



Lead company



Draft Evaluation of the Greenland Decision

Open Public Consultations

Brussels

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Main findings

EQ1

- ☐ The GD is relevant to beneficiary needs in Greenland.
- ☐ A close collaboration between the EU and Greenland is relevant to EU's ambition of expanding its influence in the Arctic region.
- ☐ The programming decision to focus on education *only* has not been conducive to ensuring policy dialogue on wider EU priorities (EU Arctic Policy).

EQ 2 on Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability

EQ2

❑ The GD has contributed to **sustainable** development in Greenland:

- Education,
- Capacity in the Greenlandic Administration.



EQ 2 on Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability

EQ2

- ❑ A framework, permitting regular discussions and converge of opinions and ideas on global issues, has not been established.
- ❑ Policy dialogue has been ad hoc and without systematic monitoring and follow-up in EU priority areas.

EQ3

- ❑ EC reduction of reporting requirements and adaption to the Greenlandic context.
- ❑ Signing an annual Financing Agreement is not efficient.
- ❑ The Common Implementing Regulation (CIR) has not led to any efficiency gains.

EQ4

- ❑ The EU adds value, compared to the Danish block grant, through the conditions linked to its support.

EQ 5 on coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies

EQ5

- ☐ There is limited interaction with other EFIs due to the special position of Greenland.
- ☐ Greenland is not receiving funding under other EFIs.
- ☐ Operational collaboration to avoid overlap between the GD and the SFPA but limited synergies.

EQ6

- ☐ Greenland is receiving limited funds from other EU sources.
- ☐ The GD has, to a limited extent, leveraged further political and policy engagement.

Conclusions

The GD reflects the pursuit of political goals and the evolving interests of the EU and Greenland

C1

- ❑ The GD is a product of a political agreement in the Council- the EU wanting to expand its influence in the Arctic region and EU Member States wanting to maintain fishing rights in Greenlandic waters.

The “development component” triggered positive dynamics

C2

- ❑ Greenland is potentially more receptive to the EU playing a more prominent role in the Arctic because of the development support.

Interests/incentives among actors have not favoured an effective political dialogue on wider issues

C3

- ❑ Neither Greenland nor the EU has had enough concrete interest in establishing structures for policy dialogue on global issues and in setting aside the necessary resources for conducting such dialogues.

A key disabling factor has been the architecture of the GD

C4

- ❑ The GD is lacking an in-built incentive structure for policy dialogue on global issues. There is no in-built mechanism for follow-up, monitoring and continuity on other issues than education.
- ❑ It is unclear where the EC leadership resides in terms of establishing a mutually beneficial framework for policy dialogue on global issues (beyond education).

The raison d'être of having a dedicated EFI for Greenland is yet to be proven

C5

- ❑ The raison d'être for continuing to have a dedicated EFI for Greenland lies in whether it can be a lever for policy dialogue. In this regard, the GD is yet to prove its value.

Opportunities for a more balanced, mutually beneficial political partnership exist

C6

- ❑ The EIB funds for a mining project in Greenland may be the first step towards closer engagement in the extractives sector.
- ❑ A new GoG in 2016 may also open up new possibilities for collaboration with the EU with regard to climate change.

Recommendations

R1

Funds could be re-allocated to the TA budget line for policy dialogue on global issues until 2020.

R2

If the main objective of the partnership is to maintain the balance of interests linked to the original political settlement then the GD could be extended post-2020 with minor adjustments.

R3

If the EU wants to use the GD as a tool to implement its Arctic Policy then the incentive structure needs to be amended post-2020.