by other EFIs in the same country, territory, region  Reporting regularly mentions programmes by other EFIs, and also provides examples of	Annex 10 Annex 20, Part B  MN 95, 445, 74, 29, 2, 741, 689, 34m 270,478, 657 Country studies in Zambia,	Strong

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	planned synergies. It is too early in EDF11 to make a judgement about implementation and there is insufficient guidance about how to achieve complementarity in practice. Global calls for projects, insufficient consultation with EUDs, and staffing affect some of the consultation processes.	Cameroon, Burkina Faso	
JC.5.2 The 11th EDF is equipped to ensure coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies between its programmes and those funded by MSs and other DPs	<p>I.5.2.1 Evidence that EU's human resources, management and organisational structures (incl. for decision-making) are set up to ensure coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies between EDF programmes and those funded by different DPs</p> <p>The EDF11 processes are set up to ensure consultation with DPs.</p>	<p>Country studies from Dominican Republic, Zambia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Cameroon, and Timor Leste.</p> <p>MN 442, 445, 44,</p>	More than satisfactory
	<p>I.5.2.2 Evidence that 11th EDF programming and programme design always identify programmes funded by MSs and other DPs in the same country, territory, region</p> <p>Activities of other MSs and DPs are systematically included in programming documents and in reporting. Coordination between donors is promoted under the EDF11. Joint programming is of limited relevance to OCTs.</p>	<p>Annex 20, Part D EAMR evidence Annex 7 Country studies: Zambia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Timor Leste</p>	Strong

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	<p>I.5.2.3 Evidence that Joint Programming is being promoted under the 11th EDF</p> <p>There has been a considerable focus under the EDF11 on joint programming (it is a requirement). Coherence and commitment to coordination/joint programming may be affected by HQ-imposed priorities. Joint programming may work better among MSs.</p>	<p>Annex 12 Annex 10 EAMR analysis</p>	Strong
	<p>I.5.2.4 Evidence that the 11th EDF, because of the nature of its partnership, facilitates coordination with the PC, regional authorities and other donors</p> <p>There is evidence that joint programming has improved although it predates the EDF11 and cannot be attributed only to the EDF. Some joint programming has been heavy handed and too focused on the process.</p>	<p>MN 112, 222, 265, 1, 162, 249 Country studies in Zambia, Cameroon, Burkina Faso.</p> <p>Annex 12 (CIR results)</p>	Strong
JC.5.3 EDF interventions at country, territorial, regional and intra-ACP levels have benefited from the EU's Policy Coherence for Development principle	<p>I.5.3.1 Evidence of any other EU policies affecting negatively the EU development objectives at country, territorial, regional and intra-ACP levels</p> <p>The EU has put in place procedures to promote PCD, including PCD reporting. Various examples of policy incoherence were identified from country studies and internal reporting.</p>	<p>Concord 2015e, Concord 2015b, EC 2015d</p> <p>Annex 20, Part F Annex 7</p>	Satisfactory considering that the indicator asks for examples
	<p>I.5.3.2 Evidence of any other EU policies promoting objectives and/or activities that contradict those pursued by EDF</p>	<p>Annex 20, Part F Annex 7 Ethiopia country study</p>	Satisfactory considering that the indicator asks for examples

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	<p>at country, territorial, regional and intra-ACP levels</p> <p>The EU has put in place procedures to promote PCD, including PCD reporting. Various examples of policy incoherence were identified from country studies and internal reporting.</p>		
<b>EQ6. To what extent has the EDF leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement?</b>			
Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
JC.6.1 The 10th and 11th EDF have successfully contributed to the increase of domestic resources mobilisation	<p>I.6.1.1 Increase of Domestic Resource Mobilisation (DRM) per country/region over time</p> <p>It is difficult to establish a causal link between the EDF and DRM. Nonetheless, there is evidence of an increase of DRM in some ACP countries and a number of mechanisms through which the EDF can influence DRM have been identified.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 21</li> <li>• Fiscus, 2014 Lawson et al, 2011, SEE, 2014; EC, 2012b; EC, 2016h; EC, 2012d; EC, 2010b; EC, 2015u; EC, 2016i; EC, 2016d; IMF, 2016</li> </ul>	Strong
	<p>I.6.1.2 Evidence that EDF programmes are supporting increases in DRM</p> <p>The EDF11 is expected to increase support to DRM in ACP countries compared to the EDF10 and work at different levels (national, regional and global).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EC, 2012d; EC, 2010b; EC, 2015u; EC, 2016i; EC, 2016d; IMF, 2016</li> </ul>	Strong
JC.6.2 The EDF has successfully leveraged funds for development	<p>I.6.2.1 Number of sectors where EDF offers blending possibilities</p> <p>Theoretically, blending facilities supported by the EDF can target many sectors, but there is a clear focus on the energy and transport</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 13</li> </ul>	More than satisfactory

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	sectors.		
	<p>I.6.2.2 Number of blending operations and amounts involved per blending operation per country, region over EDF10 and 2014-2016</p> <p>160 blending projects have been approved since the launch of the first blending facility in 2007 until October 2016 (total blending grants of €1.1bn). The blending facilities for Africa several times bigger (both in terms of projects and volume of funding) than the facilities for the Caribbean and Pacific.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 13</li> </ul>	More than satisfactory
	<p>I.6.2.3 Amounts leveraged from other DPs/development banks</p> <p>These amounts are recorded and presented in Annex 21, but there is a substantial lack of information about what these numbers mean in the absence of sufficient information to evaluate the actual capacity of blending projects to mobilize other sources of finance. There are some concerns about the design of the facilities and the use of blended finance in certain contexts</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 21</li> <li>• ECA, 2014a; EC, 2016f; ECDPM, 2016; European Parliament, 2014b</li> </ul>	Strong
	<p>I.6.2.4 Share of leveraged funds in proportion of total ODA</p> <p>These amounts are recorded and presented in Annex 21, but there is a substantial lack of information about what these numbers mean in the absence of sufficient information to evaluate the actual capacity of blending projects to mobilize other sources of finance.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 21</li> <li>• ECA, 2014a; EC, 2016f; ECDPM, 2016; European Parliament, 2014b</li> </ul>	Strong

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	There are some concerns about the design of the facilities and the use of blended finance in certain contexts.		
	<p>I.6.2.5 Share of leveraged funds in proportion of total project costs</p> <p>These amounts are recorded and presented in Annex 21, but there is a substantial lack of information about what these numbers mean in the absence of sufficient information to evaluate the actual capacity of blending projects to mobilize other sources of finance. There are some concerns about the design of the facilities and the use of blended finance in certain contexts</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 21</li> <li>• ECA, 2014a; EC, 2016f; ECDPM, 2016; European Parliament, 2014b</li> </ul>	Strong
JC.6.3 The EDF, because of the legal basis of the Cotonou partnership, has enabled the EU to take on a leading role in policy and political discussion with PCs	<p>I.6.3.1 Evidence that the EU has a leading role in policy discussions</p> <p>It is difficult to compare with the EDF10, but there is evidence that the EU plays an important role in policy and political dialogue in many ACP countries. The EDF contributes Article 8, the use of budget support and the volume of funding. Dialogue at the regional and intra-ACP level is weaker</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 21</li> <li>• EC, 2016b; WHO, 2015; Fiscus, 2014; ECA, 2009a; EC, 2016b; EC, 2014d</li> <li>• MNs 18, 69, 72, 87, 162, 203, 223, 300, 440, 74, 452, 495, 741, 69, 34, 170, 270, 443, 448, 462, 778</li> </ul>	Strong
	<p>I.6.3.2 Evidence that the EU has a leading role in donor coordination and structures</p> <p>It is difficult to compare with the EDF10, but there is evidence that the EU plays an important role in donor coordination structures. Different factors that might influence the level and quality of the role of</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 21</li> <li>• Lattanzio, 2015; ADE, 2014a; Ecorys, 2014; ECO Consult, 2012a; ADE, 2014b;</li> <li>• MNs 57, 170, 82, 51, 74, 17, 495, 321, 118, 346, 241, 267, 109; 223, 440, 69 and 462</li> </ul>	Strong

Judgment criteria	Indicators	Sources of evidence	Strength of the evidence
	the EU are explored in the report.		
	<p>I.6.3.3 Evidence that the EDF has enabled political issues to be raised with PC (HR, democracy,...)</p> <p>There is positive but limited evidence that the EDF has contributed to create dialogue on political issues in PCs. This is often dependent on the existence of good political dialogue at the country level.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annex 21</li> <li>• MNs 170, 203. 257, 365, 395, 477, 486, 498, 741, 440</li> </ul>	More than satisfactory

## Annex 7 Regional and Intra-ACP Cooperation Assessment

This annex presents the findings of the Performance Review for the Intra-ACP and regional dimensions of the EDF11. The document is structured as a comprehensive and self-standing external assessment, applying the same Evaluation Questions and Judgment Criteria as adopted for the EDF11 evaluation. This annex supports the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the main evaluation report.

### EQ 1 Relevance

*EDF11 regional and intra-ACP strategy and programming partially responded to priorities of the Agenda for Change, particularly in the selection of priority sectors, privileging themes of regional integration, improved governance, climate change and environment and private sector development. The overall relevance was, however, considerably weakened for the fragmentation of programming exercises at result level and for aspects of ownership, civil society participation, nature of intra-ACP cooperation and aid effectiveness agenda (JC 1.1)*

*Regional and intra-ACP programming addressed relevant beneficiary needs. However the relevance was weakened by a partial and shallow consultation and an uneven and often limited national commitment to regional priorities(JC 1.2)*

*Regional and intra-ACP Cooperation maintain their relevance to emerging international priorities (JC 1.3)*

*Regional and intra-ACP cooperation include mechanisms allowing some flexibility to deal with unexpected circumstances and needs. However lengthy of procedures, rigidity of governance mechanisms and limited capacities of regional organizations limit the capacity to adjust to new priorities, constraining the flexibility embedded in regulations (JC 1.4)*

#### JC.1.1 Extent to which the EDF11 design responded to EU priorities in 2014

*EDF11 regional and intra-ACP strategy and programming partially responded to priorities of the Agenda for Change, particularly in the selection of priority sectors, privileging themes of regional integration, improved governance, climate change and environment and private sector development. The overall relevance was, however, considerably weakened for the fragmentation of programming exercises at result level and for aspects of ownership, civil society participation, nature of intra-ACP cooperation and aid effectiveness agenda.*

The Agenda for Change (2011) set EU development policies and outlined principles and policy priorities for EDF11 strategy and programming. The Agenda for Change confirmed regional integration as a key strategic approach to achieve goals of sustainable development and inclusive growth. Table A.9 summarizes key variables against which the evaluation weighted the relevance to EU priorities:

**Table A.9 Relevance of EDF11 regional and intra-ACP programming to key EU priorities**

Criteria	Key findings
Relevance to concentration principle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Principle applied in regional programming, at level of sectors</li><li>• Fragmentation maintained at specific objective and result levels</li></ul>
Improved programming mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Applied through the 5 regional cooperation programming exercises</li><li>• The Consultation however was often light and limited in breadth and width, perfunctory with Civil Society, missing with private sector</li></ul>
Result-based approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Largely missing</li></ul>



Criteria	Key findings
Agenda for Change priorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Full relevance to Agenda for Change priorities</li> </ul>
Relevance to regional and intra-ACP goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Finding of often variable levels of relevance throughout programming as the pertinence to the instrument is significantly weakened by the lack of evidence, in several instances, of contributions to supranational goals and regional integration goals</li> </ul>

The following section assesses EDF11 regional and intra-ACP strategy relevance to the main principles and policy priorities of the Agenda for Change.

### Relevance to Agenda for Change principles<sup>47</sup>

**Concentration:** Concentration should be considered as a major improvement both for regional and intra-ACP cooperation with better focused and packaged programmes,<sup>48</sup> particularly when compared to the high level of fragmentation observed in previous EDF programming exercises.<sup>49</sup> The review of the regional and intra-ACP indicative programmes shows however that in several instances<sup>50</sup> the focus of the three focal sectors is diluted by a large number of specific objectives and results (up to over 100 for a regional indicative programme) providing scope for a more rigorous application of the concentration principle and the assessment of programming documents.

**Programming:** Improved programming mechanisms have been applied (see JC 2.2) although not necessarily faster (on average, programming for Regional and intra-ACP required a period of almost 2 years). Programming included a considerable amount of internal consultation and weaker levels of consultation with other actors (see EQ 5). Synergies established across national, regional and intra-ACP programming are still very low (JC 5.1).

**Common result-based approach:** An increased attention to results is manifest in the programming exercises for the regional and intra-ACP levels. However, the overall result orientation is still very weak and programming documents do not manage to quantify expected changes, lacking credible baselines and target values.<sup>51</sup> Capacities to support measurement and result-base management are lacking at all levels (JC 2.1).

**Coherence:** The analysis of policy coherence for development, applied to the 5 strategic coherence pillars, suggests<sup>52</sup> in general a good level of coherence of regional and intra-ACP programming (see JC 5.3).

### Relevance to Agenda for Change priorities

Regional and intra-ACP programming fully subscribed to the priorities set by the Agenda for Change. Focal sectors chosen for the 5 RIPs and the intra-ACP programming are detailed in Table

<sup>47</sup> The principle of differentiation is not included in the analysis as not directly relevant to regional and intra-ACP cooperation.

<sup>48</sup> The improved readability and compactness of EDF11 programming was acknowledged during interviews with DEVCO an EEAS regional and intra-ACP stakeholders; the evaluation team assessment of the 6 programming documents also evidenced a more structured presentation of sectors and goals, aligning to recommendations of previous evaluations and concentration principle.

<sup>49</sup> In the past intra-ACP was informally referred to as "the Christmas Tree" for the lack of structure and the fragmentation of its programme, largely answering calls and priorities by ACP Ambassadors (source: converging comments of several intra-ACP operators).


<sup>50</sup> The fragmentation of programming documents at specific objective and result levels was evidenced through the analysis of the following programming documents: intra-ACP, Central Africa, West Africa, East Africa and Indian Ocean and the Caribbean Region.

<sup>51</sup> Assessment based on lack of measurability of the 6 programming exercises and the absence of clear baselines for focal sectors against which to define credible targets linked to regional and intra-ACP cooperation resources. The finding of absence of result-orientation is confirmed by interviews with regional and intra-ACP stakeholders.

<sup>52</sup> In JC 5.3 the application of the 5 strategic pillars for policy coherence has been assessed through regional and intra-ACP programming documents with an overall finding of sound relevance.

A.10 below. The analysis of allocations to priority areas Figure A.7 below shows how regional economic integration absorbs almost 60% of the regional cooperation financial resources. Interventions under this envelope also support blending operations, private sector development and implementation and capacity building of EPAs.

**Figure A.7 EDF11 priority areas for regional cooperation.**



Source: based on figures in RIP files.

Climate change and environment receive an allocation of 20%, well in line with the EU priority to scale up investment for climate change and the target of 20% of the EU budget to be spent on climate action<sup>53</sup> (see main evaluation report, JC 5.1 "complementarity between sectors and levels of the EDF").

15% of regional cooperation resources are allocated to governance and peace and security. Intra-ACP also provides significant contributions to peace and security through the Africa Peace Facility, with an allocation of 25% of its envelope,<sup>54</sup> as such responding well to the Agenda for Change drive for tackling "*the challenges of security, fragility and transition... linking development cooperation, humanitarian relief and conflict prevention*". Figure A.7 above provides an overview of sector allocations in EDF11 regional programming.

Intra-ACP cooperation also supports Agenda for Change priorities of human and social development (priority area not covered by regional cooperation).

Regional cooperation is also relevant to the Agenda for Change priority of "*using new financial tools in order to leverage further resources to increase the EU's impact on poverty reduction*" as 70% of the regional integration component, i.e. €1,382m, will be assigned to blending operations (see JC 6.1).

**Table A.10 Overview of EDF11 regional and intra-ACP cooperation focal sectors**

Cooperation Mechanism	Focal sectors – EDF11
<b>Regional Cooperation</b>	
<b>West Africa</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peace, security and regional stability</li> <li>• Economic integration and support for trade</li> <li>• Resilience, food and nutrition security and natural resources</li> </ul>
<b>EA-SA-IO</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peace, security and regional stability</li> <li>• Economic integration and support for trade</li> <li>• Regional natural resources management</li> </ul>

<sup>53</sup> It is noted that although EDF Cooperation is not part of the EU budget, it is well aligned with EU policy priorities

<sup>54</sup> See sector allocation for intra-ACP programming in Appendix to this annex.

Cooperation Mechanism	Focal sectors – EDF11
Central Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peace, security and regional stability</li> <li>• Economic integration and support for trade</li> <li>• Sustainable development of natural resources and biodiversity</li> </ul>
Caribbean	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional economic cooperation and integration</li> <li>• Climate change, disaster management, environment, energy</li> <li>• Crime and security</li> </ul>
Pacific	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional economic integration</li> <li>• Sustainable Management of Natural Resources and the Environment and the Management of Waste</li> <li>• Inclusive and Accountable Governance and Human Rights</li> </ul>
Intra ACP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Human and social development</li> <li>• Climate Change, resilience building and the environment</li> <li>• Private sector development and investment</li> <li>• African Peace Facility</li> </ul>

Source: review of EDF11 regional and Intra-ACP programming documents; for overall financial allocations see Figure A.7 above.

### Relevance of intra-ACP and regional cooperation to instrument goals

The analysis of the five RIPs and intra-ACP programming shows how overall EDF11 Regional and intra-ACP programming maintains a strong relevance to the goals set by the Cotonou Agreement for financial cooperation (see box on the right). In particular, regional cooperation has a strong relevance to the progressive integration of the ACP countries into the world economy, supported by regional economic integration measures. External evaluations of regional programmes and Intra-ACP cooperation point consistently to their relevance to sustainable development and poverty reduction goals.<sup>55</sup>

Intra-ACP cooperation is also fully relevant to the provision of global and supra-national public goods, at least at the level of definition of specific objectives for focal sectors; as discussed below, the relevance at result level appears to be weaker.

The analysis of programming documents and processes also shows the need to reinforce certain aspects to ensure relevance to the instrument's goals for the aspects of ownership, civil society participation, nature of intra-ACP cooperation and aid effectiveness agenda.

The promotion of "**local ownership**" is weakly pursued by the ACP-EU partnership in regional and intra-ACP cooperation. External assessments and interviews<sup>56</sup> converge in pointing to a limited appropriation of regional integration goals at national level. The level of engagement of regional organisations is also limited as can be inferred from low performance and limited involvement of Regional Organisations beyond the allocation of financial resources; also at the level of the ACP secretariat, the level of engagement is shallow in terms of political commitment and lack of ownership of global goods. Several Commission stakeholders stated that the dialogue with the ACP secretariat largely relates to the allocation of financial resources, referring to a culture of "aid entitlement" and confirming limited engagement and ownership of interventions. The limited

#### Cotonou Agreement (2010)

##### Article 19 - Principles and objectives

The central objective of ACP–EC cooperation is poverty reduction and ultimately its eradication; sustainable development; and progressive integration of the ACP countries into the world economy. In this context, cooperation framework and orientations shall be tailored to the individual circumstances of each ACP country, shall promote local ownership of economic and social reforms and the integration of the private sector and civil society actors into the development process.

<sup>55</sup> For instance: Evaluation of the Cooperation EC Caribbean Region, 2012; Intra-ACP evaluation, COM 142 EU ACP – Final Report 31.05.2013; MTR of the EDF10 SADC RIP

<sup>56</sup> Sources include the Regional programming for Southern Eastern Africa,

engagement of the partnership with its goals is evidenced by the overarching conclusion of the ECDPM's political and economic analysis of "an asymmetrical partnership, largely based on unilateral aid flows".<sup>57</sup>

The involvement of **civil society** and private sector actors in regional and intra-ACP cooperation has been superficial, limited in the best cases to a shallow consultation during the programming phase. Cases have been pointed out where more structured consultation efforts are made during programme formulation. Civil Society representatives interviewed by the evaluation did not feel they were considered as partners in regional and intra-ACP cooperation.

**Intra-ACP cooperation** "is envisaged when national and/or regional action proves impossible or less effective, so as to provide added value in comparison to the operations carried out with other cooperation instruments".<sup>58</sup> The analysis of the EDF11 intra-ACP strategy shows how several results included in the strategy have a weak relevance to this instruction and no evidence of efforts for "proving" that the achievement of results would be less effective and/or impossible with regional and/or national cooperation instruments.<sup>59</sup> The analysis of the choice of results of programming documents points as well to few results sustaining reforms at national and regional level, and supporting political and policy dialogue, thus diluting the relevance of the intervention logic to expected goals.

As further discussed in EQ 2 several **principles of aid effectiveness**<sup>60</sup> appear inadequately supported by regional and intra-ACP cooperation including management by results, ownership and mutual accountability.

### **JC.1.2 Extent to which EDF11 design responded to beneficiary needs in 2014**

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*Regional and intra-ACP programming addressed relevant beneficiary needs. However the relevance was weakened by a partial and shallow consultation and an uneven and often limited national commitment to regional priorities*

The programming of regional cooperation, a process largely driven by DEVCO, considered beneficiary needs, both by building on past experiences and through a consultation exercise (see JC 3.1). In general, the choice of focal sectors and of specific objectives reflects priority needs for each region. However, the relevance was weakened by the shallow analysis of needs and lack of participation of key partners, including civil society and private sector.

All strategies and programming documents for regional and intra-ACP cooperation develop a beneficiary needs assessment; focal sectors consistently address key needs in the different regions (see Table A.10 above). Intra-ACP strategic priorities (climate change, development, governance, disaster prevention and peace and security) were shared by a common vision between DEVCO and the ACP Secretariat, providing evidence of a good dialogue and well-functioning partnership<sup>61</sup> at strategic level.

The overall relevance to needs of the EDF11 regional and intra-ACP programming is weakened by the limited scope of consultation and needs analysis, including a limited and shallow consultation with civil society actors,<sup>62</sup> lack of consultation with the private sector,<sup>63</sup> and limited consultation with other regional players.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> The future of EU-ACP relationship, a Political and Economic Analysis (PEA) perspective 2015

<sup>58</sup> CPA, Annex 4, art.12, §2.

<sup>59</sup> The analysis was carried out through the detailed review of results presented by the EDF11 strategy and checking whether there was a rationale proving that such results could not be financed through national or regional mechanisms; for instance in sector 3 (private sector development), the result "access to finance to small and medium enterprises" could, in principle, be achieved through a range of financial instruments and there is no explanation / rationale why the result should be supported by intra-ACP.

<sup>60</sup> Cotonou agreement (2010), preamble: "SUBSCRIBING to the aid effectiveness agenda started in Rome, pursued in Paris and further developed in the Accra Agenda for Action";

<sup>61</sup> Intra-ACP evaluation, COM 142 EU ACP – Final Report 31.05.2013

<sup>62</sup> Finding supported by several interviews with Civil Society organizations as well by interviews with EC staff responsible for programming of regional and intra-ACP cooperation

The review of the programming documents evidenced as well how RIPs and the intra-ACP strategy reflect a superficial and perfunctory analysis of problems, lack of prioritization and shallow strategic thinking about overcoming problems and dealing with needs.<sup>65</sup> Poverty focus and targeting of the poor is often missing, diminishing the relevance to the overarching goal of the Cotonou partnership. The two years of programming did not allow the development of a robust and participatory needs analysis for intra-ACP support to the private sector.<sup>66</sup>

Box A.1 evidences several issues related to national appropriation of regional goals and priorities, an aspect considerably eroding the relevance of regional cooperation.

#### **Box A.1 Regional cooperation relevance to national priorities**

Lessons from the EDF10 Regional Cooperation show how integration goals and policies are hindered by "a limited incorporation of regional laws into national laws".<sup>67</sup> The limited capacity to translate regional goals and policies into national commitments and policy reform is, according to several sources,<sup>68</sup> one of the major constraints to achieving regional and global goals for EU Cooperation.

The evaluation found evidence however that the transposition of regional priorities into national commitments and legislation is working better for Pacific regional cooperation.<sup>69</sup>

The review of regional strategies has found positive examples of increased attention to policy and political engagement, as a few RIPs identify at specific objective level key policy requirements;<sup>70</sup> however, the majority of strategy documents fall short of incorporating national commitments (i.e. legislative and regulatory frameworks, financial commitments, human resources, institutional set-up) into the result framework, and do not provide dialogue mechanisms and monitoring systems to follow up policy changes and the reform process at national level. The inadequate attention to national commitments dilutes significantly the relevance to national priorities, the ownership of the regional and supra national cooperation and the effectiveness of these instruments (see also EQ2). Strategies and indicative programming for the Pacific region and SA-EA-IO provide examples of addressing the transposition of national strategies and improving regional governance systems.

Limited country commitment is also reflected by a "*partial and unsatisfactory implementation of CPA Article 13 legal obligation, requiring countries to readmit their own nationals*"<sup>71</sup> as well as by the uneven financial contributions of country members to regional organisations.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Finding evidenced by analysis of programming and processes for Regional Cooperation (including detailed consultation agenda for Central African Region RIP) and interviews with EC staff

<sup>64</sup> Findings supported by review of regional cooperation programming processes, supported by interviews (MN 494, 416, 156).

<sup>65</sup> This finding is supported by the review of all RSP and RIP for the EDF11 regional and Intra-ACP Cooperation; the findings supported as well by views of DEVCO staff interviewed during the desk phase.

<sup>66</sup> Interviews with Commission staff responsible for intra-ACP programming (thematic lines) and regional programming; the evidence is supported as well by interviews with ACP Secretariat.

<sup>67</sup> Source: Regional Indicative Programme for Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean, 2014- 2020

<sup>68</sup> DEVCO officials for regional and intra-ACP cooperation interviewed, evaluations of regional and intra-ACP, RIPs

<sup>69</sup> Review of RIPs, triangulated with information from interviews with Commission Staff responsible for Regional Programming

<sup>70</sup> I.e. the Regional Indicative Programme for Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean, 2014- 2020

<sup>71</sup> Joint staff working document - Executive summary Evaluation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement 2016

<sup>72</sup> The finding of limited and uneven contributions to Regional Organizations is supported by interviews with Commission Staff responsible for regional cooperation

### **JC.1.3 Extent to which the original objectives and priorities of the EDF11 are still relevant in the emerging international context (priorities up to 2020)**

*Regional and intra-ACP Cooperation maintain their relevance to emerging international priorities*

The increased focus and resources on areas of security, regional stabilization, improved governance and private sector development show that emerging concerns about stability, migration and terrorism have been embraced by the EDF11 regional and intra-ACP strategies and programmes.<sup>73</sup>

In some cases, the level of attention to emerging needs could be increased, as for instance stakeholders argue that the blending facility for SA-EA-IO (525 M €) doesn't address private sector development, limiting contributions to employment and weakening the instrument's capacity to find sustainable alternatives to migration.

### **JC.1.4 Extent to which the EDF11 has foreseen space for coping with unexpected needs**

*Regional and intra-ACP cooperation include mechanisms allowing some flexibility to deal with unexpected circumstances and needs. However length of procedures, rigidity of governance mechanisms and limited capacities of regional organizations limit the capacity to adjust to new priorities, constraining the flexibility embedded in regulations.*

Regional cooperation has an envelope B, outside of the "programmable allocation" to face unforeseen needs.<sup>74</sup> Article 3 allows for this allocation to be used to mobilize resources outside of the region, while article 4 provides additional mechanisms based on: a) exceptional circumstances; and, b) "exceptional performances". The latter is interpreted by the evaluation as an innovative approach based on management by results principles and the provision of incentives to positive performances related to both result delivery and financial performance:

*"(a) needs resulting from exceptional circumstances such as crisis and post-crisis situations or from unforeseen needs as referred to in paragraph 2(b);*

*(b) exceptional performance is a situation in which, outside the mid-term and end-of-term reviews, a region's allocation is totally committed and additional funding from the regional indicative programme can be absorbed against a background of effective regional integration and sound financial management."*

The CPA foresees a non-programmable reserve also for intra-ACP cooperation although regulations are less defined than for regional cooperation.<sup>75</sup>

The flexibility embedded in regulations is, however, offset by system rigidities constraining the capacity of regional and intra-ACP cooperation to adjust to new priorities. These include the lengthiness of procedures to bring modifications to budget and programming, the inertia of governance mechanisms, limited capacities of regional organisations, NAOs and intra-ACP secretariat and, since 2016, the absence of an instrument management and unified vision for intra-ACP cooperation (MN 421, MN 267, MN 253, MN 5, MN 25).

## **EQ 2 To what extent has EDF delivered results against objectives and specific EU priorities?**

*The EDF11 strategy and programming have been informed by lessons from past cooperation. Adjustments have been significant, providing a better focus of cooperation, aiming to improve quality of programming, result orientation, governance mechanisms and financial performances for regional cooperation. However changes have been partial, unable to take into account important*

<sup>73</sup> Finding supported by analysis of focal areas, objectives and results of strategies and interviews (MN 3, MN 127, MN 485, MN 421)

<sup>74</sup> Chapter 2, article 9 (resources allocation, points 2b, 3 and 4)

<sup>75</sup> CPA, Annex 4, Chapter 2, article 12c

*constraints evidenced by previous assessments and falling short of bringing about a paradigm shift for regional and intra-ACP cooperation (JC 2.1)*

*The review of the EDF10 achievements provides mixed perspectives on regional and intra-ACP cooperation effectiveness. Substantial financial resources of regional and intra-ACP cooperation contributed to outputs and to changes supporting regional integration and production of public goods at supra-national level. On the other side the evaluation could gather evidence of significant limitations in the achievements of results in different areas of cooperation including private sector development, peace building and conflict resolution and environmental management; evidence from external evaluations, point to the limited effectiveness of regional cooperation toward regional integration; impact level the CPA contributions to poverty reduction and change political economy equilibria have been insufficient; the overall competitiveness of ACP countries remains a challenge; the evaluation found as well lack of data on quantified achievements of outcomes and impacts, evidencing the need to reinforce result orientation, measurability and focus on the outcomes of the cooperation (JC 2.2)*

*The instrument regulations, mechanisms and processes provide inadequate attention and support to sustainability and impact of regional and intra-ACP cooperation (JC 2.3)*

### **JC.2.1 Extent to which institutional structures and processes are in place for the EDF11 to deliver expected results**

*The EDF11 strategy and programming have been informed by lessons from past cooperation. Adjustments have been significant, providing a better focus of cooperation, aiming to improve quality of programming, result orientation, governance mechanisms and financial performances for regional cooperation. However changes have been partial, unable to take into account important constraints evidenced by previous assessments and falling short of bringing about a paradigm shift for regional and intra-ACP cooperation.*

The assessment of regional and intra-ACP cooperation institutional structures and processes considered the following main dimensions of effectiveness:

1. Capacity of the EDF11 to adjust from past lessons (2.1.1)
2. Institutional set up and governance mechanisms for regional and intra-ACP cooperation (2.1.2)
3. Aid effectiveness principles in regional and intra-ACP cooperation (2.1.3)
4. Monitoring and evaluation arrangements (2.1.4)
5. Regional and intra-ACP programming (2.1.5)

#### **2.1.1 Capacity of the EDF11 to adjust from past lessons for regional and intra-ACP cooperation**

*Learning from the past was one of the key drivers behind the EU's new approach to supporting regional cooperation in the EDF11 (ECDPM, PEA)*

The EDF11 strategy and programming have been informed by lessons from past cooperation, building on recommendations from regional and intra-ACP evaluations, the European Court of Auditors reports, the EU platform for blending, Commission assessments of cooperation efforts, the EDF10 mid-term review and evaluations at programme level.

Adjustments have been significant, providing a better focus of cooperation, aiming to improve quality of programming, result orientation, governance mechanisms and financial performances for regional cooperation. Additional adjustments brought by the 11th EDF were an increased (yet limited) attention to results and measurability (JC 2.1.2) and a much-needed improved attention to policy adjustments at national level aimed at achieving regional goals. Programming processes

applied the principle of concentration<sup>76</sup> with an increased focus on key priorities defined by the Cotonou Partnership Agreements (including peace and security, economic regional integration and global challenges) (see further analysis in JC 1.1 and 2.1.2).

Mechanisms and processes for strategies and programming and quality of Action Documents (including quality control mechanisms) have been strengthened, as discussed in JC 2.1.2. Changes brought as well the setting up of new governance mechanisms including regional steering committees and technical committees (see JC 2.1.3). These changes were supported by capacity development measures addressed to DMROs, ACP secretariat and EU Delegations.

An increased use of blending aid modality (see JC 6.2) and the establishing of an umbrella regional indicative programme for the Southern Africa, Eastern Africa and Indian Ocean Regions (JC 2.1.3) are also new features of the 11th EDF programming.

Changes have been significant however, as discussed in the following paragraphs, adjustments have been partial, unable to take into account important constraints evidenced by previous assessments and falling short of bringing about a paradigm shift for regional and intra-ACP cooperation.

Overall measurability, result orientation and management by results of the regional and intra-ACP cooperation remain a structural shortcoming constraining effectiveness and accountability; the EDF11 is still lacking of a clear theory of change for regional and intra-ACP strategies and programming, specifically linking resources to outcomes of regional integration and changes in terms of supra-national public goods (see EQ 2, JC 2.1.3).

Institutional changes that led to the dismantling of the intra-ACP unit did not take into account of the positive performance assessment of the EDF10 Intra-ACP; (see JC 2.1.2).

The follow up of national level engagements in regional integration is still not adequately ingrained into regional cooperation mechanisms "*Direct access may not deliver results in terms of the domestication of regional integration agendas, unless it is underpinned by a solid political economy analysis of the national incentives for pursuing regional cooperation, and unless the regional dimension of regional challenges is acknowledged and addressed*"<sup>77</sup> (see JC 2.2).

Attribution of financial envelopes and the choice of implementing partners is not based on the systematic analysis of past performances.<sup>78</sup>

Lessons for increased focus and concentration of cooperation efforts have been only partially taken into account as a relatively high number of results in regional and intra-ACP programming is diluting the effects of focal sectors concentration (see analysis in EQ 1).

Intra-ACP cooperation is still loosely linked to national and regional programming (see analysis and evidence in EQ 5).

Structural weaknesses in terms of leadership, management, number and competences of human resources and commitment of key players<sup>79</sup> remain largely unaddressed (further analysis in EQ 2).

Changes are not addressed to strengthen the position of the EU as a leader and a key player in the regional integration and the global arena through the regional and intra-ACP instruments (see JC 6.1). Moreover the EDF11 democratic participation of civil society, private actors and local administrations has been so far very limited in width and depth (see also JC1.2 and Annex 16).

The above elements support the finding that adjustments to the EDF10 contributed to improving significantly the mechanisms of governance of regional cooperation and improved focus and

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<sup>76</sup> Evidence of application of the principle of concentration is found on the review of regional and intra-ACP programming documents, with a significantly reduced number of focal sectors compared to 10th EDF programming; The finding is supported by interviews with Commission and External Action staff.

<sup>77</sup> ECPDM Political Economy Analysis\_ACP EU Cotonou

<sup>78</sup> Finding based on review on interviews with Commission Staff responsible for Regional and intra-ACP Cooperation as well as lack of evidence of systematic performance assessments for choice of implementing partners.

<sup>79</sup> Including Delegations, DEVCO and EEAS, NAOs, Regional Organizations, ACP-Secretariat



readability of programmes, and are likely to allow better financial performance. However, the EDF11 failed to support structural changes that might have strengthened the effectiveness of the regional and intra-ACP instruments and the EDF11 *"may not result in more and better regional integration"*.<sup>80</sup>

### 2.1.2 Institutional set-up and governance mechanisms

**Regional Cooperation;** Previous assessments and recent studies concur in providing evidence of structural limitations of regional cooperation mechanisms, including important weaknesses in regional organizations, which contributed to the very low performance of EDF10 regional cooperation. Lessons from the EDF10 point to a complex pattern of regional organizations, with *"multiple and overlapping partnerships and duplication of responsibilities of institutions serving the same constituencies"*.<sup>81</sup>

Constraints related to the institutional set-up include overlapping mandates, weaknesses of mechanisms at regional level supporting regional integration programmes, weak capacities to incorporate regional priorities at national level, lack of harmonization and linkages between regional programming and intra-ACP cooperation. These findings are supported by the EDF10 regional evaluations and interviews with DEVCO staff (MN 5, MN 25, MN 45). The difficult organizational set up related to regional cooperation is recognized by EDF11 programming documents for regional cooperation.

The 11th EDF programming introduced the principle of direct access to regional funds by national authorities and regional organisations, with a decreased role for Duly Mandated Regional Organisations (DMRO) with these now focusing more on aspects of coordination and overall supervision and less involved in implementation arrangements. These arrangements are likely to improve mechanisms for programme implementation but per se they will not strengthen the capacity to deliver results toward regional integration. Interviews with DEVCO and EEAS staff indicated that Steering Committees, supported by preparatory Technical Committees, focus largely on programme administration, with limited or no attention to political and policy level issues that may support regional integration (MN 253, MN 127). The finding is supported by ECDPM analysis of regional cooperation: *"Steering committees, which focus largely on formal institutions and aid-management issues, are unlikely to generate the high-level political action that is required to push the regional integration agenda forward"*.

#### **intra-ACP institutional reorganization**

Several actors consider that the reorganization has *de facto* suppressed the intra-ACP as an instrument, and that the intra-ACP financial envelope is now just providing complementary financial resources to thematic lines

The regional cooperation institutional set-up has not developed effective mechanisms for organizing, implementing, directing, monitoring and revising the integration process.<sup>82</sup> Additional constraints of the regional cooperation set up relate to limited management capacities of Regional Organisations,<sup>83</sup> complicated implementation modalities<sup>84</sup> and the limited role and capacities of DMRO to motivate member states to undertake reforms that promote regional integration.<sup>85</sup>

**Intra-ACP Cooperation;** The EDF10 Intra-ACP cooperation featured a well performing DEVCO intra-ACP unit<sup>86</sup> that centralized Commission vision, strategies, programming, implementation, and dialogue, and had an overview of key instrument functions. The mechanism was changed by the end of 2015 when, following a DEVCO management decision, the intra-ACP staff and functions were divided across 3 Directorates and 7 Units. The change, according to interviewees was driven

<sup>80</sup> ECDPM briefing note, n.89, May 2016, supporting effective regional integration? what the 11th EDF programming tells us - Alisa Herrero, with Cecilia Gregersen

<sup>81</sup> Source: Regional Indicative Programme for Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean, 2014- 2020

<sup>82</sup> Regional Indicative Programme for Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean, 2014- 2020

<sup>83</sup> Ibidem

<sup>84</sup> Ibidem; implementation modalities referred to ESA-IO RIP

<sup>85</sup> Regional Indicative Programme for Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean, 2014- 2020

<sup>86</sup> See intra-ACP evaluation, analysis of the instrument performances

by the opportunity to improve coordination of intra-ACP interventions with those supported by thematic lines. Staff were reassigned to thematic units and coordination functions were allocated to Unit D3.

The rationale for the change amongst DEVCO staff is not clear as "good coordination was already established with thematic lines even during the EDF10.<sup>87</sup> The effects of this reorganisation are already emerging, including a lack of unified management of the instrument, with loss of common vision, strategy and action and a considerably weakened partnership with the Secretariat. The dialogue with the Secretariat is difficult, with unclear lines and mandates. The negotiating capacity of the Commission *vis à vis* the Secretariat has decreased considerably;

This change has considerably affected the intra-ACP cooperation and the EU capacities to support the Agenda for Change in strengthening EU leadership and positioning on the global agenda.<sup>88</sup>

The above findings are supported by evidence gathered through interviews with intra-ACP stakeholders (see list in footnote 89), pointing to a general concern about the risk of a significant reduction of the effectiveness of the intra-ACP instrument. The fragmented institutional set-up is substantiating these perceptions, as the evaluation could not gather evidence of a unified management of the instrument.

Additional sources<sup>89</sup> point to critical weaknesses and limited sustainability of the institutional arrangements for intra-ACP cooperation. For instance, ECDPM's political economy analysis of intra-ACP<sup>90</sup> points to key limitations related to the ACP Secretariat and the EU institutional set-up: *"On paper, there is a clear division of labour between the EU and the ACP when deciding on the use of the funds, with the onus being clearly put on the ACP in terms of ensuring a true intra-ACP focus. In practice, however, the ACP Group and Secretariat have played a subdued role in this exercise, and the EU has been largely in the driving seat. This is due to capacity constraints of the ACP, secretariat, balance of power and relations between the ACP secretariat and ACP countries."*

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement evaluation provides a mixed assessment of the institutional set-up and performance: *"The CPA created a comprehensive framework for the Joint Institutions, modelled on the EU institutional setting. Institutional practice is, however, seen as complicated and burdensome, and involves processes that slow down decision-making and hamper efficiency. While the evaluation finds the overall institutional framework to be relevant to the spirit of the CPA, it indicates that the roles of the various institutions should be clarified and streamlined, in order to increase the efficiency of the partnership"*.

Analysis of the intra-ACP institutional set up evidences as well how the system is more focused on the financial aid, its allocation and disbursement rather than the ACP political agenda and results<sup>91</sup> also in consideration of the limited capacities of the ACP to act as an international organization and a cohesive group with a common agenda *"Although its legal status and UN-recognition as an international organization in principle enables the Group of Ambassadors' engagement, in practice the member states involved tend to show a strong attachment to national sovereignty, thus constraining the Group's capacity to self-organize and act."*<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Interviews (MN 485, MN 349, MN 421)

<sup>88</sup> Finding supported by statements from several interviews with staff involved with intra-ACP before and after the new institutional set up implemented in 2016. The view of a change contributing to weaker position in the international arena was also held by ACP Secretariat.

<sup>89</sup> Including: regional evaluations, intra-ACP evaluation, EDF external assessments, Regional Strategy Papers and Interviews with DEVCO staff (MN 42, MN 267)

<sup>90</sup> ECDPM (2015) The Future of ACP-EU Relations: A Political Economy Analysis Perspective. Progress Report with Preliminary Findings and Emerging Conclusions. European Centre for Development Policy Management, Brussels

<sup>91</sup> *"The skewed incentive structure (primarily geared at managing EDF resources) also means there is less space, capacity and time available for dealing with the broader political agenda or the institutional development of the Group. This suggests that the power and interest configuration is such that the ACP states mainly regard the partnership as a convenient aid delivery mechanism."* The future of EU -ACP relationship, a Political and Economic Analysis (PEA) perspective 2015

<sup>92</sup> The Cotonou Partnership Agreement evaluation.

The rules of procedures of the Committee of the Ambassadors requiring unanimity in decisions hinders the effectiveness and result orientation of decision-making while significantly slowing down the process.<sup>93</sup>

The uneven contributions of ACP countries to the Secretariat's operation costs evidence not only limitations in terms of commitment but also the frail sustainability of the set up, with ACP states able to cover only 50% of the Secretariat's 15 M € operating costs, the other 50% being paid by the EU<sup>94</sup>.

The evaluation found as well a lack of monitoring and external assessment of EU financial support to intra-ACP operation, including appraisal of capacity building, institutional performances and achievement of results<sup>95</sup>. ACP Secretariat current efforts are largely centred on financial resource allocations and programme administration with limited attention to dialogue and no follow up on results.<sup>96</sup>

*ECDPM political and economic analysis of the ACP-EU relationship concludes that it is unlikely that the ACP-EU framework will effectively promote the Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development for lack of political and institutional conditions, as the CPA is built and functions as a "North-South" partnership, focused on aid with limited collective capacity for collective action on global issues". The partnership had major merits in its time yet that is now no longer adapted to a totally different world. The ECDPM analysis over-arching conclusion is about an asymmetrical partnership, largely based on unilateral aid flows.*<sup>97</sup>

### 2.1.3 Aid effectiveness principles in regional and intra-ACP cooperation

The analysis of adherence to the aid effectiveness agenda evaluates how Paris Declaration principles of management by results, ownership, mutual accountability, alignment and harmonization are built into the EDF11 regional and intra-ACP cooperation through design, strategy and implementation mechanisms.

**Managing by results;** The overall finding concerning the adherence of regional and intra-ACP cooperation to the "managing by results" principle of aid effectiveness is that there is a very limited result orientation and measurability of Regional and Intra-ACP Cooperation, hindering the application of the Aid Effectiveness agenda advocated by the Cotonou Partnership<sup>98</sup> thus constraining EDF accountability for results, transparency, visibility, and performance.

"The incentives for rapid disbursement outweigh the incentives for investing in analysis, high-quality policy dialogue and political facilitation, which offer greater scope for building a firm basis for results"

*ECDPM 180, Implementing the Agenda for Change, 2015*

The analysis of EDF11 regional and intra-ACP programming documents<sup>99</sup> shows an improved effort in the definition of results; in addition, new templates for action documents provide better guidance

<sup>93</sup> "The strong position of the Committee of Ambassadors does not mean that it always behaves in an effective and results-oriented matter. On an individual level many ambassadors are dissatisfied with its functioning. The rules of procedure for the Committee of Ambassadors that currently apply date from 1981 when the Group had 46 members and foresee unanimity for decision-making. This often slows down decision-making and has in the past led to decisions being delayed or blocked by small groups of ACP states" (ECDPM).

<sup>94</sup> Figures provided by interviews with Commission staff working with intra-ACP. The evaluation requested details on EU financial support to the Secretariat but the information was not made available.

<sup>95</sup> These findings are supported by the lack of performance assessments, institutional audits and external evaluations of EU support to the ACP Secretariat. The finding is confirmed as well by interviews with Commission Staff, including officers working with intra-ACP cooperation.

<sup>96</sup> Finding supported by several interviews with Commission staff working with intra-ACP (before and after 2016 institutional change) and with ACP Secretariat.

<sup>97</sup> *ECDPM Political Economy Analysis, ACP EU Cotonou*

<sup>98</sup> Preamble to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement

<sup>99</sup> Evaluation Team detailed assessments of 11th EDF RIPs and intra-ACP programming documents.

for definition of results, indicators, baselines and target values. Progress has been registered in several areas related to increasing the measurability of cooperation and result orientation including a systematic effort to devise indicators for all objectives and results in the indicative programming,<sup>100</sup> improved quality of the Action Documents preparation process,<sup>101</sup> the systematic review of Logical Frameworks and Action Documents by Unit 06, with improvement to the result frameworks and the development of a comprehensive results framework for DEVCO, with the publishing of annual "Result reports". These positive signs of an increased attention to results, apply not only to regional and intra-ACP but also to all EDF and in general to EU Cooperation efforts.

However, a message emerging consistently from the EDF10 evaluations<sup>102</sup> and other sources concerns the lack of result orientation for Regional and Intra-ACP Cooperation, with renewed recommendations to strengthen result frameworks and indicator systems.<sup>103</sup>

Moreover, the analysis of the logical frameworks of the 11th EDF shows how Regional and Intra-ACP Cooperation is still largely lacking results orientation and has not yet established a management by results approach. The cooperation has not set up a system of incentives and disincentives linked to the achievement of results. Management attention, monitoring, and incentives are focused on financial performances.<sup>104</sup>

Regional and intra-ACP programming documents provide very few instances of "measurable changes", with clearly defined baseline and target values, linked to a causal relationship to EDF allocation of financial resources. The analysis of strategy papers<sup>105</sup> shows how in several cases the choice of indicators addresses two levels: outputs and impacts. The limited attention to intermediate outcome indicators, and the absence of clearly defined baseline and target values, provides a grey undefined area between cooperation outputs and expected impacts, without the possibility of tracking changes (outcomes) and attributing them to cooperation interventions.<sup>106</sup>

Lack of result orientation at senior management level is a major constraint in to a shift towards increased measurability and attention on impacts and outcomes for regional and intra-ACP cooperation.

The lack of a result-oriented management culture is well recognized within DEVCO and External Action;

*Source: Evaluation team assessment supported by several interviews with Commission staff and management*

Moreover the evaluation could not find evidence of result-based monitoring systems established at regional and intra-ACP levels and used to manage regional and intra-ACP cooperation; moreover, the recent intra-ACP reorganization is not likely to support strategic orientation and management of the intra-ACP component according to results.

The finding of lack of result orientation is supported by EDF10 evaluations for intra-ACP and regional cooperation consistently pointing to lack of measurability of cooperation efforts. The absence of a management by results approach is well recognized within DEVCO and the ACP secretariat.<sup>107</sup> Interviews also point to an overall lack of capacity to measure results at outcome level.

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<sup>100</sup> Source: analysis of indicative programming documents and their logical frameworks

<sup>101</sup> Review of the process, interviews (MN 127, MN 48, MN 45)

<sup>102</sup> Including: evaluation of Intra-ACP, The Review of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, The Evaluation of Netherland Contribution to the EDF, Evaluation of the cooperation EC and Caribbean-Region - 2012

<sup>103</sup> The Multilateral Aid Review of the EDF (2013) recommends to strengthen the result based approach to aid, including by implementing a results framework

<sup>104</sup> Finding supported by interviews with Commission staff working with regional and intra-ACP cooperation, review of programming documents and action documents.

<sup>105</sup> The following EDF11 strategies and logical frameworks have been assessed as part of the desk phase work: Regional Cooperation strategies for Central Africa, for Caribbean, for Southern and Eastern Africa, for Pacific and for Intra-ACP.

<sup>106</sup> Interviews on Regional and Intra ACP strategies confirmed the persisting lack of result orientation of these documents (MN 42, MN 25)

<sup>107</sup> MN 220, MN 88, MN 253, MN 3

The stretched human resources in Headquarters and the ACP Secretariat are not conducive to an increased attention to outcomes, including the systematic follow-up and measurement of change.

Previous external assessments, including Court of Auditors reports, have evidenced limited capacity of both Delegations and Regional Organizations to face the challenges of Regional Cooperation: *"Delegations have neither adequate guidelines nor sufficient capacity to deal with the preparation, implementation, reporting and coordination of regional activities. At the level of the regional organisations, coordination is also inadequate and there is no monitoring system to track the overall progress of the regional economic integration process in the individual countries"*.<sup>108</sup> A key lesson from the EDF10 is the need to strengthen institutional structures and processes to deliver results.<sup>109</sup> The weak absorption capacities of regional cooperation have been a key area of concern. (MN 3, MN 25, MN 20, MN 156).

The evaluation has gathered evidence of only limited and sparse efforts to strengthen transparency, accountability and management by results in institutional structures responsible for regional and intra-ACP cooperation. Positive examples include efforts by the Pacific Regional Cooperation which assigned a tentative allocation of 18 M € in priority area 3 "Inclusive and accountable governance" and few cases of assessments of regional organizations to support the definition of capacity building strategies and plans.<sup>110</sup>

The finding of lack of result orientation in regional and intra-ACP cooperation is also supported by evidence that policy dialogue (including topics relating to domestication of regional priorities) and political dialogue are not backed by clearly defined road maps, monitoring mechanisms and appraisal of results (see detailed analysis in JC 6.3).

**Alignment and ownership;** The EDF is based on parallel structures developed at national and regional level, raising an inconsistency with the principle of alignment. As evidenced by ECDPM analysis: *"the NAOs are parallel structures that are relatively separate from line ministries and domestic accountability actors, and in many cases, are run by technical assistants. We were also told that NAOs may not always and necessarily take decisions in the best interests of their constituencies (for instance, by side-lining line ministries) or of pro-poor and inclusive development (for instance, by hampering EU strategic support for civil society). This raises questions as to whether co-management really supports the democratic ownership of EU aid in all circumstances"*.<sup>111</sup>

ECDPM analysis and the conclusion that NAO and RAO mechanisms are constraining EDF democratic ownership converges with the evidence gathered by the evaluation.

The programming for the EDF11, as discussed under the analysis of relevance (EQ 1) in general shows a sound alignment to regional and national priorities, with some exceptions. However, such alignment is often not matched by real ownership of initiatives at national and regional level, as seen in the converging evidence of weak willingness for domestication of regional priorities. *"There are many reasons why alignment and ownership cannot be taken at face value. Regional strategies and policies that enjoy strong support from donors are not necessarily backed by strong support at national level, nor by regional institutions to ensure their effective implementation."*<sup>112</sup>

National commitment to regional goals is singled out by several sources as the key challenge to achieving goals of regional integration.<sup>113</sup> The limited national commitment is discussed in EQ 1

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<sup>108</sup> ECA special report no.18 on Effectiveness of EDF support for Regional Economic Integration in East Africa and West Africa, 2009.

<sup>109</sup> Finding consistently supported by several sources, including external assessments and interviews with DEVCO officials.

<sup>110</sup> This includes for instance an internal assessment of SADC and several external assessments of EGAD in view to improve organizational arrangements and institutional capacities (source: interview with DEVCO MN 25).

<sup>111</sup> ECDPM 180, Implementing the Agenda for Change, 2015

<sup>112</sup> ECDPM 180, Implementing the Agenda for Change, 2015

<sup>113</sup> Including MN 253, MN 3, MN 25, MN5, MTR of the EDF10 SADC RIP and other external assessments of regional and intra-ACP cooperation

(relevance) as it undermines the relevance of EDF cooperation to national priorities.

**Mutual Accountability.** The absence of results orientation considerably weakens adherence to the principle of mutual accountability as both ACP countries and the EU do not explicitly engage with and commit to measurable changes related to poverty reduction, regional integration, policy and political dialogue. The evaluation also finds that the limited use of monitoring tools and strategic evaluations (see § 2.14) reduces the level of accountability for regional and intra-ACP cooperation.

**Harmonization.** While the programming process in regional and intra-ACP cooperation takes the principle of harmonization well into account (see EQ 5), the EDF instrument achieved limited internal harmonization across its components, lacking overall management of the instrument capable of establishing strategic complementarities and synergies across national, regional, intra-ACP, OCT and Investment Facility mechanisms.

#### **2.1.4 Monitoring and evaluation arrangements for regional and intra-ACP cooperation<sup>114</sup>**

While some positive examples of effective programme level evaluations have been gathered both for regional and intra-ACP in the EDF10,<sup>115</sup> evidence points to the need for strengthening monitoring and evaluation arrangements for Regional and Intra-ACP cooperation to support, lesson learning and accountability. The very limited measurability and result orientation of regional and intra-ACP cooperation does not provide a solid foundation for monitoring, managing by results and evaluation practices (see above, analysis of "managing by results").

Monitoring is weak both at the level of the regional integration agenda (impact level) in general and in terms of implementation of the regional agenda at national level (outcome level).<sup>116</sup> Monitoring systems should be articulated to support countries in their follow-up of the implementation of their commitments (transposition) within their national policy frameworks.<sup>117</sup>

There is recognition by regional organizations of the key importance of effective results-based monitoring and evaluation systems for regular assessment and reporting on the state of implementation of their mandates as reflected in their strategies, action plans, programmes and projects.

The evaluation found a remarkable lack of literature looking at the impact of regional and intra-ACP cooperation; the under-evaluation of regional and intra-ACP envelopes has been highlighted as a problem by several reviews. *"Despite the considerable amount of resources involved (comprising over 20% of the EDF9 and 12% of the EDF10) few evaluations have been carried out. As such it remains unclear to what extent the various programme have effectively facilitated sustainable intra-ACP cooperation".*<sup>118</sup> Also the Multilateral Aid Review of EDF (2013) recommends improving the EDF evaluation function.

Chapter 5 (art 33) of the CPA specifies that evaluation is a joint ACP-EU effort; however, evidence shows how in general (and specifically for this EDF mid-term performance review) the ACP secretariat is not associated with the design and management of evaluations.<sup>119</sup>

Table A.11 summarizes the strategic evaluations carried out in the context of the EDF10 regional and intra-ACP cooperation

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<sup>114</sup> Chapter 5 of Annex 4 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement regulates monitoring and evaluation for Regional and Intra-ACP Cooperation

<sup>115</sup> Examples include the evaluation of the APF, PSUP evaluation, evaluation of regional infrastructure programme for Central Africa

<sup>116</sup> MTR ESA IO Joint Progress Report Final - 16 JAN 2012

<sup>117</sup> Ibidem

<sup>118</sup> ECDPM (2015). The Future of ACP-EU Relations: A Political Economy Analysis Perspective. Progress Report with Preliminary Findings and Emerging Conclusions. European Centre for Development Policy Management, Brussels.

<sup>119</sup> Composition of ISG does not include ACP partners; evaluations terms of reference do not specify the joint nature of evaluations.

**Table A.11 Overview of strategic evaluations at regional and Intra-ACP level**

Cooperation Mechanisms	EDF10 €m	Evaluations EDF10 (Yes/No)		
		MTR	End of Programme	Impact evaluations
<b>Regional</b>				
West Africa	597	No	No	No
EA-SA-IO	645	Yes	No	No
Central Africa	165	No	No	No
Caribbean	165	No	No	No
Pacific	95	Yes	No	No
<b>Overall Regional</b>		No	No	No
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1783</b>			
<b>Intra ACP</b>	<b>2700</b>	Yes	No	No
<b>Total</b>	<b>4.483</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

Source: Evaluations gathered from DEVCO (situation at December 2016)

By the end of the EDF10, for the five regional and the Intra-ACP programmes, three mid-term reviews had been carried out to cover an overall financial envelope of over €4.4bn. The three MTRs contributed to informing the preparation of relevant EDF11 regional strategies and programmes. The analysis of the evaluations carried out for regional and intra-ACP cooperation suggests a very limited use of external assessments, lack of attention to impacts and a limited capacity for uptake from previous lessons to formulate EDF11.

### 2.1.5 Regional and intra-ACP strategies and programming

The analysis of regional and intra-ACP strategies identifies how often requirements set by the CPA are not met;<sup>120</sup> the overall strategic framework is weak for most regions and the intra-ACP cooperation, undermining the foundation for effective cooperation. With few exceptions<sup>121</sup> the shallowness of the EDF11 regional and intra-ACP strategies is striking, particularly when related to the substantial envelopes of financial resources allocated to each strategy.

Appendix 2 lists key weaknesses evidenced by the review of the 5 regional and the intra-ACP strategies.

### **JC.2.2 Extent to which the EDF10 contributed to the delivery of positive results at regional and intra-ACP levels compared to its objectives and specific EU priorities**

*The review of the EDF10 achievements provides mixed perspectives on regional and intra-ACP cooperation effectiveness. Substantial financial resources of regional and intra-ACP cooperation contributed to outputs and to changes supporting regional integration and production of public goods at supra-national level. On the other side the evaluation could gather evidence of significant limitations in the achievements of results in different areas of cooperation including private sector development, peace building and conflict resolution and environmental management; evidence from external evaluations, point to the limited effectiveness of regional cooperation toward regional integration; impact level the CPA contributions to poverty reduction and change political economy equilibria have been insufficient; the overall competitiveness of ACP countries remains a challenge the evaluation found as well lack of data on quantified achievements of outcomes and impacts,*

<sup>120</sup> Evaluation Team detailed assessment of regional and intra-ACP strategy and programming documents, based on compliance with CPA stipulations and expert judgment on quality of strategies and programmes. Findings are summarized in Appendix 2.

<sup>121</sup> A significantly stronger quality is noted in the formulation of the strategy for East-Africa-Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Region, with a detailed discussion of lessons, strategic adjustments of strategy for the EDF11 and specific analysis of policy issues to be tackled by the strategy. The analysis of the Pacific Region Indicative Programme also reflects a better standard and quality of preparation.

*evidencing the need to reinforce result orientation, measurability and focus on the outcomes of the cooperation.*

The evaluation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement offers an appraisal of severe limitations in the achievements of results in different areas of cooperation.

The evaluation specifically evidences weaknesses in delivery of results related to private sector development, including increased diversification and reducing commodity dependency, and the enabling business environment to attract new investment and support job creation; also support provided to private sector development via government institutions has not been particularly effective, while the support provided directly to private sector organisations and productive sectors has been occasional and not always compatible with the procedures and systems for providing EU support.

Limited progress was assessed as well in the area of regional integration in natural resources and environmental management, considered as a "marginal objective" of the intra-ACP cooperation.<sup>122</sup>

The support provided in conflict situations has generally not been directed at tackling the root causes of conflict but rather at mitigating the consequences or providing 'classic' development support.

At impact level the evaluation evidenced how the contribution made by the CPA to promoting inclusive growth, and specifically to increasing the level of participation of the poor and accelerating the reduction of the incidence of poverty, has been insufficient and how the CPA has not been able to have a sufficient influence on either the internal mechanisms determining income distribution or the political economy equilibria in the ACP societies.

The Cooperation has also been weak in problem analysis and the assessment of the political and economic dimensions of the problems identified

Additional evidence from external evaluations and Court of Auditors reports, point to the limited effectiveness of regional cooperation toward regional integration: *Although "an increasing share of the EDF has been devoted to support regional integration, the presumed comparative advantage (of regional cooperation) is not confirmed by the findings of regional evaluations and the European Court of Auditors which register that results have been either disappointing or could not be identified."*

The same source also specifies how *"it was difficult to assess the results achieved or likely to be achieved by individual projects, due to poorly defined objectives, the lack of adequate reporting and monitoring and the fact that several major projects are ongoing and their final results are not yet known. Overall, these projects are likely to have, at best, only partially satisfactory results"*.<sup>123</sup>

**Effectiveness of intra-ACP Cooperation – EDF10:**<sup>124</sup> Programme level evaluations recognize intra-ACP results in different areas including the cultural and educational programme and the Participatory Slum Upgrading Programme. The intra-ACP evaluation recognizes that important outputs were delivered in the large number of programmes financed. However, evidence of outcomes is feeble<sup>125</sup> with a need for better definition of results at global level.<sup>126</sup>

Intra-ACP had a weak effectiveness in policy dialogue and support to reform: limited contributions to policy dialogue and frameworks could be evidenced in about only one third of programmes

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<sup>122</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>123</sup> ECA special report n.18 on Effectiveness of EDF support for Regional Economic Integration in East Africa and West Africa, 2009

<sup>124</sup> Sources for intra-ACP effectiveness include the intra-ACP evaluation, programme levels evaluations and interviews with Commission staff attached (currently in in the past) to intra-ACP cooperation

<sup>125</sup> It should be noted that intra-ACP evaluation was carried out in the early stage of the EDF10 implementation, which could contribute to explain the limited evidence about outcomes and impacts

<sup>126</sup> Intra-ACP evaluation, 2013



assessed.<sup>127</sup> The remaining two-thirds "have not set policy goals or have not yet delivered sufficient tangible results".

The establishment of and support to the Africa Peace Facility (APF) has been regarded as one of the more successful initiatives under the intra-ACP component of the EDF, "though its long-term funding remains a concern".<sup>128</sup>

For the health sector the evaluation found "indications of impact in which the GFATM contributed to progress made in preventing and fighting HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and strengthened the responsiveness of ACP countries to these diseases".<sup>129</sup>

Positive results were also appraised in terms of interconnectivity, as the Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund provided grants for blending financial sources for important infrastructures.

Many activities implemented under different programmes have been undertaken punctually, and are relatively successful (Programme Initiative Pesticides PIP, Commodities, Centre for the Development of Enterprise CDE).

However the overall competitiveness of ACP countries remains a challenge.

### **JC.2.3 Extent to which the EDF11 takes account of impact and sustainability requirements**

*The Instrument regulations, mechanisms and processes provide inadequate attention and support to sustainability and impact of regional and intra-ACP cooperation*

The Instrument regulations, mechanisms and processes provide inadequate attention and support to sustainability and impact of regional and intra-ACP cooperation. The finding is supported by the absence of provisions in Annex 4 supporting sustainability and impact for regional and Intra-ACP cooperation; the evaluation found as well lack of evidence of the instrument's adequate response to the numerous concerns about limited country commitments and financial contributions to cooperation institutions (NAOs, DMROs, ACP Secretariat) and regional organizations, an aspect undermining the sustainability of cooperation efforts and of regional integration.<sup>130</sup>

*CPA regulations for regional and Intra-ACP cooperation (Annex 4) do not mention the word "sustainability"*

The evaluation found that regional and intra-ACP cooperation lack of mechanisms requiring feasibility studies to support financial and institutional sustainability of its interventions as well as the absence of indicators and mechanisms to monitor financial and policy commitments, pre-requisites of sustainable results.<sup>131</sup>

*No impact evaluations were implemented for the EDF10 regional and intra-ACP cooperation.*

The limited use of evaluations and lesson-learning mechanisms (see also JC 2.1.4) is impairing the ability to appraise sustainability and impact of regional and intra-ACP cooperation results.

Impact and sustainability have been central concerns for past reviews of regional and intra-ACP cooperation; a key finding of the intra-ACP cooperation evaluation is that sustainability is rarely addressed in programme formulation.

The widespread practice in regional and intra-ACP cooperation of financing staff of institutions, including travel expenditures and per diem allowances, is undermining the sustainability of

<sup>127</sup> Source: Intra-ACP evaluation, Final Report 2013, reference to the following programmes: MEAs (3), EU Energy Facility (4), TBT (13), BizClim (14), Avian Flu (16), APF (17), Support to the ACP Secretariat (24), CTA, EUWI (6), Reinforcing Veterinary Governance (21), Migration (11), GCCA (2), GFDRR (5), PSUP (7) and PIP (12)

<sup>128</sup> IOB Evaluation The Netherlands and the European Development Fund - Principles and practices Evaluation of Dutch involvement in EU development cooperation (1998-2012)

<sup>129</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>130</sup> The finding is supported by the analysis of strategies and programming documents as well as by interviews with DEVCO stakeholders.

<sup>131</sup> These findings also are supported by the analysis of strategies and programming documents and interviews with DEVCO stakeholders.

institutional arrangements<sup>132</sup> while contributing to an aid-dependency culture.

### **EQ 3 To what extent is the EDF delivering efficiently?**

*The EDF10 regional and intra-ACP cooperation featured respectively the lowest and the best performances of EDF: extremely low absorption capacities have been recorded for regional cooperation; by the mid term review West Africa Region had contracted about 5% of its financial envelope; Conversely the intra-ACP evaluation (2012–2013) pointed to a remarkable performance of the instrument. The evaluation evidenced numerous constraints that are likely to slow down performance of regional and intra-ACP cooperation (JC 3.1)*

*The dismantling of the unit (December 2015) and the distribution of staff and financial envelopes across 7 DEVCO units is likely to drastically affect intra-ACP performance, due to the lack of unified management and vision of the intra-ACP, the diminished capacities of dialogue and interface with the ACP secretariat and decreased capacities of monitoring overall intra-ACP performances (JC 3.1)*

*Improved EDF11 procedures introduce more ambitious principles in several areas including advocating for a stronger role of civil society, while setting improved standards for regional strategies. The evaluation found limited compliance of several regional strategies with these provisions. Programme level visibility has been achieved for major programmes, including the APF and the Global Facility. However visibility for intra-ACP and Regional Cooperation as funding instruments remain low. Past efforts for intra-ACP increased visibility have been nullified by the new institutional set up adopted in 2016; The evaluation found evidence of increased EU visibility in the Pacific Region also due to Regional Cooperation efforts. (JC 3.2)*

#### **JC.3.1 Extent to which the EDF has been implemented in a timely manner**

*The EDF10 regional and intra-ACP cooperation featured respectively the lowest and the best performances of EDF: extremely low absorption capacities have been recorded for regional cooperation; by the mid term review West Africa Region had contracted about 5% of its financial envelope; Conversely the intra-ACP evaluation (2012–2013) pointed to remarkable performance of the instrument.*

*The dismantling of the unit in December 2015 and the distribution of staff and financial envelopes across 7 DEVCO units is likely to drastically affect intra-ACP performance, due to the lack of unified management and vision of the intra-ACP, the diminished capacities of dialogue and interface with the ACP secretariat and the decreased capacities of monitoring overall intra-ACP performances. The evaluation found evidence of increased EU visibility in the Pacific Region also due to Regional Cooperation efforts.*

"Intra-ACP is by far the best performing EDF instrument"

Source: Intra-ACP evaluation, Final Report 2013

EDF11 adjustments are largely addressed to alleviate the Commission's administrative burden, delegate responsibilities and improve cooperation financial performance. The main changes that are expected to support performance include the simplification of procedures, delegated cooperation mechanisms, increased use of blending in regional cooperation, use of fewer and larger contracts and the adoption of the direct access principle, designed to overcome the critical bottleneck of weaknesses of DMROs in implementation.

DEVCO lead in the regional and intra-ACP programming processes and also contributed to achieving the complex programming exercises in a reasonable time span of 18 - 24 months, as by mid-2015 the 5 RIPs were signed.<sup>133</sup>

<sup>132</sup> Interviews MN 421 and MN 267

<sup>133</sup> The delay is 18 months taking as start date the issuance of the regional programming guidelines. Nonetheless, preparations started earlier based on drafts.

The process of preparation and contracting for EDF11 regional and intra-ACP cooperation is complex and relatively slow as illustrated in Appendix 2, reflecting several steps of consultation and review; The overall timeline is similar to that of the EDF10.

The average timeline for definition of strategy and programming of regional and intra-ACP cooperation is comparable with most national programming exercises (see main evaluation report, EQ3).

The problem is that only three to four years are left to achieve results related to regional integration and production of public goods; the programming phase took about half of the seven years of the of EDF11 compressing considerably the timeline for formulation, implementation and achievement of sustainable results.

Now an important question is whether EDF11 with its current set-up will be able to maintain satisfactory performance over the next four years, during the contracting and implementation cycles. The EDF evaluation saw evidence of both opportunities and constraints that may affect the efficiency of regional cooperation and intra-ACP.

Opportunities comprise the improved quality of programme formulation processes and template, including a first albeit limited attention to results (see EQ 2), the direct access modality that will help in identifying options for efficient implementation, the increased delegated contracting arrangements which are likely to improve the Commission's disbursement flow. Also the improved Regional governance mechanisms and institutional set up (see EQ 2) may address programmes' bottlenecks allowing for a more efficient implementation.

At the same time the evaluation has evidenced several factors that may contribute to slow down performances for regional and intra-ACP; first of all the yet unaddressed very low capacities of Regional organizations and of the intra-ACP Secretariat, who maintain a key role in coordination, supervision and decision-making.

Another factor potentially slowing EDF 11 implementation is that choice of implementing partners has not been driven by a systematic analysis of previous performance (both financial performance and results delivery).<sup>134</sup> Additional constraints include the admittedly limited capacities of DEVCO to follow up implementation of contracts and manage them by results, both at Delegation and at Headquarters<sup>135</sup> and anticipated difficulties in coordinating, supervising and harmonizing cross-border implementation of different national entities, particularly in Africa.

The setting up of blending operations on a large scale could also prove to be time consuming, as evidenced by external evaluations of blending mechanism<sup>136</sup> (see also EQ 6).

The main challenge of regional cooperation, i.e. the limited willingness to incorporate regional priorities at national level (see EQ 2), is likely to affect performance of implementation of several results related to the adjustment of the regulatory, legislative and policy frameworks.

Additional potential bottlenecks for efficiency are the lack of awareness among potential beneficiaries about how regional and intra-ACP projects are managed and can be accessed. Moreover several actors have not a clear understanding of the institutional set-up and the processes of intra-ACP and regional cooperation.<sup>137</sup>

#### **Pacific regional cooperation timeline and performances**

- Period of RIP preparation (from start up to signature): 21 months
- Time elapsed since signature of RIPs to date: 27 months
- Contracted amount: 0%
- Estimate of contracted amount by end of 2017: 80%

*Source: DEVCO, Pacific regional cooperation*

<sup>134</sup> Interviews with DEVCO officials responsible for regional and intra-ACP cooperation

<sup>135</sup> Ibidem

<sup>136</sup> See for instance European Court of Auditors report n. 58

<sup>137</sup> Sources include Civil Society stakeholders interviewed during the evaluation.

The past remarkable financial performance of the EDF10 intra-ACP may largely be attributed to the proactive and centralized management of the Intra-ACP Unit (see intra-ACP evaluation). The dismantling of the unit in December 2015 and the distribution of staff and financial envelopes across 7 DEVCO units is likely to drastically affect intra-ACP performance, due to the lack of unified management and vision of the intra-ACP, the diminished capacities of dialogue and interface with the ACP secretariat and the decreased capacities of monitoring overall intra-ACP performances.<sup>138</sup>

The dismantling of the intra-ACP unit appears to be in clear contradiction with cooperation effectiveness and management by results principles, where the instrument adjustments and incentives are not informed by past performances and are likely to affect negatively effectiveness, efficiency and value added of the intra-ACP instrument

### **JC.3.2 Extent to which implementation was facilitated by new EDF procedures**

*Improved EDF11 procedures introduce more ambitious principles in several areas including advocating for a stronger role of civil society, while setting improved standards for regional strategies. The evaluation found limited compliance of several regional strategies with these provisions. Programme level visibility has been achieved for major programmes, including the APF and the Global Facility. However visibility for intra-ACP and Regional Cooperation as funding instruments remain low. Past efforts for intra-ACP increased visibility have been nullified by the new institutional set up adopted in 2016.*

In the past regional cooperation regulations differed significantly from national cooperation, including for instance in relation to a weaker attention to civil society, to result orientation and to sustainability. The EDF11 implementation regulations introduce more ambitious principles in several of these areas, advocating for a stronger role of civil society: *"the empowerment of the population of partner countries, inclusive and participatory approaches to development and a broad involvement of all segments of society in the development process and in national and regional dialogue, including political dialogue. Particular attention shall be given to the respective roles of parliaments, local authorities and civil society, inter alia, regarding participation, oversight and accountability".*

Provisions for the Regional Strategies<sup>139</sup> require several standard elements: i) Analysis of the regional economic integration process; ii) regional strategies and financing requirements; iii) partners' activities; iv) EU contributions to regional integration complementing those of partner countries; and v) most appropriate support mechanisms and integration. The assessment of effectiveness (EQ 2) suggests the limited compliance of several regional strategies with these provisions.

**Visibility.** Visibility has been achieved at programme level for major programmes, including the APF and the Global Facility. Documentation review points however to limited visibility of intra-ACP and regional cooperation, due also to lack of communication strategies and absence of measurable results. The 2013 intra-ACP evaluation noted how *"the visibility of intra-ACP cooperation as a funding vehicle and political instrument remained low."*<sup>140</sup> Following the evaluation several visibility initiatives were undertaken by the intra-ACP unit, including the establishment of an updated website, info-points and regular reporting. After the dismantling of the intra-ACP unit in December 2015, DEVCO staff feel that the visibility of intra-ACP cooperation will be nullified.<sup>141</sup>

Information gathered points to an increasing visibility of the EU in the Pacific Region, also supported by regional cooperation. This is the effect of the perception of the EU as a neutral player, with no or limited economic stakes in the region, genuinely supporting values and international agreements

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<sup>138</sup> The finding is supported by all interviews with DEVCO staff and ACP Secretariat, with a common perception of a significant negative impact of the new institutional set up and general lack of understanding of the decision to dismantle the Unit. DEVCO management however when interviewed regarded the change as positive for increased harmonization of intra-ACP and thematic budget lines.

<sup>139</sup> CPA, Annex for, Chapter 2, article 8

<sup>140</sup> Intra-ACP evaluation, Final Report 2013; the statement is supported by interviews with DEVCO staff (MN 42)

<sup>141</sup> Finding supported by interviews with DEVCO staff attached, currently and in the past, to intra-ACP cooperation

and providing Pacific islands with a platform for international dialogue and integration.<sup>142</sup>

#### **EQ 4 To what extent do the EDF programmes add value at country, regional and intra-regional levels?**

*Regional and intra-ACP mechanisms provide a remarkable opportunity to create political value added, allowing the EU to position itself at a supranational level contributing to shaping global and regional priorities and policies. However, this important potential is exploited only to a very limited extent, as the EU has not established itself as a regional and global leader and player and in consideration of issues of effectiveness (see EQ 2) and performances affecting regional and intra-ACP Cooperation.*

Findings on added value of intra-ACP and regional cooperation show on one hand a strong potential offered by the unique nature of the instruments and on the other the limited capacity of EU cooperation to seize this potential. There is a consensus<sup>143</sup> that both mechanisms (regional and intra-ACP cooperation) provide unique opportunities in terms of value added, for the size and scale of programmes and for the capacity to address issues which would be beyond the reach of national cooperation instruments. The capacity of Member States and other Development Partners to address regional integration and supra-national / global issues is limited. Likewise, other EFIs do not have the capacity and the scope to address interventions at such a level.

The CPA defines a legally binding framework offering a strategic value added for the promotion of EU values through cooperation and political dialogue. The potential of value added is positively assessed by the CPA evaluation: *"The added value of Intra-ACP Cooperation is high: Intra-ACP cooperation tackles global or common issues and brings added value through complementary support at supra-regional level. As such Intra-ACP Cooperation is working at a higher level than other EU and DCI cooperation instruments and Member States forms of cooperation. Furthermore, the important amount of funding available under the Intra-ACP Cooperation contributed to solving the challenges of ACP countries which cannot be easily tackled under other portfolios and forms of cooperation."*<sup>144</sup>

The same source recognizes how regional and intra-ACP instruments provide comparative advantages vis-à-vis Member States and other instruments in relation to: *"(i) presence, (ii) general neutrality, (iii) predictability of financial resources, (iv) critical mass mobilized in terms of financial support, (v) the wide range of instruments put in place, and (vi) recognized political and technical experience in critical sectors for the partnership. These elements were unique features of the EU action, and highlighted the position of the EU as a strong and reliable partner for all ACP countries."*<sup>145</sup>

Positive specific examples of value added were provided by interviews with EEAS and DEVCO officials working in intra-ACP and regional cooperation.<sup>146</sup> Examples of contribution to value added include the APF, considered by several stakeholders, including Member States, an exemplary case of value added; moreover the instrument offers opportunities to support South-South mechanisms, very positively perceived by beneficiaries. Similar opportunities are also recognized for regional cooperation as for instance with PALOP.

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<sup>142</sup> interviews with DEVCO and EEAS officers responsible for Pacific regional cooperation

<sup>143</sup> Including: EDF10 evaluations of regional cooperation and intra-ACP, interviews (MN 349, MN 485, MN 421, MN 20) regional strategy papers and indicative programming for EDF11, DAC peer review (20112)

<sup>144</sup> Source: CPA evaluation

<sup>145</sup> Ibidem

<sup>146</sup> For instance the following examples of value added were provided for Pacific Regional Cooperation: i) The establishment of a partnership with New Zealand, with whom the EU shares common development values and priorities, ii) The support of the Pacific Region to the EU agenda for Climate Change (Paris COP, sustainable innovation forum), iii) The setting up of a broad international policy dialogue at regional level, and iv) The EU building up a reputation as a neutral and honest broker in the Pacific Region (MN 421, MN 485, MN 349, MN 20)

Another example of value added is that the intra-ACP has been the only external instrument supporting cultural values. The success of its programmes allowed the re-centring of culture as a priority for EU cooperation.<sup>147</sup>

Another opportunity for value added is the promotion by the intra-ACP unit of EU values through its dialogue. However this "partnership" dimension of intra-ACP seems to have been lost now that the work is channelled through thematic units.<sup>148</sup>

This conspicuous opportunity for building a special position for the EU at regional and global level is, however, limited by several factors, including the limited capacity of the ACP group and the EU to build a common approach: EU and ACP constitute a cluster of 106 countries which could have a critical weight in shaping global issues. A rare example of cohesion is provided by a common ACP - EU front on the COP 21 agenda. In general, the partnership has very limited capacity to act cohesively for global action, supporting the Agenda for Change and SDGs; this is also in consideration of the weak internal cohesion of ACP and of the regional groups.

EEAS sources view the establishment of the Trust Fund as a loss in terms of value added related to the partnership: *"we are losing ownership and predictability because that is sacrificed in the Trust Fund as compared to the more partnership driven EDF"*.

Interviewed stakeholders point also to the limited capacity of the EU to establish itself as a leader, at regional and at global level, the EU being perceived *"as a payer more than a player"*. (MN 220, MN 253, MN 42)

ECDPM political and economic analysis points to a very limited added value of the *"aid-based partnership that consolidates dependency"*.

Value added is eroded as well by the different and sometime diverging positions of EU Member States vis-à-vis the EDF. The evaluation gathered a range of Member States' views, from very positive statements about value added to stern and critical stances.

Uneven results of regional integration have been constraining the capacity of the EU to build on regional value added. Interviews with DEVCO staff point to a *"limited value added of Regional Cooperation also in consideration of lack of sustainability of institutional set up and lack of a system of reliable contributions from partner countries"*. (MN 42, MN 45, MN 25).

The dispersion of the Intra-ACP Unit implies a significant loss in terms of added value

Source: Evaluation team assessment, following interviews with DEVCO and intra-ACP staff and external stakeholders

The institutional readjustment of the Intra-ACP has, according to stakeholders interviewed, blunted the value-added edge of the Intra-ACP financial instrument, due to a currently divided institutional set-up, split across 3 directorates and 7 units, with a marked division of policy and political dialogue and programme level dialogue (Interviews Units D3, B2, ) weakening a common vision, dialogue and management of Intra-ACP cooperation. (MN 485, MN 349, MN 421, MN 267, MN 42).

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<sup>147</sup> Interviews with DEVCO staff and external evaluation of intra-ACP cultural programmes

<sup>148</sup> MN 485, MN 349, MN 421, MN 267, MN 42, MN 414, MN 34.

## EQ 5 Coherence, consistency, complementarities and synergies

*Despite the increased efforts to establish links across national and regional programmes, the EDF11 maintains a limited capacity to support internal coherence, consistency and complementarity through regional and intra-ACP cooperation ; Regional and intra-ACP cooperation did not manage to establish an integrated approach with other instruments working at a supra-national level, including DCI, ENPI and EIB; the evaluation detected an apparent duplication between intra-ACP and the GPGC (Global Public Goods and Challenges - DCI), both mechanisms conceived for the production of public goods at global level. (JC 5.1)*

*The extent of involvement of MS and DPs in strategy and programming of regional and intra-ACP cooperation is considerably less than in national programming for lack of mechanisms and limited scope of MS at regional and intra-ACP level. The extent of application of joint programming to regional and intra-ACP cooperation is still weak. Civil Society is only marginally consulted during regional and intra-ACP programming phase. (JC 5.2)*

*The application of Policy Coherence for Development to regional and intra-ACP cooperation is constrained by significant challenges limiting trade and private sector development contributions to development efforts, including limited national commitment to regional integration priorities and low capacities to support private sector and trade. The establishment of measurable frameworks for EPA road map implementation is seen as a positive development. (JC 5.3)*

### **JC.5.1 Extent to which the EDF11 is equipped to ensure coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies between its own set of objectives and programmes**

*EDF11 maintains a limited capacity to support internal coherence, consistency and complementarity through regional and intra-ACP cooperation; Regional and intra-ACP cooperation did not manage to establish an integrated approach with other instruments working at a supra-national level, including DCI, ENPI and EIB; the evaluation detected an apparent duplication between intra-ACP and the GPGC (Global Public Goods and Challenges - DCI), both mechanisms conceived for the production of public goods at global level.*

The EDF10 design and implementation showed a limited capacity to build complementarities and synergies, as evidenced by the Court of Auditors report, the strategies and interventions for economic integration at the regional and national levels "have largely been designed and implemented independently of each other, with insufficient attention paid to the possibility of creating complementarity between them except, to some extent, in the transport sector".<sup>149</sup> The intra-ACP evaluation pointed as well that complementarities between intra-ACP and regional cooperation "remain a challenge" although "a good level of coordination during programme design"<sup>150</sup> as the level of coordination and complementarity with other instruments and bilateral and multilateral donors are "systematically assessed during programme formulation".

The consultation process set at the core of EDF11 programming phase (see EQ3) aims to take into account these lessons and strengthen complementarities, defining sectors for regional programming which could be complementary to NIPs, avoiding "duplications".<sup>151</sup> However structural conditions that in the past made regional cooperation stand in isolation (including weaknesses of regional organizations and compartmentalized approaches of different DEVCO instruments and mechanisms) have not been tackled and the challenges of limited capacities to establish coordination and complementarities across regional cooperation persist.

The analysis of programming processes (see main evaluation document, EQ2) suggests that the consultation, although it helped to increase alignment of regional and national programming, did not necessarily take into account priorities expressed by participants, as important decisions on focal

<sup>149</sup> ECA special report n.18 on Effectiveness of EDF support for Regional Economic Integration in East Africa and West Africa, 2009

<sup>150</sup> MN 421, MN 349 and MN 485.

<sup>151</sup> Several sources support the finding of a complex exercise of consultation at the basis of regional and national programming, including ECPDM report 180

sectors were taken in Brussels.

In the case of the Pacific Region a different strategy was adopted, aiming to maintain the same focal sectors for national and regional programming. On the other hand, this strategy reduces the number of sectors for EDF intervention. In other regions, choices for regional cooperation privileged an ampler spectrum of interventions, responding to a broader range of needs. Both approaches have their pro and cons, favouring either differentiation or concentration. In the case of the Pacific Region, also in consideration of needs that are more homogeneous, the strategy may strengthen complementarities and synergies and create a critical mass toward common goals.

Despite the increased efforts to establish links across national and regional programmes, the EDF11 maintains a limited capacity to support internal coherence, consistency and complementarity through regional and intra-ACP cooperation: "*The link intra-ACP and regional Cooperation doesn't work*": intra-ACP strategy and programming was not coordinated and lacked of consultation with Delegations and Regional Programmes; "*very difficult to know what Intra-ACP is doing*". In general, national stakeholders (NAOs, line ministries) have a limited knowledge of the intra-ACP.<sup>152</sup>

The analysis of regional programming documents show that although duplications have been reduced, limited synergies have been developed between national and regional EDF programmes as only in few instances regional programming identifies results related to the domestication of regional priorities and specify synergies with national programming.

Overlapping mandates and cross-membership of regional organizations have contributed to constrain coordination and the building of synergies for regional efforts.<sup>153</sup>

Complementarities and avoidance of duplications are likely to be strengthened during the programme formulation phase, as mechanisms have been established to support internal consultation including QSG1 and 2, inter-service review, and consultation with Member States.<sup>154</sup>

**Complementarities of regional and intra-ACP cooperation with other EFIs:** In consideration of the specialized nature of regional and intra-ACP cooperation, there is limited scope for complementarities with other EFIs. The review of EDF10 suggests a gap in terms of synergies in Africa, "*synergies required with EDF programmes at national and regional levels, and with other EU budget instruments, have failed to materialize to the extent necessary for a real integrated approach*". In particular, the review refers to instruments such as the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), and the Instrument for Stability and the European Investment Bank (EIB).<sup>155</sup> This deficit has been partially addressed by an increased attention to complementarities during EDF11 programming and the interventions' formulation. As most regional and intra-ACP programmes have not yet been started, the evaluation could not gather evidence as whether the increased attention to complementarities has been translated into increased synergies of regional and intra-ACP cooperation with other instruments during implementation.

An apparent duplication has been identified between intra-ACP and the GPGC (Global Public Goods and Challenges) (DCI), both mechanisms conceived for the production of public goods at global level. Sectors appear to be largely overlapping (see Table A.12 below), the main difference being the intra-ACP instrument's capacity to support the African Peace Facility.

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<sup>152</sup> Finding supported by several intra-ACP and Regional Cooperation stakeholders, including MN 267, MN 416, MN 303, MN 156

<sup>153</sup> Example of regional projects for private sector in Zambia with COMESA and in Botswana with SADC, with lack of coordination (source: Delegation staff in Zambia).

<sup>154</sup> Personal judgment based on analysis of improved specifications for formulation.

<sup>155</sup> EC (2011). 10th EDF Performance Review. Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2011) 1055 final



**Table A.12 Sectors covered by GPGC and Intra-ACP**

GPGC	Intra-ACP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Human rights and governance</li> <li>• Food and agriculture</li> <li>• Infrastructure</li> <li>• Environment</li> <li>• Energy</li> <li>• Economic growth</li> <li>• Health</li> <li>• Education</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Human and social development</li> <li>• Resilience building</li> <li>• Climate Change</li> <li>• Environment</li> <li>• Private sector development and investment</li> <li>• African Peace Facility</li> </ul>

Source: Evaluation team analysis of key documents

**JC.5.2 Extent to which the EDF11 is equipped to ensure coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies between its programmes and those funded by MS and other DPs**

*The extent of involvement of MS and DPs in strategy and programming of regional and intra-ACP cooperation is considerably less than in national programming for lack of mechanisms and limited scope of MS at regional and intra-ACP level. The extent of application of joint programming to regional and intra-ACP cooperation is still weak. Civil Society is only marginally consulted during regional and intra-ACP programming phase*

Although the EDF11 strategy has considerably broadened the processes of consultation to build coordination and synergies with Member States, development partners and other financial instruments,<sup>156</sup> the extent of involvement of MS and DPs in strategy and programming of regional and intra-ACP cooperation is considerably less than in national programming for the lack of mechanisms of joint programming and for limited scope of Member States at regional and global level.<sup>157</sup> The role of Member States in Regional Cooperation is further strengthened by the EDF committee.

However, the contribution of the Committee in strengthening programme design – while important – comes very late in the process and by the time a proposal reaches the EDF committee it has almost completed a cycle of one to two years of identification and formulation. This means stakes and investment are already high and that makes it more difficult to make changes at this stage.

The extent of application of joint programming to regional and intra-ACP cooperation is still weak. AFD study on regional cooperation (2012) evidences how coordination and the implementation of common programmes in regional cooperation, beyond infrastructure sector (energy and transport), is "more the exception than the rule".<sup>158</sup> The evaluation could not gather evidence to say whether this has improved.

There is limited record of synergies developed with Civil Society as a partner for regional and Intra-ACP cooperation. The rationale, according to DEVCO programming officers, is related to the lack of capacity of Civil Society to interface at Regional or global level and the time and costs that would be associated to a broad process of consultation. Civil Society interviewed recognized the shallowness of the consultation process and the lack of knowledge of opportunities offered by intra-ACP (MN 416, MN 494; for a more detailed analysis of the EDF11 partnership and consultation with civil society see Annex 15).

<sup>156</sup> Review of strategy papers and interviews with DEVCO officials (MN 5, MN 20, MN 45, MN 156)

<sup>157</sup> ECPDM paper 180, Implementing the Agenda for Change An independent analysis of the 11th EDF programming

<sup>158</sup> AFD 2012, L'appui à l'intégration régionale en Afrique : quels enjeux pour les partenaires au développement?

### **JC.5.3 Extent to which the EDF interventions at regional and intra-ACP levels have benefited from the EU's Policy Coherence for Development principle**

*The application of Policy Coherence for Development to regional and intra-ACP cooperation is constrained by significant challenges limiting trade and private sector development contributions to development efforts, including limited national commitment to regional integration priorities and low capacities to support private sector and trade. The establishment of measurable frameworks for EPA road map implementation is seen as a positive step.*

As discussed in the main report (section 2.5) mechanisms have been put in place to strengthen Policy Coherence for Development. Regional and intra-ACP cooperation did benefit from the increased attention to security (and the nexus development-security) and the renewed efforts to start the implementation of EPAs and establish road maps for trade. The analysis of trade policy support to development in regional cooperation shows an increasing attention to the "trade-development" link. The evaluation evidenced as well as the challenges ahead including the domestication of regional integration priorities, the very low absorption and limited capacities of regional organizations which proved key challenges for EDF10. Additional challenges include the limited capacities across DEVCO to support private sector development and the pending need to establish comprehensive frameworks at national level for trade, investment and doing business; to establish these frameworks capacities will have to be built for trading, regulation, production and administration.

Although DG TRADE recommended that EPA support be included as a priority in national programmes, this did not happen and in the EDF11 EPAs are supported by regional mechanisms; however, the principle of direct access allows for increased opportunities to reinforce national capacities through regional cooperation.

As a positive development recently started national EPA implementation plans define road maps for EPAs and allow the establishment of a measurable framework including for policy engagements; the first one was started in South Africa (one of three major EPAs negotiated in 2014).

### **EQ 6 To what extent has the EDF leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement?**

*The evaluation found that regional and intra-ACP cooperation are not geared to follow up and assess the effects on domestic resources mobilization. In specific cases domestic spending has not been adequate to support regional and intra-ACP cooperation as ACP States provided uneven and often lagging contributions to regional organizations and to ACP secretariat. Regional cooperation contributions to domestic resource mobilization is expected to increase of importance with the EDF11 blending component and support to private sector (JC 6.1)*

*Under EDF11 over € 1.380m will be allocated to blending and regional economic integration; the evaluation found that blending is a relevant mechanism to support EDF goals and there are considerable opportunities for its application. However several challenges may constrain blending effectiveness, performances and impact opportunities, including limited DEVCO and EU Delegations capacities to accompany blending operations including exercising functions of monitoring, policy dialogue, lesson learning, building complementarities and supporting EU visibility; the setting up of a blending pipeline might be slow and only few projects might be relevant for blending. Countries indebtedness is also limiting the scope for blending. (JC 6.2)*

*The Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the EDF financial instrument, including through regional and intra-ACP cooperation mechanisms, offer unique opportunities to support EU values and principles through political dialogue, promoting improved governance and supporting the instrument goals by policy discussions at country, regional and global level. The evaluation found evidence of an increased attention to policy level dialogue at regional level but overall the EU proved unable to seize the remarkable potential offered by the instrument to support and to assume a leading role in a political and policy agenda, with very limited evidence of results achieved through dialogue. Moreover, some EDF11 adjustments, including intra-ACP unit dismantling and shifting a significant part of cooperation activities to blending, may further reduce the instrument capacity to support such*

*dialogue. Weak leadership, unproductive political dialogue and limited capacities of policy dialogue are crucial constraints to the effectiveness of regional and intra-ACP cooperation (JC 6.3)*

### **JC.6.1 The extent to which the EDF10 and 11 have successfully contributed to the increase of domestic resources mobilization**

*The evaluation found that regional and intra-ACP cooperation are not geared to follow up and assess the effects on domestic resources mobilization. In specific cases domestic spending has not been adequate to support regional and intra-ACP cooperation as ACP States provided uneven and often lagging contributions to regional organizations and to ACP secretariat. Regional cooperation contributions to domestic resource mobilization is expected to increase of importance with the EDF11 blending component and support to private sector.*

The supranational nature of regional and intra-ACP cooperation restricts the scope for contributions to domestic resource mobilization (DRM). However, considering that the majority of programmes are implemented at national level, supporting national goals, the judgment criterion appears fully relevant to the assessment of regional and intra-ACP cooperation.

The evaluation found that regional and intra-ACP cooperation are not geared to follow up and assess the effects on domestic resources mobilization. The screening of regional cooperation and intra-ACP evaluations showed a lack of attention by evaluations to DRM and no specific monitoring system has been identified to support the follow up of domestic resource mobilization.

Another dimension worthy of interest is whether and to what extent the EDF has been instrumental in increasing the financial engagement of partner countries and regions in cooperation priority areas. In specific cases, it appears that domestic spending has not been adequate to support regional and intra-ACP cooperation as ACP States provided uneven and often lagging contributions to regional organizations and to ACP secretariat, a factor undermining the sustainability of EDF aid delivery mechanism;<sup>159</sup> Regional cooperation contributions to domestic resource mobilization is expected to increase of importance with the EDF11 blending component and support to private sector and this will require the set-up of adequate monitoring mechanisms.

### **JC.6.2 Extent to which the EDF has successfully leveraged funds for development**

*Under EDF11 over €1.380m will be allocated to blending and regional economic integration; the evaluation found that blending is a relevant mechanism to support EDF goals and there are considerable opportunities for its application. However several challenges may constrain blending effectiveness, performances and impact opportunities, including limited DEVCO and EU Delegations capacities to accompany blending operations including exercising functions of monitoring, policy dialogue, lesson learning, building complementarities and supporting EU visibility; the setting up of a blending pipeline might be slow and only few projects might be relevant for blending. Countries indebtedness is also limiting the scope for blending.*

The introduction of blending mechanisms to support transport and energy infrastructure networks for regional integration and private sector development is one of the approaches supported by the EDF11 strategy (see EQ1). RIPs have allocated significant resources for blending: out of €3,344m of the EDF11 for regional cooperation, 70% is earmarked for regional economic integration and of this 59% (€1.380m) is allocated to blending.

The EDF blending framework includes the Investment Facility for the Pacific, the Africa Investment Facility (AfiF), and the Caribbean Investment Facility. According to the EIB Business Strategy 2014-2016 for the ACP, priority will be given to projects with a high development impact, promoting economic stability, sustainable growth and employment creation, projects in which the EIB can provide added value in both financial and non-financial terms.

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<sup>159</sup> Interviews: MN 267, MN 421, MN 253, MN 20

Several sources, including the 2014 report on regional blending by the European Court of Auditors<sup>160</sup> back the finding that blending is a relevant mechanism to support EDF goals and that there are considerable opportunities for its application through regional and intra-ACP cooperation.<sup>161</sup> The Court of Auditors report concludes that blending is an effective instrument to support EU external policies and that regional investment facilities are well set up. However the report evidenced how Commission management shortcomings are constraining the ability to fully harvest the potential benefits of blending. Such limitations include: i) review of grants based on insufficient information, ii) review mechanisms not sufficiently focused on blending added value, iii) unnecessarily high advance disbursement upon approval, and iv) inadequate monitoring to follow up projects' added value.

Similar concerns related to management capacities are also expressed by the EPCDM report on regional programming: *"There are also concerns about the EC's ability to manage blending in a 'politically savvy' way"*. The capacity of DEVCO and EU Delegations to accompany blending operations, including exercising functions of monitoring, policy dialogue, lesson learning, building complementarities and supporting EU visibility, have been questioned by several DEVCO stakeholders during interviews.<sup>162</sup>

Country visits, interviews<sup>163</sup> and documentation reviews<sup>164</sup> also provided evidence of significant potential challenges for the EDF11 blending, including that blending mechanisms are proving to be slow to put in place.<sup>165</sup> Moreover blending needs to be in line with regional integration priorities and project identification and design will have to take into account demand and possible barriers to cross border infrastructure development. Blending is recognized to work better for middle and upper income countries.

An additional challenge for an extensive use of blending under EDF11 comprise the increased indebtedness of countries, a factor which may limit the scope for blending. Also only a limited number of projects may be relevant for blending; however experiences from regional cooperation blending show how in general IFIs have been identifying an adequate number of relevant projects.

The Court of Auditors special report on blending evidences how blending might also promote ownership of projects. Such a conclusion is however mitigated by the ECDPM report on EDF11 regional programming, which concludes that ownership might be constrained by the *"limited space available to national and regional actors for leading the implementation of blending projects"*. Previous studies on blending instruments showed the difficulty of assessing the extent to which the loan is an effect of the grant component and whether the loan would have been issued also in absence of the grant.<sup>166</sup>

### **JC.6.3 Extent to which the EDF, because of the legal basis of the Cotonou partnership, has enabled the EU to take on a leading role in policy and political discussion with PCs**

*The Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the EDF financial instrument, including through regional and intra-ACP cooperation mechanisms, offer unique opportunities to support EU values and principles through political dialogue, promoting improved governance and supporting the instrument goals by policy discussions at country, regional and global level. The evaluation found evidence of an increased attention to policy level dialogue at regional level but overall the EU proved unable to seize the remarkable potential offered by the instrument to support and to assume a leading role in a political and policy agenda, with very limited evidence of results achieved through dialogue. Moreover, some EDF11 adjustments, including intra-ACP unit dismantling and shifting a significant*

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<sup>160</sup> ECA, special report n. 16, The effectiveness of blending regional investment facility grants with financial institution loans to support EU external policies 2014

<sup>161</sup> MN 11 and MN 20

<sup>162</sup> Including MN 220, MN 468.

<sup>163</sup> MN 267, MN 487, MN 468

<sup>164</sup> ECDPM paper 192; 11th EDF programming for regional integration

<sup>165</sup> For instance out of an allocation of €525m for blending for EA-SA-IO cooperation, only two proposals have so far been identified. Commitments of about 30% of the envelope are foreseen before the end of the year

<sup>166</sup> Neighbourhood Investment Facility Mid-Term Evaluation - DRN, 2012.

*part of cooperation activities to blending, may further reduce the instrument capacity to support such dialogue. Weak leadership, unproductive political dialogue and limited capacities of policy dialogue are crucial constraints to the effectiveness of regional and intra-ACP cooperation*

Lessons from the EDF10 pointed to the limited capacity of regional cooperation to support regional integration goals through the development of national policy and regulatory frameworks aligned with regional priorities. Such weakness was recognized in the EDF11 regional programming documents, and addressed through several mechanisms; most programming documents identified key priorities for domestication of regional priorities, including specific results aimed to support policy changes. Steering Committee offered a platform to articulate political and policy dialogue at regional level. However, interviews at External Action pointed how so far Steering Committees agenda tends to deal on programme level issues with limited or lack of attention to political and global agendas.

The establishment of a single programming document for the EA-SA-IO is meant to support a broader policy and political dialogue.<sup>167</sup>

The CPA evaluation provides a positive insight into the political dialogue established with regional organizations: *"Political dialogue with regional organisations has fostered better mutual understanding of positions, has allowed the EU to raise awareness on security issues with impact beyond the regional and promote more regional ownership over issues such as maritime security or drug trafficking"*.

Notwithstanding this increased attention, evidence still points to weak capacity of the partnership and the EU to generate a beneficial political and policy dialogue. Programming documents while recognizing the importance to support regional integration through changes in national legislation and policy frameworks fail to develop specific and measurable result frameworks at regional and country level, with adequate mechanisms and follow up arrangements (including specific baselines and targets) to support these changes.<sup>168</sup> Also EEAS and DEVCO limited capacities to support political and policy dialogue have not been addressed by the EDF11.

ECDPM political and economic analysis evidences the structurally weak foundations of ACP- EU partnership including for the mixed track record for political dialogue, pointing to an increasing number of sensitive issues including a closing space for civil society and how ACP - EU discussions on such issues tend to be "polarized and "unconstructive", with lack of common vision on the purpose of the political dialogue. Most interviews converge toward a finding of a weak and ineffective political dialogue.

Several sources pointed to the limited capacity of EU supranational cooperation to steer and govern global initiatives; the intra-ACP evaluation points to a passive role and limited capacity to use Intra-ACP financial cooperation *"as a mean to voice common EU and ACP positions and to influence strategic orientations of global initiatives or multi-donor trust funds"* (see also analysis of value added in EQ 4). ACP countries, at times, have chosen to cooperate with other groupings, for instance the G77, which may have been perceived as better articulating their interests.

OPC respondents have identified a number of global challenges where the future partnership could add value. More specifically, emphasis was put on the 'SDG package', but also on climate change, poverty reduction, peace and security, the fight against international terrorism, private sector development, energy security, natural disasters, equitable trade practices, urbanisation (though some of these issues are not necessarily global challenges). Greater coordination between the EU and the ACP at the international level, as well as the need to promote Policy Coherence for (sustainable) Development were largely emphasized as needed in order to achieve better results when addressing global challenges.

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<sup>167</sup> ECDPM paper 192; 11th EDF programming for regional integration argues however that the arrangements will not necessarily support a better dialogue: *"A single RIP for the EA-SA-IO region will not necessarily lead to a deeper political dialogue on regional integration among different ROs. This is because countries may continue to see benefits in pursuing their national interests through different regional configurations and overlapping memberships. Also, the cross-regional envelope may not deliver the expected results, particularly given its strong fragmentation and focus on EU priorities"*

<sup>168</sup> Finding supported by the evaluator systematic review of all EDF11 regional programming documents

The dismantling of intra-ACP unit removed the centralized management mechanism, with its unified vision and dialogue for intra-ACP cooperation, blunting EU capacity under the EDF11 to promote political and policy dialogue through the instrument. The ACP Secretariat perceives the change as a lack of DEVCO attention to ACP partnership.<sup>169</sup>

Political dialogue mechanisms with regional organizations are often not adequate to promote a credible dialogue; participants describe the dialogue as “*two monologues*”. The once per year mechanism is reduced to a few hours of exchanges with long agenda (MN 253).

## CONCLUSIONS

The 2015 CPA provides a coherent regulatory framework for the EDF11 Regional and Intra-ACP Cooperation, although the level of definition is much weaker than the one provided for national cooperation, a factor that may affect regional and intra-ACP cooperation accountability, management by results and ownership.

The EDF11 adjusted significantly its Regional and Intra-ACP Cooperation addressing previous weaknesses evidenced by external assessments of the EDF10. Changes allowed developing a more relevant, coherent and focused cooperation at regional and Intra-ACP levels. Major useful innovations include i) the introduction of the principle of direct access of Regional Funds to national authorities and regional organizations, ii) increased focus on key priorities, including peace and security, economic regional integration and global challenges, iii) Increased use of blending aid modality adjusting to EU Agenda for Change, iv) Establishing an umbrella regional indicative programme for the Southern Africa, Eastern Africa and Indian Ocean Regions, v) Setting up of new governance mechanism including regional steering committees, vi) Capacity development for DMROs, vii) Application of the principle of concentration, with fewer sectors of interventions and a decreased number of programmes, with increased volume of interventions, viii) Improved mechanisms and processes for strategies and programming, ix) improved attention to the quality of Action Documents and strengthening of quality control mechanisms, x) simplification of procedures and xi) increased use of delegated cooperation management modality

These adjustments are designed to improve regional and intra-ACP cooperation performances and alleviate the administrative burden for the EU.

The instrument processes for definition of strategy, programming and actions have been appreciably upgraded. At programme level the formulation and quality control mechanisms are increasingly supporting measurability and result orientation. However, in general regional and intra-ACP cooperation programming documents are not result-focused and do not provide a measurable framework for EU Cooperation. A credible theory of change is not established for regional and intra-ACP linking 5 billion euro of financial resources to regional integration goals and production of public goods through the intra-ACP.

By January 2016 Intra-ACP cooperation has been considerably weakened with the suppression of the unit that was managing intra-ACP cooperation, with a track record of outstanding performances. The change has completely transformed the nature of the intra-ACP instrument, lessening its effectiveness and performances while developing a negative value added. Synergies and complementarities with thematic lines are supported by the new arrangement, although coordination with thematic lines used to work well also in the past. The capacity of dialogue with ACP secretariat has been significantly decreased. As stakeholders put it: “*there is not any more an instrument used in a strategic way, just a source of additional funding for thematic priorities*”. The dispersed management system does not support aid effectiveness principles of management by result and mutual accountability. Opportunities for policy and political dialogue associated to the financial cooperation have been undermined.

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<sup>169</sup> MN 421, MN 267, MN 253

While several changes addressed implementation bottlenecks, critical structural weaknesses of Regional and Intra-ACP cooperation have not been addressed by the EDF11, including an overall limited measurability and lack of result orientation and the lack of management by results both on EU and ACP sides.

Additional constraints include limited capacity and willingness to transpose regional ambitions at national level and weaknesses related to the institutional set up, particularly ACP secretariat and Regional Organizations.

Lack of a united voice across the ACP-EU partnership capable to support global challenges (with the exception of a common position concerning climate change) is also eroding cooperation effectiveness at a global level.

There are limited synergies between National, Regional and Intra-ACP cooperation efforts.

The improved simplification of procedures and the progressive delegation of responsibilities to partners have not been balanced by a comparable level of increased management by results and accountability for regional and intra-ACP.

The increased risk that financial, administrative and contractual irregularities will be undetected by simplified procedural arrangements and the lack of result orientation may entail a significant cost for the EDF11 regional and intra-ACP Cooperation in terms of accountability and decreased capacity to have incidence on good governance.

The incentives for rapid disbursement outweigh the incentives for investing in analysis, high-quality policy dialogue and political facilitation, which offer greater scope for building a firm basis for results

*Source: ECDPM, Political Economic Analysis*

## Appendix 1 to Annex 7:

### Overview of dashboard data on regional and intra-ACP Cooperation allocations (EDF10 and EDF11)


This appendix provides additional data on EDF10 and EDF11 allocations and commitments; Data is sourced mainly from the Commission dashboard. This information is meant to support the discussion and the assessment of regional and intra-ACP cooperation and to help in understanding the increasing trends in financial commitments.

Regional and intra-ACP cooperation are specific instruments, part of the EDF, designed to work at supra-national level contributing to regional integration in the ACP regions and to the production of global public goods.

Regional and intra-ACP cooperation are specific instruments, part of the EDF, designed to work at supra-national level contributing to regional integration in the ACP regions and to the production of global public goods.

The volume of regional and intra-ACP has been steadily increasing: the overall value of regional and intra-ACP cooperation in the EDF11 is €6,934m with a 30% increase from EDF10.

**Figure A.8 EDF11: % value of regional and intra ACP**



### Regional Cooperation

"Regional integration is the process of neighbouring countries cooperating in order to improve political stability and to stimulate economic development in a region in larger and more harmonized markets, the free movement of goods, services, capital and people enables economies of scale and stimulates trade and investment. Regional economic integration between developing countries is thus a vehicle for economic growth and can contribute to poverty reduction".

Source: Court of Auditors special report no.18

Regional integration is an important part of EDF strategy to contribute to objectives of poverty reduction, supporting at regional level goals of economic growth and private sector development, peace and security, improved environment and resilience to climate change. The revised version of



the Cotonou Agreement emphasizes a growing importance of regional integration for the ACP -EU cooperation. The budget dedicated to regional cooperation has been growing from €782 million under the 8th EDF (1996-2001), to €904m under the 9th EDF (2002-2007), €1 783m under the EDF10 (2008-2013), and €3 344m under the EDF11 (2014-2020) (ECDPM, 2016).

The main aims of regional and intra-ACP Cooperation are:

- a) Political Stability (promotion of policies related to security, human rights and democratization, political stability and conflict resolution);
- b) Economic development: regional economic integration as a motor for poverty reduction and development;
- c) Delivery of regional public goods.

The envelopes of the 5 Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) signed by mid-2015, are outlined in Table A.13.


**Table A.13 Financial commitments for EDF10 and EDF11 Regional and Intra-ACP Cooperation**

<b>Cooperation Mechanisms</b>	<b>EDF10 €m</b>	<b>EDF11 €m</b>	<b>EDF10 % Absorption</b>	<b>Change EDF10 to 11 €m</b>
<b>Regional</b>				
West Africa	597	1,150		+ 553
EA-SA-IO	645	1,332		+ 687
Central Africa	165	350		+ 185
Caribbean	165	346		+ 181
Pacific	95	166		+ 71
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1,667</b>	<b>3,344</b>		<b>+ 1,677</b>
<b>Intra-ACP</b>	<b>2,700</b>	<b>3,590</b>		<b>+ 890</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,367</b>	<b>6,934</b>		<b>+ 2,567</b>


**Table A.14 EDF allocations by Region**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Allocations</b>				
	<b>EDF8</b>	<b>EDF9</b>	<b>EDF10</b>	<b>EDF11</b>	<b>Total</b>
Africa	82%	72%	77%	<b>77%</b>	76%
Intra-ACP	9%	20%	14%	<b>15%</b>	15%
Caribbean	6%	6%	7%	<b>4%</b>	6%
Pacific	3%	2%	2%	<b>3%</b>	2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>


### Financial figures for EDF10 (source: dashboard)




### Financial figures EDF regional cooperation 2014 - 2016 (source: dashboard)



### EDF11 contracts, by management modality (source: dashboard)



**Intra-ACP EDF commitments (2014 - 2016) by sector (source: dashboard)**



## Appendix 2 to Annex 7:

### Regional and Intra-ACP strategies and adherence to CPA dispositions

CPA – dispositions for Strategies – (Annex 4)	Shortcomings as evidenced by Strategies review
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>analysis of the political, economic and social and environmental context of the region</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Shallow analysis of context.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>assessment of the process and prospects of regional economic integration and integration into the world economy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Shallow and unspecific analysis of domestication of regional priorities at national level in order to achieve regional and world economy integration.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>an outline of the regional strategies and priorities pursued and the expected financing requirements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Limited and superficial discussion of strategic choices (including choice of sectors, priorities, implementation modalities, synergies, and participation mechanisms).</li> <li>Fragmentation is maintained by a high number of objectives and results (*)</li> <li>In some cases, results appear to be only partially relevant to regional integration goals.</li> <li>In the case of intra-ACP cooperation several results are not relevant to supra-national and global cooperation (see EQ1) and several actions address micro-level interventions.</li> <li>Allocation of resources is not based on analysis of EDF10 performance and absorption capacities.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>an outline of relevant activities of other external partners in regional cooperation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Shallow review of Development Partners' efforts</li> </ul>

Source: Evaluation team review of 4 RSPs and the intra-ACP Strategy

(\*) For instance, the strategy for West Africa Region identifies 3 priority areas, including 24 specific objectives and more than 100 results

## **Appendix 3 to Annex 7:**

### **Review of the EDF11 RIP process: example from Central Africa**

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A review of consultation and preparatory activities for the Central Africa RIP enabled the evaluation team to improve their understanding of strategy development and programming mechanisms.

The process lasted almost two years (started in September 2012 and was concluded in July 2014). It was accompanied by a structured consultation with key actors and included:

1. Start-up meeting HQ – Delegations (September 2012).
2. Exercise to check areas of complementarity with other Financial Instruments
3. Meeting EU – DMROs at Director level, for a first definition of RIP priority areas and to define governance structure.
4. Support was available in terms of programming orientations.
5. Three-day programming seminar in Brussels (January 2013) with participation of Delegations,
6. DMROs and NAOs, and with the attendance of the Commissioner.
7. Meeting with financial institutions in Brussels (infrastructure, private sector development) (April 2013).
8. Development of draft RIP and concept notes (February – May 2014).
9. Preparatory meetings in Libreville and Steering Committee (June 2014).
10. Consultation with Delegations on draft RIP.
11. Internal consultation in DEVCO on draft RIP (July 2014).
12. DEVCO finalisation of draft RIP (September – December 2014).
13. Formal submission by DMRO of draft RIP (January 2015).
14. Regional team meeting (January 2015).
15. DEVCO management approval of RIP (February 2015).
16. Meeting between DEVCO and financial institutions (setting up of blending facility for Africa) (March 2015).
17. Libreville: workshop on identification of projects (DMROs, NAO and EU Delegations).
18. Technical meeting ECCAS/CEMAC for validation of roadmap for implementation.
19. European Parliament Development Committee (15 May 2015) – democratic scrutiny.
20. EDF Committee and discussion of governance mechanisms; MS questions on all regional programmes (2 June).
21. First steering committee (Libreville, 3 June), roadmap.
22. Extended Steering Committee Meeting (23-24/6) preparation of COPEL.
23. Signature of CA - RIP (24 June 2015).
24. Yaoundé 6-8 July Civil Society Seminar and Social Committee.

The output of the process (the EDF11 Regional Strategy and indicative programming for Central Africa) is assessed by this evaluation as a very weak document, with limited capacity to support effectively the delivery of regional cooperation toward goals of regional integration and stability.

## 1. Introduction

The TOR for the performance review specify that programmes are to be established in each of the 16 overseas countries and territories which are eligible for territorial allocation, as well as for regional allocations using the EDF11 funding. The thematic scope of the performance review included examining the “contribution to achieving the objectives of the Overseas Association Decision for OCTs”. However, at the time of the performance review programming for the OCTs was still in a preliminary stage. It was thus not possible to make an assessment of the contribution to achieving the objectives of the OAD. The performance review therefore focused on obtaining OCT-specific responses to each of the EQs.

This annex provides an overview of the background to the EU development cooperation, the legal framework, support under the previous EDF and under EDF11, and outlines the programming process for the OCTs (sections 1 to 3). Under section 4, this annex also summarizes findings by the performance review against each of the EQs and JCs. These findings should be interpreted with caution in light of the limitations outlined below.

**Approach:** The performance review included a specific workstream on the OCTs within its line of inquiry. The workstream sought to ensure an appropriate focus on the distinctive features of the OCTs within the wider group of EDF countries and territories, while recognizing that these represent – from a financial perspective – only a very small component of the EDF. The work stream focused on analysing existing documentation, on preparing and conducting field visits to two OCTs (out of the total of eight countries which were visited as part of the performance review), and undertook a number of wider OCT-related interviews at HQ and with Brussels representatives of OCTs and with the Association of Overseas Countries and Territories of the EU (OCTA). The OCTs to be visited (Aruba and New Caledonia) were selected in consultation with the ISG and with the OCT unit in DEVCO.

**Limitations:** The evaluation faced a number of challenges in relation to the OCTs in addition to the limitations discuss in Annex 4 of the report. A first limitation concerns the limited documentary evidence available regarding the EDF10 and EDF11, in particular the lack of recent external reviews and evaluations. This made it more challenging than in the rest of the performance review exercise to draw from secondary sources. A second limitation is that while a significant portion of the performance review’s resources was dedicated to field work in the OCTs (two out of eight countries), the heterogeneity of the OCTs, combined with the limitations in data sources, makes it difficult to generalize from the two OCTs which were studied to the broader group of OCTs. As a result, the strength of the evidence presented in section 4 of this annex is generally lower than for the mainstream EDF findings. The findings presented here are thus not fully generalizable to the group of OCTs and should be taken as a basis for further review and analysis.

### 1.1. Background context of EU – OCT Cooperation

The involvement of the OCTs in European Union (EU) cooperation is closely related to the foundation of the European Union. At the time of the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, France made its adherence to the Treaty of Rome conditional on the inclusion of arrangements for the so-called association of overseas collectivities and territories which at that time included territories still under colonial rule. In order to provide financial and technical assistance support, the EEC created the European Overseas Development Fund (EODF/FEDOM in French), which was replaced by the European Development Fund (EDF) when African states became independent.

## 1.2. Characteristics of OCTs

The number of OCTs has varied over time.<sup>170</sup> At present, there is a total of 25 OCTs,<sup>171</sup> including Greenland, with a total population of more than one million people. All OCTs are islands, scattered territories placed in the Caribbean Sea, the North Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. OCTs are different in terms of size of their territory, population, climate and degree of isolation from the rest of the world. Even though OCTs are not part of the EU, nor subject to EU law, most of their inhabitants are EU citizens.

**Table A.15 List of OCTs**

<b>Member State</b>	<b>OCTs</b>
<b>France</b>	<i>New Caledonia, French Polynesia, French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Wallis and Futuna Islands, Saint-Barthélemy, Saint Pierre and Miquelon</i>
<b>The Netherlands</b>	<i>Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, Saba, Sint Eustatius, Sint Maarten</i>
<b>United Kingdom</b>	<i>Anguilla, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Montserrat, Pitcairn, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, Turks and Caicos Islands, British Virgin Islands, British Antarctic Territory, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean, South Georgia and Sandwich Islands.</i>

\* Mayotte changed its status from OCT to outermost region of the EU in 2014.

OCTs are not sovereign countries. The relationship with the responsible Member State (MS) (France, United Kingdom, the Netherlands or Denmark) is unique in each case and is based on specific constitutional and political arrangements. Depending on the powers devolved by the MS to which they are linked, the political status differs from one OCT to another. All OCTs are parliamentary democracies.

The total population of the OCTs is 1.3 million, and varies from 42 persons on Pitcairn to 271,000 in French Polynesia. OCTs are of highly variable size, from Saba with 13 km<sup>2</sup> to Greenland with 2.17 million km<sup>2</sup>.

None of the OCTs are classified as low income countries and only Anguilla, Monserrat, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha and Wallis and Futuna are eligible for official development assistance (ODA) as they are considered middle-income countries. Economic and social development varies considerably among OCTs, including among those who are part of the same region (e.g. New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna).

Most OCTs have small economies, which are often focused on a few sectors or even a single sector, and many depend on tourism and fisheries. Their trade balances are usually in negative figures (ECO Consult, 2011a). As a result, the OCTs are highly vulnerable to external economic shocks.

As islands, all OCTs are also highly exposed to natural disasters and climate change, making these territories and their economies even more vulnerable. Another challenge facing OCTs is a decline in population as result of 'brain drain' (ECO Consult, 2011a, DFC, 2010).

Regional economic integration is seen as an important means for ensuring accessibility of OCTs to global markets, to diversify their economies (ECO Consult, 2011a) while strengthening their resilience.

<sup>170</sup> E.g. Mayotte, previously an OCT but an outermost region since 2014 (EP, 2013).

<sup>171</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/octs\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/octs_en)

## 2. Evolution of EU cooperation with the OCTs

OCTs have always been considered strategic assets to the EU because of their geographical location<sup>172</sup> and biodiversity (ECO Consult, 2011a, UKOTA, 2016) and therefore have enjoyed a singular relationship with the EU. OCTs enjoy an ‘associate status’ ruled by Articles 198-204 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), which deals with ‘the association of the overseas countries and territories’. The purpose of this association status is ‘to promote the economic and social development of countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Union as a whole’ (EU, 2012).

### 2.1. Evolution of the Legal Framework of EU cooperation with the OCTs

Cooperation between the EU and OCTs is directly linked to the creation of the European Union itself. The Treaty of Rome (1957) contained specific arrangements for overseas territories in key sectors such as trade and areas for investment to promote development (Part IV).

In 1959, a first Convention on OCTs was annexed to the Treaty of Rome. At the same time, the EDF was being created to express the EU’s solidarity with the first African countries obtaining their independence. As result of the independence of African countries and the EU enlargement process during the 1970s and 80s, the EEC and its MSs needed to broaden their cooperation with the recently created states as well as with the new adhered OCTs (e.g. from UK) through different international agreements. So, in 1975, the Georgetown Agreement established the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, a group apart from OCTs with new and different rules for cooperation with the EU.

An Implementing Convention annexed to the Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957 determined the provisions for the association of the OCTs with the Community for the first five years following the entry into force of the Treaty, i.e. until 31 December 1962. Subsequently, the detailed provisions and procedures for the EEC–OCT association were laid down in Decisions with a duration of five years, adopted by the Council on 25 February 1964, 29 September 1970, 29 June 1976, 16 December 1980 and 30 June 1986. On 25 July 1991 and on 27 November 2001, the Council adopted further decisions on the association of the OCTs with the Community, each with a validity of ten years. However, the duration of the Overseas Association Decision of 27 November 2001 was extended in 2007 until 31 December 2013, to coincide with the duration of the EDF10 and the multiannual financial framework for 2007-2013.

**Table A.16 List of legal and Policy Documents ruled EU-OCTs relations**

Year	Legal and Policy Documents
1957	Part IV of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Articles 198 to 204 TFEU)
1959	Convention on OCT's annexed to the Treaty of Rome
1991	Council Decision of 25 July 1991 (for 10 years)
2001	Council Decision of 27 November 2001
2002	Commission Regulation on the implementing the Overseas Association Decision
2007	Amendment to the Council Decision of 27 November 2001
2007	Amendment to the Commission Regulation on the implementing the Overseas Association Decision
2008	Green Paper
2009	Communication ‘Elements for a new partnership between the EU and the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs)’
2011	Joint Position Paper MS-OCTs
2013	Council Decision on the association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Union of 25 November

<sup>172</sup> EU ‘outposts’ in the Caribbean, Pacific, Atlantic, Indian Ocean and Antarctic.



The Overseas Association Decision (OAD) contains provisions that enable the EU, all the OCTs and the Member States to which they are linked, to consult each other on the principles, detailed procedures and results of the association. The OCT-EU Forum, which represents the highest instance of dialogue among the European Commission, OCTs and Member States to which they are linked, and is referred to as the 'Forum', meets annually. Up to 14 Annual Forums have taken place, some of them followed by a Political Declaration; see Table A.17 below for an overview. Regular trilateral consultations and tripartite meetings are also organised between the Commission, the OCTs and Member States. Similarly, partnership working parties have been set up with an advisory role to provide a framework for technical discussions between the OCTs, the relevant MS and the European Commission, complementing the work that is being done in the annual Forum and/or in the tripartite meetings.

**Table A.17 Summary of OCT-EU Forums**

Forum No.	Date	Place
14	February 2016	Brussels
13	February 2015	British Virgin Islands
12	December 2013	Brussels
11	September 2012	Greenland
10	January 2012	Brussels
9	March 2011	New Caledonia
8	March 2010	Brussels
7	November 2008	The Cayman Islands
6	November 2007	Brussels
5	September 2006	Greenland
4	December 2005	Brussels
3	March 2005	French Polynesia
2	December 2003	Brussels
1	September 2002	Bonaire

Source: <http://www.octassociation.org/political-dialogue-eu-oct-ms>, accessed November 2016

With the expiry of the OAD 2007, a process – based on consultations, studies, analyses and evaluations – was initiated to revise the agreement and to modernize relations between the EU and the OCTs. This was expressed in a Green Paper which was issued in 2008 to guide the review of EU–OCT relations with the aim of achieving greater reciprocity and emphasis on the strategic position and added value of OCTs vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Discussions resulted in a Communication entitled 'Elements for a new partnership between the EU and the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs)'. This Communication provided the following set of principles to guide the definition of a new framework for cooperation between the EC and the OCTs (EC, 2010a, ECO Consult, 2011a, European Parliament, 2014a).

- Enhance OCT competitiveness
- Strengthen OCT resilience
- Promote cooperation between the OCTs and other economies in the regions where they are located.
- Reduce OCT economic and environmental vulnerability.

This process ended with the adoption of a new Council Decision in 2013, known as COUNCIL DECISION 2013/755/EU of 25 November 2013 on the association of the OCT with the European Union ('Overseas Association Decision') (Council of Europe, 2013a). As was the case for earlier OADs, the 2013 OAD provides the legal basis for the association of the OCTs with the European Union. It entered into force on January 1<sup>st</sup> 2014 and is indefinite (it has no end date).

The OAD consists of various components:

- Part 1 – general provisions which include important principles such as partnership, complementarity, EU values and standards, fundamental rights, sustainability development etc. All of these are considered the cornerstones of the Association.
- Part 2 – areas of cooperation are based on mutual interests and priorities which include dedicated chapters to environment, disaster risk reduction, climate change, and sustainable management of resources. They also include an important focus on research and innovation, on youth education and employment, culture, the fight against organised crime and tourism.
- Part 3 – trade and trade-related cooperation which focuses on ensuring improved market access conditions for OCTs and supporting the OCTs in making the most of the opportunities that the relationship with the EU provides.
- Part 4 – instruments for sustainable development, which includes programming and implementation provisions for the EDF11 with two important areas of focus: a single reference document for OCTs and avoiding excessive regulation.

It also covers a number of final provisions, provides an overview of the financial resources for the OCTs for the period 2014-2020 and includes annexes regarding the functioning of the trade arrangements. The OAD is considered a renewed partnership since it establishes priority areas (including inter alia environment, trade and regional integration) for cooperation with OCTs, focusing on:

- Establishment of a reciprocal relationship between the European Union and OCTs based on mutual interest and shared values
- Support to the sustainable development of OCTs
- Enhancement of OCTs' competitiveness
- Strengthening of OCTs' resilience and reduction of their vulnerability
- Promotion of cooperation of OCTs with other partners
- Promotion of EU's values and standards in the wider world.

## **2.2. The Association of Overseas Countries and Territories of the EU (OCTA)**

A first OCT Ministerial Conference was organized in Brussels on November 16 and 17, 2000. During this conference, the OCT authorities created the Association of Overseas Countries and Territories of the European Union (OCTA). This Association was constituted as a non-profit organization with the aim of 'working collectively through the promotion of common positions and partnerships for the sustainable development of OCTs by cooperation, capacity building and communication'.

### **Box A.2 OCTA objectives**

OCTA's Strategic Objectives are:

- To consolidate and reinforce solidarity between OCTs and EU stakeholders
- To make recommendations and carry out various projects/programmes to enhance opportunities, comparative advantage and natural assets in order to strengthen the position of OCTs at regional and global levels
- To promote cooperation and develop a knowledge centre and thematic networks in order to consolidate ownership and provide a point of reference for creating and disseminating valuable information on the relationship between the EU and the OCTs
- To create a framework to engage the private sector, academia and civil society
- To enhance the profile, the reputation and position of the OCTs
- To provide a forum for exchange of ideas and discussion

Source: OCTA, 2016a

OCTA has 22 members and has served as a communication and collaboration tool among members, regardless of the EU MS to which they are linked. In practice, OCTA provides support to its members in dealing with the European Commission and all related services. Under the EDF10, OCTA was the Regional Authorizing Officer (RAO) and the Contracting Authority for the programme benefiting all OCTs (the Territorial Strategies for Innovation (TSI)<sup>173</sup> Programme). The EDF10 allocated €5 million for Technical Assistance to OCTA as well as for the Technical Cooperation Facility in the fields of trade, environment, research and education as well as communication. Under the EDF11 OCTA is not eligible to be the contracting authority as it does not comply with EC regulations. Nevertheless, it maintains its role of RAO for the thematic programme.

### 2.3. Evolution of the EU development cooperation instrument with OCTs: the EDF

Table A.18 below provides an overview of EU development cooperation instruments used for the OCTs. OCTs have been eligible for EDF funds; and as for ACP countries, EDF rules and procedures apply for EDF implementation. CPA provisions are not applicable to OCTs since OCT-EU relations are governed by the OAD and by the ad hoc supplementary decision for Greenland. However, article 28 of the CPA provisions foresees the possibility for OCTs to be associated – under conditions – with ACP regional cooperation. As the OCTs are mainly funded by the EDF, EDF rules and procedures apply for implementation of cooperation with OCTs. Funding for Greenland is made through the Budget.

Furthermore, Article 94 of the OAD – which specifies that “OCTs, shall be eligible for participation in and funding from Union programmes, subject to the rules and objectives of the programmes” – makes OCTs eligible for thematic funds (under the DCI instrument), as well as other European funds, such as the European Investment Bank, the European Regional Development Fund and Horizon 2020.

**Table A.18 Selected EU instruments for OCTs (non-exhaustive list)**

Source of funding	Development Cooperation	EU Funds	Other EU Funds
Financial Instrument	EDF	Regional Development Funds in collaboration with FED	European Investment Bank
	EDF Regional Cooperation	Horizon 2020	
	DCI Thematic lines		

Sources: ECO Consult, 2011a, EC, 2014u, OCTA, 2016b

The EDF11 performance assessment has as its main objective to assess performance and analysis of the EDF11 and to provide a review of the literature. This performance review is in respect of the implementation of the EDF and elements of other, complementing instruments.

Not all OCTs have been eligible for EDF funds since some of them do not meet the eligibility criteria. Table A.19 shows the allocation under each EDF. In the 9th EDF, eleven out of twenty OCTs benefited from EDF funds. The rest were too wealthy (ECO Consult, 2011a). Nevertheless, as can be seen in Table A.19, allocations of EDF funds by the EU to OCTs have progressively increased in the last decade, through projects and budget support as well as blending (ECO Consult, 2011a).


<sup>173</sup> With the support of the European Union, OCTA initiated a dedicated project, “Territorial strategies for innovation” or OCTA Innovation, which provides technical and demand-driven services to the governments of the 20 inhabited OCTs. The project, implemented by the consortium of Eurecna (Italy) and Egis (France), has a timespan from April 2014 to April 2018, and aims to enhance sustainable development through innovative solutions for economic diversification and to improve regional and global competitiveness of the OCTs.

**Table A.19 Financial Allocation under the 8th, 9th, 10th EDF**

EDF	OCT	Regional	EIB	Total in EUR
8 <sup>th</sup> EDF 1998-2002	105M EUR	10M EUR	-	115M
9 <sup>th</sup> EDF 2002-2007	145M EUR	-	59M EUR	204M
10 <sup>th</sup> EDF 2008-2013	195M EUR 6M Technical Assistance 15M Emergency Aid	40M EUR	30M EUR	286M

The EDF funds for OCTs are included in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) of the ACP. Once the MFF is adopted by the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, EU countries establish the actual EDF by means of internal agreement, specifying the contribution for each MS. OCTs eligible for territorial EDF allocation were requested to prepare a development cooperation strategy in the form of a so-called 'Single Programming Document' (SPD) where focal sectors of cooperation were identified with the support of the MS to which they were linked and which included also the programme itself (i.e. the Action Document). For this purpose, the authorities of each OCT appointed a Territorial Authorizing Officer (TAO) to represent the OCT in all EDF-financed activities. The TAOs, in close collaboration with the EU Delegations, were in charge of preparing a draft SPD in consultation with civil society, local authorities and the OCT MS. The TAO also submitted the draft of the SPD to the EUD for endorsement (ECO Consult, 2011a, European Parliament, 2014a). As part of the focal sectors, the SPD provided an assessment of the economic, social and political situation of the territory.

For the 8th, 9th and 10th EDF, the main focus of EU cooperation was economic and trade cooperation (rules of origin, free access for originating products etc.), sustainable development (human, social and environmental development, culture and social cooperation) and regional cooperation and integration (goods and services, free movement of people, trade etc.). However, in practice, the development cooperation between the EU and the OCTs over the last decade has focused on the transport infrastructure sector, water and sanitation, environment and climate change as well as vocational training (ECO Consult, 2011a).

**Figure A.9 OCT Sector Allocations (period 1999-2009)**

Source: ECO Consult, 2011a

The preferred aid modality has been budget support. Under the EDF10, budget support was the instrument by default, where conditions so permitted, but many programmes were equally implemented via a project approach. This has continued under EDF11.


### 3. EU development cooperation with the OCTs under the EDF11

The indicative allocation of resources to OCTs under the EDF11 is €365.5 million, which represents 1.2% of the total EDF budget. This amount is allocated as follows:

- €229.5 million for territorial (bilateral) allocations. 16 OCTs are eligible for territorial support.

- €100 million for regional cooperation and integration which is further sub-divided by region as follows:
  - €40 million for the Caribbean
  - €36 million for the Pacific Ocean
  - €4 million for the Indian Ocean
  - €20 million for the Thematic Programme and support measures.
- €21.5 million for Reserve-B to finance humanitarian and emergency assistance, or assistance for fluctuations in export earnings.
- €5 million to finance interest subsidies and technical assistance through OCT Investment Facility of the European Investment Bank.
- €8.5 million for studies and technical assistance.

**Figure A.10 Indicative Territorial Allocations for OCT under EDF11**



### 3.1. EDF11 programming process at Territorial Level

The EDF11, in line with the Agenda for Change, relates to the criteria for identifying the focal sectors for EDF intervention, the request to focus on a single sector in the case of OCTs and SIDS as well as an important increase of allocations at territory level and a substantial increase at regional level.

### 3.2. Guiding Principles for the EDF11

The Programming Instructions for the EDF11 are based on a series of guiding principles:

- **Ownership** at territorial and regional level, and coordination with the Union's response strategy with relevant MS. In this context, each OCT has primary responsibility for formulation of strategies, priorities and arrangements. The OCT has the lead in the preparation of a Programming Document in coordination with the Commission and the MS to which they are linked. The Programming Document is based on the territorial and regional policy documents and is to be aligned with the OCTs own strategies, policy analysis and budget cycles. The Programming Document is prepared on the basis of the proposal made by the Territorial Authorising Officer (TAO) or the Regional Authorizing Officer (RAO), and is based on joint consultation between DEVCO Headquarters, the respective European Union Delegation, and the TAO/RAO.
- **Comprehensiveness and coherence.** With coherence being pursued between:

- Territorial programmes and regional programmes
- Territorial programmes and thematic programmes as well as horizontal Union programmes from which the OCTs benefit
- Territorial programmes, regional programmes, regional EDF-ACP programmes and programmes financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
- Policies, instruments, and actions of the EU, and those of EU Member States and the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other European or International Development Finance institutions.
- **Enhanced coordination** – focusing on improving coordination and alignment between the agendas of the OCTs which assumes that the programming documents are elaborated jointly between the OCT and the MS and based as much as possible on existing documents.<sup>174</sup>
- **Building on past cooperation experience** by taking into account lessons from past evaluations and ensuring that all key stakeholders are aware of these.
- **Principle of Concentration** with a single priority sector of cooperation for both territorial and regional allocation, so as to increase impact and leverage of the EU financial cooperation. The sector should be proposed by the OCT in consultation with the competent Units within the Directorate General for Cooperation and Development, the EU Delegation, the MS and other donors as applicable.
- **Making use of Territorial Development Plans** for the Programming Document, ensuring a solid choice of the sector of concentration that reflects the main priorities for OCTs and supports an existing policy which is credible and relevant. The formulation of the Programming Document and the EU response strategy contained in the Programming Document will include a prior assessment of the situation, policies in force, and lessons from evaluations.
- **Civil Society Engagement**, to ensure that local authorities, non-state actors and private sector are consulted throughout the process. The TAO/RAO thus prepares a programming process for civil society involvement to guide the process.

### 3.3. Modalities of support to the OCTs

- Support is provided under one financing decision and one financing agreement for the whole period.
- Budget support is the main form of support and the preferred modality (EC, no date (b)), with projects being the exception.<sup>175</sup>
- Sector reform contracts (SRC) are the preferred option for budget support for OCTs, given that most have only a single dominant sector. SRC focus on a limited range of objectives and reduce the burden in terms of policy dialogue and programme monitoring which is often a challenge for OCTs. They can focus on a single sector or on a territorial development policy.
- The existence of a credible and relevant sector policy is an essential requirement to decide whether an OCT is eligible for budget support. The public policy eligibility is re-assessed each time a disbursement request is submitted.
- A Risk Management Framework (RMF) will be used to determine if an OCT is eligible for budget support. It is conducted by the Commission and covers macro-economic risks, development risks, public finance management risks, and aspects related to corruption and fraud (it does not cover an analysis of political risks).
- For those OCTs that do not comply with the criteria for budget support eligibility, the project modality can be used. Measures will be taken through a set of special rules applied to the OCTs as per the OAD for contract management and to ensure that rules on nationality and

<sup>174</sup> For example, World Bank and International Monetary Fund reports, Annual Implementation Reports, etc.

<sup>175</sup> Specific guidance on Budget Support to OCTs is provided in Annex 10 of the EU Budget Support Guidelines (EC, 2013h).

origin for public procurement, grants and other award procedures under Article 89 of the OAD are used.

### **3.4. Blending of grants and loans**

EDF can be used in different ways and combinations as specified by the programming instructions. This includes: equity participation, direct public investment grants, insurance premiums, guarantee and risk sharing schemes.

Blending with grants and loans from finance institutions is focused on leveraging public and private investments in support of infrastructure (including climate-related infrastructure) and the private sector (such as Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), innovation, and Research and Development (R&D)).

### **3.5. The programming process**

The programming process consists of three phases.

**Phase 1.** The first phase establishes an indicative timetable and milestones for the programming exercise, through discussions during the first semester of 2014 between the competent Units within DEVCO, the EU Delegations and OCT TAO. As part of the first phase, the TAO presents a detailed plan for consultation with civil society. These discussions include an analysis and agreement on a priority sector based on the preliminary discussions. A 'Summary Sheet', proposing the sector of concentration, is drafted by the TAO and submitted to the EUD for its further transmission to DEVCO for its endorsement by the Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development. Additional information and/or modifications may be requested by the relevant Units within DEVCO. The TAO and the Union Delegation work together to finalise the Summary Sheet. Once the document is finalised, it is submitted to DEVCO's Senior Management for approval; and then for its endorsement by the Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development. The summary sheet was one of the innovations that was adopted for the EDF11 and was expected to simplify the approval process.

In parallel to this preparatory work, Technical Assistance (TA) in charge of supporting the OCT throughout the programming exercise may be provided, upon request of the TAO. Needs for expertise are identified jointly by the TAO, the EU Delegation and DEVCO. The service contracts for TA are launched by DEVCO and may include a single contract for TA for support to the programming exercise and assessment of eligibility for budget support (when needed), or separate contracts. The TAs are financed under the Technical Cooperation Facility.

**Phase 2.** The second phase is dedicated to the preparation of Parts A and B of the Programming Documents (identification and formulation phase).

**Preparation of PART A:** Following endorsement of the sector of concentration, the TAO drafts and submits the EU response strategy to the EU Delegation. The EU Response Strategy sets out the objectives of the EU financial cooperation with the OCT, the policy agenda of the OCT and a comprehensive justification of the choice of the sector of concentration. The EU Delegation examines draft Part A and transmits it to its HQ for a preliminary endorsement (EC, 2013a, Council of Europe, 2013a).

The preparation of **Part B** (Action Document) of the Programming Document is a shared responsibility between TAO and the Union Delegation, and is coordinated with relevant Units within DEVCO.

**Identification phase:** The first part of the process consists of drafting the initial Action Document for the identification phase. The ultimate responsibility for this lies with the TAO, who is most of the time actively supported by the TA. The draft document is examined by the EU Delegation, and transmitted to DEVCO and modified as necessary. The initial Action Document is finalized by the competent DEVCO geographic Unit, in close coordination with the Unit in charge of OCTs, and is submitted for technical peer review by the competent Quality Support Group. The geographic Unit

transmits the QSG's conclusions to the Union Delegation. This may include revising the draft document, in which case this is done jointly by the TAO and the relevant Delegation.

After QSG I all new Budget Support Programmes are submitted to the Budget Support Steering Committee. This includes a Risk Management Framework Assessment.

**Formulation phase:** Once the initial Action Document is approved, the formulation process starts based on the submission by the TAO to the EUD of a draft Action Document.

This is submitted by the EUD to DEVCO and, if deemed complete, is finalized for submission for technical peer review to the competent Geographic Quality Support Group II (QSGII). QSGII may require revisions in which case this is done by the TAO and the EU Delegation.

**Phase 3.** This is the last phase and focusses on the finalization based on the outcome of the different phases of programming, identification, and formulation.

The EDF-OCT committee is consulted on the draft Programming Document (for programmes above €5 million) in accordance with the provision of Article 87 of the OCT Decision and the Rules of Procedure of the EDF-OCT Committee. Once the Programming Document has obtained the positive opinion of the EDF-OCT Committee, the relevant Commission Decision is adopted and subsequently the Programming Document is signed.

### **3.6. EDF11 programming process at Regional Level<sup>176</sup>**

At regional level, the CAP recognises the importance of including OCTs in the regional cooperation as well as the possibility for financial support through the Regional EDF. The 2013 OAD also foresees this cooperation through Article 7. In fact, the purpose of the regional cooperation is to reinforce the ties among OCTs and between OCTs and their neighbours (ACP countries).

In practice, regional allocations are divided between 3 regional geographic programmes (Pacific, Caribbean and Indian Ocean) and a thematic programme benefitting all OCTs:

According to article 93 of the OAD, a regional allocation shall be used for operations benefiting and involving:

- One or more OCTs and one or more outermost regions referred to in Article 349 of the Treaty;
- One or more OCTs, one or more outermost regions and one or more ACP and/or non-ACP States;
- One or more OCTs and regional bodies of which OCTs, ACP States or one or more of the outermost regions are members;
- The OCTs and the Union as a whole.

The funding which enables ACP States, outermost regions and other countries to participate should be additional to funds allocated to the OCTs.

The programming process of OCTs regional programmes is similar to the territorial one. Based on a shared analysis of regional challenges, each OCT region confirms its priorities. Consistency with territorial programmes and coordination with programmes of neighbouring OCTs, ACP and non-ACP countries or outmost regions is encouraged.

The process is initiated with preliminary discussions led by the EUD. Once the strategy and focal group are agreed, the RAO drafts Part A of programing documents to be submitted for endorsement to the EC. Procedures for territorial programming apply equally to the programming of the regional allocations. The regional programmes are expected to be implemented through project approaches and other implementation arrangements such as contribution agreements.

In order to ensure complementarity and synergies with other EU funds, DEVCO and DG Regio signed a Memorandum of Understanding in September 2013 to facilitate pooling EDF and ERDF resources. EU Directorates General committed to increase coordination as well as open the

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<sup>176</sup> Sources for this section: Council of Europe, 2013a; EC, 2013a; EC, 2013b



possibility for a joint financing with EDF and ERDF resources in accordance with the EDF11 Internal Agreement and OAD.

#### 4. Overview of OCT-specific findings from the EDF Performance Review

##### 1. To what extent did the overall objectives and principles of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF respond to EU priorities and beneficiary needs in 2014? To what extent can they accommodate changed parameters since then?

###### *Summary answer to the EQ*

From the existing literature mapped (evaluations and programming documents) the areas of EDF intervention are well aligned with the needs and priorities of the OCT governments and EU principles.

EDF11 sectors are aligned with OCT national and regional interests whilst also consistent with EU priorities. In particular, sustainable energy and climate change are being prioritised which are critical issues for these often remote and climate-vulnerable states.

Overall there has been a sizeable increase in EDF11 from EDF10 as well as an increase in regional funding which demonstrates the EU's commitment to the OCTs, and which was strengthened by the adoption of the Overseas Association Decision in 2013 which aims to develop and deepen a reciprocal relationship.

Interviews suggest a comprehensive stakeholder consultation process although sector and modality choices are reported to have been to a degree influenced by HQ preferences, with implications for beneficiary ownership in some OCTs. There has been good consultation at regional levels – although in the regional case there have been challenges in getting beyond consultation to action. OCTA has played a role in consultations for the regional envelope and close linkages with the OCT unit plus visits to Brussels have helped highlight EU interests and values.

##### JC 1.1 11<sup>th</sup> EDF design responded to EU priorities in 2014

- A review of the programming for the EDF10 and EDF11 shows EU support to OCTs to be broadly consistent with EU priorities. There is less of a specific orientation toward poverty reduction compared to ACP country cooperation as most of the OCTs are not LMICs.
- Overall there has been a sizeable increase of funds available in EDF11 from EDF10, with a particularly large increase in regional funding which demonstrates the EU's commitment to the OCTs, strengthened by the adoption of the Overseas Association Decision in 2013 which aims to develop and deepen a reciprocal relationship.
- EU priority issues such as trade (EDF10), environmental sustainability and energy are seen in the choice of priority sectors.
- The evidence from interviews reveals wider issues around the adequacy of the EDF instrument for the OCTs given that the OCTs are much more developed, as well as more existential questions as to the future of EC-OCT cooperation post-Cotonou (though it should be noted that as the OCTs are not signatories to Cotonou there is no formal obligation for dialogue to be reopened specifically in 2020). This is reflected in a recent European Parliament resolution that raises the idea of a dedicated OCT instrument. The Overseas Association Decision which was adopted in 2013 and entered into force in 2014 acknowledges these issues and seeks to develop and deepen a reciprocal relationship.

Docs: COSME MTR 2015, OCT Evaluation 2012, EP Resolution October 2016.

MN478, 236, 27, 445, 307, 85, 341, 270, 788, 689, 112

Strength of evidence: Medium

### JC 1.2 11<sup>th</sup> EDF design responded to beneficiary needs in 2014

- Evaluations and programming documents show that the areas of EDF intervention are well aligned with the needs and priorities of the OCT governments (Aruba – education, New Caledonia – TVET, OCTA with a role for thematic envelopes). Some countries have seen continuity with the priorities that were in place for EDF10 which stakeholders consider important.
- Interviews suggest that stakeholder consultations have generally been stronger under EDF11 than under EDF10, and that there has been better consultation at regional levels. Some interviews noted that broader stakeholder groups (civil society, etc.) did not uniformly and consistently participate in the consultations (although evidence is mixed here) and that there have been some challenges in getting beyond consultation to action.
- For the Pacific, interviews suggest that the relevance of the regional theme (biodiversity and climate change) for the regions is undeniable.
- From the Caribbean interviews there is the suggestion that the focus on one sector has been challenging for some OCTs given the myriad of priorities small islands face and the dearth of other donors.
- Some stakeholder interviews suggest that while the sectors chosen were broadly appropriate and based on stakeholder consultation, HQ was perceived as having a strong agenda which determined some of the choices (e.g. in sustainable energy). There was a sense from the stakeholder interviews that agendas had already been set at HQ level and that the margin for manoeuvre was limited.
- The country study in Aruba shows that there have been challenges over the choice of modality for EDF implementation, with budget support being prioritized. Stakeholders express a strong view that there should be more consultation and 'listening to' countries on the modality choice.
- Both global interviews and country interviews highlight that OCTA has played a role in consultations for the regional envelope and has maintained close linkages with the OCT unit. Visits to Brussels have helped highlight EU interests and values.

Docs: OCT Evaluation 2012

MN27, 422, 24, 445, 241, 400, 478, 192, 236, 452

Strength of evidence: Good, but limited to countries consulted for this performance review

### JC 1.3 The original objectives and priorities of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF are still relevant in the emerging international context (priorities up to 2020)

- The OCT regional evaluation for EDF10 found evidence that the support to the OCTs has served its purpose well in being consistent with EU policy objectives and promoting social and economic development in the OCTs and bringing OCTs economically closer to the EU, as well as being consistent with the needs and priorities of the partner countries.
- Overall, interviewees are of the view that the priorities identified for EDF11 continue to be relevant in the international context. Regional integration is considered an important objective but has yet to become a concrete reality.
- However, selected interviews suggest that relevance would be stronger if the instrument was better adapted to the needs and specificities of the OCTs and more flexible in terms of procedures. As noted by various interviewees, there is a mismatch between the local context (which is characterized by small administrations which cannot deal with the requirements of the EU), and the mechanics/rules which are practically standard.

Docs: Mid-Term Evaluation of the COSME programme 2015

MN422, 222, 445

Strength of evidence: Medium

#### JC 1.4 The 11<sup>th</sup> EDF has foreseen space for coping with unexpected needs

- Most of the implementation under the EDF11 has still to start. The view of stakeholders is that EDF is not a sufficiently flexible instrument to respond quickly to unexpected needs (and it was noted that this may not be easily compatible with its focus on long-term plans. Nonetheless it is noted that once programmes are approved the that EUDs generally work with countries to accommodate changes if they can be made within existing priorities.
- There have been some reported challenges under EDF10 with accessing the reserve. Attempts by Aruba to access the EDF11 Reserve to deal with an expected refugee crisis from Venezuela were met with challenges because of strict interpretations about when the fund can be accessed.

MN478, 142, 435, 445, 400

Strength of evidence: Moderate/Weak

#### 2. To what extent has EDF delivered results against objectives and specific EU priorities?

##### *Summary answer to EQ*

There is evidence from evaluations and stakeholder interviews of positive results achieved under EDF9 and EDF10. There is also a clear message from the documentation and interviews that cumbersome administrative EDF procedures stretch country/territorial capacity and have caused delays in implementation of the EDF. In New Caledonia this undermined the sense of government ownership of budget support.

Efforts toward regional integration have not yet been as successful for various reasons, including language barriers, participation costs, and isolation (from evaluation evidence). Interviews suggest that the absence of an ACP-OCT specific envelope also plays a role. .

#### JC 2.1 Institutional structures and processes are in place for EDF11 to deliver expected results

- Internal reporting from the Caribbean and the Pacific (EAMRs) highlights recurring obstacles related to limited capacity of partner countries and implementing partners, and the need to consider that smaller countries might need more TA and tailored (simplified) procedures.
- Cumsome EDF administrative procedures are also noted by interviews in both regions: these stretch OCT capacity, restrict OCT ability to access EU funds and cause delays in implementation. For example, as noted in internal reporting, all five tenders launched by the Guyana EUD in 2015 failed. The summary sheet which was introduced under the EDF11 does not appear to have brought about the intended simplification. Interviews suggest there is a need to review procedures for tendering and other aspects of cooperation to take into account the specificities of OCTs.
- Interviews note that the OCT Unit at HQ has been strengthened and has provided good support, but that there is insufficient understanding at HQ level (outside of the OCT unit) of the specificities of the OCTs. A specific annex was produced for the OCTs with guidelines on how to implement budget support. It was unclear from the limited number of interviews conducted how helpful this has been – it may be too early in the process.
- Overall, internal EU reporting (EAMRs) suggests that progress continues to be hampered by the high burden of administrative work on EUDs and is not helped by the staffing changes.

Docs: OCT Evaluation 2012, Guyana EAMR 2014,

MN478, 27, 5, 192, 445, 422

Strength of evidence: Medium

## **JC 2.2 The 10<sup>th</sup> EDF contributed to the delivery of positive results at territory, country, regional and intra-ACP levels compared to its objectives and specific EU priorities**

- There is evidence of positive results having been achieved under EDF10 in terms of transport, connectivity and energy infrastructure and other areas.
- Examples of positive results from the country studies include the support to TVET in New Caledonia which was found to have a positive impact on employability of vulnerable parts of the population as well as other successful infrastructure/transport projects which have improved the accessibility of isolated areas. There is also evidence of positive results being achieved through the sector budget support modality in New Caledonia. In Aruba the support provided to the establishment of the National Park and a National Museum was considered to have been successful under the EDF9.
- Evaluations suggest there has been positive, but limited impact on good governance.
- Evaluation evidence from the OCT Regional Evaluation (2010) suggests few positive results in ACP-OCT regional cooperation, due to issues of expense, distances involved and a lack of commitment on the part of the countries/territories in question. Interviews from the Caribbean suggest that the approach of identifying common issues among a wide group of countries outside of a dedicated envelope is challenging, although there were more positive findings for the Pacific interviews. The regional cooperation is perceived to be weak also because countries/territories give priority to bilateral cooperation (NIPs) (interviews, and EU Pacific cooperation evaluation).
- The OCT evaluation noted that the transition to BS has been a challenge to some OCTs, mainly related to the required conditions and inadequate consultation with implications for ownership. The challenges with the BS modality for Aruba under EDF10 have had implications for the budgeting process in the education sector. Interviews reported that successive delays in disbursements have meant that the country has not been able to include the EU in its annual budgeting exercise in 2016, potentially reducing the effectiveness of the support.
- Most interviewees expressed the view that the EDF support is important but has been hampered because of delivery mechanism and management issues (see also EQ3).

Docs: OCT Evaluation 2012, Fiji EAMR 2015, EU-Pacific cooperation evaluation,

MN 192, 307, 341, 445, 27, 643, 422, 445

Strength of evidence: Medium

## **JC 2.3 The 11<sup>th</sup> EDF takes account of impact and sustainability requirements**

- The OCT Evaluation noted that late implementation made it difficult to judge impact and sustainability of the interventions.
- Some evidence of sustainability, e.g. in Aruba the projects under EDF 9 (museum, park, Queen Emma bridge) are all seen as flagship assets for the country and at much lower risk of sustainability than typically externally funded infrastructure (interviews and OCT-EU Cooperation evaluation, 2012).

OCT Evaluation 2012

MN 445, 442, 192

Strength of evidence: Insufficient, would require more investigation.

### 3. To what extent is the EDF delivering efficiently?

#### *Summary answer to the EQ*

Evaluation evidence under EDF10 suggested that delivery was affected by complex EU procedures and that this has compromised effectiveness.

Interviews suggest that EDF11 continues to be insufficiently tailored to the specificities of the OCTs. Interviewees and internal reporting mention a number of the same issues that were raised in the 2012 OCT evaluation concerning challenges of weak institutional capacity of the OCTs, which are generally not equipped to be able to process the complex and lengthy EDF procedures, and also a lack of suitable, technical implementing partners.

Internal reporting also highlights challenges related to human resourcing with the reduction in staffing affecting the capacity to support the countries adequately. Interviews suggest that the regionalization of the contracts has created further complexity.

#### **JC 3.1 The EDF has been implemented in a timely manner**

- Complex procedures are noted in evaluations for the OCTs and the Pacific region to have affected the implementation of EDF10.
- A significant constraint – also noted in the internal reporting and interviews – is the weight of the tender procedures. Both the Caribbean and Pacific regions have very few companies which can meet the EU's high standards, and face associated high costs.
- There is mention in some of the interviews of challenges in sourcing the right technical support, and of delays affecting the efficiency of the technical support (Aruba).
- Selected interviews with external stakeholders note that a combination of long time-lines for approval and the turn-over of EUD staff contribute to rules being interpreted differently and processes having to be redone or taking longer.
- There is some suggestion from interviews that there has not been sufficient support to EUD staff for new roles following the Optimus exercise and that the re-orientation and guidance of staff on their new roles should have happened before staff took on new positions.
- The regionalization of the contracts by which the contracting and finance responsibilities were transferred from Guyana to Barbados has created further complexity.
- Stakeholder interviews suggest that there is insufficient understanding on the part of the EU HQ staff, (beyond the OCT unit), on the specificities of the OCTs. The resourcing for OCTs seems to be based on a formula that does not take account of the fact that additional support may be needed. Interviews and feedback from the OPC also highlight challenges related to the lack of understanding by other sections at HQ of OCT specificities. In addition, both in the Caribbean and the Pacific interviewees suggested that there were strong concerns about the lack of understanding of EU-sourced experts of the OCT context and issues, often contributing to delays and adding complications.

Guyana EAMR 2014, EAM Fiji 2015, Evaluation of EU-Pacific cooperation 2006-2012.

MN192, 39, 27, 422, 85, 307, 241, 445

Strength of evidence: Medium/good

#### **JC 3.2 Implementation was facilitated by new EDF procedures**

- Simplification measures under the EDF11 do not appear to have reduced the workload and in some cases have added extra steps into the process (for example the transparency measures introduced to reduce corruption).
- There is evidence also from interviews that the simplification measures have resulted in a lack of clarity on what the EC wants. The introduction of the summary sheet was not

perceived as having added any value in terms of simplification.

- Evidence that the efficiency of the regional programme has been improved under the EDF11. For example, processes for regional cooperation being simplified to be made more accessible, so now a proposal has to come from a minimum of two countries.
- Regional cooperation between OCTs and ACPs remains difficult to implement due to the costs involved which has to come from their own resources.

MN 422, 192, 71, 307, 236, 445, 9

Strength of evidence: Medium

#### **4. To what extent do the EDF programmes add value at country, regional and intra-regional levels?**

##### *Summary answer to the EQ*

The EDF is perceived as having an important added value for the OCTs by linking them to Europe. For selected MSs the OCTs are also considered of importance because of their role as European outposts.

Support to the OCTs as a group enhances their prominence as a platform in regional and global fora.

In many OCTs the EU is the only donor, so by definition is providing support in sectors which would otherwise not receive assistance. There is some evidence from the 2012 OCT evaluation of the EDF added value to PFM and sector policy planning, but less evidence of a strong role in core values of human rights and democracy.

Yet the weight of the EDF is limited by its relatively small financial size in relation to the OCTs overall budgets.

#### **JC 4.1 The EDF supports sectors and priorities at country, territorial, regional and intra-regional level not supported by other EU instruments, MSs and other donors**

- Interviewees concurred that the EDF adds value in the OCTs by providing a visible global 'platform' on the global stage. The OCTs are also seen as 'outposts' of Europe for which there is value in both strategic geographical position in and in terms of promoting EU values. For example, New Caledonia has development cooperation with Vanuatu. There is also technical expertise on both sides.
- In many OCTs the EU is the only donor, and has added value in providing funding for priorities that might otherwise not be high on the agenda of the government.
- However, the added value from the size of the envelope is not clearly evident as the percentage of the funding compared to the overall budget is very small and quite different to their regional ACP neighbours who also have development cooperation with the EU.
- The EDF is the main source of EU funding to the OCTs and in that way offers more to them than other EU instruments in terms of its accessibility; the other instruments and budget lines are difficult to access for the OCTs.

Docs: UK OCT Report 2016, OCT evaluation 2012,

MN478, 236, 445, 241, 9, 422

Strength of evidence: Medium/Good

#### **JC 4.2 EDF offers a mix of particular expertise and implementation and financing modalities level that other EU instruments, MSs and other donors do not**

- The evaluation found limited evidence that the EDF is associated with a specific high level of expertise, although the OCT evaluation (2012) suggests some added value in terms of public finance management and sector policy planning. There is some evidence of EU

added value in PFM and sector policy planning; for example, the performance framework to develop policies under budget support is perceived as a clear added value in New Caledonia since vocational training is the only national policy being conducted under that framework. In other territories (Aruba) this was less successful.

- The main perceived added value for interviewees in the OCTs comes from the identification with Europe and the access to the European space and market. These are EU areas of added value and not specific to the EDF but the EDF is seen as the embodiment of this relationship.
- In the OCTs visited, the EDF does not seem to add specific value in terms of the mix of instruments from development cooperation as there are no other donors. However, positive elements have been found in the use of other programmes, such as ERASMUS in Aruba and New Caledonia and the BEST programme under DCI in Aruba. In particular, student exchanges in Europe under the ERASMUS programme are perceived by stakeholders interviewed as having been very beneficial and having provided very good value for money (small investment with good returns); in the case of New Caledonia, it is perceived as complementary to the focal sector (vocational training and social insertion under EDF11). In New Caledonia, the performance framework for developing vocational training and social insertion policy through budget support was appreciated as the highest element of added value from the EU support.

Docs: OCT evaluation 2012, Guyana EAMR 2014, Fiji EAMR 2014

MN: 478, 236, 445, 241, 9, 422

Strength of evidence: Medium

#### **JC 4.3 EDF promotes and implements EU values and principles in its programming, programmes and projects**

- OCTs can represent Europe in regional fora. The EDF is seen as concrete evidence of this relationship.
- Regional integration is promoted (for example climate change) but limited by practical considerations (language, cost etc.) but the interviews suggested that there may also be a lack of willingness amongst the Pacific OCTs to tighten relations with the Pacific ACPs and the sometimes wide disparities in level of development need to be taken into account.
- The evaluations reviewed suggest that there is only very limited evidence that the EDF in the past has had an impact on promoting EU values such as good governance, human rights and democracy, in part (according to interviews) because OCTs are already closer to Europe in this respect than the ACP countries.

Docs: Evaluation of EU-Pacific cooperation 2006-2012, OCT evaluation 2012

MN9, 445, 14, 270, 333

Strength of evidence: Medium

#### **JC 4.4 EDF enables the EU to have a weight in advocacy that is higher than MSs and other DPs**

- This is not applicable to those OCTs which have no other DPs and generally only one MS.
- The size of the envelope is small in comparison to the overall budget which reduces the weight in advocacy. OCTs often don't have dialogue structures among partners for this reason. In the case of Aruba, there is no evidence of impact at the policy level.
- However, the EU provides for some of the territories an added value as it constitutes a form of external pressure to achieve/accomplish something locally by referencing European standards or values. The EU brings stability and welcome external pressure.
- The yearly dialogue between OCTs and the EU is seen as an important asset for the OCTs.



Docs: UK OCT Report 2016,  
MN192,445, 241, 236  
Strength of evidence: Medium

**5. To what extent does the EDF facilitate coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies both internally between its own set of objectives and programmes and vis-à-vis other EFIs?**

*Summary answer to the EQ:*

The EDF11 programming is perceived as having opened up more possibilities for complementarity between national/territorial levels and regional programmes.

The evaluation of the EU Pacific cooperation 2006-2012 found some good practices in terms of demand driven twinning projects such as INTEGRE (integrated coastal management), TEP VERTES (renewable energy) and the SOPAC Disaster Reduction Programme.

Coherence between the EDF and other EFIs in the OCTs is reported by interviewees and in previous evaluations (OCT evaluation, 2012) to be limited by the lack of accessibility to sources of EU funding outside of the EDF,

There does not seem to be a well-communicated and strategic approach to complementarity and it does not occur consistently. Awareness of what exists is a limitation for many territories as they are not aware of what other countries/territories are doing, or what other EFIs are covering.

Complementarity is pursued with MSs (in the Caribbean with the French, for example) and it is reported by interviewees that this can be beneficial but also is time-consuming.

At the regional level, there is complementarity between priorities but fundamental differences, and insufficient incentives, in ACP countries and OCTs limit the effectiveness of the relationship.

**JC 5.1 The 11<sup>th</sup> EDF is equipped to ensure coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies between its own set of objectives and programmes**

- Evidence from the countries visited suggests that continued and consistent support to the same sectors has enhanced coherence, for example support to education in Aruba (under the EDF10 and EDF11) and in New Caledonia (also education).
- The procedures under EDF11 are perceived to have opened up more possibilities for complementarities in principle although it is too early to say what the results of this will be.
- There is also evidence – from the programming to date – of complementarity in the priorities identified under EDF11 for the regional programme with country-level priorities, e.g. climate change, marine development, biodiversity. And complementarity with some MSs (French in St. Maarten).
- In the Pacific, regional cooperation between OCTs and ACPs is found to be almost non-existent, as there is reportedly insufficient political will and mechanisms in place to facilitate the coordination processes between the programmes addressed to the OCTs and those for the ACPs.
- Generally, there is evidence that the regional approach of the OCTs makes little sense given how little the ACP countries and OCTs have in common. It is perceived by a number of interviewees as a European agenda.
- Access to other EFIs and budget lines is exceptionally difficult for OCTs (except for Greenland for the IfG – Instrument for Greenland) which impacts the possible coherence and complementarity internally and with other EFIs. Different rules and procedures under different instruments are perceived as contributing to this challenge together with lack of



information on what the other EFIs are funding. Complementarity of the EDF and other EFIs for OCTs is limited by lack of visibility of these opportunities, lack of expertise (human resources), and parallel but unlinked programming exercises.

Docs: OCT evaluation 2012, EU-Pacific cooperation evaluation

MN478, 192, 6, 85, 445, 307, 241, 236, 478

Strength of evidence: Medium

**JC 5.2 The 11<sup>th</sup> EDF is equipped to ensure coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies between its programmes and those funded by MSs and other DPs**

- This is not applicable to those OCTS which have no other DPs or MSs.

Strength of evidence: Not applicable

**JC 5.3 EDF interventions have benefited from the EU's Policy Coherence for Development principle**

- No evidence was identified that this was the case.

Strength of evidence: Not applicable

**6. To what extent has the EDF leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement?**

*Summary answer to the EQ*

There is evidence of some policy dialogue in the EDF priority sectors and through BS, and in some issues the EU has emerged strongly (for example on climate change in the Pacific region).

Varying messages emerged from stakeholder interviews on the political value of the EU, and limited visibility of the EU was noted by various sources.

Challenges in terms of having influence through CSOs because of the constraints on contracting (higher grants) and level of staff to play an influencing role.

Limited evidence of DRM.

**JC 6.1 The EDF has successfully leveraged funds for development**

- There is limited evidence of DRM. There are some cases of leveraging funds at the regional level.

Guyana EAMR (2013, 2014) and Fiji EAMR (2015)

MN 445, 192

Strength of evidence: Insufficient

**JC 6.2 The EDF, because of the legal basis of the Cotonou partnership, has enabled the EU to take on a leading role in policy and political discussion with PCs**

- The Cotonou agreement does not apply to the OCTs.
- There is some evidence of policy dialogue in sectors of EDF intervention and through sector budget support activities (New Caledonia interviews, and internal reporting (EAMRs)). However in some OCTs the EDF is only a very small percentage of the budget and there is low visibility which impacts its potential for influence (Aruba).
- The EU is reported by interviewees to have become an important partner on climate change and disaster risk reduction for the Pacific OCTs. Part of the success in the Paris

COP 21 agreement is attributed to the alliance between the EU and the Pacific countries and territories (interviews and EAMRs).

- Challenges were noted by interviewees in terms of having influence through Civil Society because of the constraints on contracting and increase in the ceiling for grants to CSO which makes it more difficult for smaller, local organizations to receive grants.
- Limited visibility of the EU was also noted by various partners.

Docs: Guyana EAMR 2014, EMAR Fiji 2015 and 2013

MN85, 131, 445, 192, 241, 236, 339, 85, 71

Strength of evidence: Medium

## 1. Introduction

1. This annex reflects the contribution of the EDF Performance Review Team to the overall evaluation of the Common Implementation Regulations (CIR) of the EU's External Financing Instruments (EFIs).

2. The European Development Fund is one of the EU's EFIs, but unlike all other EFIs, it has a different set of implementation rules.<sup>177</sup> While the EU has made important efforts to harmonise the implementation regulations of the EDF with those of the other EFIs, some differences remain because of the particularities of the legal basis of the EDF: the Cotonou Agreement and the Overseas Association Decision.<sup>178</sup>

3. An overview of our approach to answering the specific questions of the CIR evaluation is provided in Appendix A below. The existence of a different set of implementation regulations for the EDF increases the complexity of the CIR evaluation and requires a two-step approach. Firstly, section 2 below provides answers to each of the evaluation questions and indicators contained in the CIR questionnaire provided by the European Commission. Secondly, section 3 below then reviews the changes introduced in the EDF11 implementation regulation (compared to EDF10) to contextualise and complement the analysis and elaborates whether it is likely that the changes relate to the regulations or to other factors. This exercise complements the analysis in section 2 and provides the necessary context to interpret the results.

### Limitations

4. There are some limitations in the amount and quality of the evidence used to compile this report. Firstly, this document is based on the preliminary data of the CIR survey<sup>179</sup> and not on the final one. Secondly, by 1st of December 2016, the deadline for submitting this report, the EDF Performance Review team had only collected data from five out of the eight case studies and had not completed the analysis of the other data collected in the context of this evaluation. As a result, it is difficult to triangulate some of the evidence or to offer deep insights into the reasons explaining the performance described in the following pages.

## 2. Answers to the evaluation questions

### 2.1. To what extent have the nationality and rules of origin requirements of the CIR increased the untying of aid for the Instrument, compared to its predecessor?

5. The monitoring data from the latest round of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation (GPEDC) shows that the EU institutions have substantially increased the share of untied aid between 2010 (47.7%) and 2014 (65.6%).<sup>180</sup>

<sup>177</sup> COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund; COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2015/323 of 2 March 2015 on the financial regulation applicable to the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund; and INTERNAL AGREEMENT between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union, meeting within the Council, on the financing of European Union aid under the multiannual financial framework for the period 2014 to 2020, in accordance with the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, and on the allocation of financial assistance for the Overseas Countries and Territories to which Part Four of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union applies


<sup>178</sup> COTONOU AGREEMENT: Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one Part, and the European Community and its Member States of the other Part; and COUNCIL DECISION 2013/755/EU of 25 November 2013 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Union ('Overseas Association Decision')

<sup>179</sup> This survey was sent out by the Commission to Delegations around the world and contained questions on the CIR applicable to all the instruments being evaluated.

<sup>180</sup> See the GPEDC monitoring data available at: <http://effectivecooperation.org/monitoring-country-progress/explore-monitoring-data/>


6. Evidence suggests that progress has also been made in the case of the EDF. Figure A.11 below shows the amounts of untied, tied and partially tied aid for the period 2011-2015. The figures show substantial variability from one year to another, but there is a clear upward trend if a two-year moving average is used to smooth the differences (see Figure A.12 below).

**Figure A.11 Untied aid in % of EDF commitments**



\* Commitment data from the EU Dashboard. Other data based on the OECD CRS database

**Figure A.12 Untied aid in % of EDF commitments, 2-year moving average**



\* 2015 commitment data from the EU Dashboard. Other data based on the OECD CRS database

7. However, some caveats apply to these two graphs. Firstly, the graphs are based on commitment data which tend to be more variable than disbursement data. The reason for this is that tied aid is only consistently reported by the EU for projects committed after 2010 in the case of the OECD database and 2014 in the case of the EU dashboard. This essentially excludes the possibility of looking at actual disbursements because they would include a substantial number of projects for which the tying status is unknown. Secondly, as of early November 2016, the OECD has not yet released the 2015 dataset for the EU Institutions. In order to complement the OECD dataset, we have used data from the EU dashboard. A small difference between the figures reported to the OECD and the figures reported in the Dashboard has been observed. The difference is of a few (<5) percentage points and does not necessarily invalidate the findings.

## 2.2. To what extent has the use of country systems per Instrument increased, compared to the situation prior to 2014?

8. The evidence collected so far is insufficient to provide an answer to this question. The main challenge is that no detailed data for the EDF has been found on the use of country systems. Instead we have used GPEDC data on indicator 9 which shows that, on average, the use of country systems by the EU Institutions (all EFIs) decreased slightly between 2010 (47.9%) and 2015 (45%). The data is not broken down by EFI.

9. This analysis can be complemented by looking at the use of country systems in individual developing countries. GPEDC data shows that there was an increase in the use of country systems in developing countries where the EDF is active. In 2015, the average for all 54 EDF countries reporting to the GPEDC was 41.7%, compared to 34.4% in 2010. If we only look at EDF countries reporting both in 2015 and in 2010, the figures are 41.3% and 34.4% respectively. In comparison, the average for all countries reporting to the GPEDC was slightly higher even if progress in percentage points was less significant: 50.8% in 2015, compared to 44.7% in 2010.

10. Unfortunately, the number of donors operating in each developing country means that, based on existing information, it is not possible to assess the specific performance of the EDF. Secondary sources suggest that the performance of the EDF is better than that of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), especially in countries using budget support.<sup>181</sup> However, the document is relatively old (2012) and without more recent information to triangulate the information it is not possible to reach a clear conclusion.

## 2.3. To what extent have stakeholders in the beneficiary country, such as civil society and local authorities, played a meaningful role in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of actions (i.e. articles 4(11) and 15 CIR)? Tools, timely access to relevant information given to stakeholders, better targeting and designing of actions.

11. Before examining the evidence to answer this questions, it is important to mention that the direct or active role of civil society organisations (CSOs) and local authorities (LAs) in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of EU actions is not explicitly stated in the EDF implementation regulation or the identification and formulation instructions accompanying the action documents for the EDF (see Appendix B below for more information). These documents foresee the following roles for CSOs and local authorities (LAs):

- recipients of support ('empowerment')
- consultative role at time of programming
- participative role in development
- external oversight responsibility for development.

12. If civil society (CS) has a role to play in the project cycle it is because it has a role to play in participating in the partner country's domestic policy. This is indeed what is found when looking at the interactions between the CS and the EU in ACP countries.

13. Looking first at the EDF10 and then comparing the way the EDF11 is set up to perform, a definite evolution is noticeable. The **role of the CSOs in the programming phase** is fairly clear. This role ranges from simple consultations to active participation: evidence is found in the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) and confirmed by the evaluations of EDF10 and the four country visits conducted so far. Our review of the role of CSOs in the EDF10 is based on a review of country and regional strategy evaluations. A first observation is that more than a third (39%) of the 23 country strategy evaluations reviewed did not look into the issue of CSO consultations or their participation in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluations of actions. This finding in itself illustrates the relative lack of importance of the subject in EDF10 preoccupations. A second finding is that from the 13 evaluations that did review this aspect, a majority noted that the EU had

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<sup>181</sup> OECD (2012) EUROPEAN UNION. Development Assistance Committee (DAC) PEER REVIEW 2012

involved CSOs at these different stages but 6 (or 38%) found that either no, very limited, or insufficient efforts had been made to involve CSOs. This confirms that CSO consultations during the EDF10 were not (yet) systematically a high priority for EUDs.

14. Pushing several years forward, to 2015 and 2016, one notes that attention to CSOs and their participation in the programming and project cycle has increased substantially: in the same 23 countries reviewed, only two countries report in their External Assistance Management Reports (EAMRs) that working with CSOs has not been possible or very limited and this was because of the political situation (Mali and Burkina Faso). All other countries report multiple instances of consultations and dialogue with CSOs as well as projects that directly or indirectly support CSOs or use them as an implementing agency; in two countries (DRC and Timor Leste) it is noted that working with CSOs is still difficult because of their weaknesses. In all others, the EU appears to have active partnerships with CSOs. The extent to which these relationships are also valid for local authorities is not explicitly addressed in the EAMRs. Naturally these findings need to be interpreted in a context of internal reporting of the EC and could be subject to some bias. However, the findings were broadly confirmed by the country visits of the EDF performance review team which evidenced substantial effort to engage with CSOs during the EDF programming stage (see below).

15. In terms of **support provided to CSOs**, it can be noted from the EDF11 programming allocations that almost a third of the 25 countries with an active relationship with CSOs do not actually support them financially. However, this means a large majority, more than two thirds, do provide financial support to CSOs in addition to involving them in the consultations. Looking at the wider picture of EDF11 programming overall (all 84 countries and regions), a small majority (58%) of EDF11 programmes contain specific envelopes for supporting CSOs but this amounts to a total of €386m or 67.8% of all support to be provided to CSOs during the Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014-2020 (figures communicated by DEVCO B2 for DCI, EDF, ENI and IPA). Whilst many envelopes are relatively small, some countries have set aside very large CSO support envelopes: Ethiopia €52m; Uganda €25m; Sierra Leone €30m; Mozambique €22m; Burkina Faso €21m; Cameroon €20m. It is not known what form this support takes and to what extent it will support other existing NIP programmes or take the form of stand-alone operations. A more detailed analysis of the EDF Performance Review field visits is expected to throw additional light on this. Information provided by DEVCO B2 shows that most of the larger allocations fall under the governance focal sector. A draft Concept Note drafted by the Roadmap Facility (prepared by EPRD, June 2016) suggests that most of the EDF11 CSO support programmes currently in preparation follow the same lines as those of EDF9 and EDF10, without much innovation and thus without linking the new activities to the roadmaps being developed and the changing environment in which CSOs operate.

16. The **CSOs' role in the preparation of actions** is more diverse and less well evidenced:

- the Action Document (AD) instructions specifically highlight the need for CSO mapping and consultations but no hard evidence is provided in the AD that the CSO actually participated in designing the project or that their views were taken on board;
- the actual role of CSOs in programme/project formulation is rarely evidenced in evaluations;
- numerous consultations with CSOs are recorded in the EAMRS (but the reason for consultations is not often specified); and
- CSOs increasingly participate in the wider development process, notably through their presence in Sector Working Groups (where these exist) where sector priorities and donor supports are discussed.

17. In general, stakeholder consultations seem to have improved with the EDF11,<sup>182</sup> possibly also partly because there has been a genuine effort to develop CSO roadmaps since 2014 as a follow up from the 2012 Communication which has required specific attention to be paid to the understanding of how CSOs operate in country, to their mapping, their strengths and weaknesses etc.

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<sup>182</sup> Confirmed in Aruba, Cameroon, Burkina Faso and at regional Caribbean level.

18. However, this increased attention paid to CSOs is in contradiction with some of the initiatives adopted as part of DEVCO's "simplification process" such as the increase in the size of grants. The field visits underscored a concern from a range of stakeholders (the Delegations, the Member States (MSs), donors, and CSOs themselves) that large grants are inaccessible to small grassroots local organisations. The result is that these grants are either 'managed' by Project Management Units (PMUs) staffed by international experts or 'delegated' through larger international CSOs. The extent to which this then effectively strengthens CSOs' capacity in terms of their own activities (as opposed to strengthening their capacities to respond to EU calls for proposals) is not ascertained. In addition it poses the disadvantage that it limits the amount of direct engagement of the EU with these organisations which can have important advocacy roles.

19. The **CSOs' role in implementation and monitoring** is probably most adequately evidenced by the allocations made in the NIPs which show, depending on the country, that CSOs will mobilise 1.6% of the total EDF11 allocations and as high as 18% of the national allocation in Botswana, for example.

20. Finally, no quantitative evidence could be found to show the role of CSOs in the monitoring and evaluation of actions. However, indications from DEVCO B2 analysis, which is confirmed by the few anecdotal examples from the field missions undertaken so far, are that CSOs are increasingly seen as, and used for, the purpose of monitoring the results of public policy implementation. This is in line with the implementing regulations for the EDF11 which highlighted the role of CSOs in accountability and external oversight. Finally, the development of the CSO roadmaps provides a tool that could, in time, provide a basis for better targeted, more coherent and improved design of actions in support of CSOs.


21. Evidence emerging from **discussions with CSOs in the countries visited for the EDF Performance Review** seems to confirm these findings. The emerging messages (this is a very preliminary set of observations, which still needs to be further triangulated during the remaining evaluation period) are that:

- CSOs have been systematically consulted for the EDF11 programming in so far as they have either had a fairly active participation in the discussions or they have been informed of the EDF11 priorities without however really being actively associated in the programming process (Cameroon, Aruba, Burkina Faso, Zambia and Timor Leste).
- CSOs, through their presence in sector working groups where these exist, are able to participate in sector discussions where the government and donors are also present; to that extent, and where it happens, they are consulted on technical and policy matters or are aware of them.
- In some countries (Burkina Faso for example), CSOs and government are systematically consulted when new projects are being formulated by the EU. In Cameroon, the EDF11 has also started setting up formal steps for CSO consultation. At the other end of the scale, in Timor Leste and Ethiopia, working with CSOs is difficult, in the former because the situation is new and CSOs are weak and find EDF procedures difficult to work with, in the latter because government has very strongly restricted the scope of CSO actions.
- A place is made in the NIPs for CSOs to execute (sometimes large parts of) activities within EU programmes, notably in the area of governance (budget analysis, social accountability, external oversight with respect to delivery of public services....).
- The extent to which CSOs are supported themselves for undertaking their own activities, rather than being used as implementing agents for EU-funded activities within EU projects, seems to remain extremely limited. This is a constraint in so far as the CSOs are very often still very fragile and have little financial room for manoeuvre to undertake advocacy and analysis on what they consider priority issues.


## 2.4. To what extent has the participation of local contractors increased since 2014 (i.e. article 8(6) CIR)?

22. The answer to this question is based on the analysis of the preliminary results of the CIR survey (file circulated on 24 November 2016). The data collected in the survey shows significant progress in the participation of EDF contracts going to local contractors. Figure A.13 below compares the progress in the volume of contracts going to local contractors. It includes both the total volume of contracts and the volume of contracts awarded following the single tender procedure. The single tender procedure is the simplest procedure and it is used for contracts under €20,000. Figure A.14 below shows the same breakdown of data but based on the number of contracts.

**Figure A.13 Percentage of volume of contracts going to local and regional contractors**



**Figure A.14 Percentage of number of contracts going to local and regional contractors**



23. The comparison of both graphs suggests that the average size of the contracts going to local contractors has increased between 2013 and 2016. Progress between 2013 and 2016 is considerably higher when measured in volume of contracts (Figure A.13), than when measured of in the number of contracts (Figure A.14). For example, in 2013, local and regional contractors got 56% of the all the contracts, but only accounted for 16% of the contracted volume. In 2016, the number of contracts going to local and regional increased by 17 percentage points to 73% while the total



volume jumped by 37 percentage points to 53%. This indicates that local and regional contractors were awarded bigger contracts in 2016 compared to 2013.

**2.5. To what extent have climate change and environment been mainstreamed in the actions financed under the instruments? To what effect (e.g. greater financial resources? Greater use of environmental impact assessments or strategic environmental impact assessments? More environment/climate change sensitive design and implementation?)**

24. In order to assess financial support for climate change and the environment, we have built a number of indicators based on the existing OECD markers and studied the evolution of EDF commitments over the period 2010-2015. As explained in section 2.1, it was necessary to use commitments instead of disbursements because of the lack of consistency in the use of the OECD markers before 2010.

25. The first indicator (Figure A.15 below) combines the markers for environment, climate change adaptation, climate change mitigation, biodiversity and desertification to provide a comprehensive picture. The second indicator (Figure A.16 below) only captures the environment marker, while the third and fourth indicators capture climate change adaptation and mitigation respectively (Figure A.17 and Figure A.18 below). The OECD markers can take three different values, depending on the nature of the project:<sup>183</sup>

- An activity can be marked as “principal” when the objective (climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation, biodiversity, combating desertification) is stated in the activity documentation to be one of the principal reasons for undertaking the activity. In other words, the activity would not have been funded (or designed that way) but for that objective.
- An activity can be marked as “significant” when the objective (climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation, biodiversity, combating desertification) is explicitly stated but is not the fundamental driver or motivation for undertaking and designing the activity. The activity has other prime objectives but has been formulated or adjusted to help meet the relevant environmental concerns.
- An activity can be marked as “not targeted” when the activity was examined but found not to target the objective in any significant way.

26. The graphs show that in general little or no progress was made between 2010 and 2014. The only exceptions are the projects reporting environment and climate change mitigation as a “significant objective”. However, the increase recorded in these two cases is small.

27. Across most indicators, some progress was made between 2014 and 2015. The increase was small and, in most cases, it brought commitments to the highest level recorded in the period 2010-2015. The main exception is the marker on climate change mitigation, which decreased slightly in 2015 compared to 2014.

28. It is not clear whether the inflexion point marked in 2014 could be the result of the transition between the EDF10 and the EDF11. Total EDF commitments were very low in 2014 and even if the indicator theoretically accounts for changes by looking at the percentage of commitments, it is still possible that there are differences in the nature of the projects committed in 2014 (e.g. that projects committed in 2014 were those of a similar nature to EDF10, while projects in new priority sectors might have still been in the identification and formulation phases).

29. Interestingly, projects using the label “significant objective” and projects using the label “main objective” show a different trend. Across most indicators, progress was recorded on the projects labelled as “significant objective”, while projects with the label “main objective” have decreased or remained stagnant. In other words, it seems that projects designed specifically to tackle environmental issues and climate change have decreased slightly in the period 2010-2015.


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<sup>183</sup> Adapted from OECD (2016) Annex 18. Rio Markers. DCD/DAC(2016)3/ADD2/FINAL


Conversely, projects with other primary objectives but which take environmental and climate issues into account have tended to increase.

30. This trend is consistent with the findings on the mainstreaming of climate change and the environment in existing projects and programmes. Theoretically, mainstreaming should result in more projects taking into account climate change and environmental issues, but not necessarily in a greater number of projects focusing on these issues.


**Figure A.15 Support to environment, biodiversity, climate and desertification as % of EDF commitments**




**Figure A.16 Support to environment as % of EDF commitments**



**Figure A.17 Support to climate change adaptation as % of EDF commitments**



**Figure A.18 Support to climate change mitigation as % of EDF commitments**



**2.6. To what extent has the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms been included in the design of actions? To what effect (e.g. greater financial resources? rights-based design of actions and implementation?).**


31. The answer to this question is based on three different indicators. Firstly, the OECD marker on “participatory democracy and good governance” that allows the tracking of projects targeting this area either as the “main objective” or as a “significant objective” (see section 2.5 above for more information on the definition of these two terms). Secondly, an analysis of the percentage of total disbursements going into key sectors that are connected to the issues being evaluated. These sectors are also generally used when support is channelled to CSOs.<sup>184</sup> Thirdly, the information gathered during the country visits on implementation of a rights-based approach to development.

<sup>184</sup> Based on the information provided by Jerome Le Roy

32. Figure A.19 below shows a significant increase in the percentage of commitments with participatory democracy and good governance as a significant objective in the period 2010-2015. The trend is interrupted in 2014, but this could be the result of the small amount of EDF commitments made during that year. At the same time, the graph shows that the percentage of commitments with participatory democracy and good governance as their main objective has decreased, even if the 2014 data point is ignored.


33. The combination of these two trends suggests that the EDF might be increasingly including the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the design of its actions in other sectors, while the volume of commitments to dedicated projects has decreased.

**Figure A.19 Participatory democracy and good governance as % of EDF commitments**



34. Figure A.20 below shows that the percentage of EDF disbursements going to a selection of key sectors remained at approximately the same level in the period 2010-2015. In 2014, it is possible to see a significant drop, the reasons for which are not clear. Unlike the previous graphs, Figure A.20 is based on disbursements. Since EDF disbursements typically take place over a variable number of years after the commitment has been done, most of the disbursements reflected in the graph are the result of the EDF10. Thus, it is probably still too early to see the impact of any changes on the implementation rules for the EDF11 in the volume of disbursements for these sectors.

**Figure A.20 Support to key sectors in % of EDF disbursements**



35. Specific questions on the implementation of a rights-based approach were asked to the EU Delegation (EUD) staff during the country visits. As of the date of submission of this document, five country visits had been performed. Out of the five missions, only the one conducted in Zambia yielded relevant evidence on this specific question. Interviews conducted in Zambia (MN 203) indicate there is little awareness about what the implementation of a rights-based approach means in practice. The EUD has requested training on human-rights-based approaches and, in the meantime, no actions were being taken in this area.

**2.7. To what extent has gender mainstreaming been included in the design of actions? To what effect (e.g. greater financial resources? Improved gender-sensitive design of actions and implementation?)**

36. The reply to this questions relies on the analysis of the OECD gender marker in EDF commitments, as well as the data collected through the five country visits conducted by the EDF Performance Review team as of the date of submission of this document.

37. Gender has been an important element of the EU development cooperation agenda since 2007, when the Council approved a set of Conclusions on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development Cooperation.<sup>185</sup> This policy and political commitment was translated, together with other international commitments in the area, into a more practical approach by the EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development 2010-2015, which was subsequently updated and replaced by the EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU External Relations 2016-2020.<sup>186</sup>


38. Data on EDF commitments shows that the amount of EDF commitments targeting gender as a significant objective showed some progress between 2010 and 2014, and has seen a much more pronounced spike in 2015, when the volume of commitments more than doubled compared to 2014. Conversely, the amount of EDF commitments targeting gender as the main objective has remained at approximately the same level since 2010. The substantial difference in the trend of projects reporting gender as the "main" or as a "significant" objective is compatible with the idea of mainstreaming gender as a horizontal issue, which should not necessarily result in more gender

<sup>185</sup> Council Conclusions on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development Cooperation, doc. 9561/07, 15 May 2007

<sup>186</sup> EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development 2010-2015, SWD SEC(2010) 265 final; and EU Action Plan Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU External Relations 2016-2020, SWD(2015) 182 final

projects but in a larger number of projects in other areas addressing gender issues. As discussed at the end of section 2.1 above, some caveats apply to the data underlying the graphs.

**Figure A.21 Gender as a % of EDF commitments**



\*Dashboard data

39. From the data on EDF commitments it is not possible to assess whether the quality of the gender component in the projects has actually increased. However, evidence collected during the country visits suggests that in the three countries for which relevant data has been collected (Burkina Faso, Timor Leste and Zambia) efforts are made to mainstream gender into projects and programmes. Zambia and Timor Leste are also developing dedicated programmes on gender.

40. In at least two cases (Burkina Faso and Zambia) qualitative changes have taken place at the delegation that should influence the identification and formulation process in this area. The existence of a gender focal point and internal Quality Support Groups (QSGs) provide a good opportunity to mainstream gender aspects in different projects and programmes. Some challenges remain, including the capacity of some staff members to actually take gender into account in a meaningful way during programme/project design and to ensure that mainstreaming is not reduced to a box-ticking exercise in the action documents and accompanying annexes.

## **2.8. To what extent have criteria regarding accessibility for persons with disabilities been taken into account in the design and implementation of programmes and projects and to what effect?**

41. The only evidence to answer this question comes from the five case studies conducted to date by the EDF Performance Review (Aruba, Cameroon, Zambia, Timor Leste and Burkina Faso). Out of the five missions, four collected relevant evidence on how projects and programmes take into account accessibility for persons with disabilities. As is the case for the other elements of response, here too due to the small sample it is not possible to draw conclusions for the whole of the EDF.

42. In Zambia, Aruba and Timor Leste the issue of accessibility is not being considered in the design and implementation of programmes and projects. Interviews conducted in Zambia (MN 203 and 149) and in Aruba mentioned a lack of awareness about the issue. EUD staff in Zambia have experienced difficulties in getting HQ to share the policies they are supposed to implement and are awaiting additional instructions and guidelines explaining what is required.

43. In Burkina Faso it seems that the issue is being addressed to a certain extent, although through a different approach. The delegation understands that horizontal issues, including accessibility for people with disabilities, are better addressed by monitoring whether vulnerable people are being excluded. The concept of vulnerable people is not restricted to gender, disability or


other EU horizontal issues and can include religious groups, income groups, etc. In order to monitor this, the EUD includes in all projects and programmes some funds to support CSOs to provide feedback on any excluded and vulnerable groups.

## 2.9. Has the use of innovative instruments (loans, guarantees, blending, ...) increased (volume)? (i.e. articles 4(1)(e) and 4(3) CIR)? Did they create a leverage effect?

44. EDF funds are used to support four different blending facilities: the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (EU-AITF); the Africa Investment Facility (AfIF), which will replace the EU AITF; the Caribbean Investment Facility (CIF); and the Investment Facility for the Pacific (IFP). Both the CIF and the IFP are exclusively funded by the EDF. The EU-AITF was predominantly funded by the EDF (€647.7m) with a further €164.3m from member states. The AfIF is being financed through the EDF and the DCI Pan-African programme. However, most of the funding is expected to come from the EDF.<sup>187</sup>

45. The aggregate amount of grants for blending projects provided by these four facilities has increased significantly in the last couple of years (Figure A.22 below). The lion's share of these funds is attributable to the EU-AITF and, since 2016, to the AfIF. For example, in 2015 the EU-AITF funding was €140m, compared to €34m provided by the CIF and no grants from the IFP. In 2016, the figures were: AfIF, €280m; EU-AITF, €58m; and CIF, €15m.

**Figure A.22 Grants from the EU blending facilities supported by the EDF (€m)**




46. The leverage effect of the four blending facilities supported by the EDF is difficult to evaluate. The European Commission uses three different types of ratios to measure the leverage effect:

- Investment leverage ratio – this compares the grant provided by the facility with the total amount of investment in the project (it thus includes all actors).
- Total eligible financial institution leverage ratio that compares the grant provided by the facility with the amount of finance contributed by other financial institutions involved in the project. In practice this generally refers to other support coming from multilateral or regional development banks or other development finance institutions (e.g. AFD, KfW, Cofides, etc.)
- Private loans/equity leverage ratio that compares the volume of grants provided by the blending facility with the amount of private finance involved in the project.

<sup>187</sup> E.g. the EDF's EA-SA-IO RIP, only one of the 5 regional envelopes, foresees a total contribution of €525m for the AfIF, while the total envelope for infrastructure in the Pan African Programme is of €200m of which only a portion is expected to be used for the AfIF (see: [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/mip-pan-african-programme-2014-2017\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/mip-pan-african-programme-2014-2017_en.pdf))

47. Figure A.23 below shows the aggregates of three different leverage ratios for the four different blending facilities supported by the EDF over the period 2009-2016. The figures do not show a clear trend and experience a significant drop in 2016. For reference, in 2014, the three leverage ratios for the totality of all EU blending facilities (including the Neighbourhood Investment Facility which is not managed by DEVCO) were substantially higher than in the case of the EDF: 20.7 (investment leverage ratio), 10.5 (total eligible FI leverage ratio) and 2.3 (private loans/equity ratio). Based on these figures, the EDF seems to show a poorer performance.

**Figure A.23 Leverage ratios in the EDF blending facilities**



48. Without additional information, leverage ratios tell us very little about the actual capacity of the blending facilities to leverage other forms of finance. For example, the use of the “investment leverage ratio” assumes that the grant from the blending facilities have leveraged all other forms of finance (i.e. that without the grant the project would not have happened). However, there is no clear information that this is the case. Moreover, one may think that higher leverage ratios are better, but in the absence of other information that confirms that leverage has actually taken place, a high leverage ratio only indicates that the funding from the blending facility is more diluted (compared to a project with a lower leverage ratio). The smaller the contribution of the blending facility to a project the less instrumental it may be (e.g. contributing €1m to a €100m project is not the same as contributing €30m).

49. Similar caveats apply to the use of the “total eligible FI leverage ratio”. This ratio assumes that the grant from the blending facility has mobilised or leveraged all other financial institutions (FIs) participating in it. Without clear evidence suggesting that this is the case, the “total eligible FI leverage ratio” is subject to the same weaknesses described above. In this regard, it is also important to mention that, in practice, blending projects are not designed by the blending facilities but by one or more FIs that subsequently present the project for a blending grant.

50. The “private loans/equity ratio” is also affected by additional problems. Firstly, the private sector does not necessarily need to be a partner in all blending projects. Many projects supported by the blending facilities (e.g. road building) generally involve the public sector in developing countries, as well as other financial institutions (development banks, etc.). In this regard, this leverage ratio might only make sense in projects where private investments are desirable or actively sought. Secondly, according to DEVCO, the figures on private investments recorded in the database are approximate and do not reflect the real private investment going into this project. The Commission is currently working on a consistent way to measure the involvement of the private sector.



51. A report from the European Court of Auditors looking at the performance of the regional blending facilities<sup>188</sup> suggests that the European Commission does not always perform a clear analysis to show the grant was necessary for the project. This problem affects approximately half of the projects evaluated. In the report, figures are discussed aggregately for all regional blending facilities supported and there is no information on the specific performance of those supported by the EDF.

**2.10. Has there been an increase (volume) in use of more coordinated methods of working (i.e. division of labour) since CIR rules have been in place (i.e. article 4(9) CIR)?**

52. EU Joint programming refers to joint planning of development cooperation by the EU development partners working together. The principle is that it includes a 'joint analysis' of the country situation followed by a 'joint response' which sets out how EU development partners will provide support and measure progress – together these two products form a 'joint strategy'. The strategy can include non-EU development partners who share the principles of joint programming.<sup>189</sup> Joint programming has been prioritized by the EU since 2012, after pre-Busan studies found that aid fragmentation had increased, in particular from EU countries. This resulted in specific Council conclusions and renewed efforts from the EU to promote joint programming. As a result, joint programming has been specifically included in the EDF programming guidelines, as well as in the reporting requirements of the EU (the EAMRs), and there has been the inclusion of a standard Annex 2 of the NIPs with a donor matrix.

53. The Cotonou evaluation (EC, 2016b) finds that *“Joint programming with Member States is on the increase”* (p.133). This evaluation mentions that *“Importantly, Joint Programming is now entering a new phase, with more ambitious objectives, including, where possible, replacing National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) with Joint Strategies, strengthening ownership and reducing transaction costs for both partner countries and development partners”* (ibid).

54. These findings from the Cotonou evaluation are on the whole supported by the evidence reviewed for this evaluation. Specific reference to joint programming is found in 17 out of the 25 EAMRs reviewed for this evaluation (Table A.64). The analysis of the NIPs (Table A.64) similarly highlights a focus on programming with other development partners which is mentioned in 20 out of the 25 NIPs.

55. This evidence suggests that there has been considerable attention to joint programming under the EDF11. A closer analysis of the information reported in both the NIPs and the EAMRs shows that joint programming often refers to programming with other donors overall (and not only with other EU MSs) which is in line with the definition cited above.

56. In some cases, joint programming has been initiated a while ago (before the EDF11) and has been built on for the EDF11 (e.g. Burkina Faso, Burundi, Kenya). In other cases the reference to joint programming is for the moment still forward looking (i.e. the intention is to develop a plan with other MSs) and builds on efforts that have already seen strong results in terms of better coordination (e.g. Uganda, Mozambique, Timor Leste and Zambia). In other countries (e.g. Chad, Malawi, Togo, Djibouti and Haiti) there have been good efforts in coordination and this is seen as a solid basis for ensuring that donor support (and EU support in particular) takes place in a complementary manner; however, this does not take the form of joint programming. In other countries there is simply a mention of some coordination for specific projects (Congo Brazzaville, Dominican Republic, DRC, and Jamaica).

57. Interviews at the global level suggest that joint programming has generally improved under the EDF11 because the EDF requires this to be done jointly with MSs ... *“now it is done with the MS, which requires discussion and consensus with MS and in turn larger process for programming”*

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
<sup>188</sup> CoA (2014). The effectiveness of blending regional investment facility grants with financial institution loans to support EU external policies. Special report No 16

<sup>189</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/eu-approach-aid-effectiveness/joint-programming\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/eu-approach-aid-effectiveness/joint-programming_en) (accessed 21 November 2016).

(MN14, and also MN47, MN 29). There are some suggestions that at times the joint programming is too focussed on the process and can be somewhat ‘heavy handed’ (MN 34). MSs at global level consider it a disadvantage that programming takes place at country level while country level partners don’t have the mandate to negotiate, and that by the time the joint programming goes up to the EDF committee it is too late to really make changes. (MN 34).

58. Comparative data on EDF disbursements in 2011 and 2014 (Figure A.24 below) for the sample of the EDF Performance Review case studies<sup>190</sup> suggests that the number of member states operating in the same sector as the EDF has decreased in three countries and remained approximately constant in the remaining three. The graphs also show the average number of MSs per sector in the country. This information can be used to account for any reduction in the number of donors (e.g. donors moving out of the country). Since the drop in the average number of MSs per EDF sector is higher than the drop in the average number of MSs per sector, it can be concluded that at least part of the reduction cannot be attributed to MSs moving out of the country (e.g. as a result of decreases in aid volumes). Some caveats apply. The graph is based on disbursement data. This means that these figures reflect only a very small portion of the EDF11 funding. Also, because disbursements can take place over a number of years after the commitment has been made, the number of sectors shown in the graph can be quite large. Despite this, the figures suggest some moderate progress, something that seems to be confirmed by additional evidence presented below.

**Figure A.24 Number of MSs active in EDF sectors**



59. Evidence from the country studies highlights that it can be difficult to attribute improved coordination among donors to the EDF only. The Zambia case study shows, for example, that joint programming among all donors had already taken hold under the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) and that it was rather a feature of the landscape that predates the current EDF. Nonetheless, under the EDF11 a specific exercise of developing sector and crosscutting papers which was organized by the EU was cited by various donors and by government stakeholders as having been useful in identifying gaps (with education emerging as a (potential) donor ‘orphan’), and highlighting areas that are oversubscribed (e.g. governance, and energy).

<sup>190</sup> Aruba and New Caledonia have been excluded from the sample, because they are not among the OECD list of ODA eligible developing countries and there is no data recorded in the database.

60. There are some indications from the country studies that joint programming may work better among EU member states than with other partners. From interview evidence this is explained by the existence of shared priorities and values among specific MSs. Some interviews suggest that the EU adds value by encouraging development partners to sit together more and share information, and through regular informal and formal communications, etc. (MN1). Regular exchanges are seen as an important part of this by MSs, but are not always sufficiently done (beyond the planning stage). Country studies support this finding, although some suggest that there may be a need for more frequent communication of on-going implementation to ensure that programmes are better coordinated in practice (not just at the programming stage) (Zambia, Cameroon).

61. For most, interview and country visit evidence (Aruba) suggest that joint programming is of limited value for overseas countries and territories (OCTs) because the EU is often the only donor in these countries. A similar situation appears to present in other relatively advanced (middle-income) countries, such as is the case for Namibia, where joint programming was done with a very small number of donors (MN1).

62. Interviews from across the different country studies show that while the joint programming is generally perceived as useful, the challenge for the EDF11 (and for other donors) is the lack of flexibility in adjusting programming, as well the political agendas coming from HQ (not just Brussels but also in the case of other MSs). The Zambia case study shows that in spite of joint programming there are still instances where donors 'discover' they are working in the same area.

63. A number of interviewees also underscored that joint programming (whether just within the group of MSs, or more broadly) really depends on the will of the donors, and not just the EU. Some interviewees quite openly suggested that the level of enthusiasm for joint programming may be waning somewhat.

## **2.11. What measures were taken to ensure EU visibility both in direct (i.e. managed by the Commission) and indirect management (i.e. managed by another agency, partner country or international organisation) further to the introduction of the CIR (i.e. article 4(5) CIR)?**

64. The answer to this question relies essentially on the analysis of the EAMRs for a sample of 25 EDF countries (see Appendix C below for more information on the sample). Information collected through the five country visits conducted to date simply confirms the analysis presented below. Evidence from the CIR questionnaire is discussed at the end of this section.

65. The EUD tries to ensure visibility through several different measures. Some of the most common ones include press releases, news articles, radio and TV interviews and promotional videos. In general, the main media hooks used by the Delegation are high-level meetings or special events (e.g. Human Rights day, EU days, etc.), project signatures, project inaugurations and similar. The use of internet (websites) and social networks is also very common (Twitter, Facebook).

66. At the project level, it is important to mention that all EU-funded or co-funded projects should have a budgeted communication and visibility plan. The plan has to be "agreed with the EU Delegation staff managing the action, in close coordination with the EU Delegation staff responsible for communication activities".<sup>191</sup>

67. In the case of EU-funded projects, 11 out of the 14 mention some challenges with the implementation of communication and visibility plans at the project level.<sup>192</sup> The quality of the plans is often described as variable. In at least 5 of these cases, improvements were recorded in 2015.<sup>193</sup> In some cases, the EUD has proactively organised training events (Lesotho, Republic of Congo) or joint meetings with all project partners to share lessons and coordinate activities (Zambia, Ethiopia

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<sup>191</sup> EC (2010) Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions. European Commission, EuropeAid Cooperation Office, Brussels

<sup>192</sup> See the EAMRs of: Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Congo DRC, Ethiopia, Haiti, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Zambia

<sup>193</sup> See the EAMRs of: Dominican Republic, Haiti, Kenya, Lesotho, Republic of Congo

and Timor Leste). These types of activities are generally considered as having made a positive contribution to improving visibility at the project level. Tools used at the project level include the ones mentioned in the previous paragraphs as well as promotional materials, placards, equipment with EU logo and social networks.

68. As regards the visibility of projects co-funded by the EU, 10 out of the 15 EAMRs in the sample that provide information on this, say that there are limitations.<sup>194</sup> In 9 cases, there are problems with the visibility of the EU in projects implemented by international organisations (UN agencies are explicitly mentioned in 8 cases). The other EAMR (Cameroon) highlights challenges regarding the visibility of blending projects. The remaining 5 describe the status as good or working well.

69. The preliminary responses to the CIR questionnaire (document circulated on 24 November) contain 30 replies to the questions of visibility, out of which 3 are not valid. However, the information contained is not very detailed compared to the information provided in the EAMRs and does not provide any new evidence. Most answers simply list some examples of activities they embark on (16 answers) or refer to the existence of funding for visibility within EU-funded projects (6 answers). One (1) answer refers to the greater visibility of large infrastructure projects and another one (1) to the need to build the capacity of the EUD and beneficiaries to increase the visibility of EU funding.

## **2.12. How could the CIR regulation be simplified? In what way?**

70. The preliminary responses to the CIR survey (document shared on 24 November 2016) contain a total of 31 replies that are applicable to the EDF, out of which 4 are not valid (N/A, blank or refer to another answer that we cannot identify in the file). Seven (7) out of the 27 valid answers (26%) consider that current rules are suitable and do not suggest any further simplification is required.

71. Nine (9) answers consider that the rules related to the treatment of taxes are difficult to implement and should be reviewed. In particular, they refer to the difficulties partners experience in getting refunds from tax authorities and the need to deal with exemptions and refunds on a case-by-case basis. Two (2) of the responses also point to a potential contradiction between the rules on taxation and the efforts made by the EU to increase domestic resource mobilisation in partner countries.

72. Six (6) answers suggest further harmonisations in the rules on nationality and origin used by the EDF and those of other EFIs. Six (6) answers also mention that the formulation and implementation process is long and complex and that it could be simplified. This issue was also prominently raised during country visits. In two (2) of these six (6) answers, a simplification of the QSG process is suggested, again supported by selected findings from the country visits. Finally, two (2) respondents request additional flexibility in the rules to adapt to the local context or implement actions outside the annual action plan.

## **2.13. Does the scope of the CIR meet the current and future implementing needs of the Instrument?**

73. The preliminary responses to the CIR questionnaire contain a total of 25 replies to this question, of which 4 can be considered invalidated (blank, not answered or non-applicable). The key outcomes of the remaining 21 valid replies are summarised below.

74. Ten (8) replies consider the rules meet current and future implementing needs or do not have any specific comments. Three additional answers (3) consider the question difficult to evaluate.

75. Five (5) answers consider that the EDF implementation rules are sometimes burdensome and/or rules could be further streamlined.

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<sup>194</sup> See the EAMRs of: Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Malawi, Mali, New Caledonia, Sierra Leone, Zambia

76. The remaining answers identify specific challenges such as the role of NAO (1 answer), the treatment of tax exemptions (1) and staffing issues on the EUD side and the capacity of project beneficiaries to implement the rules (1). Another answer (1) considers the dialogue with the NAO as a positive thing, but suggests additional efforts to ensure local companies have access to contracts.

77. One answer (1) considers the rules too relaxed and that they do not respect EU taxpayers (accountability).

#### **2.14. Are there any unintended benefits/problems arising from the CIR?**

78. The preliminary results of the CIR Survey (document shared on 24 November 2016) contain 26 replies to this question, of which 21 can be considered as valid answers (removing N/As and blanks). Out of these 21 replies, a total of 13 provide information on benefits or problems (see below), while the remaining 8 did not identify any unintended benefits or problems.

79. The most common problem identified by the respondents is the existence of delays and the complexity of the implementation of the rules (9 replies). In 4 of these cases, tax exemptions are explicitly mentioned as causing difficulties and/or delays.

80. One reply (1) mentions that the rules on nationality and origin are difficult to implement and easy to circumvent. However, this answer is partially contradicted by another reply (1) that argues that the widening of nationality and origin rules contributes to increased competition to the detriment of EU businesses.

81. There is very little information on the unintended benefits of the regulations in the case of the EDF (2 replies). Both are related. One respondent mentions that the rules prevent dodgy organisations from applying for EU funding. The other respondent mentions that the rules contribute to improving the level of the financial and operational management of the project by the beneficiaries.

### 3. Changes in the regulatory framework of the EDF11 and implication for the CIR evaluation

82. In order to assess the changes in the different CIR evaluation areas, we did a comparison of the EDF10 and EDF11 Implementation regulation. Due to the nature of the regulatory framework of the EDF, it was also necessary to compare the EDF Financial Regulation and the amendments introduced in the Cotonou Agreement. The following regulations were examined:

- Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund
- Council Regulation (EU) 2015/323 of 2 March 2015 on the financial regulation applicable to the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund
- Council Regulation (EC) No 617/2007 of 14 May 2007 on the implementation of the 10<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement
- Council Regulation (EC) No 215/2008 of 18 February 2008 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the 10<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund
- Cotonou Partnership Agreements (see the following section).

83. Table A.20 below provides a summary of the comparative analysis of the wording of different articles in the EDF regulation. The original table was too long to be included here.

**Table A.20 Summary of the comparison in key areas**

Topic	Changes EDF10 – EDF11 and comments
<b>Rules of origin</b>	<b>No significant change.</b> Rules of origin for the EDF are included in the Cotonou Agreement and were amended in 2014. More countries can now participate. Some rules have been made more flexible. See <b>detailed assessment in Appendix D below</b> . Procurement thresholds are not part of the EDF implementation regulation
<b>Ownership</b>	<b>No significant change.</b> The structure of the document (implementation regulation) has changed, but there are no significant changes in the implications for programming an implementation.
<b>Consultation with stakeholders in-country, such as civil society and local authorities</b>	Partly covered by the question above. EDF11 includes an explicit mandate to consult with civil society and local authorities which is implicit in the 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF.
<b>Participation of local contractors</b>	In the case of the EDF, this question only makes sense in the context of "rules of origin". This is essentially an indicator on the use of the impact of the changes in the rules of origin.
<b>Climate change and biodiversity</b>	EDF11 includes a new article on this
<b>Environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and strategic environmental assessments (SEAs)</b>	New wording on this, but real impact requires additional research (e.g. was it required before?).
<b>Human rights and fundamental freedoms</b>	EDF11 now considers these principles (democracy, rule of ...) as an objective and a principle of development cooperation, as well as a factor guiding allocation. 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF only considered the latter.
<b>Gender</b>	Gender implicitly included above (human rights, etc.). EDF11 also mentions it explicitly in the article on monitoring.
<b>Accessibility/disabilities</b>	Implicitly included in the principles above (human rights, etc.).
<b>Innovative instruments</b>	Wording on this was introduced in EDF11.
<b>Coordinated methods of working (i.e. division of labour)</b>	<b>No significant change.</b> EDF11 implementation regulation mentions co-financing in the general principles. More detailed provisions included in the 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF have been moved to article 13 of the financial regulation of the EDF11. Wording remains almost the same.
<b>Visibility</b>	Stronger wording and more detailed information on compliance. Wording has been aligned with the CIR.

### 3.1. Implications for the CIR evaluation

84. The comparative analysis of the EDF implementation rules shows that there are areas where changes are small or which contain some changes in wording which are difficult to evaluate. As a consequence, it would be difficult to argue that progress recorded in the following areas is due to changes in the EDF Implementation regulation:

- Rules of origin. The changes introduced in the EDF11 are not very significant. Some of the interviewees consider the increase of certain thresholds as a positive step. However, the EDF implementation regulation does not regulate the thresholds.
- Ownership. The Cotonou Agreement makes significant emphasis on this principle and the changes introduced in the EDF11 do not seem to change its relevance or introduce significant changes.
- Consultation with stakeholders in-country, such as civil society and local authorities. Same as above.
- Coordinated methods of working (division of labour). No major changes other than in the position of the wording. Moreover, the key policy document, the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour, dates from 2007. And the country visits highlight that a number of countries had made substantial progress on coordination before the start of the EDF11.
- Visibility. Some changes were introduced, but their impact is not clear as they do not contain detailed provisions on what needs to be done. The EU manual on communication and visibility dates from 2010.<sup>195</sup>

85. Even in other areas where more important changes have been recorded in the preceding chapter, the wording is generally not detailed or prescriptive enough to result in easily identifiable changes. Moreover, it is important to consider the EU's political and policy context:

- Human rights and fundamental freedoms: the EDF11 now considers these principles (democracy, rule of law, ...) as an objective and a principle of development cooperation, as well as a factor guiding allocation. The EDF10 only considered the latter. The implications of such a measure are not clear as no specific provisions are provided. Also, the key policy document in this area, the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, dates from 2012 and pre-dates the changes in the implementation regulation.<sup>196</sup> A second Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy was adopted for the period 2015-2019.<sup>197</sup> Given that the Action Plans contain specific implementation provisions, they are more likely to lead to changes at the project level than the small additions included in the implementation regulation.
- Gender: this is implicitly included among human rights and fundamental freedoms (see above). In the EDF11 gender is also explicitly mentioned in the article on monitoring. However, as discussed in section 2.7 above, gender has been a policy and political priority of the EU External Action for a number of years (the first Action Plan covers the period 2010-2015 and a Second Action Plan was approved in 2015).
- Innovative instruments: wording on this subject was introduced in EDF11, but bending facilities already existed and were leveraging funds for development under the EDF10.

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<sup>195</sup> EC (2010) Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions. European Commission, EuropeAid Cooperation Office, Brussels

<sup>196</sup> Council of the European Union, EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, Luxembourg, 25 June 2012

<sup>197</sup> Council Conclusions on the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015 – 2019. Foreign Affairs Council, 20 July 2015.

86. Interestingly, it is in areas such as climate change and environment, and accessibility where less developed policy frameworks can be found.<sup>198</sup> At the same time, and despite the changes in the implementation regulation, little progress (see section 2.5 above on climate and environment) or little evidence of implementation (rights-based approach) have been found in these areas. Although evidence is not conclusive, this suggest that progress has been mostly achieved in areas where clear policies, guidelines and measures have been issued and implemented (e.g. gender) independently of the changes introduced in the EDF11 implementation regulation. And this is also supported by a selection of interviews from the country visits where the existence of clear guidelines and technical support was mentioned as having facilitated the mainstreaming of gender.

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<sup>198</sup> E.g. The European Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe, COM(2010) 636 final contains a section on external action, but no specific commitments. In the case of climate change, increasing attention is being paid to this issue in policy documents prepared in the lead up or the aftermath of the Sustainable Development Goals such as the Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy; Commission Communication, 22 November 2016 – "Proposal for a new European Consensus on Development: Our World, our Dignity, our Future"; and the Commission Communication, 22 November 2016 – "Next steps for a sustainable European future. However, no specific action plan has been developed to date.



## Appendix A CIR evaluation – work plan

The TOR require the EDF evaluation team to submit a report reviewing the impact of the CIR evaluation on several areas by the 1<sup>st</sup> December 2016. This report reviews the CIR evaluation questions and proposes a work plan and division of labour to finalise the deliverable in time.

### 1. Research approach and overlap with the EDF evaluation

Given the workload of the EDF evaluation it is important that the CIR evaluation complements the work on the EDF evaluation as much as a possible. The overall approach to the CIR evaluation is the following:

- Reply to all CIR questions, to the extent possible.
- Built on the comparison between EDF10 and EDF11 in all CIR areas (see Annex T of the Desk report) to provide an indication of whether the changes could be due to the implementation rules (areas where changes have been made) or some other reasons (areas where there are no changes or they are small).

Table A.21 below lists all CIR indicators/questions and whether they overlap with any of the indicators on the EDF evaluation. It also proposes different data sources to answer all different questions and a responsible team member. Whenever possible, data sources align with those used in the EDF evaluation.

**Table A.21 Overlaps between the CIR and the EDF evaluation and data sources**

CIR indicator/question	EDF Evaluation indicator	Data sources	Team member
<b>To what extent the nationality and rules of origin requirements of the CIR have increased the untying of aid for the Instrument, compared to its predecessor.</b>	No overlap	Dashboard, comparison of tied aid 2011/2015 for the EDF	Javier
<b>To what extent has the use of country systems per Instrument increased, compared to the situation prior to 2014 (i.e. article 1(5) CIR)?</b>	Strong overlap. EQ4 contains an indicator on the importance of the principle of ownership at the programming level.	GPEDC (indicator 9b, use of country systems)	Javier
<b>To what extent stakeholders in the beneficiary country, such as civil society and local authorities, played a meaningful role in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of actions (i.e. articles 4(11) and 15 CIR)? Tools, timely access to relevant information given to stakeholders, better targeting and designing of actions.</b>	I.1.2.1 Evidence of consultations with PC (Government + CSO) and regional institutions during programming and their influence on 11 <sup>th</sup> EDF programming.  I.4.3.2 Evidence that stakeholder consultations have been undertaken and have been taken account of at intervention design stages.		Javier overall (EQ4)
		Country visits	All to collect during country visits
		CSO roadmaps	Karolyn overall (EQ1)
		Regional interviews/ documentation from regional level	Paolo to collect information on regional dimension
<b>To what extent has the participation of local contractors increased since 2014 (i.e. article 8(6) CIR)?</b>	In the case of the EDF, this question only makes sense in the context of "rules of origin" (see below for more information)	CIR survey	Karolyn Javier
		Country visits	All to collect during country visits

CIR indicator/question	EDF Evaluation indicator	Data sources	Team member
<b>To what extent have climate change and environment been mainstreamed in the actions financed under the instruments? To what effect (e.g. greater financial resources? Greater use of environmental impact assessments or strategic environmental impact assessments? More environment/climate change sensitive design and implementation?)</b>	Incomplete overlap with I.1.3.1, I.1.4.1. (to some extent also I.1.4.2 and I.1.4.3 more on the financing side of things), I.2.1.2, I.2.1.3 and I.2.3.1	OECD data/dashboard, volume of commitments/disbursements for relevant markers  Country visits	Javier (data)  All from country visits
<b>To what extent has the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms been included in the design of actions? To what effect (e.g. greater financial resources? rights-based design of actions and implementation).</b>	I.4.3.3 Evidence that EU fundamental values (Human Rights, democracy, justice) were promoted in political and policy discussions and in cooperation support  I.6.3.3 Evidence that the EDF has enabled political issues to be raised with PC (HR, democracy, ...)	OECD/Dashboard data on participatory democracy/good governance  Dashboard data on support to CSOs working in key areas (OECD codes)  Importance of GGDC (BS operations)  EAMRs  Country visits	Javier  Javier  Javier  Javier  All from country visits
<b>To what extent has gender mainstreaming been included in the design of actions? To what effect (e.g. greater financial resources? Improved gender-sensitive design of actions and implementation?)</b>	Some tenuous overlap: I.2.1.2	OECD data/dashboard, volume of commitments/disbursements per Gender marker (comparison earliest year with comprehensive reporting - 2013?-, with 2015)  Country visits	Javier  All from country visits
<b>To what extent have criteria regarding accessibility for persons with disabilities been taken into account in the design and implementation of programmes and projects and to what effect?</b>	Some tenuous overlap: I.2.1.2	Country visits	All, from country visits
<b>Has the use of innovative instruments (loans, guarantees, blending, ...) increased (volume)? (i.e. articles 4(1)(e) and 4(3) CIR)? Did they create a leverage effect?</b>	I.6.2.1 Number of sectors where EDF offers blending possibilities I.6.2.2 Number of blending operations and amounts involved per blending operation per country, region over EDF10 and 2014-2016 I.6.2.3 Amounts leveraged from other DPs/development banks I.6.2.4 Share of leveraged funds in proportion of total ODA I.6.2.5 Share of leveraged funds in proportion of total project costs	Analysis of blending data	Javier

CIR indicator/question	EDF Evaluation indicator	Data sources	Team member
<b>Has there been an increase (volume) in use of more coordinated methods of working (i.e. division of labour) since CIR rules have been in place (i.e. article 4(9) CIR)?</b>	I.4.1.1 Evidence of absence of overlap or duplication at sector and thematic level (country, territorial, regional and intra-ACP) between EU EFIs	Comparative analysis of sectors per donor and donors per sector	Javier (EQ4)
	I.4.1.2 Evidence of absence of overlap or duplication at sector and thematic level (country, territorial, regional and intra-ACP) between EU and MSs	Country visits	All from country interviews
	I.4.1.3 Evidence of absence of overlap or duplication at sector and thematic level (country, territorial, regional and intra-ACP) between EDF and other DPs		
	I.5.2.3 Evidence that Joint Programming is being promoted under the 11 <sup>th</sup> EDF	Data on Joint Programming (but last is end 2015 I think)	Muriel (EQ5)
<b>What measures were taken to ensure EU visibility both in direct (i.e. managed by the Commission) and indirect management (i.e. managed by another agency, partner country or international organisation) further to the introduction of the CIR (i.e. article 4(5) CIR)?</b>	Overlap on I.6.3.1 and I.6.3.2	Review of EAMRs (chapter 3, Q5 and chapter 4, Q1)	?
		Country visits	All from field interviews
<b>Regarding the instruments used in your Delegation/Unit: in which of the above areas could the CIR regulation be simplified? In what way? Provide any common feedback you have received from beneficiaries</b>	Depends on the evidence collected	CIR survey	Karolyn Javier
<b>Regarding the instruments used in your Delegation/Unit. Does the scope of the CIR meet the current and future implementing needs of the Instrument? Provide any common feedback you have received from beneficiaries</b>	Depends on the evidence collected	CIR survey	Karolyn Javier
<b>Regarding the instruments used in your Delegation/Unit Are there any unintended benefits/problems arising from the CIR?</b>	Depends on the evidence collected	CIR survey	Karolyn Javier

## 2. Next steps, deadlines and list of tasks

Given the tight deadline, it is important that data collection to answer the CIR evaluation questions starts as soon as possible. In those areas where the CIR evaluation overlaps with the EDF evaluation, responsible team members should prioritise data collection for the relevant indicators.

Please note that the CIR had not been sent to EUDs at the end of October. This could have an impact on some of the tasks listed below.

The following deadlines are suggested to deliver the CIR evaluation by 1<sup>st</sup> December.

- 22 November: draft answers to CIR questions are sent to Javier
- 24 November: deadline for comments/questions from Javier
- 28 November: final answer to CIR questions are sent to Javier
- 29 November: Javier finalises draft report
- 30 November: proofreading by Mokoro and submission to Geneviève

## Appendix B Role of CSOs and LAs in the EDF

The accent put in the Cotonou Agreement's objectives on supporting the emergence of an active and organised civil society is translated in the EDF11 implementing regulations at two levels:

- Firstly, in their general principles, the regulations state that the EU's cooperation with partner countries and regions targets *inter alia* the “*empowering (of) the civil society and local authorities in their participation in the development process at national and regional levels*” and “*Particular attention shall be given to the respective roles of parliaments, local authorities and civil society, inter alia, regarding participation, oversight and accountability*” (Art.2, general principles,5c of the EDF11 implementing regulations).
- Secondly, beyond this empowerment of civil society and local authorities, consultations with civil society and Local Authorities are also enshrined in Title III ‘Programming and Allocation of Funds’, Art. 4 ‘General framework for programming’ of the EDF11 Implementing Regulation (CR 2015/322). The article specifies that programming should be undertaken jointly with the partner country or region concerned, should be the subject of consultations with Member States and “*other donors and development actors, including representatives of civil society and regional and local authorities, shall be consulted as well*”.

However, the involvement of civil society (CS) and Local Authorities (LAs) in the project cycle, from identification, formulation, implementation, monitoring to evaluation, is not mentioned in the regulation. Indeed in its Art 9, Title III (Implementation), it is stated that “*The action programmes and individual measures shall be prepared by the Commission with the partner country or region, involving the Member States locally represented and coordinating where appropriate with other donors, in particular in cases of joint programming, and with the EIB.*” When looking at the instruction for preparing Action Documents (ADs), civil society and LAs come in because they are part of the stakeholders to be analysed and mapped at identification stage, and because “*partners should be in the first line for project and programme design to ensure ownership*” (p.2 of AD instructions) but they are not explicitly given a role in the preparation of the action.

In summary then, the implementation regulation and AD instructions offer a role for recipients of support to CS and LAs (‘empowerment’), a consultative role at the time of programming, a participatory role in development and an external oversight responsibility for development. Their direct or active role in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of EU actions is not explicitly stated. This is in line with the 2012 Communication ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations’, which defines the EU’s approach to working with CS around three priorities:

- i. To enhance efforts to promote a conducive environment for CSOs in partner countries.
- ii. To promote a meaningful and structured participation of CSOs in domestic policies of partner countries, in the EU programming cycle and in international processes.
- iii. To increase local CSOs' capacity to perform their roles as independent development actors more effectively.

The accent here lies thus firmly on the CS role in the wider development process, and with regards to EU cooperation, on their participation in the EU’s programming cycle, not on their participation in the EU’s project cycle which deals with the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of EU actions. As such, the CIR question is thus slightly misleading since if civil society has a role to play in the project cycle it is because it has a role to play in participating in the partner country’s domestic policy. This is indeed what is found when looking at the interactions between civil society and the EU in ACP countries. Looking first at the EDF10 and then comparing it to the way the EDF11 is set up to perform, a definite evolution is noticeable.

### Appendix C EDF Performance review sample of 25 countries

Given the number of ACP countries and OCTs, the team working on the EDF Performance Review has selected a sample of 25 countries to perform a more detailed documentary review. The sample was selected based on the existence of recent country evaluations performed by DEVCO (2010-2016) and complemented by the 8 countries that were selected as case studies (missions). The 25 countries are:

<b>Aruba</b>	<b>Dominican Republic</b>	<b>Madagascar</b>	<b>Sierra Leone</b>
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	Ethiopia	Malawi	Tanzania
<b>Burundi</b>	Haiti	Mali	Timor Leste
<b>Cameroon</b>	Jamaica	Mozambique	Togo
<b>Chad</b>	Kenya	New Caledonia	Uganda
<b>Congo DRC</b>	Lesotho	Republic of the Congo	Zambia
<b>Djibouti</b>			

## Appendix D Specific evidence of rules of origin

This annex assesses the changes to the rule of origins of between EDF10 and EDF11 resulting from Decision No 1/2014 of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers of 20 June 2014 regarding the revision of Annex IV to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement. Rules of origin are thus part of the Cotonou Agreement itself. The implementing regulation of the EDF11 simply refers to Annex IV of the Agreement.

The CIR evaluation requested the evaluation teams to assess “to what extent the nationality and rules of origin requirements of the CIR have increased the untying of aid for the Instrument, compared to its predecessor”. Changes introduced in the EDF11 affect three different areas:<sup>199</sup>

- eligibility criteria contained in article 20 of Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreements,
- derogation regime: when exceptions to the rule can be used, article 22
- preferences: preferential treatment in evaluation of tenders from ACP countries, article 26.

Table A.22 below summarises the main changes introduced in the EDF11, compared to the EDF10

**Table A.22 Summary of main changes in the EDF11 Rules of Origin**

Article and section	Main changes
<b>Article 20 (1)</b>	Broader, it now includes all developing countries and territories and, with some restrictions, OECD countries. Candidate countries have been replaced by beneficiaries of the pre-accession assistance.
<b>Article 20 (2)</b>	No changes
<b>Article 20 (3)</b>	Origin is not restricted when “below the threshold for the use of the competitive negotiated procedure, established in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 19C” .
<b>Article 20 (4)</b>	No changes.
<b>Article 20 (5)</b>	Wording is adjusted to reflect deletion of section 1a, no impact.
<b>Article 20 (6)</b>	Wording is adjusted to reflect deletion of section 1a, no impact.
<b>Article 20 (7)</b>	Recognises implementation through entrusted bodies (Trust Funds). Wording is adjusted to reflect deletion of section 1a.
<b>Article 20 (8)</b>	Stipulates that co-financing with other instruments should follow these eligibility rules.
<b>Article 20 (9)</b>	Foresees the possibility of employing more restrictive criteria “where required by the nature and the objectives of the action and as necessary for its effective implementation”.
<b>Article 22 (1)</b>	Clarifies that exceptions can only be made for neighbouring countries with clear ties or in cases of urgency. Deletion of reference to procurement rules of EIB for the Investment Facility.
<b>Article 26 (1)</b>	Adjustments to wordings for greater clarity, very little impact, if any.
<b>Article 26 (2)</b>	Minor adjustment in wording, no impact.

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<sup>199</sup> There is also a minor change in wording in article 19 (5), but not relevant from the point of the eligibility of applicants.

## Appendix E Analysis of NIPS and EAMRs for evidence of joint programming

Country	EAMR 2015	NIP	Specifics
Aruba	No	-	-
Burkina Faso	Yes	Yes	Joint programming exercise planned for 2016, strong donor coordination since before 2012 (NIP).
Burundi	Yes	Yes	Joint programming between EU and member states started in 2012 and has resulted in a joint strategy (NIP).
Cameroon	No	Yes	Intention to move to joint programming (NIP).
Chad	Yes	Yes	EU and France doing joint programming. Limited number of donors. Areas of synergy identified for the EDF11 (NIP).
Congo Brazzaville	No	Yes	Actions under the EDF will be implemented in coordination with other donors, especially WB and France (NIP).
Djibouti	No	Yes	Some joint programming happening on specific sectors/priorities (NIP).
Dominican Republic	Yes	Yes	Donor matrix mentioned as showing complementarity of actions (NIP).
DRC	Yes	Yes	Actions are implemented in coordination with other donors (NIP)
Ethiopia	Yes		To be confirmed ....
Haiti	Yes	Yes	Clear example of joint programming in terms of choice of sectors and complementarities within sectors though complementary projects (NIP).
Jamaica	No	No	-
Kenya	Yes	Yes	Joint programming together with 8 member states done in 2013. EU member states to explore joint analysis, joint programming, and joint implementation modalities through task teams (NIP).
Lesotho	Yes	No	-
Madagascar	No	Yes	Seeking complementarity between projects among main donors (NIP).
Malawi	Yes	Yes	Joint country analysis done in 2012 which is considered the groundwork for gradually moving towards joint programming among interested partners.
Mali	No	Yes	Joint programming on-going at the time that the NIP was designed (NIP).
Mozambique	No	Yes	Coordination system well established, although some donors have now left the joint BS group. Sector choices for EDF11 based on what other donors are doing (NIP).
New Caledonia	No	No	-
Sierra Leone	Yes	Yes	Consultation with other partners mentioned (NIP).
Tanzania	Yes	No	Donors and MSs have stepped up efforts for joint programming by doing a joint analysis and coordination in a number of key sectors including formulation of a joint approach to BS (NIP).



Country	EAMR 2015	NIP	Specifics
Timor Leste	Yes	Yes	Highlights a focus on principle of aligning but does not say how (NIP).
Togo	Yes	Yes	Coordination and division of labour (NIP).
Uganda	Yes	Yes	Joint programming mentioned as a next step in donor coordination (NIP).
Zambia	Yes	Yes	Long-term orientation of joint programming beyond 2015 is uncertain but the EU will coordinate with key donors in the sectors in which it is operating (NIP).

## **Annex 10                      Comparative analysis of EDF10 and EDF11 regulatory frameworks and processes**

### **1.        Introduction**

This annex provides a comparative analysis of the regulatory framework of the EDF10 and the EDF11 and discusses their potential impact on EDF procedures. The analysis has been performed from two different angles. Firstly, it discusses four key elements of the regulation that, when modified, should lead to changes in the EDF procedures. Secondly, it looks at changes in other areas that are relevant for the CIR evaluation and which help to complement the analysis.

The annex focuses on changes in the EDF regulations that would require significant adjustments to EDF procedures and does not aim at identifying and describing every change in EDF regulations. This has two important implications: i) this annex does not necessarily reflect other factors that might have influenced EDF procedures; and ii) it assumes that some small changes and adjustments are inevitable (e.g. the direct access modality to regional cooperation).

The annex is based on the analysis of the following regulations:

- Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund
- Council Regulation (EU) 2015/323 of 2 March 2015 on the financial regulation applicable to the 11th European Development Fund
- Internal Agreement between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union, meeting within the Council, on the financing of European Union aid under the multiannual financial framework for the period 2014 to 2020, in accordance with the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, and on the allocation of financial assistance for the Overseas Countries and Territories to which Part Four of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union applies
- Council Regulation (EC) No 617/2007 of 14 May 2007 on the implementation of the 10th European Development Fund under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement
- Council Regulation (EC) No 215/2008 of 18 February 2008 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the 10th European Development Fund
- Internal Agreement between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the financing of Community aid under the multiannual financial framework for the period 2008 to 2013 in accordance with the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement and on the allocation of financial assistance for the Overseas Countries and Territories to which Part Four of the EC Treaty applies
- Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002
- Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities

### **2.        EDF Processes and decision-making structures**

This section examines the changes between the EDF10 and the EDF11 in four key areas. These areas have been selected because of their direct influence on the EDF procedures. By examining changes in these areas, it should be possible to ascertain whether the EDF procedures required substantial adjustments under the EDF11:

- Governance/decision-making structures: changes in this area should lead to changes in decision-making processes.
- Framework for programming: changes in this area would affect programming procedures.
- Framework for implementation: changes in this area would affect implementation procedures.

- Financial instruments: a sub-set of the above, but with a very specific and direct impact on the procedures. As explained below it has been used as case study of change in the framework for implementation.

Table A.23 below summarises the main changes in these four areas between the EDF10 and the EDF11

**Table A.23 Summary of main changes between the EDF10 and the EDF11.**

EDF11	Changes compared to the EDF10
<b>1. Governance</b>	
<p><b>EDF Committee, which according to the Internal agreement: <i>A Committee ('the EDF Committee') consisting of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States shall be set up at the Commission for the 11th EDF resources which the Commission administers.</i></b></p> <p><b>African Peace Facility: follows a different procedure involving the African Union and endorsed by the ACP Committee of Ambassadors</b></p> <p><b>Investment Facility Committee: <i>"set up under the auspices of the EIB by Article 9 of the Internal Agreement shall consist of the representatives of the Member States and a representative of the Commission. An observer from the General Secretariat of the Council and an observer from the European External Action Service shall be invited to attend."</i></b></p>	<p>Same wording in the EDF10 with the precision that <i>"The EDF Committee shall be chaired by a Commission representative and its secretariat shall be provided by the Commission. A representative of the EIB shall take part in its work."</i></p> <p>African Peace Facility: no change</p> <p>Investment Facility Committee: <i>"set up under the auspices of the EIB according to Article 9 of the Internal Agreement shall consist of the representatives of the Member States and a representative of the Commission. Each Government shall nominate one representative and one designated alternate."</i> With the EDF11, the main change is thus the introduction of two observers, one from the General Secretariat of the Council and one from the EEAS.</p>
<b>2. Programming framework</b>	
<p><b>Defined in Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement. Programming for this purpose shall mean:</b></p> <p><b><i>"(a) the preparation and development of country, regional or intra-ACP strategy papers (SP) based on their own medium-term development objectives and strategies [...];</i></b></p> <p><b><i>(b) a clear indication from the Community of the indicative programmable financial allocation from which the country, region or intra-ACP cooperation may benefit during the period covered by the multi-annual financial framework [...];</i></b></p> <p><b><i>(c) the preparation and adoption of an indicative programme for implementing the SP, taking into account commitments of other donors, and in particular of the EU Member States; and</i></b></p> <p><b><i>(d) a review process covering the SP, the indicative programme and the volume of resources allocated to it."</i></b></p>	<p>No changes since the 2<sup>nd</sup> revision of the Cotonou Agreement was approved in 2010.</p> <p>Prior to that date, the Cotonou Agreement did not require the programming of the regional and intra-ACP levels. However, the programming guidelines of the EDF10 already required the programming of these facilities.<sup>200</sup></p> <p>Other changes were introduced in the 11<sup>th</sup> programming process to reflect the second revision of the Cotonou Agreement, notably changes in terms of actors involved (role of the EEAS after the Lisbon Treaty), principles applied and key steps. A comparison of the EDF10 and EDF11 programming processes is provided in section 2.2 below.</p>

<sup>200</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/programming-guidelines-10th-edf-national-and-regional-programming-2009\\_en\\_1.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/programming-guidelines-10th-edf-national-and-regional-programming-2009_en_1.pdf)

EDF11	Changes compared to the EDF10
<b>3. Framework for implementation</b>	
<p>Financial regulation stipulates that the implementation framework should be aligned as much as possible to that of budget instruments (Regulation EU, Euratom No 966/2012). (financial regulation)</p> <p>Four types of financing decisions: action programmes, individual, special and support measures (Implementation regulation article 9)</p>	<p>Financial regulation stipulates that the implementation framework should be aligned as much as possible to that of budget instruments. The text refers to an earlier version of the regulation: EC, Euratom No 1605/2002.</p> <p>Same four types of financing decisions: action programmes, individual and special measures (Implementation regulation, articles 7 &amp; 8). Support measures are referenced in the Financial Regulation of the EDF10.</p>
<b>4. Financial instruments</b>	
<p>Articles 37-40 of the financial regulation foresee the use of different instruments: grants, prizes, budget support and financial instruments. Financial instruments are defined in Regulation EU, Euratom No 966/2012 and include innovative instruments such as equity and quasi-equity investments, guarantees, etc.</p> <p>The combination of the EDF Financial Regulation and the Regulation EU, Euratom No 966/2012 provide a clear legal framework for the use of different instruments.</p> <p>Article 40 states that financial instruments <i>“shall be, whenever possible, under the lead of the EIB, a multilateral European financial institution, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or a bilateral European financial institution, such as bilateral development banks, possibly pooled with additional grants from other sources. [...] Financial instruments may be grouped into facilities for implementation and reporting purposes.”</i></p>	<p>Legal framework is much less clear. The Financial regulation only foresees the used of grants. However, in practice, budget support was provided under the EDF10, all blending facilities supported by the EDF operated under the EDF10 and used innovative financial instruments suggesting that the real range of financial instruments was the same.</p> <p>Article 25 makes possible the management of EDF resources by other institutions: <i>“national public-sector bodies or bodies governed by private law with a public-service mission and providing adequate financial guarantees for the implementation of the tasks assigned to them.”</i></p> <p>Similarly, the management of instruments such as loans, guarantees, interest rate subsidies and other instruments by the EIB is acknowledged in article 103.</p>

## 2.1 Governance structures

Table A.23 above shows that the governance structures were very similar under EDF10 and EDF11, except for the addition of the EEAS as a major actor.

## 2.2 Programming framework

With regards to programming, the framework changed little but the actual process as described in the programming guidelines underwent significant change as illustrated in Table A.24 below.

**Table A.24 Changes in the programming processes of EDF10 and EDF11 (based on programming guidelines)**

EDF10	EDF11
BILATERAL PROGRAMMING	
<b>Objective</b> Poverty reduction in the context of sustainable development Reference to all new core policy documents that followed the MDGs in 2005 <sup>201</sup> , of which these guidelines are an operationalisation	<b>Objective</b> The fight against poverty Only reference to Agenda for Change
<b>Scope</b> Guidelines cover both national and regional programming of EDF10	<b>Scope</b> Common programming guidelines for all regions: EDF and DCI (excl. centrally managed thematic cooperation and OCTs) but separate regional programming guidelines (for regional see bottom of table)
<b>Institutional set-up</b> No specific mention	<b>Institutional set-up</b> Application of the Lisbon Treaty to programming whereby EEAS is responsible for preparing the Commission Decisions w/r to the country allocations (the envelopes for each region and reserving the part for regional programmes) and the CSPs/RSPs and the NIPs/RIPs.
<b>Timing</b> Start Feb. 2006 Draft CSP: Sept 2006 Detailed agenda available (incl. regional seminars, QSG, Commissioner validation, inter-service consultations, EDF Committee, Commission decision) Finish: signature 1 June 2007	<b>Timing</b> Start Spring 2012 First phase Apr-Sept 2012: analysis of national plan and submission of overall lines of proposed response (or of justified option for CSP by July 2012) Second Phase: Jan – Apr 2013 preparation of draft MIP, programming seminars, team meetings and finalization July 2013.
<b>Deliverables</b> Format: new common framework for CSP and RSP format (April 2006) 'that takes into account the latest development commitments, initiatives and communications'	<b>Deliverables</b> Simplification: the obligation to prepare a CSP and its technical annexes has been removed: if following the national strategy, the MIP can be directly prepared on that basis.
<b>Guiding Principles and sectors of concentration</b> <u>Ownership, participation, harmonisation, and coordination</u> (Coordination: laying the basis for JP)  <u>Policy mix</u> (with a strong accent on PCD see above)  <u>Concentration</u> : concentrate aid in 2 sectors out of the 9 indicated in the European consensus and only 1 sector if the envelope is less than €40m; non-focal activities are limited to 15% of the A-envelope.  <u>Subsidiarity</u> : see above	<b>Guiding Principles and sectors of concentration</b>  <u>Ownership</u> : Addition of private sector in consultations and use of national sector definitions: 'The assessment and choice of sectors should be based on inter alia the needs and development objectives of the partner country/region and national/regional definitions of sectors (as used in National/Regional Development Plans etc.). This should, however, not lead to an artificial extension of the concept of a "sector"' (page 9, Programming Guidelines).  <u>Comprehensiveness and coherence</u> : MIP in line with Joint Framework document (JFD) or Joint Programming Document (not applicable to EDF funding) if exist.  <u>Synchronisation and flexibility</u> : possibility to synchronise programming cycle with that of the PC but nothing really said on flexibility other than that it should be done through ad hoc reviews. It also mentions the possibility to keep an amount unprogrammed in order to answer specific needs of post-

<sup>201</sup> Council conclusions on MDGs (2005), Paris Declaration (2005), European Consensus of 2005, EU Strategy for Africa (2005), Migration (2006), Caribbean (2006).

EDF10	EDF11
	<p>crisis/fragile situations</p> <p><u>Differentiation</u> <i>'the Commission has proposed to focus EU development efforts on partner countries that are most in need (including fragile states) and where EU assistance can have the greatest impact (...) The Commission has proposed that the EU should adapt its support (the mix of instruments and aid levels, modalities and arrangements) to the country's situation and progress in terms of its commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, its ability to conduct reforms and to meet its people's demands and needs'</i> Those that no longer receive bilateral aid will still be eligible for regional and thematic aid.</p> <p><u>Concentration</u>: The Commission will concentrate its development efforts on three sectors (interpreted in a narrow sense) to be chosen within two sectors defined broadly as human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance; and on inclusive and sustainable growth. Both sectors of concentration are then mapped out in more detail, effectively covering many different themes and wide sectors.</p> <p><u>Blending for growth</u>: to leverage public and private investments, primarily through regional investment facilities.</p> <p><u>Coordination and Joint programming</u>: a more elaborate section on JP and JFD</p>
<p><b>Complementarity/Coherence</b> A strong focus on the Policy Coherence for Development (section 2.2): specific analysis for environment, migration, security, etc., thus non-development policies. Application of the principle of <u>subsidiarity</u> (sect. 2.4): Accent on consistency between national and regional programming (section 2.4.1) and on coherence / complementarity between global and horizontal initiatives, thematic programmes (budget lines), fisheries agreements and geographic programmes. Attention paid to the coherence between different financing instruments (section 2.4.2)</p>	<p><b>Complementarity/Coherence</b> Noted that the new institutional set-up requires a close cooperation between EUDs, EEAS and DEVCO to ensure coherence of the EUD proposals with external relations priorities, regional and thematic priorities and EU policy orientations. The guidelines specify 'a vision regarding the EU's relationship with, and support to, a partner country/ region' but the coherence is still considered from the same angles as previously: (i) other cross-cutting or sectoral policies (security, disaster risk management, migration, etc.) and (ii) policies, instruments, actions of the EU and those of MSs, EIB and other European DFIs. The EU should deliver as one.</p>
<p><b>Financial allocations</b> EDF10 Quantitative Aid Allocation Model provides the theoretical calculation of the national and regional envelopes. Two envelopes (A and B) with top-up a function of governance appraisal at MTR (Art. 3 alinea 2 of implementing regulation)</p>	<p><b>Financial allocations</b> No details provided other than the reference to the differentiation. No details given on the allocation formula. Only in 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase instructions (May 2013) a promise of a forthcoming initial estimation of allocations. They will be given pro-rata from 2014 till MTR and from MTR to end 2020. No indications are given on the provisions of Art.7 of the Implementation Regulations w/r to the performance based mechanism and any potential <u>supplementary</u> allocation of a governance incentive tranche after the MTR (as seen above under 'differentiation', governance pays a role in establishing the initial allocation).</p>
<p><b>Implementation modalities</b> budget support, sector programme support, project/programme aid and contribution agreements (for cooperation</p>	<p><b>Implementation modalities</b> No details given</p>

EDF10	EDF11
with regional or international organisations)	
<b>Monitoring indicators</b> Programming document should include table with at least 10 MDG indicators disaggregated gender etc.	<b>Monitoring indicators</b> Less prescriptive and detailed than EDF10 in terms of including the results framework per se but more demanding in terms of risk analysis of attainment of results. Further instructions announced in the Second Phase instructions.
<b>REGIONAL PROGRAMMING</b>	
<b>Focus of regional programmes</b> Regional economic integration, trade and EPAs	<b>Focus of regional programmes</b> Peace and stability, as well as conflict prevention and resolution; economic cooperation and integration; management of sustainable development challenges with a transnational dimension.
<b>Process</b> Not explicitly detailed as part of the same programming exercise as NIPs	<b>Process</b> Rather detailed explanation about the governance of the RIP with allocations of formal roles for programming, implementation and oversight
<b>Financial allocations</b> To be calculated on the basis of EPA configurations	<b>Financial allocations</b> Availability of an envelope to cover unforeseen needs Envelope to be indicated for regional blending
<b>Beneficiaries</b> Only regional organisations were able to benefit.	<b>Beneficiaries</b> Branching out from only support to regional organisations to national administrations or regional actors for regional integration and cross-border and national projects with regional dimension (they then become RAOs for these operations).
<b>Programming</b> Nothing specific in the guidelines, assumed it is as for national programming	<b>Programming</b> Implies choice of priority areas of support, with specification of objectives, results and indicators and measures to be taken by recipient as well as identification of operations to be financed.

From the above table, several differences in programming for EDF10 and EDF11 emerge from the two sets of guidelines:

- the introduction of the EEAS in the process, preparing the Commission's decision on country and regional allocations and on NIPs/RIPs: the EEAS thus has a pivotal role to play in deciding the cooperation portfolios;
- The division of programming into two distinct phases for the EDF11 with a (long) first phase of programming without knowledge of the financial envelope;
- The application in the EDF11 of a new allocation formula based on the principle of differentiation;
- The disappearance of the 'B' envelope in favour of 'flexibility' (without however, explaining how this is to be achieved in non-fragile/crisis countries) and the absence of mention of the performance based mechanism for a possible 'top-up' at MTR (as indicated in the Implementation Regulations Art.7).
- A simplification of the programming documents, the possible full alignment on the country's national plan and the possibility to synchronize with the national planning cycle.
- A mention in the EDF11 on the need to perform a risk analysis of the results to be attained by the cooperation.

Excepting the above changes, the general process and principles such as ownership, concentration, blending, complementarity and coherence, have changed very little in content from the EDF10 guidelines except that the EDF11 guidelines specify the close cooperation required between EUDs, EEAS and DEVCO.

With regards to the regional programming guidelines, the major change between EDF10 and EDF11 is the fact that regional allocations are no longer limited to regional organisations but can also benefit national administrations or regional actors for the implementation of projects that have a regional dimension (they then become RAOs for these operations).

In terms of areas of priority support, here again changes were introduced in line with the required sector concentration in EDF11. The two development priorities for the EDF11 were defined as: (i) human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance, and (ii) inclusive and sustainable growth for human development. For the latter, the EU would target: social protection, health, education and jobs; the business environment, regional integration and world markets; and sustainable agriculture and energy. For the OCTs, concentration was to be on only one sector amongst a rather wide array of areas<sup>202</sup>, use preferably sector reform contracts, match EDF funding with European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) funding and use the thematic component of their regional allocation on biodiversity. With regards to regional cooperation in the ACP region, programming guidelines specify a focus on promoting: peace and stability, conflict prevention and resolution; economic cooperation and integration; and cooperation, coordination and harmonisation of regional cooperation policies (see EC, 2013b, page 3).

### **2.3 Implementation framework**

The assessment of the framework for implementation is more complex. Firstly, in both cases (EDF10 and EDF11), the process was aligned as much as possible with the implementation of budget instruments. However, the underlying regulation is different. The EDF10 refers to Regulation 1605/2002, while the EDF11 refers to Regulation 966/2012. The differences between the regulations are significant and it is not possible to assess the changes and implications within the remit of this report. If we restrict the analysis to the specific provisions included in the EDF regulation, then both the EDF10 and the EDF11 use the same four types of implementation measures.

### **2.4 Financial instruments**

In the particular case of the range of financial instruments supported by the EDF, it is clear that the legal framework of the EDF11 is much clearer than that of the EDF10. Nonetheless, the range of financial instruments remains the same. The use of “innovative” financial instruments is first mentioned in the EDF11, but the blending facilities were all operational under the EDF10. More importantly, blending facilities are in both cases examples of EDF resources managed by other institutions. As a result the impact of these financial instruments on EDF procedures is likely to be minimal.

In general, it seems reasonable to conclude that EDF processes and decision-making structures did not require significant adjustments to the EDF procedures between the EDF10 and the EDF11.

There have been changes such as the direct access modality to regional cooperation. However, this does not imply a substantial change to the procedures.

## **3. Other areas covered by the CIR evaluation**

The CIR evaluation requires, in the case of the EDF and in order to set a baseline, to compare changes in the regulatory framework. This section reflects some of the analysis already performed as part of the work on the CIR evaluation and discusses its implications for EDF procedures.

Table A.25 below summarises the changes in the implementation regulation in all key areas mentioned in the evaluation questionnaire. It shows that while there are some differences in some areas, the issues likely to have a greater impact on the procedures (i.e. rules of origin, consultation, or methods of working) have a very similar treatment under the EDF10 and the EDF11.

The most significant change in the EDF11 is a greater emphasis on climate change and biodiversity and human rights and fundamental freedoms (gender in particular). While this has had an impact at

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<sup>202</sup> The areas indicated for OCTs are: environmental issues, climate change and disaster risk reduction, accessibility, research and innovation, youth, education, health, employment and social policy, culture, fight against organised crime and tourism.



the procedural level (templates and checklists, gender focal points), it does not really have a significant impact on core procedures such as those described in section 2.

**Table A.25 Changes in implementation regulations mentioned in evaluation questionnaire**

Topic	Changes EDF10 – EDF11 and comments
<b>Rules of origin</b>	Rules of origin for the EDF are included in the Cotonou Agreement and were amended in 2014. More countries can now participate. Some rules have been made more flexible, but the overall process remains the same. See <b>detailed assessment below</b> .
<b>Ownership</b>	The structure of the document (implementation regulation) has changed, but there are no significant changes in the implications for programming and implementation.
<b>Consultation with stakeholders in-country, such as civil society and local authorities</b>	Partly covered by the question above. 11th EDF includes an explicit mandate to consult with civil society and local authorities which is implicit in EDF10.
<b>Participation of local contractors</b>	In the case of the EDF, this question only makes sense in the context of "rules of origin". See above.
<b>Climate change and biodiversity</b>	EDF11 includes a new article on this.
<b>Human rights and fundamental freedoms</b>	EDF11 now considers these principles (democracy, rule of ...) as an objective and a principle of development cooperation, as well as a factor guiding allocation.
<b>Gender</b>	Gender implicitly included above (human rights, etc.). EDF11 also mentions it explicitly in the article on monitoring.
<b>Accessibility/disabilities</b>	Implicitly included in the principles above (human rights, etc.).
<b>Coordinated methods of working (i.e. division of labour)</b>	<b>No significant change.</b> EDF11 implementation regulation mentions co-financing in the general principles. More detailed provisions included in the EDF10 have been moved to article 13 of the financial regulation of EDF11. Wording remains almost the same.
<b>Visibility</b>	Stronger wording and more detailed information on compliance. Wording has been aligned with the CIR. <b>Impact uncertain.</b>

#### 4. Changes to the rules of origin

This section complements the evidence presented above in relation to the Rules of Origin. It assesses the changes to the rule of origins of between EDF10 and EDF11 resulting from Decision No 1/2014 of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers of 20 June 2014 regarding the revision of Annex IV to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement. Rules of origin are thus part of the Cotonou Agreement itself. The implementing regulation of the EDF11 simply refers to Annex IV of the Agreement.

The CIR evaluation requests the evaluation teams to assess “to what extent the nationality and rules of origin requirements of the CIR have increased the untying of aid for the Instrument, compared to its predecessor”. Changes introduced in the EDF11 affect three different areas:<sup>203</sup>

- eligibility criteria contained in article 20 of Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement,
- derogation regime: when exceptions to the rule can be used, article 22
- preferences: preferential treatment in evaluation of tenders from ACP countries, article 26.

<sup>203</sup> There is also a minor change in wording in article 19 (5), but not relevant from the point of view of the eligibility of applicants.

Table A.26 below summarises the main changes introduced in the EDF11, compared to the EDF10. It shows that while some changes have been introduced, they simply update certain criteria, but do not affect the process (how decisions are made, steps, etc.).

**Table A.26 Summary of main changes in the EDF11 Rules of Origin**

Article and section	Main changes
<b>Article 20 (1)</b>	Broader, it now includes all developing countries and territories and, with some restrictions, OECD countries. Candidate countries have been replaced by beneficiaries of the pre-accession assistance-.
<b>Article 20 (2)</b>	No changes
<b>Article 20 (3)</b>	Origin is not restricted when “below the threshold for the use of the competitive negotiated procedure, established in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 19C”
<b>Article 20 (4)</b>	No changes.
<b>Article 20 (5)</b>	Wording is adjusted to reflect deletion of section 1a, no impact.
<b>Article 20 (6)</b>	Wording is adjusted to reflect deletion of section 1a, no impact.
<b>Article 20 (7)</b>	Recognises implementation through entrusted bodies (Trust Funds). Wording is adjusted to reflect deletion of section 1a.
<b>Article 20 (8)</b>	Stipulates that co-financing with other instruments should follow this eligibility rule.
<b>Article 20 (9)</b>	Foresees the possibility of employing more restrictive criteria “where required by the nature and the objectives of the action and as necessary for its effective implementation”.
<b>Article 22 (1)</b>	Clarifies that exceptions can only be made for neighbouring countries with clear ties or in cases of urgency. Deletion of reference to procurement rules of EIB for the Investment Facility.
<b>Article 26 (1)</b>	Adjustments to wordings for greater clarity, very little impact, if any.
<b>Article 26 (2)</b>	Minor adjustment in wording, no impact.

## Annex 11 Evidence from the EFI Survey (Relevance)

This annex provides an analysis of the survey responses that are relevant to EQ1. The survey was held amongst all EU Delegations and 81 Delegations responded, of which 39 were from ACP countries and/or regions, thus representing just under half of total respondents (48%). The tables and statistics presented hereafter are all drawn from the material provided by the Chapeau Team (Survey, 2016).

### 1. Use of EFIs by ACP countries

As can be seen in Table A.27 below, ACP countries that responded to the survey used the four EFIs available to them (EDF, DCI, EIDHR, IcSP) and Nigeria also used the Partnership Instrument (of which it is the only ACP beneficiary for the moment). The instruments most used (apart from the EDF, which is of course used by all as the 'standard' EFI for ACPs except Sudan<sup>204</sup>) were the EIDHR and DCI budget lines, followed by the IcSP used by just under half of the ACP respondents.

None of the ACP countries used only EDF funding, as seen in Table A.28 below; six respondent EUDs indicated they used only one additional instrument, namely DCI for Cape Verde and EIDHR for Gabon/São Tomé e Príncipe/Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Rwanda, Mauritius/Seychelles/Comoros and the SADC region. All other EUDs (85% of respondents) made use of at least 3 instruments, the most popular ones being EIDHR<sup>205</sup> and DCI (97% and 82% of respondents respectively), followed by ICSP (49% of respondents). Some respondents indicated that the use of a greater number of instruments was constrained by the limited absorption capacity of the countries.

**Table A.27 External Financing Instruments (EFIs) used by EU Delegations**

Instrument	No. of countries		Share ACP response
	All	ACP	
Development Co-operation Instrument	63	32	82%
European Development Fund	39	39	100%
European Instrument on Democracy and Human Rights	72	38	97%
European Neighbourhood Instrument	8		
Greenland Decision	0		
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace	40	19	49%
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation	3		
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance	5		
Partnership Instrument for co-operation with third countries	11	1	3%

Source: Survey, Part I, Section 2.

<sup>204</sup> Sudan was not implementing programmable funds of the EDF in 2016 and did not sign the revised Cotonou Agreement. Instead it is using the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa funding, itself mainly funded from the EDF envelope but not subject to EDF systems and procedures.

<sup>205</sup> The only country not having used EIDHR is Cape Verde.

**Table A.28 Number of External Financing Instruments (EFIs) used by EU Delegations in ACP countries**

No. of EFIs used	No. of ACPs	Share of ACP respondents
5 EFIs	1	3%
4 EFIs	16	41%
3 EFIs	16	41%
2 EFIs	6	15%
1 EFI	0	0%
Total	39	100%

Source: Survey, Part I, Section 2.

Looking at these instruments in more detail (Table A.29 below), the most used components of the DCI are the budget line for CSOs and LAs, used by 79% of respondents, the GPGC (49% of respondents). Surprisingly the PANAF is only used by four ACP countries (Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and The Gambia) and by South Africa (which is not an ACP country but belongs to the group of middle-income ENP-S countries).

The EIDHR is mostly used for its human rights and fundamental freedoms component (95% of respondents made use of this budget line) and the IcSP is divided between a quarter of respondents using the short term facility for responding to crises, almost a third using the crisis preparedness and conflict prevention component (31%) and a minority having made use of the Global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats or long-term component.

**Table A.29 Use of the different components of each External Financing Instrument by EU Delegations.**

Instrument	No. of countries		Share ACP response
	All	ACP	
<b>Development Co-operation Instrument</b>			
Geographic bilateral component	36	12	31%
Geographic regional component	29	11	28%
Global Public Goods and Challenges component	32	19	49%
Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities component	59	31	79%
Pan African programme component	5	4	10%
<b>European Instrument on Democracy and Human Rights</b>			
Democracy component (in particular support to elections)	24	12	31%
Human rights and fundamental freedoms component	71	37	95%
<b>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</b>			
Crisis response or short-term component (Art 3)	32	17	44%
Crisis preparedness and conflict prevention component (Art 4)	26	12	31%
Global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats or long-term components (CBRN, etc.) (Art 5)	8	5	13%

Source: Survey, Part I, Section 2.

## 2. Opinions on the mix of instruments

The mix of instruments as detailed above corresponded well to the needs of a majority of respondents: 81% of respondents found this to be the case, with only 18% finding that the instruments available did not satisfy their needs, see Table A.30 below. This is slightly lower than the overall rate of satisfaction with the mix of instruments at 85% (or a rate of satisfaction of 88% for the non-ACP respondents). Amongst the 7 ACP respondents who found the array of instruments to be failing to respond to their needs, the main arguments advanced were:

- Lack of flexibility of the instruments and not corresponding to political priorities/challenges (e.g. where political dialogue fails).
- Difficulty of access of some instruments such as the IcSP.
- The lack of respect of the subsidiarity and complementarity principles between the national and regional components of the geographic instrument.
- Divergent objectives, accessibility rules, decision centres, sectors of application of instruments, thus impeding the development of complementarities and synergies, especially when actions are managed directly from HQ, or originating in HQ and transferred to EUDs. This also requires important operational capacities and affects the ability to concentrate on selected sectors only.

These are arguments that the team also heard to various degrees in the countries visited.

**Table A.30 Does the mix of instruments available to your Delegation correspond to current needs?**

Answer	All respondents		ACP respondents only	
	Number	%	Number	%
Yes	69	85%	32	82%
No	12	15%	7	18%
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Survey, Part I, Section 3.

Flexibility and fit for purpose of the mix of instruments was justified by respondents with a diversity of arguments, loosely falling within three categories:

- more flexible use of instruments when in crisis and when circumstances are changing (EDF found rigid, requiring time to be operational and to be modified);
- in some countries, the use of other budget lines where EDF would be meeting problems because of the NAO co-signature requirement so that sensitive issues both at political level and at operational level and/or areas closer to EU values and principles can be supported;
- mix enables to cover areas that could not be covered independently and facilitates complementarities between medium-long-term (EDF), short-term concerns (IcSP) and regional migration related issues (EU TF) as well as between sectors and areas, including with other donors (even if some overlap is also noted by some respondents).

In addition, several respondents argued for the possibility of access to more flexible, ad hoc, non-programmable resources to respond to specific opportunities/needs. Some also observed that amounts of funding and scope fall short of needs.

Asked whether or not the number of instruments helped or impeded relations with partner countries/regions or other actors, the ACP respondents were significantly more negative than the non-ACP respondents. As is shown in Table A.31 below, the opinions are rather divided with a majority of respondents finding the number of instruments having a 'neutral' effect on relations, 36% finding that the mix was a help and a minority of 13% finding it impeded relationships. In terms of arguments to justify the response, they are actually rather similar across the three types of responses; only the weight would be different from one country to another.

Hence positive responses (the multiplicity of instruments helped relations) were justified by some of the same arguments as mentioned above, i.e. it enables to address sensitive political issues, facilitates greater coherence and complementarities of development actions, helps to tackle specific issues, allows to expand the number of sectors of intervention; but some of the negative traits of having so many instruments were pointed out (see below).

Amongst those indicating an overall neutral effect, a few respondents indicated that the multiplicity of instruments is either not really noticed by respondents or confuses them and that, although it provides much welcomed flexibility to the EUD, it also creates additional workloads due to the different procedures, approaches, etc. (as indicated above). A couple of respondents drew attention to the fact that the type of instrument is of no consequence but the fact that some instruments intervene in sensitive areas without involvement of the authorities is potentially very damaging to EU-PC relations; similarly, it has been pointed out that the quality of the relations with the PC/region/actors is not so much due to the instrument itself as to the way the EUD uses it and the capacity of the beneficiaries to absorb it.

**Table A.31     Extent to which the number of instruments helped or impeded relations with partner countries/regions or other actors**

Answer	All respondents		non-ACP respondents		ACP respondents	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Help	37	46%	23	55%	14	36%
Neutral	37	46%	17	40%	20	51%
Impede	7	9%	2	5%	5	13%
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Survey, Part I, Section 3.

For those for whom the number of instruments was felt to have impeded the relationships, it was mostly because the multiplicity of instruments with their multiplicity of procedures, eligibility/mobilisation criteria, sectors, decision-making centres, management and monitoring responsibilities, and sometimes conflicting priorities, was felt to be confusing, lowering EU visibility, reducing the EU aid's effectiveness and impact, and working against the division of labour and concentration on a limited number of sectors.

### 3. Opinions on the flexibility of instruments

The ACP respondents in general find the mix of instruments slightly less flexible than their colleagues from non-ACP countries. As shown in Table A.32 below, a majority of ACP respondents nevertheless find that the mix of instruments allows them to respond better to unforeseen demands from the PC/region (55% of respondents) and from changes in emphasis in the EU agenda (59% of respondents). However, a majority of those who responded to this question (55%) also indicated that this mix is not (yet) able to cater for unforeseen demands linked to new international commitments.

**Table A.32 Extent to which the mix of instruments allows a flexible and pro-active response to unexpected changes in context/crises**

Answer	All respondents		non-ACP respondents		ACP respondents	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
<b>Unforeseen demands from partner countries/regions</b>						
Yes	46	58%	25	60%	21	55%
No	34	43%	17	40%	17	45%
<b>Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>100%</b>
No answer	1				1	
<b>Unforeseen demands from new international commitments</b>						
Yes	35	49%	20	51%	15	45%
No	37	51%	19	49%	18	55%
<b>Total</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>100%</b>
No answer	9		3		6	
<b>Unforeseen demands emerging from changes in emphasis in EU agenda</b>						
Yes	47	59%	25	60%	22	59%
No	32	41%	17	40%	15	41%
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>100%</b>
No answer	2				2	

Source: Survey, Part I, Section 3.

Most of the respondents who found that existing instruments were not sufficiently flexible to respond to unforeseen PC demands argued that it is very difficult to change or adapt programming to new needs; in addition limited human resources within EUDs and the nature of the instruments work against rapid reaction with available instruments. In fact even the respondents who answered positively to the question pointed out the limitations of the instruments in terms of flexibility and speed of response and pointed out that there is a possibility to react if there is an emergency (by using IcSP, EU TF, envelope B...) but that this is different from responding to new demands. Those who responded positively unanimously pointed to the non-EDF instruments, and above all to the IcSP. A couple of respondents attributed the flexibility to the fact of using budget support in their countries.

Responding to new international commitments was not really (yet) on the agenda for most ACP respondents but those for whom the support to international commitments was being envisaged and/or undertaken mentioned the DCI, and specifically the Global Public Goods and Challenges and DCI-ENV budget lines, as the source of funding.

The ability of the mix of instruments to provide a flexible and pro-active response to unforeseen demands emerging from changes in emphasis in the EU's own agenda gathered the most positive answers (even though still 41% of respondents thought this was not really easy): here the EU Trust Fund is the most cited answer in terms of providing opportunities to respond to EU priorities, and the IcSP is cited as second. Some of the respondents who found that they could not respond to these new EU demands argued that this type of response to new EU priorities goes against the principles of aid effectiveness, not only by increasing unpredictability and lowering ownership but also by pulling resources away from the long-term structural problems of the country.

### 1. Complementarity or duplication between instruments used by EUDs

The survey asked EUDs to respond to the question “*Is there any duplication or complementarity between the instruments used in your Delegation?*”. This question was answered by all 39 ACP delegations.

As shown in Table A.33 below, over four fifth (82%) of respondents replied that there was either duplication or complementarity.

**Table A.33 Responses to survey question on existence of duplication or complementarity between instruments used by EUDs**

Answer	Number	%
Yes	32	82%
No	7	18%
<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100%</b>

The formulation of the question – it is not clear whether the ‘yes’ refers to duplication or complementarity – required a more detailed analysis of the comment boxes.

The negative responses make a distinction between the absence of duplication and the existence of complementarity as in this response from Burkina Faso: “*(there is) no duplication between EDF and DCI, but complementarity can be improved between these two instruments. Complementarity could also be improved between EIDHR (long term) and IcSP (short term)*”.

Table A.34 below captures the responses on complementarity and duplication. Key points from the open responses include the following:

- Most of the responses cite specific instruments that are complementary to one another e.g. EIDHR with EDF, IcSP with EDF, etc.
- A number of responses shed light the nature of this complementarity, which is related to:
  - the timing of the instrument (the sequential nature noted also in our analysis in Annex 20 below, Part B) with the EIDHR being cited as longer-term, compared to the IcSP short-term, and the instrument covering the full range of needs from humanitarian to development support;
  - the primary target groups and the primary interlocutor (with EDF focusing on government led and DCI complementing the civil society engagement).
- Some responses suggest improvements in complementarity under the EDF11. For example, Zambia mentions the introduction of country envelopes for thematic programmes/instruments and the possibility given to Delegations to define the specific objectives of local calls for proposals in line with country priorities. This is found to have maximized complementarity and synergies with interventions under the main geographical programme/s. (Zambia)
- A number of responses highlight tensions internally within the EDF in terms of the timing of the national and regional programming not being synchronized, making it difficult for these two levels to be complementary to one another.



**Table A.34 Complementarity as highlighted in responses to the survey question on existence of duplication or complementarity between instruments used by EUDs**

Instrument and characteristics	EDF	EIDHR	IcSP	DCI
Overall strength of the instrument	Clearly supports government plans, including local governance  Takes over where humanitarian aid ends	Supports actions not supported by government  Targets very specific actors	Complementarity because short-term emergency funding  Offers the advantage of flexibility and a rapid response	Supports actions not supported by government
Complementarity to the EDF	N/a	EIDHR allows for test pilot approaches that can be followed by larger EDF interventions  EIDHR complements governance components of the NIP which are funded by the EDF  EIDHR funding is limited	IcSP test pilot approaches that can be followed by larger EDF interventions	DCI strengthens advocacy in areas where EDF is used for institution building (e.g. around EDF NIP areas)  Complements sector budget support by EDF through support to communities and private sector  DCI provides additional resources where EDF provides core funding
Complementarity with other instruments			IcSP is complementary to EIDHR because of different time frame EIDHR long-term, IcSP short-term	
Duplication with EDF			In some cases IcSP duplicates the governance commitment of the EDF	May duplicate actions started by ECHO in crises/emergency context

Examples of complementarity from the open responses include:

- Support to justice and democracy under the EDF and funding of support to victims of human rights violations under EIDHR (Guinea Republic)
- Support to security sector reforms (medium and long term) under the EDF and short term under the IcSP (Guinea Republic).

Examples of overlap:

- EIDHR and CSO/LA (Congo Brazzaville), and CSO/LA and EDF in Haiti.

## 2. Which instruments complement or duplicate actions of EU external action instruments

A follow up question asked: *“Please indicate which of the instruments used in your Delegation complement or duplicate actions of other EU external action instruments”*. Responses were provided by all 39 ACP countries and are shown for the EDF in Table A.35 below.

**Table A.35 Responses to survey question whether instruments used by the EUD were duplicating or being complementary**

Instrument	EUDs using EFI	EUDs stating EFI complements/duplicates other EU external action instrument	% EUDs stating EFI complements/duplicates other EU external action instrument
European Development Fund	39	26	67%

Over two thirds responded that complementarity or duplication existed. As was the case for the previous question the detailed responses are necessary to understand whether this refers to duplication or complementarity.

The analysis of the detailed responses shows some overlap with the previous question. This analysis showed that the majority of the responses indeed refer to instances of complementarity between instruments rather than duplication:

- DCI and EDF are complementary to the humanitarian response. DCI adds value by supporting CSOs.
- EIDHR and EDF seen as being complementary in that the EIDHR enlarges the scope of actions on human rights and allows for this to be addressed more directly.
- DCI (food) and ECHO seen as being complementary from the perspective of building resilience.
- EDF and IcSP also seen as being complementary from the perspective of building resilience and preventing new crises (IcSP intervening before EDF, and EDF bringing in the longer term development focus).
- The complementarity between DCI/EDF and the IcSP and ECHO seen to address the full range of needs from a crisis/emergency situation (e.g. in Haiti) to building resilience.
- Some responses, e.g. Burkina Faso, also raise challenges related to the duplication of actions between ECHO and the support by EDF.
- Other responses relate to limitations of the shorter-term instruments in not engaging in the political dialogue with government (e.g. in Swaziland on the drought).

## 3. Duplication and complementarity of instruments with actions by other donors

The survey also sought to understand whether there was complementarity or duplication of the instruments with the actions of other donors. The question asked was: *“Please indicate which of the instruments used in your Delegation complement or duplicate those of other actors/donors.”*. Again responses came from 39 EUDs with a large majority responding ‘yes’ to this question (Table A.36 below).

**Table A.36 Responses to survey question whether instruments used by the EUD were duplicating or being complementary to actions of donors/MSs**

Instrument	EUDs using EFI	EUDs stating EFI complements/duplicates other actors	% EUDs stating EFI complements/duplicates other actors
European Development Fund	39	34	87%

The manner in which the question was asked did not allow for a breakdown by instrument (the closed response options only asked for a binary response and did not break down by instrument). As is the case for the above questions, the fact that the question asked for an ‘either/or’ response made it difficult to interpret the results.

An open question following this provided more informative responses. This asked: *“Please provide information in support of your response”*. The analysis shows that in most cases examples were provided of positive coordination with other donors (see examples in Table A.37 and in Box A.3), i.e. of complementarity rather than duplication. As shown in Table A.37, the open responses included various instruments by response.

### Box A.3 Examples of complementarity with other donors

In Sudan: Sweden has fully aligned with the EU by allocating funds (€3 mn) to the CSO/LA funds managed by the Delegation

In Zambia: successful work on family planning by the EUD with Marie Stopes has also led to further collaborations with other Member States (Sweden). Also successful work with other MSs on nutrition in the context of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement.

**Table A.37 Selected responses on complementarity with other instruments**

Country	Example	Donors concerned	Instruments concerned
Niger	IcSP projects are complemented by other MS programmes	Denmark and France	IcSP
Niger	DCI complements actions funded by others in the area of food fortification, land issues and climate change adaptation	French, German and Luxembourg	DCI
The Gambia	The bilateral programmes funded under the EDF envelopes are used to complement the activities of other actors in alignment to country strategies and priorities.	Global Environment Facility (GEF - UN) & Green Climate Fund (GCF – UN).	EDF/ GCCA
Cameroon	Civil registry and public finance management	Unspecified	EDF
Angola	EDF activities coordinate with large International Financing Institutions, while action financed by DCI are at a completely different level. EIDHR finances activities that promote European values and therefore complement any other activity implemented by the Delegation.	Unspecified	DCI, EIDHR and EDF
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu	Gender and elections and Rural Development and WASH in Solomon Islands  Division among donors in Vanuatu (EU on rural development)	Unspecified	Unspecified
Sierra Leone	The EDF NIP identifies education and agriculture as focal sectors. In education, the EU programme complements the UK's and in agriculture, the World Bank's.	World Bank and UK	EDF
Zimbabwe	There are co-funded or parallel programmes, particularly on institutional support with the WB, AfDB and the UN. Also on Resilience programmes. Most donors have support to Human Rights Defenders as a priority.	Unspecified	WB, AfDB and UN
Senegal	Complementarities are mainly with the EDF (budget support for example) and with the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the IcSP	Unspecified donors	EDF and Emergency Trust Fund and IcSP

Country	Example	Donors concerned	Instruments concerned
Swaziland	The EDF-Bilateral can be complementary to WB loans in the country. The EU coordinates with other Development partners in the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS. The DCI and EIDHR are complementary to UN activities.	WB	EDF, DCI, EIDHR
Lesotho	Difficult to say.. Donor coordination takes a lot of effort and in our case is not steered by the Government.	Unspecified	Unspecified
Rwanda	CSOs are supported by other donors as well. Several Donors are active in sectors that we support with EDF funds	Unspecified	EDF
Jamaica, Belize, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos and The Cayman Islands	Complementarity on PFM and justice	Unspecified	EDF
Ghana	EDF complements Infrastructure for agriculture, decentralisation, private sector development, employment. EIDHR complements other development partners on support to CSOs, accountability, governance and access to basic services. DCI complements WB/USAID/EU MSs on fisheries, marine environment and security.	EIB, EU MSs	EDF, EIDHR, DCI
Sudan	Mostly complementary CSO – quite well with France; Sweden has gone for a full alignment / collaboration and by allocating funds (€3 mn) to the CSO/LA funds managed by the Delegation. In education – with WB (EDF). In health – with Italy(EDF). In livestock – with IFAD (EDF) UN on ICSP matters	France, Sweden	EDF and IcSP
Kenya	EDF actions on our sectors of intervention in infrastructure, agriculture and macroeconomics and governance are complementary to other donors in the sectors of concentration such as the Member States and other donors.	Unspecified	EDF
Timor Leste	The EU coordinates activities under EDF with other donors like AusAID.	AusAID	EDF
Guinea Bissau	CSO-LA Programme made it possible to fund the transition phase of our EDF civil society support programme.	Unspecified	CSO –LA EDF
Zambia	Different Sector Groups meet on a regular basis to prevent the duplication of efforts and promote complementarity in energy, justice, electoral support.	MSs, World Bank, Germany, Ireland, USAID, AfDB	EDF10 and 11, and all other instruments (unspecified)
Pacific region	Direct coordination with main donors – DCI – climate financing and CSO EDF – regional and bilateral programmes EIDHR – Australia/NZ support for human rights actions; also close coordination with UN.	Australia, NZ, ADB, WB	DCI (for climate and CSO), EIDHR (human rights)
Chad	Coordination attempted with all donors. Some less collaborative than others. WB less coordination-oriented.	Unspecified,	Unspecified
Congo	Informal division of labour and constant communication. WB less coordination-oriented.	MSs (unspecified)	Unspecified

Country	Example	Donors concerned	Instruments concerned
		and others	
Haiti	The risk of duplication exists for all instruments given the number of donors but is minimized by the level of need (i.e. many needs)	Unspecified	Unspecified
Guinea Bissau	In all areas EDF systematically complements Bretton Woods and UN	Bretton Woods, UN	EDF

#### 4. Challenges of coordination when using instruments simultaneously or sequentially

A follow-up question asked: *“Please comment on any challenges of co-ordination/transition experienced when using instruments simultaneously or sequentially for different aspects of the same action/situation”*. In analysing these responses we coded the challenges as referring to internal (EU) issues or external (related to the coordination with others) – see Table A.38 below.

The analysis of these responses shows that the majority of challenges that were mentioned relate to internal EU issues on the nature of the instruments (15 responses), and a smaller number to external challenges related to the coordination with other donors (7 responses).

Overall the issues relate mainly to six main topics:

- (i) Insufficient coordination of HQ initiatives with EUDs, creating problems of coherence with priorities in the NIP.
- (ii) Challenges in staffing to manage range of instruments and requirements.
- (iii) Challenges in transitioning between emergency and development instruments, with evidence of gaps falling).
- (iv) Insufficient coherence/coordination between regional and national initiatives.
- (v) Delays in approval affecting coordination with other donors.
- (vi) Other donors not being coordination-minded.

**Table A.38 Analysis of open ended response on challenges to coordination/transition**

Issue	Number of responses	Type
Internal issues	15	<p>DCI managed at HQ poses challenges (Angola), insufficient information exchange at global and regional levels with the national level (Solomon Islands and Vanuatu); Unannounced interventions (Gabon, STP, Equatorial Guinea).</p> <p>Coordination with regional funds (Swaziland); Regional interventions not always well coordinated with national interventions (Caribbean).</p> <p>Proper staffing in delegation is the main limitation in irrationally multiplying the programmes/instruments (Sierra Leone), and need qualified staff to understand the range and specificities of the instruments (Nigeria).</p> <p>Regional programmes slower to get off the ground; Problems of finding appropriate instrument to continue with relevant programmes funded by IcSP (Zimbabwe), duration of interventions by humanitarian actors (Sudan), transition from IcSP to EDF because of lack of flexibility on duration (Guinea Republic), defining where one instruments starts and the other ends (Haiti); different calendars and time frames (Senegal) and conditions (Ethiopia), delays on the EU side complicate coordination with others (Burundi and also Timor Leste).</p> <p>NAO does not always have information on other instruments (Cameroon)</p>

Issue	Number of responses	Type
External issues	7	Coordination in general is a challenge (Mali). Some donors not being Accra/Paris oriented. Challenges of transitioning out of sectors.

## 5. Summary on complementarity

Taken together the various responses discussed in the previous section are summarised in Table A.39 below.

**Table A.39 Summary of key instrument characteristics from survey responses**

Instrument and characteristics	EDF	EIDHR	IcSP	DCI
Overall strength of the instrument	Clearly supports government plans, including local governance  Takes over where humanitarian aid ends	Supports actions not supported by government  Targets very specific actors	Complementarity because short-term emergency funding  Offers the advantage of flexibility and a rapid response	Supports actions not supported by government
Complementarity to the EDF	N/a	EIDHR allows for test pilot approaches that can be followed by larger EDF interventions  EIDHR complements governance components of the NIP which are funded by the EDF  EIDHR funding is limited	IcSP test pilot approaches that can be followed by larger EDF interventions	DCI strengthens advocacy in areas where EDF is used for institution building (e.g. around EDF NIP areas)  Complements sector budget support by EDF through support to communities and private sector  DCI provides additional resources where EDF provides core funding
Complementarity with other instruments			IcSP is complementary to EIDHR because of different time frame EIDHR long-term, IcSP short-term	Where EUDs manage envelopes this has increased complementarity
Duplication with EDF			In some cases IcSP duplicates the governance commitment of the EDF	Duplication results from centrally managed instruments which are not coordinated with the EUD  May duplicate actions started by ECHO in crises/emergency context



## **Annex 13                      Quantitative analyses**

This annex provides supporting evidence for different sections of the evaluation. It contains a description of the quantitative analysis performed during the evaluation and any graphs that provide supporting evidence for the statements made in the report. This annex only contains additional data that is not already reflected in other annexes.

The first section describes the main databases used during the evaluation. The following sections contain a description and a summary of the analysis by topic

### **1. Databases used during the evaluation**

The following databases were mined during the evaluation. The list below does not contain databases generated during the evaluation and discussed in other annexes:

- CRIS (Common RELEX Information System): internal database used by the Commission that contains all project and contract information, including on projects cancelled.
- EU Dashboard: an internal EC database built on CRIS but adjusted so that it matches the data provided to the OECD. It is built to provide a user-friendly access to key data and makes strong use of OECD criteria.
- OECD CRS (OECD Creditor Reporting System): a public database based on common reporting standards and containing data on development flows for many donors over several years. Bulk files are accessible at:  
<https://stats.oecd.org/DownloadFiles.aspx?DatasetCode=CRS1>
- DG DEVCO blending database: internal database in excel that contains information for all blending facilities managed by DG DEVCO.
- QSG Pipeline: a database in Excel that tracks the status of all projects undergoing identification and formulation. There are different pipeline files for each geographical directorate at DG DEVCO.
- EU results database: the internal database in Excel that contains project-level results data across a number of harmonized indicators. This is the database used to compile the First Report on Selected Results of projects ended between July 2013 and June 2014. The database has been updated with projects ending in June 2015 in preparation for the Second Report on Selected Results.
- GPECD Monitoring data (Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation): a public database of data used to monitor progress on the implementation of the different commitments in the development effectiveness agenda across different countries. The database is accessible through the GPECD's website: <http://effectivecooperation.org>
- Other: small data files on different quantitative aspects of the EDF that were collected through interviews.


### **2. Sector overlap between EDF, other EFIs, member states and development partners**

Data from the EU Dashboard was used to explore the number of sectors where the EDF is active and compare it with other EFIs in a sample of 6 countries: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Dominican Republic, Cameroon, Zambia and Timor-Leste. Subsequently, data from the OECD CRS database was used to compare the EDF with the choice of sectors by EU MSs and other development partners (DPs). The analysis is based on disbursements which means that the data for the EDF is still influenced by the EDF10. In order to compensate for this, the analysis takes two pictures at similar points in the implementation of the EDF10 and the EDF11: 2011 and 2015. The use of data on disbursements is not possible in this case because EDF disbursement data is too variable from one year to another at country level. In addition, commitments are made in one year, but disbursements take place over a number of years. As a result, data on disbursements would not reflect the real number of sectors.


Comparative data on sectors per instrument in the sample of countries (see Figure A.25 and Figure A.26 below) shows that overall the number of sectors in which the EDF works has reduced slightly across all countries in 2015 compared to 2011, with the exception of Ethiopia. Figure A.27 shows

the average number of EFIs that are active in the sectors where the EDF works in each of the six countries. A value of 1 means that, on average, there is another EFI active in each of the sectors where the EDF works. A value of zero means that no other EFIs are active in the sectors where the EDF operates. The comparison between 2011 and 2015 shows that the overlap between EDF sectors and other EFIs' sectors has decreased across all countries with the exception of Cameroon. Figure A.28 and Figure A.29 show the number of instruments per sector for each of the six countries. This complements the analysis of Figure A.27 and confirms that, on average, the overlap between all EFIs has decreased.

**Figure A.25 Sectors per instrument 2015**




**Figure A.26 Sectors per instrument 2011**







**Figure A.27 Average number of EFIs in sectors where the EDF is active**



**Figure A.28 Instrument per sector in 2015**




**Figure A.29 Instrument per sector in 2011**




The analysis of the sector overlap between the EDF and MSs and between the EDF and other DPs is shown in Figure A.30 and Figure A.31 below. The graph suggests that the number of MSs and DPs operating in the same sector as the EDF decreased on average between 2011 and 2014. The graphs also show (dots) the average number of MSs and DPs per sector in the country. This information can be used to account for any reduction in the number of donors (e.g. donors moving out of the country). Since the drop in the average number of MSs and DPs per EDF sector is higher than the drop in the average number of MSs and DPs per sector, it can be concluded that the observed reduction in the overlap with EDF sectors cannot be attributed to MSs and DPs moving out of the country (e.g. as a result of decreases in aid volumes), but to MSs, DPs and EDF increasingly working in different sectors.

**Figure A.30 Number of MSs active in EDF sectors**




**Figure A.31 Number of DPs active in EDF sectors**




### 3. Tied aid

OECD CRS data, complemented with data from the EU Dashboard for 2015, was used to explore the evolution of untied aid under the EDF10 and the EDF11. The analysis was based on EDF commitments and is presented in Figure A.32 and Figure A.32 below for the period 2011-2015. Data on EDF commitments was used because the tied aid markers started to be used consistently by the EC in 2011. Since money committed in 2010 and earlier years is reflected in disbursements in the following years, most of the data presented below would be contaminated by unscreened projects.

**Figure A.32 Tied aid in % of EDF commitments**



**Figure A.33 Tied aid in % of EDF commitments, 2-year moving average**




#### 4. OECD markers on gender, climate change, environmental issues and good governance


OECD CRS data, complemented with data from the EU Dashboard for 2015, was to explore different thematic OECD markers. OECD markers are used to track support to horizontal issues and can take three different values that translate into the following categories (based on <http://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/dac-gender-equality-marker.htm>) :

- Main objective: the marker is the main objective of the project/programme and what is fundamental is its design and expected results.
- Significant objective: the marker is an important and deliberate objective, but not the principal reason for undertaking the project/programme.
- Not targeted.


**Figure A.34** Aid to environment, biodiversity , desertification and climate change adaptation and mitigation in % of EDF commitments




**Figure A.35** Aid to environment in % of EDF commitments




**Figure A.36** Aid to biodiversity in % of EDF commitments




**Figure A.37 Aid to climate adaptation in % of EDF commitments**




**Figure A.38 Aid to climate mitigation in % of EDF commitments**




**Figure A.39 Aid to desertification in % of EDF commitments**



**Figure A.40 Aid to gender in % of EDF commitments**



**Figure A.41 Aid to participatory democracy and good governance in % of EDF commitments**




## 5. Support to CSOs

According to internal sources from DG DEVCO, support to CSOs is generally coded using one of the following OECD Sector Codes:


- Dem. Participation: 15150
- Political parties and legislature: 15152
- Media: 15153
- Human rights: 15160
- Women's equality: 15170

EU Dashboard data on EDF disbursements was used to assess support to CSOs over the period 2009 and 2015. The results are presented in Figure A.42 and Figure A.43 below.

**Figure A.42 Annual EDF disbursements in support to CSOs (€m)**



**Figure A.43 EDF support to CSOs in % of total disbursements**




## 6. Aid modalities

Data on commitments from the EU dashboard database was used to explore the use of different aid modalities among the EDF, the DCI and all EFIs (excluding the EDF). The results are presented in Figure A.44. Data on commitments was used in order to isolate data from the EDF11 and avoid the “noise” of the EDF10 that affects data on disbursements (EDF10 disbursements are large in both 2014 and 2015). Some caveats apply to the data: i) it is possible that commitment patterns differ in the first few years of implementation compared to the whole life of the instrument (7 years); ii) as discussed in the main report (EQ2), some of the delays in deploying certain types of contracts (e.g. PAGODA) might have affected the use of the aid modality.




**Figure A.44** Average used of aid modalities by the EDF, DCI and all EFIs (excluding the EDF) in 2014-2015



## 7. Management modes

Contract level data for the EDF11 covering the period 2014-2016 has been used to compare the use of different management modes in the EDF11. The data is presented in Figure A.45 to Figure A.48 below both in volume of contracts (€m) and in number of contracts. It shows that “direct management” is the preferred management mode in the period covered by the data. Unfortunately, management modes have been updated since the EDF10 and it has not been possible to make a comparative analysis with a similar period. Some caveats apply: i) it is possible that management modes patterns differ in the first few years of implementation compared to the whole life of the instrument (7 years); ii) as discussed in the main report (EQ2), some of the delays in deploying certain types of indirect management contracts (e.g. PAGODA) might have had an impact on the data.


**Figure A.45**      **Number of contracts per management mode**




**Figure A.46**      **Volume of contracts per management mode**



**Figure A.47** Number of contracts per management mode in % of total contracts



**Figure A.48** Volume of contracts per management mode in %




## 8. Blending


Data from DG DEVCO's database on the blending facilities has been used to assess the facilities supported by the EDF from different angles:

- Volume of grants Figure A.49
- Distribution of blending projects by sector (Figure A.50 and Figure A.51)
- Use of financial instruments for all facilities supported by the EDF (Figure A.52)
- Aggregated leverage ratios for all facilities supported by the EDF (Figure A.53)


**Figure A.49 Grants from the EU blending facilities supported by the EDF (€m)**




**Figure A.50 Distribution of blending projects by facility and sector, number of projects**




**Figure A.51** Distribution of blending projects by facility and sector, volume of grants (€m)



**Figure A.52** Use of financial modalities by facility, volume of grants (€m)




**Figure A.53 Aggregated leverage ratios in the EDF facilities**



## 9. QSG/pipeline

The pipeline files for the different directorates were mined to assess the changes in the efficiency of the process. Results are presented in Figure A.54. Differences in the formatting and level of detail of the different pipeline files mean that the analysis relies mostly on data from directorates D and E. However, this is not a problem because this pipeline file represents the bulk of the EDF both in number of projects and volume of financial support (it covers Africa, including regional projects and Intra-ACP projects).


**Figure A.54 Length of the pipeline in 2014 and 2015**



## 10. Budget execution


Data files compiled for the elaboration of DEVCO's annual accounts were collected during the interviews conducted as part of this evaluation. One of these files (Annex 3b) was used to compare the execution of the EDF10 and the EDF11 during the first two years of implementation (Figure A.55).

**Figure A.55 Budget execution EDF10 and EDF11**




Data on EDF decisions from CRIS has been used to compare the execution of EDF10 and EDF11 over the first three years of implementation. Figure A.56 and Figure A.57 below summarise the results by region. The graphs show that in approximately the same period, the EDF11 has committed, contracted and paid a substantially larger volume of the regional envelope.

**Figure A.56 Budget execution EDF11 2014-2015**



**Figure A.57 Budget execution EDF10 2008-2009**





## 1. Sector allocations under EDF11 programming

The following table shows the sector allocations of the EDF11 according to the two priority sectors as defined in the Agenda for Change (EC, 2011a). The Agenda's first priority sectors are: human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance. This includes support to civil society, rule of law, public sector management, tax, corruption, development and security nexus and budget support (state building contracts and good governance and development contracts). The second priority sectors are: inclusive and sustainable growth for human development. This grouping includes: social protection; education, Erasmus; natural resources/environment; sustainable agriculture and food and nutrition security; infrastructure and transport; energy; growth, jobs and private sector engagement; trade, markets and regional integration; and migration. Other, non-priority sectors are: cross-cutting and non-allocable, support measures to civil society and project preparation. As can be noted from the large array of sectors included in the two priority sectors, these 'priority' sectors of support include almost all areas of public spending with the exception of defence and security.

**Table A.40 Sector allocations under the EDF11 programming in national, regional and intra-ACP programmes**

	Share of number of programmes			Share of total amount allocated		
	National	Regional	Intra-ACP	National	Regional	Intra-ACP
First priority sectors (1)	24.5%	21.4%	14.3%	27.1%	16.5%	27.7%
Second priority sectors (2)	54.9%	78.6%	85.7%	70.4%	83.5%	72.3%
Other sectors (3)	20.6%	-	-	2.5%	-	-
Average number of sectors	2.4	5.6	7			

Source: EU-aid-2014-2020-Programming sector table\_April2016.xlsm

## 2. Evidence from country visits regarding relevance (EQ1)

The following table summarises the main findings per judgment criterion for EQ1 for each of the countries visited.

	JC1.1 EU Priorities	JC1.2 Beneficiary needs	JC1.3 Continued relevance	JC1.4 Unexpected needs
Burkina Faso	Yes programming led by EU choices but difficult to concentrate in 3 sectors	Yes, alignment to sector policies and very extensive and wide consultations, which did not however, decide on the areas of support.	Yes, MDG targets are also SDG targets and accent in BF is on sustainability; EDF11 also integrated security and migration.	Highly responsive to the Coup d'État with support to transition government. MIP rather flexible (no definition of actions, only expected results + unallocated envelope for MTR), and use of BS allows general flexibility.
Cameroon	Yes but programming led by EU choices with abandoning of roads (despite sector leadership and expertise).	Lack of consultation and poor match: roads abandoned, BS not well suited to needs, rural development not an EU comparative advantage.	Yes.	Procedures are a hindrance to meeting of emergencies and unexpected needs.

	<b>JC1.1 EU Priorities</b>	<b>JC1.2 Beneficiary needs</b>	<b>JC1.3 Continued relevance</b>	<b>JC1.4 Unexpected needs</b>
Zambia	Yes, programming led by EU choices.	Yes, very broad national priorities but consultation process was about validating EU choices, not making the choices. Improvement of consultations with CSOs.	Yes current portfolio mix still relevant although gap identified for education sector support.	EDF little flexibility (rigorous instrument plus length of programming cycle) so MTR plus wide sector definitions in the MIP which are open to interpretation.
Ethiopia	Yes programming led by EU choices. Sector concentration not successful as large envelope and many EFIs.	Yes, strong alignment but little CS involvement due to specific laws.	Rigid framework in a complex, challenging and fast-changing socio-political, policy and institutional context: relevance only reasserted with MTR.	(i) EDF MTR; (ii) EU TF but potential effectiveness issues; (iii) use of other EFIs but threatens coherence.
Dominican Republic	Yes and differentiation applied (substantial reduction of envelope for DR) without noticeable impact on sustainability of quality of EDF cooperation	Yes, meetings organised with ministries to ensure coordination and feedback on programming but CS felt less opportunity to influence the agenda	good fit between the priorities set in the NIP and emerging EU priorities (gender, climate change and environment, growth and job creation and migration).	benefits of the long-term engagement outweigh any potential limitations in the flexibility of the assistance. Priorities in NIP allow some flexibility
Timor Leste	Locally determined priorities were not easily accepted by Brussels. Concentration of sectors was not really applied since BS increased EDF sector involvement to 10 sectors.	Yes but not necessarily the most priority needs (choice between short and long-term considerations	Yes but too soon to say (will have to be looked at during the MTR).	Only to the extent that they can be addressed under good governance or rural development.
Aruba	Yes, climate change and sustainability	Yes but delays between programming and implementation expected to reduce relevance. Also BS not relevant.	Yes, climate change and contribution to job creation.	EDF10 procedures very heavy, unknown for EDF11. EDF unable to cope with foreseen risks (have to be realised). Procedures not adapted to needs: cannot mobilise funds rapidly.
New Caledonia	Yes, focus on education in line with EU priorities (focus on vocational training since EDF9).	Yes, very much aligned to national priorities.	Yes, to the country's own priorities.	Difficult to adapt a rigid programming and tension between length of programming period, time it takes to programme and adapt to changes. Indicators in EDF11 were drafted more flexibly than EDF10.

	<b>JC1.1 EU Priorities</b>	<b>JC1.2 Beneficiary needs</b>	<b>JC1.3 Continued relevance</b>	<b>JC1.4 Unexpected needs</b>
Main sources	Meeting Notes 372, 300, 46, 483, 274, 74, 272, 394, 69, 203, 223, 375, 172, 162, 843, 614, 142, 177, 71, 85, 131, 114, 192, 422, 445	Meeting Notes 372, 17, 401, 300, 186, 401, 495, 369, 74, 57, 148, 402, 444, 322, 107, 82, 500, 437, 230, 51, 120, 310, 375, 69, 440, 87, 54, 172, 121, 147, 163, 192, 354, 443, 451, 464, 462, 162, 673, 843, 613, 122, 142, 177, 71, 85, 131, 114, 192, 422, 445, 27	Meeting Notes 346, 118, 372, 74, 51, 69, 63, 223, 87, 381, 486, 354, 462, 162, 673, 613, 142, 177, 71, 85, 131, 114, 422, 445, 192	Meeting Notes 17, 372, 495, 346, 74, 51, 444, 167, 69, 61, 203, 440, 375, 193, 245, 162, 85, 142, 422, 236, 445, 400, 241

## **1. Regulatory background to CSO participation in EDF11**

### **1.1 EDF11 Implementing Regulations**

The accent put in the Cotonou Agreement's objectives on supporting the emergence of an active and organised civil society is translated in EDF11 implementing regulations at two levels:

- Firstly, in its general principles, the regulations state that EU's cooperation with partner countries and regions targets inter alia the 'empowering (of) the civil society and local authorities in their participation in the development process at national and regional levels' and 'Particular attention shall be given to the respective roles of parliaments, local authorities and civil society, inter alia, regarding participation, oversight and accountability' (Art.2, general principles, alinea 5c of EDF11 implementing regulations).
- Secondly, beyond this empowerment of civil society and local authorities, consultations with civil society and Local Authorities are also enshrined in Title III 'Programming and Allocation of Funds', Art. 4 'General framework for programming' of the EDF11 Implementing Regulation (CR 2015/322). The article specifies that programming should be undertaken jointly with the partner country or region concerned, should be the subject of consultations with Member States and 'other donors and development actors, including representatives of civil society and regional and local authorities, shall be consulted as well'.

However, the involvement of civil society (CS) and Local Authorities (LAs) in the project cycle, from identification, formulation, implementation, monitoring to evaluation, is not mentioned in the regulation. Indeed in its Art 9, Title III (Implementation), it is stated that 'The action programmes and individual measures shall be prepared by the Commission with the partner country or region, involving the Member States locally represented and coordinating where appropriate with other donors, in particular in cases of joint programming, and with the EIB.' When looking at the instruction for preparing Action Documents (ADs), civil society and LAs come in because they are part of the stakeholders to be analysed and mapped at identification stage, and because 'partners should be in the first line for project and programme design to ensure ownership' (p.2 of AD instructions) but they are not explicitly given a role in the preparation of the action.

### **1.2 The 2012 Communication 'The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations'**

In summary then, the implementation regulation and AD instructions offer a role of recipients of support to CS and LAs ('empowerment'), a consultative role at time of programming, a participative role in development and an external oversight responsibility for development. Their direct or active role in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of EU actions is not explicitly stated. This is in line with the 2012 Communication 'The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations', which defines the EU's approach to working with CS around three priorities:

- i. To enhance efforts to promote a conducive environment for CSOs in partner countries.
- ii. To promote a meaningful and structured participation of CSOs in domestic policies of partner countries, in the EU programming cycle and in international processes.
- iii. To increase local CSOs' capacity to perform their roles as independent development actors more effectively.

The accent here thus lies firmly on the CS role in the wider development process, as a participant in the partner country's domestic policy, and with regards to the EU cooperation, on their participation in the EU's programming cycle, not on their participation in the EU's project cycle which deals with the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of EU actions. This is indeed what is found when looking at the interactions between the CS and the EU in ACP countries. Looking first at

EDF10 and then comparing to the way EDF11 is set up to perform, a definite evolution is noticeable.

## **2. The role of civil society in EDF10 and EDF11**

### **2.1. Roles in EDF10 and EDF11 programming**

Our review of country and regional strategy evaluations shows that the role of CSOs was not prominent in EDF10. More than a third (39%) of the 23 country strategy evaluations reviewed did not look into the issue of CSO consultations or their participation in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluations of actions. This finding in itself illustrates the relative lack of importance of the subject in EDF10 preoccupations. A second finding is that from the 13 evaluations that did review this aspect, a majority noted that the EU had involved CSOs at these different stages but 6 (or 38%) found that no, very limited or insufficient efforts had been made to involve CSOs. This confirms that CSO consultations during EDF10 were not (yet) systematically a high priority for EUDs.

Pushing several years forward, to 2015 and 2016, one notes that attention to CSOs and their participation in the programming and project cycle has increased dramatically: in the same 23 countries reviewed, only two countries report in their EAMRs that working with CSOs has not been possible or very limited and this was because of the political situation (Mali and Burkina Faso). All other countries report multiple instances of consultations and dialogue with CSOs as well as projects that directly or indirectly support CSOs or use them as an implementing agency; in two countries (DRC and Timor Leste) it is noted that working with CSOs is still difficult because of their weaknesses. In all others, the EU appears to have active partnerships with CSOs (no information was found with respect to Local Authorities).

However, an independent study undertaken by CONCORD amongst its NGO network (report forthcoming) confirmed that consultations were probably less widespread than suggested by the EAMRs (CONCORD mentioned that only 30% of respondents confirmed having been consulted for EDF11 programming) and, more importantly, found that there were more presentations from the EUDs than discussions on programming priorities. This was also confirmed by interviews undertaken in the context of this review: whilst they have been systematically consulted for EDF11 programming of the NIP, and more so than in the EDF10 programming exercise, consultations were more often than not sessions to validate the EU-presented choices of programming without real discussions; where discussions were held, they did not influence the outcome of the programming choices made. In all cases, CSOs did not feel actively associated in the programming process. With regards to the RIP, CSOs were not invited to participate and were not consulted (even where they made a conscious effort to be involved). These findings corroborate those of ECDPM (Herrero et al. 2015) which concluded that the EDF11 programming was characterised by tight control from headquarters, which undermined country ownership.

### **2.2. CSO participation in programme formulation, implementation and monitoring**

In general stakeholder consultations seem to have improved with EDF11,<sup>206</sup> possibly also partly because there has been a genuine effort to develop CSO roadmaps since 2014 as a follow up from the 2012 Communication which has required specific attention to be paid to the understanding of how CSOs operate in country, to their mapping, their strengths and weaknesses etc. However, firstly, the increased number of consultations have not necessarily resulted in better account having been taken of CSOs' contributions to the discussions (if discussions there were), as evidenced above. Secondly, this increased attention paid to CSOs is at the same time curtailed by a difficult staffing situation at EUDs: often the CSOs might not be mainstreamed across sectors (one person dealing with all CSO matters in isolation of sector/thematic desks) and the one staff member in EUDs is often not equipped to manage lots of small CSO contracts. This represents a double constraint: firstly it pushes EUDs to put out for tender large grants which remain inaccessible to

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<sup>206</sup> Confirmed in Aruba, Cameroon, Burkina Faso and at regional Caribbean level.

small grassroots local organisations, and secondly, to strengthen smaller CSOs to respond to calls for proposals, they are either 'managed' by PMUs manned by international experts or 'delegated' through larger international CSOs from whom they are expected to learn. The extent to which this then effectively strengthens their capacity in terms of their own activities (as opposed to strengthening their capacities to respond to EU calls for proposals) is not ascertained but anecdotal evidence points towards limited gains for CSOs from this approach and potential dangers of larger NGOs dictating to smaller NGOs over their budgets. Finally, it is recognised by many, including the EU itself, that the space for civil societies is being squeezed in many countries; here the EU needs to step up its political and policy dialogues if it wants to preserve and/or enlarge the involvement of civil society in the different aspects of public policy.

What emerged from discussions with CSOs and their representative organisations (in-country and in Europe) in the context of this EDF performance review is that:

- Formulation: In some countries (Burkina Faso for example), CSO and government are systematically consulted when new projects are being formulated by the EU. In Cameroon, EDF11 has also started setting up formal steps for CSO consultation. At the other end of the scale, in Timor Leste and Ethiopia, working with CSOs is difficult, in the former because the situation is new and CSOs are weak and find EDF procedures difficult to work with, in the latter because Government has very strongly restricted the scope of CSO actions.
- Implementation: A place is made in the NIPs for CSOs to execute (sometimes large parts of) activities within EU programmes, notably in the area of governance (budget analysis, social accountability, external oversight with respect to delivery of public services....).
- Advocacy and public watchdog role: There is wide agreement amongst CSOs and their representative network organisations about the EU's role in ensuring that CSOs are consulted by the government in areas where they are active. Hence, at country level, CSOs are usually invited to participate in sector or thematic working groups (where these exist), and are able to contribute to sector/thematic discussions alongside the government and donors. The EU has thus created or encouraged this space for CSOs to actively participate in technical and policy discussions at country level.
- Use of CSOs: More widely, in terms of advocacy and their role in public policy implementation, some CSOs have felt that whilst the EU is not supportive (financially) of general advocacy activities undertaken by CSOs or of building their capacities as 'public watchdogs', they are often being used by the EU to broach difficult matters with the government authorities and/or encouraged to push certain agendas forward with the authorities. This is the case in-country as well as at European level. Two major drawbacks: (i) the EU usually wants only a single interlocutor (hence the push for umbrella organisations) even though within one umbrella organisation there may be many individual divergent voices, and (ii) being able to issue only one 'general' CSO message means this has to be diluted to a level where all members feel happy.
- Access to information: At country and European level, the relations between CSOs and the EU are limited by the lack of CSO access to relevant EU information, knowledge about who does what in the Commission and the uncertainty over whether CSO analysis and views will be taken into account by the EU.

### 3. EDF support to CSOs

In terms of support provided to CSOs, it can be noted from EDF11 programming allocations that almost a third of the 25 countries having an active relationship with CSOs do not actually support them financially: this means a large majority, more than two thirds, do provide financial support to CSOs in addition to the consultations. Looking at the wider picture of EDF11 programming overall (all 84 countries and regions), a small majority (58%) of EDF11 programmes contain specific envelopes for supporting CSOs but this amounts to a total of €386m or 67.8% of all support to be provided to CSOs during the MFF 2014-2020 (figures communicated by DEVCO B2 for DCI, EDF, ENI and IPA). Whilst many envelopes are relatively small, some countries have set aside very large CSO support envelopes: Ethiopia's is reported as €52m, but field evidence shows that this is €16m with the remainder going to governance; Uganda €25m; Sierra Leone €30m; Mozambique €22m;

Burkina Faso €21m; Cameroon €20m. It is not always known what form this support takes and to what extent it will support other existing NIP programmes or be stand-alone operations. In Ethiopia for example, the fund is a stand-alone operation whilst in Burkina Faso each programme has a CSO window that is managed in coherence across sector programmes. Information provided by DEVCO B2 shows that most of the larger allocations fall under the governance focal sector. A draft Concept Note drafted by the Roadmap Facility (prepared by EPRD, June 2016) suggests that most of EDF11 CSO support programmes currently in preparation follow the same lines as those of EDF9 and EDF10, without much innovation and thus without linking the new activities to the roadmaps being developed and the changing environment in which CSOs operate.

Interviews with CSOs have shown that the main focus of EU support under EDF10 in West and Central Africa has been to build or strengthen CSOs' organisational structure: the setting up of umbrella organisations that are representative of a network of NGOs and can discuss on their behalf. However, direct support to these umbrella organisations once established has not been systematic. On the contrary, support to CSOs for undertaking their own activities (rather than being used as implementing agents for EU-funded activities within EU projects) seems to have remained extremely limited. This finding for West and Central Africa is shared by CSOs in other regions: direct financial support to advocacy, for example, even where, as shown above, the EU relies on CSOs to put pressure on Government on certain issues, is rarely forthcoming from the EU unless it is in the context of a specific project. As a rule, the EU does not fund the general operations of CSOs. This is a constraint in so far as the CSOs are very often still very fragile and have little financial room for manoeuvre to undertake advocacy and analysis on what they consider priority issues.

#### **4. Summary**

In summary then, the role of the CSOs in the programming phase is fairly clear, ranging from simple consultations to active participation: evidence is found in the NIPs and confirmed by the evaluations of EDF10 and country visits so far. The CSOs' role in the preparation of actions is more diverse and less well evidenced:

- the Action Document instructions specifically highlight the need for CSO mapping and consultations but no hard evidence is provided in the AD that the CSO actually participated in designing the project or that their views were taken on board;
- the actual role of CSOs in programme/project formulation is rarely evidenced in evaluations;
- numerous consultations with CSOs are recorded in the EAMRS (but the reason for consultations is not often specified); and
- CSOs increasingly participate in the wider development process, notably through their presence in Sector Working Groups (where these exist) where sector priorities and donor supports are discussed.

The CSOs' role in implementation is probably most adequately evidenced by the allocations made in the NIPs which show, depending on the country, that CSOs will mobilise 1.6% of the total EDF11 allocations and as high as 18% of the national allocation in Botswana, for example. Finally, no quantitative evidence could be found to show the role of CSOs in the monitoring and evaluation of actions; however, indications from DEVCO B2 analysis, confirmed by the few anecdotic examples from the field missions undertaken so far, that CSOs are increasingly seen as and used for the purpose of monitoring the results of public policy implementation as indicated by the implementing regulations for EDF11 which highlighted the role of CSOs in accountability and external oversight. Finally, the development of the CSO roadmaps provides a tool that could, in time, provide a basis for better targeted, more coherent and improved designing of actions in support of CSOs.

## 1. Context

Due to Ethiopia's role as the main host for migrants and refugees within the Horn of Africa, the European Commission supported migration issues in Ethiopia well before the eruption of the Syrian crisis and the various ensuing EU initiatives with regards to security and migration. The most important of these, the Communication of September 2015 on 'Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: the role of EU External Action' (JOIN(2015)40) (EC, 2015q),<sup>207</sup> proposed the creation of the 'European Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa' ('the EU Trust Fund' or 'EU TF'). This TF has, since 2015, complemented EDF and DCI resources in supporting migration in Ethiopia. It provided an initial envelope of €1.88 billion to 26 countries affected by migration to support migration related areas as set out in the Valletta discussions. The initial fund was financed at 90% from EDF resources (the EDF reserve plus contributions from three RIPs and some NIPs). As of mid-December 2016 (see EC, 2016m), overall contributions to the fund stood at €2.5bn, of which €2.289 billion or 86% from EDF (€1.5 billion from the EDF reserve and the remainder from NIP and RIP allocations). Allocations in December 2016 were €883m for the Horn of Africa and €1.346m for the Sahel and Lake Chad region.

## 2. Past involvement of the EU in migration in Ethiopia

Before 2014/15, migration in Ethiopia benefited from two main streams of EU support (as illustrated in Table A.41 below). Firstly, Ethiopia benefited from indirect support provided by the EU through its financing of the African Union, and in particular of the Pan-African Programme (PANAF), which was initially funded from EDF resources, and has been funded since 2014 from DCI resources.<sup>208</sup> The PANAF *inter alia* provides financial support to the African Institute for Remittances, to the Joint Labour Migration Program for Africa (implemented by the ILO) and to the regional dialogue on migration and mobility. The latter started with the migration mobility and employment partnership (2010-2013) under the Africa-EU partnership where dialogue focused *inter alia* on the human rights of domestic workers. It was replaced in 2014 with the Migration and Mobility Dialogue (2014-2017) supporting the Khartoum process of political cooperation amongst the countries along the migration route between the Horn of Africa and Europe. It animates a dialogue on enhanced cooperation on migration and mobility, acts to reduce trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of migrants, and facilitates cooperation between transit and destination countries. Since 2015 it also monitors the implementation of the Valletta Action Plan (ILO, 2015; MN 321, 17, 372).<sup>209</sup>

Secondly, Ethiopia benefited from direct support through the financing of projects and programmes through the DCI-MIGR budget line (4 projects) and the DCI-HUM budget line (1 project) benefiting several countries but implemented at national level. This included notably two projects started in 2013<sup>210</sup> of which some funding was redirected, together with some ECHO funding, at the

<sup>207</sup> See also the Council conclusion on Migration and Development Cooperation of 12 December 2014, which focused on the links between migration and development and was followed by the European Agenda on Migration of 13 May 2015.

<sup>208</sup> The EU (EDF) also contributes to the funding of the African Peace Facility which finances *inter alia* the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in which the Ethiopia National Defence Forces have participated since November 2013 (source: 2014 Annual CFSP report, p110). This funding is not taken into account since the focus here is on migration rather than on security.

<sup>209</sup> See also <http://www.khartoumprocess.net/about/the-khartoum-process>.

<sup>210</sup> The two projects were one DCI-MIGR project supporting the policy and legal framework for Ethiopian migrant women working in the GCC States, Lebanon and Sudan as well as their safety and re-integration upon return (2013-2016 implemented by the ILO) and the DCI-HUM project, which sought to strengthen regional multi-national coordination for increased protection of vulnerable and trafficked migrant children travelling through the Gulf of Aden Migration Route. Other DCI-MIGR projects include a project supporting the strengthening of the protection for refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in the Horn of Africa and Yemen (2013-2015); a project aiming to strengthen criminal justice responses to



Government of Ethiopia's request, towards providing assistance to the unexpected flow of 160,000 returnees from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in December 2013. This assistance marked the beginning of the Delegation's active involvement with migration issues in Ethiopia; it was complemented in 2014 by the launch of two EDF11 funded projects, one in support of the Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs, and one supporting civil society actions (the Civil Society Fund II), both projects mainly benefiting migrants. **As such, the support to migration in Ethiopia thus predated the launch of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa** with €17.4m allocated to migration between 2010 and 2014 from both the NIP and the DCI. Table A.41 below shows the amounts allocated for support to migration in Ethiopia, in the year the project started (total amount allocated to the project as it stood in the year the project started) for 2010-2016 and the projects in the pipeline at November 2016 as well as the estimated yearly disbursements (estimated on the basis of total allocations divided by the number of years the project was designed to run).

**Table A.41 EU support to migration in Ethiopia: total project allocations at start of project, estimated average disbursement per year of implementation) and number of projects started in each year, per year and per financing instrument.**

Year of project start	Source of Financing	Estimated amount allocated to Ethiopia in Euro		Number of projects
		Total amount of project (at start year)	Estimated * average yearly disbursement	
2010	Delegation to AU	31,646	10,549	1
2012	DCI-MIGR	750,000	187,500	1
2013	DCI-MIGR	2,500,000	929,761	2
	DCI-HUM	1,000,000	400,219	1
2014	EU EDF 11	12,400,000	2,499,065	2
	EU, DCI-MIGR	753,969	215,335	1
2015	EDF 11	5,000,000	1,666,667	1
	EDF Intra-ACP Programme	126,582	40,996	1
	TF	20,000,000	5,000,000	1
	DG HOME	1,000,000	500,000	1
	DCI PANAF	393,617	115,213	1
2016	TF	85,683,333	22,540,929	4
	GPGC DCI-MIGR	666,667	222,020	1
in the pipeline for after 2016	ISF-police	93,750	n/a	1
	TF	80,750,000	n/a	6
	TF, EIB	15,000,000	n/a	1
	NIP, TF, EIB	75,000,000	n/a	2
	DCI PANAF	308,511	n/a	1
<b>All</b>	<b>Total excl. ECHO</b>	<b>301,458,075</b>		<b>29</b>
2016	ECHO	200,000,000	100,000,000	1
<b>Grand Total including ECHO</b>		<b>501,458,075</b>		<b>30</b>

Source: authors, based on figures provided by the EUD in Ethiopia, November 2016.

Note: \* averages per year have been calculated by dividing the total allocation by the number of years foreseen for implementation: **these figures do not represent the pipeline of disbursements.**

trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants in Ethiopia and Djibouti (2012-2016); and a project of support to civil society action for promoting the rights of migrants (2013-2017).

**Table A.42 Summary of EU support to migration in Ethiopia per financing instrument**

Financing Instrument	Allocations in millions of Euro				Total 2010-18
	2010-14	2015	2016	pipeline after 2016	
DCI	5.0	0.4	0.7	0.3	6.4
EDF	12.4	5.1	-	-	17.5
TF	-	20.0	85.7	80.8	186.4
Mix (EDF, TF, EIB)	-	-	-	90.0	90.0
DG Home	-	1.0	-	-	1.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>17.4</b>	<b>26.5</b>	<b>86.4</b>	<b>171.1</b>	<b>301.4</b>
ECHO			200.0		200.0
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>17.4</b>	<b>26.5</b>	<b>286.4</b>	<b>171.1</b>	<b>501.4</b>


Source: authors, based on figures provided by the EUD in Ethiopia, November 2016.

Note: averages per year have been calculated by dividing the total allocation by the number of years foreseen for implementation: these figures do not represent the pipeline of disbursements. This table excludes possible EIB loans in excess of €300m for 2017/18.

### 3. Recent EU support to migration in Ethiopia

As can be seen in Table A.42 above and Figure A.58, from 2015 onwards, allocations in support of migration in Ethiopia increased dramatically even when excluding the amounts provided through ECHO, amounts which are also directed towards the migrant communities. In 2015, €26.5m were allocated to five projects of which €20m were from the newly established TF, €5m from the NIP, €1m from DG-Home and two small allocations from the EU intra-ACP Programme and the DCI PANAFA. In 2016, the amount allocated more than trebled with €86m (again not counting the €200m allocated to ECHO, which also benefits the migrants), funded almost exclusively from the TF and benefiting four projects. After 2016, the amounts foreseen increase again with €171m in the pipeline for 2017 and 2018 funded by a mix of NIP, TF and EIB as well as TF alone and some small allocations from EU DCI and EU Internal Security Fund (ISF)-Police.

**Figure A.58 EU Support to migration (excl. ECHO): past allocations and current pipeline**



Most of the allocations made over the period 2010-2016 came from ECHO for humanitarian crisis assistance. Excluding ECHO funding, the most important contributions in terms of funding came from the EU TF (62%). As mentioned above, the EU TF was officially established at the Valletta Summit on 12 November 2015 to address the migration crises in the region of Sahel/Lake Chad, Horn of Africa and North Africa (a total of 23 countries, later extended to 26 countries). Initial resources amounted to €1.88 billion of which €1.8 billion were for the European Commission (including €1.5 billion from the EDF reserve) to fund projects in the areas of employment creation, food and nutrition security, migration management, and conflict prevention (EC, 2015z).

As seen in Table A.43 below, most allocations from the EU TF in Ethiopia were focused on the development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement (Valletta Theme 1, 66% of funding excl. ECHO). Allocations supporting legal migration and mobility (Theme 2) represented 16% of total allocations (excl. ECHO), and support addressing Protection and asylum (Theme 3) 10% (excl. ECHO).

**Table A.43 EU support to migration in Ethiopia: estimated allocations as per the five Valletta themes and per financing instrument, in millions of Euro.**

Financing Source	Theme 1	Theme 2	Theme 3	Theme 4	Theme 5	Total
EU (ISF-police)	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.1
EU DCI AU	0.0	0.4	-	0.3	-	0.7
EU EDF	12.4	-	-	-	5.1	17.5
EU TF	110.2	32.3	30.0	9.0	5.0	186.4
EU, DG HOME	-	-	-	1.0	-	1.0
EU, ECHO	-	-	200.0	-	-	200.0
Mix (NIP, EUTF, EIB)	75.0	15.0	-	-	-	90.0
Other DCI	-	1.5	1.0	3.2	-	5.7
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>197.6</b>	<b>49.1</b>	<b>231.0</b>	<b>13.6</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>501.5</b>

Source: authors, based on figures provided by the EUD in Ethiopia, November 2016.

Note: The five Valletta themes are as follows:

- Theme 1: Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement
- Theme 2: Legal migration and mobility
- Theme 3: Protection and asylum
- Theme 4: Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings
- Theme 5: Return, readmission and reintegration

In addition to the financing of direct and indirect support to migration, Ethiopia is also set to benefit from the newly signed (June 2016) EU-Ethiopia Strategic Engagement where migration is one of the six issues of common interest for political cooperation.<sup>211</sup> Although no financing is associated with this agreement which focuses on political dialogue only, it will provide ‘an effective tool to implement Art. 13 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMP) signed in Valletta on 11 November 2015, as well as to implement and follow up the five priority domains of the Valletta Action Plan’ (p.4 of the Agreement). As no high level meetings had yet taken place since this Agreement was signed (and there have been serious political developments with a State of Emergency declared in October 2016), the practical outcomes of this Agreement are not yet visible at the time of writing (November 2016).

<sup>211</sup> The other five issues are: regional peace and security; countering terrorism and violent radicalization; social and economic development, investment and trade; governance and human rights; and, climate change and environmental cooperation.

#### 4. Particularities of the use of the EU TF in Ethiopia

As seen in Table A.41 above, a total of 11 operations (amounting to €105.6m) have so far been approved for financing under the EU TF of which 5 were on-going in November 2016<sup>212</sup>; in addition one project is foreseen with EIB co-financing (€10m from the EU TF and €35m from EIB loans<sup>213</sup>) and two projects are in the pipeline in November 2016, which are expected to be financed from a mix of EU TF, EIB and NIP funding (of which one will be provided with €50m from NIP and EU TF plus €200m from the EIB; the other will be provided with €25m from NIP/EU TF but the EIB contribution is as yet unknown<sup>214</sup>). The amounts of funding provided from the EU TF to Ethiopia make Ethiopia the first recipient of TF funding.

Part of Ethiopia's success in drawing EU TF funding is because of the enormous needs of the country and its geo-political strategic importance for stability in the region. With a population of more than a million displaced persons (domestic and regional migrants), of which an estimated 800,000 refugees, and surrounded by Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan, Ethiopia is at the crossroads of migration and refugee flows: within the region, towards the Gulf countries and Middle East (Eastern Route), to Europe (Northern route) and to South Africa (Southern route).<sup>215</sup> This together with the structural food security problems of the country and the pressures of a young and growing population (it is estimated that more than 2.5 million youth enter the labour market every year), makes for a potentially explosive situation which could rapidly deteriorate, jeopardising Ethiopia's stability and the orderly management of its migratory flows. Although emigration towards the EU is very low, the EU wishes to support Ethiopia in its efforts to address the causes of migration and to manage migration.

Secondly, however, the high allocations from the EU TF for operations in Ethiopia are also due to the manner in which the EUD and the NAO have used the NIP funding to complement TF funding. Indeed, at end 2015 it was decided to redirect €30m of NIP resources to the TF so that (i) migration could benefit from a higher allocation (than only NIP or only TF) and (ii) fast track procedures could be used for the projects to be financed (see below under point 5). With the transfer of €30m from the NIP into the TF, Ethiopia's allocation from the EU TF amounted to €69.5m. Complementing EU TF funding with NIP funding will be pushed further in the next couple of years by using NIP to attract both EU TF resources and EIB loans through blending operations. It is intended to be used for the financing of industrial parks (€25m might be mobilised from the NIP) and of the job compact, which will include €25m from the NIP, €25m from the TF and €200m from the EIB for blending.<sup>216</sup> Transferring NIP allocations to the TF is thus considered as one way to increase the allocations to Ethiopia as well as to circumvent the standard EDF procedures, considered slow and difficult (mainly because of the NAO's interference). The EUD has thus successfully played the variety of instruments available to maximise support to the sector.

#### 5. Particularities of the EU TF governance and management

The EU TF governance is comprised of a Strategic Board (setting the global strategy of the TF and meeting once a year) and an Operational Committee. The former, composed of representatives of MSs and other contributing donors and chaired by the European Commission, sets the global strategy. Partner countries (or regions) can be invited to attend to the meetings of the EU TF Board as observers when found relevant: they are invited to participate in discussions and the governance procedures state that 'the Board shall take into account the opinion expressed by observers.' Partner countries (or regions) can also be invited to attend meetings of the Operational Committee. The latter, composed of contributing MSs and the Commission, selects appropriate projects.

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<sup>212</sup> Ongoing projects and their start date were: Stemming Irregular Migration in Northern & Central Ethiopia (SINCE, 2015); Better Migration Management in the Horn of Africa (BMM, 2016); Regional Development and Protection Programme in Ethiopia (RDPP, 2016); Research and Evidence Facility (REF, 2016); and Resilience Building and creation of Economic Opportunities in Ethiopia (RESET II, 2016).

<sup>213</sup> LIFE (Leather integrated Initiative to Foster sustainable Employment creation).

<sup>214</sup> Jobs Compact and Support to Agro-industrial Parks.

<sup>215</sup> See Action Documents for the projects RESET II or Rural Development and Protection Programme, Interviews 46.

<sup>216</sup> Information collected during interviews 50, 372, 346.

Although Partner countries and regions are thus not part of the decision-making process of the projects to be funded by the EU TF, they appear, in practice, to be participating in discussions at the meetings and their concerns appear to be taken on board in the Action Fiches (according to some of the minutes of the meetings). In the field, ministries and institutions supported by EU TF projects are of course consulted as for any project that concerns the public administration but there is no obligation to pass through the NAO, with a subsequent loss of oversight of central authorities on what the EU is funding and doing in the country. This is perfectly illustrated in paragraph 16 of the constitutive agreement of the EU TF: “It will cover activities where it can have an added-value compared to other EU instruments (or other development partners, including EU Member States), for example by targeting actions in areas that are not under the control of the national authorities and/or by implementing necessary activities that might fall outside of the scope of the signed National and Regional Indicative Programmes and/or by using different implementing methods.”

The basis for selecting projects, other than that they should fit within one of the 5 Valetta themes<sup>217</sup> (see above) and respond to one of the four strategic objectives as set out in the TF’s Strategic Orientation Document,<sup>218</sup> was not entirely clear from documentation consulted and people interviewed during field visits in November 2016.<sup>219</sup> TF management is based in Brussels at the Commission.

The process of preparing financing decisions is however clear, and the TF projects benefit from simplified, faster procedures than standard EDF projects. Identification and formulation procedures differ from standard EDF procedures in that:<sup>220</sup>

- Action Documents are to be submitted to the Operational Board 5 working days in advance (15 days for standard EDF projects).
- Action Documents use a reduced and more concise version (only 8 pages).
- Action documents are submitted to one (not two) Quality Support Group (QSG) evaluations, they are not subjected to inter-service consultations and are not looked at by the EDF Committee.

The identification and formulation phases of TF projects are thus much simpler than for EDF-funded projects since the EU TF projects use accelerated procedures and, very importantly, do not have to involve partner country consultations since the NAO is not required to co-sign spending decisions (even though, reportedly, local ownership is ensured in practice through political dialogue and consultations with partner countries and CSOs).<sup>221</sup> The whole preparatory and approval/decision phase can thus be considerably shortened. Projects are approved on the basis of the simplified Action Document and thus before they have been formulated in detail: the operating partners (EU MS cooperation agencies, NGOs, international organisations or private sector entities) play a key

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<sup>217</sup> Theme 1: Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; Theme 2: Legal migration and mobility; Theme 3: Protection and asylum; Theme 4: Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; and, Theme 5: Return, readmission and reintegration.

<sup>218</sup> The four strategic objectives are: (i) Greater economic and employment opportunities; (ii) Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable, as well as refugees and displaced people; (iii) Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination; and (iv) Improved governance and conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration. In addition a cross cutting output is improved policy and practice. See Strategic Orientation Document, 16 February 2016.

<sup>219</sup> EU Factsheet, November 2015; Companion July 2016; The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa - Strategic Orientation Document; Financial regulations of the EU, Art, 187; Interviews 98, 50, 46, 40. In interviews, several MS expressed their concern over the project submission process, as they did not understand the reasons for accepting or rejecting project submissions to the EU TF.

<sup>220</sup> See Companion Chapters 6 and 21.

<sup>221</sup> See European Commission Fact sheet for the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, Valletta, 12 November 2015: ‘Partner countries and their relevant regional organisations will be invited to participate at both levels of the Trust Fund’s governance. (...) All partners will also be duly associated with the process of identification, formulation and implementation, and may express their views in the Board and the Operational Committee.’

role in the conception (and implementation) of projects<sup>222</sup>. Detailed project design is realised by the operating partners after approval and thus without in-depth quality check by the Commission's services (notably the two QSGs) on issues such as relevance to country context, needs and priorities, coherence and complementarity with on-going and planned interventions.

Country consultations are not required and projects respond to an emergency perceived by the EU rather than to a country's longer-term objective. In some countries benefiting from the EU TF, there is no migration strategy to serve as a guiding framework. A compressed preparation time leading to a potential lack of project effectiveness would also affect sustainability and impact opportunities. Furthermore, as the EU TF operates outside the EU-Government normal cooperation process (where the NAO plays a centralising role, ensuring also that all EDF support is aligned with national priorities), the manner in which decisions are taken may undermine partnership, ownership and predictability.

Contracting procedures are also simplified (no NAO signature required, simplified procurement rules, derogations on sub-granting rules, ...). However, as was pointed out by several persons interviewed, and is discussed below, the efficiency gain is limited since at some stage, detailed project formulation and design with all the adequate analysis has to be undertaken: if not before project approval, then after but before implementation since any project not properly prepared runs the risk of not being effective.

In terms of implementation modalities, the same modalities as EDF apply, except without the intervention of the NAO and budget implementation can be delegated to third parties (indirect management). For contracting, procedures are also simplified, again without intervention of the NAO and with the relaxation of the N, N+1 and D+3 rules, simplified and more direct procurement rules, more decision-making autonomy to the manager, and the possibility for derogations on sub-granting rules.<sup>223</sup> The differences with the standard EDF procedures are limited in the case of Ethiopia since in Ethiopia emergency procedures already apply to contracting. The financial execution, accounting, IT systems, filing and archiving are the same as EDF funding. EU TFs are audited every year and normal EDF evaluation and reporting procedures apply.

## **6. Complementarities and concerns with the use of the EU TF and other EFIs in migration**

Although Ethiopia is used here as an illustration of findings, the analysis draws from a much wider body of evidence.<sup>224</sup> The EU TF allows a quick response and addresses the same category of beneficiaries as the NIP and other budget lines as seen above: a large chunk of the NIP and DCI support resilience and food security, which also target the refugee population of Ethiopia. It is rather difficult to separate the migration issues in Ethiopia from the normal development concerns, which also include youth employment, food security etc. It has been suggested in interviews that the use of the TF is then justified not in the scope of its application (same areas covered) but rather because:

- it responds very clearly to a political situation: the TF is a political tool that sends a political signal to the European constituency (we are doing something about (im)migration);
- it is a fast response that provides the flexibility lacking in the EDF.

In other countries the advantage of the TF is also that it can address a problem not usually addressed with the development portfolio and that it addresses population groups that are not normally under the development cooperation spectrum: the destitute and those that have no economic and social perspectives. This is not the case in Ethiopia where, as noted, the NIP does address these issues and population groups.

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<sup>222</sup> See [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eutf\\_governance\\_final\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eutf_governance_final_en.pdf) on the governance and procedures for the EU TF for Africa.

<sup>223</sup> See section 21.4.2.5 of the Companion, pages 629 and 630.

<sup>224</sup> Here we draw upon many different interviews: 34, 369, 40, 372, 50, 270, 657, 118, 57, 222, 300, 689, 74, 274, 57, 167, 495, 346.

For many interviewees, the TF thus fills an existing gap and is very complementary to the existing instruments. However, the use of the TF mechanism has also received much criticism.

From HQ level, the TF has been the subject of some discomfort amongst MSs and EU HQ, who see it as an instrument that has been 'imposed' by the European Commission and has not been well thought through before it was launched, especially with regards to its financial implications in drawing upon the EDF reserve; it used an important share of the EDF reserve, thus making some MS nervous about the fund being depleted for any other 'emergency' use; there is also doubt that the instrument can balance the difficult transition between short-term humanitarian needs and the longer-term development needs.

At field level it is felt that as an instrument managed and 'imposed' by HQ, it is too centralised and doesn't take proper account of the local knowledge of the situation; EU Delegations are supposed to be key in the process of identifying and formulating actions but in fact the actions are more often than not imposed by HQ; it doesn't take the time to respect ownership; it provides unpredictable amounts of funding; projects are approved even before they are formulated in detail, making them liable to being ineffective and inefficient; sometimes projects could just as well have been funded from NIP since they address development areas rather than migration issues; projects are believed to carry high transaction costs since they are contracted to MSs who most often contract to other bilateral or international organisations who themselves contract out again (a chain of several layers of management costs thus ensues). Concerns thus arise with regards to the project's value for money since the use of several intermediaries (EUDs, MS as operating partner, a bilateral, regional or international agency as sub-contractor and a local sub-contractor) is likely to carry high transaction costs.

Both parties (HQ and field) agree that the TF is foremost a political tool, very subject to political pressures from MSs; lobbying from different MSs is done at the highest levels and once projects are approved, it is difficult to criticise fellow MSs in how they are using the funds or want to use the funds for; linked to this, it is felt that there is a lack of transparency in the project selection process accompanied by a lack of guidance on project scope/content and a lack of transparency for monitoring, especially when sub-delegation agreements are used.

What can be said from the point of view of the evaluator and all other things being equal, is that the procedures do indeed not favour a thorough analysis of projects: projects are approved for a specific objective but their detailed design is developed only after approval so that there is no external checking of the relevance of the approach and of potential efficiency and effectiveness of the project. This is a major drawback from the value-for-money and/or results-oriented approach now commonly applied to EU and especially EDF operations. It is feared indeed that the projects funded through the TF will not only be less efficient but also less effective and more costly than the standard EDF projects, especially in Ethiopia where the only major gain from using the TF is in the initial speed of project approval. Monitoring arrangements would need to be set up rapidly to ensure that TF projects contribute effectively and efficiently to the stated objectives.

In Ethiopia the concern with efficiency and effectiveness of TF projects exists but is dampened by a very pro-active Delegation that not only scrutinises projects before they are sent to Brussels for consideration by the TF Operational Committee but also uses the TF to attract funding from the EDF PIN and the EIB as seen above. The TF is thus part of the EU strategy and is used in complementarity with other EFIs. The EUD thus has a central role to play in maintaining coherence between the different TF and EFI funded projects.

In this annex the main findings underlying the analysis of effectiveness are presented from different angles: firstly, the institutional and organizational framework that should help ensuring that conditions are in place for the EU to deliver effective EDF cooperation; secondly, effectiveness findings from existing documentary evidence, which mostly refers to evaluations of EDF10 and to 2015 EAMRs; and, thirdly, findings from the eight country visits realised in the framework of this performance review.

## 1. Background on the EDF institutional and organisational framework<sup>225</sup>

Human resources. In terms of management of EDF resources, the responsibilities are shared between (i) at EU level: DG DEVCO and the EEAS, located at HQ and present in the field through the EU Delegations (EUDs); (ii) at country/territory level: the National/Territorial Authorising Officer (NAO/TAO); and (iii) at regional level: the Regional Authorising Officer, the latter two categories collectively termed 'EDF Authorising Officers'.

EEAS, DG DEVCO and EUD staff share the responsibility for the programming of the national and regional indicative cooperation in close consultation with national/regional authorities and the NAO/TAO/RAO.

DG DEVCO and EUD staff have specific responsibilities with regards to the identification, formulation, implementation, monitoring and reporting of EDF at the three different levels of engagement:

- bilateral programmes are managed by the EUDs with staff allocated to different countries according to a formula based on the OPTIMUS programme developed in 2014;
- regional and intra-ACP programmes are managed by HQ (DG DEVCO) according to its different geographic DGs; and,
- the investment facility is managed by the EIB.

In addition to providing policy guidance, supervision, technical guidance and systems to the EUDs for the implementation of bilateral cooperation programmes and managing the regional and intra-ACP programmes funded by the EDF, DG DEVCO is also responsible for managing programmes funded from non-EDF sources (instruments and DCI).

The EDF Authorising Officers represent the partner country or territory in all matters of implementing the EDF and are assigned a number of responsibilities linked to the budget implementation tasks (EC, 2016f, section 3.3.7.4), including coordination, programming, monitoring, reporting on the cooperation with the EU.

Political and policy dialogues. The political dialogue is enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement whilst policy dialogue is linked to the cooperation portfolio and in particular to the support provided to sector and country reforms. Both are increasingly seen as essential inputs of development cooperation. Political dialogue is the responsibility of the EEAS and policy dialogue is the responsibility of DGDEVCO. Policy and political dialogues are undertaken both at HQ and at EUD levels.

Aid modalities and management modes. In accordance with its Financial Regulation, the Commission implements EDF resources through two management modes in ACPs and OCTs (EC, 2016f): centralized direct and indirect methods. Direct management is when HQ or the EUD performs all budget-implementation tasks related to an intervention; indirect management is when the EU entrusts budget implementation tasks to an agency, whose eligibility to do this is subject to a

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<sup>225</sup> This section is an extract from the initial Intervention Logic presented in the Inception and Desk Reports.



pillar assessment.<sup>226</sup> Indirect management can be done through member states or third country agencies, international agencies and partner country (PC) agencies. Indirect management with PCs is the preferred management mode for the EDF as it comes closest to ensuring ownership by the PC. It can take the form of partial delegation<sup>227</sup> or full delegation with Programme Estimates.

The issue of ownership and wider aid effectiveness also comes up in the choice of aid modalities, which include projects, budget support and blending; the recommended use of blending of loans and grants is stepped up in EDF11 to leverage new resources from the private sector and investment banks, especially at regional level. Like the preference for indirect management with the PC, budget support is the EU's preferred aid modality, subject of course to the satisfaction of four eligibility criteria.<sup>228</sup>

Guidelines and instructions. EDF11 benefits, like its predecessors, from implementation rules, financial and contractual procedures, programming guidelines, a series of thematic policy guidelines, as well as from many different instructions and tools that are produced on a case-by-case basis. In addition, Council conclusions and Council decisions provide formal EU positions on specific topics that influence programming and formulation and thus the likely results of EU interventions. The main guidelines, tools and instructions include:

- The EDF11 implementation rules (Council of Europe, 2015b) and the OCT-specific Council Decision (Council of Europe, 2013a) setting out general provisions, areas of cooperation, trade arrangements and instruments. EDF11 has its own implementing rules (Council of Europe, 2015b), which are different from the Common Implementing Regulations used for DCI and other budget lines; furthermore, the OCTs within EDF11 are governed by a specific Council Decision (Council of Europe, 2013a) that sets out their specific general provisions, areas of cooperation, trade arrangements and instruments.
- The DEVCO companion to financial and contractual procedures (EC, 2016f) with all procedures for the management of the funds, including areas ranging from the various aid modalities and management modes to programming and formulation circuits, and to contracting etc.
- An evolving ensemble of instructions and templates that focus on a specific process such as EDF11 programming guidelines (country, regional, OCTs), Action Documents, MIPs, CSPs, etc.
- Guiding documents for the EU's approach to various sectors and themes (such as migration, security and development, poverty eradication, climate change, health, social protection, budget support, engagement with Civil Society, Joint programming, ...); tools (CRIS, DWH, EAMRs, PRAG etc.); and EU Action Plans for specific related issues (human rights and democracy, anti-terrorism, external conflict and crises, ...) and for specific regions/countries.

All in all, the inputs, processes, rules and guidelines used for the implementation of the EDF are thus complex, with different EU and PC structures involved, two possible modes of management and choices between three main aid modalities (and many more contractual modes not mentioned here) and different processes, rules and guidance for ACPs and OCTs.

## **2. Findings from internal EAMRs and externally carried out EDF10 evaluation reports**

The evidence presented is drawn from the EAMRs for the 25 sample countries, some external evaluations, the DEVCO country, regional, instrument and thematic strategy evaluations listed below and the Court of Auditors reports. Sources of all documents are provided in the bibliography.

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<sup>226</sup> The pillar assessment (or seven pillar assessment), carried out by an external auditor, covers seven areas as follows: (1) internal control, (2) accounting, (3) independent external audit, and procedures and rules for (4) grants, (5) procurement, (6) financial instruments, and finally (7) a specific pillar for sub-delegation. See section 3.3.6 of the DEVCO Companion to financial and contractual procedures (EC, 2016f).

<sup>227</sup> Partial delegation is limited to conducting procurement and grant award procedures and managing the resulting contracts only; full delegation also includes carrying out payments to contractors and grant beneficiaries. See EC, 2016f, section 3.3.7.3.

<sup>228</sup> The four criteria relate to macro-economic stability, the implementation of a Public Finance Management Reform programme, the existence of a credible and relevant national or sectoral policy document, and budget transparency and oversight.

List of thematic evaluations reviewed:

Agricultural Commodities; Health; Research and Innovation; Human Rights; Technical Cooperation; Private Sector Development; Conflict Prevention and Peace Building; Decentralisation; Synthesis of Budget Support Evaluations; Trade.

List of country evaluations reviewed:

Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo DRC (but mostly EDF9), Congo Republic, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia (but mostly EDF9), Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Timor Leste, Togo and Zambia.

Other evaluations reviewed:

- Mid-Term Evaluation of 10th EDF OCT SME Programme (COSME).
- The Netherlands and the European Development Fund – Principles and practices. Evaluation of Dutch involvement in EU development cooperation (1998-2012).
- Evaluation of France's contribution to the European Development Fund.
- DFID, Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) Update 2013 progress rating.
- DFID, Multilateral Aid Review: Assessment of the European Development Fund (EDF).
- Concord, The Role of the EU in ensuring Global Tax Justice.
- Concord, The EPA between the EU and West Africa: Who benefits?
- Concord, Investing for Development? Examining the impacts of the EU's investment regime on food security, the right to food and land governance.

List of Court of Auditors reports reviewed:

- Effectiveness of EDF support for regional economic integration in East Africa and West Africa. Special Report No. 18. 2009
- The Commission's management of Non-State Actors' Involvement in EC Development Cooperation. Special Report No.4. 2009
- The European Development Fund (EDF) Contribution to a sustainable road network in Sub-Saharan Africa. Special Report No. 17. 2012
- European Union Development Assistance for Drinking Water Supply and basic Sanitation in Sub-Saharan Countries. Special Report No. 13. 2012
- EU Climate Finance in the Context of External Aid. Special Report No. 17. 2013.
- The effectiveness of blending regional investment facility grants with financial institution loans to support EU external policies. Special Report No.16. 2014
- EuropeAid's evaluation and results- oriented monitoring systems. Special Report No. 18. 2014
- ACP–EU Energy Facility support for renewable energy in East Africa. Special Report No. 15. 2015
- The ACP Investment Facility: does it provide added value? Special Report No. 14. 2015
- Review of the risks related to a results- oriented approach for EU development and cooperation action. Special Report No. 21. 2015

**Table A.44 Problems with staffing mentioned in the 2015 EAMRs and main reasons for dissatisfaction**

	Expressed dissatisfaction with staffing situation	Reasons mentioned				
		Not enough posts	Not the right profiles	Vacancies	Work conditions (local/contractual staff)	Leave
<b>Africa</b>						
Mozambique	1	1				
Zambia	1	1		1		
Mali	1	1	1	1		1

	Expressed dissatisfaction with staffing situation	Reasons mentioned				
		Not enough posts	Not the right profiles	Vacancies	Work conditions (local/contractual staff)	Leave
Cameroon	1			1		
Madagascar	1			1	1	1
Lesotho	1	1				
Ethiopia	1	1			1	
Djibouti						
Togo	1	1			1	
Burkina Faso	1		1	1		
Sierra Leone						
Tanzania						
Uganda						1
Kenya						
DRC						
Congo		1	1			
Burundi						
Malawi						
Chad						
<b>Caribbean</b>						
Dominican Rep	1	1	1			
Jamaica	1	1		1		1
Haiti				1		1
<b>Pacific and OCTs</b>						
New Caledonia				1		
Timor Leste	1	1	1	1	1	
Aruba	1	1				
<b>Total</b>	13	11	5	9	4	5
in percent of total	52%	44%	20%	36%	16%	20%

Source: based on the EAMR reports from 2015

**Table A.45 Evidence from thematic evaluations on institutional structures and processes, on results from EDF10 implementation and on impact and sustainability requirements**

Thematic Evaluation	Evidence attesting to weak monitoring & reporting systems	Evidence attesting to results from EDF10 implementation	Evidence attesting to consideration of impact and sustainability
Agricultural Commodities		✓	
Health	✓	✓	
Research and Innovation	✓	✓	
Human Rights	✓	✓	
Technical Cooperation			
Private Sector Development		✓	
Conflict Prevention and Peace Building	✓	✓	✓
Decentralisation	✓	✓	✓
Synthesis of Budget Support Evaluations			
Trade	✓	✓	

**Table A.46 Findings from country strategy evaluations**

**JC.2.1 Institutional structures and processes are in place for EDF11 to deliver expected result**

<b><i>1.2.1.1 HR and organisational structures with clear management and organisation systems exist</i></b>	
Country Evaluations	Out of the 17 countries reviewed, 7 had insufficient HR capacities compared to the portfolio they were managing and this was felt to have affected either efficiency of operations, effectiveness of support or both. In a couple of instances, evaluations found specifically that limitations of HR had meant that most of the time had been taken up by administrative, financial and technical management of projects, rather than by analysis and policy dialogue (PD). As a result the EU's cooperation was less strategic than it should have been considering its objectives. In the three cases where the EU had no or a limited field presence (Togo, Timor Leste, Djibouti), effectiveness of operations had been severely affected (with notably shortcomings in the ability to monitor projects, hold PD,..).
<b><i>1.2.1.3 Monitoring and reporting systems of development results linked to the MDGs/SDGs exist and are functional</i></b>	
Country Evaluations	In a vast majority of cases where the subject was touched upon in evaluations, the national M&E systems (and often also the statistical systems providing data) were found very weak, not able to provide baseline data, results and impact indicators. Monitoring capacities of sector ministries were found equally weak as were the capacities to use monitoring to feed back into decision-making.
Court of Auditors report	There is no monitoring system to track the overall progress of the regional economic integration process in the individual countries and individual reporting was poor and often delayed making it difficult to assess effectiveness (ECA, 2009a). CoA found good monitoring and evaluation functions but at the same time objectives prepared in a political context and not useful at implementation level (need operational objectives) and insufficient ROM and ex post evaluations limit the EU's capacity to track actual results achieved.
<b>JC.2.2 The 10th EDF contributed to the delivery of positive results at territory, country, regional and intra-ACP levels compared to its objectives and specific EU priorities</b>	
<b><i>1.2.2.1 Evidence of positive results obtained in areas supported by EDF funded programmes</i></b>	
Country Evaluations	In all 15 country strategy evaluations reviewed, EU cooperation has had positive results (except possibly Timor Leste, where generally the evaluation is rather negative); however, many of these results were short-lived or fell short of expectations. General budget support was found on the whole to have delivered positive results although in a couple of cases the effect on public policies was very limited. In infrastructure, in almost all cases where road transport had been supported, evaluations raised concerns over the sustainability of achievements, considering insufficient attention paid to the maintenance of these roads. In education, health, food security, agriculture, governance, security, results were found positive but most often fragmented, with limited effectiveness due to a range of different factors, including a lack of appreciation of the challenges faced (leading to a weak design of support), a lack of strategic engagement, sector approach and policy dialogue, a lack of Government commitment to reform (including as a manifestation the lack of budgetary resources allocated to the sector/activities).
Court of Auditors report	Some evidence is reported on trade and transport regional integration (ECA, 2009a). On drinking water, the CoA found that fewer than half of the projects examined delivered results meeting the beneficiaries' needs and even there the results were not sustainable (ECA, 2012b). On energy (ECA, 2015a) 75% of projects were successful and likely to be sustainable.
<b><i>1.2.2.2 Synergies have been realised between the EU's territory, country, regional and intra-ACP programmes</i></b>	
Country Evaluations	Out of the 15 country evaluations, only two mentioned positive interactions between the national and the regional programmes (Chad in transport and Zambia more generally).
Court of Auditors report	No synergies are noted (ECA, 2009a) as the two programmes are designed quite independently. The CoA concludes that blending the regional investment facility grants with loans from financial institutions to support EU external policies has been generally effective (ECA, 2014a).
<b>JC.2.3 The 11th EDF takes account of impact and sustainability requirements</b>	

<b>1.2.3.1 Evidence that the same sectors consistently receive EU support</b>	
Country Evaluations	While this review did not look into the continuity of EDF sector support over time, EDF10 evaluations generally attest to a high degree of continuity over time of some sectors. Whilst this is not necessarily singled out as a positive feature of EU cooperation, where the EU stopped support for certain activities (for example in capacity strengthening or some sector cooperation) or where it temporarily ceased cooperation (Madagascar for a couple of years), the evaluations noted a drop in effectiveness, whereas in sectors where the EU had been present for a long time impact and sustainability were less at risk.
<b>1.2.3.2 Existence of EDF systems for monitoring and evaluation of results which take into account sustainability and impact</b>	
Country Evaluations	All evaluations except one (Zambia) point to the weakness of the EU's systems for monitoring results and impacts. The most common criticism is that all attention on project reporting and monitoring in EDF10 was on inputs and outputs but that the EU rarely, if at all, looked at results and impacts of its activities and did not in any case have the systems to do this.
Court of Auditors report	Projects were not properly monitored in energy (ECA, 2015a) so appropriate and timely actions were not taken when projects encountered difficulties. Only half the planned for ex post evaluations were undertaken. It was the same in blending: lack of monitoring; and the same for climate, with no monitoring of compliance of EU and MS financing commitments (ECA, 2013).
<b>1.2.3.3 Government commitment to reforms</b>	
Country Evaluations	The lack of Government commitment to reforms, often materialised through insufficient (operations and maintenance) funding of sectors supported by the EU, is cited in many cases as a major cause for the undermining of the sustainability of results obtained by EU cooperation. Other reasons for lack of sustainability of actions include institutional weaknesses and undertaking actions without addressing strategic issues in the sector.
Court of Auditors report	The lack of Government commitment to reforms, often materialised through insufficient (operations and maintenance) funding, is also a finding of the CoA report on road support (ECA, 2012a) that clarifies that the Commission's PD, when using sector budget support is often weakened by difficulties in assessing disbursement conditions and making them into binding commitments for the Government. This report also points out for the road transport sector that sustainability is at risk due to non-implementation of reforms, funding and institutional weaknesses. Other reasons for lack of sustainability of actions include institutional weaknesses and undertaking actions without addressing strategic issues in the sector. This is confirmed by the CoA review of EU support to water and sanitation (ECA, 2012b) also pointing out the role of institutional weaknesses and tariff adjustments.

### 3. Findings from the eight country visits

**Table A.47 Main findings from the countries visited.**

	<b>JC2.1 Framework</b>	<b>JC2.2 Results</b>	<b>JC2.3 Sustainability</b>
Burkina Faso	Human resources in EUD are not an issue: staff work very closely together and spend adequate time with PC counterparts. Portfolio coherence and inclusion of cross sector issues is thus facilitated. EUD also responsible for RIP for 8 countries plus infrastructure in all region: heavy workload. Very weak public administration capacities. Guidelines mixed usefulness but useful contacts with HQ.	Contributions of EDF10 very valuable: concrete results (roads, buildings...) and 'soft' results linked to the important support provided to policy reforms with budget support (governance, health). Most important results are the SBC and EU's contribution to nutrition and food security. No results from regional programmes under EDF10 and no knowledge about the intra-ACP programme results.	Roads: sector weakened by withdrawal of EDF (AfDB also reducing support) and no exit strategy BS facilitates sustainability through eligibility criteria on Government political and financial commitment. EUD and Government monitor progress in attaining results from public policy implementation: regular policy dialogue meetings facilitate the timely taking of corrective actions where necessary to ensure effectiveness of

	<b>JC2.1 Framework</b>	<b>JC2.2 Results</b>	<b>JC2.3 Sustainability</b>
	No knowledge of HQ results framework: ROM not found as useful as ex post evaluations. Monitoring through BS and SWG of outputs and outcomes.		expected results. Sustainability and impact are potentially undermined by weak administration but accent in EDF11 on TA and DRM.
Cameroon	Problem of measurability of results, of national institutional capacities and organisation, of muted role of CSOs. Effectiveness of regional cooperation affected by weakness of regional organisations, upcoming political elections, unstable borders, lack of national commitment to regional integration goals.	Major contribution to road infrastructure but weak contributions to policy reforms and changes related to the political dialogue, to other focal sectors or to CSOs. Questioning of the effectiveness of BS versus project modality. Very low capacity of regional cooperation to deliver results in Central and Western Africa	Factors for sustainability and risk management are not systematically included in the detailed analysis.
Zambia	Room for improvement in terms of HR capacity, M&E, and streamlining institutional complexities to implement the EDF. Small CSOs are excluded from funding through new grant ceilings. NAO office is a bottleneck when it comes to EDF procedures and contracting.	Mixed results from EDF10: little contribution from BS to absolute poverty reduction despite increased fiscal space. Evidence of positive outcomes from sustained support to agriculture. Evidence of emerging synergies between the regional and national level (in particular transport infrastructure).	Instrument responsiveness to impact and sustainability requirements is not strong, especially when considering changes of focal sectors, but the longer-term programming frame provides stability and predictability. Roads: no exit strategy, sector weakened by withdrawal of EDF.
Ethiopia	Stretched human resources due to EU coordinating role, many EFIs operating and many requests from Brussels. NAO role jeopardises efficiency and effectiveness	CSO fund, APF, food security/resilience, poverty, basic social services.	Results framework takes no account of pooled funding and BS. Effectiveness undermined by use of Programme Estimates. Monitoring of reforms difficult.
Dominican Republic	Concerns about human resources (availability, expertise, level of responsibility) after Optimus and Finance and Contracts regionalisation. Concerns over burden of EU procedures on CSO and government staff	There is strong evidence of the EU having achieved results during the EDF10 and conditions seems to be in place for the EDF11 as well.	Concerns that reforms (esp. on local government) will falter if not supported by donors. EDF's long term engagement is highly valued, especially in the context of state reforms.
Timor Leste	The main issue that came up was the difficulty for CSOs to work with the EDF's complex procedures when government and absorption capacities are still very low.	Positive results booked in rural development, health (in particular nutrition) and governance (strengthening of national parliament, media institutions and civil society actors).	No exit strategy defined for agriculture. Lots of capacity strengthening.
Aruba	Institutional constraints carried over from EDF10: high bureaucracy; complicated procedures which do not match the small country contexts and their relatively developed status;	Evidence of positive and sustainable results and outcomes under EDF9 (project modality) but limited results under EDF10 (BS to education) because major delays in the implementation	Flagship projects from EDF9 were sustainable to the extent that the Government will continue maintaining them. However, BS could only have very limited effects and was not really found to be

	<b>JC2.1 Framework</b>	<b>JC2.2 Results</b>	<b>JC2.3 Sustainability</b>
	<p>staff turn-over combined with long time-lines affect progress; differences in guidelines' interpretation and requirements.</p> <p>EDF not an instrument designed for OCT contexts.</p> <p>New problem: regionalisation of EUD FC staff.</p> <p>No knowledge of HQ results framework and reporting frameworks do not capture OCT specificities.</p>	<p>affect the delivery of the National Education Plan.</p> <p>Results at regional level were judged positively overall despite the difficulties in finding a single unifying agenda across all OCTs. In this respect EDF11 has a more unified approach.</p>	<p>appropriate in this OCT context.</p>
New Caledonia	<p>Procedures too complex and management too fragmented over different geographical locations.</p> <p>No involvement of stakeholders.</p>	<p>Important results in vocational education system improvement (BS).</p> <p>Results from regional cooperation more difficult to evidence as regional cooperation suffers from geographical distances and lack of political commitment to regional integration.</p>	<p>Consistent support to the same sector over past three EDFs but need more social involvement.</p>
Main Interviews	<p>Meeting Notes 372, 75, 300, 470, 74, 204, 148, 107, 51, 82, 756, 72, 341, 71, 85, 131, 192, 422, 445, 27, 39, 400, 69, 61, 203, 440, 375, 101, 223, 394, 64, 54, 109, 121, 147, 152, 163, 172, 181, 193, 257, 368, 443</p>	<p>Meeting Notes 372, 428, 401, 186, 170, 154, 274, 82, 444, 322, 115, 107, 500, 51, 310, 896, 613, 843, 307, 34, 851, 445, 422, 192, 27, 69, 61, 63, 223, 440, 375, 35, 64, 54, 109, 147, 163, 172, 193, 443</p>	<p>Meeting Notes 372, 218, 167, 57, 74, 310, 162, 711, 896, 341, 142, 177, 71, 114, 445, 422, 400, 69, 440, 223, 54, 109, 121, 443, 451, 464</p>

## Part A Programming, pipeline and budget execution

### 1. Programming at national and regional levels

The original national programming process comprises the following stages and deadlines (EC, 2012h and EC, 2012c).

- Draft documents shared with delegations, first contacts with PCs encouraged (February 2012).
- First phase submission of lines of response and choice of sectors (May 2012–end of September 2012): end of first stage.
- Second phase: consists in drafting and approving the NIPs. No deadline was foreseen from the outset, but the project identification and formulation (that comes after phase 2) was expected to be conducted in 2013.

Delays discussed in the report refer to second phase, in particular (see below and text of the report):

- Launch of second phase in May 2013, 8 months after finalising phase 1
- Approval of NIPs and finalisation of phase 2, due to the EU elections.

Programming instructions for the EDF were sent to EU delegations in May 2012 (EC, 2012c). The dissemination of the guidelines marked the start of the first phase of the programming process and the deadline was fixed at the end of September 2012 with a view to starting identification and formulation in 2013 and implementation in 2014 (EC, 2012c). The second phase of the programming process was launched a year later, in May 2013 (EC, 2013g), and was due to conclude with the presentation of a draft NIP by 30 October 2013 (EC, 2013g). The signature date of the NIPs shows that, with the notable exception of Mali, the first NIPs were approved in June 2014, two years after the programming process was launched. The average NIP took 28 months to be approved and some NIPs were approved as late as Q4 of 2015 (EC, 2015v).

Regional programming guidelines date from December 2013.<sup>229</sup> This means that the regional programming could not be ready by the original EDF11 implementation date (January 2014). All RIPs were approved between May and June 2015, which means that if the issuance of regional programming guidelines is taken as the start date, the average RIP took 18 months to complete (EC, 2015v). This is 10 months less than the average NIP. However, interview evidence has indicated that the regional programming started much earlier, and that in fact most of the programming was done before the regional programme guidelines were finalized, thus making for a much longer preparation period (MN 327, 380).

### 2. Project pipeline

The “project” pipeline comprises the final stages of the identification process and all the formulation process until the final approval of EDF projects (EC, 2016f and EC, 2016o). The “pipeline” comprises the following key steps:

- Submission of Action Document
- Review at QSG 1 and subsequent modifications
- Review at QSG 2 and subsequent modifications
- Inter-service consultations
- Review at EDF Committee

<sup>229</sup> 11<sup>th</sup> EDF - Regional Programming Orientations, December-2013. Ares(2014)116957



- Formal approval in three steps: Decision, and signature from DEVCO and NAO.

In practice, EUDs are requested to inform DEVCO when they start working on the identification of a project and provide an estimated submission date for the action document (EC, 2016f). This allows EUDs and HQ to track all the projects undergoing identification and provide an estimated date for approval.

### **3. Budget execution at country level**

EAMRs use a number of “key performance indicators” (KPIs) to monitor the financial performance of EUDs. The analysis focuses on the following KPIs:

- KPI 1: Accuracy of initial annual financial forecast for payments
- KPI 2: Accuracy of initial annual financial forecast for contracts
- KPI 3: Accuracy of mid-year annual financial forecast for decisions

KPIs in the EAMR do not only reflect EDF data. The indicator contains aggregated information for all instruments used at the delegation level. However, the fact that the EDF represents by far the largest funding instrument in all 25 countries in the sample and that several of the internal procedures and systems are shared among instruments (e.g. IT systems, guidelines and templates) suggests that, to a large extent, the results of the analysis are applicable and attributable to the EDF.

The analysis of the sample of EAMRs shows that budget execution is generally quite poor in the sample of 25 countries. Out of the countries in the sample, only 11 delegations met the payment execution indicator (Key Performance Indicator 1 – KPI 1), 2 met the contract execution indicator (KPI 2) and 5 met the decision execution indicator (KPI 3).

The explanatory factors for the lack of performance were also explored. This gives a total of 75 potential explanations (3 KPIs by 25 countries) or 57 explanations if only the cases where there is a lack of performance are considered. Since explanations were only offered in the cases where performance was bad, the latter figure is probably a better reference. The analysis shows that:

- Methodological and technical problems are mentioned on 26 occasions. This category includes mistakes in encoding projects, bugs in the IT system, divergences in the data recorded in central databases and delays in updating/creating the entries in the central databases. On 8 out of these 26 occasions, the fault in meeting the indicators was attributed to the use of a risk adjustment factor (as the risk increases the real amount is adjusted downwards).
- Delays in the implementation of projects (e.g. works taking longer than expected or delays attributable to other agencies) are mentioned in 13 cases.
- Faster than expected implementation and the effort to speed up things in order to achieve the KPIs come up on 10 occasions.
- The political and humanitarian situation in partner countries (elections, instability, crisis) explains the lack of performance on 5 occasions.

## Part B Analysis of Quality Support Group processes

This section summarizes the analysis of the Quality Support Group (QSG) process performed in the context of EQ3. A random sample of 19 projects in 6 different countries and OCTs has been analysed to explore the contribution of both QSG1 and QSG2 to the projects under review (see Table A.51 at the end of this Part B for a list of projects). The original idea was to cover all 8 countries in the research sample, but there were limitations in the availability of data for Aruba and the Dominican Republic.

The analysis covers 26 QSG assessments of which 12 QSG1 and 14 QSG2. Out of the 19 projects, 7 were assessed both with a QSG1 and with a QSG2 assessment. The difference in the coverage of the sample can be explained by a combination of three factors: i) both QSG documents were not always available online for all projects; ii) some of the projects in the sample only underwent QSG2 (according to procedures in the Companion, EC, 2016f) and some projects had not yet reached the QSG2 by the time this evaluation examined them; and iii) sometimes QSG documents were available, but it was not possible to obtain a list of participants to conduct the assessment.

### Research approach

The exercise focused on the analysis of the comments and recommendations provided in the “template for QSG assessment”. The sample comprises two different types of templates. Older projects were assessed based on a “QSG checklist” that was prepared by the officials involved in the project and shows an intermediary level of standardisation (i.e. a template was adapted for each project and the number of fields was changed). More recent projects were assessed on the basis of the “template for QSG assessment” which is now fully standardised (i.e. all projects used the same template). A two-step analysis of the QSG templates was performed.

Firstly, the team examined and assessed the comments made on different areas:

- Project Design: activities, indicators, etc.
- Horizontal issues: gender, environment, climate change, etc.
- Synergies/complementarity with other donors and/or projects
- Finance/contractual aspects
- Project relevance and alignment to country priorities

After reviewing the document, comments provided at each of the QSG stages in the above areas were ranked based on two different categories:

- Not assessed or generic answer (Yes/No)
- Area has been assessed

Secondly, a single mark was given for the overall level of detail/quality of the comments for the whole document. This was done to take into account deviations in the areas above that could be due to things like the good quality of the projects being evaluated (a well-designed area in any given project is more likely to get a generic positive answer, i.e. a “Yes” according to the above coding scale). The following levels and definitions were used to rank the QSG templates:

- High: Fields are consistently assessed. Answers generally show a good understanding of the project and country contexts and are generally supported by evidence. Comments and suggestions are generally clear about what can be improved and how.
- Medium: Fields are not consistently assessed. Some answers suggest a good understanding of the project and country contexts. Some comments and suggestions for improvement are made, but the instructions are not always clear about what needs to be improved.
- Low: Only a few fields are properly assessed. Most answers are generic and do not prove a good understanding of the project or country contexts and are not generally backed up by evidence. Comments and suggestions are generally absent and/or provide insufficient information.

## Results

During QSG1, all areas were found to have been consistently assessed (see Table A.48). There is a very small number of “not assessed/generic” areas which could be explained by aspects linked to the nature of the project (e.g. the area not being relevant to the project). In QSG1, performance is weakest when it comes to the assessment of synergies and complementarities, suggesting that perhaps this is an area that receives less attention and requires a better understanding of the country context. In any case, the deviation is small.

The analysis of QSG2 templates shows a similar picture, but with evidence of a larger number of gaps or generic assessments. This difference can be explained by the fact that most areas were consistently reviewed and suggestions made in QSG1 were addressed and therefore did not require further comments. Once more, the area of synergies and complementarities received comparatively less attention during the assessments.

**Table A.48 Results by area**

Area	QSG1		QSG2	
	Assessed	Not assessed/generic	Assessed	Not assessed/generic
Design	11	1	10	4
Horizontal issues	11	1	12	2
Synergies/complementarity	8	4	7	7
Finance/contractual	11	1	14	0
Relevance/alignment	10	2	11	3


One of the most remarkable findings is not the difference between QSG 1 and QSG2, but the fact that most areas are consistently reviewed in both instances, with the possible exception of the complementarity and synergies. This increases the chances of any weaknesses being addressed. The consistent review at both levels can probably be explained by two factors. Firstly, the more advanced design for the projects and the increased amount of documentation that needs to be presented at QSG2 compared to QSG1 (EC, 2016f). Secondly, the difference in the number of participants between QSG1 and QSG2 (see Table A.49). The higher number of participants during QSG2 means that there are more and different people who have a chance to provide comments.

**Table A.49 Average number of participants**


	Avg. participants	Avg. units
QSG 1	5.33	3.66
QSG2	7.75	5.5

The number of participants shows a significant level of variability between projects. There is some correlation with the size of the projects (measured in grant volume) at the QSG2 stage (see Figure A.59 and Figure A.60 below). There are probably other important explanatory factors, although it has not been possible to assess them due to limitations with the size of the sample.

**Figure A.59 Participants and project size in QSG 1**



**Figure A.60 Participants and project size in QSG 2**




The assessment of the quality of the input provided in the QSG templates (Table A.50) suggests that that review process in the QSG templates at the QSG2 stage is usually less detailed and thorough than in QSG1. This finding is in line with the reduction in the number of areas assessed during QSG2 (see above) and can probably be explained by the same reasons: QSG1 has already resulted in improvements in certain aspects.

**Table A.50 Assessment of the quality of the projects**


Level of detail/quality	QSG 1	QSG2	Total
High	4	4	8
Medium	6	4	10
Low	2	6	8

The level of detail/quality of the assessment in the templates seems to be strongly correlated with the number of participants (Figure A.61). This seems like a logical finding as the likelihood of making comments and of cross-fertilisation of ideas should increase in line with the number of participants. The correlation between the level of detail/quality of the QSG templates and the size of the project could not be clearly established (Figure A.62), even if Figure A.60 above suggests a correlation between participants and size of the project. Nonetheless, Figure A.62 suggests that larger projects seem to be associated with medium and high levels of detail.

**Figure A.61 Level of detail/quality and number of participants**



**Figure A.62 Level of detail/quality and average project size**



**Table A.51 Sample of projects**

Project	Country	CRIS number	Total finance (€m)	QSG1 assessed	QSG2 assessed
Support to the sustainable commercialisation of smallholder farmers	Zambia	39612	87	Yes	No
Livestock Value Chain Public Private Dialogue: Quality of integrated public and private veterinary service delivery improved in Ethiopia (LVC-PPD II)	Ethiopia	39004	15	Yes	No
Programme d'appui à la bonne gouvernance en milieu forestier (PAMFOR)	Cameroon	38782	10	Yes	Yes
Programme d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle, à l'agriculture durable et à la résilience 1/2	Burkina Faso	38575	117	Yes	Yes
Programme d'appui à la politique sectorielle Eau et Assainissement PAPS-EA 1/2	Burkina Faso	38569	54	Yes	No
Programme d'appui à la Politique Sectorielle Santé II (Appui budgétaire) 1/2	Burkina Faso	38564	84	Yes	Yes
Pro-Civis – Programme de soutien à la citoyenneté active	Cameroon	38511	10	No	Yes
Support to the Agricultural Growth Program-Phase II (AGP-II) and Complementary Action to promote Nutrition into AGP-II	Ethiopia	38376	45	Yes	Yes
Up-Scaling EnDev Ethiopia – Access to Energy through off-grid Renewable Energy solutions	Ethiopia	38370	9	Yes	Yes
Pro-Rural – Programme d'appui au développement rural	Cameroon	38250	70	No	Yes
Lusaka Transmission and Distribution Programme (LTDP)	Zambia	38238		No	Yes
Sector reform contract: mobilité rurale, productivité agricole, finance publique	Cameroon	37965	70	Yes	No
Support to the Energy Sector: Increased Access to Electricity and Renewable Energy Production	Zambia	37933	40	No	Yes
Legal empowerment and enhanced justice delivery in Zambia	Zambia	37428	7	Yes	Yes
Enhanced Capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock for Better Service Delivery to Farmers	Zambia	37359	10	Yes	Yes
Partnership to improve service delivery through strengthened Public Finance Management and Oversight (PFMO)	Timor-Leste	37957	30	No	Yes
Partnership for Sustainable Agro-Forestry between Timor-Leste, the EU & Germany (PSAF)	Timor-Leste	38767	25	Yes	Yes
Programme territorial d'appui au secteur de l'emploi et insertion professionnelle en Nouvelle Calédonie	New Caledonia	38967	29.8	Yes	No
Supporting safe reintegration of returnees and improved management of labour migration in Ethiopia	Ethiopia	37325	10	No	Yes

**Part C QSG analysis for a selection of Action Documents from case study countries**

Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
Gender Based Violence (GBV) Prevention and Support to GBV Survivors in Zambia	Zambia	39799	25	23/06/16	5	3	D1: Development coordination Southern Africa & Indian Ocean. E3: Finance, Audits & Contracts. B1: Human rights, gender, democratic governance				
Support to the sustainable commercialisation of small-holder farmers	Zambia	39612	87	23/06/16	6	3	D1: Development coordination Southern Africa & Indian Ocean. E3: Finance, Audits & Contracts. C1: Rural development, food security and nutrition.				
TCF VI	Ethiopia	39047						20/07/16			
EDF11 Support to PFM in Zambia	Zambia	39020		30/09/16				01/03/17			
Civil Society Fund III (CSF)	Ethiopia	39017						20/07/16			
Livestock Value Chain – Public Private Dialogue:	Ethiopia	39004	15	15/03/16	3	3	D2: Development cooperation East Africa and regional cooperation in	20/07/16			

Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
Quality of integrated public and private veterinary service delivery improved in Ethiopia (LVC-PPD II).							Eastern and Southern Africa. E3: Finance, Audits and contracts. C1: Rural development, food security and nutrition.				
Partnership for Resilience Building in Ethiopia (P4 RESET)	Ethiopia	38008	30	22/07/15	5	4	D2: Development cooperation East Africa and regional cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa. E4: Finance, contracts and audit. EEAS. ECHO.				
Ethiopian Coffee Sector Enhancement Project (ECOSEP)	Ethiopia	38977	15	15/03/16	3	3	D2: Development cooperation East Africa and regional cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa. E3: Finance, audits and contracts. C1: Rural development, food security and nutrition.	20/07/16			



Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
NIP contribution to EU Trust Fund	Ethiopia	38807						22/07/15			
Programme d'appui à la bonne gouvernance en milieu forestier (PAMFOR)	Cameroon	38782	10	17/11/15	3	3	E1: Development cooperation and regional cooperation Central Africa, E3: Finance, audits & Contract. C2: Environment, ecosystems, biodiversity and wildlife	23/06/16	3	3	E1: Development cooperation and regional cooperation Central Africa, E3: Finance, Audits & Contract. 06: Quality and results.
Technical Cooperation Facility V and Support to National Authorising Officer (NAO)	Zambia	38653	10					15/03/16	4	3	D1: Development coordination Southern Africa & Indian ocean. E3: Finance, Audits & Contracts (West & Central Africa). 06: Quality and results
TCF + Appui à l'Ordonnateur National	Burkina Faso	38576						21/10/15			
Programme d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle, à l'agriculture	Burkina Faso	38575	117	17/11/15	5	4	E2: Development coordination and regional coordination West Africa. E3: Finance,	13/07/16	10	7	E2: Development coordination and regional coordination West Africa. E3: Finance,

Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
durable et à la résilience 1/2							audits and contracts. C1: Rural development, food security and nutrition. A4: Budget support and PFM.				Audits and contracts. C1: Rural development, food security and nutrition. A4: Budget support and PFM. 06: Quality and results. EEAS. ECHO.
Appui à la bonne gouvernance	Burkina Faso	38574	135	27/04/16	7	5	E2: Development coordination and regional coordination West Africa E3: Finance, Audits and contracts. B1: Human rights, gender and democratic governance. A4: Budget support and PFM. EEAS.	20/07/16	6	4	E2: Development coordination and regional coordination West Africa. E3: Finance, audits and contracts. B1: Human rights, gender and democratic governance. EEAS.
Programme d'appui à la politique sectorielle Eau et Assainissement PAPS-EA 1/2	Burkina Faso	38569	54	16/02/16				29/06/16	5	4	E2: Development coordination and regional coordination West Africa. E3: Finance, Audits and

Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
											contracts. C5: Water, infrastructure and cities. 06: Quality and results.
Programme d'Appui à la Politique Sectorielle Santé II (Appui budgétaire) 1/2	Burkina Faso	38564	84	15/12/15				25/05/16	8	5	E2: Development coordination and regional coordination West Africa. E3: Finance, Audits and contracts. B4: Education, health, research, culture. 06: Quality and results. EEAS.
Pro-Civis-Programme de soutien à la citoyenneté active	Cameroon	38511	10	06/07/16				20/07/16	5	4	E1: Development cooperation and regional cooperation Central Africa, E3: Finance, Audits & Contract. B1: Human rights, gender, democratic governance. 06: Quality and results.
Sustainable Land	Ethiopia	38486	20					22/07/15	5	4	D2: Development cooperation East

Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
Management Programme (SLMP) II											Africa and regional cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa. E4: Finance, contracts and audit. EEAS. ECHO.
Aviation Sector Support Programme II	Zambia	38479	5.6	14/10/15				15/03/16	5	4	D1: Development coordination Southern Africa & Indian ocean. E3: Finance, Audits & Contracts (West & Central Africa). C5: Water, infrastructure and cities. 06:Quality and results
Health sector reform contract	Ethiopia	38386	115	19/06/15				27/04/16	8	6	D2: Development cooperation East Africa and regional cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa. E3: Finance, audits and contracts. D1: Development cooperation Southern African

Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
											and Indian Ocean. B4: Education, health, research, culture. A4: Budget support and PFM. 06: Quality and results.
Support to the Agricultural Growth Program-Phase II (AGP-II) and Complementary Action to promote Nutrition into AGP-II	Ethiopia	38376	45	20/05/15				22/07/15	5	4	D2: Development cooperation East Africa and regional cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa. E4: Finance, contracts and audit. EEAS. ECHO.
Up-Scaling EnDev Ethiopia - Access to Energy through off-grid Renewable Energy solutions	Ethiopia	38370	9	20/05/15				29/07/15	4	4	D2: Development cooperation East Africa and regional cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa. E4: Finance, contracts and audit. C4: Private framework development, trade, regional

Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
											integration. C5: Water, infrastructure, cities.
Pro-Rural-Programme d'appui au développement rural	Cameroon	38250	70	20/05/15				13/01/16	8	5	E1: Development cooperation and regional cooperation Central Africa, E3: Finance, audits & contract. C1: Rural development, food security & nutrition. 06: Quality and results. EEAS.
Lusaka Transmission and Distribution Programme (LTDP)	Zambia	38238		15/03/16				19/07/16			
Biogas Dissemination Scale-Up Project – NBPE+	Ethiopia	38189	20.86	25/03/15				29/07/15	3	3	D2: Development cooperation East Africa and regional cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa. E4: Finance, contracts and audit. C5: Water,

Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
											infrastructure, cities.
Sector reform contract: mobilité rurale, productivité agricole, finance publique	Cameroon	37965	70	13/01/16	10	7	E1: Development cooperation and regional cooperation Central Africa, E3: Finance, Audits & Contract. E2: Development cooperation and regional cooperation West Africa. A4: Budget Support and PFM. C5: Water, infrastructure and cities. C1: Rural development, food security & nutrition. B1: Human rights, gender, democratic governance. EEAS.				
State Building Contract Sortie de crise	Burkina Faso	37936						08/04/15	3	3	E2: Development coordination and regional coordination West Africa.

Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
											E4: Finance, contracts and audit. 03: Knowledge management
Support to the Energy Sector: Increased Access to Electricity and Renewable Energy Production	Zambia	37933	40	09/09/15				04/04/16	6	4	D1: Development coordination Southern Africa & Indian ocean. E3: Finance, audits & contracts (West & Central Africa). C6: Sustainable energy and climate change. EEAS.
Programme d'Appui à la Gestion Publique et aux Statistiques (PAGPS) 1/2	Burkina Faso	37927	15					17/11/15	5	4	E2: Development coordination and regional coordination West Africa. E3: Finance, Audits and contracts. A4: Budget support and PFM. 06: Quality and results.
Support to the Productive Safety Net Programme IV (PSNP IV)	Ethiopia	37775	50					19/11/14	4	4	D2: Development cooperation East Africa and regional cooperation in



Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
											Eastern and Southern Africa. E4: Finance, contracts and audit. C1: Rural development, food security and nutrition. ECHO.
Road Sector Policy Support Programme (SPSP IV)	Ethiopia	37753	140					19/11/14	6	5	D2: Development cooperation East Africa and regional cooperation in eastern and southern Africa. E4: Finance, contracts and audit. D1: Development cooperation Southern African and Indian ocean. C5: Water, infrastructure and cities. 03: Knowledge management
TCF	Cameroon	37597	4					06/08/14	3	2	E1: Development cooperation and regional cooperation Central Africa. E4:

Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
											Finance, contracts and audit.
Legal empowerment and enhanced justice delivery in Zambia	Zambia	37428	7	19/11/14	7	4	D1: Development coordination Southern Africa & Indian Ocean. E4: ? B1: Human rights, gender, democratic governance. EEAS.	18/02/15	3	3	D1: Development coordination Southern Africa & Indian Ocean. E4: Finance, contracts and audit. B1: Human rights, gender, democratic governance
Support to strengthen electoral processes	Zambia	37363	7	30/04/14				19/11/14	7	4	D1: Development coordination Southern Africa & Indian ocean. E4: Finance, contracts and audit. B1: Human rights, gender, democratic governance. EEAS.
Strengthening market engagement in Zambia's small-scale agriculture sector	Zambia	37360	13	04/06/14				19/11/14	8	5	D1: Development coordination Southern Africa & Indian ocean. E4: Finance, contracts and audit. B1: Human rights, gender, democratic

Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
											governance. C1: Rural development, food security and nutrition. EEAS.
Enhanced Capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock for Better Service Delivery to Farmers	Zambia	37359	10	22/05/14				18/02/15	5	4	D1: Development coordination Southern Africa & Indian Ocean. E4: Finance, contracts and audit. B1: Human rights, gender, democratic governance. C1: Rural development, food security and nutrition
Supporting safe reintegration of returnees and improved management of labour migration in Ethiopia	Ethiopia	37325	10	09/04/14				27/08/14	5	3	D2: Development cooperation East Africa and regional cooperation in eastern and southern Africa. E4: Finance, contracts and audit. B3: Migration, employment, inequalities.
Kariba Dam	Zambia	31570	74	12/03/14				02/07/14	7	4	D1: Development

Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
Rehabilitation											coordination Southern Africa & Indian ocean. E4: Finance, contracts and audit. C5: Water, infrastructure and cities. EEAS.
Justice et sécurité	Burkina Faso			01/04/16				01/07/16			
SRC décentralisation	Burkina Faso			01/10/16				01/04/17			
Partnership for Sustainable Agro-Forestry between Timor-Leste, the EU & Germany (PSAF)	Timor Leste			21/04/16				14/07/16			
Partnership to improve service delivery through strengthened Public Finance Management and Oversight (PFMO)	Timor Leste			19/05/16							

Project data				QSG1				QSG2			
Project	Country	CRIS	Total finance €m	Date	No. of participants	No. of diff't units/ instit'ns	List of units and institutions	Date	No. of participants	No. of different units/ institutions	List of units and institutions
Programme territorial d'appui au secteur de l'emploi et insertion professionnelle en Nouvelle Calédonie	New Caledonia			07/07/16							
Support of Technical & Vocational Education & Training	Dominican Republic			19/04/16							

## Annex 19 Supporting evidence and analyses for EQ4 (added value)

### Part A Evidence of added value from evaluations

Note: This table summarises the findings from global and regional evaluations of the EDF (or with EDF related components) on the latter's added value. The areas of added value are mentioned when these constitute significant finding of the evaluation that were linked to conclusions and/or recommendations.

Source	Example/description	Added value	Money	Dialogue	Political weight	EU values	Expertise	Other
DFID MAR 2011  DFID, 2011		Predictable funding  Strong focus on MDGs	Yes, predictable and volume		Yes		High level of BS	Unique partnership model highly appreciated in country and accompanied by political dialogue, strong monitoring and financial management systems, moderate administration costs, high predictability of funding, allocations based on needs and performance, high levels of budget support.
DFID MAR 2016  DFID, 2016	The EU partnered with DFID in Health Pool Fund with NGOs to strengthen health facilities and capability building of the Ministry of Health  Viewed as a separate entity from the individual Member States	Yes	Pooling of resources with other donors		Extra political weight			Strengthens donor coordination.  Broad set of instruments to draw from: delegated cooperation, budget support.  Political neutrality – allows it to address sensitive issues blending TF. However, often slow.
EDF evaluation, France  EY, 2014	Focuses on EDF10 and on added value by France	Yes, including for OCTs	Yes, as well as specific modalities	Contributed to improved dialogue through BS	EDF through Cotonou a privileged partnership but insufficiently capitalized on		In governance but mixed results	Important contributions across sectors, in particular in the infrastructure sector.  Mix of modalities (including blending), and leveraging of additional funding (in the future).  Makes Insufficient use of MS expertise.  EU-ACP partnership to which EDF is main financier allows for privileged relations with specific geographical areas where European territories are situated and with which the MSs have to face specific challenges (drugs, climate

Source	Example/description	Added value	Money	Dialogue	Political weight	EU values	Expertise	Other
								change) but not sufficiently explored.
Review of EDF performance  ODI, 2012	Looks at three specific areas of the EDF where critiques have been made (focus on MIC countries, is inflexible, and is slow to disburse)	Yes, predictable funding, flexibility	Yes, specific modalities (BS)	Unique partnership through Cotonou agreement				Added value in budget support, governance, infrastructure (quoting EDF10 MTR)  More effective than other EU financial institutions in contributing to the MDG (quoting DFID MAR 2011)  Flexibility of funding through B envelope, 25% access by ECHO for humanitarian, etc.
EDF10 MTR  EC, 2011b	Cites the EDF as an original and progressive model of North-South cooperation  Offers global reach and for many ACP countries the only significant development cooperation partner	Yes, nature of the partnership	Large volume of money – presence, scale and focus offers significant advantage	Combines strong political dialogue, trade preferences and aid				Biggest global donor gives it a strong voice on issues such as governance, budget support, regional cooperation, economic development and infrastructure, areas in which an isolated action of individual member states would have less impact.  EDF0 added value by strong responsiveness to unplanned needs and by focusing on clearly identified areas where it could offer the best added value by focusing its funds strongly on <b>areas where a critical mass is necessary</b> – BS, governance and infrastructure  Disappointing progress on joint programming
Cotonou evaluation  EC, 2016b	Added value from predictable and reliable funding and as a tangible and significant aspect of	Yes, nature of the partnership	Predictable and reliable	Yes, with improved quality and range of issues (migration) but rarely goes	In principle yes, but geopolitical, security	Recognised political and technical experience		EDF is the Cotonou partnership's main instrument.  BS a key instrument in dialogue, but has

Source	Example/description	Added value	Money	Dialogue	Political weight	EU values	Expertise	Other
	<p>the ACP-EU relationship</p> <p>Full potential of political dialogue remains to be realized</p> <p>African Peace Facility</p> <p>Regional dialogue</p>		<p>funding</p> <p>Volume of funding allows for scaling up innovative initiatives</p>	<p>beyond exchange of views</p> <p>Regional dialogue important<sup>230</sup></p> <p>Political dialogue with regional organisations has also contributed to the identification of concrete opportunities for support, for example, under the EDF's African Peace Facility</p>		<p>and economic interests may interfere and water down EU positioning in favour of human rights</p>	<p>in key sectors for the partnership.</p>	<p>lost leverage in changing contexts</p> <p>Intra-ACP as adding value by addressing what other levels don't address</p> <p>The comparative advantages of an EU-wide approach have included: (i) a long-term presence, (ii) general neutrality, (iii) predictability of financial resources, (iv) critical mass mobilised in terms of financial support, (v) the wide range of instruments put in place, and (vi) recognised political and technical experience in key sectors for the partnership.</p> <p>Benefit of political as a 'lifeline' to CSOs working on human rights, particularly in repressive environments (e.g. Ethiopia)</p>
<p>Public consultation EU-ACP</p> <p>EC, 2016p</p>	<p>CPA has contributed to making substantial progress on human development, including poverty reduction, gender equality and empowerment of women</p> <p>EDF - CPA combination has played a role in agriculture and trade.</p>	<p>Yes, strong poverty focus of the EDF</p>				<p>Yes, gender, although challenges remain</p>		<p>EDF is perhaps one of the most tangible and significant aspects of the ACP-EU relationship.</p>
<p>DAC Peer Review</p> <p>OECD, 2012</p>	<p>Size, geographical reach and partnership dimension</p> <p>But insufficient cohesion between EU institutions.</p>	<p>Yes, nature of the partnerships, predictability (although not annually)</p>	<p>Allows for engagement in high investment sectors</p>	<p>Dialogue with partner countries under Cotonou</p>	<p>Insufficient use of potential</p>		<p>Lack of expertise</p>	<p>Size allows for support to sectors MSs cannot address</p> <p>Offers neutrality in former colonies (not EDF-specific)</p> <p>Engagement in specific modalities (BS)</p>

<sup>230</sup> "Political dialogue with regional organisations has showed a positive impact by fostering better mutual understanding of positions, has allowed the EU to raise awareness on security issues with impact beyond the region and promote more regional ownership over issues such as maritime security and drug trafficking"



Source	Example/description	Added value	Money	Dialogue	Political weight	EU values	Expertise	Other
		specific aid modalities	(infra-structure)					Progress on opening up to CSOs Added value in regional integration Flexibility through A and B envelopes Notes lack of expertise in policy dialogue, PFM, health, education
Implementing the Agenda for Change – ECDPM  Herrero et al. 2015	Presents an independent analysis of EDF11 programming	Yes, from size of commitments and relative weight in sector	Yes, volume and weight in sector important	Significant erosion of aid principles with EDF11 programming	Stronger political leverage & convening power than MSs in governance issues		Lack of expertise especially in social sectors – and loss of expertise leaving sectors	Analysis of programming shows that EDF11 has been successful in focusing aid on the countries that need it most and in concentrating aid in specific sectors (70% to sustainable inclusive growth, 30% to governance)
NL evaluation  MFA Netherlands, 2013	Netherlands view on added value of the commission relates to the combination of volume of funding, only actor present in certain contexts, and because of EU political neutrality has more leverage than MSs	Yes	Volume of money.  Rapid response through B envelope	Has played a role in donor coordination – seen as committed through BS and political issues	Dialogue challenges when MSs and EU differ in opinion.  Has not lived up to expectation on regional integration or on EPA	Article 96 not invoked. Silent diplomacy.  Potential yes, mixed in practice. Evaluations do not report on BS results on dialogue political terms	Insufficient expertise in delegations – policy dialogue, PFM, health, education (as noted by OECD)	Added value from volume of resource available, generally exceeding that of the individual Member States. This aid volume facilitates policy dialogue with Government and the adoption of key policies (macroeconomic, poverty reduction, sector policies). Budget support could reach a critical mass for 'more visible and effective outcomes'. Aid volume also was specifically put into relation with the added value of the Commission's interventions in the field of road infrastructure.  Supposed comparative advantage in regional integration but not confirmed by evaluations  B-envelope allows for flexible allocation of funds under specific circumstances

Source	Example/description	Added value	Money	Dialogue	Political weight	EU values	Expertise	Other
								such as crises, but not always effective (e.g.Haiti) <sup>231</sup>

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<sup>231</sup> Note: the question of what the Commission should do to have comparative advantage if it is not just another donor has never been sufficiently answered. Not clear whose added value (for Commission, Union, MS).

## Part B Summary of interview evidence on Added Value

Total number of interviews: 30<sup>232</sup>

Added value	MN	Observations
Unspecified – EDF has added value	49, 16, 75, 300, 85, 440	Not visible enough EU as an honest broker
Volume of funding	788, 33, 203, 33, 689, 478, 440, 203, 442, 445, 85, 613, 95	Money gives leverage Grant funding is more important Money opens doors Part of a mix of different ingredients in getting a place at the table
Political role/weight	33, 689, 478, 69, 445, 613, 395, 300, 131, 88	Works through government Cotonou provides space for political dialogue Important in new balance of power (China etc.) Budget support important for political dialogue Brings stability Political value of the EU in the region (Caribbean and Pacific responses) Importance of the African Peace Facility
EU values	88, 192, 395	EU as an honest broker Adds value in good governance Promotes EU values in other regions Relevant because shares values of the country it works in Can exert soft pressure
Expertise	42, 33, 95	Expertise has been lost through changes of sectors, staffing policies Engaging in new areas without required expertise (energy) and leaving other areas Not perceived by MSs as having technical competence
Intra-ACP	75	Promotes regional integration
OCT	270, 657, 131	Should be a separate instrument
Other	85, 75,	Not visible enough Too many envelopes
No added value	657, 49	

<sup>232</sup> Some interviews were meetings with groups of respondents e.g. CS, EUD staff, etc.

## Part C Summary findings from the CIR Survey

The CIR survey contained two questions related to added value that are of relevance to the EDF.

### 1. Added value of EFIs compared to action by EU MSs

The first question asked “Which of the following instruments adds value to the EU's external action compared to interventions by EU Member States or other donors/actors?” and listed all nine instruments of the EU. Respondents could choose multiple instruments based on what was used by the EUD. No open response option was provided.

**Table A.52 Responses to CIR survey question on the overall added value of the EFIs for EUDs using the instrument**

Instrument	EUDs using EFI	EUDs stating EFI adds value	% EUDs stating EFI adds value
Development Cooperation Instrument	63	51	81%
European Development Fund	39	38	97%
European Instrument on Democracy and Human Rights	72	61	85%
European Neighbourhood Instrument	8	7	88%
Greenland Decision	0	0	
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace	40	37	93%
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation	3	3	100%
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance	5	5	100%
Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries	11	10	91%
None		0	

The responses show little variation in response. Taken overall the EUDs rate the added value of all instruments positively. The INSC and the IPA score the highest, but both are used by few EUDs.

The EDF – which is used by 39 EUDs – is rated very highly at 97%. This rates somewhat better than other much used instruments such as the DCI and the EIDHR with 81 and 85 percent respectively.

### 2. Specific areas of added value of each of the EDF, and comparison of EDF added value with selected other instruments

The second question asked, for each of the nine instruments, whether respondents could “define the added value of the instrument?” Only closed response options were provided, as shown in Table A.53.

**Table A.53 Responses to CIR survey question on criteria of added value of the EDF**

Response options	Number	%(of EUDs using the component)
Size of engagement	37	95%
Particular expertise	14	36%
Political influence/leverage	31	79%
Speed of mobilizing or engaging funds	2	5%
Other	8	21%
EUDs using the instrument	39	100%

The responses show that the EDF's highest added value is rated as being the size of engagement, followed by the political influence/leverage value.

The EDF scores poorly on “particular expertise”, and on “speed of mobilizing or engaging funds”.

Table A.54 compares the responses for the EDF to those of the other main instruments.<sup>233</sup>

**Table A.54 Responses to CIR survey question on criteria of added value of different instruments used by EUDs**

Response options	EDF responses	DCI geographic bilateral	DCI regional	DCI CSO	EIDHR democracy	EIDHR Human Rights
Size of engagement	95%	56%	41%	51%	38%	38%
Particular expertise	36%	28%	38%	11%	58%	54%
Political influence/leverage	79%	58%	38%	42%	54%	55%
Speed of mobilizing or engaging funds	5%	3%	3%	10%	17%	8%
Other	21%	11%	11%	17%	4%	20%
EUDs using the instrument	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

This shows that the EDF globally scored higher on size of engagement and on political influence/leverage than other major instruments. It scores low on speed of mobilizing/engaging funds, which the data would suggest is also a challenge for the DCI and EIDHR as all the scores are low.

Eight (8) EUDs responded “Other” to the question about the EDF’s added value. They provided the following responses:

- Ownership – 4 responses (including reference to the partnership principles, the dialogue framework and information and insight into local governance systems)
- Long term predictability – 2 responses
- Credibility of the EUs commitment and methods – 1 response.

<sup>233</sup> The number of EUDs using each instrument was as follows: EDF = 39; DCI geographic/bilateral = 36; DCI geographic/regional = 29, DCI CSO = 59; EIDHR Democracy = 24; EIDHR Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms = 71.

## Part D Analysis of the NIPs

The evaluation reviewed evidence from the programming for 25 EDF countries that were part of the sample for the performance review for evidence of key aspects related to EQ4. The assessment systematically reviewed the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) for evidence of:

- Values of ownership and partnership
- EU fundamental values (human rights, gender, etc.)
- South–south and triangulation cooperation
- Advocacy

Table A.55 summarizes the quantitative findings in terms of the number of NIPs that included attention to these issues.<sup>234</sup>

**Table A.55 Analysis of the EDF11 NIPs for evidence of reference to ownership, EU fundamental values, south–south and triangular cooperation and advocacy**

Specific areas assessed	Number of NIPs with specific references	Unclear	Number of NIPs with no reference	Not evaluated	Total number of countries
Cotonou – ownership and partnership	18	1	4	2	25
EU fundamental values	20	2	1	2	25
Advocacy	16	7	0	2	25
South–south and triangular cooperation	1	0	22	2	25


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<sup>234</sup> A total of 23 NIPs were reviewed, corresponding to an equal number of countries. There were no NIPs available for Aruba and New Caledonia.


## Part E Analysis of overlap between EDF and MSs and DPs

The analysis of the sector overlap between the EDF and MSs and between the EDF and other DPs is shown in Figure A.63 and Figure A.64. The graphs suggest that the number of MSs and DPs operating in the same sector as the EDF decreased on average between 2011 and 2014. The graphs also show (dots) the average number of MSs and DPs per sector in the country. This information can be used to account for any reduction in the number of donors (e.g. donors moving out of the country). Since the drop in the average number of MSs and DPs per EDF sector is higher than the drop in the average number of MSs and DPs per sector, it can be concluded that the observed reduction in the overlap with EDF sectors cannot be attributed to MSs and DPs moving out of the country (e.g. as a result of decreases in aid volumes), but to MSs, DPs and EDF increasingly working in different sectors.

**Figure A.63 Number of MSs active in EDF sectors**



**Figure A.64 Number of DPs active in EDF sectors**



## Part F References to Regional Integration in the EDF11 NIPs

NIP Country 2014-2020	References to Regional Integration	Specific sectors mentioned
NIP Cameroon	Appui au processus d'intégration économique régionale et à la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de Partenariat Economique (APE) d'étape puis de l'APE régional (p.14)	Le développement des chaînes de valeur des produits agricoles par l'appui à la transformation et à la commercialisation des produits du secteur renforcera les échanges régionaux et le processus d'intégration regional. (p.14)
NIP Mozambique	The two prongs of the approach will complement each other as part of a coherent effort, (...) and will be complementary to the regional programme, which is expected to address the wider regional integration agenda, including from the infrastructural point of view. (pp.10 & 16)	
NIP Burkina Faso	Par ailleurs, les objectifs de l'Initiative G8, mis en œuvre conjointement par les Partenaires techniques et financiers et le gouvernement, sont cohérents avec les objectifs du PNSR en mettant l'accent sur l'implication plus forte du secteur privé et l'aide au commerce dans un contexte d'intégration régionale. (pp.11 & 13)	
NIP Djibouti	En s'appuyant sur le Cadre stratégique pour la Corne de l'Afrique, l'UE accompagnera le programme de développement politique et économique régional à Djibouti qui, en tant qu'acteur clé, contribue à la stabilité et la paix dans la région." and "C'est pourquoi le soutien aux réfugiés sera inclus dans le programme régional en cours d'élaboration financé par le 11eme FED.	Les interventions se baseront sur les recommandations du "Régional Political Integration and Human Security Programme (RPIHSSP)" du 10eme FED et s'intégreront au "Régional Migration Policy Framework" de l'IGAD. (pp.10 &18)
NIP Timor Leste	The EU expects to strengthen its political dialogue with Timor-Leste and support to regional integration. (p.15)	
NIP Uganda	The Multiannual Indicative Programme of Uganda will contribute to promote regional cooperation and integration in the EA-SA-IO region. Coherent linkages will be sought between activities benefitting Uganda from the RIP for East Africa and the national MIP. (pp. 9& 17)	Wherever possible, the implementation of regional activities will be integrated into national programmes. This is particularly relevant for infrastructure, trade and regional economic integration endeavours. (pp. 9 & 17)
NIP Dominican Republic	To promote deeper regional integration and stronger regional ties between the Dominican Republic and its neighbours, as a necessary instrument to face more efficiently regional and global challenges, and ultimately to progress towards greater regional stability and shared prosperity." (pp. 7,9 &11)	It would focus on a priority of the government and the EU in the country (citizen security and the fight against criminality and corruption). Regional cooperation under the EDF11 will also be an essential source of complementarity, with its focus on regional integration including EPA implementation, on climate change and natural disasters, and on security.



<b>NIP Country 2014-2020</b>	<b>References to Regional Integration</b>	<b>Specific sectors mentioned</b>
NIP Sierra Leone	Reinforcement of Energy & Transport ministries in particular would also aim to foster stronger cooperation at the regional level (e.g. West African Power Pool, Mano River Union, ECOWAS...). (pp 8, 11, 17, 18)	This corridor, as part of the West African Coastal Highway, is of major importance for West African regional integration as well as for' Sierra Leonean agricultural- development and economic diversification
NIP Tanzania	The National Indicative Programme will contribute to promoting regional cooperation and integration in the EA-SA-IO region. (pp. 7,9,11,14,18)	improving the business environment and trade facilitation;  The EDF11 will contribute to increased energy access and security and the strengthening of Tanzania's role in the regional energy markets through support to core reforms in the electricity sector

**Part A Summary of findings from evaluations and other documentation on complementarity, coherence and synergies**

Document	Main findings	Area	Observations
Court of Auditors report on Effectiveness of EDF support for Regional Economic Integration in East Africa and West Africa ECA, 2009a	The strategies and interventions at the regional and national levels <i>"have largely been designed and implemented independently of each other, with insufficient attention paid to the possibility of creating complementarity between them except, to some extent, in the transport sector"</i> .	National and regional	Comprehensive analysis of the complementarity between national and regional programming and implementation
The intra-ACP evaluation EC, 2013d	Complementarities between intra-ACP and regional cooperation <i>"remain a challenge"</i> .	Intra-ACP and regional	Intra-ACP found to be unconnected
10th EDF Performance Review. Commission Staff Working Paper EC, 2011b	The review of the EDF10 evidences a gap in terms of synergies in Africa, <i>"synergies required with EDF programmes at national and regional levels, and with other EU budget instruments, have failed to materialise to the extent necessary for a real integrated approach"</i> .	National and regional EDF levels Other EFIs	Concludes synergies at different levels and with EFIs have failed to materialise, in particular with DCI, ENPI, the Instrument for Stability and the EIB
AFD 2012, L'appui à l'intégration régionale en Afrique : quels enjeux pour les partenaires au développement ? Mamaty et al, 2012	AFD study on regional cooperation evidences how coordination and the implementation of common programmes in regional cooperation, beyond infrastructure sector (energy and transport), are <i>"more the exception than the rule"</i> .	Regional cooperation	Joint programmes are more the exception than the rule
ECDPM paper 180, Implementing the Agenda for Change An independent analysis of the EDF11 programming Herrero et al. 2015	The extent of involvement of MSs and DPs in strategy and programming of regional and intra-ACP cooperation is less than in national programming because of the lack of mechanisms of joint programming and the limited scope of Member States at regional and global level.	Joint programming	
DFID Multi-Annual Aid Review – Assessment of the European Development Fund 2011 DFID, 2011	<i>"The Commission is in an excellent position to ensure better policy coherence, promote best practice and ensure more donor coordination, though so far the picture is mixed for the EDF. Full implementation of the Lisbon Treaty may change this."</i>	PCD	

Document	Main findings	Area	Observations
DFID Multi-Annual Aid Review – MAR 2016 DFID, 2016	A major challenge remains to ensure that development aspects are integrated into policy initiatives from the outset. The Better Regulation Package includes guidelines for more systematic use of impact assessments. High quality, timely assessments are critical to ensure risks and opportunities are identified early on, and remedial action can be taken if necessary. This new mechanism will be tested with current trade negotiations.	PCD	
DFID MAR Update 2013 Progress Rating DFID, 2013	As of October 2014, the EU was engaged in joint programming in 55 countries (often as lead) which had an average of 7 partners, and 12 with non-EU partners. The implementing regulations (the legal framework) for both the EDF and DCI have joint working and donor coordination at their core. The EU works with a range of partners to deliver development at the country level including co-financing, delegated cooperation and agreement of division of labour to improve donor coordination with all partners. All programme documents include references to other donor programmes including multilateral partners. All programmes are shared with EU member states throughout the process with a focus on working in three sectors only to counter duplication and overlap.	Joint Programming	Only reference to JP, nothing on complementarity or synergies

## Part B Regulatory framework EDF-EFIs: complementarity and synergies

### Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to explore the complementarity and synergies between the EDF and other European Financing Instruments (EFIs). The paper focuses on the regulatory level and it is divided into two parts. The regulatory framework provides a starting point to formulating hypotheses and identifying key questions and stakeholders who can provide additional information and validate the conclusions. The analysis in this report has been performed using the EDF as a reference. This means that it only considers the complementarity and synergies between the EDF and other instruments and not among EFIs.

The **first part** assesses the existence of overlap among instruments by looking at four key dimensions. Absence of overlap could suggest instruments are being complementary (e.g. pursuing different objectives). The four dimensions are:

- Objectives
- Geographical scope
- Sequential complementarity (whether some instruments are designed to provide a quicker response than others and to support different stages)
- Choice of financial instruments

The **second part** looks at the structures and systems that are necessary in order to ensure different instruments are complementary and synergies are maximised. Special attention would be paid to the duplication of structures and systems and the existence of coordination among them. This part of the analysis focuses on three different areas:

- Governance/decision-making
- Framework for programming
- Implementation

#### Box A.4 The 3Cs as defined by the Commission

**Coordination** is defined as “activities of two or more development partners that are intended to mobilise aid resources or to harmonise their policies, programmes, procedures and practices so as to maximise the development effectiveness of aid resources”.

**Complementarity** is intended to ensure that Community development policy “...shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States”. It addresses the fact that development cooperation is a competence shared between the Community and the Member States. As a result, both the Commission and the Member States may have competences and tasks at the same level.

**Coherence:** other policies should consider development objectives.

Source: EU, 2007

### Legal framework

The main sources used in this report are the following regulations:

- COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund
- COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2015/323 of 2 March 2015 on the financial regulation applicable to the 11th European Development Fund
- COUNCIL DECISION 2013/755/EU of 25 November 2013 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Union (‘Overseas Association Decision’)
- INTERNAL AGREEMENT between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union, meeting within the Council, on the financing of European

Union aid under the multiannual financial framework for the period 2014 to 2020, in accordance with the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, and on the allocation of financial assistance for the Overseas Countries and Territories to which Part Four of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union applies

- REGULATION (EU) No 236/2014 of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action
- REGULATION (EU) No 233/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014-2020
- REGULATION (EU) No 231/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II)
- REGULATION (EU) No 232/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument
- REGULATION (EU) No 230/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace
- REGULATION (EU) No 235/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide
- COUNCIL REGULATION (EURATOM) No 237/2014 of 13 December 2013 establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
- REGULATION (EU) No 234/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing a Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries

## Part I. Overlap

This section assesses the existence of overlap between the EDF and other EFIs in the four key dimensions. In order to assess the existence of complementarity and synergies between the EDF and other instruments it is important to consider all these four dimension at the same time. For example, an overlap in terms of objectives is not necessarily a major concern if the instruments focus on different regions. Moreover, even when instruments share objectives and regions, this might not be a problem if they operate in a sequential manner.

The results of this exercise are summarised in section 5 at the end of Part I.

### 1. Objectives

Table A.56 below lists the objectives of the EDF and other EFIs as these are defined in their respective regulations. The last column indicates the relevant article in the instrument's regulations.

The table shows the existence of the following areas of overlap:

- EDF and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) pursue exactly the same general objectives
- EDF, the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) overlap on aspects linked to democracy
- EDF and EIDHR overlap on human rights

**Table A.56 Objectives**

Instr.	Objectives	Art.
EDF	a) the primary objective of cooperation under this Regulation shall be the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty; (b) cooperation under this Regulation will also contribute to: (i) fostering sustainable and inclusive economic, social and environmental development; (ii) consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and the relevant principles of international law; and (iii) implementing a rights-based approach encompassing all human rights.	1
DCI	(a) the primary objective of cooperation under this Regulation shall be the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty; (b) consistently with the primary objective referred to in point (a), cooperation under this Regulation shall contribute to: (i) fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development, and (ii)	2

Instr.	Objectives	Art.
	consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and the relevant principles of international law.	
IPA	The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance for the period from 2014 to 2020 ('IPA II') shall support the beneficiaries listed in Annex I in adopting and implementing the political, institutional, legal, administrative, social and economic reforms required by those beneficiaries in order to comply with the Union's values and to progressively align to the Union's rules, standards, policies and practices, with a view to Union membership.	1
ENI	Union support under this Regulation shall focus on promoting enhanced political cooperation, deep and sustainable democracy, progressive economic integration and a strengthened partnership with societies between the Union and the partner countries and, in particular, the implementation of partnership and cooperation agreements, association agreements or other existing and future agreements, and jointly agreed action plans or equivalent documents.	2
IcSP	The specific objectives of this Regulation shall be: (a) in a situation of crisis or emerging crisis, to contribute swiftly to stability by providing an effective response designed to help preserve, establish or re-establish the conditions essential to the proper implementation of the Union's external policies and actions in accordance with Article 21 TEU; (b) to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and to ensuring capacity and preparedness to address pre-and post-crisis situations and build peace; and (c) to address specific global and trans-regional threats to peace, international security and stability.	1
EIDHR	(a) supporting, developing and consolidating democracy in third countries, by enhancing participatory and representative democracy, strengthening the overall democratic cycle, in particular by reinforcing an active role for civil society within this cycle, and the rule of law, and improving the reliability of electoral processes, in particular by means of EU EOMs [Election Observation Missions]; (b) enhancing respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as proclaimed in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international and regional human rights instruments, and strengthening their protection, promotion, implementation and monitoring, mainly through support to relevant civil society organisations, human rights defenders and victims of repression and abuse.	1
INSC	The Union shall finance measures to support the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety, radiation protection, and the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries, in line with the provisions of this Regulation and the Annex thereto.	1
PI	(a) supporting the Union's bilateral, regional and inter-regional cooperation partnership strategies by promoting policy dialogue and by developing collective approaches and responses to challenges of global concern [...] (b) implementing the international dimension of 'Europe 2020'. [...] (c) improving access to partner country markets and boosting trade, investment and business opportunities for companies from the Union, while eliminating barriers to market access and investment, by means of economic partnerships, business and regulatory cooperation. [...] (d) enhancing widespread understanding and visibility of the Union and of its role on the world scene by means of public diplomacy, people-to-people contacts, cooperation in educational and academic matters, think tank cooperation and outreach activities to promote the Union's values and interests. [...]	1

IPA: Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance; IcSP: Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace; INSC: Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation; PI: Partnership Instrument

## 2. Geographical scope

Table A.57 below summarises the geographical scope of the different EFIs. It shows that the EDF has the same geographical scope as other EFIs for certain types of interventions. In particular:

- DCI on thematic programmes
- IcSP
- EIDHR
- INSC

- PI

This list is based on the general rules contained in the regulations, but these rules often provide some flexibility for targeting other countries and territories when relevant. For example, the EDF foresees cooperation with non-ACP countries “where the project or programme concerned is of a regional or cross-border nature and complies with Article 6 of Annex IV to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement”. Similarly, the DCI can target “other countries ... where the action to be implemented is of a global, regional, trans-regional or cross-border nature”.

These sorts of ‘exceptions to the rule’ have not been taken into account in the assessment made at the end of this paper, as they would require a case-by-case assessment. However, this analysis could be worth exploring during the country visits.

**Table A.57 Geographical scope**

Instr.	Geographical scope	Art.
EDF	ACP countries and regions OCTs and Outermost Regions (article 77 of Overseas Association Decision) Non-ACP developing countries and regional integration bodies with ACP participation that promote regional cooperation and integration, [...] where the project or programme concerned is of a regional or cross-border nature and complies with Article 6 of Annex IV to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement	1 17
DCI	(a) geographic programmes aimed at supporting development cooperation with developing countries that are included in the list of recipients of ODA established by the OECD/DAC, except for: (i) countries that are signatories to the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (5), excluding South Africa; (ii) countries eligible for the European Development Fund; (iii) countries eligible for Union funding under the European Neighbourhood Instrument established by Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) (the ‘European Neighbourhood Instrument’); (iv) beneficiaries eligible for Union funding under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance established by Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) (the ‘Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance’). (b) thematic programmes to address development-related global public goods and challenges and support civil society organisations and local authorities in partner countries pursuant to point (a) of this paragraph, countries eligible for Union financing under the instruments referred to in points (i) to (iii) of point (a) of this paragraph, and countries and territories falling within the scope of Council Decision 2013/755/EU (3); (c) a Pan-African programme to support the strategic partnership between Africa and the Union and subsequent modifications and additions thereto, to cover activities of a transregional, continental or global nature in and with Africa. Other countries “where the action to be implemented is of a global, regional, trans-regional or cross-border nature”.	1 16
IPA	Countries listed in Annex I: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.	1
ENI	Countries listed in Annex I: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, The Republic of Moldova, Morocco, occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine	1
IcSP	Third countries, regional and international organisations and other State and civil society actors (including anything from NGOs to research institutions and media)	1
EIDHR	The measures referred to in this Regulation shall be implemented in the territory of third countries or shall be directly related to situations arising in third countries, or to global or regional actions.	2
INSC	Third countries as defined in the annex: Cooperation may cover all third countries worldwide. Priority should be given to accession countries and countries in the European Neighbourhood Area, preferably by using a country approach. The regional approach should be favoured for countries in other regions.	1
PI	1. This Regulation primarily supports cooperation measures with countries with which the	2

Instr.	Geographical scope	Art.
	<p>Union has a strategic interest in promoting links, especially developed and developing countries which play an increasingly prominent role in global affairs, including in foreign policy, the international economy and trade, multilateral fora and global governance, and in addressing challenges of global concern, or in which the Union has other significant interests.</p> <p>2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, all third countries, regions and territories may be eligible for cooperation under this Regulation.</p>	

### 3. Sequential complementarity

This section assesses whether some instruments are designed to provide a quicker response than others and to support different stages of the EU's cooperation in a given situation. It does not consider the use of emergency and humanitarian aid, which is generally managed by ECHO and potentially funded from different sources including EDF under certain circumstances (see article 1 of the Internal Agreement).

Compared to other sections in this paper, assessing sequential complementarity is a slightly more complex exercise. There are two different approaches to doing it.

**Firstly**, the assessment can be conducted based on the type of support that different instruments can provide. However, this approach does not prove very useful because all EFIs, including the EDF, can potentially use the same four types of support:<sup>235</sup>

- **Annual action programmes** (actions that have been programmed): *based on the indicative programming documents referred to in the relevant Instrument*
- **Individual measures:** *when necessary [...] before or after the adoption of annual or multi-annual action programmes.*
- **Special measures:** *In the event of unforeseen and duly justified needs or circumstances, and when funding is not possible from more appropriate sources*
- **Support measures:** *expenditure for the implementation of the Instruments and for the achievement of their objectives, including administrative support associated with the preparation, follow-up, monitoring, audit and evaluation activities directly necessary for such implementation, as well as expenditure at Union delegations on the administrative support needed to manage operations financed under the Instruments.*

**Secondly**, one can look at whether the instrument regulations foresee and contain special provisions for interventions in case of urgency, as opposed to longer-term actions. This is the approach used in Table A.58 below. In reality this approach does not look at the possibility of adopting urgent measures because they all can, but at whether there is the expectation that the instrument would frequently do so.

The analysis in the table shows that two instruments have a particular focus or foresee interventions in particular circumstances. This is an important aspect to take into account when assessing the possibility of indifferent instruments implementing sequential actions to tackle a given development situation. In all other cases, the focus seems to be on development actions of a longer term and therefore a potential overlap in terms of sequencing is possible.

**Table A.58 Sequential complementarity**

Instr.	Sequential complementarity
EDF	No clear indication
DCI	No clear indication
IPA	No clear indication
ENI	No clear indication
IcSP	Exceptional assistance measures and interim response programmes 1.

<sup>235</sup> The definitions below are based on the CIR, but the EDF Implementation regulations contain equivalent text



Instr.	Sequential complementarity
	Union assistance under Article 3 shall be provided through exceptional assistance measures and interim response programmes. 2. In situations as referred to in Article 3(1), the Commission may adopt exceptional assistance measures which fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 3(3). Such an exceptional assistance measure may have a duration of up to 18 months, which may be extended twice by a further period of up to six months, up to a total maximum duration of 30 months, in the event of objective and unforeseen obstacles to its implementation, provided that there is no increase in the financial amount of the measure.
EIDHR	The measures referred to in this Regulation shall take into account the specific features of crisis or urgency situations and countries or situations where there is a serious lack of fundamental freedoms, where human security is most at risk or where human rights organisations and defenders operate under the most difficult conditions.
INSC	No clear indication
PI	No clear indication

#### 4. Choice of financial instruments

Table A.59 shows that both the EDF and other EFIs share the same legal basis when it comes to the choice of financial instruments (Regulation EU, Euratom No 966/2012). This means that the choice of financial instruments is not a relevant aspect for assessing complementarity and synergies at the regulatory level, since all EFIs share the same range of instruments.

The choice of financial instruments can still be relevant at the project level, but this is something that would need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

**Table A.59 Financial instruments**

Instr.	Financial instruments
EDF	Not listed in the financial regulation, but refers back to the same regulation than the CIR so they are potentially the same (EU, Euratom No 966/2012).
DCI	Harmonised by the Common Implementing Regulations:
IPA	1. The Union's financial assistance may be provided through the types of financing envisaged by
ENI	Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, and in particular:
IcSP	(a) grants;
EIDHR	(b) procurement contracts for services, supplies or works;
INSC	(c) general or sector budget support;
PI	(d) contributions to trust funds set up by the Commission, in accordance with Article 187 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012;
	(e) financial instruments such as loans, guarantees, equity or quasi-equity, investments or participations, and risk-sharing instruments, whenever possible under the lead of the EIB in line with its external mandate under Decision No 1080/2011/EU, a multilateral European financial institution, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or a bilateral European financial institution, e.g. bilateral development banks, possibly pooled with additional grants from other sources.

#### 5. Summary and conclusions

Table A.60 below summarises the results of the analysis conducted in Part I of this report. It does not include the assessment of the use of financial instruments because, since the range of choices is the same, this is not a relevant factor for analysis.

Table A.60 shows that, based on existing regulations, most instruments seems to be complementary with the EDF, with the exception of the following caveats, which should be explored in greater depth during the validation phase and country visits:

- EDF and the DCI show a potential overlap, in particular as far as the thematic programmes are concerned.
- The EDF overlaps with the EIDHR on issues related to democracy and human rights. At the same time the EIDHR seems to have a stronger focus on situations of urgency, which could help to avoid the overlap.

**Table A.60 Existence of overlap between the EDF and other EFIs at the regulatory level**

	<b>Objectives</b>	<b>Geographical scope</b>	<b>Sequential</b>
DCI	Yes, fully	Yes, on thematic programmes	Potentially
IPA	No	No	Potentially
ENI	Yes, democracy	No	Potentially
IcSP	No	Yes	Unlikely, strong focus on emergency situations
EIDHR	Yes, democracy and human rights	Yes	Less likely, urgency is foreseen
INSC	No	Yes	Potentially
PI	No	Yes	Potentially

## Part II. Processes and structures leading to complementarity

Part II looks at different structures and processes of the regulations that are important in order to ensure different EFIs are complementary, and more importantly, that synergies are achieved.

### 1. Governance

Governance/decision-making structures are highly harmonised as a result of the comitology rules, which essentially require that the Commission consult with member states before implementing an EU legal act.<sup>236</sup> Table A.61 summarises the contents of the different regulations.

The most interesting finding is not in the difference but in the duplication of structures for decision-making. The existence of geographical and thematic overlaps among some of the instruments raises questions about the:

- Formal or informal coordination structures within the Commission (e.g. having the same people representing the Commission where there are geographical or thematic overlaps could be an informal way of coordinating actions).
- Formal or informal coordination structures among member state representatives.

**Table A.61 Governance**

<b>Instr.</b>	<b>Governance</b>	<b>Art.</b>
EDF	EDF Committee, which according to the Internal agreement: A Committee ('the EDF Committee') consisting of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States shall be set up at the Commission for the EDF11 resources which the Commission administers.	14
	African Peace Facility: follows a different procedure involving the African Union and endorsed by the ACP Committee of Ambassadors	15
	Investment Facility Committee: set up under the auspices of the EIB by Article 9 of the Internal Agreement shall consist of the representatives of the Member States and a representative of the Commission. An observer from the General Secretariat of the Council and an observer from the European External Action Service shall be invited to attend.	16
DCI	DCI Committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. <sup>237</sup> An observer from the EIB shall take part in the DCI committee's proceedings with regard to questions concerning the EIB	19
IPA	An Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance committee (the 'IPA II Committee') shall be established and shall be composed of representatives of the Member States and chaired by a representative of the Commission. That committee shall be a committee within the	13

<sup>236</sup> For more information on comitology see:

<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=implementing.home>

<sup>237</sup> This Regulation is a key component of the comitology rules. It essentially states that: "The Commission shall be assisted by a committee composed of representatives of the Member States. The committee shall be chaired by a representative of the Commission". It also provides a set of common operational and procedural guidelines for the operation of the committees.

Instr.	Governance	Art.
	meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.	
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument Committee: shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011	15
IcSP	Stability and Peace Instrument Committee: shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.	11
EIDHR	Democracy and Human Rights Committee: shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.	8
INSC	Nuclear Safety Cooperation Committee: shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011	11
PI	Partnership Instrument Committee: shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.	7

## 2. Framework for programming

Table A.62 summarises the main the framework for programming of the different EFIs. Although programming is quite similar, recipient governments are given a stronger role in the programming process under the EDF. Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement makes clear that programming is a joint process, while the CIR and other EFIs make it possible for the Commission to take unilateral action (even if they recommend “whenever possible” that programming is conducted jointly).

A similar difference can be observed in cases of urgency, although in this case, there is a potential contradiction between the Cotonou Agreement and the EDF implementation regulation. Under the Cotonou Agreement, the review process, including in cases of urgency, requires the involvement of the NAO, while under the CIR, the Commission can take unilateral action. However, as mentioned in Table A.62, the Implementation regulation of EDF11 contains the same provision as the CIR, allowing the EC to take unilateral action.

As a result, the following aspects deserve additional attention, including through interviews with DEVCO legal experts:

- Whether the seemingly stronger role of partner countries under the EDF does translate into any actual differences during programming and implementation.
- If the above holds true, whether it has an impact on issues such as ownership, time required for the programming and review process, etc.
- Potential conflict between Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement and the implementation regulation in relation to unilateral action by the EC in case of urgency.
- Formal or informal coordination mechanism during EFI programming. Despite the high level of harmonisation, it is not clear in the regulation how the programming process ensures actions implemented under different EFIs and coordinated and synergies are achieved.

**Table A.62 Framework for programming**

Instr.	Programming
EDF	<p>Defined in Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement. <i>Programming for this purpose shall mean:</i></p> <p>(a) <i>the preparation and development of country, regional or intra-ACP strategy papers (SP) based on their own medium-term development objectives and strategies, and taking into account the principles of joint programming and division of labour among donors, which shall, to the extent possible, be a partner country or region-led process;</i></p> <p>(b) <i>a clear indication from the Community of the indicative programmable financial allocation from which the country, region or intra-ACP cooperation may benefit during the period covered by the multi-annual financial framework of cooperation under this Agreement as well as any other relevant information, including a possible reserve for unforeseen needs;</i></p> <p>(c) <i>the preparation and adoption of an indicative programme for implementing the SP, taking into account commitments of other donors, and in particular of the EU Member States; and</i></p> <p>(d) <i>a review process covering the SP, the indicative programme and the volume of resources allocated to it.</i></p> <p>In spite of this the EDF11 implementation regulation states that: <i>In the cases referred to in Article 4(3) and in cases of unforeseen and duly justified needs or exceptional circumstances, the Commission may adopt special measures, including measures to ease the transition from emergency aid to long-term development operations, or measures to better prepare people for</i></p>

Instr.	Programming
	<i>dealing with recurring crises.</i>
DCI	Harmonised by the Common Implementing Regulations, essentially: <i>1. The Commission shall adopt annual action programmes, based on the indicative programming documents referred to in the relevant Instrument, where applicable. The Commission may also adopt multi-annual action programmes in accordance with Article 6(3). In duly justified imperative grounds of urgency, such as crises or immediate threats to democracy, the rule of law, human rights or fundamental freedoms, the Commission may adopt individual or special measures or amendments to existing action programmes and measures [...]</i>
IPA	
ENI	
IcSP	
EIDHR	
INSC	
PI	

### 3. Framework for implementation

This section assesses the general framework for implementation of the different EFIs. The framework for implementation refers to the principles and processes required to implement the actions under the different EFIs. It includes things such as the types of support discussed in section 3 of Part I.

Table A.63 shows that the implementation regulation of all EFIs is rooted on the same piece of regulations. This means that no substantial differences can be expected in this area at the regulatory level.

**Table A.63 Framework for implementation**

Instr.	Implementation
EDF	Refers back to the same regulation than the CIR so it is essentially the same (EU, Euratom No 966/2012).
DCI	Refers to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012
IPA	
ENI	
IcSP	
EIDHR	
INSC	
PI	

### 4. Summary and conclusions

The internal processes and structures of all EFIs are highly harmonised. Minor differences have been detected in the framework for programming that might deserve additional attention, in particular, the seemingly more important role of partner countries in the programming and review processes of the EDF.


In relation to programming, the similarities in the process suggest there are both formal or informal coordination mechanisms between different EFIs during the programming stages which do the ‘de facto’ coordination to ensure coordination takes place and synergies are realised.

Similarly, despite the similarities, the duplication of decision-making structures (Committees) resulting from the EU comitology rules is something that is worth exploring in greater depth from a complementarity perspective. The existence of formal or informal coordination structures between the committees could be a good starting point to assess whether they could facilitate or obstruct greater complementarity and synergies during decision-making.

## Part C Overview of the decision-making at the programming stage

The evaluation examined the various steps of the programming process. It should be noted that this decision-making process predates EDF11 and is applied to all instruments: it is not specific to the EDF. The process includes key steps of identification and the QSG1, QSG2, ISC, and EDF Committee approval with various feedback loops.

**Figure A.65 Programming process**



Source: Programming process as reconstructed by the evaluation team from EC, 2016f, Chapter 5.

The evaluation reviewed these systems to understand whether they are set up to avoid duplication and ensure complementarity. The overall process is depicted in Figure A.65 above. The steps of the QSG1 and QSG2 process from the DEVCO Companion are shown in Figure A.66 below.

Under the EDF11 the internal process of approval has been complemented by the introduction of internal reporting between different directorates (so called Thematic Budget Line Reports (see also Annex 20, Part B), as well as with a system of country fiches (produced by DEVCO and EEAS) which are intended to further improve the overall view of each of the countries and the instruments that are being used.

Interviews made it clear that prior to the QSGs directors already have insight and are able to provide comments on the proposals. There has also been the introduction for EDF11 of a steering committee review for major proposals.

Interviews and country studies provided additional evidence on the process as follows:

- The overall programming process is acknowledged/critiqued to be much too long. Interviews and country studies broadly converge that the ISC and the EDF Committee don't change

anything but add many months to the approval process.

- The EDF Committee comes too late to meaningfully influence the process.
- The long planning process affects the image of the EU externally as well as the effectiveness of the aid provided.
- There is insufficient consideration at times of the fact that the proposals that come to the QSG have already been subject to considerable discussion and consultation at country level. Rejection and modifications by Brussels go against these processes
- Overall the QSG process is considered important. It is broadly seen as helping ensure quality although various examples were provided of proposals where the QSGs were seen as going through the motions rather than adding value
- It provides a framework and is important for ensuring that cross-cutting issues are addressed
- However, it is also critiqued for not ensuring sufficient learning: “A first question for the QSG should be whether there have been other projects of this kind in the past” (MN 203).
- For smaller countries it is a heavy process which would suggest eliminating one of the QSGs to reduce the burden or making the process lighter in other ways.
- The Companion specifies clearly who should be present. In practice there may be variable participation as the desk officer is the one issuing invitations.
- EEAS participation can be perfunctory and does not add significantly (they have observer status). This is a weakness as some proposals have a strongly political dimension. Strategic dialogue between EEAS and DEVCO is noted by various countries as not being satisfactory.
- Thematic and geographic directorates do not approach programming from the same perspective. Geographic directorates will look at proposals from the sector concentration point of view. Thematic directorates look at gaps and seek to fill those with additional initiatives.

Overall, the analysis leads the evaluation to conclude that the mechanisms and procedures are in place at the identification and the planning stage in the EDF that provide a framework for interaction between the various stakeholders (thematic and geographic directorates as well as other DGs, contract and financing, etc.) and that this should ensure that duplication is avoided. There are various areas of potential improvement:

- Consideration could be given to having parallel rather than consecutive processes to speed up the overall planning process, and to merging some steps (ISC and QSG2 as DGs are also observers in the latter).
- There could be room for further delegation of authority to the EUDs on certain proposals, for example for the OCTs where the whole process is very burdensome, and the proposals are often small in size.
- The dialogue between EEAS and DEVCO could be further strengthened to ensure meaningful exchanges in particular on the nexus between political and development issues.
- Ensuring a more significant presence of the EUDs at the approval process..

Sources: MN 33, 29, 49, 24, 31, 8, 327, 448, 485, 203, 8, 448, 203, 149, 204, 375, 351, 122, 300, 452

**Figure A.66 The steps of the QSG process**

Preparation steps	Geographic directorate	Thematic directorates	Devco Unit 06 Quality and Results	Finance and contract	Budget support Steering Committee	Desk officer (geographic)/ operational manager (thematic)	EEAS	Relevant DG	QSG focal point	EUD	EDF Cttee	European College	Partner country	Comments
<b>PROGRAMMING</b>														
<i>Drafting of Strategy Paper (SP): Purpose - outlines the aims of the cooperation and political agenda</i>										EUD is involved but does not have final responsibility				The SP includes overview of past and on-going EU cooperation, as well as overview of EU engagement and current cooperation
NIP/RIP : Purpose - outlines overall objectives and strategic choices for the EU and financial estimates for each sector including expected results											Reviews Strategy paper and NIP for opinion	Approves the NIP/RIP by written procedure if approved by EDF Committee		It includes complementarity with MS but not explicitly complementarity with other EU instruments
<b>Identification and formulation of specific projects and programmes</b>														
Drafting of the Initial Action Document (AD) - lays down the analysis of the identification phase and preliminary indication of envisaged implementation partner and implementation		Thematic support should be provided where requested and possible. Thematic units may want to be pro-active and be in contact with EUD and	provides support to EUD and operational HQ for indicators		Will be consulted for certain actions entailing budget support								Should be closely consulted and involved in every step at this stage	Thematic support is envisioned but not compulsory

Preparation steps	Geographic directorate	Thematic directorates	Devco Unit 06 Quality and Results	Finance and contract	Budget support Steering Committee	Desk officer (geographic)/ operational manager (thematic)	EEAS	Relevant DG	QSG focal point	EUD	EDF Cttee	European College	Partner country	Comments
modalities		HQ at early stage												
Overall QSG process	Geographic directorates members of the QSG - presence is required.	Thematic directors are members of the QSG - presence is required.		Finance and contracts are members of the QSG – presence is required		Desk officer is a member and presence is required	Observer at the QSG process - not required	Observer at the QSG process - not required	Responsible for planning QSG meetings of their directorates					
QSG 1 - Is mandatory for all types of actions (with some exceptions) and focusses on the analysis of the context including public policies, stakeholders and institutional capacity.	May ask EUD to further improve before QSG 1. Will chair if the QSG concerns a geographic AD. Consolidates the comments	Programmes proposed by a geographical directorate always need to be reviewed by the relevant thematic directorate	Overall responsibility for coordination, monitoring and reporting of QSG process	Has to contribute to the QSG assessment process		Ensures all comments are approved by the Chair. Final QSG is transmitted to EUD, and that appropriate follow-up is given			Schedules the thematic action at the upcoming QSG 1 meeting	Finance and contracts in EUD screens proposal, and proposal is approved by HoC, then submits to Geographic Director				If there is a difference of opinion between geographic and thematic directorates and the respective directors can not reach agreement then the Director General will receive the file for decision making
	Either the Geographic Dir. Or the EUD is responsible for the preparation of the QSG	Will chair if the QSG concerns a thematic AD.				Operational manager submits the Initial Action Document to Head of Section/Head of Unit for approval				Either the Geographic Dir. Or the EUD is responsible for the preparation of the QSG				Note: Compendium does not mention a specific requirement for the geographical directorate to review (as opposed to above for



Preparation steps	Geographic directorate	Thematic directorates	Devco Unit 06 Quality and Results	Finance and contract	Budget support Steering Committee	Desk officer (geographic)/ operational manager (thematic)	EEAS	Relevant DG	QSG focal point	EUD	EDF Cttee	European College	Partner country	Comments
														geographical proposals)
<b>FORMULATION PHASE: Aims at confirming and updating the context analysis and elaborate intervention logic of action.</b>														
QSG 2 - examines the operational, technical, contractual and financial aspects and ensures that recommendations from QSG 1 were taken into account. Identical procedure for submission as above for QSG 1	Responsible for ensuring that comments during QSG2 are taken on board before submission to ISC	Responsible for ensuring that comments during QSG2 are taken on board before submission to ISC	Overall responsibility for coordination, monitoring and reporting of QSG process	Are members of the QSG - presence is required		Ensures all comments are approved by the Chair. Final QSG is transmitted to EUD, and that appropriate follow-up is given								The formal agreement of the QSG is followed by agreement by the NAO or RAO. The formulation phase is followed by the Financing phase (Chapter 7 of the Compendium)

Source: Inter-Service Commission

## Part D Joint programming

1. EU Joint programming refers to joint planning of development cooperation by the EU development partners working together. The principle is that it includes a 'joint analysis' of the country situation followed by a 'joint response' which sets out how EU development partners will provide support and measure progress: together these two products form a 'joint strategy'. The strategy can include non-EU development partners who share the principles of joint programming.<sup>238</sup> Joint programming has been prioritized by the EU since 2012, after pre-Busan studies found that aid fragmentation had increased, in particular from EU countries. This resulted in specific Council conclusions and renewed efforts from the EU to promote joint programming. As a result, joint programming has been specifically included in the EDF programming guidelines, as well as in the reporting requirements of the EU (the EAMRs), and there has been the inclusion of a standard Annex 2 of the NIPs with a donor matrix.

2. The Cotonou evaluation (EC, 2016b) finds that *“Joint programming with Member States is on the increase”* (p.133). It also states that *“Importantly, Joint Programming is now entering a new phase, with more ambitious objectives, including, where possible, replacing National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) with Joint Strategies, strengthening ownership and reducing transaction costs for both partner countries and development partners”* (ibid).

3. These findings from the Cotonou evaluation are on the whole supported by the evidence reviewed for this evaluation. Specific reference to joint programming is found in 17 out of the 25 EAMRs reviewed (see Table A.64 at the end of this paper). The analysis of the NIPs (ibid) similarly highlights a focus on programming with other development partners which is mentioned in 20 out of the 25 NIPs.

4. This evidence suggests that there has been considerable attention to joint programming under EDF11. A closer analysis of the information reported in both the NIPs and the EAMRs shows that joint programming often refers to programming with other donors overall (and not only with other EU MSs) which is in line with the definition cited above.

5. In some cases, joint programming has been initiated a while ago (before EDF11) and has been built on for EDF11 (e.g. Burkina Faso, Burundi, Kenya). In other cases the reference to joint programming is for the moment still forward-looking (i.e. the intention is to develop a plan with other MSs) and builds on efforts that have already seen strong results in terms of better coordination (e.g. Uganda, Mozambique, Timor Leste and Zambia). In other countries (e.g. Chad, Malawi, Togo, Djibouti and Haiti) there have been good efforts in coordination and this is seen as a solid basis for ensuring that donor support (and EU support in particular) takes place in a complementary manner; however, this does not take the form of joint programming. In other countries there is simply a mention of some coordination for specific projects (Congo Brazzaville, Dominican Republic, DRC, and Jamaica).

6. Interviews at the global level suggest that joint programming has generally improved under EDF11 because the EDF requires this to be done jointly with member states ... *“now it is done with the MSs, which requires discussion and consensus with MSs and in turn larger process for programming”* (MN14, and also MN47, MN 29). There are some suggestions that at times the joint programming is too focused on the process and can be somewhat 'heavy-handed' (MN 34). MSs at global level consider it a disadvantage that programming takes place at country level while country level partners do not have a mandate to negotiate, and that by the time the joint programming goes up to the EDF committee it is too late to really make changes. (MN 34).

7. Comparative data on EDF disbursements in 2011 and 2014 (see Figure A.67 below) for the sample of the EDF Performance Review case studies<sup>239</sup> suggests that the number of member


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<sup>238</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/eu-approach-aid-effectiveness/joint-programming\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/eu-approach-aid-effectiveness/joint-programming_en) (accessed 21 November 2016).

<sup>239</sup> Aruba and New Caledonia have been excluded from the sample because they are not among the OECD list of ODA eligible developing countries and there is no data recorded in the database.

states operating in the same sector as the EDF has decreased in three countries and remained approximately constant in the remaining three. Figure A.67 also shows the average number of MSs per sector in the country. This information can be used to account for any reduction in the number of donors (e.g. donors moving out of the country). Since the drop in the average number of MSs per EDF sector is higher than the drop in the average number of MSs per sector, it can be concluded that at least part of the reduction cannot be attributed to MSs moving out of the country (e.g. as a result of decreases in aid volumes). Some caveats apply. The graph is based on disbursement data. This means that these figures reflect only a very small portion of the EDF11 funding. Also, because disbursements can take place over a number of years after the commitment has been made, the number of sectors shown in the graph can be quite large. Despite this, the figures suggest some moderate progress, something that seems to be confirmed by additional evidence presented below.

**Figure A.67 Number of MSs active in EDF sectors**



8. Evidence from the country studies highlights that it can be difficult to attribute improved coordination among donors to the EDF only. The Zambia case study shows, for example, that joint programming among all donors had already taken hold under the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) and that it was rather a feature of the landscape that predates the current EDF. Nonetheless, under EDF11 a specific exercise of developing sector and cross-cutting papers which was organized by the EU was cited by various donors and by government stakeholders as having been useful in identifying gaps (with education emerging as a (potential) donor 'orphan'), and highlighting areas that are oversubscribed (e.g. governance, and energy).

9. There are some indications from the country studies that joint programming may work better among EU member states than with other partners. From interview evidence this is explained by the existence of shared priorities and values among specific MSs. Some interviews suggest that the EU adds value by encouraging development partners to sit together more and share information, and through regular informal and formal communications, etc. (MN1). Regular exchanges are seen as an important part of this by MSs, but are not always sufficiently done (beyond the planning stage). Country studies support this finding, although some suggest that there may be a need for more frequent communication about on-going implementation to ensure that programmes are better coordinated in practice (not just at the programming stage) (Zambia, Cameroon).

10. For most, interview and country visit evidence (Aruba) suggest that joint programming is of limited value for overseas countries and territories (OCTs) because the EU is often the only donor in these countries. A similar situation appears to be the case in other relatively advanced (middle-

income) countries, such as Namibia, where joint programming was done with a very small number of donors (MN1).

11. Interviews from across the different country studies show that while the joint programming is generally perceived as useful, the challenge for EDF11 (and for other donors) is the lack of flexibility in adjusting programming, as well the political agendas coming from HQ (not just Brussels but also in the case of other MSs). The Zambia case study shows that in spite of joint programming there are still instances where donors 'discover' they are working in the same area.

12. A number of interviewees also underscored that joint programming (whether just within the group of MSs, or more broadly) really depends on the will of the donors, and not just the EU. Some interviewees quite openly suggested that the level of enthusiasm for joint programming may be waning somewhat.

**Table A.64 Analysis of NIPS and EAMRs for evidence of joint programming**

Country	EAMR 2015	NIP	Specifics
Aruba	No	-	-
Burkina Faso	Yes	Yes	Joint programming exercise planned for 2016, strong donor coordination since before 2012 (NIP).
Burundi	Yes	Yes	Joint programming between EU and member states started in 2012 and has resulted in a joint strategy (NIP).
Cameroon	No	Yes	Intention to move to joint programming (NIP).
Chad	Yes	Yes	EU and France doing joint programming. Limited number of donors. Areas of synergy identified for EDF11 (NIP).
Congo Brazzaville	No	Yes	Actions under the EDF will be implemented in coordination with other donors, especially WB and France (NIP).
Djibouti	No	Yes	Some joint programming happening on specific sectors/priorities (NIP).
Dominican Republic	Yes	Yes	Donor matrix mentioned as showing complementarity of actions (NIP).
DRC	Yes	Yes	Actions are implemented in coordination with other donors (NIP).
Ethiopia	Yes		-
Haiti	Yes	Yes	Clear example of joint programming in terms of choice of sectors and complementarities within sectors though complementary projects (NIP).
Jamaica	No	No	-
Kenya	Yes	Yes	Joint programming together with 8 member states done in 2013. EU member states to explore joint analysis, joint programming, and joint implementation modalities through task teams (NIP).
Lesotho	Yes	No	-
Madagascar	No	Yes	Seeking complementarity between projects among main donors (NIP).
Malawi	Yes	Yes	Joint country analysis done in 2012 which is considered the groundwork for gradually moving towards joint programming among interested partners.
Mali	No	Yes	Joint programming on-going at the time that the NIP was designed (NIP).

Country	EAMR 2015	NIP	Specifics
Mozambique	No	Yes	Coordination system well established, although some donors have now left the joint BS group. Sector choices for EDF11 based on what other donors are doing (NIP).
New Caledonia	No	No	-
Sierra Leone	Yes	Yes	Consultation with other partners mentioned (NIP).
Tanzania	Yes	No	Donors and MSs have stepped up efforts for joint programming by doing a joint analysis and coordination in a number of key sectors including formulation of a joint approach to BS (NIP).
Timor Leste	Yes	Yes	Highlights a focus on principle of aligning but does not say how (NIP).
Togo	Yes	Yes	Coordination and division of labour (NIP).
Uganda	Yes	Yes	Joint programming mentioned as a next step in donor coordination (NIP).
Zambia	Yes	Yes	Long-term orientation of joint programming beyond 2015 is uncertain but the EU will coordinate with key donors in the sectors in which it is operating (NIP).

## Part E Thematic Budget Line Report Analysis

**Table A.65 2015 – Evidence of duplication in TBL reports**

Report	Directorate <sup>240</sup>	Country	Description
DEVCO D	n/a Ref. DCI-GPGC	n/a	Key issue overall is the <b>coherence and complementarity with the relevant NIP</b> , or lack thereof.
DEVCO D	n/a Ref. DCI-GPGC	n/a	A general call for <b>improving communication and information flow from HQ to Delegations</b> is made by the Delegations and is considered crucial to enhance Delegations' involvement.
DEVCO D	n/a Ref. DCI-CSO/LSA	Zambia	The Delegation flags very <b>weak capacity and high staff turnover</b> putting related projects to risk during implementation. It calls HQ for an exchange of views and practices on how to best implement the allocation (calls and grants do not seem appropriate).
DEVCO D	n/a Ref. DCI-CSO/LSA	Madagascar	In terms of the <b>lack of payment credits</b> in Madagascar, the Delegation flags the reputational risk as well as the very negative impact on already weak local NGOs.
DEVCO E	n/a Ref. DCI-GPGC	Mali	The <b>lack of payment credits</b> has put implementation at risk, e.g. only 50% prefinancing could be paid to WFP and FAO.
DEVCO E	n/a Ref. DCI-CSO/LSA	Chad	Risk of <b>duplication with the NIP</b> .
DEVCO E	n/a Ref. DCI-CSO/LSA	Ivory Coast	<b>Labour intensive vs limited resources.</b>
DEVCO E	n/a Ref. DCI-CSO/LSA	Cameroon	<b>Tension between competing objectives</b> of supporting local actors but also pressure from HQ to increase the size of grants awarded.
DEVCO E	n/a Ref. EIDHR	Guinea Bissau	An inconsistency and <b>lack of coordination</b> between projects supporting the same initiatives
DEVCO G	n/a Ref. DCI-CSO/LSA	n/a	As in previous years, the management of thematic budget lines continues to be challenging for some Delegations, in particular in graduated countries, since these are often <b>labour-intensive</b> . The launching of calls for proposals is demanding, as well as the fact that often the average contract size is small, despite the recent efforts made to increase average costs of this type of projects.
DEVCO G	n/a Ref. DCI-CSO/LSA	Nicaragua	<b>[Lack of coherence]</b> In general terms, one issue is the risk of having global calls resulting in projects that do not fit into the Delegation's portfolio and expertise, which reduces their added value in terms of policy dialogue and impact
DEVCO G	n/a Ref. DCI-CSO/LSA	East Caribbean	The East Caribbean countries received an allocation for Country Based Support Schemes (CBSS) under the EIDHR programme as well as an allocation under the CSO-LA. Whereas funds required to contract all successful proposals under EIDHR amounted to more than double the available country allocation, <b>the Delegation did not receive a sufficient number of proposals under the CSO-LA call for proposals that were of an acceptable quality to be contracted</b> . Therefore, part of the country allocation for 2014 had to be returned. This is the first time that the region has been exposed to a (local) call for proposal under the

<sup>240</sup> In 2015 TBL reports were written to cover all thematic directorates.

Report	Directorate <sup>240</sup>	Country	Description
			CSO-LA Thematic Programme, and the limited response shows that local and European/ international CSO actors may have more difficulties to grasp the thematically less clear-cut global programme than its EIDHR counterpart that is more focused on 'hot topics' and therefore might attract more attention.
DEVCO H	n/a Ref. EIDHR	General	<b>[Example of simplification procedures not being optimal]</b> EUDs are not involved in evaluating EIDHR proposals at concept note stage, only at full proposal stage. This is a new provision in the PRAG for grant contracts and aimed at simplification – this increases the risk of very sensitive proposals slipping through and becoming a burden at a later stage and is difficult to reconcile with our commitment to involve delegations as upstream as possible in the evaluation of EIDHR projects.

**Table A.66 2015- Evidence of synergies in TBL reports**

Report	Directorate	Country	Description
DEVCO D	n/a Ref. DCI-GPGC	South Africa	Specific attention drawn to the South Africa case, where "a solid counterpart" and "scope for impact" exist in most areas covered by GPGC.
DEVCO D	n/a Ref. DCI-CSO/LSA	Somalia, Tanzania, Comoros and Seychelles	<b>Efficiency gains, in relation to administrative costs/limited resources</b> , have been achieved through the combination of calls across relevant thematic instruments. In Somalia, considerable efforts to ensure synergies, coordination and complementarity across all programmes and instruments (e.g. EDF, IcSP, newly created Trust Fund root causes of migration) are put in place on the ground and include advocacy and dialogue events. E.g. combined CSO-LA and EIDHR operations in one call.
DEVCO E	n/a Ref. DCI-GPGC	Benin	<b>Dialogue with local actors</b> is dynamic and there is complementarity with the NIP.
DEVCO E	n/a Ref. DCI-GPGC	Ghana	<b>Participatory approach</b> to defining priorities and good dialogue with local actors
DEVCO E	n/a Ref. DCI-GPGC	Cape Verde	Good <b>quality of proposals</b> (and quantity) has led to increase of allocations – operations working well.
DEVCO E	n/a Ref. DCI-GPGC	Togo	<b>Efficiency gains</b> in terms of reduced administrative costs and best use of limited resources were obtained by combining calls (e.g. CSO/EIDHR in Togo), which in turn increase their attractiveness.
DEVCO E	n/a Ref. EIDHR	Chad	Good <b>synergies</b> in terms of human rights promotion under the EIDHR between the <b>political and operational level</b> .
DEVCO G	n/a Ref. DCI-CSO/LSA	Haiti	Allocations under the CSO/LA budget line (and the EIDHR) successfully complement the funds provided under the NIP and the Instrument for Stability, increasing both support to CSO and responding to urgencies resulting from the fragile situation in the country.

**Table A.67 Common challenges and successes across 2015 TBL reports**

Staffing weaknesses (capacity, high turnover, profile, level)	Weakness in CSO/NGO capacity	Lack of EU visibility	Low quality of proposals and labour intensity	Lack of payment credits	Efficiency gains
Zambia Malawi Mauritania	Madagascar Malawi Cameroon Republic of Congo Cuba Haiti	Zambia Zimbabwe	Mozambique Zambia Cameroon Ivory coast	Lesotho Madagascar Mali	Togo Somalia Tanzania Seychelles Comoros

**Table A.68 2014- Evidence of duplication in TBL reports**

Report	Directorate	Country	Description
DEVCO D	B	Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Sudan, and Zambia	Thematic projects are <b>labour intensive</b> ; often the number of thematic contracts is much higher than the contract amount: this aspect conflicts with the objective of increasing contract sizes and limiting the overall number of contracts to obtain efficiency gains in view of staff cuts.
DEVCO D	B	Namibia and Djibouti	Requires extra thematic support from HQ
DEVCO D	B	n/a	Some EUDs mentioned the fact that they would like <b>to be consulted more often in the project selection process</b> in order to avoid funding projects which may be disconnected from local realities as it has sometimes been the case in a few countries.
DEVCO D	B	Swaziland	The <b>multiplicity of programmes with different geographical levels</b> , different implementation modalities and management location (HQ, region, local) sometimes entails confusion and opacity
DEVCO D	B	Zambia	Thematic projects and programmes offer an opportunity to intervene in specialised areas not covered by the NIP- but at the same time this work remains <b>largely uncoordinated</b> with the national level interventions and the information flows and engagement of the Delegation needs to be improved in order to achieve complementarity and coherence of EU support at country level.
DEVCO D	B	Zimbabwe	The suspension of payments and poor capacity of implementation resulted in the partial achievement of the expected results. The lack in quantity and quality of <b>well trained personnel</b> also remains a challenge.
DEVCO E	B	general	Whilst thematic instruments are considered flexible and relevant in crises of fragile political/economic contexts, most West and Central African Delegations indicated that thematic projects require a <b>relatively extensive use of staff resources</b> . This can be particularly challenging in a context of staff constraints.
DEVCO E	B	general	In budgetary terms, thematic contracts represent more or less 10% of the EUDs portfolio in Central and Western Africa. However, in terms numbers of contacts managed, they represent between a quarter and a third of the total number of contracts handled. This discrepancy may be tackled, for example, by <b>raising the average amount per grant contract</b> (as already



Report	Directorate	Country	Description
			formally requested), or promoting consortia and sub-granting to bring down the number of contacts managed directly by EUD staff.
DEVCO E	B	general	The importance of <b>complementarity between thematic operations and other programmes</b> was also underlined by many EUDs; hard to handle thematic operations when the scope falls outside the NIP focal sectors.
DEVCO E	B	general	EUDs would like to be <b>consulted in the project selection process</b> in order to avoid funding projects which may be disconnected from local realities.
DEVCO E	B	Benin	Thematic projects meant the EUD could not focus on a limited number of sectors which impacts an adequate level of follow-up. <b>Do not feel the EUD is sufficiently involved in the project selection which impacts coordination with NIP-funded programmes.</b>
DEVCO E	B	Cote d'Ivoire	The EUD does seek to ensure complementarity amongst different funding instruments – including thematic programmes. However, they do not feel that there is a specific strategy to ensure complementarity at a headquarters. The EUD suggests that having three different types of authority officers, namely HQ, NAO and RAO, <b>does not support better coordination and more coherence within EU cooperation.</b>
DEVCO E	B	DRC	Implementing a wide variety of funding instruments including thematic budget lines, the EUD <b>finds challenging ensuring the complementarity and coherence of all the tools used.</b> This has sometimes led to inefficient programme disconnected from local needs. An example of this has been in the health sector, where projects have been approved at headquarters without consulting the EUD.
DEVCO E	B	Mali	The number of projects funded under thematic instruments leads to a large number of smaller size projects, which is contrary to the commitment taken by EUD in the context of OPTIMUS exercise. There is a need to pay more attention to the issue of <b>complementarity amongst EU funding instruments.</b>
DEVCO E	B	Senegal	EUD raised the issue of complementarity as some thematic instruments do not correspond to <b>EUD areas of concentration</b> and are centrally managed.
DEVCO G	B & C	General	As in previous years the management of thematic budget lines has continued to pose a challenge for Delegations, since these are often labour-intensive, particularly in cases where average contract sizes are small, as is often the case for CSO/LA and EIDHR-funded grants. In 2014 this became more challenging due to staff reductions seen in many Delegations in Latin America. In Ecuador for example, thematic projects represents 84% of all on-going projects, while signifying only 25% of the financial portfolio...it will be important to maintain an adequate balance in the future between the size of the contracts and the capacity of local CSOs to manage large contracts.

**Table A.69 2014- Evidence of synergies in TBL reports**

Report	Directorate	Country	Description
DEVCO D	B & C		<b>Complementarity between thematic budget lines and EDF</b> programmes noted in: Angola, Botswana, Madagascar, Mauritius Comoros, Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland
DEVCO D	B & C	Angola Malawi Tanzania	Complementarity between thematic projects and the NIP
DEVCO E	B	Sierra Leone	As far as thematic programmes per se are concerned, there is a concerted effort to bring down their number in order to build government capacity to provide direct services and hence free up human resources at EUD level as managing small size projects in a very labour intensive activity. EUD also supports the use of sub-granting and encourages wider consortia as much as possible in a general context of fragile and post conflict state characterised by weak absorption capacity and very low levels of service delivery through governments systems.
DEVCO G	B	Haiti	Allocations under the NSA/LA budget line and the EIDHR successfully complement the funds provided under the NIP and the Instrument for Stability, increasing both support to CSO and responding to urgencies resulting from the fragile situation in the country.
			With the strong encouragement of HQ, many Delegations in Latin America have been putting in place measures to balance out this disproportion to the possible extent, mainly by raising the average amount of the contracts under local calls for proposal, thus reducing the number of contracts being awarded.
DEVCO G	C	Bolivia	The country evaluation report for cooperation with Bolivia in the 2007-2013 period points out the excellent complementarity that has been achieve between bilateral programmes, food security thematic programme and ECHO actions in the ground.
DEVCO G	C	Honduras	In 2014 there have been 34 grant contracts (all TBL included) with an average size of €440,000 as opposed to 45 contracts with an average size of €346,000 in 2013

**Table A.70 Common challenges & successes across 2014 TBL reports**

Staffing weaknesses (capacity, high turnover, profile, level)	Weakness in CSO/NGO capacity	Labour intensity of thematic projects and poor quality of proposals	Complementarity between thematic and EDF projects
Zimbabwe Tanzania South Africa	Zimbabwe Lesotho Namibia Nigeria	Angola Eritrea Ethiopia Lesotho Mozambique Namibia South Sudan Zambia Burkina Faso Cameroon Ghana Guinea-Bissau	Angola Botswana Madagascar Mauritius Comoros Mozambique Somalia

## Part F EAMR analysis of Policy Coherence for Development

This analysis examined the reporting by EUDs on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). The External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) format includes a specific question on PCD in Section 7, with four sub-questions which ask for:

- Reporting on PCD, with a priority for the following areas: trade and finance, food security, climate change, migration, and security
- Evidence of dialogue with government and CSOs
- Evidence of dialogue with MSs on PCD
- Specific evidence of drivers of PCD

All 25 EAMRs related to the 2015 were reviewed. Answers were recorded in a table to reflect:

- Whether the EAMR contained responses under the PCD section;
- What areas of PCD were mentioned;
- Whether there was reference to dialogue with government and CSOs;
- Whether there was reference to dialogue with MSs;
- Whether instances of policy coherence or incoherence were mentioned.

The responses were compiled in Table A.71 below and analysed for quantitative and qualitative material.

The following key findings stand out:

- 17 out of the 25 EAMRS include reporting on PCD
- Areas mentioned cover a range of areas including trade, climate change, security, migration, with somewhat less attention to food security. The qualitative analysis highlights that PCD is often interpreted to mean dialogue with sectors.
- Dialogue with government and CSO and MSs is reported in most cases, although in many cases this appears to be interpreted broadly and not just as related to PCD
- Very few examples of policy coherence benefiting development emerge from the analysis (only 3 countries – Kenya, Uganda and Dominican Republic). This may reflect under-reporting rather than absence of policy coherence, given that these questions come at the end of a very long questionnaire.
- Examples of policy incoherence were cited in 7 of the EAMRs (Zambia – wildlife; Mali – security; Uganda – economic; DRC – health; Malawi – economic; Republic of the Congo – economic) with a predominance for incoherence with economic policies.
- Other policy incoherence examples are related to incoherence between objectives that the EU is seeking to pursue and the priorities and approaches ‘in practice’ by government with a particular emphasis on contradictions between EU development objectives and the engagement of other actors in countries, and a lack of government capacity/willingness to address issues of exploitation of natural resources, privileged access by certain economic partners (China), as well as the lack of redistribution of economic gains to the population in general affecting the poverty alleviation objectives of the EU.
- Overall the qualitative reporting reflects different levels of understanding of what PCD means. In a number of cases PCD reporting consists of a listing of sectors with which the EUD engages in dialogue (formally or informally) without an analysis of how this relates to policy coherence.
- Only very few EUDs report on engaging directly with non-government actors to get feedback of their views on EU policy coherence.

**Table A.71 EAMR analysis of PCD**

Country	PCD reporting	Areas mentioned	Dialogue with Gov and CSOs	Dialogue with MSs	Coherence/incoherence	Policy coherence/incoherence examples
Mozambique	Yes	Trade and development Food security Climate change	Yes	Yes	None	
Zambia	Yes	Climate change Trade	Yes	Yes	Yes incoherence	Risk of incoherence as regards the EU position towards wildlife. The conservation of wildlife is a recognized political priority as most of the tourism (source of incomes for local rural population) originates from wildlife-related tourism. This is in contradiction to the decision of the EU Scientific Review Group (SRG), and related messages received from DG ENV allowing for import of trophies of elephants and possibly in the near future of lions.
Mali	Yes	Security	Yes	No	Yes, potential incoherence	Although challenges mentioned of formulation of interventions because of CSDP mission
Cameroon	Yes	Commercial relations improved through APE Climate change Dialogue with different actors of views on EU policy coherence	Yes	Yes	None	But poor governance by the country is likely to have an impact on the coherence of the EU actions in Cameroon. Government commitment to be confirmed on key areas (climate and L4APE)
Madagascar	No		No	No	Yes, potential incoherence	Weak government and excessive depletion of natural resources by China and others threatening EU objectives of development cooperation.

Country	PCD reporting	Areas mentioned	Dialogue with Gov and CSOs	Dialogue with MSs	Coherence/incoherence	Policy coherence/incoherence examples
Lesotho	Yes	Limited dialogue with government, lack of MS presence for engagement	Yes, very limited	Yes, limited by lack of MSs	None	
Ethiopia	No		No	No	None	
Djibouti	Yes	Maritime security	No	No	Yes, incoherence	Interventionist government policies which leave no room for foreign investment. In spite of economic growth there is little job creation and most of the benefits go to a small elite.
Togo	Yes	Migration	No	No	No	
Burkina Faso	Yes	Security and trade issues	No	Yes	No	
Dominican Republic	Yes	Business and climate	Yes	Yes	Yes, coherence	The two audits by DG SANTE on plant pests and on pesticide residues, motivated by frequent rejection at EU borders of DR vegetable and fruit exports, generated a very welcome reaction by the national authorities to upgrade their plant health and food safety controls. The results are clear in terms of reduced number of border rejections. The delegation actively accompanied the SANTE missions, and linked their activities with cooperation projects in that area.
Timor Leste	Yes	Tourism (visa) Economic development Climate change	Yes	Yes	None	
Aruba-Guyana	No			No		
Jamaica	No		No	Yes, informally	Yes, incoherence with government policy	Challenges in the regulation of the energy sector which inhibits increase the use of Renewable

Country	PCD reporting	Areas mentioned	Dialogue with Gov and CSOs	Dialogue with MSs	Coherence/incoherence	Policy coherence/incoherence examples
						energy and investment in the sector.
Sierra Leone	Yes	Fisheries	Yes	Yes	Yes, incoherence with government	Mismanagement and corruption seriously affect public revenues and have been raised in political dialogue with government.
Tanzania	Yes	Fisheries	Yes	No	None	
New Caledonia	No			No		
Uganda	Yes	Trade, business (preventing import ban to EU of two commodities) health Climate	Yes	Yes	Yes, incoherence between EU policies	<p>Climate Change and Trade policies can have some discrepancies, for example in terms of intercontinental exports, choice of value chains, etc. that would deserve some more policy level coherence.</p> <p>G SANTE: Preventing import ban on from Uganda to EU for two commodities</p> <p>DG TRADE: The promotion of networking, advocacy for improved business conditions and sharing of information</p> <p>DG CLIMA: preparation COP 21 with Government. There is also a will to implement the Climate Change Policy, which has yet to materialize.</p>
Kenya	Yes	Economic	Yes	Yes	Yes, coherence with EU policies	Imposition of 10% reinforced checks on Kenya's French Beans and Snow Peas by the EU in 2013 led to reduced production and had an effect especially on small-scale farmers. since exporters shunned

Country	PCD reporting	Areas mentioned	Dialogue with Gov and CSOs	Dialogue with MSs	Coherence/incoherence	Policy coherence/incoherence examples
						them for fear of non-compliance with Maximum Residue Levels (MRL) for pesticides The 10% sampling also led to reduced earnings for exporters. The cost of sampling was borne by the exporter leading to reduced earnings. The lifting of these reinforced checks in June 2015 is especially welcome. Continued work with the government on-going to ensure appropriate standards.
DRC	Yes	Security and defence	-	-	Yes, incoherence with EU policies	In health EU policy is incoherent. On the one hand the national programme prioritizes universal health access. On the other hand policies by Gavi and the GFATM which are supported by the EU and MSs are not aligned with the policy of government and have negative effects on the essential medicines supply chain.
Republic of the Congo	Yes	HR Constitutional and justice areas	Yes	Yes	Yes, with government and with EU (no EPA)	Special funding mechanisms in favour of Chinese companies Non-compliance with CEMAC regulations. Any national policy decided out of line with regional integration The absence of EPA agreement will affect Congo negatively: no privileged access to European market any more. It would be useful to study how this will impact sectors such as forestry and sugar.
Haiti	No		No	No	None	

Country	PCD reporting	Areas mentioned	Dialogue with Gov and CSOs	Dialogue with MSs	Coherence/incoherence	Policy coherence/incoherence examples
Burundi	Yes	Migration	Yes	Yes	None	
Malawi	No	Trade	Yes	Yes	Yes, with EU policy	The end of the EU protocol for sugar in 2017 was regularly referred too negatively by local sugar stakeholders in the media. It is important for HQ to share when possible with concerned delegations a communication plan with clear lines to take.
Chad	Yes		No	No	No	



## Part G DEVCO Evaluation Summaries

**Table A.72 Evidence from DEVCO thematic evaluations on the use of different instruments**

Evaluations	Extract of key findings
Evaluation of EC support to Health Particip, 2012	A budget of €1.5 billion is foreseen for this type of GBS contract and it amounts to 42% of the GBS provided through the EDF10 which targets especially MDG-relevant social sectors, such as health and education. The evaluation has found that the EC was involved in essentially every aspect of health using a wide range of financing instruments, modalities and aid channels.
Evaluation of EC support to Research and Innovation Particip, 2016c	There is no evidence that DG DEVCO had an overall rationale for combining different instruments, modalities and channels for its funding of R&I in any of the four sectors, but careful reflection has gone into the choices made for each programme. Thus, the evidence suggests that where DG DEVCO has specifically wished to support R&I in a particular sector, it has first identified the instrument to be used for funding. It has then sought out relevant actors with whom to collaborate. This then has led to a choice of channel, which may or may not prompt a review of the instrument to be employed. These choices have then in turn led to a choice of modalities. Where R&I has occurred within a wider sectoral support programme, the choices of instrument, channel and possibly even of modalities have been dictated by that sector's needs.
Evaluation of EC support to Human rights Petrucci et al., 2011	On the whole one can conclude that in many countries the EC has made valuable contributions to promoting human rights through the creative use of instruments and the action of highly committed staff. The degree of commitment and success varies greatly from country to country. Nevertheless, this was not part of a structured strategy but represents more a way to find ad hoc solutions to actual problems. Feedback from field missions, seminars and interviews confirmed that the overall environment for working on human rights is "very difficult", particularly for addressing civil, political rights and fundamental freedoms. Nevertheless, the EC has a good track record in reinforcing the support to "non-sensitive" human rights, using a mix of thematic and geographical tools to remain engaged in difficult environments. Ethiopia offers a case in point. It shows the potential of using the diversity of EU instruments to promote the HR agenda in hostile countries.
Evaluation of EC support to the Private sector ADE, 2013	The EU value added as a development partner was the financial weight of its contribution, its continued presence, the fact that it was perceived as less tied to specific economic or political interests, and the emphasis on poverty reduction when other actors adopted a perspective of economic cooperation. The PSD-specific areas of potential value added were its capacity to leverage grant resources for PSD through investment and blending facilities, its ability to link PSD with trade liberalization matters; and the transfer of EU good practices and knowledge.
Evaluation of Peace and Conflict Prevention ADE, 2011	<p>The Commission's ability to draw on a wide array of instruments, allowing intervention in the short and longer terms as well as in different sectors (cf. above), was also mentioned as a real value added. The country level evaluation for Sierra Leone for instance notes that the availability of different instruments proved to be a strong strategic approach.</p> <p>It is considered to be an advantage of the EU, notably because "major support has been provided without interruption, passing from humanitarian aid, over support to reconstruction and rehabilitation, to support for social and economic development of the country." This is also mentioned for instance in the context of the Timor-Leste (short-term: IfS-RRM, Rehabilitation; and long-term: EDF).</p>
Evaluation of EC support to Trade Particip, 2013	A certain shift in the financing modalities becomes clear when looking at the different ratios for each modality in relation to the overall contracted amounts for the contracts signed within each year. While over the entire period evaluated the project approach accounted for 60%-80% of the funds, the SBS spending already accounted for more than 30% of the EU direct support in 2009. However, in 2010, this development was seemingly reversed again, with a decreasing share of SBS in the field of TRA. No clear trends can be derived from the figures, either for Support to Sector Programs or

Evaluations	Extract of key findings
	for SBS, as changes are either very small or very ambiguous over time.
EU support to Environment and Climate Change Particip, 2015	The degree of success in mainstreaming efforts varies considerably from country to country, and is much dependent on the underlying political and institutional commitment to environment and climate change. Programmes and projects supported under the modality of project support have addressed the environmental and climate change issues at project level, but seem not to have prompted wider mainstreaming of environment and climate change into sector policy. By providing SBS (to agriculture/rural development in Bolivia, Ukraine, Egypt, Rwanda) the EU has been instrumental – through policy dialogue and promotion of the inclusion of environmental and climate change targets and performance criteria – in advancing the mainstreaming of environment and climate change
EU support to Transport Sector Ecorys, 2016b	Blending of financial instruments has demonstrated potential in the transport sector but it is not a universal panacea as conventional measures of financial viability of many transport sector projects in outside urban and peri-urban areas are low. A further issue is lack of familiarity with the concept of blending on the part of governments and EUDs.

**Table A.73 Evidence from DEVCO country evaluations on the use of different instruments**

Evaluations	Extract of key findings
Evaluation of EC support to Chad 2008-2014. Coste et al, 2016	Les différentes modalités de mise en œuvre de l'aide de l'UE ont été en adéquation avec l'analyse de la situation (facteurs de fragilité) et les objectifs poursuivis.
Evaluation of the EC support to Madagascar, 2002-2013. Coste et al, 2015	Due to the 2009 political crisis, the cooperation portfolio that stemmed from this programming was substantially restructured. On the one hand, budget support was cancelled and on the other hand, the implementing arrangements of other interventions were redefined so as not to involve the authorities of the transitional period (support to local communities and devolved technical services via independent managing units, grants awarded to civil society organizations, contribution agreements with international agencies, delegation agreements with Member States agencies, etc.).
Evaluation of the EU cooperation with Cameroon (2014). Particip, 2014b	Alors que l'UE finalise le choix de ses secteurs de concentration dans le cadre du 11ème FED, la valeur ajoutée des différentes modalités de financement au sein du PIN et la pertinence des autres instruments et politiques communautaires hors PIN doivent faire l'objet d'une articulation plus explicite (Recommandation)
Evaluation of the EC cooperation with Kenya, 2006-2012 Ecorys, 2014	The EU is recognized as one of the main donors in the transport sector and has a comparative advantage based on its specific knowledge and expertise and long-lasting support to the construction and rehabilitation of different kind of roads.  EU's support to improving public governance in Kenya has taken place through dialogue with the government and specific support programmes/projects. The EU has been active in various different governance areas and has used several financing instruments and programming modalities to contribute to the governance reforms in Kenya.
Evaluation of Budget Support to Sierra Leone 2002-2015 Ecorys, 2016a	Project grants and loans have been the dominant aid modality through most of the period. As a proportion of overall aid to Sierra Leone, Budget Support has never come close to representing the dominant modality and in 2013 comprised only 9% of total ODA, having been on a declining trend since its peak of 24% in 2005.

Evaluations	Extract of key findings
Joint Evaluation of Budget Support to Uganda (2015) Particip, 2015a	Recommendations: Regarding the future directions, four areas are important in defining the way forward: focusing on the areas of highest impact and need, implementing sector-wide approaches, broadening the mix of support instruments, and strengthening mutual accountability and dialogue.
Evaluation of the cooperation with Haiti (2014) Particip, 2014b	Ceci dit, dans le cas de l'UE, l'approche basée sur la combinaison d'aide sous forme d'AB et d'interventions spécifiques sectorielles et/ou locales a pu être maintenu et, grâce à l'AB, l'UE a été l'un des seuls grands bailleurs à avoir augmenté la quantité de ressources placée sous le contrôle direct du GdH pendant la période 2010-2011. La valeur de ce choix stratégique n'a malheureusement pas été suffisamment mise en avant par l'UE. Les résultats de l'appui ont été limités à plusieurs niveaux. L'effet de l'appui sur les dépenses d'investissement du GdH dans différents secteurs clés est par exemple resté faible.
Evaluation de la coopération de l'UE à Djibouti 2012. ECO Consult, 2012b	Dans ce contexte, la Commission européenne met une gamme complète d'instruments et de modalités à la disposition de ses gestionnaires, dont des fonds programmables, des lignes budgétaires et des instruments spécialisés (ex. stabilité). Les entretiens avec la DUE, des bailleurs de fonds et des représentants du gouvernement indiquent que la Commission européenne n'a pas utilisé une logique de gestion de programme fondée sur les effets de levier
Joint Evaluation of Budget Support in Tanzania (2014). Itad, 2013	Design policies and strategies on the use of different aid modalities, based upon the available evidence regarding their relative effectiveness. Increasing scepticism over the effectiveness of Budget Support has marked the period of this evaluation. This has been especially marked amongst European Development Agencies but is present more widely, and is leading to a reduction and increasing marginalization in the role of Budget Support. Yet, the experience of Tanzania has shown that, in contrast to other modalities, Budget Support can contribute to the scaling up of public spending on agreed, high priority areas in a manner which is predictable, low in transaction costs and conducive to good fiscal and macroeconomic management.
Evaluation of EU support to Jamaica (2012). ECO Consult, 2012c	The efficiency and effectiveness of support provided by the EC has increased due to the use of budget support as the preferred aid instrument. Delivery of support to rural development through a mix of instruments (BS and TA) is proving effective and should be continued.
Evaluation of the EU's Cooperation with Lesotho 2008-2013. (2015). ADE, 2015	In Lesotho, implementation modalities have never been used exclusively for one sector and have always been used as a mix: even BS has been accompanied by large TA programmes. When looking at the range of financing sources and implementation modalities, none stood out as being more specifically timely and/or flexible than others.
Evaluation of the EU Cooperation with Timor-Leste (2008-2013). 2015. Lattanzio, 2015	Conditions are being established for applying complementary modalities (including budget support) to co-operation work. Thematic budget lines contributed to positive outcomes at project level but failed to impact at sector or national levels, owing to uncoordinated and non-strategic use of the instruments. Non-strategic use of regional instruments and an absence of critical mass limited impact. Financial instruments and projects would have significantly benefited from policy and political dialogue.
Evaluation Republic of Malawi (2011). ECO Consult, 2011c	The choice of aid modalities has had very variable impacts on efficiency of implementation of the support of the Commission of the EU. Some of its modalities contributed positively to implementation progress as measured by rate of disbursement and effectiveness, i.e., especially budget support. However, also other modalities contributed positively to implementation progress, such as basket funding, contribution and administration agreements. At least some of the perceived benefit appears to accrue from avoidance of constantly changing procedural complications of the Commission of the EU. Other modalities were impediments to implementation progress; especially programme estimates and EDF procurement procedures.


## Annex 21 Supporting evidence and analyses for EQ6

This annex provides supporting evidence for different judgement criteria addressed in EQ6. The structure of the annex replicates the structure followed in the main report.

### 1. JC 6.1 Domestic resource mobilisation

Data extracted from the IMF database has been used to explore the evolution of government revenues over the period 2002-2012 for the following regions: Caribbean, Western and Central Africa and Eastern and Southern Africa. The Pacific Region has not been included in the graph because there is very limited data for countries and territories in the region. The data is presented in the figure below. It shows that, on average, DRM in % of GDP has increased from 18.5% in 2002 to just over 22% in 2012 across all regions. The analysis stops in 2012 due to limitations in the availability of IMF data.

**Figure A.68 Government revenues by region 2002-2012 (% of GDP)**



Source: based on data from the IMF

### 2. JC 6.2 Analysis of leverage ratios


The European Commission has adopted the following three types of leveraging ratios to monitor the leveraging effect of blending facilities:

- Investment leverage ratio that compares the grant provided by the facility with the total amount of investment in the project (it thus includes all actors). An investment leverage ratio of 10 or 1:10 means that by every €1 of EDF grants dedicated to the projects, a total of €10 have been invested in the project.
- Total eligible financial institution leverage ratio that compares the grant provided by the facility with the amount of finance contributed by other financial institutions involved in the project. In practice this generally refers to other support coming from multilateral or regional development banks or other development finance institutions (e.g. AFD, KfW, Cofides, etc.). In this case a leverage ratio of 10 means that by every €1 of EDF grants, other financial institutions have contributed €10.
- Private loans/equity leverage ratio that compares the volume of grants provided by the blending facility with the amount of private finance involved in the project. In this case, a

leverage ratio of 10 means that by every €1 of EDF grants, the private sector has invested €10 in the project.

The evaluation team was granted access to DEVCO's database of blending facilities. The database was used to evaluate the three different leverage ratios for the EDF blending facilities across the period 2009-2016. Figure A.69 summarises the results of this analysis. The figures do not show a clear trend and experience a significant drop in 2016. For reference, in 2014, the three leverage ratios for the totality of all EU blending facilities managed by DEVCO were substantially higher than in the case of the EDF. The aggregate values for all blending facilities managed were: 20.7 (investment leverage ratio), 10.5 (total eligible FI leverage ratio) and 2.3 (private loans/equity ratio) (EC, 2016q).

**Figure A.69 Leverage ratios in the EDF blending facilities**



Source: based on the analysis of DEVCO's database on blending facilities

### 3. JC 6.3 Supporting evidence from EAMRs and DEVCO's evaluations

#### Evidence from DEVCO's country evaluations

A total of 17 DEVCO country evaluations have been reviewed: Lesotho, Togo, Timor Leste, Malawi, Burundi, Chad, Madagascar, Cameroon, Congo DRC, Kenya, Haiti, Tanzania, Djibouti, Jamaica, Mozambique, Dominican Republic, Republic of Congo. The full references can be found in the bibliography.

The analysis of the evaluations has been performed using the mapping matrix described in the annex on the methodology. The results for JC 6.3 are presented by indicator below. Three categories have been used to classify the responses:

- EU played an active and important role in policy/political dialogue
- EU played a role, but it was not seen as important or instrumental
- Important limitations were found due to the difficult political situation
- Evaluations not listed in either of these three categories contained no evidence on the indicator

In practice, making the difference between the first two categories is quite difficult and Sometimes, the differences are quite subjective and the quality and level of detail of the evaluations can change substantially from one to another. For practical reasons, the first two categories have been grouped together in the desk report.

Role of the EU in political/policy dialogue:

- Active role: Chad, Haiti, Togo, Ethiopia, Malawi, Kenya, Madagascar, Tanzania

- Active, but weaker role/difficulties: Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Mozambique, Timor-Leste
- Challenging political situation: Lesotho, Zambia and Timor Leste

Role in donor coordination structures:

- Active role: Chad, Togo, Malawi, Cameroon, Haiti
- Active, but weaker role/difficulties: Congo DRC, Congo Rep., Kenya, Mozambique, Timor-Leste
- Challenging political situation: non

Dialogue on HR, democracy, etc.:

- Active role: Chad, Togo, Malawi, Cameroon, Tanzania
- Active, bur weaker role/difficulties:
- Challenging political situation: Ethiopia, Timor-Leste

### **Evidence from DEVCO's instrument evaluations**

A total of 5 DEVCO instrument evaluations have been reviewed: Synthesis of budget support evaluations, Burkina Faso budget support evaluation, Budget Support in Mali, Evaluation of Budget Support in Sierra Leone, and Joint Evaluation of Budget Support in Uganda. The full references can be found in the bibliography.

Instrument evaluations reviewed during the research focus on the use of budget support. The findings of the different findings are well summarised by the synthesis evaluation (Synthesis of Budget Support Evaluations). In general, budget support has created the structures and incentives for policy dialogue, but the quality of the policy dialogue has generally fall short of expectations, including in countries with a long history of budget support.

### **Evidence from DEVCO's thematic and regional evaluations**

A total of 15 DEVCO thematic evaluations and 5 DEVCO regional evaluations have been reviewed. The full references can be found in the bibliography.

These evaluations provide very limited evidence for any of the three indicators. The only exception is perhaps the regional evaluation for the Pacific region that acknowledged the existence of policy dialogue at the regional level.

### **Evidence from the EAMRs**

All 2015 EAMRs for the research sample of 25 countries (see annex on methodology) were reviewed for evidence on all three indicators included in JC 6.3. Aruba is included in the EAMR for Guyana (2014 EAMR) and New Caledonia is included in Fiji.

The results are presented by indicator following the same criteria used for the DEVO evaluations. Once more, making the difference between the first two categories is quite difficult and they have been grouped together in the desk report. This does not applies to the last of the indicator in the JC because the evidence from the EAMRs was only enough to ascertain whether the issues were raised or not.

Role of the EU in political/policy dialogue:

- Active role: Zambia, Mozambique, Cameroon, Madagascar, Togo, Burkina Faso, Dominican Republic, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Kenya, Haiti, Malawi and Chad
- Active, but seemingly weaker role/evidence: Mali, Ethiopia, Timor-Leste, Aruba, Jamaica and Republic of Congo
- Political difficulties: Djibouti, Tanzania, DRC, Burundi and Lesotho
- No evidence: New Caledonia

Role in donor coordination structures:

- Active role: Mozambique, Zambia, Mali, Cameroon, Madagascar, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Dominican Republic, Timor Leste, Jamaica, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Republic of Congo, Malawi and Chad
- Active, but weaker general coordination structures in place: Lesotho, Ethiopia, Congo, Haiti and Chad
- No or weak evidence: Togo, New Caledonia, Burundi and Aruba

Dialogue on HR, democracy, etc.:

- Evidence: Mozambique, Cameroon, Zambia, Mali, Lesotho, Ethiopia, Togo, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Malawi and Chad
- No clear evidence: Madagascar, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Timor-Leste, Aruba, Jamaica, Tanzania, New Caledonia, Kenya, Congo DRC, Republic of Congo, Haiti and Burundi

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