



External Evaluation of the Development Co-operation Instrument (2014 – mid 2017)

Final Report - Annexes June 2017

Evaluation carried out on behalf of the European Commission



ECORYS



Lead company

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External Evaluation of the Development Co-operation Instrument

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External Evaluation of the Development Co-operation Instrument Final Report - Annexes

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1 Annex 1: Evaluation matrix

1.1 EQ 1 on relevance

To what extent do the overall objectives (DCI Regulation, Article 2) and the objectives of each of its three components, the designated areas of co-operation (DCI Regulation, Annexes I, II, III) and the design of the DCI respond to:

- (i) EU priorities and beneficiary needs identified at the time the instrument was adopted (2014) and
- (ii) Current EU priorities and beneficiary needs, given the evolving challenges and priorities in the international context (2017)?

JC 11: Relevance of the overall DCI objectives and design in the light of EU priorities and beneficiary needs at the time the instrument was adopted	
Main findings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall the DCI 2014-2020 objectives, component elements and design were reasonably relevant from the perspective of EU policy priorities. • Strategic congruence with needs of partner countries was observed in terms of aligning to national development plans. • Yet often divergence on place and weight to be given to human rights, global public goods and non-state actor participation. Strength of the evidence base: <i>Strong</i>	Main sources of information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of policy documents and regulations, • Programming documents, Annual Action Plans and Actions Documents, • EU reporting documents (e.g. EAMRs), • Evaluations and external literature, • EU Statistical Dashboard • Interviews (EU HQ, MS representatives, EUD, beneficiaries), • Survey to EU Delegations.
JC 12: Flexibility of the DCI to adapt to evolving needs and challenges in the international/EU context (2016-17).	
Main findings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Content-wise new agendas (SDG) and pressing internal priorities were increasingly integrated in DCI and often translated into relevant actions (mainly through thematic programmes). • Yet in growing number of (graduated) countries the DCI –primarily conceived as a development cooperation tool- is no longer sufficiently fit for purpose to engage in new forms of international cooperation based on mutual interests and other means of implementation (as spelled out in 2030 Agenda, the June 2016 EU Global Strategy and other key policy documents). Strength of the evidence base: <i>Medium-Strong</i>	Main sources of information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of policy documents and regulations, • Programming documents • Evaluations and external literature, • EU Statistical Dashboard, • Interviews, • Survey to EU Delegations.

1.1.1 JC 11: Relevance of the overall DCI objectives and design in the light of EU priorities and beneficiary needs at the time the instrument was adopted

1.1.1.1 I-111 Extent to which DCI Regulation aligns with EU development policy documents and commitments as of 2014.

Indicator Summary

“Alignment” strongly suggests alignment of objectives, and it is in this sense that the Indicator has been interpreted.

The reflective and consultative process that resulted in the 2014-20 DCI instrument was well underway in 2010, and many of the major political and policy commitments to which it would be bound in that year were already quickening in 2010 and published in 2011. The Commission SWD related to the DCI Impact Assessment (2011)¹ sheds a light on what was at stake during the formulation of the new DCI. It reviewed successes, areas of improvement and lessons learnt – including the need to integrate a growing number of EU internal policies (e.g. justice, security) into external actions. Based on this it identified several “*drivers of DCI problems*”, including: (i) limited alignment of objectives to latest EU policy development; (ii) lack of differentiation; (iii) insufficient integration of human rights, democracy, good governance concerns; (iv) absence of a framework to support strategic cooperation with Africa as a whole; (iv) a fragmentation of thematic programmes hampering a comprehensive response to global problems; (v) limited consideration of specific needs in crisis, post-crisis and fragility situations; (vi) insufficient flexibility in fund allocation; and (vii) complex programming process and stringent implementation rules.

What is in many ways the seminal document informing the present DCI, the 2011 Agenda for Change, strongly re-affirmed that poverty alleviation as spelled out in the Consensus on Development (2006) remained the core objective of EU development policy and hence at the core of the new DCI. This marked a strong source of continuity with the MDG-era. At the same time, both broader and more specific objectives were added to the mix. As spelled out under I-112, the Agenda for Change called for enhanced importance to be accorded to human rights, democracy, and rule of law; to the importance of inclusive and sustainable growth encompassing the economic, social and environmental dimensions; and to security, fragility, and crises. The Global Europe (2011) Communication covering all forms of EU external action, which would cover DCI, strategically placed the DCI in a broader and, indeed, more European self-interest oriented context. The strategic objective of EFIs, it stated were not only eradicating poverty, but also (i) promoting and defending EU values abroad, (ii) supporting EU interests abroad, (iii) projecting EU policies to address major global challenges (e.g. global public goods such as climate change), (iv) enhancing EU solidarity after natural or manmade disaster, and (v) enhancing peace and security.

In short, and at the level of objectives alone, while preserving poverty as its main focus, EU development policy that governed the DCI 2014-20 became more attuned to European concerns and priorities as compared to EU development policy implemented under DCI 2007-13. These orientations were reflected in the new DCI, inter alia in the preliminary language:

- Overriding objective of poverty elimination (1) and continuing relevance of the MDGs (11)
- Reliance on European values (5)
- Human rights, democracy and rule of law (7); gender equality (12)
- Crisis and disaster (13); resilience (14)
- Smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth (19)
- Climate change and environment (20).

¹ SEC(2011)1469final Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment. Accompanying the document Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation.

The orientations are reflected in the programmatic structure of the DCI (Articles 4-9 enumerating geographic and thematic programmes).

A data extraction of figures available to date indicates that half of DCI decisions to date have been for support to Least Developed Countries, affirming the fundamental anti-poverty orientation of the programme.

Review national MIPs

An important aspect of policy relevance is how the extent to which EU development policy trickled down to the programming documents such as the MIPs. The country MIPs make systematic references to major policy commitments, especially to the Agenda for Change (AfC), and more occasionally to the Busan aid effectiveness commitments. The principles of AfC are referred to specifically with respect to concentration of support in priority sectors. In the vast majority of countries the principle of engaging in no more than three sectors has been respected. Exceptions include Afghanistan, where special circumstances were held to apply, and Paraguay, where, rather than treat it as a cross-cutting theme, democratisation was added as a fourth sector in order to increase visibility and impact.

References to Policy Coherence for Development are much less common in MIPs although they are found in a few (e.g., Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Viet Nam). With respect to the policy priorities of AfC, elements of good governance (including PFM, human rights, rule of law, and democracy) are included in all MIPs, either as priority sectors or as cross-cutting/specific issues in others. Selection of priority sectors is generally discussed with reference to their importance for inclusive/equitable and sustainable growth.

Other development related policy documents are referred to in MIPs on case by case basis, notably The *EU Strategic Framework and Action plan on Human Rights and Democracy*² in six country MIPs, and the Communication on *EU Approach to resilience*³ in ten country MIPs.

Review regional MIPs

As in the case of national MIPs, a trickle-down effect in terms of alignment to major programming documents can be observed in the regional MIPs. The three regional MIPs (for Asia, Central Asia and Latin America) systematically highlight alignment with the Agenda for Change and two (Asia and Latin America) to the European Consensus on Development and the DCI regulation.

MIPs CSO/LA 2014-2020, GPGC 2014-2020

The MIPs for CSO/LA and GPGC refer to major EU development policy documents such as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, European Consensus on Development, Agenda for Change, etc.

Source: EU (2014) MIP for the Thematic Programme “Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities for the period 2014-2020”.

EU (2014) Programming Thematic Programmes and Instruments, Programme on Global Public Goods and Challenges 2014-2020.

Objectives DCI 2007-13

The objectives of DCI 2007-13 (Article 2, Reg (EC) No. 1905/2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation) were

- Eradication of poverty, achievement of the MDGs
- Promotion of
 - Democracy
 - Good governance
 - Respect for human rights
 - Rule of law

² Council Conclusion on Human Rights and Democracy, 25.06.2012

³ COM (2012)586 final

Sub-objectives identified were democracy, human rights, rule of law, etc.; sustainable development, particularly for the most disadvantaged; integration into the global economy, environment and natural resources including climate change, and strengthening the relationship between the Community and partner countries and regions.

Objectives DCI 2014-20 and alignment with Treaty commitments

According to Article 2, Reg (EU) No. 233/2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (and replacing the former DCI Regulation), the “primary objective” of cooperation under the Regulation is eradication of poverty, consistent with Title V, Chapter 1, Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Title III, Chapter 1, Part Five of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Under the primary objective, cooperation under the Regulation is to foster sustainable economic, social and environmental development and support democracy, good governance, human rights, and rule of law.

The Consensus on Development

The “primary and overarching objective” of EU development cooperation is poverty eradication and sustainable development in the context of the MDGs (Part 1, (1), “Common Objectives”). Sustainable development “includes” good governance, human rights, and political, economic, social, and environmental aspects.

(Joint Statement, European Parliament, Council Commission 2006/C 46/01)

Agenda for Change - COM(2011) 637 Final

The primary objective of development policy is supporting developing countries’ efforts to eradicate poverty. Note: The Agenda for Change was the major policy document calling for shifts in thematic emphasis, better differentiation, increased results focus via concentration, etc. Further extractions below.

Global Europe: a New Approach to financing EU external action – COM(2011) 865 Final

Strategic objectives of EFIs:

- Promoting and defending EU values abroad
 - Human right, democracy, and rule of law at the core of external action
- Supporting EU interests abroad
 - Protecting EU citizens
 - Enhancing trade opportunities
 - Promoting EU norms and standards
 - Ensuring energy security
- Projecting EU policies to address major global challenges
 - Climate change
 - Biodiversity loss
 - Protecting global public goods and resources
- Increasing impact, with primary aim of contributing to eradicating poverty
- Enhancing mechanisms of European solidarity following natural or man-made disasters
- Improving crisis prevention and resolution capabilities, preserving peace, preventing conflict and strengthening international security

Note: Global Europe was the major policy document calling for a stronger orientation towards European needs and priorities in external finance.

Dashboard extractions on committed amounts per country/region

Table 1 DCI geographic instrument – committed amounts per country/region 2014-2015⁴


Budget line	Region/country	Committed in mEUR
Geographic budget lines and Pan-African Programme		
DCI_ACP	Africa, regional	192,48
	South Africa	53,80
	South of Sahara, regional	6,50
DCI_ACP Total		252,78
DCI_ALA	Bolivia	122,63
	America, regional	95,77
	Honduras	81,60
	Colombia	67,18
	South America, regional	49,52
	Peru	43,30
	North & Central America, regional	34,00
	Guatemala	30,66
	Nicaragua	28,00
	Cuba	7,70
	El Salvador	5,00
	Paraguay	3,98
DCI_ALA Total		569,42
DCI_ASIA	Afghanistan	409,62
	Pakistan	226,50
	Myanmar	190,00
	Nepal	149,65
	Asia, regional	123,42
	Bangladesh	122,05
	Cambodia	90,00
	Central Asia, regional	82,70
	Kyrgyz Republic	80,16
	Philippines	76,00
	Sri Lanka	52,00
	Tajikistan	51,53
	Yemen	51,00
	Iraq	50,01
	Laos	44,50
	South Asia, regional	30,00
	Uzbekistan	20,70
	Far East Asia, regional	20,00
	Viet Nam	15,10
	Mongolia	10,86
	Thailand	10,00
	Middle East, regional	2,50
DCI_ASIA Total		1.908,71
Thematic budget lines		
DCI_ENER	Africa, regional	57,88
	Developing countries, unspecified	10,00
DCI_ENER Total		67,88
DCI_ENV	Developing countries, unspecified	238,05
	Africa, regional	98,93

⁴ Only countries/regions with commitments above 1mEUR are taken into consideration.

<i>Budget line</i>	<i>Region/country</i>	<i>Committed in mEUR</i>
	Niger	11,00
	Far East Asia, regional	10,00
	South of Sahara, regional	8,90
	America, regional	8,50
	Bangladesh	8,00
	Madagascar	8,00
	South America, regional	5,00
	Asia, regional	5,00
	Guinea-Bissau	4,00
	Rwanda	4,00
	Suriname	3,00
	Europe Unallocated	3,00
	Samoa	3,00
	Seychelles	3,00
	Oceania, regional	1,90
DCI_ENV Total		423,55
DCI_ERASM	Developing countries, unspecified	107,33
	Central Asia, regional	53,26
	MADCT Unallocated	43,48
	Turkey	0,12
	Macedonia, Fyr	0,00
DCI_ERASM Total		204,20
DCI_FOOD	Developing countries, unspecified	310,05
	South of Sahara, regional	32,00
	South Asia, regional	15,00
	Haiti	5,00
	Pakistan	4,00
	Brazil	4,00
	Cape Verde	1,25
	Asia, regional	1,20
DCI_FOOD Total		372,56
DCI_HUMAN	Developing countries, unspecified	284,69
	South of Sahara, regional	20,00
	Africa, regional	10,00
	Middle East, regional	2,00
DCI_HUMAN Total		316,72
DCI_MIGR	Developing countries, unspecified	67,11
	Africa, regional	21,00
DCI_MIGR Total		88,21
DCI-CSO+LA	Developing countries, unspecified	439,15
	Europe Unallocated	36,00
DCI-CSO+LA Total		475,41


Dashboard extractions on committed amounts per country type

Figure 1 DCI geographic instrument – committed amount per country type (2014-15)



Source: Statistical dashboard extractions, Particip analysis

Figure 2 DCI thematic instrument – committed amount per country type (2014-15)



Source: Statistical dashboard extractions, Particip analysis

1.1.1.2 I-112 Extent to which DCI Regulation consistent with EU overall policy framework documents as of 2014.

Indicator Summary

Whereas Indicator I-111 concerned mostly objectives, this indicator takes a broader look at whether DCI 2014-20 as designed was in line with broader EU development policy. Major

policy documents considered are the Consensus, the Agenda for Change, and the Busan Agenda.

As described under I-111, EU development objectives, under the new DCI remained focused on poverty as in the Consensus while adding additional emphasis to aspects such as human rights, democracy and rule of law; inclusive and sustainable growth including environmental sustainability. This is consistent with the Agenda. There was an overall increase in the importance given the conflict-crisis-security nexus and migration as well as European concerns and priorities; this was in line with Global Europe and also reflected the new role of EEAS in contributing to development policy.

However, as repeatedly brought up in interviews with DEVCO and EC officials, the real teeth in Agenda, which have bitten with considerable force in the design and implementation of the new DCI are (i) differentiation and (ii) concentration into no more than three sectors in order to reduce resource dilution and maximise effectiveness.

While the Agenda did not neglect issues of improved aid effectiveness, these moved to the forefront with the EU's adhesion to the principles of effective development cooperation from Busan (2011). The four principles laid forth were (i) ownership by developing countries, (ii) a focus on results, (iii) inclusive development partnerships (i.e., more civil society, private sector, and private philanthropy), and transparency and accountability of both donors and aid recipients. The new DCI has made progress towards national ownership by stressing alignment with national development plans and phasing out of the old CSP system. A focus on results is implicit in concentration and differentiation, and, as well, the coming on stream of the new DCI coincided with the design and implementation of the Results Framework monitoring system (see I-212 and I-322 for descriptions).

Review of policy documents

DCI Regulation 2014-20, Article 3 "General Principles"

The EU shall seek to promote democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms through dialogue and cooperation.

There shall be differentiation based on

- Population, income, level of human development, etc.
- Absorptive capacity and capacity to mobilise alternative resources.
- Commitments and performance on
 - Political, economic, and social progress,
 - Gender equality,
 - Good governance and human rights,
 - Effective use of aid resources, including domestic resource mobilisation

The EU committed to giving priority in resource allocation to least developed countries and countries in crisis. Cross-cutting issues to be mainstreamed are

- Conflict prevention,
- Decent work,
- Climate change
- Non-discrimination,
- Rights of persons belonging to minorities,
- Rights of persons with disabilities,
- Rights of persons with life-threatening diseases and of other vulnerable groups,
- Core labour rights and social exclusion,
- Empowerment of women,
- Rule of law,
- Capacity building for parliaments and civil society,
- Promotion of dialogue, participation, and reconciliation, and

- Institution building, including at local and regional level.

The Consensus on Development (Joint Statement, European Parliament, Council Commission 2006/C 46/01)

“Common Principles” in the European vision of development are ownership, partnership; in-depth political dialogue, participation of civil society, gender equality, and addressing state fragility. The EU commits itself to “more and better [more effective, more complementary and better coordinated] aid,” and policy coherence for development.

The development policy implementing the European vision consists of (i) building on the particular role and comparative advantage of the EC, differentiation based on partner country context and needs including objective and transparent criteria for resource allocation, (iii) responding to needs of partner countries, utilising a range of modalities based on needs and performance, progress in management reform, and monitoring and evaluation. The “needs of partner countries” enumerated are

- trade and regional integration,
- environment and sustainable management of natural resources,
- infrastructure communication, and transport,
- water and energy,
- rural development, territorial planning, agriculture, and food security,
- governance, democracy, human rights, and support for economic and institutional reforms, and
- conflict prevention and fragile states, and
- human development

A “mainstreaming” approach is called for in

- promotion of human rights
- gender equality
- democracy and good governance,
- children’s rights and indigenous peoples,
- environmental sustainability, and
- HIV/AIDS

Agenda for Change - COM(2011) 637 Final

The Agenda for Change re-affirms the Consensus commitment to poverty elimination in the context of sustainable development but calls for

More prominence to be given to **governance** through incentives for results-oriented reforms regarding human rights, democracy, and rule of law (including linking the mix and level of aid to the country’s ability to achieve reforms). Where states are fragile, the EU should concentrate on helping them to develop basic institutions for services and poverty reduction. Where governments are backsliding, support should be provided to civil society and LAs. Focal areas should be

- Democracy, human rights, rule of law
- Gender equality and empowerment of women
- Public-sector management
- Tax policy and administration
- Corruption
- Civil society and local authorities
- Natural resources (sustainable and transparent management)
- Development and security

Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development

- Social protection, health, and education

- Stronger business environment and regional integration
- Sustainable agriculture and energy

Differentiated development partnerships

- Country needs
- Capacities, including possibilities to access alternative international resources and mobilise domestic ones,
- Potential EU impact
 - Extent to which EU cooperation could promote policy reforms
 - Leverage effect on other resources for development, especially private sector
 - Again, fragile states may require special treatment

Coordinated EU action

- Joint programming, joined up approaches (eg, budget support, trust funds), delegated cooperation

Improved PCD

- Joined-up approach to security and poverty
- Smooth transition from humanitarian aid / crisis response to development cooperation

Strengthened policies in development-migration nexus.

The Agenda for Change specifically calls for

- Increased share of cooperation to be devoted to (i) human rights, democracy, and other key elements of good governance and (ii) inclusive and sustainable growth for human development (emphasis added above).
- Concentration of EU country activities into no more than 3 sectors (4 in special cases)
- Enhanced importance of human rights, democracy, and good governance in determining mix of instruments and modalities.
- At least 20% of EU aid to social inclusion and human development
- Greater focus on “investing in drivers” of inclusive and sustainable economic growth
- Higher share in innovative instruments including blending
- Focus on resilience to global shocks
- Security, fragility, transition
- A joint EU-MS approaches with division of labour
- A common EU results reporting framework

Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation

Shared principles:

- Ownership of development priorities by developing countries
- Focus on results
- Inclusive development partnerships
- Transparency and accountability

EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan) – Council Conclusions, Brussels, 14 November 2011.

Detailed elements:

Deepening aid effectiveness

- Ownership
- Results and accountability
- Transparency and predictability
- Reduced fragmentation (partner-country led joint assistance strategies)
- Alignment (with national priorities and systems)

- Fragile and conflict situations

Partnership for impact

- Importance of South-South cooperation
- CSOs, LAs, private foundations
- For-profit private sector
- International climate change finance

Governance and monitoring of aid

Global Europe: a New Approach to financing EU external action -- COM(2011) 865 Final

Underlying principles (for all EFIs):

- Seizing new opportunities
- Maximising impact of scarce resources
 - Differentiated approach
 - Different forms of cooperation
 - Concentration
 - Flexibility
 - Simplified rules and procedures
 - Mutual accountability
 - Stronger involvement of European Parliament
- Revised and simplified programming
- Comprehensive joint EU strategies

A more flexible and reactive programming process

DCI to focus on poverty, also contributing to achieving other EU external action objectives:

- fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development and
- promoting democracy, rule of law, good governance, and respect for human rights.

MIP allocations

The following table, based on indicative programming documents, shows that the major focus areas for DCI bilateral programmes, consistent with the poverty orientation, have been education and sustainable agriculture. Regional programmes, not surprising, have concentrated on environmental issues and trade and regional integration. Support for civil society has come mainly through CSO/LA. GPGC has been a major player in natural resources and environment as well as sustainable agriculture and nutrition and on and sustainable agriculture.

Table 2 Indicative allocations for the DCI MIPs 2014-2020 by type of DCI programme (mEUR)⁵

<i>Priority / Sector</i>	<i>Geogr. (national)</i>	<i>Geogr. (regional)</i>	<i>Thematic GPGC</i>	<i>Thematic CSO&LA</i>	<i>PANAF⁶</i>	<i>Total</i>
Human rights, democracy and good governance	1,731	190	-	1,834	127	3,882
Civil society & local authorities ⁷	0	-	-	1,834		1,834
Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law	864	-	-	-	52	916
Development and security nexus	503	148	-	-	30	681
Public Sector management	364	42	-	-	45	451
GBS (GGDC/SBC)	0	-	-	-	-	-
Sustainable growth for human development	4,983	2,312	4,915	-	600	12,810
FNSSA	2,421	122	1,425	-	90	4,058
Environment / Natural resources	130	775	1,327	-	100	2,332
Education	1,502	-	266	-	125	1,893
Sustainable Energy	594	170	590	-	230 ⁸	1,584
Health	336	-	545	-	-	881
Other (Erasmus, culture, children)	37	670	165	-	-	872
Trade / Regional Integration	30	575	-	-	55	660
Growth, Jobs and Private Sector	339	-	104	-	-	443
Migration	0	-	344	-	-	344
Social protection	131	-	150	-	-	281
Infrastructure & Transport	0	-	-	-		
Total	6,714	2,502	4,915	1,834	727	16,692

Source: authors calculation based on MIPs 2014-2020.

⁵ The table only includes amounts which could be allocated to specific sectors. For instance, it does not include allocations related to support measures.

⁶ Does not include Support mechanism to the partnership and civil society: - EUR43M CSOs - EUR 45M AUC, and reserve, management costs

⁷ While CSO's-LA did not receive a special allocation via the geographic components of the DCI, they have played an active role as channel via other sectors, e.g. Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law.

⁸ Allocated for Infrastructure and Energy.

Commission Staff Working Paper: Impact Assessment accompanying the document Regulation establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation COM(2011) 840 final

Box 1 ***DCI Impact Assessment - Successes***

Geographic

- Incentive to take strategic approach (i.e., align with country-owned strategies; “beneficiary countries in driver’s seat”). In past, Commission had often selected sectors to support
- New implementation modalities – Budget Support, sector-wide approaches – have increased effectiveness of policy dialogue.
- Involvement of MSs (conduit of funds from small countries, beneficiary of experience)

Thematic

- Investing in People: Allowed responses to emerging priorities, co-funding international initiatives, reaching vulnerable populations.
- Environment, Natural Resources: support key EU and international policy initiatives (including climate change), involved partner countries in international initiatives, promoted EU policies externally, promoted smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth, especially the low carbon aspect.
- Non-state actors and local authorities: Actor-oriented, actions do not necessarily have endorsement of host government.
- Food security: Better performance over time; partners stronger, governance and networks strengthened, standards and tools being shared by donors, implementing partners, and recipient governments; enhanced involvement of CSOs in LRRD contexts; success in intervening in crisis and post-crisis situations.
- Migration: High quality of technical assistance and capacity building; significant flexibility and scope of action; increased integration of migration and asylum into development policies, matching EU political priorities with country needs; stimulates coordination between EU- and MS-financed programmes.

Box 2 DCI Impact Assessment - Areas of improvement

Geographic

- More comprehensive view of poverty
- Reform and modernization stressing inclusion and the environment
- More differentiation based on income level and fragile state status ... enhanced flexibility in objectives and cooperation modalities
- Transition challenges – unjustified expectation that DC will take over when IfS ceases in fragile states / countries in crisis.
- Persisting need for more concentration; still fragmented and over-ambitious.

Thematic

Overall

- Improve coherence between actions supported by geographic and thematic programmes
- Reduce number of small actions
- Move some actions to bilateral envelope
- More coordination with EU non-development policies
- **Investing in People:** Too many themes; high number of calls with low allocations; technical and operational difficulties; “dust bin” programme.
- **Environment and Natural Resources:** Wide range of themes makes it hard to have priorities; EU visibility weak; wide range of channels and implementation modalities makes management difficult.
- **Non-state actors and local authorities:** Calls for proposals systematically favour strong applicants to the exclusion of those in need of capacity building.
- **Food security:** Fragmented into too many sub-components and projects; need to streamline in fewer areas while maintaining basic orientation.
- **Migration:** Better involve partner governments, provide more support to CSOs-LAs; increase visibility and facilitate political dialogue by better implicating partner and MS governments.

Box 3 DCI Impact Assessment – Lessons Learnt

- Need to integrate growing number of EU internal policies (climate change, justice and security, et.) into external actions – need for integration, not duplication.
 - Existing fragmented architecture of DCI with several thematic programmes made it difficult to intervene quickly and on sufficient scale to project internal policies.
 - Thematic programmes were not sufficient to intervene quickly in crises (e.g., avian flu) or to support highest-level political engagements (climate change, biodiversity) – need for thematic programmes to allow longer-term engagement and to react to shocks.
- Too fragmented and over-ambitious.
- Insufficient provisions for fragile states – countries in post-crisis ... underestimate of need to support political processes and strengthen rule of law and governance.
- Limited possibility to mobilise resources for unforeseen needs
- Complex programming and implementation processes; difficulty of aligning with partner programming cycles; insufficient possibilities for joint programming with MSs

Box 4 *DCI Impact Assessment – Drivers of DCI problems and recommended responses:*

- Objectives not aligned with latest policy development trends
- Agenda for change insufficiently reflected
 - Inclusive and sustainable growth
 - Reducing vulnerability
 - Global public goods

Recommended response: Elevate sustainable and inclusive growth to be the driver of poverty alleviation “in order to increase [DCI’s] response capacity to global challenges and the protection of public goods that would properly take into account EU internal policy objectives.”

- Insufficient differentiation

Recommended response: Allow more differentiated response taking into account needs, capacities, and performance.

- Good governance, democracy, human rights, and rule of law insufficiently embedded

Recommended response: Increased linkage between allocation/programming and EU values.

- No framework so support strategic cooperation with Africa as a whole
 - No mechanism to support JAES -- reliance on intra-ACP unsuccessful.
 - Difficulties in mobilising ENPI for North Africa

Recommended response: Legal basis and coverage for supporting JAES.

- Thematic programmes too fragmented to address global problems comprehensively

Recommended response: Sufficient flexibility to mobilise significant resources (i) to project EU core values, (ii) allow EU to intervene more effectively on global public goods, and (iii) allow cooperation with countries not eligible for bilateral cooperation.

- Specificities of crisis, post-crisis, and fragility insufficiently taken into account – need for greater flexibility to finance sequenced actions.

Recommended response: Flexibility to allow swift adaptation of EU response to changing environment in crisis, post-crisis, and fragile state situations.

- Insufficient flexibility in fund allocation (no unallocated envelope)

Recommended response: Allocation between regions/countries/themes flexible enough to re-attribute in case of unanticipated needs.

- Complex and rigid programming process; stringent implementation rules.

Recommended response: Simplified and flexible process

Interviews

In DEVCO HQ interviews, a number of DEVCO officials stated that the most significant changes between the old DCI and the new were (i) concentration and (ii) differentiation. One of priorities of Agenda for Change was food security, and now about 1/3 of partner countries have food security as a focal sector.

In EEAS it was stressed that there is a danger that, without overall strategic vision, instrument becomes guided by purely technical considerations. Concerns were expressed regarding moving large amounts of money under close scrutiny and supervision.

Survey

The relevance of DCI as a policy driven tool was also corroborated by the survey. **The EUD survey largely confirms the above analysis of the DCI as a comprehensive tool for policy-driven development cooperation.** Almost all participating EUDs (87%) indicate that the DCI offers a suitable menu of options to deal with development priorities, engage in different policy areas and work with a variety of partners (e.g. public actors, civil society, private sector). When the DCI cannot be activated, other EFIs such as the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument contributing to Stability

and Peace (IcSP) or the Partnership Instrument (PI) are available to complement the EU response strategy at various levels (national, regional, continental). The existence of instruments that can be used autonomously by the EU for interventions in sensitive areas (e.g., human rights, civil society) is particularly important as this type of issues cannot always be easily mainstreamed in bilateral programmes to which government is a party.

Two examples from the survey illustrate this. In **Paraguay** the mix of instruments available was seen to correspond in general to current needs. In particular the bilateral geographical allocation under the DCI (168 M€) allows direct engagement and joint work with the government of Paraguay in several key sectors. The CSO-LA under DCI and the EIDHR make it possible to engage and support directly civil society. The regional instruments under the DCI allow the government and civil society (including the private sector) to benefit from exchange of experiences and good practices with other countries in the EU and/or Latin America, or from technical assistance. Finally interventions under the Global Public Goods and Challenges may also address, jointly with other countries, relevant issues for Paraguay.

The feedback received from Guatemala is that the mix of instruments covers the current needs of the Delegation. DCI caters for the government/Estate related issues as well as the Civil Society ones. The EIDHR takes care of the Human Rights questions and their defenders. This Delegation has only one programme finance by the Stability and Peace Instrument and it is related to the border dispute between Guatemala and Belize.

1.1.1.3 I-113 Extent to which DCI geographic programming processes give voice to major stakeholders, resulting in alignment with partner country needs.

Indicator Summary

This indicator is also relevant to JC 12.

There does not appear to have been much difficulty in strengthening, under the new DCI, the alignment of programming (for more on see I-332) with national development plans, at least in formal terms, including the flexibility to step outside them when EU and government priorities differ. Published official documents will not, of course, always reflect actual government priorities. The primary role of national policies and priorities is explicit in the DCI programming instructions. All MIPs reviewed refer to national plans and priorities, but these are skewed towards government. This suggests that, the new DCI notwithstanding, there is significant persistence of the traditional donor-government aid recipient relationship.

In line with international and EU policy commitments, the **DCI Regulation has defined clear ambitions in terms of reaching out to “all segments of society” in development and dialogue processes.** This holds particularly true for parliaments, local authorities and civil society regarding participation, oversight and accountability (see Article 3, par. 8, point c). However, extensive documentary analysis, including the review of recent EU strategic evaluations, shows that EU cooperation under DCI (and other EFIs) remains essentially centralised, leaving limited space for meaningful participation of other actors (civil society, local authorities, private sector, etc.) in domestic policy processes and strategic dialogue and cooperation with donors – despite dedicated efforts of the latter to create space for effective involvement of these other actors in development (as requested by the Busan Outcome Document and various EU policies). The DCI, despite ambitions for multi-actor partnerships, remains essentially a government-to-government instrument.

In a similar vein, the existence of Civil Society Roadmaps has not necessarily led to stronger civil society involvement in setting priorities. While CSOs are regularly consulted, it is important that they raise concerns and propose priorities in the early stages of the programming process, before an initial proposal has been agreed between the EUD HQ and a second stage of policy dialogue commences. It was noted that discussions of sector choice are heavily informed by statistical and quantitative indicators, with little discussion of the qualitative, institutional, and political dimensions of the sectors identified. There was a fair bit of simple inertia in programming, i.e. the sectors chosen being those in which the EU had worked in the past. In interviews, it was noted that, while programming originates at the country level, priorities identified have frequently been adjusted by EU HQ in Brussels.

Despite commitment in the programming instructions to mainstreaming issues of particular importance from the Agenda for Change point of view, it is not clear from information to date how successful mainstreaming was. One thematic evaluation (gender) was critical of progress in mainstreaming, and elsewhere, we have found that mainstreaming of human rights has also been found weak.

Building on the Agenda for Change, **the DCI Regulation 2014-2020 upgraded the status of democracy, rule of law and human rights (including gender equality)**. These principles are seen to be “*essential for the development of partner countries*” and should therefore be “*mainstreamed in the Union’s development policy*” (see preliminary point 8 of the DCI Regulation). While highly relevant from a European perspective (i.e. promotion of core EU values in external action), a recent review of strategic evaluations suggests that many partner governments across regions are reluctant to engage with the EU on this agenda⁹. The review concludes that results are “*conditioned by the political commitment of the partners, the limited leverage of the EU, and the difficult mainstreaming*” as well as by “*the quality of the strategy, which has been strongly state-centred and supply-driven, with limited attention to the involvement of non-state actors*”. The EUD survey confirms how challenging it can be in particular DCI countries to address controversial, human rights related issues in a meaningful way. Academic literature confirms widespread “pushback” in which the Western model of liberal democratic development is encountering increasing resistance¹⁰. Hence, the level of strategic congruence between EU actors and partners on political issues is less than assumed in official documents

Regional programming exercises give proper weight to the regional and cross-border aspect of the areas selected for concentration and reflect dialogue with relevant institutions, especially ASEAN for Asia and ECLAC for Latin America.

Review national MIPs

All country MIPs systematically refer to government priorities as outlined in national development strategies and/or relevant sector strategies or similar documents, and highlight the alignment of the EU strategy to those priorities.

Some country MIPs refer to specific dialogue with the government in the MIP programming process (*‘The definition of the two priority sectors is the result of ample exchanges with national authorities [...]’*, Colombia (p.2); *‘The choice of the focal areas has been discussed with Government [...]’*, Mongolia (p.3)), or to a direct response to government request for engagement (*‘[...]this would enable the EU to respond effectively to the recent requests from the Government and President Atambaev to assist with reforming the election framework [...]’*, Kyrgyz Republic (p.5))

Partner country needs are discussed in the contextual analysis for each priority sector, highlighting the relevance of the EU response to those needs. Nevertheless, elements of political economy analysis are not present or perhaps (rarely) implicitly. Sector contexts/needs are therefore presented using mostly various statistical indicators, government implemented and planned reforms and priorities, and often EU’s and other donors’ past activity in the sector.

See also I-231 on CSO/LA contribution to programming, and I-233 for private sector.

Review regional MIPs

Compared to the national MIPs, the involvement of stakeholders at national level is very limited. In situations, where there is a strong counterpart at regional level, such as ASEAN in the case of the Asia MIP or via the EU-CELAC Strategic Partnership in the Latin America MIP, major stakeholders have been involved in the programming process. Naturally, while

⁹ Review of strategic evaluations managed by DEVCO to assess the European Consensus on Development. Final Report, October 2016.

¹⁰ See Youngs R. 2015. *Exploring Non-Western democracy*. Journal of Democracy, October 2015, Vol 26, Issue 4, pp. 140-155. The issue of the “global pushback” of Western models of democracy is also analysed in Carothers, T and S. Brechenmacher. 2014. *Closing Space: Democracy and human rights support under fire*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

the national MIPs are focussed on partner country needs, the regional MIPs focus on areas in which a regional approach adds value.

“ASEAN’s integration efforts will be further supported in the 2014-20 period. In order to foster ownership and visibility, a distinctive envelope for cooperation with ASEAN is included in this MIP. In April 2012 at the Ministerial Meeting in Brunei, the EU and ASEAN agreed the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership (2013-2017). This Plan of Action forms the basis for the cooperation programme, together with the key strategic documents adopted by ASEAN.” (Asia MIP 2014-2020, 2014, 3-4)

The Multiannual Indicative Regional Programme for Latin America (2014, 5) highlights “The continental nature of the challenges faced, and of the responses required, is widely recognised in the region. This is also reflected in the EU-LAC dialogue at the highest political level (as illustrated in outcomes of the EU-CELAC7 Summit, January 2013). This expression of ownership and political will on the part of all the countries of the region is an asset for the purposes of implementing EU cooperation responses at continental level.”

Review of evaluations

Overall, evaluation reports stress the alignment between DCI programming and national priorities and development plans, except in special cases where EU and government policy priorities do not coincide. For example: *“The EU regional support strategy has adequately taken into account many of the key priorities of Central American Heads of States [...] However, in contrast to their concurrence on high level cooperation objectives, the two parties showed less agreement on the intended results of specific cooperation programmes and their key deliverables [...]”* (Evaluation of the EU’s Cooperation with Central America, p. 32); *“In the same vein, the EU has generally aligned its support to the beneficiary countries’ priorities but has also, on good grounds, reserved itself the right not to align when confronted by specific drawbacks to alignment, [...]”* (Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries, p. iii). According to the Evaluation of EU regional level support to Central Asia (2007-2014) (Draft Final Report), alignment with national priorities varies from one sector to another.

A review of evaluations leaves the impression that stakeholder involvement in programming is heavily slanted towards government. Some reports specifically refer to the participation of non-government stakeholders in the design and implementation of programmes and projects although overall it seems that their involvement have been weak and limited e.g.: *“The participation of non-government stake-holders in the design and especially the implementation of programmes and projects has clearly grown during the duration of the RSP. However, this does not yet extend to a systematic and institutionalised involvement of civil society across all major fields of the co-operation programme.”* (Evaluation of the EU’s Cooperation with Asia, Viii). *“The relevance of strategy and programmes has been undermined by limited engagement with intended beneficiaries during formulation processes [...]”* (Evaluation of EU Cooperation with Yemen, 19); *“While project programming and evaluation have been progressively relatively open processes, the EC convened only specific stakeholders for its strategic planning exercises during the evaluation period. Consultation – more than participation in this case - has been restricted to State and Non-State Actors, leaving out EU MS and other donors.”* (Evaluation of the Commission of the European Union’s Co-operation with Colombia, 76-77); *“While, in most operations, no complementary component to support the participation of non-state actors was included in the SBS package (e.g. in MSB III, the responsibility for the inclusion of CSOs in the water and sanitation sector was entirely left to GoSA), some SBS operations include specific envelopes to directly support CSOs (e.g. Access to Justice).”* (Evaluation of Budget Support in South Africa, 104-105).

The Review of Strategic Evaluations (October 2016) provides additional evidence of the limited success achieved with involving the private sector (e.g. on institutional and regulatory reforms affecting private sector development). It concluded that the *“consolidation and mainstreaming of the strategic role of CSOs, non-state and decentralised actors in development processes – including in the identification of the country priorities and the association to the main programmes- is still a challenge.”*

Instructions for the programming of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – 2014-2020

Guiding principles:

- Ownership – programming starts with national governments / regional organisations, national parliament and other representative institutions, CSOs, social partners, private sector. EUD to report to EEAS and DEVCO what consultations took place.
- Comprehensiveness and coherence – overall vision should ensure
 - Coherence between country and regional programmes
 - Coherence between country and regional programmes and HQ-managed thematic programmes
 - Coherence between development and other EU policies (PCD)
 - Coherence between EU policies and actions and those of MSs and EIB
- Synchronisation and flexibility – synchronization with partner country / regional programming cycle, flexibility to respond to crises and volatility.
- Differentiation – “graduation” combined with new forms of development partnership.
- Sector concentration, priority to be given to sectors identified in Agenda for Change.
- Blending for growth, primarily through regional investment facilities
- Coordination and joint programming

First phase programming process:

- To extent possible, base programming on country development plan or equivalent. – CSPs/RSPs to be exception, not rule.
- Can step outside national development plan to support policies and actions in areas considered vital to country or regional development (e.g., climate change).
- Joint programming – joint analysis and response by EU and MSs
- Wherever possible, prepare Joint Framework Document covering diplomatic and political aspects (CCFSP, political dialogue, democracy and human rights), development cooperation, humanitarian aid, security, and external projection of internal EU policies.

Second phase programming process:

- MIP
- Identify focal sectors
 - Sector policy commitments must take into account cross-cutting issues
 - Human rights
 - Gender equality
 - Democracy
 - Good governance
 - Children’s rights
 - Disabilities
 - Indigenous peoples
 - Environmental sustainability
 - Combating HIV/AIDS
- Indicative amount allocated to each sector
- Overall and specific objectives for each sector
- For each specific objective, main expected results
- For each result, main indicators and targets
- Where possible, use national monitoring system

Possible amount to be un-programmed in order to respond to specific needs of post-crisis / fragile situations.

Interviews

The programming process begins with the allocation model, which combines needs and resources and is designed to be neutral. Once the amount is set, programming begins at the EUD. While the EUD produces the first draft of the proposed country programme, frequent changes have been reported to be introduced by HQ.

1.1.1.4 I-114 Extent to which regional and thematic programmes have been effectively used to support cooperation in countries not qualifying for DCI ODA.

Indicator Summary

It has been stated, based on interviews, that one of the main changes in the post-2014 period has been the increase in differentiation, the major implication of which is that some countries are no longer eligible for ODA. The dramatic decrease in the share of DCI allocated to upper middle income countries (UMICs) is illustrated under I-241. This is consistent with the continuing focus on poverty, and the increased emphasis on inclusion of the most vulnerable, in the new DCI. It may also be consistent with the view that, in many UMICs, the persistence of poverty and social exclusion (i) reflects national policies that the EU is reluctant to support and (ii) could be addressed by improved domestic resource mobilisation and allocation.

The two downsides of differentiation are that substantial numbers of persons in UMICs remain poverty (e.g. Brazil; one estimate has it that most of the world's poor live in UMICs) and (ii) many UMICs are still eager to collaborate in selected thematic areas which may provide significant opportunities for promoting European values (e.g., social protection in China).

The response in the new DCI is to specify that countries who have “graduated,” i.e. are no longer eligible for bilateral geographic cooperation, may nonetheless qualify for regional or thematic cooperation. Quantitative analysis indicates that (i) significant amounts of geographic cooperation decided funds (presumably all regional) go to UMICs (see data extraction under I-111) and (ii) 20% of DCI thematic programme decided funds go to UMICs (see data extraction below). Whether this is support has been effectively used cannot be said on current evidence.

In presenting evidence under I-112, we presented regional and thematic allocations by sector. While we cannot break out non-ODA-eligible countries, it is clear that substantial regional sums go to sectors associated with inclusive and sustainable growth, as do all GPGC allocations.

Review regional MIPs

While co-operation at national level has a clear focus on poor countries, regional programming has the flexibility to go beyond traditional cooperation. This is particularly highlighted in the Asia and Latin America MIP, but also apparent for Central Asia.

In the case of the Asia MIP, 19 countries are eligible to receive financing at regional level compared to 12 countries that will continue to benefit from bilateral programmes financed by the DCI. Notably China, India, Indonesia, People's Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Maldives and Thailand are only included under the DCI regional programming, out of which two are considered as EU strategic partners (China and India).

The Latin America MIP highlights that *“since 2002, poverty and extreme poverty have steadily declined in both relative and absolute terms lifting 60 million out of poverty (out of a total population of 580 million); the middle-classes are rapidly growing and many countries have now achieved Upper Middle Income Country (UMIC) status. This creates an historic opportunity for the continent to eradicate poverty, in particular extreme poverty, poverty pockets and to address the feminisation of poverty. This will require a comprehensive and multidimensional approach.*

With many countries having achieved UMIC status, aggregate EU bilateral cooperation programmes (i.e. those pursued at national level) with Latin America will diminish in relative

importance for the next programming period 2014-2020. Bilateral cooperation will of course remain significant in relation to those countries where the development challenges are greatest and where it could have greatest impact. Conversely, the EU's regional programmes for Latin America will remain and be consolidated.” (2014, 1)

The continental activities in Latin America include Upper Middle Income countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The Central Asia MIP covers all Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan.

The Asia MIP (2014, 5) stresses that “EU support to uprooted people remains important, also in countries which may no longer benefit from a bilateral DCI allocation. The recent Evaluation Report found that “in many settings, the EU was the main provider of needed basic services to large groups of uprooted people”, and that “AUP-financed interventions have delivered a significant amount of LRRD (Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development) in the context of crises of uprooting.” Continued assistance is or may be needed in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Given current and future needs – in particular to finance actions to effectively link relief, rehabilitation and development – allocations broadly in line with previous commitments are warranted.”

MIP CSO/LA 2014-2020

The MIP for CSO/LA highlights the possibility to support cooperation in countries not qualifying for DCI ODA:

“The Programme will support actions in partner countries (pursuant to Art. 1.1.b of the DCI) and in the Union. When actions relate to Development Education and Awareness Raising of European citizens this is extended to countries covered by the Instrument of Pre-Accession (IPA) Regulation.

Being not subject to the concentration and differentiation principles, it can fund activities in all developing countries including in countries that are not benefitting any longer from bilateral EU development assistance (the so-called ‘graduated countries’).”

Source: EU (2014) MIP for the Thematic Programme “Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities for the period 2014-2020”, 10.

1.1.1.5 I-115 Extent to which DCI thematic programmes cover major EU priorities in global public goods and challenges identified while engaging CSOs and LAs in a strategic manner.

Indicator Summary

Both the MIPs for CSO-LA and GPGC show evidence of a thoroughly reasoned strategic approach. The former reflects lessons learned in an evaluation of the precursor Non-State Actors-Local Authorities thematic instrument 2007-13. GPGC essentially brought together all remaining thematic instruments under the DCI 2007-13, with the exception of EIDHR, under one umbrella (see I-321 and I-322 for further discussion). Reportedly there was consideration of consolidating EIDHR as well, but this option was rejected in recognition of the fact that democracy and human rights is unique sector in many respects and requires an explicitly political approach. Remaining focal areas – environment and climate change, sustainable energy, human development (mostly health and education) and migration and asylum all have very significant public good aspects. Consolidation under GPGC, it was felt, would help to streamline administration, which in many country evaluations had been found to be fragmented and lead to a proliferation of small projects, with correspondingly high management costs at EUD level. It does not appear that the consolidation led to the emergence of gaps, i.e. major areas being left behind, but it is equally unclear that it reduced fragmentation or tightened focus (see I-322). From the strategic point of view, GPGC highlights the European concerns and priorities as set forth under Global Europe (see under I-111) and, from a development perspective builds on strong links between the areas highlighted and poverty / exclusion / vulnerability. The theme of resilience is strongly reflected in GPGC. As discussed under EQ 3 on efficiency, in theory the consolidation could be seen as leading to efficiency gains. Yet in practice, the actual benefits are rather limited as the GPGC is very broad in terms of coverage (de facto re-introducing all areas previously

covered by separate instruments). Moreover, these thematic lines are tied to specific programming and allocation processes, potentially reducing flexibility and bringing along the risk of managing these funds “in a silo”

The role accorded to CSOs under the new DCI is consistent with the relevant Communications (2012), excerpted below, as are the processes and mechanisms set forth in the DCI Programming Guide. Country evaluations report positive experiences of CSO involvement in reform processes. EAMRs reviewed generally refer to dialogue with CSOs with enthusiasm, although one expert remarked that the emphasis was often on quantity rather than quality. The CSO Roadmap is frequently mentioned in EAMRs and a recent analysis by an independent group generally remarked favourably on the Roadmap process, which recommending that associated Action Plans need to be more tangible (and a further statement could be made about LAs). An analysis of roadmaps also shows that in many DCI countries the involvement of CSOs is hampered by the phenomenon of “shrinking space” (e.g. through restrictive measures by governments), a reality also observed during the field missions (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia). In response, the EU has often committed itself in these roadmaps to promote an “enabling environment” for civil society.

In general, the CSO-LA budget line is small compared to bilateral cooperation, and the real challenge is to integrate these actors better into mainstream development cooperation. To this might be added that Roadmaps tend to be regarded as development tools as opposed to broader external action tools with an explicit political dimension.

Under I-323 the fact that the LA component of CSO-LAs has been slow to take off relative to the CSO component. An institutional hypothesis is advanced to explain this.

The new DCI formalises the Global Europe commitment to devote no less than 25% of GPGC to climate change and no less than 20% to social inclusion and human development. While it is not possible, based on the contracted amounts in the data extraction below, to determine whether GPGC is on track in this regard, it is at least obvious that sectors crucial to social inclusion and human development – basic health and education, agriculture and food have received a substantial share of resources. This is less evident for sectors closely related to the climate change-sustainable energy-environment nexus. For evidence that budgeted amounts for 2014 met these targets, see under I-221.

MIP CSO/LA 2014-2020

The thematic programme Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities provides a vehicle for engaging with CSOs/LAs in a strategic manner:

“The Thematic Programme ‘Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities’ (CSOs LAs) has its legal base in Regulation 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 11 March 2014, establishing a financing Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI). The DCI defines the objective of the Programme as to strengthen civil society organisations and local authorities in partner countries and, when their actions relate to Development Education and Awareness Raising (DEAR) of European citizens, in the Union and beneficiaries eligible under the IPA Regulation. The Programme will be implemented over the period 2014-2020. Three priorities are identified:

- Action at country level will be at the core of the Programme to support CSOs and LAs contributions to governance and accountability through inclusive policy-making - hence empowering citizens and populations through the voicing and structuring of their collective demands to tackle injustice and inequality, to benefit from qualitative social services and to profit from wealth and job creation. The Programme will also support actions aimed at a sustainable territorial development, including in urban contexts, to foster local development and social cohesion. The promotion of an enabling environment for CSOs and LAs - in its legal, regulatory and operational dimensions – will be a crosscutting element.
- Regional and global CSOs networks and associations of LAs are essential stakeholders playing a pivotal role in linking local concerns, often caused by global challenges, to regional and international debates. The EU aims at strengthening them with a view to enhance their contributions to development, especially in the post-2015 Development Agenda.

- DEAR activities will aim at developing citizens' awareness and critical understanding of the interdependent world, of their role and responsibility in relation to a globalised society; and to support their active engagement with global attempts to eradicate poverty and promote justice, human rights and democracy, social responsibility, gender equality, and a sustainable social economic development in partner countries."

Source: EU (2014) MIP for the Thematic Programme "Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities for the period 2014-2020", 2.

"Informed by the outcomes of the "Structured Dialogue on the involvement of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Local Authorities (LAs) in EU Development Cooperation", the Agenda for Change recognises both actors as key players in its two pillars. It calls for strengthened "links with civil society organisations, social partners and local authorities, through regular dialogue and use of best practices", in particular to "support the emergence of a local civil society which can effectively contribute to dialogue with public authorities and to oversee public authorities' work", and to "consider ways of mobilising local authorities' expertise, e.g. through networks of excellence or twinning exercises". It also highlights the value of multi-actor partnerships including public actors, civil society, the private sector and local communities."

Source: EU (2014) MIP for the Thematic Programme "Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities for the period 2014-2020", 3.

Lessons learned from the previous NSA/LA programme have been integrated. Particular attention has been paid to:

"Go beyond the traditional model of CSOs as pure service deliverers to acknowledge CSOs work to empower populations, promote inclusion and enhance governance and accountability – beyond project implementation and service delivery."

Source: EU (2014) MIP for the Thematic Programme "Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities for the period 2014-2020", 7.

MIP NSA/LA 2007-2013

"The predecessor of this Programme was the "Non-State Actors (NSAs) and Local Authorities in Development" Thematic Programme (2007- 2013), implemented at country, regional and global levels. The legal base was the Regulation 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation. It has been a key instrument in supporting Civil Society and Local Authorities, particularly in partner countries. It has integrated important innovations, including opening up the eligibility criteria to allow access of partner countries' organisations to funding (as before only European organisations were eligible). or the period 2007-2013, a total amount of EUR 1.567 million was committed under the NSA-LA Programme. It was articulated around three main objectives. 83% of funds were allocated to the first objective of promoting an inclusive and empowered society at country level and to facilitate NSAs' and LAs' participation in poverty reduction and sustainable development. The second objective of development education and awareness raising in the EU and acceding countries received 14% of the funds; 2% were allocated to the third objective of coordination of NSAs and LAs networks in the EU and acceding countries. Over the period 2007-2011 the geographical allocation of funds reflected the principles established in the NSA-LA Strategy. Therefore, funds for in-country initiatives were allocated as follows: 48% to the ACP region; 20% to Latin America; 23% to Asia; 6% to the Neighbourhood; 2% to the Middle East and 1% to Central Asia.

Support to CSOs and LAs has also been provided, directly or indirectly, through geographical instruments (bilateral and regional Programmes) as well as other instruments and Thematic Programmes (the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument for Stability (IfS), other Thematic Programmes under the DCI, the Civil Society Facility under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)."

Source: EU (2014) MIP for the Thematic Programme "Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities for the period 2014-2020", 6-7.

A final evaluation of the previous Thematic Programme NSA-LA (2007-2013) was carried out in 2013 with the following main conclusions and recommendations:

- “In partner countries, the Programme has reached an increasing share of local CSOs, thus contributing to their empowerment and build-up of capacities as development and governance actors. The Programme is also commended for its valuable contribution to the enabling environment in the countries covered, by widening and deepening the dialogue between CSO, partner governments and other stakeholders including local authorities. The flexibility provided at country level has allowed for better responses to the local contexts and changing conditions, including shrinking space for CSOs.
- The evaluation praised the gradual re-orientation of support to multi-country projects and multi-actor partnerships was towards strategic strengthening of existing and representative NSAs and LAs networks at regional and global level. This approach has successfully contributed to the regional and continental structuring of these actors and has also enhanced their capacity to engage on international issues with the Union and other development partners.
- In EU Member States, the development education and awareness-raising component has contributed to enhance dialogue at national level, with increasing attention for development issues, notably in new Member States. In addition, continued exchange of best practices under the Programme has led to innovation and quality improvements. In terms of management, the Programme evaluation recommends more structured and systematic monitoring and evaluation of projects to allow for effective management of results, especially above project level; it also recommended adopting a more strategic approach beyond the project funding.
- Other recommendations include a more widespread and strategic use of support measures, less funding-related and more focused on strategic capacity development of CSO and LA; reaching out to other types of actors (social partners in dialogue), more attention to the quality of partnerships, to the inclusion of disadvantaged and marginalised groups and to cross-cutting issues such as gender mainstreaming.”

Source: EU (2014) *MIP for the Thematic Programme “Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities for the period 2014-2020”*, 7-8.

MIP GPGC 2014-2020

“In line with the DCI Regulation's call for Union assistance to respond to the global challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable and inclusive development, and in line with the commitment of the Union to promote in its internal and external policies smart inclusive and sustainable growth bringing together the three pillars of sustainable development , the GPGC programme will seek to achieve this objective through coherent, coordinated and focused action, in complementarity with the geographic programmes, in a number of key areas:

- Environment and climate change
- Sustainable energy
- Human development
- Food and nutrition security and sustainable agriculture
- Migration and asylum.”

EU (2014) *Programming Thematic Programmes and Instruments, Programme on Global Public Goods and Challenges 2014-2020*, 6.

Review EAMRs 2013

CSOs remain important partners for implementing EU programmes in a wide range of sectors under DCI, either directly or in association with other institutions (e.g: health, education, social protection, climate change, etc.).

Review EAMRs 2015


The GPGC thematic instrument is currently being implemented in 8 out of 24 countries reviewed under 2015 EAMRs. (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Laos, Nicaragua, and Tajikistan).

Only a few cases refer to thematic/sub-thematic priorities under the GPGC programme: children and gender (e.g. Bangladesh), nutrition (e.g. Bangladesh, Laos), climate change (e.g. Bangladesh, Nicaragua), forestry (e.g. Cambodia), Health (e.g. Bangladesh, Nicaragua), food security/value chains and preservation of marine/coastal biodiversity (Cuba), and human trafficking and migration (e.g. Nicaragua, Tajikistan).

Overall, the EU strongly engages with CSOs and LAs in a strategic manner. All EAMRs except those from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have launched or are planning to launch Calls for Proposals under the CSO/LA thematic instrument, but in terms of LAs the EU faces some challenges and difficulties. Reports mainly refer to CSOs as important EU partners and interlocutors in the implementation of EU external assistance. CSO Roadmap exercises are also frequently mentioned, and are perceived as a major contribution and a positive development for further strengthening relations with CSOs e.g. “[...] the introduction of the Civil Society Roadmap has equally been a very positive development. OSC platforms and networks have seen this instrument as a welcome EU contribution facilitating their policy influence and the improvement of the political environment for their work” (EAMR Colombia 2015, 7-9); Bangladesh “In this context, and in line with the Roadmap for engagement with the civil society in Bangladesh, the Delegation has consolidated its engagement with advocacy, watchdog and human rights CSOs through CSO/LA and EIDHR support.” (EAMR Bangladesh 2015, 10-11).

In general, the EU engages in dialogue with civil society under DCI programmes. Dialogue is multi-faceted and occurs at different levels (political/technical), in many different settings (informal/formal), and in different areas. Consultations cover multiple topics and subjects and vary from country to country depending on the particular context and needs. EAMRs usually refer to areas covered by Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC), thematic programmes such as food security and sustainable agriculture (e.g. Cambodia, Cuba, Kyrgyzstan), climate change (e.g. Guatemala, Myanmar), education (e.g. Cambodia, Kirgizstan, Myanmar) and health (e.g. Vietnam).

Figure 3 Inclusion and dialogue with CSO/LAs



Source: EAMRs 2013 & 2015

Global Europe: a New Approach to financing EU external action – COM(2011) 865 Final

Thematic programmes to be “streamlined” for “enhanced flexibility to allow for swift responses to new global challenges.”

GPGC for “main” global public goods and challenges, while ensuring coherence with poverty reduction objective:

- Climate change and environment (no less than 25%)
- Energy

- Social inclusion and human development (no less than 20%)
- Food security and sustainable agriculture
- Migration

CSO-LA to empower these actors to become involved in development strategies and processes.

COM(2012) 492 Final The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations"

Sets forth priorities for EU support:

- Promote a conducive environment for CSOs in partner countries
- Promote meaningful and structure participation of CSOs i
 - Domestic politics
 - EU programming
 - International processes
- Increase local CSO's capacities

COM(2012) 492 Final The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations"

Analysis of six EU country roadmaps

- Best cases were those where there was engagement of broader donor community.
- Roadmaps mainstreamed CSOs into all sectors; CSOs generally involved in development of roadmap but their role in implementation needs to be highlighted.
- Roadmaps all reflect guidance received from DG DEVCO.
- Action Plans often not tangible enough.

Source: Concord, Analysis of six EU country roadmaps with civil society and recommendations for the future (22 September, 2015).

Dashboard extraction

The following table gives the amounts committed per sub-sector under the thematic instruments. As called for, major sectors include human development (health and education) and the climate change-environment-sustainable energy nexus.

Table 3 Comparison between distribution of committed amounts and MIPs allocations – Thematic programmes

Priority / Sector	Committed amounts	MIP allocation	% of MIP committed
Human rights, democracy and good governance	475	1,834	26%
Civil society & local authorities	475	1,834	
Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law	-	-	
Development and security nexus	-	-	
Public Sector management, Tax, Corruption	-	-	
GBS (GGDC/SBC)	-	-	
Sustainable growth for human development	1,269	4,915	26%
Food & Nutrition Security, Sustainable Agriculture	373	1,425	
Natural resources, environment and climate change	424	1,327	
Human development	317	1,229	
<i>Health</i>	190	545	
<i>Education</i>	62	266	
<i>Growth, Jobs and Private Sector Engagement</i>	28	104	

<i>Priority / Sector</i>	<i>Committed amounts</i>	<i>MIP allocation</i>	<i>% of MIP committed</i>
<i>Other (e.g. gender, children, culture)</i>	23	165	
<i>Social protection</i>	14	150	
Sustainable Energy	68	590	
Migration	88	344	
Trade, Markets and Reg Integration	-	-	
Infrastructure & Transport	-	-	
Total	4,915	6,792	

Source: authors calculation based on 2016 DEVCO Dashboard data and MIPs 2014-2020 allocations.

Interviews

Thematic programmes sometimes have the side effect of diluting concentration.

1.1.1.6 I-116 Extent to which the Pan-African Programme effectively supports the Joint Africa Europe Strategy (JAES).

Indicator Summary

Based mostly on interviews (DEVCO HQ, EEAS, EUD to the African Union, AUC staff and MS representatives) and documentary review (EAMRs, MIP, Annual Action Plans and Action documents), the explicit purpose of the Pan-African Programme was to support the JAES, which during its initial years 2008-10 found itself a strategy with no dedicated funds to back it up.

The main source of funding for Africa was EDF, which did not cover the countries of North Africa (ENI) and South Africa (DCI). This resulted in the JAES becoming more of a platform for dialogue than a genuine strategy under implementation. One major feature of the Pan-African Programme is its support to the African Union, especially via a EUR 40 million budget support programme for capacity building (African Union Support Programme III (AUSP III)).

The effectiveness of AU capacity building to date has been questioned; for example, the EU is financing many staff positions. This raises questions of whether the Pan-African Programme adequately responds to JAES priorities, how priorities are identified through dialogue, how programmes are designed, etc. Field mission interviews and documentary review revealed the emphasis of the Pan-African Programme on capacity building measures and financing staff positions in the African Union to ensure that the second Seven Pillar Assessment will be positive (the AU failed to pass the bar on three aspects of the previous Assessment). Yet while the Pan-African Programme and the support to the AUC can be considered a high risk (e.g. related to AUC capacity, sustainability of the programme) initiative, it was frequently reported that the potential high return and positive developments are worth taking the risk. The Programme is supporting a wide range of African institutions through the AU, dealing with issues ranging from human rights, civil society, remittances, etc., as well as the Pan African Parliament and dialogue processes related to migration.

Interviews indicate that the JAES is considered as a relatively effective policy instrument. While some voices expressed doubts about the viability of the JAES as a strategic policy instrument, EUD staff and MS representatives highlight the added value of the EU and the Pan-African Programme as a means of conducting policy and political dialogue in an increasingly difficult context. At the project level, the Pan-African Programme has made a major priority of supporting African research and innovation, e.g. through the Africa Connect project to boost ITC. A substantial decision on support for the African Migration and Mobility Dialogue was signed in 2014.

The attachment of the Pan-African Programme to DCI was essentially an arrangement of convenience. The Pan-African Programme has become a sort of regional DCI instrument for the African continent.

MIP allocations

The Pan-African Programme MIP 2014-2020 presents a breakdown of the overall allocation to the Pan-African Programme for the period 2014-2017 (a total of 415 mEUR, i.e. half of the overall allocation to the Pan-African Programme for 2014-2020 excluding administrative support allocations) – see table below.

Table 4 Pan-African Programme Indicative allocations MIP 2014-2017 (mEUR)

MIP/Area	mEUR
MIP 2014-2017	415
Strategic area 1: Peace and security <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring and assessment of organised crime at cross-regional and continental level Capacities of national, regional and continental stakeholders, in particular civilian security and judicial authorities Continental/cross-regional coordination and operational cooperation 	15 (4%)
Strategic area 2: Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights <ul style="list-style-type: none"> African Governance Architecture Electoral observation and support CSOs Contribution to Good Governance and Human Rights Public Finance Management 	45 (11%)
Strategic area 3: Human Development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Science, Technology and Innovation Higher Education Mobility and Migration 	90 (22%)
Strategic area 4: Sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trade and Continental Integration Raw Materials Statistics and Economic Analysis Infrastructure Agriculture 	210 (51%)
Strategic area 5: Global and cross-cutting issues <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Climate change and Environment Capacity building for AUC and other AU institutions/organs Civil society in the JAES Support to the implementation of the JAES 	55 (13%)

Source: Pan-African Programme MIP 2014-2020.

Overview of interventions

Year	CRIS#	Title	EU contr mEUR	Channel/ Aid method
Strategic area 1: Peace and security				
2015	DCI/PANAF/037-964	Enhancing African capacity to respond more effectively to transnational organised crime (TOC)	14,5	A non-pillar assessed direct grant
Strategic area 2: Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights				
2014	DCI/PANAF/037-481	The African Union Capacity in Election Observation (AUCapEO)	6,5	Direct mgmt – grant-direct award to the AU Commission and procurement of services

<i>Year</i>	<i>CRIS#</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>EU contr mEUR</i>	<i>Channel/ Aid method</i>
2014	DCI/PANAF/037-507	Pan-African Financial Governance Programme	5	Indirect management with Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ)
2015	DCI/PANAF/037-827	Strengthening the African Human Rights System	10	Direct management (grants – direct award and procurement of services)
2015	DCI/PANAF/38025	Enhancing civil society's role in Pan African issues (also relevant for strategic area 5)	20	Direct mgmt – grants – CfP
2015	DCI/PANAF/038-221	Contribution to the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) – Phase 2	5	Indirect management with UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund)
Strategic area 3: Human Development				
2014	DCI/PANAF/037-472	Support to the Pan African Masters Consortium in Interpretation and Translation (PAMCIT)	4,7	Indirect management (DEVCO) with UNON Direct management through cross-sub-delegation
2014	DCI/PANAF/037-621	African Union Research Grants II (AURG II)	10	Indirect management with the African Union Commission
2014	DCI/PANAF/037-526	AfricaConnect2	20	Direct management – grants- direct award
2014	DCI/PANAF/037-479	Harmonisation of Higher Education in Africa	5	Direct mgmt by DG EAC – procurement of services
2014	DCI/PANAF/037-485	Support to Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue	17,5	Indirect mgmt with the ICMPD
2015	DCI/PANAF/037-532	Intra-Africa Academic Mobility Scheme	10	Direct management through EU executive agency: Education Audio-visual and Culture Executive Agency Grants (call for proposals) and procurement of services
2016	DCI/PANAF/038-821	Intra-Africa Academic Mobility Scheme II	10	Direct mgmt through EACEA and Grants (CfP) and procurement of services
Strategic area 4: Sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental				

<i>Year</i>	<i>CRIS#</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>EU contr mEUR</i>	<i>Channel/ Aid method</i>
integration				
2014	DCI/PANAF/037-484	Contribution to the African Legal Support Facility (ALSF)	5	Indirect management with the African Development Bank
2014	DCI/PANAF/037-475	Pan African Statistics (PAS)	10	Direct management through cross-sub-delegation with Eurostat (component 1) Direct management – Grant – Direct award to the AfDB (component 2)
2014	DCI/PANAF/037-500	EU-Africa Infrastructure Support Mechanism	6	Part in direct management – procurement of services ; and Part in indirect management with GIZ and SIDA (alternatively UNDP)
2014	DCI/PANAF/037-525	Support to Africa Transport Policy Programme Development Plan 2014-2018 (SSATP-DP3)	8	Indirect management with an international organisation (Trust Fung managed by the World Bank)
2015	DCI/PANAF/038-009	Pan-African Support to the EuroGeoSurveys-Organisation of African Geological Surveys (EGS-OAGS) Partnership (PanAfGeo)	10	Direct management grants – direct award to BRGM (Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières) who will form a consortium with EuroGeoSurveys (EGS) and several of its members to implement the action
2015	DCI/PANAF/038-360	European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) in Africa Support Programme	4,7	Direct management – grants direct award and Indirect management with n EU specialised agency (European Global Navigation Satellite Systems Agency (GSA))
2016	DCI-PANAF/038-619	LIVE2AFRICA: Pan-African Support to the AU-IBAR for a Sustainable Development of Livestock for Livelihoods in Africa	19	Indirect mgmt with AU-IBAR

<i>Year</i>	<i>CRIS#</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>EU contr mEUR</i>	<i>Channel/ Aid method</i>
Strategic area 5: Global and cross-cutting issues				
2014	DCI/PANAF/037-565	Joint Africa-EU Strategy Support Mechanism II and Communication Strategy (JAES SM II)	9,5	Direct mgmt – Procurement of services
2015	DCI/PANAF/038-010	Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) and Africa Support Programme	26,5	Direct mgmt: procurement of services and administrative Arrangement with the JRC and Indirect mgmt with AUC
2015	DCI/PANAF/038-010	Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) and Africa Support Programme	26,5	Direct management: procurement of services and administrative Arrangement with the Joint Research Centre Indirect management with the African Union Commission (AUC)
2015	DCI/PANAF/038-506	African Union Support Programme III (AUSP III) (Relevant for strategic areas 2,3,4 and 5)	45,15	Grants (direct mgmt – direct award)
2015	DCI/PANAF/038-363	Support measures - Annual Action Plan 2	0,5	Direct management - Procurement of services
Other				

Source: Review of MIP, Annual Action Plans and Action Documents

Review of EAMR

The EAMR from the EUD African Union reports that good progress has been achieved since the Summit, in particular with the completion of the programming of the Pan-African Programme. In addition, while the EAMR also notes that progress in policy dialogue has been achieved, an increasing portfolio of projects and staff shortages has constrained the Operations, Finance and Contracts Section.

The EAMR highlights several risks which were associated with managing the programme:

- Such as worsening security situation with several long running complex crises across the Horn of Africa, Sahel, North and Central Africa,
- AU capacity to implement programmes, including those financed by the EC due to the loss of key staff (this also includes that AU Member States will not fulfil their AU Summit pledge to increase African financing of the AUC's activities, which will also slow down programme implementation by the AUC, and the non-compliance of 3 out of 6 pillars),
- Lack of capacity at the level of the EUD AU.

Source: EU (2015) External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) 01.01.2015-31.12.2015 African Union

Interviews

Field mission interviews: The Pan-African Programme is perceived as *highly relevant* by all stakeholders interviewed during the field mission. However, the risks already flagged in the EAMR prepared by the EUD African Union were repeatedly emphasised during interviews. EUD staff mentioned the emphasis of the Pan-African Programme on capacity building measures and financing staff positions in the African Union to ensure that the second Seven Pillar-Assessment will be positive. EUD staff stated that in case the AUC should not become positive pillar-assessed, it will become difficult for the EUD (and MS) to continue working with them.

EUD staff, EU MS representatives and AUC staff see a *clear added value* of the co-operation with the AUC through the Pan-African Programme. Explanations put forward relate to size and presence of the EU Delegation (and being able to follow up and monitor implementation on a daily basis), its negotiating power and the ability to conduct policy and political dialogue and its funding predictability, scale and regularity of disbursement.

It is still too early to assess impacts of the Pan-African Programme and sustainability of the programme will depend to some extent on the Pillar Assessment and the ability of the AUC to finance its own staff. While the Pan-African Programme and the support to the AUC can be considered a high risk (e.g. related to AUC capacity, sustainability of the programme) initiative, it was frequently reported that the potential high return and positive developments are worth taking the risk.

DEVCO HQ: The Pan-African Programme was designed to (i) support the JAES and (ii) develop projects covering both sub-Saharan Africa (EDF) and North Africa/South Africa (budget). In 2008-10 there was a joint strategy but the money was in EDF, not covering the entire continent. After the 2010 EU-African summit, there was an acknowledged need for a dedicated funding instrument. That it was attached to DCI is essentially an arrangement of convenience (also confirmed through field mission interviews); in effect, the Pan-African Programme has become a DCI regional instrument for the African continent. The Pan-African Programme has always been as much a political as a development instrument; it concentrates on AU treaties, strategies, conventions, etc. The associated dialogue is broader than donor-recipient.

The Pan-African Programme Consultative Committee consists of the AU Commission, regional economic commissions, UN ECA, AfDB. There is a high-level AU Commission – EC meeting annually. There is a large budget support facility to AU for capacity building (EUR 40 million). Slow success; challenges remain regarding generating governance impacts through policy dialogue.

While thematic programmes could finance multi-country projects, these are mainly just collections of countries – hence, the Pan-African Programme fills a gap.

EEAS HQ: The Pan-African Programme was an instrument invented to back up a political commitment (JAES). Main purpose is to build AU capacity.

Expert interview: The Pan-African Programme is no stronger than JAES, which has proven for political reasons to be a difficult strategic agreement to implement-

1.1.2 JC 12: Flexibility of the DCI to adapt to evolving needs and challenges in the international/EU context (2016-17).

1.1.2.1 I-121 Smooth transition process from MDGs to SDGs (Including SDG 17 on partnerships) in DCI programme design and programming

Indicator Summary

As set forth in a number of Council Conclusions excerpted below, the transition from MDGs to SDGs was marked by more continuity than change, with eradicating poverty remaining the key objective. However, and has also developed in discussing I-111, the Decent Life Communication marking the transition from MDGs to SDGs called for more attention to be given to aspects such as social inclusion, environmental sustainability including climate change, and democracy and human rights. With the possible exception of the latter, which falls mostly under EIDHR, the new DCI incorporates the call for a shift of emphasis. As the

enumeration of priority areas makes clear, the complementarity of the geographic and thematic programmes plays a central role in ensuring the proper balance of “soft” and “hard” aspects of development. As discussed under I-111, early experience with programming suggests progress in addressing the Agenda for Change also mark. The SDGs / Agenda 2030 also take a broader view of the development process and partnership; one that goes beyond poverty.

In HQ interviews, it never emerged that the transition from MDGs to SDGs (in whose definition the EU played a very prominent role) posed either a strategic or programming challenge. And, it must be remembered, time lags in the project cycle mean that the full transition will not be operationally effective for several years to come.

MIP GPGC 2014-2020

The MIP GPGC mentions including the SDGs in the context of its environment and climate change component:

“The approach to programming will be unified in promoting synergy across different sectors and will also be sufficiently flexible to accommodate key development processes, in particular the follow-up to the Rio+20 outcomes, including the concept of the inclusive green economy, and the work towards a post-2015 framework including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as EU climate and energy policies, the 7th Environment Action Plan, EU commitments under multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), the Decent Work Agenda (including ILO core labour standards) and the ILO Recommendation concerning National Social Protection Floors. It will also reflect recent Communications and Council Conclusions, and EP resolutions, notably on social protection, on food security, nutrition and resilience and on a common EU approach towards accelerating progress on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and developing an EU approach to the post-2015 framework.”

EU (2014) Programming Thematic Programmes and Instruments, Programme on Global Public Goods and Challenges 2014-2020, 6.

Council statements

MDGs and Rio+20 remain central reference documents for post-2015 framework. Calls for balanced economic, social, and environmental dimensions; emphasis on rights based approach, and addressing fragility.

Council of the European Union, The Overreaching Post 2015 Agenda –Council Conclusions Luxembourg, 25 June, 2013

Re-affirms above, plus post-Busan commitments to global partnerships.

Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on a transformative post-2015 agenda, Brussels, 16 December 2014. Renews commitments to MDGs and Rio+20; economic, social, and environmental dimensions

Key elements of new Global Partnership

- Enabling and conducive policy environment at all levels
- Developing capacity to deliver
- Mobilizing and making effective use of domestic public finance
- Mobilizing and making effective use of international public finance
- Mobilizing the domestic and international private sector
- Stimulating trade and investment
- Fostering science, technology, and innovation
- Addressing challenges and harnessing positive effects of migration.

Source: Council Conclusions, A new global partnership for poverty eradication and sustainable development after 2015, Brussels, 26 May 2015.

COM(2014) 335 Final A decent life for all: from vision to collective action.

Elaborates key principles, sets out possible priority areas and potential target topics for post-2015.

Principles:

- Universality and differentiation based on national circumstances
- Transformative agenda integrating three dimensions of sustainable development
 - Economic
 - Social
 - Environmental
- Accountability
 - Transparency
 - Review of progress
- Participation in policy choices

While there was a great deal of continuity between MDGs and SDGs, MDGs did not sufficiently cover

- Inclusive and sustainable growth
- Inequalities
- Sustainable consumption and production
- Migration and mobility
- Decent work
- Digital inclusion
- Health and social protection
- Sustainable management of natural resources.
- Climate change
- Disaster resilience and risk management
- Knowledge and innovation

Post-2015 framework should ensure rights based approach. Post-2015 framework should address climate change as a cross-cutting issue.

Priority areas

- Poverty
- Inequality
- Food security and nutrition, sustainable agriculture
- Health
- Education
- Gender equality and women's empowerment
- Water and sanitation
- Sustainable energy
- Full and productive employment and decent work for all
- Inclusive and sustainable growth
- Sustainable cities and human settlements
- Sustainable consumption and production
- Oceans and seas
- Biodiversity and forests
- Land degradation, including desertification and drought
- Human rights, rule of law, good governance and effective institutions

- Peaceful societies

Another key policy document is June 2016 EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy. It spells out a shared vision for common action, based on a clear definition of EU interests in a multi-polar world. The EU new strategic priorities are likely to fundamentally affect the use of EFIs and their evolution. The key words are security, state/societal resilience, integrated regional orders and global governance.

Three recent EU Communications (issued end November) were also integrated in the analysis. They deal respectively with search for a new European Consensus on development; the future of the ACP-EU partnership; and the EU vision on how it will implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The proposal for a new European Consensus is particularly important as it is likely to provide one of the foundational factors for the new generation of EFIs. The Communication looks at future EU development policy from the angle of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, stresses the need for more effective EU action around the “4 Ps” (People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace) as well as for new means of implementation, including multi-actor partnerships. There is a clear link with the recently issued ‘*Global Strategy on the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS)*’.¹¹ The proposed new Consensus wants to build on the vision provided by the EUGS for Europe’s engagement in the world, including its “*main interests and priorities*,” to be pursued through various policies, amongst others development policy. There is a strong emphasis on the values underpinning EU external action, including the application of rights-based approaches and a core concern for gender equality. Security issues and “EU interests” (e.g. on migration) appear more forcefully now but they are not occupying the dominant position feared by development constituencies. The document also sees a crucial role for Member States to achieve greater impact.

1.1.2.2 I-122 Extent to which DCI has been flexible enough to address emerging nexuses of concern – migration (e.g. Communication COM(2016) 385 – New Partnership Framework with Third Countries under European Agenda to Migration), climate, security, fragile states, etc.

Indicator Summary

This Indicator examines the flexibility of the DCI to adapt to new developments. As seen in discussing I-112, the theme of the need for greater flexibility and ran throughout the Impact Assessment staff working paper that informed the design of the new DCI. It has proven a difficult Indicator to assess, in part because so little time has passed since the new DCI came into effect. MIPs, as documents from the beginning of the DCI period, do not reflect potential flexibility with respect to emerging nexuses of concern. Some MIPs hint at the expected need for flexibility, but this is only a hint.

The European Agenda on Migration (COM(2015) 240final), emphasises the role of development co-operation in tackling global issues, such as poverty, insecurity, inequality and unemployment which are among the main root causes of irregular and forced migration.

Interviews in HQ have identified a number of challenges to dealing with the emerging themes. The area of migration is fraught, as is that of human rights, and EU and MS priorities do not always align. The difference in institutional incentives between DEVCO, on the implementing side, and EEAS, on the CFSP and programming side, are acknowledged on both sides (see I-333 for a discussion of programming). Yet, a number of data extractions suggest that new themes and priorities are, indeed being picked up. Under GPGC, significant sums have been contracted in migration, energy, and environment. The largest DCI contracted sectors (by DAC code) to date is infectious disease control, a strongly emerging concern.

Moreover, the 2016 Annual Report confirms some flexibility in addressing emerging concerns *“in 2015 efforts were significantly stepped up to increase and better target EU support to*

¹¹ EU(2016) Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.

priority partner countries in all areas related to migration and refugee management. In addition, more focus was placed on strengthening and targeting EU assistance to more effectively address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement. In this respect, a range of measures have been launched.

With the May 2015 European Agenda on Migration, the EU sets out to approach migration in a comprehensive and coherent way by mainstreaming migration into all policy areas, at internal and external level. DEVCO and NEAR were closely associated and contributed to the elaboration of this new Agenda, in particular its external dimension. DEVCO and NEAR contribute to the comprehensive implementation of this Agenda by ensuring all migration related programmes under their respective financing instruments are fully in line with their objectives.”

A review of 2014 decisions by project title identifies significant actions in human rights, democracy, and rule of law; migration, asylum, and refugees; and (presented under I-123 below) environment, energy, and climate change. The GPGC thematic programme has been quick to direct money to the latter. In presenting evidence under I-112, the development and security nexus was found to be a major sector under both national and regional allocations, although no evidence on actual commitments or decisions are yet available.

Fragile states accounted for 43% of DCI geographic and 33% of thematic decided funds in 2014.

Review national MIPS

‘EU aims at devising a cooperation scheme which will be flexible enough to accommodate rapid changes and place a focus on governance and promotion of international human rights standards, instead of massive financial aid.’, Iraq (p.6); ‘In light of the fluidity and unpredictability inherent to countries in transition, maximum flexibility should be ensured in order to allow for an appropriate and tailored response.’, Myanmar (p.3)). Several MIPS foresee future review of the MIP based on planned/expected events (e.g. Philippines with respect to future joint programming process with other donors, Afghanistan with respect to military disengagement and other expected developments, Myanmar regarding the alignment of joint EU and MSs strategy with election and national planning cycle).

Review regional MIPS

A number of MIPS explicitly identify the expected need for flexibility:

- In the Asia the MIP flags that *“continued assistance is or may be needed in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. However, as new crises might emerge, all countries covered under the Regional Strategy are potentially eligible, and specific interventions may be designed to meet particular needs and challenges.”*

Less pronounced, but some reference can also be found in the Central Asia MIP on the “Multi-country Technical Assistance Facility (MC- TAF) - institutional, administrative, legal and economic reforms, trade This multi-country facility will provide targeted policy advice, in complementarity with the two focal sectors and in line with National Policies and Reforms. It should be a flexible instrument to provide expertise in different fields, through focused interventions.”

Review of evaluations

EU’s flexibility to address concerns and adapt to different contexts and needs varies from one country/region/topic to another. The Central Asia regional evaluation found *“EU regional programmes had to be pragmatic and adapt to a challenging context and limited Central Asian interest in regional cooperation. In this challenging context, EU’s regional programmes demonstrated flexibility, adapted their approaches, and sought out entry points they could utilise.”* (Evaluation of EU regional level support to Central Asia (2007-2014) (Draft Final Report), 63-64). In the Bolivia Country Strategy Evaluation, it was found, *“The EU has demonstrated its high adaptive capacity to the needs that the context and political changes of Bolivia have demanded, crowning this period with an European Coordinated Response (ECR), [...]”* (Evaluation of EU Cooperation with Bolivia, 67-68). From a thematic point of view, successful examples can be found in Budget Support in South Africa *“Flexibility in the*

approach adopted by the parties in the design of SBS operations reflects the efforts made to ensure relevance and alignment to GoSA needs and priorities.” (Evaluation of Budget Support in South Africa, 104-105).

Nonetheless, cases emerge where the EU has not been able to apply a flexible approach. For example, according to the Evaluation of EU Cooperation with Yemen (p.67) *“EU Co-operation with Yemen has suffered historically from the institutional disconnects within and between DEVCO and the EEAS and by the well-documented inflexibilities of EU instruments and programming processes and practices that have in general been poorly suited to the particular context of Yemen and the capabilities present there.”* Another challenging example can be found in Nepal *“[...] the room for a flexible interpretation of the CSP/NIP was not fully used, due to capacity constraints both from the side of the EC, as well as from involved national stakeholders, GoN and NSAs.”* (Evaluation of the European Union’s Co-operation with Nepal, 36). The lack of flexibility was especially pronounced as regards gender equality and women’s empowerment. The thematic evaluation in that area found, *“The EU is not delivering the strong institutional commitment on GEWE, as set out in the 2007 Communication, the 2010 Council conclusions on the MDGs, and the Gender Action Plan. Senior management in EC Services and EEAS have not sufficiently prioritised the EU’s ambitious GEWE commitments, which neither permeate cooperation strategies nor systematically feature in programmes, projects or political and policy dialogue.”* (Evaluation of EU Support to Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Partner Countries p. viii-ix).

2016 Annual Report on the implementation of the EU’s instruments for financing external actions in 2015

Due to events in 2014 and 2015, migration and forced displacement rose to the top of the EU agenda, with increased expectations for effective and efficient delivery of EU development assistance to partner countries in this field. Managing migration flows whilst ensuring that those who seek refuge always find safe haven here continues to be a daily challenge in Europe.

The EU has an advanced policy framework for external relations and development cooperation on migration, with migration firmly embedded as a priority area in the Agenda for Change. In 2015 efforts were significantly stepped up to increase and better target EU support to priority partner countries in all areas related to migration and refugee management. In addition, more focus was placed on strengthening and targeting EU assistance to more effectively address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement. In this respect, a range of measures have been launched.

With the May 2015 European Agenda on Migration, the EU sets out to approach migration in a comprehensive and coherent way by mainstreaming migration into all policy areas, at internal and external level. DEVCO and NEAR were closely associated and contributed to the elaboration of this new Agenda, in particular its external dimension. DEVCO and NEAR contribute to the comprehensive implementation of this Agenda by ensuring all migration related programmes under their respective financing instruments are fully in line with their objectives.

With this existing framework, the EU is well placed to contribute to the new 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, which now clearly recognises migration as a development enabler.

On 11 - 12 November 2015, the Valletta Summit brought together leaders of the EU and the African nations to jointly agree on a number of concrete and operational measures through the adoption of two key documents:

- 1) A Political Statement underlining the determination of the parties to forge stronger partnerships on migration at country and regional level in the spirit of partnership, ownership and shared responsibility.
- 2) An Action Plan identifying priority actions under five headings: 1. Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes; 2. Legal migration and mobility; 3. International protection and asylum; 4. Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; and 5. Making progress on return arrangements and readmission agreements.

An important and tangible outcome of the Valletta Summit was the launch of a new EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa at the end of 2015. This Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, set up at a record speed, shows the EU's commitment to swiftly reply to the challenges affecting the region. Signed at the EU - Africa Valletta Summit by the 27 Heads of State contributing to the EUR 1.8 billion EU Trust Fund, it supports some of the most fragile and vulnerable countries across Africa (in three regions: Sahel and Lake Chad, Horn of Africa, and North of Africa), reinforcing the EU's significant ongoing development cooperation on the continent. The EU Trust Fund for Africa demonstrated its capacity to work as a flexible instrument to respond to crisis. Within two months of its establishment, a first operational committee for Horn of Africa was held at the end of 2015 and the first operational committee for the Sahel/Lake Chad region was held at the start of 2016 providing over EUR 350 million in projects for the two regions. Substantive activities will start in early 2016.

In December 2015, the Commission also adopted a Financing Decision made up of six Actions for an amount of EUR 41.6 million under the Development Cooperation Instrument - Global Public Goods & Challenges (GPGC) programme focusing on improving migration management in developing countries and to maximise the positive impact of migration on the development of partner countries. 188 With the increased attention to migration in 2015, the Commission stepped up its thematic support to staff working both in headquarters and in EU delegations to increase awareness and knowledge in the area of migration and asylum. In this context, three dedicated thematic training workshops on migration and asylum were organised in 2015.

Mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020: An EU budget focused on results COM(2016)603

Europe has been experiencing unprecedented migratory flows in 2015, driven by geopolitical and economic factors expected to persist over the coming years. The European Agenda on Migration has set out measures needed to prevent human tragedies and to strengthen emergency responses, as well as to address this issue comprehensively with a focus on four key areas: securing Europe's external borders; a strong Common Asylum System; a new European policy on legal migration and fighting irregular migration and human trafficking more robustly .

JOIN(2015) 17 Final Capacity building in support of security and development—Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises.

The use of DCI to finance the security-development nexus is limited by the fact that the DCI contains specific ODA targets. More precisely the joint communication mentions “*the definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA) potentially limits spending on security capacity building, insofar as ODA criteria generally exclude military expenses.(...) In addition, the DCI contains specific ODA targets, and a restriction on the procurement of arms or ammunition, or operations having military or defence purposes*” (...) However, under the IcSP, IPA, ENI, DCI and EIDHR, financial support in favour of capacity building in the security sector is subject to various limitations, as explained above. As a consequence, there is currently no EU budget instrument designed to provide a comprehensive financing to security capacity building in partner countries, in particular its military component. (p. 7-8)

Shared Vision, Common Action: a Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy

Calls for state and societal resilience in the South (Africa extending to Central Africa) combination of a secure state with SDGs. Joined-up approach in humanitarian, development, migration, trade, investment, infrastructure, education, health, and research policies; improve horizontal coordination among MSs.

- Strengthening social resilience by reaching out to CSOs, “notably” in their effort to keep government accountable;
- Encouraging energy and environmental resilience;

- Special focus on resilience in migration origin, development, diplomacy, mobility, legal migration, border management, readmission and return. prevent root causes of displacement, manage migration, fight cross-border crime and transit countries.
- Integrated approach to conflicts and crises

***JOIN(2015) 16 Final Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019)
“Keeping human hearts right at the heart of the EU agenda”***

Under 2012-2014 Strategic Framework and Action Plan, there were improvements in mainstreaming human rights, the setting up of human rights focal points in EUDs, adoption of Human Rights Action Plans, and adoption of a toolbox for human-rights based approach to development.

Five strategic areas of action for 2015-19:

- Boosting ownership of local actors
- Addressing key human rights challenges
- Ensuring a comprehensive HR approach to conflicts and crises
- Fostering better coherence and consistency
- Deepening effectiveness and results culture in Human Rights and Democracy

Richard Frides, post to Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe blog, Carnegie Europe, 23.07.2015

Weaknesses identified:

- No clarity on resources
- Progress in HR Action Plans slow and under-resources to date – lack of buy-in from MSs

Interviews

The area of migration is particularly fraught. In the past, it has proven difficult to implement comprehensive, multi-sector approaches to issue of migration, in part because of the competing interests of the various Member States and DGs. The recent Migration Partnership Framework approach has promise, and pilot partnerships are in the course of being negotiated; however, the domestic political situation in Europe provides a difficult context in which to make substantial progress.

EEAS: EEAS has incentive to try to absorb development policy under the umbrella of CFSP. Coordination between development and CFSP has been mentioned to be difficult at EUD level; main enforcement of complementarity rests with HQ.

Coordination between political and development sides are challenged by the fact that, due to time lags between policy, strategy, etc. and implementation, it can be five years before an action gets implemented. Challenge of split between EEAS and DEVCO have been reported, with EEAS responsible for programming and DEVCO for implementation.

Emerging Migration Partnership Frameworks stress return, but as part of an overall integrated approach, The key will be convincing MSs that migration is one aspect to be incorporated into a broader political relationship (i) with a country-specific orientation that (ii) takes all aspects of EU policy into consideration.

The instruments have plenty of flexibility; what is needed is to bring MSs on board.

1.1.2.3 I-123 Extent to which Paris commitments on climate change are being incorporated into DCI programming.

Indicator Summary

In four MIPS (Bolivia, Guatemala, Maldives, and Tajikistan) climate change was a focal sector. In addition, all EAMRs refer to climate change and especially to the EU’s active role in outreach, advocacy, event organisation, etc. In addition, the GPGC programme has supported a large number of initiatives related to climate change, environment, and sustainable energy (2014 decisions below). Data presented under I-221 indicate that the EU

is on track to exceed the GPGC 25% target for environment and climate change, although it is impossible to verify this for contracted or decided amounts.

Review of EAMRs 2015

All EAMRs take the environment and climate change into consideration. Overall, the EU has been very active in the area of environment and climate change beyond project implementation. Above all, the EAMRs refer to numerous communication activities (seminars, events, dialogues, exchanges, Climate Change Days, photo competitions, social media, workshops, etc.) carried out by the EU with the aim to raise awareness and enhance climate change cooperation. They also make references to many events organised by the EU presenting its position as a leader in climate negotiations in preparation for COP21 in Paris (de-marches, high level conferences, roundtables, dialogues, etc.).

There are a few instances where the EU has included this area under the MIP 2014-2016 as a focal sector (Bolivia, Guatemala, Maldives and Tajikistan). Others countries refer to EU-funded projects in this sector (Afghanistan, Cuba, Honduras, Myanmar, Paraguay, Peru, and Nepal). A good practice can be seen in Myanmar, “According to the information provided by the Ministry of Environment Conservation and Forestry, in June 2015, thanks to the thematic and regional programmes, the EU was the first Development partner in numbers of projects providing support to the Myanmar Government in addressing environmental issues and Natural Resources Management.” (EAMR Myanmar 2015, 77-78).

1.1.2.4 I-124 Extent to which DCI programming has increasingly stressed partnership with private sector (see also EQ 6 on leverage).

Indicator Summary

A review of both national and regional MIPs suggests that forming partnerships with the private sector is not a strong feature of early programming under the new DCI. When discussed, it is usually in general terms. This finds some echo in the evaluation of EU support for private sector development, which concluded that the EU’s “generalist” approach, results in a lack of clarity about its role. SWITCH-Asia, a regional DCI project, revolved around partnerships with the private sector and has received consistently high marks (e.g., the thematic evaluation on Research and Innovation). The same evaluation noted strong interest in private sector partnerships in South Africa, but the reluctance of private firms to engage in shared not-for profit activities. The apparent weak involvement of the private sector in EU cooperation programmes runs counter to the emphasis placed on new financial sources in Busan and the broader view taken in the SDGs.

Review national MIPs

As for initial (2014) references to the partnership with private sector, where present, it is often in fairly general terms (e.g. ‘This ambitious goal can only be achieved by mobilising partners from, and building alliances with, a wide spectrum of development institutions, from the Government to the private sector, the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and the people themselves.’ Bangladesh (p.5); ‘The EU should work with Bolivia to develop a more results-oriented approach at the national level and a more constructive engagement with the private sector on climate change issues’, Bolivia (p.2)). The treatment of partnership with private sector is also somewhat uneven across regions, and is present more in MIPs of Latin American countries. Some MIPs refer to policy dialogue with private sector, either as an interlocutor for the EU or in terms of the intention to support government partnership with private sector (e.g. Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam). Overall, it cannot be said that partnership with private sector would be particularly ‘stressed’ in any of the MIPs.

Review regional MIPs

Only limited references to partnerships with the private sector have been identified during the review of the regional MIPs. Similarly to the national MIPs, partnership with the private sector has not been particularly stressed in the programming documents.

Review of evaluations

Overall, private sector is not being particularly addressed with only two references in two Evaluation Reports. The first and successful experience can be found in Asia “[...] a key feature of SWITCH-Asia, the EU-funded Asia Programme to promote Sustainable Consumption and Production, is its focus of working with the private sector. The programme has thereby opened up a new target group and network for EU co-operation.” (Evaluation of the EU’s Cooperation with Asia, p. viii). The second reference relates to the Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries and with mixed results: “The EU positioned itself as a ‘generalist’ in terms of PSD support, capable of funding a nearly all-encompassing range of diverse activities, which enabled it to be responsive to country needs in a context of partner-ship building with beneficiary countries. [...] This has enabled it to respond to diverse country needs and align with partner government priorities across a range of areas, thereby increasing the EU’s capacity to build partnerships. However, the generalist approach also had a negative impact on the clarity of the EU’s role as a provider of PSD support among stakeholders, both within and outside the EU.” (Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries, p. ii-iii)

Interviews

EEAS: Private sector plays important role in emerging Migration Partnership Frameworks.

DEVCO: Private sector is a stakeholder in the Pan-African Programme.

1.1.2.5 I-125 Extent to which regional and thematic instruments address income disparities and exclusion in countries not qualifying for DCI ODA.

See I-114.

1.2 EQ 2 on effectiveness, impact, sustainability

EQ 2: To what extent does the DCI deliver results against the instrument's objectives, and specific EU priorities?

JC 21: DCI mainstreams EU policy priorities and, where relevant, delivers on the commitments including the prescribed financial allocations per priority	
Main findings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial allocations reflect well EU policy priorities. The DCI integrates well the emerging themes defined in recent EU policy documents. Strength of the evidence base: <i>Strong</i>	Main sources of information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Statistical analysis (Dashboard and CRIS/Datawarehouse extractions), Documentary review (e.g. MIPs, AAPs, EU Strategic evaluations), Interviews (EU HQ, MS representatives, EUDs, resource persons / thematic experts).
JC 22: DCI programmes contribute toward the overarching goal of poverty reduction.	
Main findings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most EU partner countries have experienced considerable progress in terms of poverty reduction and human and economic development. There has been great variation in effectiveness across types of interventions and geographical contexts. The most successful interventions have been those rooted in a strong partnership framework with the partner country. Strength of the evidence base: <i>Medium¹²</i>	Main sources of information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Documentary review (including recent MDG reports, DEVCO reporting, EU Strategic evaluations) and statistical analysis (WDI database; EU results framework), Interviews (EU HQ, MS representatives, EUDs).
JC 23: The process of differentiation (including graduation) has given priority in the resource allocation process to countries most in need while promoting new forms of strategic co-operation with graduated countries.	
Main findings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The differentiation process has led to a substantial re-allocation of DCI funds to countries most in need. The differentiation process was mainly about improving resource allocation, it did not focus on adjusting the EU external assistance to the specific contexts of operation. The EU has yet to establish a firm basis for co-operation with graduated countries. Strength of the evidence base: <i>Strong</i>	Main sources of information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Statistical analysis (Dashboard and CRIS/Datawarehouse extractions), Documentary review (e.g. MIPs, AAPs, strategic evaluations, EU reporting), Interviews (EU HQ, MS representatives, EUDs), Survey to EU Delegations.
JC 24: DCI principles (Article 3), programmes (DCI Regulation, Articles 4-9), and processes related to programming (Articles 5-15) promote post-Busan principles of development effectiveness.	
Main findings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There has been a strengthening in results orientation under the DCI 2014-2020. The EU has strongly promoted the use of country 	Main sources of information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Documentary review, Interviews (EU HQ, MS representatives, EUDs, resource

¹² The DCI 2014-2020 is in too early a stage to credibly judge impacts to date. Most of the analysis here has focused on the results of the support provided under DCI 2007-2013.

systems and BS has increased. • Evidence on deeper partnerships is mixed. Strength of the evidence base: <i>Strong</i>	persons / thematic experts).
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1.2.1 JC 21: DCI mainstreams EU policy priorities and, where relevant, delivers on the commitments including the prescribed financial allocations per priority.

1.2.1.1 I-211 Overall planned allocations per policy priority in MIPs.

Preliminary remarks

For the purpose of the analysis under this indicator, a list of “priority areas” has been identified and is presented in Table 5 below. The list has been defined based on the overall priorities and sectors of intervention mentioned in the DCI regulation, the European Consensus and the Agenda for Change.

Table 5 Overview of the overall EU policy priorities and related sectors

Priority	Sector
Human rights, democracy and good governance	Civil society & local authorities
	Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law
	Development and security nexus
	Public Sector management, Tax, Corruption
	GBS (GGDC/SBC ¹³)
Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development	Food & Nutrition Security, Sustainable Agriculture (FNSSA)
	Environment, natural resources and climate change
	Sustainable Energy
	Education
	Health
	Growth, Jobs and Private Sector Engagement
	Trade, Markets and Regional Integration
	Migration and Asylum
	Social protection
	Infrastructure & Transport
	Erasmus

Overlaps between the EU priority areas make it difficult to precisely estimate the allocations of DCI resources per priority area.¹⁴ However, a number of simplifications (highlighted below) can be made to get an overall picture of the distribution of the DCI envelope per policy priority based on the information available in the 2014-2020 MIPs.

Indicator Summary

Overall, planned allocations of DCI resources reflect an adequate integration of EU policy priorities in the 2014-2020 programming exercise:

- The overall priority of “*Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development*” indicated in the Agenda for Change is receiving 77% of DCI allocations (all programmes) for the period 2014-2020. This priority area covers sectors which feature high in the main EU policy documents such as “*Food and Nutrition Security and Sustainable Agriculture*” (FNSSA) which alone accounts for around 23% of total

¹³ The new EU budget support guidelines identify two types of General Budget Support (GBS): Good Governance Development Contract (GGDC) and State Building Contract (SBC).

¹⁴ For instance, there are overlaps between areas like ‘*Civil society & local authorities*’ and ‘*Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law*’ (e.g. interventions focusing on the inclusion of the civil society in democratic processes) or between ‘*Food & Nutrition Security, Sustainable Agriculture*’ and ‘*Health*’ (e.g. interventions focusing on nutrition).

DCI allocations. “*Environment, natural resources and climate change*” represents 14% of total DCI allocations and is the second biggest sector under this overall priority area.

- The overall priority of “*Human rights, democracy and good governance*” is receiving 23% of DCI allocations (all programmes) for the period 2014-2020. The EU strong engagement with “*Civil society and local authorities*” is reflected by the existence of a specific thematic programme which accounts alone for 11% of total DCI allocations.

The “*Human development*” priority accounts for 21% of total DCI allocations and 25% of the specific allocations going to the GPGC thematic programme. *Education* and *Health*, the major components of the human development priority, account for 11% and 5% of total DCI allocations, respectively.

Looking specifically at geographic programmes, analysis also shows that allocations cover well the main EU policy priorities. *FNSSA* and *Education* sectors account for 33% and 21% of allocations going to bilateral programmes, respectively. The area of ‘*Democracy, Human rights and Rule of Law*’ receives a bigger share of bilateral geographic allocations (12%) compared to the share it represents in total DCI allocations (5%). An analysis at a more disaggregated level (analysis by region/country) is presented in the next indicator.

Overall MIP 2014-2020 allocations

As indicated above, overlaps between the EU priority areas make it difficult to precisely estimate the allocations of DCI resources per priority area. A number of simplifications were made to elaborate an overview of DCI MIPs allocations per policy priority. In particular:

- The various sub-components of the GPGC programme match well the policy areas mentioned in the EU policy documents. Consequently, the allocations going to a sub-component were fully categorised under the policy area it was covering.
- For the geographic allocations, the co-operation sectors indicated in the MIPs also largely correspond to specific policy areas although the situation is not as clear-cut as for thematic programmes. When a co-operation sector covers various priority areas, the whole envelope going to the sector is earmarked to the main policy area it covers.¹⁵
- Allocations related to support measures are not categorised since they are not sector specific.

The table below presents the distribution of MIP allocations by type of DCI programme (based on the MIPs data and the above mentioned simplifications).

Table 6 *Indicative allocations for the DCI MIPs 2014-2020 by type of DCI programme (mEUR)¹⁶*

Priority / Sector	Geogr. (national)	Geogr. (regional)	Thematic GPGC	Thematic CSO&LA	PANAF¹⁷	Total
Human rights, democracy and good governance	1,731	190	-	1,834	127	3.882
Civil society & local authorities ¹⁸	0	-	-	1,834		1,834

¹⁵ In bilateral programmes, some focal sectors of co-operation related to democratic governance (e.g. ‘Strengthening Democratic Government’ in Bangladesh or ‘Democratisation and Accountability’ in Afghanistan) foresee EU-financed interventions focusing on civil society and local authorities of substantial size. But, because of the overall themes covered, they were considered as fully belonging to the sector ‘*Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law*’.

¹⁶ The table only includes amounts which could be allocated to specific sectors. For instance, it does not include allocations related to support measures.

¹⁷ Does not include Support mechanism to the partnership and civil society: - EUR43M CSOs - EUR 45M AUC, and reserve, management costs

¹⁸ While CSO’s-LA did not receive a special allocation via the geographic components of the DCI, they have played an active role as channel via other sectors, e.g. Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law.

<i>Priority / Sector</i>	<i>Geogr. (national)</i>	<i>Geogr. (regional)</i>	<i>Thematic GPGC</i>	<i>Thematic CSO&LA</i>	<i>PANAF¹⁷</i>	<i>Total</i>
Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law	864	-	-	-	52	916
Development and security nexus	503	148	-	-	30	681
Public Sector management	364	42	-	-	45	451
GBS (GGDC/SBC)	0	-	-	-	-	-
Sustainable growth for human development	4,983	2,312	4,915	-	600	12,810
FNSSA	2,421	122	1,425	-	90	4,058
Environment / Natural resources	130	775	1,327	-	100	2,332
Education	1,502	-	266	-	125	1,893
Sustainable Energy	594	170	590	-	230 ¹⁹	1,584
Health	336	-	545	-	-	881
Other (Erasmus, culture, children)	37	670	165	-	-	872
Trade / Regional Integration	30	575	-	-	55	660
Growth, Jobs and Private Sector	339	-	104	-	-	443
Migration	0	-	344	-	-	344
Social protection	131	-	150	-	-	281
Infrastructure & Transport	0	-	-	-	-	-
Total	6,714	2,502	4,915	1,834	727	16,692

Source: authors calculation based on MIPs 2014-2020.

GPGC

The table below presents the overview of DCI allocations per priority sector for the GPGC programme.

Table 7 GPGC indicative allocations MIP 2014-2020 (mEUR)

<i>Priority / Sector</i>	<i>GPGC</i>	<i>% of total</i>
Human rights, democracy and good governance	-	
Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development	4,915	100%
Food & Nutrition Security, Sustainable Agriculture	1,425	29%
Environment, natural resources and climate change	1,327	27%
Human development	1,229	25%
<i>Health</i>	<i>545</i>	<i>11%</i>
<i>Education</i>	<i>266</i>	<i>5%</i>
<i>Social protection</i>	<i>150</i>	<i>3%</i>
<i>Other (e.g. gender, children, culture)</i>	<i>165</i>	<i>3%</i>
<i>Growth, Jobs and Private Sector Engagement</i>	<i>104</i>	<i>2%</i>

¹⁹ Allocated for Infrastructure and Energy.

<i>Priority / Sector</i>	<i>GPGC</i>	<i>% of total</i>
Sustainable Energy	590	12%
Migration	344	7%
Erasmus	-	0%
Trade, Markets and Reg Integration	-	0%
Infrastructure & Transport	-	0%

Source: authors calculation based on MIPs 2014-2020.

The table below presents the detailed (indicative) distribution under each sector according to the GPGC MIP 2014-2020.

Table 8 GPGC Indicative allocations 2014-2020 – distribution of sector allocations

<i>Sector / Thematic area</i>	<i>%</i>
Food and nutrition security and sustainable agriculture	
Support poor & food insecure to react to crises and increase resilience	32%-42%
Pro-poor innovation and research for food and nutrition security and sustainable agriculture.	30%-34%
Governance & capacity for all relevant stakeholders - increase opportunities for farmers	30%-35%
Environment and climate change	
Climate change adaptation and mitigation and transition to climate resilient low-carbon societies	41% - 46%
Valuation, protection, enhancement of ecosystems	30% - 38%
Transformation towards an inclusive green economy and mainstreaming of environmental sustainability, climate change, disaster risk reduction	6% - 11%
International governance of environment and climate	9% - 12%
Human development²⁰	
Health	42% - 47%
Education, knowledge and skills	20% - 24%
Employment, decent work, skills, social protection and social inclusion	10% -14%
Growth, jobs and private sector	7% - 10%
Gender, women empowerment, protection of women and girls rights	5% - 7%
Children, youth, non-discrimination	4% - 6%
Culture	2% - 4%
Sustainable energy	
Increased access to sustainable energy/ Renewable energy/ Energy efficiency; including rural electrification	70% - 80%
Sustainable energy in poor urban and semi-urban communities and smart energy use	20%-30%
Building strategic alliances to achieve sustainable energy goals	5% - 10%
Migration and asylum	
Promoting effective migration governance	45-55%
Enhance positive impact of migration and mobility on development	35-40%
Improving understanding of migration and development nexus	13-17%

Source: GPGC MIP 2014-2020.

The table below presents the voted budget of the GPGC programme for the year 2014.

²⁰ Health at least 40% of the total; Education at least 17.5%; Others at least 27.5%; funds under Environment and Climate Change would in principle be allocated evenly between environment and climate change.

Table 9 GPGC 2014 budget (mEUR)

	Voted budget 2014	%
Food and nutrition and sustainable agriculture	197	30%
Environment and CC	163	25%
Human development	163	25%
Sustainable energy	83	13%
Migration and asylum	46	7%

Source: GPGC MIP 2014-2020.

CSO&LA

The table below presents the detailed indicative distribution of the CSO-LA MIP 2014-2020 allocations by priority theme (the MIP does not provide any further breakdown of the allocations).

Table 10 CSO-LA Indicative allocations MIP 2014-2020 (mEUR)

Priorities	Indicative allocations
Priority 1: Focus on country level: enhancing CSOs and LAs contributions to governance and development processes	65-75%
Priority 2: Reinforcing regional and global CSOs networks and Associations of LAs	5-10%
Priority 3: Develop and support education and awareness raising initiatives fostering citizens' awareness of - and mobilization for - development issues	10-15%
Support measures and unallocated reserve	2,5-5%

Source: CSO-LA MIP 2014-2020.

Pan-African Programme

The Pan-African Programme MIP 2014-2020 presents a breakdown of the overall allocation to Pan-African programme for the period 2014-2017 (a total of 415 mEUR, i.e. half of the overall allocation to the programme for 2014-2020 excluding administrative support allocations) – see table below.

Table 11 Pan-African programme indicative allocations MIP 2014-2017 (mEUR)

MIP/Area	mEUR
MIP 2014-2017	415
Strategic area 1: Peace and security <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring and assessment of organised crime at cross-regional and continental level Capacities of national, regional and continental stakeholders, in particular civilian security and judicial authorities Continental/cross-regional coordination and operational cooperation 	15 (4%)
Strategic area 2: Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights <ul style="list-style-type: none"> African Governance Architecture Electoral observation and support CSOs Contribution to Good Governance and Human Rights Public Finance Management 	45 (11%)
Strategic area 3: Human Development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Science, Technology and Innovation Higher Education Mobility and Migration 	90 (22%)
Strategic area 4: Sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration	210 (51%)


MIP/Area	mEUR
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trade and Continental Integration • Raw Materials • Statistics and Economic Analysis • Infrastructure • Agriculture 	
Strategic area 5: Global and cross-cutting issues <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate change and Environment • Capacity building for AUC and other AU institutions/organs • Civil society in the JAES • Support to the implementation of the JAES 	55 (13%)

Source: Pan-African programme MIP 2014-2020.

Detailed information on support to countries in fragile / crisis situations

Using the internal EU classification of “countries in fragile/crisis situations,” the team has calculated that around 39% of bilateral allocations to DCI countries are going to this category of countries – see figure below.

Figure 4 National allocations fragile/ non-fragile state



Source: authors calculation based on MIPs 2014-2020.

1.2.1.2 I-212 Degree of mainstreaming of EU policy priorities in the programming of DCI country and regional programmes.

Indicator Summary

Concentration areas of bilateral programmes are in line with EU priorities. 25 out of the 29 DCI countries with a bilateral programme have at least one concentration sector related to each of the two overall priority areas (“*Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development*” and “*Human rights, democracy and good governance*”).

In continuity with previous EU geographic programmes, there is a strong focus on agriculture-related interventions in rural areas. In all regions, the FNSSA sector is the main concentration area of bilateral programmes. This sector covers a wide variety of themes ranging from food and nutrition security and the provision of basic services to economic growth and rural infrastructure development. Most programmes make clear reference to the objective of strengthening the resilience of rural populations to external shocks.

Only two countries (Bolivia with a focus on Integrated water resource management and Nicaragua with a focus on adaptation to climate change) have a specific concentration area related to environment/climate change. However, issues related to natural resource management, environment and climate change are substantially covered in FNSSA-related concentration areas in many countries. In a few countries, the themes are explicitly

integrated in other sectors (e.g. "Education" and "Private sector development" in Paraguay or "Energy" in Vietnam and the Philippines). They are also a major focus of regional programmes.²¹

"Education" and "Employment" are also important themes in many bilateral programmes. "Education" is the second biggest sector in terms of DCI allocations in Asia and Central Asia. The sector has a strong TVET focus in Central Asia. In Latin America, "Employment" is a concentration area in two countries (Honduras and Nicaragua) and is a key theme a few other countries (e.g. El Salvador).

Issues of *Migration* and *Mobility*²² is only marginally included in bilateral programmes²³ but feature quite prominently in regional programmes²⁴.

Detailed information related to geographic programmes (national and regional)

Asia (excluding Central Asia)

The table below presents the breakdown of the bilateral envelopes (indicative allocations) by priority area in the Asia region. Some key observations:

- The FNSSA sector features high in bilateral programmes in a large majority (nine out of the 12) of countries. Overall, it is the sector which receives the biggest allocations.
- Other key sectors include: "education" and "democracy, human rights, rule of law."
- Substantial funds go to the "development and security nexus" area. They are concentrated in two countries in fragile/crisis situation (Afghanistan and Myanmar).
- Important allocations to the energy sector are also made in two countries (Vietnam and the Philippines).

Table 12 Indicative allocations to geographic (country) programmes per policy priority – Asia

Area \ Country	MM	KH	VT	PH	MN	LA	AF	BD	PK	NP	LK	BT	Total
Human rights, Democracy and good governance													1.285
Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law	96		50	95		5	163	103	98	74			684
Development and security nexus	103						319						422
Public Sector mngt, Tax, Corruption		120			34							25	179
Civil society													0
GBS													0
Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development													3.667
FNSSA	241	144				27	337	276	340	146	208	16	1.735
Education	241	140				27		304	209	136			1.057
Energy			346	225									571
Health							274						274

²¹ "Promotion of a Green Economy" – EUR 441 million – in Asia; "Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change" – EUR 110 million – in Latin America.

²² The wide range of programmes financed through the DCI include regional interventions (focusing on aid to uprooted people in Asia or border and migration management in Central Asia), thematic interventions (under the GPGC component on Migration and Asylum), specific support to the Africa Migration and Mobility Action Plan (under the Pan-African Programme) or direct financial contributions to the EU Emergency Trust Fund, etc.

²³ It explicitly features as an area of cooperation only in a few countries such as Nepal.

²⁴ The Asia regional MIP foresees interventions focusing on aid to uprooted people and the Central Asia one interventions on border and migration management.

Area \ Country	MM	KH	VT	PH	MN	LA	AF	BD	PK	NP	LK	BT	Total
Growth, Jobs and Private Sector					30								30
Environment / Natural resources													0
Trade / Reg. integr.													0
Social protection													0
Infrastr. / Transport													0
Migration													0

Source: authors calculation based on MIPs 2014-2020.

The FNSSA sector (the biggest sector in terms of bilateral allocations) is actually a sector covering a diversity of interventions as illustrated in the table below. Some key observations:

- This broad sector overlaps with several other priority areas:
 - “natural resource management, environment” and “growth, jobs and private sector”; and
 - (to a lesser extent) “health,” “infrastructure, transport” and “energy.”
- There is a strong “natural resource management” component only in two countries (Cambodia and Bhutan).
- In most countries, FNSSA interventions integrate a strong “resilience” dimension.
 - This is often related to climate change adaptation aspects (e.g. Bhutan, Cambodia, Myanmar).
 - In a few countries (e.g. Nepal), resilience is more closely linked to the concept of disaster risk preparedness.
- In most countries (e.g. Myanmar, Laos, Bangladesh, Nepal), the EU support includes specific interventions focusing on nutrition.

Table 13 Coverage of the FNSSA sector in Asia

Country	Code	Details on the FNSSA sector	Resilience
Myanmar	MM	<u>Rural development / Agriculture / Food and nutrition security</u> • Climate resilient food and nutrition security of rural households • Wealth in rural areas, with a specific focus on agriculture • Delivery of basic services to rural communities.	Yes
Cambodia	KH	<u>Agriculture/Natural Resource Management</u> • Business enabling context for agriculture and natural resource management • Value chains • Local communities and natural resource management / FLEGT	Yes
Vietnam	VT	<i>Not explicitly covered as a focal sector</i>	-
Philippines	PH	<i>Not explicitly covered as a focal sector</i>	-
Mongolia	MN	<i>Not explicitly covered as a focal sector</i>	-
Laos	LA	<u>Sustainable agriculture, food and nutrition security</u> • Food and nutrition security • Wealth creation (value chains, rural infrastructure, finance)	No
Afghanistan	AF	<u>Agriculture and Rural Development</u>	Yes

Country	Code	Details on the FNSSA sector	Resilience
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Market driven agriculture, and on and off-farm enterprises. • Food and nutrition security • Narcotic crops • Sector Wide Approach and participatory processes 	
Bangladesh	BD	<u>Food security and Nutrition</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food and nutrition security policy, • Social protection & Livelihoods (resilience and poor women) • Maternal and child nutrition 	Yes (flagship)
Pakistan	PK	<u>Rural Development</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local governance • Rural livelihoods (SMEs and renewable energy) • Nutrition 	No
Nepal	NP	<u>Sustainable Rural Development</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agricultural commercialization (value chains, infrastructure, renewable energy) • Agriculture sector policy • Maternal, infant and child nutrition • Disaster risk preparedness • Migration 	Yes (flagship)
Sri Lanka	LK	<u>Integrated rural development</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic infrastructure and social services • Food and nutrition security • Disaster risk preparedness and local planning • SMEs and business development 	Yes
Bhutan	BT	<u>Sustainable Agriculture and Forests</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food and nutrition security • Rural livelihoods and employment • Natural resource management (forest, biodiversity) • Resilience to climate change 	Yes

Source: authors' review of MIPs 2014-2020.

The “Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law” sector is the sector which receives the biggest allocations under the priority area “Human rights, democracy and good governance” and features in all but four bilateral programmes in Asia. The table below provides details on the coverage of this sector in the relevant bilateral programmes. The “Development security nexus” category actually overlaps with this sector in countries in crisis situations (Myanmar and Afghanistan). The table below therefore also include the bilateral programmes with a concentration area focusing on “Development security nexus.”

Table 14 Coverage of the “Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law” sector in Asia

Country	Code	Details on the sector	Allocation
Myanmar	MM	Governance / Rule of law / State capacity building <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public administration accountability and responsiveness to citizen's needs Access to independent, impartial and transparent justice and legal aid Legal / institutional capacity of justice and law enforcement agencies Preventive / professional approach by law enforcement agencies Democratic process and elections Decent work and respect of labour standards 	96
Myanmar	MM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Peacebuilding (Development – security nexus) Dialogue and monitoring of ceasefire Reform of the security sector Socio-economic recovery in conflict-affected communities	103
Cambodia	KH	<i>Not explicitly covered as a focal sector</i>	
Vietnam	VT	Governance and rule of law <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Justice system Accountable, transparent and cost-effective service delivery Citizen's effective participation in public governance 	50
Philippines	PH	Rule of law <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Justice system Oversight bodies and civil society Local and regional authorities and civil society in Bangsamoro/ Mindanao 	95
Mongolia	MN	<i>Not explicitly covered as a focal sector</i>	
Laos	LA	Governance, rule of law and human rights <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public participation (National Assembly) CSOs (good governance, research and advocacy) Access to justice Domestication of international obligations and enforcement Corruption 	5
Afghanistan	AF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Democratisation and Accountability Election Public administration Sub-national governance Accountability and oversight CSO & Media (human rights and informal domestic accountability) 	163
Afghanistan	AF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policing and Rule of Law (Development – security nexus) Police Justice CCI: anti-corruption, PFM, etc. 	319
Bangladesh	BD	Strengthening Democratic Government <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Democratic ownership (CSO, social dialogue, youth participation) Local governance Financial governance 	103
Pakistan	PK	Good Governance, Human Rights and Rule of Law <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Democracy / elections Federalisation/ decentralisation Security and the rule of law 	98

Country	Code	Details on the sector	Allocation
Nepal	NP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening democracy and decentralisation • Electoral assistance • Capacity-building of legislative bodies and other key institutions (judiciary, human rights institutions, media, civil society) • Rule of law environment and access to justice • Local governance (policy and institutional framework, local capacity, citizens participation) • PFM and corruption at national and local level 	74
Sri Lanka	LK	<i>Not explicitly covered as a focal sector</i>	
Bhutan	BT	<i>Not explicitly covered as a focal sector</i>	

Source: authors' review of MIPs 2014-2020.

At the level of the Asia regional programme, it should be noted that:

- **In the priority area of Human rights, democracy and good governance:**
 - No interventions are explicitly foreseen.
- **In the priority area of Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development:**
 - Natural resources / environment ("Promotion of a Green Economy"): EUR 441 million is allocated to this sector.
 - Trade / Regional integration: EUR 320 million is allocated to this sector.
 - FNSSA (Aid to uprooted people): EUR 122 million is allocated to this sector.

In several countries, there has been a clear evolution in bilateral programme approaches reflecting integration of new EU policy priorities. For instance, in Bangladesh, there has been a shift from food security initiatives focusing on production and access (with little attention to nutrition aspects) to interventions with a specific focus on resilience and nutrition aspects.

Central Asia

The table below presents the breakdown of the bilateral envelopes (indicative allocations) by priority area in the Asia region. Some key observations:

- The FNSSA and Education sectors are the main areas of intervention.
 - Issues related to climate change and disaster risk reduction are regularly mentioned in relation to FNSSA and education sector interventions. The FNSSA interventions in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have a strong component focussing specifically on resilience/climate change.
 - All education programmes have a strong focus on TVET in the three countries (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan) where education is a key sector of intervention.

Table 15 Indicative allocations to geographic (country) programmes per policy priority – Central Asia

	TJ	KG	UZ	TM	Total bilateral	Regional
Human rights, Democracy and good governance						
Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law		38			38	
Development and security nexus					0	38
Public Sector mngt, Tax, Corruption					0	

	<i>TJ</i>	<i>KG</i>	<i>UZ</i>	<i>TM</i>	<i>Total bilateral</i>	<i>Regional</i>
Civil society					0	
GBS					0	
Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development						
FNSSA	110	72	166		348	
Education	75	72		64	211	
Health	62				62	
Energy					0	170
Erasmus					0	115
Environment / Natural resources					0	
Social protection					0	
Infrastr. / Transport					0	
Trade / Reg. integr.					0	
Growth, Jobs and Private Sector					0	
Migration					0	

Source: authors calculation based on MIPs 2014-2020.

At the level of the Central Asia regional programme:

- **Human rights, democracy and good governance:**
 - Development and security nexus: EUR 38 million is allocated to this sector.
- **Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development:**
 - Energy: EUR 170 million.
 - Erasmus: EUR 115 million.

Latin America

The table below presents the breakdown of the bilateral envelopes (indicative allocations) by priority area in the Asia region. Some key observations:

- Environment / climate change: present as a significant sub-component in many programmes (e.g. in Education and Private sector development in Paraguay or in Food security in Honduras) and foreseen as a specific sector of intervention in two countries (Bolivia “Integrated water resource management” and Nicaragua – “Adaptation to climate change”).
- Strong focus on “employment” in relation to education/TVET (Paraguay), private sector development (El Salvador) or directly as a concentration area (Honduras).
- Public sector management: main focus on sub-national level and continuity with efforts made in past EU financed budget support programmes.
- Some attention to nutrition (Guatemala, Honduras and Peru).

Table 16 *Indicative allocations to geographic (country) programmes per policy priority – Latin America*

	<i>PY</i>	<i>BO</i>	<i>CO</i>	<i>PE</i>	<i>EC</i>	<i>HN</i>	<i>NI</i>	<i>GT</i>	<i>SV</i>	<i>Total</i>
Human rights, Democracy and good governance										
Public Sector mgmt, Tax, Corruption			54	54	52					160

	<i>PY</i>	<i>BO</i>	<i>CO</i>	<i>PE</i>	<i>EC</i>	<i>HN</i>	<i>NI</i>	<i>GT</i>	<i>SV</i>	<i>Total</i>
Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law	10	15				40				65
Development and security nexus		86						37		123
Civil society										0
GBS										0
Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development										
FNSSA						100	78	80		258
Growth, Jobs and Private Sector	20					85		65	61	231
Education	85						68			153
Social protection	48								83	131
Environment / Natural resources		60					50			110
Trade, Markets and Regional Integr.			10	10	10					30
Health										0
Infrastructure and Transport										0
Energy										0
Migration										0

Source: authors calculation based on MIPs 2014-2020.

The table below provides some details on the sectors covered.

Table 17 Details on sector coverage of bilateral allocations in Latin America

<i>Country</i>	<i>Code</i>	<i>Sector / details on the sector coverage in the country</i>
		FNSSA
Honduras	HN	<u>Food security</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy & strategy on food security and nutrition with a focus on family agriculture • Climate-resilient agroforestry systems • Technical skills and rural advisory capacity in vulnerable areas
Nicaragua	NI	<u>Support to the productive sector (with a focus on rural areas)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agricultural and agro-industrial MSMEs (productivity, competitiveness, quality, safety, inclusiveness, environmental sustainability and climate resilience) • Capacity of supporting public and private institutions
Guatemala	GT	<u>Food and nutritional security</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food and nutrition education and health interventions • Environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient method for producing food • Capacity for climate change mitigation at municipal level
		Growth, Jobs and Private Sector
Paraguay	PY	<u>Private sector development and trade policy</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business environment and competitiveness

Country	Code	Sector / details on the sector coverage in the country
		• Green market and sustainable production
Honduras	HN	<u>Employment</u> • Decent work and social protection policy
Guatemala	GT	<u>Competitiveness</u> • Regulatory framework for MSMEs development • Capacity building, productive infrastructure and innovation systems • Quality systems
El Salvador	SV	<u>Private sector development</u> • Agro-industry: diversification of production, quality and value chains. • Business climate and trade facilitation • Economic growth, employment, corporate social responsibility in the territories with social violence
		Public Sector mngt, Tax, Corruption
Colombia	CO	<u>Local development and institution building</u> • Territorial planning • Citizens' participation • Local social and economic development
Peru	PE	<u>Inclusive development at regional and local level</u> • Local governance • Nutrition
Ecuador	EC	<u>Sustainable and inclusive growth at the local level</u> • Capacity of provincial governments • Local private sector (SMEs), business clusters and value chains

Source: authors' review of MIPs 2014-2020.

There is a substantial regional programme for the *Latin America* region (compared to Asia):

- **Human rights, democracy and good governance:**
 - Development and security nexus: EUR 70 million is allocated to this sector.
 - Public Sector management, Tax, Corruption: EUR 42 million
- **Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development:**
 - Natural resources / environment: EUR 300 million.
 - Trade / Regional Integration: EUR 215 million.

There is a specific regional programme for *Central America*:

- **Human rights, democracy and good governance:**
 - Development and security nexus: EUR 40 million is allocated to this sector.
- **Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development:**
 - Natural resources / environment: EUR 35 million.
 - Trade / Regional Integration: EUR 40 million.

Middle-East

The EU is active via the DCI geographic programmes in only two countries in this region: Iraq and Yemen. In both countries, the EU provides a substantial support to reforms in the Justice and Security Sector. Other areas covered are education and (Iraq), and rural development/ resilience (Yemen) – details are provided in the table below.

Table 18 Focus of the support provided via bilateral programmes in the Middle East

Country	Sector / details on the sector coverage in the country
Yemen	<u>Good Governance and the Rule of Law</u> • Security Sector Reform and Justice) • PFM

Country	Sector / details on the sector coverage in the country
	<u>Integrated Rural Development</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Growth and Resilience, including: access to financial services and income-generating activities (for IDPs, vulnerable groups, women, young people, etc.), sustainable (nutritional) farm and off-farm income generating activities, renewable energies and "green" water technologies, climate adaptation • Sustainable basic services (welfare & health)
Irak	<u>Human Rights and Rule of Law</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratic institutions (incl. parliament) and good governance (incl. corruption) • Human rights, international humanitarian law and civil society as oversight body and human rights defender • Justice and security sector reform (incl. penitentiary) • Electoral reform <u>Primary and Secondary Education</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sector policies on access & quality to primary and secondary education • Education management at central, district and school levels • PFM (budgeting, expenditure controls and reporting) <u>Sustainable Energy for All</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local private sector (SMEs), Business clusters and value chains • Capacity of provincial governments

Source: authors' review of MIPs 2014-2020.

South Africa

The MIP 2014-2020 for South Africa foresees interventions in three main sectors of co-operation:

- Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development
 - Employment creation (EUR 77 million)
 - Education, training and innovation (EUR 58 million);
- Human rights, Democracy and other key elements of good governance
 - Building a capable and developmental state (EUR 60 million)

The MIP explains:

“Under the new DCI South Africa is eligible for bilateral cooperation, as an exceptional case, including in view of the phasing out of development grant aid. The multiannual indicative programme (MIP) takes this requirement into account: the bulk of the bilateral envelope will be committed over 4 years, whilst funds for Erasmus+ (and regional, if South Africa so wishes) will be committed over the full period 2014 – 2020.”

It also put a special emphasis on cross-cutting issues

“As in the past the following cross-cutting issues will be brought into the mainstream of the chosen sectors of cooperation:

- *Gender equality and women's empowerment. The main issue is translating policies into practice in all the MIP interventions to foster implementation of the strong constitutional, legal and policy framework, hampered by deep rooted societal norms and traditions that undermine the attainment of substantive equality. Actions will include women's access to employment, skills development, and delivering and receiving social services (including women specifically affected by RN/AIDS), and tackling the issue of gender-based violence.*
- *Environment/climate change. Each MIP intervention will be in compliance with global environmental objectives and South African environmental policy, present and future. Special attention will be paid to mainstreaming environment and climate change related issues under the focal sectors. In this respect, coordination will be ensured with other EU funding sources.*

- *HIV and AIDS. All interventions will contain, where relevant, a capacity building, awareness, and human-resources component as a response to the pandemic, including actions aimed at changing behaviour.*
- *Other key issues: Addressing other key issues will be important, such as disability and good governance. In the area of good governance sound public financial management, including taxation, service delivery, and accountability and the participation of targeted beneficiaries in delivery processes shall be addressed."*

1.2.1.3 I-213 Evidence of policy priorities being mainstreamed during the programming and implementation of specific DCI-financed interventions

Indicator Summary

Several guidance documents and new tools were developed in recent years: e.g. Guidance document on *"EU Country Roadmaps for a more strategic engagement with civil society,"* (2013), *"Tool-box on rights-based approach"* (2014), Approach paper on *"Research and innovation for sustainable agriculture and food and nutrition security"* (2014) Handbook on *"Operating in situations of conflict and fragility,"* (2015) Guidelines on *"Integrating the environment and climate change into EU international cooperation and development (2016)"*. But the effective application of the new concepts and tools developed will still require time and training of EU staff.

There is strong evidence that there has been significant mainstreaming of climate and environment action in the DCI since 2014. Mainstreaming of other priority issues such as gender, democracy and human rights remains a challenge.

With respect to *Smart growth*, the EU is increasingly recognising the essential role of research and innovation in food and nutrition security. The theme is a key dimension of the Pan-African Programme's strategic area 3 on Human development and strategic area 4 on Sustainable and inclusive development and growth. The theme is also prominent in the interventions focusing on sustainable energy in both geographic programmes (e.g. regional programmes in Asia) and thematic programmes (e.g. GPGC).

Environment / climate change

According to the DCI regulation 2014-2020 (20) *"Fighting climate change and protecting the environment are among the great challenges which the Union and developing countries are facing, and where the need for national and international action is urgent. This Regulation should therefore contribute to the objective of addressing at least 20 % of the Union budget to a low carbon and climate resilient society (...)"*

On climate change, *"The Commission's method for tracking climate related expenditure across the EU budget is based on using the so-called climate markers which distinguish 'primary' and 'significant' expenditure with respective assigned values of 100% and 40% that are counted as climate related spending. Given the range of implementing procedures (centrally managed, shared management, programmable/bottom - up), the approach to implementation varies across programmes and the general methodology is refined to reflect the specific circumstances"* EU (2016) SWD accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Mid-term review/ revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020.

The data available from the Mid-term review of the MFF indicates that the climate change target has not been met for 2014 (16% of overall commitment), but was on track for 2015 (20%). Given estimated commitments for upcoming years, an upward trend can be observed, indicating that targets are likely to be met until 2020.


Table 19 DCI climate mainstreaming 2014-2020 – totals (mEUR)

	2014-2017				2018-2020 estimates		
Reporting Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
DCI climate change mainstreaming totals	379,9	497,9	639,8	682,5	748,5	803,7	837,2
DCI total commitment	2.366,5	2.490,7					

Source: EU (2016) SWD accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Mid-term review/ revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020. An EU budget focused on results SWD(2016)299 final and authors calculation based on Dashboard data.

Looking at the information from the Statistical Dashboard, 41% of DCI commitments for 2014-2015 were marked²⁵ as being Aid to environment (13% main objective, 28% significant objective).

Figure 5 DCI commitments with environment / biological diversity markers (mEUR)



Source: Dashboard, Commitments for DCI geographic and thematic for years 2014 and 2015

Interview with DEVCO.C6:

Development and climate action go more and more together. Integration of environmental concerns is encouraged in all actions. Countries have realised the benefits of including climate change and biodiversity into their targets. Rio markers have been used for past years as a common method to track climate change and biodiversity. They are based on the Rio Convention. (...) There is a list of 42 priority countries that have a monitoring system for climate change. In most of the countries there is an EUD officer for environment and climate change.

Interview with DEVCO.C2:

Since 2014 and in compliance with the CIR, the QSG now systematically screens MIPs and AARs if the goal to spend 20 % of the budget is achieved in five sectors: a) infrastructure (including water); b) transport; c) climate change and environment; d)

²⁵²⁵ Rio markers are policy markers used for the statistical reporting (notably to the OECD's Development Assistance Committee) of amounts of official development assistance dedicated to the themes of the 'Rio conventions': Biodiversity; Desertification; Climate change mitigation (i.e. reductions in or absorption of greenhouse gas emissions); Climate change adaptation (including climate risk mitigation and vulnerability reduction). In line with the OECD-DAC's methodology, there are three possible values for the Rio markers: Not targeted; Significant objective; Principal objective.

agriculture and e) energy. Analysis is undertaken against Rio-Markers (OECD) Compliance can be at 100 %, 50 % or 0 %. This also affects projects under the GPGC. While in 2014 not many GPGC projects were ready, results in 2015-2016 are much better. The idea is that the target will progressively be met until 2020. This is also in conformity with COP-21 requirements and the need to report to OECD. The EU uses a strict methodology as compared to most Member States. As far as the monitoring of the Hyderabad objective on biodiversity is concerned, the situation is more fluid. The goal and related monitoring is not restricted to the EU.

Table 20 Proportion of EU's development assistance related to climate change and biodiversity during 2007-2013

Year	DCI (revised)	DCI total	% of DCI total
2007	125,323,161	2,195,000,000	5.7%
2008	281,960,958	2,321,000,000	12.1%
2009	265,382,758	2,419,000,000	11.0%
2010	257,307,920	2,462,000,000	10.5%
2011	357,427,070	2,591,000,000	13.8%
2012	315,089,600	2,697,000,000	11.7%
2013	220,920,000	2,715,400,000	
2007-2013	1,823,411,467	17,400,400,000	10.5%

Source: 2014 Annual Report on the EU's development and external assistance policies and their implementation in 2013

All EAMRs take the environment and climate change into consideration. Overall, the EU has been very active in the area of environment and climate change beyond project implementation. Most examples relate to communication and visibility activities aimed at raising awareness and enhancing cooperation in this sector. They also make references to many events organised by the EU presenting its position as a leader in climate negotiations in preparation for COP21 in Paris (demarches, high level conferences, roundtables, dialogues, etc.). In some cases, the environment and climate change have been included as focal sectors under 2014-2020 MIPs (Bolivia, Guatemala, Maldives and Tajikistan). Others countries refer to EU-funded projects in this sector (Afghanistan, Cuba, Honduras, Myanmar, Paraguay, Peru, and Nepal). Only a few countries specifically refer to the importance of mainstreaming climate change as a key priority on the development agenda (Bolivia, Nepal, Paraguay and Sri Lanka).

Bolivia EAMR 2015 (SECTION 7 – Q2.Mainstreaming Environment and Climate Change):

With environment and water being one of the focal sector under MIP 2014-16, climate change mainstreaming and related policy dialogue have been high on the Delegation agenda. Activities have been carried out in close coordination with Member States in the country. The most visible activities included a two-day event hosted by the embassies of France and Germany at the end of June (which included presentations on European funded projects and a dialogue on climate change, biodiversity and energy) and a section on climate change at Germany's Unification Day celebration. (...). The Delegation also supported Bolivian-led initiatives such as the celebration of Water Day (in March) and Protected Areas day (in November), with significant communication campaigns. Together with Switzerland, the EUD co-chairs the environment and climate change donor group in the country, for which updated ToRs were drafted. At the higher political level, climate change was one of the topics discussed during the High Level Dialogue between EU representatives and Bolivia in November. (...) Alongside key member states, we had regular discussions with the Bolivian Chief Climate Change Negotiator and other key ministerial interlocutors on the preparations for the Paris COP.

Sampling of questionnaires on “cross-cutting issues” (environment and climate change) submitted with Action documents to QSG:

- Forty-one out of forty-nine programmes take into account the environment and/or climate change as a cross-cutting issue.
- Exceptions include: three GPCG programmes²⁶ – two related to human development and one linked to migration and asylum – two Pan African Programme interventions²⁷; two geographic programmes²⁸ - one in Cambodia and one in Bangladesh – plus one more regional project.²⁹
- Supporting documents - mainly environmental screening checklists - are only attached in fourteen programmes, and in some cases, the environment/climate change is not included as a cross-cutting issue. This is for instance the case of the “EU Expert Facility on Employment and Social Protection,” the “Support to Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue” and the “Support to Electoral Reform in Cambodia” (among others).
- In some cases, QSG checklist recommends taking environmental issues on board.

Since 2015, DEVCO has significantly stepped up environment and climate change mainstreaming efforts, further strengthened during 2016 building on the "Note on mainstreaming to HoDs managing DEVCO financing instruments" sent last January after COP21. A dedicated Environment and Climate Change Mainstreaming Facility (ECC Facility, jointly managed by C2 and C6) has been set up to support the effective integration of environment and climate change issues in the EU's international cooperation and development programmes. Tools being deployed include, among others: a helpdesk to support delegations and colleagues in headquarters to integrate environment and climate change in their programmes, new environment and climate change mainstreaming guidelines³⁰, the systematic screening and review of action documents submitted to the QSG in five priority sectors³¹ that have the highest potential to contribute to the 20% target, and the delivery of training courses and workshops. C2 and C6 have also identified 42 priority countries selected for their highest potential to contribute to climate and environment action. Videoconferences with these priority countries aim at raising awareness and exploring opportunities with the EU Delegations to strengthen climate and environmental integration, as well as identifying the support Delegations might require, including requests for capacity building.

Note to Heads of EU Delegations covered by the DCI and EDF Financing Instruments and to Directors in DG DEVCO (25 Jan 2016):

Much more needs to be done. We therefore request you to engage with the authorities of the country or countries to which you are accredited or for which you are responsible to consider how we can support the further development and implementation of their national climate change policies. By 15 December 2015, INDCs, Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, covering 187 countries had been submitted to the UNFCCC. These can be found on the UNFCCC website (...)

Please consider these INDCs in all cases in which the countries for which you are responsible have submitted them, along with other relevant country climate plans and strategies, which in principle should have been reflected in countries' INDCs, such as their National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs).

Furthermore, we request you to step up efforts to systematically integrate environment and climate change across all instruments and levels of intervention – national, regional and

²⁶ 'Multi-annual contribution 2014-16 to the Global fund to Fight Aids Tuberculosis and malaria (GFATM)'; 'EU Expert Facility on Employment and Social Protection' and 'Pilot action on voluntary return and sustainable, community-based reintegration'

²⁷ 'Support to Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue' and 'Support to the Pan African Master Consortium for Interpretation and translation (PAMCIT)'.

²⁸ 'Support to Electoral Reform in Cambodia' and 'Activating Village Courts in Bangladesh'.

²⁹ 'EUROSociAL +'

³⁰ https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/mainstreaming-guidelines-2016_en.pdf.

³¹ The five priority sectors are: i) agriculture, food and nutrition security (incl. rural development if not related to other sectors); ii) economic development (incl. growth, employment, private sector, sustainable consumption and production); iii) energy; iv) transport and infrastructure (other than water or energy infrastructure); v) water, sanitation and waste management.

thematic. To be most effective, this integration effort has to start early in the cycle of operations, ideally before or at the identification stage. To this effect, all Action Documents should be screened by Quality Support Group 1 (QSG1). This effort should also be made when carrying out mid-term reviews (MTRs) of programmes, revising programmes and preparing programmes for the second programming period within the Multiannual Financial Framework when applicable.

The 2015 Evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change reached the following conclusions:

Conclusion 2: The EU policy-level influence on environment and climate change has been considerable, but has not yet reached its full potential. Through a combination of direct policy support actions, the use of indicators related to environment and climate change in budget and project support, and policy dialogue, the EU focus on sustainable development substantially increased in the period 2007 to 2013. However, the full potential has not been reached, and there is still considerable scope for increasing policy influence. Close to half of the Delegations surveyed report that environment and climate change still does not feature strongly in their interaction with national partners. Moreover, opportunities have not been fully exploited to make greater use of indicators in budget support and to strengthen the linkages between country-level and global dialogue.


Conclusion 10: There has been significant progress in mainstreaming environment and climate change in EU support to sectors such as infrastructure and agriculture/rural development, especially where there is national ownership. EU support has contributed to an increased focus on mainstreaming environment and climate change at national policy level in “environmentally sensitive sectors” in partner countries. However, there is still a gap between policy/ strategies and actual implementation. In line with its policy objectives related to mainstreaming of environment and climate change in its development co-operation, and to promoting a green economy, the EU has significantly increased its capacity and developed solid approaches to ensure that environmental considerations are addressed. As a result, EUDs have increasingly engaged in mainstreaming in the agriculture/rural development sector and in the infrastructure sector – although more strategically so in relation to energy than to the transport infrastructure. An example of this change is the increased and more strategic use of SEAs – such as in Rwanda, where an SEA of the agriculture sector inspired the government to make it a legal requirement. An SEA is an important input for the future support for Rwanda’s energy sector, which will focus specifically on sustainable energy. Moreover, mainstreaming is, in general, figuring more prominently in the new NIPs for 2014-2020, compared to the CSPs for 2007-2013. Partner country policies and strategies generally lack clear mainstreaming related outcome indicators and budgetary breakdowns by which progress could be measured. The EU is supporting work on the establishment of such indicators, and seeks – through dialogue with the governments – to get these incorporated as national sector performance indicators. The modality of providing SBS support seems to facilitate this dialogue and a broader dialogue on environmental mainstreaming in sector policies and development plans (e.g. Bolivia, Rwanda and Egypt), to a larger extent than project support (e.g. Kenya). However, it is also evident that mainstreaming has been most successful where there is a strong national ownership of the mainstreaming agenda. In countries, where this ownership is strong (e.g. Rwanda), the results are more convincing than in countries with less buy-in. However, EU support has also contributed to build such national ownership – for example, through ENRTP, which has supported the UNEP-UNDP PEI that has focused on building national mainstreaming awareness and capacity. The PEI has played an important role in building the mainstreaming capacity in several countries – and, in the case of Rwanda, this has also been of benefit to the country programme.

Democracy and Human rights

The strong emphasis in EU action on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms is reflected in all existing information. There are only very few exceptions where the DCI bilateral programmes do not contain a concentration area in relation to "Human Rights, Democracy or other elements of good governance" (e.g. Sri Lanka in Asia and Nicaragua in Latin America).

The financial information from the Statistical Dashboard shows that 75% of all DCI commitments between 2014-2015 have been marked as targeting participatory democracy and good governance (37% as main objective, 38% as significant objective).

Figure 6 Policy marker: Participatory Democracy/ Good Governance Marker DCI 2014-2015 (mEUR)



Source: Dashboard, Commitments for DCI geographic and thematic for years 2014 and 2015
Democracy and human rights have been part of all considerations applied in General and Sectoral Budget Support at least since 2013.

The dimensions are well documented in all EU reporting. The 2015 DEVCO Annual Report Staff Working document indicates:

Human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance have been addressed either as key focal sectors or the rights-based approach has been applied in other areas of cooperation in the new programming 2014-2020.

The analysis of a sampling of QSG “cross-cutting issues” documents for action documents shows that:

- Thirty-two out of forty-nine programmes include democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights as cross-cutting issues. Most projects refer to human rights and good governance though in some cases democracy is also cited as an issue to be mainstreamed.
- GPGC thematic and regional programmes are among those interventions where such priorities have been underweight: six out of fourteen GPCG actions and five out of nine regional projects.
- Supporting documents such as assessment of cross-cutting issues, containing the rights-based approach, are not usually attached to project proposals.

Six Budget Support (BS) programmes³² were recently launched in DCI countries. The analysis of the Risk Management Frameworks in budget support operations shows that, in all instances excluding the ‘Sector Budget Support for the Implementation of the National Strategy for the Fight against the Drug Trafficking and Reduction of Surplus Cultivation of Coca (ELCNyRHEC)’, the Risk Management Frameworks were jointly submitted with the action documents and assessed risks related to human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

³² ‘Support to Public Financial Management’ (Cambodia), ‘Education Sector Reform Partnership 2014-16’ (Cambodia), ‘Third Primary Education Development Programme (PEDPIII)’ (Bangladesh), ‘Renforcement de l’agriculture familiale et de la souveraineté alimentaire dans les municipalités d’expulsion de main d’oeuvre vers la Coca’ (Bolivia), ‘Integrated Water and Natural Resources Management’ (Bolivia) and ‘Sector Budget Support for the Implementation of the National Strategy for the Fight against the Drug Trafficking and Reduction of Surplus Cultivation of Coca’ (Bolivia).

Interviews with DEVCO.A4 unit highlighted the following elements related to BSs:

General Budget Support (GBS) and Sectoral Budget Support (SBS) are primary vehicles of making use of country systems. BS is provided to different categories of countries: a) countries having been found to have good governance through a fundamental assessment, in which case respect of these principles and requirements is not a problem; b) countries in need of state building support, i.e. fragile countries due to political upheaval or natural disasters (e.g. Tunisia in transition), supported short-term and with these conditions included; c) countries in need of sectoral budget support, in which a rights-based approach is required (especially for justice reform and education). For countries under b) and c) a Risk Management Framework is applied, which includes criteria like respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Risks may be low, median, substantial or high. The risk of non-intervention is considered. Under all circumstances, BS is accompanied by some form of performance assessment, policy dialogue and capacity building.

Following the Council Conclusions on an “EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy” adopted in 2012, specific tools for working towards a “rights-based approach” (RBA) to development was developed by DEVCO staff. A Commission staff working document offering a complete tool-box on RBA was finalised in 2014. Interviews with DEVCO.B1 highlighted the fact that “*the Rights -Based Approach (RBA) is a new concept for some delegations (...) documents are quite new and date back from last year so they need to be seen as work in progress.*”


The analysis of MIPs 2014-2020 shows that references to the importance of respecting fundamental rights are regularly made in programming documents and several of them explicitly mention the concept of “rights-based approach”. However, these references remain quite general. For instance,

- In Asia, mention to the RBA is made in three MIPs:
 - Bangladesh MIP 2014-2020: *In line with the commitments under the Agenda for Change, a rights-based approach will be adopted in all focus areas.*
 - The Philippines MIP 2014-2020: *In line with the Agenda for Change, a rights based approach will be applied in future EU support across the chosen priority areas, to assist partner countries in implementing their international human rights obligations and to support the right holders, with a focus on poor and vulnerable groups, in claiming their rights.*
 - Cambodia MIP 2014-2020: *In accordance with EU policy, a rights based approach encompassing all human rights, including labour rights, will be applied across all priority areas, to assist partner countries in implementing their international human rights obligations and to support the right holders, with a focus on poor and vulnerable groups, in claiming their rights.*
- In Central Asia, “human-rights based approach” is a cross-cutting issue (together with the “promotion of gender-based policies”) in the “Rule of law” concentration area in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, mention to the RBA is made in the MIPs of the three other DCI countries of the region, for instance:
 - Uzbekistan MIP 2014-2020: *The EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy calls for a human rights based approach to development cooperation to be reflected throughout the whole programming.*
 - Kyrgyzstan MIP 2014-2020: *In accordance with the Agenda for Change, a rights based approach encompassing all human rights shall be applied across all the priority areas, to assist partner countries in implementing their international human rights obligations and to support the right holders, with a focus on poor and vulnerable groups, in claiming their rights.*

Gender

The Statistical Dashboard illustrates that around 45% of DCI commitments for 2014-2015 are taken into account in the gender equality marker (4% main objective, 41% significant objective).

Figure 7 Policy marker: Gender Equality DCI 2014-2015 (mEUR)



Source: Dashboard, Commitments for DCI geographic and thematic for years 2014 and 2015

However, gender mainstreaming has remained a challenge. For example, according to QSG data, the use of sex-disaggregated indicators in projects and programmes analysed has only been practised in twenty of the forty-nine programmes. The results achieved in this regard are uneven. CSO-LA interventions are at the bottom of the list, with no references to sex-disaggregated data, followed by the Pan African Programmes (with just one intervention with gender data). GPGC thematic (nine out of fourteen) and Geographic (nine out of thirteen) programmes contain multiple examples where logframes have been engendered.

The 2014 DEVCO Annual Report Staff Working Document indicates that gender equality remains both a challenge and a key EU priority. An achievement highlighted by the AR SWD 2014 is the elaboration of the Gender Action Plan in each country where the EU cooperation takes place. According to the AR SWD 2014 twenty-five Gender Country Profiles were published in 2013 (e.g. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) and more were being prepared. The 2014 Staff Working Document refers to the third report on the implementation of the Action Plan for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) in development cooperation (covering the period 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013). The GEWE report shows some results in this area including: i) gender equality is increasingly mainstreamed in fields that are not usually engendered such as infrastructure; ii) the number of sectors using sex-disaggregated indicators has increased in 2013 from 5 to 18. This includes sectors that provide water and sanitation facilities, agriculture and forestry, regional development, environment and public financial reform.

According to the 2015 DEVCO Annual Report Staff Working Document, the EU had a comprehensive strategy that included both strong gender mainstreaming activities in all major aid programmes but there is barely any example about this approach beyond some dispersed mentions of gender in several countries or projects. Gender equality is mainly covered under the thematic programme Investing in people by both AR-SWD 2014 and 2015. It is worth noticing that gender is not included in the subheading related to "mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues". According to the AR 2015, the new DCI-Global Public Goods and Challenges will allocate more than EUR 100 million to finance women and children's wellbeing projects over the period 2015-2020. The AR 2015 also refers to a strategic evaluation of the EU's support to gender equality and women's empowerment in partner countries launched in 2014 as well as to the EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 to be published as a Staff Working Document in 2015.

The analysis of the EAMRs 2015 shows that, overall, most countries raise gender concerns in policy dialogue and/or mainstream gender issues through DCI programmes. Fifteen out of 24 countries have selected objectives from the GAP 2016-2020: Afghanistan, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Uzbekistan. Though in the cases of Bolivia

and Peru the objectives selected from GAP II is a tentative list and Nepal and Nicaragua mention broad thematic areas without being very specific. Bangladesh, Cambodia, Colombia, Guatemala, Laos, Myanmar and Tajikistan have not chosen goals but plan to do it in the future. According to EAMRs 2015, 10 countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Cuba, El Salvador, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Myanmar, Paraguay, Sri Lanka and Tajikistan) have not carried out a gender analysis yet though most of them plan to do it in 2016. Still seven countries attest that findings of gender analysis have provided insightful information on EU support to gender (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua and Vietnam). The cases of Colombia, Guatemala, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines and Uzbekistan are difficult to assess given the information provided by EAMRs. Yemen does not answer. It is worth noticing that EAMRs 2013 do not contain any specific section with regard to gender issues.

Smart growth (Europe 2020)

The DCI regulation indicates:

(19) A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, i.e. involving growth patterns that enhance social, economic and territorial cohesion and enable the poor to increase their contribution to, and benefit from, national wealth, underlines the commitment of the Union to promote, in its internal and external policies, smart, inclusive and sustainable growth bringing together three pillars: economic, social and environmental.

Evidence from different sources shows that the EU is increasingly recognising the essential role of research and innovation in food and nutrition security. For instance, this theme is a key dimension of the Pan-African Programme's strategic area 3 on human development and strategic area 4 on Sustainable and inclusive development and growth. In 2014, within the framework of the EU Africa Partnership, EU and African Heads of States endorsed a jointly-funded EU-Africa Research and Innovation Partnership, which identified food and nutrition security and sustainable agriculture as the top priority.

The theme is also prominent in the interventions focusing on sustainable energy in both geographic programmes (e.g. regional programmes in Asia) and thematic programmes (e.g. GPGC) – see also previous indicators.

In particular, as explained in the 2016 evaluation of the EU support to research and innovation for development, the theme of “research and innovation” played an increasing role in the DCI 2007-2013:

The EU's main budget instrument for supporting development co-operation, the DCI, sets up geographic and thematic programmes. In the geographic programmes, relevant to Asia and Latin America, scientific and technological co-operation is specifically promoted in the area of education. The strategic partnership between the EU and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has also prioritised intensifying co-operation in research, science and technology.

(...) The thematic programmes outlined in the DCI regulation discuss research especially with regards to Investing in People (health, education), and Food Security.

- *The DCI Investing in People strategy (2007-2013) elaborates on the priorities in health, including accelerating and improving the availability and access to “public goods”, stimulating development of innovative strategies to confront diseases and improving capacity of institutions and communities to participate in this process, and support for innovative environmental measures for disease prevention.*

- *Under the DCI strategy for the Food Security thematic programme (2007-2013), Research, technology transfer and innovation to enhance food security is one of three strategic priorities. The main emphasis is on agricultural research for development (ARD) with an expanded focus that includes nutrition (including horticulture and livestock production), ecologically efficient intensification of agriculture, sustainable natural resources management, and agricultural biodiversity and the sustainable management of agricultural ecosystems.*

- *The DCI thematic programme on Environment and Natural Resources strategy (2007-2013) prioritises technology capacity building in climate change mitigation to facilitate the development of enabling environments, the design of mechanisms for knowledge sharing*

and improvement of know-how. It should also help to adapt technologies to local circumstances. In sustainable energy area, the priority is to boost capacity and technology transfer in developing countries with a view to creating an enabling environment for investments in sustainable energy solutions, as well as a suitable policy dialogue improving co-operation with the EU.

But, the 2016 evaluation also highlights:

In all sectors, the story is repeated – a good high level vision of complementarity but little done to operationally implement it. In FSNA, as established in Brussels interviews, there is clear understanding of the division of labour and complementary roles. DG DEVCO funds regional and continental research organisations active in FP7 to build capacity and translate research results into tangible approaches to food security and nutrition. DG DEVCO also finances research at the global level (e.g. CGIAR through the Food Security Thematic Programme), and this coordinates with and complements FP7. However, there was little evidence at field level of co-ordination or consciously exploiting complementarities.

1.2.1.4 I-214 Committed amount per policy priority to-date.

Indicator Summary

The analysis of DCI committed amounts focuses on the years for which data is available (2014 and 2015). The analysis shows that the importance given to the overall priority areas in the initial plans (roughly 27% for the “Human rights, democracy and good governance” area and 73% for the “Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development” area) has been respected so far. Commitments made to geographic programmes show some divergences from the foreseen allocations. These are mainly related to large interventions being launched in crisis situations such as a general budget support programme in Nepal which was initiated after the 2015 earthquake but was not foreseen in the initial MIP. Given the fact that less 30% of the overall DCI envelope has been committed during the first two years of the current MFF, it is too early to come up with final firm statements on whether the initial plans have been fully respected.

Detailed information

The “Environment” sector represents around 33% of the committed amounts under the GPGC programme so far. “Health” is representing only 15% of GPGC committed amounts.

Table 21 Comparison between distribution of committed amounts and MIPs allocations – Thematic programmes

Priority / Sector	Committed amounts	MIP allocation	% of MIP committed
Human rights, democracy and good governance	475	1,834	26%
Civil society & local authorities	475	1,834	
Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law	-	-	
Development and security nexus	-	-	
Public Sector management, Tax, Corruption	-	-	
GBS (GGDC/SBC)	-	-	
Sustainable growth for human development	1,269	4,915	26%
Food & Nutrition Security, Sustainable Agriculture	373	1,425	
Natural resources, environment and climate change	424	1,327	
Human development	317	1,229	
Health	190	545	
Education	62	266	
Growth, Jobs and Private Sector Engagement	28	104	

<i>Priority / Sector</i>	<i>Committed amounts</i>	<i>MIP allocation</i>	<i>% of MIP committed</i>
<i>Other (e.g. gender, children, culture)</i>	23	165	
<i>Social protection</i>	14	150	
Sustainable Energy	68	590	
Migration	88	344	
Trade, Markets and Reg Integration	-	-	
Infrastructure & Transport	-	-	
Total	4,915	6,792	

Source: authors calculation based on 2016 DEVCO Dashboard data and MIPs 2014-2020 allocations.

In Latin America, the share between the actions foreseen in the two overall priority areas (75% for “Sustainable growth for human development” against 25% for “Human rights, Democracy and Good governance”) has been respected (the ratio is 71%/29% for the committed amounts so far).

Table 22 Comparison between distribution of committed amounts and MIPs allocations – Geographic programmes (Latin America)

<i>Priority / sector</i>	<i>Committed amounts</i>	<i>MIP³³ allocation</i>	<i>% of MIP committed</i>
Sustainable growth for human development	369	1498	25%
Growth, Jobs and Private Sector Engagement	183	231	
FNSSA	101	258	
Natural resources / environment	64	440	
Social protection	20	131	
Trade, Markets and Reg Integration	1	285	
Education	0	153	
Human rights, democracy and good governance	150	500	30%
Development and security nexus	81	233	
Public Sector management	68	202	
Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law	1	65	

Source: authors calculation based on 2016 DEVCO Dashboard data and MIPs 2014-2020 allocations.

In Asia, the level of amounts committed so far point to some divergence from the initially foreseen split between the main two overall priority areas (34%/65% in terms of committed amounts against 22%/78% for the foreseen allocations). Discrepancies in the sector distribution (compared to the distribution indicated in the MIP) can be explained by the team’s approach to categorise certain interventions which can be different from the one used by DEVCO during the programming of the MIP 2014-2020. But the overall difference observed in the split between the main two priority areas is largely explained by the launch of a GBS programme in Nepal following the 2015 earthquake and a large programme supporting the Afghan public sector which has been launched quite early in the current financing cycle. The analysis thus indicates that a substantial amount of funds (42% of the foreseen envelope) has already been committed in the overall priority area “Human rights, democracy and good governance” and points to an important attention given to this theme by

³³ Bilateral and Regional geographic indicative allocations.

the EU in the region which can be explained by the particular crisis situation of certain countries.

Table 23 Comparison between distribution of committed amounts and MIPs allocations – Geographic programmes (Asia)

<i>Priority / sector</i>	<i>Committed amounts</i>	<i>MIPs³⁴ allocation</i>	<i>% of MIP committed</i>
Sustainable growth for human development	1.049	4.550	23%
FNSSA	474	1.857	
Education	225	1.057	
Natural resources / environment	145	441	
Health	80	274	
Energy	60	571	
Trade, Markets and Reg Integration	57	320	
Growth, Jobs and Private Sector Engagement	8	30	
Human rights, democracy and good governance	542	1.285	42%
Public Sector management	198	179	
Democracy, Human rights, Rule of Law	142	684	
GBS / SBC	105	0	
Development and security nexus	97	422	

Source: authors calculation based on 2016 DEVCO Dashboard data and MIPs 2014-2020 allocations.

1.2.2 JC 22: DCI programmes contribute toward the overarching goal of poverty reduction³⁵.

1.2.2.1 I-221 DCI partner country results as of 2013-14.

Indicator Summary

The analysis of DCI partner country results shows that most regions and countries have experienced considerable progress in poverty reduction and human and economic development, as illustrated by the evolution of key MDG indicators. Some remarkable changes have occurred in countries such as Vietnam (around 90% of reduction in the incidence of poverty in the last decade), Cambodia (88%), Peru (74%), Bolivia (50%). Notable achievements have been made in the area of human development with, in particular, substantial increase in access to education on all continents. Gender parity has been achieved in both primary and secondary education in Latin America and Asia and important improvements have been made in other regions. Maternal and child mortality declined in all regions, with Asia experiencing the most positive evolution. Democratic processes have also strengthened in several countries with open elections and relatively peaceful political transition processes taking place in an increasing number of countries.

DCI interventions made positive contributions to these evolutions. However, there has been great variation in effectiveness across types of DCI interventions and geographical contexts.

³⁴ Bilateral and Regional geographic indicative allocations.

³⁵ DCI programmes contribute toward the overarching goal of poverty reduction by: Fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development consistent with EU priorities; consolidating and supporting democracy, rule of law and good governance, human rights and relevant principles of international law; contributing to the EU's priorities for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.

In particular, recent strategic evaluations show that the most successful interventions have been those rooted in a strong partnership framework with the partner country.

Details from recent MDG reports

The table below summarises some achievements presented in the 2015 MDG report.

Table 24 Achievements highlighted in the 2015 MDG report

MDG	Achievements
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extreme poverty has declined significantly over the last two decades. In 1990, nearly half of the population in the developing world lived on less than \$1.25 a day; that proportion dropped to 14 per cent in 2015. • Globally, the number of people living in extreme poverty has declined by more than half, falling from 1.9 billion in 1990 to 836 million in 2015. Most progress has occurred since 2000. • The number of people in the working middle class—living on more than \$4 a day—has almost tripled between 1991 and 2015. This group now makes up half the workforce in the developing regions, up from just 18 per cent in 1991. • The proportion of undernourished people in the developing regions has fallen by almost half since 1990, from 23.3 per cent in 1990–1992 to 12.9 per cent in 2014–2016.
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The primary school net enrolment rate in the developing regions has reached 91 per cent in 2015, up from 83 per cent in 2000. • The number of out-of-school children of primary school age worldwide has fallen by almost half, to an estimated 57 million in 2015, down from 100 million in 2000. • Sub-Saharan Africa has had the best record of improvement in primary education of any region since the MDGs were established. The region achieved a 20 percentage point increase in the net enrolment rate from 2000 to 2015, compared to a gain of 8 percentage points between 1990 and 2000. • The literacy rate among youth aged 15 to 24 has increased globally from 83 per cent to 91 per cent between 1990 and 2015. The gap between women and men has narrowed.
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Many more girls are now in school compared to 15 years ago. The developing regions as a whole have achieved the target to eliminate gender disparity in primary, secondary and tertiary education. • In Southern Asia, only 74 girls were enrolled in primary school for every 100 boys in 1990. Today, 103 girls are enrolled for every 100 boys. • Women now make up 41 per cent of paid workers outside the agricultural sector, an increase from 35 per cent in 1990. • Between 1991 and 2015, the proportion of women in vulnerable employment as a share of total female employment has declined 13 percentage points. In contrast, vulnerable employment among men fell by 9 percentage points. • Women have gained ground in parliamentary representation in nearly 90 per cent of the 174 countries with data over the past 20 years. The average proportion of women in parliament has nearly doubled during the same period. Yet still only one in five members are women.
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The global under-five mortality rate has declined by more than half, dropping from 90 to 43 deaths per 1,000 live births between 1990 and 2015. • Despite population growth in the developing regions, the number of deaths of children under five has declined from 12.7 million in 1990 to

MDG	Achievements
	<p>almost 6 million in 2015 globally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Since the early 1990s, the rate of reduction of under-five mortality has more than tripled globally. • In sub-Saharan Africa, the annual rate of reduction of under-five mortality was over five times faster during 2005–2013 than it was during 1990–1995. • Measles vaccination helped prevent nearly 15.6 million deaths between 2000 and 2013. The number of globally reported measles cases declined by 67 per cent for the same period. • About 84 per cent of children worldwide received at least one dose of measles containing vaccine in 2013, up from 73 per cent in 2000.
Goal 5: Improve maternal Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Since 1990, the maternal mortality ratio has declined by 45 per cent worldwide, and most of the reduction has occurred since 2000. • In Southern Asia, the maternal mortality ratio declined by 64 per cent between 1990 and 2013, and in sub-Saharan Africa it fell by 49 per cent. • More than 71 per cent of births were assisted by skilled health personnel globally in 2014, an increase from 59 per cent in 1990. • In Northern Africa, the proportion of pregnant women who received four or more antenatal visits increased from 50 per cent to 89 per cent between 1990 and 2014. • Contraceptive prevalence among women aged 15 to 49, married or in a union, increased from 55 per cent in 1990 worldwide to 64 per cent in 2015.
Goal 6: Combat HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New HIV infections fell by approximately 40 per cent between 2000 and 2013, from an estimated 3.5 million cases to 2.1 million. • By June 2014, 13.6 million people living with HIV were receiving antiretroviral therapy (ART) globally, an immense increase from just 800,000 in 2003. ART averted 7.6 million deaths from AIDS between 1995 and 2013. • Over 6.2 million malaria deaths have been averted between 2000 and 2015, primarily of children under five years of age in sub-Saharan Africa. The global malaria incidence rate has fallen by an estimated 37 per cent and the mortality rate by 58 per cent. • More than 900 million insecticide-treated mosquito nets were delivered to malaria-endemic countries in sub-Saharan Africa between 2004 and 2014. • Between 2000 and 2013, tuberculosis prevention, diagnosis and treatment interventions saved an estimated 37 million lives. The tuberculosis mortality rate fell by 45 per cent and the prevalence rate by 41 per cent between 1990 and 2013.
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ozone-depleting substances have been virtually eliminated since 1990, and the ozone layer is expected to recover by the middle of this century. • Terrestrial and marine protected areas in many regions have increased substantially since 1990. In Latin America and the Caribbean, coverage of terrestrial protected areas rose from 8.8 per cent to 23.4 per cent between 1990 and 2014. • In 2015, 91 per cent of the global population is using an improved drinking water source, compared to 76 per cent in 1990. • Of the 2.6 billion people who have gained access to improved drinking water since 1990, 1.9 billion gained access to piped drinking water on premises. Over half of the global population (58 per cent) now enjoys this higher level of service. • Globally, 147 countries have met the drinking water target, 95 countries have met the sanitation target and 77 countries have met both. • Worldwide, 2.1 billion people have gained access to improved sanitation.

MDG	Achievements
	<p>The proportion of people practicing open defecation has fallen almost by half since 1990.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The proportion of urban population living in slums in the developing regions fell from approximately 39.4 per cent in 2000 to 29.7 per cent in 2014.

Source: 2015 MDG report.

The box below summarises some major challenges highlighted in the 2015 MDG report.

Box 5 Development challenges reported in the last MDG report

Although significant achievements have been made on many of the MDG targets worldwide, progress has been uneven across regions and countries, leaving significant gaps. Millions of people are being left behind, especially the poorest and those disadvantaged because of their sex, age, disability, ethnicity or geographic location. Targeted efforts will be needed to reach the most vulnerable people.

Gender inequality persists: Women continue to face discrimination in access to work, economic assets and participation in private and public decision-making. Women are also more likely to live in poverty than men. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the ratio of women to men in poor households increased from 108 women for every 100 men in 1997 to 117 women for every 100 men in 2012, despite declining poverty rates for the whole region.

Big gaps exist between the poorest and richest households, and between rural and urban areas: In the developing regions, children from the poorest 20 per cent of households are more than twice as likely to be stunted as those from the wealthiest 20 per cent. Children in the poorest households are four times as likely to be out of school as those in the richest households. Under-five mortality rates are almost twice as high for children in the poorest households as for children in the richest. In rural areas, only 56 per cent of births are attended by skilled health personnel, compared with 87 per cent in urban areas.

Climate change and environmental degradation undermine progress achieved, and poor people suffer the most: Global emissions of carbon dioxide have increased by over 50 per cent since 1990. Addressing the unabated rise in greenhouse gas emissions and the resulting likely impacts of climate change, such as altered ecosystems, weather extremes and risks to society, remains an urgent, critical challenge for the global community. An estimated 5.2 million hectares of forest were lost in 2010.


Conflicts remain the biggest threat to human development: By the end of 2014, conflicts had forced almost 60 million people to abandon their homes—the highest level recorded since the Second World War.

Millions of poor people still live in poverty and hunger, without access to basic services: Despite enormous progress, even today, about 800 m people still live in extreme poverty and suffer from hunger. Over 160 children under age five have inadequate height for their age due to insufficient food. Currently, 57 children of primary school age are not in school. Almost half of global workers are still working in vulnerable conditions, rarely enjoying the benefits associated with decent work.

Source: 2015 MDG report.

The following figure provides an overview of the progress made against MDG 1.A / poverty.


Figure 8 *Progress against MDG 1.A / poverty by region³⁶*



Source: 2015 MDG report.

The figure below provides an overview of the progress made against MDG 1.C / hunger.

Figure 9 *Progress against MDG 1.C / hunger by region³⁷*



Source: 2015 MDG report.

The table below highlights the positive progress obtained against MDG (e.g. MDG 1 / poverty, MGD 3 / gender, MGD 4 / mortality rates) in many Asian countries.

³⁶ Proportion of people living on less than \$1.25 a day, 1990, 2011 and 2015 (percentage).

³⁷ Proportion of undernourished people 1990-1992 and 2014-2016 (percentage).

Table 25 DCI Asia countries on- and off-track for the MDGs


Region & Country \ MDG		\$1,25 Country line poverty Underweight children	Primary enrolment Reaching last grade Primary completion	Gender primary Gender secondary Gender tertiary	Under-5 mortality Infant mortality	Maternal mortality Birth attendance Antenatal care	HIV prevalence TB Incidence TB prevalence	Forest cover Protected area CO2 emissions Safe drinking water Basic sanitation
East & South-East Asia	China	●	●	●	●	■	●	●
	Cambodia	●	●	●	●	■	●	●
	Indonesia	●	■	●	●	■	●	●
	Lao PDR	▶	●	●	■	■	●	●
	Malaysia	●	●	●	■	■	●	●
	Mongolia	●	▶	●	●	■	●	■
	Myanmar	●	■	●	■	■	●	●
	Philippines	▶	■	●	■	■	●	■
	Thailand	●	●	●	▶	■	●	●
	Viet Nam	●	●	●	■	▶	■	●
South & South-West Asia	Afghanistan	▶	■	●	■	■	▶	▶
	Bangladesh	▶	▶	■	●	■	▶	■
	Bhutan	●	▶	■	●	■	●	■
	India	●	●	▶	■	■	●	■
	Maldives	●	▶	■	●	■	●	■
	Nepal	●	■	■	●	■	■	■
	Pakistan	●	●	■	■	■	▶	■
	Sri Lanka	●	●	■	■	■	▶	■
Central Asia	Kazakhstan	●	■	●	■	■	■	■
	Kyrgyzstan	●	■	●	■	■	■	■
	Tajikistan	●	●	■	■	■	■	■
	Turkmenistan	●	●	■	■	■	■	■
	Uzbekistan	●	■	■	■	■	■	■
● Early achiever		▶ On track			■ Slow			■ Regressing/No progress

Source: 2015 Asia MDG report.

WDI database

The figure below highlights the trends in poverty reduction in selected DCI countries in Asia and Latin America.

Figure 10 Trends in poverty reduction³⁸ in selected DCI countries (2007-2014)




Source: authors' calculations World Bank's World Development Indicators data.

The figure below highlights the trends in poverty reduction in selected DCI countries in Asia and Latin America.

³⁸ Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

Figure 11 Trends in access to education³⁹ in selected DCI countries (2007-2014)



Source: authors' calculations World Bank's World Development Indicators data.

Details from DEVCO annual reporting

The table below presents some results reported (against the six Key Performance Indicators⁴⁰ related to the EU external assistance' policy achievements) in the 2015 DEVCO Annual Activity Report.

Table 26 Achievements highlighted in the 2015 MDG report

KPI	Achievements
MDG 1.1 (poverty)	Target: "Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than \$1.25 a day" Target achieved five years ahead of schedule, in 2010. In 2015 this

³⁹ Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

⁴⁰ These Key Performance Indicators refer to Policy achievements and are different from the 24 KPIs that DEVCO monitors for external aid management.

<i>KPI</i>	<i>Achievements</i>
	proportion is estimated to 14%. This indicator has already been achieved and, having regard to its share in the world's ODA and its policy objectives, the EU has significantly contributed to it.
MDG 1.1 (education)	<p><u>Target: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girl alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling</u></p> <p>Together with the net enrolment rate the primary school completion rate gives a good picture of progress towards the education MDG. While the net enrolment rate in primary school increased substantially between 2000 and 2011, the persistent early school leaving has slowed progress towards this goal in developing regions. The completion rate of primary school remained constant between 2000 and 2012 at 73%. More efforts should be done in tackling early school leaving by addressing factors like travelling long distances from home to school, household poverty, the expense of education, and lack of teachers and classrooms.</p> <p>EU's support to education has produced tangible progress, even if the targets have not fully been met yet. Since 2000, EU aid contributed to enrolling over 13 million children in primary education. Under the 2007-2013 financial framework, the EU brought support to the education sector in 42 countries (EUR 4.2 billion). As an example of progress achieved in the education sector, the number of children not attending primary education decreased by 50% between 1999 and 2011, and 63% of countries had achieved gender parity by 2011 (up from 57% in 1999). Challenges remain, as 57 million children and 69 million adolescents have no access to effective basic education</p>
MDG 1.1 (under 5 mortality rate)	<p><u>Target: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-5 mortality rate</u></p> <p>Globally major progress has been made in improving child survival over the past 2 decades. This indicator has halved since 1990, dropping from 90 to an estimated 43 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2015 (projections). Despite impressive improvements, progress has been insufficient to meet the MDG target. Inequities in child mortality between high-income and low-income countries remain large. Sub-Saharan Africa has the world's highest child mortality rate; however the absolute decline in child mortality was the largest over the past 2 decades. This rate has fallen from 179 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to an estimated 86 in 2015. Reducing these inequities across and within countries and saving more children's lives by ending preventable child deaths are important EU priorities.</p> <p>EU's support to health has produced tangible progress, even if the targets have not fully been met yet. Since 2004, EU aid contributed to providing immunisation against measles to over 20 million children. As another illustration of progress in the health sector, maternal mortality ratio dropped by 43%, from 380 to 216 deaths per 100,000 live births between 1990 and 2015, and 71% of deliveries were attended by skilled health personnel (up from 59% in 1990). Challenges remain, as still an estimated 16,000 children under the age of 5 die each day, the majority in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia. The EU continues to be committed to allocate at least 20% of its aid to basic social services, with a focus on health and education, throughout the new 2014-2020 financial framework.</p>
Improved governance at country level	<p><u>Target: Positive trend in the number of countries improving their overall governance performance as measured by the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators.</u></p> <p>For the developing countries progress was achieved in the number of countries improving their overall governance performance, from 75 in 2010 to 90 in 2014.</p>

<i>KPI</i>	<i>Achievements</i>
CO2 equivalent emission reduction	<p><u>Target (by 2020): Developing countries, 26-32 GtCO2 equivalent ; Globally, 44 GtCO2 equivalent.</u></p> <p>The latest global emission figures available relate to the 2011-2012 period. Preliminary estimates indicate that global emissions grew by an average of 3% per year, to 53 GtCO2e in 2011 and 54 GtCO2e in 2012. Trends varied from an increase of 6% in G20 countries that are not members of OECD to a decline of 1% and 2% in OECD Europe and OECD North America. Globally emissions continue to grow in all groups of developing countries that are not on track to meet the 2020 target mentioned above. Latest available data published in the IPCC Fifth Assessment report (AR5) completed in November 2014. The EU is the largest contributor to climate-related financing in developing countries. Its support helps to protect biodiversity worldwide, protect countries against natural disasters and improve forest protection.</p>
GDP per capita partner countries	<p><u>Target: Increasing trend in the number of countries with a stable or growing GDP/capita</u></p> <p>For the developing countries progress was achieved in the last years. Data availability remains an important factor in assessing if a positive trend was registered for the last year.</p>

Source: 2015 DEVCO annual activity report.

1.2.2.2 I-222 Results Framework Level 2 indicators for DCI.

Indicator Summary

The outputs of EU support reported in Level 2 of the EU Results Framework⁴¹ provide numerous examples of positive contributions made by the EU external assistance in all areas of co-operation. For instance, interventions financed through the DCI health thematic programme and completed in 2013-2015 have contributed to the distribution of around 150 million insecticide-treated bed-nets all around the world. More than 600,000 food insecure people have received assistance through social transfers supported by DCI funding, most of the support having been provided through thematic programmes. More than 16 million of hectares of protected areas have been managed with EU support (mostly provided through geographic programmes).

There are obvious limitations to Results Framework data. They are not scaled by population in need or amount spent, the first important for relevance, effectiveness, and impact; the latter for efficiency. They are only as reliable as the reporting system in the field. And they do not capture qualitative effects. However, the reliably demonstrate that DCI projects coming to an end at the beginning of the current programming period did produce tangible results.

Detailed information

The team has explored a database compiling results of EU-financed projects and programmes of more than 750,000EUR that were completed between 1 July 2013 and 30 June 2015. The table below summarises results related to DCI geographic and thematic programmes reported in this database. It is organised by sector and level 2 indicators of the Results Framework.

Table 27 2013-2015 Results Framework level 2 indicators

<i>Sector</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>DCI total</i>	<i>GEO</i>	<i>GPGC</i>	<i>CSO-LA</i>
Good Governance	1. Number of human rights defenders who have received EU support	10.291	0	10.291	0
Good	2. Number of elections	1	1	0	0

⁴¹ Whereas Level 1 indicators in the Results Framework seek to track development impacts, Level 2 Indicators aim to track programme / country results.

<i>Sector</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>DCI total</i>	<i>GEO</i>	<i>GPGC</i>	<i>CSO-LA</i>
Governance	supported by the EU where the electoral process is perceived by independent observers as free and fair				
Good Governance	3. Number of individuals directly benefitting from Justice, Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform programmes funded by EU external assistance programmes	173.022	157.983	6.559	8.480
Good Governance	4. Number of people directly benefitting from legal aid programmes supported by the EU	276.759	69.168	206.210	1.381
Conflict prevention, peace building and security	5. Number of individuals directly benefitting from EU supported programmes that specifically aim to support civilian post-conflict peacebuilding and/or conflict prevention	663.374	585.286	78.088	0
Sustainable and inclusive Agriculture	6. Agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable land management practices have been introduced with EU support (number of hectares)	3.050.400	51.804	2.907.55 ₄	90.000
Sustainable and inclusive Agriculture	7. Number of people receiving rural advisory services with EU support	1.241.888	139.156	716.346	380.035
Sustainable and inclusive Agriculture	8. Number of women and men who have secure tenure of land with EU support	54.479	27.951	2.477	15.051
Nutrition (Agriculture and Food Security)	9. Number of women of reproductive age and children under 5 benefiting from nutrition related programmes with EU support	4.991.299	3.865.41 ₅	55.611	1.070.273
Systemic resilience to food crisis (Agriculture and Food Security)	10. Number of food insecure people receiving assistance through social transfers supported by the EU	634.027	1.350	631.547	1.130
Energy	11. Number of people provided with access to sustainable energy services with EU support	45.494	27.751	17.743	0
Energy	12. Renewable energy production supported by the EU	108	0	108	0
Energy	13. Kilometres of transmission /distribution lines built or upgraded with EU support	0	0	0	0
PFM, taxation, transparency and	14. Number of countries where overall public financial management has improved	5	4	1	0

<i>Sector</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>DCI total</i>	<i>GEO</i>	<i>GPGC</i>	<i>CSO-LA</i>
oversight (Good Governance)					
Education	15. Number of children enrolled in primary education with EU support	10.409.128	10.337.939	68.661	2.528
Education	16. Number of children enrolled in secondary education with EU support	9.400.309	9.346.736	52.651	922
Education	17. Number of teachers trained with EU support	188.790	184.717	1.069	3.004
Health	18. Number of births attended by skilled health personnel with EU support	5.869.317	4.803.605	543.737	521.975
Health	19. Number of 1-year olds immunised with EU support	5.590.064	5.559.436	0	30.628
Health	20. Number of women using any method of contraception with EU support	56.291.448	13.238.248	43.053.200	0
Health	21. Number of people with advanced HIV infection receiving antiretroviral therapy with EU support	4.233.380	0	4.200.000	33.380
Health	22. Number of insecticide-treated bed-nets distributed with EU support	150.000.000	0	150.000.000	0
Natural Resources / Environment	23. Number of countries/regions with climate change strategies (a) developed and/or (b) implemented with EU support	62	0	62	0
Natural Resources / Environment	24. Number of hectares of protected areas managed with EU support	16.431.627	12.510.495	3.488.256	432.876
Natural Resources / Environment	25. Number of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) applying Sustainable Consumption and Production practices with EU support	9.070	8.348	722	0
Transport	26. Total length of road constructed /rehabilitated /maintained with EU support (kms)	687	377	186	0
Transport	27. Number of people with access to all season roads with EU support	14.398	0	4.500	0
Employment and Social Protection	28. Number of people who have benefitted from VET/ skills development and other active labour market programmes with EU support	351.951	173.870	90.564	73.035
Trade and Private sector	29. Number of countries whose capacity to trade across borders has improved with EU support	15	15	0	0

Sector	Indicator	DCI total	GEO	GPGC	CSO-LA
Trade and Private sector	30. Number of firms with access to credit with EU support	4.057	3.372	50	0
Trade and Private sector	31. Number of quality certifications issued with EU support	131	103	28	0
Trade and Private sector	32. Number of countries where the business environment has improved with EU support	5	3	2	0

Source: EU Results Framework database (accessed in November 2016).

The table below provides a disaggregation of above results by reporting year. It is difficult to highlight trends based on only two years of reporting.

Table 28 Evolution in the indicators of the results framework

Indicator	2013-14	2014-15
Good Governance		
1. Number of human rights defenders who have received EU support	10.171	120
2. Number of elections supported by the EU where the electoral process is perceived by independent observers as free and fair	0	1
3. Number of individuals directly benefitting from Justice, Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform programmes funded by EU external assistance	156.975	16.047
4. Number of people directly benefitting from legal aid programmes supported by the EU	201.188	75.571
Conflict prevention, peace building and security		
5. Number of individuals directly benefitting from EU support that specifically aims to support civilian post-conflict peacebuilding and/or conflict prevention	502.123	161.251
Sustainable and inclusive Agriculture (Agriculture and Food Security)		
6. Agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable land management practices have been introduced with EU support (number of hectares)	2.868.511	181.889
7. Number of people receiving rural advisory services with EU support	391.167	845.446
8. Number of women and men who have secure tenure of land with EU support	50.703	3.776
Nutrition (Agriculture and Food Security)		
9. Number of women of reproductive age and children under 5 benefiting from nutrition related programmes with EU support	1.015.766	3.975.533
Systemic resilience to food crisis		
10. Number of food insecure people receiving assistance through social transfers supported by the EU	260.102	373.925
Energy		
11. Number of people provided with access to sustainable energy services with EU support	41.494	4.000
12. Renewable energy production supported by the EU	1	107
13. Kilometres of transmission /distribution lines built or upgraded with EU support	0	0
PFM / Good Governance		
14. Number of countries where overall public financial management	5	0

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>2013-14</i>	<i>2014-15</i>
has improved		
Education		
15. Number of children enrolled in primary education with EU support	10.340.512	68.616
16. Number of children enrolled in secondary education with EU support	9.397.711	2.598
17. Number of teachers trained with EU support	27.726	161.064
Health		
18. Number of births attended by skilled health personnel with EU support	566.067	5.303.250
19. Number of 1-year olds immunised with EU support	69.177	5.520.887
20. Number of women using any method of contraception with EU support	43.053.200	13.238.248
21. Number of people with advanced HIV infection receiving antiretroviral therapy with EU support	4.233.380	0
22. Number of insecticide-treated bed-nets distributed with EU support	150.000.000	0
Natural Resources / Environment		
23. Number of countries/regions with climate change strategies (a) developed and/or (b) implemented with EU support	25	37
24. Number of hectares of protected areas managed with EU support	13.503.538	2.928.089
25. Number of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) applying Sustainable Consumption and Production practices with EU support	3.738	5.332
Transport		
26. Total length of road constructed /rehabilitated /maintained with EU support (kms)	200	487
27. Number of people with access to all season roads with EU support	0	14.398
Employment and Social Protection		
28. Number of people who have benefitted from VET/ skills development and other active labour market programmes with EU support	240.658	111.093
Trade and Private sector development		
29. Number of countries whose capacity to trade across borders has improved with EU support	5	10
30. Number of firms with access to credit with EU support	451	2.971
31. Number of quality certifications issued with EU support	88	43
32. Number of countries where the business environment has improved with EU support	3	2

Source: EU Results Framework database (accessed in November 2016).

The table below presents some country results reported in the last EU Results Report.

Table 29 Level 2 Indicator Country Results, DCI Countries

<i>Country</i>	<i>Country level results</i>
Afghanistan	124.000 individuals directly benefiting from Justice, Rule of Law Security Sector Reform programmes 2.400 people directly benefiting from legal aid programmes 140 agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable land-management

Country	Country level results
	practices have been introduced with EU support (hectares) 8.500 persons receiving rural advisory services 500 food-insecure persons receiving assistance through social transfers 300 children enrolled in primary education 2 ha protected areas managed 17 km road constructed/maintained 2.100 persons with access to all season roads 2.800 persons benefited from VET / skills development and other active labour market programmes
Bangladesh	62 person directly benefiting from legal aid programmes 46.000 persons receiving rural advisory services 600 women and men have secure land tenure 17.000 food-insecure persons receiving assistance through social transfers 9.600 children enrolled in primary education 140 children enrolled in secondary education 3.800 births attended by skilled health personnel 590 persons benefited from VET / skills development and other active labour market programmes
Bhutan	Climate change strategy developed and / implemented
Cambodia	5.300 individuals directly benefiting from programmes that specifically aim to support civilian post-conflict peace building 2.000 persons receiving rural advisory services 810 women of reproductive age and children under benefiting from nutrition-related programmes 1.200 food-insecure persons receiving assistance through social transfers 11.000 births attended by skilled health personnel Climate change strategy developed and/or implemented 720 persons have benefited from VET / skills development and other active labour market programmes
China	910 individuals directly benefiting from Justice, Rule of Law and Security Reform programmes 2.000 persons receiving rural advisory services 1.800 women and men who have secure land tenure 1.300 micro, small, and medium enterprises applying sustainable consumption and production practices 51 quality certifications issued
Iraq	No results reported
Kyrgyz Republic	3.800 individuals directly benefiting from Justice, Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform programmes 3.800 persons receiving rural advisory services 540 teachers trained 1.900 persons benefited from VET / skills development and other active labour market policies
Laos	140 ha agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable land-management practices have been introduced 470 persons receiving rural advisory services
Mongolia	No results reported
Myanmar/Burma	420 individuals directly benefiting from Justice, Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform programmes 790 individuals directly benefiting from EU-supported programmes that specifically aim to support civilian post-conflict peace building 840 women of reproductive age and children under 5 benefiting from nutrition-

Country	Country level results
	<p>related programmes</p> <p>190 births attended by skilled health personnel</p> <p>55.000 1-year olds immunised</p> <p>1.300 persons benefited from VET / skills development and other active labour market programmes</p>
Nepal	4.800 persons benefited from VET / skills development and other active labour market programmes
Pakistan	<p>780 individuals directly benefiting from Justice, Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform programmes</p> <p>55 persons directly benefiting from legal aid programmes</p> <p>Public financial management improved</p> <p>3.017.000 children enrolled in primary education</p> <p>5.200 persons benefited from VET / skills development and other active labour market programmes</p>
Philippines	<p>300.000 individuals directly benefitting from programmes that specifically aim to support civilian post-conflict peace building</p> <p>24.000 persons receiving rural advisory services with EU support</p> <p>15.000 women and men who have secure tenure of land</p> <p>8.800 children enrolled in primary education</p> <p>820 ha of protected areas managed</p> <p>610 micro, small, and medium enterprises applying sustainable consumption and production practices</p>
Sri Lanka	<p>530 persons directly benefiting from legal aid programmes supported by the EU</p> <p>88.000 individuals directly benefiting from programmes that aim to support civilian post-conflict peace building</p> <p>610 ha agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable land-management systems have been introduced</p> <p>7.700 persons receiving rural advisory services</p> <p>4.800 women and men who have secure land tenure</p> <p>88 km road constructed / maintained</p> <p>31.000 persons with access to all season roads</p>
Tajikistan	<p>850 persons directly benefiting from legal aid programmes</p> <p>28.000 persons receiving rural advisory services</p> <p>Public financial management improved</p> <p>72 teachers trained with EU support</p> <p>450 firms with access to credit</p>
Turkmenistan	No results reported
Uzbekistan	No results reported
Vietnam	<p>7.304.000 children enrolled in primary education</p> <p>9.347.000 children enrolled in secondary education</p> <p>420 micro, small, and medium enterprises applying sustainable consumption and production practices</p>
Yemen	No results reported
Bolivia	<p>700 persons receiving rural advisory services</p> <p>30.000 food-insecure persons receiving assistance through social transfers</p> <p>52.000 ha protected areas managed</p> <p>82 km road constructed / rehabilitated / maintained</p> <p>433.000 persons with access to all season roads</p> <p>15 quality certifications issued</p>
Colombia	1.500 individuals directly benefiting from Justice, Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform programmes

Country	Country level results
	57.000 persons directly benefiting from legal aid programmes 21.000 persons receiving rural advisory services 460 micro, small, and medium size enterprises applying sustainable consumption and production practices 250 persons benefited from VET / skills development and other active labour market programmes
Cuba	4.700 ha agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable land-management practices have been introduced 11.000 persons receiving rural advisory services
Ecuador	1 micro, small and medium size enterprise applying sustainable consumption and production
El Salvador	No results reported
Guatemala	510 individuals directly benefiting from Justice, Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform programmes 1.000 agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable land-management practices have been introduced 12.000 persons receiving rural advisory services
Honduras	Overall public financial management has improved
Nicaragua	7.500 individuals directly benefitting from Justice, Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform Programmes 130 persons have benefited from VET / skills development and other active labour market programmes
Paraguay	No results reported
Peru	13.000 people directly benefiting from legal aid programmes supported by the EU 41.000 people receiving rural advisory services 2.000 people have benefited from VET / skills development and other active labour market programmes
South Africa	740 individuals directly benefiting from Justice, Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform programmes 760 people directly benefiting from legal aid programmes 550 teachers trained with EU support Business environment has improved
South Sudan	59.000 food-insecure people receiving assistance through social transfers

Source: 2016 EU Results Report on results for the period July 2013 – June 2014


1.2.3 JC 23: The process of differentiation (including graduation) has given priority in the resource allocation process to countries most in need while promoting new forms of strategic co-operation with graduated countries.

1.2.3.1 I-231 Extent to which DCI allocation across countries favours those most in need of support.

Indicator Summary

As the chart below makes clear, there has been a substantial re-allocation of funds to LDCs as between the 2007-13 and 2014-20 DCIs. Under DCI 2007-13, LDCs accounted for a quarter of total DCI, under the 2014-20 allocations they account for over half. To some extent this is due to the new allocation algorithm and to a great extent it is due to graduation, which increased the pot of money to be allocated.

Figure 12 DCI- Total national Allocations per type of country (%) 2007-2013 vs 2014-2020- All regions



Source: Methodology for country allocations: European Development Fund and Development Cooperation Instrument 2014-2020

Since the list of countries categorised by the EU as in situation of crisis, post-crisis or fragility is adjusted every year and important changes in EU programming regularly occur in these countries (see the examples of Myanmar or Yemen), it is difficult to measure precisely the evolution of DCI allocations going to these countries. However, the analysis of some countries which have been and are still in situation of crisis or fragility (e.g. Afghanistan or Pakistan) shows that the differentiation process has favoured these countries.

Finally, a review of MIPs reveals that the poorest or most vulnerable are often explicitly targeted in at least one priority sector:

- At national level, a review of MIPs reveals that the poorest or most vulnerable are invariably foregrounded in at least one priority sector, and always in the frequent case that one of those priority sectors is the food security – nutrition – agriculture nexus. In health and education, equitable access is the driving theme. When trade or other economic sectors feature, pro-poor aspects are emphasised.
- At regional level, poverty links are less developed because regional approaches are especially suitable for infrastructure, integration, security, etc., whose poverty linkages are less apparent than those at bilateral level.

Review national MIPs

Most MIPs highlight support of the poorest or most vulnerable groups in at least one of the priority sectors. This is almost invariably true of the agriculture / (integrated) rural development / food security / nutrition nexus. The justification for the selection of these sectors often discusses poverty indicators in the country and makes commitments to target areas or groups most in need. Examples include Afghanistan MIP in the sector to 'reduce hunger and vulnerability' (p.10), Bangladesh MIP to 'enhance livelihoods, in particular for extremely poor women' (p.11), Kyrgyz Republic MIP aiming to 'reduce poverty, especially among women, children and the most vulnerable segments of the population' (p.14), Pakistan MIP 'to focus on more fragile and underserved areas and communities that are unlikely to benefit from mainstream development' (p.9), Sri Lanka MIP 'special focus on the most vulnerable provinces and districts' (p.8), Uzbekistan MIP objective to enhance 'living standards and welfare of the most vulnerable groups in rural areas' (p.10). Other examples can also be cited.

Similarly in health, less common as a focal sector, the standard objective is to reach those most in need. Examples include MIP Afghanistan 'particular attention to ensuring health care to the very poor, vulnerable minorities (e.g. nomadic Kuchi tribes), vulnerable people including women, girls and children, as well as addressing disability and mental health care'

(p.7), and Tajikistan *'delivery mechanisms for primary health care, especially for vulnerable populations'* (p.4).

In sectors related to local economic development / sustainable trade / employment / private sector development, a pro-poor focus is emphasised. Examples include Colombia MIP *'oriented to using trade as an instrument for poverty reduction'* (p.9), Peru *'focus on some of the poorest regions'* (p.3), Philippines *'bring electricity to more families especially in disadvantaged areas'* (p.4), Viet Nam *'access to energy, with particular focus on the poorer areas'* (p.6), or Mongolia *'focus primarily on those rural areas that do not benefit from the mining and construction boom'* (p.8).

Discussion of priority sectors is often cross-cut with specific attention to rural populations vulnerable to climate change or natural disasters; e.g. *'EU support in both sectors will be subject to standard EU environmental and climate screenings in view of addressing pro-poor environmental and climate change concerns in project/programme formulation and implementation.'* (p.3) MIP Philippines.

In other sectors such as education or justice / rule of law, the goal presented is frequently making access to these services more equitable; increasing access for those now left behind, and addressing those most in need. Examples in education include Kyrgyz Republic, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan or Iraq; and in justice Philippines, Viet Nam and Bolivia.

Review regional MIPs

Since regional programmes are especially suitable for projects involving economic integration, infrastructure, trade, security, etc. it is not surprising that the poverty link is less apparent in regional than in bilateral MIPs. However, for example, the need to target the most vulnerable and poorest is prominently discussed in the Asia MIP. Under the regional integration component, it is stated that the EU ASEAN Dialogue Initiative (READI) *"will cover subjects reflecting ASEAN priorities and which allow identification of policies that improve the situation of the poorest, such as disaster risk reduction, education, productive employment and decent work, social protection, migration, border management, natural resources management and environmental protection."* (2014, 4).

Furthermore, it is stated that *"cooperation will be considered in areas that affect predominantly the poorest and most vulnerable population. [...] Regional cooperation includes support to cooperation between the countries of the Lower Mekong, one of the poorest and most vulnerable regions in Asia."* (Asia MIP, 2014, 5)

The Latin America MIP highlights *"Human rights protection, in particular of vulnerable populations, and enhanced adherence to relevant international mechanisms."* (Latin America MIP, 2014, 7).

Review of other studies and reports

The DEVE study on Criteria for differentiation and methods for phasing out EU's development cooperation for the new DCI expressed some caution when applying differentiation criteria.

"Although EU bilateral aid relatively represents a very small share amongst MIC's non-aid dependent national budgets, there are prospected impacts which deserve consideration when assessing the suitability to apply certain differentiation criteria; in particular, the risk of turning away from addressing MICs' arguably major challenges: inequality and social cohesion. Furthermore, the potential cut of EU bilateral aid vis-à-vis MICs as a way to maximise its impact may be misplaced. Beyond the fact that MICs house a majority of the world's poor, there is no evidence unambiguously linking the degree of impact of aid on poverty reduction to the per capita income level. Indeed, reducing the percentage of poor largely depends, inter alia, on the extent of inequality and on how poor the poor are –i.e. the poverty gap. All in all, the EU needs to fine-tune its development policy toward MICs. Its development assistance can play a catalytic, supporting role in addressing inequality and fostering inclusive development through redistributive policies, institutional reform and increased competitiveness. Building upon MICs' transition from aid to mainly technical support, and given the Partnership Instrument (PI) - DCI 'focus gap' resulting from the EC proposal, it is recommended herein to envisage a strategic adaptation period (SAP). This

should encompass a new aid paradigm, new types of development cooperation, alternative financing mechanisms, and a renewed development agenda with MICs. Against this backdrop the EU could better exploit its potential to leverage policy coherence for development beyond developed countries' scope. Moreover, it can gain in terms of increasing development effectiveness and in promoting its comparative advantage as a global player.” (p.4)

1.2.3.2 I-232 Extent to which DCI aid allocation across countries takes degree of partnership including progress towards good governance into account.

Indicator Summary

The allocation algorithm introduced along with DCI 2014-2020 does take good governance into account. However, it is not clear from the memo on the methodology for country allocations how important a role it plays in determining results.

A reported three-quarters of the final allocations have followed the algorithm up to a 10% up-or-down qualitative adjustment. That adjustment might be enough to effectively “zero out” poor progress in governance or, for that matter, negate good progress.

Memo on the ‘Methodology for country allocations: European Development Fund and Development cooperation Instrument 2014-20’

The EU is required by the DCI agreement to take country needs, capacities, commitments, performance and potential EU impact into account when allocating resources. This underlies, in part, the concentration on the poorest countries and the increased importance accorded to fragile states.

The methodology seeks to combine a quantitative approach with qualitative adjustments after the fact to take country-specific factors into account, especially the political / security situation and past EU experience with respect to absorptive capacity.

Factors going into the quantitative algorithm: population, GNI per capita, Human Asset Index (UNDESA), Economic Vulnerability Index (UNDESA), World Governance Index (World Governance Index).

74% of DCI allocations have followed results of quantitative algorithm or have experience up/down adjustments of less than 10%. In extreme cases, qualitative adjustments can be up/down 25%.

1.2.3.3 I-233 Extent to which PI and regional and thematic programmes have been applied to maintain and develop innovative partnerships with graduated countries.

Indicator Summary

The differentiation process was mainly about improving resource allocation and did not focus on adjusting the EU external assistance to the specific contexts of operation. There is very little in the DCI regulation about the diversity of contexts in which the EU is operating and the resulting implications for designing specific approaches to co-operation. While the DCI leaves great flexibility during the programming phase to develop approaches tailored to the specific contexts of co-operation, it does not give any overall strategic guidance on how to adopt a genuine differentiated approach to co-operation (e.g. highlighting the importance of context analysis and the development of long term strategic partnership) nor does it promote the adoption of innovative forms of co-operation.

The shift towards new forms of partnership (i.e. those that go beyond the traditional donor-beneficiary relationship) between the EU and graduated countries has been quite challenging for both parties, partly due to the financial limitations of the thematic, regional geographic, and Partnership Instrument that are now available in these countries. Thematic programmes, 20% of whose DCI 2014-2020 funds decided to date have been devoted to UMICs, are one important means of maintaining co-operation after graduation. However, the opportunities they offer still fall short of the goal to engage in strong partnerships with graduated countries. Beyond the small amount of funds relative to geographic programmes, a major weakness with the thematic programmes is the fact, that, inconsistent with the idea

of graduation, as they are still largely oriented towards traditional development co-operation. The Partnership Instrument has been designed specifically to allow the EU to continue co-operation with countries that have graduated, with an emphasis not on poverty but on projecting European values, visibility, and strategic / economic interests and addressing global problems such as energy and environment. Partner countries to date have included China, Korea, India, Mexico, and Brazil. While it may truly be called an innovative instrument, and one particularly in line with Global Europe, the Partnership Instrument is small relative to DCI geographic programmes and is not suited to long-term structural engagement. There are also few staff relative to the number of countries and these covered to manage it and it is largely confined to Strategic Partners.

Partnership Instrument MIP 2014-17 and AAP 2014 & 2015

The PI allows the EU to engage in countries where it has a strategic interest but which do not qualify for bilateral development cooperation. It is designed to support the external dimension of EU internal policies in line with Europe 2020. Priorities include global challenges such as climate change and energy security. Under Objective 1 on developing collective responses to global challenges, sub-themes are energy, climate change, environment, and environment. Under Objective 2 on the international dimension of Europe 2020 the main objectives are to promote policy dialogue in areas of mutual interest, promote “science diplomacy,” promote EU environmental business opportunities, support EU and mutual security interests, and others. Objective 3 covers improving EU access to third country markets and Objective 5 seeks to promote understanding and visibility of the EU. PI supports global programmes such as Policy Support Facility (includes trade component) and TAIEX.

The Annual Action Programmes for 2014 and 2015 focussed on:

- 2014 (EUR 107 million) - sample projects:
 - Emissions trading in Korea;
 - Low carbon industries in Brazil and Mexico;
 - Low carbon energy production in India, EU-China dialogue on migration and mobility, green growth and EU presence in South Korea and ASEAN markets;
 - Alignment to EU ICT standards in India.
- 2015 (EUR 91 million) - sample projects:
 - Energy efficiency in India;
 - EU role in multilateral fora in Asia;
 - EU-South Asia civil aviation cooperation.

Review of regional MIPs

Because a number of countries, especially in Latin America and Asia, have achieved UMIC status, EU cooperation at national level has decreased in relative importance for the programming period 2014-2020. Yet major challenges (such as security, trade, energy, nuclear safety) remain to be addressed at regional level. Against this backdrop and as mentioned before under I-114, regional programmes are considered a flexible tool that can go beyond traditional cooperation by permitting cooperation with countries that can no longer qualify for bilateral programming.

In the case of the Asia MIP, 19 countries are eligible to receive financing at regional level compared to 12 countries that continue to benefit from bilateral programmes financed by the DCI. China, India, Indonesia, People’s Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Maldives and Thailand are included under the DCI regional programming. Two of these (China and India) are considered EU strategic partners. DCI-financed activities in Latin America include UMICs such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The Central Asia MIP covers all Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan.

Potential synergies and complementarities with the Partnership Instrument (PI) are at least mentioned in all three regional programming documents. For example the Latin America MIP (2014, 12) mentioned that “*Synergies will also be pursued under DCI thematic programmes, the Partnership Instrument (PI), particularly as regards economic and trade/related*

programmes as well as initiatives in the area of sustainable inclusive development, and with the activities carried out by the EU-LAC Foundation.”

EFI online Survey

While a respondent (EUD) to the 2016 EFI online survey indicated that “*The PI has flexibility to cover broad needs areas of engagement*” another highlighted that:

The country has graduated. We are now busy looking at alternative ways of engaging with the Government. Thematic and regional lines are important, as is the partnership instrument. And we look at the Taiex facility too. But engaging with a middle income country on technical assistance and a dialogue facility remains challenging. Most tools proposed are ad hoc and short term (partnership instrument). We need something more structural.

1.2.4 JC 24: DCI principles (Article 3), programmes (DCI Regulation, Articles 4-9), and processes related to programming (Articles 5-15) promote post-Busan principles of development effectiveness.

1.2.4.1 I-241 Extent to which CSOs-LAs participate in strategic programming and programme monitoring.

Indicator Summary

Approaching this indicator necessarily involves some ambiguity, much of which also figured into discussions under EQ1 on relevance. National MIPs in DCI countries, on one hand, tend to give some evidence of CSO consultations in the process of priority setting, but only in general terms. They often declare goals of promoting CSO participation in discussion with government and capacity building. At the same time, it is not uncommon for evaluations to find inadequate EU engagement with civil society. Experts level a number of criticisms – failure to increase the role of civil society in mainstream DCI-financed cooperation, the low involvement of CSOs in budget support, the difficulties experienced by small CSOs to gain access to DCI thematic programme funding, etc. The view is expressed that the EU’s main interlocutor in setting priorities is overwhelmingly the government, whose priorities as stated in official documents may not correspond to their actual priorities.

The striking fact is that EAMRs invariably identify CSOs as key stakeholders, enumerate multiple consultations and events, cite activities and projects to support structured dialogue between CSOs and government etc. There is evidently a complete contrast in perspective between EUDs and the experts interviewed. EAMRs, the latter argue, stress the quantity of CSO contacts, but not the quality.

A further weakness (mentioned, as well, under EQ1) is that the CSO-LA programme is treated as more of development tool than a means of external action including a significant political dimension.

Based on EAMRs as well as interviews with DG DEVCO HQ staff, there has been more progress on engaging CSOs than LAs. The latter are identified much less frequently as important partners. Yet, as recognized by the 2013 LA Communication, these are actors of rising importance in many partner countries and some EUDs have engaged with them in their geographic programmes. The relatively slow take off may be for institutional reasons, LAs being public sector agencies with democratic priority setting, decision making, and budgetary responsibilities, whose views may not coincide with those of central government.

Details from the review of national and regional MIPs

There is no mention of CSO-LAs participating in strategic programming in the regional MIPs. There is some mention of CSOs being involved in programme implementation. For example, the in the Central Asia MIP, the Multi-country Technical Assistance Facility “*will focus on promoting the transfer of European know-how, expertise and best practices, notably through the participation of relevant EU Member States Institutions/European Agencies and/or Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).*” (2014, 11).

The national MIPs present some evidence of a participatory approach to programming, especially with respect to CSOs. Ten MIPs⁴² refer to CSOs having been consulted in the development of the strategy, although in general terms only (*'The choice of the focal areas has been discussed with Government and other donors, EU Member States and Mongolian civil society organizations (CSOs) [...]'*, Mongolia (p.3), would be a fairly representative statement of those). Only in the Bangladesh MIP is CSO input discussed in some more detail (*'[...] following the recommendations of the consultations with the civil society, the EU will continue to promote democratic empowerment and participation of youth [...]'* (p.6), and *'During our consultations, civil society recommended that EU continues supporting primary education with a focus on quality.'* (p.8)).

The MIP Colombia discussed the International Co-operation Strategy as the product of dialogue between the government, international community and civil society, and the Myanmar MIP notes the participation of CSOs at the country's Development Cooperation Forum, and in several sector working groups. Otherwise CSOs' participation in donor coordination is rarely discussed. Apart from participation in programming, MIPs variously discuss their intention for support to CSOs in terms of facilitating their engagement in dialogue with the government and their participation in development /democratisation processes. They are also indicated as beneficiaries of capacity development, or as agents of implementation or service delivery.

The participation of LAs in the programming process is covered to a much lesser extent in the MIPs. As a matter of fact, no mention of consultation with LAs for the purpose of MIPs was found. LAs are discussed as the beneficiaries of EU support to decentralisation processes, PFM, governance, etc. In the Viet Nam MIP, reference is made to planned LA involvement in the design of sustainable energy programmes. In Pakistan, the MIP discusses strategic development planning processes at provincial government level, and views this as a good opportunity for the EU to work *'even more at the provincial level'* (p.6). Nevertheless, the choice of priority sectors for the MIP is still discussed mainly with reference to the national development agenda, EU's national strategic and political priorities and consultations with CSOs and the private sector at national level.

Details from the CSO-LA thematic programme MIP

See Indicator 115 for information on engaging with Civil Society in a strategic manner.

Further to that, the MIP CSO-LA describes that *"The Programme will track progress of its impact by monitoring an indicative set of indicators as described below, corresponding to the three Programme priorities (being it country, regional /global or European levels) and according to actor benefitting (either CSOs, or LAs, or both). **The sources for the data will be evidence collected through the numerous CSOs-led monitoring initiatives, LAs Peer Review Programme, EU internal monitoring tools such as the External Assistance Management Report (EAMR), EU Roadmaps for engagement with CSOs (see box in section 5), including EU Human Rights Strategies, along with independent assessments and surveys and where appropriate internationally recognised data sources or indices (existing or under development).**"*

Source: EU (2014) MIP for the Thematic Programme "Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities for the period 2014-2020", 10.

However, the programming document also critically expresses: *"While there is consensus on the importance of an enabling environment for CSOs to engage in development, there is a range of views on what can be considered as such and how to measure progress. Data collection remains problematic. Major advancements have been made by the International community in the context of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation."*


Source: EU (2014) MIP for the Thematic Programme "Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities for the period 2014-2020", 13.

⁴² Bangladesh, Colombia, Guatemala, Mongolia, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan

Details from the review of EAMRs 2013

EAMRs suggest that the EU regards CSOs as important drivers of change. CSOs are regularly consulted through different means (information sessions, formal/informal meetings and online consultations) to discuss programming, calls for proposals and topics of interest. According to EAMRs 2013, most countries held consultations with CSOs, mainly regarding priority areas to be included in the 2014-2020 MIP, and subsequently incorporated input from the sessions into the draft programming document.

Figure 13 Consultations with Civil society reported in 2013 EAMRs (nr of EUDs, %)⁴³



Source: EAMRs for DCI countries, 2013

In Honduras, Nepal and the Philippines, the EU has been very active in this respect. Other examples can be found in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Guatemala, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Paraguay, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. In Nicaragua *“The Government also pronounced itself against the consultation of CSO, in the framework of the future EU programming 2014-2020. Nevertheless, the Delegation proceeded with the formal consultations.”* (EAMR Nicaragua 2013, 12-13). In the case of Uzbekistan, consultations on programming were not effective due to the difficult context *“[...] the civil society is under control of the state [...] There are few local NGOs able to access to EU funds via call for proposals. Their technical, administrative and financial capacity is very limited. International NGOs are facing difficulties to be registered in the country. In such conditions the consultation of civil society for the programming of EU assistance is not very productive.”* (EAMR Uzbekistan 2013, 6).

Participation of LAs in programming processes is also addressed, but to a much lesser extent with only a handful of references to LA consultations in EAMRs. This is also true for the private sector.

Most countries attest that consultations were extremely helpful and led to the establishment of a long-term partnership between the EU and CSOs and CSO networks. However, evidence of frustration can be found in Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Colombia, Guatemala, Nepal, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. E.g.: *“The Delegation has initiated discussions about the possibility to build longer term strategic partnerships with key civil society organisations and networks. However the call for proposal system somehow limits the possibilities for this. Nevertheless, the Delegation has had a number of internal meetings to discuss options and aid modalities that could allow it to move in the direction of long term partnerships in the future.”* (EAMR Nepal 2013, 11-12). Successful examples include e.g. Honduras *“During 2013, the Delegation consolidated long term relationships and dialogue with local NGOs and platforms. [...] During the programming consultation process, new actors were identified, especially those working in the future focal sectors.”* (EAMR Honduras 2013, 8).


⁴³ Question: Consultations with Civil society led to the establishment of a long-term partnership between the EU and individual Civil Society Organisations or Civil Society networks? (Figures/ % of EUDs)

According to EAMRs 2013 there are 564 on-going projects that promote structured dialogue between Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) / Local Authorities (LAs) and governments and EU institutions. The number of projects differs sharply from one country to another: Peru, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nepal top the list with 60, 55, 54 and 53 projects apiece, respectively, while Honduras, India and Nicaragua are at the bottom of the list with zero projects implemented. Additionally, there are 557 ongoing projects whose objectives include the inclusion of CSOs/LAs in national policymaking. The differences are also significant here: India, Peru and Colombia lead with 62, 60, 35 and 54 such projects, respectively, while in Nicaragua this kind of intervention is non-existent and Laos and Uzbekistan have only two projects each.

Details from the review of EAMRs 2015

Whenever possible, the EU ensures dialogue and regular consultations, primarily with the CSOs in each country. It also engages with and gives voice to other stakeholders such as Member States, national governments, local authorities and other donors. With regard to the private sector, there are only a few mentions of dialogue and consultation: Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, Vietnam and Yemen. Examples of women's organisation representation in consultations are cited in Bolivia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Myanmar and Tajikistan, although the comments are general in nature.

Figure 14 Consultations with Civil society reported in 2015 EAMRs (nr of EUDs, %)⁴⁴



Source: EAMRs for DCI countries, 2015

In some countries, engagement with CSOs and LAs is made difficult by government restrictions. See the reference above to Uzbekistan, where civil society is under state control and only a limited number of NGOs can access EU funds. Other challenging cases include Cuba, Vietnam and Yemen. Nevertheless, in all these countries the EU has made efforts to ensure CSO participation. In Nicaragua, CSO dialogue is referred to as “incipient, though growing” (EAMR Nicaragua 2015, 13).

It is clear that, in engaging with stakeholders other than national government, the EU focuses on CSOs. The CSO Roadmap exercise has strengthened the EU's relations with CSOs in many countries (e.g Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru and the Philippines). In most cases the EU engages CSOs and LAs in programming exercises under thematic instruments (in particular CSO/LA and EIDHR calls for proposals) and geographical programmes, mainly during the identification/formulation phase. In a few cases, CSOs have also been involved in implementation, monitoring and some evaluation exercises. A good example of CSOs

⁴⁴ Question: Consultations with Civil society led to the establishment of a long-term partnership between the EU and individual Civil Society Organisations or Civil Society networks? (Figures/ % of EUDs)

participation can be found in Laos “A consultation mechanism with civil society is fully embedded into the cooperation management cycle” (EAMR Laos 2015, 17-18). There are only scattered references to LAs.


According to EAMRs 2015 there are 432 ongoing projects that promote structured dialogue between CSOs/LAs and governments or EU institutions. The number of projects varies widely: Pakistan, Colombia, Guatemala and Myanmar top the list with 53, 50, 49 and 46 projects, respectively, while Laos (one project), El Salvador and Sri Lanka (two projects), and Paraguay and Kyrgyzstan (three projects) are at the bottom of the list. In addition, there are 340 ongoing projects whose objectives include the inclusion of CSOs / LAs in national policymaking. Myanmar, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Guatemala report 39, 36, 35 and 32, respectively, while in Sri Lanka this kind of intervention is non-existent and Colombia and Laos have only one project each.

Overall, 19 out of the 24 countries reviewed report that consultations (EAMRs particularly refer to the CSO Roadmap) with civil society have led to the establishment of long-term partnerships between the EU and individual CSOs or CSO networks. Many countries describe CSOs as key stakeholders in promoting development. For example: Cambodia “The added value of this partnership is that the Delegation can receive additional and 'informal' information on the implementation and enforcement of national policies in the provinces that may not be reported in formal reports.” (EAMR Cambodia 2015, 22); Kyrgyzstan “In several cases, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have provided the expertise needed to make projects effective.” (EAMR Kyrgyzstan 2015, 23); Laos “Their knowledge of the challenges on the ground and need of the local context and beneficiaries is a real added value to our strategic thinking.” (EAMR Laos 2015, 18); Paraguay “They are strong partners to enhance our understanding of developments in Paraguay and to make EU action (cooperation, policy dialogue) more effective” (EAMR Paraguay 2015, 10).

Particularly successful examples of EU-CSO long-term engagement under DCI can be found in the Philippines “Likewise, the GoJUST justice sector reform project foresees a direct support to civil society for the oversight of the functioning of the justice system. In this context, the role of civil society as a watchdog of the justice system has been discussed, and this project provides a good illustration of the way bilateral cooperation can complement policy dialogue with civil society, in a sector that is not necessarily an easy one for this dual approach” (EAMR Philippines 2015, 13).

The figure below shows the number of interventions with objectives related to CSOs/LAs participation in policy processes reported in EAMRs.

Figure 15 Number of interventions with objectives related to CSOs/LAs participation in policy processes reported in EAMRs



Source: Review EAMRs DCI countries for 2013 & 2015

Details from interviews

Expert interviews show that there are gaps in DCI support for CSOs-LAs. One is that far more progress has been made with CSOs than LAs. A second is that, while the thematic programme has made some progress towards encouraging an inclusive approach to priority setting, CSOs and LAs remain apart from the main discussions, which are primarily between the EU and governments. In addition, the thematic programmes are financially small as compared to geographic programmes. Other problems are that, although raising the minimum amount for thematic programme grants has reduced administrative burden on EUDs, it has put access to CSO-LA (and GPGC) outside the reach of small NGOs lacking capacity.

EAMR reports on civil society dialogue are to be taken with a grain of salt – they report far more on quantity of dialogue than on its quality.

In many DCI countries we see clear trends that LA are rising as political and development actors. The EC has issued a landmark Communication in May 2013 regarding LAs. Several EUDs have engaged with LAs in their geographic programmes.

The problem with funding LAs through the thematic line is mainly inadequate procedures. Using a call for proposal is not only far too complex a thing for LAs. It is also not coherent with the nature of LAs as public sector actors with formal (democratic) decision-making and budgeting processes.

1.2.4.2 I-242 Share of budget support in overall support.

Indicator Summary

A review of EAMRs 2013 and 2015 suggests that there has been a significant increase in use of the budget support modality. This impression is confirmed by DEVCO Annual reports for 2016 and 2015, which indicate that budget support (general and sector combined) represented 26% of 2015 DCI geographic commitments as opposed to 15% in 2014. However, (i) at 74% the traditional project approach continues to occupy an important position and (ii) there are some countries with low capacity (e.g., Bangladesh and Lao PDR) where projects are overwhelmingly the main modality. Thematic lines do not finance budget support for obvious reasons, and CSO-LA involvement in budget support priority setting is reported to be limited. In 2015, DCI geographic had the highest share of any EFI in the form of budget support, although EDF was roughly the same with 25% and ENI was not far behind with 21%. A significant development since 2012 has been the development of State building Contracts, budget support instrument aimed at fragile, crisis, and post-crisis states and designed to improve governance (including notably PFM) and put in place the conditions for an eventual transition to full budget support. Budget support has been identified as a significant source of EU value added (see EQ 4).

Details from the review of EAMRs 2013

[Use of country systems] Use of BS is limited since many countries do not comply with requirements and conditions (namely, PFM and transparency). Yet, there are good examples where the EU channels its aid through this modality thus using national country systems. E.g. Ecuador “93 % of the bilateral cooperation use the BS modality, meaning national systems.” (EAMR Ecuador 2013, 16); Peru “Whenever eligibility criteria are met, the sector budget support appears to be the most suitable implementation modality to support the national sector policies in Peru (80% of bilateral portfolio 2007-2013).” (EAMR Peru 2013, 20); Philippines “Our focal sector, health, is mainly implemented through sector budget support and therefore makes no big difference to yourself re fully aligned with government procedures and systems.” (EAMR Philippines 2013, 18). Overall, there is will to increase this trend, whenever possible, in the future.

Details from the review of EAMRs 2015

[Use of country systems] The EU strongly promotes the use of country systems in line with the aid effectiveness agenda. Most countries use budget support as the main aid modality, therefore national systems. Many examples can be found in Latin American countries: e.g. El Salvador “All the ongoing bilateral programmes in 2015 (PARE-ES and PACSES) are


implemented through budget support modality which have used almost exclusively the public financial management system of the partner country.” (EAMR El Salvador 2015, 27); Ecuador “93 % of the 2007-2013 bilateral cooperation used the BS modality, meaning national systems” (EAMR Colombia 2015, 29); Colombia “Out of 67 million in the AAP 2014-2017, 57 will be channelled through budget support.” (EAMR Colombia 2015, 29); Guatemala “All on-going bilateral programmes designed under the 2007-2013 Country Strategy and the new programme of MIP 2014-2020 (Competitiveness) that use budget programmes systematically adopt country's public financial management systems.” (EAMR Guatemala 2015, 35); Bolivia “For example, in the framework of the MIP 2014-2016, we expect 78% of the budget to be channelled through the BS modality.” (EAMR Bolivia 2015, 24).

In other countries the share of aid channelled through these modalities is increasing or is expected to increase in the future. In Cambodia, “An increasing proportion of bilateral funding uses country systems through the budget support aid modality. This has now increased to represent almost one third of the Delegation's portfolio and is expected to increase in the future.” (EAMR Cambodia 2015, 38); and Kyrgyzstan “In 2015 the proportion of total EU grant disbursements that were made in the form of budget support (including the MFA grant tranche) was 45.4%, while in 2014 it was 39.9%. It is expected that the proportion will increase significantly for 2016.” (EAMR Kyrgyzstan 2015, 37-38). According to the EAMR Pakistan (2015, 32-33) “When our support is channelled through the government accounting system, it has a catalytic value and supports the policy dialogue on reforms and focuses the debate on results.”

Yet, there are exceptions to this rule in which country systems are partially used or non-existent, mainly due to political reasons, human rights records, weak public finance systems and/or lack of transparency and corruption. For instance, in Bangladesh and Laos the great majority of programmes are project-based. Other examples include: Cuba “[...] some Member States are reluctant to channel EU aid through Cuban Government institutions” (EAMR Cuba 2015, 35); Tajikistan “Currently, approximately one third of EU's development cooperation for Tajikistan (under direct management) is channelled through Budget Support. It is the only part of EU support that is using country systems. Given the persisting capacity weaknesses of the Tajik government, it is not likely that local procurement systems can be used in the near future.” (EAMR Tajikistan 2015, 38); Uzbekistan “Use of country systems is a big challenge in Uzbekistan mainly due to critical risks related to corruption, transparency and human rights issues.” (EAMR Uzbekistan 2015, 24-25). In Yemen country systems are “Not used, because of the conflict.” (EAMR Yemen 2015, 21).


Details from the Annual Report 2015 and 2016

Figure 16 Breakdown commitments of DCI per aid modality 2014-2015



Source: Annex Annual Report 2016 & 2015, Annex 14A Breakdown by aid mechanism and by instrument 2015 – Commitments.

Figure 17 Breakdown commitments of DCI per aid modality 2014



Source: Annex Annual Report 2015 Breakdown by aid mechanism and by instrument Commitments

Table 30 Breakdown by aid mechanism and by instrument 2015 – Commitments

Aid Mechanisms	ENI	DCI_Geo	DCI_Them	DCI	EIDHR	ICSP	INSC	CFSP	IPA2	HUMA	EDF	OTH	Total
Project-type interventions	1.296	860	732	0	129	233	60	12	1.400	1.387	1.657	49	7.815
Sector budget support	435	272	3	0	0	0	0	0	162	0	372	0	1.244
General budget support	70	105	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	862	0	1.038
Other mechanisms	596	236	191	77	45	7	1	248	85	13	2.003	341	3.844
Total	2.397	1.473	927	77	173	240	61	260	1.647	1.401	4.893	390	13.941
% BS (SBS & GBS) of Total	21%	26%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	10%	0%	25%	0%	16%

Source: 2015 Annual report.

Table 31 EU Budget Support in 2014: breakdown by instrument (commitments, € million)

Aid Mechanisms	GBS	SBS	Total BS	Total ODA	BS / ODA
ENI	342	561	903	2,294	39%
DCI - Geographic	-	185	185	1,252	15%
DCI - Thematic	-	4	4	1,043	0%
EDF	170	21	191	836	23%
IPA	-	42	42	1,340	3%
Total	512	813	1,325	6,765	20%

Source: 2015 Annual report.

HQ independent expert statement

Budget support has proven to be a valuable tool to support governments' and (although only in few cases) also civil societies' commitment toward innovative strategies and sectoral reforms. When the reforms were owned by both the governments and civil societies, as in different Latin America cases (Ecuador, Bolivia and more recently Colombia⁴⁵), the EU budget support - despite the relatively modest amounts - has represented a significant political endorsement at international level, has provided a base for dialogue between government and donors, with the Commission playing a leading role among the EU member states, and has ensured important financial and technical means for successful policy implementation. This contribution has helped establish sector wide approaches in the supported sectors, thereby improving the national policy processes.

As said, in some cases (e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador-education) civil society has been successfully involved in monitoring and implementation of the reforms. The latter however is not the norm and the poor involvement of CSO in the implementation of BS is a typical challenge of this type of aid.

The different level of priority, attributed by the recipient governments and EU to the supported reforms, is another challenge of budget support. In some cases (e.g. in some sector policy support to justice or other governance-related reforms), the recipient's ownership is rather formal and the dialogue related to BS disbursements tends to lose its policy relevance and become a complex technical negotiation on the percentage of achievement of any single conditionality.

Another recurrent challenge of BS, which contributes to lower the ownership, may be the weak accompanying measures, in terms of capacity development, and an insufficient complementarity with investment projects.

1.2.4.3 Other: elements on joint programming

In an effort to increase efficiency and effectiveness and better coordinate with MSs, the EU has committed itself to increase utilization of Joint Programming (JP). While available studies (e.g. ECDPM (2015)⁴⁶) indicate that still some effort is needed for JP to fully achieve better development effectiveness, there seems to be an agreement that generally JP *"is working well, noting, it is a mid- to long-term endeavour that requires time, but can help the EU and its member states to work jointly on long-term challenges (e.g. delivering on the SDGs, migration)."* (GPEDC, 2016) The Council Conclusions of May 2016 on Stepping-up Joint Programming brought renewed impetus for Joint Programming.


Current data indicate that in general, JP is more advanced in EDF countries compared to DCI countries (= countries included under the DCI geographic instrument). In DCI countries seven countries (Bolivia, Cambodia, Guatemala, Laos, Myanmar, Nicaragua, and Paraguay) have finalised their Joint Strategy or are at Draft stage, when this report was prepared. Another five (Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan and Philippines) have developed roadmaps, while four (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) are currently undergoing feasibility and scoping.

The Joint Programming Evaluation indicates, while joint programming has encouraged better coordination and harmonization between the EU and its MSs with positive impact on coherence, it has enjoyed greater support from donors at field level than at headquarters.

⁴⁵ In Ecuador and Bolivia, the country evaluations are very positive on the level of ownership associated with BS. In Colombia, in 2015 a budget support for local development, with a focus on conflict areas, has been agreed upon and launched as a key tool to support the peace process.

⁴⁶ ECDPM (2015) Stepping up? Best Practices in Joint Programming and Prospects for EU Joint Cooperation Strategies.

Figure 18 Joint Programming state of play (January 2017)



Source: EEAS 2017, Slide presentation made available January 2017.

1.3 EQ 3 on efficiency

To what extent is the DCI delivering efficiently?

JC 31: DCI has been implemented in a timely fashion and with a reasonable ratio of development results to money spent.	
Main findings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DCI 2014-2020 has performed relatively well on standard administrative efficiency measures. DCI 2014-2020 compares reasonably well with other instruments on administrative costs as a share of budget (3%), proportion of projects with red traffic lights on implementation (3.6%), comparison between projected and actual spending, speed of spending following contract, and other measures. Strength of the evidence base: <i>Strong</i>	Main sources of information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU reporting documents (Annual Report, EAMRs, EU Results Framework), Evaluations, Interviews with DG DEVCO and EEAS HQ and EUDs.
JC 32 : Opportunities for consolidation and rationalisation have been exploited with resulting efficiency gains as from 2014 as compared to 2007-2013.	
Main findings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> While there have been some efficiency gains from consolidation, these have been modest for the most part. There has been consolidation in the sense of nomenclature, but every sub-theme of the four DCI 2007-13 thematic programmes found a home in GPGC. The consolidation resulted in some efficiency gains in that previously separate budget lines were consolidated under one umbrella covering public good issues that directly affect both partner countries and Europe. Strength of the evidence base: <i>Medium – Strong</i>	Main sources of information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy documents (DCI regulation and Impact Assessment, DCI programming documents, CIR), EU reporting documents (EAMRs), Evaluations, Interviews with DG DEVCO and EEAS HQ and EUDs, Survey to EU Delegations.
JC 33 : Appropriate strategic framework and monitoring system to measure results and performance of the DCI are in place and operational.	
Main findings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DCI 2014-20 has seen the introduction of the EU Results Framework, a tool to strengthen results orientation. While recognising this as a step forward (and relying on it heavily to answer EQ 2 on aid effectiveness), the evaluation notes a few limitations. Staff shortages and turnover, combined with the complexity of the programming process, mean that there are risks that lessons learnt are lost or diluted. Strength of the evidence base: <i>Strong</i>	Main sources of information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy documents (DCI regulation and Impact Assessment, DCI programming documents, CIR), EU reporting documents (EU Results Framework, EAMRs, SDAOs), External literature (e.g. ICAI study and OECD peer review), Evaluations and reviews (e.g. study on uptake), Interviews with DG DEVCO and EEAS HQ and EUDs.

1.3.1 JC 31: DCI has been implemented in a timely fashion and with a reasonable ratio of development results to money spent.

1.3.1.1 I-311 Administrative costs as share of budget.

Indicator Summary

Data in the table below indicate that EUR 80 million or 3% of the EU budget for DCI was spent on administrative costs in 2015. This is comparable to ENI, but data on the other large programme, EDF, are not available.

Table 32 Administrative costs in EUR million and as percentage of overall budget

Country / Region	DCI	ENI	EIDH R	ICSP	INSC	CFSP	IPA2	HUM A	EDF	OTH
Part I: ODA	2,398	2,351	163	233	60	260	1,607	1,389	4,893	130
Admin Costs	80	47	10	9	1	1	42	11		5
% of ODA	3%	2%	6%	4%	2%	0%	3%	1%	N/A	4%

Source: Annex Annual Report 2016, Annex 13A Breakdown by aid mechanism and by instrument 2015 – Commitments

1.3.1.2 I-312 Trends in relevant Results Framework indicators of administrative efficiency (e.g., “% of projects assessed as satisfactory in internal peer review” or “Time needed to disburse”).

Indicator Summary

This indicator looks at a five key performance indicators (KPIs), some taken directly from the RF and some calculated based on EAMRs 2013 and 2015. The following indicators have been examined:

- Accuracy of initial annual financial forecast for payments,
- Accuracy of initial annual financial forecast for contracts,
- % of projects with red traffic lights concerning progress on implementation,
- % of projects with red traffic lights concerning the achievement of objectives,
- % of invoices paid within the period of 30 days.

There was an improvement in four out of five KPIs under the DCI 2014-2020. Only the percentage of invoices paid within the period of 30 days deteriorated, decreasing from 65% in 2013 to around 60% in 2015, thus not reaching the target of 66%.


Key Performance Indicators & Results Reporting

The following graph compares the initial annual financial forecasts for payments and contracts for 2013 (DCI 2007-2013) and 2015 (DCI 2014-2020). This indicator is not reported in the RF, so what is presented below is an arithmetic average based taken from EAMRs 2013 (Section 8) and 2015 (Section 9) across all DCI countries.

With a benchmark set between 90% and 110%, for both data sets the accuracy has increased under the current DCI. Although the benchmark was not reached in both years, forecasts have seen significant improvement from 153% to 120% under the new DCI.

Target: Between 90% and 110%

Figure 19 Accuracy of initial annual financial forecast




Source: EAMRs 2013 and 2015

The following graph looks at the projects with red traffic lights concerning progress on implementation and achievement. In addition, the last column presents data from the 2016 Results report to allow for a comparison with the average numbers retrieved from all financing instruments. Compared to 2013, the number of projects with red traffic lights (implementation and achievement of objectives), have decreased in 2015.

The 2013 and 2015 columns are calculated based on EAMRs as described above. While data in the RF can be used to calculate EFI-specific data, this has not been done in the data provided in the Results Report, so the figures in the right hand column refer to all EFIs combined. These show that proportionally fewer DCI projects with red traffic lights compared to the other EFIs.

Target: Below 10% for 2015.

Figure 20 % of projects with red traffic lights




Source: EAMRs 2013 and 2015, EU International Cooperation and Development Results Report 2016

The graph illustrates the percentage of invoices that have been paid within the period of 30 days and compares it with the Results Report numbers.

See the row above for a note on calculations

Target: 66% (2014)

Figure 21 % of invoices paid



Source: EAMRs 2013 and 2015, EU International Cooperation and Development Results Report

1.3.1.3 Other evidence

Review EAMRs 2013

Obstacles and problems

Overall, the EU has encountered a wide array of obstacles in managing external aid. These stem from multiple causes and EUDs in some countries have described them in detail (e.g: Bangladesh, Nepal). Moreover, this section of the EAMR does not provide a structure for classifying/organising obstacles into different categories (e.g: internal/external), so it does not give a clear overview of the situation.

Among the challenges most commonly mentioned are those linked to the lack of human resources, staff turnover and reallocations (e.g: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Yemen). Likewise, some EU Delegations refer to the “precarious situation” resulting from the Workload Assessment (WLAD) exercise (e.g: India, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar and Nicaragua). Particularly, Nicaragua, Nepal, Paraguay and Tajikistan have expressed their concerns about the Delegation’s capacity as regards the MIP 2014-2020 programming. For example: “[...] it is clear that the Delegation is currently operating close (or above) its management and absorption capacity. In the face of the proposed three-fold increase of the MIP for 2014-2020, the Delegation will not be able to continue to deliver at the required level unless human resources are also increased in a commensurate manner [...] The first impact may be felt on our capacity to continue to play the human-resource intensive role of donor chair in any of the sectors we are present, including regrettably the focal areas where we are planning to scale up significantly in the context of the new MIP” (EAMR Nepal 2013, 6). “There are no specific problems requiring the attention of the Director, except as regards staff allocation in relation to the increase in budget allocation for the period 2014-2020.” (EAMR Tajikistan 2013, 7).

Others obstacles identified by countries as regards the MIP 2014-2020 programming exercise are mainly related to aid modalities: For example: “Due to the limited array of available instruments and the considerable amount of budget for bilateral cooperation, the possibility to use efficient implementation modalities will be critical for absorption capacity of bilateral cooperation in 2014-20.” Nicaragua “SICA’s absorption capacity of newly EU-funded

actions during 2014-2020 should be carefully scrutinized [...] The new intergovernmental approach of the General Secretary of SICA, breaking the supranational approach followed until early 2013, is to be seriously considered for the 2014-2020 programming to efficiently mainstream new EU projects.” (EAMR Nicaragua 2013, 6-7); *“This being said, in the mid to long-term perspective of the ongoing programming for the 2014-2020 MIP we need to carefully consider the level of fiduciary risks that the EU is willing to continue taking and carefully assess the balance of various implementation modalities in the proposed focal areas of intervention.”* (EAMR Nepal 2013, 6).

Other difficulties that have been confronted range from political crises, security, conflict, macroeconomic instability, weak PFM systems, corruption and lack of CSO autonomy to cumbersome administrative procedures, fragmented EU portfolios and difficult adaptation to new EU rules and templates.

Performance of Delegation in terms of sound financial management and efficient use of EU resources

Overall, EAMRs assess sound financial management and efficient use of resources as satisfactory. However, in some cases countries give a positive assessment even with a low achievement rate in terms of KPIs (4/5 out of 12 KPIs) e.g.: Laos, Myanmar, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. The main problems seem to be financial forecasts (e.g. Afghanistan), ROM performance (e.g. Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Peru, the Philippines) and slow decrease in old RAL (e.g. Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, South Africa, Tajikistan).

Many EAMRs refer to the “under-staffing” of the Finance Contracts and Audit Section (FCA) as one of the major constraints affecting quality and causing delays (e.g. Cambodia, Colombia, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Peru and South Africa) or to the fact that the FCA is placed in a different country/Delegation (e.g. El Salvador and Honduras with the FCA located in Managua). For example: Nicaragua *“the current situation of staffing, especially in the finance and contract section, will put at risk the quality of controls and might undermine delivery and quality in the future.”* (EAMR Nicaragua 2013, 37); Peru *“The only factor which could affect in the future the delegation’s capacity to ensure implementation and control according to forecast, is a certain fragility of the finance contract section, as the current reduction of staff makes unforeseen deputysing [...]”* (EAMR Peru 2013, 34). Other countries refer to the difficult context or political situation.

Review EAMRs 2015

Obstacles and problems

Most problems raised by the EUDs are external obstacles that frustrate the achievement of objectives and impede the implementation of development cooperation interventions in a timely manner. External obstacles most commonly encountered involve weak PFM and cumbersome national procedures resulting in serious delays and hindering the use of certain aid modalities (BS). In terms of internal obstacles, EAMRs mainly refer to a lack of human resources leading to delays in programming and implementation.

Main external obstacles:

- Corruption, mismanagement of funds (e.g. Bangladesh, Honduras); lack of transparency/accountability and weak PFM systems that hamper the implementation of certain aid modalities such as BS e.g. Laos *“[...] the Implementation Plan 2016-2020 foresees around two thirds of the total envelope to be implemented preferably through budget support and EU Member States are, locally, not in favour of Budget Support due to the weak PFM systems and the lack of transparency.”* (EAMR Laos 2015, 3-6).
- Cumbersome national legal and administrative procedures (e.g. Cuba, Guatemala, Laos, Myanmar and the Philippines) and a lack of coordination between government departments delaying contract signings and the implementation of activities. (e.g. Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, the Philippines).
- Macroeconomic instability and cuts to national budgets (e.g. Colombia, Honduras), impossibility of co-financing in cash (e.g. Vietnam), political changes/crises (e.g. Guatemala, Nepal), and unstable and complex in-country situations (e.g. Myanmar,

Yemen) that have resulted in delays and, in some cases, early termination or cancellation of projects.

- Restrictions to the registration of CSOs/NGOs (e.g. Ecuador, Laos, Uzbekistan, Vietnam).
- Development in certain sectors has proven particularly challenging, as in the case of human rights in Guatemala and rule of law (justice, human rights and elections) in Honduras.
- Conflict and post-conflict areas where limited access hinders the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development cooperation interventions (e.g. Bangladesh, Myanmar, Yemen).
- Natural disasters such as the earthquake in Nepal during April-May 2015.

Main internal obstacles are:

- Scarcity of human resources, sometimes due to lack of posts but also due to sick leave, long-term maternity leave, staff rotation (e.g. Cambodia, Ecuador, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan), lack of local officials to engage in policy dialogue with national counterparts (e.g. Myanmar). This leads to delays in programming exercises, heavy workloads, and staff frustration.
- Payment delays affecting the EU's credibility as a major donor (e.g. Afghanistan, Myanmar).
- Others: Lack of clear guidance from HQ (e.g. Cambodia 2016 EAMR), insufficiency of mission budget hampering project monitoring (e.g. the Philippines, Pakistan); frequent updating of guidelines and templates (e.g. Cambodia, Vietnam) and PRAG templates that fall short of national requirements (e.g. the Philippines); insufficient coordination with some key MSs (e.g. Pakistan).

Performance of Delegation in terms of sound financial management and efficient use of EU resources

On average, and taking into account the potential risks in each country, EAMRs describe the overall performance of the EU in terms of sound financial management as efficient and satisfactory. The main challenges include: calculation of forecasts (e.g. Paraguay, Vietnam), payment delays (e.g. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Paraguay, Peru, Sri Lanka), lack of human resources and staff turnover (e.g. Cambodia, Paraguay, Peru), low execution of projects (e.g. Pakistan, Peru) and external circumstances such as the lack of commitment and payment credits (e.g. Afghanistan, Myanmar, Vietnam), natural disasters (e.g. Nepal) difficult contexts and conflict (e.g. Uzbekistan, Yemen).

Review Sub Delegated Authorising Officer Report

“Staff issues are recurrently raised by Delegations as a major concern, notably to ensure business continuity. Amongst the most particularly affected ones, Cambodia (absence of in the 2 officials of the FCS (maternity and sick leaves) and ATM functions not ensured during 9 months) and Bangladesh (vacancy of the Head of Cooperation until May 2015, diminution of resources while the financial allocation is increased) faced difficult situations which have been partially addressed through floaters and are now solved.

Laos and Thailand Delegations underline the challenging situation of mixed posts covering two Delegations (Head of Cooperation being based in Laos and Head of Finance and Contracts in Bangkok) which requires close coordination and forward-planning, but may lead to delays. The Delegation to Laos recalls that the potential three-fold increase of ODA to Laos may require reinforcement of FCA staff.

Further to the earthquakes in Nepal, Delegation underlines that business continuity was ensured despite the fact that 4 of the 9 people in the Operations sections and one FCA staff were evacuated; one was transferred to another Delegation, and the other returned progressively. The reinforcement of the Operations section in 2016 is welcome but the absence of secretariat in the FCA section remains an issue.

Many Delegations (Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Timor-Leste) are affected as well by high turnover, rotations, and understaffing, which sometimes make challenging the delivery of our

assistance while ensuring full implementation of the financial circuits. These issues are followed by our Directorate in order to provide a timely replacement whenever possible (see Human resources section)”

Sub Delegated Authorising Officer Report, DEVCO H, p. 41

Review evaluations

Two country-level evaluations (Bolivia and Yemen) refer to the efficiency of DCI programmes but with different conclusions. In Bolivia, despite some delays, the EU has done well and *“In general, goals were reached within the programmed costs”* (Evaluation of EU Cooperation with Bolivia, p. 67). In contrast, Yemen encountered many blockages (e.g. EU ambitious goals, lack country absorption capacity and insufficient human resources) that hampered objectives’ achievement and undermined efficiency.

To judge from thematic evaluations, the EU has not performed in a cost-effective way. Main obstacles are e.g.: lack of overall strategy (Research & Innovation), inflexible EU rules and procedures not suited to private sector actors and in several cases counter-productive *“the Commission’s global approach based on delivering aid to the private sector via the public sector proved not to be the most effective or efficient in many cases.”* (Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries, 16), inadequate attention to maintenance and operating costs, weak coordination with partner organisations, (mainly with UN agencies) in regional interventions and lack of human resources (Health). However, there have been successful experiences, for example, Environment and Climate Change: *“The recommendations from the first phase review to simplify the structure of the ENRTP, to reduce the scattered nature of calls for proposals and to work more systematically through global governance bodies such as UNEP and UNFCCC have been implemented. [...] Working through the global agencies has led to a greater economy of scale than would have been possible under EU-launched projects.”* (Thematic evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2007-2013), p. ii); Trade-related Assistance *“In most circumstances, the chosen delivery channels (i.e. the partners through which support was implemented) were efficient in providing the required expertise for TRA, and the EU made judicious use of different channels to that effect.”* (Evaluation of the European Union’s Trade-related Assistance in Third Countries, p ii).

1.3.2 JC 32 : Opportunities for consolidation and rationalisation have been exploited with resulting efficiency gains as from 2014 as compared to 2007-2013.

1.3.2.1 I-321 Coverage under GPGC of sub-thematic areas compared to former thematic instruments.

Indicator Summary

The rows below describe the structure of thematic programmes under DCI 2007-13 and 2014-20. Five programmes from the DCI 2007-13 were merged and consolidated into two in the DCI 2014-20. NSA-LA was virtually unchanged apart from the fact that its name was changed to CSO-LA. As illustrated in the third row below, every sub-theme under the other thematic programmes in 2007-13 was taken over under GPGC (and a handful of new ones were added). Presumably some sub-areas gained in prominence while others diminished, but from an organisational point of view, none were left behind. One reason is reported to be the need for the EU to continue to meet commitments after concentration into three focal sectors. It was pointed out that there is not a call in every area in every year and HQ staff was of the view that, while there do not appear to have been substantial efficiency gains – apart from the increased clarity of placing all under the umbrella of addressing global problems of direct importance to Europe as well as partner countries – the reason was not maintenance of the broad range of themes.

Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment accompanying the document Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation SEC(2011) 1469 final

Under the 2007-13 DCI, there were five thematic programmes:

- Investing in People
 - Health
 - Education
 - Gender equality and women's empowerment
 - Social inclusion, employment, and decent work
 - Children and youth, cultural diversity
 - Covered disabled persons
- Environment and sustainable management of natural resources including energy (covered climate change)
 - Covered Global Climate Change Alliance, Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade
- Non-state Actors and Local Authorities
- Food Security
 - Omnibus programme, aimed at interventions in favour of the poorest and most vulnerable
- Migration and Asylum
 - Fostering links between migration and development
 - Promoting well-managed labour migration
 - Preventing and curbing irregular immigration and facilitating the readmission of illegal immigrants
 - Protecting migrants against exploitation and exclusion
 - Promoting asylum and international protection

Working document for programming – Strategic dialogue with the European Parliament on the GPGC thematic programme under the DCI

GPGC:

- Environment and climate change
- Sustainable energy
 - Enable developing countries to secure energy for growth while simultaneously reducing greenhouse gas emissions through renewables and energy efficiency
- Human development
 - Health
 - Education, knowledge, and skills
 - Gender equality, women empowerment and protection of women and girl's rights
 - Children and youth
 - Non-discrimination
 - Employment and skills
 - Social protection and social inclusion
 - Growth, jobs, and private sector engagement
 - Culture
- Food security and sustainable agriculture and fisheries
- Migration and asylum

DCI 2007-13 and 2014-20**Table 33** Comparison sub-thematic areas DCI2007-13 and 2014-20

DCI 2007-13	DCI 2014-20
Investing in People: Health	GPGC human development : Health
Investing in People: Education	GPGC human development: :Education, knowledge, and skills
Investing in People: Gender equality and women's equality	GPGC human development : Gender equality, women's empowerment, and protection of women's and girls' rights
Investing in people: Social inclusion, employment, and decent work	GPGC human development: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employment and skills • Social protection and social inclusion • Growth, jobs, and private sector engagement • Non-discrimination
Investing in people: Children and youth, cultural diversity (covered disabled persons)	GPGC human development: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Children and youth • Culture
Environment and sustainable management of natural resources including energy and climate change	GPGC environment and climate change GPGC sustainable energy
Food security	GPGC food security and sustainable agriculture and fisheries
Migration and asylum	GPGC migration and asylum
Non-state actors and local authorities	CSO-LA

EU HQ staff comment

One reason for maintaining all the DCI 2007-13 sub-themes was concentration, into three sectors, raising the need for the thematic programmes to take on the task of maintaining EU presence in areas to which it was committed.

1.3.2.2 I-322 Merging of thematic instruments resulted in efficiency gains.**Indicator summary**

Thematic programmes are meant to serve a number of ends. One is to provide opportunities for non-government partners, such as CSOs, to independently propose and implement actions. The CSO community and its international NGO supporters are therefore major stakeholders in the design of the thematic programmes. Another purpose is to complement geographic programmes by permitting small, flexible interventions. This may have allowed the EU, when its bilateral geographic programmes were focused on three key sectors, to continue to cooperate in a broader range of areas. Finally, thematic programmes offer a means to support reliable international partners, such as WHO, CGIAR, IOM, etc., with direct awards to work in areas of global importance. The size and expertise of these institutions also allows thematic programmes to reap economies of scale.

During the deliberations that led to design of the DCI 2014-20, a number of problems with the existing approach to thematic programmes were identified. One was the frequent absence of coordination and complementarity between geographic and thematic programmes. For example, EUDs were often unaware of the activities of thematic programme projects (as well as regional ones) that were not being managed locally.

A second was the proliferation of small projects, particularly in Investing in People and Food Security, which became omnibus programmes covering a dizzying range of actions. Many small projects translated into high administrative costs, particularly at EUD level.

A third was fragmentation, with the same area sometimes falling into two or more thematic programmes. At the same time, some global crises, such as avian influenza, emerged for which no thematic programme was appropriate.

No hard information has been obtained on whether the consolidation has increased administrative efficiency, although the number of actions in some areas has reduced. Headquarters staff expressed the view that there had been no real efficiency gains directly attributable to consolidation because procedures remained the same. Minimum grant size has been increased to reduce the proliferation of many small projects. This has come at some expense to smaller CSOs, who lack the capacity to manage large grants and, through lack of experience, are now less likely to gain that capacity. In response, rules for sub-contracting to smaller CSOs have been loosened and the EU has encouraged the formation of both horizontal and vertical partnerships. Local Authorities have been encouraged to collaborate with NGOs that have the capacity to handle EU grants. In addition, the CSO-LA programme contains a substantial capacity building component.

As the table above makes clear, there has been no reduction in the number of focal areas; everything from DCI 2007-13 has been carried along and new concerns continue to be added.

Staff shortages in EUDs have discouraged EUDs from taking thematic programme projects on board. In the case of UMICs, this has diminished the ability of thematic programmes to support cooperation after graduation.

An example of a flexible and rapid response to a rapidly evolving situation is the increase in 2015 AAP allocation to the Migration and Asylum thematic programme.

Review EAMR 2013

There are no references to the merging of thematic instruments. EAMRs only highlight two cases identifying a correlation between complementarity and the fragmentation of the EU Delegation's portfolio. For example: *"Other thematic programmes such as SWITCH-Asia, FSTP and ENRTP, can be seen to complement the bilateral portfolio by addressing areas not included in the focal sectors, notably biodiversity, sustainable resources management and environmental conservation. However such support induces further fragmentation in the Delegation's portfolio and impact on the Delegation's workload."* (EAMR Cambodia 2013, 12); *Nepal "However, despite efforts to gradually strengthen the cohesiveness of the Delegation's portfolio, overall our actions are still more thinly spread than optimal. Fragmentation stems largely from significant numbers of (often sizeable projects) granted from global calls."* (EAMR Nepal 2013, 11).

Review EAMR 2015

There are only a few cases, in Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam, where the EU refers to challenges related to the CSO/LA thematic instrument. For instance, in Cambodia a CfP launched under this programme has encountered some difficulties due to new requirements established by DEVCO (increased grant size and compulsory financing to third parties). According to the EAMR Cambodia (2015, 14-15) *"[...] more dialogue is needed with civil society to foster changes and optimize some of the new funding modalities for thematic instruments."* According to the EAMR Myanmar (2015, 21-23) *"The issue of direct granting to local NGOs needs to be carefully addressed, with the need to keep smaller size contracts for local CSOs to apply and succeed. The number of larger Myanmar NGOs able to manage large contracts is very limited."* In the case of Vietnam the concept of CSOs is quite new thus it also brings complexities. As highlighted in the EAMR Vietnam (2015, 9-11) *"Absorption capacity is an issue for some CSO grant beneficiaries in Vietnam. As national CSO structures are relatively small and new, there have been some cases of difficulties in managing administrative expenditure in conformity with EU rules...The increase in the average contract size, while necessary from a point of view of economies of scale, could*

further exacerbate this issue if organisations are selected which do not have prior experience and capacity or managing significant budgets.”

Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment

Improvements to be considered:

- Improving coherence between actions supported by geographical and thematic programmes
- Reducing number of small actions
- Moving some thematic programme concerns into bilateral envelope
- Greater synergy with other EU policies and internal instruments

Specific areas for improvement:

- IIP – high number of small calls for proposals with small allocations, ‘dustbin’ programme where anything that could not be financed elsewhere found a home
- ENRTP – wide scope made it difficult to have clear priorities; EU visibility low, wide range of channels
- NSA-LA – calls for proposals favoured organisations with already high capacity
- Food security – need to streamline into fewer areas
- Need to better engage governments in partner countries, provide more support to NSAs and LAs, and better inform governments in Europe and partner countries at highest political level.

Source: Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment accompanying the document Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation SEC(2011) 1469 final

Working document for programming – Strategic dialogue with the European Parliament on the GPGC thematic programme under the DCI

Lessons learnt over 2007/13:

- Insufficiently flexible
- Too fragmented to respond to global crises and challenges

Insufficiently integrated programming

EU HQ staff comment

HQ staff agreed with the proposition that the consolidation had not resulted in substantial efficiency gains, but disputed that this had much to do with having carried over all the previous themes. The point is that procedures remain largely the same.

The reduction of staff in the EUDs had an impact in the management of thematic programmes. EUDs were sometimes reluctant to give a green light to thematic programmes in their countries – even when the programmes were centrally managed – because of staff shortages. These may have particularly affected UMIC due to staff reductions, affecting the ability of thematic programmes to continue cooperation with these countries.

The GPGC Migration and Asylum has been quick to respond to the crisis, with the AAP 2015 calling for an increase of EUR 12.5 million. A proposal to increase the allocation for AAP 2017 by EUR 15 million is currently under discussion,

1.3.2.3 I-323 Extent to which LA component of CSO/LA is developed and operational.

Indicator Summary

LAs are increasingly emerging as significant political and development actors, and a 2013 Communication called on the EU to engage them more fully in cooperation. Yet EAMRs cited below, as well as the discussions under I-113 and I-231, suggest that the LA component of CSO-LA is slow in getting off the ground. This observation is based largely on the fact that mention of LAs is extremely low, and stands in contrast to the numerous references to CSOs. One possible reason that has been proposed is that LAs are by nature public-sector entities with inherently political priority-setting, decision-making, and budgetary

responsibilities. As such the call for proposals approach may be unsuitable. In addition, many LAs may not have the capacity to navigate their way through the process. Interviews with B2 confirm that the LA component has experienced difficulties. One response (as in Cambodia) has been to partner with the national association of LAs.

MIP CSO/LA 2014-2020

The term Local authorities (LAs) and their role is defined in detail in the programming document for CSO/LA 2014-2020:

“What is meant by Local Authorities (LAs) The term refers to public institutions with legal personality, component of the State structure, below the level of central government and accountable to citizens. Local Authorities are usually composed of a deliberative or policy-making body (council or assembly) and an executive body (the Mayor or other executive officer), directly or indirectly elected or selected at local level. Local authorities encompass a large variety of subnational levels and branches of government, i.e. municipalities, communities, districts, counties, provinces, regions etc. The EU includes in this definition also the «Associations of Local Authorities» (ALAs), to be understood as umbrella organisations based on membership and representativeness at sub-national, national, sub-continental, continental and international level. ALAs may be organised as autonomous entities in accordance with the legislation in force in the country of registration. Associations of Local Authorities may be composed of a representative body elected by its LA members and a permanent secretariat.

The role of Local Authorities Adhering to the principle of subsidiarity, LAs may act as decision-makers, in favour of transparent and accountable policy-making and service delivery at the local level. Being closer to citizens than other public institutions, LAs hold responsibility in mobilising local societies' opinions and resources while acting as catalysts for change. This is particularly true in terms of more efficient public administration, more inclusive development processes, in cooperation with CSOs, and solutions to urgent challenges faced by local communities. Such challenges include social exclusion and lack of access to adequate education and trainings, migration, food security, limited infrastructures, rapid urbanisation, depletion of resources, public safety and violence, environmental and social impact of extractive activities, climate adaptation and mitigation, rule of law and access to justice. Therefore, LAs play a double role: (i) representing and ensuring welfare of local political community (agents of a local political constituency); (ii) representing and facilitating the action of the State in their jurisdiction (agent of the central State).”

Source: EU (2014) MIP for the Thematic Programme “Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities for the period 2014-2020”, 4-5.

MIP CSO/LA 2014-2020

Under the three priorities mentioned in the CSO/LA programming document, support to LA's receives equal attention compared to CSOs. E.g.

1. “Focus on country level: enhancing CSOs' and LAs' contributions to governance and development processes.

Support will be provided to:

- I. Enhance CSOs' contributions to governance and development processes as:
 - a. Actors in governance and accountability;
 - b. Partners in fostering social development;
 - c. Key stakeholders in promoting inclusive and sustainable growth.
- II. Enhance LAs' contributions to governance and development processes as:
 - a. Actors of enhanced local governance;
 - b. Welfare providers (public basic services, according to their institutional mandate) and promoters of inclusive and sustainable growth at the local level.
- III. Test pilot actions promoting local development through a territorial approach.”

Source: EU (2014) MIP for the Thematic Programme “Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities for the period 2014-2020”, 11.

Review EAMR 2013

In the case of the CSO/LA thematic instrument, countries mostly refer to interventions that are linked to CSOs; LAs are barely mentioned, with only a few examples found (e.g: Ecuador and Paraguay).

Review EAMR 2015

The CSO/LA thematic programme is being developed in nearly every country, yet the LA component is mentioned only seldom. In addition, some countries are facing problems implementing this component due to political reasons and weak institutional capacity (e.g. Bolivia, Cambodia Colombia, Myanmar, Nicaragua and Vietnam).

Examples: Afghanistan *“Local Authorities continue to be unable to apply directly for EU funding, given the Law on Local Administration and the Law on Municipalities have not been approved in Parliament”* (EAMR Afghanistan 2015, 5); Bolivia *“As for specific problems in the implementation of projects, those with LAs present the most challenges. In particular, a project with the Municipality of Calacoto was partially suspended due to severe delays in implementation, while an issue with the Municipality of Yotala regarding a recovery order is causing some controversy between the Delegation and the Ministry of Economy”* (EAMR Bolivia 2015, 5-6); Cambodia *“The 2014 LA allocation was returned to HQ at the end of 2015 due to difficulties for sub-national government entities to pass the eligibility check”* (EAMR Cambodia 2015, 14-15); Colombia *“grants contracts with Local Authorities (GADs) show the GADs limitations, in terms of local governance, political interference and lack of project implementation capacities”* (EAMR Colombia 2015, 7-9); Myanmar *“Under the 2014 LA Thematic programme one project awarded to the Kayin State Government was not signed and the funds had to be returned. The applicant finally refused the grant claiming a change in priorities. In reality, it is likely that this decision followed higher level instructions. That shows the need to better communicate the scope of the programme to Government, as well as the lack of full decentralization in the country.”* (EAMR Myanmar 2015, 21-23); Nicaragua *“Work with local authorities faces difficulties due to a lack of continuity in commitment and political will, as well as difficult communication with remote municipalities”* (EAMR Nicaragua 2015, 8-9); Vietnam *“A further issue under the CSO/LA thematic line is that Local Authorities have a specific role in Vietnam's political system. As such, the Delegation has not generally funded grants for local authorities up to now”* (EAMR Vietnam 2015, 9-11).

1.3.2.4 I-324 Evidence for linkages and synergies between the Pan-African Programme and other DCI components, and with EDF.

Indicator Summary

In an interview, the former Ambassador to the AU drew attention to the complementarity between the Pan-African Programme, financing projects and building capacity at the AU, the EDF African Peace Facility, financing peacekeeping operations. Unit B2 reports synergies between the Pan-African Programme and their support for CSOs in Africa through the thematic budget line CSO-LA. A number of points of complementarity and synergy were identified during the field mission to Addis.

EUD to AU interviews

The Pan-African programme has been active in a wide range of areas, from migration to transnational crime to human rights, civil society development, and support to African institutions including the African Union. Capacity building at the AU is highly complementary to EDF support to African countries, including the African Peace Facility. The CSO-LA programme in Africa is complemented by the civil society development component of Pan-African Programme, and GPGC has financed research and innovation projects that complement country programmes.

1.3.2.5 I-325 Steps taken to simplify administration and management of DCI funds.

Indicator Summary

To be assessed within the CIR study – cf. “Other Evidence” below for extracts from the draft CIR final report.

1.3.3 JC 33 : Appropriate strategic framework and monitoring system to measure results and performance of the DCI are in place and operational.

1.3.3.1 I-331 A robust framework allowing to measure development results of the DCI and its components exists and is operational.

Indicator Summary

See below, as well as I-211 and I-212 for a description of the EU's Results Framework. One of the strongest criticisms of the EU aid in low-income countries made by the DfID Independent Commission for Aid Impact study of December 2012 was weak performance management and the lack of a results framework. The OECD-DAC peer review of 1012 also found that the EU was monitoring for financial accountability, not results.

Putting in place the new EU Results Framework represents a significant step forward in strengthening the results orientation of EU cooperation. At the same time, limitations need to be kept in mind:

- It is difficult to measure the qualitative dimension.
- The RF does not scale results by population or amount spent, although presumably this could be done to some extent via side-calculations or just subjectively comparing results to the scale of the problem and the project.
- The RF is only as accurate as reporting at the project, programme, and country level.
- Level 1 indicators are extremely slow moving, and it is difficult to link what is happening at Level 2 to impacts at Level 1. As stated in I-211, it may be better to consider Level 1 indicators as more important to relevance than to effectiveness or efficiency. These internationally comparable indicators can be used at programming stage to choose areas and sectors in which EU support is likely to be most responsive to needs.

The Results Framework largely meets expectations expressed in the 2011 Agenda for Change. It has been particularly successful in covering the SDGs.

2011 Agenda for Change

The EU should develop a common framework for measuring and communicating the results of development policy, including for inclusive and sustainable growth. In line with the Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness, the EU will work with partner countries and other donors on comprehensive approaches to domestic and mutual accountability and transparency, including through the building of statistical capacity. Page 11

Results framework

The EU has developed a Results Framework monitoring tool to improve DEVCO's capacity to report on results in accordance with the Agenda for Change. It operationalises the approach spelled out in the SWD. The purpose is to measure results against objectives. Covering 12 sectors/ areas and 16 of 17 SDGs, extensive use of the first outputs of the RF have been used in answering EQ2 (see I-211 and I-212 for further information).

There are three levels of indicators:

- Development progress (impact)
- EU contributions to development progress (output-outcome)
- DEVCO's organisational performance (input-process)

Level 1: These indicators are 'swept in' from international organisation databases. The source organisations have adjusted and massaged them to make them internationally comparable. Level 1 indicators are most closely linked to the SDGs.

Level 2: These indicators are aggregated up from end-of-project reports (hence the unevenness from year to year noted under I-212). As the RF progresses, it is intended to cumulate results from the initial year (2013-14) to alleviate this problem. The indicators have been selected to align with sector choices and indicators in programming documents 2014-20. These are collected by EUDs from implementing partner records and, based on pilot experience, refer to end –of-project results (projects often report only inputs and activities

prior to end-of-project reporting). Results are reported on a contribution basis, meaning that no attempt is made to pro rate overall project results for the share of the EU (in case of co-financing).

Level 3: These organisational performance indicators; swept in from internal information sources (principally EAMRs), provided the information used in assessing JC 31 above. There are also estimates of the extent of mainstreaming in nutrition, gender, fragile states, human development, and climate change.

From the EFI point of view, the main value added on the RF is that it permits results, including performance to be aggregated by instrument and by region.

Sources: SWD(2013) 530 final 'Paving the way for an EU Development and Cooperation Results Framework

SWD(2015) final 'Launching the EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework

1.3.3.2 I-332 The systems in place allow for the provision of feedback and recommendations to be fed into future programming.

Indicator Summary

In the absence of a full institutional analysis, which would take us well beyond the DCI, it is difficult to credibly assess this indicator on the adequacy of systems in place for taking into account lessons learnt (including utilising the RF to its full potential). The DCI programming process is complicated. To simplify, the gist of the DCI programming process 2014-20, following rules promulgated in early 2012 (after considerable initial confusion), is:

- EUDs prepare EU response strategy based on political analysis and analysis of development situation – governments and civil society may proactively identify sectors and priorities:
- Proposal reviewed by EEAS taking lead in cooperation with DEVCO for geographic
- Proposal reviewed by DEVCO taking lead in cooperation with EEAS for thematic
- Based on feedback from EEAS and DEVCO HQ, EUDs prepare MIPs.
- Policy dialogue with partner country stakeholders
- Formal adoption by the EU.
- MIPS => basis for identification and implementation of concrete actions.

Any multi-step process involving multiple actors – EEAS and DEVCO (whose priorities and main concerns do not always coincide) as well as EUDs, partner country stakeholders, and MSs – provides opportunities for lessons learned and knowledge accumulated to be lost or diluted to the point of disappearance. High staff turnover in EUDs and at EU HQ, as well as human capacity constraints – all amply attested to by past evaluations – raise the risk. A 2014 study on DEVCO uptake of strategic evaluations cited below found that the uptake chain has many weak points.

Review of external studies

Study on the uptake of learning from EuropeAid's strategic evaluations into development policy and practice, 2014

Several strategic evaluations have influenced EU policies and practices, but missed opportunities as well.

Uptake chain is not effective – ownership deficit, limited institutional learning

Difficult to draw in EEAS as client for strategic evaluations.

Evaluations insufficiently embedded.

Lack of enabling overall institutional environment

Lack of clear signals from management


Recommendations:

- Promote and incentivise learning and evaluation culture

- Review evaluation process to enhance ownership and uptake
- Better exploit formal and informal processes
- Strengthen focus on outcomes in evaluations and management response system

Tannous, Isabelle (2013). The programming of EU's external assistance and development aid and the fragile balance of power between EEAS and DG DEVCO. European Foreign Affairs Review 18(3):329-54.

Figure 22 *Programming and Management Cycle of Extrnal Assistance and Development Aid for MFF 2014-20 (excluding MSs)*



Source: Tannous, Isabelle (2013). The programming of EU's external assistance and development aid and the fragile balance of power between EEAS and DG DEVCO. European Foreign Affairs Review 18(3):329-54

Strategic and political coordination now with High Representative and EEAS; Commission responsible for subsequent implementation. EEAS prepares strategic multiannual steps and prepares country allocations for each regions, CSPs/RSPs (now on their way out), and NIPs/RIPs (now MIPs).


Missing – overall strategic and political coordination of development portfolio, DCI remains under the responsibility of Commissioner for Development Policy; is submitted jointly with High Commissioner for adoption by Commission.

DCI geographic – EEAS and Commission have joint responsibility for strategic programming

DCI thematic – Commission has sole responsibility for strategic programming

Complex procedures for Strategy Papers and MIPs has not been simplified as originally intended (348-50).

Figure 23 *Programming Arrangements between Commission Services and the EEAS on EU Financial Assistance and Co-operation for the Multiannual Financial Framework*



Source: Tannous, Isabelle (2013). The programming of EU's external assistance and development aid and the fragile balance of power between EEAS and DG DEVCO. European Foreign Affairs Review 18(3):329-54

Görtz, Simone and Niels Keijzer 2012. Reprogramming EU development cooperation for 2014-2020

Working arrangements and modalities for cooperation between DEVCO and EEAS were formalised in January 2012 following a period of initial confusion. The institutional memory of development cooperation resides in DEVCO, formed in 2011 by merging DG DEV and DG EuropeAid. EEAS, by contrast, has worldwide responsibilities as well as interests in security and foreign policy (including economic) that go well beyond DEVCO's.

EEAS takes lead on DCI geographic programming (in agreement with Commission; decisions submitted jointly to Commission by DEVCO and HR/VP).

DEVCO takes lead on DCI thematic programming (in consultation with EEAS)

EUDs consist of EEAS, DEVCO, and other Commission staff.

Crucial role of EUDs is preparing EU response strategy based on political analysis and analysis of development situation – governments and civil society may proactively identify sectors and priorities:

- Proposal reviewed by EEAS in cooperation with DEVCO for geographic
- Proposal reviewed by DEVCO in cooperation with EEAS in case of thematic

Based on feedback from EEAS and DEVCO HQ, EUDs prepare MIPs.

Policy dialogue with partner country stakeholders.

Formal adoption by the EU.

MIPs => basis for identification and implementation of concrete actions.

1.3.3.3 Other evidence

See also evidence under JC 31

Review EAMRs 2013

Overall, the above-mentioned obstacles encountered by the EU during 2013 made monitoring and following up on DCI programmes a difficult task. In addition, the limitation of field missions due to in-country restrictions (e.g: Afghanistan, Bangladesh) or shortages of EU funds (e.g: Pakistan) were also a constraint to maintaining adequate levels of programme supervision.

Review evaluations

In two thematic evaluation reports there is reference to monitoring systems: Gender Equality and Women Empowerment, and Private Sector Development. Both cases refer to difficult experiences and describe monitoring and evaluation mechanisms as weak and problematic.

E.g.: *“Weak systems for GAP reporting and accountability are symptomatic of the low priority that GEWE has received in practice and further undermine the EU’s ability to deliver to its commitments. [...] The number of EUDs submitting annual GAP reports is inadequate and there are no sanctions for failing to do so. [...] The EU’s mainstream monitoring and evaluation processes pay scant attention to gender. EU evaluation and results-oriented monitoring (ROM) systems do not provide adequate information on results achieved generally. The use of gender-sensitive indicators is largely limited to the social sectors, particularly health and education. [...] ROM reports are not delivering insights into GEWE performance. The Gender Marker is poorly understood and inconsistently applied by EC Services and as a result it is impossible to determine with any confidence the EU’s gender spend and the extent of gender mainstreaming in programming.”* (Evaluation of EU Support to Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Partner Countries, ix). *“The EU devoted substantial efforts to the monitoring and evaluation of its support to PSD, but it remained difficult to obtain a clear and complete picture of the results, notably because weaknesses in terms of monitoring and evaluation subsisted, for instance the lack of baseline data or clear definition of expected results.”* (Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries, iv).

Independent Commission on Aid Impact, Report 17, December 2012, “DfID’s Oversight of the EU’s Aid to Low Income Countries

Executive Summary:

- EU has no effective performance management and results system in place.
- EU’s scale and influence provide opportunity for impact not being effectively harnessed.
- Slow decision-making and processes hamper delivery of results.
- While recipient governments are involved in planning, less evidence of how intended beneficiaries are involved in design and assessment.
- Possible over-reliance on local CSOs as proxies for beneficiaries’ views.

Poor performance management and results framework make impact difficult to assess.

European Union (2012), DAC Peer Review: Main Findings and Recommendations

Included among key findings is that EU institutions monitor closely, but for financial accountability, not results.

CIR study – aid tying (p. 10)

According to the 2014 OECD report on untying of aid, the EU was a relatively good performer as compared to other donors even before 2014. The share of untied aid reached 82.2% in 2013.

In 2014-2015, according to EU Statistical Dashboard, only 4% of DCI commitments was tied and 25% only partially untied. 70% of all DCI commitments were classified as being untied during this period. As the Statistical Dashboard became operational only recently, a comparison with the situation before 2014 is not possible.

Although the CIR provisions are more comprehensive and better organised than the 2007-2013 DCI Regulation, untying of aid had already become a well-established practice in 2014, which was mostly only endorsed by the CIR. No significant increase of the untying of aid for the Instrument as a result of the CIR can be observed.

The survey conducted among all EUDs on all EFIs leads to the conclusion that rules on nationality and origin are still felt to be complex and challenging in their implementation and not always adapted to local and regional realities. Delegations also question the need to request partner governments for tax exemption / reimbursement, both as a matter of principle and because of the tedious and stressful procedures involved.

CIR study – participation of local contractors (p. 19)

A comparison between 2016 and 2013 shows that the participation of local contractors has increased since 2014 in terms of relative share of volume of funds, even though their relative share of the total number of contracts has decreased. Whereas in 2013, on average, the relative share of funds spent through local contractors amounted to 37% of all amounts spent, this share amounted to 52% in 2016. In contrast, the share of number of contracts concluded with local contractors as compared to the total average number of contracts decreased from 87% to 69%.

It can hence be concluded that, on average, local contractors were granted less contracts in 2016 than in 2013 amounting to a higher share in total volume, as the contracts were larger in size. This information is based on the responses of 17-20 EUDs.

CIR study – EUD survey comments on ways to improve efficiency (p. 37)

One question in the survey was: *How can procedural and managerial processes be further simplified and harmonized to increase the efficiency of the implementation of the DCI?* Responses cover issues that are part of the CIR, but also policies and procedures that go beyond the CIR. Main issues raised and proposals made are:

- There is a widespread sense that policies and procedures related to EFIs in general and the DCI in particular are too heavy and complex, not only for EU staff, but notably also for governmental and non-governmental partners. Harmonisation notably

between EDF and DCI procedures is well-appreciated, but there is no evidence that this was due to the CIR.

- There is also a call from several Delegations to increase devolution to the field and allow Delegations to be more involved in the identification and approval of projects. The role of the thematic units in Directorates B and C should be only consultative.
- Further communication between thematic units managing DCI-thematic funds and delegation would further increase efficiency (for instance the CODESA seminar on agriculture was most useful to share information between HQ and delegations)
- Many Delegations also suggest to reduce the number of QSG meetings from the current two to only one (notably the first QSG meeting could be eliminated).
- Multi-annual envelopes per country will add flexibility and would allow for better planning. It would also allow for larger and longer projects that would increase predictability and enhance a more structural approach while reducing the workload of Delegations and reducing the administrative costs.

Another question in the survey was more specifically related to issues covered by the CIR: *Adoption of action programmes and measures; taxes; rules on nationality and origin; monitoring and evaluation. Could these rules be simplified for the DCI? In what way?*

On taxes, main observations were:

- Several Delegations question tax exemption requested from partner governments as a matter of principle, as it seems to contradict the need for domestic resource mobilisation promoted by the EU and also to be incompatible with budget support.
- Tax refund procedures are felt to be tedious and in some cases straining relations with partner governments.
- Some find tax rules still to be complex and hard to practise, however without suggesting ways in which they could be further simplified.

On rules of nationality and origin, the following main comments have been made:

- Rules on nationality and origin are still felt to be complex and challenging in their implementation.
- They are also not always adapted to local and regional realities, e.g. in countries of Southern Africa, which strongly depend on the Republic of South Africa.

On monitoring and evaluation, main observations are:

- There should be more focus/resources on facilitating project monitoring by programme managers rather than short, generic monitoring missions by external persons not familiar with local context and/or intervention sector.
- Evaluations need to be used judiciously so as to add value and not distract from regular work. The internal monitoring function should be strengthened.

There should be greater flexibility in using evaluation under a single AAP to evaluate the scope of the AAP.

1.4 EQ 4 on added value

To what extent do the DCI programmes add value compared to interventions by Member States or other key donors?

JC 41: DCI makes a contribution that other donors, particularly MSs, would be unable to effectuate in terms of financial inputs, development impacts, and political influence.

Main findings

- The EU is perceived as a stakeholder not bound by a specific national agenda.
- However, EU support does not come without strong expectations, and partners may not always perceive the difference between the EU and MSs in non-commercial areas. This suggests that EU leverage may be particularly strong in trade, investment, and commerce.
- While size matters, it does not appear that the sheer volume of DCI determines EU comparative advantage. Particular expertise was defined as the clearest added value for the GPGC programme. Value added will be enhanced when partner governments have identified areas of high potential, and is leveraged by the opportunities for peer-to-peer contact with European experts.

Strength of the evidence base:

Medium

Main sources of information:

- Programming documents (MIPs, Annual Action Plans and Action Documents),
- EU reporting documents (Annual Report, EAMRs),
- Evaluations and studies,
- Interviews with DG DEVCO and EEAS HQ and EUDs and EU Member States,
- Survey to EU Delegations.

JC 42: DCI promotes European values and approaches and values regarding development.

Main findings

- DCI-funded actions promote and support, inter alia, democracy, political transition, free and fair elections, good governance, human rights, labour and environmental standards, empowerment of citizens and community-driven socio-economic development, accountability of decision-making and political rule, rule of law, transparent dispute resolution, human development, reduction of inequality and fairer distribution, and gender equality.
- Throughout its history, the EU has not only been seen as a model or at least reference point for integration processes elsewhere but also actively promoted regional integration around the world. Particular EU contributions have been noted in Asia and Latin America.

Strength of the evidence base:

Strong

Main sources of information:

- Programming documents (MIPs, Annual Action Plans and Action Documents),
- EU reporting documents (EAMRs),
- Evaluations,
- Interviews with DG DEVCO and EEAS HQ and EUDs and EU Member States,
- Survey to EU Delegations.

1.4.1 JC 41: DCI makes a contribution that other donors, particularly MSs, would be unable to effectuate in terms of financial inputs, development impacts, and political influence.

1.4.1.1 I-411 Extent to which DCI is able to attain critical financial mass, e.g. relative to MS support.

Indicator Summary

In 2011 and 2012 the EU (EU institutions collectively) was the largest donor as compared to EU Member States. However, in 2013, the UK overtook the EU as the largest donor and in 2014 and 2015 the ODA flows of both the UK and Germany were larger than those of the EU. While value added is not restricted to sheer financial mass, evaluation reports have identified the provision of funds through budget support as a source of EU added value in comparison with other donors including MSs (see EQ 2 on share of budget support within DCI). This is confirmed by AAPs for 2014, 2015 and – to the extent available – for 2016 which provide evidence of DCI critical mass attained through budget support.

Another source of DCI value added, according to field interviews with MS representatives, is the EU's ability to take the lead (or play one of the leading roles) in multi-donor actions. Some 55 countries are in one stage or the other of Joint Programming as of the end of 2016. Current data indicate that in general, JP is more advanced in EDF countries compared to DCI countries (= countries included under the DCI geographic instrument). In DCI countries seven countries (Bolivia, Cambodia, Guatemala, Laos, Myanmar, Nicaragua, and Paraguay) have finalised their Joint Strategy or are at Draft stage, when this report was prepared. Another five (Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan and Philippines) have developed roadmaps, while four (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) are currently undergoing feasibility and scoping.

An evaluation report, as well as field interviews conducted in the course of this evaluation, suggest that despite good progress, the full potential of Joint Programming has not yet been exploited. This is in part because of relatively high transaction costs, MS concerns over visibility, and the fact that JP remains largely an EU-MS exercise with relatively little involvement of partner governments.

As also discussed under JC 62, the importance of financial mass should not be overestimated. DCI and ODA in general are small as compared to trade, FDI, and migrant remittances. Greater policy and political influence, including on issues related to governance, social, environmental, and human rights issues, increasingly comes from dialogue in the context of trade agreements (e.g., FTAs) side, not from traditional ODA co-operation. The EU's reputation as an unbiased partner because of its supranational status, and its expertise in regional integration issues, plus its expertise in issues related to global public goods such as climate change and the environment, may also outweigh sheer financial weight in the ODA basket.

Review of evaluations

Some evaluation reports (e.g.: Geographic – Ecuador CSP, Asia RSP; Thematic – Private Sector Development, Health) highlight financial weight and the provision of funds through DCI budget support as a source of EU added value in comparison with other donors.

An example of adding value through financial weight is Budget Support in South Africa: *“SBS operations have enabled line departments to finance innovative policies and programmes that had not yet found an allocation in the national budget”*. (Evaluation of Budget Support in South Africa, p. 105-107). In environment and climate change, *“The added value of the EU support has been in its scale, consistency and coherence with other support efforts.”* (Thematic evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2007-2013), p.ii).

Also cited in the environment and climate change thematic evaluation as a source of EU value added is the financial leverage that results from blending DCI funds with other funds (see Indicator I-611).

The ability of the EU to take the lead in Joint Programming is regarded as a source of value added (and was cited as such by MS representatives). Progress in Joint Programming, which covers a wide front ranging from joint strategies to joint implementation to joint monitoring, depends on where in the process of evolution towards a truly joined-up approach it is measured.

The ongoing evaluation of Joint Programming, admitting the challenge of evaluating a practice just getting off the ground, reaches a cautious assessment. Quoting from the draft Executive Summary, *“On the whole, the review of the country case studies thus shows that the Joint Programming exercise was worthwhile: it is starting to deliver positive results although these are so far still mostly limited to the EU family rather than benefiting the partner countries. The ambitions of Joint Programming in terms of aid effectiveness (reduced aid fragmentation, increased transparency and predictability, reduced transaction costs) have thus not as yet been realised. However, it is argued on the basis of findings in the field, that other results (better coordinated and more strategic EU aid with joint understanding, shared objectives and joint positioning) are being obtained, which are valuable contributors to better development effectiveness of European Union aid.”* (p. iii)

AAPs

The AAPs for 2014, 2015 and – to the extent available – for 2016 provide evidence of DCI critical financial mass attained through budget support and as the result of the EU's roles as lead donor of joint EU-MS interventions and multi-donor actions. Examples include:

In Cambodia, the EU through DCI has committed EUR 30 million in line with the national Rectangular Strategy III (RS III) 2014-18. The objective of the Government-owned Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PFMRP) is to strengthen public finance management systems. According to the EU's own assessment, *“support to PFMRP through the World Bank managed Trust Fund (PFM-TF) since 2006 has resulted increased budget credibility and financial accountability.”* EU support to PFMRP Stage 3 is delivered through budget support combined with a delegation agreement with SIDA to strengthen the PFM reform environment. Support to the PFMRP is also provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), through direct support to the Government and, again according to the EU complementary to the actions undertaken by the PFM-TF (Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme of 2015 in favour of Cambodia to be financed from the general budget of the European Union Action Document for EU support to Public Financial Management – Stage 3)

A significant multi-donor initiative led by the EU is the programme “Support to Police Reform in Afghanistan”. The total estimated cost of EUR 810.9 million is comprised of contributions by the EU via DCI (EUR 91 million), Denmark (EUR 16.6 million), Germany (EUR 55 million) Finland (EUR 11.35 million), the Netherlands (EUR 85 million), Hungary (USD 100,000), the United Kingdom (GBP 2.5 million), Poland (PLN 650,000), as well as Australia (USD 20 million), Canada (CAD 27.5 million), Japan (USD 260 million and JPY 429 million), Korea (USD 100 million), Norway (NOK 234.5 million), Switzerland (CHF 2.482 million), and United States (USD 117.32 million) (Annex 2: of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2015 (part 2) and 2016 (part 1) in favour of Afghanistan Action Document for Support to Police Reform in Afghanistan)

Another significant multi-donor programme led by the EU is the “Sustainable Use of Peatland and Haze Mitigation in ASEAN” (SUPA) programme with a total estimated cost of EUR 24.6 million co-financed by the DCI (EUR 20 million), the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB) (EUR 4 million) as part of its as part of its International Climate Initiative, and potential grant beneficiaries (EUR 556,000). The intervention is aligned with the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP) which responds to Southeast Asia's massive environmental problem of large scale uncontrolled land and forest fires occurring mainly in peatlands. Through SUPA the EU aims to strategically support ASEAN's efforts to promote sustainable management of its peatlands. The EU stresses that the programme also contributes to EU's commitment to address global environmental issues. *“By channelling the funds through*

national budgeting process, it is expected that governments be committed to allocating complementary national resources to peatland management" (ANNEX 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2015 Part III and 2016 Part II in favour of the Asia region to be financed from the general budget of the European Union Action Document for Sustainable Use Of Peatland And Haze Mitigation in ASEAN (SUPA))

Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Sector in Pakistan (TVET III) with a total estimated cost of EUR 49 million is jointly co-financed by Germany for an amount of EUR 4 million. (Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2015 in favour of Pakistan to be financed from the general budget of the European Union Action Document for "Support to the Technical and Vocational Education and Training Sector in Pakistan (TVET III))

In Lao PDR the programme "Citizen Engagement for Good Governance, Accountability and rule of law" (CEGGA). is a joint initiative of the EU, Germany and Switzerland, with the overall objective of increasing citizens' engagement in the development of Lao PDR. The total estimated cost of EUR 14 million is shared by the EU through DCI (EUR 5.5 million), Germany (BMZ) (EUR 3.5 million) and Switzerland (SDC) (EUR 5 million). (Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2015 Part 2 and Annual Action Programme 2016 Part 1 for Lao People's Democratic Republic Action Document for "Citizen engagement for good governance, accountability and rule of law").

The programme Aid to Uprooted People in Pakistan with a total estimated cost of EUR 34 million (EU DCI contribution EUR 22 million) is co-financed in joint co-financing by the German Government (EUR 12 million) (Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programmes 2015 part II and 2016 part I in favour of the Asia region to be financed from the general budget of the European Union Action Document for Aid to Uprooted People in Pakistan).

The Food and Nutrition Security programme for Bangladesh with a total estimated cost of EUR 126.5 million and an EU DCI contribution of EUR 85 million is jointly co-financed by USAID (EUR 7 million), the United Kingdom (DFID) (EUR 27.4 million), and potential grant beneficiaries (EUR 7.1 million) (Annex 2 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2015 part 2 and 2016 part 1 in favour of Bangladesh to be financed from the general budget of the European Union Action Document for the Food and Nutrition Security programme for Bangladesh 2015).

The Programme "Support to the Agricultural Growth Programme" in Ethiopia with a total estimated cost EUR 498.1 million features an EU contribution of EUR 45 million (of which EUR 40 million is provided by the EDF and EUR 5 million by DCI) is co-financed in joint co-financing by WB (IDA) (USD 350 million), DFATD (Canada) (USD 17 million), USAID (USD 5 million), The Netherlands (USD 30 million), Spain (AECID) (USD 6 million), Italy (International Development Cooperation) (amount to be determined). (Annex 3 of the Commission Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2015 Part 2 in favour of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia to be financed from the 11th European Development Fund Action Document for Support to the Agricultural Growth Programme (AGP Phase-II) of Ethiopia and a Complementary Action to promote Nutrition into AGP-II).

Field mission MS representative interviews

MS representatives frequently expressed the view that EU value added was not so much a result of its financial weight, but rather its character as a supranational institution (see I-412 below). However, financial weight gave the EU an advantage when it took the lead in discussing technical issues of implementation with governments and development partners, e.g. tax matters or per diem policy. The reliability and predictability of EU support, due to the multi-annual programming process, was viewed as a particular source of value added. Major DCI programmes are co-financed by partners such as Germany, the UK, and Sweden; as well as smaller Member States. Member States report that it is unlikely that they would be able and willing to fund major programmes in partner countries and regions entirely on their own, and appreciate the coordination lead that the EU is willing to take. However, while a number of examples of joint work were cited, the full potential of joint programming was not exploited because of relatively high transaction costs, MS concerns about visibility, and the

fact that JP remains largely an EU-MS exercise with relatively little involvement of partner governments. To this the evaluation of Joint Programming (see above) has added the fact that JP procedures are relatively demanding and the involvement of partner governments limited.

EUD survey


82% of responding EUDs felt that the DCI adds value as compared to interventions by EU MSs or other donors / actors. All components were felt to contribute to this, albeit somewhat less so in the case of regional geographic programmes. EUDs were evenly spread between those citing size of DCI engagement, particular expertise of the EU, and political influence / leverage as sources of value added for geographic programmes. Expertise was identified as the main source of value added for the GPGC programme – this factor was also cited by DG DEVCO HQ staff interviewed.

Table 34 Total ODA flows by donor in USD million (ODA+OOF+Private), 2011-2015

<i>Institution / Member State</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>
EU Institutions	17,391	17,479	15,959	16,451	13,848
Austria	1,111	1,106	1,171	1,235	1,207
Belgium	2,807	2,315	2,300	2,448	1,894
Czech Republic	250	220	211	212	202
Denmark	2,931	2,693	2,927	3,003	2,566
Finland	1,406	1,320	1,435	1,635	1,292
France	12,997	12,028	11,339	10,620	9,226
Germany	14,093	12,939	14,228	16,566	17,779
Greece	425	327	239	247	282
Ireland	914	808	846	816	718
Italy	4,326	2,737	3,430	4,009	3,844
Luxembourg	409	399	429	423	361
Netherlands	6,344	5,523	5,435	5,573	5,813
Poland	417	421	487	452	442
Portugal	708	581	488	430	306
Slovak Republic	86	80	86	83	86
Slovenia	63	58	62	62	62
Spain	4,173	2,037	2,348	1,877	1,604
Sweden	5,603	5,240	5,827	6,233	7,092
United Kingdom	13,832	13,891	17,871	19,306	18,700
Bulgaria	48	40	50	49	„
Croatia	„	21	45	72	51
Cyprus	38	25	20	„	„
Estonia	24	23	31	38	33
Hungary	140	118	128	144	152
Latvia	19	21	24	25	23
Lithuania	52	52	50	46	44
Malta	20	19	18	20	14
Romania	164	142	134	214	„
Total Member States	73,401	65,186	71,662	75,837	73,794

Source: OECD (2016): *OECD Statistics - Total flows by donor (ODA+OOF+Private) [DAC1]*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?ThemeTreeId=3>. [Accessed 22 September 2016]

Figure 24 Total ODA flows by EU institutions and EU MS in USD million, 2011-2015



Source: OECD (2016): *OECD Statistics - Total flows by donor (ODA+OOF+Private) [DAC1]*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?ThemeTreeId=3>. [Accessed 22 September 2016]

1.4.1.2 I-412 Extent to which the EU has taken advantage of its supranational status as a dialogue partner under DCI in areas such as migration, trade, etc.

Indicator Summary

MS representatives interviewed both at in their respective capitals and during field missions frequently expressed the view that the EU has a unique advantage in policy dialogue because it is a supranational, rather than a national, actor. This allows it to be perceived as a neutral interlocutor, or at least one more neutral than a MS with an explicitly national interest to pursue. This has been particularly the case in migration, where the EU's migration and development perspective sees migration not only as a security problem but also as a potentially positive resource for development through labour mobility, brain circulation, and remittances. This perspective has been consistently applied in the various migration processes supported under the Pan-African Programme and provides a clear-cut example of the EU's perspective being distinguishable from that of individual MSs', some of whom are more concerned with stemming migrant inflow and speeding repatriation. The comparative advantage of the EU is strengthened in this particular case because the partnership is Union-to-Union and Commission-to-Commission. More generally, the EU is perceived by partner governments to be a good listener, and one who takes country ownership seriously.

Several caveats are in order. While the EU has not bilateral trade or commercial interest to advance, its support does come with strong expectations related to democracy, human rights, gender, etc. attached. In addition, partner country governments and CSO-LAs may not always perceive the differences between "the EU," "Europe," and the MSs. EU views on the subjects just mentioned are in general indistinguishable from those of MSs.

The EU's specific value added in regional integration is examined in Indicator I-423. See also indicators under JC 62 on policy leverage obtained through DCI policy dialogue. Also consistently cited – in trade and related issues but also in GPGCs -- was value added in the form of European expertise and the ability to interact peer-to-peer with European experts. However, the degree to which the EU is able to add value also depends on the capacity and willingness of partner governments to identify areas in which EU experience and expertise can effectively add value.

Review national MIPs

MIPs state that the EU, as a supranational organisation, has an advantage in policy dialogue because it is not perceived to be defending the interests of a particular country. For example, in the Nepal MIP (p. 5): *‘Largely considered to be a “neutral” actor in Nepal, the EU is in a unique position to support the political transition process including support to the elaboration of a new Constitution.’* In the Pakistan MIP (p. 5): *“Recognized as an objective and transparent partner without any historic legacy, the European Union has the potential to play a significant role vis-à-vis Pakistan.”* In Iraq (p. 8): *“In the case of Iraq in particular, the EU might also be seen as an independent broker. This fact is believed to increase the likelihood of impact.”*

Review regional MIPs

According to regional MIPs, regional or sub-regional partners (e.g. ASEAN, SAARC, SIECA, CARIFORUM) consider the EU, as a supranational organisation, to be a dialogue partner at an equal level. While the absence of a regional organisation as a dialogue partner is a disadvantage, according to the Central Asia MIP (2014, p. 2, *“EU regional programmes aim at supporting a broad-based process of dialogue and collaboration between CA countries, promoting an environment conducive to a non-confrontational approach within the region, notably in areas sensitive for overall political and social stability.”* The Latin America MIP (2014, p. 5) states, *“The continental nature of the challenges faced, and of the responses required, is widely recognised in the region. This is also reflected in the EU-LAC dialogue at the highest political level (as illustrated in outcomes of the EU-CELAC Summit, January 2013). This expression of ownership and political will on the part of all the countries of the region is an asset for the purposes of implementing EU cooperation responses at continental level.”* In the Asia MIP (2014, p. 2) *“Furthering strategic dialogues with key partners is a central priority, as well as facilitating Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations and their implementation across the region. PCA and framework agreement negotiations have been concluded or are on-going with Australia, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam. The first EU-Asian FTA was concluded with South Korea in October 2010, and another FTA was concluded with Singapore in December 2012. Further FTAs are being negotiated with India, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam.”*

Review EAMRs 2013

The EU has taken a leadership position as a dialogue partner with national authorities, DPs, CSOs, LAs and key stakeholders on numerous occasions, becoming an influential player. Areas in which EAMRs 2013 report the EU playing an important role under the DCI include health, education, PFM, food security, climate change, justice, and rural development.

Review EAMRs 2015

The EU actively participates as a key dialogue partner in many different areas under DCI programmes, including human rights, democracy and good governance, human and social development and conflict prevention. Despite difficulties, these dialogues and exchanges have led to positive results and the EU has been recognised as an influential and trusted partner by governments, development partners, and other stakeholders. In some cases, the EU’s supranational status has allowed it to serve as a key facilitator for discussions among stakeholders. Examples of this can be found in Cuba *“Sectoral Policy Dialogues has consolidated the Delegation’s expertise both towards the Cuban authorities and with the donor community in Havana”* (EAMR Cuba 2015, 5-8); Vietnam *“[...] where appropriate, the EU Delegation brokered joint positions and approaches, for example in the run-up to the Vietnam Development Partners Forum (VDPF)”* (EAMR Vietnam 2015, 3-5); Colombia *“[...] the Delegation is a lead donor for Aid Effectiveness and Focal point for the EU Members States.”* (EAMR Colombia 2015, 4-5).

Some supporting evidence by sector:

Trade: Cambodia *“[...] the Delegation continues to be a key interlocutor for the Ministry of Commerce in bilateral and general trade issues [...] Since 2015 the Delegation also took on the role of the lead donor facilitator in the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) process,*

handed over from ADB. This provides the Delegation with a privileged position in coordinating actions in support of aid for trade.” (EAMR Cambodia 2015, 5-10); Myanmar, “: In the area of trade and investment, the EUD has kept its position as a key donor and main political dialogue interlocutor for the government.” (EAMR Myanmar 2015, 7-13).

Education: Laos “[...] the Delegation has become the co-chair with Australia of the education Sector Working Group. This resulted in the EU Delegation co-chairing, with the Vice-Minister of Education and Australia, the high-level dialogue in November on the Education Sector Development Plan 2016-2020 and influencing the discussion on budget implications of the plan.” (EAMR Laos 2015, 3-6).

Health: Tajikistan “[...] the EU took over the lead in the coordination between donors [...] After over 5 years of an intense policy dialogue between the Development partners and the GoT, led by the EU Delegation, the Tajikistan National Water Sector Reform Programme for the period 2016-2025 has been formally approved by the government at the end of December 2015”..” (EAMR Tajikistan 2015, 7-9).

Peace and security: Myanmar “the EU has been a strong supporter of the peace process, including through the financing of the Myanmar Peace Centre which coordinated and facilitated the discussions leading up to the NCA. The peace process will in the future be supported by the Joint Peace Fund, set up throughout 2015 under the EU's leadership.” (EAMR Myanmar 2015, 7-13)

Review of evaluations

Evaluations have found that DCI programmes generate opportunities to engage in policy dialogue and advocacy. In some cases, EU funding and its significant contribution through development interventions have given the EU a leading position as a dialogue partner.

- For instance, in Ecuador the provision of aid through budget support allowed the EU to “Have access to a privileged dialogue, exchange of information (i.e. on PFM) and relations of trust with the GoE.” (Evaluation of the Commission of the European Union's co-operation with Ecuador, p. 69).
- Regarding Budget Support in South Africa “This operation-level policy dialogue has been particularly important and has expanded to strategic themes providing a strong contribution to successful SBS in the Governance Sector and partly in the Water Sector, where it built on long experience of collaboration and trust between GoSA and the EU.” (Evaluation of Budget Support in South Africa, p. 105-107).
- In Central Asia, “At the regional level, the value added by EU support was mainly a contribution to enhancing the dialogue between CA countries, although some outcomes were achieved at the interstate level” (Evaluation of EU regional level support to Central Asia (2007-2014) (p. 68).

Yet, evaluations have identified instances in which dialogue opportunities have not been fully exploited.

- In environment and climate change: “Opportunities to make better use of EU expertise and know-how, and to engage with EU business interests and promote an exchange of civil society, have not been fully exploited.” (Thematic evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2007-2013), p. ii) and “The EU policy-level influence on environment and climate change has been considerable, but has not yet reached its full potential.” (p. 103).
- In Central Asia: “In the case of WECOOP, the Rule of Law Platform and CAEP, which were service contracts aimed at supporting the EU-CA dialogues, a significant limitation was that they focused exclusively on facilitating dialogue and raising awareness without a direct link to tangible implementation activities, and were thus not perceived to provide any real benefits, so in turn the interest in engaging was limited.” (Evaluation of EU regional level support to Central Asia (2007-2014) (p. 64-65).
- In South Africa, “The strategic dialogue and the knowledge sharing processes combined with SBS are limited by the absence of specific tools and procedures.” (Evaluation of Budget Support in South Africa, p. 105-107).

1.4.1.3 Other evidence

Review national MIPs

Value added in general:

Where MIPs identify the value added/ comparative advantage of the EU in the sector, this is related to:

- The EU's having previous experience and knowledge of the sector, including the familiarity with authorities and main local stakeholders; e.g. "comparative advantage in terms of long-term experience, commitment and diversity of partnerships and is recognised as a key player by the Government, donor partners and other stakeholders [...] It ensures continuity with successful EU on-going and past programmes and complementarity with other DPs, and especially with the EU Member States" (Bangladesh, pp.6 and 8). In the Philippines (p. 5): 'With its long-term partnership in the rule of law and its participation and extensive support to the peace process, the EU is very well placed to assist the Government [...]'. In Sri Lanka (p. 8): "[The] new programme will build on past EU experience and draw lessons from three successive programmes";
- The EU's specific technical/regulatory expertise or familiarity with best practices; e.g. in the Philippines (p. 4): "The EU is considered a leader in the area of regulation for renewable energy and climate change mitigation. Relevant energy efficiency technologies can be shared with the Philippines (this constitutes EU value added)." In Vietnam (p. 5): "In governance and rule of law, the remarkable experience of both European Member States and European Union in the introduction and implementation of good governance practices, including the justice and legislative sectors and full participation of civil society, contribute to add value to the EU's engagement." In South Africa (p.3): "[...] taking an innovative 'value added' approach which looks beyond the finance itself to what comes with it, namely best practice, innovation, risk-taking, pilot programmes, systems development, capacity building, and above all skills and knowledge'."
- The departure of other donors; e.g. in Vietnam (p. 2): "In a context of increased disengagement and gradual phasing out of several traditional (European) grant donors over the coming years, the EU aims at playing an important role in supporting Viet Nam to address its remaining development challenges." In Iraq (p. 4): "Iraq has also witnessed the significant reduction in development co-operation volume and in many cases the gradual withdrawal of donors from country (e.g. DfID, SIDA, etc.). In this context, the EU together with the US (State Department) have become the lead donors in terms of overall funding in Iraq." A striking example of the EU becoming a mainstay of co-operation after the departures is Bolivia (p. 4): "This is particularly relevant after the departure of US agencies involved in the matter in Bolivia (NAS and USAID) in 2013 which have left the EU as the only relevant actor supporting government efforts in this area."

Review EAMR 2013

Most references in EAMRs are related to international organisations, in some cases to MSs. In a few examples countries describe the EU as a key leader and strategic contributor e.g. *"With regards to cooperation with both WFP and UNICEF, the visibility gained by EU has been more strategic. EU has risen to a role of a key partner of respective Government bodies (NPC, MoAD, MoHP) with relatively low investments, and is now considered an active and important member of the MSNP coordination groups."* (EAMR Nepal 2013, 12-14). *"During 2013 the EU Delegation continued to coordinate closely with the UNDP through the implementation of an Election Support Programme (ESP). The project was instrumental in providing support to the Election Commission of Nepal during the Constituent Assembly elections of November 2013. As one of the main donors to the programme (co-funded with DFID, Denmark and Norway) the EU contribution was acknowledged by all major stakeholders during the election period and EU visibility requirements were respected. The EU has a prominent role in the main management structure of the programme [...]"* (EAMR Nepal 2013, 12-14); *"The Delegation has been approached by other UN Agencies present in*

Cuba or with a delegate in the country (FAO, WFP, UNIDO, UNFPA) to express their interest in becoming leading implementing partners in future EU-funded projects.” (EAMR Cuba 2013, 12-13).

Review AAPs

In 2013, the EU Delegation to Bolivia, jointly with the representations of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, adopted a European Coordinated Response (ECR), which establishes a co-operation framework for partner states willing to coordinate effectively their respective programming exercises. The ECR, which has been discussed and agreed with the Bolivian government, will guide the programming exercises of participating countries and their agencies, and represents the basis for a joint development co-operation dialogue with the Bolivian government. *“This coordinated approach will lead to a clearer division of labour, and improved complementarity between the interventions, in respect of the international principles of Aid Effectiveness and the EU Code of Conduct”* (Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014-2016 Bolivia)

MS representative interviews (field and Development Committee delegates)

MS representatives interviewed consistently cited the fact that the EU was viewed as a neutral actor, above bilateral national interest, as a central source of EU added value -- note, however, that this must be tempered with the fact that partner countries may not always make the distinction between “the EU,” “Europe,” and the MSs; in addition, EU support does not come without its own agenda in areas such as gender, human rights, etc.; an agenda that is largely indistinguishable from that of the MSs. The absence of bilateral interest is strongest in the area of trade, investment, and commerce. The EU was characterised as taking partnership and country ownership seriously and as being a good listener. The point was specifically made that, whereas MSs may prefer to concentrate on one or two key issues, especially in areas of controversy or contention with governments, the EU’s supranational and size status helped it to engage in dialogue on a wide range of issues.

1.4.2 JC 42: DCI promotes European values and approaches and values regarding development.

1.4.2.1 I-421 Extent to which the projects under the DCI 2014-20’s newly streamlined thematic programmes have promoted concerns high on the EU’s priority list.

Indicator Summary

See indicators under JC 21 for evidence that DCI has promoted EU concerns. All thematic programmes strongly focus on European concerns; in fact, their political foundation is (i) the need to ensure that development cooperation addresses European, as well as partner, priorities (via the public goods argument) and (ii) European conviction that GPGCs (climate change is an obvious example) are highly relevant to the basic DCI objective of reducing poverty.

1.4.2.2 I-422 Extent to which DCI promotes European values in policy approaches.

Indicator Summary

The Agenda for Change and Global Europe both made it clear that the EU regards European values in human rights, democracy, rule of law, and good governance as essential aspects of sustainable and inclusive development. All reviewed documents provide textual evidence for the EU’s strong commitment to promote this agenda under DCI, a view confirmed by interviews with EU HQ staff, EUD field visits, CSO-LA focus groups in the field, and EU MS representatives both in the field and in capital.

Review national MIPs

MIPs systematically emphasise that human rights, democracy, rule of law, and governance issues such as transparency and accountability in PFM and ensuring a vigorous civil society are central to inclusive, equitable and sustainable growth. These policy priorities, representing European values, are highlighted in the Agenda for Change, to which most MIPs explicitly refer.

There are examples where the link to European values is made explicit. These include Mongolia (p. 6): “[...] improved legal, social, economic and environmental governance, in support of inclusive and sustainable development, in particular drawing on EU practise where relevant. The focus will be on those policies and legislative reforms, which directly relate to inclusive and sustainable growth (e.g. good governance, environmental governance and rural development) and where the EU and its Member States have particular knowledge and/or experience, which could be adapted to the Mongolian context.” In Myanmar (p. 4): ‘Moreover, European experiences and lessons learned regarding political transition, democratisation and peace processes will be actively shared.’ In Nepal (p. 8): “This provides a strong rationale for the EU to offer support in this area given its extensive experience in supporting good governance and accountability, especially in countries undergoing transition.” In Pakistan (p. 5): “There is a large degree of similarities in goals and objectives between the EU and Member States cooperation programmes, reinforcing a strategic EU-Pakistan partnership for peace and development. Rooted in shared values, principals [sic] and commitments, it sets out clear priorities to invest in catalysing reforms [...]”. In Viet Nam (p.): “In governance and rule of law, the remarkable experience of both European Member States and European Union in the introduction and implementation of good governance practices, including the justice and legislative sectors and full participation of civil society, contribute to add value to the EU’s engagement. The EU has now developed in Viet Nam a long-standing commitment in these areas and has on-going support to the judicial sector.”

Review regional MIPs

Like the national MIPs, all regional programming documents systematically highlight issues of sustainable and inclusive growth, good governance, human rights, rule of law, etc.

The Latin America MIP (2014, p. 1) particularly emphasises the importance of shared values “The EU’s partnership with Latin America is founded on close historical and cultural ties; extensive people-to-people exchanges; strong and growing trade and investment flows; and a deep bedrock of shared values and aspirations (commitment to democracy, human rights and rule of law; pursuit of social cohesion and sustainable development). Over the years, the two sides have progressively built up a broad-based relationship of equals, founded on mutual respect and open dialogue.”

Review EAMRs 2013

The EU commonly takes advantage of activities in programmes and policy dialogue exchanges under DCI to promote and reconfirm the importance of European values like governance, human rights and rule of law.

Review EAMRs 2015

The EU promotes European values through DCI programmes.

As specifically concerns the Gender Action Plan (GAP) 2014-2020, overall EAMRs refer very generally to gender issues. Only some (e.g. El Salvador, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam) of them have selected specific objectives of the Plan. Others plan to choose them in the near future (e.g. Colombia, Myanmar).

Review evaluations

European values are promoted throughout DCI programmes. At the same time, the thematic evaluation of gender found that promotion of the European gender equality agenda had been uneven and haphazard, characterised by a lack of consistent approaches and commitment. DEVCO HQ staff commented that steps have been taken, in the form of a Gender Toolkit and identification of gender focal points in all EUDs, to address these deficits.

Review AAPs

Most AAPs give evidence of the promotion of European values. Examples include, but are not limited to, *electoral democracy* (Cambodia), *democracy* (Bangladesh), *human rights* (Pakistan, Thailand, Bhutan), *labour and environmental standards*, *empowerment of citizens and community-driven socio-economic development* (Pakistan), *good governance, accountability and rule of law* (Laos), *fair, effective, expeditious, transparent and affordable system of dispute resolution at the local government level* (Bangladesh),

Review thematic programmes MIPs

All thematic programmes strongly focus on European values:

- The focus of the GPGC is on *“inclusive and sustainable growth for human development.”* Good governance, human rights, risk management, stability and security should therefore be regarded as elements underpinning the GPGC programme. These aspects will be tackled in so far as they have a direct impact at global level on inclusive and sustainable growth for human development and through a rights-based approach to the programme as a whole in line with the EU's commitments as set out in the DCI Regulation. However, policy priorities related to human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance are mainly addressed through the bilateral geographical programmes and also through a separate dedicated instrument – the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).” (Programming Thematic Programmes and Instruments Programme on Global Public Goods and Challenges 2014-2020 Multi-Annual Indicative Programme 2014-2017)
- The thematic programme *“Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities”* aims at developing citizens' awareness and critical understanding of the interdependent world, of their role and responsibility in relation to a globalised society; and to support their active engagement with global attempts to eradicate poverty and promote justice, human rights and democracy, social responsibility, gender equality, and a sustainable social-economic development in partner countries (Multiannual Indicative Programme for the Thematic Programme *“Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities”* for the period 2014-2020)
- Not a thematic programme but considered here, the Pan-African Programme 2014-2020 follows the objective of strengthening and promoting *“peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, and regional and continental integration in Africa”*. (Pan-African Programme 2014-2020 Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2017)

1.4.2.3 I-423 Extent to which under DCI the EU has made effective use of its unique expertise in regional integration issues.

Indicator Summary

Throughout its history the EU has not only been seen as a model or at least reference point for integration processes elsewhere but also actively promoted regional integration throughout the world. According to evaluation reports, the EU has strongly supported regional integration issues in Central and Southeast Asia, Central America (geographic) and Trade-related Assistance sector (thematic). In Africa the EU sees itself as the natural partner of the African Union in that organisation's efforts to promote continental integration. However, and perhaps surprising, neither national and regional MIPs nor EAMRs systematically elaborate on the EU's expertise and experience in regional integration issues as an advantage for the implementation of actions under DCI.

The main sources of evidence for the important role of regional integration (including but going beyond those below) are (i) evaluations, (ii) MS representative interviews both in the field and capitals, and (iii) EUD interviews in the field. Arguably the strongest case can be made for EU experience in Asia, but experience in Latin America has also been positive. While the contribution to regional integration in Africa remains limited, the view was expressed that potential is high and that the EU is uniquely positioned to provide support and expertise.

Review national MIPs

Trade and DCI-financed co-operation are seen to be tightly linked, for example, in several Latin American MIPs. In Nicaragua (p. 5): *“[...] in this context, the potential benefits from the EU-CA Association Agreement (AA) and from Central American integration will largely depend on the extent to which the weaknesses of MSMEs and of the economic environment*

can be resolved.” In El Salvador (p. 4): *‘It is proposed that the EU’s support for the ‘economic growth’ focal sector in the 2007-13 CSP be maintained, but geared mainly to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and cooperatives, in order to continue supporting the ‘economic tissue’ so as to increase productivity, investment, job creation and exports, especially in view of the implementation of the EU-Central America Association Agreement.’* In Colombia (p. 10): *“Policy dialogue on trade between the EU and the Colombian government takes place in the context of the trade agreement, which foresees a framework allowing to address all relevant issues that may arise regarding the interaction between trade, social, environmental and human rights objectives.”*)

Review regional MIPs

Both the Asia and Latin America MIPs contain references to the EU’s ability to add value through its contribution to regional integration. In the case of the Asia MIP it is stated that *“ASEAN is one of the most successful integration initiatives among developing countries and the EU with its rich experience is considered as a natural and reliable partner with a clear comparative advantage on integration issues.”*

The Latin America MIP indicates *“The EU remains the main donor of regional cooperation and integration, the region’s second largest trading partner and one of the largest foreign investors.” [...] The EU-CA Association Agreement has acted as a catalyst of progress on economic integration and trade, mainly driven by the private sector. This has led to positive outcomes like the accession of Panama to the Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana SIECA, the economic integration body.”*

In the Central Asia MIP, regional integration is not among the focal sectors, which might be attributable to the lack of a regional counterpart organisation.

Review EAMRs 2013

Regional integration is only mentioned in three EAMRs (Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru). In Guatemala, “The EUDEL also attended invitations by national and regional institutions, private sector, academia and civil society, organised and participated in fora, debates and conferences on the Association Agreement. [...] The EUDEL has promoted and facilitated discussion on Aid for Trade (AfT) matters and strengthened synergies between bilateral and regional trade-related programmes.” (EAMR Guatemala 2013, 4-5); in Peru, “Throughout 2013 the Delegation maintained a critical dialogue with the Secretariat of the Andean Community (CAN GS) on issues related to regional integration and cooperation, in particular in the context of the CAN re-engineering decided in October 2013.” (EAMR Peru 2013, 3-4). References to sub-regional programming for 2014-2020 are only made in the case of Nicaragua: “Despite up to date this mechanism has neither been discussed nor consulted with international donors, the upcoming EU sub-regional programming (2014-2020) for CA will seemingly need to try to adapt to it in order ensure an efficient coordination with SICA.” (EAMR Nicaragua 2013, 3-6).

Review EAMRs 2015

There are only a few examples in Central America where the EU reports having made useful contributions to regional integration issues: Guatemala *“the EUDEL has promoted and facilitated discussion on Aid for Trade (AfT) matters and strengthened synergies between bilateral and regional trade-related programmes.” (EAMR Guatemala 2015, 7-11); Nicaragua “In general, attention was paid during the whole period to reinforce SICA’s leverage to articulate the institutions and increase coherence between rotating presidencies. [...] The EU-SICA cooperation was presented as a model to others for embedding SICA’s ownership.” (EAMR Nicaragua 2015, 4-6); Panama “[...] regional programs also contributed several opportunities to exchange on e.g. environment, money laundering, international cooperation.” (EAMR Nicaragua 2015, 4-6).*

Review evaluations

The EU is particularly suited to add value in the area of regional economic integration because of its historical experience.

- In Asia “[...] the EU is seen as ASEAN’s most trusted and relevant partner, given the importance of the European integration process as a reference point (but not necessarily a model) for ASEAN’s own regional integration.” (Evaluation of the EU’s Cooperation with Asia, p. 29-30). “Of particular importance has been the EU support to the emergence and implementation of regional standards, preferential trading agreements, customs harmonisation, regional statistics, and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). In most cases, a substantial EU contribution in the aforementioned areas is evident, both qualitatively (based on the assessments in previous evaluations and in interviews) and quantitatively (based on data and surveys).” (Evaluation of the EU’s Cooperation with Asia, 29-30). EU DCI Asia regional support also contributed to progress in areas with a strong regional dimension but not related to trade: health, disaster management, border control, and civil aviation. EU assistance was mainly focused on ASEAN countries rather than on SAARC Member States, where the EU has made more modest contributions
- In Central America, despite limited financial and human resources the EU established itself through the DCI regional programme as a trusted partner and key stakeholder with regard to the regional integration process. The programme “[...] *has helped to put into place potentially important tools and mechanisms that could help the key regional integration organisations of SICA in defining the regulatory and legal frameworks and to advance regional integration.*” (Evaluation of the EU’s Cooperation with Central America, p. 75).
- As regards Trade-related Assistance, “*The EU has made strong contributions to the fostering of regional integration processes, albeit with significant geographical variations.*” (Evaluation of the European Union’s Trade-related Assistance in Third Countries, p. lii-iv). The EU has been a major provider of trade-related assistance through DCI: “*The EU has made strong contributions to the fostering of regional integration processes, albeit with significant geographical variations.*” (Evaluation of the European Union’s Trade-related Assistance in Third Countries, p. iii-iv).

1.5 EQ 5 on coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies

To what extent does the DCI facilitate coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies both internally between its own set of objectives and programmes and vis-à-vis other EFIs?

JC 51: Alignment and consistency of DCI with coherence provisions in EU external action policies and EU development policy	
<p>Main findings</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The 2014 DCI Regulation was shaped by provisions laid down in the 2011 Agenda for Change, which strongly emphasized the need for EU policy coherence and coordinated EU Action. • The same commitment was renewed in the 2016 EU Global Strategy and 2016 Consensus on Policy Coherence, albeit with a stronger emphasis on partnerships and the need for flexibility to meet challenges related to migration and security. <p>Strength of the evidence base: <i>Strong</i></p>	<p>Main sources of information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of policy documents and regulations, • Programming documents.
JC 52: Internal coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies in the design of the DCI	
<p>Main findings</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The 2014 DCI Regulation emphasizes the need for consistency, coordination, complementarity and synergies in much stronger terms than its 2006 predecessor. • The Regulation explains the complex architecture of the DCI with its geographic (national and regional) and thematic programmes (GPGC and CSO-LA, but does not provide any guidance how these different parts should relate to each other. • For geographic programmes, basic principles were translated into programming guidance in the 2012 EDF and DCI programming document. They include inter alia, coordination and joint programming. • Guidance for thematic programmes and for the Panafrican Programme contained in the 2014-2020 MIPs remains at a fairly general level, as far as the need for coherence and complementarity is concerned, lacking any degree of specificity. <p>Strength of the evidence base: <i>Strong</i></p>	<p>Main sources of information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of policy documents and regulations • Programming documents
JC53: DCI geographic and thematic programmes and the Panafrican programme complement or overlap with each other and with other EFIs	
<p>Main findings</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DCI geographic and thematic programmes largely operate in distinct compartments with an insufficient degree of transparency, especially for regional and GPGC programmes. • Consultations take place mainly around transversal themes to be mainstreamed (human rights, gender, climate change etc) and for reporting purposes. 	<p>Main sources of information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of policy documents and regulations • Programming documents • EU reporting documents (e.g. EAMRs, TBLs, Annual Report) • Evaluations and external literature

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Centralized decision-making and limited devolution to the field. • Examples of complementarity between components of DCI and between DCI and other instruments have been found, e.g. DCI thematic (CSO-LA and GPGC) and DCI geographic, (at least at the overall strategic level), DCI geographic and IcSP / EIDHR. • The potential for complementarity between the Pan-African Programme (policy development at continental level) and EDF (policy implementation at country level) is present. • Limited evidence that the DCI actively encourages coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies between its various components and vis-à-vis other EFIs. <p>Strength of the evidence base: <i>Strong for consultation mechanisms and medium for evidence of complementarity and synergies in the field</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with HQ staff in DEVCO, NEAR, FPI and EEAS • Survey to EU Delegations • DCI field visits to Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ethiopia and Cambodia
<p>JC54: DCI complementarity with development activities of EU Member States and other donors</p>	
<p>Main findings</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a clear commitment to joint programming from EU Member States in all DCI countries, but actual implementation faces challenges linked to concerns about decreased visibility. From the partner country side, there are fears that aid will be diluted. • EU with 20+ bilateral aid programmes and EU external development action major source of aid fragmentation. • 2016 Consensus for Development more strongly emphasizes needs for enhanced partnerships, inter alia between EU and Member States. • New Agenda on Migration and Trust Fund with contributions from EFIs, including DCI, as well as from others (DG Home), well-co-ordinated with Member States, shows the way for the future. • Little information on complementarity of GPGC and regional programmes with activities of other donors. <p>Strength of the evidence base: <i>Strong on joint programming and donor coordination / medium on complementarity of GPGC and regional programmes with other donors.</i></p>	<p>Main sources of information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of policy documents and regulations • Programming documents • EU reporting documents (e.g. EAMRs, Annual Report) • Evaluations and external literature • Interviews with HQ staff in DEVCO, NEAR, FPI and EEAS • DCI field visits to Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ethiopia and Cambodia

1.5.1 JC 51: Alignment and consistency of DCI with coherence provisions in EU external action policies and EU development policy

1.5.1.1 I-511 Extent to which DCI was aligned with EU development policy with regards to coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies in 2014

Indicator Summary

The 2014 DCI Regulation was shaped by provisions laid down in the 2011 Agenda for

Change, which strongly emphasized the need for EU policy coherence and coordinated EU Action. The roots of these provisions are by no means new, as they go back all the way to the 3-Cs of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 2006 European Consensus on Development as well as the 2007 Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour in Development Policy.

A comparison between the 2006 and 2014 DCI Regulations shows how strongly the EU development policy agenda since 2006 has influenced the design of the 2014-2020 DCI. Alignment with EU development policy was an evolutionary process at least since 2010, without a radical gear shift at the start of the 2014-2020 period.

3-Cs of Maastricht (1992)

The Maastricht Treaty (1992) established the principle that development cooperation should provide for interdependence between the EU and its Member States by instituting the “3-Cs of Maastricht”: coordination, complementarity and coherence. In 2005, the principles were reiterated in the European Consensus on Development (EU 2005). In 2007, the EU agreed on the Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour in Development Policy (EU 2007).

European Consensus on Development (2006)

Coordination and complementarity

30. In the spirit of the Treaty, the Community and the Member States will improve coordination and complementarity. The best way to ensure complementarity is to respond to partner countries' priorities, at the country and regional level. The EU will advance coordination, harmonisation and alignment (1). The EU encourages partner countries to lead their own development process and support a broad donor-wide engagement in national harmonisation agendas. Where appropriate, the EU will establish flexible roadmaps setting out how its Member States can contribute to countries' harmonisation plans and efforts.

31. The EU is committed to promote better donor coordination and complementarity by working towards joint multiannual programming, based on partner countries' poverty reduction or equivalent strategies and country's own budget processes, common implementation mechanisms including shared analysis, joint donor wide missions, and the use of co-financing arrangements. 32. The EU will take a lead role in implementing the Paris Declaration commitments on improving aid delivery and has in this context made four additional commitments: to provide all capacity building assistance through coordinated programmes with an increasing use of multi-donors arrangements; to channel 50 % of government-to-government assistance through country systems, including by increasing the percentage of our assistance provided through budget support or sector-wide approaches; to avoid the establishment of any new project implementation units; to reduce the number of un-coordinated missions by 50 %.

The EU will capitalise on new Member States' experience (such as transition management) and help strengthen the role of these countries as new donors.

The EU will undertake to carry out this agenda in close cooperation with partner countries, other bilateral development partners and multilateral players such as the United Nations and International Financial Institutions, to prevent duplication of efforts and to maximise the impact and effectiveness of global aid. The EU will also promote the enhancement of the voice of developing countries in international institutions.

Policy coherence for development (PCD)

The EU is fully committed to taking action to advance Policy Coherence for Development in a number of areas (2). It is important that non-development policies assist developing countries' efforts in achieving the MDGs. The EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. To make this commitment a reality, the EU will strengthen policy coherence for development procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels, and secure adequate resources and share best practice to further these aims. This constitutes a substantial additional EU contribution to the achievement of the MDGs. C 46/6 Official Journal of the European Union EN 24.2.2006 (1) This includes the Council Conclusions of

November 2004 on: 'Advancing Coordination, Harmonisation and Alignment: the contribution of the EU'. (2) May 2005 Council Conclusions confirm the EU is committed to the implementation of the objectives contained in the Commission's Communication on PCD dealing with the areas of Trade, Environment, Climate change, Security, Agriculture, Fisheries, Social dimension of globalisation, employment and decent work, Migration, Research and innovation, Information society, Transport and Energy.

The EU strongly supports a rapid, ambitious and pro-poor completion of the Doha Development Round and EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Developing countries should decide and reform trade policy in line with their broader national development plans. We will provide additional assistance to help poor countries build the capacity to trade. Particular attention will be paid to the least advanced and most vulnerable countries. The EU will maintain its work for properly sequenced market opening, especially on products of export interest for developing countries, underpinned by an open, fair, equitable, rules-based multilateral trading system that takes into account the interests and concerns of the weaker nations. The EU will address the issues of special and differentiated treatment and preference erosion with a view to promote trade between developed countries and developing countries, as well as among developing countries. The EU will continue to promote the adoption by all developed countries of quota free and tariff free access for LDCs before the end of the Doha round, or more generally. Within the framework of the reformed Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), the EU will substantially reduce the level of trade distortion related to its support measures to the agricultural sector, and facilitate developing countries' agricultural development. In line with development needs, the EU supports the objectives of asymmetry and flexibility for the implementation of the EPAs. The EU will continue to pay particular attention to the development objectives of the countries with which the Community has or will agree fisheries agreements.

Insecurity and violent conflict are amongst the biggest obstacles to achieving the MDGs. Security and development are important and complementary aspects of EU relations with third countries. Within their respective actions, they contribute to creating a secure environment and breaking the vicious cycle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and political structures. The EU, within the respective competences of the Community and the Member States, will strengthen the control of its arms exports, with the aim of avoiding that EU-manufactured weaponry be used against civilian populations or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in developing countries, and take concrete steps to limit the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons, in line with the European strategy against the illicit traffic of small arms and light weapons and their ammunitions. The EU also strongly supports the responsibility to protect. We cannot stand by, as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or other gross violations of international humanitarian law and human rights are committed. The EU will support a strengthened role for the regional and sub-regional organisations in the process of enhancing international peace and security, including their capacity to coordinate donor support in the area of conflict prevention.

The EU will contribute to strengthening the social dimension of globalisation, promoting employment and decent work for all. We will strive to make migration a positive factor for development, through the promotion of concrete measures aimed at reinforcing their contribution to poverty reduction, including facilitating remittances and limiting the 'brain drain' of qualified people. The EU will lead global efforts to curb unsustainable consumption and production patterns. We will assist developing countries in implementing the Multilateral Environmental Agreements and promote pro-poor environment-related initiatives. The EU reconfirms its determination to combat climate change.

Source: European Consensus for Development 2006

Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour in Development Policy (EU 2007).

The focus was on in-country complementarity through the use of existing co-ordination mechanisms in the field, with the primary leadership and ownership being assumed by the partner country governments. The Code stated that EU donors should concentrate on a maximum of three sectors per country, based on their respective comparative advantages,

whereby GBS and support for civil society and programmes for research and education are not to be counted as sectors.

Cross-country complementarity was to address the imbalances of aid flows to “aid darlings” (countries highly favoured by donors) and “aid orphans” (countries largely deprived of such support), based on improved information-sharing facilitating decision-making between EU member states and the Council of the EU.

Cross-sector complementarity referred to a situation at country level where some sectors received much more donor attention than others, leading to congestion and/or under-funding. This complementarity was to be achieved through self-assessments by EU member states of their respective areas of strength and comparative advantages.

Operational guidelines of the Code:

- Concentrate activities on a limited number of focal sectors.
- Redeploy into other activities in-country (non-focal sectors).
- Encourage the establishment, in each priority sector, of a lead donor.
- Encourage the establishment of delegated co-operation/partnership arrangements.
- Ensure appropriate support in the strategic sectors.
- Replicate this division of labour at regional level.
- Designate a limited number of priority countries.
- Grant adequate funding to countries that are overlooked as far as aid is concerned (“aid orphans”).
- Analyse and expand areas of strength.
- Pursue progress on other aspects of complementarity, such as its vertical and cross-modality/instruments dimensions.
- Deepen the reforms of donors’ own aid systems.

MFA Finland Evaluation Report 2014-2 p. 36-37

Impact Assessment (2011)

The European Commission conducted an impact assessment of the 2007- 2013 DCI Regulation. It observed the following issues in the implementation of the Regulation:

1. The DCI does not fully take into account the objectives of the latest trends of EU development policy.
2. The world has changed since 2007 and a number of current beneficiaries of the DCI have since emerged as new world powers and have themselves become donors. The DCI does not ensure sufficient differentiation amongst its beneficiaries with regard to economic and social disparities amongst and in- side partner countries.
3. The DCI does not sufficiently take into account partner countries' progress on democratisation and respect for basic human rights.
4. Supporting cross-regional or continent-wide initiatives has proved difficult given the current architecture of external assistance instruments, in particular regarding the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU strategy.
5. Thematic programmes are not sufficiently flexible and are too fragmented to respond to recent global crises or to international commitments taken at the highest political level.
6. The specific needs of countries in crisis, post-crisis and fragile situations do not sufficiently feature in the current DCI, thus not always allowing a swift EU response to a rapidly evolving situation.
7. The DCI suffers from an overall lack of flexibility, as it does not foresee unprogrammed funds to be used in response to unforeseen needs.
8. The current programming process of the DCI is too complex and rigid. For example, it does not permit the alignment of the EU programming cycle and strategy to those of its partners, and it also does not sufficiently facilitate joint programming with Member

States, as required by the aid effectiveness agenda. It does not provide a sufficient legal basis for using innovative measures for the delivery of aid such as mechanisms for blending loan- and grant-based assistance or public-private partnerships.

Impact Assessment Executive Summary p.2-3

Interestingly, lack of coherence, consistency and complementarity is not explicitly mentioned. There are only references to complexity and fragmentation and a lack of flexibility.

Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change (2011)

Coordinated EU Action

Joint programming of EU and Member States' aid would reduce fragmentation and increase its impact proportionally to commitment levels. The aim is for a simplified and faster programming process, to be largely carried out on the ground. Where the partner country has formulated its own strategy, the EU should support it by developing, wherever possible, joint multi-annual programming documents with the EN 11 EN Member States. Where the partner country has not done so, the EU will endeavour to develop a joint strategy with the Member States. This process would result in a single joint programming document which should indicate the sectoral division of labour and financial allocations per sector and donor. The EU and Member States should follow the document when devising their bilateral implementation plans. Participation should be open to non-EU donors committed to the process in a given country. To boost country ownership, joint programming should be synchronised with the strategy cycles of partner countries where possible. Operationally, the EU and Member States should make use of aid modalities that facilitate joint action such as budget support (under a 'single EU contract'), EU trust funds and delegated cooperation. On cross-country division of labour, the Commission encourages all Member States to be more transparent when entering or exiting, in line with the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour¹¹. A coordinated approach is needed, including a coordination mechanism for cross-country division of labour. The EU should develop a common framework for measuring and communicating the results of development policy, including for inclusive and sustainable growth. In line with the Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness¹², the EU will work with partner countries and other donors on comprehensive approaches to domestic and mutual accountability and transparency, including through the building of statistical capacity. Transparency is a cornerstone of effective and accountable aid. The Commission, which has adopted the International Aid Transparency Initiative standard, is already one of the most transparent donors. It should continue this effort, along with Member States.

Source: Agenda for Change 2011 Page 10

Improved coherence among EU policies

The EU is at the forefront of the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) agenda and will continue to evaluate the impact of its policies on development objectives. It will strengthen its country-level dialogue on PCD and continue to promote PCD in global fora to help shape an environment that supports the poorest countries' efforts. The future MFF should reinforce PCD. Thematic programmes are envisaged as instruments to tackle global concerns and will both project EU policies into development cooperation and help eradicate poverty. The EU must intensify its joined-up approach to security and poverty, where necessary adapting its legal bases and procedures. The EU's development, foreign and security policy initiatives should be linked so as to create a more coherent approach to peace, state-building, poverty reduction and the underlying causes of conflict. The EU aims to ensure a smooth 11 9558/07. 12 18239/10. EN 12 EN transition from humanitarian aid and crisis response to long-term development cooperation. In terms of the development-migration nexus, the EU should assist developing countries in strengthening their policies, capacities and activities in the area of migration and mobility, with a view to maximising the development impact of the increased regional and global mobility of people.

Source: Agenda for Change 2011 Page 11-12

Commission SWD Policy Coherence for Development Report 2015

Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) is a priority for the European Commission and mechanisms and procedures to avoid contradictions and build synergies between different

EU policies have continued to improve since the last PCD report of 2013. The 2015 report covers both cross-cutting and thematic issues from 2013-15 and presents examples of progress on PCD across different policy areas.

Source: *Executive Summary* p. 3

1.5.1.2 I-512 Extent to which DCI is still aligned with EU development policy with regards to coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies in 2016

Indicator Summary

2016 Policy documents renew the commitment to overall EU policy coherence with an emphasis on mainstreaming sustainable development and addressing interlinkages between SDGs. There is, however, an increased emphasis on the need for partnerships between the EU and Member States as well as involvement of non-governmental stakeholders.

EU Global Strategy 2016

Development policy will become more flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities. We reaffirm our collective commitment to achieve the 0.7% ODA/GNI target in line with DAC principles. Development funds must be stable, but lengthy programming cycles limit the timely use of EU support, and can reduce our visibility and impact. The availability of limited sums for activities on the ground, notably for conflict prevention and civil society support, should be made more flexible. Across the Commission, flexibility will be built into our financial instruments, allowing for the use of uncommitted funds in any given year to be carried on to subsequent years to respond to crises. This will also help fill the gaps between financial instruments and budgetary headings. In parallel, the time has come to consider reducing the number of instruments to enhance our coherence and flexibility, while raising the overall amount dedicated to development.

Source: *EU Global Strategy 2016, Page 48*

Proposal for a new European Consensus on Development Our World, our Dignity, our Future (Nov. 2016)

Policy coherence for development

87. The Consensus contributes to the requirement to ensure consistency between the different areas of the EU's external action and between these and its other policies³⁴.

The policy coherence requirement embedded in the 2030 Agenda implies mainstreaming sustainable development in all related EU policies, integrating in a balanced manner the three dimensions of sustainable development, addressing interlinkages between different SDGs and ensuring consistency between EU's external action and its other policies, and across international frameworks.

88. The EU and its Member States reaffirm their commitment to policy coherence for development, as an important contribution to the collective effort towards achieving broader policy coherence for sustainable development. They will continue to take into account the objectives of development cooperation in policies which are likely to affect developing countries (Art. 208 TFEU). The Consensus will guide efforts in applying policy coherence for development across all policies and all areas covered by the 2030 Agenda, seeking synergies wherever possible, including notably on trade, finance, environment and climate change, food security, migration and security. Particular attention will be given to combating illicit financial flows and tax avoidance, and to promoting trade and responsible investment.

89. Delivering on the new universal framework for sustainable development in the field of development cooperation is a shared responsibility of all stakeholders. The EU and its Member States will, therefore, promote whole-of-government approaches and ensure the political oversight and coordination efforts at all levels for SDG implementation. In order to better support policy formulation and decision-making they will ensure the evidence base of policy impacts on development countries by consultations, stakeholder engagements and ex-ante impact assessments and ex-post evaluations of major policy initiatives³⁶. Policy initiatives should, wherever relevant, indicate how they contribute to sustainable

development in developing countries. This is also instrumental for improving the EU and its Member States' monitoring and reporting capabilities on policy coherence for development and impact on developing countries. Given the universality of the 2030 Agenda, the EU and its Member States will also encourage other countries to assess the impact of their own policies on the achievement of the SDGs, including in developing countries. The EU and its Member States will moreover support partner countries in their own efforts to put in place enabling frameworks for policy coherence for sustainable development. They will promote policy coherence at international fora such as the UN and the G20.

Source: Proposal for a new European Consensus on Development Our World, our Dignity, our Future (Nov. 2016), Page 26-27

Review of evaluations

The Evaluation of EU'S cooperation with Pakistan found no incoherence between EU development cooperation policies and EU policies in other fields affecting Pakistan : *"By and large, the evaluation found no incoherence between EU development cooperation policies and EU policies in other fields affecting Pakistan. On the contrary, there was an active search of coherence between different domains of interventions. The relationship between trade and human rights emerged for instance as an interesting case where GSP+ provided trade benefits to the textile industry and raised awareness to comply with international legislation on human rights and working conditions. GSP+ used as a political instrument fed into the EU's political dialogue on human rights, and hence proved to be a complementary instrument (I-1.5.3). Additionally, EU's support to the trade sector was a coherent complement to the local development activities undertaken under the rural development programmes, insofar as it aimed at promoting employment opportunities for local qualified workers in a geographically isolated area."* (p. 17)

1.5.2 JC 52: Internal coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies in the design and implementation of the DCI

1.5.2.1 I-521 Extent to which the 2006 and 2014 DCI Regulations encourage programming that actively seeks to achieve synergies, including with other EFIs.

Indicator Summary

The 2014 DCI Regulation emphasizes the need for consistency, coordination, complementarity and synergies in much stronger terms than its 2006 predecessor. It must, however, be noted that these provisions are mostly mentioned in the preamble and the general principles of the 2014 DCI Regulation and to a lesser extent in the more specific sections dealing with geographic or thematic programs.

The Regulation explains the complex architecture of the DCI with its geographic (national and regional) and thematic programs (GPGC and CSO-LA, but does not provide any guidance how these different parts should relate to each other.

It is also noteworthy that the Regulations of other EFIs (e.g. EDF, ENI, EIDHR, IcSP and INSC) also make broad references to complementarity and the need for synergies, but contain relatively few details in this regard.

DCI Regulation 2006

The Regulation aims at policy coherence in a general sense: With a view to policy coherence for development, it is important that Community non- development policies assist developing countries' efforts in achieving the MDGs in line with Article 178 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. How this will be achieved remains relatively implicit throughout the document. There are no references to other EFIs and possible complementarity and synergies.

DCI Regulation (233/2014) Preamble

Aid effectiveness, greater transparency, cooperation and complementarity and better harmonisation, alignment with partner countries, as well as coordination of procedures, both between the Union and the Member States and in relations with other donors and

development actors, are essential for ensuring the consistency and relevance of aid whilst at the same time reducing the costs borne by partner countries. Through its development policy, the Union is committed to implementing the conclusions of the Declaration on Aid Effectiveness adopted by the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in Paris on 2 March 2005, the Accra Agenda for Action adopted on 4 September 2008 and their follow up Declaration adopted in Busan on 1 December 2011. Those commitments have led to a number of conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, such as the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy and the Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness. Efforts and procedures for achieving joint programming should be reinforced.

Source : Preamble, Paragraph 8

The Union and the Member States should improve the consistency, coordination and complementarity of their respective policies on development cooperation, in particular by responding to partner countries' and regions' priorities at country and at regional level. To ensure that the Union's development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement and reinforce each other, and to ensure cost-effective aid delivery while avoiding overlaps and gaps, it is both urgent and appropriate to provide for joint programming procedures which should be implemented whenever possible and relevant.

Source: Preamble Paragraph 10

The Union should seek the most efficient use of available resources in order to optimise the impact of its external action. That should be achieved through a comprehensive approach for each country based on coherence and complementarity between the Union's instruments for external action, as well as the creation of synergies between this instrument, other Union instruments for financing external action and other policies of the Union. This should further entail mutual reinforcement of the programmes devised under the instruments for financing external action. While striving for overall consistency of the Union's external action in accordance with Article 21 TEU, the Union is to ensure policy coherence for development as required by Article 208 TFEU.

Source: Preamble Paragraph 16

The basic principles of coherence, consistency and complementarity are implicitly referred to in the more operational sections of the document (e.g. on geographic and thematic programmes), but there are no specific provisions on possible complementarity and synergies with other EFIs.

DCI Regulation 2014 Pan-African Programme

Article 9 Pan-African Programme

The objective of Union assistance under the Pan-African programme shall be to support the strategic partnership between Africa and the Union, and subsequent modifications and additions thereto, to cover activities of a trans-regional, continental or global nature in and with Africa.

The Pan-African programme shall be complementary to and consistent with other programmes under this Regulation, as well as other Union's instruments for financing external action, in particular the European Development Fund and the European Neighbourhood Instrument.

2014 Regulations ENI, IPA, IcSP, PI, INSP etc.

All 2014 Regulations for the other EFIs contain general provisions aiming at consistency, coordination and complementarity, both internal, within the EU and more specifically among EFIs, and external, i.e. with domestic policies in partner countries and other donors. Principles of joint programming and national execution are emphasized.

1.5.2.2 I-522 Extent to which DCI geographic (national and regional), thematic programmes and the Pan-African programme seek to achieve synergies among each other

Indicator Summary

For geographic programmes, basic principles were translated into programming guidance in the 2012 EDF and DCI programming document. They include ownership by partner countries and regions, comprehensiveness and coherence, synchronisation and flexibility, sector concentration and choice of sectors, blending for growth, coordination and joint programming.

For thematic programmes and the Pan-African programme, MIP documents 2014-2020 provide guidance. The MIP on CSO-LA emphasizes complementarity with geographic programmes (national and regional), however with the provision that funds will not be used to top-up or duplicate activities funded under those Programmes. Similar provisions are contained in the MIP of the GPGC. In the MIP on the Pan-African Instrument, under the various strategic areas (peace and security; democracy, good governance and human rights; human development; sustainable and inclusive growth and continental integration; global and cross-cutting issues), there are systematic references to other DCI components and other EFI instruments (IcSP, EDF, ENI, EIDHR).

However, it is noteworthy that guidance documents remain at a fairly general level, as far as the need for coherence and complementarity is concerned, lacking any degree of specificity.

EDF and DCI Programming Document 2012

This document contains the detailed instructions and guidance for the EEAS, DEVCO services and EU Delegations for the programming of the EU's bilateral development cooperation with partner countries and regions in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) under the 11th European Development Fund (EDF), and in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and in the context of the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the period 2014-2020. The instructions set out how the programming process is organized and how the overarching policies and principles which will govern the programming for that period (in particular the proposals for a new EU development policy, as laid down in the Agenda for Change Communication 1), are to be translated into the programming process and documents. These instructions do not apply to centrally managed regional and continental cooperation or to thematic programmes under the DCI, nor do they apply to cooperation with the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), which will be the subject of separate instructions.

Introduction p. 1

One of the main purposes of the present instructions is to simplify the process of programming the EU's bilateral development cooperation with partner countries and regions, making use, wherever possible, of existing national or regional policy documents as the main reference documents for the programming process. Consequently, the multiannual indicative programme should become the central document of the programming process and EU specific strategy papers) should in most cases no longer be needed and should only be used where no other option is available. Instead, the existing national or regional development plans (or their equivalents) should from now on be used as the point of departure for the programming process, and as the main basis for coordination and dialogue with EU Member States and other donors.

Programming process p. 4

Ownership The programming normally starts with the national government/regional organisation, national parliament and other representative institutions, taking ownership of an inclusive development process. Civil society organisations (CSOs), social partners such as trade unions and employers organisations, and the private sector play a vital role in advocating transparency and accountability in governance, democratic and representative governance, gender equality and providing services to populations that are sometimes out of the reach of governments. The private sector is the engine of national economies and indispensable for achieving sustainable growth and poverty reduction. CSOs and the private

sector are therefore crucial to ensuring national ownership and should be consulted in the process of defining the priorities to be retained in the EU programming documents.

Comprehensiveness and coherence There is a need for an assessment of the overall situation of the partner country/region with a view to defining a vision regarding the EU's relationship with, and support to, a partner country/region. This vision should guide all the EU's relations with that country/region, including its cooperation and assistance under different instruments. This vision should be set out in the Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP). Where a Joint Framework Document (JFD) exists, outlining the EU's main priorities and objectives in its overall relations with a partner country/region (see Section 3.4), or where a Joint programming document exists, the MIP will be in line therewith.

Synchronisation and flexibility. In order to strengthen the national/regional ownership of the development process, to become more effective and to have a greater impact, the EU should be flexible and better able to adapt to specific country/regional contexts. It can do this in the first place by synchronizing the programming cycle with the partner country/regional cycle. This may in some cases lead to shorter programming cycles (see Section 3.1 for more details). Flexibility is also key to ensuring EU capacity to respond to sudden changes (crisis, conflicts, outcome of elections, etc.) in the political and/or developmental context in a partner country/region. Such responses may need to be adopted through accelerated procedures so as to ensure a timely EU response on the ground.

Sector concentration and choice of sectors Focusing the resources of the EU on a smaller number of sectors/areas in partner countries and regions will increase the impact and leverage of EU assistance and will help to keep EU assistance manageable both for the partner countries and regions as well as for the Commission services and for the EU Delegations. In the Agenda for Change Communication, the Commission has proposed that the EU focuses its bilateral assistance on a maximum of three sectors, understood in a narrow sense. Budget support is not a sector but an implementation modality and may be used within the sectors chosen, but cannot be seen as a justification for a fourth, additional sector.

Blending for growth Grants can be used in different ways and combinations (technical assistance, equity participation, direct public investment grants, insurance premia, guarantee and risk sharing schemes) to leverage 10 public and private investments. This will be done primarily through the regional investment facilities, including through dedicated financing windows such as for climate-related investments. These facilities are generally funded under the regional/interregional programmes. In addition, blending could also take place by using funds foreseen in the MIP:

Coordination and joint programming Joint EU-Member States programming is a priority and a powerful tool for coordination. Other relevant actors in the local development community should be consulted, including humanitarian partners (e.g. in situations of transition, linking short-term interventions to longer term engagement). See Section 3 for further details. In all cases, strong coordination and cooperation with and between EU Member States and other donors (including emerging donors, international NGOs and private foundations) is essential. Coordination should also cover the EIB, other European Development Financing Institutions (EDFIs) and International Financing Institutions (IFIs) active in development in the country/region, including Regional Development Banks.

Guiding Principles pages 7-10.

MIP CSO/LA 2014-2020

The programming document for CSO/LA refers to complementarity to bilateral geographic actions:

"In countries benefitting from bilateral cooperation, actions may be supported both within and outside of the selected focal sectors. To ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of assistance, this Programme should complement geo- graphic Programmes (bilateral or regional). Funds will not be used to top-up or duplicate activities funded under those Programmes.

The Programme will thus act in complementarity with other Programmes and Instruments benefitting Civil Society and/or Local Authorities, namely the European Instruments for

Democracy and Human Right, the Thematic Programme on Global Public Goods and Challenges, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, the Partnership Instrument, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the Pan-African Programme and projects supported by bilateral or regional cooperation.”

Source: EU (2014) MIP for the Thematic Programme “Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities for the period 2014-2020”, 11.

Pan-African Programme MIP (2014-2017)

The Pan-African Programme will work within the frame of this continental/trans-regional strategy. It will not replace but complement where relevant, through a continental or trans-regional approach, the other EU instruments and programmes that address the priority areas of the EU development policy in the African continent. These are the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) covering Sub-Saharan Africa through the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), the Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) and Intra-African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) programme; the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) covering North African countries, DCI geographic programmes covering South Africa and the thematic programme Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGCs) covering global issues concerning Africa, and the support to Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities (CSO-LA), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP).

Furthermore, the Pan-African Programme will, in line with the JAES, address the external dimension of EU policies. Through the Pan-African Programme, the EU operationalizes Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and puts into practice the principle of building synergies between EU policies and development cooperation. This is being done by widening the scope of the EU cooperation and by involving all concerned services in the programming and implementation processes.

MIP p. 7

Under the various strategic areas (peace and security; democracy, good governance and human rights; human development; sustainable and inclusive growth and continental integration; global and cross-cutting issues), there are systematic references to other ECI instruments (IcSP, EDF, ENI, EIDHR).

MIP GPGC 2014-2020

The GPGC is a new programme, which only started with the 2014-2020 DCI. The MIP for GPGC highlight that it will mainly be used to address challenges at a global or multi-regional level, however there might be situations where it will be used at country-level.

The challenge of complementarity and consistency

“The cross-cutting nature of the GPGC programme makes it potentially a key element for ensuring the consistency and effectiveness of the Union's external actions, in line with the Agenda for Change's recognition that EU development policy is firmly anchored within EU external action as a whole. A joined-up approach to policy making, encompassing the EU's development cooperation as well as other EU policies and actions, will be essential for addressing the EU's external interests, including the achievement of global development objectives and coherence will be an essential element for transmitting a consistent message across policies. The DCI Regulation recognises that in a globalised world internal EU policies are increasingly becoming part of the EU's external action and underlines the Union's commitment to promoting in its internal and external policies smart, inclusive and sustainable growth bringing together the three pillars of sustainable development: economic, social and environmental.

In line with the principle of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), special attention will be given to ensuring that approaches to addressing key global issues are coherent with and contribute to the achievement of development cooperation objectives. The Agenda for Change specifically calls for improved PCD that builds synergies between global interests and poverty eradication and further underlines a focus on PCD. Issues like trade, climate change, food security, including CAP and fisheries, and migration are among the main five PCD challenges identified by the Council in 2009 and reiterated in 2011. Improved

monitoring and evaluation of EU internal policies will be pursued as to better assess their impacts on developing countries. On this basis concrete actions, responding to specific challenges identified, can be designed in the different themes.

It will be particularly important to ensure complementarity and synergy with the Partnership Instrument (PI), which aims to address a number of global challenges including climate change, energy security and the protection of the environment. The external projection of the “Europe 2020” Strategy will be a major strategic component of the PI.

It will also be important to mainstream GPGC themes into other programmes under all external instruments, which should in turn contribute wherever possible to sustainability by promoting human development, including respect for cultural diversity and inter-cultural dialogue climate resilience and protection of the environment and natural capital. The need to coordinate and build synergies with humanitarian aid interventions in crisis and post crisis situations will also be taken into account.”

EU (2014) Programming Thematic Programmes and Instruments, Programme on Global Public Goods and Challenges 2014-2020, 18.

Review of evaluations

Please refer to I-532

1.5.3 JC53: DCI geographic and thematic programmes and the Pan-African programme complement or overlap with each other and with other EFIs in practice

1.5.3.1 I-531 Extent to which mechanisms for co-ordinating internally between DCI programmes, EDF, ENI, IPA, EIDHR, and PI are in place and operational.

Indicator Summary

The 2015 Policy Coherence for Development Report of the European Commission provides official evidence that policies, procedures and mechanisms are in place to ensure policy coherency, e.g. definition of focus areas, impact assessments and involvement of EUDs. But the report remains at a relatively general level without more detailed references to the workings of EFIs and particularly the DCI.

The multitude of geographic and thematic programmes under the DCI and a similar diversity among other EFIs as well as the complexity of rules and procedures for each of these instruments and programmes result in a relative lack of transparency both a HQ and EUD level. At HQ, decision-making by managers and also in Committees happens to a large extent in programme- and instrument-specific compartments.

Consultations in QSGs take place mainly to check adherence to broad transversal themes, e.g. democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, gender or climate change and environment. Migration has also become a prominent theme that has mobilized contributions from various EFIs (and beyond, e.g. DG Home). External reporting requirements (to the European Parliament, the Council, OECD or the UN) also require cooperation and consultation among Units.

Decision-making on EFIs in general and DCI programmes in particular, notably under the GPGC, is highly centralized at EU HQ. EUDs often feel that they are not informed or consulted early and extensively enough. Staff in many EUDs call for greater devolution of decision-making to the field. Decentralised components of CSO/LA programmes seem to be best geared towards field needs and priorities, but face local constraints and in many partner countries a “shrinking space”.

EU Regulation no 236/2014 governing the CIR lays down common rules and procedures for EFIs for financing, programming and evaluation stating that they need to be consistent with the Financial Regulation and that harmonisation should be on the basis of the simplest rule. The CIR does not contain provisions as to coordination among DCI programmes or between DCI and other EFIs. Changes in comitology rules concern higher thresholds as compared to the situation in 2007-2013, above which decision-making by Committees composed of Member State representatives is required. However, they do not require Committees to systematically assess coherence and complementarity of proposed DCI projects with

actions under other EFIs.

Commission SWD Policy Coherence for Development Report 2015

In 2009 areas were clustered into five strategic challenges - Trade and Finance, Climate Change, Food Security, Migration and Security – which re-main the guiding principles of Policy Coherence for Development efforts at European level.

Page 4

Promoting Policy Coherence for Development Progress on embedding Policy Coherence for Development has continued at both European and national (Member State) levels. Impact Assessments (IA) allow ex-ante assessments of policy proposals and can help ensure that possible impacts on developing countries are taken into account at an early stage of the preparation of a political initiative. Specific and operational guidance is now provided on how to systematically assess the effects of new policies on developing countries. The Better Regulation Package adopted by the Commission on 19 May 2015 contains guide-lines and also a toolbox to assess potential impacts of future EU initiatives on developing countries in an appropriate and proportionate manner.² These new tools will be pivotal in promoting the principle of Policy Coherence for Development across Commission services. The same Better Regulation Package strengthens the guidelines for ex-post evaluations of EU policies and the Commission has scheduled an external evaluation of PCD for the second half of 2015.

EU delegations play a pivotal role providing feedback on the impact of EU policies on partner countries and in identifying challenges on policy coherence. Following a PCD reporting exercise concluded during the first half of 2014 and involving reports from 41 EU delegations covering 62 partner countries, the Commission took steps to strengthen the monitoring of country-level PCD issues and the capacity of delegations to contribute to PCD, e.g. via the organisation of targeted training on PCD and initiating steps for a regular PCD reporting mechanism from EU delegations.

The institutional organisation of the Commission headed by President Juncker is a policy coherence instrument in itself. Clusters of competency areas headed by Commission Vice-Presidents promote cross-cutting and coherent policy making. Concerning EU external policy, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice- President of the Commission, ensures coherence between different policy strands and a common approach for EU external action. Development policy is a parallel competence³ between the EU and its **Member States**. Overall Policy Coherence for Development is clearly progressing across Member States. Legal and political requirements, reporting, coordination mechanisms and coherence-related work are on the rise. OECD peer reviews in 2013-15 confirm this progress. ⁴ 1 <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/45425> 2

http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/index_en.htm 3 Article 4(4) TFEU 4 OECD's Peer Reviews are in-depth examinations of development systems and policies, including lessons learned, in all member countries of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Each member country is peer-reviewed approximately every four years. Sweden, France, Italy, Ireland, UK, and Austria were

Attention to Policy Coherence for Development has also increased in the Council over the last two years. Dedicated discussions and debates have increased through the introduction of policy coherence-related issues as a regular agenda item in the Working Party on Development Cooperation (CODEV), COREPER and the Foreign Affairs Council in Development Formation.

The European Parliament has also maintained its strong support for PCD and made concrete proposals in its 2014 Resolution⁵ to reinforce political commitment in practice. It is playing an increasingly important role in raising awareness on policy coherence for development in relevant policy initiatives.

Since 2013, three main Commission Communications and corresponding Council conclusions have underlined **policy coherence for development as a key element for the post-2015 development agenda**. Continuing international reflection on the form and content of a post-2015 framework has further highlighted the key importance of “beyond-aid” issues, including the need for enhancing policy coherence. The Council reaffirmed that the EU

remains fully committed to ensuring PCD as a key contribution to the collective global effort towards sustainable development in the post-2015 context.

Executive Summary pp. 3-4

HQ Interviews

The general picture emerging from many interviews with geographical and thematic desks in EU Headquarters (DEVCO, NEAR, FPI and EEAS) is that desks with responsibilities for specific DCI programmes (geographic or thematic) and specific other EFIs work in relative isolation from each other (compartments), albeit with numerous meetings taking place, notably as part of the QSG process. Coherence and complementarity is also not a major feature in deliberations and decision-making of Committees of Member States.

Consultations take place mainly to meet mainstreaming requirements under broad transversal themes, e.g. democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, gender or climate change and environment. Migration has also become a prominent theme that has mobilized contributions from various EFIs (and beyond, e.g. DG Home). External reporting requirements (to the European Parliament, the Council, OECD or the UN) also require cooperation and consultation among Units.

Since neither the individual EFI Regulations nor the CIR contain specific requirements to systematically check on coherence, the dimension is left to the initiative of managers and desk officers to meet above-mentioned requirements and challenges. A good example is a fairly systematic exploration of opportunities to integrate activities under completed IcSP projects under DCI (and EDF) projects and also to delineate IcSP projects from humanitarian action undertaken by ECHO.

A complaint voiced by many managers and staff is the complexity of the regulatory framework with multiple rules and procedures applying to a huge number of instruments and programmes. The lack of transparency is not conducive to the optimal use of opportunities for coherence and complementarity. It should be mentioned that this issue was also raised in several interviews with representatives of Member States taking part in Committee meetings.

EAMRs, survey results and field visits

There are few references in the documentation to the internal mechanisms used beyond a few exchanges between EU Delegations and HQ. In a few cases, there is mention in EAMRs that internal communications have been weak, so there is room for improvement. For instance, in Bangladesh *“Overall complementarity among instruments has been satisfactory. However, ex-ante planning by HQ is welcomed so EU Delegations can anticipate workload. It is equally important that the Delegations are timely consulted on the proposals for centralised calls to ensure appropriate ex-ante appraisal. For the effectiveness of implementation, notably, in case of so called ‘regional’ projects deconcentrated to Delegations, we would also appreciate if Thematic Directorates could have a different approach, selecting countries with similar context and problematic and avoiding the combination of countries with too diversified situations.”* (EAMR Bangladesh 2015, 14-15).

Responses to the survey conducted among all EUDs (with a relatively high response rate of around two thirds of all EUDs) reflect a strong sense in the field that decision-making on EFI programmes is highly centralized and not sufficiently geared to take into account needs and priorities that exist in specific countries. There is, however, a recognition that information-sharing and consultations have improved in recent years, which allowed EUDs in turn to better inform and consult with partner governments and other stakeholders in their countries. At the same time, there is a persistent call for greater devolution of decision-making to EUDs. EUDs visited as part of the DCI evaluation (Bangladesh, Bolivia and Cambodia) raised the issue of insufficient coherence between geographic and thematic programmes of the DCI and with other EFIs. CSO/LA programmes (along with action under the EIDHR) seems to be best tailored to country needs (albeit facing local capacity constraints and in some cases a “shrinking space” for CSO action). However, EUDs tend to become involved in GPGC and regional programmes relatively late in the process. A concrete example is the identification of Bangladesh as a flagship country for nutrition which has led to a proliferation of GPGC projects uncoordinated with the geographic sector programme implemented by FAO, resulting in competing messages and inconsistent approaches. The EUD in Bolivia

recognizes that HQ communication and consultations have improved, but with the government it is still struggling to fully grasp opportunities offered by regional programmes (*“we would like to turn this from a black box into a tool-box”*).

CIR Regulation

The CIR was established in March 2014, at the start of the 2014-2020 MFF, with retroactive effect to 1 January 2014. It was meant to define a single set of common rules for financing, implementation and evaluation of all EFIs. Each of the eight instruments financed under the EU budget (as well as the EDF outside the budget) have their own European Council Regulations or Decision that provide the legal basis for expenditures of the budgets in the defined areas. The Regulations and Decision translate the political intentions of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers as to the purpose of specific funds and how they should be spent, i.e. individual governance and accountability provisions.

While all instruments broadly adhere to EU policies and priorities at the time of their adoption, notably on democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and comply with EU budget rules, their implementing rules also used to be diverse and complex with the risk of overlaps and gaps, affecting the overall performance of EU external action. EU Regulation no. 236/2014 governing the CIR lies down common rules and procedures for above-mentioned instruments stating that they need to be consistent with the Financial Regulation and that harmonisation should be on the basis of the simplest rule (Art. 1.4).

The CIR does not contain provisions as to coordination among DCI programmes or between DCI and other EFIs. Changes in comitology rules concern higher thresholds as compared to the situation in 2007-2013, above which decision-making by Committees composed of Member State representatives is required. They do not require Committees to systematically assess coherence and complementarity of proposed DCI projects with actions under other EFIs⁴⁷.

Thematic Budget Line Report

“It is important to ensure full complementarity between our thematic and geographical operations. Thematic programmes should complement, or increase funding for, geographical operations, and be fully in line with the focal sectors outlined in the MIPs. This is not only important in terms of the impact of our operations, but equally in terms of human resources in the current context of continuing staff cuts.

As far as possible, we should ensure that thematic programmes come as an effective top up to our geographic operations and do not undermine coherence and complementarity with MIP/NIP and RIP actions. With regards to the newly launched GCCA+ (formerly GCCA) for example, projects should try, where possible, to top-up geographic operations rather than acting as stand-alone projects. Ideally, they should be connected to our focal sectors in the MIP/NIP and RIP. To ensure this, both thematic and geographic operations should be involved as upstream as possible in the preparation of these projects. QSG1 meetings are a useful occasion to influence the development of these projects and ensure closer dialogue between our operations.” (DEVCO H, p.3)

1.5.3.2 I-532 Illustrative examples of complementarity and synergies or overlaps between DCI and other EFIs

Indicator Summary

The primary source of evidence concerning the extent to which DCI geographic programmes complement other EU development support in DCI ODA- eligible countries (including other EFIs) are EAMRs and geographic and thematic evaluations. The DEVCO Annual Report for 2014 also contains some interesting remarks on the subject.

EAMRs are expected to refer to the complementarity between regional, thematic and geographic programmes and mostly do, but there is variation in the level of reported detail.

⁴⁷ To what extent the CIR was fit for purpose is subject of a separate study, the outcome of which is expected in parallel with the draft reports of the DCI evaluation and other EFI evaluations.

Some national EAMRs provide a good deal of illustrative detail, occasionally also striking a critical note on insufficient coordination between bilateral and regional support and between geographic and thematic support.

No significant differences were found between the EAMRs 2013 and 2015, which confirms that attention for complementarity and synergies was continuous and evolutionary. Evidence from evaluations mostly stems from the previous programming period.

Evaluations contain few references to complementarity between DCI and other EFIs, but they are by and large more critical than EAMRs. In Asia, the regional evaluation found that complementarity between DCI programmes and other EU development instruments (mainly EIDHR and IcSP) was not made clear and that the EU could have implemented a better strategy. In the Pacific region, there was combination of DCI thematic programmes, EDF, EIDHR, and IfS, but it must be remembered that EDF accounted for 90% of support. In Georgia, there was successful complementarity between IcSP and DCI in response to the IDP crisis.

The DEVCO Annual Report for 2014 emphasizes major efforts to ensure complementarity between bilateral, regional and thematic instruments by coordinating the choice of concentration sectors with development partners and more importantly with EU Member States. It does highlight some challenges with joint programming especially in Latin America (see JC 54)

There are some examples of sequential complementarity between EFIs, e.g. between IcSP activities being integrated in DCI programmes and PI being challenged to take over from DCI in a graduating country (Mexico).

Survey responses report no duplication (except in procedures requiring calls for proposals for several EFIs), but many examples of complementarity, especially between CSO/LA and EIDHR, but also between IcSP and DCI as well between DCI and PI.

Review EAMR 2013

EAMRs are expected refer to the complementarity between regional, thematic and geographic programmes. Some countries explain these complementarities in great detail by sector or even by project (e.g: Pakistan). A few exceptions can be found in Ecuador, Guatemala, Nepal, South Africa and Uzbekistan where complementarity is not found to be as effective as expected. Nevertheless, even in those cases the EU has achieved an acceptable level of coordination e.g. *“Currently there is no direct link between geographic and thematic programmes, nevertheless the guidelines of the local call for proposals (NSA-LA and EIDHR) require project proposals to be in line with national and territorial strategies.”* (EAMR Ecuador 2013, 6); *“The EU Delegation strives to ensure that all local Calls under thematic budget lines complement the priorities under the bilateral cooperation [...] In the area of food security, there is a strong correlation between the regional interventions (PRESANCA II), the national Budget Support Programme and the thematic projects.”* (EAMR Guatemala 2013, 11)

References to the 2014-2020 MIP can be found in Laos, Nepal, Nicaragua and Paraguay. In these cases the EU commits to further strengthening complementarity and ensuring coordination between different cooperation programmes within the new programming. E.g.: *“Within the 2014-2020 programming exercise, complementarity of instruments has been further promoted between bi-lateral and regional cooperation as well as enhanced coordination with CSPs.”* (EAMR Nicaragua 2013, 12); *“In 2013 the Delegation has sought to continue to strengthen such complementarities in light of the priorities of the future MIP. We have closely aligned the local NSA call with the focal areas of the MIP2014-2020: rural development, education and the demand side of PFM.”* (EAMR Nepal 2013, 11).

Some cases refer to the complementarity between DCI programmes and trade. For example: *In the area of trade, support is provided through a mix bilateral DCI, regional DCI and ICI+ resources. This approach “requires substantial work in the programming phase but carries the advantage of maximising the complementarities between the projects that can be funded under the various instruments (ODA, non-ODA, sustainability, etc.).”* (EAMR Myanmar 2013, 11-12)

Review EAMR 2015

All EAMRs systematically refer to the complementarity between bilateral, regional and thematic programmes. Overall, complementarity is reported to be satisfactory. Most countries have actively pursued suitable actions in order to ensure close complementarity between thematic programmes and priorities under bilateral cooperation. Some positive examples include Myanmar *“The 2015 CSO Call for Proposals requested applicants that their proposed actions shall add value to, and be complementary to and coherent with actions funded under the geographic programmes”* (EAMR Myanmar 2015, 27-29); Laos *“the effort undertaken by the Delegation to reduce the fragmentation of its thematic and bilateral portfolio is resulting in greater convergence and cohesiveness of its cooperation”* (EAMR Laos 2015, 16-17). *“The new DCI actions especially in the Governance and Peace sectors are hence most of the times based on experiences and lessons learnt from smaller pilot-projects initially funded by the thematic instruments”* (EAMR Myanmar 2015, 27-29).

An exception can be found in Yemen, where complementarity has not been possible due to national conflict *“Most bilateral programmes have been put on hold or are being implemented at a very slow pace.”* (EAMR Yemen 2015, 10).

Mentions of complementarity with regional programmes are less frequent, but they do exist. Most cases occur in Latin America (e.g. Cuba, Colombia Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Paraguay) with a few cases in Asian countries (e.g. Laos, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Vietnam). Complementarity with regional programmes appears to be more challenging and to require better coordination, particularly in Central America and Andean Regions. For example: Colombia *“The articulation between national and regional programmes remains a challenge except for the Latin America instrument AL- INVEST and the fiscal component of EuroSocial”* (EAMR Colombia 2015, 12- 13); Guatemala *“There is scope for improvement in general terms concerning the overall interaction between regional initiatives (managed by Nicaragua and HQ) and the EU Delegation's bilateral projects.”* (EAMR Guatemala 2015, 20- 21); Honduras *“There is a need for improved coordination with regional programmes [...]”* (EAMR Honduras 2015, 12); Nicaragua *“The challenge – for the countries of the region, the SICA institutions and the Delegation - is to optimize operational coherence.”* (EAMR Nicaragua 2015, 12-13) Though, it does seem that Nicaragua has some good practices and is taking measures to address these concerns.

Review evaluations

Most evaluation reports refer to complementarity in general terms without making a clear distinction between thematic and geographic (national and regional) DCI programmes and other EFIs.

From **regional evaluations**, complementarity within DCI (bilateral and regional) and with other EFIs remains a challenge and in general coordination is weak with the exception of the Pacific region where a number of instruments have been implemented (DCI thematic programmes, EDF, EIDHR, IfS),

- In the Pacific region good examples of combination of thematic, regional and thematic programmes exist, though it has to be noted that 90% of the regional funding comes from EDF. E.g.: *“the DCI-SUCRE programme (€37.5 million) supported Pacific ACP States’ sugar exporters, which complemented the work done under the 1 st Focal Sector of the RIP (regional economic integration); the DCI-ENV programme (€30.4 million) supported both national and regional projects in the area of climate change adaptation, which complemented the work done on sustainable management of natural resources under the RIP.”* (Evaluation of the EU's cooperation with the Pacific Region 2006-2012, p. 64).
- In Asia coordination between regional and bilateral programmes has increased but overall the EU has put little effort in order to ensure complementarities. For instance, although there is evidence of the complementarity between regional and bilateral programmes, programming documents (RSP, CSP) do not usually refer to potential linkages. (Evaluation of EU cooperation with Asia)
- According to the Evaluation of EU regional level support to Central Asia (2007-2014) (p. 67-68) *“The extent to which regional dialogue, regional programmes and bilateral*

action took place in a coordinated manner varied significantly across the sectors. (...) A major limitation for ensuring synergies between bilateral programmes on the one hand, and regional dialogues and programmes on the other, was the limited involvement of EUDs, except when they managed the regional programmes, like the EUD in KZ which managed EURECA and the EUD in KG that managed BOMCA and CAI. EUDs could often not use the regional programme results and lessons in their bilateral policy dialogues, even if relevant, due to their limited knowledge of these."

- In Ecuador *"Overall, interventions have not been designed with a view to being mutually supportive and as a result, few evidences of synergies have been found."* (Evaluation of the Commission of the European Union's co-operation with Ecuador, p. 69). In Colombia, mainly due to the conflict context *"[...] the EC cooperation strategy during the evaluation period suffered from a serious lack of internal coherence that even affected EUD's internal organizational balance."* (Evaluation of the Commission of the European Union's Co-operation with Colombia, p. 78).

From **country-level evaluations**, results differ from one country to another. Good experiences of coordination can be found in Bolivia and Nepal. Eg: *"To a large extent, instruments and modalities have complemented each other and are combined in an appropriate fashion, promoting the achievement of the cooperation strategy."* (Evaluation of EU Cooperation with Bolivia, p. 130); *"Good examples of synergy in the use of the various financing instruments and aid modalities were identified, as illustrated in the Peace Building and Consolidation of Democracy sector (with the adequate use of EC geographic and thematic instruments) and in the Education sector (through budget support and latterly the funding of four small NSA projects)."* (Evaluation of the European Union's Co-operation with Nepal, p. 44-45).

In contrast, challenging experiences can be found in Ecuador, where synergies and coordination between different instruments were good at a strategic level but they were not operational; and Colombia, *"Coordination between the many aid instruments and modalities implemented in the country was weak, even non-existent."* (Evaluation of the Commission of the European Union's Co-operation with Colombia, p. 78).

From **thematic evaluations**, results differ across sectors. Trade-related Assistance and Environment and Climate Change have done quite well in terms of complementarity. However, in the case of Gender Equality and Women Empowerment, Private Sector Development and Health coordination has been poor and in some cases non-existent. Some examples include:

- Coordination was not enough in the Health and Gender Equality and Women Empowerment sectors. E.g. *"There could be better co-ordination and complementarity between the multiple interventions that are supported by the EC through multiple instruments, modalities and channels."* (Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector, p. x-xi); *"The EC has not systematically ensured a complementary use of the various instruments and modalities available to support GEWE outcomes."* (Evaluation of EU Support to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Partner Countries, p. 62).
- Regarding Environment and Climate Change and Research and Innovation, reports refer to the percentage covered by different instruments but they do not give an assessment nor provide much detail e.g.: *"The EU's support to environment and climate change was funded by a variety of financing instruments, other than the ENRTP. A third (34%) of the support came from the EDF. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) covered 15% of the overall funding, while the DCI for Asia (DCI-ASIE) provided 8%, and the DCI for Latin America (DCI-ALA) 4% of the funding."* (Thematic evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2007-2013), p.22); *"The EU support to R&I in partner countries was funded by a variety of financing instruments, both geographic and thematic."* (Research and Innovation for development in partner countries (2007-2013), p. 26). Another statement in this regard: *"The thematic and geographic instruments have been complementary and have created results, but advantage has not always been taken of opportunities for synergy"* (Thematic

evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2007- 2013), p. 105). A good practice in this thematic sector is the FLEGT process *"In this, the combination of geographic instruments finance support for governments and the ENRTP funding of global capacity support and support for civil society constituted a comprehensive approach to forest governance [...]"* (Thematic evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2007-2013), p. 105).

- The Trade-related Assistance sector seems to be a good example for complementarity but it refers very generally to the EU support and it does not mention other instruments: *"The EU's support to TRA has been designed and implemented in a co-ordinated and complementary fashion."* (Evaluation of the European Union's Trade-related Assistance in Third Countries, p. ii-iii). In this last case, policy dialogue was key to promote and achieve coherence although according to the evaluation report coordination remains a challenge.

EU(2014) Annual Activity Report

Complementarity between the financial instruments and programming process

The principles and priorities laid down in the "Agenda for change" were reflected in the new External Action instruments for the new Financial Framework (2014-2020) and in the subsequent programming process, which was completed in 2014. The programming documents therefore duly implement priorities and principles such as concentration and differentiation. Moreover, the programming process resulted in major efforts to ensure complementarity between bilateral, regional and thematic instruments by coordinating the choice of concentration sectors with development partners and more importantly with EU Member States. Complementarity ensures that objectives pursued by the EU do not result in overlapping actions at national, regional and global levels. Complementarity reinforces the comprehensiveness of EU action. For example, in the case of crisis affected countries, different instruments have been utilized – i.e. both national and regional envelopes together with thematic actions - have been taken into consideration to ensure a comprehensive approach. Turning towards regional programmes, these focus on issues best addressed at regional level such as peace and security (i.e. development security nexus), environment, natural resources management, infrastructure and energy, trade markets and regional integration. All EDF regional programmes have transport/infrastructure as a sector of concentration, along with trade. In DCI countries, the development security nexus is among one of the regional sectors of concentration. Most thematic and regional programmes also allow focusing on global actions, to stay engaged in graduated countries and support policy dialogue on issues of common interest.

The new External Action instruments introduced new programmes in 2014. For instance, the EU cooperation with Africa at the trans-regional and continental level is supported through the new "Pan-African Programme" within the DCI Regulation. This is the only instrument cooperating with "Africa as one"; it complements the other instruments that address geographical areas of the continent (ENI for North Africa, EDF for Sub-Saharan Africa, DCI for South Africa). Also, the thematic programmes of the previous DCI Regulation (with the exception of the Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities) were merged into a single programme named "Global Public Goods and Challenges", thus ensuring synergies and a consistent approach in areas such as environment and climate change, sustainable energy, human development, food and nutrition security and sustainable agriculture and migration and asylum.(p. 4)

Geographical programmes

In Latin America region, 2014 was particularly challenging as it concerns the joint programming exercise which was successfully completed in Guatemala with Paraguay and Bolivia underway. For the latter, the coordination exercise is even more demanding given that a total of seven Member States plus Switzerland are taking part.(p. 34)

Interview with EU HQ staff

IcSP flexibly intervenes in situations with risks for stability and peace for a short while, whereby sustainability of results may be ensured by the DCI through integration in its intervention package. Interviews with EU staff at HQ level suggest that there are regular consultations among Directorates and Divisions as well as with EUDs how to ensure sustainability of IcSP initiatives, which are time-bound by nature, whereby integration into DCI projects and programmes is a preferred option. In graduating countries, DCI activities need to be phased out, whereby the expectation often is that the PI might take over. Anecdotal evidence related by EU staff draws attention to bottlenecks experienced at the graduation of Mexico, where DEVCO staff was withdrawn rather rapidly from the EUD and the PI had insufficient capacity to ensure continuity.

Survey results

Survey responses do not include a single mention of duplication between DCI programmes or between DCI and other EFIs. One Delegation mentions that there may be duplication in procedures, e.g. the need to call for proposals under different instruments, which could be made simpler.

Most responses mention that complementarity is achieved notably between the CSO/LA component of DCI and EIDHR as well as between IcSP and DCI (the former preparing the ground for DCI) and DCI and PI (the latter to a certain extent following DCI projects).

Is there any duplication or complementarity between the instruments used in your Delegation⁴⁸?

<i>Response</i>	<i>Country⁴⁹</i>
All instruments can be complementary if used and planned with this objective in mind. For example, EIDHR complements DCI in focusing on specific topics that may be only "mainstreamed" in bilateral or regional projects. Duplication concerns procedures: for example launching a CSO/LA CfP and a EIDHR CfP every year or every two year implies a significant workload. It may be more efficient to launch a single CfP with different lots.	
Both but more complementary than duplication. - DCI regional and IcSP	
Each instrument is used in complementarity thanks to close coordination (meetings, missions etc) between Echo/FPI/Devco and EEAS.	
Each instrument is used in complementarity thanks to close coordination (meetings, missions etc) between Echo/FPI/Devco/EUTF and EEAS.	
There is complementarity between the different instruments used in our Delegation: NIP, CSO/LA thematic line, EIDHR, Pro-Act, GCCA+	
There is no duplication between the instruments used in our Delegation but rather complementarity. In particular, bilateral cooperation under the DCI allows to work directly with the whilst the CSO-LA under DCI and the EIDHR allow to work directly with civil society (and, in the case of CSO-LA, local authorities as well).	
There are no duplications between instruments. There is complementarity between the DCI and EIDHR instruments and inside the DCI, between the bilateral programmes and the Civil Society and Local Authorities projects. The Delegation is equipped to implement the Rights Based Approach to Development and in the identification and formulation of programmes (regardless of the instrument) this will be the transversal axe.	
NSA budget line covers important development issues that complement work under the bilateral programme, eg in relation to decentralisation, education,	

⁴⁸ As the question refers to complementarity and duplication at the same time, a yes / no grouping of responses does not make sense. The information needs to be drawn from the content of the responses.

⁴⁹ For confidentiality purposes, countries are hidden in the publication.

<i>Response</i>	<i>Country⁴⁹</i>
natural resource management.	
ICSP projects will be scaled up through long term DCI interventions - based on lessons learned and needs / gaps	
L'IcSP, instrument rapide peut permettre une réponse immédiate qui peut ensuite être confortée par le FED si nécessaire. L'IEDDH peut aussi compléter les autres instruments en ciblant des acteurs bien précis.	
Complementarity as far as ICSP has been used to address immediate needs and prepare ground for DCI intervention.	
The EFIs are used in complementarity, to attend new areas or to support others actors in the concentration areas of the MIP	
Good complementarity between regional and bilateral DCI with regional MIP focused on sectors not covered by focal sectors of bilateral MIP. Also MFA provided additional incentive for government to meet conditionality for sector budget support programmes.	
In the extent possible, we try to have complementarity between different instruments.	
All instruments used in the EUD complement each other.	
synergies between DCI and Erasmus, DCI and Horizon 2020	
There is good complementarity. In particular, EIDHR enables us to work on sensible topics outside the official public policy agenda. IcSP has a more limited specificity.	
- The DCI Regional Indicative Programme and the EIDHR were developed in complementarity with the MIP 2014-2020. - CSOs continue to be important partners and interlocutors of the EU in the implementation of its external assistance in Bangladesh under all pillars of the MIP, with increasing attention placed on the role CSOs in the areas of advocacy, accountability and human rights through CSO/LA and EIDHR funding. The MIP and EIDHR support to CSO managed at the local level complement each other (e.g. a local call was launched at the local level with different actions). The IFS-funded project (on the prevention of violence through counter-radicalisation of youth) is consistent with the priorities addressed under the civil society and human rights portfolio. - However, EIDHR calls launched from HQ do necessarily not align with the national programme, which creates problems in coherence.	
PI projects in many cases try to build on DCI and continue engagement in key areas.	
Complementarity not duplication	
all instruments have been used systematically in a complementary way. IcSP has been key to broaden our range of action (and influence)	
- Good complementarity between DCI and PI in terms of speed of mobilisation (PI allows for short term actions) and interest (PI allows for EU interest) - Overlap between Instrument for stability and DCI?	
EDF funding is the most important part but is complemented by DCI (climate financing, CSO) and EIDHR.	
In terms of complementarity/duplication, the real challenge comes when the EUDEL is not in full control from the very inception phase of any new initiative. i.e. global call for proposals for CSOs that respond to global HQs defined priorities, not always fully aligned with EUDEL country defined priorities.	
We seeks complementarity between EIDHR and CSO/LA by launching in alternate years (each 2 years).	
there is complementarity between DCI and ICI+ / Partnership instrument. EIDHR and DCI can sometimes overlap (ex. Switch Asia programme to	

<i>Response</i>	<i>Country⁴⁹</i>
promote sustainable female work in rural areas) but the DCI support to the reform of the Justice system in is a nice example of the DCI supporting directly better governance, i.e. ultimately a better rule of law / human rights situation.	
Complementarity is ensured by having EUD playing a central role in funds are designed and managed. There are limits to this linked to the available Human Resources	
There is no duplication but complementarity between the different instruments.	
Poorly-phrased question - contradictory question!!! Overall no duplication; every effort made to capture all possible synergies between instruments.	
The Delegation is always analysing the context to propose synergies in the programming process.	

<i>Additional information from other DCI countries</i>	<i>Country</i>
EDF is clearly to support government's action plan. EIDHR or DCI NAS-LA can be used to support actions that are not being supported by the government.	
Few examples of duplication but many examples of complementarity, for example between EDF and DCI in the area of civil society support.	
Il n'existe pas de duplication mais plutôt de la complémentarité entre les différents instruments	
Specific instruments (i.e. IcSP and EIDHR) are used as test approaches and pilot experiences to be followed by larger EDF interventions. DCI (FOOD and ENV) are used to complement the sectoral budget support under EDF with specific in-country activities in support to communities and private sector.	
The DCI ENV (GCCA) and DCI-FOOD (GPGC) instruments are complimentary as Climate Change, amongst others, is having a long term impact on agriculture/food security/nutrition/resilience building in the Sahel region (of which is a part). Projects funded under CSO/LA & EIDHR often complement bilateral programmes funded under the EDF. Projects funded under CSO/LA & EIDHR often complement bilateral programmes funded under the EDF.	
The instruments address different and specific issues, but complementarity can be found in support to electoral process focusing on inclusion of women, support to CEDAW, addressing domestic violence through EIDHR. The EDF addresses strengthening local governance, promoting participation of communities in decision making processes.	
Thematic Funding DCI provides additional resources in specific areas like Food Security on which EDF is providing core funding. EIDHR/ DCI-CSOs provide support for the advocacy component in areas where EDF is used for institutional building. DCI/CSOs is used to strengthen the civil society engagement in areas like basic services where as well the EDF is used to do institutional/sector support. Duplication in terms of goals can be noticed in some areas (especially IcSP with the governance commitment of the EDF).	
There is complementarity between EDF and support to civil society though DCI. Civil society has been asked to work around the NIP focal sector in their promotion of dialogue, advocacy and watchdog work. The use of the EIDHR and IcSP instruments is also conceived in complementarity with the Governance componenets of the NIP.	
Complementarity of DCI to Agriculture and Climate Change Civil Society on CSO budget line Complementarity on Education, EIDHR Complementarity of	

<i>Additional information from other DCI countries</i>	<i>Country</i>
general budget support with EIDHR	
between: EDF and the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa EDF and DCI (CSO-LA and GPGC) IcSP (Art. 3 - through our support to the return of refugees and IDPs , initially funded under the IcSP and now taken over by the EU TF, or our support to the reconciliation process in Casamance, which is in direct line with our political dialogue with the authorities ; nevertheless, some redundancy can be observed under Art. 5 between the PIR, EU TF and IcSP in the field of security) and the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa	
There is strong complementarity between DCI-ASMP, EDF-Bilateral, DCI-Thematic as all focusing on developing the agriculture sector in through addressing different issues and learning lessons across programs. There is strong complementarity between EDF-Bilateral (capacity building support measures) and DCI-CSO/LA and EIDHR as all working to strengthen Swaziland civil society at different levels. There is complementarity to be further developed with EDF-Regional and global funds supported by the EU.	
There is good complementarity in terms of the choice of both intervention sectors and implementing partners.	
EU Trust Fund addresses the main issues as many parts of EDF (resilience , job creation etc). Same with DCI and IcSP drought resilience) and EIDHR, CSO LA. EIB loans are absent but as an instrument, but blending implies mixing them with EDF, EU Trust Fund etc.	
Complementarity between EIDHR and EDF in Maternal Health, Employment/TVET and governance/decentralisations. Complementarity between DCI & EDF on Governance and Environment/Climate Change, agriculture...	
There is a degree of complementarity between the EIDHR and the ICSP – both addressing governance issues. Also, ICSP has in past addressed livelihood / agriculture/livestock sectors in which we also work based on EDF funding. In the future, there is a desire and plan of the Delegation to seek to increase this complementarity. This will be done, if possible, through fewer EIDHR and CSO/LA contracts (which will be larger) and which will target partners in our focal areas to a much greater extent.	
DCI programmes in support of maternal health and nutrition and our EDF programme SHARE which targets nutrition; EIDHR programmes on empowerment of women political candidates and our EDF elections reform programme	
GCCA under the Global Public Goods Programme complements the focal sector of rural development under the EDF NIP.	
complementarity between civil society support programmes provided through three instruments: EIDHR, DCI, ENI complementarity between ICSP and humanitarian aid, ICSP and ENI	
EIDHR: work on sensitive issues / potential irritants DCI/CSO-LA: Some actions reinforced/repeated with combined use of ENI regional funds - which offer the same scheme of HQ-managed decision (no Financing Agreement with the Government) dispatching funds to EUDs for local contracts. If such ENI regional actions were discontinued, DCI country-based schemes would remain the only available instrument in countries with a shrinking space for civil society. Thanks to recent political opening, the EUD has developed a new project on capacity development at local level targeting Local Authorities (funded from ENI Single Support Framework 2014-17).	
The Delegation ensures complementarity of EFIs used in its current and planned activities. Some of the programmes are addressed to the national authorities while others provide funding to civil society. HoOps meets all EU MS and non-EU representatives, as well as other donors for mutual briefings	

Additional information from other DCI countries	Country
<p>on their respective activities on an annual basis. Regularly, the Operations and Political teams meet donors, relevant consultants, government and civil society representatives to ensure that there is no duplication in activities carried out under the different programmes. However, often it is difficult, both for the Delegation and the local stakeholders, to distinguish between the goals and activities of the different initiatives when the same issues are addressed by different programmes. Thematic programme for the environment and sustainable management of natural resources including energy are complementary to regional environment programme/projects. The relevant thematic programmes are Thematic Programme for Environment, MEDEUWI and ENRTP, but only some of parts are open to . The regional programmes are Med Enec II, Horizon 2020, SWIM, SEIS, CIUDAD, PPRD, Integrated Maritime Policy in the Mediterranean, CLIMA South and "Cleaner, energy-saving Mediterranean Cities", CIVITAS. The Local CfPs of Local Authorities is complementary to the SUDEP regional programme.</p>	
<p>We have worked to improve complementarity between our EDF projects/focal sectors and budget line funding during the last few years. This is also thanks to the introduction of country envelopes for thematic programmes/instruments and the possibility given to Delegations to define the specific objectives of local calls for proposals in line with country priorities and in order to maximize complementarity and synergies with interventions under the main geographical programme/s.</p>	
<p>Note: it is strange to have complementarity and duplication in one question. Examples of complementarities: Support to justice and democracy under the EDF and funding of support to victims of human rights violations under EIDHR ; Support to security sector reforms (medium and long term) under the EDF and short term under the IcSP. Example of duplication: none</p>	
<p>Au-delà de la complémentarité qui est assurée par la DUE, il y a une recherche de synergie (par exemple entre les projets financés par IcSP et ceux mis en oeuvre via le FED sur les questions de prévention des conflits et coexistence pacifique au niveau de la société civile ou encore entre le DCI et le FED (exemple de Pro-Act et PADL). Les duplications sont évitées autant que faire se peut.</p>	
<p>On recent experience, EIDHR and CSO/LA overlap locally. This is due to the lack of space (and appetite/capacity) for CSOs to work on sensitive Democracy & HR issues through the EIDHR. EIDHR funded projects tend to revolve around children's and indigenous rights rather than political participation.</p>	
<p>Complementarity between DCI and EDF</p>	
<p>more complementarity than duplication I regret that humanitarian assistance is not fully part of the survey</p>	
<p>Complementarity exists between IcSP funds and ENI funds. For instance support to municipalities is given in the country via IcSP funds and through the ENI funds</p>	
<p>la complémentarité existe entre tous les instruments utilisés. Le risque de chevauchement existe en particulier entre le CSO-AL et le FED concernant l'appui à la société civile. Nous avons cependant réduit le risque au maximum en ciblant des groupes d'activités/bénéficiaires différents. En revanche il existe un risque de dispersion entre le FED - PIN géré au niveau national et le FED tout ACP qui est géré à Bruxelles avec le secrétariat ACP sans une réelle coordination préalable avec les directions géographiques ni avec les délégations.</p>	
<p>Complementarity, as some instruments allow to pilot and test the reaction and response of CSOs to innovative approaches (e.g. thematic programmes)</p>	

<i>Additional information from other DCI countries</i>	<i>Country</i>
that can then be capitalised through longer term geographic instruments (EDF). Complementarity with regional instruments is more difficult because of different timings.	
There is no duplication and there is complementarity. As already mentioned each instrument has its own features that allow us to use them in different conditions	
No duplication between EdF and DCI, but complementarity can be improved between these two instruments Complementarity could also be improved between IDHR (long term) and IcSP (short term)	
ENI, IcSP, EIDHR and DCI have been all working in a coordinated manner.	
The EIDHR funding is very limited and is allocated to sectors/activities that are complementary to those of the EDF actions. Likewise with the funds under DCI-ENV/GCCA	

1.5.3.3 I-533 CSO/LA complements non-DCI support (including EIDHR) to civil society and local authorities

Indicator summary

Evidence from 2013 and 2015 EAMRs as well as 2014 and 2015 Annual Action Programmes for CSO-LA, complemented by some interviews, suggests that decentralized components of the CSO-LA component of the DCI systematically seeks coordination and complementarity with other EFIs dealing with similar partners, notably EIDHR and IcSP. In general, complementarity between interventions under these instruments is rated as satisfactory, although in many cases specific examples or details are not given.

EIDHR allows to respond to more short-term human rights and democracy needs, without clear evidence of overlapping mandates or activities with CSO-LA. Similarly, IcSP flexibly intervenes, *inter alia*, in situations with risks for stability and peace for a limited time-span (DEVCO components more long-term than FPI components), whereby sustainability of results may be ensured by the DCI through integration in its intervention package.

Review EAMR 2013

According to EAMRs there is strong coordination/complementarity between DCI (particularly with OSC/LA thematic programme), EIDHCR and IcSP (former IfS) instruments. A good example of coordination among EFIs can be found in the Mindanao region in the Philippines “EU support for this region, covers the whole spectrum of aid; from humanitarian aid (ECHO), to rehabilitation (Aid to Uprooted People), to long-term development assistance (Health services for indigenous people and Mindanao Trust Fund), coupled with support to human rights defenders (EIDHR), civil society organisations (NSA/LA), while providing more 'political support' to the peace process (IfS).” (EAMR Philippines 2013, 8).

AAP CSO/LA 2014, 2015

The Annual Action Programme for 2014 and 2015 Part 1 “Civil Society Organisation and Local Authorities” refers to complementary actions under the different six actions that have been set out in the AAP:

“The Action will act in complementarity with other Programmes and Instruments benefitting Civil Society and/or Local Authorities, namely the European Instruments for Democracy and Human Rights, the Thematic Programme on Global Public Goods and Challenges, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, the Partnership Instrument, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the Pan-African Programme, the European Development Fund and projects supported by the bilateral or regional cooperation in partner countries. In fragile, crisis and risk-prone situations, synergies will be explored with emergency and humanitarian aid favouring CSOs.

In countries benefitting from bilateral cooperation, actions may be supported both within and outside of the selected focal sectors. To ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of

assistance, funds will not be used to top-up or duplicate activities funded under those Programmes.” (CSO/LA AAP, 9)

While the statement does not provide details on how the action will achieve complementarity, further information can be found under different activities for the actions. For example under Action 1, a need to ensure complementarity is specifically highlighted under one activity:

“- providing social services where public authorities, including LAs, do not have the capacity or the resources to effectively deliver services to populations. This will be supported in least developed or low income countries, fragile states and in crisis situations. In middle income countries, in duly justified cases, direct service provision by CSOs could be supported to ensure that disenfranchised populations and out of mainstream segments of society can benefit from social services. While supporting the above actions, particular attention should be devoted to ensuring that initiatives funded by this Programme do add value and complement support provided with bilateral, Thematic and regional actions in the same sectors.” (CSO/LA AAP, 6)

Source: EU (2014) Commission Implementing Decision of 28.10.2014 on the Annual Action Programmes for 2014 and 2015 Part 1 “Civil Society Organisation and Local Authorities” to be financed from the general budget of the European Union.

Review EAMR 2015

EAMRs frequently refer to the strong links and coordination between the CSO component of the CSO/LA thematic programme and EIDHR (e.g. Bangladesh, Ecuador, Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, Costa Rica, Vietnam), the latter being pre- sent in at least 19 countries of the 24 reviewed. In most cases EIDHR and the CSO component pursue similar objectives: strengthening the capacity of the CSOs to play a major role in national policies and advocacy work while improving the human rights situation in the country.

An interesting case can be seen in Cambodia where the Delegation has launched a combined CSO/LA/EIDHR call for proposals, but with “mixed results”: *“A CSO-LA and EIDHR call for proposals was launched in 2015 combining CSO/LA allocations for 2014 and EIDHR allocations for 2014 and 2015 for a total amount of 7.3 M Euro. [...] More dialogue is needed with civil society to foster changes and optimize some of the new funding modalities for thematic instruments.”* (EAMR Cambodia 2015, 14-15).

Another interesting example is Vietnam, where in order to minimise the risk of overlap between CSO/LA and EIDHR lines, *“[...] the Delegation took the decision to launch the CSO/LA Calls for Proposals and the EIDHR Calls for Proposals in alternate years, each time pooling resources of two years”* (EAMR Vietnam 2015, 9-11).

Nearly every country refers to the complementarity between some of the EFIs in place. All EAMR references mention the strong connection between DCI, EIDHR and IcSP. Particularly, EAMRs frequently refer to the strong links and coordination between the CSO component of the CSO/LA thematic programme and EIDHR (e.g. Bangladesh, Ecuador, Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, Costa Rica, Vietnam). In most cases EIDHR and the CSO component pursue similar objectives: strengthening the capacity of the CSO to play a major role in national policies and advocacy work, while improving the human rights situation in the country.

In general, complementarity between interventions under these instruments is rated as satisfactory, although in many cases specific examples or details are not given.

A good example of coordination between different EFIs can be found in the Philippines *“Benefitting from a wide range of instruments, the Delegation has successfully managed to establish a substantial and coherent overall EU assistance programme, paying close attention to the complementarity of the different programmes available. A good example is the support to the most impoverished and conflict affected region, Mindanao. EU support for this region, covers the whole spectrum of aid; from humanitarian aid (ECHO), to rehabilitation (Aid to Uprooted People), to long-term development assistance (health services for indigenous people and Mindanao Trust Fund), coupled with support to human rights defenders (EIDHR), civil society organisations (CSO/LA), while providing more 'political support' to the peace process (IcSP)”* (EAMR Philippines 2015, 12).

Comments draft desk report 14 Oct 2016

IcSP has also a long-term component aimed to assist in addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats, namely:

- Fight against organised crime
- Protection of critical infrastructures
- Countering terrorism
- Climate change and security
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) risks mitigation

IcSP's long-term component is managed by DEVCO, while the short-term component falls under FPI mandate. Complementarity and coordination with other existing EU instruments (both geographical and thematic) is ensured throughout the entire project cycle. IcSP is an “instrument of last resort” (i.e. it should not be used to support activities which can be supported under other instruments, especially geographic instruments) and addresses issues that cannot be effectively tackled under other EU cooperation instruments when: 1. the issue addressed exceeds the scope of a geographic instrument; 2. an activity is not “DAC-able”; 3. assistance is not country-specific; 4. there is a need to pursue a “continuous thematic approach”

1.5.4 JC54: DCI complementarity / overlap with development activities of EU Member States and other donors

1.5.4.1 I-541 EU joint programming in DCI countries

Indicator Summary⁵⁰

Joint programming is covered in some capacity in about half of the country MIPs. This does not necessarily mean that there is joint programming in place, or there will be over the MIP programming period – sometimes there is just an intention/possibility signalled, subject to various factors, while sometimes a clear commitment is expressed and first actions have been taken for future implementation

According to the Joint Programming Evaluation, while joint programming has encouraged better coordination and harmonization between the EU and its MSs with positive impact on coherence, it has enjoyed greater support from donors at field level than at headquarters.

According to an independent study of ECDPM, some EU Member States perceived the process as being a “HQ-led” initiative that could prove to be burdensome and time-consuming. While committed to the aid effectiveness agenda in high-level forums, some representatives of Member States also seemed to fear that their national interests and priorities would become diluted in aid co-ordination. Interest in donor co-ordination and complementarity seemed to be more pronounced among Member States with small and medium-sized programmes. Partner countries also gave EU joint programming a mixed reception. The initiative was often perceived to be cumbersome with little added value, and in some cases duplicating existing donor co-ordination efforts. There was also a concern that joint programming might be part of donor strategies to decrease overall aid levels.

The 2016 Consensus for Development and the post-Valetta Agenda on Migration, supported by a Trust Fund with contributions from various EFIs, including the DCI, as well as from DG Home, renew the impetus for partnerships between the EU and Member States.

2015 Annual Report European Commission

In 2014, the Commission and Member States sustained their efforts towards Joint Programming of development cooperation. The process was taken forward in 18 partner countries and, in 14 partner countries, Joint Programming documents were finalised. The

⁵⁰ Major up-to-date evidence is expected from an on-going evaluation of EU joint programming, the results of which is expected to become available before January 2017.

majority of joint programming countries are either in the least developed or lower-middle income group, with more than half classified by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as fragile states. The 14 partner countries where documents were finalized were Burma/Myanmar, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, Ghana, Guatemala, Laos, Mali, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, South Sudan and Togo.

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Evaluation of Joint Programming

While joint programming has encouraged better coordination and harmonization between the EU and its MSs with positive impact on coherence, it has enjoyed greater support from donors at field level than at headquarters. The benefits of JP so far have accrued more to the EU and MSs than to partners, i.e. national governments and civil society. Partners have not been sufficiently implicated, and there is persistent fear that JP will lead to a reduction in total aid resources (not necessarily a bad thing if there are significant overlaps and inefficiencies). The evaluation found no evidence of efficiency gains in the form of reduced transaction costs and aid fragmentation.

Review national MIPs

Joint programming is covered in some capacity in about half of the country MIPs. This does not necessarily mean that there is joint programming in place, or there will be over the MIP programming period – sometimes there is just an intention/possibility signalled, subject to various factors, while sometimes a clear commitment is expressed and first actions have been taken for future implementation. Examples include Afghanistan *‘EU partners have committed to consider a move to Joint Programming, which will be assessed on an ongoing basis and ahead of any review.’* (p.3); Bangladesh, where *‘the EU is committed to launch joint programming in selected areas with interested EU+ Member States’* (p.5), which might necessitate amendments to the current MIP; El Salvador, where joint programming *‘has been discussed on several occasions with the Member States present’* (p.2), and first steps have been taken in synchronisation and information exchange; Nicaragua MIP notes that the planned mid-term review of the MIP in 2017 *‘will pave the way for the adoption of a Joint Programming Document from 2018, to be agreed by EU Member States’* (p.2); and others.

In some countries a joint EU-MS strategy was developed and is presented in the MIP. Lao PDR MIP presents the Joint EU strategy 2014-2015, and indicates a new ‘full-fledged joint EU strategy’ for 2016-2020 will be developed to align the programming cycle with the government. Similarly in Myanmar a “Joint EU Development Partners Transitional Strategy for Myanmar/Burma 2014-16” was agreed in late 2013, and the MIP indicates that the next joint EU-MS strategy will be developed for 2016-2020 to align with the election and national planning cycle, and the MIP will be reviewed at that time. Guatemala MIP presents the Joint EU-MS strategy for the years 2014-2020.

A couple of MIPs mention specific reasons why joint programming is not taking place in the country – Iraq *‘Unfortunately the development of a joint EU and Member States programming document for the new DCI cycle has not been possible due to the phasing out of Member States cooperation programmes from Iraq’*(p.4); and Mongolia *‘In the absence of an EU Delegation in Ulaanbaatar and given the fact that programming cycles of other relevant donors, including of EU Member States where only Germany is a major donor, are not synchronized with the DCI, the conditions for Joint Programming are not there at present.’* (p.2)

EAMR 2013 and 2015

The EU strongly promotes the use of country systems in line with the aid effectiveness agenda. Most countries use budget support as the main aid modality therefore national systems. In other countries aid channelled through these modality is increasing or is expected to increase in the future, thus gaining weight in the overall budget. Yet, there are exceptions to this rule in which country systems are partially used or non-existent, mainly due to political reasons, human rights records, weak public finance systems and/or lack of transparency and corruption.

Galeazzi, Helly & Kratke, 2013, All for One or Free for All? Early experiences in EU joint programming, ECDPM

According to this study, joint programming had not gained momentum by 2013 (Galeazzi, Helly & Krätke 2013). Some member states perceived the process as being a “HQ-led” initiative that could prove to be burdensome and time-consuming. While committed to the aid effectiveness agenda in high-level forums, some representatives of member states also seemed to fear that their national interests and priorities would become diluted in aid co-ordination. Interest in donor co-ordination and complementarity seemed to be more pronounced among member states with small and medium-sized programmes. Partner countries also gave EU joint programming a mixed reception. The initiative was often perceived to be cumbersome with little added value, and in some cases duplicating existing donor co-ordination efforts. There was also a concern that joint programming might be part of donor strategies to decrease overall aid levels (Galeazzi et al 2013). It should be noted that during **field visits conducted for the present evaluation** (to Ethiopia, Kenya and Lao PDR), it was found that EU joint programming was still a slow process. Joint Co-operation Strategies had been conceptualised in Ethiopia and Lao PDR, whereas Kenya was still at the design stage.

The European Parliament 2013 The Cost of Non-Europe in Development Policy: Increasing co-ordination between EU donors (European Parliament 2013).

The European Parliament in 2013 presented a draft study on The Cost of Non-Europe in Development Policy: Increasing co-ordination between EU donors (European Parliament 2013). It concluded that lack of co-ordination of development aid among EU donors had economic and political costs. Economically, € 800 million could be saved annually on transaction cost, if donors concentrated their aid efforts on fewer countries and activities, and an extra € 8,4 billion of annual savings could be achieved from better cross-country allocation patterns. Politically, better co-ordination would result in increased impact and greater visibility of the EU development policy. The document was in favour of more division of labour and joint programming.

Co-operation, MFA Finland 2014

2007 Conduct of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour. Notably, in-country complementarity was further developed. The concept of EU joint programming was initiated in 2010 and was being implemented in a limited number of partner countries, with the intention of considerable scaling-up in the future. Academic studies have sought to quantify benefits in terms of cost savings arising from specific co-ordination and division of labour measures. However, they also demonstrated the numerous obstacles that exist on the road to translating good principles into practical solutions on the ground. Finland was fully aware of these obstacles, but remained entirely committed to EU joint programming.

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1.5.4.2 I-542 EU and donor coordination in DCI countries

Indicator Summary

The evidence for this indicator is not entirely DCI-specific, but the general literature on donor coordination and division of labour is highly relevant in this context. Of particular importance is the Common EU position in relation to the 2011 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, which emphasized *strengthening aid as a catalyst for effective delivery of development results and seek a new consensus on an inclusive development partnership*.

The important dimension of complementarity of EU development action with other donors in general, and EU member states in particular, receives a lot of attention in MIPs. There has been progress on concentration (sometimes over the resistance of EUDs and with dilution by thematic programmes). However, according to EAMRs and evaluations, the division of labour remains a challenge in many countries. In general terms, it seems that the EU struggles to overcome difficulties and obstacles in this area. It can be concluded that moving forward in an effective manner would require further analysis and a different approach. Main reasons cited include: lack of political will and differences in priorities by national

governments, absence of appropriate platforms, lack of will from EU member states and other development partners, difficulties to agree joint positions, resistance to change, decrease in the number of donors and, in some cases, the relatively low volume of cooperation.

According to several external – not DCI-specific – studies, lack of adequate donor coordination and division of labour results in inefficiencies and ultimately limited development impact. Factors explaining this state of affairs are: a) a combination of volatility and lack of predictability of aid flows undermining public finance management planning and budgeting systems, especially in aid-dependent partner countries; b) the tying of aid forcing partner countries to purchase goods and services in developed countries, rather than in cheaper developing countries; c) the proliferation of donors in certain partner countries and in certain sectors resulting in duplication of strategies, missions, offices and studies; d) the considerable degree of aid fragmentation –that is, an increasing number of aid activities (projects and programmes), with the EU bilateral ODA portfolio accounting for 40,000-50,000 activities in 2009, compared with 30,000 in 2003; and e) insufficient use of partner country systems and government ownership.

2015 Annual Report European Commission

In 2014, the Commission and Member States sustained their efforts towards Joint Programming of development cooperation. The process was taken forward in 18 partner countries and, in 14 partner countries, Joint Programming documents were finalised. The majority of joint programming countries are either in the least developed or lower-middle income group, with more than half classified by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as fragile states. The 14 partner countries where documents were finalized were Bur-

ma/Myanmar, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, Ghana, Guatemala, Laos, Mali, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, South Sudan and Togo.

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EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 29 November – 1 December 2011) – Press Release

The Council adopted the following conclusions: "Part I: Key messages for Busan 1. The Busan Forum should be a turning point for strengthening aid as a catalyst for effective delivery of development results and seek a new consensus on an inclusive development partnership. Looking beyond aid, Busan should also seek ways to enhance domestic resources mobilization in partner countries thereby helping to reduce aid dependency as a long-term objective.

2. By assessing progress against existing commitments, setting out priorities for the aid and development effectiveness agenda and linking with new global development challenges and partnerships, the Busan Forum will contribute to better quality of aid and increased impact of development financing from all sources. The overall objective is to accelerate the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and contribute to the establishment of the post-2015 development architecture.

3. In view of the changing global context, the Council endorses the following priorities for the EU and its Member States (hereinafter referred to as the EU) in the negotiations of the Busan outcome document:

3.1 Be inclusive and thus build bridges between different development actors, notably emerging economies, in their pursuit of development results and long-term impact. This aim of reaching out and broadening cooperation with all relevant development partners should strengthen development effectiveness while ensuring that the ambition in the aid effectiveness agenda is not reduced.

3.2 Agree on a single outcome document which reaffirms the aid effectiveness principles through focusing and deepening the key commitments of the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action.

3.3 Focus and deepen commitments on results and accountability, ownership, transparency and reduced fragmentation. Predictability, alignment and capacity development are other

priority areas. In addition, the Busan outcome document should address risks and joint risk management including shared identification and mitigation of risks.

3.4 Strengthen the engagement of parliaments, local authorities, oversight bodies, the civil society, the academic sector and the independent media as essential stakeholders in development and in promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

3.5 Engage the private sector in aid and development effectiveness in order to advance innovation, create income and jobs, mobilize domestic resources and further develop innovative financial mechanisms.

Adopt a new approach to fragile and conflict-affected situations, based on effective support for peacebuilding and statebuilding goals agreed jointly at the level of partner countries.

Prioritise and substantially strengthen implementation at the country-level, led by the partner countries and allow for flexibility according to partner country priorities, local contexts and the inclusion of a wide set of development partners.

Reduce and streamline the global governance structure and monitoring, and use existing mechanisms and forums to follow up and pursue the aid and development effectiveness agenda.

It is important that all relevant development partners including the providers of South-South cooperation, emerging economies, multilateral organizations, private sector and civil society, non-for profit private foundations, implement commitments agreed upon in Busan.

Part II: The European Union's contribution

The Council stresses that the EU1 performs above the average in implementing the Paris and Accra commitments. This is encouraging progress but not satisfactory.

With this in mind, the Council emphasises the need to focus and deepen the commitments to achieve concrete and sustainable results. This requires increased political support to the aid and development effectiveness agenda and pursuit of a comprehensive approach.

To further deepen the aid effectiveness commitments and strengthen development effectiveness, the EU will promote and support specific initiatives with a view to:

Establish an EU Transparency Guarantee to increase accountability and predictability, strengthen democratic ownership and improve development results.

Implement joint programming at the country level to reduce aid fragmentation and promote harmonization.

Strengthen delivery, accountability, measurement and demonstration of sustainable results.

Commit to a new approach to situations of conflicts and fragility.

Deepen Public-Private engagement for development impact.

8. Aid and development effectiveness will be further strengthened in the context of the EU development policy and future financial instruments.

P. 1-3

Review national MIPs

All MIPs systematically refer to complementarity with other donors for each priority sector selected for EU cooperation. This includes the key donors present in the sector, and existing coordination mechanisms (working groups, steering committees, task forces). Some MIPs/sectors provide more details on the actual division of labour and complementarity in the sector than others. MIP annexes also contain donor matrices with indicative donor allocations per sector.

Review regional MIPs

Similar to the bilateral programming documents, the three MIPs refer to complementarity with other donors.

Both the Asia and Central Asia MIP include a donor matrix which details sector of intervention and budget. In the case of the latter, the table even provides information on the implementing organisation, budget and duration of the project.

Considerably fewer references to donor coordination can be found in the Latin America MIP. For security and rule of law interventions it is mentioned that *“it is crucial to further strengthen the existing donor coordination mechanism. The Group of Friends of the Central American Strategy needs to regain momentum, as it remains the right forum to assure coordination and complementarity between the international partners of Central America.”* (Latin America MIP, 2014, 22)

Review of EAMR 2013

EAMR question: What progress is being made in improving division of labour? What are the main obstacles that remain?

Overall, EU ensures DCI complementarity with donors and, in general, countries have made significant progress in coordinating their work. Yet, EU Delegations refer to coordination, complementarity and Division of Labour indistinctly. Though nearly all EAMRs refer to DoL, my sense is that most examples are related to general donor coordination (which is a good basis) rather than to formal DoL mechanisms. Nonetheless, good examples exist mainly in Latin American countries in e.g. Bolivia *“European Co-ordinated Response” which for the first time gives a comprehensive picture of what the EU and its Member States intend to do in the coming years. This document shows a good division of labour among us, with 2-3 donors present in each important sector and no badly overcrowded or orphan sectors at EU level.* (EAMR Bolivia 2015, 17); Colombia *“During 2013 the EU delegation, as chair of the donor cooperation group (Grupo de Cooperantes), initiated and led the first phase of a Division of Labour (DoL) exercise.* (EAMR Colombia 2013, 16); Guatemala *“Consultations on the MIP took place both with Member States and the wider donor community, requesting their input to a donor matrix. With regard to Division of Labour amongst MS, a long debate took place within the framework of the JP process.”* (EAMR Guatemala 2013, 22); Honduras HN 19 *“2013 saw a break-through as regards division of labour, as the first two delegation agreements in Honduras were signed by the end of the year, one with Spain (AECID) and one with Germany (GIZ).”* (EAMR Honduras 2013, 19). Other good examples can be found in Nepal, Nicaragua and Paraguay.

Main obstacles mentioned in EAMRs are: different involvement and aid cycles of MS (e.g. Cambodia, El Salvador, Nepal), low volume of aid (e.g. China, South Africa, Uzbekistan) and difficult political context (e.g. Cuba, Tajikistan).

Mention to MIP 2014-2020 is found in Yemen *“Joint Programming with MS: in 2013 a first overview has been made of the interventions of the present MS, DEVCO and ECHO in Yemen and was the basis to launch the discussion on joint programming. Everybody agreed to establish a roadmap towards joint programming with the drafting of the new MIP 2016-2020 in mind.”* (EAMR Yemen 2013, 19).

Roles assigned to international organisations

Coordination with international organizations is generally good. The EU holds regular meetings to exchange information on ongoing and future programmes and priorities, as well as on political developments. Main Development Partners are UN Agencies and IFIs in addition to MS. Nowadays, coordination with IOs seems to be better than it was in the past. Overall, there is a trend towards better coordination for the sake of development and growth. Some successful examples include Kyrgyzstan *“During the development of the SPSP/sector budget support for Social Protection and Public Finance Management, the cooperation with UNICEF and WB was exemplary, e.g. in terms of sharing policy and programming documents or relevant studies. When it come to advocacy (e.g. on children's rights) important steps are taken in close coordination with these and other partner [...] Coordination with other international organisations and donors over the implementation of BOMCA and CADAP has clearly yielded tangible results.* (EAMR Kyrgyzstan 2013,14-15); Sri Lanka *“The specific monitoring and implementation architecture designed for SDDP⁹ allowed for intensive and well-coordinated work with the six implementing agencies [...]”* (EAMR Sri Lanka 2013, 14-15); Tajikistan *“Prior to the preparation of Identification and Action Fiches the EU Delegation invites donors and International Organisations to present their plans and views to further strengthen coordination and avoid duplication.”* (EAMR Tajikistan 2013, 14- 15).

Nevertheless there are some experiences where complementarity is still weak, but these are individual cases concerning one or two of the development agencies that the EU works with in any given country, e.g.: Pakistan *“However, within the implementation of the “Sustainable rural development in the refugee- affected and hosting areas”- RAHA programme, the implementing and reporting capacity and response towards EU requirements has proven to be weak and is currently an issue of concern for the Delegation.”* (EAMR Pakistan 2013, 9-10); Nicaragua *“The collaboration with IO, and the degree of involvement and of information sharing with the Delegation during project implementation is variable (good with UNDP and UNWTO, reasonable with UNOPS, and not so good with FAO).”* (EAMR Nicaragua 2013, 13-14). EU visibility seems to be another challenge in several countries (e.g. Cambodia, Colombia, Honduras and Uzbekistan).

References to the MIP 2014-2020 can be found in Guatemala, Honduras and Kyrgyzstan: e.g. *“In addition to the usual EU meetings, further coordination was undertaken throughout the year with the EU Member States within the framework of the Joint Programming exercise as well as the MIP. [...] In November donor consultations were held on the priorities of the Multi-Indicative Programme, and a separate meeting was held with the Member States and with USAID.”* (EAMR Guatemala 2013, 12-13); *“The EU Delegation frequently talks to representatives of IOs (particularly UN agencies and institutions, OSCE, and EBRD) as well as embassies (particularly embassies of Germany, France, and UK) and international development agencies such as GIZ, USAID, and JCI. This is done to identify challenges, needs, and ways of assistance in the Rule of Law sector, including the content and possible cooperation under the EU 2014-2020 budgetary period.”* (EAMR Kyrgyzstan 2013, 14-15).

Review EAMR 2015

EAMR question: What progress is being made in improving division of labour? What are the main obstacles that remain?

Overall, EAMRs 2015 describe the level of coordination between donors and international organisations as good and satisfactory, but Division of Labour (DoL) remains a challenge in many countries. In general terms, it seems that the EU struggles to overcome difficulties and obstacles in this area. It can be concluded that moving forward in an effective manner would require further analysis and a different approach. Main reasons cited include: lack of political will and interference from national governments, absence of appropriate platforms, lack of will from MS and DPs, difficulties to agree joint positions, resistance to change, decrease in the number of donors and volume of cooperation.

Some examples include:

Bangladesh “DoL is still not applied mainly due to lack of leadership by government, difficulties for the government to shift from the traditional project approach to a more strategic sectorial partnership but also due to most DPs’ unwillingness to withdraw from their traditional ‘pré carré’ (EAMR Bangladesh 2015, 34); Cambodia “While speaking with one voice gives a greater visibility to EU policies and gives weight to European partners’ voices in the larger discussion, coordination within the European partners group to agree joint positions requires a large amount of work, much of which falls to the Delegation. Operationalisation of division of labour is challenged both by the desire of some European partners to be actively involved and present in all sectors and by the desire of some not to find themselves ‘alone’ in the sector” (EAMR Cambodia 2015, 36); El Salvador “In el Salvador the number of donors and the volume of cooperation is globally decreasing. Division of labour is not perceived as a priority by the Member States (MS) present in the country and by the donor community in general, neither for the Government which is not taking initiative in this sense (even if El Salvador is one of the 60 countries which is voluntarily reporting on aid efficiency)” (EAMR EL Salvador 2015, 26); Tajikistan “Division of labour remains a challenge in Tajikistan. Overall, the intermediary level of division of labour exists mainly due thanks to the donors’ willingness to avoid duplication of activities, and looking for synergies and added value of their interventions” (EAMR Tajikistan 2015, 24); Uzbekistan “Division of labour remains a challenge in Uzbekistan as the authorities would like to maintain a reduced and highly controlled level playing field and do not seem enthusiastic about having a concerted voice of international actors. Thus the intermediary

level of division of labour is mainly due and works thanks to donors who are willing to avoid duplication of activities and financing, and are looking for synergies and added value of their interventions.” (EAMR Uzbekistan 2015, 24).

Nevertheless, good practices and successful experiences can be found in: Kyrgyzstan “Division of labour is ensured via very active and effective operations of DPCC and DPCC of the thematic sub-groups. All donors are part of DPCC and committed to aid mapping towards coordination and division of labour.” (EAMR Kyrgyzstan 2015, 36); Laos “Division of labour within the frame- work of European Joint Programming 2016-2020 has been done with the understanding that development cooperation programmes should complement each other to foster efficiency gains and avoid duplications in line with the 2007 EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy and The Vientiane Declaration on Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 2016-2025. Each European development partner strives to concentrate their programming in three sectors or less and using division of labour to better coordinate and share the workload.” (EAMR Laos, 2015, 32). Other positive examples include Myanmar and Paraguay.

In the context of gender issues (Gender Action Plan 2016-2020) the DoL is rarely mentioned.

Roles assigned to international organisations

Overall, EAMRs 2015 indicate that the level of coordination between donors and international organisations is good and satisfactory. The primary international organisations and partners are UN Agencies as well as international financial institutions such as UNDP, FAO, UNICEF, UNOPS, UNEP, IFAD, WB, UNCHR, WHO, ADB, ILO, OCDE, IMF (among others) and Member States. Coordination is especially relevant in countries where the EU has a large portfolio managed through indirect management. This is the case in Sri Lanka where “54 % of the cooperation portfolio is managed through indirect management (joint management) with International Organisations.” (EAMR Sri Lanka 2015, 12).

The EU ensures complementarity through different means and mechanisms (Sector Working Groups, formal/informal meetings and/or more formal plat- forms) adapted to each country's context and needs. For instance, “In Cuba, there is not a formal mechanism of donor coordination, being the preference of the Cuban Government to negotiate bilaterally with each donor, with a pen- chant for multilateral led-actions” (EAMR Cuba 2015, 32-33) thus donor coordination is maintained through regular contacts and exchanges. Interesting cases can be found in Kyrgyzstan “A clear division of labour between the donors is jointly elaborated and followed as well as reflected in the Joint Statement between the Kyrgyz Government and DPs” (EAMR Kyrgyzstan 2015, 23- 24); Tajikistan “[...] coordination with the International Community is performed through the Development Coordination Council (DCC) composed of nearly all traditional donors (including the International Organisations which operate in Tajikistan)” (EAMR Tajikistan 2015, 36); Myanmar “The Development Partners Working Committee (DPWC) is a very effective donor coordination group of 9 of the largest providers of development assistance in Myanmar, in which the EUD participates” (EAMR Myanmar 2015, 48-52). An interesting example related to coordination mechanisms and their results can be found in Laos “In general, the level and quality of coordination between the EU and the International organizations (IO) is satisfactory but also depends on whether these are multi-donor programmes with regular joint review mechanisms (in which the EU Delegation can often take a prominent role, e.g. PRSO or TDF-2) or more traditional bilateral agreements as are in place with UNDP (even if 'formally' multi- donor), WHO and UNODC. In the latter case the partnership was traditionally rather 'loose' and it required (and still requires) a big effort to ensure a certain level of EUD involvement in the strategic steering of the operation. The trend is however positive.” (EAMR Laos 2015, 18-19).

A few incidents, mainly related to communication, reporting and visibility with some UN agencies, can be found in e.g. Bangladesh, Cambodia, Guatemala, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines and Vietnam: “The Delegation co- ordinates quite well with International Organisations in Vietnam, although the donor community as a whole could be better structured [...] Problems with UN Agencies implementing projects funded by the EU have also been identified.” (EAMR Vietnam 2015, 16-17).

Review of evaluations

From a geographic perspective, overall the EU has promoted complementarity with other donors but efforts have not always produced positive results (e.g. Yemen) and in some cases the EU has not followed a clear division of labour (e.g. Nepal).

- In Colombia it was reported “The EC has neither sought coordination and complementarity nor carried out any joint strategic programming with key stakeholders, undermining the possibility of harmonization between donors.” (Evaluation of the Commission of the European Union’s Co-operation with Colombia, p. 76-77).
- In Yemen despite harmonisation attempts coordination remains weak and challenging.
- In Nepal the level of coordination is rather good although the EU has not implemented a clear strategy.

However, the geographic evaluations also reported some positive examples:

- In Asia coordination with MS and other donors is overall good although it seems that synergies could be further extended to joint design exercises and coordination improved at regional level.
- An interesting example can be found in Honduras: “*Following Hurricane Mitch, a true forum for coordination was created with the setting-up of the G-16 group of donors. The EC has promoted this forum to share information and has tried in some cases to achieve a clear division of labour with other donors.*” (Evaluation of the European Commission’s Cooperation with Honduras, p. 72).
- In the case of Pakistan, the evaluation mentioned that “*In the absence of formal division of labour, the EU and its MS were pragmatic in terms of complementarity (I-10.1.1). There was no overarching strategy established and implemented during the period to ensure complementarity of the EU strategy with that of EU Members States. (...) Concerning other development partners, aid generally remained quite fragmented. While the EU often aligned its inputs on the ones of like-minded donors - such as the United Kingdom, Germany, the USA or the World Bank – and tended to focus on areas where it has had a stronger comparative advantage, there was still ample scope for improved donor coordination towards the end of the period.*” (Evaluation of the EU’s cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 2017, p.66)
- In Bangladesh, donor coordination has evolved during the evaluation period and increased efforts to take the aid effectiveness agenda forward: “*Over the evaluation period, EPs (together with other DPs) pursued joined approaches, most of the time under the umbrella of the UN or WB, which enhanced donor coordination and harmonisation. Whilst EPs (and more generally DPs) have typically been willing to exchange information and reduce aid fragmentation, little progress has been made as far as division of labour is concerned. DPs’ own interests remained strong and over the period the government has not shown increased interest in coordinating donors. At EU+ level, coordination efforts led EU MS to take common positions and views on overall Bangladeshi challenges. In addition, EPs’ strategies have on the whole shown strong responsiveness to key Bangladeshi challenges. In 2013, coordination efforts were reinvigorated with the EU+ Joint Programming process, which led EU partners to jointly identify key challenges, select key sectors and define common messages at sector level. Finally, the EU’s global trade, human rights and development policies have been implemented in a coherent manner in Bangladesh.*” (Joint strategic country evaluation of the development cooperation of Denmark, Sweden and the EU with Bangladesh 2007-2013)

From a thematic perspective, coordination with MS and other donors has been more satisfactory though it can be improved. This is the case of Environment and Climate Change and Health sectors. E.g.:

- In the case of environment: “*Although there is room for improvement, the EU support has been coherent, co-ordinated and complementary to assistance provided by*

Member States and other donors, as well as between the thematic and geographic instruments.” (Thematic evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2007- 2013), p. ii);

- In health, *“The EC has played a key role especially in MS co-ordination as well as in co-ordination mechanisms including partner governments. While, the role of partner governments in donor-government co-ordination mechanisms has increased, weak capacity and low government leadership continue to be bottlenecks.”* (Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector, p. x-xi).
- Particularly interesting is the case of Trade-related Assistance *“The importance of achieving stronger policy coherence related to TRA was increasingly recognised, not only by decision makers at EU head- quarters, but also at EU Delegation and Member States level. [...] Co- ordination mechanisms with EU Member States were well developed in most cases.”* (Evaluation of the European Union’s Trade-related Assistance in Third Countries, p. ii-iii).

Interviews with Experts

In terms of ODA flows the EU ranked third in 2015 behind the UK and Germany, contributing 15.8% to the EU’s total development cooperation (EU institutions and EU Member States combined). The figures for earlier years are similar. As the presumed result of an effective division of labour, the EU indeed leads a wide range of major development programmes across all regions, many of which are co-financed by EU Member States and other donors. In these cases, the EU makes the largest contribution to the overall funding and thus provides added value. However, judging from their ODA budgets the large Member States would equally be able to implement programmes of these or similar financial dimensions.

The only potential exception is budget support. Here, the EU – including through DCI -seems to contribute more substantially than EU Members states and therefore significantly contributes to achieving the Paris objectives of partner country ownership and systems alignment. However, the importance of budget support under DCI relative to other donors cannot be verified at this stage based on the reviewed documents alone (see EQ 3 on share of budget support within DCI).

EU budget support certainly contributes more to “government ownership” (Paris Declaration) but we cannot empirically argue in any way that BS also automatically contributes to “country ownership” (Busan) as the participation of non-state actors in DCI countries tends to be minimal (state-centred approaches)

Carlsson, Schubert & Robinson, 2009, The Aid Effectiveness Agenda. Benefits for a European Approach, HTSPE

The 2009 study was entitled The Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a European Approach (Carlsson, Schubert & Robinson 2009). It sought to determine quantitative and qualitative costs associated with “*inefficient aid*”, and to highlight how increased co-ordination at the European level might provide a platform for a more value-for-money approach to aid. The study concluded that high cost was associated with the following aid practices: a) a combination of volatility and lack of predictability of aid flows undermining public finance management planning and budgeting systems, especially in aid-dependent partner countries; b) the tying of aid forcing partner countries to purchase goods and services in developed countries, rather than in cheaper developing countries; c) the proliferation of donors in certain partner countries and in certain sectors resulting in duplication of strategies, missions, offices and studies; d) the considerable degree of aid fragmentation –that is, an increasing number of aid activities (projects and programmes), with the EU bilateral ODA portfolio accounting for 40.000-50.000 activities in 2009, compared with 30.000 in 2003; and e) insufficient use of partner country systems and government ownership. The study concluded that two initiatives were most likely to generate savings: improving aid predictability through better donor co-ordination at the central level; and further division of labour at both cross-country and in-country levels as set out in the EU Code of Conduct. Summary in Evaluation of complementarity for MFA Finland.

Bigsten, Platteau & Tengstam, 2011, The Aid Effectiveness Agenda: the benefits of going ahead, SO GES

The 2011 study was entitled The Aid Effectiveness Agenda: the benefits of going ahead (Bigsten, Platteau & Tengstam 2011). It pinpointed the same aid practices that were reducing EU aid effectiveness: unpredictability and volatility of aid; tying of aid; and high transaction costs linked to a high number of partner countries and a multitude of projects and programmes. The study concluded that major cost savings could be achieved by concentrating aid efforts in fewer countries, and by opting for more general forms of aid transfers – such as GBS. However, the study noted that this would mean that co-operation with certain countries would have to be suspended, which might not be politically acceptable. In general, the theoretical analysis of this study showed that intensification of aid co-ordination efforts may: a) reduce the transaction costs borne by each individual donor country; b) enhance aid effectiveness, in the sense of better reaching the donor's objectives in the recipient countries; and c) entail a political cost in the form of a loss of national autonomy. Summary in Evaluation of complementarity for MFA Finland.

The European Parliament 2013 The Cost of Non-Europe in Development Policy: Increasing co-ordination between EU donors (European Parliament 2013).

The European Parliament in 2013 presented a draft study on The Cost of Non-Europe in Development Policy: Increasing co-ordination between EU donors (European Parliament 2013). It concluded that lack of co-ordination of development aid among EU donors had economic and political costs. Economically, € 800 million could be saved annually on transaction cost, if donors concentrated their aid efforts on fewer countries and activities, and an extra € 8,4 billion of annual savings could be achieved from better cross-country allocation patterns. Politically, better co-ordination would result in increased impact and greater visibility of the EU development policy. The document was in favour of more division of labour and joint programming.

1.5.4.3 I-543 DCI thematic and regional programmes complement with interventions of other donors

Indicator Summary

While CSO/LA funding is disbursed in partner countries, a significant share of GPGC and regional programme funding is spent through multilateral channels (UN and international development banks), universities or research institutes, international NGOs and similar institutions. As this funding involves individual agreements with each of these partners, all of which have other sources of funding, it may be assumed that complementarity is assessed on a case-to-case basis and that overlaps are avoided.

From interviews conducted with DEVCO staff at HQ level it must be concluded that there is relatively little information on how GPGC and other DCI funding disbursed in this way is used by partner institutions, e.g. UN-organisations, international NGOs, research institutions etc. It may not be excluded that, at country level, funds for education disbursed through UNICEF, for example, are not well coordinated with sector funding for education disbursed through DCI bilateral cooperation. There is a risk of overlap and inconsistency, but also a potential for complementarity and synergies. The dimension is not well documented.

DCI GPGC

<i>Budget line</i>	<i>Channel</i>	<i>Commitments in mEUR</i>
Environment and climate change	UN	152,46
	Donor Government	84,85
	Recipient Government	33,27
	Donor Country-Based NGO	30,31
	Other	50,81
	Multilateral Organisations and Development Banks	27,77
	Third Country Government (Delegated Co-Operation)	15,00
	Developing Country-Based NGO	13,28
	University or research institute	8,90

<i>Budget line</i>	<i>Channel</i>	<i>Commitments in mEUR</i>
	Network	3,90
	Public-Private Partnerships	3,00
Food Security and sustainable agriculture	NGOs and Civil Society	196,66
	UN	96,75
	Multilateral Organisations	42,68
	Other	14,22
	University or research institute	12,00
	Recipient Government	10,25
Human Development	GFATM	141,81
	World Bank Group	79,60
	UN	49,70
	Public-Private Partnerships	20,00
	Other	15,09
	Third Country Government (Delegated Co-Operation)	7,10
	WTO	3,00
	University or research institute	0,38
Migration and Asylum	UN	40,41
	Recipient Government	15,09
	Multilateral Organisations	7,19
	Third Country Government (Delegated Co-Operation)	1,00
Sustainable energy	Multilateral Organisations	57,88
	Other	10,00

DCI CSO-LA

<i>Budget line</i>	<i>Channel</i>	<i>Commitments in mEUR</i>
DCI-CSO+LA	Developing Country-Based NGO	363,75
	Recipient Government	81,41
	Donor Country-Based NGO	30,25
	Other	0,00

DCI Geographic⁵¹

<i>Budget line</i>	<i>Channel</i>	<i>Commitments in mEUR</i>
DCI_ASIA	Recipient Government	505,30
	UN	321,67
	World Bank Group	233,00
	Developing Country-Based NGO	202,15
	Other	188,01
	Third Country Government (Delegated Co-Operation)	168,13
	NGOs and Civil Society	106,05
	Multilateral Organisations	131,70
	University or research institute	32,71
	Donor Government	20,00
DCI_ALA	Recipient Government	434,48
	Donor Government	40,01
	NGOs and Civil Society	25,00
	Other	19,01
	Third Country Government (Delegated Co-Operation)	18,85
	University or research institute	15,00
	World Bank Group	14,57

⁵¹ Including Pan-African Programme. The Dashboard includes actions funded under the PanAfrican Programme under DCI_Geo (instruments level 2) and DCI_ACP (instruments level 1).

<i>Budget line</i>	<i>Channel</i>	<i>Commitments in mEUR</i>
	Multilateral Organisations	2,50
	Developing Country-Based NGO	0,00
DCI_ACP	Multilateral Organisations	70,08
	Recipient Government	50,70
	Other	45,00
	University or research institute	32,80
	Developing Country-Based NGO	20,00
	Donor Government	10,00
	UN	9,70
	World Bank Group	8,00
	Third Country Government (Delegated Co-Operation)	6,50

UN channels

<i>UN channel - details</i>	<i>Commitments in mEUR</i>
United Nations Development Programme	156,27
United Nations_other	112,68
Food And Agricultural Organisation	86,75
United Nations Environment Programme	61,13
International Fund For Agricultural Development	40,40
United Nations Childrens Fund	33,85
International Labour Organisation - Regular Budget Supplementary Account	32,00
World Health Organisation - Assessed Contributions	28,00
International Organisation For Migration	17,00
United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime	15,00
United Nations Human Settlement Programme	14,00
United Nations Population Fund	13,00
International Labour Organisation - Assessed Contributions	11,70
International Maritime Organization - Technical Co-Operation Fund	10,00
United Nations Office Of The United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees	8,00
United Nations Capital Development Fund	8,00
United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change	8,00
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation	5,00
United Nations Educational, Scientific And Cultural Organisation	5,00
United Nations Conference On Trade And Development	3,90
Convention To Combat Desertification	1,00
World Meteorological Organisation	0,00

1.6 EQ 6 on leverage

To what extent has the DCI leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement?

JC 61: DCI co-operation leverages additional resources – from government, other donors, diaspora remittances, private sector.

Main findings

- Blending has been the main point of engagement with the private sector from the leveraging point of view.
- In the eight years that the blending mechanism has been in place, EUR 2.7 billion in EU assistance has been used to unlock EUR 50 billion in investment.
- No evidence has emerged of crowding out; blending has helped to reduce information asymmetries and has had positive poverty-reduction effects in the form of better access to infrastructure.
- High-profile EU global public-private partnerships tend to be platforms for dialogue rather than operational, risk-taking and sharing partnerships which can leverage DCI grant funds.

Strength of the evidence base:

Medium

Main sources of information:

- Programming documents (MIPs, Annual Action Plans and Action Documents),
- EU reporting documents (Annual Report, EAMRs),
- Evaluations and studies including Draft Final Report, Blending evaluation, December 2016,
- Interviews with DG DEVCO and EEAS HQ and EUDs and EU Member States,
- EU Statistical Dashboard.

JC 62 : Under DCI the EU has made a strategic use of policy and political dialogue to leverage reforms.

Main findings

- The EU engages in policy dialogue through DCI programmes, especially budget support, with the main stakeholders in all partner countries in an effort to leverage policy reforms.
- When partners' ownership is strong, BS helps strengthen their commitment (politically, financially and technically) and leverage their own resources.
- Policy dialogue is most effective at sector, technical, and Ministry level. At political level, its effectiveness is blunted by the fact that the importance of DCI ODA is dwarfed by the importance of trade.
- In controversial areas such as civil society development and human rights, progress has been slowed by the phenomenon of "pushback," i.e. the declining authority of the Western liberal model of democratic development. Also constraining effective policy dialogue, particularly outside focal sector, are EUD staff constraints.
- Although blending contributed to leverage policy reforms, it did not always fully exploit opportunities.

Strength of the evidence base:

Medium - Strong

Main sources of information:

- Programming documents (MIPs, Annual Action Plans and Action Documents),
- EU reporting documents (EAMRs),
- Evaluations including 2014 synthesis of budget support evaluations,
- Interviews with DG DEVCO and EEAS HQ and EUDs and EU Member States,
- Survey to EU Delegations.

1.6.1 JC 61: DCI co-operation leverages additional resources – from government, other donors, diaspora remittances, private sector.

1.6.1.1 I-611 Extent to which blending has been used to leverage DCI resources.

Indicator Summary

The Agenda for Change emphasises the support of inclusive growth and job creation as a key priority of EU external co-operation. In this context, blending is recognised as an important vehicle for leveraging additional resources and increasing the impact of EU aid. The DCI Regulation highlights the importance of promoting “innovative instruments such as blending.” (p.7).

Three major investment facilities are currently implemented in DCI regions (i.e., regions eligible under DCI geographic instrument), the Latin American Investment Facility (LAIF), the Asian Investment Facility (AIF) and the Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA). They are used to unlock public and private resources (Afghanistan), to generate “significant investment of renewable energy technologies such as wind or solar” (Philippines), to “strengthen access to finance” (Mongolia) or to “leverage additional non-grant financing, and achieve investments in infrastructure and support to the private sector” (Latin American Investment Facility), to quote only a few examples.

According to the Blending Evaluation Blending encouraged a more strategic approach to cooperation, particularly in lower-middle and middle-income countries. The evaluation found that, by leveraging loans, blending allowed projects to go ahead that would not have been possible if financed purely by loans or purely by grants. It had a positive effect on DCI potential leverage by giving the EU a seat at the table with large donors (including MS agencies such as KfW and AFD) and a voice in strategic policy areas such as energy, transport, and water and sanitation. While the full potential of blending to mobilise the private sector have not been realized, there is evidence of at least some generation of private finance. The evaluation recommended, however, that additionality issues, and particularly the case that a grant element was necessary for the project to succeed, be better analysed and stated at the outset. While only 26% of blending focused on low-income countries, some poverty impacts and reductions in disparities were identified. In general, though, the evaluation concluded that the potential of blending to serve development needs in the poorest countries and to target the poorest populations has not yet been realized. The evaluation called for a greater focus on poverty alleviation (as well as job creation).

Innovative financing instruments

Investment needs in EU partner countries are substantial. Government and donor funds are far from sufficient to cover these needs. Countries need to attract additional public and private finance to drive economic growth as a basis for poverty reduction. Therefore, as part of its call for support to inclusive growth and job creation, the Agenda for Change commits the EU to seek innovative financing mechanisms to allow DCI to leverage additional funds. In this context, **blending is recognised as an important vehicle for leveraging additional resources and increasing the impact of EU aid.**

International Cooperation and Development. 2016. *Innovative Financial Instruments (blending)* - European Commission. [ONLINE] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/innovative-financial-instruments-blending_en. [Accessed 18 October 2016].

Annual report on blending facilities

Blending is an innovative financial mechanism that allows the strategic use of EU development assistance to attract the additional finance needed to implement infrastructure projects in areas vital to the economic development of our partner countries. In the eight years since it was launched, the mechanism has seen approximately EUR 2.7 billion in EU assistance being used to unlock an estimated EUR 50 billion in investment. Hence, **this mechanism continued to prove its efficacy in 2015**, as the projects implemented last year under the **Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA)**, the **Asia Investment Facility (AIF)** and Investment Facility for the Pacific (IFP) clearly demonstrate.

Source: EU (2015) Operational Report IFCA, AIF, IFP

Review national MIPs

About a half of the MIPs mention the possibility of blending the EU DCI resources with investment for increasing leverage, often in fairly uncertain/exploratory terms. Among others, this includes expected blending with EIB lending.

Examples include:

'Blending mechanisms will be pursued in trying to unlock public and private resources and thereby increasing the impact of external cooperation and development policy.' (Afghanistan, p. 5)

'In order to guarantee best use of resources, the EU envisages blending grants with ADB loans for the Secondary Education Sector Investment Programme (SESIP).' (Bangladesh, p. 8)

'[...] the EC and the EIB could explore the possibility to offer Iraq an integrated EU financing package in the upcoming programming cycle through the blending of EIB loans and related activities with a) a technical assistance grant from the EU budget or b) refundable technical assistance [...]' (Iraq, p.21)

'The EU will explore options to deploy a higher percentage of funds through new financial instruments, such as blending grants and loans and other risk-sharing mechanisms, in order to leverage further resources, and respectively strengthen access to finance.' (Mongolia, 9)

'Linkages to the Asia Investment Facility (through blending of grants and loans) should be considered.' (Nepal, p. 6)

'Through blending loans and grants, significant investment of renewable energy technologies such as wind or solar can be generated; saving millions of tons of carbon emissions and moving the Philippines towards the path of a Green Economy.' (Philippines, p.6)

Review regional MIPs

The regional programming documents all foresee opportunities to use blending as an implementation mechanism.

- "Asia Investment Facility (AIF): Blending loans from European Financial Institution and EU grants will be used to support both regional initiatives and national projects. Its scope will include all DCI-eligible countries in the region with a priority given to low income countries. Areas for co-operation include: energy, climate change, environment and natural resources management, including water management, disaster preparedness and risk reduction. This would contribute to limiting the emission of CO₂ and increase resilience to climate change in vulnerable countries. Blending could also improve access to finance for Small and Medium Enterprises, support investments in the transport sector and contribute to the ASEAN Connectivity Master Plan. Support may be provided to co-operation on regional level or cross-border co-operation of two or more Asian partner countries. The types of operations to be financed under the AIF are the following:
 - Investment co-financing in infrastructure projects and climate change projects
 - Loan guarantee cost financing;
 - Interest rate subsidy;
 - Technical assistance (financed as part of an investment operation);
 - Risk capital" (

Source: Asia MIP, 2014, 14

- "The blending mechanism In Central Asia, we want to use a replicable model approach, with small-medium scale Investment on key infrastructures, notably in rural areas. Blending may usefully contribute, for instance within the rural development sector, to poverty reduction and improving the living conditions of rural population providing sustainable energy, drinking water, sanitation and irrigation systems as well as supporting the SMEs development and new income generating activities. Renewable energies (hydroelectric, solar or wind power generation) are an important

area of interest for all CA countries. The EU fully supports the development of small-medium scale alternative energy source generation and rural electrification but DCI will not fund large-scale infrastructure projects which would not be environmentally, socially and/or politically sustainable in the Central Asian regional context.”

Source: *Central Asia MIP*, 2014, 5

- “Blending, based on the experience of the **facility for Latin America (LAIF)**, will be a major mechanism of implementation in particular for supporting investments complementing the above mentioned objectives, and clearly linked to the overall EU objectives and policy priorities in the region. Innovative investment operations and pilot initiatives could also be supported.”

Source: *Latin America MIP*, 2014, 11

In addition, the Latin America MIP (2014, 12) mentions that “*The EU response for this component may be complemented by operations financed by the European Investment Bank (EIB).*”

Review of evaluations

In addition to the Blending evaluation, two evaluation reports refer to the blending mechanism: Central Asia and Private Sector Development.

According to the Evaluation of the European Union's Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries, (p. 25) “*A key value added provided by the Commission was that its grant money could be blended with loans. By so doing the Commission leveraged investment provided by international institutions and allowed certain constraints to PSD to be addressed, notably by contributing to mitigation of the risks taken by financial institutions. However, while grant money in risk mitigation schemes has high potential, in a few instances guarantee schemes were directly supported by the Commission, but with little or no effect due to poor design, itself generally a result of weak diagnosis.*” In the evaluation of the performance of the EU in the Private Development thematic Sector: “*The Commission contracted, on behalf of the EU, €2.4bn of direct support to PSD. This compared favourably with several other well-recognised PSD donors such as France (€1.3bn), Sweden (€0.9bn) or Denmark (€0.9bn), all of which are members of the Donor Committee on Enterprise Development. [...] The PSD-specific areas of potential value added were its capacity to leverage grant resources for PSD through investment and blending facilities, its ability to link PSD with trade liberalisation matters; and the transfer of EU good practices and knowledge.*” (Evaluation of the European Union's Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries, p. ii). In the case of Central Asia the report does not provide any assessment or example.

According to the Blending Evaluation (2016)⁵², blending encouraged a more strategic approach to cooperation, particularly in lower-middle and middle-income countries. The evaluation found that, by leveraging loans, blending allowed projects to go ahead that would not have been possible if financed purely by loans or purely by grants. It had a positive effect on DCI potential leverage by giving the EU a seat at the table with large donors (including MS agencies such as KfW and AFD) and a voice in strategic policy areas such as energy, transport, and water and sanitation. While the full potential of blending to mobilise the private sector have not been realized, there is evidence of at least some generation of private finance. The evaluation recommended, however, that additionality issues, and particularly the case that a grant element was necessary for the project to succeed, be better analysed and stated at the outset.

While only 26% of blending focused on low-income countries, some poverty impacts and reductions in disparities were identified. In general, though, the evaluation concluded that the potential of blending to serve development needs in the poorest countries and to target the

⁵² The evaluation covered the following investment facilities: Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF), Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), • Latin American Investment Facility (LAIF), Caribbean Investment Facility (CIF), Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA), Asian Investment Facility (AIF), Investment Facility for the Pacific (IFP). While some of the investment facilities did not cover DCI countries, the conclusions were regarded as relevant nonetheless.

poorest populations has not yet been realized. The evaluation called for a greater focus on poverty alleviation (as well as job creation).

The evaluation concludes that blending has been particularly useful for supporting large infrastructure projects and engaging in countries in transition to medium-income status. *“Blending allowed the EU to engage more broadly and with strategic advantage - particularly in support of large infrastructure projects and for cooperating with countries in transition to medium income status.”* (p. 63)

It generally filled gaps left by grant-based support and led to improved development impacts. The evaluation cited no evidence of crowding-out (i.e. grants or blending substituting for public or private funds that would otherwise have been available), based largely in the conclusion that blending addressed information asymmetries, particularly regarding risk. By making infrastructure more available to marginalised populations, it addressed poverty-reduction objectives; infrastructure provided also contributed to goals related to global public goods. Regarding the extent to which blending has been able to leverage additional funds, the evaluation reports that *“blending has had a high average leverage ratio between the EU grant and total financing of around 20. However, the actual contribution of the EU grant has laid in its effects on a) mobilising additional funding, b) enabling previously earmarked financing to be formally approved and committed to the project, and/or c) directing funding to policy-compliant objectives. Finally, blending mechanically offered the EU opportunities to have wider positive effects on the EU potential ‘footprint’ in global development assistance. (...) The average investment leverage ratio for EU grants was 20. The additional funds came principally from key European financial institutions partners in the form of loans but also from multilateral lending agencies, public and private sector investors. As an arithmetic ratio (with no implication for causality), blending had an average investment leverage ratio between total financing and the EU grant of 23 during the period 2007-2014. Digging into the average leverage ratio across the different types of grants under the sample of 40 projects (see table below), one can notice that the averages are not remarkably different for three of the grant types: investment grant, investment rate subsidy and risk capital. Still, investment grants were considered by the EUD respondents to the survey as being more successful than IRS and guarantees to mobilise additional funding. A leverage of 23 is high and by far exceeds typical leverage ratios in project finance of 5-7. This is explained by i) the role that blending grants play to resolve the ‘specific challenges’ discussed earlier; ii) the fact that blending is prominent in high cost capital intensive infrastructure projects – so almost by definition the leverage ratio is high; and iii) the fact that the EU grant is not the only source of grant funding. For multi-grant blending projects (17 projects out of the 32 visited), the full grant leverage ratio (comprising both EU and other donors grants) is inferior to the average EU leverage ratio.*

Figure 25 Average leverage ratio per type of grant sample of 40 projects

Grant instrument	Average leverage ratio	Number of projects	Example of projects
Guarantee	10,80	1	EBRD-13 SME Facility - EBRD / KfW window
IG	16,03	13	MD-02 Moldova Road Rehabilitation project
IRS	14,84	3	Mauritania Submarine Cable
Risk capital	14,73	1	KfW-03 Subscription and management on behalf of the European Commission of a participation in the European Neighbourhood Fund (ENBF) window of the European Fund for South East Europe (EFSE)
TA	102,81	14	EBRD-03 Ukrrenerg Corporate Sustainable Development
TA without outliers	28,00		
TA/IG	26,33	6	MA-04 Programme National d'Assainissement (PNA-ONEP) - Phase I
TA/IRS	14,48	2	Port de Pointe Noire (PAPN)

Source: Evaluation of Blending, 2016

“Blending grants have often either caused other funds to be mobilised, enabled already earmarked funds to be used and/or directed funding to policy-compliant objectives.”

Figure 26 What was the role of the EU grant in leverage

The EU grant has ...	Illustrative examples
a) Mobilised additional funding in half of the cases reviewed (16/32 cases)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BANK/EFSE/MC #36: at Fund level, EU 'C' shares have attracted over €400 million in specialist private funding for EFSE ENER/SEFF/MA-JO #35: the EU investment grant was decisive to pool the funds of the EU IFIs and of the largest Moroccan banks to promote private sector investments in sustainable energy TRANS/Corridor/MZ #26: IRS was critical for capital investment to proceed including facilitation of equity and shareholder loans for the rail component of the Beira corridor

Source: *Evaluation of Blending*, 2016

Review AAPs

The Asia Investment Facility will operate under the governance of the DCI blending framework. The operational decision-making process will be prepared in a two level structure: opinions on projects will be formulated at the Board meetings, held if possible back to back with the respective financing instrument's committee (DCI Committee (Annex 4 to the Commission implementing decision on the Annual Action Programmes 2015 part II and 2016 part I in favour of the Asia region to be financed from the general budget of the European Union Action Document for a contribution to the Asian Investment Facility (AIF)

The Latin American Investment Facility (LAIF) is a blending facility which combines EU grants with other public and private sector resources such as loans and equity in order to leverage additional non-grant financing, and achieve investments in infrastructure and support to the private sector. LAIF aims at reducing the social and economic inequalities which represent one of the biggest threats of the continent by promoting actions which foster economic activities in different sectors (Annex 3 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Action Document for the Latin American Investment Facility (LAIF))

The Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA) is a regional blending facility permitting the combination of EU grants with other public and private sector resources such as loans and equity in order to leverage additional non-grant financing. The European Commission has established IFCA in 2010 through the DCI. Roughly EUR 20 million a year have since been allocated through this aid modality under the EU's Development Co-operation Instrument. IFCA's main objective is to promote investments in key infrastructures in Central Asia. In order to further improve the effectiveness of blending operations in meeting their policy objectives of poverty reduction and sustainable socio-economic development as well as the efficiency of their management including a reduction of transaction costs, blending operations will be managed under the "DCI blending framework", with three facilities covering Asia (AIF), Central Asia (IFCA), and Latin America (LAIF). Financing of the DCI blending framework will be possible from DCI Regional and Bilateral Multi-Annual indicative programmes as well as relevant Thematic Programmes.(Annex 3 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2015 part 2 in favour of Central Asia Action Document for the Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA) 2015 bis)

IFCA**Figure 27** IFCA portfolio**Figure 28** Key IFCA figures 2010-2015**AIF****Figure 29** AIF portfolio**Figure 30** AIF key figures

LAIF

Figure 31 LAIF portfolio




Figure 32 LAIF key figures



Source: EU (2015) Operational Report LAIF

Review of other reports and studies

The DEVE study on Blending grants and loans for financing the EU's development policy in the light of the Commission Proposal for a Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) for 2014-2020 reported that blending facilities have been successful in leveraging considerable development finance (2012), but need to be well devised in order to be successful. *“For the next Multiannual Financial Framework for 2014-2020 the European Commission proposes to introduce loan and grant blending facilities into the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI). These facilities have succeeded in leveraging considerable development finance from development banks and other financiers in the countries embraced by the EU Neighbourhood policy, the Balkans and Sub-Saharan Africa. There are justified concerns, however, that these blending facilities are not appropriate to address many development needs and that the assistance in the form of concessional loans can put heavily indebted countries at risk. Nevertheless, the use of blending facilities in the DCI can be beneficial if well devised. They should be used to complement but not substitute for traditional development finance. Furthermore, care is required to ensure that blending instruments are effectively oriented towards poverty reduction, avoiding a return to a focus on investment. To ensure that the blending facilities expand the effectiveness of development finance, the governance and coherence of the instruments need to be reviewed, with the aim of retaining the positive elements of flexibility, but keeping the risks for the beneficiaries low and ensuring a poverty reduction approach.”* (p.1)

1.6.1.2 I-612 Extent to which MSs and other donors have participated in EU-led, DCI-implemented trust funds.

Indicator Summary

DCI resources have significantly contributed to multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs). In doing so, they have leveraged the expertise of specialised organisations to deal with both new and protracted crises. The EU is increasingly creating its own EU Trust Funds (EUTFs) which respond to the EU's commitment to deliver more flexible, comprehensive and effective joint

EU support. DCI support helped to launch the EU Regional Trust Fund for Syria (Madad Fund), established in December 2014; and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa ('the Migration Trust Fund') set up and signed in November 2015. In both cases, the DCI contribution is significant, but modest as compared to other instruments and donors. The EU's contribution to the Emergency Trust Fund, while mostly through EDF, was also financed through GPGC and the Pan-African Programme. MS contributions to both the Madad Fund and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa were slow to materialise, leading some to express concern that lack of visibility and governance issues made these instruments unattractive in some MS eyes. Fears that the Migration Trust Fund would be used to finance non-development interventions have proved baseless; for example, all returns financed under the instrument are voluntary returns.

DCI Trust Funds in EU Statistical Dashboard

<i>Reporting year</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Instrument</i>	<i>Country/Region</i>	<i>Committed amount (mEUR)</i>
2015	Special measure on the contribution to the European Union Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis, "the Madad Fund"	DCI_ASIA	Iraq	10
2014	FAO Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade Trust Fund	DCI_ENV	Developing countries, unspecified	13
2015	Contribution to the Trust Fund "Cooperation in International Waters in Africa (CIWA)"	DCI_ENV	Africa, regional	5
2014	Livelihood and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT)	DCI_ASIA	Myanmar	60

The EU Regional Trust Fund for Syria (Madad Fund)

The Madad Fund was established in December 2014 to provide a coherent, comprehensive and joint aid regional response to the Syrian crisis, with a focus on stabilisation, resilience and recovery needs of refugees from Syria in neighbouring countries, and host communities and administrations. The Madad Fund aims at responding to EU political priorities in the region, and linking with the EU's regional strategy for Syria and Iraq, as well as providing a framework that could support joint EU programming in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. It is designed to improve efficiency and coherence through financing multi-partner, multi-country and multi-year actions, with a preference for large actions that minimise contract management costs and a focus on leveraging European capacities and knowledge available in the field. It also aims at increasing flexibility, notably by using a wide range of funding modalities, making use of flexible crisis procedures authorised by the Financial Regulation. With the agreement of the Trust Fund Board, ring-fencing is allowed, and funding can shift between and among countries, in a much more flexible manner than with pre-programmed EU instruments. These options include speedy delivery mechanisms that allow fast track contracting and disbursement, leaving behind lengthy and cumbersome procurement and calls for proposals. In terms of complementarity, the Madad Fund ensures links with ongoing programmes and aligns its decisions with the orientations provided by multilateral frameworks.

The funding comes mainly from ENI and IPA, DCI only contributed via a special measure. With recent pledges and contributions from 22 EU Member States (amounting to over EUR 72 million), Turkey (EUR 24 million co-financing for reoriented IPA I funds) and from various EU instruments (ENI 381 million, IPA EUR 243 million, DCI EUR 16 million), the Fund has now reached a total volume of EUR 736 million.

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/syria/madad/index_en.htm

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

On 9 September 2015, the President of the European Union, Jean-Claude Juncker, delivered his State of the Union speech and called for a 'bold, determined and concerted' European response to the current refugee crisis. He also announced the creation of a Trust Fund aimed at bringing stability and addressing the root causes of destabilisation, displacement and irregular migration.

The Trust Fund will provide funding to fulfil the objectives and implement the Valletta Action Plan and complement financial instruments available for co-operation with African partners by the EU, its Member States and associated countries.

More specifically, it will help address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration by promoting economic and equal opportunities, strengthening resilience of vulnerable people, security and development. The Trust Fund will enable the EU, its Member States and contributing donors to respond to the different dimensions of crisis situations by providing support jointly, flexibly and quickly. In doing so, it will complement other strands of action such as political dialogue and development co-operation programmes, as well as humanitarian assistance, stabilisation and crisis response assistance and CFSP/CSDP2 actions where appropriate. It will also complement the activities of EU Member States and of other development partners.

It is part of a wider response to the challenges posed by the multifaceted migration phenomenon with which Europe and Africa are both confronted, fully recognising the benefits of well managed migration and mobility between and within the two continents. It also reflects the joint interest of all parties to ensure that refugee flows are managed in an effective, sustainable and safe manner and with full respect for human rights and international law.

It also complements the EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, which recognises the benefits deriving from well-managed mobility taking account of the interests of all parties – the EU, partner countries and migrants themselves – and includes political instruments (bilateral and regional policy dialogues and action plans), legal instruments (such as visa facilitation and readmission agreements), operational support and capacity-building as well as programme and project support made available to third countries and other stakeholders, e.g. civil society and international organisations.

The EU has established dedicated bilateral and regional migration dialogues with countries of West, Central and North Africa (Rabat Process) and East Africa (Khartoum Process). In addition, bilateral Mobility Partnerships (MP) and Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMP) have been established with a number of strategic partners, such as Morocco, Tunisia (MPs) and Nigeria (CAMP). Further such bilateral dialogues are under consideration with Egypt, Ethiopia, and Niger. The Trust Fund will contribute to this overall approach on migration with high level dialogues at its centre.

The overall objective of the Trust Fund is to address crises in the regions of the Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and in parts of North Africa. It will support all aspects of stability and contribute to better migration management as well as addressing the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration, in particular by promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development, and addressing human rights abuses. The Trust Fund shall intervene in coordination with national and regional frameworks, the other EU instruments, the bilateral co-operation of Member States, and the instruments of other development partners. The actions identified in the Trust Fund shall feed into the future and ongoing joint programming actions/documents elaborated jointly by the Commission services, the EEAS, Member States, and the recipient countries.

The Fund's interventions will be based on an integrated and evidence-driven approach, coordinated with regional, national or local actors and with other donor interventions and in line with relevant EU and African strategic frameworks and action plans. Its overall impact – the desired end result – should include a more inclusive political and economic environment across the regions, expansion and strengthening of the rule of law, increased economic productivity and social cohesion and new opportunities for local populations.

Table 35 Indicative resources table

Financing instrument	Contribution (mEUR)
Reserve of the 11th EDF	1,000
Regional Indicative Programme for West Africa – 11th EDF	200
Regional Indicative Programme for Central Africa – 11th EDF	10,
Regional Indicative Programme for Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean – 11th EDF	25
National Indicative Programmes for Horn of Africa 11th EDF	80
Special Support Programme for South Sudan – 9th and previous EDFs	80
European Neighbourhood Instrument	200,
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace	10 (tbc)
Humanitarian aid, food aid and disaster preparedness*	50,
Development Co-operation Instrument	125
Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund / Internal Security Fund	20(tbc)
EU Member States' contributions	Amounts to be confirmed

Source: *The European Union emergency trust fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa strategic orientation document*
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu-emergency-trust-fund-revised-strategy-15022016_en.pdf

Other evidence

EU contributions to MDTFs represent since 2003 an average of 40% of the total contributions to the UN and the World Bank Group. They are mainly due to specific reconstruction programmes and global challenges such as: 1/ Natural Disasters (Tsunami, earthquakes...), 2/ Wars or post-war interventions (Iraq, Afghanistan...), 3/ Global critical issues such as major pandemic diseases (AIDS, Malaria, Tuberculosis, Avian and human influenza). With 60 MDTF in Asia, Middle East, and Latin America, the DCI is the EU instrument financing the bulk of the contributions to MDTF (EUR 2,793 million). 78% of the funds are concentrated on the four major crises of these last years:

Afghanistan – Contributions to MDTFs set up by the international community for the reconstruction of the country (38%), managed by the WB (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and Support to Public Administration Reform) and the UNDP (Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan and Support to Sub-National Governance and National Area Based Development Programme).

Iraq – Contributions to the International Reconstruction Fund facility managed by the WB and the UNDP (29%).

Natural disasters – 9% of the DCI funds allocated to MDTFs, managed by the WB, have been affected to the support to the post tsunami reconstruction and Java's earthquake

Major pandemics – Finally around 2% of the funds went to MDTFs set up by WB or UN at the request of the international community for fighting Avian and Human influenza, aids, tuberculosis and malaria.

4 MDTFs are supported through the thematic budget lines (one managed by DG Environment) through DCI and EIDHR. This represents a total funding of around EUR 1,378 million of which 44% (EUR 612 million) of the funds are dedicated to The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria created in 2002 to provide international financing to the fight against these three major diseases killing over 6 million people each year.

Rationale for MDTFs:

Effective external assistance demands, in crisis and post crisis situations in particular, that those actors responsible for the implementation of such large volumes of aid cooperate both at a policy and strategic level and during implementation. Such co-operation is fully in line with the European Consensus, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and UN reform

(including the One UN approach at country level). In crisis situations, the donors must avoid duplicating the work. EU participation at a strategic level, in the governance structure of major 10 partners' programmes, allows it to play a strong role in terms of policy dialogue, allowing it to promote EU policies. This upstream co-operation translates into coordination of procedures and harmonisation, increasing the effectiveness of external aid and reducing transaction costs for partner countries.

Indeed, as it has been stated in the General Budget of the EU, there are many reasons to justify implementing EU funded activities through international organisations: their specific expertise; the UN and Red Cross families have singular capacities, privileges, and access for effective delivering of humanitarian aid and are recognised by the EU's framework agreements; the continuation of an existing programme; an international mandate; the absence of alternatives; their experience in the country/region; the optimisation of donor coordination; the participation in research project; their presence in the country/region; their logistical and management capacities; and neutrality or security reasons.

The experience developed so far as well as the results of internal and external analysis show that MDTFs are important and well adapted tools for collaboration between donors and International Organisations especially in crisis situations. MDTFs normally reach a high level of effectiveness with planned goals usually achieved. Large MDTFs allow for the sharing of common policies on implementation and the developments of best practices (Tsunami, Iraq, Afghanistan).

The UN and the World Bank have or can access skills and expertise in specific sectors which are not always available directly in EU Delegations or not in sufficient quantity. The UN and the WB also enjoy privileged, neutral relations with local and national governments, which facilitates working at country and regional level.

For both organisations (UN and WB), results of an independent evaluation of the Commission's external co-operation with partner countries through the organisations of the UN family and the WB have confirmed the advantages of this partnership:

Channelling through the UN opened doors which would otherwise have remained closed for the Commission. Findings show that this is particularly the case when (1) the Commission has had difficulties in its co-operation with local governments due to security reasons (Iraq); when (11) the Commission wished to intervene in global problems which needed global solutions (e.g. Tsunami, major pandemics); when (u) the international community provided the UN with a special mandate to intervene and in politically sensitive situations (e.g. refugees, elections).

Source: Information Note On Multidonor Trust Funds supported by The European Union Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development – EuropeAid BUDGET SINCE 2003 (Updated 31st March 2015).

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/multidonor-trust-funds-supported-by-the-european-union-2003-march-2015_en.pdf

Limitations of EUTFs to leverage MS resources

So far, the buy-in of EU member states in the Madad and the Africa Trust Fund has not matched the EU's announced expectations: contributions are often around the minimum of EUR 3 million for a voting-seat and mostly do not pass the EUR 10 million mark. For the Madad Fund, EU Member states have initially taken a 'wait and see' approach. In the current fiscal, economic and political context it is also difficult for EU Member States to match the EU's expectations.

Some Member States fear they will have fewer opportunities to steer decision making through these new management arrangements, as one representative of an EU Member State mentioned during an interview. The Africa Trust Fund, for example, draws massively from EDF reserve funds and regional indicative programmes; yet, it only provides voting rights to contributing donors. As a result, EU member states that sit in the EDF Committee but do not contribute a minimum of EUR 3 million to the Trust Fund lose influence over EDF spending. Some EU Member states have thus argued that if resources from the EU general budget or non-budgetary instruments are used, the participation of all EU Member states in the Trust Fund's management should be guaranteed. For the Africa Trust Fund EU Member

states aimed to lower the minimum contribution to EUR 1 million, yet after long discussions the EUR 3 million threshold remained.

The creation of EUTFs may have also deepened a rift with those Member states that believe in the primacy of UN coordination efforts over EU joint action, particularly in emergency situations, and see more added value in channeling funds through UN managed trust funds. In the case of the Madad Fund, some EU Member states wanted to keep funding support through the UN rather than channeling it through a newly created EUTF, in order to avoid additional transaction costs and delays in processing the funding for urgent emergency responses.

Source: Volker Hauck, Anna Knoll and Alisa Herrero Cangas. EU Trust Funds – Shaping more comprehensive external action? ECDPM Briefing Note No. 81, Nov 2015.

http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/Briefing_Note_81_EU_Trust_Funds_Africa_Migration_Knoll_Hauck_Cangas_ECDPM_2015.pdf

1.6.1.3 I-613 Extent to which mobilisation of national public resources for sustainability is taken into consideration in DCI programming.

Indicator Summary

While there is a trend towards the use of budget support, whenever possible, no evidence has emerged that DCI resource allocation was influenced by the extent of national mobilisation of resources. The reviewed documents, particularly evaluation reports, solely refer to budget support as the appropriate aid modality to foster government ownership and support reforms and thus create an enabling environment for the mobilisation of national resources.

Review national MIPs

The national public resources are systematically covered in MIPs for each priority sector (although with various level of detail) together with the government's policy commitments. The link to decisions in the DCI programming (i.e. whether DCI resource allocation was influenced by the extent of national mobilisation of resources) is not made in the MIPs.

Review of evaluations

A few reports (Nepal, Health and Trade-related Assistance) refer to budget support as the appropriate aid modality to foster government ownership and thus enable national resources mobilisation. However, in the case of the sector of health the use of this modality has not being as effective as expected e.g.: *“Although the EC, both on its own and in conjunction with other donors, has made a contribution through GBS and SBS to inclusive objectives in the health sector, this does not seem to have been translated into improved policy based resource allocations. There is no strong evidence on a significant positive impact of budget support on national health expenditures and on budget processes at both central and decentralised levels.”* (Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector, 61).

1.6.2 JC 62: Under DCI the EU has made a strategic use of policy and political dialogue to leverage reforms.

1.6.2.1 I-621 Extent to which policy dialogue under DCI budget support is perceived to have strengthened in the post-2014 period.

Indicator Summary

Limited evidence indicates that, when partners' ownership is strong, BS helps strengthen their commitment (politically, financially and technically) and leverage their own resources. Such leverage effect is particularly high when BS dimension goes beyond its limited financial size and is linked to wider strategic partnerships between EU and the partners. The same has been noticed in countries with well-functioning Association agreements (e.g., South Africa), where BS leverages commitments to reforms that will open new visible opportunities to the national economies. While sector budget support can result, especially after a long

time, in significant leverage at the sectoral policy level (e.g., through targets and monitoring), high-level political leverage from ODA is limited (see I-622). The effectiveness of policy dialogue, especially outside focal sectors, is also limited by EUD staff constraints including turnover.

Review national MIPs

The opportunity for policy and political dialogue is mentioned in most of the MIPs as part of EU planned activity in the priority sectors. Some MIPs discuss the strategic areas for policy dialogue in great detail (e.g. Guatemala, Ecuador). The argument is commonly made that substantive sector presence (including financial volume and the relationship with governments built up in previous periods result in the ability/opportunity to influence policies and choices.

As almost all MIPS cite policy dialogue, only one example is given here: the link to policy dialogue through financial incentives under DCI in Afghanistan – *‘This will require a critical mass of EU finance in each sector to help leverage policy dialogue and ensure impact on institutional development and service delivery, as well as on improving the country's investment climate.’* (p.3), *‘EU will use approximately 20 percent, or EUR 300 million, of its allocation to incentivize Government's fulfilment of its commitments agreed under the Tokyo Framework’* (p.9);.

Review regional MIPs

Similarly to the bilateral programming documents, the DCI at regional level has enabled the EU to engage with the partner countries at policy and political level. MIPs frequently cite the importance of entering in strategic dialogues with key partners in various areas.

To give only one example, the Central Asia MIP (2014, 2) stresses that *“in the priority areas for cooperation agreed between the EU and the Central Asian partners a common agenda has been developed for modernisation and reform, building on regional policy dialogues and expert working groups.”*

AAPs

In the AAPs policy dialogues are only mentioned in the context of budget support to Bangladesh: For the *“EU in particular, it has been challenging to engage in a dialogue in PFM with the Government given the limited ownership of the PFM reforms. While harmonising with the other eight donors, it was also difficult to ensure proper understanding of the specific EU requirements within the government entities. Nevertheless, due to consistent support and commitment to the education sector, EU has played a key role in strengthening the dialogue and the process of education sector reforms. EU's active involvement with all the relevant partners of the sector has been instrumental in the dialogues for strengthening the coordination between state and non-state actors in order to improve service delivery”*

Independent expert interview

In Ecuador and Bolivia, the EU political decision to support the innovative (and relatively risky) development strategies of the new governments has put budget support in a wider framework, which has contributed to enhance its effects. The country evaluations are very positive on the level of ownership associated with BS. In Colombia, in 2015 a budget support for local development, with a focus on conflict areas, has been agreed upon and launched as a key tool to support the peace process.

In South Africa, BS has leveraged important financial and knowledge investment in policy innovation in several sectors (Justice, Health, Innovation in poverty reduction, etc.). Here BS has acted as a tool for the implementation of the EU-SA Strategic Partnership, which covers shared principles and areas of know-how exchanges and involves civil society. In such framework, BS has helped both government and civil society test new approaches to access to justice, application of science and technology to fight against poverty, alternative models for a modern and equitable system of health insurance, etc.

EUD interviews

Policy leverage through sector budget support can be significant when the EU has given substantial, long-term support at the sector level. Political leverage from sector or even general budget support, by contrast, is limited low (see I-622). This is particularly the case where the subject is controversial, as in the case of laws governing civil society or hot political issues such as the South China Sea. Between the availability of non-DAC resources and overall pushback against the Western liberal democratic model, ODA is not nearly as persuasive as it once was. The effectiveness of EU policy dialogue outside focal sectors is also limited by EUD staff constraints, which can result in an asymmetry of expertise in discussions between EUD staff and government counterparts.

Review of evaluations

In Paraguay, "Policy dialogue constitutes the Budget Support input that has achieved the greatest influence. In particular, it has had a significant influence on the strengthening of the design and implementation of policies in the education and social protection sectors. Its influence on the strengthening of Public Finance Management was more moderate; yet, it is notable that, in the absence of the Budget Support, the implementation of the PEFA assessments and the development of the PFM Action Plans would have been undertaken more slowly or not at all." (Evaluation of Budget Support in Paraguay, 2006-2014, p. 4)

1.6.2.2 I-622 Policy dialogue under DCI, complemented by political dialogue, can be credibly considered to have given impetus to policy reforms.

Indicator Summary

While the EU is involved in, and indeed facilitates, a broad range of policy and political dialogues in relations with partner countries and regions, no systematic evidence has emerged for a causal link between such dialogues and reform processes. While dialogue through DCI yields positive results overall, field mission interviews with EUD officials, confirmed by interviews with government officials, indicate that policy dialogue is most effective at sector, technical, and Ministry level, largely through targets and monitoring. The 2014 synthesis of budget support evaluations found that, where there was convergence of policy interests (more often the case in middle-income than low-income countries), budget support produced political influence but, where there was no convergence, the leverage provided by budget support was low. Interviews, particularly field interviews, as well as academic literature suggest that, at political level, its effectiveness is blunted by the fact that the importance of DCI ODA is dwarfed by the importance of trade. The possibility of GSP+, for example is a stronger leverage tool for projecting EU values and expectations regarding country commitment to international conventions than is DCI budget support. The diminishing role of ODA in resource flows, the availability of new sources of finance, the lower than optimal visibility of the EU beyond sector level were all cited in interviews as constraints. In controversial areas involving the role of civil society and human rights, the Western liberal democratic model of governance is seen to have diminishing appeal; the phenomenon broadly known as "pushback."

Review national MIPs

Coverage of policy dialogue in the MIPs is described in I-412; the intention for policy dialogue is there. Beyond that, whether the policy dialogue under DCI has actually credibly given impetus to reform will need to be found from other sources.

Review regional MIPs

Please see I-412.

Policy dialogue is frequently referred to in all three MIPs, also in connection to initiate or promote reform processes. For instance, the Central Asia MIP (2014, 3) states *"A long term perspective and cooperation continuity are critical factors for a successful institution building approach in CA countries. The aim is to promote policy and institutional reforms, including through sharing of the EU experience and transfer of best practices."*

Review Evaluations

Three evaluations – Evaluation of the European Union’s regional co-operation with Asia (2014), Thematic Global Evaluation of European Commission’s Support to Trade-related Assistance in Third Countries (2012) and Evaluation of EU regional-level support to Central Asia (2016) – cover political and policy dialogues in detail. While the first two come to positive conclusions on the reinforcing link between development co-operation and high level dialogues, the Central Asia evaluation does not present conclusive evidence for a mutually reinforcing nature of the two approaches. None of the evaluation reports mentions any direct impact of political and policy reports on policy reforms.

- “Development co-operation and interregional policy dialogues, as the two main strategic approaches towards Asia, have mutually reinforced each other and increased the EU’s leverage on key agendas. It is a particular strength of the RSP that it is based on development co-operation and policy dialogues as mutually reinforcing pillars. The cross-linkages between the co-operation programme and institutionalised high-level political relations have increased the EU’s and Asian partners’ ability to respond more effectively to emerging challenges in political, economic, social and environmental fields.” (Evaluation of the European Union’s regional co-operation with Asia. Final Report Volume 1 March 2014, p. ix)
- “It is a particular strong feature of the [EU-ASEAN] co-operation that TRA projects run in parallel, and are coordinated, with a high-profile political dialogue on economic co-operation. The EC participates in a series of consultative meetings with ASEAN which includes the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting (AEMM), ASEAN-EU Economic Ministers Meeting, ASEAN-EU Senior Officials Meeting, the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC) and the Joint Co-operation Committee (JCC) Meeting. These meetings offer opportunities for the EU and ASEAN to review their relations in the fields of economic and development co-operation affecting the two sides” (Thematic Global Evaluation of European Commission’s Support to Trade-related Assistance in Third Countries, Field visit report ASEAN, July 2012, pp. 19, 21)
- “A less quantifiable added value is the diplomatic role the regional programmes and policy dialogues played in terms of bringing representatives at the political and in particular technical levels together, thereby contributing to fostering better relations and increased trust and hence, to some extent, countering the general trend of declining regional integration (see conclusion 3). For example, the dialogues initiated under the regional programmes provided a first step towards promoting a more regional approach to PSD [private sector development] in CA [Central Asia].” (Evaluation of EU regional-level support to Central Asia (2007-2014), p. 64).
- Budget support funding is not correlated with policy leverage. Despite the significant funds provided in the LICs, there were reforms which the partner governments did not undertake despite losing funding. In the MICs, by contrast, donors did not raise fundamental policy issues but were able to influence aspects of the design of reforms through policy dialogue and technical assistance, even though levels of budget support funding comprised less than 2% of public spending. Budget support influenced policy, where interests converged; where they did not converge, domestic political interests drove the agenda and, those interests proved impervious to external influence. (Synthesis of budget support evaluations (2014), Executive Summary, p. 11).

Review AAPs

The Regional Facility for International Cooperation and Partnership Action is designed to link development co-operation with policy dialogue. “*The present proposal seeks to establish a new approach for engaging with Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) partner countries in the area of development cooperation. It aims at creating a flexible mechanism for joint activities between the EU and LAC countries to work together in the region with two overarching objectives: (i) poverty reduction, as per the objectives of the Development Cooperation Instrument³ (DCI), and (ii) enhanced strategic and mutual interest partnerships between both regions in areas of global concern, in line with the Partnership Instrument’s⁴*

(PI) aims. This approach will provide the EU with new entry into dialogue on global challenges with our partner governments in the region. It will help build new alliances based on solidarity and shared principles. This will also answer the requests of Latin American and Caribbean countries to enter into a new policy framework of working jointly as partners with the EU in other countries of the region, with the primary objective of better integrating developing countries in the region and extending support to them in reaching their development and enhanced policy cooperation goals. The approach foresees a Facility encompassing two components to provide response to both Official Development Assistance (ODA) and non-ODA cooperation needs in the region. It will provide an overarching political umbrella that ensures effective complementarity and coordination of actions financed under the DCI and PI. Parallel PI-DCI financing should be undertaken under the common framework of this proposal where activities would correspond to the objectives of the PI and the DCI. This approach will help maximise the impact of different EU action in Latin America and the Caribbean, fostering policy coherence for development and opportunities for deepening EU's strategic relations in areas of mutual interest, creating value added for the EU cooperation in the region as a whole" (ANNEX 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Regional Facility for International Cooperation and Partnership Action Document for the Regional Facility for International Cooperation and Partnership, 2015)

In Central Asia, the implementation of the EU – CA enhanced regional co-operation on Environment, Water and Climate Change includes a structured political dialogue with the Central Asian Countries through regular high-level meetings coordinated by Italy with the support of the European External Action Services and the European Commission, “*in order to ensure that the proposed priorities, as well as the undertaken actions, such as the EU Cooperation programs, are in line with the national and regional priorities and interests.*” A regular dialogue was launched on how to address the threats posed by climate change in Central Asia, and a new EU-CA Working Group on Environmental Governance and Climate Change (WG EGCC), led by Italy, established to strengthen policy co-operation at regional level. The policy dialogue is supported by projects implemented under the EU Regional Environmental Programme for Central Asia (EURECA) (Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2015 part 2 in favour of Central Asia Action Document for the Regional coordination and support for the EU – CA enhanced regional co-operation on Environment, Water and Climate Change, 2015).

Field mission interviews

A number of EUD officials interviewed made the point that, while DCI gave rise to fruitful policy dialogue at the technical or ministerial level in sectors receiving support, it failed to support high-level political dialogue, especially in controversial areas. In Bangladesh and Cambodia, the view was that it was trade, dwarfing ODA in size, which provided real political leverage. The availability of alternative external resources (e.g. from China in those two cases) also reduced the effectiveness of DCI in promoting high-level political dialogue. Policy dialogue in both countries was unsuccessful in deterring government from imposing new restrictions on civil society. In Cambodia, policy dialogue failed to prevent government from endorsing China's position in ASEAN discussions of the South China Sea dispute. However, in Bolivia, the EUD was successful in encouraging government to align with an important European ant-drug policy. The phenomenon of “pushback,” diminishing respect for the Western liberal democratic model of governance, is widespread.

EUD capacity constraints were also reported to be a factor constraining the effectiveness of policy dialogue, with staff members lacking the technical expertise (a factor also cited in EU HQ interviews with officials from thematic DEVCO units) and the time necessarily for effective participation. This can give rise to an asymmetry of expertise in discussions with government counterparts.

1.6.2.3 I-623 Extent to which DCI is viewed as an effective means of obtaining policy leverage.

Indicator Summary

Programming documents (MIPs) and EAMRs give a great deal of attention to the fact that the EU engages in policy dialogue through DCI programmes, especially budget support, with the main stakeholders in all partner countries. Both national and regional MIPs frequently mention DCI as an opportunity and framework for political and policy dialogues with key partners. EAMRs stress the EU's engagement in policy dialogue in a broad range of thematic areas through DCI programmes. The Pan-African Programme 2014-2020 elaborates in detail how policy and political advocacy are embedded within the overall development co-operation framework.

As developed under I-622, EUD opinion on the effectiveness of DCI-based policy dialogue is equivocal – it is often effective at sector level, not particularly effective at political level. EU MS representatives interviewed, both at EU HQ and in the field, cited the EU's reputation as a neutral actor, not defending a bilateral interest, as a factor strengthening the EU's voice (more than the sheer financial weight of the DCI). This has been discussed under EQ 4 on EU value added, as well. At the same time, it must be remembered that, by design, EU ODA comes carrying significant baggage related to gender, human rights, civil society engagement, environment, etc. To say that the EU is a disinterested partners would be to go too far.

Review of evaluations

The EU has actively and increasingly over time engaged in policy dialogue under DCI. Overall, financial support and policy dialogue are mutually reinforcing. In most cases there is no doubt that policy dialogue has strengthened the effectiveness of co-operation, mainly in terms of outputs-outcomes although there are differences across regions.

- In Asia: *“However, this finding does not apply to EU-SAARC relations, which lack a dialogue setting comparable to EU-ASEAN relations.” (Evaluation of the EU's Cooperation with Asia, 22); and within countries across sectors e.g. Nepal: “Whereas policy dialogue was an explicit part of the cooperation in the education sector, in other sectors the policy dialogue is still only emerging, such as trade related assistance and environment.” (Evaluation of the European Union's Co-operation with Nepal, 44-45).*
- Good experiences of EU contributions can be found in e.g. Asia *“Programmes and projects implemented under the RSP have had some success in contributing to new or revised national policy frameworks and innovative practises among key stakeholders in core thematic areas.” (Evaluation of the EU's Cooperation with Asia, p. 22); Health sector “There is, however, evidence that SBS has resulted in increased levels of capacity building support for health, including all EC financed SBS and in some instances GBS.” (Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector, p.61).*
- Of particular interest are the cases of Trade-related Assistance and Environment and Climate Change: *“Often, SBS effectively supported trade reform processes requiring a broad range of development activities to be driven by the partner government. Unsurprisingly, a common denominator for the success appeared to be highly-committed governments that assumed strong leadership and capacities for trade reform processes, and for ownership in policy design, implementation and monitoring.” (Evaluation of the European Union's Trade-related Assistance in Third Countries, 21);*
- *“The EU has an ambitious policy framework, which clearly emphasises that addressing economic development and environment and climate change cannot be done in isolation from each other [...] The EU implemented these policies and promoted EU positions through a combination of: a) policy dialogue at global and national levels; b) bilateral programme support to countries, based on the national priorities of partner countries; c) thematic funding for environment under ENRTP, based on MEAs and EU policy aspirations. This combination approach enabled the*

EU to influence national priorities towards a gradually increased emphasis on environment and climate change (even if it is still somewhat low in many countries)." (Thematic global evaluation of the EU support to environment and climate change in third countries (2007-2013), 28-29).

Nevertheless, there is little evidence that policy dialogue has triggered political reforms leading to results at impact level. E.g.: *"The EC has actively participated in the policy dialogue with the GoN in line with the size of its support (the EC is a relatively small DP in Ne-pal), but more could have been done."* (Evaluation of the European Union's Co-operation with Nepal, 22);

- *"They did however consider that some types of VA were not fully realised, notably with respect to political leverage and the capacity to coordinate EU players and build synergies with other institutions."* (Evaluation of the European Union's Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries, 25)
- *"While EU Delegations' participation in policy dialogue in the context of SWAp / SBS / GBS contributed to better health sector policies and management, there is little evidence that it resulted in concrete increases in resources allocated to health."* (Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector, 76).

The Evaluation of Blending (2016) reports that the role of blending was mainly to support ongoing rather than trigger major policy reforms. *"Blending actively contributed to ongoing reforms in many of the countries and sectors that it operated in through: policy level discussion; TA and advisory services and; through complementing reforms with physical investments. There were some cases where the combination of budget support and blending was complementary and proved a powerful factor of change. The role of blending was mainly to support ongoing rather than trigger major policy reforms. Although blending contributed, it did not always fully exploit opportunities to advance policy reforms. Blending projects were primarily aimed at physical investment and improving access to finance and did not always explicitly include policy reform in the objectives, expected outcomes and result reporting. Where blending contributed strongly it was commonly associated with one or more of the following factors: the project originated from a wider reform agenda; was closely linked to an EU focal sector; benefitted from and contributed to the implementation of EU partnership and association agreements and/or; was led by an IFI that had offices in the country concerned and had a history of engagement in the sector. (...) Although blending contributed, it did not always fully exploit opportunities to advance policy reforms. Factors that affected how much blending contributed to leveraging policy reforms included:*

- *The extent to which blending projects included policy reform in the objectives, expected outcomes and activities.*
- *The extent to which the project originated from a wider reform agenda or was linked to EU, WB or other reform efforts supported by major actors*
- *The extent to which blending projects in a particular country supported projects that were in a EU focal sector and could interact with an already established policy dialogue platform and /or the leverage provided by budget support*
- *The presence of wider EU partnership and association agreements*
- *The presence of IFI offices in the country concerned"*

A remarkable exception can be found in the Gender Equality and Women Empowerment sector *"Senior management in EC Services and EEAS have not sufficiently prioritised the EU's ambitious GEWE commitments, which neither permeate cooperation strategies nor systematically feature in programmes, projects or political and policy dialogue. This undermines the EU's contribution to the achievement of gender equality as a fundamental human right and goes against the clear global evidence of the costs of neglecting GEWE as a policy priority."* (Evaluation of EU Support to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Partner Countries, viii-ix).

Some reports refer to the lack of capacity and expertise of EUD staff and strategies (e.g. Health sector) and poor governance and political instability (e.g. Nepal) as the main obstacles encountered to have a greater impact.

Review of EAMRs

To judge from these EAMRs, the EU is engaged in policy dialogue with national authorities and development partners at many different levels (regional, national, local, technical and senior) and in many forms (formal, informal, bilateral, jointly with MS and DPs, CSOs, private sector and other stakeholders) in every country where DCI operates. In numerous cases, sectorial policy dialogue and negotiations about the implementation of co-operation programmes have been a window of opportunity for raising the EU's major concerns and elevating political dialogue to a higher level. Some examples include: Cuba "the reinforcement of the Operations section has enhanced policy dialogue" (EAMR Cuba 2015, 5-8); Guatemala *"the EUD organised two high profile events together with Oxfam aimed at providing political incidence in support of the adoption of an integrated Human Rights Defenders' protection policy by the State"* (EAMR Guatemala 2015, 7-11); Honduras *"the government has identified the MADIGEP program (DCI-ALA/2014/026524) as a privileged new space for dialogue on EU interventions and governance issues in general"* (EAMR Honduras 2015, 3-4); Laos *"the EUD consistently and successfully pushed for the setting up of a National Nutrition Forum mechanism"*. (EAMR Laos 2015, 3-6).

Policy dialogue takes place around EU key sectors, but it advances at a different pace depending on a country's political, social and economic context. Overall, the EU has applied a flexible and effective approach, tailoring policy dialogue to specific country and sector conditions. Policy dialogue and DCI programmes mutually reinforce each other, and both are essential for an effective and comprehensive approach. Some examples include: Myanmar *"policy dialogue served to support the set-up of new cooperation programmes under several focal sectors and it was instrumental in the programming of new actions and the setting up of new programmes of support."* (EAMR Myanmar 2015, 7-13); Nicaragua *"EU-funded initiatives of civil society contributed to enriching the dialogue on sector budget and priorities."* (EAMR Nicaragua 2015, 4-6); Paraguay *"Policy dialogue also allowed making substantial progress towards programming budget support intervention."* (EAMR Paraguay 2015, 3-4); Vietnam *"Regular dialogue with the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) in Vietnam also allowed smooth implementation of EU development aid and the preparation of new programmes."* (EAMR Vietnam 2015, 3-5); Tajikistan *"BS Specific conditions under HDSP II are the basis of the EU policy dialogue."* (EAMR Tajikistan 2015, 7-9).

However, EAMRs also cite challenges that have slowed policy dialogue and co-operation progress. The main obstacles are: bureaucratic burden and sometimes outright hostility from governments (Myanmar, Cambodia); institutional fragmentation and unstable distribution of competences between ministerial departments (e.g. Nicaragua); political interference and lack of ownership (e.g. Pakistan); reorganisation of ministries and their portfolios after elections (e.g. Sri Lanka); and lack of coordination between ministries and services (e.g. Vietnam).

Review of AAPs


The AAPs do not generally provide evidence on political and policy advocacy through dialogues with partner countries. A prominent exception is Myanmar where the "Comprehensive Framework for the European Union's policy and support to Myanmar/Burma", adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council in July 2013, sets out the framework for EU policy and support to the ongoing reforms in Myanmar/Burma. The EU has pledged to support the peace process on all sides and has established a regular political dialogue involving all concerned stakeholders to a) achieve sustainable peace in Myanmar/Burma by addressing longstanding differences in an inclusive way; b) to consolidate democratic achievements; c) to strengthen human rights and the rule of law; and d) to adhere to international agreements. (ANNEX 3 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2015 in favour of Myanmar/Burma to be financed from the general budget of the European Union Action Document for EU Peace Support in Myanmar/Burma – PEACE II). This is a good example for an approach which combines foreign policy with development co-operation.

2 Annex 2: Evaluation and data collection process

2.1 Evaluation process

The evaluation process is summarised in the graph below.

Figure 33 Evaluation Process




The various methodological steps coincide with different evaluation phases undertaken within the framework of the evaluation:

- During the **inception phase**, the evaluation team has gained an understanding and overview of the object of the evaluation, produced an inventory of the evidence base, a preliminary intervention logic and elaborated the evaluation matrix including judgement criteria, areas of attention / indicators, sources of information and methodological approach for each EQ. It has formed a view on evidence and identified approaches to collecting it.
- Data collection takes place in two steps:
 - During the **desk phase**, a variety of documents have been consulted. In addition, the team conducted a series of interviews with EU HQ staff. The purpose of these activities was to gather evidence on EQs, draft preliminary findings and hypotheses, identify information gaps and refine the Intervention Logic.
 - Through further discussions with EU HQ staff, MS committee members and field visits during the **validation phase**: This phase was also devoted to seek out additional evidence fill data gaps and validate or revise the preliminary findings and hypotheses formulated in the desk report.
- A separate study on the effects of the **Common Implementing Regulation (CIR)** on DCI was undertaken in parallel to the aforementioned desk collection under the desk and validation phases.
- The DCI evaluation also benefitted from a **joint EFI survey** conducted in parallel with the DCI validation phase.
- The **synthesis phase** was then devoted to constructing answers to the EQs, and formulating conclusions and recommendations on the basis of the data collected

throughout the process. A draft report was made available for an Open Public Consultation.

2.2 Data collection and analysis

During the whole evaluation, the evaluation team has followed a structured data collection process as outlined in the figure below.



To ensure a high level of data reliability and validity of conclusions, the evaluation collected and reviewed and analysed more than 2,000 documents and conducted more than 150 interviews (including EU HQ staff, EUD staff, EU MS representatives in the field and DCI Committee Members, Civil Society representatives, beneficiaries and others). An EFI-wide survey to all EU Delegations yielded 84 responses. Field missions were conducted to Cambodia, Bangladesh, Bolivia and Ethiopia during October/November 2016.

The table below presents an overview of type of evidence used.

Table 36 Overview of (non-exhaustive) evidence used during the evaluation

Evidence	Description
Policy documents	Targeted analysis of policy documents at EU and international level (including policy documents after adoption of the regulation and external action policy documents to capture both, the wider policy context and evolving policy priorities such as policy documents on security and development and the Global Strategy).
Regulations and Programming documents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regulations of the DCI and other EFIs (and related Impact assessments) Multi-Annual Indicative Programming Documents Annual Action Plans and related Action Documents
Financial information and statistics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU Statistical Dashboard extractions on committed and disbursed amounts, Allocations from MIPs for 2014-2020, The EU Results Framework Database (incl. Report on Results), Other databases (e.g. OECD, World Bank, IMF, UN)
EU reporting	<p>Examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> External Assistance Management Reports (EAMRs) Thematic Budget Line Reports (TBLs) Sub-delegated Authorising Officer Reports (SDAOs) Results Oriented Monitoring Reports (ROM) Quality Support Group (QSG) documentation Annual Reports (e.g. Annual Activity Reports) Court of Auditor Reports (special and annual)

<i>Evidence</i>	<i>Description</i>
Evaluation and studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Geographic evaluations (Country-level, regional) • Thematic evaluations • Aid modality evaluations • Other instruments evaluations
Academic and think tank literature	Numerous studies, reviews and articles from think tanks, institutions and individual academics.
Interviews, and group discussions	Interviews were held with a number of key informants at DEVCO and EEAS HQ level, with various stakeholders in four partner countries and MS Committee Members.
EUD survey	The survey was addressed to Delegations in all partner countries in which EFIs are used. It solicits views and information from Delegations which cannot be derived from other sources. The tool will allowed reaching a large number of respondents and obtaining structured and directly comparable data on topics of interest.

2.3 Validation phase and field mission proposal

The purpose of the validation phase was to test hypotheses and assumptions that emerged from the desk study on all EQs and collect additional information. It consisted of:

- Further interviews in EU HQ with ISG members, staff in charge of CIR and a selection of stakeholders from relevant thematic DGs in EU HQ.
- Interviews with Member States Committee members.
- Mission to Bangladesh, Bolivia and Cambodia as well as Ethiopia (the latter on the Pan-African Programme and DCI thematic programmes) to conduct interviews and group discussions.
- Possible revision of the IL, based on the data collected and its validation, including whether the IL is plausible to key stakeholders and agreed upon by them.
- Based on the success of data collection, assessing whether there is need for further research and interviews to prepare the draft report, and in particular the conclusions chapter.

In line with the consultation strategy presented in the inception report, a number of people, especially from the Commission, have already been consulted during previous phases. The field missions allowed for more extensive consultations in DCI countries with various ministries, CSO representatives, EU Member States and other development partners. The field missions served to validate or revise the preliminary findings, hypotheses and assumptions formulated in this desk report in previous sections and it particularly served as an opportunity to obtain more “real life” examples. Moreover, the field missions generated evidence that has been used to refine the Intervention Logic.

The table below presents the field mission proposal for the four field mission countries.

Figure 34 Field mission proposal

<i>Country</i>	<i>Rationale for selection</i>	<i>Planned interview partners</i>	<i>Dates⁵³</i>
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coverage of a Latin American country • Highest level of DCI allocations in Latin America 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delegate and senior management in the Delegation • DCI desk officers at the technical level • Meeting with at senior counterparts of the government coordinating DCI support 	23/10 – 26/10
Bangladesh	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coverage of a South East Asian country 		21/10 – 25/10

⁵³ Including travel

<i>Country</i>	<i>Rationale for selection</i>	<i>Planned interview partners</i>	<i>Dates⁵³</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High level of DCI allocations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Possibly meetings with technical Ministries receiving DCI report. • A meeting with CSOs and LAs • A meeting with representatives of EU Member States 	
Cambodia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coverage of a South East Asian country • High level of DCI allocations 		26/10 – 29/10
Ethiopia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Location of the African Union • Coverage of the Pan-African Programme • Use of thematic programmes in a non-DCI country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • African Union officials (Ethiopia only) • Other (e.g. other development partners, trade union and representatives from private sector) 	28/11 – 30/11


3 Annex 3: Consultation strategy

3.1 Introduction

The evaluation of the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI) for the period 2014 to June 2017 will, together with parallel evaluations of other external financing instruments (EFIs) under the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2014-2020, feed into the mid-term review (MTR) report. The MTR is required by the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR) Article 17, by the end of December 2017.

This Consultation strategy provides an overview of the approach that has been taken for the DCI evaluation with the main objective to ensure that the evaluation team could fully engage with the major stakeholders during the evaluation process. The following figure provides an overview of the consultation activities and at what point they took place in the evaluation process.

Figure 35 Time frame of consultations



The evaluation team considers that the combination of semi-structured interviews, group discussions, survey to EU Delegations, face-to-face consultations, web-consultation and the possibility to provide additional written inputs allowed a broad range of relevant stakeholders to be consulted.

3.2 Consultation activities

Consultation took place via the following means:

- ISG meetings,
- Interviews (face-to-face and via phone) and group discussions with various stakeholders (see table below for further details),
- Survey to EU delegations,
- Open Public Consultation (OPC) via web and face-to-face.

ISG meetings

During all phases of the evaluation, several ISG meetings took place which allowed the evaluation team to receive feedback on the various deliverables.

Interviews and group discussions

During all phases of the evaluation, the team conducted more than 150 interviews (including EU HQ staff, EUD staff, EU MS representatives in the field and DCI Committee Members, Civil Society representatives, beneficiaries and others).

Survey to EU delegations

An EFI-wide survey to all EU Delegations allowed reaching a large number of respondents and obtaining structured and directly comparable data on topics of interest. For DCI it yielded 84 responses.

Open Public Consultation

An important component of this consultation process has been the Open Public Consultation (OPC) done at the end of the synthesis phase of the evaluation which collected feedback

through a web-OPC. A total of 238 contributions were received for DCI from 64 contributors. The objective of the web-consultation was twofold:


- To gather feedback from the broadest possible range of stakeholders, including those in beneficiary countries and in the EU Member States, on the emerging conclusions from the evaluations.
- To gather preliminary ideas on the future external financing instruments after the current ones have expired by 31 December 2020.

Additionally and as part of the public consultation, DEVCO, EEAS, FPI and NEAR organised a technical workshop with over 180 participants from the European Parliament and EU Member States on 27-28 March 2017. The purpose of this workshop was to gather views on the draft evaluation reports of the EFIs and start reflections on the future of the instruments post-2020. Moreover, the draft evaluation report was presented at a meeting with the Working Party on Development Cooperation (CODEV) of the Council of the European Union on 23, February 2017 and at the Policy Forum on Development Meeting on 23, March 2017. The meeting brought together Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Local Authorities (LAs) from the European Union and partner countries. The summary of the OPC can be found in a separate Annex.

3.3 Stakeholder mapping

An important element of any consultation strategy is to identify or map the stakeholder groups that should be consulted. Below is a presentation of the main stakeholder groups that have been identified for DCI.

Figure 36 Stakeholder Mapping



3.4 Stakeholder consultation

The table below gives an overview of the strategy used for the stakeholders and on which issue the evaluation team has engaged with them.⁵⁴

Table 37 Consultation strategy: Who, what, when and how?

Name	Position	Organisation / Unit	Consultation issue						Strategy	
			EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6	When?	How?
DG DEVCO – Dir A – Development Policy and International Cooperation										
António Carlos Fernandes Teixeira	Policy Officer – Team Leader of Economic Analysis Policy and Coherence, EU Development Policy	1. Policy and Coherence	■				■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Nicoletta Merlo	Deputy Head of Unit	1. Policy and Coherence	■				■		Desk and synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Guiseppe Balducci	Development policy	1. Policy and Coherence	■				■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Katarina Tafvelin	Policy Officer	2. Financing and Effectiveness	■	■					Desk phase	Group presentation
Susanne Wille	Deputy Head Of Unit	4. Budget Support and Public Finance Management		■	■	■		■	Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
DG DEVCO – Dir B – Human Development and Migration										
Jean-Louis Ville	Acting Director	Human Development and Migration	■	■					Synthesis phase	Group interview
Sarah Rinaldi	Deputy Head of Unit	1. Human Rights, Gender, Democratic Governance		■					Desk phase	Semi-structured interview
Michel Laloge	International Aid / Cooperation Officer	2. Civil Society, Local Authorities	■	■	■	■	■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Patrice Lenormand	Deputy Head of Unit	2. Civil Society, Local Authorities	■	■	■	■	■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured

⁵⁴ To note that information on stakeholders consulted during the OPC can be found below.

Name	Position	Organisation / Unit	Consultation issue						Strategy	
			EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6	When?	How?
										interview
Maria Cohi-Ramon	Programme Assistant - External Relations	2. Civil Society, Local Authorities	■	■	■	■	■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Francoise Millecam	Deputy Head of Unit	3. Migration, Employment, Inequalities	■	■	■	■	■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Alicia Martin Diaz	Programme Officer	3. Migration, Employment, Inequalities	■	■	■	■	■		Desk phase	Semi-structured interview
Isabelle Wahdeova	Secteur Migration et Politique d'Asile	3. Migration, Employment, Inequalities	■	■	■	■	■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Walter Seidel	Secteur Santé	4. Education, Health, Research, Culture	■	■	■	■	■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Marja Karjalainen	Deputy Head of Unit	4. Education, Health, Research, Culture	■	■	■	■	■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Rui Costa	Project Manager - EU Policies	5. Stability, Security, Development and Nuclear Safety					■		Desk phase	Semi-structured interview
Laurent Derouaux	Finance and Contracts Assistant	6. Finance, Contracts, Audit	Transversal, covering all EQs						Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Josick van Dromme	Financial Officer	6. Finance, Contracts, Audit	Transversal, covering all EQs						Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview, emails
DG DEVCO – Dir C – Sustainable Growth and Development										
Maria Paris-Ketting	Head of Sector - Policy and Planning, Food Security Policy	1. Rural Development, Food Security, Nutrition	■	■	■	■	■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Laura Gualdi	GPGC FSSA and Project Assistant ISS-FANSSA	1. Rural Development, Food Security, Nutrition	■	■	■	■	■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Jose Soler Carbo	Deputy Head of Unit; Head of Sector	2. Environment, ecosystems, biodiversity and wildlife	■	■			■		Desk phase	Semi-structured

Name	Position	Organisation / Unit	Consultation issue						Strategy	
			EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6	When?	How?
										interview
Maria Barbara Chojnacka	Manager de Programmes - Chef de secteur	3. Financial Instruments						■	Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Bertrand Jolas	Policy Officer - Trade and Regional Integration : Services, Rules of Origin, Fair Trade, Green Economy	4. Private Framework Development, Trade, Regional Integration		■			■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Sofia Martinez	Thematic Officer	6. Sustainable Energy and Climate Change		■			■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
DG DEVCO – Dir D – Development Coordination East and Southern Africa										
Marzia Pietrelli	Deputy Head of Unit	3. ACP Coordination					■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Emilie Wattellier	Team Leader - EDF Programming	3. ACP Coordination					■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Jonathan van Meerbeeck	Team Leader - Panafrican Programme	4. Africa-EU Partnership, African Peace Facility	■	■		■	■	■	Desk phase	Group discussion
DG DEVCO – Dir G – Development Coordination Latin America and Caribbean										
Aniceto Rodriguez Ruiz	International Aid / Cooperation Officer	1. Development Coordination Latin America and Caribbean	■	■			■		Desk phase	Semi-structured interview
DG DEVCO – Dir H – Development Coordination Asia, Central Asia, Middle East/Gulf and Pacific										
Giulio Gentile	International Aid / Cooperation Officer - Development Coordinator Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia	DG DEVCO 1. Development Coordination South and South East Asia	Transversal, covering all EQs						Desk phase	Group interview
Enora Marenne	International Aid / Cooperation Officer - Development Coordinator-Co-desk Pakistan and	1. Development Coordination South and South East Asia	Transversal, covering all EQs						Desk phase	Group interview

Name	Position	Organisation / Unit	Consultation issue						Strategy	
			EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6	When?	How?
	Afghanistan									
Simone Ceramicola	N/A	3. Finance, Contracts, Audit	Transversal, covering all EQs						Desk phase	Group interview
Camilla Lombard	Head of Sector	3. Finance, Contracts, Audit	Transversal, covering all EQs						Desk phase	Group interview
DG DEVCO – Dir R — Resources and Centre of Gravity of Human Resources in Delegations										
Jerome Le Roy	Project Officer	1. Planning and Budget			■				Desk phase	Group presentation and exchange
Yves Tielemans	Deputy Head of Unit	1. Planning and Budget		■	■				Desk phase	Semi-structured interview
Eva Réka Vasas	Legal Officer	3. Legal Affairs			■				All phases	Various
Laurent Sarazin	Head of Unit	3. Legal Affairs			■				All phases	Various
Paul Verwimp	N/A	3. Legal Affairs			■				Synthesis phase	Various
Nicola Santini	Assistant Co-ordinator for Inter-institutional Relations	5. Local Support and Logistics				■			Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
DG DEVCO – Coordination Dir C, G, H										
Adrian Costandache	Evaluation Manager (second) Chapeau Contract	04. Evaluation	Transversal, covering all EQs						All phases	Various
Bridget Dillon	Evaluation Manager Chapeau Contract	04. Evaluation	Transversal, covering all EQs						All phases	Various
Philippe Loop	Head of Unit	04. Evaluation			■				Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview (mainly on CIR)
Franco Conzato	Deputy Head of Unit	06. Quality and Results		■	■				Desk phase	Semi-structured interview and Group interview
Andrea Alfieri	Team Leader	06. Quality and Results			■				Desk phase	Group interview

Name	Position	Organisation / Unit	Consultation issue						Strategy	
			EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6	When?	How?
DG DEVCO – Reporting directly to the Director-General										
Bernard San Emeterio Cordero	International Aid/Cooperation Officer	01. General Coordination and Inter-Institutional Relations	Transversal, covering all EQs						All phases	Various
Homa Dean	International Aid / Cooperation Assistant	01. General Coordination and Inter-Institutional Relations	Transversal, covering all EQs						All phases	Various
Milko van Gool	Acting Head Of Unit	02. Communication and Transparency			■				Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
DG DEVCO - Deputy Director General - Coordination Dir A, B, D, E										
Klaus Rudischhauser	Deputy Director General		■				■		Synthesis phase	Group interview
DG NEAR										
Helena Laakso	Evaluation Coordinator	Dir A — Strategy and Turkey 3. Thematic Support, Monitoring and Evaluation	■				■		All phases	Various
Isabel Combes	Deputy Head of Unit	Dir A — Strategy and Turkey 4. Financial Assistance: Policy and Strategy	■				■		All phases	Various
Odoardo Como	Team Leader - Evaluation and Monitoring	Dir A — Strategy and Turkey 3. Thematic Support, Monitoring and Evaluation	■				■		All phases	Various
Stephan Dietzen	Policy Officer	Dir A — Strategy and Turkey 4. Financial Assistance: Policy and Strategy	■				■		All phases	Various
DG CLIMA										
Martin Kaspar	Policy Officer – Climate finance	Dir A — International and Mainstreaming 2. Climate Finance, Mainstreaming, Montreal Protocol	■	■					Synthesis phase	Phone interview
DG ENV										
Veronique Hyeulle	Senior Expert	Dir F — Global Sustainable Development 2. Bilateral and Regional Environmental Cooperation		■					Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Jill Hanna	Adviser	Dir F — Global Sustainable Development		■					Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Fabien Sordet	Policy Assistant	Dir F — Global Sustainable Development 3. Multilateral Environmental Cooperation		■					Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview

Name	Position	Organisation / Unit	Consultation issue						Strategy	
			EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6	When?	How?
FPI - Service for Foreign Policy Instruments										
Laura Auger-Perez	Senior Expert	FPI — Service for Foreign Policy Instruments	■				■			Group interview
Gary Miller	Adviser	FPI — Service for Foreign Policy Instruments	Transversal, covering all EQs						All phases	Various
Marc Fiedrich	Deputy Head of Unit	2. Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)	■				■		Desk phase	Interview
Oliver Nette	Head of Unit	2. Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)	■				■		Desk phase	Interview
Sebastian Augustiño Macias	Financial Assistant - Project/Process Manager - Budget/Finance	2. Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)	■				■		Desk phase	Interview
Kamil Valica	Planning and Programming Officer	4. Partnership Instrument	■				■		Desk and synthesis	Group interview and phone
Nona Deprez	Deputy Head of Unit	4. Partnership Instrument	■				■		Desk phase	Group interview
Georgios Tsitsopoulos	Head of Unit	5. EU Foreign Policy Regulatory Instruments & Election Observation	■				■		Desk phase	Interview
EEAS — European External Action Service										
Leonello Gabrici	Head of Division	Deputy Secretary General for economic and global issues MD-GLOBAL — Human rights, global and multilateral issues 4 — Global issues	■	■					Synthesis phase	Group interview
Filiberto Ceriani Sebregondi	Head of Division	Service Deputy Secretary General for economic and global issues MD-GLOBAL — Human rights, global and multilateral issues 5 — Development cooperation coordination	■	■					Synthesis phase	Group interview
Wolfram Vetter	Deputy Head of Division	Deputy Secretary General for economic and global issues MD-GLOBAL — Human rights, global and multilateral issues 5 — Development cooperation coordination	■	■					Synthesis phase	Group interview
Joaquín Tasso Vilallonga	Deputy Head of Division	Deputy Secretary General for economic and global issues MD-AFRICA — Africa Pan-African affairs	■	■			■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
Gerald Hatler	Policy Officer	Development Cooperation Coordination	Transversal, covering all EQs						All phases	Various

Name	Position	Organisation / Unit	Consultation issue						Strategy	
			EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6	When?	How?
Konstantin von Mentzingen	Desk officer - Desk officer Vietnam	Deputy Secretary General for political affairs, Political Director MD-ASIAPAC — Asia and Pacific 3 — South-east Asia	■	■					Synthesis phase	Group interview
Leontine von Levetzow		Service Deputy Secretary General for economic and global issues MD-GLOBAL — Human rights, global and multilateral issues 5 — Development cooperation coordination	■	■					Synthesis phase	Group interview
Gary Quince	N/A	Deputy Secretary General for economic and global issues Dir AFRICA — Africa Principal Adviser		■			■		Synthesis phase	Semi-structured interview
SG — Secretariat-General										
Cindy van den Boogert	Policy Officer	Deputy Secretary-General in charge of Institutional and Administrative Policies, Policy Co-ordination II (Directorate E), Data Protection and the Mediation Service Dir E — Policy Co-ordination II 3. International Dimension (including G7/G20)	■						Desk phase	Semi-structured interview
EU Member States Committee Members and EU MS representatives										
Stella Avalone	Austria, Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs of Austria	■				■	■		Synthesis phase	Phone interview
Ernesto Salina	Slovakia, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic									
Brian Penny	UK, DfID									
David Lloyd-Davies	UK Permanent Representation to the EU									
Marie-Eva Bernard	France, Secrétariat général des affaires européennes RELEX									
Marie Houdart	France, Secrétariat général des affaires européennes RELEX									
Jonathan Gindt	France, Secrétariat général des affaires européennes RELEX									
Florens Vogt	Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development									
Dorothee Starck	German Permanent Representation									
Charmaine Kerr	Permanent Representation of Malta									
Ritienne Bonavia	Permanent Representation of Malta									
Tiziana Caruana	Permanent Representation of Malta									
Åsa Pousard	Sweden, Enheten för internationellt utvecklingssamarbete (IU, f.d. USTYR) Utrikesdepartementet									


Name	Position	Organisation / Unit	Consultation issue						Strategy	
			EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6	When?	How?
Frank Svensson	Sweden, Enheten för internationellt utvecklingssamarbete (IU, f.d. USTYR) Utrikesdepartementet									
Bolivia field mission										
Leon de la Torre-Krais	Head of Delegation	EU Delegation to Bolivia	Touching on most EQs with a focus on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, added value and complementarity between geographic and thematic DCI programmes.						Field mission	Semi-structured interview // group discussion
Rocco Busco	Section Chief	EU Delegation to Bolivia								
Gimenez Calvo Meritxell	Section Chief	EU Delegation to Bolivia								
Nuria Calzada	Section Chief	EU Delegation to Bolivia								
Susana Erostegui	CSO representative	UNITAS								
Antonio Aramayo Tejada	CSO representative	UNIR								
Marco Antonio Mendonza Crespo	CSO representative	Fundacion Construir								
Javier Fernando Espejo	CSO representative	Capitolo Boliviano de DDHH								
Sabino Mendoza	CSO representative	CONALTID								
Gary Suarez	Director of Planning	Ministry of Environment and Water								
Nilo Yanguas	Director of Planning	Ministry of Rural Development								
Erlan Oropeza		FONADAL								
Dalita Brozovich		Ministry of Public Investment and External Funding								
Cecilia de Bonadona Mercado	Municipality representative	Small Enterprise Development Local Administration								
Miguel Angel Escobar Tinta	Municipality representative	Tourism Development Calacoto								
Alejandro Diz Rodriguez	Technical Officer	EU Delegation to Bolivia								
Franco Mendizabal Llano	Technical Officer	EU Delegation to Bolivia								
Africa Sanchez Sala	EU MS representative	EU MS representative Spain								

Name	Position	Organisation / Unit	Consultation issue						Strategy	
			EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6	When?	How?
Thomas Bodenschatz	EU MS representative	EU MS representative Germany								
Ricardo Royder Yanez	EU MS representative	EU MS representative Italy								
Cambodia field mission										
Fiona Ramsey	Head Of Cooperation	EU Delegation to Cambodia	Touching on most EQs with a focus on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, added value and complementarity between geographic and thematic DCI programmes.						Field mission	Semi-structured interview // group discussion
Walter Egbert	Deputy Head of Cooperation	EU Delegation to Cambodia								
Genoveva Hernandez Uriz	Head of Political and Communication	EU Delegation to Cambodia								
Ratana Phurik-Callebaut	Executive Director	EuroCham								
Dagmar Minarikova	Development Counsellor	EU Member States Czech Republic								
Pascale Turquet	Development Counsellor	EU Member States France								
Kristina Kuhnel	Development Counsellor	EU Member States Sweden								
Cashel Gleeson	Development Counsellor	EU Member States France UK								
Chan Sothea	Deputy Head of NCDD	Ministry of Interior, Secretariat of National Committee for Decentralisation								
Chhun Bunnara	Director of Program Management	Ministry of Interior, Secretariat of National Committee for Decentralisation								
Vuthy Rith	Secretary General	Council for the Development of Cambodia								
Seilava Ros	Secretary General	Ministry of Economy and Finance								
Samphors Vorn	CSO representative	Action Aid								
Savath	CSO representative	FACT								
Piotr Sasin	CSO representative	People in Need								
Chea Vantha	CSO representative	VSO								
Bangladesh field mission										
Pierre Mayaudon	Head of Delegation	EU Delegation to Bangladesh	Touching on most EQs with a focus on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, added value and complementarity between geographic and thematic DCI programmes.						Field mission	Semi-structured interview // group discussion
Mario Ronconi	Head of Cooperation	EU Delegation to Bangladesh								
Anna Lixi	Team Leader Governance	EU Delegation to Bangladesh								
Jürgen Heinmann	Team Leader Education & Human Development	EU Delegation to Bangladesh								
Dörte Bosse	Team Leader FNSS	EU Delegation to Bangladesh								

Name	Position	Organisation / Unit	Consultation issue						Strategy	
			EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6	When?	How?
Muhammad Alkama Siddiqui	Additional Secretary	Economic Relations Division								
Group Meeting with Civil Society Organisations	Manusher Jonno Foundation on local justice, women, Dalits, local governance, land; Indigenous People Forum on indigenous people; Kaepeng Foundation on Chittagong Hills Tracts; CAMPE on education; Uttaran on access to land; Centre for Disability in Development on disability; Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation on food security									
Group Meeting with MS rep	EU Member States Sweden, Germany, The Netherlands									
Ethiopia field mission										
Chantal Hebberecht	Head of Delegation	EU Delegation to Ethiopia	Touching on most EQs, with a focus on complementarity between Pan-African Programme and other support provided via DCI and EDF, added value and relevance.						Field mission	Semi-structured interview // group discussion
Francisco Carreras	Head of Cooperation	EU Delegation to Ethiopia								
Anna Burylo	Head of Cooperation	EU Delegation the African Union								
Ron Hendrix	Cooperation Section	EU Delegation the African Union								
Stephan Fox	Cooperation Section	EU Delegation the African Union								
Pietro Nardi	Cooperation Section	EU Delegation the African Union								
Peter Maher	Cooperation Section	EU Delegation the African Union								
Rainieri Sabatucci	Head of Delegation	EU Delegation the African Union								
Karin Kaup	Political Section	EU Delegation the African Union								
Group Meeting with MS rep	EU Member States UK, Belgium and France									
Crispen Zana	EUEI PDF	African Union Commission								
Dir Maiyegun	Department of Social Affairs	African Union Commission								
Dr Mahama Ouedraogo	Department of Human Resources, Science and Technology, HRST	African Union Commission								
Jacques Mukwende	Department of Strategic Planning	African Union Commission								
Guy Cyrille Tapoko	Elections support	African Union Commission								
Samuel Mondays Atuobi	Elections support	African Union Commission								

In addition to the preceding table, from the web OPC, a total of 238 contributions were received for DCI from 64 contributors. Most of the contributions were made by organisations or associations, followed by public authorities. In addition, six inputs were provided in written, not using the web-OPC. The graph below illustrates the type of contributors from the web OPC.

Figure 37 Type of contributors for the web OPC



In the framework of the web OPC, contributors were invited to respond to the following five DCI-specific questions:

- Question 1: How well do you think the DCI has addressed its objectives?
- Question 2: How well do you think the DCI has addressed the objectives of development co-operation more specifically in Least Developed Countries? To what extent has the DCI had an impact on poverty reduction and sustainable development in Middle Income Countries, where pockets of poverty persist and which may play a critical role to tackle regional and global challenges?
- Question 3: The evaluation has found that many partner countries often disagree on the place and weight to be given to human rights issues and governance, which are part of the principles that guide the external action of the EU, including the DCI. Has the DCI enabled the EU to project its principles and values (e.g. democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms)?
- Question 4: The DCI accommodates internal EU policy concerns, such as migration and climate change, in external action. To what extent do you think the DCI has been able to adapt to shifts in policy and the external environment?
- Question 5: If you have any other views on the DCI you would like to share, they are welcome here.

4 Annex 4: Summary of OPC contributions

4.1 Summary of OPC contributions


4.1.1 Introduction

The draft evaluation report on the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI)⁵⁵ was posted on the website of the European Commission for an Open Public Consultation (OPC) between 7 February and 5 May 2017⁵⁶, together with the evaluation reports of all other External Financing Instruments (EFIs). All stakeholders in beneficiary and EU countries were welcome to participate in this process. The objective of the web-consultation was twofold:

- To gather feedback from the broadest possible range of stakeholders, including those in beneficiary countries and in the EU Member States, on the emerging conclusions from the evaluations.
- To gather preliminary ideas on the future external financing instruments after the current ones have expired by 31 December 2020.

From the web OPC, a total of 238 contributions were received for DCI from 64 contributors. Most of the contributions were made by organisations or associations, followed by public authorities. In addition, six inputs were provided in written form, not using the web-OPC. The graph below illustrates the type of contributors from the web OPC.

Figure 38 Type of contributors for the web OPC




Each contributor could choose the level of confidentiality of their contribution. The following graph shows the option chosen by the different contributors. Contributors who chose the option “cannot be directly published but may be included within statistical data” are included in the statistical overviews for each question. The content of their comments is not included in the summaries of contributions, but have been taken into consideration by the evaluators.

⁵⁵ Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014-2020.

⁵⁶ https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/public-consultation-external-financing-instruments-european-union_en

Figure 39 *Level of confidentiality chosen by each contributor*



In the framework of the web OPC, contributors were invited to respond to the following five DCI-specific questions:

- Question 1: How well do you think the DCI has addressed its objectives?
- Question 2: How well do you think the DCI has addressed the objectives of development co-operation more specifically in Least Developed Countries? To what extent has the DCI had an impact on poverty reduction and sustainable development in Middle Income Countries, where pockets of poverty persist and which may play a critical role to tackle regional and global challenges?
- Question 3: The evaluation has found that many partner countries often disagree on the place and weight to be given to human rights issues and governance, which are part of the principles that guide the external action of the EU, including the DCI. Has the DCI enabled the EU to project its principles and values (e.g. democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms)?
- Question 4: The DCI accommodates internal EU policy concerns, such as migration and climate change, in external action. To what extent do you think the DCI has been able to adapt to shifts in policy and the external environment?
- Question 5: If you have any other views on the DCI you would like to share, they are welcome here.

As part of the public consultation, DEVCO, EEAS, FPI and NEAR organised a technical workshop with over 180 participants from the European Parliament and EU Member States on 27-28 March 2017. The purpose of this workshop was to gather views on the draft evaluation reports of the EFIs and start reflections on the future of the instruments post-2020.

In addition, the draft evaluation report was presented at a meeting with the Working Party on Development Cooperation (CODEV) of the Council of the European Union on 23 February 2017, and at the Policy Forum on Development Meeting on 23 March 2017. The meeting brought together Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Local Authorities (LAs) from the European Union and partner countries.

The following summary synthesises the main contributions received from the web OPC, additional written comments and the various face-to-face consultations in relation to key findings and emerging conclusions of the evaluation.

4.1.2 Summary of OPC contributions


4.1.2.1 Question 1: Addressing DCI objectives

Question 1: How well do you think the DCI has addressed its objectives? The main assessment criteria for the evaluation are: relevance; effectiveness, impact and sustainability; efficiency; EU added value; coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies; and leverage. Feel free to comment on the findings, conclusions or recommendations for any/all of the criteria.

Summary of contributions

For this question a total of 62 contributions were received from the web OPC. The majority of contributions provided a mixed assessment on the extent to which the DCI has addressed its objectives. The graph below illustrates the number contributions that were mainly *positive*, *negative*, *mixed* or *other*⁵⁷. Where possible the contributions have been grouped by instrument component.

Figure 40 Question 1: Type of contributions from web OPC



From the contributions received that provided a *mainly positive* assessment, most contributors feel that the DCI has been **relevant** and **provided an added value**, while some also highlighted the effectiveness of the instrument and complementarity with other EFs. In this context, a European think tank noted that *“The Regulation was updated and allowed DCI to globally function as an “enabling instrument” that responded to both EU policy priorities and partner country expectations. Efforts were made to consistently apply the principles of the Agenda for Change (including differentiation) and Busan (country ownership). Synergies were sought with other instruments and interventions of MS, thus trying to produce EU added value.”* On added value, amongst others, the following explanations were provided:

- *“The DCI clearly constituted an added value, particularly thematic programmes that mainstreamed decent work for all, as stipulated in the DCI Regulation.”* (Industry, business or workers' organisations)
- *“When actions have been taken in relation to disability, the added value of the European Union has been very large since disability is not a priority issue in the countries and this population is invisible”* (Organisation or association)

⁵⁷ The category *other* includes contributions that are either neutral or considered as not being relevant for this question.

- The capacity of the DCI to intervene in several ways: geographic, thematic including CSO-LA in relation to the needs of actors identified as key to achieving all other objectives, and who otherwise would be excluded *“is a key factor in the success of the program. This ability to achieve these different targets and priorities is unique and an added value for the EU.”* (Organisation or association)

From the contributions that provided a *mixed* assessment, there is no doubt that the DCI with its focus on poverty reduction is perceived as a **highly relevant** instrument (especially in least developed countries). Yet, several factors have been identified which could potentially limit the relevance and effectiveness of the DCI:

- Growing need to adapt to changing environment and challenges (e.g. migration and addressing root causes of migration) and current political framework and priorities of the EU.
- Shrinking space for Civil Society.
- Growing need to identify and include multiple stakeholders (especially CSOs, private sector).
- Growing need to systematically mainstream issues such as climate change, gender equality and disability.
- Limited alignment to international commitments on funding for biodiversity and sustainable development (Organisation or association).

Regarding **efficiency**, several comments noted that the DCI is an administratively demanding instrument posing significant burden on the stakeholders involved, e.g. *“The heavy procedural requirements continue to pose challenges both to EU staff and to grant beneficiaries (...)”* (EU platform, network, or association) Linked to this, a number of contributors identified a lack of human resources in EU Delegations and lack of transparency and flow of information between EU MS, HQ and EU Delegations as factors limiting efficiency of the DCI.

Regarding the extent to which the DCI was perceived as being **complementary, coherent and consistent**, several comments expressed some concern, noting a potential risk of overlap between EFIs and within DCI, calling for a more holistic approach. To provide some examples:

- *“Under the DCI, flagship programmes were set up with the aim to overcome silo approaches. In the same line, the GPGC was initially set up as a new thematic programme to increase flexibility and avoid a fragmented approach, especially to respond to global crises and international commitments. While several thematic programmes were merged into the single GPGC, the problem of thematic areas being treated in isolation remains.”* (Organisation or association)
- *“The portfolio of interventions appears very diversified, in many sectors, and fragmented. This raises the issue of coordination and coherence between the various financial instruments and calls for a more direct combination of these instruments.”* (Public Authority)

On **EU added value**, while it was recognised that more work needs to be done and the EU still needs to tap its full potential, several examples of EU added value have been identified:

- The EU is usually seen as an honest broker striving to act on the basis of a true partnership with their development cooperation partners. (Public authority)
- EU cooperation has a high value for EU MS themselves through regular coordination and “joint programming”. (Public authority)
- Mainly in promoting democracy, civil society, gender and sexual and reproductive health and rights which have been sometimes neglected by beneficiary governments. (Public authority)
- EU added value relies also on the variety of European players such as European local and regional governments, who can share their experience of local public policies and development, accessing and managing EU funds. (EU platform, network, or association)

From the contributions that provided a *mainly negative* assessment, the following main reasons were identified as to why contributors felt that the DCI did not well address its objectives:

- Limited involvement of stakeholder, such as EU Member States in broader DCI discussions (Public Authority), CSOs and LAs (Public Authority).
- Limited expertise at EUDs (Public Authority).
- Neglecting certain topics such as market reforms (Citizen/individual), and water and sanitation for sustainable development (Organisation or association).
- Need for better engagement with Middle Income Countries (Public Authority).
- Limited synergies and complementarity between geographic and thematic instruments and with other donors, e.g. due to fragmented approach (Public authority).

From the OPC sessions, repeated concern was expressed on the (“weak”) involvement of CSOs and LAs. Participants felt that *“these instruments are not adapted to the realities of local authorities. The LAs are bound by their government and cannot just change their way of working and thus the instruments need to be flexible.”* One participant expressed that they *“Would like to see support to CSO regarding right to initiatives and plurality across the instruments (not only CSO-LA). CSO-LA have experience and knowledge which are also relevant to thematic and sectoral envelope. Would like to see a strong role in geographic and thematic programmes. Thematic programmes funding agreement could be explored to see if CSO have a role there.”*

Moreover, during the OPC session’s participants expressed in the context of **efficiency**, it was felt that there is a lack of transparency of information. A significant factor hampering the DCI performance seems to be limited staff capacity both in EUDs and in HQ.

Additional written comments expressed the following:

- The need to consult MS much earlier in the identification and development of programmes process and maintain ongoing dialogue.
- DCI is an effective tool that generally meets the EU's priorities for poverty reduction, yet several weaknesses of the DCI are to be noted:
 - The monitoring of projects must be improved, including better formulation of efficiency indicators.
 - The projects put in place are not always sustainable and strong enough to last.
 - Disbursement rates are relatively low in some countries, in particular due to insufficient capacity (administrative deficiencies and inadequate human resources).
- Positive experience with the thematic programme/ GPGC on food security, nutrition, agriculture, and rural development. The thematic programmes reflect a shared agenda of development objectives in these areas and are complementary to EDF programmes. Through the DCI the EU has offered consistent and therefore more sustainable support to important shared agendas on global governance of food security; forest governance; etc. Through its flexible approach and adaptation to local context and needs, the DCI helps to promote greater policy and investment coherence, and ensures complementarity between the actions of various development agents. The DCI has also allowed the creation of a very close partnership and synergies between support provided by FAO, EU, Government and other development partners, better linking investment and policy support to create an enabling environment for achieving SDG2.

Response of the evaluation team

Most of these comments, positive, negative, or mixed have already been reflected in the text commented upon. The limited engagement of civil society and Local Authorities has been criticised by the evaluators, as has the restricted the capacity of EUDs.

Under EQ 3, it has been stated that the DCI is regarded by stakeholders as an administratively demanding instrument, and one with only limited flexibility. The evaluation has been essentially positive on the complementarity of geographic and thematic programmes, while stating that the problem of compartmentalisation within the GPGC programme remains a problem.


4.1.2.2 Question 2: Addressing DCI objectives in LDCs and poverty reduction and sustainable development in MICs

Question 2: How well do you think the DCI has addressed the objectives of development co-operation more specifically in Least Developed Countries? To what extent has the DCI had an impact on poverty reduction and sustainable development in Middle Income Countries, where pockets of poverty persist and which may play a critical role to tackle regional and global challenges?

Summary of contributions

For this question, a total of 47 contributions were received from the web OPC. The majority of contributions provided a mixed assessment on the extent to which the DCI has addressed its objectives in Least Developed Countries and Middle Income Countries. The graph below illustrates the number contributions that were mainly *positive*, *negative*, *mixed* or *other*⁵⁸.

Figure 41 Question 2: Type of contributions from web OPC



From the contributions received that provided a *mainly positive* assessment, contributors felt that the DCI programming has well respected the principle of differentiation, and it is welcomed that most of the funding is now targeted to LDCs, where it is expected to have bigger added-value (e.g. Public authority, Organisation or association, Research and academia, Other).

Some contributions also considered that the DCI is an appropriate instrument for both LDCs and MICs (EU platform, network, or association). In this context, two contributions specifically mentioned the GPGC as an appropriate tool to reach MICs:

⁵⁸ The category *other* includes contributions that are either neutral or considered as not being relevant for this question.

- *“Direct benefits to local communities in least developed countries (Liberia) and middle income countries (Ghana)” are visible (Organisation or association).*
- *“In our view, the DCI thematic instrument on ‘Global Public Goods and Challenges’ (GPGC) helped to respond to the need to involve MICs in addressing regional and global challenges.” (Research/ academia)*

From the contributions that provided a *mixed* assessment, most of the contributions agree that the DCI has been relevant for Least Developed Countries and contributed to progress in poverty reduction. However and in line with the evaluation findings, most of the contributions in this category expressed concerns as to what extent the DCI was able to reach MICs and UMICs where poverty still exists and suggested the deepening of partnerships (e.g. with CSOs) in these countries:

- *“(…) Unfortunately, so-called “pockets of poverty” still persist in the MICs, and it has proven difficult for DCI to address this issue accordingly. Therefore other forms of partnership with these countries need to be explored.” (EU platform, network, or association)*
- *“The DCI was particularly relevant in poorer, weak and fragile states (...)The DCI was less relevant in Middle Income countries.” (Public authority)*
- *“The DCI has to a large extent played a positive role in helping the the EU meet its objectives of development cooperation in Least Developed and Middle-Income Countries. The facing out of development cooperation in Middle Income Countries needs to be compensated with thorough analysis of the characteristics of poverty in the country, and well thought out investment in human rights and strengthening of civil society organisations representing and supporting people who are discriminated against or under-served.” EU platform, network, or association)*

The contributions that provided a *mainly negative* assessment were often related to the issue of lacking a platform for cooperation with MICs and UMICs or lack of achieving results in general:

- *“Countries that graduate from bilateral aid programmes would still need support from the EU to ensure that their development is equitable, with a reduction in inequalities going parallel to opportunities for growth.” (Organisation or association)*
- *“While the DCI has the right commitment to advance development cooperation namely in LDCs, it fell short in doing so. The understanding of human development (HD), which is fundamental to people-centred policies, under the DCI thematic programme is too broad and should be refined.” (Organisation or association)*

During the OPC sessions, participants noted that the evaluation addressed well the real challenges on how to go forward, how to look at UMICs where there is still poverty, shrinking space and pushback.

Additional written comments noted that the DCI fulfils its role as a vector for development (health, food security, economic and social development), consistent with the SDGs, and its impact is considered structured and relatively rapid in LDCs and UMICs. Yet, the lack of an accompanying mechanism for graduated countries prevents it from making it an instrument capable of fully responding to the developments that can be observed.

Response of the evaluation team

The main thrust of the comments appears to be that there is continuing need for development cooperation in Middle Income Countries; one of the main conclusions of the evaluation. The Partnership Instrument, while serving a valued role in particular related to regional and global challenges, is not well suited, either by size or goal, to addressing persistent poverty. Nor is it an effective basis for policy leverage to address problems of human rights, democracy, etc. in “graduated” countries. The evaluation team is gratified that independent readers reached much the same conclusions as they.


4.1.2.3 Question 3: DCI enabling the EU to project its principles and values

Question 3: The evaluation has found that many partner countries often disagree on the place and weight to be given to human rights issues and governance, which are part of the principles that guide the external action of the EU, including the DCI. Has the DCI enabled the EU to project its principles and values (e.g. democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms)?

Summary of contributions

For this question, a total of 47 contributions were received from the web OPC. The majority of contributions provided a positive assessment on the extent to which the DCI enabled the EU to project its principles and values. The graph below illustrates the number contributions that were mainly *positive*, *negative*, *mixed* or *other*⁵⁹.

Figure 42 Question 3: Type of contributions from web OPC



The majority of contributions provide a *mainly positive* assessment and agree that the EU's external actions should be guided by principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights. In this context, three contributions explicitly mentioned the crucial role of the CSO-LA component to work in this area:

- “The CSOs/LAs budget line focus on the creation of an enabling environment for the actions and initiatives of civil society organizations and local authorities is testimony of the enabling role DCI has played in that regard.” (Public Authority)
- “(...) there is no doubt that EU's external action should be guided primarily by principles of democracy, rule of law, human rights, including the right to a healthy environment, and fundamental freedoms. The DCI has great potential to project such values. The CSO/LA programme has a strong emphasis on improving governance and strengthening the rule of law by engaging civil society and work on Civil society roadmaps by EU delegations is important in this respect.” (Organisation or association)

The contributions that provide a *mainly mixed* assessment emphasised the importance of the DCI promoting the principles and values of the EU. An EU platform noted that “The EU is perceived as a reliable dialogue partner and more neutral than the single Member States. This is an additional added value in order to promote reform processes such as in the field of strengthening local democratic governance.” While progress has been noted (especially in

⁵⁹ The category *other* includes contributions that are either neutral or considered as not being relevant for this question.

relation to the CSO-LA programme), several factors, mainly at EUD level and in relation to CSO involvement have been identified that have hindered progress:

- EUDs have been confronted with major bottlenecks, *“originating from both political resistance among partner countries (e.g. the phenomenon of “closing space” for civil society and human rights associations), internal EU constraints (e.g. lack of political, institutional and bureaucratic incentives to mainstream the values) and MS interests.”* (Research and academia).
- Limited political support and resources in EUDs to promote human rights issues and governance. (Organisation or association)
- Need to improve sectoral dialogue in partner countries and strengthen partnerships. (Public authority)
- Limited use of its civil society and democracy roadmaps to support this objective. (EU platform, network, or association)

From the contributions that provided a *mainly negative* assessment, no further explanations were provided.

Additional written comments noted that due to the strong involvement of civil society in DCI, the EU succeeds in relaying its principles and values, in particular with regard to gender equality, child protection and the fight against discrimination. By contributing to the capacity building of non-state actors, the instrument promotes the participation of the population in the economic and social development of beneficiary countries. However, in the case of the thematic component of the DCI, the projection of legal principles does not appear to be a *sine qua non* of the funding granted under this instrument. Furthermore, in the area of democratic governance and human rights, the link between the geographical DCI, particularly where the modality of budget support is chosen, the CSO-LA programme, and the EIDHR, deserves to be improved in a number of cases. The political leverage effect of funding in this area should therefore be further strengthened.

Response of the evaluation team

These mixed comments underscore the predicament faced by the EU, which runs throughout the evaluation: the EU is committed to promoting a liberal democratic model of development, yet this model is under attack in a growing number of partner countries. The *realpolitik* of the situation is that the EU needs lasting partnerships with governments; even those with which it fundamentally disagrees in many areas. The response mounted through DCI in such cases is to encourage the development of civil society; however, as the evaluators have noted, the EU struggles to effectively engage civil society. Many of the reasons are administrative: the DCI is simply too challenging an instrument for NGOs outside the privileged few to exploit. The need to better develop multi-partner relationships outside the traditional donor-beneficiary model is a major recommendation of the evaluators.


4.1.2.4 Question 4: DCI ability to adapt to shifts in policy and the external environment

Question 4: The DCI accommodates internal EU policy concerns, such as migration and climate change, in external action. To what extent do you think the DCI has been able to adapt to shifts in policy and the external environment?

Summary of contributions

For this question, a total of 40 contributions were received from the web OPC. The majority of contributions provided a mixed assessment on the extent to which the DCI has been able to adapt to shifts in policy and the external environment. The graph below illustrates the number of contributions that were mainly *positive*, *negative*, *mixed* or *other*⁶⁰.

Figure 43 Question 4: Type of contributions from web OPC



The majority of contributions provide a *mainly mixed* assessment. There seems to be a feeling that the DCI has managed to address EU's internal policy concerns "*such as climate change and environment, especially through its thematic programme Global Public Goods and Challenges*" (EU platform, network, or association) and scaled up migration work through the adoption of Trust Funds (EU platform, network, or association, research/academia). Yet, some concerns were expressed emphasising that EU's internal policy concerns (especially related to migration) should not interfere too much with DCI's primary objective of poverty reduction:

- "In terms of responsiveness, the scaling up of migration related work has shown that the DCI can respond. However, the rationale and policy framework under which these funds will be used have also changed. The DCI thus increasingly incorporates shorter-term security interests into its development funding as relates to migration. While this may be interpreted as accommodating 'internal EU policy concerns', long-term development effects in the area of migration are not only achieved by focusing on security-related aspects." (Research/academia)
- "DCI has been used to respond to changes in the external environment, such as the migration challenge. Significant resources have been channeled to EU Trust Funds. (...) activities have been proposed under the geographical programmes that are not in line with the DAC criteria. It is critical that the integrity of ODA is safeguarded." (Public authority)

⁶⁰ The category *other* includes contributions that are either neutral or considered as not being relevant for this question.

The contributions that were *mainly negative*, mostly emphasised the lack of progress in the area of climate change, e.g.” *The Paris Agreement has not induced any major shift in climate funding under DCI, which remains restricted to GPGC. The lack of biodiversity and climate mainstreaming through DCI funding also suggests that the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the international commitments to implement the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development has had limited impact on DCI’s programming.*” (Organisation or association)

During the OPC sessions, two participants expressed that they agree with the findings of the evaluation, particularly regarding topics of flexibility and the EU’s reaction to current challenges. One participant explicitly mentioned that *“flexibility comes at a cost, the situation that exists today is the product of ages ago. The participant is in favour of more flexibility and integration between instruments (e.g. the Trust Fund being a clear example).”*

Additional written comments expressed that through the use of budget support, the DCI has been better able to adapt to the sometimes rapid changes in country contexts, both internally and externally. With regard to climate change and the environment, a more systematic and cross-cutting integration in all areas of cooperation where it could have a place is needed, notably agriculture urban development, sanitation and water, etc..

Regarding migration, the contribution noted that it is still insufficient and vague in many beneficiary countries, even diluted within other priorities. The existence of a thematic migration line did not make it possible to respond to the needs of the countries of origin and transit, which necessitated in particular, the creation of trust funds (in particular the Trust Fund For Africa). An additional written comment expresses that the priorities of the EC in the DCI are clear and reflect a shared agenda of concerns and priorities in the food security, nutrition, resilience, and rural development realms. There is also indeed flexibility to adapt and fine-tune those objectives over time, as context and needs evolve globally. For instance, the resilience agenda and the nutrition agenda have both been promoted jointly by the EU and FAO in this context using the DCI. (...)

Response of the evaluation team

The fact that GPGC is being used to meet commitments related to climate change and social sector development (especially health) has been highlighted in the evaluation. In an era of declining aid leverage over partner government policies, also highlighted in the evaluation, it is impossible for the EU to impose its priorities on partners. At most it can advocate, with some (but limited) effectiveness. Migration is an area very much in flux. The DCI’s contribution to the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, designed to tackle the root causes of migration, was actually rather modest. So, too, is the Pan African Programme’s initiative on harnessing migration of all types as an engine for development on the continent. The evaluators’ approach has been to identify positive aspects of the EU’s involvement with migration through DCI while at the same time appreciating the magnitude of the issue. The pent-up African and Middle Eastern demand to migrate to the EU is beyond any European capacity to reduce, let alone satisfy it. While we have not pointed this out in the evaluation, as it would be regarded as inflammatory, senior team members with experience in the migration field are of the view that “addressing the root causes of migration” – unemployment, poverty, insecurity – is just as likely to enable beneficiaries’ ability to act on migratory desires as to reduce the migratory impulse.

4.1.2.5 Question 5: If you have any other views on the DCI you would like to share, they are welcome here.

Summary of contributions

In the *other views on the DCI* section, 42 contributions were provided via the web-OPC. The contributions have been grouped along overarching topics:

Complementarity, coherence and coordination of the different programmes and EFIs and with Member States:

- *“In the short term the most important challenge is to further improve on effectiveness and coherence in particular with regard to potential overlaps between the regional and thematic programmes. In the long term: The DCI should be merged with other DC instruments like the EDF. This one DC-instrument shall the implementation of Agenda 2030. This instrument needs to be flexible, the time to delivery shorter. It needs to be ready for cooperation in “multi actor partnerships.” The cooperation with Middle Income countries, promotion of democracy and equity in these countries, is critical.”* (Public authority)
- *“The geographic part and the thematic part are not well integrated within the same instrument and those who do not have in-depth expertise are likely to confuse the various plans”* (Organisation or association)
- *“There are problems with communication and sharing of information concerning the DCI. Whereas the geographic programs are well known, the regional, thematic (GPGC in particular) and Pan-African programs are not.”* (Public authority)

Efficiency

- *“The DCI globally fits for purpose. For its better efficiency, it is advisable that its procedures and access be simplified. The actions it finances should also strive to systematically be consistent with the core values of the EU. It should also fully respect the subsidiarity principle as long one is concerned with the development aid impact and efficiency.”* (Public authority)
- *“1/ Due to heavy, labor intensive processes, timelines to get to implementation are overly long. 2/ Whilst the introduction of the EU results framework has increased focus on results, there is room to improve further by clearly setting out expected results and ensuring that related indicators in logframes are measurable. 3/ Staffing capacity/ numbers/ skill sets in EUDs continue to remain problematic for example, there has been an emphasis on gender programming, but has there been sufficient expertise building in EUDs to be able to deliver this?”* (Public authority)

Involvement of stakeholder and building partnerships also in relation to co-operation with UMICs and MICs:

- *“Beneficiaries should be more involved and engaged in setting and developing the DCI from the beginning.”* (Public authority)
- *“As DCI “looses” development partners (following graduation processes) the question raises whether it would not be wise to bring together in one single instrument all partner countries that will still be dependent on “development aid” in next decade. It would allow the EU to develop a global approach to LDCs and fragile countries - irrespective of past frameworks and financial arrangements.”* (Research/ academia)

A number of contributions provided comments and recommendations regarding the **CSO-LA programme**:

- *“We would like to emphasise the critical importance of the CSO-LA programme, and especially DEAR, which is very relevant sub-programme for supporting global citizenship education in Europe. The minimum and maximum allocations in the calls should be much smaller. We appreciate and welcome the proposal to move towards annual thematic calls, yet warn against supporting only large consortia.”* (EU platform, network, or association)

- *“An appropriate mix of funding modalities needs to be ensured under the DCI, including calls for proposals, which must be accessible to a broad range of local and international CSOs. (...)”* (Organisation or association)
- *“The next Multiannual action plan should clearly identify a percentage of support for CSOs as partners in pro-poor services and providers in social basic services. In this context, the upcoming strategy should also include supporting components to gender equality and respective pre-conditions. Likewise, the next CSO/LA strategy should dedicate an earmarked component to social accountability and the role CSOs can play in promoting upward accountability.”* (Organisation or association)
- *“The DCI also includes the CSO-LA thematic budget line. (...). The EU successfully adapted its policy frameworks to define a more political and structured approach to engaging with civil society and local authorities. Yet the various EFI evaluations show that there are still major bottlenecks (including of a procedural nature) to fully integrate these actors in mainstream development and cooperation processes. The challenge ahead for the EU and MS will be to move towards truly inclusive “multi-actor partnerships” (SDG 17) to tackle development and global challenges, including through a quite fundamental review of the approaches to engage, support and leverage the contribution of civil society, local authorities and private sector actors.”* (Research/ academia)
- *“The DCI includes the thematic programme CSO-LA, the main financing programme for local and regional governments. However, LRGs could also be relevant in other thematic or geographic components of DCI : many other focal sectors such as health, agriculture/food security and roads/energy include a “hidden local dimension”* (EU platform, network, or association)
- *“In the future, certain programmes within the DCI such as Development Education and Awareness Raising (DEAR) could benefit from a more thorough application of the actor-based approach to development cooperation.”* (Industry, business or workers's organisations)

Some contributions focused on the **GPGC** and provided specific recommendations. It was especially highlighted by several contributors that the GPGC climate change component is perceived as highly relevant for supporting the implementation of the SDGs and the Paris Agreement:

- *“The new strategy of the GPGC should also foresee support to integrated approaches that bring together the GPGC siloed areas into holistic solutions. As an example, Population, Health and Environment (PHE) programmes should be further supported under this programme.”* (Organisation or association)
- *“Implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement in developing countries through the EU's external Actions is quite dependent of the Global Public Goods and Challenges - Environment and Climate Change (GPGC E&C) sub-programme (...) very much supports the objectives of the GPGC and specifically the program Environment and Climate Change, and we would advocate that it is important to increase support to this program. The GPGC program should however be a better tool to work more in an integrated manner and support cross-cutting activities, such as the so-called Landscape Approach”* (Organisation or association)
- *“The Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) Thematic Programme has decent work is a thematic area, including through the contribution to the decent work agenda). (...) Trade unions should be further considered as best placed to contribute to the achievement of decent work, through social dialogue as a driver of sustainable and inclusive development.”* (Industry, business or workers's organisations)

Some contributions focused on the **Pan-African Programme** and provided specific recommendations:

- *The next MIP should increase support to CSOs to play an active role in EU-AU policy-making and to advance gender equality and women's rights, health and youth empowerment. The current framework does not offer enough support on these fronts*

and doing so at the African continental level is fundamental. It should also foresee more decisions on Science, Technology and Innovation particularly for sectors that are barely covered by other programmes, such as health. It should support the African continent and relevant AU policies and strategies, rather than just the JAES roadmap. (Organisation or association)

Other comments promoted (better) integration of specific topics, such as improving mainstreaming on gender equality and disabilities.

- *“Ensure GAP objective of 85% programmes scoring G1/G2 is reached. Ensure 20% of all programmes to score G2 to ensure targeted funding. Increase GPGC budget for gender equality from the current 1.5% to at least 20%. Ensure sufficient funding for SRHR to deliver on Agenda 2030 and GAP II commitments. Ensure that consultations and analyses take multiple discriminations into account to “leave no one behind”. - Use disaggregated data on gender for all EU funded programmes and consistent OECD DAC reporting.” (EU platform, network, or association)*
- *“The European Union must fulfill the commitments made after ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and include its principles in the DCI. (...)” (Organisation or association)*
- *“We recommend that the EU adopts a systematic and institutionalised approach to mainstream the rights of persons with disabilities across all its international cooperation policies and programmes. The EU should take appropriate steps to identify quality disability markers and investigate the feasibility of their implementation in all EU funded programmes and projects by the mid-term review of the Multi-Annual Financial Framework in 2017, including a systematic assessment of CRPD compliance in the awarding and evaluating processes of EU-funded projects. Migration: An enhanced focus on all aspects of migration has been triggered by the various crisis situations in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. However, migration will be not just an issue in the coming years, but a permanent point on the European agenda. Consequently, the migration-sensitivity of the programmes launched within the framework of the DCI and other EU external financial instruments should be enhanced. Migration is a special concern for many EU citizens. Thus a rapid reaction by the EU would be a clear-cut signal to the wider European public that Europe can handle such crisis situations in a quick and efficient way. In recent years, we can observe an intensified use of EU budget support within the framework of the DCI and other external financial instruments as a means to strengthen financial national development strategies and poverty reduction and promoting sound and transparent public finances in our partner countries. However, we believe that budget support is not a panacea and can only assist a partner country’s development, if the necessary conditions are in place and only under a strict control of the entire budget support process, in particular of the eligibility and disbursement criteria, in order to guarantee the necessary transparency and to fight corruption.” (EU platform, network, or association)*

Response of the evaluation team

Many of these comments are quite specific and the team will not respond to each individually. However, a few major themes from the evaluation are worth pointing out. One is the need for more effective engagement with civil society and local authorities in the context of “shrinking space” and “pushback.” The rather mitigated success in mainstreaming gender has been noted, and the final revision will pay attention to assuring that the rights of persons with disabilities are adequately represented as well. Not reflected in the text of the evaluation, as it would be inflammatory, is the fundamental weakness of all rights-based approaches, that they whet a moral thirst far exceeding the resources or political will needed to satisfy it. This is, for example, why satisfying the EU’s DCI commitments in areas such as climate change and social development has become heavily dependent on thematic programmes. The “silo” nature of GPGC, easily traceable to the influence of European advocacy groups, has been criticised by the evaluators, as has the difficulty that CSO-LA has experienced in delivering on its goals. Weak engagement with these actors is a matter of

competing forces: monetary pressures demanding large sums be spent quickly, the heavy administrative cost of dealing with weak grantees, and the inability of these partners to comply with demanding EU procedures. In an earlier draft, the evaluators called for merging DCI and EDF, a contentious political issue in Brussels for some time. The evaluators have omitted this recommendation because it is more properly a subject for discussion at the stage of the EFI mid-term review next year. The evaluators have striven not to usurp the role of that mid-term review.

4.2 Résumé des contributions de la CPO (Consultation Publique Ouverte)


4.2.1 Introduction

Le projet de rapport d'évaluation sur l'instrument de coopération au développement (ICD)⁶¹ a été publié sur le site internet de la Commission européenne pour une consultation publique ouverte entre le 7 février et le 5 mai 2017⁶², de même que les rapports d'évaluation de tous les autres instruments de financement extérieur (IFE). Toutes les parties prenantes dans les pays bénéficiaires et les États membres de l'UE ont été invitées à participer à ce processus. L'objectif de la consultation en ligne était double:

- Recueillir des commentaires auprès de la plus large gamme possible d'intervenants, y compris ceux des pays bénéficiaires et des États membres de l'UE, sur les conclusions issues des évaluations.
- Recueillir des idées préliminaires sur les futurs instruments de financement extérieur après que les derniers sont arrivés à échéance le 31 décembre 2020.

La consultation publique ouverte en ligne a recueilli un total de 238 contributions pour l'ICD de la part de 64 contributeurs. La plupart des contributions ont été apportées par des organisations ou des associations, suivies par des autorités publiques. En outre, six contributions ont été apportées par écrit, sans utiliser la consultation publique ouverte en ligne. Le graphique ci-dessous illustre le type de contributeurs à la consultation publique ouverte en ligne.

Schéma 44 Type de contributeurs à la consultation publique ouverte en ligne




Chaque contributeur pouvait choisir le niveau de confidentialité de sa contribution. Le graphique suivant montre l'option choisie par les différents contributeurs. Les contributeurs qui ont choisi l'option «ne peut pas être publiée directement mais peut être incluse dans les données statistiques» sont inclus dans les aperçus statistiques pour chaque question. Le contenu de leurs commentaires n'est pas inclus dans les résumés des contributions, mais a été pris en considération par les évaluateurs.

⁶¹ Règlement (UE) no 233/2014 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 11 mars 2014 instituant un instrument de financement de la coopération au développement pour la période 2014-2020.

⁶² https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/public-consultation-external-financing-instruments-european-union_en

Schéma 45 Niveau de confidentialité choisi par chaque contributeur



Dans le cadre de la consultation publique ouverte en ligne, les contributeurs ont été invités à répondre aux cinq questions suivantes relatives à l'ICD :

- Question 1: Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que l'ICD a répondu à ses objectifs?
- Question 2: Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que l'ICD a répondu aux objectifs de la coopération au développement, en particulier dans les pays les moins avancés? Dans quelle mesure l'ICD a-t-il eu un impact sur la réduction de la pauvreté et le développement durable dans les pays à revenu intermédiaire, où des poches de pauvreté persistent, qui peuvent jouer un rôle crucial pour relever les défis régionaux et mondiaux?
- Question 3: L'évaluation a constaté que de nombreux pays partenaires sont souvent en désaccord sur la place et le poids à accorder aux questions relatives aux droits de l'homme et à la gouvernance, qui font partie des principes qui guident l'action extérieure de l'UE, y compris l'ICD. L'ICD a-t-il permis à l'UE de projeter ses principes et ses valeurs (par ex. la démocratie, la primauté du droit, les droits de l'homme et les libertés fondamentales)?
- Question 4: L'ICD prend en compte des préoccupations de politique intérieure de l'UE, telles que la migration et le changement climatique, dans l'action extérieure. Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que l'ICD a été en mesure de s'adapter à l'évolution des politiques et à l'environnement extérieur?
- Question 5: Si vous avez d'autres points de vue sur l'ICD, il est vous est loisible de les partager ici.

Dans le cadre de la consultation publique, DEVCO, le SEAE, la FPI et NEAR ont organisé un atelier technique avec plus de 180 participants du Parlement européen et des États membres de l'UE, les 27 et 28 mars 2017. Le but de cet atelier était de recueillir des points de vue sur les projets de rapports d'évaluation des IFE et de commencer les réflexions sur l'avenir de ces instruments après 2020.

En outre, le projet de rapport d'évaluation a été présenté lors d'une réunion avec le Groupe «Coopération au développement», (GCD) du Conseil de l'Union européenne le 23 février 2017 et lors de la réunion du Forum politique pour le développement le 23 mars 2017. Cette réunion a rassemblé les organisations de la société civile (OSC) et les autorités locales (AL) de l'Union européenne et des pays partenaires.

Le résumé suivant synthétise les principales contributions reçues lors de la consultation publique ouverte en ligne, d'autres observations écrites et les différentes consultations de vive voix en ce qui concerne les principaux résultats et les conclusions que l'on peut déduire de l'évaluation.

4.2.2 Résumé des contributions à la consultation publique ouverte


4.2.2.1 Question 1: Répondre aux objectifs de l'ICD

Question 1: Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que l'ICD a répondu à ses objectifs? Les principaux critères d'évaluation sont les suivants: la pertinence, l'efficacité, l'impact et la durabilité, l'efficience, la valeur ajoutée de l'UE, la cohérence, l'homogénéité, la complémentarité et les synergies, et l'effet de levier. N'hésitez pas à formuler des observations sur les données recueillies, les conclusions ou les recommandations pour tout ou partie des critères.

4.2.2.1.1 Résumé des contributions

Pour cette question, un total de 62 contributions ont été reçues dans le cadre de la consultation publique ouverte en ligne. La majorité des contributions ont présenté une évaluation mitigée de la mesure dans laquelle l'ICD a répondu à ses objectifs. Le graphique ci-dessous illustre le nombre de contributions essentiellement *positives*, *négatives*, *mitigées* ou *autres*⁶³. Dans la mesure du possible, les contributions ont été regroupées par volet de l'instrument.

Schéma 46 Question 1: Type de contributions à la consultation publique ouverte en ligne



Dans les contributions reçues qui ont présenté un évaluation *essentiellement positive*, la plupart des contributeurs estiment que l'ICD a été **pertinent** et a **apporté une valeur ajoutée**; certains ont également souligné l'efficacité de l'instrument et sa complémentarité avec d'autres IFE. Dans ce contexte, un groupe de réflexion européen a noté que «Le règlement a été actualisé et a permis à l'ICD de fonctionner globalement comme un "instrument favorable" qui a répondu aux priorités politiques de l'UE et aux attentes des pays partenaires. Des efforts ont été déployés pour appliquer systématiquement les principes du programme pour le changement (y compris la différenciation) et le partenariat de Busan (appropriation par le pays). Des synergies ont été recherchées avec d'autres instruments et interventions des États membres, en vue d'apporter ainsi une valeur ajoutée de l'UE». En ce qui concerne la valeur ajoutée, notamment, les explications suivantes ont été fournies:

⁶³ La catégorie *autres* comprend des contributions neutres ou considérées comme n'étant pas pertinentes pour cette question.

- «L'ICD constitue une valeur ajoutée manifeste, notamment en ce qui concerne les programmes thématiques qui intègrent le travail décent pour tous, comme le stipule le règlement instituant l'ICD.» (Industrie, entreprises ou organisations de travailleurs)
- «Lorsque des mesures ont été prises en ce qui concerne le handicap, la valeur ajoutée de l'Union européenne a été très importante car le handicap n'est pas une question prioritaire dans les pays et cette population est invisible». (Organisation ou association)
- La capacité de l'ICD d'intervenir de plusieurs façons: géographique, thématique, y compris les OSC-LA, par rapport aux besoins des acteurs considérés comme essentiels à la réalisation de tous les autres objectifs et qui, s'il n'en était pas ainsi, seraient exclus «est un facteur clé de la réussite du programme. Cette capacité de réaliser ces différents objectifs et priorités est unique et constitue une valeur ajoutée pour l'UE.» (Organisation ou association)

Dans les contributions qui ont présenté une évaluation *mitigée*, il ne fait aucun doute que l'ICD, axé sur la réduction de la pauvreté, est perçu comme un instrument **très pertinent** (en particulier dans les pays les moins avancés). Cependant, plusieurs facteurs mis en évidence sont susceptibles de limiter la pertinence et l'efficacité de l'ICD:

- Un besoin croissant de s'adapter à l'évolution de l'environnement et des défis (par ex. la migration et la nécessité d'aborder les causes profondes de la migration) et au cadre politique actuel et aux priorités de l'UE .
- La moindre marge de manœuvre de la société civile.
- Le besoin croissant de recenser et d'inclure plusieurs parties prenantes (en particulier les OSC, le secteur privé).
- Le besoin croissant d'intégrer systématiquement des questions telles que le changement climatique, l'égalité entre les sexes et le handicap.
- L'harmonisation limitée avec les engagements internationaux en matière de financement de la protection de la biodiversité et du développement durable (Organisation ou association).

En ce qui concerne **l'efficacité**, plusieurs observations ont relevé que l'ICD est un instrument exigeant du point de vue administratif, qui représente une charge considérable pour les parties prenantes concernées, par exemple «Les lourdes exigences de procédure continuent de poser des difficultés tant pour le personnel de l'UE que pour les bénéficiaires des subventions [...]» (plateforme, réseau ou association de l'UE). À cet égard, un certain nombre de contributeurs ont constaté un manque de ressources humaines dans les délégations de l'UE, un manque de transparence et un manque de fluidité de l'information entre les États membres de l'UE, le siège et les délégations de l'UE comme autant de facteurs limitant l'efficacité de l'ICD.

En ce qui concerne la mesure dans laquelle l'ICD est perçu comme étant **complémentaire, cohérent et homogène**, plusieurs observations ont exprimé des inquiétudes, indiquant un risque potentiel de double emploi entre les IFE et au sein de l'ICD, et préconisé une approche plus globale. À titre d'exemple:

- «Dans le cadre de l'ICD, des programmes phares ont été mis en place dans le but de surmonter les approches fondées sur le cloisonnement. Dans le même ordre d'idées, le programme concernant les biens publics mondiaux et les défis qui les accompagnent (GPGC) a été mis en place au départ comme un nouveau programme thématique visant à accroître la flexibilité et à éviter une approche fragmentée, en particulier pour répondre aux crises mondiales et aux engagements internationaux. Si plusieurs programmes thématiques ont été fusionnés dans le GPGC unique, le problème des domaines thématiques traités isolément demeure.» (Organisation ou association)
- «L'éventail des interventions semble très diversifié, dans de nombreux secteurs, et fragmenté. Cela soulève la question de la coordination et de la cohérence entre les différents instruments financiers et appelle à une combinaison plus directe de ces instruments.» (Autorité publique)

En ce qui concerne la **valeur ajoutée de l'UE**, s'il a été reconnu que davantage d'efforts devaient être déployés et que l'UE devait encore exploiter pleinement son potentiel, plusieurs exemples de valeur ajoutée de l'UE ont été présentés:

- L'UE est généralement considérée comme un intermédiaire désintéressé s'efforçant d'agir sur la base d'un véritable partenariat avec ses partenaires de la coopération au développement. (Autorité publique)
- La coopération de l'UE revêt une grande utilité pour les États membres de l'UE eux-mêmes grâce à une coordination régulière et à la «programmation conjointe». (Autorité publique)
- Principalement dans la promotion de la démocratie, de la société civile, de la santé et des droits sexuels et reproductifs, qui ont parfois été négligés par les gouvernements bénéficiaires. (Autorité publique)
- La valeur ajoutée de l'UE repose également sur la variété des acteurs européens tels que les gouvernements locaux et régionaux, qui peuvent partager leur expérience des politiques publiques locales et du développement, en accédant aux fonds de l'UE et en les gérant. (Plateforme, réseau ou association de l'UE)

Dans les contributions qui ont présenté une évaluation *essentiellement négative*, les raisons principales suivantes ont été mentionnées pour expliquer pourquoi les contributeurs estimaient que l'ICD ne répondait pas de manière satisfaisante à ses objectifs:

- Participation limitée des parties prenantes, telles que les États membres de l'UE, aux discussions plus générales sur l'ICD (autorité publique), les OSC et les autorités publiques (autorité publique).
- Expertise limitée des DUE (autorité publique).
- Désintérêt pour certains sujets tels que les réformes du marché (citoyen/individu), et l'eau et l'assainissement pour le développement durable (organisation ou association).
- Nécessité d'une meilleure coopération avec les pays à revenu intermédiaire (autorité publique).
- Synergies et complémentarité limitées entre les instruments géographiques et thématiques et les autres donateurs, par ex. en raison d'une approche fragmentée (autorité publique).

Lors des sessions de la consultation publique ouverte, des préoccupations répétées ont été exprimées sur la participation («faible») des OSC et des AL. Les participants ont estimé que *«ces instruments ne sont pas adaptés aux réalités des autorités locales. Les AL sont liées par leur gouvernement et ne peuvent pas simplement modifier leur façon de travailler; les instruments doivent par conséquent être flexibles.»* Un participant a déclaré qu'elles *«souhaitaient que les OSC bénéficient d'un soutien en ce qui concerne le droit à l'initiative et la pluralité dans l'ensemble des instruments (pas uniquement les OSC-LA). Les OSC-LA possèdent une expérience et des connaissances qui sont également pertinentes pour l'enveloppe thématique et sectorielle. J'aimerais qu'elles jouent un rôle de premier plan dans les programmes géographiques et thématiques. L'accord de financement des programmes thématiques pourrait être examiné afin de déterminer si les OSC ont un rôle à jouer dans ces programmes.»*

En outre, des participants à la session de la consultation publique ont mis en évidence, du point de vue de **l'efficacité**, un manque de transparence de l'information. Les capacités limitées du personnel dans les DUE et au siège semblent constituer un facteur important qui entrave la performance de l'ICD.

D'autres observations écrites ont exprimé ce qui suit:

- La nécessité de consulter les États membres beaucoup plus tôt en ce qui concerne la définition et l'élaboration des processus des programmes et de maintenir un dialogue continu.
- L'ICD est un outil efficace qui répond généralement aux priorités de l'UE en matière de réduction de la pauvreté, mais plusieurs faiblesses de l'ICD doivent être notées:

- Le suivi des projets doit être amélioré, y compris une meilleure formulation des indicateurs d'efficience.
- Les projets mis en place ne sont pas toujours durables et suffisamment solides pour durer.
- Les taux de décaissement sont relativement faibles dans certains pays, en raison notamment de la capacité insuffisante (déficiences administratives et ressources humaines inadéquates).
- L'expérience positive du programme thématique/GPGC sur la sécurité alimentaire, la nutrition, l'agriculture et le développement rural. Les programmes thématiques reflètent un programme commun d'objectifs de développement dans ces domaines et complètent les programmes du FED. Au moyen de l'ICD, l'UE a apporté un soutien systématique et par conséquent plus durable à d'importants programmes communs sur la gouvernance mondiale de la sécurité alimentaire, la gouvernance des forêts, etc. Grâce à son approche flexible et à son adaptation au contexte et aux besoins locaux, l'ICD contribue à promouvoir une plus grande cohérence des politiques et des investissements et assure la complémentarité entre les actions de différents acteurs du développement. L'ICD a également permis d'établir un partenariat très étroit et de créer des synergies entre le soutien apporté par la FAO, l'UE, les pouvoirs publics et d'autres partenaires de développement, en renforçant les liens entre l'investissement et l'appui des politiques afin de créer un environnement propice à la réalisation de l'ODD 2.

4.2.2.1.2 Réponse de l'équipe d'évaluation

La plupart de ces observations, positives, négatives ou mitigées figurent déjà dans le texte commenté. La participation limitée de la société civile et des autorités locales a été critiquée par les évaluateurs, de même que la capacité restreinte des DUE.

Au titre de la QE 3, il a été affirmé que l'ICD est considéré par les parties prenantes comme un instrument exigeant du point de vue administratif et peu flexible. L'évaluation a été essentiellement positive en ce qui concerne la complémentarité des programmes géographiques et thématiques, indiquant toutefois que le problème de la compartimentation au sein du programme GPGC reste un problème.

4.2.2.2 Question 2: Répondre aux objectifs de l'ICD dans les PMA et agir en matière de réduction de la pauvreté et de développement durable dans les PRI


Question 2: Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que l'ICD a répondu aux objectifs de la coopération au développement, en particulier dans les pays les moins avancés? Dans quelle mesure l'ICD a-t-il eu un impact sur la réduction de la pauvreté et le développement durable dans les pays à revenu intermédiaire, où des poches de pauvreté persistent, qui peuvent jouer un rôle crucial pour relever les défis régionaux et mondiaux?

4.2.2.2.1 Résumé des contributions

Pour cette question, un total de 47 contributions ont été reçues dans le cadre de la consultation publique ouverte en ligne. La majorité des contributions ont présenté une évaluation mitigée de la mesure dans laquelle l'ICD a répondu à ses objectifs dans les pays les moins avancés et les pays à revenu intermédiaire. Le graphique ci-dessous illustre le nombre de contributions essentiellement *positives*, *négatives*, *mitigées* ou *autres*⁶⁴.

⁶⁴ La catégorie *autres* comprend des contributions neutres ou considérées comme n'étant pas pertinentes pour cette question.

Schéma 47 Question 2: Type de contributions à la consultation publique ouverte en ligne



Dans les contributions reçues qui ont présenté une évaluation *essentiellement positive*, les contributeurs ont estimé que la programmation de l'ICD a bien respecté le principe de la différenciation et ont accueilli avec satisfaction que la plupart des fonds soient désormais destinés aux PMA, où leur valeur ajoutée devrait être plus élevée (par ex. autorité publique, organisation ou association, recherche et universités, autres).

Certaines contributions ont également estimé que l'ICD constitue un instrument approprié pour les PMA et les PRI (plateforme, réseau ou association de l'UE). Dans ce contexte, deux contributions ont spécifiquement mentionné le GPGC comme un outil approprié pour les PRI:

- On observe «des avantages directs pour les communautés locales des pays les moins avancés (Liberia) et des pays à revenu intermédiaire (Ghana)» (organisation ou association).
- «De notre point de vue, l'instrument thématique de l'ICD relatif aux "biens et défis publics mondiaux" (GPGC) a contribué à répondre à la nécessité d'associer les PRI aux efforts visant à relever les défis régionaux et mondiaux.» (Recherche/universités)

Dans les contributions qui ont présenté une évaluation *mitigée*, la plupart des contributions conviennent que l'ICD a été pertinent pour les pays les moins avancés et a contribué aux progrès dans la réduction de la pauvreté. Cependant, conformément aux résultats de l'évaluation, la plupart des contributions dans cette catégorie ont exprimé des préoccupations quant à la mesure dans laquelle l'ICD a pu toucher les PRI et les PRITS où la pauvreté existe encore et ont proposé un approfondissement des partenariats (par ex. avec les OSC) dans ces pays:

- «[...] Malheureusement, les "poches de pauvreté" subsistent dans les PRI, et l'ICD a éprouvé des difficultés pour répondre de manière pertinente à ce problème. Par conséquent, d'autres formes de partenariat avec ces pays doivent être envisagées.» (Plateforme, réseau ou association de l'UE)
- «L'ICD a été particulièrement pertinent dans les États les plus pauvres, vulnérables et fragiles [...] L'ICD a été moins pertinent dans les pays à revenu intermédiaire.» (Autorité publique)
- «L'ICD a dans une large mesure joué un rôle positif en contribuant à ce que l'UE atteigne ses objectifs de coopération au développement dans les PMA et les PRI. La suppression progressive de la coopération au développement dans les PRI doit être compensée par une analyse approfondie des caractéristiques de la pauvreté dans le pays et par des investissements judicieux dans les droits de l'homme et le

renforcement des organisations de la société civile qui représentent et soutiennent des personnes victimes de discrimination ou souffrant d'un manque de services.» (Plateforme, réseau ou association de l'UE)

Les contributions qui ont présenté une évaluation *essentiellement négative* évoquaient souvent l'absence de plateforme de coopération avec les PRI et les PRITS ou le manque de résultats en général:

- *«Les pays qui ont mené à bien les programmes d'aide bilatérale auraient encore besoin d'un soutien de la part de l'UE afin de veiller à ce que leur développement soit équitable et s'accompagne d'une réduction des inégalités, parallèlement au développement des perspectives de croissance.»* (Organisation ou association)
- *«Si l'ICD affiche les engagements nécessaires au renforcement de la coopération au développement, en l'occurrence dans les PMA, il ne les a pas tenus pleinement. La conception du développement humain, qui est fondamentale pour les politiques axées sur les personnes, est trop générale dans le cadre du programme thématique de l'ICD et devrait être affinée.»* (Organisation ou association)

Au cours des sessions de la consultation publique ouverte, les participants ont indiqué que l'évaluation répondait de manière appropriée aux véritables enjeux liés à la marche à suivre, à la façon de se pencher sur les PRITS où la pauvreté subsiste, sur la marge de manœuvre réduite et les moyens de faire reculer les limites.

D'autres observations écrites ont indiqué que l'ICD joue son rôle de vecteur de développement (santé, sécurité alimentaire, développement économique et social), en cohérence avec les ODD, et que son impact est structuré et relativement rapide dans les PMA et les PRITS. Cependant, l'absence d'un mécanisme d'accompagnement pour les pays gradués l'empêche de devenir un instrument capable de répondre pleinement aux évolutions qui peuvent être observées.

4.2.2.2 Réponse de l'équipe d'évaluation

Le sens général des observations semble mettre en évidence un besoin continu de coopération au développement dans les pays à revenu intermédiaire ; il s'agit là de l'une des principales conclusions de l'évaluation. L'instrument de partenariat, s'il est apprécié pour son rôle en ce qui concerne notamment les enjeux régionaux et mondiaux, n'est pas bien adapté, quant à sa taille ou à son objectif, pour remédier à la persistance de la pauvreté. Il ne constitue pas non plus une base politique efficace pour résoudre les problèmes liés aux droits de l'homme, à la démocratie et autres dans les pays «gradués». L'équipe d'évaluation se félicite du fait que les lecteurs indépendants aboutissent aux mêmes conclusions.

4.2.2.3 Question 3: L'ICD comme instrument de l'UE lui permettant de projeter ses principes et valeurs


Question 3: L'évaluation a constaté que de nombreux pays partenaires sont souvent en désaccord sur la place et le poids à accorder aux questions relatives aux droits de l'homme et à la gouvernance, qui font partie des principes qui guident l'action extérieure de l'UE, y compris l'ICD. L'ICD a-t-il permis à l'UE de projeter ses principes et ses valeurs (par ex. la démocratie, la primauté du droit, les droits de l'homme et les libertés fondamentales)?

4.2.2.3.1 Résumé des contributions

Pour cette question, un total de 47 contributions ont été reçues dans le cadre de la consultation publique ouverte en ligne. La majorité des contributions ont présenté une évaluation positive de la mesure dans laquelle l'ICD a permis à l'UE de projeter ses principes et ses valeurs. Le graphique ci-dessous illustre le nombre de contributions essentiellement *positives, négatives, mitigées ou autres*⁶⁵.

⁶⁵ La catégorie *autres* comprend des contributions neutres ou considérées comme n'étant pas pertinentes pour cette question.

Schéma 48 Question 3: Type de contributions à la consultation publique ouverte en ligne



La majorité des contributions présentent une évaluation *essentiellement positive* et conviennent que les actions extérieures de l'UE doivent être guidées par les principes de la démocratie, de l'état de droit et des droits de l'homme. Dans ce contexte, trois contributions ont explicitement mentionné le rôle crucial du volet OSC-AL dans ce domaine:

- «L'orientation de la ligne budgétaire affectée aux OSC-AL sur la création d'un environnement propice aux actions et initiatives des organisations de la société civile et des autorités locales témoigne du rôle favorable que l'ICD a joué à cet égard.» (Autorité publique)
- «[...] il ne fait aucun doute que l'action extérieure de l'UE doit être guidée essentiellement par les principes de la démocratie, de la primauté du droit, des droits de l'homme, y compris le droit à un environnement sain et les libertés fondamentales. L'ICD recèle un grand potentiel pour projeter ces valeurs. Le programme OSC-AL met fortement l'accent sur l'amélioration de la gouvernance et le renforcement de l'état de droit en associant la société civile, et le travail des délégations de l'UE sur les feuilles de route de la société civile est important à cet égard.» (Organisation ou association)

Les contributions qui présentent une évaluation *essentiellement mitigée* ont souligné l'importance de l'ICD dans la promotion des principes et valeurs de l'UE. Une plateforme européenne a indiqué que «L'UE est perçue comme un partenaire de dialogue fiable et plus neutre que les différents États membres. Il s'agit là d'une valeur ajoutée supplémentaire afin de promouvoir des processus de réforme tels que dans le domaine du renforcement de la gouvernance démocratique locale.» Si des progrès ont été observés (notamment en ce qui concerne le programme OSC-AL), plusieurs facteurs, essentiellement à l'échelle des DUE et en rapport avec la participation des OSC, qui entravent les progrès ont été recensés:

- Les DUE ont fait face à des blocages considérables, «découlant de la résistance politique dans les pays partenaires (par ex. le phénomène de réduction de la marge de manœuvre de la société civile et des associations de défense des droits de l'homme), les contraintes internes de l'UE (par ex, manque d'incitations politiques, institutionnelles et administratives pour intégrer les valeurs) et les intérêts des États membres.» (Recherche et universités).
- Soutien et ressources politiques limitées dans les DUE pour promouvoir les questions relatives aux droits de l'homme et à la gouvernance.(Organisation ou association)
- Nécessité d'améliorer le dialogue sectoriel dans les pays partenaires et de renforcer les partenariats. (Autorité publique)
- Utilisation limitée des feuilles de route de la société civile et de la démocratie pour soutenir cet objectif. (Plateforme, réseau ou association de l'UE)

Dans les contributions qui ont présenté une évaluation *essentiellement négative*, d'autres précisions n'ont pas été apportées.

D'autres observations écrites ont indiqué que, grâce à la forte participation de la société civile à l'ICD, l'UE réussit à transmettre ses principes et valeurs, en ce qui concerne notamment l'égalité entre les sexes, la protection de l'enfance et la lutte contre les discriminations. En contribuant au renforcement des capacités des acteurs non étatiques, l'instrument encourage la participation de la population au développement économique et social des pays bénéficiaires. Toutefois, dans le cas du volet thématique de l'ICD, la projection des principes juridiques ne semble pas constituer une condition sine qua non du financement octroyé au titre de cet instrument. En outre, dans le domaine de la gouvernance démocratique et des droits de l'homme, le lien entre l'ICD géographique, notamment lorsque la modalité de l'appui budgétaire est sélectionnée, le programme OSC-AL, ainsi que l'IEDDH, méritent d'être améliorés dans un certain nombre de cas. L'effet de levier politique du financement dans ce domaine devrait donc être encore renforcé.

4.2.2.3.2 Réponse de l'équipe d'évaluation

Ces observations mitigées soulignent la situation difficile rencontrée par l'UE, mise en évidence tout au long de l'évaluation: l'UE est attachée à la promotion d'un modèle libéral et démocratique du développement, mais ce modèle est remis en question dans un nombre croissant de pays partenaires. La *realpolitik* qui caractérise cette situation est liée au fait que l'UE a besoin de partenariats durables avec les gouvernements, même ceux avec lesquels elle est fondamentalement en désaccord dans de nombreux domaines. La réponse apportée par l'ICD dans ces cas consiste à encourager le développement de la société civile; cependant, comme l'ont fait observer les évaluateurs, l'UE éprouve des difficultés pour susciter une participation efficace de la société civile. De nombreuses raisons sont d'ordre administratif: l'ICD constitue tout simplement un instrument trop exigeant pour les ONG à l'exception de quelques privilégiées. Un meilleur développement des relations multipartenaires en dehors du modèle traditionnel donateur-bénéficiaire constitue une recommandation majeure des évaluateurs.

4.2.2.4 Question 4: capacité de l'ICD de s'adapter aux changements de politique et à l'environnement externe


Question 4: L'ICD prend en compte des préoccupations de politique intérieure de l'UE, telles que la migration et le changement climatique, dans l'action extérieure. Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que l'ICD a été en mesure de s'adapter à l'évolution des politiques et à l'environnement extérieur?

4.2.2.4.1 Résumé des contributions

Pour cette question, un total de 40 contributions ont été reçues dans le cadre de la consultation publique ouverte en ligne. La majorité des contributions ont présenté une évaluation mitigée sur la mesure dans laquelle l'ICD a pu s'adapter aux changements de politique et à l'environnement externe. Le graphique ci-dessous illustre le nombre de contributions essentiellement *positives*, *négatives*, *mitigées* ou *autres*⁶⁶.

⁶⁶ La catégorie *autres* comprend des contributions neutres ou considérées comme n'étant pas pertinentes pour cette question.

Schéma 49 Question 4: Type de contributions à la consultation publique ouverte en ligne



La majorité des contributions présentent une évaluation *essentiellement mitigée*. L'ICD semble avoir été perçu comme ayant été en mesure de répondre aux préoccupations politiques internes de l'UE «tels que le changement climatique et l'environnement, notamment via son programme thématique concernant les biens publics mondiaux et les défis qui les accompagnent» (plateforme, réseau ou association de l'UE) et de renforcer les initiatives en matière de migration grâce à l'adoption de fonds fiduciaires (plateforme, réseau ou association de l'UE, recherche/universités). Cependant, certaines inquiétudes manifestées soulignent que les préoccupations de politique intérieure de l'UE (en ce qui concerne notamment la migration) ne devraient pas trop empiéter sur l'objectif premier de l'ICD, à savoir la réduction de la pauvreté:

- «Du point de vue de la souplesse de réaction, le renforcement des initiatives en matière de migration a illustré la capacité d'adaptation de l'ICD. Toutefois, la logique et le cadre politique sur lesquels se fondera l'utilisation de ces fonds ont également évolué. L'ICD intègre ainsi de manière croissante des intérêts de sécurité à plus court terme dans son financement du développement en ce qui concerne la migration. Si cette évolution peut être interprétée comme une prise en considération des «préoccupations politiques internes de l'UE», les effets à long terme sur le développement dans le domaine de la migration ne se produisent pas seulement en privilégiant les aspects liés à la sécurité.» (Recherche/universités)
- «L'ICD a été utilisé pour répondre aux évolutions de l'environnement extérieur, telles que le défi que représentent les migrations. Des ressources importantes ont été consacrées aux fonds fiduciaires de l'Union. [...] des activités ont été proposées dans le cadre des programmes géographiques qui ne sont pas conformes aux critères du CAD. Il est essentiel de garantir l'intégrité de l'APD.» (Autorité publique)

Les contributions *essentiellement négatives* ont surtout souligné le manque de progrès dans le domaine du changement climatique, par exemple. «L'Accord de Paris n'a entraîné aucun changement majeur dans le financement de la lutte contre le changement climatique dans le cadre de l'ICD, qui reste limité au programme GPGC. L'intégration insuffisante de la protection de la biodiversité et de la lutte contre le changement climatique dans le financement de l'ICD semble également indiquer que le Programme de développement durable à l'horizon 2030 et les engagements internationaux pour la mise en œuvre du Programme d'action d'Addis-Abeba sur le financement du développement ont eu une incidence limitée sur la programmation de l'ICD.» (Organisation ou association)

Au cours des sessions de la consultation publique ouverte, deux participants ont déclaré qu'ils étaient d'accord avec les résultats de l'évaluation, notamment en ce qui concerne les aspects relatifs à la flexibilité et la réaction de l'UE aux défis actuels. Un participant a explicitement mentionné que *«la flexibilité a un coût, la situation actuelle est le produit des années passées. Le participant est en faveur d'une plus grande flexibilité entre les instruments et de leur intégration (le fonds fiduciaire est un exemple clair).»*

D'autres observations écrites ont indiqué que, grâce au recours à l'appui budgétaire, l'ICD a davantage été en mesure de s'adapter aux évolutions parfois rapides des contextes nationaux, sur les plans interne et externe. En ce qui concerne le changement climatique et l'environnement, une intégration plus systématique et transversale dans tous les domaines de coopération est parfois nécessaire, notamment dans l'agriculture, le développement urbain, l'assainissement et l'eau, etc.

En ce qui concerne la migration, la contribution a relevé que les initiatives restent insuffisantes et vagues dans de nombreux pays bénéficiaires, voire s'affaiblissent dans le cadre d'autres priorités. L'existence d'une ligne thématique relative à la migration n'a pas permis de répondre aux besoins des pays d'origine et de transit, pour lesquels la création de fonds fiduciaires a notamment été nécessaire (en particulier le fonds fiduciaire pour l'Afrique). Une autre observation écrite indique que les priorités de la CE dans l'ICD sont claires et reflètent un programme partagé de préoccupations et de priorités dans les domaines de la sécurité alimentaire, de la nutrition, de la résilience et du développement rural. Il existe par ailleurs une certaine flexibilité pour adapter et affiner ces objectifs au fil du temps, à mesure que le contexte et les besoins évoluent à l'échelle mondiale. Par exemple, le programme relatif à la résilience et le programme relatif à la nutrition ont tous deux été soutenus conjointement par l'UE et la FAO dans le cadre de l'ICD. [...]

4.2.2.4.2 Réponse de l'équipe d'évaluation

Le fait que le GPGC soit utilisé pour respecter les engagements en matière de lutte contre le changement climatique et de développement du secteur social (en particulier la santé) a été mis en évidence dans l'évaluation. À une époque caractérisée par une moindre influence de l'aide sur les politiques publiques, également mise en évidence par l'évaluation, il est impossible pour l'UE d'imposer ses priorités aux partenaires. L'UE peut tout au plus plaider en faveur de ces causes, avec une efficacité relative. La migration est un domaine en évolution constante. La contribution de l'ICD au fonds fiduciaire d'urgence pour l'Afrique, destiné à s'attaquer aux causes profondes de la migration, a été plutôt modeste. Il en va de même de l'initiative du Programme panafricain visant à mettre à profit tous les types de migration comme moteur du développement sur le continent. L'approche des évaluateurs a consisté à recenser les aspects positifs de la participation de l'UE à la question migratoire au moyen de l'ICD tout en mesurant l'ampleur du problème. L'UE n'a pas la capacité de réduire, et à plus forte raison de satisfaire la demande migratoire d'Afrique et du Moyen-Orient. Bien que cela n'ait pas été relevé dans l'évaluation, s'agissant d'une question extrêmement délicate, des membres de l'équipe d'évaluation expérimentés dans le domaine de la migration considèrent que «s'attaquer aux causes profondes de la migration» - le chômage, la pauvreté, l'insécurité - est tout aussi susceptible de favoriser la capacité des bénéficiaires d'agir sur la volonté de migration que de réduire l'incitation à la migration.

4.2.2.5 Question 5: Si vous avez d'autres points de vue sur l'ICD, il est vous est loisible de les partager ici.

4.2.2.5.1 Résumé des contributions

Dans la section relative aux *autres opinions sur l'ICD*, 42 contributions ont été apportées dans le cadre de la consultation publique ouverte en ligne. Ces contributions ont été regroupées sous des thèmes principaux:

Complémentarité, cohérence et coordination des différents programmes et IFE ainsi qu'avec les États membres:

- «À court terme, le défi le plus important est de renforcer l'efficacité et la cohérence, en ce qui concerne notamment les chevauchements potentiels entre les programmes régionaux et thématiques. À long terme: l'ICD devrait être fusionné avec d'autres instruments de coopération au développement comme le FED. Cet instrument unique de coopération au développement doit porter sur la mise en œuvre du Programme de développement durable à l'horizon 2030. Cet instrument doit être flexible et les délais de mise en œuvre doivent être raccourcis. Il doit être adapté à une coopération dans le cadre de "partenariats multi-acteurs". La coopération avec les pays à revenu intermédiaire, la promotion de la démocratie et de l'équité dans ces pays est essentielle.» (Autorité publique)
- «Les volets géographique et thématique ne sont pas intégrés de manière satisfaisante dans le même instrument et les personnes qui ne disposent pas de compétences approfondies risquent de confondre les différents plans» (organisation ou association).
- «Il existe des problèmes de communication et de partage d'informations concernant l'ICD. Si les programmes géographiques sont bien connus, ce n'est pas le cas des programmes régionaux, thématiques (GPGC en particulier) et panafricains.» (Autorité publique)

Efficacité

- «Dans l'ensemble, l'ICD est adapté à son objet. Afin d'améliorer son efficacité, il est recommandé de simplifier ses procédures et l'accès à l'instrument. Les actions qu'il finance devraient également viser une compatibilité complète et systématique avec les valeurs fondamentales de l'UE. Il devrait également respecter pleinement le principe de subsidiarité, étant donné l'importance de l'impact et de l'efficacité de l'aide au développement.» (Autorité publique)
- «1. En raison de processus lourds, à forte densité de main-d'œuvre, les délais de mise en œuvre sont beaucoup trop longs. 2. Si l'introduction du cadre de résultats de l'UE a mis davantage l'accent sur les résultats, il y a encore matière à amélioration, en établissant clairement les résultats escomptés et en veillant à ce que les indicateurs connexes dans les cadres logiques soient mesurables. 3. Les effectifs et les ensembles de compétences dans les DUE continuent de poser problème; par exemple, l'accent a été mis sur une programmation fondée sur l'égalité des sexes, mais les DUE disposent-elles de compétences suffisantes pour répondre à cette demande?» (Autorité publique)

Participation des parties prenantes et établissement de partenariats en ce qui concerne également la coopération avec les PRITS et les PRI:

- «Les bénéficiaires devraient être associés davantage et participer à la définition et à l'élaboration de l'ICD dès le début». (Autorité publique)
- «À mesure que l'ICD "perd" des partenaires de développement (après les processus de graduation), on peut se demander s'il ne serait pas judicieux de rassembler dans un seul instrument tous les pays partenaires qui dépendront encore de "l'aide au développement" au cours de la prochaine décennie. Cela permettrait à l'UE d'élaborer une approche globale à l'égard des PMA et des pays vulnérables - indépendamment des cadres et des dispositions financières adoptés précédemment.» (Recherche/universités)

Un certain nombre de contributions ont présenté des observations et des recommandations concernant le **programme OSC-AL**:

- «Nous souhaitons souligner l'importance cruciale du programme OSC-AL, notamment DEAR, qui est un sous-programme très pertinent pour soutenir l'éducation à la citoyenneté mondiale en Europe. Il convient de réduire nettement les allocations minimales et maximales dans les appels. Nous apprécions et accueillons avec satisfaction la proposition d'orientation vers des appels thématiques annuels, mais nous soulignons les risques d'un soutien limité aux grands groupements.» (Plateforme, réseau ou association de l'UE)

- «L'ICD doit prévoir une combinaison appropriée de modalités de financement, y compris les appels à propositions, auxquels doit pouvoir accéder un large éventail d'OSC locales et internationales.» [...] » (Organisation ou association)
- «Le prochain plan d'action pluriannuel devrait clairement établir un pourcentage de soutien aux OSC en tant que partenaires dans les services favorables aux pauvres et prestataires de services en faveur des services sociaux de base. Dans ce contexte, la prochaine stratégie devrait également comprendre le soutien des volets relatifs à l'égalité des sexes et prévoir les conditions préalables correspondantes. De même, la prochaine stratégie pour les OSC/AL devrait consacrer un volet réservé à la responsabilité sociale et au rôle que les OSC peuvent jouer dans la promotion de la responsabilisation ascendante.» (Organisation ou association)
- «L'ICD comprend également la ligne budgétaire thématique OSC-AL. [...]. L'UE a réussi à adapter ses cadres politiques pour définir une approche plus politique et structurée de la coopération avec la société civile et les autorités locales. Cependant, les différentes évaluations des IFE révèlent que d'importants blocages subsistent (y compris de nature procédurale) et empêchent d'intégrer pleinement ces acteurs dans les processus généraux de développement et de coopération. Le défi à relever pour l'UE et les États membres sera de s'orienter vers des «partenariats multi-acteurs» véritablement inclusifs (ODD 17) afin de faire face aux défis mondiaux et aux enjeux du développement, y compris par un examen approfondi des initiatives visant à prendre en compte, à soutenir et à mettre à profit la contribution de la société civile, des autorités locales et des acteurs du secteur privé.» (Recherche/universités)
- «L'ICD comprend le programme thématique OSC-LA, le principal programme de financement des gouvernements locaux et régionaux. Toutefois, ces gouvernements pourraient être également pertinents dans d'autres volets thématiques ou géographiques de l'ICD: de nombreux autres secteurs prioritaires tels que la santé, l'agriculture/la sécurité alimentaire et les routes/l'énergie comprennent une "dimension locale cachée"» (plateforme, réseau ou association de l'UE).
- «À l'avenir, certains programmes au titre de l'ICD, tels que le programme pour l'éducation et la sensibilisation aux problèmes de développement (DEAR) pourraient bénéficier d'une application plus complète de l'approche axée sur les acteurs de la coopération au développement.» (Industrie, entreprises ou organisations de travailleurs)

Certaines contributions ont porté principalement sur le **GPGC** et formulé des recommandations spécifiques. Certains contributeurs ont en particulier souligné que le volet relatif au changement climatique du GPGC est considéré comme très pertinent pour soutenir la mise en œuvre des ODD et de l'Accord de Paris:

- «La nouvelle stratégie du GPGC devrait également prévoir de soutenir les approches intégrées qui regroupent les domaines compartimentés du GPGC sous la forme de solutions globales. À titre d'exemple, les programmes "population, santé et environnement" devraient bénéficier d'un soutien accru au titre de ce programme.» (Organisation ou association)
- «La mise en œuvre du Programme de développement durable à l'horizon 2030 et de l'Accord de Paris dans les pays en développement dans le cadre de l'action extérieure de l'Union dépend du sous-programme concernant les biens publics mondiaux et les défis qui les accompagnent - Environnement et changement climatique [...] soutient très largement les objectifs du GPGC et plus précisément le programme Environnement et changement climatique, et nous proposons de renforcer le soutien à ce programme. Le programme GPGC devrait toutefois constituer un meilleur outil pour travailler de manière plus intégrée et soutenir les activités transversales, telles que l'approche paysagère» (organisation ou association).
- «Le programme thématique concernant les biens publics mondiaux et les défis qui les accompagnent (GPGC) comprend le travail décent comme domaine thématique, notamment par la contribution au programme pour un travail décent. (...) Les

syndicats devraient être davantage pris en compte car ils sont les mieux placés pour contribuer à la réalisation du travail décent, par le dialogue social en tant que moteur d'un développement durable et inclusif.» (Industrie, entreprises ou organisations de travailleurs)

Certaines contributions ont porté sur le **Programme panafricain** et formulé des recommandations spécifiques:

- *Le prochain PIP devrait renforcer le soutien aux OSC afin qu'elles jouent un rôle actif dans l'élaboration des politiques UE-UA, la promotion de l'égalité entre les sexes et des droits des femmes, la santé et l'autonomisation des jeunes. Le cadre actuel n'offre pas un soutien suffisant à cet égard, qui est fondamental à l'échelle du continent africain. Il devrait également prévoir davantage de décisions dans les domaines de la science, de la technologie et de l'innovation, en particulier pour les secteurs qui ne sont guère couverts par d'autres programmes, tels que la santé. Il devrait soutenir le continent africain et les politiques et stratégies pertinentes de l'UA, plutôt que simplement la feuille de route du partenariat stratégique Afrique-UE. (Organisation ou association)*

D'autres observations ont encouragé l'intégration/une meilleure intégration de thèmes spécifiques, tels que l'amélioration de l'intégration des questions d'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes ainsi que des personnes handicapées.

- *«Selon le Plan d'action sur l'égalité des sexes et l'émancipation des femmes dans le cadre de la coopération au développement (GAP), garantir la réalisation de l'objectif de 85 % des programmes au niveaux G1/G2. Veiller à ce que 20 % de l'ensemble des programmes atteignent le niveau G2 afin de garantir un financement ciblé. Augmenter le budget du GPGC pour l'égalité entre les sexes, de 1,5 % actuellement à au moins 20 %.Garantir un financement suffisant de la santé génésique et sexuelle et des droits connexes afin de mettre en oeuvre les engagements au titre du Programme de développement durable à l'horizon 2030 et du GAP II. Veiller à ce que les consultations et les analyses tiennent compte des discriminations multiples afin que personne ne soit laissé pour compte. - Utiliser des données désagrégées sur le genre pour l'ensemble des programmes financés par l'UE et les rapports systématiques du CAD de l'OCDE.»* (Plateforme, réseau ou association de l'UE)
- *«L'Union européenne doit respecter les engagements pris après la ratification de la Convention relative aux droits des personnes handicapées (CRPD) et inclure ses principes dans l'ICD. [...]»* (Organisation ou association)
- *«Nous recommandons que l'UE adopte une approche systématique et institutionnalisée pour intégrer les droits des personnes handicapées dans l'ensemble de ses politiques et programmes de coopération internationale. L'UE devrait prendre les mesures appropriées afin de définir des indicateurs de handicap de qualité et étudier la faisabilité de leur mise en œuvre dans l'ensemble des programmes et projets financés par l'UE d'ici l'examen à mi-parcours du cadre financier pluriannuel en 2017, y compris une évaluation systématique du respect de la CRPD dans l'attribution et les processus d'évaluation des projets financés par l'UE. Migration: les différentes situations de crise en Afrique, au Moyen-Orient et en Asie ont renforcé l'accent sur l'ensemble des aspects de la migration. Toutefois, la migration ne représentera pas seulement un problème dans les années à venir, mais constituera un point permanent du programme européen. Il convient par conséquent de renforcer la prise en compte de la migration dans les programmes mis en place dans le cadre de l'ICD et d'autres instruments de financement extérieur de l'UE. La migration préoccupe particulièrement de nombreux citoyens de l'UE. Par conséquent, une réaction rapide de l'UE lancerait un signal clair à la population européenne, indiquant que l'Europe est en mesure de gérer ces situations de crise de manière rapide et efficace. Au cours des dernières années, nous avons pu observer un recours accru à l'appui budgétaire de l'UE dans le cadre de l'ICD et d'autres instruments de financement extérieur comme moyen de renforcer les stratégies de financement du développement national et la réduction de la pauvreté et de promouvoir des finances*

publiques saines et transparentes dans nos pays partenaires. Cependant, nous estimons que l'appui budgétaire n'est pas une panacée et ne peut que contribuer au développement d'un pays partenaire, si les conditions nécessaires sont en place et uniquement sous un contrôle strict de l'ensemble du processus de soutien budgétaire, en particulier des critères d'éligibilité et de décaissement, afin de garantir la transparence nécessaire et de lutter contre la corruption.» (Plateforme, réseau ou association de l'UE)

4.2.2.5.2 Réponse de l'équipe d'évaluation

Nombre de ces observations sont assez spécifiques et l'équipe ne répondra pas à chacune d'elles séparément. Certains thèmes importants de l'évaluation méritent néanmoins d'être soulignés. L'un est la nécessité d'une coopération plus efficace avec la société civile et les autorités locales en ce qui concerne «la marge de manœuvre réduite» et «les moyens de faire reculer les limites». Les succès plutôt mitigés dans l'intégration des questions d'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes ont été relevés, et la révision finale veillera à ce que les droits des personnes handicapées soient également représentés adéquatement. Ce que ne reflète pas le texte, s'agissant d'une question extrêmement délicate, c'est la faiblesse fondamentale de toutes les approches fondées sur les droits, qui suscitent une soif morale dépassant largement les ressources ou la volonté politique nécessaire pour la satisfaire. C'est pourquoi le respect des engagements pris par l'UE au titre de l'ICD dans des domaines tels que le changement climatique et le développement social est devenu fortement tributaire des programmes thématiques, par exemple. La nature «cloisonnée» du GPGC, étroitement liée à l'influence des groupes de sensibilisation européens, a été critiquée par les évaluateurs, de même que la difficulté du programme OSC-AL à atteindre ses objectifs. La faible coopération avec ces acteurs est une question de forces concurrentes: les pressions monétaires exigeant la dépense rapide de sommes considérables, les frais administratifs importants liés aux faiblesses des bénéficiaires et l'incapacité de ces partenaires de respecter les procédures exigeantes de l'UE. Dans un projet antérieur, les évaluateurs ont proposé de fusionner l'ICD et le FED, une question politique controversée à Bruxelles depuis un certain temps. Les évaluateurs ont omis cette recommandation parce qu'il s'agit plus exactement d'un sujet qui sera abordé lors de l'évaluation à mi-parcours des IFE l'année prochaine. Les évaluateurs se sont efforcés de ne pas usurper le rôle de cette évaluation à mi-parcours.

4.3 Resumen de contribuciones a la Consulta Pública Abierta (CPA)


4.3.1 Introducción

El proyecto de informe de evaluación del Instrumento de Cooperación para el Desarrollo (ICD)⁶⁷ se publicó en el sitio web de la Comisión Europea para una Consulta Pública Abierta (CPA) entre el 7 de febrero y el 5 de mayo de 2017⁶⁸, junto con los informes de evaluación de todos los demás Instrumentos de Financiación Externa (EFI). Se invitó a participar en este proceso a todas las partes interesadas en países beneficiarios y de la UE. El objetivo de la consulta vía web fue doble:

- Obtener información del mayor margen posible de partes interesadas, incluidas las ubicadas en países beneficiarios y en Estados miembros de la UE, sobre las conclusiones producto de las evaluaciones.
- Reunir ideas preliminares sobre futuros instrumentos de financiación externa una vez expiren los actuales el 31 de diciembre de 2020.

En la página web de la CPA se recibieron un total de 238 contribuciones para el ICD por parte de 64 participantes. La mayoría de las contribuciones fueron realizadas por organizaciones o asociaciones, seguidas por autoridades públicas. Además, se proporcionaron seis aportaciones por escrito sin emplear la web de la CPA. El siguiente gráfico ilustra el tipo de contribuciones recogidas desde la web de la CPA.

Figura 50 Tipo de colaboradores para la web de la CPA




Los participantes podían elegir el nivel de confidencialidad de su contribución. El siguiente gráfico muestra la opción elegida por los diferentes participantes. Los participantes que eligieron la opción "no se puede publicar directamente, pero puede incluirse dentro de los datos estadísticos" se incluyen en los resúmenes estadísticos de cada pregunta. El contenido de sus comentarios no se incluye en los resúmenes de contribuciones, pero los evaluadores los han tenido en cuenta.

⁶⁷ Reglamento (UE) no 233/2014 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 11 de marzo de 2014, por el que se establece un Instrumento de Financiación de la Cooperación al Desarrollo para el período 2014-2020.

⁶⁸ https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/public-consultation-external-financing-instruments-european-union_en

Figura 51 Nivel de confidencialidad elegido por cada participante



En el marco de la web de la CPA, se invitó a los participantes a responder a las siguientes cinco preguntas específicas sobre el ICD:

- Pregunta 1: ¿Cómo de bien cree que el ICD ha abordado sus objetivos?
- Pregunta 2: ¿Cómo de bien piensa usted que el ICD ha abordado los objetivos de cooperación al desarrollo, concretamente en Países Menos Adelantados? ¿Hasta qué punto el ICD ha tenido un impacto en la reducción de la pobreza y el desarrollo sostenible en los Países de Ingresos Medios, donde persisten focos de pobreza y que pueden desempeñar un papel fundamental para hacer frente a desafíos regionales y mundiales?
- Pregunta 3: La evaluación ha revelado que muchos países asociados a menudo no están de acuerdo con el lugar y el peso que deben darse a las cuestiones de derechos humanos y la gobernanza, que forman parte de los principios que guían la acción exterior de la UE, incluido el ICD. ¿Ha permitido el ICD a la UE proyectar sus principios y valores (p. ej., la democracia, el estado de derecho, los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales)?
- Pregunta 4: El ICD responde a las preocupaciones internas de la política de la UE, como migración y cambio climático, en la acción exterior. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que el ICD ha sido capaz de adaptarse a los cambios en la política y el entorno exterior?
- Pregunta 5: Le invitamos a compartir aquí cualquier otra opinión que tenga sobre el ICD.

Como parte de la consulta pública, DEVCO, SEAE, FPI y NEAR organizaron un taller técnico con más de 180 participantes del Parlamento Europeo y de los Estados miembros de la UE los días 27 y 28 de marzo de 2017. El objetivo de este taller fue reunir puntos de vista sobre los proyectos de informes de evaluación de los IFE e iniciar las reflexiones sobre el futuro de los instrumentos después de 2020.

Además, el proyecto de informe de evaluación se presentó en una reunión con el Grupo de Trabajo sobre Cooperación para el Desarrollo (CODEV) del Consejo de la Unión Europea el 23 de febrero de 2017 y en la reunión del Foro de Políticas sobre Desarrollo, celebrada el 23 de marzo de 2017. La reunión congregó a Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil (OSC) y Autoridades Locales (AL) de la Unión Europea y países asociados.

El siguiente resumen sintetiza las principales contribuciones recibidas de la web de la CPA, comentarios adicionales por escrito y las diversas consultas en persona, en relación con los principales hallazgos y conclusiones surgidos de la evaluación.

4.3.2 Resumen de las contribuciones a la CPA


4.3.2.1 Pregunta 1: Tratamiento de los objetivos del ICD

Pregunta 1: ¿Cómo de bien cree que el ICD ha abordado sus objetivos? Los principales criterios de evaluación para la evaluación son: relevancia; eficacia, impacto y sostenibilidad; eficiencia; valor añadido de la UE; coherencia, consistencia, complementariedad y sinergias; e influencia. Siéntase libre de comentar los hallazgos, conclusiones o recomendaciones para cualquiera de los criterios o para todos ellos.

4.3.2.1.1 Resumen de las contribuciones

Para esta pregunta se recibieron un total de 62 contribuciones en la web de la CPA. La mayoría de las contribuciones proporcionaron una evaluación mixta sobre la medida en que el ICD ha abordado sus objetivos. El siguiente gráfico ilustra el número de contribuciones que fueron principalmente *positivas*, *negativas*, *mixtas* u *otras*⁶⁹. Cuando ha sido posible, las contribuciones se han agrupado por componente del instrumento.

Figura 52 Pregunta 1: Tipo de contribuciones desde la web de la CPA



De las contribuciones recibidas que proporcionaron una valoración *principalmente positiva*, la mayoría de participantes consideran que el ICD ha sido **relevante** y **un valor añadido**, mientras que algunos también destacaron la eficacia del instrumento y la complementariedad con otras FE. En este contexto, un grupo de expertos europeo apuntó que «El Reglamento se actualizó y permitió al ICD funcionar a escala mundial como "instrumento habilitador" que responde tanto a las prioridades políticas de la UE como a las expectativas de los países asociados. Se hicieron esfuerzos para aplicar sistemáticamente los principios del Programa para el Cambio (incluida la diferenciación) y de Busan (propiedad del país). Se buscaron sinergias con otros instrumentos e intervenciones de los EM, intentando así aportar un valor añadido de la UE». Sobre el valor añadido se dieron, entre otras, las siguientes explicaciones:

- «El ICD constituye claramente un valor añadido, en particular los programas temáticos que incorporan el trabajo digno para todos, tal como se estipula en el Reglamento del ICD». (Industria, empresas u organizaciones de trabajadores)

⁶⁹ La categoría *otras* incluye contribuciones que son neutras o consideradas como no relevantes para esta pregunta.

- «Cuando se han tomado medidas en relación con la discapacidad, el valor añadido de la Unión Europea ha sido muy grande, ya que la discapacidad no es una cuestión prioritaria en los países y esta población es invisible». (Organización o asociación)
- La capacidad del ICD para intervenir de varias maneras: geográfica, temática, incluyendo las OCS-AL en relación con las necesidades de los actores identificados como clave para lograr todos los demás objetivos y que de otro modo serían excluidos es un factor clave en el éxito del programa. Esta capacidad para alcanzar estos objetivos y prioridades diferentes es única y un valor añadido para la UE». (Organización o asociación)

De las contribuciones que han proporcionado una valoración *mixta*, no cabe duda de que el ICD con su enfoque en la reducción de la pobreza se percibe como un instrumento **muy relevante** (especialmente en países menos adelantados). Sin embargo, se han identificado varios factores que podrían limitar la relevancia y eficacia del ICD:

- La creciente necesidad de adaptarse a un entorno y desafíos cambiantes (como la migración y el tratamiento de las causas profundas de la migración) y el marco político actual y prioridades de la UE.
- Reducción del espacio para la sociedad civil.
- Necesidad creciente de identificar e incluir a múltiples partes interesadas (en especial OSC, sector privado).
- Necesidad creciente de incorporar sistemáticamente temas como el cambio climático, la igualdad de género y la discapacidad.
- Alineación limitada de los compromisos internacionales sobre la financiación de la diversidad biológica y el desarrollo sostenible (Organización o asociación).

Respecto a la **eficiencia**, varios comentarios señalan que el ICD es un instrumento administrativamente exigente que representa una carga significativa para las partes interesadas, por ejemplo: «Los elevados requisitos de procedimiento siguen planteando problemas tanto al personal de la UE como a los beneficiarios de las ayudas (...)». (Plataforma, red o asociación de la UE) En relación con esto, varios participantes identificaron la falta de recursos humanos en las delegaciones de la UE y la falta de transparencia y flujo de información entre los EM de la UE, la sede y las delegaciones de la UE como factores que limitan la eficiencia del ICD.

En cuanto a la medida en que el ICD fue percibido como **complementario, coherente y consistente**, varias observaciones expresaron cierta preocupación, señalando un posible riesgo de superposición entre los EFI y el ICD, pidiendo un enfoque más holístico. Para dar algunos ejemplos:

- «En el marco del ICD, se establecieron programas emblemáticos con el objetivo de superar los enfoques fragmentarios. En la misma línea, se estableció inicialmente el BPGD como un nuevo programa temático para aumentar la flexibilidad y evitar un enfoque fragmentado, especialmente para responder a crisis mundiales y compromisos internacionales. Si bien varios programas temáticos se fusionaron en el BPGD único, sigue existiendo el problema de las áreas temáticas que se tratan de forma aislada». (Organización o asociación)
- «La cartera de intervenciones parece muy diversificada, en muchos sectores, y fragmentada. Esto plantea la cuestión de la coordinación y la coherencia entre los diversos instrumentos financieros y requiere una combinación más directa de estos instrumentos». (Autoridad pública)

En **valor añadido de la UE**, si bien se reconoció que había que trabajar más y que la UE todavía debía aprovechar todo su potencial, se han identificado varios ejemplos de valor añadido de la UE:

- «La UE suele verse como un intermediario honesto que se esfuerza por actuar sobre la base de una verdadera asociación con sus socios en la cooperación para el desarrollo». (Autoridad pública)

- «La cooperación de la UE tiene un alto valor para los propios Estados miembros de la UE mediante una coordinación regular y una "programación conjunta"». (Autoridad pública)
- «Principalmente en la promoción de la democracia, la sociedad civil, el género y la salud sexual y reproductiva y los derechos que a veces han sido descuidados por los gobiernos beneficiarios». (Autoridad pública)
- «El valor añadido de la UE depende también de la variedad de actores europeos, como gobiernos locales y regionales europeos, que pueden compartir su experiencia en las políticas públicas locales y el desarrollo, el acceso y la gestión de los fondos de la UE». (Plataforma, red o asociación de la UE)

De las contribuciones que proporcionaron una valoración *principalmente negativa*, se identificaron las siguientes razones principales por las que los contribuyentes consideraban que el ICD no abordaba bien sus objetivos:

- Participación limitada de las partes interesadas, como los Estados miembros de la UE, en las discusiones más amplias sobre el ICD (Autoridad pública), las OSC y las AL (Autoridad pública).
- Experiencia limitada en EUD (Autoridad pública).
- Desprecio por ciertos temas como las reformas de mercado (Ciudadano/particular) y el agua y saneamiento para el desarrollo sostenible (Organización o asociación).
- Necesidad de un mejor compromiso con los países de ingresos medio (Autoridad pública).
- Sinergias limitadas y complementariedad entre instrumentos geográficos y temáticos y con otros donantes, p. ej., debido al enfoque fragmentado (Autoridad pública).

Desde las sesiones de la CPA, se expresó una reiterada preocupación por la participación ("débil") de las OSC y las AL. Los participantes consideraron que *«estos instrumentos no están adaptados a las realidades de las autoridades locales. Las AL están obligadas por sus gobiernos y no pueden simplemente cambiar su forma de trabajar y por lo tanto los instrumentos deben ser flexibles»*. Un participante expresó que *«me gustaría ver apoyo a las OSC en cuanto al derecho a iniciativas y pluralidad a través de los instrumentos (no solo OSC-AL). Las OSC-AL tienen experiencia y conocimientos que también son relevantes para la cobertura temática y sectorial. Me gustaría ver un papel importante en los programas geográficos y temáticos. Se podría explorar el acuerdo de financiación de los programas temáticos para ver si la OSC desempeñan algún papel»*.

Además, durante los períodos de sesiones de la CPA, los participantes expresaron que en el contexto de **eficiencia** se consideraba que había una falta de transparencia en la información. Un factor significativo que obstaculiza el desempeño del ICD parece ser una limitada capacidad de personal tanto en las delegaciones de la UE como en la sede.

Otros comentarios escritos expresaron lo siguiente:

- La necesidad de consultar a los EM mucho antes en la identificación y desarrollo de los programas y de mantener un diálogo permanente.
- El ICD es una herramienta eficaz que en general satisface las prioridades de la UE para la reducción de la pobreza, pero hay varias deficiencias en el ICD que deben señalarse:
 - Debe mejorarse la supervisión de los proyectos, incluida una mejor formulación de indicadores de eficiencia.
 - Los proyectos establecidos no siempre son sostenibles y lo suficientemente fuertes como para durar.
 - Las tasas de desembolso son relativamente bajas en algunos países, en particular debido a la insuficiente capacidad (deficiencias administrativas y recursos humanos inadecuados).
- Experiencia positiva con el programa temático/BPGD sobre seguridad alimentaria, nutrición, agricultura y desarrollo rural. Los programas temáticos reflejan una agenda

compartida de objetivos de desarrollo en estos ámbitos y son complementarios de los programas del FED. A través del ICD, la UE ha ofrecido un apoyo coherente y, por lo tanto, más sostenible a las importantes agendas compartidas sobre la gobernanza mundial de la seguridad alimentaria; gobernanza forestal; etc. A través de su enfoque flexible y su adaptación al contexto y las necesidades locales, el ICD ayuda a promover una mayor coherencia en las políticas e inversiones y garantiza la complementariedad entre las acciones de los diversos agentes de desarrollo. El ICD también ha permitido la creación de una estrecha colaboración y sinergias entre el apoyo prestado por la FAO, la UE, gobiernos y otros asociados para el desarrollo, vinculando mejor las inversiones y el apoyo a las políticas para crear un entorno favorable al logro del ODS2 (SDG2).

4.3.2.1.2 Respuesta del equipo de evaluación

La mayoría de estos comentarios, positivos, negativos o mixtos, ya se han reflejado en el texto comentado. La escasa participación de la sociedad civil y las autoridades locales ha sido criticada por los evaluadores, al igual que ha limitado la capacidad de las delegaciones de la UE.

Ante la pregunta de evaluación EQ 3, se ha afirmado que el ICD es considerado por los interesados como un instrumento administrativamente exigente y con tan solo una limitada flexibilidad. La evaluación ha sido esencialmente positiva en cuanto a la complementariedad de los programas geográficos y temáticos, al tiempo que se afirma que el problema de la compartimentación dentro del programa BPGD sigue siendo un problema.

4.3.2.2 Pregunta 2: Abordar los objetivos del ICD en los PMA y la reducción de la pobreza y desarrollo sostenible en los países PIM.


Pregunta 2: ¿Cómo de bien piensa usted que el ICD ha abordado los objetivos de cooperación al desarrollo, concretamente en Países Menos Adelantados? ¿Hasta qué punto el ICD ha tenido un impacto en la reducción de la pobreza y el desarrollo sostenible en los Países de Ingresos Medios, donde persisten focos de pobreza y que pueden desempeñar un papel fundamental para hacer frente a desafíos regionales y mundiales?

4.3.2.2.1 Resumen de las contribuciones

Para esta pregunta se recibieron un total de 47 contribuciones en la web de la CPA. La mayoría de las contribuciones proporcionaron una evaluación mixta sobre la medida en que el ICD ha abordado sus objetivos en los Países Menos Adelantados y en los Países de Ingresos Medios. El siguiente gráfico ilustra el número de contribuciones que fueron principalmente *positivas*, *negativas*, *mixtas* u *otras*⁷⁰.

⁷⁰ La categoría *otras* incluye contribuciones que son neutras o consideradas como no relevantes para esta pregunta.

Figura 53 Pregunta 2: Tipo de contribuciones desde la web de la CPA



De las contribuciones recibidas que proporcionan una valoración *principalmente positiva*, los participantes consideraron que la programación del ICD ha respetado el principio de diferenciación y acoge con satisfacción que la mayor parte de la financiación se destine ahora a los PMA, donde se espera que tenga mayor valor añadido (p. ej., Autoridad pública, Organización o asociación, Investigación y academia, Otros).

Algunas contribuciones también consideraron que el ICD es un instrumento apropiado tanto para los PMA como para los PIM (plataforma, red o asociación de la UE). En este contexto, dos contribuciones mencionaron específicamente el BPGD como herramienta apropiada de enfoque a los PIM:

- «Los beneficios directos para las comunidades locales de los países menos adelantados (Liberia) y los países de ingresos medios (Ghana)» son visibles (Organización o asociación).
- «A nuestro juicio, el instrumento temático del ICD sobre «Bienes Públicos Globales y Desafíos» (BPGD) ayudó a responder a la necesidad de hacer partícipes a los PIM en la solución de los problemas regionales y mundiales». (Investigación / académico)

De las contribuciones que proporcionaron una valoración *mixta*, la mayoría de las contribuciones coinciden en que el ICD ha sido pertinente para los Países Menos Adelantados y ha contribuido al progreso en la reducción de la pobreza. Sin embargo, y en consonancia con los resultados de la evaluación, la mayor parte de las contribuciones de esta categoría expresaron su preocupación en cuanto a la medida en que el ICD podía llegar a los PIM y PIMA donde la pobreza todavía existe y sugirió la profundización de las asociaciones (p.ej., con las OSC) de estos países:

- «(...) Por desgracia, los llamados «focos de pobreza» persisten en los países PIM, y ha resultado difícil para el ICD abordar esta cuestión de manera adecuada. Es necesario, por tanto, explorar otras formas de asociación con estos países». (Plataforma, red o asociación de la UE)
- «El ICD fue particularmente relevante en los estados más pobres, débiles y frágiles (...)El ICD fue menos relevante en los Países de Ingresos Medios». (Autoridad pública)
- «El ICD ha desempeñado en gran medida un papel positivo ayudando a la UE a cumplir sus objetivos de cooperación para el desarrollo en los PAM y los PIM. El enfoque de la cooperación para el desarrollo en los países en desarrollo debe ser compensado con un análisis profundo de las características de la pobreza en el país y una inversión bien pensada en los derechos humanos y el fortalecimiento de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil que representan y apoyan a las personas discriminadas o más desprotegidas». (Plataforma, red o asociación de la UE)

Las contribuciones que proporcionaron una valoración *principalmente negativa* a menudo estaban relacionadas con la falta de una plataforma de cooperación con los PIM y PIMA o con la falta de resultados en general:

- «Los países que se gradúan de los programas de ayuda bilateral seguirán necesitando el apoyo de la UE para asegurar que su desarrollo sea equitativo, con una reducción de las desigualdades paralela a las oportunidades de crecimiento». (Organización o asociación)
- «Si bien el ICD tiene el compromiso correcto de impulsar la cooperación para el desarrollo, en el caso concreto de los PMA, no lo hizo. La comprensión del desarrollo humano (DH), que es fundamental para las políticas centradas en las personas, en el marco del programa temático del ICD es demasiado general y debería ser afinada». (Organización o asociación)

Durante las sesiones de la CPA, los participantes señalaron que la evaluación abordaba bien los desafíos reales sobre cómo avanzar, cómo examinar los PIMA donde todavía hay pobreza, espacios reducido y retrocesos.

Otros comentarios por escrito señalan que el ICD cumple su función de vector del desarrollo (salud, seguridad alimentaria, desarrollo económico y social), compatible con los ODS, y su impacto se considera estructurado y relativamente rápido en los PMA y los PIMA. Sin embargo, la falta de un mecanismo de acompañamiento para los países graduados impide que se convierta en un instrumento capaz de responder plenamente a los acontecimientos que se pueden observar.

4.3.2.2 Respuesta del equipo de evaluación

La idea principal de los comentarios parece ser que sigue habiendo necesidad de cooperación para el desarrollo en los Países de Ingresos Medios; una de las principales conclusiones de la evaluación. El Instrumento de Asociación, si bien desempeña un papel importante, en particular en relación con los desafíos regionales y mundiales, no se adapta bien, ni por tamaño ni por objetivo, a la lucha contra la pobreza persistente. Tampoco es una base efectiva para la influencia política para abordar los problemas de derechos humanos, democracia, etc. en los países «graduados». El equipo de evaluación está satisfecho de que los lectores independientes llegaran a las mismas conclusiones que ellos.

4.3.2.3 Pregunta 3: Medida en que el ICD ha permitido a la UE proyectar sus principios y valores


Pregunta 3: La evaluación ha revelado que muchos países asociados a menudo no están de acuerdo con el lugar y el peso que deben darse a las cuestiones de derechos humanos y la gobernanza, que forman parte de los principios que guían la acción exterior de la UE, incluido el ICD. ¿Ha permitido el ICD a la UE proyectar sus principios y valores (p. ej., la democracia, el estado de derecho, los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales)?

4.3.2.3.1 Resumen de las contribuciones

Para esta pregunta se recibieron un total de 47 contribuciones en la web de la CPA. La mayoría de las contribuciones proporcionaron una valoración positiva de la medida en que el ICD permitió a la UE proyectar sus principios y valores. El siguiente gráfico ilustra el número de contribuciones que fueron principalmente *positivas*, *negativas*, *mixtas* u *otras*⁷¹.

⁷¹ La categoría *otros* incluye contribuciones que son neutras o consideradas como no relevantes para esta pregunta.

Figura 54 Pregunta 3: Tipo de contribuciones desde la web de la CPA



La mayoría de las contribuciones proporcionan una valoración *principalmente positiva* y están de acuerdo en que las acciones exteriores de la UE deben guiarse por los principios de democracia, estado de derecho y derechos humanos. En este contexto, tres contribuciones mencionaron explícitamente el papel crucial del componente OSC-AL para trabajar en esta área:

- «La línea presupuestaria de las OSC-AL centrada en la creación de un entorno propicio para las acciones e iniciativas de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil y las autoridades locales es testimonio del papel que el ICD ha desempeñado a este respecto». (Autoridad pública)
- «(...) no cabe duda de que la acción exterior de la UE debe guiarse principalmente por los principios de la democracia, el estado de derecho, los derechos humanos, incluido el derecho a un medio ambiente sano y las libertades fundamentales. El ICD tiene un gran potencial para proyectar estos valores. El programa OSC-AL tiene un fuerte énfasis en mejorar la gobernanza y el fortalecimiento del estado de derecho mediante la participación de la sociedad civil y el trabajo sobre las hojas de ruta de la sociedad civil por parte de las delegaciones de la UE es importante a este respecto». (Organización o asociación)

Las contribuciones que proporcionan una valoración *principalmente mixta* hicieron hincapié en la importancia del ICD para promover los principios y valores de la UE. Una plataforma de la UE señaló que «la UE es percibida como un socio de diálogo fiable y más neutral que los Estados miembros individuales. Este es un valor añadido adicional para promover procesos de reforma tales como en el campo del fortalecimiento de la gobernanza democrática local.». Si bien se han observado progresos (especialmente en relación con el programa OSC-AL), se han identificado varios factores, principalmente a nivel de delegaciones de la UE y en relación con la participación de las OSC, que han obstaculizado el progreso:

- Las delegaciones de la UE se han encontrado frente a grandes cuellos de botella, «(p. ej., el fenómeno del «espacio cerrado» para la sociedad civil y las asociaciones de derechos humanos), las limitaciones internas de la UE (p. ej., la falta de incentivos políticos, institucionales y burocráticos para incorporar los valores) y los intereses de los EM». (Investigación y académico).
- Limitaciones en apoyo político y recursos en las delegaciones de la UE para promover cuestiones de derechos humanos y gobernanza. (Organización o asociación)
- Necesidad de mejorar el diálogo sectorial en los países socios y fortalecer las asociaciones. (Autoridad pública)

- Uso limitado de su sociedad civil y las hojas de ruta de la democracia para apoyar este objetivo. (Plataforma, red o asociación de la UE)

Para las contribuciones que proporcionaron una valoración *principalmente negativa*, no se proporcionaron más explicaciones.

Otros comentarios escritos señalan que, debido a la fuerte participación de la sociedad civil en el ICD, la UE logra transmitir sus principios y valores, en particular en lo que respecta a la igualdad de género, la protección de los niños y la lucha contra la discriminación. Al contribuir a la creación de capacidad de los actores no estatales, el instrumento promueve la participación de la población en el desarrollo económico y social de los países beneficiarios. Sin embargo, en el caso del componente temático del ICD, la proyección de los principios jurídicos no parece ser una condición sine qua non de la financiación concedida en virtud de este instrumento. Además, en el ámbito de la gobernanza democrática y de los derechos humanos, el vínculo entre el ICD geográfico, en particular en lo que se refiere a la modalidad de apoyo presupuestario, el programa OSC-AL y el IEDDH, merece ser mejorado en varios casos. Por lo tanto, el efecto de apalancamiento político de la financiación en este ámbito debe reforzarse todavía más.

4.3.2.3.2 Respuesta del equipo de evaluación

Estos comentarios mixtos ponen de relieve la difícil situación a la que se enfrenta la UE, que se extiende a lo largo de toda la evaluación: la UE se ha comprometido a promover un modelo democrático liberal de desarrollo, pero este modelo está siendo atacado por un creciente número de países socios. La *realpolitik* de la situación es que la UE necesita asociaciones duraderas con los gobiernos; incluso con aquellos con los que fundamentalmente no está de acuerdo en muchas áreas. La respuesta a través del ICD en estos casos es fomentar el desarrollo de la sociedad civil; sin embargo, como han señalado los evaluadores, la UE se esfuerza por involucrar efectivamente a la sociedad civil. Muchas de las razones son administrativas: el ICD es simplemente un instrumento demasiado desafiante para que lo exploten las ONG, fuera de unas pocas privilegiadas. La necesidad de desarrollar mejor las relaciones entre múltiples socios fuera del modelo tradicional de donante-beneficiario es una importante recomendación de los evaluadores.

4.3.2.4 Pregunta 4: Capacidad del ICD para adaptarse a los cambios en las políticas y en el entorno externos


Pregunta 4: El ICD responde a las preocupaciones internas de la política de la UE, como migración y cambio climático, en la acción exterior. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que el ICD ha sido capaz de adaptarse a los cambios en la política y el entorno exterior?

4.3.2.4.1 Resumen de las contribuciones

Para esta pregunta se recibieron un total de 40 contribuciones en la web de la CPA. La mayoría de las contribuciones proporcionaron una evaluación mixta sobre la medida en que el ICD ha podido adaptarse a los cambios en la política y en el entorno externos. El siguiente gráfico ilustra el número de contribuciones que fueron principalmente *positivas*, *negativas*, *mixtas* u *otras*⁷².

⁷² La categoría *otros* incluye contribuciones que son neutras o consideradas como no relevantes para esta pregunta.

Figura 55 Pregunta 4: Tipo de contribuciones desde la web de la CPA



La mayoría de las contribuciones proporcionan una valoración *principalmente mixta*. Parece existir la sensación de que el ICD ha logrado abordar las preocupaciones de la política interior de la UE «como el cambio climático y el medio ambiente, especialmente a través de su programa temático Bienes Públicos Globales y Desafíos» (Plataforma, red o asociación de la UE) y ha ampliado el trabajo en migración mediante la adopción de fondos fiduciarios (Plataforma, red o asociación de la UE, Investigación / académico). Sin embargo, se expresaron algunas inquietudes al subrayar que las preocupaciones de la UE en materia de política interna (especialmente relacionadas con la migración) no deberían interferir demasiado con el objetivo principal de la reducción de la pobreza del ICD:

- «En términos de capacidad de respuesta, la ampliación del trabajo relacionado con la migración ha demostrado que el ICD puede responder. Sin embargo, la lógica y el marco político en el que se utilizarán estos fondos también han cambiado. Por lo tanto, el ICD incorpora cada vez más intereses de seguridad a más corto plazo en su financiación para el desarrollo en relación con la migración. Si bien esto puede interpretarse como una adaptación a las "preocupaciones internas de la política de la UE", los efectos a largo plazo del desarrollo en el ámbito de la migración no solo se logran centrándose en los aspectos relacionados con la seguridad». (Investigación / académico)
- «El ICD se ha utilizado para responder a los cambios en el entorno externo, como el desafío de la migración. Se han canalizado importantes recursos a los fondos fiduciarios de la UE. (...) se han propuesto actividades en el marco de los programas geográficos que no se ajustan a los criterios del CAD. Es fundamental que se proteja la integridad de la AOD». (Autoridad pública)

Las contribuciones que fueron *principalmente negativas*, enfatizaron sobre todo la falta de progreso en el área del cambio climático, por ejemplo «El Acuerdo de París no ha inducido ningún cambio importante en la financiación del clima en virtud del ICD, que sigue estando restringido al BPGD. La falta de integración de la biodiversidad y el clima a través de la financiación del ICD también sugiere que la adopción del Programa de Desarrollo Sostenible de 2030 y los compromisos internacionales para implementar el Programa de Acción de Addis Abeba sobre Financiación para el Desarrollo han tenido un impacto limitado en la programación del ICD». (Organización o asociación)

Durante las sesiones de la CPA, dos participantes expresaron su acuerdo con los resultados de la evaluación, en particular en lo que respecta a los temas de flexibilidad y la reacción de la UE ante los desafíos actuales. Un participante mencionó explícitamente que «la

flexibilidad tiene un costo, la situación que existe hoy es el producto de hace años. El participante está a favor de una mayor flexibilidad e integración entre los instrumentos (p. ej., el Fondo Fiduciario es un claro ejemplo)».

Otros comentarios escritos expresaron que, mediante el uso del apoyo presupuestario, el ICD ha podido adaptarse mejor a los cambios, a veces rápidos, en los contextos de los países, tanto interna como externamente. En relación con el cambio climático y el medio ambiente, se necesita una integración más sistemática e intersectorial en todos los ámbitos de cooperación donde pueda tener cabida, en particular en la agricultura, el desarrollo urbano, el saneamiento y el agua, etc.

Con respecto a la migración, la aportación señaló que en muchos países beneficiarios aún es insuficiente y vaga, incluso diluida en otras prioridades. La existencia de una línea temática de migración no permitió responder a las necesidades de los países de origen y de tránsito, lo que requirió, en particular, la creación de fondos fiduciarios (en particular el Fondo Fiduciario para África). Un comentario escrito adicional expresa que las prioridades de la CE en el ICD son claras y reflejan una agenda compartida de preocupaciones y prioridades en los ámbitos de seguridad alimentaria, nutrición, resiliencia y desarrollo rural. También existe flexibilidad para adaptar y afinar esos objetivos a lo largo del tiempo, a medida que el contexto y las necesidades evolucionan globalmente. Por ejemplo, la agenda de resiliencia y la agenda de nutrición han sido promovidas conjuntamente por la UE y la FAO en este contexto usando el ICD. (...)

4.3.2.4.2 Respuesta del equipo de evaluación

El hecho de que el BPGD se está utilizando para cumplir con compromisos relacionados con el cambio climático y el desarrollo del sector social (especialmente la salud) ha sido destacado en la evaluación. En una era de disminución del apalancamiento de la ayuda sobre las políticas de los gobiernos asociados, también destacada en la evaluación, es imposible que la UE imponga sus prioridades a los socios. A lo sumo puede abogar, con cierta (pero limitada) eficacia. La migración es un área en constante movimiento. La contribución del ICD al Fondo Fiduciario de Emergencia para África, destinada a hacer frente a las causas profundas de la migración, fue en realidad bastante modesta. Al igual que la iniciativa del Programa Panafricano para aprovechar la migración de todo tipo como motor del desarrollo en el continente. El enfoque de los evaluadores ha sido identificar aspectos positivos de la participación de la UE en la migración a través del ICD, apreciando al mismo tiempo la magnitud de la cuestión. La reprimida demanda africana y de Oriente Medio de emigrar a la UE está más allá de cualquier capacidad europea para reducirla, y mucho menos satisfacerla. Si bien no hemos señalado esto en la evaluación, ya que sería considerado como incendiario, los miembros del equipo de alto nivel con experiencia en el campo de la migración son de la opinión de que «abordar las causas raíces de la migración» – desempleo, pobreza, inseguridad– es exactamente como habilitar a los beneficiarios para actuar sobre los deseos migratorios a fin de reducir el impulso migratorio.

4.3.2.5 Pregunta 5: Le invitamos a compartir aquí cualquier otra opinión que tenga sobre el ICD.

4.3.2.5.1 Resumen de las contribuciones

En la sección *otras opiniones sobre el ICD*, se facilitaron 42 contribuciones a través de la web de la CPA. Las contribuciones se han agrupado en torno a temas generales:

Complementariedad, coherencia y coordinación de los diferentes programas y EFI y con los Estados miembros:

- «A corto plazo, el desafío más importante consiste en mejorar aún más la eficacia y la coherencia, en particular en lo que respecta a las superposiciones potenciales entre los programas regionales y temáticos. A largo plazo: el ICD debe fusionarse con otros instrumentos de CD, como el FED. Este instrumento único de CD será la aplicación del Programa 2030. Este instrumento debe ser flexible y el tiempo de entrega más corto. Tiene que estar preparado para la cooperación en "asociaciones multiactor". La cooperación con los países de ingresos medios, la promoción de la democracia y la equidad en estos países son fundamentales». (Autoridad pública)

- «La parte geográfica y la parte temática no están bien integradas en el mismo instrumento y quienes no poseen una profunda experiencia pueden confundir los diferentes planes». (Organización o asociación)
- «Hay problemas con la comunicación y el intercambio de información sobre el ICD. Mientras que los programas geográficos son bien conocidos, los programas regionales, temáticos (en particular, BPGD) y panafricanos no lo son». (Autoridad pública)

Eficiencia

- «El ICD se adapta globalmente para el propósito. Por una mayor eficiencia, es aconsejable simplificar sus procedimientos y acceso al mismo. Las acciones que financia también deberían esforzarse por ser sistemáticamente coherentes con los valores fundamentales de la UE. También deben respetar plenamente el principio de subsidiariedad, ya que se refiere al impacto y la eficacia de la ayuda al desarrollo». (Autoridad pública)
- «1 / Debido a unos procesos intensivos que requieren mucho trabajo, los plazos para llegar a la implementación son excesivamente largos. 2/ Si bien la introducción del marco de resultados de la UE se ha centrado más en los resultados, es posible seguir mejorando estableciendo claramente los resultados esperados y garantizando que los indicadores conexos en los marcos lógicos sean mensurables. 3/ La capacidad de personal, los números y los conjuntos de aptitudes en las delegaciones de la UE siguen siendo problemáticos; por ejemplo, se ha hecho hincapié en la programación de género, pero ¿ha habido suficiente experiencia en las delegaciones de la UE para poder proporcionarla?» (Autoridad pública)

Participación de las partes interesadas y creación de asociaciones también en relación con la cooperación con los PIMA y los PIM:

- «Los beneficiarios deberían estar más involucrados y comprometidos en establecer y desarrollar el ICD desde el principio». (Autoridad pública)
- «A medida que el ICD "pierde" socios de desarrollo (después de los procesos de graduación), la pregunta plantea si no sería conveniente reunir en un único instrumento a todos los países socios que seguirán dependiendo todavía de la "ayuda al desarrollo" en la próxima década. Esto permitiría a la UE desarrollar un enfoque global para los PMA y los países frágiles, con independencia de los anteriores marcos y arreglos financieros. " (Investigación / académico)

Varias contribuciones aportaron observaciones y recomendaciones sobre el **programa OSC-AL**:

- «Queremos destacar la importancia fundamental del programa OSC-AL, y especialmente DEAR, que es un subprograma de gran relevancia para apoyar la educación de la ciudadanía global en Europa. Las asignaciones mínimas y máximas en las llamadas deberían ser mucho más pequeñas. Apreciamos y acogemos con agrado la propuesta de avanzar hacia las convocatorias temáticas anuales, pero advertimos en contra de apoyar solo grandes consorcios». (Plataforma, red o asociación de la UE)
- «Debe garantizarse una combinación adecuada de modalidades de financiación en el marco del ICD, incluidas las convocatorias de propuestas, que deben ser accesibles a una amplia gama de OSC locales e internacionales». (...)» (Organización o asociación)
- «El próximo plan de acción plurianual debería identificar claramente un porcentaje de apoyo a las OSC como socios en servicios y proveedores en favor de los pobres en los servicios sociales básicos. En este contexto, la próxima estrategia debería incluir también componentes de apoyo a la igualdad de género y las respectivas condiciones previas. Asimismo, la próxima estrategia de OSC-AL debe dedicar un componente específico a la responsabilidad social y al papel que las OSC pueden desempeñar en la promoción de la responsabilidad ascendente». (Organización o asociación)

- *«El ICD también incluye la línea presupuestaria temática de las OSC-AL. (...). La UE ha adaptado satisfactoriamente sus marcos políticos para definir un enfoque más político y estructurado de la participación con la sociedad civil y las autoridades locales. Sin embargo, las distintas evaluaciones de los IFE muestran que siguen existiendo importantes cuellos de botella (incluso de carácter procedimental) para integrar plenamente a estos actores en los procesos generales de desarrollo y cooperación. El desafío para la UE y los Estados miembros será avanzar hacia asociaciones multipartitas verdaderamente inclusivas (ODS 17) para abordar el desarrollo y los desafíos mundiales, incluso mediante un examen bastante completo de los enfoques para involucrar, apoyar y aprovechar la contribución de la sociedad civil, las autoridades locales y los actores del sector privado». (Investigación / académico)*
- *«El ICD incluye el programa temático OSC-AL, el principal programa de financiación para los gobiernos locales y regionales. Sin embargo, los LRG también pueden ser relevantes en otros componentes temáticos o geográficos del ICD: muchos otros sectores focales como salud, agricultura/seguridad alimentaria y carreteras/energía incluyen una «dimensión local oculta» (Plataforma, red o asociación de la UE)*
- *«En el futuro, determinados programas del ICD, como Educación para el Desarrollo y la Sensibilización (DEAR), podrían beneficiarse de una aplicación más completa del enfoque basado en los actores de la cooperación para el desarrollo». (Industria, empresas u organizaciones de trabajadores)*

Algunas contribuciones se centraron en el **BPGD**, proporcionando recomendaciones específicas. Varios contribuyentes destacaron especialmente que el componente de cambio climático de BPGD es percibido como muy relevante para apoyar la implementación de los ODS y el Acuerdo de París:

- *«La nueva estrategia del BPGD también debe prever el apoyo a enfoques integrados que reúnan a las áreas de BPGD en soluciones holísticas. Como ejemplo, los programas de Población, Salud y Medio Ambiente (PHE) deben ser apoyados en este programa». (Organización o asociación)*
- *«La aplicación de la Agenda 2030 y del Acuerdo de París en los países en desarrollo a través de las acciones exteriores de la UE es muy dependiente del subprograma de Bienes Públicos Globales y Desafíos - Medio Ambiente y Cambio Climático (...) apoya mucho los objetivos de BPGD, y específicamente el programa Medio Ambiente y Cambio Climático, y recomendamos que es importante aumentar el apoyo a este programa. Sin embargo, el programa BPGD debería ser una mejor herramienta para trabajar más de manera integrada y apoyar actividades transversales, como el denominado enfoque del paisaje». (Organización o asociación)*
- *«El Programa Temático de Bienes Públicos Globales y Desafíos (BPGD) tiene como tema el trabajo digno, incluyendo la contribución a la agenda de trabajo digno. (...) Las organizaciones de trabajadores deberían considerarse más aptas para contribuir al logro del trabajo digno, a través del diálogo social como motor del desarrollo sostenible e integrador». (Industria, empresas u organizaciones de trabajadores)*

Algunas contribuciones se centraron en el **Programa Panafricano**, proporcionando recomendaciones específicas.

- *El próximo PMI debería aumentar el apoyo a las OSC para desempeñar un papel activo en la formulación de políticas de UE-UA y promover la igualdad de género y los derechos de las mujeres, la salud y el empoderamiento de los jóvenes. El marco actual no ofrece suficiente apoyo en estos frentes y hacerlo a nivel continental africano es fundamental. También debería prever más decisiones sobre ciencia, tecnología e innovación, en particular para los sectores que apenas están cubiertos por otros programas, como la salud. Debería apoyar al continente africano y las políticas y estrategias pertinentes de la UA, y no solo a la hoja de ruta de JAES. (Organización o asociación)*

Otros comentarios promovieron la (mejor) integración de temas específicos, como la mejora de la incorporación de la igualdad de género y las discapacidades.

- «Asegurar el objetivo de la BPA de que el 85 % de los programas logra una puntuación G1/G2. Asegurar que el 20 % de todos los programas obtenga una puntuación G2 para asegurar una financiación específica. Aumentar el presupuesto de BPGD para la igualdad de género desde el actual 1,5 % a por lo menos el 20 %. Asegurar fondos suficientes para que la SDSR cumpla con los compromisos de la Agenda 2030 y de la BPA II. Asegurar que las consultas y análisis tengan en cuenta múltiples discriminaciones para "no dejar a nadie atrás". - Utilizar datos desagregados sobre género para todos los programas financiados por la UE y un informe coherente del CAD de la OCDE». (Plataforma, red o asociación de la UE)
- «La Unión Europea debe cumplir los compromisos asumidos tras la ratificación de la Convención sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad (CDPD) e incluir sus principios en el ICD». (...)» (Organización o asociación)
- «Recomendamos que la UE adopte un enfoque sistemático e institucionalizado para integrar los derechos de las personas con discapacidad en todas sus políticas y programas de cooperación internacional. La UE debería adoptar las medidas adecuadas para identificar indicadores de calidad de la discapacidad e investigar la viabilidad de su aplicación en todos los programas y proyectos financiados por la UE mediante la revisión intermedia del marco financiero plurianual en 2017, incluida una evaluación sistemática del cumplimiento de la CDPD en la adjudicación y evaluación de los proyectos financiados por la UE. Migración: Las diversas situaciones de crisis en África, Oriente Medio y Asia han propiciado un mayor enfoque en todos los aspectos de la migración. Sin embargo, la migración no será un tema solamente en los próximos años, sino un punto permanente en la agenda europea. Por consiguiente, debería mejorarse la sensibilidad a la migración de los programas lanzados en el marco del ICD y otros instrumentos financieros externos de la UE. La migración es una preocupación especial para muchos ciudadanos de la UE. Así, una reacción rápida de la UE sería una señal clara para el público europeo en general de que Europa puede manejar estas situaciones de crisis de una manera rápida y eficiente. En los últimos años se puede observar un uso intensificado del apoyo presupuestario de la UE en el marco del ICD y otros instrumentos financieros externos como medio para fortalecer las estrategias financieras nacionales de desarrollo y la reducción de la pobreza y promover unas finanzas públicas sanas y transparentes en nuestros países socios. Sin embargo, creemos que el apoyo presupuestario no es una panacea y solo puede ayudar al desarrollo de un país socio si las condiciones necesarias están establecidas y solo bajo un estricto control de todo el proceso de apoyo presupuestario, en particular de los criterios de elegibilidad y desembolso, a fin de garantizar la transparencia necesaria y luchar contra la corrupción». (Plataforma, red o asociación de la UE)

4.3.2.5.2 Respuesta del equipo de evaluación

Muchos de estos comentarios son bastante específicos y el equipo no responderá a cada uno de forma individual. Sin embargo, vale la pena señalar algunos temas importantes de la evaluación. Uno de ellos es la necesidad de un compromiso más efectivo con la sociedad civil y las autoridades locales en el contexto de "espacio cada vez menor" y «retroceso». Se ha observado el éxito más bien mitigado en la incorporación de la perspectiva de género, y la revisión final prestará atención a asegurar que los derechos de las personas con discapacidad estén también adecuadamente representados. No se refleja en el texto de la evaluación, pues sería incendiario, la debilidad fundamental de todos los enfoques basados en los derechos, que arrojan una sed moral muy superior a los recursos o la voluntad política necesarios para satisfacerla. Por ejemplo, la satisfacción de los compromisos de la UE en el marco del ICD en ámbitos como el cambio climático y el desarrollo social ha dependido en gran medida de los programas temáticos. Los evaluadores han criticado la naturaleza de «fragmentada» de BPGD, fácilmente identificable con la influencia de grupos de defensa europeos, así como la dificultad que han tenido las OSC-AL para cumplir sus objetivos. El débil compromiso con estos actores es una cuestión de fuerzas competidoras:

las presiones monetarias que demandan grandes sumas se gastan rápidamente, el alto costo administrativo de tratar con donantes débiles y la incapacidad de estos socios para cumplir con los exigentes procedimientos de la UE. En un borrador anterior, los evaluadores hicieron un llamamiento para fusionar ICD y FED, una cuestión política contenciosa en Bruselas durante algún tiempo. Los evaluadores han omitido esta recomendación porque es más propiamente un tema de discusión en la etapa de la revisión intermedia de IFE del próximo año. Los evaluadores se han esforzado por no usurpar el papel de esa revisión de mitad de período.

4.4 Resumo dos contributos para a CPA


4.4.1 Introdução

O projeto de relatório de avaliação sobre o Instrumento de Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento (ICD)⁷³ foi publicado no sítio da Comissão Europeia para uma consulta pública aberta (CPA) que decorreu entre 7 de fevereiro e 5 de maio de 2017⁷⁴, juntamente com os relatórios de avaliação de todos os outros instrumentos de financiamento da ação externa (IF). Todas as partes interessadas dos países beneficiários e da UE foram convidadas a participar neste processo. A consulta em linha tinha um duplo objetivo:

- Reunir opiniões do maior número possível de partes interessadas, incluindo as dos países beneficiários e dos Estados-Membros da UE, sobre as conclusões das avaliações.
- Reunir ideias preliminares sobre os futuros instrumentos de financiamento da ação externa, após a caducidade dos atuais instrumentos em 31 de dezembro de 2020.

Foram recebidos 238 contributos relativos ao ICD, oriundos de 64 participantes na CPA em linha. A maioria dos contributos foram de organizações ou associações, seguidas dos órgãos de poder público. Seis contributos foram apresentados por escrito, sem recurso à CPA em linha. O gráfico que se segue ilustra o tipo de participantes na CPA em linha.

Gráfico 56 Tipo de participantes na CPA em linha




Os participantes podiam escolher o nível de confidencialidade do seu contributo. O gráfico que se segue indica as opções escolhidas pelos diferentes participantes. Os participantes que escolheram a opção «não pode ser publicado diretamente, mas poderá ser incluído em dados estatísticos» estão incluídos nas sínteses estatísticas relativas a cada pergunta. O teor das suas observações não está incluído nos resumos dos contributos, mas foi tido em conta pelos avaliadores.

⁷³ Regulamento (UE) n.º 233/2014 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 11 de março de 2014, que cria um instrumento de financiamento da cooperação para o desenvolvimento para o período 2014-2020.

⁷⁴ https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/public-consultation-external-financing-instruments-european-union_en

Gráfico 57 Nível de confidencialidade escolhido por cada participante



No âmbito da CPA em linha, os participantes foram convidados a responder às cinco perguntas seguintes especificamente relativas ao ICD:

- Pergunta 1: Em que medida considera que o ICD abordou os seus objetivos?
- Pergunta 2: Em que medida considera que o ICD abordou os objetivos da cooperação para o desenvolvimento, mais concretamente nos países menos desenvolvidos? Em que medida o ICD contribuiu para a redução da pobreza e para o desenvolvimento sustentável nos países de rendimento médio, onde continuam a existir focos de pobreza, e que podem desempenhar um papel fundamental na superação dos desafios a nível regional e mundial?
- Pergunta 3: A avaliação concluiu que muitos países parceiros discordam frequentemente quanto ao lugar e ao peso a atribuir às questões de direitos humanos e de governação, que fazem parte dos princípios orientadores da ação externa da UE, incluindo o ICD. O ICD permitiu à UE projetar os seus princípios e valores (por exemplo, a democracia, o Estado de direito, os direitos humanos e as liberdades fundamentais)?
- Pergunta 4: O ICD integra na ação externa as preocupações da UE em matéria de política interna, nomeadamente a migração e as alterações climáticas. Em que medida considera que o ICD tem sido capaz de se adaptar às mudanças na política e no ambiente externo?
- Pergunta 5: Se tiver outras opiniões sobre o ICD que queira partilhar, poderá fazê-lo aqui.

No âmbito da consulta pública, a DEVCO, o SEAE, o FPI e a NEAR organizaram um ateliê técnico com mais de 180 participantes do Parlamento Europeu e dos Estados-Membros da UE nos dias 27 e 28 de março de 2017. O ateliê tinha por objetivo reunir opiniões sobre os projetos de relatórios de avaliação dos IF e iniciar reflexões sobre o futuro dos instrumentos pós-2020.

Além disso, o projeto de relatório de avaliação foi apresentado numa reunião com o Grupo da Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento (CODEV) do Conselho da União Europeia em 23 de fevereiro de 2017 e na reunião do Fórum de Políticas para o Desenvolvimento, em 23 de março de 2017. A reunião juntou organizações da sociedade civil (OSC) e órgãos de poder local (OPL) da União Europeia e dos países parceiros.

O resumo que se segue sintetiza os principais contributos recebidos na CPA em linha, observações escritas adicionais e as várias consultas presenciais em relação aos principais resultados e conclusões da avaliação.

4.4.2 Resumo dos contributos para a CPA


4.4.2.1 Pergunta 1: Abordagem aos objetivos do ICD

Pergunta 1: Em que medida considera que o ICD abordou os seus objetivos? Os principais critérios de avaliação são: pertinência; eficácia, impacto e sustentabilidade; eficiência; valor acrescentado para a UE; coerência, consistência, complementaridade e sinergias; e alavancagem. Não hesite em comentar os resultados, as conclusões ou as recomendações relativamente a um ou mais critérios.

4.4.2.1.1 Resumo dos contributos

Relativamente a esta pergunta, foram recebidos 62 contributos na CPA em linha. A maioria dos contributos fez uma avaliação mista da forma como o ICD abordou os seus objetivos. O gráfico abaixo ilustra o número de contributos que foram principalmente *positivos*, *negativos*, *mistos* ou *outros*⁷⁵. Sempre que possível, os contributos foram agrupados por componente do instrumento.

Gráfico 58 Pergunta 1: Tipo de contributos da CPA em linha



Dos contributos recebidos que fizeram uma avaliação *principalmente positiva*, a maioria dos participantes considerou que o ICD foi **relevante** e **proporcionou valor acrescentado**, ao passo que alguns salientaram a eficácia do instrumento e a complementaridade com outros IF. Neste contexto, um grupo de reflexão europeu observou que «O regulamento foi atualizado e permitiu ao ICD funcionar globalmente como um "instrumento facilitador" que correspondeu às prioridades políticas da UE e às expectativas dos países parceiros. Foram envidados esforços coerentes para aplicar os princípios da Agenda para a Mudança (incluindo a diferenciação) e de Busan (apropriação pelos países). Foram procuradas sinergias com outros instrumentos e intervenções dos Estados-Membros, tentando assim produzir valor acrescentado para a UE». Quanto ao valor acrescentado, foram apresentadas, entre outras, as seguintes explicações:

- «O ICD trouxe um valor acrescentado claro, sobretudo os programas temáticos que integraram o trabalho digno para todos, conforme estipulado no Regulamento ICD». (Indústria, empresas ou organizações de trabalhadores)
- «Quando são tomadas medidas em relação à deficiência, o valor acrescentado da União Europeia tem sido muito significativo, uma vez que a deficiência não é uma

⁷⁵ A categoria *outros* inclui contributos neutros ou considerados irrelevantes para esta questão.

questão prioritária para os países, tratando-se de uma população invisível» (Organização ou associação)

- A capacidade do ICD para intervir de várias maneiras: geográfica, temática, incluindo as OSC-OPL, em relação às necessidades dos intervenientes identificados como essenciais para alcançar todos os outros objetivos e que, de outra forma, seriam excluídos» *é um fator-chave para o êxito do programa. Esta capacidade para alcançar estes diferentes objetivos e prioridades é única e confere valor acrescentado à UE.*» (Organização ou associação)

Dos contributos que fizeram uma avaliação *mista*, não há dúvida de que o ICD, com a sua atenção à redução da pobreza, é considerado como um instrumento **altamente pertinente** (sobretudo nos países menos desenvolvidos). No entanto, foram identificados diversos fatores que poderão limitar a pertinência e a eficácia do ICD:

- A crescente necessidade de se adaptar ao ambiente em mudança e aos desafios (por exemplo, a migração e o combate às causas profundas da migração) e ao quadro político e às prioridades atuais da UE.
- O espaço cada vez menor para a sociedade civil.
- A crescente necessidade de identificar e incluir múltiplas partes interessadas (sobretudo as OSC e o setor privado).
- A crescente necessidade de ter em conta, sistematicamente, questões como as alterações climáticas, a igualdade de género e a deficiência.
- Harmonização limitada com os compromissos internacionais em matéria de financiamento da biodiversidade e do desenvolvimento sustentável (Organização ou associação).

No que se refere à **eficiência**, várias observações referiram que o ICD é um instrumento administrativamente exigente que impõe um encargo significativo sobre as partes interessadas envolvidas, por exemplo «*Os pesados requisitos processuais continuam a impor dificuldades, tanto para o pessoal da UE como para os beneficiários de subvenções (...)*». (Plataforma, rede ou associação da UE) Neste contexto, vários participantes identificaram a falta de recursos humanos nas delegações da UE e a falta de transparência e de troca de informações entre os Estados-Membros da UE, a sede e as delegações da UE como fatores que limitam a eficiência do ICD.

Quanto à medida em que o ICD foi considerado **complementar, coerente e consistente**, várias observações manifestaram alguma preocupação, assinalando um potencial risco de sobreposição entre os IF e no interior do ICD, apelando a uma abordagem mais holística. A título de exemplo:

- «*No âmbito do ICD, foram criados programas emblemáticos com o objetivo de superar abordagens compartimentadas. Na mesma linha, o programa consagrado aos bens públicos mundiais e aos desafios globais (BPDG) foi inicialmente criado como um novo programa temático para aumentar a flexibilidade e evitar uma abordagem fragmentada, sobretudo para responder às crises mundiais e aos compromissos internacionais. Embora vários programas temáticos tenham sido incorporados no BPDG único, o problema do tratamento isolado das áreas temáticas persiste.*» (Organização ou associação)
- «*O portefólio de intervenções afigura-se muito diversificado em muitos setores, bem como fragmentado, o que levanta a questão da coordenação e da coerência entre os vários instrumentos financeiros e exige uma combinação mais direta desses instrumentos.*» (Órgão de poder público)

Relativamente ao **valor acrescentado para a UE**, embora reconhecendo que é necessário fazer mais e que a UE tem de explorar ao máximo o seu potencial, foram identificados vários exemplos do valor acrescentado:

- A UE é geralmente vista como um mediador honesto que procura atuar com base numa verdadeira parceria com seus parceiros de cooperação para o desenvolvimento. (Órgão de poder público)

- A cooperação da UE é muito valiosa para os próprios Estados-Membros da UE graças à coordenação regular e à «programação conjunta». (Órgão de poder público)
- Sobre tudo no que diz respeito à promoção da democracia, da sociedade civil, das questões de género e da saúde e direitos sexuais e reprodutivos, que têm sido, por vezes, negligenciados pelos governos beneficiários. (Órgão de poder público)
- O valor acrescentado para a UE depende também da diversidade de intervenientes europeus, como as administrações locais e regionais europeias, que podem partilhar as suas experiências em matéria de políticas públicas e desenvolvimento local e de acesso e gestão de fundos da UE. (Plataforma, rede ou associação da UE)

Dos contributos que fizeram uma avaliação *principalmente negativa*, foram identificados os seguintes motivos principais para que os participantes sintam que o ICD não abordou adequadamente os seus objetivos:

- Envolvimento limitado das partes interessadas, como os Estados-Membros da UE, em discussões mais amplas sobre o ICD (Órgão de poder público), as OSC e os OPL (Órgão de poder público).
- Conhecimentos especializados limitados nas delegações da UE (Órgão de poder público).
- A negligência de determinados temas, como as reformas dos mercados (Cidadão/particular) e a água e saneamento para o desenvolvimento sustentável (Organização ou associação).
- A necessidade de um maior envolvimento com os países de rendimento médio (Órgão de poder público).
- Sinergias e complementaridade limitadas entre instrumentos geográficos e temáticos e com outros doadores, por exemplo devido à abordagem fragmentada (Órgão de poder público).

Nas sessões da CPA, foi repetidamente manifestada preocupação com o envolvimento («fraco») das OSC e dos OPL. Os participantes sentiram que *«estes instrumentos não estão adaptados à realidade dos órgãos de poder local. Os OPL estão vinculados ao seu governo e não podem simplesmente mudar a sua forma de trabalhar, pelo que os instrumentos têm de ser flexíveis»*. Um participante manifestou que *«gostaria que fosse prestado mais apoio às OSC no que se refere ao direito às iniciativas e à pluralidade em todos os instrumentos (não só OSC-OPL). As OSC-OPL têm experiência e conhecimentos que também são pertinentes para a dotação temática e setorial. Gostaria que desempenhassem um papel proeminente nos programas geográficos e temáticos. O acordo de financiamento dos programas temáticos poderia ser explorado, procurando atribuir um papel às OSC»*.

Além disso, durante a sessão da CPA, os participantes manifestaram, no que diz respeito à **eficiência**, que consideram que existe falta de transparência no que se refere à informação. Um fator significativo que dificulta o desempenho do ICD parece ser a capacidade limitada em termos de recursos humanos, tanto nas delegações da UE como na sede.

Outras observações escritas manifestaram o seguinte:

- A necessidade de consultar os Estados-Membros muito mais cedo no processo de identificação e desenvolvimento de programas e de manter um diálogo contínuo.
- O ICD é uma ferramenta eficaz que geralmente atende as prioridades da UE em matéria de redução da pobreza, embora seja pertinente assinalar várias fragilidades do ICD:
 - O acompanhamento dos projetos tem de ser melhorado, incluindo uma melhor formulação de indicadores de eficiência.
 - Os projetos implementados nem sempre são sustentáveis e suficientemente sólidos para durarem.
 - As taxas de desembolso são relativamente baixas em alguns países, nomeadamente por falta de capacidade (deficiências administrativas e insuficiência de recursos humanos).

- Experiência positiva com o programa temático/BPDG sobre segurança alimentar, nutrição, agricultura e desenvolvimento rural. Os programas temáticos refletem uma agenda comum de objetivos de desenvolvimento nestes domínios e são complementares aos programas do FED. Através do ICD, a UE tem prestado apoio constante e, conseqüentemente, mais sustentável a importantes agendas comuns sobre a governação global da segurança alimentar, governação florestal, etc. Através da sua abordagem flexível e da adaptação ao contexto e às necessidades locais, o ICD ajuda a promover uma maior coerência política e de investimento e assegura a complementaridade entre as ações de vários agentes de desenvolvimento. O ICD também permitiu a criação de uma parceria muito estreita e de sinergias entre o apoio prestado pela FAO, pela UE, pelo governo e por outros parceiros de desenvolvimento, estabelecendo uma melhor ligação entre o investimento e o apoio político para criar um ambiente propício à consecução do ODS 2.

4.4.2.1.2 Resposta da equipa de avaliação

A maioria destas observações, quer positivas, negativas ou mistas, já foram refletidas no texto comentado. O envolvimento limitado da sociedade civil e dos órgãos de poder local foi criticado pelos avaliadores, assim como a capacidade limitada das delegações da UE.

No âmbito da PA 3, foi afirmado que o ICD é considerado pelas partes interessadas como um instrumento administrativamente exigente e com flexibilidade limitada. A avaliação foi essencialmente positiva no que se refere à complementaridade dos programas geográficos e temáticos, afirmando, simultaneamente, que o problema da compartimentação no âmbito do programa BPDG se mantém.

4.4.2.2 Pergunta 2: Abordagem aos objetivos do ICD nos PMD e à redução da pobreza e desenvolvimento sustentável nos PRM


Pergunta 2: Em que medida considera que o ICD abordou os objetivos da cooperação para o desenvolvimento, mais concretamente nos países menos desenvolvidos? Em que medida o ICD contribuiu para a redução da pobreza e para o desenvolvimento sustentável nos países de rendimento médio, onde continuam a existir focos de pobreza, e que podem desempenhar um papel fundamental na superação dos desafios a nível regional e mundial?

4.4.2.2.1 Resumo dos contributos

Relativamente a esta pergunta, foram recebidos 47 contributos na CPA em linha. A maioria dos contributos fez uma avaliação mista sobre a medida em que o ICD abordou os seus objetivos nos países menos desenvolvidos e nos países de rendimento médio. O gráfico abaixo ilustra o número de contributos que foram principalmente *positivos*, *negativos*, *mistos* ou *outros*⁷⁶.

⁷⁶ A categoria *outros* inclui contributos neutros ou considerados irrelevantes para esta questão.

Gráfico 59 Pergunta 2: Tipo de contributos da CPA em linha



Dos contributos recebidos que fizeram uma avaliação *principalmente positiva*, os participantes consideraram que a programação do ICD respeitou o princípio da diferenciação, sendo bem recebido o facto de a maior parte do financiamento ser agora direccionado para os PMD, aos quais se espera que confira um maior valor acrescentado (p. ex. Órgão de poder público, Organização ou associação, Investigação e academia, Outros).

Alguns participantes também consideraram que o ICD é um instrumento apropriado, tanto para os PMD como para os PRM (Plataforma, rede ou associação da UE). Neste contexto, dois contributos mencionaram especificamente o BPDG como uma ferramenta adequada para alcançar os PRM:

- «Os benefícios diretos para as comunidades locais dos países menos desenvolvidos (Libéria) e dos países de rendimento médio (Gana)» são visíveis. (Organização ou associação)
- «Na nossa opinião, o instrumento temático do ICD sobre bens públicos mundiais e desafios globais (BPDG) ajudou a responder à necessidade de envolver os PRM na resolução dos desafios regionais e mundiais.» (Investigação/academia)

Dos contributos que fizeram uma avaliação *mista*, a maioria concorda que o ICD tem sido importante para os países menos desenvolvidos e que contribuiu para alcançar progressos em matéria de redução da pobreza. No entanto, e em consonância com os resultados da avaliação, a maioria dos contributos nesta categoria manifestou preocupações quanto à medida em que o ICD conseguiu alcançar os PRM e os PRMS onde a pobreza ainda existe, sugerindo um aprofundamento das parcerias (por exemplo, com as OSC) nesses países:

- «(...) infelizmente, continuam a existir focos de pobreza nos PRM, revelando-se difícil para o ICD abordar esta questão em conformidade. É, portanto, necessário explorar outras formas de parceria com estes países.» (Plataforma, rede ou associação da UE)
- «O ICD foi particularmente relevante nos Estados mais pobres, mais fracos e mais frágeis (...) Foi menos relevante nos países de rendimento médio.» (Órgão de poder público)
- «O ICD tem desempenhado um papel amplamente positivo para ajudar a UE a cumprir os seus objetivos de cooperação para o desenvolvimento nos PMD e nos PRM. A eliminação gradual da cooperação para o desenvolvimento nos PRM tem de ser compensada por uma análise minuciosa das características da pobreza no país e

por um investimento bem pensado nos direitos humanos e no fortalecimento das organizações da sociedade civil que representam e apoiam as pessoas discriminadas ou insuficientemente servidas.» (Plataforma, rede ou associação da UE)

Os contributos que fizeram uma avaliação *principalmente negativa* estavam muitas vezes relacionados com a questão da falta de uma plataforma de cooperação com os PRM e os PRMS ou da ausência de resultados em geral:

- «*Os países que concluem programas de ajuda bilaterais (graduados) ainda precisam de apoio da UE para garantir que o seu desenvolvimento é equitativo, com uma redução das desigualdades acompanhada de oportunidades de crescimento.*» (Organização ou associação)
- «*Embora tenha assumido o compromisso certo de promover a cooperação para o desenvolvimento, nomeadamente nos PMD, o ICD ficou aquém dos seus objetivos. A compreensão do desenvolvimento humano no âmbito do programa temático do ICD, que é fundamental para as políticas centradas nas pessoas, é demasiado ampla e tem de ser mais exata.*» (Organização ou associação)

Durante as sessões da CPA, os participantes observaram que a avaliação abordou os verdadeiros desafios relativos ao caminho a seguir, a como olhar para os PRMS onde ainda existe pobreza, à redução do espaço e à resistência à mudança.

Outras observações escritas assinalaram que o ICD cumpre o seu papel como vetor do desenvolvimento (saúde, segurança alimentar, desenvolvimento económico e social), em conformidade com os ODS, e que o seu impacto é considerado estruturado e relativamente rápido nos PMD e PRMS. No entanto, a falta de um mecanismo de acompanhamento para os países graduados impede que seja um instrumento capaz de responder de forma cabal à evolução observável.

4.4.2.2 Resposta da equipa de avaliação

A ideia principal retirada das observações parece ser a de que existe uma necessidade contínua de cooperação para o desenvolvimento nos países de rendimento médio, que é uma das principais conclusões da avaliação. O Instrumento de Parceria, embora desempenhe um papel valorizado, nomeadamente relacionado com desafios a nível regional e mundial, não é adequado, quer pela sua dimensão, quer pelo seu objetivo, para abordar a pobreza persistente. Tão-pouco é uma base eficaz de alavancagem política para resolver problemas de direitos humanos, democracia, etc. nos países «graduados». A equipa de avaliação está satisfeita com o facto de os leitores independentes terem chegado às mesmas conclusões.

4.4.2.3 Pergunta 3: O ICD permite à UE projetar os seus princípios e valores


Pergunta 3: A avaliação concluiu que muitos países parceiros discordam frequentemente quanto ao lugar e ao peso a atribuir às questões de direitos humanos e de governação, que fazem parte dos princípios orientadores da ação externa da UE, incluindo o ICD. O ICD permitiu à UE projetar os seus princípios e valores (por exemplo, a democracia, o Estado de direito, os direitos humanos e as liberdades fundamentais)?

4.4.2.3.1 Resumo dos contributos

Relativamente a esta pergunta, foram recebidos 47 contributos na CPA em linha. A maioria dos contributos fez uma avaliação positiva da medida em que o ICD permitiu à UE projetar os seus princípios e valores. O gráfico abaixo ilustra o número de contributos que foram principalmente *positivos, negativos, mistos* ou *outros*⁷⁷.

⁷⁷ A categoria *outros* inclui contributos neutros ou considerados irrelevantes para esta questão.

Gráfico 60 Pergunta 3: Tipo de contributos da CPA em linha



A maioria dos contributos faz uma avaliação *principalmente positiva* e concorda que as ações externas da UE se devem orientar pelos princípios da democracia, do Estado de Direito e dos direitos humanos. Neste contexto, três contributos mencionaram explicitamente o papel crucial do componente OSC-OPL para os trabalhos neste domínio:

- «A rubrica orçamental OSC-OPL centrada na criação de um ambiente favorável às ações e iniciativas das organizações da sociedade civil e dos órgãos de poder local é testemunho do papel facilitador do ICD a esse respeito.» (Órgão de poder público)
- «(...) não há dúvida de que a ação externa da UE se deve guiar *principalmente* pelos princípios da democracia, do Estado de direito e dos direitos humanos, incluindo o direito a um ambiente saudável, e pelas liberdades fundamentais. O ICD tem um grande potencial para projetar esses valores. O programa OSC/OPL dá uma grande ênfase à melhoria da governação e ao reforço do Estado de direito envolvendo a sociedade civil, e o trabalho das delegações da UE relativo aos roteiros da sociedade civil é importante a este respeito.» (Organização ou associação)

Os contributos que fizeram uma avaliação *principalmente mista* salientaram a importância da promoção dos princípios e valores da UE pelo ICD. Uma plataforma da UE observou que «a UE é vista como um parceiro de diálogo fiável e mais neutro do que os Estados-Membros. Trata-se de um valor acrescentado adicional que promove processos de reforma, nomeadamente no domínio do reforço da governação democrática local». Embora tenham sido registados progressos (especialmente em relação ao programa OSC-OPL), foram identificados vários fatores, sobretudo a nível das delegações da UE e em relação ao envolvimento das OSC, que os dificultaram:

- As delegações da UE têm-se confrontado com grandes constrangimentos, «decorrentes da resistência política entre os países parceiros (por exemplo, o fenómeno da "redução do espaço" para as organizações da sociedade civil e as associações de direitos humanos), de restrições internas da UE (por exemplo, falta de incentivos políticos, institucionais e burocráticos à integração dos valores) e dos interesses dos Estados-Membros». (Investigação e academia)
- Apoio político e recursos limitados nas delegações da UE para promover questões de direitos humanos e governação. (Organização ou associação)
- Necessidade de melhorar o diálogo setorial nos países parceiros e de reforçar as parcerias. (Órgão de poder público)
- Uso limitado dos roteiros sobre sociedade civil e democracia para apoiar este objetivo. (Plataforma, rede ou associação da UE)

Relativamente aos contributos que fizeram uma avaliação *principalmente negativa*, não foi facultada nenhuma explicação.

Outras observações escritas assinalaram que, devido ao forte envolvimento da sociedade civil no ICD, a UE consegue transmitir os seus princípios e valores, nomeadamente no que se refere à igualdade de género, à proteção de menores e à luta contra a discriminação. Ao contribuir para o desenvolvimento das capacidades dos intervenientes não estatais, o instrumento promove a participação da população no desenvolvimento económico e social dos países beneficiários. No entanto, no caso do componente temático do ICD, a projeção de princípios legais não parece ser uma condição indispensável para o financiamento concedido ao abrigo deste instrumento. Além disso, no domínio da governação democrática e dos direitos humanos, importa melhorar a ligação entre o ICD geográfico em vários casos, sobretudo quando é escolhida a modalidade de apoio orçamental, o programa OSC-OPL e o IEDDH. O efeito de alavanca política do financiamento neste domínio deve, assim, ser reforçado.

4.4.2.3.2 Resposta da equipa de avaliação

Estes comentários mistos sublinham a situação difícil enfrentada pela UE, que é refletida ao longo de toda a avaliação: a UE está empenhada em promover um modelo democrático liberal de desenvolvimento, mas esse modelo está a ser atacado num número cada vez maior de países parceiros. A *realpolitik* da situação é que a UE precisa de parcerias duradouras com os governos, mesmo aqueles com os quais discorda fundamentalmente em muitas questões. A resposta criada através do ICD nesses casos consiste em incentivar o desenvolvimento da sociedade civil. No entanto, tal como os avaliadores observaram, trata-se de um objetivo que a UE tem dificuldade em alcançar. Muitas das razões são administrativas: o ICD é simplesmente um instrumento demasiado complexo para ser explorado pelas ONG, com exceção de umas poucas privilegiadas. A necessidade de desenvolver melhor as relações com vários parceiros fora do modelo tradicional de doadores e beneficiários é uma recomendação importante dos avaliadores.

4.4.2.4 Pergunta 4: Capacidade do ICD para se adaptar às mudanças na política e no ambiente externo


Pergunta 4: O ICD integra na ação externa as preocupações da UE em matéria de política interna, nomeadamente a migração e as alterações climáticas. Em que medida considera que o ICD tem sido capaz de se adaptar às mudanças na política e no ambiente externo?

4.4.2.4.1 Resumo dos contributos

Relativamente a esta pergunta, foram recebidos 40 contributos na CPA em linha. A maioria dos contributos fez uma avaliação mista sobre a medida em que o ICD se conseguiu adaptar às mudanças na política e no ambiente externo. O gráfico abaixo ilustra o número de contributos que foram principalmente *positivos*, *negativos*, *mistos* ou *outros*⁷⁸.

⁷⁸ A categoria *outros* inclui contributos neutros ou considerados irrelevantes para esta questão.

Gráfico 61 Pergunta 4: Tipo de contributos da CPA em linha



A maioria dos contributos faz uma avaliação *principalmente mista*. Parece haver um sentimento de que o ICD conseguiu abordar preocupações de política interna da UE «como as alterações climáticas e o ambiente, especialmente através do seu programa temático consagrado aos bens públicos mundiais e aos desafios globais» (Plataforma, rede ou associação da UE) e intensificou os trabalhos relativos à migração através da adoção de fundos fiduciários (plataforma, rede ou associação da UE, investigação/academia). No entanto, foram manifestadas algumas opiniões de que as preocupações da UE em matéria de política interna (sobretudo relacionadas com a migração) não devem interferir demasiado com o objetivo principal do ICD de redução da pobreza:

- «Em termos de capacidade de resposta, a intensificação do trabalho relativo à migração demonstrou que o ICD possui essa capacidade. No entanto, a lógica e o quadro político no âmbito dos quais estes fundos serão utilizados também mudaram. O ICD integra, portanto, cada vez mais os interesses de segurança a curto prazo no seu financiamento do desenvolvimento em relação à migração. Embora isso possa ser interpretado como refletindo "preocupações da UE em matéria de política interna", os efeitos do desenvolvimento a longo prazo no domínio da migração não são alcançados apenas pela concentração em aspetos relacionados com a segurança.» (Investigação/academia)
- «O ICD tem sido utilizado para responder a mudanças no ambiente externo, como o desafio da migração. Foram canalizados recursos significativos para fundos fiduciários da UE. (...) foram propostas atividades no âmbito dos programas geográficos que não estão em conformidade com os critérios do CAD. É fundamental que a integridade da APD seja salvaguardada.» (Órgão de poder público)

Os contributos que foram *principalmente negativos* salientaram sobretudo a falta de progressos no domínio das alterações climáticas, por exemplo «O Acordo de Paris não induziu qualquer mudança importante no financiamento da ação climática no âmbito do ICD, que continua a ser limitado ao BPDG. A não integração da biodiversidade e do clima no financiamento do ICD também sugere que a adoção da Agenda 2030 para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável e os compromissos internacionais de aplicar a Agenda de Ação de Adis Abeba sobre o Financiamento para o Desenvolvimento tiveram um impacto limitado na programação do ICD». (Organização ou associação)

Durante as sessões da CPA, dois participantes afirmaram concordar com os resultados da avaliação, nomeadamente no que diz respeito aos temas da flexibilidade e da reação da UE aos desafios atuais. Um participante mencionou explicitamente que «a flexibilidade tem um

custo; a situação que vivemos hoje é o produto do passado. O participante é a favor de uma maior flexibilidade e integração entre instrumentos (sendo o fundo fiduciário um exemplo claro disso)».

Outras observações escritas assinalaram que, graças à utilização do apoio orçamental, o ICD tem sido mais capaz de se adaptar às mudanças, por vezes rápidas, nos contextos nacionais, tanto a nível interno como externo. No que se refere às alterações climáticas e ao ambiente, é necessária uma integração mais sistemática e transversal em todos os domínios de cooperação onde estas sejam pertinentes, nomeadamente a agricultura, o desenvolvimento urbano, a água e o saneamento, etc.

Em relação à migração, o contributo observou que o instrumento ainda é insuficiente e vago em muitos países beneficiários, estando inclusive diluído noutras prioridades. A existência de uma rubrica temática da migração não permitiu responder às necessidades dos países de origem e de trânsito, o que exigiu, em especial, a criação de fundos fiduciários (nomeadamente o Fundo Fiduciário para África). Uma outra observação escrita assinala que as prioridades da Comissão Europeia no que diz respeito ao ICD são claras e refletem uma agenda comum de preocupações e prioridades nos domínios da segurança alimentar, da nutrição, da resiliência e do desenvolvimento rural. Existe também flexibilidade para adaptar e especificar estes objetivos ao longo do tempo, à medida que o contexto e as necessidades evoluem no plano mundial. Por exemplo, a agenda da resiliência e a agenda da nutrição foram promovidas conjuntamente pela UE e pela FAO neste contexto utilizando o ICD. (...)

4.4.2.4.2 Resposta da equipa de avaliação

O facto de o BPDG estar a ser utilizado para cumprir compromissos relacionados com as alterações climáticas e o desenvolvimento do setor social (especialmente a saúde) foi salientado na avaliação. Numa altura em que se verifica uma diminuição da alavancagem em termos de ajuda sobre as políticas dos governos parceiros, também salientada na avaliação, é impossível para a UE impor as suas prioridades aos parceiros. No máximo, pode defendê-las com alguma eficácia (embora limitada). A migração é um domínio em rápida evolução. O contributo do ICD para o Fundo Fiduciário de Emergência para África, criado para combater as causas profundas da migração, foi bastante modesto. O mesmo aconteceu relativamente à iniciativa do Programa Pan-Africano para o aproveitamento de todos os tipos de migração como motor de desenvolvimento do continente. A abordagem dos avaliadores consistiu em identificar os aspetos positivos do empenhamento da UE na migração através do ICD, apreciando, ao mesmo tempo, a dimensão da questão. A procura reprimida de migração para a UE em África e no Médio Oriente está além de qualquer capacidade europeia para a reduzir, e muito menos para a satisfazer. Embora não tenhamos apontado este aspeto na avaliação, uma vez que seria considerado inflamatório, os membros superiores da equipa, com experiência no domínio da migração, são de opinião de que «o combate às causas profundas da migração» – desemprego, pobreza e insegurança – é tão suscetível de capacitar os beneficiários a agir face aos desejos migratórios como de reduzir os impulsos migratórios.

4.4.2.5 Pergunta 5: Se tiver outras opiniões sobre o ICD que queira partilhar, poderá fazê-lo aqui.

4.4.2.5.1 Resumo dos contributos

Na secção *Outras opiniões sobre o ICD*, foram recebidos 42 contributos através da CPA em linha. Os contributos foram agrupados sob temas abrangentes:

Complementaridade, coerência e coordenação entre os diferentes programas e IF e com os Estados-Membros:

- «A curto prazo, o desafio mais importante consiste em melhorar ainda mais a eficácia e a coerência, em especial no que diz respeito a possíveis sobreposições entre os programas regionais e temáticos. A longo prazo: o ICD deve ser fundido com outros instrumentos de cooperação para o desenvolvimento, como o FED. Este instrumento de cooperação para o desenvolvimento deve implementar a Agenda 2030. Este instrumento tem de ser flexível, e o tempo de entrega mais curto. Tem de estar preparado para cooperação em "parcerias com vários intervenientes". A cooperação

com os países de rendimento médio, a promoção da democracia e a equidade nestes países é fundamental.» (Órgão de poder público)

- *«A parte geográfica e a parte temática não estão bem integradas no mesmo instrumento, e as pessoas que não possuem conhecimentos aprofundados são suscetíveis de confundir os diferentes planos.» (Organização ou associação)*
- *«Existem problemas de comunicação e partilha de informações sobre o ICD. Enquanto os programas geográficos são bem conhecidos, os programas regionais, temáticos (em especial BPDG) e Pan-Africano não o são.» (Órgão de poder público)*

Eficiência

- *«O ICD adequa-se, em termos gerais, à sua finalidade. Para melhorar a sua eficiência, é aconselhável simplificar os procedimentos e o acesso. As ações que financia também devem procurar ser sistematicamente coerentes com os valores fundamentais da UE. Além disso, o instrumento deve respeitar plenamente o princípio da subsidiariedade, uma vez que existe uma preocupação com o impacto e a eficácia da ajuda ao desenvolvimento.» (Órgão de poder público)*
- *«1/ Devido aos processos pesados e intensivos no uso de mão de obra, os prazos de execução são excessivamente longos. 2/ Embora a introdução do quadro de resultados da UE tenha aumentado o foco nos resultados, ainda há margem para melhorias se se definirem claramente os resultados esperados e se garantir que os indicadores correspondentes nos quadros lógicos são mensuráveis. 3/ A capacidade de pessoal/números/conjuntos de competências nas delegações da UE continua a ser problemática. Por exemplo, a programação de género tem sido enfatizada, mas será que se têm desenvolvido conhecimentos especializados suficientes nas delegações da UE que permitam concretizá-la?» (Órgão de poder público)*

Participação das partes interessadas e construção de parcerias também em relação à cooperação com os PRMS e PRM:

- *«Os beneficiários devem estar mais envolvidos e empenhados em definir e desenvolver o ICD desde o início.» (Órgão de poder público)*
- *«À medida que o ICD "perde" parceiros de desenvolvimento (após os processos de graduação), surge a questão de se não seria sábio reunir num único instrumento todos os países parceiros que ainda dependerão da "ajuda ao desenvolvimento" na próxima década. Tal permitiria à UE desenvolver uma abordagem global para os PMD e para os países frágeis, independentemente dos quadros e das modalidades financeiras do passado.» (Investigação/academia)*

Vários contributos formularam observações e recomendações relativas ao **programa OSC-OPL**:

- *«Gostaríamos de salientar a importância crítica do programa OSC-OPL, em especial o DEAR, que é um subprograma muito importante para apoiar a educação global para a cidadania na Europa. As dotações mínimas e máximas nos concursos devem ser muito menores. Agradecemos e congratulamo-nos com a proposta de avançar para concursos temáticos anuais, mas advertimos contra o apoio apenas a grandes consórcios.» (Plataforma, rede ou associação da UE)*
- *«É necessário assegurar uma combinação adequada de modalidades de financiamento no âmbito do ICD, incluindo convites à apresentação de propostas, que devem ser acessíveis a um amplo conjunto de OSC locais e internacionais. (...)» (Organização ou associação)*
- *«O próximo plano de ação plurianual deve identificar claramente uma percentagem de apoio às OSC enquanto parceiros em serviços favoráveis aos mais pobres e prestadores de serviços básicos sociais. Neste contexto, a estratégia também deve incluir componentes de apoio à igualdade de género e respetivas condições prévias. Da mesma forma, a próxima estratégia OSC-OPL deve dedicar um componente reservado à responsabilidade social e ao papel que as OSC podem desempenhar na promoção da responsabilidade ascendente.» (Organização ou associação)*

- «O ICD inclui ainda a rubrica orçamental temática OSC-OPL. (...). A UE adaptou com êxito os seus quadros políticos para definir uma abordagem mais política e estruturada ao envolvimento com a sociedade civil e os órgãos de poder local. No entanto, as várias avaliações dos IF mostram que ainda existem grandes obstáculos (nomeadamente de carácter processual) à plena integração desses intervenientes nos processos habituais de desenvolvimento e cooperação. O desafio para a UE e para os Estados-Membros consistirá em avançar no sentido de "parcerias com vários intervenientes" verdadeiramente inclusivas (ODS 17) para enfrentar os desafios no domínio do desenvolvimento e os desafios globais, inclusive através de uma revisão fundamental das abordagens para envolver, apoiar e alavancar a contribuição da sociedade civil, dos órgãos de poder local e dos intervenientes do setor privado.» (Investigação/academia)
- «O ICD inclui o programa temático OSC-OPL, que é o principal programa de financiamento das administrações locais e regionais. No entanto, as administrações locais e regionais também podem ser pertinentes noutros componentes temáticos ou geográficos do ICD: muitos outros setores focais, como a saúde, a agricultura/segurança alimentar e as estradas/energia incluem uma "dimensão local oculta".» (Plataforma, rede ou associação da UE)
- «No futuro, certos programas no âmbito do ICD, como o programa DEAR de sensibilização e educação para o desenvolvimento (Development Education and Awareness Raising), poderiam beneficiar de uma aplicação mais completa da abordagem baseada nos intervenientes para a cooperação para o desenvolvimento.» (Organizações industriais, empresariais ou de trabalhadores)

Alguns contributos centraram-se no **BPDG** e formularam recomendações específicas. Vários participantes sublinharam que o componente das alterações climáticas do BPDG é considerado altamente relevante para apoiar a concretização dos ODS e a aplicação do Acordo de Paris:

- «A nova estratégia do BPDG também deve prever apoio a abordagens integradas que reúnam as áreas compartimentadas do BPDG em soluções holísticas. A título de exemplo, os programas de População, Saúde e Ambiente devem ser mais apoiados no âmbito deste programa.» (Organização ou associação)
- «A aplicação da Agenda 2030 e do Acordo de Paris em países em desenvolvimento através das ações externas da UE depende bastante do subprograma consagrado aos bens públicos mundiais e aos desafios globais — ambiente e alterações climáticas (BPDG-AAC) (...) e apoia os objetivos do BPDG, mais concretamente o programa consagrado ao ambiente e às alterações climáticas, pelo que consideramos importante aumentar o apoio a este programa. No entanto, o programa BPDG deve ser uma ferramenta melhor para trabalhar de forma mais integrada e apoiar atividades transversais, como a chamada "abordagem paisagística"» (Organização ou associação)
- «O programa temático consagrado aos bens públicos mundiais e aos desafios globais (BPDG) tem o trabalho digno como área temática, inclusive através da contribuição para a agenda do trabalho digno). (...) Os sindicatos devem ser considerados como os mais bem posicionados para contribuir para a realização do trabalho digno, através do diálogo social como motor do desenvolvimento sustentável e inclusivo.» (Organizações industriais, empresariais ou de trabalhadores)

Alguns contributos centraram-se no **Programa Pan-Africano** e formularam recomendações específicas:

- «O próximo PIP deve aumentar o apoio às OSC para que desempenhem um papel ativo na elaboração de políticas UE-UA e para promoverem a igualdade de género e os direitos das mulheres, a saúde e o empoderamento dos jovens. O quadro atual não oferece apoio suficiente nestas frentes, e é fundamental fazê-lo ao nível do continente africano. Deve, além disso, prever mais decisões no domínio da ciência, tecnologia e inovação, particularmente para setores que são pouco abrangidos por outros programas, como a saúde. Deve apoiar o continente africano e as políticas e

estratégias relevantes da UA, em vez de apoiar apenas o roteiro da Estratégia Comum UE-África.» (Organização ou associação)

Outros comentários promoveram a (melhor) integração de temas específicos, como a melhoria da integração da igualdade de género e da deficiência.

- *«Certificar-se de que o objetivo do GAP de 85 % de programas com pontuação G1/G2 é alcançado. Garantir que 20 % dos programas obtêm uma pontuação G2 para garantir financiamento específico. Aumentar o orçamento do BPDG para a igualdade de género dos atuais 1,5 % para pelo menos 20 %. Garantir financiamento suficiente para os SDSR, a fim de cumprir os compromissos assumidos no âmbito da Agenda 2030 e do GAP II. Certificar-se de que as consultas e análises têm em consideração múltiplas discriminações, para "não deixar ninguém para trás". - Utilizar dados desagregados sobre género para todos os programas financiados pela UE e para uma elaboração de relatórios OCDE/CAD coerentes.» (Plataforma, rede ou associação da UE)*
- *«A União Europeia deve cumprir os compromissos assumidos após a ratificação da Convenção sobre os Direitos das Pessoas com Deficiência (CDPD) e incluir os seus princípios no ICD. (...)» (Organização ou associação)*
- *«Recomendamos que a UE adote uma abordagem sistemática e institucionalizada para integrar os direitos das pessoas com deficiência em todas as suas políticas e programas de cooperação internacional. A UE deve tomar as medidas adequadas para identificar marcadores de deficiência de qualidade e investigar a viabilidade da sua aplicação em todos os programas e projetos financiados pela UE antes da revisão intercalar do Quadro Financeiro Plurianual em 2017, incluindo uma avaliação sistemática da conformidade com a CDPD nos processos de adjudicação e avaliação de projetos financiados pela UE. Migração: as várias situações de crise em África, no Médio Oriente e na Ásia levaram a que fosse prestada maior atenção a todos os aspetos da migração. No entanto, a migração não será apenas um problema nos próximos anos, mas um elemento permanente na agenda europeia. Por conseguinte, a sensibilidade à migração dos programas lançados no âmbito do ICD e de outros instrumentos de financiamento da ação externa da UE deve ser reforçada. A migração é uma preocupação especial para muitos cidadãos da UE. Assim, uma rápida reação da UE seria um sinal claro para o público europeu em geral de que a Europa consegue responder de forma célere e eficiente a este tipo de situações de crise. Nos últimos anos, tem-se verificado uma utilização mais intensiva do apoio orçamental da UE no âmbito do ICD e de outros instrumentos de financiamento da ação externa como meio de fortalecer as estratégias financeiras de desenvolvimento nacional e redução da pobreza e promover finanças públicas sólidas e transparentes nos nossos países parceiros. No entanto, acreditamos que o apoio orçamental não é uma panaceia e só pode auxiliar o desenvolvimento de um país parceiro se este tiver as condições necessárias para isso e apenas sob um controlo rigoroso de todo o processo de apoio orçamental, em especial dos critérios de elegibilidade e desembolso, a fim de garantir a necessária transparência e de combater a corrupção.» (Plataforma, rede ou associação da UE)*

4.4.2.5.2 Resposta da equipa de avaliação

Muitas destas observações são bastante específicas e a equipa não responderá a cada uma delas individualmente. No entanto, alguns dos principais elementos da avaliação merecem destaque. Um deles é a necessidade de um envolvimento mais eficaz com a sociedade civil e os órgãos de poder local no contexto da «redução do espaço» e da «resistência à mudança». O êxito bastante atenuado da integração das questões de género foi tido em consideração, e a revisão final procurará assegurar que os direitos das pessoas com deficiência também estarão devidamente representados. Um aspeto que não se refletirá no texto da avaliação, uma vez que seria inflamatório, é a fragilidade fundamental de todas as abordagens baseadas nos direitos e o facto de aguçarem uma sede moral muito superior aos recursos ou à vontade política necessária para a satisfazer. É por este motivo que, por exemplo, a satisfação dos compromissos do ICD da UE em domínios como as alterações

climáticas e o desenvolvimento social se tornou fortemente dependente de programas temáticos. A natureza compartimentada do BPDG, facilmente atribuída à influência dos grupos europeus de defesa de causas, foi criticada pelos avaliadores, assim como a dificuldade sentida pelas OSC-OPL no cumprimento dos seus objetivos. O fraco envolvimento com estes intervenientes é uma questão de forças concorrentes: as pressões monetárias exigem que grandes somas sejam gastas rapidamente, o elevado custo administrativo de lidar com os beneficiários fracos e a incapacidade destes parceiros para cumprirem os exigentes procedimentos da UE. Num projeto anterior, os avaliadores apelaram à fusão do ICD com o FED, uma questão política controversa em Bruxelas há já algum tempo. Os avaliadores omitiram esta recomendação porque se trata de um assunto mais adequado para discussão na fase da revisão intercalar dos IF no próximo ano. Os avaliadores procuraram não usurpar o papel dessa revisão intercalar.

5 Annex 5: List of people interviewed

<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Organisation / Unit</i>
DG DEVCO – Dir A – Development Policy and International Cooperation		
António Carlos Fernandes Teixeira	Policy Officer – Team Leader of Economic Analysis Policy and Coherence, EU Development Policy	1. Policy and Coherence
Nicoletta Merlo	Deputy Head of Unit	1. Policy and Coherence
Guiseppe Balducci	Development policy	1. Policy and Coherence
Katarina Tafvelin	Policy Officer	2. Financing and Effectiveness
Susanne Wille	Deputy Head Of Unit	4. Budget Support and Public Finance Management
DG DEVCO – Dir B – Human Development and Migration		
Jean-Louis Ville	Acting Director	Human Development and Migration
Sarah Rinaldi	Deputy Head of Unit	1. Human Rights, Gender, Democratic Governance
Michel Laloge	International Aid / Cooperation Officer	2. Civil Society, Local Authorities
Patrice Lenormand	Deputy Head of Unit	2. Civil Society, Local Authorities
Maria Cohi-Ramon	Programme Assistant - External Relations	2. Civil Society, Local Authorities
Francoise Millecarn	Deputy Head of Unit	3. Migration, Employment, Inequalities
Alicia Martin Diaz	Programme Officer	3. Migration, Employment, Inequalities
Isabelle Wahdeova	Secteur Migration et Politique d'Asile	3. Migration, Employment, Inequalities
Walter Seidel	Secteur Santé	4. Education, Health, Research, Culture
Marja Karjalainen	Deputy Head of Unit	4. Education, Health, Research, Culture
Rui Costa	Project Manager - EU Policies	5. Stability, Security, Development and Nuclear Safety
Laurent Derouaux	Finance and Contracts Assistant	6. Finance, Contracts, Audit
Josick van Dromme	Financial Officer	6. Finance, Contracts, Audit
DG DEVCO – Dir C – Sustainable Growth and Development		
Maria Paris-Ketting	Head of Sector - Policy and Planning, Food Security Policy	1. Rural Development, Food Security, Nutrition
Laura Gualdi	GPGC FSSA and Project Assistant ISS-FANSSA	1. Rural Development, Food Security, Nutrition
Jose Soler Carbo	Deputy Head of Unit; Head of Sector	2. Environment, ecosystems, biodiversity and wildlife
Maria Barbara Chojnacka	Manager de Programmes - Chef de secteur	3. Financial Instruments
Bertrand Jolas	Policy Officer - Trade and Regional Integration : Services, Rules of Origin, Fair Trade, Green Economy	4. Private Framework Development, Trade, Regional Integration
Sofia Martinez	Thematic Officer	6. Sustainable Energy and Climate Change

<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Organisation / Unit</i>
DG DEVCO – Dir D – Development Coordination East and Southern Africa		
Marzia Pietrelli	Deputy Head of Unit	3. ACP Coordination
Emilie Wattellier	Team Leader - EDF Programming	3. ACP Coordination
Jonathan van Meerbeeck	Team Leader - Panafrican Programme	4. Africa-EU Partnership, African Peace Facility
DG DEVCO – Dir G – Development Coordination Latin America and Caribbean		
Aniceto Rodriguez Ruiz	International Aid / Cooperation Officer	1. Development Coordination Latin America and Caribbean
DG DEVCO – Dir H – Development Coordination Asia, Central Asia, Middle East/Gulf and Pacific		
Giulio Gentile	International Aid / Cooperation Officer - Development Coordinator Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia	DG DEVCO 1. Development Coordination South and South East Asia
Enora Marenne	International Aid / Cooperation Officer - Development Coordinator-Co-desk Pakistan and Afghanistan	1. Development Coordination South and South East Asia
Simone Ceramicola	N/A	3. Finance, Contracts, Audit
Camilla Lombard	Head of Sector	3. Finance, Contracts, Audit
DG DEVCO – Dir R – Resources and Centre of Gravity of Human Resources in Delegations		
Jerome Le Roy	Project Officer	1. Planning and Budget
Yves Tielemans	Deputy Head of Unit	1. Planning and Budget
Eva Réka Vasas	Legal Officer	3. Legal Affairs
Laurent Sarazin	Head of Unit	3. Legal Affairs
Paul Verwimp	N/A	3. Legal Affairs
Nicola Santini	Assistant Co-ordinator for Inter-institutional Relations	5. Local Support and Logistics
DG DEVCO – Coordination Dir C, G, H		
Adrian Costandache	Evaluation Manager (second) Chapeau Contract	04. Evaluation
Bridget Dillon	Evaluation Manager Chapeau Contract	04. Evaluation
Philippe Loop	Head of Unit	04. Evaluation
Franco Conzato	Deputy Head of Unit	06. Quality and Results
Andrea Alfieri	Team Leader	06. Quality and Results
DG DEVCO – Reporting directly to the Director-General		
Bernard San Emeterio Cordero	International Aid/Cooperation Officer	01. General Coordination and Inter-Institutional Relations
Homa Dean	International Aid / Cooperation Assistant	01. General Coordination and Inter-Institutional Relations
Milko van Gool	Acting Head Of Unit	02. Communication and Transparency
DG DEVCO - Deputy Director General - Coordination Dir A, B, D, E		

<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Organisation / Unit</i>
Klaus Rudischhauser	Deputy Director General	
DG NEAR		
Helena Laakso	Evaluation Coordinator	Dir A — Strategy and Turkey 3. Thematic Support, Monitoring and Evaluation
Isabel Combes	Deputy Head of Unit	Dir A — Strategy and Turkey 4. Financial Assistance: Policy and Strategy
Odoardo Como	Team Leader - Evaluation and Monitoring	Dir A — Strategy and Turkey 3. Thematic Support, Monitoring and Evaluation
Stephan Dietzen	Policy Officer	Dir A — Strategy and Turkey 4. Financial Assistance: Policy and Strategy
DG CLIMA		
Martin Kaspar	Policy Officer – Climate finance	Dir A — International and Mainstreaming 2. Climate Finance, Mainstreaming, Montreal Protocol
DG ENV		
Veronique Hyeulle	Senior Expert	Dir F — Global Sustainable Development 2. Bilateral and Regional Environmental Cooperation
Jill Hanna	Adviser	Dir F — Global Sustainable Development
Fabien Sordet	Policy Assistant	Dir F — Global Sustainable Development 3. Multilateral Environmental Cooperation
FPI - Service for Foreign Policy Instruments		
Laura Auger-Perez	Senior Expert	FPI — Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
Gary Miller	Adviser	FPI — Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
Marc Fiedrich	Deputy Head of Unit	2. IcSP
Oliver Nette	Head of Unit	2. IcSP
Sebastian Augustiño Macias	Financial Assistant - Project/Process Manager - Budget/Finance	2. IcSP
Kamil Valica	Planning and Programming Officer	4. Partnership Instrument
Nona Deprez	Deputy Head of Unit	4. Partnership Instrument
Georgios Tsitsopoulos	Head of Unit	5. EU Foreign Policy Regulatory Instruments & Election Observation
EEAS — European External Action Service		
Leonello Gabrici	Head of Division	Deputy Secretary General for economic and global issues MD-GLOBAL — Human rights, global and multilateral issues 4 — Global issues
Filiberto Ceriani Sebregondi	Head of Division	Service Deputy Secretary General for economic and global issues MD-GLOBAL — Human rights, global and multilateral issues 5 — Development cooperation coordination
Wolfram Vetter	Deputy Head of Division	Deputy Secretary General for economic and global issues

Name	Position	Organisation / Unit
		MD-GLOBAL — Human rights, global and multilateral issues 5 — Development cooperation coordination
Joaquín Tasso Vilallonga	Deputy Head of Division	Deputy Secretary General for economic and global issues MD-AFRICA — Africa Pan-African affairs
Gerald Hatler	Policy Officer	Development Cooperation Coordination
Konstantin von Mentzingen	Desk officer - Desk officer Vietnam	Deputy Secretary General for political affairs, Political Director MD-ASIAPAC — Asia and Pacific 3 — South-east Asia
Leontine von Levetzow		Service Deputy Secretary General for economic and global issues MD-GLOBAL — Human rights, global and multilateral issues 5 — Development cooperation coordination
Gary Quince	N/A	Deputy Secretary General for economic and global issues Dir AFRICA — Africa Principal Adviser
SG — Secretariat-General		
Cindy van den Boogert	Policy Officer	Deputy Secretary-General in charge of Institutional and Administrative Policies (Directorate B), Policy Co-ordination II (Directorate E), Data Protection and the Mediation Service Dir E — Policy Co-ordination II 3. International Dimension (including G7/G20)
EU Member States Committee Members and EU MS representatives		
Stella Avalone	Austria, Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs of Austria	
Ernesto Salina	Slovakia, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic	
Brian Penny	UK, DfID	
David Lloyd-Davies	UK Permanent Representation to the EU	
Marie-Eva Bernard	France, Secrétariat général des affaires européennes RELEX	
Marie Houdart	France, Secrétariat général des affaires européennes RELEX	
Jonathan Gindt	France, Secrétariat général des affaires européennes RELEX	
Florens Vogt	Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development	
Dorothee Starck	German Permanent Representation	
Charmaine Kerr	Permanent Representation of Malta	
Ritienne Bonavia	Permanent Representation of Malta	
Tiziana Caruana	Permanent Representation of Malta	
Åsa Pousard	Sweden, Enheten för internationellt utvecklingssamarbete (IU, f.d. USTYR) Utrikesdepartementet	
Frank Svensson	Sweden, Enheten för internationellt utvecklingssamarbete (IU, f.d. USTYR) Utrikesdepartementet	
Bolivia field mission		
Leon de la Torre-Krais	Head of Delegation	EU Delegation to Bolivia
Rocco Busco	Section Chief	EU Delegation to Bolivia
Gimenez Calvo	Section Chief	EU Delegation to Bolivia

<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Organisation / Unit</i>
Meritxell		
Nuria Calzada	Section Chief	EU Delegation to Bolivia
Susana Erostequi	CSO representative	UNITAS
Antonio Aramayo Tejada	CSO representative	UNIR
Marco Antonio Mendonza Crespo	CSO representative	Fundacion Construir
Javier Fernando Espejo	CSO representative	Capitolo Boliviano de DDHH
Sabino Mendoza	CSO representative	CONALTID
Gary Suarez	Director of Planning	Ministry of Environment and Water
Nilo Yanguas	Director of Planning	Ministry of Rural Development
Erlan Oropeza		FONADAL
Dalita Brozovich		Ministry of Public Investment and External Funding
Cecilia de Bonadona Mercado	Municipality representative	Small Enterprise Development Local Administration
Miguel Angel Escobar Tinta	Municipality representative	Tourism Development Calacoto
Alejandro Diz Rodriguez	Technical Officer	EU Delegation to Bolivia
Franco Mendizabal Llano	Technical Officer	EU Delegation to Bolivia
Africa Sanchez Sala	EU MS representative	EU MS representative Spain
Thomas Bodenschatz	EU MS representative	EU MS representative Germany
Ricardo Royder Yanez	EU MS representative	EU MS representative Italy
<i>Cambodia field mission</i>		
Fiona Ramsey	Head Of Cooperation	EU Delegation to Cambodia
Walter Egbert	Deputy Head of Cooperation	EU Delegation to Cambodia
Genoveva Hernandez Uriz	Head of Political and Communication	EU Delegation to Cambodia
Ratana Phurik-Callebaut	Executive Director	EuroCham
Dagmar Minarikova	Development Counsellor	EU Member States Czech Republic
Pascale Turquet	Development Counsellor	EU Member States France
Kristina Kuhnel	Development Counsellor	EU Member States Sweden
Cashel Gleeson	Development Counsellor	EU Member States France UK
Chan Sothea	Deputy Head of NCDD	Ministry of Interior, Secretariat of National Committee for Decentralisation and Deconcentration
Chhun Bunnara	Director of Program Management	Ministry of Interior, Secretariat of National Committee for Decentralisation and Deconcentration

Name	Position	Organisation / Unit
Vuthy Rith	Secretary General	Council for the Development of Cambodia
Seilava Ros	Secretary General	Ministry of Economy and Finance
Samphors Vorn	CSO representative	Action Aid
Savath	CSO representative	FACT
Piotr Sasin	CSO representative	People in Need
Chea Vantha	CSO representative	VSO
Bangladesh field mission		
Pierre Mayaudon	Head of Delegation	EU Delegation to Bangladesh
Mario Ronconi	Head of Cooperation	EU Delegation to Bangladesh
Anna Lixi	Team Leader Governance	EU Delegation to Bangladesh
Jürgen Heinmann	Team Leader Education & Human Development	EU Delegation to Bangladesh
Dörte Bosse	Team Leader FNSS	EU Delegation to Bangladesh
Muhammad Alkama Siddiqui	Additional Secretary	Economic Relations Division
Group Meeting with Civil Society Organisations	Manusher Jonno Foundation on local justice, women, Dalits, local governance, land; Indigenous People Forum on indigenous people; Kaepeng Foundation on Chittagong Hills Tracts; CAMPE on education; Uttaran on access to land; Centre for Disability in Development on disability; Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation on food security	
Group Meeting with MS representatives	EU Member States Sweden, Germany, The Netherlands	
Ethiopia field mission		
Chantal Hebberecht	Head of Delegation	EU Delegation to Ethiopia
Francisco Carreras	Head of Cooperation	EU Delegation to Ethiopia
Anna Burylo	Head of Cooperation	EU Delegation the African Union
Ron Hendrix	Cooperation Section	EU Delegation the African Union
Stephan Fox	Cooperation Section	EU Delegation the African Union
Pietro Nardi	Cooperation Section	EU Delegation the African Union
Peter Maher	Cooperation Section	EU Delegation the African Union
Rainieri Sabatucci	Head of Delegation	EU Delegation the African Union
Karin Kaup	Political Section	EU Delegation the African Union
Group Meeting with MS representatives	EU Member States UK, Belgium and France	
Crispen Zana	EUEI PDF	African Union Commission
Dir Maiyegun	Department of Social Affairs	African Union Commission
Dr Mahama Ouedraogo	Department of Human Resources, Science and Technology, HRST	African Union Commission
Jacques Mukwende	Department of Strategic Planning	African Union Commission
Guy Cyrille Tapoko	Elections support	African Union Commission
Samuel Mondays Atuobi	Elections support	African Union Commission

6 Annex 6: Field mission programmes

6.1 Field mission to Bolivia

<i>Monday 24 October – Mission Day 1</i>	
8:30 - 9.30	Briefing with the Head of Delegation Sr. Leon de la Torre-Krais and Section Chiefs Mr. Rocco Busco, Ms. Gimenez Calvo Meritxell and Ms. Nuria Calzada
9:45 – 11:00	Meeting with Civil Society: Ms. Susana ErosteGUI (UNITAS), Mr. Antonio Aramayo Tejada (UNIR), Mr. Marco Antonio Mendonza Crespo (Fundacion Construir), Mr. Javier Fernando Espejo (Capitolo Boliviano de DDHH)
11:30 – 12:30	Meeting with Mr. Sabino Mendoza CONALTID
15:00 – 16:00	Meeting with Director General of Planning Ministry of Environment and Water - Mr. Gary Suarez
16:30 – 17:30	Meeting on Food Security with Director of Planning Ministry of Rural Development Mr. Nilo Candia Yanguas and with FONADAL Mr. Erlan Oropeza
<i>Tuesday 25 October – Mission Day 2</i>	
09:00-10:00	Meeting with Minstry of Public Investment and External Funding : Ms. Dalitza Brozovich
10:30 – 11:30	Meeting with Representatives of Municipalities: Ms.Cecilia de Bonadona Mercado (Smmal Enterprise Development Local Administration La Paz) and Mr. Miguel Angel Escobar Tinta (Tourism Development Calacoto)
12:00 – 13:00	Meeting with Technical Officers EUD: Mr. Alejandro Diz Rodriguez, Mr. Franco Mendizabal Llano,
14:30 – 15:30	Meeting with Representatives of EU Member States: Ms. Africa Sanchez Sala (Spain), Mr. Thomas Bodenschatz (Germany) and Mr. Ricardo Royder Yanez (Italy)
17:00 – 18:00	Debriefing with EUD Section Chiefs Mr. Rocco Busco, Ms. Gimenez Calvo Meritxell and Ms. Nuria Calzada

6.2 Field mission to Bangladesh

6.2.1 Agenda

Time	Subject	Attendants	Venue
Monday 24 October – Mission Day 1			
10:00 - 10:30	Introductory meeting with Head of Delegation [M. Pierre Mayaudon] and Head of Cooperation-Head of Unit [M. Mario Ronconi]	PM, MR	EUD / HoD office
10:30 - 12:00	Meeting with Head of Cooperation-Head of Unit [M. Mario Ronconi] + Team Leaders [Ms. Anna Lixi, Ms. Dörte Bosse, M. Jürgen Heinmann] + Head of Finance, Contracts and Audits [M. Joseph Buckley] on the general development portfolio and focal sectors	MR, AL, DB, JH, JB	EUD / MR office
15:00 - 17:30	Meeting with the Economic Relations Division (ERD) [Mr. Muhammad Alkama Siddiqui, Additional Secretary] and line Ministries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Primary and Mass Education (MoPME); - Education (MoE); - Land and Reclamation (LR) - Food (MoF) 	MEH	ERD / Ministry of Finance, Govt. of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Sher-e-Bangla Nagar, Dhaka 1207
Tuesday 25 October – Mission Day 2			
09:30 - 11:30	Meeting with Civil Society Organisations (Manusher Jonno Foundation on local justice, women, Dalits, local governance, land; Indigenous People Forum on indigenous people; Kaepeng Foundation on Chittagong Hills Tracts; CAMPE on education; Uttaran on access to land; Centre for Disability in Development on disability; Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation on food security)	FC, NQ, OA, LB, MEH	EUD / Conference room
16:30 - 17:00	Meeting with EU+ Development Counsellors*	MR, EU+, EB, MEH	EUD/ Conference room
17:30 - 18:00	Debriefing	PM, MR	EUD

* Back-to-back meeting with regular EU+ Development Counsellors meeting

6.2.2 List of persons interviewed

<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Organisation/Unit</i>
Mario Ronconi	Head of Cooperation-Head of Unit	EU Delegation
Anna Lixi	Team Leader Governance	EU Delegation
Dörte Bosse	Team Leader Food & Nutrition Security and Sustainable Development	EU Delegation
Jürgen Heinmann	Team Leader Education & Human development	EU Delegation
Evangelina Blanco Gonzales	Cooperation coordination and aid effectiveness	EU Delegation
Meriem Elharouchi	Programme Manager	EU Delegation
Mohammed Aminul Islam	Senior Secretary Cooperation	EU Delegation
Shaheen Anam	Executive Director	Manusher Jonno Foundation Local justice, women, Dalits, local governance, land
Sanjeeb Drong	President	Indigenous People Forum Indigenous people
Signe Leth		Kapaeeng Foundation Chittagong Hill Tracts
Rasheda K. Chowdhury	Executive Director	CAMPE Education
Shahidul Islam	Director	Uttaran Access to land
Noman Khan	Executive Director	Centre for Disability and Development Disability
AKM Nuruzzaman	Deputy General Manager (DGM) and Project Coordinator	Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation Food security

6.3 Field mission to Ethiopia

<i>Date and Time</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Venue</i>	<i>Confirmation</i>	<i>Logistics</i>
Sunday 27 November				
27 November	Arrival			
Monday 28 November – Mission Day 1				Accompanying Colleagues
10:30-11:30	DCI and EDF teams - Meeting with HoC EUAU	AB's office	confirmed	AB, RH
11:30-12:30	DCI team – Meeting with Ron Hendrix and Stephan Fox of Cooperation Section	AB's office	confirmed	RH, SF

14:45-15:30	DCI team – Meeting with Peter Maher	EUAU 3 rd floor	confirmed	PM
16:00-17:00	DCI team – Meeting with Crispen ZANA on "EU Energy Initiative – Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEI PDF)"	AUC	confirmed	SF
18:15-18:45	DCI and EDF teams – Meeting with HoD EUAU	EUAU 2 nd floor meeting room	confirmed	RS, RH
<i>Tuesday 29 November – Mission Day 1</i>				
09:30-10:30	DCI team – Meeting with Karin KAUP, EUAU Political Section	EUAU 5 th floor	confirmed	KK
11:00-12:00	DCI team - Meeting with EU MS Development Counsellors meeting	EUAU Ground floor	confirmed	MS and OPS
15:00-16:00	DCI team – Meeting with Ron Hendrix, EUAU Cooperation Section	EUAU 3 rd floor	confirmed	RH
16:30-17:30	DCI team – Meeting with Director Maiyegun (Department of Social Affairs)	AUC	confirmed	RH
17:30-18:30	DCI team – Meeting with Acting Director Dr Mahama Ouedraogo (Department of Human Resources, Science and Technology, HRST)	AUC	confirmed	RH
<i>Wednesday 29 November – Mission Day 1</i>				
10:00-11:00	DCI team – Meeting with Jacques Mukwende, Department of Strategic Planning	AUC	confirmed	PM, RH
11:30-12:30	DCI team - Meeting with Pietro Nardi, EUAU, Cooperation Section	EUAU 3 rd floor	confirmed	PN
14:00-14:15	Debriefing meeting with DCI and EDF teams plus cooperation section	EUAU 3 rd floor	confirmed	RH

14:30-15:30	DCI team – Meeting with Guy Cyrille TAPOKO and Samuel Mondays Atuobi on Elections support	AUC	confirmed	
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6.4 Field mission to Cambodia

<i>Date/Time</i>	<i>Agenda Item</i>	<i>Meeting with /contacts</i>	<i>Venue</i>	<i>Mission Team/ Status</i>
Wed, 26 August, Evaluator travels to Phnom Penh				
Thursday, 27 October, Phnom Penh – Mission Day 1				
10:00 - 11:30	Discuss experience / thoughts on the DCI	Egbert Walter (Deputy Head of Cooperation) Programme Officers Operations (per sub-sector 1 diplomatic and 1 local agent: AR, SB, VLT, LHK, JCA, NB) Optional: Mateusz PROROK (Junior Professional Expert)	EU Delegation, GF MR	confirmed
12:30 - 14:00	Lunch meeting: Gather views on DCI	Ms Ratana PHURIK-CALLEBAUT (Executive Director EuroCham)	Open Wine, Str 240 (to be booked by the evaluator)	Confirmed
14:30 - 15:30	Gather views on DCI	EU Member States' Development Counsellors: CZ : Dagmar Minikarova, FR : Pascale Turquet SE : -Kristina Kuhnel UK : Cashel Gleeson	EU Delegation, GF MR	Confirmed (german, France, se)
16:00 - 17:00	Gather views on DCI	HE. Chan Sothea, Deputy Head of NCDDS and Mr. Chhun Bunnara, Deputy Director of Program Management Support Division	Ministry of Interior, Secretariat of National Committee for Decentralisation and Deconcentration	Confirmed
17:30- 18:30	Gather views on DCI	Mr RITH Vuthy, Secretary General, Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC)	CDC, Wat Phnom	confirmed
Friday, 28th October, Phnom Penh – Mission Day 2				
11:00 - 12:00	Gather views on DCI	Mr ROS Seilava, Secretary General of General Secretariat of Steering Committee for Public Financial Management Reform Programme	Ministry of Economy and Finance, GSC Office, 2nd Floor, Main Building	confirmed
12:00 – 13:00	Discuss experience /	Fiona RAMSEY (Head of Cooperation)	EU Delegation, GF MR	Confirmed

<i>Date/Time</i>	<i>Agenda Item</i>	<i>Meeting with /contacts</i>	<i>Venue</i>	<i>Mission Team/ Status</i>
	thoughts on the DCI and Debriefing	Egbert Walter (Deputy Head of Cooperation) Genoveva HERNANDEZ URIZ (Head of Political and Communication)		
13:30 - 15:00	Gather views on DCI	Representatives of Civil Society Organisations supported through DCI thematic programme 'CSO and LA': Action Aid- samphors.vorn@aide-et-action.org FACT- savath@fact.org.kh People in Need- Piotr Sasin Plan International- cambodia.co@plan-international.org VSO- Chea Vantha Gruppo di Volontariato Civile Associazione- gvc.cambogia@gvc-italia.org	EU Delegation GF MR	Confirmed (Actionaid-Pin-)

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8 Annex 8: Terms of Reference



EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development

SPECIFIC TERMS of REFERENCE

CHAPEAU CONTRACT – ATTACHMENT 1

EVALUATION

of

DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION INSTRUMENT

(DCI)

FRAMEWORK CONTRACT COM 2015

EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/Muli

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1 **MANDATE**

Systematic and timely evaluation of its programmes, activities, instruments, legislation and non-spending activities is a priority¹ of the European Commission² in order to demonstrate accountability and to promote lesson learning to improve policy and practice³.

2 **EVALUATION RATIONALE and SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES**

The Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI) evaluation, together with the other independent evaluations of each External Financing Instrument (EFI) and the Coherence Report, will be some of the sources of information to feed into the Mid Term Review Report (MTR) of the EFIs. The MTR is required by the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR) Article 17, by end December 2017.

In addition to generating information for the MTR Report, the DCI evaluation will also provide information for:

- the delegated acts (where relevant) to be adopted by March 2018 in order to amend the DCI Regulation;
- the impact assessment for the next generation of instruments. (Proposal due mid-2018)
- the final evaluation of the external financing instruments 2014-2020.

The objective of the DCI evaluation is:

- to provide the relevant external relations services of the European Union and the wider public with an independent assessment of the European Union's EFIs, including complementarities/synergies between the DCI and each of the other EFIs.
- to inform the programming and implementation of the current DCI, as well as the next generation of the DCI.

The main users of this evaluation include the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Council of the European Union, and the European Parliament. The evaluation may also be of interest to the wider international development community, such as partner countries, EU Member States and their National Parliaments, EU expert groups, donors and international organisations, civil society organisations, and the general public interested in external assistance.

3 **BACKGROUND**

¹ EU Financial Regulation (art 27); Regulation (EC) No 1905/2000; Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006; Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006; Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006; Regulation (EC) No 215/2008

² SEC (2007) 213 'Responding to Strategic Needs: Reinforcing the use of evaluation'; Better Regulation package

³ COM (2011) 637 'Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change'

The multiannual financial framework (MFF) lays down the maximum annual amounts ('ceilings') which the EU may spend in different political fields ('headings') over a period of at least 5 years. The current MFF covers seven years: from 2014 to 2020.

As part of the 2014-2020 MFF, a package of External Financing Instruments (EFIs) was adopted in 2014. This package⁴ includes the following mix:

- Development Cooperation Instrument⁵ (DCI), 19 661,64 EUR million,
- The European Development Fund (EDF)⁶ 30 506 EUR million
- European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights⁷ (EIDHR) 1 332,75 EUR million,
- European Neighbourhood Instrument⁸ (ENI) 15 432,63 EUR million,
- Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace⁹ (IcSP) 2 338,72 EUR million,
- Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance¹⁰ (IPA II) 11 698,67 EUR million,
- Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries¹¹ (PI) 954,76 EUR million,
- Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation¹² (INSC) 225,321 EUR million and
- The Greenland Decision¹³ (GD) 217,8 EUR million.
- Common Implementing Regulation (CIR)¹⁴,

Together, these cover a significant part of the EU's external action policies.

⁴ For more info: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/introduction/index_en.cfm#headings

⁵ Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p 44

⁶ Internal Agreement establishing the 11th EDF, OJ L 210, 6.8.2013, p. 1. For the purpose of this evaluation, EDF has been included in the EFI package but it is outside of the EU budget.

⁷ Regulation (EU) No 235/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p 85

⁸ Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p 27

⁹ Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p 1

¹⁰ Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p 11

¹¹ Regulation (EU) No 234/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p 77

¹² Regulation (EU) No 237/2014 of the Council of 13 December 2013, OJ L77, p 109

¹³ Council Decision 2014/137/EU of 14 March 2014 on relations between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other, OJ L76, p 1

¹⁴ Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77, p 95

The DCI aims to reduce poverty in developing countries. It also contributes to the achievement of more specific objectives of EU external action. This includes, in particular, fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development as well as promoting democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights.

The DCI 2014-2020 covers the following:

- **Geographic programmes**, 11 809 EUR million: to support bilateral and regional cooperation in areas such as health, education, employment, infrastructure, human rights, democracy, good governance and sustainable development. These cover developing countries in North and South East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and South Africa.
- **Thematic programmes** - these fall into two groups, as follows:
- **Global public goods and challenges**, 5 101 EUR million: to cover aspects such as environment and climate change, sustainable energy, human development including decent work, social justice and culture, food and nutrition security and sustainable agriculture, and migration and asylum, while ensuring coherence with the poverty reduction objective.
- **Civil society organisations and local authorities**, 907 EUR million: this programme encourages civil society (i.e. non-state actors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and citizens' organisations) and local authorities to play a greater role in development strategies.
- **Pan-African programme**, 845 EUR million - to support the EU's strategic partnership with Africa. This programme complements other financing instruments which are used in Africa, such as the European Development Fund and the European Neighbourhood Instrument. Activities under this programme are of a trans-regional, continental or global nature.

The DCI 2007-2013¹⁵ (16,900 EUR million) covered the following:

- geographic programmes¹⁶
- five thematic programmes¹⁷
- programmes for African, Caribbean and Pacific sugar protocol countries

The Common Implementing Regulation, was established for the first time in March 2014, to provide a single set of rules for the implementation of the DCI, ENI, EIDHR, IcSP, IPA II, PI instruments. Prior to this, implementing rules were included in each separate instrument.

The Common Implementing Regulation (Article 17), calls for a Mid-Term Review (MTR) Report of the six EFIs mentioned above and the CIR itself, to be submitted to the European Parliament and the Council by the end of 2017. However, as the INSC instrument and Greenland Decision

¹⁵ Regulation (EU) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006, OJ L 378, p. 41–71

¹⁶ Covering the same geographic area: Latin America, South Asia, South East Asia, North Asia, Central Asia, Middle East and South Africa.

¹⁷ The five thematic programmes were: investing in people; the environment and sustainable management of natural resources; non-state actors and local authorities; the improvement of food security; co-operation in the area of migration and asylum

also require a similar report, and the EDF requires a Performance Review it has been decided that all the ten instruments will be covered by the MTR Report.

The evaluation of the DCI is being undertaken at mid-point of its current implementation (2014-2020). It should be understood as part of a set of separate but interlinked evaluations of each EFI, which will be undertaken during 2016 and the first half of 2017.

Evaluation roadmaps for each of the EFIs were published in November 2015 and are available via the following link: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/index_en.htm

The DCI Roadmap can be found at this link: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2017_devco_001_evaluation_dci_en.pdf

4 SCOPE OF THE DCI EVALUATION

4.1. LEGAL SCOPE

The DCI is the Union's main financing instrument under the budget to support the Union's development cooperation policy which has as its main objective the eradication of poverty in a context of sustainable development in accordance with Article 208 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Union's development policy is a cornerstone of the Union's relations with the outside world – alongside Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), trade and humanitarian aid (and external aspects of other policies like environment, migration, agriculture and fisheries). Providing over 50% of all global development aid, the EU and its Member States are the world's leading donor.

In addition to the respective treaty provisions (Article 21 TEU and Article 208 TFEU), the Union's action in the field of development cooperation is based on the 2005 European Consensus on Development¹⁸, which commits the European Parliament, Council, the Commission and the Member States to a common vision.

4.2. THEMATIC SCOPE

The DCI is the instrument within the overall package of external financing instruments, with the widest reach, geographically and thematically (see Background section). It also engages with all other instruments to a greater or lesser extent.

Focus: The DCI evaluation will cover:

- the achievement of the objectives of the DCI, taking into account the evolving international context and EU priorities.
- the implementation of the principles, programming and operations of DCI.
- the complementarities, synergies of the DCI in relation to the other instruments
- the DCI interface with the implementation rules as set out in the CIR.

¹⁸ OJ C46, 24.2.2006, p. 1

This evaluation will not cover actions implemented under ERASMUS+ Regulation¹⁹ which will be covered by the mid-term evaluation planned in article 21.1 of the ERASMUS+ Regulation.

Inclusion of assessment of implementing rules: Given that the CIR contains the implementing rules relevant to the DCI, this evaluation includes assessment of how the DCI has applied these rules.

Consistency of the DCI evaluation with the other EFI evaluations

Whilst recognizing that each EFI has its own specificities, information pertaining to the collective set of EFIs is also needed for the MTR Report. To facilitate comparison and overview of the EFI evaluations it is therefore important that the set of evaluations are broadly consistent with each other in terms of objectives, key evaluation questions, methods, evaluation process, and deliverables. Co-ordination across the evaluations, led by the Global ISG and the 'Chapeau' EFI contract (see attached) is built into the evaluation process.

Data sources: core information/data sources, including policy frameworks are included in Annex 1.

Temporal scope: This evaluation will cover the period January 1st 2014 to June 1st 2017. However, in order to assess the outcomes and impact of the DCI, it will also be necessary to consider the previous DCI programming period (2007 – 2013) as a significant amount of available data refers to this period.

Geographic scope: countries eligible under the DCI Regulation (Article 1). Four short field visits are envisaged (see validation phase).

5 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

In line both with the Better Regulation guidelines on evaluations introduced by the Commission in 2015, and the requirements of the CIR, the main assessment criteria are: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, EU added value, scope for simplification, coherence, complementarity and synergies, consistency, sustainability leverage, and impact.

Evaluation issues, and questions to be further developed at inception stage are set out below. Unless otherwise indicated, the questions apply to the current DCI 2014-2020:

5.1. RELEVANCE

1. To what extent do the overall objectives (DCI Regulation, Article 2) and the objectives of each of its three components, the designated areas of co-operation (DCI Regulation, Annexes I, II, III) and the design²⁰ of the DCI respond to:

- (i) EU priorities and beneficiary needs identified at the time the instrument was adopted (2014)?

- (ii) Current EU priorities and beneficiary needs, given the evolving challenges and priorities in the international context (2017)?

Information sought in this area includes:

¹⁹ Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013, OJ L347, 2012.2013, p.50

²⁰ i.e. how it all fits together

- A timeline showing congruence/divergence of the instrument against evolving context, including global challenges, and institutional policy changes e.g. to what extent does the DCI respond to the demands of Agenda 2030, including the need to co-operate with emerging developing countries on implementing the SDGs.
- To what extent programmes undertaken under the GPGC have responded to 'global challenges'

5.2. EFFECTIVENESS, IMPACT, SUSTAINABILITY

2. To what extent does the DCI deliver results against the instrument's objectives, and specific EU priorities?²¹

Information sought in this area includes:

- To what extent do DCI programmes contribute towards poverty reduction, and more specifically towards:
 - fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development;
 - consolidating and supporting democracy, rule of law and good governance, human rights and relevant principles of international law (DCI Regulation, Article 2)
- To what extent has the DCI contributed to the European Union's priorities for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth?
- To what extent does the DCI mainstream EU policy priorities (e.g. gender, climate change) and other issues highlighted for mainstreaming in the instrument, and, where relevant, deliver on the commitments including the financial allocations (DCI Regulation preamble, Article 3, Annex IV)
- To what extent does the DCI promote principles of aid effectiveness, such as ownership and joint programming (DCI Regulation, Article 3)
- To what extent are the processes conducive to programming, identification/formulation of effective actions (DCI Regulation, Article 5-15)?
- How has the process of differentiation (including graduation) been managed e.g. have countries most in need been given priority in the resource allocation process, have differentiated partnerships with new forms of strategic cooperation been developed as set out in Agenda for Change, have any negative effects been minimised?
- To what extent is the DCI flexible enough to respond to changing needs? (e.g. changed policy priorities, changed contexts)

5.3. EFFICIENCY

3. To what extent is the DCI delivering efficiently?²²

²¹ Evaluators will need to look at both the current DCI 2014-2020 and the previous DCI 2007-2013 to respond to this question. Evaluators should distinguish the findings between the two periods.

²² Evaluations will need to compare, where possible, information from the current DCI 2014-2020 with the previous DCI 2007-2013.

Information sought in this area includes:

- What is the ratio of administrative costs (as defined as “DCI Support Expenditure” in the Draft General Budget of the EU23) to overall budget?
- How efficient is budget execution in terms of time taken from commitments to payments?
- Have the changes made to DCI 2014 – 2020 from the previous DCI 2007 – 2013 brought efficiency gains ? e.g. Has the merging of various separate thematic programmes into one GPGC brought positive change in terms of efficiency of delivery? To what extent the creation of designated support to a Pan African programme has made a change ?
- Are there areas, such as administrative/management procedures, where the DCI can be simplified to eliminate unnecessary burden?
- To what extent is the DCI in line with the implementing rules of the CIR ? Specifically in terms of :
 - Implementation
 - Subject matter and principles
 - Adoption of action programmes, individual measures and special measures
 - Support measures
 - Provisions on the Financing Methods
 - General financing provisions
 - Taxes duties and charges
 - Specific financing provisions
 - Protection of the financial interests of the Union
 - Rules on nationality and origin for public procurement, grant and other award procedures
 - Climate action and biodiversity expenditure
 - Involvement of stakeholders of beneficiary countries
 - Common rules
 - Eligibility under the DCI
 - Monitoring and evaluation of actions
- To what extent are the following in place and functioning:
 - appropriate monitoring processes and indicators for measurement of the performance of the DCI instrument
 - relevant strategic and operational indicators to measure results achieved by the DCI?

5.4. ADDED VALUE

4. To what extent do the DCI programmes add value compared to interventions by Member States or other key donors?

Information sought in this area includes :

²³ See Title 21, item 21-01-04, page 949 of the latest, 2016 draft budget <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/DB/2016/en/SEC03.pdf>

- Where the DCI is operating in the same field as other donors, does it offer added value in terms of size of engagement, particular expertise, and/or particular weight in advocacy ?

5.5. COHERENCE, CONSISTENCY, COMPLEMENTARITY AND SYNERGIES

5. To what extent does the DCI facilitate coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies both internally between its own set of objectives and programmes and vis-à-vis other EFIs?

Information sought in this area includes:

- To what extent are the different DCI programmes coherent/overlapping with one another?
- To what extent are the different DCI programmes aligned with EU development policy?
- To what extent are the programmes consistent with EU external action policies?
- To what extent do the programmes complement/overlap/stimulate synergies with other external action financing instruments?²⁴
- To what extent does the DCI complement/overlap with other EU instruments outside of development policy?
- To what extent does the DCI complement/overlap with interventions of other donors?

5.6. LEVERAGE

6. To what extent has the DCI leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement?
7. How could the DCI be enhanced to achieve its policy objectives more effectively and efficiently?
8. How can programming and implementation of DCI assistance be enhanced to improve the impact and sustainability of financial assistance?

6 **RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION**

The DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit is responsible for the management and the supervision of the DCI evaluation.

The relevant EU services have established a system of Interservice Groups to ensure appropriate oversight of the various EFI evaluations (process, content, co-ordination) related to the development of the MTR Report. The system comprises a Global EFI ISG with overall oversight, and then individual instrument ISGs. Core members of individual instrument ISGs are also members of the Global EFI ISG

The principal tasks of the Global EFI ISG are to :

- brief the evaluation team on issues pertaining to the overall set of EFIs

²⁴ Note the respective mandates of DEVCO and FPI in EIDHR, PI and IcSP instruments

- ensure coherence across all individual Terms of Reference
- ensure co-ordination of process across the EU stakeholders
- assist in setting a schedule/plan for co-ordination across the evaluations
- ensure a coherent approach to the work and implementation eg
 - Coherent set of evaluation and impact assessment questions
 - Common plan and schedule for Open Public Consultation
- provide criteria of assessment and required format for the synthesis of findings from all the evaluations.
- discuss and provide feedback on draft Coherence Report

The principal tasks of the DCI ISG are to

- brief the external evaluators and ensure they have access to all information sources and documentation on activities undertaken
- discuss draft reports produced by the external evaluators during meetings in Brussels;
- assess and provide feedback on the quality of work done by the evaluators;
- provide feedback on the findings and conclusions.

To avoid duplication and consolidate communications, the ISG members communicate with the evaluation team via the Evaluation Manager.

To promote robust understanding and discussion, participation of the evaluation team at DCI ISG meetings will be as follows: the key parts of the initial briefing meeting (in Brussels) will be attended by the whole evaluation team. All other meetings with the DCI ISG will be attended at least by the evaluation team leader.

7. EVALUATION PROCESS AND DELIVERABLES

The overall methodological guidance to be used is available on the Better Regulation website to be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/toc_guide_en.htm

The contractor may also find useful methodological guidance on the DG DEVCO website of the Evaluation Unit to be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/methodology/index_en.htm

Methodological essentials for the evaluation

- The evaluation team should establish baselines against which change/progress will be measured. The policy frameworks relevant to the instrument should be included when establishing these baselines.
- The evaluation will be based on both quantitative and qualitative data. Where there is a lack of data, it may be necessary to devise a survey to obtain information from EU Delegations, Member States, specific beneficiaries and other stakeholder as appropriate, in line with the consultation strategy agreed upon. See also reference to co-ordination in Chapeau introduction.
- Intervention logics will be further strengthened/reconstructed and the theory of change which underpins them will be validated. (See Annex)

- Findings, conclusions and recommendations should be presented in the Final Report.

Co-ordination across the evaluations

- The Chapeau contract team leader is assigned tasks relating to co-ordination across all the EFI evaluations (see Chapeau ToRs)
- To fulfil this coordination role, evaluators responsible for each of the EFI evaluations must cooperate and work closely with the 'Chapeau' contract team leader, and the Global ISG

Evaluation Approach

The evaluation approach consists of three main phases, each of which encompass several stages. Deliverables in the form of reports²⁵ and slide presentations should be submitted at the end of the corresponding stages.

The table below summaries these phases:

Evaluation phases:	Stages:	Deliverables ²⁶ :
1. Desk phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inception: setting out the detailed design of the evaluation, including all aspects of methodology, and consultation strategy 	¾ Slide presentation ¾ Inception Report, including the proposed consultation strategy
	Data collection Initial analysis Hypotheses for validation	¾ Slide presentation
2. Validation phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data collection Validation of hypotheses (including through field visits) 	¾ Slide presentation ¾ Collated feedback

²⁵ For each Report a draft version is to be presented. For all reports, the contractor may either accept or reject through a *response sheet* the comments provided by the Evaluation manager. In case of rejection, the contractor must justify (in writing) the reasons for rejection. When the comment is accepted, a reference to the text in the report (where the relevant change has been made) has to be included in the response sheet.

²⁶ The contractors must provide, whenever requested and in any case at the end of the evaluation, the list of all documents reviewed, data collected and databases built.

Evaluation phases:	Stages:	Deliverables ²⁶ :
3. Synthesis phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis • Assessment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ³/₄ Slide presentation ³/₄ Draft Final Report with executive summaries, ³/₄ Brief to accompany Report during Open Public Consultation and questions to guide the Open Public Consultation ³/₄ Summary report of issues raised in the Open Public Consultation ³/₄ Slide presentation ³/₄ Final Report with executive summaries, including annex summarising consultation process

All reports will be written in English and submitted according to the timetable in annex 4 to the evaluation manager. The reports must be written in Arial or Times New Roman minimum 11 and 12 respectively, single spacing. Inception and Desk reports will be delivered only electronically. The Draft Final report and the Final report will also be delivered in hard copies. The Executive Summaries (1 page; and 4 pages) will be delivered both electronically and in hard copy. The 4 page version of the summary will be available both integrated into the Final Report, and as a separate stand-alone document.

The electronic versions of all documents need to be delivered in both editable (Word) and non-editable format (PDF).

7.1. THE DESK PHASE

7.1.1 Inception

At the start of the evaluation process, a substantive set of **Briefing Meetings** (2-3 days) will be held in Brussels. This will be a briefing for all the four evaluative products of the Chapeau contract, but will give emphasis to the two individual instrument evaluations at this stage - the DCI and GD. The purpose of the briefing is for the evaluation team to meet and be briefed by the Evaluation manager, relevant ISG groups, and thereafter their members individually, and to meet any other key players. It will also be used by the evaluation team for at least initial discussion of the relevant intervention logics with the relevant ISG.

7.1.2. The Inception Report

Taking into account the learning from the Briefing Meeting, the contractor will deliver an **Inception Report** which will contain the following elements:

- the proposed design of the evaluation – this includes identification of

- data and information to be collected from which sources, how and when
 - methods to be used to analyse the data, with justification
 - limitations - including an assessment of the data and whether it will provide a sound basis for responding to the evaluation questions.
 - a consultation strategy – identification of the stakeholder groups and key stakeholders within each group. Identification of who will be consulted on what, when and why
 - provision of a detailed work plan and schedule for the overall evaluation process,
- the background and institutional context of the DCI, and the types of partners with whom it co-operates and the types of intended beneficiaries;
 - a concise description and analysis of the evolution of the DCI since its start in 2007;
 - further defined intervention logics (see annex 6, showing the theory of the change of the DCI programmes);
 - an inventory of the evidence base (e.g. programming documents 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 see annex 2 for further details);
 - if appropriate, revised evaluation questions, and proposed judgement criteria per evaluation question and proposed quantitative and/or qualitative indicators related to each judgement criterion.

If necessary, the Inception Report will also include suggestions of modifications to the composition of the evaluation team.

The Inception Report will be discussed with the ISG prior to approval by the contracting authority. The Inception Report shall not exceed 30 pages. Additional material may be placed in annexes, as necessary. The inception report is expected to be submitted swiftly, within max three weeks of the initial briefing session.

7.1.3 The Desk Report

Upon approval of the Inception Report, the contractor will prepare and present a **Desk Report** which should include at least the following elements:

- a concise first analysis and first elements of response to each evaluation question which also concisely sets out the hypotheses and assumptions to be tested in the validation phase;
- progress in the gathering of data. Any complementary data required for analysis and for data collection during the validation phase must be identified;
- a comprehensive list of the evidence that has been analysed and a list of the documentation reviewed and the justification for their choice.
- further development of any methods to be used, in light of information up-dated since the Inception Report
- a work plan for the validation phase: a list with brief descriptions of people to interview for in-depth analysis of issues. The evaluators must explain the choice of in-country visits, the value added of the visits, and the added value of planned interviews.

During the inception and desk phase relevant stakeholders will be consulted via/phone/email/face-to-face/video-conference discussions. The use of interviews, surveys, design of questionnaires, and other tools should be considered and decided upon during the inception phase. In the case of a survey, these will be coordinated by the EFI Chapeau team leader in conjunction with the Global EFI ISG so that stakeholders only receive one set of questions.. However, the questions asked for each instrument do not need to be the same.

The contracting authority expects the evaluation team to build in considerable time to look through documents and to have face-to-face discussions in Brussels throughout the evaluation process, particularly during inception and desk phases.

The external evaluators will make a slide presentation and discuss the Desk Report with the ISG in a half-day meeting in Brussels. The report will not exceed 40 pages. (Further information may be placed in annexes.) The report will be finalised after consideration of the comments received from ISG.

The Evaluation Manager will authorise the start of the validation phase.

7.2. VALIDATION PHASE

The validation phase enables the evaluators to check the hypotheses which they have developed during the Desk phase, through detailed interviews/discussion with key players and stakeholders.

The initial findings and recommendations, drawn together at the end of the validation phase, will be discussed with the ISG with the help of a short slide presentation.

The validation phase will involve discussions with:

- EU officials responsible for oversight of the overall DCI instrument and its different programmes, and those with experience in implementation (face-to-face or by phone in Brussels and Delegations)
- Partner country stakeholders, Aid Co-ordination Ministries
- CSOs and LAs in country with experience of the DCI instrument programmes
- EU Member States and other donors – international NGOs, bi-laterals and multi-laterals

It will also entail four (4) short visits to countries in each of the different component parts of the instrument as follows:

Geographic, GPGC and CSO/NLA – 2 countries in Asia region (within South East Asia and South Asia) and 1 country in Latin America. The selection of the particular countries to visit will be determined in the inception discussion. Plus a trip to Addis Ababa, to discuss the **Pan Africa** programme with relevant officials at the African Union, and GPGC and CSO/NLA with Ethiopian authorities.

The information gained from these visits is to provide some first-hand knowledge of the DCI on the ground.

7.3. DRAFT FINAL REPORT AND DISSEMINATION PHASES

7.3.1 The Draft Final Report

The contractor will submit the Draft Final Report as per the report structure set out in annex 2. The Draft Final Report shall not exceed 50 pages. Additional relevant material may be placed in annex.

This document should deliver the results of all tasks covered by these Terms of Reference, and must be written such that readers, who are not working in this area, can easily understand.

The Draft Final Report will be discussed with the ISG in Brussels. The Report will be revised, as the evaluation team considers necessary, in light of feedback from the ISG. The evaluation team will prepare a short brief to accompany the Report, for the purposes of the forthcoming Open Public Consultation (OPC) which highlights some areas and questions where feedback would be particularly welcome. This brief and its accompanying questions will be translated by the evaluation team from English into the other main languages of the Open Public Consultation, namely French, Spanish and Portuguese. The Draft Final Report will subsequently be submitted for approval.

Subsequently, the Draft Final Report will be placed on the web by the appropriate authority in DG DEVCO, in order to feed into the 12 week OPC on the EFI evaluation scheduled for February-April 2017. (See schedule Attachment 6). The Draft Final Reports of all the EFI evaluations will be synchronised to appear on the web.

The team leader of this evaluation and pertinent other members of the DCI evaluation team will be present for the targeted group consultations on this evaluation, and other relevant EFI Draft Report consultations. The group consultations will be chaired by DG DEVCO, and will be targeted at Member States, key EU officials, CSOs, and representatives of Partner countries.

The consultation costs related to the presence of the experts (travel cost, per diem etc.) must be covered by the offer. Costs for logistics (room rental, catering etc.) will be dealt with, as necessary, in a separate contract.

Following the Open Public Consultation, a summary of the contributions received regarding the DCI evaluation consultation will be delivered by the evaluation team²⁷. This summary shall not exceed 20 pages, and will include responses for both the evaluation and the impact assessment. The summary should include a concise summary of contributions received, a statistical analysis of the contributions received, the evaluation team's response to each question, the evaluation team's conclusions for each section, and identification of the evidence/contributions which will be fed into the evaluation. The evaluation team will translate the summary from English into the other main languages of the Open Public Consultation, namely French, Spanish and Portuguese.

7.3.2. The Final Report

The contractor will prepare the **Final Report** taking into account the feedback from the ISG and the Open Public Consultation. The Final Report will be submitted to the ISG. The length of the Report will not exceed 50 pages. Additional relevant material may be placed in annex.

²⁷ The evaluation team should note the data protection rules in the Better Regulation Guidelines (p.81)
 External Evaluation of the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI)
 Final Report – Volume II Annexes - June 2017

Executive summaries – One executive summary should be provided, not exceeding four (4) pages, and one executive summary of one (1) page only, should be provided. Guidance is provided in annex 2

The contracting authority will publish the Final Report, the Executive Summaries, the annexes and its quality assessment of the Evaluation Final Report on the Commission's central website.

Approval must be given by the Evaluation Manager before the Final Report is printed.

The offer will be based on 50 hard copies in English of the **Final Main Report** (without annexes) and 20 copies of the annexes. A non-editable version on a USB stick shall be added to each printed Final Main Report.

7.4. DISSEMINATION

Dissemination activities may be requested. In case of financial implications on the total contractual amount, such requests will be formalised via a rider.

8 **THE EVALUATION TEAM, OFFER, SELECTION CRITERIA**

The requirements of the evaluation team, offer and selection criteria are set out in the Chapeau Contract

8.1 WORKING LANGUAGES – CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONSULTATIONS

Contributions to any internal consultations/surveys are expected to be received in English, French, Spanish or Portuguese. The Commission will provide no translation into English of the contributions provided in French, Spanish or Portuguese.

Contributions to the Open Public Consultation (OPC) are expected to be received mainly in English, French, Spanish or Portuguese. Contributions received in any other languages will be translated by the European Commission into English. No translation into English will be provided for responses received in French, Spanish or Portuguese.

9 **TIMING**

The evaluation is due to start at latest in late May 2016. The expected duration is May 2016 to early June 2017 (13 months). As part of the technical offer, the framework contractor must adhere to the timetable in annex 4, and provide their proposed, more detailed schedule within that timetable in terms of "week 1" etc. The contracting authority underlines that the contractor should ensure that the evaluation team is available to meet the demands of this schedule.

10 **ANNEXES**

The contracting authority reserves the right to modify the annexes without prior notice.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: INDICATIVE DOCUMENTATION TO BE CONSULTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION BY THE SELECTED CONTRACTOR, INCLUDING DCI POLICY FRAMEWORK

General documentation

- The Common Implementing Regulation (CIR) 2014
- Regulation establishing the Development Cooperation Instrument (2014)
- European Consensus on Development (or any subsequent adaptation)
- External action annual reports
- Programming documents
- EU Results Framework
- Available relevant evaluations
- Other relevant regulations (EFIs)
- DCI Impact Assessment 2011
- <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011SC1469>
- Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Learned from the Evaluations managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit (July 2011) covering DCI, ENPI, IPA, INSC, IfS, EIDHR, ICI can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/evaluation-cooperation-ec-legal-1292-main-report-201107_en_0.pdf
- Other more specific evaluations can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/80199_en
- Annual reports on the EU's development and external assistance policies and their implementation: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/annual-reports_en
- Annual and special reports of the EU Court of Auditors <http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/AuditReportsOpinions.aspx>
- Cotonou Agreement Evaluation (due May 2016)

The following will be provided to the selected contractor:

- Template for the cover page of the final report

DCI POLICY FRAMEWORK:

Policy documents as set out in DCI regulation (2014)

- Treaty of the European Union (Title V)
- Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Part Five)
- Millennium Development Goals
- The European Consensus
- Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Paris, 2005), Accra Agenda for Action (2008), and their follow-up declaration (Busan, 2011)
- EU code of conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy; and the Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness.
- Joint EU-Africa Strategy
- Universal Declaration on Human Rights
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
- UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
- UN Declaration on the Right to Development
- EU Plan of Action 2010-2015 on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development
- Council Conclusions on an EU response to situations of fragility (19 November 2007); Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States

meeting within the Council on security and development(19 November 2007); Council Conclusions on conflict prevention (20 June 2011)

- UN Istanbul Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade (2011-2020)

Other main policy documents:

International Level:

- Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (Addis Ababa Action Agenda)
- Agenda 2030
- COP 21
- The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States
- UN World Conference in Sendai 2015 on Disaster Risk Reduction

EU Overall Policy:

- The Union as a strong global actor (EUCO 79/14)
- EU Global Strategy
- Regional and thematic policies (e.g. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/policies/index_en.htm; http://www.eeas.europa.eu/security-defence/index_en.htm)
- Commission Communication 13 October 2011: Increasing the impact of EU Development policy: An Agenda for Change
- Commission Communication 27 February 2013: "A Decent Life for All: Ending poverty and giving the world a sustainable future".
- Council Conclusions, 25 June 2013 - "The Overarching Post 2015 Agenda"
- Commission Communication 2 June 2014 - "A Decent Life for All: From Vision to Collective Action".
- Council Conclusions, 16 December 2014 - "On a transformative post-2015 agenda".
- Commission Communication, 5 February 2015 - "A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015"
- Council Conclusions, 26 May 2015 - "A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015"

EU Thematic Communications

- EU budget support Communication from 2011
- European Commission Communication COM(2014)263 - "A Stronger Role of the Private Sector in Achieving Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Developing Countries"
- Trade, growth and development Communication 2012
- EU support for Sustainable change in Transition Societies, Communication 2012
- The EU approach to resilience - learning from food crises, Communication of 2012 and Commission's Resilience Action Plan, issued on 19 June 2013
- Empowering Local Authorities in partner countries for enhanced governance and more effective development outcomes, Communication 2013
- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Social Protection in European Union Development Cooperation COM/2012/0446 final
- The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations, 2012

ANNEX 2: OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL REPORT

The overall layout of the **Final report** is:

- Executive summary (see 1 below);
- Introduction
- Background to the initiative
- Evaluation questions
- Method
- Implementation state of play (results)
- Responses to questions (findings);
- Conclusions and recommendations (see 2 below)

Length: the final main report may not exceed 50 (fifty) pages, excluding annexes. Each annex must be referenced in the main text. Additional information regarding the context, the activities and the comprehensive aspects of the methodology, including the analysis, must be put in the annexes.

The evaluation matrix must be included in the annexes. It must summarise the important responses at indicator/ judgement criteria level. Each response must be clearly linked to the supporting evidence. The matrix must also include an assessment of the quality of evidence for each significant finding.

(1) Executive summaries

The 1 (one) page executive summary of the evaluation report is extra to the 50 page limit for the main report. It should cover the objective of the evaluation, key findings and key conclusions.

The 4 (four) page executive summary of the evaluation report is extra to the 50 pager limit for the main report. It should be structured as follows:

- a) 1 paragraph explaining the objectives and the challenges of the evaluation;
- b) 1 paragraph explaining the context in which the evaluation takes place;
- c) 1 paragraph referring to the methodology followed, spelling out the main tools used
- d) The key findings and general conclusions and recommendations
- e) A limited number of main conclusions should be listed and classified in order of importance

The chapter on conclusions should be drafted taking the following issues into consideration:

(2) Conclusions and recommendations

- The conclusions should be grouped in "clusters" of similar issues which reflect the requirements of the CIR (e.g. added value, scope for simplification).
- The chapter on conclusions must also identify lessons to be drawn -, both positive and negative.
- Recommendations should address the weaknesses identified and reported.
- Recommendations should be clear, well structured, operational and realistic in the sense of providing clear, feasible and relevant input for decision making.

Annexes (non-exhaustive)

- Methodological approach;
- Evaluation matrix;
- Case studies;
- List of documents consulted;
- List of institutions met and persons interviewed;
- Results of any focus groups, expert panel etc.;
- All data bases constructed for the purpose of the evaluation;
- Summary of Open Public Consultation;
- Summary of overall consultation process²⁸

EDITING

The Final Report must have been copy edited and proof read such that it is:

- consistent, concise and clear;
- well balanced between argument, tables and graphs;
- free of typos and language errors;
- include a table of contents indicating the page number of all the chapters listed therein, a list of annexes (whose page numbering shall continue from that in the report) and a complete list in alphabetical order of any abbreviations in the text;
- contain an Executive summary (or summaries in several language versions when required).
- be typed in single spacing and printed double sided, in A4 format.

The presentation must be well spaced (the use of graphs, tables and small paragraphs is strongly recommended). The graphs must be clear (shades of grey produce better contrasts on a black and white printout).

Reports must be glued or stapled; plastic spirals are not acceptable.

²⁸ This annex should be in line with the requirement of annex 2 of tool 47 of the toolbox (http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/tool_47_en.htm) and the Better Regulation Guidelines on Consultation, of no more than 10 pages.

The contractor is responsible for the quality of translations and ensuring that they correctly reflect with the original text.

ANNEX 3 :QUALITY ASSESSMENT GRID (TBC revised grid under construction)

	Unacceptable	Poor	acceptable	Good	Very good	Excellent
1. Meeting needs: Does the evaluation adequately address the information needs of the commissioning body and fit the terms of reference?						
2. Relevant scope: Is the rationale of the policy examined and its set of outputs, results and outcomes/impacts examined fully, including both intended and unexpected policy interactions and consequences?						
3. Defensible design: Is the evaluation design appropriate and adequate to ensure that the full set of findings, along with methodological limitations, is made accessible for answering the main evaluation questions?						

<p>4. Reliable data: To what extent are the primary and secondary data selected adequate? Are they sufficiently reliable for their intended use?</p>						
<p>5. Sound data analysis: Is quantitative information appropriately and systematically analysed according to the state of the art so that evaluation questions are answered in a valid way?</p>						
<p>6. Credible findings: Do findings follow logically from, and are they justified by, the data analysis and interpretations based on carefully described assumptions and rationale?</p>						
<p>7. Validity of the conclusions: Does the report provide clear conclusions? Are conclusions based on credible results?</p>						
<p>8. Usefulness of the recommendations: Are recommendatio</p>						

ns fair, unbiased by personal or shareholders' views, and sufficiently detailed to be operationally applicable ?					
9.. Clearly reported: Does the report clearly describe the policy being evaluated, including its context and purpose, together with the procedures and findings of the evaluation, so that information provided can easily be understood?					
Taking into account the contextual constraints on the evaluation, the overall quality rating of the report is considered.					

ANNEX 4 :TIMING

Evaluation Phases and Stages	Notes and Reports	Dates	Meetings/Communications
Desk Phase			
Inception stage		May 2016	Briefing session in Brussels
	Inception Report	June 2016 (no later than 3 weeks after briefing session)	DCI ISG Meeting
Desk Review	Desk Report	September 2016	DCI ISG Meeting
Validation Phase			
	Field Visits	October 2016	DCI ISG Meeting
	Presentation of	October/November 2016	
Synthesis Phase			
	Draft Final Report	December 2016	DCI ISG Meeting
	Presentation of Draft Final Report for consultation		Open Public Consultation (12 weeks as of February 1 st 2017)
	Submission Final Report Submission printed version	1 st June 2017 24 th June 2017	