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Commission



Evaluation of the EU's Cooperation with the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region (2008-2015)

Final Report

Volume II – Annexes

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International
Cooperation and
Development

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the European Commission*

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*The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' point of view,
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Cover pictures:

EU, Regional Integration

EU, Critical Maritime Routes Programme in the Indian Ocean

Eric Buhl-Nielsen, Mauritius, The harvest from six hours of fishing

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Development and International Cooperation — EuropeAid

Evaluation

**Evaluation of the European Union's
co-operation
with the Region of
Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (EA-SA-IO)

Regional Level Evaluation
(2008-2015)**

TERMS OF REFERENCE

FWC COM 2015 – LOT 1

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1 MANDATE AND OBJECTIVES

Systematic and timely evaluation of its programmes, activities, instruments, legislation and non-spending activities is a priority¹ of the European Commission² in order to demonstrate accountability and to promote lesson learning to improve policy formulation and practice.³

The evaluation of the European Union's co-operation with the **Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region (EA-SA-IO)** is part of the 2015 evaluation programme as approved by the Development Commissioner.

The generic purpose of geographic evaluations is :

- To provide the relevant external co-operation services of the European Union and the wider public with an **overall independent assessment** of the European Union's past and current cooperation ;
- To identify **key lessons** and to produce recommendations to improve current and inform future choices on co-operation strategy and delivery.

2 EVALUATION RATIONALE

The objective is to provide an overall independent assessment of the EU's co-operation strategy and delivery in the EA-SA-IO region between 2008 and 2015. It will draw lessons from the implementation and formulation of the EA-SA-IO 10th and 11th EDF RIS/RIPs and provide recommendations on how to improve current and future co-operation and future strategic choices.

The evaluation will draw on pertinent major EU policy strategy and documents related to this region.

The main users of this evaluation include the EU Commissioners, EU Management, European Parliament, thematic units and the European Union Delegation of the countries of EA-SA-IO region as well as Governments, regional coordinating bodies, external partners and donors. The evaluation will also be of interest to the wider international development community.

3 BACKGROUND

3.1. General context

The region under review covers five DMROs (Duly Mandated Regional Organisation) and 29 Members states, these are diverse in size and roles, have different mandates for regional integration and cooperation, and progress at a different pace. These are:

- **COMESA**, headquartered in Lusaka, is the biggest DMRO in the region. It has 18 member states⁴: Its main focus is on the formation of a large economic and trading unit capable of overcoming the barriers faced by individual states in the sub-region.

¹ EU Financial Regulation (art 27); Regulation (EC) No 1905/2000; Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006; Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006; Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006; Council Regulation (EC) No 215/2008.

² SEC(2007) 213 "Responding to Strategic Needs: Reinforcing the use of evaluation"

³ COM (2011) 637 final "Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change"

⁴ Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

COMESA's current strategy focuses on economic prosperity through regional integration. Its Free Trade Area was launched in 2000, but full implementation is proving challenging due partly to the size and heterogeneity of the sub-region and the limited transposition of regional commitments. COMESA is also pursuing the formulation and progressive implementation of a tri-partite trade and investment agreement with the EAC and SADC regions promoting larger “regional integration strategy that places high priority on infrastructure development, industrialization, and free movement of business persons. Although the final integration appears remote despite high level political commitment the convergence analysis and convergence mechanisms set in place are powerful drivers in the harmonization of trade, investment and industrialisation national policies.

- **EAC**, headquartered in Arusha, is geographically compact and has five member states: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania. It has a clear regional integration mandate aiming at achieving a monetary union and eventually political integration. To this end EAC countries established a Customs Union in 2005 and signed a Common Market Protocol, which came into effect on 1st July 2010. It has also adopted a Defence Pact and it is active in anti-trafficking. The full realisation of the Common Market remains challenging due to poor transposition of regional commitments at national levels, a lack of enforcement mechanisms and of satisfactory instruments to track progress with implementation of regional commitments. In October 2014, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda have initialled the EU-EAC EPA.
- **IGAD**, based in Djibouti, covers the seven countries of the Greater Horn of Africa: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan and Sudan. Eritrea's membership has been suspended since 2007. IGAD's core mandate was broadened through the adoption in 2011 of the IGAD Regional Strategy, and is built on four strategic pillars: agriculture, natural resources and environment; economic cooperation, integration and social development; peace, security and humanitarian affairs, and corporate services. A new strategy (2016-2020) is about to be approved.
- **IOC** based in Mauritius, include five island states: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion⁵ (France) and Seychelles. Its main focus is to strengthen the relationship and solidarity of the Indian Ocean islands for sustainable development and enhanced regional cooperation and advocacy for SIDS. IOC's key priorities for the period 2013-2015 are political stability, regional competitiveness, blue and green growth, sustainable development and climate change, connectivity; food security and culture and media. IOC member states also ratified the interim Economic Partnership Agreement with European Union (along with Zimbabwe) in 2012 and are benefiting from the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements with DG Mare ensuring compensations for sustainable fishing.
- **SADC**, Headquarter in Gaborone, aims to achieve development through economic growth and equitable and sustainable development to be attained through increased regional integration. It has 15 member States: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A SADC free trade area was launched in 2008.

⁵ The fact that Reunion is a member of IOC and also an EU ultra-peripheral territory calls for increased consistency and synergies between the EDF and the European Regional Development Fund

- However its full and effective implementation has been problematic due to limited transposition of regional commitments at national levels. Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland have also initialled the EU-SADC EPA on 15 July 2014. SADC has asserted a strategic role in political mediation and election observation (i.e. in Madagascar and Zimbabwe). Challenges ahead relate to furthering political stability, the promotion of viable democracies as well as trade and economic development that lead to more equitable sharing of economic benefits and poverty reduction.

The following regional EU delegations are accredited to respective DMROs: Zambia to COMESA; Tanzania to the EAC; Ethiopia (African Union) ⁶ and Djibouti to IGAD; Mauritius to the IOC; Botswana to SADC.

3.2. EU Context of the Evaluation

10th EDF ESA-IO RSP/RIP (2008-2013)

The Duly Mandated Regional Organisations (DMROs) concerned with the ESA-IO RSP are COMESA, EAC, IGAD and IOC. The four ROs have decided to pursue the collaboration they started under the 9th EDF, to jointly prepare and implement the 10th EDF RSP/RIP for the ESA-IO region. The Member States that form part of the ESA-IO region are heterogeneous in terms of size, economic structure, as well as endowment with resources. However, they share a common objective to address poverty reduction through regional economic integration and trade.

The overall objective of the 10th EDF ESA-IO RSP was to contribute to the eradication of poverty in the region's countries and assist them in attaining the MDGs, as enshrined in the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, by supporting economic growth and developing trade.

The specific objectives were:

- To support the regional integration agendas of the ROs,
- To strengthen regional cooperation,
- To support the integration of the region into the global economy.

Interventions were envisaged under two focal areas: Regional Economic Integration, covering regional integration policies, trade and EPA, and regional sector policies, (Focal Area 1); and furthering the Regional Political Integration/Cooperation Agenda (Focal Area 2).

Focal Area 1:

aimed to support deepening regional economic integration by fully implementing the Customs Unions and moving towards common internal markets (and eventually monetary unions), covering sub-regions of the whole ESA-IO region, through the implementation of the necessary regulatory framework and financial support for the trade liberalisation process and its possible economic and fiscal costs. It aimed also to leverage funds for trade-related infrastructure to deepen regional integration and ensure the sustainable management of the region's natural resources, as a core asset for livelihood systems, so that it provided a basis for sustainable food security.

• ⁶ The EU Delegation is responsible of half of the 11th EDF RIP funds for IGAD. They also manage a substantial part of the pan African programme and African Peace Facility.

Focal Area 2:

Aimed to strengthen the political integration/cooperation process in the ESA-IO region by promoting a coherent regional perception of the concept of good governance, establishing regional mechanisms for early warning, conflict prevention, management and resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction, and overall capacity building in the areas of peace and security.

The non-focal areas included programmes that may not be covered under Focal Areas 1 and 2 but which were consistent with the mandates and strategies of the ROs, including institutional capacity building, support for the IRCC, involvement of non-state actors, etc.

An initial amount of EUR **645 Million** was allocated to the Regional Indicative Programme, raised to EUR **734 Million** during the MTR⁷, and was allocated as follows:

- Regional Economic Integration: € 551 M (75%)
- Regional Political Integration: € 160 M (22%)
- Other Programmes: € 23 M (3%).

Implementation was coordinated through the Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee (IRCC), to contribute to the harmonisation of policies in line with the recommendations of the AU. By May 2015, all funds had been fully committed and the disbursement rate for the COMESA, EAC, IGAD and IOC RIP 10th EDF was 64%.

10th EDF SADC RSP/RIP

The main objective of the Regional Strategy Paper was poverty reduction, supporting the acceleration of economic growth and development in the SADC region through deeper levels of regional economic integration and political cooperation. This objective was consistent with the goals set out in the SADC Common Agenda and the priorities described in the associated long-term Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic Indicative Plans for the Organ (SIPO).

The EUR **116 Million** of the Regional Indicative Programme (exclusively in grant form) later increased to EUR **148 Million** has been allocated as follows:

- Regional Economic Integration: €106 M (72%)
- Regional Political Cooperation: €18 M (12%)
- Non-Focal areas: €24 M (16%)

²By May 2015, all remaining funds for the 10th EDF SADC RIPs had been fully committed and the disbursement rate was 47.7%.

11th EDF EA-SA-IO RIP (2014-2020)

Lessons learned from the 10th EDF experience led to propose one single regional indicative programme (RIP) under the 11th EDF for the entire EA-SA-IO, with an allocation for each DMRO.

By broadening the support for regional integration to different stakeholders, it is expected to foster greater ownership by governments and other regional actors involved in the regional integration process, in the spirit of the principles of "subsidiarity" and "direct access".

⁷ Ref: EEAS II 1/AG/gvdm (2012)344717

The total allocation for the single RIP is EUR **1.332 Billion**, doubling the 10th EDF joint envelopes as a clear signal of EU commitment to regional integration in these regions. The following sectors have been prioritised:

- **Peace and Security** (€169 M, 12%): to foster peace, security and regional stability, helping to prevent and manage conflicts, in a region of key strategic importance for Europe. This complements the EU efforts to enhance resilience and tackle the root causes of migration.
- **Regional economic integration and trade** (€834 M, 63%), by integrating markets, promoting investment and improving production capacities, including the development of infrastructures.
- **Sustainable natural resource management** (€167 M, 12.5%) at regional level, to improve resilience and biodiversity conservation.
- **Institutional capacity building** (€34 M, 3%) to better equip the DRMO/RAO in their functions.

4. SCOPE (Legal, temporal and geographical)

Legal

The overall engagement with the EA-SA-IO regions must be taken into consideration including the Economic Partnership Agreements and other trade agreements with the EU, the co-operation framework and any other official commitments. This concerns notably: the financing instruments DCI, EDF, IfS including the thematic programmes, investing in people, Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources, Migration and asylum, Non state actors and local authorities and Food security, including the iEPAs concluded in the region.

Changes in the European Union institutional set-up with the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) should be taken into account.

The evaluation will cover spending and non-spending regional cooperation activities for EA, SA and IO regions which have been completed, in progress or being planned in the evaluation period. It will include:

- All of DEVCO's co-operation regional programmes
- EEAS development co-operation initiatives
- The interaction of DEVCO's interventions with those of ECHO, TRADE and EIB
- All EU financial instruments and channels relevant to the region

Temporal

The evaluation covers the European Union's regional co-operation strategy during the period 2008 to 2015⁸ in the EA-SA-IO. It includes two programming cycles: the 10th EDF with two regional programmes - the ESA-IO RSP/RIP⁹ and the SADC RSP/RIP; and the 11th EDF with one single EA-SA-IO RIP.

⁸ It encompasses the programmes financed in the frame of the RIPs. The other funds (via AU, thematic budget lines etc.) are not part of this evaluation with exception of the aspects related to coherence and complementarities of EU support to these regions.

⁹ COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), EAC (East African Community), IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) and IOC (Indian Ocean Commission).

Geographical

The evaluation will include the five DMROs (and 29 countries). The map of the region with the different organisations is in annex 7.

4 Evaluation Issues and criteria

The key issues to be addressed are:

- The relevance and coherence of the European Union's co-operation strategies for the period 2008-2015 in strengthening the regional institutional systems, peace and security and the regional economic integration. Diversity of regional organisations and their evolution in a context of rapid socio-economic transformation should be taken into account;
- The results of the European Union's co-operation, focusing on impact, sustainability, effectiveness and efficiency for the 10th EDF in 2008-2015 - and on the relevance and coherence of the 11th EDF programming (2016- 2020);
- The consistency between regional and national programming and implementation during the period evaluated ;
- The value added¹⁰ of the European Union's interventions (at both the strategic and implementation levels) in the key focal sectors;
- The 3Cs: coordination and complementarity of the European Union's interventions with other donors' interventions (focusing on EU Member States); and coherence¹¹ between the European Union 's interventions in the field of development cooperation and other European Union policies that are likely to affect the EA-SA-IO region;

The evaluation shall take into account the agreed recommendations of the evaluations of the Commission's support to these regions. The consultant must check to what extent they have been implemented, including in the following programming cycle, i.e. 11th EDF.

The evaluation should assess focal sectors and other important areas of European Union co-operation with the region.

The level, the quality and the evolution of the political and policy dialogue with regional organisations must be analysed, including formal dialogue structures and ad hoc ones related to Article 8 of Cotonou Agreement.

The contractor should also consider whether the following cross-cutting issues: Human rights; Gender equality; Democracy; Good governance; Children's rights; Indigenous people's rights; Environment and climate change sustainability; Combating HIV/AIDS were taken into account in the programming documents and the extent to which they have been reflected in the implementation modalities.

Interventions funded by the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), and/or the European Investment Bank (EIB) are not part of the evaluation scope. However, the interaction between these interventions and the strategies evaluated must be examined.

¹⁰ See annex 5.

¹¹ This definition of coherence refers to its definition under the 3Cs (see annex 5).

Under the different evaluation criteria, the evaluation will notably take into account:

Relevance

Were the regional programmes and projects in line with the EU global strategy, the EU strategy in the region and the strategies and objectives followed by the different DMROs?

Coherence

Was there coherence, synergies and/or overlaps between continental (at Pan-African level through the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (JAES) and the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), regional and national EU strategies and programmes? Coherence between the ESA-IO RSP/RIP and the SADC RSP/RIP and within the 11th EDF RIP?

Was there coherence with the interventions by Member States?

Opinion from the Member States of these 5 DMROs and from Non-State Actors of the region (Were they aware of EU regional support? Did it match their needs/priorities in the area of regional integration/cooperation?)

Effectiveness and results

Looking at the situation in 2008 and in 2015, what key/most significant progress has been achieved in terms of regional integration/cooperation in the 3 focal areas in the region – Economic/Trade integration, Peace and security and Natural Resources Management? To what degree causality links (attribution, correlation, contribution) can be established between the EU support in these areas and the progress/achievements observed?

How has the cooperation/coordination among the 5 DMROs evolved during this period? How effective was the IRCC coordination structure? (Programme design, implementation and overall coordination).

Are the regional agreements transposed at national levels? What can be done to ensure this happens?

Has the 11th EDF RISP design addressed the shortcomings identified under the 9th and 10th EDF with regards to overlapping regions and low absorption capacity?,

Efficiency

Was the EU support to the 5 DMROs good value for money?

Were the different implementation modalities (notably Programme Estimates and Contribution Agreements) used by the DMROs efficient, appropriate and effective in achieving the regional EU objectives? What could be improved in the future? Are there likely to be other, better, more efficient modalities that could or should have been considered?

What about the quality of design and the extent to which programmes have been underpinned by evidence concerning regional cooperation and evidence concerning how DMROs perform?

Sustainability

Is the EU institutional capacity building support to the 5 DMROs (staff, systems/processes...) sustainable? Is it effective in terms of institutional development? Has there been some "take-over" from the DMROs?

Value Added

Is there a value added to intervene at the regional level vs the national one?

Is there a value added to EU intervention in the region?

CCC – Cross Cutting Issues

Can we observe an impact of the regional programmes on the CCI notably on women's economic empowerment?

6 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION

The EuropeAid Evaluation Unit is responsible for the management and the supervision of the evaluation.

The progress of the evaluation will be followed closely by a Reference Group consisting of representatives of all involved services in the Commission and EEAS , as well as the Regional EU Delegations to Botswana, Djibouti, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia and Ethiopia (African Union). Its principal functions will be to:

- discuss draft reports produced by the evaluation team during meetings in Brussels;
- ensure the evaluation team has access to and consults all information sources and documentation on activities undertaken;
- discuss and comment on the quality of work done by the evaluation team;
- Provide feedback on the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.

The Reference Group communicates with the evaluation team via the Evaluation manager.

All meetings with the Reference group will be attended at least by the team leader. Other experts will be available to be reached by phone. For the briefing meeting, the presence of the Team leader may be sufficient.

7. PROCESS AND DELIVERABLES

The overall guidance to be used is available on the web page of the DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit under the following address: http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/evaluation_guidelines/

The basic approach to the assignment consists of three *main phases*, which encompasses several stages. *Deliverables* in the form of reports¹² and slide presentations should be submitted at the end of the corresponding stages.

The table below summaries these phases:

1. <u>Desk phase</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inception: Structuring of the evaluation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Inception report ➤ Slide presentation ➤
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data collection • Analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Desk report ➤ Slide presentation
2. <u>Field phase</u> (Missions in the region)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data collection • Verification of the hypotheses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ One global Slide presentation ➤ DMROs notes
3. <u>Synthesis phase</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis • Judgements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Draft final report ➤ Slide presentation ➤ Final report + An executive summary

¹² For each Report a draft version is to be presented. For all reports, the contractor may either accept or reject through a *response sheet* the comments provided by the Evaluation manager. In case of rejection, the contractor must justify (in writing) the reasons for rejection. When the comment is accepted, a reference to the text in the report (where the relevant change has been made) has to be included in the response sheet.

All reports will be written in English. The reports must be written in Arial or Times New Roman minimum 11 and 12 respectively, single spacing. Inception and Desk reports will be delivered only electronically. The Draft Final report and the Final report will also be delivered in hard copies. The summary as well as the cover page photo (free of any copyright, free of charge) will be delivered separately in electronic form. The electronic versions of all documents need to be delivered in both editable and not editable format.

The executive summary will be in EN and translated in FR and DE. It should be a reader-friendly (for the unfamiliar reader) stand-alone document. Thus, a journalistic style should be applied, providing the full picture of the evaluation, and any technical terminology and jargon should either be adapted or explained.

7.1. The Desk phase

The desk phase comprises two components: the Inception phase, covering a presentation and the delivery of the **Inception report** and a second stage which ends with the production of the **Desk report**.

Inception report

The assignment will start with an introductory meeting of the Team leader and key experts (if possible) with the Evaluation Unit and the Reference Group in Brussels. The objective of this meeting is to discuss the objectives of the evaluation and reach a consensus on the scope and nature of the evaluation, as well as gather sensitivity and concerns.

Following this initial exchange, and ad hoc bilateral meetings, the contractor will deliver an **Inception report**, clearly demonstrating what will be evaluated and how, with evidence of sound evaluation methods. The draft report should contain at least the following elements:

A background/context (political, economic, social, etc.) of the 5 DMROs and a review of the cooperation context between the European Union and the EA-SA-IO region;

A concise description of the EU's cooperation rationale with the regions, the regional bodies and relevant countries identifying and prioritizing the cooperation objectives as observed in relevant documents and translating them into intended results. Reconstructing the intervention logics (both faithful and reconstructed) of the EU in the framework of its co-operation with these regions, including Mid Term Reviews and End of Term Reviews findings and recommendations;

An inventory of spending and non-spending activities carried out by the EU during the period to be finalised in the desk report; this will include a representative sample of proposed projects to be analysed during the desk phase¹³. This sample has to be representative and has to be approved by the Reference Group;

¹³ The representativeness must address the different dimensions (percentage of funds, sample size and choice – diversity, illustration of the chosen interventions ...).

The draft evaluation questions with their rationale¹⁴; judgement criteria and quantitative and/or qualitative indicators for each criterion;

A proposal for the evaluation design – outlining;

The type and nature of information/data to be collected, and critically its sources and availability;

How the intervention logic(s) will be used as part of the evaluation method and how the data/information to be collected is linked to each evaluation question;

A Description of methods of analysis for each question;

A proposal of 10 countries to be visited during the field phase.

A half-day inception meeting will be held with the Reference group in Brussels, to present the draft Inception report via a **slide presentation, to validate:**

The Intervention Logic diagrams;

The evaluation questions, their justification and judgement criteria;

The proposed methodological approach on how to conduct the evaluation, gather data and address the EQs;

The work plan for the next phases.

Following the meeting, the contractor will submit a revised Report taking into account the comments formulated by the Reference group, to be approved by the Evaluation Team. The deadline for a revised version is 2 (two) weeks

The Desk report

Upon approval of the Inception report, the contractor will carry out the last stage of the desk phase and will prepare and present a **Desk report** which should include at least the following elements:

The agreed evaluation questions with judgement criteria and their corresponding quantitative and qualitative indicators

A first analysis and first elements of response to each evaluation question and the hypotheses and assumptions to be tested in the field phase;

Progress in the gathering of data. The complementary data required for analysis and for data collection during the field mission must be identified;

Methodological design, including the evaluation design, data collection tools to be applied in the field phase, and appropriate methods to analyse the information, indicating any limitations;

¹⁴ Upon validation by the Evaluation unit of the inception report, the evaluation questions become contractually binding. More information on the main principles for drafting evaluation questions, on the evaluation criteria and key issues can be found in the annexes 5 and 6. No preparatory visit is planned.

A work plan and detailed time schedule for the field phase: a list with brief descriptions of activities and list of key contacts to be interviewed for in-depth analysis in the field. The Evaluators must explain their representativeness and the value added of the planned visits. The list of countries to be visited has to be approved by the Reference Group.

The contractor will present (slides presentation) and discuss the Desk report with the Reference group in a half-day meeting in Brussels. The report will be finalised on the basis of the comments formulated by the reference group. The deadline for a revised version is 2 (two) weeks

The field mission cannot start without the authorisation of the Evaluation manager. Dates for field missions to various countries have to be agreed by the Reference Group.

7.2. The field phase

The fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out in the Desk report. The work plan and schedule of the mission will be agreed in advance (in principle at least three weeks before the mission starts). If it appears necessary to substantially deviate from the agreed fieldwork approach and/or schedule, (duration, number of experts, category etc.), the contractor must ask for the approval of the Evaluation manager before any changes can be applied. The related eligible costs will be revised accordingly.

At the conclusion of the field mission the contractor will present the preliminary findings of the evaluation to the EU Delegations, during a de-briefing meeting and to the Reference group in Brussels with the support of a **slide** presentation (half-day meeting).

A total of 10 (ten) missions is foreseen, one for each RO and one other country in each sub region¹⁵.

7.3. The synthesis phase

The Draft final report

The contractor will submit the Draft final report in conformity with the structure set out in annex 2. The Draft final report will be discussed with the Reference group in Brussels. Following the meeting with the Reference group, the consolidated comments will be sent by the Evaluation Manager and the contractor will make appropriate modifications to the Draft final report taking into consideration comments received during de-briefing meetings with the Delegation and with the Reference group. The deadline for a revised version is 2 (two) weeks.

The Final report

The contractor will prepare the **Final report** which must be approved by the Evaluation manager before it is printed. The summary not exceeding 5 pages shall be translated in FR is included into the Final main report.

¹⁵ In the 10 missions, it is necessary to include Ethiopia. Ethiopia is essential to be visited because a part of the support to IGAD is managed via the Regional EU Delegation in Ethiopia and Ethiopia is the basis of the African Union. For the purpose of the offer the flights to and from Nairobi will be considered.

The offer will be based on 50 hard copies of the **Final main report** (without annexes) and 2 copies with annexes. A CD-ROM shall be added to each printed Final main report.

The Evaluation Unit will make a formal judgement on the quality of the evaluation in the "Quality Assessment Grid" (see annex 3) to be sent to the contractor before publication on Internet.

7.4. The Dissemination phase

The approved Final Report will be presented at a one day seminar in Brussels using a slide presentation. The purpose of the seminar is to present the results, the conclusions and the recommendations of the evaluation to all the main stakeholders (EU Member States, partner countries' representatives, civil society organisations, European institutions, other donors, etc.). The slide presentation is considered as a product of the evaluation.

For the seminar, 100 hard copies of the report comprizing an executive summary have to be produced and delivered to the DEVCO Evaluation unit and to the place of the seminar in Brussels (the exact number of reports per destination and delivery date will be specified by the Evaluation Manager). Before printing, a proof copy shall be sent for approval to the Evaluation manager. All prints will correspond exactly to the version approved inclusive colours. The contractor shall submit minutes of the seminar. Once approved, these minutes as well as the slide presentation will be published on Internet along with the evaluation report.

The seminar logistics (room rental, catering etc.) costs are not to be included in the offer. The cost related to the presence of the experts (travel cost, per Diem etc.) is to be covered by the offer.

The Team Leader is expected to present (in the covered region,) current 2017 the results of the evaluation on the occasion of the Annual High Level Committee Meeting¹⁶

Other seminars and/or dissemination activities may be requested by the Contracting authority. In case of financial implications on the total contractual amount, such request (requests) will be formalised via a rider.

8 THE EVALUATION TEAM

The evaluation team as such is expected to possess expertise in:

- **Evaluation methods and techniques in general** and, if possible, of evaluation in the field of external relations and development cooperation. It is highly desirable that at least the Team leader is fully familiar with the Commission's methodological approach (cf. EuropeAid Evaluation Unit's website: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/introduction/introduction_en.htm);
- previous relevant **expertise in the EA- SA-IO region**;
- the following fields:

¹⁶ High Level Committee is an annual forum for representatives of the EU, the 5 DMRO's and their respective Member States. It is organized alternatively one year in the region and the year after in Brussels.

- **Regional economic integration** (Aid for Trade, Infrastructure and Private sector development)
 - **Regional political integration** (with a focus on **Peace and Security**, and **Good Governance**)
 - **Institutional capacity building**
 - **Natural resource management** (biodiversity, environment, energy, fishery)
- The working Knowledge of the following languages: **English** and French and also Portuguese in case of missions in one or more PALOP countries.

The key skills are indicated **in bold**. In their absence, the 80 points threshold may not be reached.

The team leader will be of category 1. The experts will have a master degree in at least one of the sectors required above.

The team will have excellent writing and editing skills in English. The Contractor remains fully responsible for the quality of the report. Any report which does not meet the required quality will be rejected.

During the offers evaluation process the contracting authority reserves the right to interview by phone one or several members of the proposed evaluation teams.

The team members must be independent from the programs/projects/policies evaluated. Should a conflict of interest be identified in the course of the evaluation, it should be immediately reported to the Evaluation Manager for further analysis and appropriate measures.

9. TIMING

The implementation is due to start in June 2016. The expected duration is of 15 months. As part of the technical offer, the framework contractor must fill-in the timetable in the Annex 4. This table shall not start by a precise date but by "day/week".

10. OFFER FOR THE ASSIGNMENT

The breakdown for days/expert shall be provided in the financial offer

The financial offer will be itemised to allow the verification of the fees compliance with the Framework contract terms. In particular, the local travel costs will be detailed and if necessary, justified in an Explanatory note. The per diems will be based on the EU per diems.

CV may not exceed 4 pages. References and data relevant to the assignment must be highlighted in bold (font minimum Times New Roman 12 or Arial, 11). The methodology will not exceed 15 pages (font minimum Times New Roman 12 or Arial, 11).

11. TECHNICAL OFFERS' EVALUATION CRITERIA

The offers must contain as minimum all items referred to in the Framework contract.

The offers evaluation criteria and their respective weights are:

	Maximum
Total score for Organisation and methodology	
Organization of tasks including timing	10
Evaluation approach, working method, analysis, tools	25
Sub Total	35
Experts/ Expertise	
Team leader	25
Other experts	40
Sub Total	65
Overall total score	100

11. ANNEXES

The contracting authority reserves the right to modify the annexes without prior notice.

Annex 1: Indicative documentation to be consulted for the purpose of the evaluation by the selected contractor

General documentation

- Communications of the European Union; and
- Various regulations.

Region

- CRIS¹⁷ (information on the projects), ROM¹⁸ and other databases concerning the financed projects, engagements, payments, etc.;
- EU Regional Cooperation strategies;
- Conclusions of the Mid-term and End-of-Term Reviews;
- Key regional planning and policy documents;
- Regional and Projects evaluation reports;
- Relevant documentation provided by the regional organisations, the local authorities and other local partners, etc.;
- Other donors and OECD/DAC documentation.

Official Documents (notably the following)

- 10th Regional Indicative Programme for Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean (2008-2013);
- 10th EDF Regional Strategy Paper/Regional Indicative Programme for EU-SADC cooperation (2008 -2013);
- 11th Regional Indicative Programme for Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean (2014-2020);
- Joint Progress Report on Cooperation between the EU and the ESA-IO Region 10TH EDF MTR 2011 (dated 16/1/2012);
- Joint Progress Report on cooperation between SADC and EU (2011);
- Final evaluation of the regional political integration and human security support programme (RPIHSSP), January 2016;
- Evaluation of the 9th & 10th IRCC Support Project, October 2012.

The following will be provided to the selected contractor:

- Access to the information contained in the CRIS and ROM systems for an evaluation;
- Template for the cover page.

¹⁷ Common RELEX Information System

¹⁸ Results Oriented Monitoring

Annex 2: Overall structure of the final report

The overall layout of the **Final report** is:

- A summary (1);
- Context of the evaluation and methodology;
- Evaluation questions and their answers (findings);
- Conclusions (2); and
- Recommendations (3).

Length: the final main report may not exceed 70 pages excluding annexes. Each annex must be referenced in the main text. Additional information regarding the context, the activities and the comprehensive aspects of the methodology, including the analysis, must be put in the annexes.

The evaluation matrix must be included in the annexes. It must summarise the important responses at indicator/ judgement criteria level. Each response must be clearly linked to the supporting evidence. The matrix must also include an assessment of the quality of evidence for each significant finding. The table below presents an example of how the quality of evidence may be ranked. This is purely indicative. The contractor should present a specific approach for assessing the quality of evidence.

Ranking of Evidence	Explanation of ranking of quality of evidence
<i>Strong</i>	The finding is consistently supported by a range of evidence sources, including documentary sources, quantitative analysis and qualitative evidence (i.e. there is very good triangulation); or the evidence sources, while not comprehensive, are of high quality and reliable to draw a conclusion (e.g. strong quantitative evidence with adequate sample sizes and no major data quality or reliability issues; or a wide range of reliable qualitative sources, across which there is good triangulation).
<i>More than satisfactory</i>	There are at least two different sources of evidence with good triangulation, but the coverage of the evidence is not complete.
<i>Indicative but not conclusive</i>	There is only one evidence source of good quality, and no triangulation with their sources of evidence.
<i>Weak</i>	There is no triangulation and / or evidence is limited to a single source.

Source: ITAD, 2014

(1) A summary (maximum 5 pages)

The summary of the evaluation report may not exceed 5 pages (3.000 words). It should be structured as follows:

- a) 1 paragraph explaining the objectives and the challenges of the evaluation;
- b) 1 paragraph explaining the context in which the evaluation takes place;

- c) 1 paragraph referring to the methodology followed, spelling out the main tools used (data on the number of projects visited, number of interviews completed, number of questionnaires sent, number of focus groups conducted, etc.);
- d) The general conclusions related to sectorial and transversal issues on one hand, and the overarching conclusion(s) (for example on poverty reduction) on the other hand;
- e) A limited number of main conclusions should be listed and classified in order of importance; and
- f) A limited number of main recommendations should be listed according to their importance and priority. The recommendations have to be linked to the main conclusions.

The chapters on conclusions and recommendations should be drafted taking the following issues into consideration:

(2) Conclusions

- The conclusions have to be assembled by homogeneous "clusters" (groups). It is not required to set out the conclusions according to the evaluation criteria.
- The general conclusions related to sectorial and transversal issues and the overarching conclusion(s) (for example on poverty reduction).
- Specific conclusions on each financial instrument indicated in the ToR section "3.1.1. Legal scope". These conclusions will focus on effectiveness, efficiency, added value, complementarity and synergies with other financial instruments.
- The chapter on conclusions must enable to identify lessons learnt, both positive and negative.

(3) Recommendations

- Recommendations should be substantiated by the conclusions.
- Recommendations have to be grouped in clusters (groups) and presented in order of importance and priority within these clusters.
- Recommendations have to be realistic and operational.
- The possible conditions of implementation (who? when? how?) have to be specified and key steps/action points should be detailed when possible.

The findings/recommendations of this evaluation will be useful notably for the 11th EDF MTR and eventual identification/formulation of future programmes. In that respect, structure the findings and recommendations by thematic areas, based on the three focal areas of the 11th EDF RIP (Economic integration, peace and security, and NRM). In addition, maybe this regional evaluation could be useful also to feed into/inform somehow the ongoing post-Cotonou strategic reflection (how will we cooperate with the ROs after 2020?)

Annexes (non-exhaustive)

- National background;
- Methodological approach;
- Evaluation matrix;
- Monograph, case studies;
- List of documents consulted;

- List of institutions and persons met;
- People interviewed;
- Results of the focus group, expert panel etc.;
- Slide presentations in the country/regional seminar and the seminar minutes;
- All data bases constructed for the purpose of the evaluation.

EDITING

The Final report must:

- be consistent, concise and clear;
 - be well balanced between argumentation, tables and graphs;
 - be free of linguistic errors;
 - include a table of contents indicating the page number of all the chapters listed therein, a list of annexes (whose page numbering shall continue from that in the report) and a complete list in alphabetical order of any abbreviations in the text;
 - Contain a summary of maximum 5 pages (or summaries in several linguistic versions when required).
 - Be typed in single spacing and printed double sided, in A4 format.
- The presentation must be well spaced (the use of graphs, tables and small paragraphs is strongly recommended). The graphs must be clear (shades of grey produce better contrasts on a black and white printout).
 - The contractor is responsible for the quality of translations and their conformity with the original text.

Annex 3 :Quality Assessment Grid

Concerning these criteria, the evaluation report is:	Unacceptable	Poor	Good	Very good	Excellent
1. Meeting needs: Does the evaluation adequately address the information needs of the commissioning body and fit the terms of reference?					
2. Relevant scope: Is the rationale of the policy examined and its set of outputs, results and outcomes/impacts examined fully, including both intended and unexpected policy interactions and consequences?					
3. Defensible design: Is the evaluation design appropriate and adequate to ensure that the full set of findings, along with methodological limitations, is made accessible for answering the main evaluation questions?					
4. Reliable data: To what extent are the primary and secondary data selected adequate? Are they sufficiently reliable for their intended use?					
5. Sound data analysis: Is quantitative information appropriately and systematically analysed according to the state of the art so that evaluation questions are answered in a valid way?					
6. Credible findings: Do findings follow logically from, and are they justified by, the data analysis and interpretations based on carefully described assumptions and rationale?					
7. Validity of the conclusions: Does the report provide clear conclusions? Are conclusions based on credible results?					
8. Usefulness of the recommendations: Are recommendations fair, unbiased by personnel or shareholders' views, and sufficiently detailed to be operationally applicable?					
9. Clearly reported: Does the report clearly describe the policy being evaluated, including its context and purpose, together with the procedures and findings of the evaluation, so that information provided can easily be understood?					
Taking into account the contextual constraints on the evaluation, the overall quality rating of the report is considered.					

Annex 4 :Timing

To be filled by the contractors and submitted as part of the methodology

Evaluation Phases and Stages	Notes and Reports	Dates (tentative)	Meetings/Communications
Desk phase		(6/2016)	
Structuring stage		(6/2016)	Briefing session in Brussels
	Draft Inception report	(7/2016)	Reference Group (RG) meeting
	Final Inception report	(8/2016)	
Desk study	Draft Desk report	(10/2016)	RG Meeting
	Final Desk report	(12/2016)	
Field phase (10 countries)		(1-3/2017)	De-briefing meetings with the Delegations in the countries visited
	Presentation	(4/2017)	RG Meeting
Synthesis phase			
	1 st Draft final report	(6/2017)	RG Meeting
	2 nd Draft final report Presentation + Minutes	(9/2017)	Seminar in Brussels
	Final report + other deliverables (including executive summary)	(11/2017)	Participation of the consultant to the annual High Level Meeting (in the region)

Annex 5: Evaluation criteria and key issues

(1) Definitions of the **five OECD-DAC evaluation criteria** can be found at the following address:

<http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationofdevelopmentprogrammes/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

(2) **Relevance**: the extent to which an intervention's objectives are pertinent to needs, problems and issues to be addressed.¹⁹

(3) **"Coherence"** is used in two different contexts: as an evaluation criterion and as part of the 3Cs (key issues).

i. The definitions of coherence as evaluation criteria:

Coherence²⁰: the extent to which the intervention logic is not contradictory/the intervention does not contradict other intervention with similar objectives

ii. *Provisions regarding the 3Cs (key issues):*

Development cooperation is a shared competence between the European Community and the Member States. The EU competence on development cooperation was established in law by the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. To guide its practical implementation the Maastricht Treaty established three specific requirements: *coordination, complementarity and coherence* – the “*three Cs*”. These commitments are reaffirmed in the “European Consensus for Development”²¹. The legal provisions with regard to the 3Cs remain largely unchanged in the Lisbon Treaty. They offer basic definitions of the various concepts involved as can be seen in the box below.

Lisbon Treaty

Art. 208 (ex Art. 177 TEC)

1. "Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. The Union's development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement and reinforce each other.

Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries."

Art. 210 (ex Art. 180 TEC)

1. "In order to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Union shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid programmes, including in international organisations and during international conferences.

¹⁹ Evaluating EU activity - Glossary p.101 (Relevance, p. 108):

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/evaluation/docs/eval_activities_en.pdf.

While, according to the DAC Glossary the **relevance** is the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies. The terms '**relevance and coherence**' as European Union's evaluation criteria cover the DAC definition of 'relevance'.

²⁰ Evaluating EU activity - Glossary p.101 (Coherence: p.102):

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/evaluation/docs/eval_activities_en.pdf

²¹ (2006/C 46/01)

2. They may undertake joint action. Member States shall contribute if necessary to the implementation of Community aid programmes.

2. The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote the coordination referred to in paragraph 1."

Coordination: In EC policy documents the distinction is made between three levels of coordination: (i) policy coordination; (ii) operational coordination and (iii) coordination in international forums.

Complementarity: The obligation to ensure complementarity is a logical outcome of the fact that development cooperation is a shared competence between the EC and the Member States. Over time, the concept was linked to a better distribution of roles between the Commission and the Member States on the base of their respective comparative advantages. This interpretation is also the basis for the Code of Conduct on Complementarity (2007) emphasizing the need for a „division of labour“ (DOL) between the various European actors in delivering aid.

Coherence: One such typology distinguishes between (i) coherence/incoherence of European development policy itself; (ii) coherence/incoherence with the partner country's/region's policies; and (iii) coherence/incoherence between development co-operation policies and policies in other fields²².

(4) **Value added of the European Union's interventions:** The criterion is closely related to the principle of subsidiarity and relates to the fact that an activity/operation financed/implemented through the Commission should generate a particular benefit.

There are practical elements that illustrate possible aspects of the criterion:

- 1) The European Union has a particular capacity, for example experience in regional integration, above that of EU Member States.
- 2) The European Union has a particular mandate within the framework of the '3Cs' and can draw Member States to a greater joint effort.
- 3) The European Union's cooperation is guided by a common political agenda embracing all EU Member States.


²² In recent years, the concept of „policy coherence for development“ (PCD) has gained momentum, in the European Consensus (2005) PCD was defined as “ensuring that the EU takes account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries, and that these policies support development objectives.” (par. 9).

Annex 6: Principles regarding the drafting of Evaluation Questions

Main principles to follow when preparing evaluations questions (EQ)

- (1) Limit the total number of EQ to 10 for each evaluation.
- (2) In each evaluation, more than half of EQ should cover specific actions and look at the chain of results.
 - Avoid too many questions on areas such as cross cutting issues, 3Cs and other key issues, which should be covered as far as possible in a transversal way, introducing for example specific judgement criteria in some EQs.
 -
- (3) Within the chain of results, the EQs should focus at the levels of results (outcomes) and specific impacts.
 - Avoid EQs limited to outputs or aiming at global impact levels.
 - In the answer to EQs, the analysis should cover the chain of results preceding the level chosen (outcomes or specific impacts).
 -
- (4) EQ should be focused and addressing only one level in the chain of results.
 - Avoid vague questions where follow-up questions are needed (questions à tiroirs).
 - Avoid questions dealing with various levels of results (for example looking at outcomes and specific impacts in the same EQ).
 -
- (5) The 7 evaluation criteria should not be present in the wording of the EQ.
- (6) General concepts such as sustainable development, governance, reinforcement, etc. should be avoided.
- (7) Each key word of the question must be addressed in the answer.
 - Check if all words are useful.
 - Check that the answer cannot be "yes" or "no".
 - Check that the questions include a word calling for a judgement.
 -
- (8) Every EQ must be accompanied by a limited number of judgement criteria; some of them dealing with cross cutting and some key issues (see point 2 above).
- (9) A short explanatory comment should specify the meaning and the scope of the question.

Annex 7: Map of the Region



Annex 8: Amounts contracted and paid (by DAC sectors (2008-2015))

(Extracted from the DEVCO DWH – data warehouse)

Contracted and Paid Amount by DAC Sector (RSO) 2008-2015		
DAC Sector	Contracted Amount (Euro)	Paid Amount (Euro)
Air transport	1 000 000,00	1 000 000,00
Basic health care	3 600 000,00	3 080 000,00
Basic nutrition	5 500 000,00	4 700 000,00
Bio-diversity	21 015 059,47	8 702 128,67
Communications policy and administrative management	276 823,00	161 713,20
Democratic participation and civil society	2 747 685,51	2 503 830,71
Disaster prevention and preparedness	287 963,00	287 963,00
Elections	3 822 535,00	2 626 046,33
Electrical transmission/ distribution	1 162 967,34	1 162 967,34
Emergency food aid	1 310 626,00	1 310 626,00
Energy policy and administrative management	2 704 500,00	543 895,85
Energy research	51 289,00	51 289,00
Environmental policy and administrative management	7 133 348,60	4 464 616,07
Environmental research	62 700,41	62 700,41
Fishery development	9 453 076,48	9 427 540,11
Fishing policy and administrative management	28 092 968,51	20 355 813,33
Forest industries	183 950,03	183 950,03
Legal and judicial development	6 278 828,00	2 388 392,28
Livestock/veterinary services	5 880 000,00	4 093 418,00
Material relief assistance and services	999 624,44	999 624,44
Multisector aid	3 996 987,30	2 610 363,00
Power generation/non-renewable sources	2 337 000,00	300 000,00
Public sector policy and administrative management	14 851 610,47	14 831 672,97
Regional trade agreements (RTAs)	36 434 393,13	2 216 112,76
Relief co-ordination; protection and support services	3 000 000,00	3 000 000,00
Road transport	7 225 323,62	6 421 698,33
Sectors not specified	637 172,15	632 876,47
Security system management and reform	11 850 038,24	6 407 560,60
Tourism policy and administrative management	96 256,00	96 256,00
Trade education/training	14 997,00	0,00
Trade facilitation	40 000 000,00	38 825 418,00
Trade policy and administrative management	22 564 883,33	15 936 929,31
Transport policy and administrative management	282 563,00	169 537,80
Water resources policy and administrative management	13 255 131,00	10 319 058,65
Somme :	258 110 300,03	169 873 998,66

Contracted and Paid Amount by DAC Sector (RSA) 2008-2015

DAC Sector	Contracted Amount (Euro)	Paid Amount (Euro)
Administrative costs	12 145,17	12 145,17
Advanced technical and managerial training	770 103,67	770 103,67
Basic nutrition	1 789 677,60	1 789 677,60
Bio-diversity	7 720 602,17	7 636 094,28
Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution	8 218 958,05	7 202 342,80
Environmental policy and administrative management	3 057 383,95	11 329 041,52
Food aid/Food security programmes	849 084,57	744 818,80
Higher education	31 370,00	31 370,00
Human rights	1 500 000,00	1 500 000,00
Infectious disease control	2 172 129,99	2 172 129,99
Information and communication technology (ICT)	21 934,00	667 607,00
Livestock	883 065,28	4 599 593,28
Livestock/veterinary services	1 488 303,92	1 488 303,92
Multisector aid	42 487,22	42 487,22
Population policy and administrative management	2 500 000,00	2 500 000,00
Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation	15 447 345,00	14 292 750,42
Reintegration and SALW control	2 123 804,67	2 123 804,67
Relief co-ordination; protection and support services	976 086,40	817 371,00
Road transport	1 166 479,74	12 365 044,62
Sectors not specified	186 895,83	186 895,83
Trade facilitation	2 340 687,48	2 340 687,48
Trade policy and administrative management	483 650,00	483 650,00
Water resources policy and administrative management	52 154,28	16 586,28
Somme :	53 834 348,99	75 112 505,55

Annex 2: Inventory


This annex aims at providing an overview of EU funding dedicated to Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean during the period 2008-2015. The database constructed serves for data analysis and where relevant has been used to contribute to the analysis of the evaluation questions.

After a quick introduction on the approach followed, this annex presents a general overview of EU support in the region, followed by breakdowns by year, by DMROs, by priority areas and sub areas and the list of decisions.

2.1 Description of the approach taken in the inventory

The following figure depicts the general approach to the mapping of the regional level EU support to EA-SA-IO during the evaluation period.

Figure 1: Overview of the approach to the inventory



Step 1 consisted of extracting information from the CRIS database (Common RELEX Information System). The extraction was based on two criteria: the zone benefitting from the action and the years, so as to center the inventory on the temporal and geographical scope of this evaluation. The data extraction was done on the 17 June 2016.

Step 2 consisted of identifying interventions which fall under the three RIPs this evaluation is studying. For this, the evaluation team compared their information with lists received from key stakeholders (e.g DG DEVCO D2).

Step 3 involved categorising each intervention by priority area and sub area, and by DMRO. The following grid was used. It is based on the RIP for the 11th EDF¹.

Table 1: Grid 11th EDF for categorisation

11th EDF	
Priority area	Sub area
Peace, security and regional stability	DMRO institutional capacity
	Electoral observation and conflict
	Democratisation, GG, RoL, HR
	Cross border
Regional economic integration	DMRO institutional capacity
	National Facilitation of trade/private sector development
	Regional infrastructure (investments)
	Strategy and regulatory framework for regional infrastructure
Regional NRM	Regional Drought resilience
	Regional NRM
Non focal sector	Non focal sector
Technical cooperation	Technical cooperation

Source: ADE

Limitation

The categorisation of the interventions by focal sector of the EDF 11 RIP needs to be approved by key informants. The inventory will be adapted during the desk phase if need be.


2.2 General Overview during the period 2008-2015

Overall the EU allocated €780 million for the EA-SA-IO region under EDF 10 and 11 during the period 2008-2015. Figure 3 provides an overview of the evolution of the allocated, contracted and paid amounts. The contracting under EDF 10 started in 2009 and ended in 2013 and was of €665million. This graphs shows that the funding accelerated at the end of the EDF 10 period. It should be noted that no commitment could occur between 31 December 2013 (end 10th EDF) and 5 June 2015 (signature of the 11th EDF RIP).

By end-2015, €20 million were allocated under EDF 11 and €2 million contracted (for the EAC Regional electoral support programme).

¹ The team used a conversion table (from EDF 10 to EDF 11) as a guide and then applied the judgment of a skilled person on individual case.

Figure 2: Evolution of Allocated, Contracted and Paid Amounts (in €m)



The commitment peak at the end of the EDF10 period reflects the €115m allocated to the African Peace Facility (APF) and the €225.5m contribution to the SE4All programme.

The payment rate of €444m can be explained partly by the disbursement at 72% (€163.2m)² of the SE4ALL contribution of €225.5m. It can also be explained by the smaller disbursement for more recent projects. The payment rate is on average of 55% in more recent years and of 90% in older years.

A total of 41 programmes received EU funding during the period analysed, all from EDF 10 expect for 1. The average project size during this period was of €21m.

2.3 EDF 10 analysis

The data in this subsection concentrates on data contracted during the EDF 10. The total amount contracted under the EDF 10 is €778m.


To show things more clearly, the APF contribution of €115m was taken out of the analysis below.

2.3.1 DMROs

Of the five DMROs benefitting from EDF 10, COMESA received the most EU funding in 2009-2015: €147m, or 19% of the total. It is followed by SADC €107m (14%), IOC €85m (11%), IGAD €61m (8%) and EAC €24m (3%). The 'Other' category includes mainly the funding for the 'Sustainable Energy for All' (SE4All) initiative (€225.5m).

² EU source

Figure 3: Overview of Contracted Amounts by DMROs (in €m)




2.3.2 Distribution by priority areas

The priority areas were classified according to the ones defined in the EDF 11 EA-SA-IO RIP: Regional Economic Integration; Peace, Security and Regional Stability; Regional Natural Resources Management; the Technical Cooperation Facility; and Non-focal sector (IRCC).

Regional Economic Integration is the most important priority area with €482m representing 73% of total funding. It is followed by the Regional Natural Resources Management sector, 16%. Peace, Security and Regional Stability and Non focal sector including the Technical cooperation represented, respectively, 6.4 and 4.6%.

The distribution by priority area differs from one DMRO to another. Regional Economic Integration represents 86% of the EU's COMESA funding and only 14% of its IGAD support. Regional Economic Integration is present in all DMRO activities and Peace, Security and Regional Stability in all but COMESA. By contrast, Regional Natural Resources Management is concentrated in two DMROs: IOC and IGAD.

Figure 4: Overview of contracted funds by priority area (in €m)




The sections below detail each priority area by its different objectives.

- *Regional Economic Integration*

Figure 5 below shows that most of the Regional Economic Integration funding went to regional infrastructure and investment, €297m (61%) and DMRO institutional capacity development, €102m (21%). The largest share of contracted amounts for regional infrastructure and investment (€225.5m) went to the SE4all initiative. The biggest programme financed in the sub area of DMRO institutional capacity was the Regional Integration Support Project (RISP).


Figure 5: Overview, Regional Economic Integration (in €m)



- *Peace, Security and Regional Stability*

€20m (47%) of the Peace, Security and Regional Stability funding went to cross border. The cross border sub area is constituted mostly by the MASE Programme, which promotes regional maritime security.


Figure 6: Overview, Peace, Security and Regional Stability (in €m)



- *Regional NRM*

The biggest project financed under the Regional Natural Resources Management was the implementation of a regional fisheries strategy for the ESA-IO (€20m for Phase 1, €16m for Phase 2).


Figure 7: Overview, Regional Natural Resources Management (in €m)



- *Others*

The most important intervention under the 'Other' category was the contribution to the IRCC2 accounting for €21m. The EU contributed €10m for the Technical Cooperation Facility.

Figure 8: Overview Others Sub-sectors (in €m)




2.4 EDF 11 analysis

The data in this subsection was obtained from the Financial overview table of the 2014-2020 EA-SA-IO RIP created by DEVCO D2, in its version last updated in June 2016.

Under EDF 11, the EU allocates €1,332 million to the EA-SA-IO region, see RIP EDF 11. Figure 10 provides an overview of the repartition of the funds amongst the five envelopes defined in the EDF 11 EA-SA-IO RIP: cross-regional; sub-regional; infrastructure financing; technical cooperation facility; and the reserve.

Figure 9: Repartition of allocated amounts by envelope



Most of the allocated funding goes to the infrastructure financing (45%) and sub-regional (34%) envelopes. 87.5% of the infrastructure financing funds are directed towards the contribution to African Investment Facility.

The sub-regional fundings are subdivided between the 5 DMROs and a reserve of €60m. Of the five organisations, SADC is allocated the most money: €90m or 20% of the envelope. It is followed by COMESA and EAC, which are both allocated €85m and by IGAD, with €80m. IOC is allocated the least funding with €50m.

2.4.1 Distribution by priority areas


The distribution of funds between priority areas is represented in Figure 10 below. The 'Other' area is constituted of the general reserve and the reserve for the sub-regional envelope.

Regional economic integration is the priority being allocated the most funding, with 66% of the funds going its way (€886m). A similar proportion to the one in EDF 10 which was 67%.

'Natural resources management' is the second most important area with €144m, representing 11% of the total allocated amounts, the proportion is smaller than the one in EDF 10 which was of 16%. It is followed by 'Peace security, stability' which is allocated €120m.

The IGAD Trust Fund (EUR 75m) supports the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI).

Figure 10: Distribution by priority area




Regional economic integration

Figure 11 below shows the distribution of 'Regional economic integration' funds per sub-priority area. The sub-area 'regional infrastructure and investment' is allocated €557m, which represents the largest share of the area funding. This is more than for EDF 10, where 61% of the economic integration funds went to infrastructure, versus 63% in EDF 11.

The second sub-priority area in importance is 'National facilitation of trade and private sector development' which is allocated €155m. It is followed by 'Strategy and regulatory framework for regional infrastructure', with €88m, and 'DMRO institutional capacity', with €86m.

Figure 11: Overview, Regional Economic Integration




Peace, security, stability

The total amount allocated to this area increased by €118m between EDF 10 and EDF 11. The distribution of funds between sub-priority areas underwent some changes.

- The 'Cross border' sub area only represented 43% of 10th EDF funding for Peace, security, stability', whereas under the 11th EDF, 71% goes to cross-border issues, with most of the projects concerned being centered on the themes of security and migration;
- The 'Democratisation, good governance, rule of law, human rights' share of funding went from 10 to 17% ;
- The sub area 'Electoral observation and conflict mediation' constitutes 12% of the EDF 11 funds and was not present as such under the EDF10.

Figure 12: Overview, Peace, security, stability




Natural resources management

The main priorities in natural resources management are ‘Fisheries and aquaculture’, ‘Water resources management’, ‘Ecosystems, biodiversity, wildlife’, and ‘agriculture and livestock, food and nutrition security’. All of them are close to €30m;

The main changes between the 10th and 11th EDF are the disappearance of the ‘renewable energy’ and ‘environmental monitoring’ ones.

Figure 13: Overview, natural resources management



2.5 List of decisions

EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO	Priority area	Sub area
10	2009	FED/2008/020-647	IRCC Bridging Project	€ 973.960	€ 973.960	€ 630.000	COMESA	Non focal sector	Non focal sector
10	2009	FED/2009/021-403	IRCC 2	€ 19.998.502	€ 19.668.848	€ 16.544.427	COMESA	Non focal sector	Non focal sector
10	2013		Contribution to African Peace Facility (APF)	€ 115.000.000	€ 115.000.000	€ 115.000.000		Peace, security and regional stability	Electoral observation and conflict mediation
11	2014	FED/2014/033-788	EAC REGIONAL ELECTORAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME	€ 5.000.000	€ 2.144.325	€ 1.072.163	EAC	Peace, security and regional stability	Electoral observation and conflict mediation
10	2011	FED/2011/023-107	Startup project to promote regional maritime security (MASE)	€ 2.000.000	€ 1.680.834	€ 1.362.885	IOC	Peace, security and regional stability	Cross border
10	2013	FED/2013/024-098	Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE)	€ 37.499.260	€ 18.566.962	€ 8.931.220	IGAD	Peace, security and regional stability	Cross border
10	2009	FED/2009/021-302	Regional Political Integration and Human Security Support Programme (RPIHSSP)	€ 4.920.000	€ 4.238.773	€ 3.811.511	EAC	Peace, security and regional stability	Democratisation, GG, RoL, HR
10	2011	FED/2011/022-832	Support to SADC Regional Political cooperation	€ 18.000.000	€ 17.600.000	€ 9.410.153	SADC	Peace, security and regional stability	DMRO institutional capacity

EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO	Priority area	Sub area
11	2015	FED/2015/038-552	Institutional Support and Capacity Building for the Indian Ocean Commission	€ 5.000.000	€ -	€ -	IOC	Peace, security and regional stability	DMRO institutional capacity
10	2009	FED/2009/021-404	Regional Multi-disciplinary Centre of Excellence (RMCE)	€ 711.412	€ 689.496	€ 689.496	COMESA	Regional Economic Integration	DMRO institutional capacity
10	2009	FED/2009/021-716	RISP 2	€ 40.000.000	€ 40.000.000	€ 39.651.227	COMESA	Regional Economic Integration	DMRO institutional capacity
10	2010	FED/2010/022-550	Support to ESA-IO region AFRITACs	€ 14.750.000	€ 14.675.000	€ 14.675.000	IOC	Regional Economic Integration	DMRO institutional capacity
10	2012	FED/2012/024-090	AFRITAC South	€ 5.000.000	€ 5.000.000	€ 5.000.000	SADC	Regional Economic Integration	DMRO institutional capacity
10	2012	FED/2012/023-847	SADC Project Preparation Development Facility	€ 12.000.000	€ 11.750.000	€ 1.989.000	SADC	Regional Economic Integration	DMRO institutional capacity
10	2012	FED/2012/023-213	SADC Secretariat Institutional Capacity-Development Programme (ICDP)	€ 12.000.000	€ 11.587.858	€ 7.570.776	SADC	Regional Economic Integration	DMRO institutional capacity
10	2013	FED/2013/024-903	Regional Integration Support Programme 3 (RISP3) - IGAD	€ 2.000.000	€ 1.451.443	€ 1.233.789	IGAD	Regional Economic Integration	DMRO institutional capacity
10	2013	FED/2013/024-615	Regional Integration Support Programme 3 (RISP3) - EAC	€ 4.450.000	€ 3.884.004	€ 2.085.668	EAC	Regional Economic Integration	DMRO institutional capacity

EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO	Priority area	Sub area
10	2013	FED/2013/024-855	Regional Integration Support Programme III (Indian Ocean Commission)	€ 6.150.000	€ 5.226.613	€ 3.182.147	IOC	Regional Economic Integration	DMRO institutional capacity
10	2013	FED/2013/023-899	Regional Integration Support Programme 3 (RISP3) - COMESA	€ 7.400.000	€ 7.400.000	€ 5.419.095	COMESA	Regional Economic Integration	DMRO institutional capacity
10	2013	FED/2013/023-240	SADC Trade Related Facility	€ 32.000.000	€ 31.600.000	€ 4.651.422	SADC	Regional Economic Integration	National Facilitation of trade/private sector development
10	2013	FED/2013/024-191	Consolidation of Regional Integration Support Mechanism (RISM)	€ 33.410.000	€ 33.410.000	€ 2.628.547	COMESA	Regional Economic Integration	National Facilitation of trade/private sector development
10	2009	FED/2009/021-504	Northern Corridor Route Improvement Project: Mbarara - Ntungamo - Katuna	€ 5.000.000	€ 5.000.000	€ -	COMESA	Regional Economic Integration	Regional infrastructure (investments)
10	2009	FED/2009/021697	Réhabilitation de la section Kigali-Gatuna du Corridor Nord et appui à l'entretien routier	€ 15.000.000	€ 15.000.000	€ 14.220.000	COMESA	Regional Economic Integration	Regional infrastructure (investments)
10	2010	FED/2010/021-767 ³	Programme de Relance de la CEPGL (Burundi,RDC,Rwanda)	€ 30.000.000	€ 1.162.967	€ 1.162.967	CEPGL	Regional Economic Integration	Regional infrastructure (investments)

³ Updated figures (CRIS, January 2017) : € 45.000.000 allocated, € 43.128.927 contracted, and € 29.803.496 paid.

EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO	Priority area	Sub area
10	2011	FED/2011/022-874	Feasibility study and detailed design for Berbera-Togochale Road (Berbera- Addis Corridor)	€ 1.814.200	€ 1.814.200	€ 1.814.200		Regional Economic Integration	Regional infrastructure (investments)
10	2011	FED/2011/022-078	Prolongement de la réhabilitation du Corridor Sud (Carrefour d'Arta-Guélilé) sur 10,2 km	€ 7.500.000	€ 7.245.294	€ 6.522.564	IGAD	Regional Economic Integration	Regional infrastructure (investments)
10	2012	FED/2012/023-764	Burundi Component of the Power Interconnection Rwanda – Burundi (Buco-Pirubu)	€ 16.000.000	€ 15.820.827	€ 2.800.000	EAC	Regional Economic Integration	Regional infrastructure (investments)
10	2012	FED/2006/017-948	Infrastructure: Kampala-Mbarara road-Rider Uganda	€ 25.000.000	€ 25.000.000	€ 25.000.000	COMESA	Regional Economic Integration	Regional infrastructure (investments)
10	2012	FED/2012/024-335	Contribution to Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All)	€ 32.000.000	€ 32.000.000	€ 32.000.000		Regional Economic Integration	Regional infrastructure (investments)
10	2012	FED/2012/024-335	Contribution to Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All)	€ 193.500.000	€ 193.500.000	€ 193.500.000		Regional Economic Integration	Regional infrastructure (investments)
10	2013	FED/2013/024-121	One Stop Inspection Stations (OSIS)	€ 21.000.000	€ -	€ -	EAC	Regional Economic Integration	Regional infrastructure (investments)
10	2012	FED/2012/023-214	Regional Economic Integration Support programme (REIS)	€ 20.000.000	€ 19.600.000	€ 12.767.689	SADC	Regional Economic Integration	Strategy and regulatory framework

EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO	Priority area	Sub area
10	2010	FED/2005/17769	Rider IGAD Livestock policy initiative	€ 1.098.000	€ 1.098.000	€ 870.000	IGAD	Regional NRM	Agriculture and livestock, food and nutrition security
10	2012	FED/2012/023-702	Animal Disease Surveillance in Support of Trade in IGAD Member States	€ 6.000.000	€ 5.880.000	€ 5.569.448	IGAD	Regional NRM	Agriculture and livestock, food and nutrition security
10	2012	FED/2012/023-700	Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region	€ 14.000.000	€ 13.233.030	€ 6.428.251	IGAD	Regional NRM	Biodiversity, wildlife, forests
10	2012	FED/2012/022-995	Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States	€ 15.000.000	€ 9.509.000	€ 2.427.143	IOC	Regional NRM	Biodiversity, wildlife, forests
10	2009	FED/2009/021-331	Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS)	€ 9.151.352	€ 9.139.845	€ 7.986.133	IOC	Regional NRM	Climate change and resilience
10	2013	FED/2013/024-107	Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO	€ 7.500.000	€ 6.693.815	€ 3.128.201	IOC	Regional NRM	Climate change and resilience
10	2011	FED/2011/022-553	Monitoring of Environment and Security in Africa (MESA)	€ 5.000.000	€ 5.000.000	€ 5.000.000		Regional NRM	Environmental monitoring

EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO	Priority area	Sub area
10	2011	FED/2011/022-553	Monitoring of Environment and Security in Africa (MESA)	€ 5.000.000	€ 5.000.000	€ 5.000.000		Regional NRM	Environmental monitoring
10	2009	FED/2009/021-330	Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO	€ 19.958.795	€ 19.880.010	€ 18.136.885	IOC	Regional NRM	Fisheries and aquaculture
10	2013	FED/2013/024-111	Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)	€ 16.000.000	€ 12.912.372	€ 9.831.579	IOC	Regional NRM	Fisheries and aquaculture
10	2012	FED/2012/023-041	Renewable energy development and energy efficiency improvements in IOC member countries	€ 15.000.000	€ 5.044.300	€ 1.200.490	IOC	Regional NRM	Renewable energy
10	2009	FED/2009/021-334	Inland Water Resources Management in the IGAD region	€ 14.700.000	€ 13.254.263	€ 11.100.366	IGAD	Regional NRM	Water resources management
10	2010	FED/2010/022-060	10th EDF Technical Cooperation Facility	€ 6.000.000	€ 4.969.493	€ 4.969.493	SADC	Technical Cooperation	Technical cooperation
10	2012	FED/2012/023-223	Technical Cooperation Facility II	€ 6.000.000	€ 5.223.227	€ 3.895.249	SADC	Technical Cooperation	Technical cooperation
11	2015	FED/2015/038-732	EDF 11 Technical Cooperation Facility for the Indian Ocean Commission under Regional Indicative Programme	€ 910.000	€ -	€ -	IOC	Technical Cooperation	Technical cooperation

EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO	Priority area	Sub area
11	2015	FED/2015/038-707	EA-SA-IO Regional Technical Cooperation Facility 1 - 11th EDF - IGAD	€ 1.445.000	€ -	€ -	IGAD	Technical Cooperation	Technical cooperation
11	2015	FED/2015/038-751	EA-SA-IO Regional Technical Cooperation Facility 1 - 11th EDF - EAC	€ 1.535.000	€ -	€ -	EAC	Technical Cooperation	Technical cooperation
11	2015	FED/2015/038-706	TCF I - SADC component 11th EDF EA-SA-IO RIP	€ 1.625.000	€ -	€ -	SADC	Technical Cooperation	Technical cooperation
11	2015	FED/2015/038-698	TCF I - COMESA component 11th EDF EA-SA-IO RIP	€ 4.485.000	€ -	€ -	COMESA	Technical Cooperation	Technical cooperation
Total =				€ 895.485.482	€ 779.528.759	€ 620.869.184			

2.6 Selection of projects for in-depth study

Sub area	EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO
Peace, security and regional stability								
Electoral observation and conflict mediation	11	2014	FED/2014/033-788	EAC REGIONAL ELECTORAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME	€ 5.000.000	€ 2.144.325	€ 1.072.163	EAC
	10	2013		Contribution to African Peace Facility (APF)	€ 115.000.000	€ 115.000.000	€ 115.000.000	
Cross-border	10	2011	FED/2011/023-107	Start-up project to promote regional maritime security (MASE)	€ 2.000.000	€ 1.680.834	€ 1.362.885	IOC
	10	2013	FED/2013/024-098	Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE)	€ 37.499.260	€ 18.566.962	€ 8.931.220	IGAD
Regional Economic Integration								
DMRO institutional capacity	10	2009	FED/2009/021-716	RISP 2	€ 40.000.000	€ 40.000.000	€ 39.651.227	COMESA
	10	2012	FED/2012/023-213	SADC Secretariat Institutional Capacity-Development Programme (ICDP)	€ 12.000.000	€ 11.587.858	€ 7.570.776	SADC
	10	2012	FED/2012/023-847	SADC Project Preparation Development Facility	€ 12.000.000	€ 11.750.000	€ 1.989.000	SADC
	10	2013	FED/2013/023-899	Regional Integration Support Programme 3 (RISP3) - COMESA	€ 7.400.000	€ 7.400.000	€ 5.419.095	COMESA
	10	2013	FED/2013/024-615	Regional Integration Support Programme 3 (RISP3) - EAC	€ 4.450.000	€ 3.884.004	€ 2.085.668	EAC

Sub area	EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO
	10	2013	FED/2013/024-903	Regional Integration Support Programme 3 (RISP3) - IGAD	€ 2.000.000	€ 1.451.443	€ 1.233.789	IGAD
National Facilitation of trade/private sector development	10	2013	FED/2013/023-240	SADC Trade Related Facility	€ 32.000.000	€ 31.600.000	€ 4.651.422	SADC
Regional infrastructure (investments)	10	2012	FED/2006/017-948	Infrastructure: Kampala-Mbarara road-Rider Uganda	€ 25.000.000	€ 25.000.000	€ 25.000.000	COMESA
	10	2009	FED/2009/021-504	Northern Corridor Route Improvement Project: Mbarara - Ntungamo - Katuna	€ 5.000.000	€ 5.000.000	€ 0	COMESA
	10	2009	FED/2009/021697	Réhabilitation de la section Kigali-Gatuna du Corridor Nord et appui à l'entretien routier	€ 15.000.000	€ 15.000.000	€ 14.220.000	COMESA
	10	2010	FED/2010/021-767	Programme de Relance de la CEPGL (Burundi,RDC,Rwanda)	€ 30.000.000	€ 1.162.967	€ 1.162.967	CEPGL
	10	2011	FED/2011/022-874	Feasibility study and detailed design for Berbera-Togochale Road (Berbera- Addis Corridor)	€ 1.814.200	€ 1.814.200	€ 1.814.200	
	10	2013	FED/2013/024-121	One Stop Inspection Stations (OSIS)	€ 21.000.000	€ 0	€ 0	EAC
	10	2012	FED/2012/023-214	Regional Economic Integration Support programme (REIS)	€ 20.000.000	€ 19.600.000	€ 12.767.689	SADC
Strategy and regulatory framework	10	2013	FED/2013/024-191	Consolidation of Regional Integration Support Mechanism (RISM)	€ 33.410.000	€ 33.410.000	€ 2.628.547	COMESA

Sub area	EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO
Regional NRM								
Biodiversity, wildlife, forests	10	2012	FED/2012/023-700	Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region	€ 14.000.000	€ 13.233.030	€ 6.428.251	IGAD
	10	2012	FED/2012/022-995	Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States	€ 15.000.000	€ 9.509.000	€ 2.427.143	IOC
Climate change and resilience	10	2009	FED/2009/021-331	Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS)	€ 9.151.352	€ 9.139.845	€ 7.986.133	IOC
	10	2013	FED/2013/024-107	Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO	€ 7.500.000	€ 6.693.815	€ 3.128.201	IOC
Fisheries and aquaculture	10	2009	FED/2009/021-330	Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO	€ 19.958.795	€ 19.880.010	€ 18.136.885	IOC
	10	2013	FED/2013/024-111	Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)	€ 16.000.000	€ 12.912.372	€ 9.831.579	IOC
Non focal sectors								
Non focal sector	10	2009	FED/2009/021-403	IRCC 2	€ 19.998.502	€ 19.668.848	€ 16.544.427	COMESA

Sub area	EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO
Technical cooperation	10	2012	FED/2012/023-223	Technical Cooperation Facility II	€ 6.000.000	€ 5.223.227	€ 3.895.249	SADC
	11	2015	FED/2015/038-698	Technical Cooperation Facility I - COMESA component 11th EDF EA-SA-IO RIP	€ 4.485.000	€ 0	€ 0	COMESA
	11	2015	FED/2015/038-706	Technical Cooperation Facility I - SADC component 11th EDF EA-SA-IO RIP	€ 1.625.000	€ 0	€ 0	SADC
	11	2015	FED/2015/038-707	EA-SA-IO Regional Technical Cooperation Facility 1 - 11th EDF - IGAD	€ 1.445.000	€ 0	€ 0	IGAD
	11	2015	FED/2015/038-732	EDF 11 Technical Cooperation Facility for the Indian Ocean Commission under Regional Indicative Programme	€ 910.000	€ 0	€ 0	IOC
	11	2015	FED/2015/038-751	EA-SA-IO Regional Technical Cooperation Facility 1 - 11th EDF - EAC	€ 1.535.000	€ 0	€ 0	EAC

Annex 3: Methodology

The methodology for this evaluation followed **DG DEVCO's methodological guidelines** for regional and other complex evaluations, which is itself based on the OECD-DAC approach. It also took account of good practices developed by ADE for strategic evaluations and notably for regional-level evaluations.

As in most strategic evaluations for EuropeAid, a **theory-based non-experimental design** was applied for this evaluation¹, using an intervention logic as the basis for assessing the contribution of EU cooperation to expected results (this is close to theory of change analysis). The analytical framework is mainly based on 'contribution analysis' principles. The intervention logic analysis consolidates all the most relevant elements of EU cooperation in a single framework that links rationale to strategy, projects and results. An evaluation framework consisting of evaluation questions (EQs), judgement criteria and indicators structures data collection and verification. Analysis has then then performed on this basis, to assess to what extent and how EU cooperation contributed to attainment of objectives set. This allowed determining the extent to which judgment criteria were validated, and then provided synthesised answer to the EQ. The evaluation team specified the information and the quality of the evidence for each of them. From the answers to the EQs, the team derived a set of overall conclusions and recommendations.

3.1 Overview of the intervention logic

The EA-SA-IO programme as a whole has an **overarching intervention logic that brings together and is common to all priority areas** (figure 1). Each priority area also has its own more specific intervention logic which is outlined in subsequent sub-chapters. Evaluation questions are developed to test and examine the overall intervention logic. Where evaluation questions directly focus on specific priority areas, the relevant judgement criteria are placed on the area-specific intervention logic. The theory of change within each priority area is briefly outlined.²

Objectives and impact - The overarching objective of the EU support to regional cooperation in EA-SA-IO is "a stable, peaceful and prosperous region". The ultimate desired impact of the support is:

- A deepening market integration with more interconnected regional infrastructure, and higher-value-added production and trade

¹ Theory-based evaluation is an approach in which attention is paid to *theories* of policy makers, programme managers or other stakeholders, i.e. collections of assumptions, and hypotheses - empirically testable - that are logically linked together.

² The intervention logic and the theory of change are analytical approaches which support and complement each other. The intervention logic illustrates the chain of results from inputs to outputs to outcomes and impacts. The theory of change examines in greater detail the underlying assumptions made in moving across the intervention logic and in particular from outputs to outcomes and from outcomes to impacts. It identifies both assumptions that act as barriers to reaching outcomes and impacts, and drivers that act positively on the creation of outcomes and impacts.

- An improved democratic governance where conflicts are prevented and managed and security threats addressed
- Natural resources being maintained and providing a basis for sustainable and resilient livelihoods, economic growth and food security

The priority areas of the EDF 11 explicitly reflect the intention to contribute to impacts in these areas. The three areas also reflect the intentions of the EDF 10, although they are not as clearly delineated in that programme.

Outcomes to impacts – for the programme as a whole, a number of expected outcomes are common across all the priority areas and contribute to the impacts.

These are:

- Policy dialogue and policy frameworks – as outcomes of the support, realistic, relevant and credible policy frameworks are created that serve to direct and guide regional and national efforts towards the overall goals of a stable, peaceful and prosperous region.
- Institutional capacity – as outcomes of the support, the institutional capacity of the regional and national institutions is increased and used in practice in order to implement the improved policy frameworks
- Governance and enforcement – as outcomes of the support, more effective governance and enforcement mechanisms and practices are put to good use to ensure that the incentive environment for regional integration motivates all actors to strive towards a deepening market integration, greater democracy, peace and security and, sustainable management of natural resources.
- Regional cooperation – as outcomes of the support, improved regional cooperation leads to greater economic integration, peace and the early resolution of regional conflict, improved security and effective action on ensuring sustainable management of regional natural resources.

These outcomes, if achieved will make a significant contribution to the overarching goal of a stable, peaceful and prosperous region. There are a number of factors, largely external to the EU cooperation, that drive the attainment of the goal of a stable, peaceful and prosperous region and also factors that can act as barriers and which in effect are assumptions

Drivers of the intervention logic – there are a number of largely external driving forces that influence change and the speed of change. The presence of a critical mass of member governments that have conducive policies and priorities that favour regional integration is key. Advances in free trade agreements and in domesticating regional agreements are very much dependent on the policies and priorities of individual member states. Political settlements are a driving force for creating peace, security and stability as is the rule of law. The presence of international funding (outside of the EU) that complements the efforts of regional and national bodies is also a driving force.

Assumptions behind the intervention logic – the emergence of new or scaled up conflicts will set back the achievement of peace and security despite the best efforts of the cooperation programme. The influence of vested interests that profit from instability or low regional integration (e.g. smuggling, arms dealing) can also reduce the effectiveness or likelihood that outcomes, even if achieved, will lead to impacts. The effectiveness and incentives for global

governance of natural resource conventions and international treaties can also similarly affect the attainment of the expected impacts.


Intervention areas and outputs to outcomes – interventions and outputs created within the 3 priority areas are expected to lead to the intended outcomes. Regional economic integration is composed of a number of priority actions including development of operational capacity at DMRO level and support to cross border trade measures. An important aspect is the improvement of regional infrastructure that enhances connectivity. There are similar actions under peace and security and under natural resources management that are expected to lead to improved policies, capacity, governance and cooperation mechanisms. These outputs, when put into practice and used, should lead over time to the expected outcomes.

Actions of others within the EU family and instruments and within other donors and EU member states are also relevant and one of the focus points of the evaluation.

Thus it is important to recognise and isolate the role and actions of other development partners and instruments and strategies that are formally beyond the scope of the study but where it is necessary to look at the complementarity, consistency and coherences. As outlined in the TOR there is a need to take into account the overall engagement i.e. the EPAs, iEPAs, trade agreements, cooperation framework (Development cooperation instrument, EDF, IfS, ESMR, migration and asylum, food security, EEAS cooperation initiatives, interaction with ECHO, TRADE, EIB, and the financial instruments and channels relevant to the region.

We present on the following pages the hierarchy of objectives pursued by the EU in the form of intended effects diagrams, for its regional support overall and then per key area of intervention. We have hereby remained faithful to the main objectives expressed in EU strategy papers, notably the RSP/RIPs, while reconstructing the detailed expected causal chains and complementing them where necessary.

Figure 1: Overall Intervention logic of EU's cooperation with the EA-SA-IO (2008-2015)



Source: ADE

2 Sector / priority area EQs

3.2 Regional economic integration

The EU Strategy for the EA-SA-IO region (embodied in the three RIPs of the 10th and 11th EDFs) and the discussions with EU officials in Brussels provided sufficient information to prepare a Theory of Change for the Regional Economic Integration priority (see the intervention logic in Figures 1 and 2 in Annex 3 and the description below).³

Objectives and Intervention Priorities

As mentioned earlier, the overarching objective of EU support is a “stable, peaceful, prosperous EA-SA-IO Region”.

Economic integration featuring open and fair markets is considered one of the key success factors for achieving stability, peace and prosperity. The EU, in its 11th EDF RIP, noted that the rationale for its focus on regional integration was that expansion and harmonisation of markets facilitate economies of scale and lower transaction costs; and they stimulate investment, enhance competition and spur more inclusive economic and trade growth, thus accelerating poverty reduction.

The RSPs/RIPs for 2008-2013 and 2014-2020 spell out in detail how EU cooperation on regional economic integration can contribute toward the overarching goal of stability, peace and prosperity.

The charts identify an impact pathway with drivers and assumptions based on the objectives and desired results outlined in the EU Strategies. The first, second, third and fifth columns are derived from the RIPs. The fourth column (Intermediate Impacts) attempts to link the first three to the fifth in a causal path.

Inputs to Outputs

These columns refer to EDF 10 and 11 (inputs) and Intervention Priorities (outputs), respectively. The four specific objectives set out in the 11th EDF RIP for EA-SA-IO underpin the main intervention priorities, including most of those featured in the 10th EDFs for ESA-IO and SADC:

1. enhance DMROs' institutional capacity to advance regional integration, EPAs and resource mobilisation
2. deliver national-level trade-related assistance and private sector support (EPAs, market integration, implementation of trade commitments, business and trading environment)
3. connect regional infrastructure networks ('missing links', interconnectivity among transport, energy, telecommunications networks)
4. improve the strategic and regulatory frameworks for regional infrastructure networks.

The main outputs, all of which relate to the above four objectives, include:

- Capacity building and institutional strengthening at regional and national level
- Support for EPA and Tripartite negotiations and implementation

³ This write-up refers to both tables; please refer to both tables while reading it.

- Harmonisation of legal frameworks related to trade agreements (including regional integration agreements)
- Regional cooperation arrangements that will underpin the harmonisation and integration agenda
- Addressing regional and national obstacles to freer and fairer trade in goods and services
- Upgrading statistics systems
- Enhancing the business-, innovation, and investment-enabling environment
- Supporting private sector - especially SME - development
- Improving infrastructure connectivity, regulatory frameworks and resource mobilisation.

Outputs to Desired Results/Outcomes

The outcome column is divided into four main areas that encompass the specific objectives and intervention priorities:

1. Knowledge and capacity
2. Policy frameworks
3. Enforcement mechanisms/governance
4. Regional cooperation and integration.

The action agendas relating to the strategic objectives and intervention priorities of both EDF 10 and 11 have been based largely on the following principles and assumptions:

- Improved capacity and systems will lead to stronger institutional and trade performance (assumes beneficiary ownership and political will).
- Transparent, accessible laws, rules, practices, systems and data will reduce corruption and improve governance (assumes laws will be enforced and systems/data will be kept up to date).
- EPAs can be a tool to promote regional harmonisation of legal frameworks and good practices (assumes EPAs will be implemented and become more comprehensive over time)
- Well-connected regional infrastructure networks (transport, power, telecommunications, water, quality assurance facilities, etc) will facilitate market integration (assumes these will be maintained and kept up to date).

EQ 2 assessed the objectives, priorities and premises. EQ 3 looked at the infrastructure-related issues.

Outcomes to Impacts

Intermediate progress indicators: The analysis identifies an intermediate element between the desired outcomes and the longer-term desired impacts and provides examples of possible evidence that might indicate how the strategy implementation is progressing along the impact pathway:

- Institutional capacity to implement and manage regional integration reaches a sustainable level.

- A common regional and national understanding and application of trade and infrastructure policies and rules is attained.
- Effective, well-informed advocacy by business, civil society, and progressive implementation of policy frameworks and trade agreements is contributing to better business, trading and labour conditions, including for women and youth.
- Improved access to information, skills, technology, finance, quality infrastructure and networks is driving SME - and consequently job - expansion.
- More reliable, accessible regional infrastructure is facilitating trade development.
- Trade and investment are growing enough to motivate continuing pursuit of change.

Given the number of donors/international organisations involved in these areas, a key element in the impact pathway will be the extent to which the strategy has: (1) exploited the EU's comparative advantages (e.g. experience in regional economic integration and regional regulatory reform); and (2) bolstered other aid efforts that will play an important role in job creation, trade and economic development.

The **principles/assumptions** listed under 'desired outcomes' above relate directly to the intermediate impact analysis.

Drivers of progress toward the desired impacts: One key driver of progress toward the desired impacts would be that technical-level project interventions must demonstrate in a pragmatic fashion the trade- and investment-related benefits of harmonised, transparent and enforceable rules, regulations, practices and systems. Experience around the world shows that even where political tensions impede broader political cooperation, much can still be achieved at the technical and 'business-to-business' levels. This in turn can influence political will. The key assumptions are:

1. beneficiaries of such interventions would put to good use the good practices, systems, know-how and information they acquire; and
2. governments and institutions would implement their international obligations (e.g. WTO SPS and TBT Agreements, etc)
3. business people would combine forces to advocate for regional and subregional solutions to overcome impediments to regional trade and market development.

Another key driver would be that project activities improve transparency and systems to remove opportunities for bureaucratic discretion and other potentially corrupt practices. This combined with activities that promote common understanding on technical issues across the region could contribute to greater confidence in capabilities and systems. The assumption is that this, in turn, would reduce misunderstandings and mistrust, help change mindsets, and ease resistance to change. Eventually, if all went well, a more cooperative regional environment would emerge.

A third key driver would be the full implementation of trade agreements, because the (largely common) legal and regulatory frameworks and transparency obligations of the WTO, regional, EPA and Tripartite agreements can lead to a more transparent, predictable and fair business and trade environment. This in turn would underpin the other drivers of progress.

Finally, access to infrastructure financing and trustworthy partners and management services could lead to more reliable transport, logistics, energy, information and communication technologies, and quality assurance services, all of which are essential for sustainable trade and business development.

Overall desired impacts: As mentioned above, the overarching objective of the EU strategy is a “stable, peaceful, prosperous EA-SA-IO Region”. This would feature:

- professional, well-run, member-supported regional integration bodies
- stronger, deeper regional integration contributing to sustainable economic and trade development and ‘decent’ job creation
- diversified economies
- a competitive private sector
- progressive poverty alleviation.

The key **assumptions** here are that governments will implement and enforce their regional and international obligations and that the regional organisations (RECs/DMROs) will demonstrate their worth to their members, by delivering on their regional commitments and visions, thereby inspiring greater trust and facilitating the resource mobilisation necessary for sustainable services. It may be worth noting here that the Tripartite process may eventually lead to regional organisation consolidation (e.g. one or two RECs instead of three). However, that is a rather distant prospect at the moment.

Driving factors that will influence achievement of these long-term impacts include:

- rule of law
- good governance
- market access
- regional interconnectivity
- well-coordinated international and regional pressure and support
- access to resources (finance, skills, partners, technology, services).

This is not a long list, but if these can be achieved, then so can regional market integration and a good degree of stability, peace and stability.

Figure 2: IL Regional Economic Integration EU regional support for EASAI0 2008-2015 Excluding Infrastructure





Figure 3: IL Regional Economic Integration EU regional support for EASAI0 2008-2015 Infrastructure component



3.3 Peace, security and regional stability

Political cooperation (the democratic governance, human rights, peace and security nexus) is integral to regional support to EASAIIO under both the 10th and 11th EDF, and is a focal sector under both.

Inputs to outputs: In the 10th EDF, the regional support to political cooperation was mainly provided for EAC, IGAD, and IOC (support for and through SADC was provided separately). Under the 11th EDF, SADC is now also supported through the same envelope, and cross-regional programmes have been stepped up. Two are thematic (migration; maritime security); and one targets the Great Lakes, a subregion that sits between several DMROs. Funding for Electoral observation and conflict mediation has been reduced.

The funding centers around (i) elections and democratic governance; (ii) early warning, crisis prevention and mediation; (iii) terrorism and transnational crime; (iv) migration; and (v) maritime security. Combined with other EU support (e.g. the National Indicative Programmes; CSDP missions; support under the Africa-EU Strategy; the IcSP; the Pan-African Programme on Migration and Mobility; the thematic programme on migration and asylum; the Critical Maritime Routes Programme; Law Enforcement Capacity Building in East Africa...), the funding aims to

- Develop technical and managerial capacity for regional bodies and government institutions, in election observation, early warning, crisis prevention and mediation, counter-terrorism, crime-fighting, justice, NRM (Great Lakes), migration management and maritime safety
- Support to governance mechanisms and *fora*
- Promote the development and implementation of policies, strategies and plans related to elections, terrorism and cross-border/transnational crime
- Support outreach to and involvement of civil society for increased awareness
- Promote the protection of, and development projects for refugees, IDPs and other migrants
- Strengthen regional cooperation on election observation, peace and security

The interventions target both regional and national levels, acknowledging that national actors are key agents of change for regional political cooperation.

Outputs to outcomes: The improved capacity; governance mechanisms; policies, strategies and plans; outreach to and involvement of civil society; and migration-related projects that would result from the interventions above, are meant to lead, in turn, to (i) improved regional democratic governance, including credible and violence-free elections; (ii) Conflicts prevented and managed; (iii) Security issues addressed, such as terrorism, transnational crime and maritime security; (iv) Migration issues addressed. Furthermore, for SADC, an outcome is that the regional organisation is accountable to citizens of member countries.

The assumptions that would allow these outputs to translate into these outcomes are rather extensive and include:

- Political economy/vested interests in limited democratic governance and limited regional security (i.e. special interests and/or national interest take precedence over common interests) are factored in and addressed
- There is value-added in addressing governance, peace and stability from a regional perspective

Outcomes to impact: Improved democratic governance, conflicts prevented and managed, security threats addressed are meant to directly contribute to a stable, peaceful, and by extension prosperous, region.


The assumptions that would allow these outcomes to lead to “a stable, peaceful, and prosperous, region” include:

- Regional organisations and initiatives demonstrate their value-added and have influence over national behaviours and norms (through peer-review mechanisms, enforcement, incentives)
- Threats to peace and security originate from the region (i.e. are not driven primarily from outside the region)

At the same time, there are trends that could facilitate the advent of “a stable, peaceful, and prosperous, region”, such as:

- Region's citizens aware and involved in furthering democratic governance, peace and security
- Region's elites have a common vision of good governance and negotiate political settlements that are conducive to democratic governance, peace and security

Figure 4: Intervention logic of EU regional support for East/Southern Africa 2008-2015, with regards to democratic governance and peace/security



3.4 Regional natural resources management

NRM was not a focal sector under the 10th EDF and the intervention logic is thus outlined with more detail for the 11th EDF. Nonetheless, their logics are largely similar in terms of thematic focus, the gaps they seek to address, and the anticipated types of outcomes. There are however, significant differences in terms of the programme packages and implementation arrangements.


Inputs to outputs: The regional support is provided as project funding. In the 10th EDF, these were mainly provided for IOC and IGAD. Under the 11th EDF, the number of programmes with, and amount of funding for, IOC and IGAD has been reduced, but EAC is now also supported and the support to SADC has increased.

However, the most significant change is that three large cross-regional programmes have been introduced. The grants aim at improving technical and managerial capacities at both regional and national level; assisting with the development, harmonisation and implementation of NRM policies, enhancing monitoring and information systems, and piloting sustainable NRM practices. The interventions deliberately target both regional and national levels, acknowledging the regional cooperation is required to handle the main NRM challenges as there are often transboundary in nature, but that the implementation of regional commitments mainly take place at the national level.

Outputs to outcomes: The capacity and institutional enhancement outputs anticipated to emanate from EU's regional support will lead to an improved and more accessible knowledge base, which in turn will allow for: a) informed decision-making, b) engagement in improved and more sustainable and more productive NRM practices (e.g. in agriculture and fisheries), and c) enhanced stakeholder participation. Regional institutions and national government agencies will establish an improved policy framework for sustainable NRM, and be enabled to carry out planning, regulation and legal enforcement more effectively. Moreover, enhanced regional cooperation is envisaged, especially in terms of managing transboundary resources.

Outcomes to intermediary to impact: The improved capacities and frameworks are anticipated to translate into tangible improvements in environmental governance. The improved planning, regulation and enforcement combined with the improved skills in managing natural resources are expected to lead to reduced/halted environmental degradation and loss of biodiversity, improved agricultural and fisheries productivity, and enhanced resilience to the climate change and natural disasters. The hoped-for impact is that the natural resource base in the region is managed sustainably and provides the basis for resilient livelihoods, food security and economic growth thereby contributing to stable, peaceful and prosperous region. However, the achievement of the intermedia and the impact depends on some critical assumptions; including that vested interests and corruption can be effectively addressed by authorities, that the private sector is will to transform their business into more sustainable ones, and that the ongoing devolution of responsibilities is coupled with a commitment at the local level to environmental sustainability.

Figure 5: IL NRM EU regional support for EASAI0 2008-2015



3.5 Presentation of evaluation questions

The intervention logic provides a number of points where it is highly informative to develop evaluation questions in order to test whether how the assumptions implicit in the theory of change have worked out in practice. This critical analysis allows a reality check. The TOR also point to a number of key issues including: i) the relevance of the EU's cooperation strategies; ii) the results achieved; iii) the consistency between regional and national programming; iv) the value added by EU interventions and v) the coordination, complementary and coherence across EU/Member State/other development partner interventions. In general it is not possible to test for a counterfactual (i.e. what would have happened if the EU had not provided assistance). However, it was attempted through interview and through the survey to gain an insight into the opinion of key people on this topic.

Eight evaluation questions have been agreed at inception in discussion with the team, EU staff interviewed and the reference group:

EQ1 Strategic relevance	To what extent was the EA-SA-IO regional programme (EDF 10/11) - as a whole - well informed and strategic in its response to partner organisations'/ countries' needs and priorities and to the EU's own strategic priorities?
EQ2 Regional Economic integration	To what extent has EU regional-level support in Eastern and Southern Africa and IO since 2008 facilitated progress towards regional market development/integration?
EQ3 Regional infrastructure	To what extent has regional-level EU support since 2008 contributed to improved regional trade-related infrastructure connectivity in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean states?
EQ4 Regional peace, security and stability	To what extent has regional-level EU support contributed to improved democratic governance, peace and security, and better management of migration – thereby contributing to a stable and peaceful region?
EQ5 Regional natural resources management	Environmental governance – has regional-level EU support contributed to improved regional cooperation and harmonisation among Indian Ocean island states, and thereby led to more sustainable management of the region's biodiversity and fisheries?
EQ6 Coordination, complementary and coherence.	To what extent have EU interventions been complementary with those of Member States, coordinated with those of the other development partners, and coherent both with other EU actions in the region and with EU policies beyond development cooperation?
EQ7 Efficiency	To what extent has the EU contributed to leveraging DMRO member states' funding and to improving DMROs' operational management?
EQ8 Regional integration prospects	To what extent has the EU support enabled the DMROs and their partners at national level to better realise regional policy objectives?

EQ 1 strategic relevance. This question looks at the programmes as a whole and seeks to determine the extent to which the strategic 'idea' and approach underpinning the EA-SA-IO RSPs/RIPs were well conceived and relevant to the target groups. This analysis is important because it shed light on lessons learned that may be useful in devising strategic choices for the future.

EQ 2 to 5 relate to the three priority areas. Regional economic integration is dealt with through two questions; one concerning economic integration (EQ 2) and another one focussed on infrastructure (EQ 3). Two further evaluation questions address the other priority areas of peace, security and regional stability (EQ 4) and regional natural resources management (EQ5). These priority area evaluation questions aimed at identifying the results achieved and effectiveness of the cooperation within a selected sample of actions. In a general sense they look at improvements in the policy frameworks, governance, regional cooperation practice and institutional capacity. Where relevant for example in infrastructure and natural resources, issues of sustainability were also examined.

EQ 6 coordination, complementarity and coherence – this questions looks whether EU interventions have been complementary with those of Member States, and coordinated with those of the other development partners. It also examines how coherent the programmes have been with both other EU actions in the region (including at the national, continental and global/thematic levels) and EU policies such as trade.

EQ 7 efficiency – this question looks at change in the leverage of external and internal funding, the proportion of funds spent on core tasks as well evidence for increases in financial and administrative efficiency.

EQ 8 regional integration prospects – this question is forward looking and attempts to look for evidence of the new directions introduced by the EDF 11 have an effect on : i) Policy – whether EU policy dialogue has added value in opening a debate on and clarifying the strategic objectives of the DMROs; ii) Ownership –whether the ownership and commitment to the regional integration objectives and structures by member states is increasing – and how the EU has contributed: iii) Capacity – Whether institutional strengthening has led to greater operational capacity to programme and implement projects – and how the EU has contributed: iv) Modalities – whether the new implementation modalities appear to be proving more efficient and whether the new procedures have clarified the roles of DMROs, national implementing partners and the EUDs. The question examines in part the efficiency of the programmes.

A summary of the evaluation questions and judgement criteria are given below.

EQ 1: To what extent was the EA-SA-IO regional programme (EDF 10/11) - as a whole - well informed and strategic in its response to partner organisations'/ countries' needs and priorities and to the EU's own strategic priorities?

JC1.1 "The EU EA-SA-IO strategies/programmes were based on relevant, solid and credible evidence and assumptions regarding the regions' needs and priorities"

JC 1.2 "The regional strategies/programmes were aligned with European Union's interests, policies and strategies"

JC 1.3 Efforts and resources have been targeted at where they are needed the most and could have the greatest impact in terms of achieving the desired results: greater regional integration and cooperation, and stronger regional structures

EQ 2: To what extent has EU regional-level support in Eastern and Southern Africa and IO since 2008 facilitated progress towards regional market development/integration?

JC 2.1 "EU regional support has improved the capacity of the DMROs to drive horizontal and vertical harmonisation of legal and institutional frameworks/mechanisms necessary to achieve regional and global trade-related integration goals"

JC 2.2 "EU support has made a measurable contribution to growth and diversification of regional flows of goods and services since 2008"

JC 2.3 "EU regional support has contributed to SME competitiveness"

EQ 3: To what extent has regional-level EU support since 2008 contributed to improved regional trade-related infrastructure connectivity in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean states?

JC 3.1 "EU regional support has contributed to the design of feasible trade-related regional infrastructure projects aligned with continental and regional (EA-SA-IO) infrastructure development priorities"

JC 3.2 "EU regional support for trade-related infrastructure has strengthened regional markets for trade in EASAIIO"

JC 3.3 "EU support ensured that sufficient mechanisms/structures were put in place to ensure sustainability"

EQ 4: To what extent has regional-level EU support contributed to improved democratic governance, peace and security, and better management of migration – thereby contributing to a stable and peaceful region?

JC 4.1 "EU regional cooperation contributed to enhancing democratic governance in the region"

JC 4.2 "EU regional cooperation contributed to improved peace and security"

<p>EQ 5: Environmental governance – has regional-level EU support contributed to improved regional cooperation and harmonisation among Indian Ocean island states, and thereby led to more sustainable management of the region's biodiversity and fisheries?</p>	<p>JC 5.1 “EU support contributed to the establishment of a regional policy and institutional framework, which is conducive for regional cooperation and management of regional biodiversity and fish resources”</p>
<p>EQ 6 : To what extent have EU interventions been complementary with those of Member States, coordinated with those of the other development partners, and coherent both with other EU actions in the region and with EU policies beyond development cooperation?</p>	<p>JC 5.2 “EU support contributed to enhancing the knowledge base on biodiversity management and utilisation”</p>
<p>EQ 7: To what extent has the EU contributed to leveraging DMRO member states' funding and to improving DMROs' operational management?</p>	<p>JC 5.3 “EU support contributed to enhancing biodiversity governance (management, regulation, and enforcement)”</p>
<p>EQ 8: To what extent has the EU support enabled the DMROs and their partners at national level to better realise regional policy objectives?</p>	<p>JC 5.4 “EU support ensured that sufficient mechanisms/structures were put in place to ensure sustainability”</p>
<p>EQ 6 : To what extent have EU interventions been complementary with those of Member States, coordinated with those of the other development partners, and coherent both with other EU actions in the region and with EU policies beyond development cooperation?</p>	<p>JC 6.1 The EU's regional co-operation strategies (2008-2015) were complementary to EU Member States' interventions and coordinated with other development partners</p>
<p>EQ 7: To what extent has the EU contributed to leveraging DMRO member states' funding and to improving DMROs' operational management?</p>	<p>JC 6.2 The EU's regional co-operation was coherent with other European Union policies, strategies and programmes impacting the EA-SA-IO region</p>
<p>EQ 8: To what extent has the EU support enabled the DMROs and their partners at national level to better realise regional policy objectives?</p>	<p>JC 7.1 The leverage of EU funds and the financial commitment by member states is increasing</p>
<p>EQ 8: To what extent has the EU support enabled the DMROs and their partners at national level to better realise regional policy objectives?</p>	<p>JC 7.2 EU support has contributed to the DMROs having greater operational capacity and increasing in efficiency</p>
<p>EQ 8: To what extent has the EU support enabled the DMROs and their partners at national level to better realise regional policy objectives?</p>	<p>JC 7.3 EU support has contributed to the DMROs having improving value for money and procurement practices</p>
<p>EQ 8: To what extent has the EU support enabled the DMROs and their partners at national level to better realise regional policy objectives?</p>	<p>JC 7.4 EU cooperation support has been efficient in its delivery</p>
<p>EQ 8: To what extent has the EU support enabled the DMROs and their partners at national level to better realise regional policy objectives?</p>	<p>JC 8.1 The policy dialogue with the EU is leading to clearer set of strategic regional objectives for the DMROs</p>
<p>EQ 8: To what extent has the EU support enabled the DMROs and their partners at national level to better realise regional policy objectives?</p>	<p>JC 8.2 Ownership by member countries of the DMROs and their objectives is increasing</p>
<p>EQ 8: To what extent has the EU support enabled the DMROs and their partners at national level to better realise regional policy objectives?</p>	<p>JC 8.3 The new implementation modalities are having their intended effects</p>


3.6 Evaluation tools

The team relied on a set of tools to collect and analyse data for the different levels of analysis. The combination of these tools enables the team to collect all the required information at the level of the indicators, and to triangulate the information from different sources with a

view to validate (or invalidate) the judgment criteria. The context analysis and literature review provide information from a general, both internal and external, perspective. The inventory and the survey provide data and information from an overall portfolio perspective. The survey is used to test the question of what would have happened without EU support – at least at the level of personal/expert opinion. If there is a strong consensus then this might provide additional insight – but the results will need to be viewed with care.

In-depth desk study and site visits provide specific information at the level of individual operations funded. The combination of these tools, sources, and levels of analysis will contribute to the robustness of the conclusions of the evaluation.

Figure 6: Evaluation tools



3.6.1 Selection of projects for in-depth study

The answers to the EQs is based on overall analysis (general documentary study, portfolio analysis, interviews, etc.) as well as on in-depth analysis of a selection of interventions. This in-depth study allows the team to better understand the cooperation through concrete cases, and to provide clear examples to enrich and illustrate answers to the evaluation questions.

The selection of projects aimed at covering most important projects in the key sectors to be examined, and at covering a variety of parameters addressed in this evaluation:

- **Sectors and sub-sectors:** The selection covers a large share of each sector to be evaluated, as shown in the small table below.
- **DMROs:** The selection covers all five DMROs as well as the CEPGL;

- **Sizes:** The selection covers a wide array of sizes, from large (193.5 €m) to relatively small (0.7 €m) projects;
- **Period:** The selection covers contracts spread on the entire evaluation period 2008-2015.
- **Closed and on-going projects:** The selection includes closed projects, for which results should be observable. It also includes on-going or recent projects, for which we may examine preliminary results or the relevance of the design according to latest practices.

The following table shows that the list of 31 projects mirrors as much as possible the overall set of projects.

Table 1: Comparison of selected projects vs. global number of projects

Criteria	Items	Selection projects	31 Total inventory
Focal sector	Regional Economic Integration	49%	48%
	Peace, security and regional stability	30%	29%
	Regional Natural Resources Management	15%	20%
	Technical Cooperation	2%	3%
Subsector	Regional Economic Integration		
	Regional infrastructure (investments)	37%	39%
	DMRO institutional capacity	30%	34%
	Strategy and regulatory framework	20%	17%
	National Facilitation of trade/private sector development	12%	10%
	Peace, security and regional stability		
	Electoral observation and conflict mediation	75%	64%
	Cross border	25%	21%
	DMRO institutional capacity	0%	12%
	Democratisation, Good Governance, Rule of Law, Human Rights	0%	3%
	Regional Natural Resources Management		
	Fisheries and aquaculture	44%	28%
	Biodiversity, wildlife, forests	36%	23%
	Climate change and resilience	20%	13%
	Renewable energy	0%	12%
	Water resources management	0%	11%
	Environmental monitoring	0%	8%
	Agriculture and livestock, food and nutrition security	0%	6%
Technical Cooperation			

Year	2009	20%	15%
	2010	6%	6%
	2011	1%	4%
	2012	19%	41%
	2013	52%	32%
	2014	1%	1%
	2015	1%	2%
Regional Organisation	COMESA	27%	17%
	No DMRO	22%	39%
	SADC	16%	13%
	IOC	13%	12%
	IGAD	10%	9%
	EAC	6%	6%
	CEPGL	6%	3%

The list of projects can be found in the table below.

Table 2: Selection of projects for in-depth study

Sub area	EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO
Peace, security and regional stability								
Electoral observation and conflict mediation	11	2014	FED/2014/033-788	EAC REGIONAL ELECTORAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME	€ 5.000.000	€ 2.144.325	€ 1.072.163	EAC
	10	2013		Contribution to African Peace Facility (APF)	€ 115.000.000	€ 115.000.000	€ 115.000.000	
Cross-border	10	2011	FED/2011/023-107	Start-up project to promote regional maritime security (MASE)	€ 2.000.000	€ 1.680.834	€ 1.362.885	IOC
	10	2013	FED/2013/024-098	Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE)	€ 37.499.260	€ 18.566.962	€ 8.931.220	IGAD
Regional Economic Integration								
DMRO institutional capacity	10	2009	FED/2009/021-716	RISP 2	€ 40.000.000	€ 40.000.000	€ 39.651.227	COMESA
	10	2012	FED/2012/023-213	SADC Secretariat Institutional Capacity-Development Programme (ICDP)	€ 12.000.000	€ 11.587.858	€ 7.570.776	SADC
	10	2012	FED/2012/023-847	SADC Project Preparation Development Facility	€ 12.000.000	€ 11.750.000	€ 1.989.000	SADC
	10	2013	FED/2013/023-899	Regional Integration Support Programme 3 (RISP3) - COMESA	€ 7.400.000	€ 7.400.000	€ 5.419.095	COMESA
	10	2013	FED/2013/024-615	Regional Integration Support Programme 3 (RISP3) - EAC	€ 4.450.000	€ 3.884.004	€ 2.085.668	EAC
	10	2013	FED/2013/024-903	Regional Integration Support Programme 3 (RISP3) - IGAD	€ 2.000.000	€ 1.451.443	€ 1.233.789	IGAD

Sub area	EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO
National Facilitation of trade/private sector development	10	2013	FED/2013/023-240	SADC Trade Related Facility	€ 32.000.000	€ 31.600.000	€ 4.651.422	SADC
Regional infrastructure (investments)	10	2012	FED/2006/017-948	Infrastructure: Kampala-Mbarara road-Rider Uganda	€ 25.000.000	€ 25.000.000	€ 25.000.000	COMESA
	10	2009	FED/2009/021-504	Northern Corridor Route Improvement Project: Mbarara - Ntungamo - Katuna	€ 5.000.000	€ 5.000.000	€ 0	COMESA
	10	2009	FED/2009/021697	Réhabilitation de la section Kigali-Gatuna du Corridor Nord et appui à l'entretien routier	€ 15.000.000	€ 15.000.000	€ 14.220.000	COMESA
	10	2010	FED/2010/021-767	Programme de Relance de la CEPGL (Burundi,RDC,Rwanda)	€ 30.000.000	€ 1.162.967	€ 1.162.967	CEPGL
	10	2011	FED/2011/022-874	Feasibility study and detailed design for Berbera-Togochale Road (Berbera-Addis Corridor)	€ 1.814.200	€ 1.814.200	€ 1.814.200	
	10	2013	FED/2013/024-121	One Stop Inspection Stations (OSIS)	€ 21.000.000	€ 0	€ 0	EAC
Strategy and regulatory framework	10	2012	FED/2012/023-214	Regional Economic Integration Support programme (REIS)	€ 20.000.000	€ 19.600.000	€ 12.767.689	SADC
	10	2013	FED/2013/024-191	Consolidation of Regional Integration Support Mechanism (RISM)	€ 33.410.000	€ 33.410.000	€ 2.628.547	COMESA
Regional NRM								

Sub area	EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO
Biodiversity, wildlife, forests	10	2012	FED/2012/023-700	Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region	€ 14.000.000	€ 13.233.030	€ 6.428.251	IGAD
	10	2012	FED/2012/022-995	Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States	€ 15.000.000	€ 9.509.000	€ 2.427.143	IOC
Climate change and resilience	10	2009	FED/2009/021-331	Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS)	€ 9.151.352	€ 9.139.845	€ 7.986.133	IOC
	10	2013	FED/2013/024-107	Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO	€ 7.500.000	€ 6.693.815	€ 3.128.201	IOC
Fisheries and aquaculture	10	2009	FED/2009/021-330	Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO	€ 19.958.795	€ 19.880.010	€ 18.136.885	IOC
	10	2013	FED/2013/024-111	Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)	€ 16.000.000	€ 12.912.372	€ 9.831.579	IOC
Non focal sectors								
Non focal sector	10	2009	FED/2009/021-403	IRCC 2	€ 19.998.502	€ 19.668.848	€ 16.544.427	COMESA
Technical cooperation	10	2012	FED/2012/023-223	Technical Cooperation Facility II	€ 6.000.000	€ 5.223.227	€ 3.895.249	SADC
	11	2015	FED/2015/038-698	Technical Cooperation Facility I - COMESA	€ 4.485.000	€ 0	€ 0	COMESA

Sub area	EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO
				component 11th EDF EA-SA-IO RIP				
	11	2015	FED/2015/038-706	Technical Cooperation Facility I - SADC component 11th EDF EA-SA-IO RIP	€ 1.625.000	€ 0	€ 0	SADC
	11	2015	FED/2015/038-707	EA-SA-IO Regional Technical Cooperation Facility 1 - 11th EDF - IGAD	€ 1.445.000	€ 0	€ 0	IGAD
	11	2015	FED/2015/038-732	EDF 11 Technical Cooperation Facility for the Indian Ocean Commission under Regional Indicative Programme	€ 910.000	€ 0	€ 0	IOC
	11	2015	FED/2015/038-751	EA-SA-IO Regional Technical Cooperation Facility 1 - 11th EDF - EAC	€ 1.535.000	€ 0	€ 0	EAC

3.6.2 Survey

The survey aims at quantifying perceptions from relevant stakeholders, for the period 2008-2015. The target participant groups are:

- The EU regional Delegations;
- The EU Delegations (including those visited during the field phase);
- The DMROs.

The survey was launched on the 24th of January. It was distributed by e-mail, through an on-line survey tool. The final results were analysed after the field phase.

The questionnaire is articulated around the 8 EQs (see Annex 6). Each of them served as a basis for a specific number of sub-questions.

Another survey targeted the CSOs, implementers and private sector. This survey has been launched after the field missions, once the targeted persons were identified.

The team has designed the questionnaire so that it doesn't require more than 20 minutes of respondents' time. It includes mostly closed questions, although also leaving space for open responses for respondents willing to clarify their response.

The survey questionnaire can be found in Annex 5.

3.6.3 Field visits


As per the ToR, the field mission included multi-country visits covering the EA-SA-IO region. The evaluation team visited the following ten countries, which cover the five countries with DMROs headquarters.

- Botswana (DMRO HQ - SADC)
- Djibouti (DMRO HQ -IGAD)
- Mauritius (DMRO HQ- IOC)
- Tanzania (DMRO HQ- EAC)
- Zambia (DMRO HQ -COMESA)
- Ethiopia (AU, IGAD) (selected as most of the DMRO activities are in Ethiopia and Ethiopia hosts important African Union and other international organisations)
- Kenya (EAC) (selected as it is one of the leading countries within the EAC and hosts a number of regional organisations)
- Rwanda (COMESA) (selected as it will allow interaction with the CEPGL on the peace and security priority area)
- Zimbabwe (SADC) (to cover SADC and COMESA national committees involvement)
- Madagascar (IOC) (suggested by the RG)

In each case, the DMRO headquarters were visited by two members and a further country within the sub-region was visited by one or two members depending on the logistical arrangements, the issues and nature of activities. The key DMROs for regional economic

integration are COMESA, EAC and SADC. The ones for peace and security are IGAD, EAC and COMESA. Finally, the key DMROs for NRM are IOC and IGAD.

Figure 7: Field visits conducted



Annex 4: Answers to the EQs

This annex presents the information collected for each EQ at JC and indicator level.

EQ 1 Strategic Relevance

To what extent was the EA-SA-IO regional programme (EDF 10/11) - as a whole - well informed and strategic in its response to partner organisations'/ countries' needs and priorities and to the EU's own strategic priorities?

Rationale & Coverage of the EQ

Rationale: The objective of this evaluation question is to determine the extent to which the strategic 'idea' and approach underpinning the EA-SA-IO RSPs/RIPs were well conceived. This analysis is important because it will shed light on lessons learned that may be useful in devising strategic choices for the future.

Coverage and focus: EQ 1 (with input from the other EQs) covers EDF 10 and 11, and explores such important issues as:

- Validity of the key assumptions underpinning the EU Strategy
- Influence of these assumptions on the choices the EU has made
- How realistic were/are the main objectives
- Extent to which the choices addressed key impact drivers
- Response of strategy and approach to previous reviews and the evolving context
- Effectiveness of the strategy in achieving the stated objectives of greater regional integration and cooperation, and stronger regional structures.

Judgement Criteria:

- 1.1 The EU EA-SA-IO strategies/programmes were based on relevant, solid and credible evidence and assumptions regarding the regions' needs and priorities
- 1.2 The regional strategies/programmes were aligned with European Union's interests, policies and strategies.
- 1.3 Efforts and resources have been targeted at where they are needed the most and could have the greatest impact in terms of achieving the desired results: greater regional integration and cooperation, and stronger regional structures.

JC1.1 The EU EA-SA-IO Strategies/Programmes were based on relevant, solid and credible evidence and assumptions regarding the regions' needs and priorities.		
Summary response	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
I- 1.1.1 EU EA-SA-IO policies and strategies reflected a <i>realistic</i>, well-documented analysis of continental, regional and national strategies and priorities (in 2008 and 2015 when EDF 10 and EDF 11 were launched).		
<p>The analyses/strategies touched on continental and regional strategies and priorities, but did not analyse in any depth how the EDFs related to them in a practical sense (ie, in terms of achieving mutual goals). A weakness of the EDFs is that they did not delve deeply enough into the national connections (including political will or national champions) or the interests and roles of the end users (mostly business). Thus the 'impact chain' analysis was unfinished.</p> <p>While the regional support aligned with documented DMRO plans and priorities, the documentation provided to the evaluators did not yield rigorous analysis of DMRO capacity to absorb and implement (e.g., no recent in-depth organisational audits). In addition, the strategies could have tested more thoroughly the linkages between the stated DMRO priorities and the member states' actual priorities and needs. Indeed, the strategies did not appear to challenge the programmes' underlying assumptions, some of which - particularly in the case of EDF 10 - proved to be on weak foundations and therefore affected overall effectiveness - e.g. regional and national desire for EPAs, national desire for customs unions, national commitment/capacity to implement regional deals, DMRO capacity to absorb funding and deliver programmes, DMRO and national capacity to deliver national uptake of regional policies and agreements, etc. (JC 1.1)</p> <p>"EDF 10 was very broad. EDF 11 was to be much more focused, and it does focus very much on economic integration for the COMESA region. However, that too is broad and even a bit too macro focused given the stronger focus on countries and private sectors. There were consultations on needs, but were there real needs assessments for institutional capacity building?" "EDF 11 does allow us to focus more on the real constraints such as nontariff barriers, trade facilitation, border issues, etc." (EUD, COMESA)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Joint EU-Africa Strategy - EA-IO EDF 10 RSP/RIP - SADC EDF 10 RSP/RIP - EDF 11 RSP/RIP - ECDPM - PCD Guidelines - EDF 10 Programming Guidelines - https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/programming-guidelines-10th-edf-national-and-regional-programming-2009_en_1.pdf - RSPs, RIPs - Cotonou Partnership and ACP-EPA documents - http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/economic-partnerships/Economic-partnerships - DG Trade interviews. - DMRO/REC regional strategies and plans, annual reports - EAC, Comesa websites; UNECA website, reports - TCF 1 - European Court of Auditors global report on EU TA - Court of Auditors reports on EA-IO, 2007, 2010?? <p>Action Fiche IRCC undated Title/Number IRCC SUPPORT CRIS code : 2009/021-403</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EA-IO EDF 10 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EuropeAid Cooperation Office evaluations of ESA-IO EDFs 8 and 9 (1996-2007) - Midterm Review of EDF 10 (2008-2011) EDF 11 <i>EDF 10, 11</i> https://www.transparency.org - Survey results - Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia - Field interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA) - Field interviews with regional/continental organisations in Ethiopia (e.g. AU, UNECA), Kenya (e.g. AU-IBAR, Aga Khan University), Tanzania (e.g. AFRITAC), - Field interviews with business organisations, donors, project implementers in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia - Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade) 	
I-1.1.2 EU regional strategies presented a sound baseline analysis of evolving problems, needs, expectations and capacities.		
<p>The broad developmental challenges faced by the EA-SA-IO region are similar to those faced by Africa as a whole. They include undiversified markets with low value addition, overdependence on raw material exports, low levels of effective trade and economic integration, lack of infrastructure, regional food insecurity, conflicts and political instability. However, the various countries and sub-regions differ significantly in terms of their exposure to these challenges. Each EA-SA-IO region is at a different stage in the regional integration process, and diversely affected by development, democratic governance, peace, security and migration challenges. Each DMRO and its member states operate in a dynamic socio-</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EDF 10 and 11 programme documents, decisions, project fiches, action documents, progress reports - Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) reports - Presentation by Alex Nakajjo, DG Development and Relations with ACP States, May 2008, Kampala 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

<p>economic environment, with rapid changes occurring in terms of politics, globalisation effects and the influence of new technologies.</p> <p>The needs assessment carried out by RPTF in 2008 appears to have been well documented and focused on the right things (at least in terms of the trade integration priorities). The recommendations were incorporated into the EDF programmes, especially in the SADC EDF. However, the RSPs provided little further analysis of needs, problems, expectations or capacities (ESA-IO EDF 10 mentioned briefly on page 173 that capacity issues presented the main risk for implementation).</p> <p>The RSPs and RIPs and the logframes aimed for many 'improvements' without providing concrete baselines from which the improvements could be measured.</p> <p>EDF 10, the EDF midterm reviews and the subsequent EDF 11 did not explore regional or national 'ownership' and capacity issues in sufficient depth. Underplaying these critical success factors affects programme effectiveness and efficiency.</p> <p>The fact that EDF 10 did not 'perform' (according to DEVCO interviews) indicates <u>weaknesses in targeting, capacity assessment and the assumptions</u> underpinning the programme.</p> <p>The main findings of the EDF 10 midterm review, summarised in the EDF 11 RIP, bear this out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The focal areas were too broad, and actions and priorities were not clearly identified. ▪ Assistance targeted mainly DMRO Secretariats, which had limited technical capacity. ▪ Implementation modalities were complicated and added a burden in terms of the preparation and implementation of regional programmes. <p>A number of documents from EUDs - including in 2016 - referred to the <u>need to improve national and regional statistics and data collection</u> to facilitate monitoring of, for example, the <u>transposition of regional-to-national commitments</u>. This <u>vital indicator</u>, therefore, appears to remain a major challenge. National transposition of regional policies and commitments is an important aim of the EU strategy, and a critical factor in regional integration.</p> <p>Field interviews and programming documentation secured from EUDs and DMROs showed a good understanding of the issues and improvements in results-oriented programming in some cases (e.g. the EDF 11 Trade Facilitation Action Document for COMESA). (See Box 2.2 in EQ 2.)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Survey results - Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia - Field interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA) - Field interviews with regional/continental organisations in Ethiopia (e.g. AU, UNECA), Kenya (e.g. AU-IBAR, Aga Khan University), Tanzania (e.g. AFRITAC), - Field interviews with business organisations, donors, project implementers in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia - Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade) 	
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I-1.1.3 DMROs and partner country representatives were involved in the analysis and design, and believe the programmes addressed their pressing priorities.		
<p>Various documents state that the EDFs were preceded by exhaustive consultations, as per EDF programming guidelines, and that DMROs signed off on them. Documents from DMROs attest to their role in formulating RISP, RISM, TRF, REIS and other instruments for delivering the programmes. However, other sources point to 'supply-driven' programming (eg, European Court of Auditors). Reports on EDF 10 show that DMROs later took forward certain areas more in line with their priorities (and possibly capabilities?), leaving others on the back burner, including some EU priorities.</p> <p>The EDF Programming Guidelines called for broad consultations in the preparation for EDF 10 and 11 programming. The RPTF conducted numerous seminars and consultative activities to document needs and priorities.</p> <p>ECDPM's 2015 Analysis of EDF 11 Programming stated: "In many countries, initial programming proposals based on in-country consultations were superseded by HQ choices. Although the 11th EDF is closely aligned with national development plans, there is evidence that a top-down approach to programming has led to a significant erosion of key aid and development effectiveness principles, in particular country ownership.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) PPT presentations - EDF 10 Programming Guidelines - https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/programming-guidelines-10th-edf-national-and-regional-programming-2009_en_1.pdf <p>http://ecdpm.org/publications/programming-agenda-change-11-european-development-fund-acp-eu/</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Survey results - Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia - Field interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA) - Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade) 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
I-1.1.4 Robust risk assessments and risk-mitigation/management strategies underpinned EU regional strategies, programmes and action plans		
<p>Risk assessments highlighted key issues, but rarely challenged the assumptions.</p> <p>EA-IO EDF 10: paras 169-173: Risks related to political will, especially on regional integration; looming shocks; conflicts; capacity to implement the programme. Assumptions all optimistic.</p> <p>"At the level of implementation, the main risk relates to the available capacities (in-country, at RO and EC service level) to absorb the resources made available through the regional programme, and to achieve the expected results in a timely fashion. This risk can be managed within the EDF10 RSP/RIP itself, through significant efforts to develop managerial, financial and technical capacities in the different ROs, allowing them to efficiently assume further implementation responsibilities, as well as by reinforcing the intra-</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EDF 10 and 11 RIPs (or equivalent staff papers), programme documents, decisions, project fiches, action documents, progress reports 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

<p>regional coordination structures, in particular, by strengthening the institutional and technical capacities of the IRCC to play the extended role.”</p> <p>EDF 11 took steps to address these issues. However, as explained in the text, the assumption that the risk can be managed as suggested is not realistic. Lessons learned should be applied.</p>		
<p>JC 1.2 The regional strategies/programmes were aligned with European Union's interests, policies and strategies.</p>		
<p>Summary response</p>	<p>Sources of information</p>	<p>Quality of evidence</p>
<p>I-1.2.1 Regional strategies/programmes mirrored evolving EU regional and global strategic interests.</p>		
<p>Studies indicate that globalisation and regionalisation dynamics are the primary force driving EU external action. With Africa on its doorstep, the EU has a clear interest in seeing a stable continent providing growth and jobs. The assumption is that this will reduce conflict, contribute to global and market stability and enhance trading and investment opportunities.</p> <p>In an interview, an EEAS officer reflected on strategic interests: “We have ‘assumed’ - since the 90s - that we are the key donor partner for regional integration in Africa. Doctrine for this exists since 90s. We haven’t really studied in depth the best way/processes/methods to <i>advance our strategic interests</i> most effectively: eg, bilaterally, regionally, and continentally.”</p> <p>The RSPs/EDF regional strategies and programmes <u>do not</u> explore in depth how to advance the EU’s strategic interests, perhaps for pragmatic reasons. Nonetheless, the assumption above is implicit in the thinking and the strategies. The programmes do reflect the EU’s broader strategic interests, including a stronger Pan-African focus. One example is the shift to a strong emphasis on regional infrastructure in line with continental and regional initiatives from the African Union’s Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa. Another is EDF 11’s linking part of the trade facilitation support to the implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, which the EU and its Member States strongly support politically and economically (they are the main donors into the WTO Trade Facilitation Facility).</p> <p>That said, field interviews supported the EEAS quote above, that EU strategic interests for the EA-SA-IO region needed to be reviewed as part of future programming, to take into consideration the evolving EU membership, ACP relations, EPA issues, etc.</p> <p>The ongoing review and evolution of the <u>Cotonou Partnership</u> offers opportunity to rethink ways and means of engagement in the region. Perhaps - eventually - a comprehensive EU agreement with the Tripartite FTA, and even the Continental FTA would be easier - and more efficient - than individual EPAs</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Joint EU-Africa Strategy - Joint EU-Africa Strategy - Cotonou/ACP - EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, Nov 2011 - Interviews with EU officials in Brussels (EEAS, DG Trade, DEVCO D) - Survey results - Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia - Field interviews with business organisations, donors, project implementers in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia 	<p>Satisfactory.</p>

<p>with the various RECs. These issues are already being discussed at national and regional levels by trade ministries, EUDs and DMRO Trade Departments.</p> <p>Apart from global interests (eg, implementation of WTO and other international treaties and conventions) and continental interests, EU strategic interests include EU investor interests related to the business and investment environment, corruption, governance, etc. The continental-regional-national - and EPA - links in these issues (and programmes) can be possibly most efficiently addressed through better coordination with donors and international organisations at national and regional level.</p>		
<p>I-1.2.2 Regional strategies and programmes were consistent with EC policies.</p>		
<p>EDF 11 regional programming reflects the <i>Agenda for Change</i> 2011 objectives and implicit instructions regarding tighter focus on EU policy priorities (human rights, democracy, good governance; inclusive, sustainable growth, including regional integration), innovative financial instruments (eg, blending), joint EU-Member State response strategies with sectoral division of labour, focus on countries where the aid can have the greatest impact, etc.</p> <p>See I-1.3.3 for aid coordination and EU policy coherence.</p> <p><u><i>Agenda for Change, 2011:</i></u> “While the Commission implements 20 % of the collective EU aid effort, it also acts as coordinator, convener and policy-maker. The EU is an economic and trading partner, and its political dialogue, security policy and many other <u>policies</u> - from trade, agriculture and fisheries to environment, climate, energy and migration - <u>have a strong impact on developing countries</u>. To be fully effective, the EU and its Member States must <u>speak and act as one</u> to achieve better results and to improve EU's visibility. Difficult economic and budgetary times make it even more critical to ensure that <u>aid is spent effectively</u>....</p> <p>EU must seek to focus its offer to partner countries where it can have the greatest impact and should concentrate its development cooperation in support of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance (see Crosscutting Issues below) – inclusive and sustainable growth for human development (social protection, health and education; stronger business environment and <u>deeper regional integration</u>; sustainable agriculture and energy). <p>To ensure best value for money, this should be accompanied by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – differentiated development partnerships – coordinated EU action – improved coherence among EU policies.” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Agenda for Change</i>, 2011 COM(2010) 629 - http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-consultations/5241_en.htm - EDF 10 and 11 concept papers (or equivalent staff papers) - EDF 10 and 11 programme documents, decisions, project fiches, action documents - Interviews with EC in Brussels - Survey results - Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

<p>Regional development and integration can spur trade and investment and foster peace and stability. The EU should support regional and continental integration efforts (including South-South initiatives) through partners' policies in areas such as <u>markets, infrastructure and crossborder cooperation on water, energy and security</u>. Support will be offered to tackle competitiveness gaps, as part of the EU's substantial and growing Aid for Trade activities, Economic Partnership Agreements and other free trade agreements with developing regions.</p> <p>Policy on EU aid coordination and policy coherence. Interview EEAS, July 2016: "There was minimal coordination between the two EDF 10s (ie, EA-IO and SADC)."</p> <p>From EU Staff Working Doc, Pg. 62, 2015 Annual Report on the European Union's development and external assistance policies and their implementation in 2014: "To improve the effectiveness of European Aid, the EU and EU member states are moving towards closely coordinating the programming of their aid. In 26 of the 55 partner countries, which have been earmarked for Joint Programming (JP), EU and Member States have already begun to adopt this approach. In 2014, Joint Programming documents were agreed or drafted for Burundi, Chad, Comoros, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo. Preparations are underway or planned in a further 15 African countries."</p> <p>Field interviews confirmed that EUDs and some Member States (i.e. Germany) are increasingly working together. However, with other Member States there appeared to be room for improvement (e.g. Sweden, UK). Sweden's regional integration delegate posted in Lusaka was keen to work more closely with the Lusaka EUD, but had been having trouble finding the right 'entry point'.</p> <p>Field interviews revealed that coordination among EUDs and EU Member States was stronger at the national level than at the regional level, where the coordination task was expected to be assumed by the DMROs and the AU. However, few DMROs were adept at donor coordination. SADC was said to be the most advanced on this. COMESA has a donor coordination unit, but it is not very active. EAC coordinates around the Partnership Agreement, but its main donors (EU, GIZ, TMEA) tend to liaise separately, and are only now talking about more formal coordination and cooperation.</p>		
<p>I-1.2.3. EU's regional support programmes implemented EU's guidelines for addressing crosscutting issues: human rights, good governance and democracy, gender, and environment and climate change.</p>		
<p>Generally, the issues listed in the title were covered specifically in the RSPs and RIPs. In EDF 11, this follows the Agenda for Change principles (below). However, it is not clear to what extent guidelines have been implemented in practice or how effective monitoring mechanisms are.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Agenda for Change 2011 - EU guidelines for crosscutting issues 	<p>Inconclusive</p>

<p><u>Agenda for Change 2011:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The EU should continue to support democratisation, free and fair elections, the functioning of institutions, media freedom and access to internet, protection of minorities, the rule of law and judicial systems in partner countries. • Gender equality and the empowerment of women as development actors and peace-builders will be mainstreamed in all EU development policies and programmes through its 2010 Gender Action Plan. • Public-sector management for better service delivery. The EU should support national programmes to improve policy formulation, public financial management, including the setting up and reinforcement of audit, control and anti-fraud bodies and measures, and institutional development, including human resource management. Domestic reform and pro-poor fiscal policies are vital. • Tax policy and administration. The EU will continue to promote fair and transparent domestic tax systems in its country programmes, in line with the EU principles of good governance in the tax area, alongside international initiatives and country by country reporting to enhance financial transparency. • Corruption. The EU should help its partner countries tackle corruption through governance programmes that support advocacy, awareness-raising and reporting and increase the capacity of control and oversight bodies and the judiciary. • Civil society and local authorities. Building on the ‘Structured Dialogue’5, the EU should strengthen its links with civil society organisations, social partners and local authorities, through regular dialogue and use of best practices. It should support the emergence of an organised local civil society able to act as a watchdog and partner in dialogue with national governments. The EU should consider ways of mobilising local authorities’ expertise, e.g. through networks of excellence or twinning exercises. • Natural resources. The EU should scale up its support for oversight processes and bodies and continue to back governance reforms that promote the sustainable and transparent management of natural resources, including raw materials and maritime resources, and ecosystem services, with particular attention to the dependence of the poor on them, especially smallholder farms. • Development-security nexus. The EU should ensure that its objectives in the fields of development policy, peace-building, conflict prevention and international security (including cyber security) are mutually reinforcing. It should finalise and implement the requested Action Plan on security, fragility and development. 	<p>- EDF 10 and 11 programme documents, decisions, project fiches, action documents</p> <p>http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/ECDPM-2016-Political-Economy-Regional-Integration-Africa-SADC-Report.pdf (has good comparison of EAC and SADC gender mainstreaming and where it could be improved.)</p> <p>Interviews with EUDs in Zambia, Tanzania</p> <p>interviews with DMROs in Tanzania, Zambia</p> <p>Interview with AU Gender Department.</p>	
<p>COMESA: EDF 10 provided funding for the Gender Mainstreaming Policy and Action Plan. Both were revised in 2016, without EU support; no specific funding for gender was allocated after 2014 under RISP 3. There remain challenges to the inclusion of gender in COMESA activities. Gender should ideally be included in project planning, but it is often only addressed at the end of the activities – sometimes after gender-blind results have been achieved. It requires constant training and sensitisation, especially as staff move and different project experts come and go. Work is underway on developing a set of indicators on gender activities that will enable more effective monitoring and evaluation. The COMESA gender unit is</p>		

<p>also working on youth development with some support from UNIDO. RISM programme has some FEMCOM implementation at national level.</p> <p>COMESA reported smooth interaction with the EUD in Lusaka on gender issues under EDF 10, especially when there was an EUD gender mainstreaming officer able to work directly with the COMESA Secretariat. Gender does not tend to be included in EUD-COMESA management discussions. The gender unit has been consulted on EDF 11 planning; no specific gender activities had been included at the time of interviews, but it was expected that the gender and trade divisions - and the CBC - would work together on small-scale women crossborder traders and entrepreneurs. A number of donors are active in the gender and crossborder traders area, so coordination is crucial. COMESA has experience from its previous work with 'women in business', including under Femcom and in the COMESA Business Council.</p> <p>Tanzania and AU Gender officers both suggested that the EU might wish mainstream gender in its programmes in the region.</p>		
<p>SADC: The SADC Gender Protocol is a strong instrument that combines global targets with regional objectives. It is monitored on a regular basis by civil society, who are particularly active on gender issues. Gender Links and the Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance publish a Gender Protocol Barometer that includes two measures for progress – the SADC Gender and Development Index and the Citizen Score Card. Between the two measures, all areas of the Protocol are assessed. The Index has 23 indicators in six main areas. EU support has been provided for the publication of the Barometer in some years.</p>	<p>SADC Gender Protocol Gender Protocol Barometer 2014, 2015, 2016</p>	
<p>JC 1.3 Efforts and resources were targeted at where they were needed the most and could have the greatest impact in terms of achieving the desired results: greater regional integration and cooperation, and stronger regional structures.</p>		
	<p>Sources of information</p>	<p>Quality of evidence</p>
<p>I-1.3.1 The strategic choices in EDF 10 and 11 reflected/incorporated key impact drivers.</p>		
<p>A key question is: <i>To what extent did the underlying assumptions reflect the impact drivers?</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Basic Assumptions</p> <p>The action agendas for the strategic objectives and intervention priorities of EDF 10 and 11 were based largely on the following principles/rationale and <u>assumptions</u>:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improved capacity and systems will lead to stronger institutional and trade performance. 2. Transparent, accessible laws, rules, practices, systems and data will reduce corruption and improve governance. 3. EPAs can be a tool to promote regional harmonisation of legal frameworks and good practices. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EDF 10 and 11 documents - Logical frameworks - Inception Report - Survey - Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia 	<p>Indicative</p>

<p>4. Well-connected regional infrastructure networks (transport, power, telecommunications, water, quality assurance facilities, etc) will facilitate market integration.</p> <p>Overall desired impacts: The overarching objective of the EU strategy is a “stable, peaceful, prosperous EA-SA-IO Region”. This would feature:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ professional, well-run, member-supported regional integration bodies ▪ stronger, deeper regional integration contributing to sustainable economic and trade development and ‘decent’ job creation ▪ diversified economies ▪ a competitive private sector ▪ progressive poverty alleviation. <p>Driving factors that will influence achievement of these long-term impacts include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ political will ▪ rule of law ▪ good governance ▪ predictable, rule-based market access in a critical mass of member countries giving regional integration visible priority (ie, practise what they preach) ▪ regional interconnectivity ▪ well-coordinated international and regional pressure and support ▪ access to resources (finance, skills, partners, technology, services). <p>These basic factors contribute heavily to the success of regional market integration and to stability, peace and stability.</p> <p>If one looks at the main drivers that will affect the desired impacts, one sees that the basic assumptions neglected the key elements of political will, advocacy and well-coordinated international pressure and support.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Field interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA) - Field interviews with regional/continental organisations in Ethiopia (e.g. AU, UNECA), Kenya (e.g. AU-IBAR, Aga Khan University), Tanzania (e.g. AFRITAC), - Field interviews with business organisations, donors, project implementers in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia - Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade) 	
<p>I-1.3.2 The EDF 10 and 11 approaches added value in terms of <u>applying specific EU experience and competencies to addressing specific problems and gaps in priority areas, and complementing DMROs’ and other donors’ activities (to be informed by the findings of the other EQs).</u></p>		
<p>It is not clear how much the EDFs have applied the EU’s experience/expertise to resolving specific regional problems.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2008 Evaluation of ESA-IO - EDF 10 and 11 programme documents, decisions, project fiches, action documents - Cariforum 5-year review. 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

<p>The EU regional integration model, along with the lessons it has learned - and is learning - can be valuable for other regions pursuing a similar path. Africa has longstanding aspirations towards a unified continental market, through the building blocks of the regional economic communities. The AU and the RECs generally welcome the EU's support, as an ally with a similar vision.</p> <p>The 2008 Evaluation of the ESA-IO strategy (pg 62) noted: "The EC has a strong comparative advantage at regional level that builds on its regional knowhow, on the importance of its regional programme envelopes..., and on its strong institutional mandate on trade issues. Nevertheless, because of organisational and staffing impediments, not all the potential for EC value added is fulfilled." This appears to remain the case (as per midterm reviews, ECDPM reports, interviews). For example, it is not clear to what extent, under EDF 10 or 11, the EU has applied in Africa its own experience in securing national adoption of EU policies and commitments, or if it has engaged Member States to assist in such an endeavour (such 'domestication' being a longstanding EDF priority).</p> <p>Nor is it clear to what extent the EU and its EPA partners in Africa have considered the lessons learned from the Caribbean EPA evaluation and 5-year review - especially regarding managing expectations, delivering common regional positions, and managing implementation of a comprehensive EPA (what the EU would like its Africa EPAs to be).</p> <p>Feedback from field visits indicated that there was considerable interest among EUDs, DMROs and other stakeholders in taking greater advantage of EU practical experience and expertise in managing and promoting regional integration. Some implementers (eg, AFRITAC) are already sourcing EU expertise for statistics, finance, tax and monetary management programmes, and some Member States have applied their own experience in EU integration through training and capacity building in the area of customs, for example. Relevant quotes are provided in the text.</p> <p>EQ 8 examines the issue of value added as well, as does the Conclusions section.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Survey tested partner and stakeholder perceptions of EU added value compared with other donors, especially EU Member States - Findings of the other EQs - Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia - Field interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA) - Field interviews with regional/continental organisations in Ethiopia (e.g. AU, UNECA), Kenya (e.g. AU-IBAR, Aga Khan University), Tanzania (e.g. AFRITAC), - Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade) 	
<p>I-13.3 Extent to which donor coordination has become more effective.</p>		
<p>EU-Member States coordination</p> <p>An interview with EEAS indicated that EU-MS coordination and cooperation in EA-SA-IO is improving. The Group of Friends of Regional Integration meets 2-3 times a year with Member States. The UK has suggested joint programming for COMESA, and Germany has sought it for SADC and EAC. The interview also suggested that the EPAs may offer better opportunities for joint collaboration. "This has been happening in South Africa under the trade agreement that has existed for numerous years, when specific issues arise (eg, plant health, food safety), because their economic interests are directly affected.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Other EQs - Survey - Interviews with EEAS - Survey results 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

<p>This (practical approach) binds us much closer than (formal) aid programmes.” He went on to say that this improved collaboration - if it indeed eventuates - could give a new push to the EPAs.</p> <p>Interviews with donors found that national-level donor coordination by the EU was quite effective in some countries (eg, Tanzania), and not so effective in others (e.g. Zambia). All agreed that regional-level donor coordination was poor and that a better way had to be found. Leaving it to the DMROs, with conflicts of interest, was not the most effective solution.</p> <p>The EU Staff Working Document, Pg. 62, 2015 Annual Report on the European Union’s development and external assistance policies and their implementation in 2014: “To improve the effectiveness of European Aid, the EU and EU member states are moving towards coordinating the programming of their aid. In 26 of the 55 partner countries which have been earmarked for Joint Programming (JP), EU and Member States have already begun to adopt this approach. In 2014, Joint Programming documents were agreed or drafted for Burundi, Chad, Comoros, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo. Preparations are underway or planned in a further 15 African countries.”</p> <p>EQ7 and 8 explore a number of these issues in more detail.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia - Field interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA) - Field interviews with regional/continental organisations in Ethiopia (e.g. AU, UNECA), Kenya (e.g. AU-IBAR, Aga Khan University), Tanzania (e.g. AFRITAC), - Field interviews with business organisations, donors, project implementers in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia - Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade) 	
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EQ 2: Regional Economic Integration

To what extent has EU regional-level support in Eastern and Southern Africa and IO since 2008 facilitated progress towards regional market development/ integration?

Rationale: This Evaluation Question aims to ascertain the extent to which EU support has furthered market integration in the ESA-IO region, particularly in priority areas highlighted in EDF 10 and 11.

The overarching objective of EU support is a “*Stable, peaceful, prosperous EA-SA-IO region*”. It is widely acknowledged that economic integration featuring open and fair markets is among the key factors contributing to stability, peace and prosperity. Two key pillars for regional integration are: (1) regional rules, policies and systems consistent with global rules and conventions; and (2) national commitment and compliance. An effective regional oversight and convening mechanism is also needed. The EU programmes’ long-term objectives address all of these areas; none is without its challenges.

Coverage and focus: EQ2 explores the EU’s contribution to the key areas that can influence regional market integration:

- Institutional strengthening of the ‘duly-mandated regional organisations’ (DMROs) in key trade-related areas.¹
- Horizontal and vertical harmonisation of high-priority regional trade-related policies and compliance measures.
- Growth and diversification of trade in priority areas through support for regional trade negotiations; regional trade facilitation/customs procedures; standards, food safety and related quality infrastructure; and services trade.
- SME competitiveness through support for SME development frameworks, business environment, export readiness and business advocacy.

Judgement Criteria:

JC 2.1: EU regional support has improved the capacity of the DMROs to drive horizontal and vertical harmonisation of legal and institutional frameworks/mechanisms necessary to achieve regional and global trade-related integration goals.

JC 2.2: EU support has made a measurable contribution to growth and diversification of regional flows of goods and services since 2008.

JC 2.3: EU regional support has contributed to SME competitiveness.

¹ To clarify usage of DMRO and REC in this review: REC is ‘regional economic community’. DMRO is the ‘duly-mandated organisation’ (secretariat) overseeing it. The agreements pertain to the RECs. The DMROs are to oversee their implementation, among other responsibilities.


JC 2.1 EU regional support has improved the capacity of the DMROs to drive horizontal and vertical harmonisation of legal and institutional frameworks/mechanisms necessary to achieve regional and global trade-related integration goals.

Summary response	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
<p>DMRO capacity to manage regional integration and drive domestication has improved, <u>thanks in large part to EU and other donor support</u>. However, these are early days and both <u>integration and transposition still have a way to go</u>. Key hindrances remain political will, vested interests, capacity, trust, monitoring and enforcement. These can be dealt with - to a degree - with: effective leadership and champions; competition and fair trade policies and their enforcement mechanisms; dispute settlement mechanisms; transparency; reliable data; monitoring mechanisms (e.g. peer review, name and shame, etc); and 'teeth' to get action. Member States may implement on paper but not in practice, sometimes because they don't know how, or they don't have the resources, or they simply lack the motivation. DMROs require additional quite focused assistance to improve their capacity to develop regional policies <i>and</i> the strategies and systems (e.g. monitoring, enforcement) to get them implemented at national level. DMRO capacity requirements for this 'core business' need to be determined and filled (with MS footing the bill).</p> <p>For regional integration, a dual-pronged regional/national approach is necessary, requiring <u>tighter links between the two pillars of regional solutions and national compliance</u>.</p> <p><u>Regional trade solutions</u> typically include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ regional trade agreements (preferably comprehensive ones covering goods, services, investment, competition policy, trade facilitation, intellectual property, government procurement, etc) and their resulting regionally agreed policy/regulatory regimes ▪ regional standards ▪ regional accreditation, testing and conformity assessment facilities (e.g. regional reference laboratories) ▪ mutual recognition agreements ▪ regional connectivity (road, rail, aviation; energy; information and communications technology; finance) ▪ regional monitoring mechanisms, including reliable statistics systems ▪ oversight, enforcement and convening mechanisms (e.g. professional Secretariat and/or other institutions) <p>Converting regional solutions into national development tools requires systematic encouragement and enforcement. This in turn requires robust monitoring systems, including reliable data that are accepted by the Member States as useful tools for tracking regional development. The DMROs have been struggling with this for years, and to date no 'one-size-fits-all' system has emerged. (EQ 1, JC 1.1, I-2.1.2, 2.1.4).</p> <p>As the EU knows from its own history, regional integration is a never-ending story that requires enormous political will, a clear vision and strategy, and careful management. In terms of the overall objectives of stability, peace and prosperity, regional market integration can take different forms; it does not necessarily have to follow the customs, monetary, political union track. The important thing is to create the common bases that will foster trade, investment, job creation and participatory growth. In this sense, the EU is making a valuable contribution in the EA-SA-IO region, though the desired economic impacts may not be seen for some time.</p>		

I-2.1.1 Progress on key trade negotiations: EPAs, WTO, Tripartite Free Trade Area, Continental Free Trade Area, Customs Unions

Progress in regional integration

Africa's Regional Economic Communities



Source: The Economist, 27 Feb. 2016

The first African Regional Integration Index was released in 2016, charting performance on Five Dimensions of Regional Integration: trade, regional infrastructure, production integration, free movement of people, financial/macroeconomic integration. This establishes a good baseline and highlights weaknesses for attention.

Main findings:

EAC is the top performing REC on regional integration overall, with higher than average scores across all dimensions except financial and macroeconomic integration.

- African Regional Integration Index (ARI), UNECA, 2016)
- COMESA, EAC, SADC websites
- COMESA Trade Ministers Council, Aug. 2016 report
- Interviews at UNECA www.uneca.org
- www.integrate-africa.org

Baseline information

<p>SADC has higher than average scores for regional infrastructure, free movement of people, and financial and macroeconomic integration. It scores lower on trade and productive integration.</p> <p>COMESA scores higher than average for trade and production integration, but lower on regional infrastructure, free movement of people, and financial and macroeconomic integration.</p> <p>IGAD scores higher than average on regional infrastructure and productive integration, and lower on the rest.</p> <p>Across the 8 RECs, the highest scores are on trade integration, with average REC scores of 0.540 (1 is best). Trade integration is a longstanding priority across all RECs.</p> <p>The lowest scores are on financial and macroeconomic integration, with average REC scores of 0.381 (best is 1). Financial and macroeconomic integration has been limited across the RECs, including ensuring the convertibility of currencies or coordination of macroeconomic policies. Free movement of people is the second lowest area; protocols have been signed but their application on the ground faces different challenges in different regions.</p> <p>Average REC scores are closest together on regional infrastructure and productive integration. Both areas are covered by REC programmes, and progress is occurring across the regions.</p> <p>Average REC scores are furthest apart on free movement of people and financial and macroeconomic integration.</p>		
<p>EPAs Between 2008 and 2016, three goods-and-cooperation EPAs were completed with 15 of the region's 25 ACP members: all five East Africa Community (EAC) members, six Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) governments and four Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) countries. EDF 11 has allocated support under several instruments for their national implementation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EAC EPA: Eastern African Community: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda: negotiations completed 16 October 2014; so far signed by Kenya and Rwanda, 1 Sept. 2016, and later ratified by Kenya. Rwanda's ratification status remained unclear following the field interviews, even to the officials directly involved. Further ratifications of the EPA are being held up by Tanzania's reluctance to sign unless the EU agrees to renegotiate parts of it (including development cooperation). Burundi wants the EU to lift sanctions. Uganda is sitting on the fence, waiting to see what the others will do. Kenya's preferences status has been extended in the meantime. (It was the one country that stood to lose its preferences under the Everything but Arms preferences for LDCs when it graduated to middle-income status.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Survey results</i> - <i>Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - <i>Field interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA)</i> - <i>Field interviews with AU, UNECA</i> - <i>Field interviews with business organisations, donors</i> - <i>Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade)</i> 	<p>Satisfactory but not complete.</p> <p>The EU fact sheets on the EPAs are out of date and the link to the EAC roadmap is invalid.</p>

<p>- SADC EPA: Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland: negotiations completed 15 July 2014; agreement signed 10 June 2016 by all members. Entered into force in October 2016. Has progressed to the roadmap stage. Angola participated as an observer in the negotiations and is eligible to join in the future.</p> <p>- ESA EPA: interim agreement completed in 209 with four members of the ESA EPA negotiating group: Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles and Zimbabwe; applied provisionally since May 2012. Has progressed to roadmap stage. Interviews hinted that Malawi and Zambia were showing greater interest, and that Ethiopia might even consider joining one day before it reaches middle-income status. That seems to be a major driver for joining this EPA. (Zambia was looking at the SADC EPA as another option, given its stronger trade relations with the SADC group.)</p> <p>The EU hopes that EPA implementation will bolster the lagging REC implementation agenda at the national level. According to the EU website: “EPAs...are also designed to be drivers of change that will help kick-start reform and contribute to good economic governance. This will help ACP partners attract investment and boost their economic growth.” In an interview, a DG Trade officer confirmed this basic premise: “The EU considers EPAs a good base to strengthen regional economic integration through common trade policies, rules, implementation mechanisms, development cooperation strategies and instruments. These provide more certainty and predictability, and thus improve business and investment environments. But we have to go step by step.”</p> <p>Uncertainty on EPAs and other trade agreements lingers in the EA-SA-IO region, due to mistrust, protectionist forces, and lack of confidence in political or physical ability to implement. This contributes to the relatively low level of compliance with regional commitments to liberalise sectors and remove barriers to trade.</p> <p>In addition, the high time and cost of meeting preference requirements (e.g. standards and norms, rules of origin) leads to suboptimum utilisation of the agreements. This can pose a further disincentive to reciprocal liberalisation. (I-2.1.1; I-2.1.3)</p>	<p>http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/economic-partnerships/</p> <p>http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/sadc/</p> <p>http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/eac/</p> <p>http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/esa/</p> <p>http://www.acp.int/node</p> <p>http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/planned_ia/docs/2015_trade_016_017_epa_eac_fta_en.pdf</p> <p>http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151901.pdf</p> <p>www.sacu.int</p>	
<p>WTO: Synopsis: <i>Twenty of the 26 countries targeted by the EDFs belong to the WTO. All are longstanding members, except Seychelles which joined in 2015. Comoros, Ethiopia and Sudan are in the process of accession, as they were in 2008. Somalia recently began the accession process. This means that virtually all the countries covered by the EDF are quite familiar with a comprehensive and binding set of trade rules, and have had some time - and considerable donor assistance - to implement them. This assistance will intensify as the largely EU/EU MS-funded Trade Facilitation Facility and complementary donor programmes assist EA-SA-IO countries to implement the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, which 10 of them have ratified to date.</i></p> <p>In 2008, 19 of the 25 ACP countries covered by this evaluation were long-standing - and mostly founding - WTO members. Only Comoros, Seychelles, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan were not WTO members. Of those, Comoros, Seychelles, Ethiopia and Sudan were in the process of accession. Since then, only Seychelles has become a member (in April 2015). Comoros had its first Working Party meeting in December 2016, long after the WP was</p>	<p>World Trade Organisation (WTO) reports and documents (e.g. Trade Policy Reviews for SACU, EAC; accession documents, Working Party Reports)</p> <p>www.wto.org</p> <p>TPR list at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tp_r_e/tp_rep_e.htm#chronologically</p> <p>Trade Facilitation Agreement:</p>	

<p>established in October 2007. It aims to complete the negotiations during 2017. Ethiopia's Working Party was set up in 2003 and held three meetings by 2012, after which no progress has occurred. The Trade Ministry, in an interview in February, said they were planning to restart the process. Sudan's Working Party was established on 25 October 1994 and had met only twice by March 2004. Somalia's Working Party was formed in December 2016.</p> <p>10 of the 20 EA-SA-IO WTO members had ratified the new WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement by April 2017. EDF 11 has a component to support WTO TFA roll-out, along with ongoing efforts to support implementation of WTO SPS and TBT Agreements.</p>	<p>https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm</p> <p>World Customs Organisation (WCO) www.wcoomd.org</p>	
<p>Progress on Regional Trade Negotiations</p> <p>The African Union's 2012 decision to establish a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) set an indicative establishment date of 2017. The AU CFTA Unit, underwritten by the EU, has completed the modalities for negotiation and, with the help of UNECA and UNCTAD's Regional Office, a framework text for the first phase of negotiations covering goods, services and investment. This framework text was submitted to and endorsed by the DMROs in late 2016-early 2017, and was to be sent to AU member states for consideration in March-April. Some AU Member States resist this top-down approach, but virtually all of them are participating in the technical working group sessions that have produced the draft text. The AU remains confident that the framework text will be adopted in 2017. (Detailed information for this whole section is at I-2.1.1.)</p> <p>The Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) framework agreement on Goods was signed in June 2015 by 16 of the 26 member states of COMESA, EAC and SADC. When it was launched in 2008, people were enthusiastic that the envisioned comprehensive accord would overcome overlapping-membership problems and bolster industrialisation and infrastructure development. To date, negotiators are still working on basic goods-related market access issues, particularly Rules of Origin (RoO) and tariff offers. Field interviews indicated that a RoO solution might be found in the first half of 2017, freeing up the road to an agreement. Interviews also suggested that the second phase, on services and investment, might start in parallel, or it might be reconsidered, depending on what happens in the CFTA. Several Trade Ministry officials in the region questioned the value-added of the TFTA, in light of the CFTA. The main contribution will be in linking those countries or subregions (e.g. SACU) in Southern and Eastern Africa that do not yet have trade agreements in place e.g. SACU and the EAC.</p> <p>Background on CFTA and TFTA</p> <p>Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA)</p> <p>The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, in January 2012, adopted a decision to establish a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by an indicative date of 2017. The Summit also endorsed the Action Plan on Boosting Intra-Africa Trade (BIAT) which identifies seven clusters: trade policy, trade facilitation, productive</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - AU Continental FTA Unit interview https://www.au.int/en/ti/cfta/about - UNECA interviews and reports www.uneca.org - www.integrate-africa.org - <i>Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - <i>Field interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA)</i> - <i>Field interviews with business organisations, donors in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - <i>Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade)</i> 	

<p>capacity, trade-related infrastructure, trade finance, trade information, and factor market integration. The CFTA will bring together 54 AU countries with more than one billion people and a combined GDP of US \$3.4 trillion.</p> <p>Objectives of the CFTA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create a single continental market for goods and services, with free movement of business persons and investments, and thus pave the way for accelerating the establishment of the Continental Customs Union and the African customs union. • Expand intra-African trade through better harmonisation and coordination of trade liberalisation and facilitation regimes and instruments across RECs and across Africa in general. • Resolve the challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships and expedite regional and continental integration processes. • Enhance competitiveness at the industry and enterprise level through exploiting opportunities for scale production, continental market access and better reallocation of resources. • Double intra-African trade flows between January 2012 and January 2022. <i>Q: What is the 2012 baseline?</i> <p>The CFTA is now at the stage of a draft text for the first phase of goods, services and investment negotiations. DMROs commented on this text in early 2017; it was further refined and submitted to member states for consideration in March-April. The CFTA Unit is still optimistic that the framework text will be agreed in 2017.</p>		
<p>Tripartite Agreement: COMESA, EAC, SADC</p> <p>2008 ESA-IO Evaluation: pg 26: “The Task Force between SADC and COMESA, established in 2001 with the objective of discussing differences between the CU envisaged in COMESA and that in SADC, was restructured (May 2006) to include EAC, thus becoming the SADC/COMESA/ECA Tripartite Task Force. This Task Force represents clear progress (at least from the institutional point of view) in the harmonisation process. Overall, it is expected that - after some years of generally slow-moving coordination efforts by the COMESA, EAC and SADC Secretariats - the envisaged Tripartite Ministerial meeting will give new life to the process.”</p> <p>2008 saw the launch of the Tripartite Free-Trade Area (TFTA) Agreement linking the three regions. It provoked much enthusiasm among development partners and others who expected its ambitious region-linking instrument to define the future vision and strategic objectives of Eastern and Southern Africa. Some believed it would lead to a single Regional Economic Community in due course, overcoming the overlapping-membership problems that contributed to the initiative. The Tripartite process presented an <u>innovative three-pillar approach, linking market access negotiations to industrial development and infrastructure</u>. Responsibilities were divided among the three RECs: EAC - industrial development, SADC - infrastructure, COMESA - market development.</p> <p>The TFTA has not fulfilled the lofty expectations of 2008. So far, the negotiations have not progressed much beyond <u>partial accords on trade in goods</u>. The Agreement signed in June 2015 by the 16 of the 26 negotiating parties included</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UNECA reports and interviews www.uneca.org - www.integrate-africa.org - <i>Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - <i>Field interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA)</i> - <i>Field interviews with business organisations, donors in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya 	

<p>a basic framework for the trade in goods component, but the detail remains to be agreed. The unfinished business included tariff liberalisation (offers), rules of origin, trade remedies, movement of business people, and modalities for cooperation in industrial development. The 10 member states that did not sign (including regional heavy-weight South Africa) indicated that they would only sign once the market access commitments were clearly defined. South Africa and Namibia said much the same about more comprehensive SADC EPA negotiations.</p> <p>The Tripartite Free Trade Area negotiations are still at the 'partial goods agreement' stage, held up by South African and others' caution on giving away too much on rules of origin and tariff protection. Phase 2 (Services, investment) may start in parallel, even while Phase 1 (Goods) remains unsettled. Evaluators heard during the field visit that a solution may have been found on rules of origin that could permit the Goods negotiations to be finalised in 2017. The main contribution will be in linking those countries or sub-regions (e.g. SACU) in Southern and Eastern Africa that do not yet have trade agreements in place e.g. SACU and the EAC.</p> <p>TFTA-CFTA linkages Field interviews with DMROs, their Member States and TFTA negotiators (funded by the EU and other donors), confirmed earlier viewpoints that at this point in time the TFTA may be adding another layer of complexity to regional trading relations rather than streamlining and harmonising trade rules and addressing overlapping membership issues. This concern was borne out in field interviews, which raised other concerns over the TFTA becoming irrelevant because the Continental FTA may move faster on services and investment. Several DMRO trade officers wondered why the CFTA didn't wait for the TFTA to conclude first. Others questioned the need to go on to the next stage of TFTA negotiations (services, investment) if the CFTA was going to cover this anyway. Ministries of Trade and DMROs were concerned about having sufficient resources to manage all the negotiations.</p> <p>The Tripartite process may still lead to some regional organisation consolidation (e.g. one or two DMROs instead of three) if member states with overlapping associations decide they no longer want to pay fees for similar services to more than one REC Secretariat. However, that is a distant prospect at the moment. Field interviews -especially at COMESA - confirmed some angst over this possibility.</p>	<p>(Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade)</p> <p>www.tralac.org/resources/by-region/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-fta.html</p>	
<p>I-2.1.2 Progress (in a critical mass of priority areas/countries) in implementing the above trade agreements in terms of regional legal harmonisation and compliance</p>		
<p>The titles of an <i>Economist</i> article on 27 Feb 2016 summed up its impression of progress in implementing trade agreements: "Tear down these walls: Africa's internal trade deals look good on paper. A pity they are rarely followed."</p> <p>Progress on customs unions</p>	<p>- 10th and 11th EDF RSP/RIPs</p> <p>- COMESA, EAC, SADC websites: www.comesa.int; www.eac.int; www.sadc.int</p>	<p>Indicative, but not complete</p>

<p>COMESA: Progress towards a customs union is slow. “The definition of Customs Union in COMESA is evolving in line with realities in the region,” said the Director of Trade. “Better to package it as a trade facilitation and industrial facilitation arrangement. The 3-4 instruments, CTN, CET, CMR, are still work in progress.”</p> <p>FTA: 16 of 19 have ratified it, up from 9 in 2000 and 14 in 2012. Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, DR Congo, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Seychelles, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Swaziland has a derogation.</p> <p>Common External Tariff: 6 of 19 members have implemented it: Burundi (74%), Kenya (74%), Malawi (68.7), Rwanda (74%), Uganda (74%), and Zambia (66.4%). A number of countries are expected to remain outside it (e.g. Mauritius, Seychelles, Egypt and others due to their lower tariffs under other agreements). COMESA and EAC are working on aligning CETs (74% achieved in 2016; MS have the flexibility to keep 20% SLP and 5% excluded products which are not required to be aligned). (RISP</p> <p>Common Tariff Nomenclature (CTN): Burundi (74%), Eritrea (63.5%), Ethiopia (74.7%), Kenya (74%), Malawi (62.8%), Mauritius (64.46%), Rwanda (74%), Sudan (77%), Uganda (74%), Zambia (66.6%) and Zimbabwe (70.7%)</p> <p>Customs Management Regulations (CMR): Burundi (100%), Comoros (100%), Djibouti (91%), DR Congo (98%), Egypt (99%), Eritrea (96%), Ethiopia (100%), Kenya (100%), Madagascar (98%), Malawi (100%), Mauritius (95%), Rwanda (100%), Seychelles (100), Sudan (95%), Swaziland (99), Uganda (100%), Zambia (100%) and Zimbabwe (99%).</p> <p>COMESA Investment Agreement: No ratifications; being rewritten.</p> <p>EAC: The customs union, approved in 2005, is being implemented, along with the Common Market Protocol, laid out in 2010. All five members have adopted the CET but the customs union implementation still has a way to go. According to the East Africa Business Council, “The EAC customs union is working <i>a bit</i>, i.e. trade flows are easier. But NTBs keep popping up, and the process of removing one is long and difficult - even getting people to accept that it is an NTB is difficult. And there are no teeth. The regional NTBs policy is developed and passed, and some presidents have signed, so we hope that when all sign some enforcement mechanisms will be put in place.”</p> <p>SADC: Work towards establishing a customs union for SADC is effectively on hold. Member States, particularly South Africa, have shifted emphasis away from a customs union to ‘deeper’ integration, including through work on industrial development and infrastructure. This is in line with the approach also adopted under the TFTA negotiations. In the area of trade, the current focus in SADC is on ensuring full implementation of the FTA as well as completing negotiations on trade in services for key sectors.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - http://www.comesa.int/sixteen-countries-now-in-free-trade-area/ - COMESA Trade Ministers Annual Council Report, August 2016 - RISP Progress Report, COMESA, December 2016 - RISM Progress Report, COMESA, December 2016 - 2008 Evaluation of the Commission’s support to the ESA-IO Region <p>DRN-ADE-ECO-NCG-ECORYS, Dec 2008</p> <p>www.economist.com/news/21693562-africas-internal-trade-deals-look-good-paper-pity-they-are-rarely followed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - East African Common Market Scorecard 2016.pdf <p>http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/planned_ia/docs/2015_trade_016_017_epa_eac_fta_en.pdf</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discussion Paper No. 192 www.ecdpm.org/dp192 - <i>Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i> 	
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Field interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA)</i> - <i>Field interviews with business organisations, donors, project implementers in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - <i>Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade)</i> 	
<p>Monitoring Compliance and Progress in Regional Integration</p> <p>Achieving stronger regional-national policy and programme coherence remains a challenge, affected in part by a dearth of effective ways to encourage and monitor national uptake of regional and global policies, commitments and good practices.</p> <p>At the Tripartite level there is a monitoring mechanism for non-tariff barriers. SADC is establishing a Trade Monitoring and Compliance Mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the Free Trade Area, with a specific mechanism for identifying and eliminating non-tariff barriers (with GIZ help). COMESA has a system for monitoring tariffs, rules of origin and nontariff measures and is implementing an online reporting and compliance facility. The COMESA Legal Division is also developing, since 2016 with the support of RISP 3 (EDF 10), a pilot system to document, track and verify Member State compliance with COMESA protocols, decisions, etc. This is a promising evidence-based trial that could close a number of data gaps and facilitate forward monitoring.</p> <p>The most comprehensive monitoring system used so far seems to be the EAC Common Market Scorecard developed by Trademark East Africa under the EAC Investment Climate Programme, a 2012-2017 World Bank/IFC project. Among other nontariff barriers, the CMS pointed to sanitary/phytosanitary and technical measures, as well as border issues and services barriers that had already been identified for elimination in 2014, noting that some were unresolved because they required a regional solution. (EACMS 2016, pg 7, 15). It also highlighted numerous data deficiencies in areas that are common throughout the EA-SA-IO region, including information on trade in services and poor understanding of services' vital contribution to regional integration.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - COMESA Report on EU Contribution, Oct. 2016 - RISP Progress Report, COMESA, December 2016 - RISM Progress Report, COMESA, December 2016 	
<p>Please see RISM case study at end of Annex</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EDF 10, 11 - RISM Action Fiches - Midterm Review of EDF 10 (2011) 	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Midterm Evaluation of RISM Rider (2014) - COMESA reporting on RISM use (Country Briefs, COMESA RISM Progress Report Dec. 2016) - Interviews with RISM Coordinator at COMESA, RISM Coordinator at Kenya Treasury, Kenya RISM Focus Group, EUDs, RISM evaluator, RISP Coordinator at COMESA, RISP 3 evaluator 	
<p>I-2.1.3 Enhanced capacity, confidence and trust among regional partners at both political and technical levels leading to more cohesive, coordinated action</p>		
<p>Coordination between EUDs and DMROs: The Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee (IRCC), set up under EDF 9 to facilitate more coordinated programming and priority-setting by the DMROs, was dissolved at the end of EDF 10 due to poor results and accountability, in turn attributed by insiders to dis functioning due to political tensions among RAOs and other such issues. EDF 11 replaced it with a more streamlined mechanism for DMRO-EU coordination and consultation, while leaving relevant DMRO-member state consultations to DMRO's internal mechanisms.</p> <p>High-Level Group (HLG): The HLG has two levels: (1) technical experts and (2) chief executives of the DMROs. The relevant EUDs and DMROs are represented in both. In 2015 the HLG met twice in Nairobi to prepare the EDF 11 RIP, and in 2016 twice again in Brussels (two technical meetings and one CEO session). In future, however, EUDs envisage meeting once a year. As the two levels tend to have the same agendas, EUD representatives are instructed to convey the same messages at both.</p> <p>According to interviews, the discussions have focused mainly on programming issues, with little attention to strategic matters. "There has been no discussion on in-depth issues, such as <i>real</i> regional integration. Last time, we were meant to have discussion on APSA, but it didn't happen, even though everyone from the RECs came prepared for it." Regarding the nostalgia expressed by certain ESA DMRO officers for the IRCC, interviewers questioned: if it was so useful, why don't you replicate it through a permanent inter-REC mechanism? They said they intended to use the EDF Technical Cooperation Facility. (JC1.1, 7.2, TZ01, TZ03)</p> <p>EQ 7 reports that the new High-Level Group and the technical inter-DMRO consultation forum have regular, well-attended meetings. (TCF and TRF support attendance.) "The discussions are mainly on aid management issues which is understandable at the start of a new programming cycle. There does not appear to be a systematic mechanism for recording and following up on decisions and matters arising." (JC 7.2, Desk Report)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EDF 10 and 11 documents - 2008 evaluation and EDF 10 MTRs - ECDPM and other analyses - Survey - Field interviews with EUDs, DMROs, EU Member State donors, other donors - Interviews with EEAS, DG Trade 	<p>Anecdotal evidence, inconclusive</p>

<p>Coordination between DMROs and their Member States: The coordination arrangements within the DMROs with their members states and between the DRMOs and the international community are still weak. The EAMR (Botswana, 2015) notes that the “SADC engagement with member states and the international community is ad hoc and without strategic vision”, and that more attention is needed to ensure complementarity between SADC and COMESA on future and on-going trade programmes. It is moreover noted that “The main remaining obstacle is to transform the existing 'information-sharing' platforms into real coordination groups where division of labour can be tabled under SADC leadership (lack of willingness on the part of SADC for political considerations; lack of capacity on the part of some development partners to engage in policy dialogue)”. Similar observations were found in EAC and IGAD with less emphasis placed on this point for COMESA and IOC. (I-7.2.3, Desk Report)”</p> <p>Coordination between DMROs and donors: Regional-level donor coordination is largely left to the DMROs, few of which have well-functioning mechanisms. Interviews indicated DMROs have tended to ‘cherry-pick’ in the past, and therefore were not interested in coordinating and joint programming. As better practices such as a programme approach and results-based management take hold - in response to donor demands for greater accountability and better performance - the importance of donor coordination may become more evident to the DMROs. Certainly stronger opportunities for joint programming on regional activities will emerge. While the DMROs are not exactly overwhelmed by donors, the need for stronger coordination remains, particularly given the fragile sustainability of some of them and the heavy sunk cost made by certain donors (e.g. EU, USAID, Germany, UK, World Bank, AfDB). Several donors said they would welcome stronger EU leadership in regional donor coordination, given that the EU is the overall major player and therefore the ‘natural leader’. EUDs noted lack of capacity for such a role. Perhaps a solution suitable to all can be found. (Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia interviews)</p> <p>Coordination between EU and Member States: EQ 1, JC 1.3 discussed some of these issues, pointed to instances of improvements and explained how EPA implementation at the local level may offer opportunities for joint collaboration on specific issues (eg. SPS, food safety, standards). Field interviews indicated that coordination and communications between EUDs and EU Member States is stronger and more formalised at national level than at regional level. However, at regional level, the EU and GIZ are planning to work together on EAC activities and possibly elsewhere. DfID’s hitherto strong position is up in the air due to Brexit. They and several other EU MS donors share the EUD building in Dar-es-Salaam, and donors said the EU was effective in bringing them all together regularly. In Lusaka, however, EU MS did not paint the same picture.</p>		
<p>I-2.1.4 DMROs’ staff, systems and processes have improved enough to allow them to meet their regional trade-related commitments and goals in a more informed, timely, efficient manner</p>		
<p><u>Capacity to absorb</u> and <u>ability to manage major change</u> remain big challenges at the DMROs. Neither COMESA nor EAC appeared to have sufficient qualified core staff on board to deal with the priorities listed under EDF 11. For</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DMRO annual reports, Council Reports (COMESA), Budget Speeches (EAC) - Evaluations, Midterm Reviews 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

<p>those projects that were to be managed internally (versus delegated to third parties), the DMROs were counting on contracting short-term experts as in the past. While short-term experts are important for certain projects, they cannot replace the need for a core base of sustainable in-house expertise on key issues.</p> <p>For example, in COMESA the monitoring and evaluation expertise was largely in the form of project staff (e.g. some projects had an officer in charge of M&E; they left when the projects finished). The official M&E Unit was an absentee person with no contract. The Agriculture and Industry Division, with a large set of mandates, had few if any competent non-project staff (several COMESA Member State officials mentioned this). In EAC, fully half of the professional staff was to turn over during 2016-2018, as they reached the 10-year service limit. In SADC, the work on political cooperation remains at the heart of the DMRO agenda, but under EDF 10 it was implemented with a large team of (approximately) 17 technical advisors. SADC was undergoing a restructuring of its Secretariat that could impact on EDF 11 focus areas, such as industrialisation.</p> <p>EQ1 and EQ 7 discuss issues and progress related to DMRO capacity building and regional coordination. Challenges remain in terms of DMROs' internal shortcomings. Independent comprehensive organisational audits (beyond the areas covered by pillar assessments) appear necessary to identify exactly what capabilities exist and what capabilities are needed in order to deliver the desired results. There is considerable debate in DMROs (and the AU Secretariat) about merit-based, rather than geographically- and politically-based, appointments. However, this politically sensitive situation is not likely to change for some time, but a stronger focus on merit-based recruiting is definitely needed and this is something that donors can influence as a group. The shift in SADC to merit-based recruiting for positions at Director level and lower could provide a precedent. (I-2.1.3, 2.1.4, 7.2.3)</p> <p>*COMESA passed a six-pillar assessment in 2015. The EAC's 2016 six-pillar assessment was being reviewed in Brussels in early 2017. The decision was not available to evaluators at the time of writing the final report. The other DMROs were at various stages of pillar assessments and had not yet passed the critical pillar assessment pursuant to Financial Regulation # 966/2012 which allows internal systems and procedures to be used.</p> <p>EDF 11 continues institutional support to DMROs, but it is no longer as intensive as before. Nevertheless, it is focused on the right things (M&E, harmonisation, etc). The Regional Integration priorities and specific objectives are listed in the box below.</p> <p>COMESA Capacity to Manage Services Trade Issues expected to improve under EDF 11: The Trade Division was particularly satisfied that EDF 11 had a 'budget line' for <u>Services trade</u>. "Neither COMESA nor the EU prioritised Services enough in the past." This comes at an important moment when COMESA wants to conclude its own regional accord, and when both TFTA and CFTA are poised to start Services work (though</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EDF 10 and 11 programme documents, decisions, project fiches, action documents, progress reports - DMRO organisation charts - DMRO planning documents - DMRO institutional reviews where available - <i>Survey results</i> - <i>Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - <i>Field interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA), Djibouti (IGAD)</i> - <i>Field interviews with regional/ continental organisations in Ethiopia (e.g. AU, UNECA), Tanzania (e.g. AFRITAC)</i> - <i>Field interviews with business organisations, donors, project implementers in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade) 	
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<p>overlapping issues need to be addressed at REC and AU level). The Trade Division plans to reactivate the Services Unit, develop a team, work on commitments and implementation, enhance public awareness, offer capacity building for business with the COMESA Business Council (CBC). A longstanding 'problem' is the fragmented distribution of trade responsibilities around COMESA. For example, the Services Unit is still located in the Assistant Secretary-General's office, but the officer has gone to SADC. The Director of the Trade Division is confident that under COMESA's Programme Approach, the various parts will continue to work together. (JC2.1, COMESA)</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;">EDF 11 Regional Integration Priorities by DMRO</p> <p>Cross-regional envelope</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Implementation of the EU-East and Southern Africa interim EPA. - Enhance institutional capacity of DMROs. - Deliver at national level trade-related assistance and support to private sector. - Improved connectivity and efficiency and resilience of regional infrastructure networks (blending facility) - Improve the strategic and regulatory framework of regional infrastructure networks. <p>COMESA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reduced cost of cross-border trade through removal of internal barriers in line with Tripartite Agreement. - Increased private sector participation in regional and global value chains, through improved investment/business climate and enhanced competitiveness and productive/innovation capacity. - Enhanced capacity of the COMESA Secretariat and member states, including the private sector, to deepen regional integration. <p>EAC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Foster the implementation of the EAC Common Market as well as monitoring the Customs Union and Common Market Protocols. - Develop EAC industries and private sector, and facilitate trade. <p>IGAD</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reduce barriers to free movement of persons in the IGAD region. <p>IOC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Competitiveness and business facilitation. <p>SADC</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EDF 11 RIP - EDF 11 COMESA programming documents for Trade Facilitation and Crossborder Traders - DEVCO programme budgeting/spending reports - Interviews and follow-up correspondence with programme officers at COMESA, EAC and at the relevant EUDs 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Consolidation of the SADC FTA and Implementation of the SADC-EU EPA. - Support for industrialisation and the productive sectors. - Support to intra-SADC investment and FDI through improving the business and investment environment. <p>Source: 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programmes; Discussion Paper No. 192 www.ecdpm.org/dp192</p>		
<p>COMESA RISP3/TCF EDF 10 projects: «As of 24 April 2017, out of 17 projects that were approved, 11 projects are ongoing. By 30 June 2017, 6 projects will be completed while 5 projects would not have been completed in the following countries: DR Congo, Malawi, Sudan, Swaziland and Uganda. In general, TCF supported projects have had slow implementation due to the delays in the procurement process in which some tasks are undertaken at member State level (initiation of the preparatory work, TOR, etc) and others at the Secretariat level (controls ex ante and ex post, tendering process, execution of payments, etc). As of now, all procurement processes are completed for the 5 projects that would not be completed by 30 June 2017. Detailed revised implementation schedules have been proposed to ensure completion within the requested extension period. Refer attachment for details.» Note from COMESA RISP Coordinator.</p> <p>EAC RISP 3: PE 3 was approved in April 2017 for just under €1m.</p>		
<i>JC 2.2 EU support has made a measurable contribution to growth and diversification of regional flows of goods and services since 2008.</i>		
Summary response	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
<p>EU support at the national and regional levels is contributing to realising the potential for growth and diversification of regional trade. Intra-REC trade is increasing, and EU and other donor work on crossborder trade and trade statistics should help to document better some of that increase, including in terms of documenting the level of informal trade which could add one-third more to official figures. High tariffs and nontariff barriers on value-added products are impeding effective diversification and need to be addressed in TFTA and CFTA negotiations. Regarding work on value chains and cluster initiatives, this is one area where the regional and national roles need to be spelled out more clearly and support needs to be targeted where it can produce the most impact, given each stakeholder's competences. In fact there were comments and examples of where the current 'cluster' approach could potentially have unintended negative consequences on growth and diversification (due to support focusing on similar subsectors in different bordering countries - e.g. leather, processed food, clothing, handicrafts).</p>		
I-2.2.1 Changes in regional trade flows, overall & in priority sectors (e.g. higher-value-added goods, services)		
<p>Progress in Regional Integration Regional integration is advancing slowly in terms of official intra- and inter-REC trade. While an increase in volume terms is evident during the period under evaluation, data are not consistent on the amount and distribution. If informal trade were included, overall trade growth would undoubtedly show faster progress, but reliable statistics do not exist. UNCTAD says informal - mostly crossborder - trade could add about one-third to official trade figures. (The EU Crossborder Traders project described in the box in EQ 2 expects to address some of these information issues.)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EU-Region trade statistics - EAC Tradoc 151901.pdf* - SADC tradoc 151902.pdf* - ESA tradoc 151900.pdf* 	<p>Insufficient consistent data</p>

<p>According to the COMESA reports (website, Trade Ministers Council report 2016), intra-COMESA trade doubled from US\$7 to \$16bn in 2006-2015. Intra-COMESA trade as a percent of global trade by each member state has been fairly stable when averaged over the 2006-16 period, though there were sharp ups and downs due to the financial crisis and the heavy share of commodities in the export mix. Zambia was the only country to show progressive expansion in its intra-COMESA trade - from 9% to 19%. The overall average was 5% in 2006 and 7% in 2015. (ARII)</p> <p>According to the EAC website, intra-EAC trade grew approximately 25% between 2008 and 2014, with 20% of exports from EAC countries going to other EAC countries. This is corroborated by other sources (e.g. WTO). A Bank of Tanzania report showed that in 2008-2012, intra-SADC transactions averaged 31% of their total exports, and 35% of total imports. Other sources, however, including the very outdated SADC website information, show considerably lower figures for (eg, 10-12% of exports). As for SACU, 16% of South Africa's exports and 5% of its imports were to/from SACU; for the rest of SACU on average 43% of exports and 78% of imports were to/from other SACU members, especially South Africa. Just over half of the top 20 items, which make up half of intra-SACU trade, were value-added products.</p> <p>The African Regional Integration Index (ARII), initiated by UN Economic Commission for Africa in 2016, provides the most complete baseline to date, and will be a useful guide for monitoring progress in trade growth and diversification in future. (I-2.1.1, I-2.2.1)</p> <p>Diversification</p> <p>Anecdotal evidence indicates that value-added goods and services accounted for a growing portion of the total, though high tariff and nontariff barriers (including high transport costs) tend to discourage manufactured exports within Africa. As does the heavy dependence on basic commodities and agriculture exports. Plus the export infrastructure is still set up to deal with commodities, more than manufactures or processed goods. The services sector, so important for value adding, needs to develop considerably more in order to support further value addition.</p>	<p>*2012 is earliest available in this series, as per Eurostat Comext - Statistical regime 4 SITC product groupings</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WTO Trade Profiles - World Bank - - UNCTAD Africa report - African Development Bank - African Union reports <p>www.integrate-africa.org/rankings/regional-economic-communities/comesa/</p> <p>http://comstat.comesa.int</p> <p>COMESA Trade Ministers Council report, August 2016</p> <p>African Regional Integration Index (ARII), UNECA, 2016</p> <p>Interviews with economists at UNECA and UNCTAD in Addis Ababa</p>	
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COMESA Members' Export Base is Commodity Intensive

The African Regional Integration Index 2016 provided some baseline data on value added in trade among COMESA's 19 members. Industrialisation was measured by these states' increasing use of machinery, technology and automated processes in their respective productive undertakings. This was assessed by tracking over time the technological classification of exports, sophistication of exports, and knowledge and technology output. In technological classification, for all the COMESA member states, primary products and resourced-based products together accounted for more than 50% of the export basket. For 11 countries, these accounted for more than 80% (Sudan, Libya, Ethiopia, Seychelles, Comoros, Zambia, Malawi, DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi). No high-tech products were exported in 2015 by Sudan, Libya, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, DRC, Rwanda and Burundi. No medium-tech products were exported by Sudan, DRC and Rwanda. The top innovators were Mauritius, Seychelles and Kenya in that order.

Source: ARII, UNECA, 2016

EAC exports showed a slight move toward a more industrial mix (to the EU). However, vegetables continued to represent about 60% of EAC exports to the EU and manufactures just 10%. ESA's export mix to the EU remained largely unchanged (44% agriculture, 28% manufactures), as did SADC's (40% minerals, 32% manufactures). It will be interesting to see if the EPAs have any impact on higher value-added exports. Since an EU official said the EPAs basically consolidated the 'applied' status quo (like many trade agreements), the immediate effects may not be notable.

Trade Facilitation and Trade Flows: Evidence from Africa (WTO 2016) Hertel and Mirza (2009) and Hoekman and Nicita (2008) used the World Bank's *Logistics Performance Index* and *Doing Business* report within a gravity framework to model trade facilitation. Using the WB's indices of trade restrictiveness and trade facilitation, the authors suggested that **tariffs and non-tariff measures continued to be a significant source of trade restrictiveness** for low-income countries **despite preferential access programmes**, in part because the **value of trade preferences was quite limited**. If you don't use trade preferences (due to complex paperwork, for example), then you have to use the MFN tariff rates, which are higher.

Intra-COMESA Trade

According to the COMESA Trade Ministers Council August 2016 report based on the COMSTAT and UN COMTRADE Databases, intra-COMESA exports rose from US\$3bn in 2006 to nearly \$8bn in 2015, after peaking at \$10bn in 2011. The EU was COMESA's top export market, followed by intra-COMESA sales, then China and Switzerland. In 2006 COMESA was in fifth place. As for imports, intra-COMESA purchases doubled from nearly \$4bn in 2006 to \$8bn in 2015. The top suppliers in 2015 were EU, China, India and South Africa in that order. COMESA was in fifth place in both 2006 and 2015.

<p>Of 2016 exports, the top 20 - accounting for \$45bn of \$67bn - were mostly unrefined commodities (only copper, cobalt, gold and postage stamps had any value added). Of intra-COMESA exports, among the top 20 products, medicaments were nearly the only value-added item to improve its ranking (from 20 in 2011 to 13 in 2015).</p> <p>Intra-COMESA trade as a % of global trade by each member state has been fairly stable when averaged out over the 2006-16 period, though there were sharp ups and downs. Zambia was the only country to show progressive expansion from 9% to 19%.</p> <p>EA-SA-IO Trade with the EU While the EU remained the RECs' main market in 2007-2015, export growth was mixed (EAC exports to the EU grew 40%, ESA's 30% and SADC's just 6% due to a big fall in 2012-2015). China was EAC's and ESA's main supplier, while the EU was SADC's.</p>		
I-2.2.2 Time and cost of border crossing/clearance has declined, including for women border traders		
<p>The World Bank's Logistics Performance Index for 2016 shows that <u>sub-Saharan Africa has the furthest to go of all regions</u> to reach the level of the top performer, Germany (see chart below) in a variety of trading across borders indicators. However, it is narrowing the gap with Latin America. The LPIs for 2007-2016 show that sub-Saharan Africa performed relatively poorly compared to the Asia-Pacific region, for example, particularly between 2012 and 2016, when it actually went backwards on 3 of the 6 indicators. <u>The only area where Africa made measurable progress in 2012-2016 was border clearance efficiency</u>. However, Africa outperformed Latin America in improved scores for customs clearance, infrastructure and timeliness between 2007 and 2016, closing some of the gap on these indicators between the two regions and thus improving its trading competitiveness vis-a-vis LA.</p> <p>South Africa was the top performer in sub-Saharan Africa in 2016, ranking 20th worldwide after Australia. It was followed by Kenya (42), Botswana (57), Uganda(58), Tanzania (61), Rwanda (62), Namibia (79) and Mozambique (84), Comoros (98), Sudan (102), Burundi (107), Zambia (114), DR Congo (117), Ethiopia (126), Djibouti (134), Angola (139), Eritrea (144), Madagascar (147), Zimbabwe (151), Lesotho (154), Somalia (158). Syria was last (160).</p> <p><u>The World Bank's Logistics Performance Index (LPI) 2007-2016</u> The components analysed in the International LPI were chosen based on recent theoretical and empirical research and on the practical experience of logistics professionals involved in international freight forwarding. The logistics performance (LPI) is the weighted average of the country scores on the six key dimensions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Efficiency of the clearance process (i.e., speed, simplicity and predictability of formalities) by border control agencies, including customs 2) Quality of trade and transport related infrastructure (e.g., ports, railroads, roads, information technology) 3) Ease of arranging competitively priced shipments 4) Competence and quality of logistics services (e.g., transport operators, forwarders, customs brokers) 	<p>World Bank Logistics Performance Index 2016</p> <p>World Bank: Doing Business 2017, Time and Cost of Export/Import Procedures www.doingbusiness.org</p> <p>https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/scorecard/radar/254/C/DEU/2016/R/SSA/2016/R/SSA/2012/R/SSA/2007/R/EAP/2016/R/EAP/2007</p> <p>www.oecd.org/tad/facilitation/indicators.htm</p> <p>WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement www.wto.org</p> <p>Trademark East Africa interviews: Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda.</p> <p>Njiwa D., "Informal Cross-Border Trade: Challenges and Opportunities: a Case of COMESA and its STR Implementing Borders"</p>	<p>Satisfactory, except for data on women border traders</p>

- 5) Ability to track and trace consignments
6) Timeliness of shipments in reaching destination within the scheduled or expected delivery time.

The LPI uses standard statistical techniques to aggregate the data into a single indicator that can be used for cross-country comparisons.

Data Table

(Toggle Rank and Score for Sub indicators)

Country	Year	LPI Rank	LPI Score	Customs	Infra-structure	Inter-national shipments	Logistics competence	Tracking & tracing	Time-liness
Germany	2016	1	4.23	4.12	4.44	3.86	4.28	4.27	4.45
Region: East Asia & Pacific	2016		3.14	2.98	3.02	3.08	3.07	3.12	3.54
Region: East Asia & Pacific	2007		2.66	2.47	2.46	2.71	2.61	2.61	3.09
Region: Sub-Saharan Africa	2016		2.47	2.36	2.29	2.49	2.42	2.39	2.84
Region: Sub-Saharan Africa	2012		2.46	2.27	2.29	2.47	2.43	2.41	2.85
Region: Sub-Saharan Africa	2007		2.35	2.21	2.11	2.36	2.33	2.31	2.77
Region: Latin America & Caribbean	2016		2.66	2.48	2.46	2.69	2.60	2.67	3.05
Region: Latin America & Caribbean	2012		2.71	2.45	2.57	2.71	2.64	2.73	3.12

Interviews with customs and infrastructure officers at COMESA, EAC, UNECA

Interviews with relevant officers at EUDs in Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia

Interview with Kfw, Tanzania

Survey results

<p>Region: Latin America & Caribbean</p> <p>& 2007</p> <p>2.57 2.38 2.38 2.55 2.52 2.58 3.02</p>		
<p>I-2.2.3 Progress of the trade facilitation agenda throughout the region (customs, export procedures, cooperation among customs and other border authorities, transit issues)</p>		
<p>The WTO, WCO, UNCTAD, World Bank and other organisations have been assisting Africa with trade facilitation for many years. <u>The EU has funded some of these projects, directly and indirectly</u> (eg, ASYCUDA customs systems, one-stop border posts, transport infrastructure, ICT, etc). Trade facilitation is one of the priorities in EDF 11 - very timely given the imminent entry into force of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement which will give rise to considerable TA projects to facilitate implementation of the TFA.</p> <p>As of end April 2017, 10 of the 20 WTO members in the EA-SA-IO region had ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, which all WTO members approved in 2013-2014 and which two thirds of WTO members had ratified by 22 February 2017, permitting it to go into effect. The TFA is innovative in terms of WTO agreements in that its big TA undertaking is an integral part. The EU and its MS are the main donors of the WTO Trade Facilitation Facility.</p> <p>Trade facilitation can contribute strongly to competitiveness and trade diversification. <i>Trade Facilitation & Trade Flows: Evidence from Africa (WTO, 2016):</i> Key points:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Africa is still widely recognised as the place where importers and exporters face far greater obstacles in trade than in any other region in the world - Inefficient border procedures have caused a large reduction in revenues – up to 5% of GDP – in African countries. - Studies focusing on sub-Saharan Africa show that maritime transport connectivity and logistics performance are very important determinants of bilateral trade costs. - Port efficiency and services infrastructure are primary factors driving intra-African trade expansion. - One study estimated that implementation of TF reforms would see sub-Saharan Africa's trade rise 22%. - Other studies suggested that reducing inland transit times by just one day could raise exports 7-10%. - The quality of trade infrastructure, export and import processes, implementation of new technologies, and the regulatory environment were crucial elements contributing to reduce transit time. - Iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2009) suggested that the <u>low performance of African manufacturing exports could largely be attributed to poor infrastructure and the institutional environment</u>. The study's gravity modelling results indicated that trade facilitation could be a key to increasing Africa's trade in manufactured goods. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EDF 10 and 11 RSPs, RIPs, programme documents - EDF 11 Action Documents for COMESA, April 2017: Trade Facilitation and Crossborder Traders programmes - COMESA RISP documents - World Trade Organisation - www.wto.org - WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement - https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_agreecacc_e.htm - www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade-costs-incl-growth_chap7_e.pdf - World Customs Organisation - www.wcoomd.org - OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators - www.oecd.org/tad/facilitation/indicators.htm - COMSTAT and UN COMTRADE Databases 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews with trade facilitation officers at COMESA, EAC - <i>Survey results</i> - <i>Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - <i>Field interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA)</i> - <i>Field interviews with regional/continental organisations in Ethiopia (e.g. AU, UNECA)</i> - <i>Field interviews with business organisations, donors, project implementers in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade) 	
<p>I-2.2.4 Progress of implementation, enforcement of SPS and TBT-related rules, good practices, institutions, infrastructure [sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS), standardisation (TBT), certification, quality infrastructure]</p>		
<p>SPS and technical regulation/standards (TBT) are among the most crucial areas for trade development and regional integration. Donors in the EA-SA-IO region have carried out considerable SPS/TBT work. The EU has been active on both levels, though attribution is sometimes difficult. The EU and its Member States are the main donors to the WTO Standards and Trade Development Facility (SDTF), which supports COMESA and regional SPS work. The EU is a longstanding major supporter of the Nairobi-based regional African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR) through the EDF, the Intra-ACP fund and other modalities. This organisation has contributed considerably to improving livestock trade prospects in the region. The EU has contributed to COMESA SPS/TBT regional work on a small scale through RISP and directly to national implementation efforts through RISM. The COMESA Trade Division said that the EU funding had helped stakeholders gain a better common understanding of SPS/TBT issues and to speak the same language on problematic areas. At the EAC level, the EU and GIZ are considering a co-financing arrangement for work on regional harmonisation of standards. (I-2.2.4)</p>	<p>EDF 10 and 11 RIPs Reports provided by EUDs, COMESA, EAC (e.g. RISM, RISP, TCF)</p> <p>WTO Trade Policy Reviews of EAC, SADC</p> <p>WTO SDTF reports</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Survey results</i> - <i>Field interviews with EUDs in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - <i>Field interviews with DMROs: Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA)</i> 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Field interviews with regional/continental organisations in Ethiopia (e.g. AU, UNECA), Kenya (AU-IBAR)</i> - <i>Field interviews with business organisations, donors, project implementers in Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - <i>Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade)</i> 	
I-2.2.5 Services trade		
<p>Generally, the services sector is not prioritised as it should be, given its importance for trade and business development - and for everything else. This is often due to the fragmentation of the services sector - 160 subsectors on the WTO list - and that fact that these subsectors span all ministries and agencies in any government. However, a number of African services advocates - often former WTO services negotiators now back in capitals - are researchers are working to highlight the value of services in all trade and business activities, to dispel misconceptions about services trade liberalisation and to clarify expectations about managing all the regulation that is necessary to ensure service quality.</p> <p>The EAC Common Market Scorecard 2016 gave good examples illustrating the need for tighter regional/national linkages. Among other nontariff barriers, the CMS pointed to sanitary/phytosanitary and technical measures, as well as border issues and services barriers that had already been identified for elimination in 2014, noting that some were unresolved because they required a regional solution. (EACMS 2016, pg 7, 15). It also highlighted numerous data deficiencies, including statistics and other information on trade in services and services' vital contribution to regional integration. Such data needs are common throughout the EA-SA-IO region.</p> <p>The report says none of the EAC member states has complied with its services-related obligations. The CMS (pg.74) gives a good sum-up of the challenges and provides good recommendations on how to resolve a number of outstanding services-related economic integration problems.</p> <p>Interviews with the trade division in COMESA revealed that they welcomed EDF 11's stronger emphasis on services and they were going to use part of the €4m allocation for Services <i>et al</i> under the Trade Facilitation Programme to establish a proper Services team and get moving on the expanded services negotiations (7 sectors instead of just 4, as per MS agreement some years ago - one of the RISM indicators since late 2013). "Neither COMESA nor the EU</p>	<p>WTO and International Trade Centre analysis and statistics on service sector development in EA-SA-IO</p> <p>Tralac: Services trade in Africa - recs for CFTA https://www.tralac.org/publications/article/11239-services-trade-in-africa.html#downloads https://www.tralac.org/publications/article/11312-issues-for-cfta-negotiators-to-consider.html#downloads</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Survey results</i> - <i>Field interviews with EUDs in Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - <i>Field interviews with DMROs in Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA)</i> 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

<p>prioritised Services enough in the past.” This comes at an important moment when COMESA wants to conclude its own regional accord, and when both TFTA and CFTA are poised to start Services work (though overlapping issues need to be addressed at REC and AU level). The Trade Division plans to reactivate the Services Unit, develop a team, work on commitments and implementation, enhance public awareness, offer capacity building for business with the COMESA Business Council (CBC). A longstanding ‘problem’ is the fragmented distribution of trade responsibilities around COMESA. For example, the Services Unit is still located in the Assistant Secretary-General’s office, but the officer has gone to SADC. The Director of the Trade Division is confident that under COMESA’s Programme Approach, the various parts will continue to work together. (JC2.1, COMESA)</p> <p>At EAC, GIZ was funding the EAC Services negotiator and coordinator ((Stacy) who was busy upgrading the EAC services commitments as per the Council directive.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Field interviews with regional/ continental organisations in Ethiopia (e.g. AU, UNECA), Kenya (Aga Khan University), Tanzania (e.g. AFRITAC)</i> - <i>Field interviews with business organisations, donors, project implementers in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>interview with TMEA regarding the EAC Scorecard results on Services</i> - <i>Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade)</i> 	
<p>JC 2.3 EU regional support has contributed to SME competitiveness.</p>		
<p>Summary response</p>	<p>Sources of information</p>	<p>Quality of evidence</p>
<p>Regionally, RISM/RISP and REIS/TRF have contributed to improving the business environment and facilitating a number of sectoral and general export-readiness activities for SMEs. Work on SPS, TBT, NTBs, competition policy, etc, all improve the business and trading environment, which benefits SMEs directly. It is important to find the right balance between regional and national support for private sector development and competitiveness-related work. This is an area that DMROs need to review carefully in terms of their own mandates and sustainability.</p>		
<p>I-2.3.1 Business environment improved</p>		
<p>The annual World Bank ‘Doing Business’ ratings are a good tool to track progress in the areas that have the most effect on the business environment.</p> <p>The most recent set of ratings (2017, issued in 2016 based on 2015/16 data) provide subregional breakdowns for the EAC, SADC and sub-Saharan Africa. The scores are relative; some countries may fall in the rankings as others pass them in regulatory action. One data set shows the change in ranking vis-à-vis various indicators in recent years. <u>All three regions/subregions showed some progress in starting a business</u>, but challenges persisted in treatment of minority investors and paying taxes. Only EAC as a whole showed progress in ‘getting credit’. Both EAC and SADC showed relatively respectable levels of ‘paying taxes’. <u>All three regions/subregions continued to lag on ‘trading across borders’.</u></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - World Bank ‘Doing Business 2017’ Ratings www.doingbusiness.org/reports/~/_media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Profiles/Regional/DB2017/EAC.pdf - EDF 10 and 11 RSPs/RIPs - <i>Survey results</i> - <i>Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - <i>Interview with EU Business Group, Tanzania</i> 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

<p>Since 2010, the EAC has shown measurable progress in starting a business and getting credit. In most of the other areas it has not advanced much overall, its scores pulled down by Burundi's difficulties. Star performers in overall 'ease of doing business' were Rwanda (56 of 190) and Kenya (92) (<i>note: 1 is best</i>).</p> <p>SADC has also improved in starting a business, but it has not shown little progress in the other areas, even posting lower scores in the all-important 'getting credit' category. Mauritius (49), Botswana (71) and South Africa (74) were the top performers in 'ease of doing business' overall.</p> <p>There is no breakdown for COMESA. However, the overall sub-Saharan Africa scores show that 14 of the 24 ACP countries covered by the rankings (not Eritrea) are above the regional average, and 10 are below it. All the countries above the average except Malawi are involved in one of the three signed EPAs. Two of the countries below it - Burundi and Zimbabwe - are EPA parties.</p> <p>EU regional support for horizontal and vertical harmonisation of regulatory reform and good practices has contributed to improvements in the business environment, though there is still a long way to go. Examples include regional support for Competition Policy, COMESA PTA Bank, trade facilitation/border efficiency, infrastructure, tax reforms, etc.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Field interviews with DMROs in Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA)</i> - <i>Field interviews with COMESA Business Council, EAC Business Council, TMEA</i> - <i>Field interviews with regional/continental organisations in Ethiopia (e.g. AU, UNECA, UNCTAD), Tanzania (e.g. AFRITAC)</i> - <i>Field interviews with business organisations, donors, project implementers in Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - <i>Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade)</i> 	
<p>I-2.3.1: EDF 11 COMESA Regional Integration Programme, page 30 of RIP:</p> <p>Specific Objective 2: <u>Increased private sector participation in regional and global value chains, through improved investment/business climate and enhanced competitiveness and productive/innovation capacity</u></p> <p>An indicative EUR 10 million shall be reserved for this specific objective.</p> <p>The policy measures to be taken and major operations foreseen are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to develop more small and medium enterprise clusters and business linkages including with multinationals, in more economic sectors and in more countries and with a specific focus on fostering women's economic empowerment (in the context of the COMESA Cluster Initiative, and in close coordination with national initiatives); • Support to COMESA initiatives in the area of science, technology and innovation; • Support to COMESA member states to align their national policies to the COMESA regional small and medium enterprise policy (or to develop one when inexistent) and monitor subsequent implementation; • Support to update/review, implement and monitor the COMESA Common Investment Area (CCIA); <p>The main expected results to be achieved are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small and medium enterprise productive/innovation capacity and competitiveness enhanced; • Enabling environment for small and medium enterprises and the private sector in general in the COMESA region improved. <p style="text-align: right;"><i>(click and pull to enlarge)</i></p>	<p>EDF 11 RIP</p>	

I-2.3.2 SME frameworks operational		
<p>While SMEs have long been a stated priority in EDF RIPs, details on specific regional SME-related projects were not readily available in reports on the CRIS system. Similarly, very little information was available on DMRO websites or in their annual reports. The only regional SME framework found through a variety of searches was COMESA's, as described below. Field interviews confirmed the initial impression that it had not evolved much.</p> <p>COMESA's Micro and Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) Policy of October 2013 stated: "The COMESA MSME institutional framework will strive to achieve the following: - Ensure coordination and harmonization of the different national MSME development policies and programmes to enhance intra-regional and global trade; - Provide a regional institutional support mechanism to facilitate MSME development at national and regional level relevant to enhancing intra-regional and global trade; - Develop guidelines on priorities and appropriate allocation of resources for MSME development in the Region; - Assign tasks, responsibilities and accountability for implementation of regional MSME development programmes and activities.</p> <p>For effective implementation, there will be a need for a clear definition of the roles of the various stakeholders particularly the COMESA Secretariat, national governments, the private sector, MSMEs and other actors.</p> <p>The COMESA Secretariat, through the Coordinating Office, will produce annual work plans to guide implementation and annual reports to document progress on implementation. The monitoring process will include performance reviews and field visits as appropriate. A fully-fledged Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) will be developed prior to implementation of the MSME Policy. Annual reviews will be conducted by the COMESA Secretariat while the mid-term evaluation and final evaluation will be undertaken by independent consultants."</p> <p>None of these work plans or reviews are to be found on the COMESA website. Nor were they available upon request to COMESA during the field visit. Moreover, no one interviewed in COMESA was familiar with the MSME Policy (officers responsible for trade, investment, private sector development, COMESA Business Council...). CBC reported that in April 2013 it convened SME Associations in the region to develop common regional positions to improve the business environment for SMES, to feed into the COMESA MSME policy released in October 2013. CBC reported no follow-up to this policy.</p>	<p>EDF 10 and 11 RSPs/RIPs</p> <p>DMRO websites, annual reports</p> <p>Regional Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) Policy for COMESA Member States (COMESA, Oct. 2013)</p> <p>RISM reports, including the 2016 progress report, December 2016.</p> <p>RISP 3 2016 progress report, December 2016.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Survey results</i> - <i>Field interviews with EUDs in Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - <i>Field interviews with DMROs in Mauritius (IOC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA)</i> - <i>Field interviews with COMESA Business Council, EAC Business Council</i> - <i>Field interviews with regional/continental organisations in Ethiopia (e.g. AU, UNECA, UNCTAD)</i> - <i>Field interviews with business organisations, donors, project implementers in Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe</i> 	<p>Inconclusive</p>

<p>COMESA was able to confirm that the EU did not contribute financially to the MSME project. However, a review of EU RISP and RISM reports revealed that some regional funding was disbursed at the national level for SME policies and in Djibouti, for aligning its SME policy with the COMESA framework. And EDF 11 suggests more support for aligning MS policies with a regional SME policy, “or to develop one if inexistent”. (RIP COMESA programme, objective 2, page 30)</p>	<p>- Field interviews with government officials in Ethiopia (Ministry of Trade), Kenya (Treasury and focus group of line agencies), Tanzania (Ministry of Trade), Zimbabwe (Ministry of Trade), Mauritius (Ministry of Trade)</p>	
<p>Under EDF 11, private sector development work moved from NIPs to the RIP, with more focus on clusters and regional value chains in specific sectors. Box 2.1 shows private sector-related priorities for all the DMROs. EDF 11 does not explain its objectives for these in detail, and since programming is still ongoing, the evaluators were not able to ascertain how the new private sector focus might work in practice. The two Action Documents described in Box 2.2 shed some light on this. For example, the TF document says “the beneficiaries will primarily be the member states of COMESA and the <u>private sector/traders</u> in the COMESA/Tripartite region”; and among key stakeholders is “the <u>Private Sector</u>: service providers such as crossborder transporters and clearing and forwarding agencies, port and maritime authorities in the transport and logistics industry; business associations representing key export services sectors, professional associations”. It goes on to say that it will build awareness of NTBs’ impacts in the <u>private sector</u>; have a “structured dialogue mechanism with <u>private sector</u> on customs reforms”; provide support to the COMESA Secretariat on TFTA and CFTA negotiations, “in close coordination with the other RECs, member states and the <u>private sector</u>”; support ... a COMESA Business Visa scheme (in close partnership with the <u>COMESA Business Council</u>); compile COMESA commercial directory; support participation in COMESA regional trade fairs, B2B meetings, creation of a regional platform to bring regional producers together, etc. The only new approach here is the close partnership with the CBC. Even though the East Africa Business Council is involved in these areas, it is not mentioned, despite the TF programme covering all EAC member states.</p> <p>The Crossborder Traders programme is more specific, since small traders - especially women - are the main end-beneficiary and several private sector associations are targeted for support. A number of the proposed activities align closely with objectives of the EU May 2014 report, ‘A Stronger Role of the Private Sector in Achieving Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Developing Countries’ which says a top priority is to support progressive transition from the informal to the formal economy, the economic empowerment of women, and support to informal business associations and business support services.</p>		
<p>I-2.3.3 SMEs’ export readiness has improved</p>		
<p>EU regional support to improve the business and trading environment has assisted SMEs as well as other enterprises. Export readiness, however, is more a local (national) activity than a regional one, since it involves directly helping businesses to develop the skills, knowledge, systems and capacity to compete in export markets (e.g. to meet EU food safety requirements). EU national-level support, combined with that of other donors, has made some headway.</p>	<p>EDF 10 and 11 RSPs/RIPs</p> <p>Interviews at COMESA, EAC, COMESA and EAC Business Councils, Trade Mark East Africa, Governments of Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, AU-IBAR, USAID</p>	<p>Satisfactory.</p>

<p>The EU EDF 10 support to clusters/value chain development in COMESA was terminated (2014?), due to poor management, following the midterm review of RISP 3. RISP 3 and RISM support for a variety of ‘incubator’, cluster and value chain initiatives continues. Some beneficiaries have contracted International Trade Centre (ITC), a Geneva-based UNCTAD affiliate, to manage these activities.</p> <p>Field interviews revealed the view among member states and donors that such activities are outside the competence and role of the DMROs.</p>	<p>RISM reports, including the 2016 progress report, December 2016.</p> <p>RISP 3 2016 progress report, December 2016.</p>	
<p>I-2.3.4 Regional business networks delivering results in trade and advocacy</p>		
<p>The COMESA and East Africa Business Councils (CBC and EABC, respectively) represent the ‘voice of business’ and contribute a business perspective to the regional economic integration agenda. The CBC and EABC have close ties with the respective REC Secretariats and are active in convening business people and gathering business views on trade, SME and industrialisation matters, as well as contributing to negotiating positions for regional trade negotiations. In November 2016, for example, the CBC, EABC and SADC jointly convened a workshop to prepare common positions for TFTA negotiations on free movement of business people. CBC has also done a lot of work on the proposed COMESA Business Visa. The Councils are also active in the <u>Women in Business</u> movement.</p> <p>USAID has been the main supporter of the CBC; TMEA and GIZ have been supporting EABC, and GIZ and the African Development Bank have supported the Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry and more recently the Southern African Business Forum.</p> <p>COMESA Business Council (CBC)</p> <p>The EU provided limited support to the COMESA Business Council (CBC) under RISP 2. CBC received no support from the EU under RISP 3. It has 8 officers, of which half are donor supported. USAID is the main donor, with rolling three-year funding channelled through COMESA. CBC also gets project-specific support from the International Trade Centre, an UNCTAD-WTO supported institution. Like at the EAC Business Council, CBC is feeling the crunch of lower donor spending.</p> <p>CBC said it has engaged with the EUD in recent years on a number of issues, including value chains and the COMESA Business Visa initiative, where CBC has developed a model instrument that will be presented to the COMESA policy meetings in April-May. If it works, it will be applicable to the Tripartite process. EDF 11 will support this initiative under the new Trade Facilitation programme’s Component 5: <i>Support for the design, piloting and roll-out of a COMESA Business Visa scheme (in close partnership with the COMESA Business Council – CBC)</i>.</p> <p>The Council may be able to add value in other areas as well, given its involvement in such areas as women in business, formulation of an enterprise development strategy focusing on agro-suppliers, SPS/TBT matters, value</p>	<p>Interviews with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - COMESA Business Council - EAC Business Council. - EU Business Group - TMEA <p>EAMR 2015 report on Tanzania EUD</p> <p>EDF 10 and 11 RSPs/RIPs</p> <p>EDF 11 Trade Facilitation Action Fiche for COMESA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Survey results</i> - <i>Field interviews with EUDs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zambia</i> - <i>Field interviews with DMROs in Botswana (SADC), Tanzania (EAC), Zambia (COMESA)</i> - <i>Field interviews with business organisations, donors, project implementers in Botswana, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zambia</i> 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

chains, services trade, etc. Indeed, it may be more appropriate for certain SME activities than the COMESA Agriculture and Industry Division, which was described as incompetent in interviews with number of member state officials (e.g. Mauritius).

East Africa Business Council (EABC)

“The good thing about EAC is that it has an active Business Council.” (TZ02)

EABC is celebrating its 20th anniversary this year. It is primarily member-funded and works closely with the EAC Secretariat. The EABC has permanent observer status in EAC policy dialogue and plays an important role in trade negotiations on goods (with the Trade Division) and in Women in Business (with the Gender Division). Like its counterparts in the COMESA and SADC regions, it depends on donor funding for many of its activities. Trade Mark East Africa (TMEA) supports sectoral and women in business activities and a senior policy officer. The Federation of German Industries (BDI) supports a variety of membership services, communications and advocacy activities. GIZ supports activities related to its own EAC priorities - mainly events and publications. EABC also works closely with the East Africa Local Govt Authorities Association and local chambers of commerce.

The EU has not provided any direct support to the EABC. The EAC, however, has used RISP funding to commission work by them (e.g. on nontariff barriers and harmonisation of regional standards). EABC said it wanted to organise a regional private sector conference to discuss the EAC EPA and present an impact paper that would give an objective view, which is what business was asking for at the time. However, it did not have the funds to do so, “and by the time we asked the Ambassador, it was too late”. (JC 2.3, TZ02, TZ03)

EU Business Group in Tanzania (EUBG)

The EUD in Tanzania provided seed funding (“less than €20 000”) in 2015 to start the EU Business Group with the aim of engaging EU business interests in the country and increasing efficiency of dialogue with authorities on specific challenges and obstacles to doing business. It now has 113 members and is largely self-supporting. It has produced position papers and advocated on tax, immigration and transit cargo issues, among others. The EUBG also participates in regional activities (e.g. EABC meetings). During the formulation of the SADC Trade-Related Facility in 2015, it organised a specific consultation with the Tanzanian private sector to discuss business environment issues. The EUD, for its part, disseminates EUBG work to partners in EAC countries and beyond, e.g. the EU Business Organisations Worldwide Network. It also promotes the Group in Tanzania, highlighting to government authorities the benefits of dialogue with the private sector as a key contributor to social and economic improvements. The EUD continues to provide funding for analytical studies - assistance the EUBG says sets it apart from such groups in other countries which are reportedly struggling due to lack of capacity to produce the reports necessary to back up their advocacy claims. If it is successful, it could possibly serve as a model for other EUDs to consider.

RISM Brief

Sum-Up: The Regional Integration Support Mechanism (RISM) has allocated €111m since 2007 to help COMESA and its overlapping EAC Member States adjust to and implement their regional integration programmes. RISM started out in 2007 as a revenue-loss compensation instrument. It evolved in 2012 into a pilot programme based on the logic of providing an incentive to governments to honour regional commitments, by tying disbursements to progress in meeting agreed targets based on indicators reflecting key COMESA and EAC agreements and strategies.

1. Objective and expected results of the initiative

The dependency of many countries on tariffs and other trade charges as a source of revenue reduces their ability and motivation to implement trade liberalisation and regional economic integration. The **Regional Integration Support Mechanism (RISM)** was established at the end of EDF 9 in November 2007 under a Contribution Agreement for **€78m**, operationalising the COMESA Adjustment Facility (CAF - one of two windows in the COMESA Fund Protocol for Cooperation, Compensation and Development set up in 2002 but dormant for lack of funds).

Overall Objective	To support the economic integration process of the ESA-IO region through the consolidation of the COMESA free trade area and implementation of COMESA and EAC customs unions and common markets.
Specific Objective	To support Member Countries to participate fully in the COMESA, EAC and Tripartite free trade areas, and the COMESA and EAC customs unions and common markets, with minimum disruption to public expenditure commitments, as well as enabling them to implement reform programmes in the context of regional integration.
Expected Result(s)	A substantive contribution to the effective transposition and implementation of COMESA/EAC Regional Integration policies, regulations and programmes ('regional integration commitments') at the national level. (The Action Fiche further specified "in the free trade area, the customs union, resolution of non-tariff barriers, harmonised standards, trade in services, investment and competition policies, transport and trade facilitation policies'. It also sought improvements in national planning and budgeting systems, inter-institutional coordination on trade/regional integration, and COMESA M&E capacity".)

Source: RISM Consolidation, July 2014, and Addendum, 2015; Action Fiche 2012/024-191, 3.1, 3.2, p.3

COMESA has 19 Member States: Burundi, Comoros, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. All except Eritrea, Egypt and Libya may participate in RISM. Four belong to the EAC (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda).

RISM provided adjustment support to Burundi and Rwanda (€12.7m and €22.6m, respectively in 2009/10) when they joined the EAC Customs Union. They were the only countries to benefit from RISM until **mid-2012** when RISM's scope was broadened through a 24-month **Rider** responding to recommendations of the EDF 9 Midterm Review. By then most COMESA members had joined the FTA and EAC members had joined their Customs Union, and there was little demand for revenue compensation. Of the €42.7m remaining in the fund in 2012, €5m were set aside for revenue-loss compensation. The rest was to go for project support to underpin national implementation of COMESA and EAC regional integration commitments and instruments. (Since the €5m set for revenue losses remained unused at December 2013, an amendment in 2014 incorporated it into the project support facility and the revenue-loss provision was removed.)

For EDF 10, the EU further refined RISM ('RISM Consolidation') to provide funding predictability over 36 months, taking account of the step-by-step approach needed to 'anchor and entrench reforms'. EDF 10 committed an additional €33.4m. In 2014, the RISM Rider merged with the RISM Consolidation programme.


Pay for performance: The reformulated RISM was designed to reward member states (MS) for progress on transposition and implementation of regional agreements. To apply for RISM support,

MS had to prepare a Regional Integration Implementation Plan (RIIP) outlining their strategy for implementing outstanding commitments against a set of performance indicators aligned with the COMESA Medium-Term Strategy. Disbursements were to be tied to the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) and its 18 indicators (21 since a 2013 revision) based on specific targets and variable geometry (Action Fiche RISM/2012/024/191, p. 3).

Objective aligned to COMESA Strategy	Performance Indicators (2013-14 substantive revisions/additions in blue)
National monitoring & reporting mechanisms	1. National Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committees officially constituted and operational 2. Selected regionally agreed harmonised statistical clusters (frameworks) to produce national statistics implemented
Consolidation of free trade area (FTA)	3. Implementation of the COMESA Free Trade Area 4. At least 30% 70% of reported Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) resolved by Member State per year 5. Number of COMESA and/or EAC Harmonised Standards adopted by each Member State per year
Removal of barriers to trade and business	6. Key elements of the Simplified Trade Regime (STR) implemented (comment: to facilitate small-scale crossborder trade activities) 7. Reduction in number of documents to export a consignment (as per EODB framework) 8. Reduction in number of documents to import a consignment (as per EODB framework)
Operationalising the Customs Unions	9. Common Tariff Nomenclature (CTN) domesticated by Member States 10. Customs Management Regulations (CMR) adopted at national level 11. Final schedule of commitments in 7 (previously 4) key priority Services submitted to & confirmed by COMESA (financial services, communications, transport and tourism + energy, business, and construction and related engineering services)
Launch of the Common Market	12. Provisions of the protocol on gradual relaxation and eventual elimination of visas implemented
Common Competition Policy	13. Competition regulations adopted at national level
Improved business and investment enabling environment	14. COMESA Common Investment Area Agreement (CCIA) signed and ratified 15. Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs) negotiated, signed, ratified at national level
Transport Facilitation	16. Harmonised Road Transport Charges (HRTC) implemented 17. Harmonised Axle Load Limits (ALL) & Overload Control certificate implemented 18. COMESA Harmonised Vehicle Dimensions (HVD) implemented 19. COMESA Carrier Licence (CCL) implemented 20. COMESA Yellow card adopted and used where applicable 21. Air transport liberalisation in compliance with COMESA Legal Notice #2 of 1999

* The two areas removed from the previous list were Common External Tariff implementation and notification of the Sensitive List. Source: RISM Action Fiche 2012, COMESA SG letter to EU 2013; RISM Consolidation Addendum 2015.

How RISM Works



Source: RISM Unit, COMESA, from RISM Consolidation Contribution Agreement, 2014

Budget versus project support: Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda and Seychelles are eligible for budget support, according to an EU letter to COMESA dated 10 October 2016. (Under the RISM scheme, they may opt for project support). The rest receive project support: Burundi, Comoros Djibouti, DR Congo, Malawi, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Budget support beneficiaries are subject to fewer requirements in terms of linking funding to performance, but they, like the others, must submit annual performance monitoring reports (PMRs). As the Mauritius Trade Department and the Kenyan Treasury explained, Treasury does not pass on (to line agencies) RISM funds as such, but the line agencies' achievement of the targets/indicators - detailed in the PRM - allows COMESA to release the following year's RISM allocation to Treasury.

Under EDF 9, €73,4m (of the €78m allocation) was approved under five 'calls' for submissions in 2009-2014. Of this, €67,9m has been disbursed (92,5%), according to COMESA's Dec. 2016 RISM Progress Report and subsequent updates to May 2017. The EDF 9 RISM timeframe has been extended to December 2017.

Under EDF 10 (2015, 2016) two calls have led to disbursements of €5,3m (36% of the €14,7m approved). A third call for €16,8m is scheduled for July 2017. The EDF 10 RISM timeframe has been extended to December 2019.

RISM 'Calls' for Submissions, 2008 -2016; Status at May 2017

EDF 9: RISM 2008-2012: €78m

Calls 1 & 2: 2009, 2010: **€35.3m** disbursed to Burundi (€12.7m) and Rwanda (€22.6m)

EDF 9: 'RISM Rider', Nov. 2012-Dec. 2014: covered what was left of the €78m, ie, €42,7m.

Rider extended to December 2017 on case by case basis, upon approval of a justifiable request by December 2016.

Call 3: 2012: €9 748 052. 100% disbursed.

RIIPs approved for Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Call 4: 2013: €16 374 660. €14 741 253 disbursed (90%).

RIIPs approved for DRC, Djibouti, Malawi, Swaziland. Progress monitoring reports (PMRs) for Call 3 (2012) approved for Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Call 5: 2014: €11 981 130. €8 071 207 disbursed (67%), mostly extensions to Calls 3-4. Deadline extended to mid-2017.

RIIPs approved for newcomers: Ethiopia, Madagascar, Sudan. PMRs for Call 4 (2013) approved for Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda and Zambia.

Total EDF 9 disbursements: €35.3m disbursed in Calls 1-2 and **€32,6m** disbursed in Calls 3-5 = **€67,9m** of the €73,4m approved for disbursement to Member States

Note: 94% of the EU RISM Consolidation allocation goes to project/budget support; 6% is for administrative and contingency purposes.

EDF 10: 'RISM Consolidation': July 2014-Dec.2016: **€33,4m** (additional allocation) *Timeframe extended to Dec. 2019.*

Call 6: 2015: €9 020 419. €4 550 411 disbursed (50%).

PMRs for Call 5 (2014) approved for Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda and Zambia.

Call 7: mid-2016. €13m initially allocated, but just **€5 672 820 approved for disbursement** due to low attainment of 2015 targets (42%). (Call 6 funds were only to be programmed in early 2017, per 2016 Progress Report.) To April 2017, **€747 907 disbursed (13%)**. PMRs for Call 6 (2015) were submitted by 15 countries: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, D.R Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The following 10 have been approved to receive all or part of their Annual Nominal Allocations: Comoros, DRC, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda and Zambia.

Call 8: July 2017: €16 770 764.

Sources: RISM Action Fiche 2012, RISM Consolidation Contribution Agreement 2014, RISM Progress Report 2016, COMESA Country Briefs 2016; EUD and COMESA updates, mid-May 2017.

2. Significant changes

General institutional improvements:

- 'The RISM programme has been instrumental for fostering stronger linkages between regional decisions and national frameworks in COMESA,' wrote COMESA's Secretary-General to DEVCO D in May 2014.
- Clearer, more visible focus on COMESA and EAC regional economic integration commitments (including because MS were able to use RISM funds for publicity campaigns on COMESA/EAC and regional integration benefits).
- Mindset changes regarding results-oriented planning and performance due to focus on setting targets linked to specific commitments and to the 'pay for performance' approach.

- National Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committees (organised by MoFs/MoTs) have enhanced interagency interaction, and facilitated opportunities for agencies to work together in other matters such as trade negotiations.
- EUD involvement at both regional and national level helps ensure complementarity between RISM and other regional and national programmes.
- Stronger technical ties between member states and the COMESA Secretariat.
- MS capacity to develop performance-based project proposals and plans is improving.
- Responsiveness of the COMAid RISM Unit to questions from MS has led to the Unit becoming a contact point for broader COMESA-related queries.
- Improved internal collaboration and coordination within the COMESA Secretariat. The RISM Grant Management Task Force, with relevant divisions, meets or liaises regularly to review the projects.
- Improved Secretariat and MS understanding of political and technical challenges of implementing the regional integration agenda.
- RISM Advisory Committee, a 'subcommittee' of the COMESA Fund Ministerial Committee, serves as a 'peer review mechanism' for reviewing and approving MS applications for RISM support, and for monitoring progress against commitments.
- SADC is invited to participate in RISM committees and COMESA in SADC's Trade-Related Facility. SADC has not come to meetings but has visited COMESA to exchange experiences and project documents. Both Secretariats share experience with the overlapping MS, and encourage them to assign responsibility for RISM/TRF projects to the same national division. This has to some extent minimised duplication. The EAC Secretariat is also invited to participate in assessment and technical meetings. (Tanzania uses the SADC TRF, as it is the only EAC MS that does not belong to COMESA. RISM sought to allow Tanzania to participate, but Tanzania would have had to contribute to the COMESA Fund in order to qualify.)

Performance against major indicators:

- Regarding the 21 indicators, the RISM annual progress report inexplicably does not report on this, so it is difficult to assess overall gains. However, interviews revealed that most participants have national coordinating committees, 16 of 19 COMESA members have ratified the FTA, most now have NTB reporting mechanisms, the number of harmonised standards adopted is rising, trade procedures are being streamlined, CMR is almost fully adopted, CTN domestication is progressing, competition policy harmonisation is advancing, and the various road transport indicators are being progressively adopted. Progress on the statistics, services, investment, visas, and border procedures is slow (no progress for CCIA and visas). EDF 11 addresses all of these areas. See JC 2.1 in Annex 4 for customs union statistics.

3. Explanatory factors

The indicators reflected well documented Member State commitments and aspirations. Reforms were already underway in many of the areas. The coordinating committees and higher visibility increased pressure to perform. The EUD in Lusaka has played an active role, looking at indicators, reviewing progress reports, participating in planning. The country EUDs participate in the NIMCCs, review project design for complementarity with NIPs.

4. Influence of EU support on the changes

EU support, i.e. fully funding the RISM programme, has been instrumental in delivering the improvements listed above and in strengthening regional-national linkages in terms of key harmonisation and domestication issues. The EU's flexibility in extending the timeframes for use of the funding has been appreciated by the Secretariat and MS (interviews, January-February 2017). Kenya said that the EU's approval of budget support in late 2015 placed the RIIP on Kenya's budget agenda and this has helped increase accountability and awareness across government.

5. Alternative explanations

RISM funding complements other EU and donor support and COMESA Member State spending. In a number of cases (especially under budget support), RISM may not have been the primary source

of funds. However, MS still had to perform well against the targets and indicators in order for Treasury to receive the allocated funds.

6. Challenges and lessons learned

Issues raised in assessment and interviews:

- Overestimation of national ability to programme and implement, and underestimation of the complex, onerous process led to several extensions. Undisbursed EDF 9/10 funds will be used throughout EDF 11, so further RISM funding may be unlikely, especially since EDF 11 covers many of the target areas.
- Annual nominal allocations pose a challenge as they demand a continuous cycle of programming funds.
- Verifiable, up-to-date baseline data and quantifiable monitoring indicators and evidence sources need to be quite clear, and agreed upfront with both the beneficiaries and the reviewers in order to inform expectations.
- For years, the EU has been raising the issue of the quality of MS reporting and verification tools. This problem has led to delays in disbursement.
- Diversion into clusters, incubators and other such schemes tends to fragment the use of the rather limited funds and takes the eye off compliance issues in project-support countries.
- Diversification of CAF funding and longer-term sustainability of the facility remains a big issue. A Sustainability Strategy has been in the making for some time.

Issues raised in ROM 2015/MTR 2014:

- Tight 'pay for progress' timeframes and complex procedures have contributed to poor performance: the ROM and MTR suggested instituting a time-bound 'milestone' system in country/sector reform roadmaps and targets, and disbursing against progress in meeting the agreed milestones and timeframes. RISM Consolidation could accommodate such changes given its 'variable geometry' approach and the fact that the project documents already mention such an approach.
- Annual 'calls' have both pros and cons. The reviews suggested they might be too frequent since complex procedures and delays in disbursements leave little time after all the paperwork to implement and show results by the PMR is due at the next call. The other side of the coin is that annual calls instil discipline with the requirement to report on progress in order to receive the annual nominal allocations.

7. Suggestions for future consideration

- The RISM indicators were last updated in 2013-2014, so it may be opportune to: (1) take a new look at them and the evidence used to measure performance, and (2) recalibrate each country's baseline to reflect progress to date; this will facilitate performance targeting and measuring.
- Reporting guidelines may also benefit from a revision, to avoid vague or overstated claims, and to fortify credibility, accountability and honesty.
- Involving the private sector from the beginning (e.g. in designing national roadmaps to implement regional directives) can lead to more practical, results-oriented programmes.
- Any future RISM or RISM-like mechanism may wish to consider a more efficient disbursement process. Both MS and national EUDs say the present 'arms-length' EU-to-COMESA-to-Member States disbursement process is inefficient. COMESA Member States interviewed said they would prefer direct disbursement by EUDs.
- Interviews and document analysis revealed confusion between RISM and RISP use at national level. Any future programme may wish to clarify at all levels how 'complementary' programmes will be used.

Sources: Interviews, Action Fiche 2012/024-19, RISM Consolidation, Addendum 2015, 2016 Progress Report

EQ 3 Regional Infrastructure: Progress on Regional Interconnectivity

To what extent has regional-level EU support since 2008 contributed to improved regional trade-related infrastructure connectivity in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean states?

Rationale & Coverage of the EQ:

Infrastructure is a critical driver of regional economic integration in EASAIIO but there remains a significant deficit in terms of the financing (a gap of \$93 billion per year in 2015) and capacity available to prepare, plan and implement infrastructure projects.² Both continental (like PIDA) and regional development plans (e.g. SADC Infrastructure Masterplan) respond to these challenges by prioritising the construction of infrastructure, as well as its ongoing maintenance, in order to achieve higher levels of intra-regional trade and investment. The approach of the Tripartite Free Trade Area has been to include infrastructure as one of the three pillars for regional integration (together with market access and industrial development).

The EU has highlighted infrastructure development in the region in both EDFs 10 and 11 as part of its overall objective of supporting regional economic integration. The priority sectors are energy, transport (road under EDF10 and with rail, civil aviation and maritime corridors added under EDF11) and communications in line with the regional plans of COMESA, EAC, IOC and SADC. The objectives of EU regional support cover soft infrastructure issues such as the development of policy frameworks, connectivity projects, and improvement of the strategic and regulatory frameworks for infrastructure networks in the region.

Table: Summary of Infrastructure Interventions


	EDF 10	EDF 11
Priority Infrastructure Sectors	Road transport Energy Communications/ICT	Road and rail transport Civil aviation Maritime corridors Energy Communications/ICT
Funding Mechanisms	EU Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund Support to DMROs – COMESA, SADC Project Preparation Development Fund	Africa Investment Facility – now part of European External Investment Plan Cross-region projects on soft infrastructure: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transport and transit (SADC) • Rail (EAC) • Civil aviation (COMESA) • Maritime corridors (IOC) • ICT (COMESA) • Energy (COMESA)


² World Economic Forum, Africa Competitiveness Report, 2017, p.17.

		Greater emphasis on blending
Funds Available	61% of the Regional Economic Integration allocation	42% of the total RIP allocation 62% of Regional Integration allocation

There has been funding provided under EDF10 (through the EU/Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund) and under EDF11 (through the Africa Investment Facility) for hard infrastructure projects. The main modality used for support for infrastructure was blending under which grants are provided in order to complement and leverage loans. EU regional funding for infrastructure projects is included under the priority area of regional economic integration (the most prominent of the three areas being evaluated). Under EDF 10 regional infrastructure investment received the largest allocation of funds (61%) behind DMRO institutional capacity development from the allocation to Regional Economic Integration. Under the 11th EDF (2014-2020), infrastructure will be by far the largest beneficiary (42% of total RIP allocations of €1332m and 62% of Regional Integration allocations of €886m, including for regional infrastructure-related regulatory regimes). This is expected to cover physical infrastructure projects as well as policy and regulatory support and capacity building.

Breakdown of allocation to Regional Economic Integration EDF 10:



Breakdown of allocation to Regional Economic Integration EDF 11:

The evaluation question examines the extent to which EU support has furthered infrastructure connectivity in the EASAIOR region, particularly in priority areas highlighted in both EDFs 10 and 11 (transport, energy and communication). It considers improvement of **physical infrastructure**, especially roads in priority corridors and energy as well as infrastructure linked to ports (such as transport corridors, as per the 10th EDF), as reflected in a range of indicators of the overall business climate in the region. In addition, this EQ (together with EQ 2 on regional integration) covers **'soft' infrastructure issues**. This includes harmonisation of laws, regulations, standards, good practices, management in infrastructure planning, procurement, financing, maintenance and protection of physical infrastructure through a secure environment. It will consider the roles of DMROs in the promotion and monitoring of infrastructure projects, including the capacity and facilitation potential of these organisations with respect to cross-border projects.

The overwhelming focus of EU supported regional transport infrastructure projects under EDF 10 was in East Africa during the period under review, specifically on the Northern Corridor, which is the key transport corridor in the East African Community that links the Port of Mombasa to Uganda, South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo by road, rail and inland waterways (see case study below). This evaluation can build on and add value to the transport evaluation done in June 2016 – Evaluation of EU Support to the Transport Sector in Africa 2005-2013 - as well as the blending evaluation (2007-2013). The time periods are different which is potentially useful. It will test the corridor approach to infrastructure connectivity in the context of East Africa. The focus on East Africa for the sample projects has necessitated a more detailed analysis of the role of COMESA and the EAC in the area of infrastructure, with less focus on the other DMROs (SADC, IGAD and the IOC).

There is a limited consideration given to energy projects under this EQ, which should also be considered in conjunction with any observations under EQ 5 on renewable energy projects. The regional contributions of the EU in the area of energy under EDF10 were directed at removing supply side constraints, especially for SMEs. Under EDF11 there will

continue to be some support for energy projects as well as a cross-region initiative to strengthen the regulatory environment. A number of interconnector projects have been supported under EDF10 and are on the list for the Africa Investment Facility (EDF11). This EQ will consider the linkage between energy-related regional infrastructure interventions and the levels of intra-regional trade in EASAI0. It also reflects on the key partner organisations in this area that could be supported by the EU going forward in the implementation of EDF11.

Regional water and information and communication technologies projects were also included under the programme but will not be considered as part of this evaluation as there was limited spending in these areas by the EU. This EQ will also not cover CEPGL and IOC projects, although where relevant information was sourced during the field work in Rwanda and Mauritius respectively it is included here.

Summary of Regional Infrastructure Interventions in EASAI0

EDF10 Sample Projects:

- Northern Corridor Route Improvement Project: Mbarara - Ntungamo – Katuna, FED/2009/021-504 (EC), Uganda.
- Kampala-Mbarara Road, FED/2006/017-948, Uganda.
- Réhabilitation de la section Kigali-Gatuna du Corridor Nord et appui à l'entretien routier, FED/2009/021697, Rwanda-Burundi.
- SADC Project Preparation Development Facility, FED/2012/023-847 (EC), SADC.
- One Stop Inspection Services on the Central Corridor, FED/2013/024-121, Tanzania.
- Horn of Africa Corridors – Berbera-Addis corridor, FED/2011/022-874 (CL), IGAD.

EDF11 (planned):

- African Investment Facility
- Regulatory frameworks (soft infrastructure):
 - Energy (COMESA lead)
 - Transport and transit facilitation (SADC lead)
 - Civil aviation (COMESA lead)
 - ICT (COMESA lead)
 - Maritime corridors (IOC lead)
 - Rail (EAC lead)
- Capacity building

Source: Various action documents

In the area of infrastructure at a continental level, the EU/Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund managed by the EIB also funded cross-border and regional projects under EDF 10. EASAI0 support during this period tended to focus on project preparation and planning activities. It appears that there was some evolution in this regard under the 11th EDF with a return to the direct funding through blending of physical infrastructure activities under the Africa Investment Facility rather than through support mechanisms managed by DMROs. The use of blending under EDF11 is expected to allow the more efficient use of limited resources to support large infrastructure projects. This is explored below as part of the assessment of EQ3 together with questions related to the coordination of regional initiatives with national level projects as well as interactions among the EU and numerous other donors involved in infrastructure programmes in EASAI0. The conclusions and recommendations reflect the assessment of the value addition provided by EU regional support in this area.

<i>JC 3.1 EU regional support has contributed to the design of feasible trade-related regional infrastructure projects aligned with continental and regional (EASAI0) infrastructure development priorities</i>		
Summary response	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
<i>I-3.1.1 Capacity established in DMROs and other regional organisations (e.g. corridor authorities) for the preparation of regional infrastructure project proposals</i>		
<p>Summary: EASAI0 DMROs have units or programmes responsible for infrastructure issues but these have limited human and financial capacity (1-3 staff). All EASAI0 DMROs have units or programmes responsible for infrastructure issues set up in their respective Secretariats. However, there are limited human and financial resources dedicated to regional infrastructure projects (1-3 people), with only a few sector specialist positions identified during the review of the literature (e.g. the COMESA Secretariat organigram includes dedicated positions on energy and telecommunications) and confirmed during the field research. There is some evidence in the annual reports of the DMROs that regional infrastructure project proposals were actively developed during the period under review with support and encouragement of the Secretariats, in conjunction with national government, financing agencies other partners. This in part reflects a desire by the DMROs to carve out a strong role for themselves in the area of infrastructure development. Capacity challenges related to human and financial resources remain. For example, in the 2011-2012 report of the SADC Executive Secretary it was explicitly stated that “human and financial resources constraints” at both regional and national levels hamper the coordination of infrastructure projects in the region (p. 23). (I-3.1.1)</p> <p>The effectiveness of coordination between DMROs and with other regional organisations in the infrastructure space (such as corridor authorities, regional power pools) is variable. For example, in the energy sector both the Southern and Eastern African Power Pools are actively involved in DMRO activities on regional regulation (soft infrastructure) and interconnector projects (hard infrastructure). The TFTA process does present an opportunity for sustained and regular interactions between the three DMROs</p>	<p>DMRO documentation – organigrams, annual reports, strategic plans and legal texts (establishing treaties of SADC, COMESA and the EAC plus protocols on infrastructure, trade and movement of people) as noted under the detailed sections below.</p> <p>Interviews COMESA Infrastructure, EAC Secretariat, IOC, IGAD, SADC advisor</p> <p>RIP EASAI0 2014-2020, p.76.</p> <p>Luke and Mabuza, “The Tripartite Free Trade Agreement: A milestone for Africa’s regional integration process”, ICTSD, 23 June 2015.</p> <p>Interviews SADC PPDF, COMESA Infrastructure, EAC, EUD Zambia</p>	<p>Satisfactory</p>

<p>involved – COMESA, SADC and the EAC – including on infrastructure development (one of the three pillars). There are concerns however that the cross-region soft infrastructure projects under EDF11 will be dominated by the designated leading DMRO (e.g. SADC for transit and transport, EAC for rail) with little significant participation or input from the others. (I-3.1.1)</p>		
<p>COMESA – result area 2 under institutional support programme under EDF10 – largest allocation and includes infrastructure management by Secretariat – Director for Infrastructure Development with dedicated positions on transport, energy and ICT – anticipate some coordination with the Directors for Investment Promotion and Private Sector Development as well as for Trade, Customs and Monetary Affairs on infrastructure projects under EDF11.</p>	<p>COMESA Secretariat organigram (2015), RSP and RIP EASAI0 2008-2013 p.47, Action Fiche RISP 3 Interviews COMESA Secretariat</p>	
<p>EAC – according to the organisation chart: Deputy Secretary General for Planning and Infrastructure – specific officers dealing with transportation, meteorology and aviation – energy and private sector promotion under the Deputy Secretary General for Productive and Social Sector. Secretariat is currently in state of flux with change of staff. Not clear what will be the capacity in infrastructure following this process.</p>	<p>EAC Organisation Chart 2016 Interviews EAC Secretariat</p>	
<p>SADC – Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan is guiding document – energy a priority sector with the Southern Africa Power Pool leading on cross border transmission projects – SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology – Regional Strategic Action Plan for Integrated Water Resource Development and Management – “human and financial resources constraints” at both regional and national levels hamper implementation of infrastructure projects in the region (p. 23). SADC is also going through a restructuring process that might have implications for capacity in the area of infrastructure where there are current staff gaps.</p>	<p>SADC Executive Secretary Annual Report 2011-2012, p.23 SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan Executive Summary 2012 Interviews SADC Secretariat</p>	
<p>IGAD – Division for Economic Cooperation and Social Development – program managers for Trade, Industry & Tourism plus Transport & Communication.</p>	<p>IGAD Organigram</p>	
<p>IOC – Charge de Mission 1 is responsible for trade and infrastructure.</p>	<p>IOC Organigram 2009-2015</p>	
<p><i>I-3.1.2 EU interventions have supported infrastructure projects identified as priorities in AU and regional plans (e.g. PIDA, SADC Infrastructure Masterplan)</i></p>		
<p>- Consistent recognition of the priority infrastructure projects identified by the AU and DMROs in continental and regional plans, including PIDA, in the sample project documentation. For example, the Uganda roads project (Maska Mbarara) is part of the Northern Multimodal Corridor that is an EAC and PIDA priority. The action fiche notes</p>	<p>PIDA EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructure, declarations of EU-</p>	<p>Strong</p>

<p>various regional plans and studies that prioritise the intervention such as the EAC Roads Development Programme and Transport Strategy.</p>	<p>Africa summits Action Fiche Maska Mbarara (2010) EU Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund Monitoring Report, June 2015, p.47</p>	
<p>- Overall PIDA priority sectors of transport, energy, ICT and transboundary waters are reflected in EU regional interventions in EA-SA-IO (together with continental and national programmes of the EU on infrastructure). The alignment with African infrastructure strategies is also reflected in the EU Africa partnership on infrastructure (Communication in 2006 on Interconnecting Africa). There are a number of EU supported continental initiatives that are relevant in consideration of the regional programme for EASAI0, such as the priority infrastructure initiatives under the JAES in transport, water, energy and ICT. Under EDF10 the EU Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund was critical in this respect and the EASAI0 regional programme appears to be supportive of its objectives through the alignment of priority areas (i.e. transport and energy and to a lesser extent water and communications) and the focus on creation of an enabling environment that is supportive of sustainable projects financed by the AITF. The list of hard infrastructure projects identified for the Africa Investment Facility (EDF11) is also aligned with continental and regional priorities. A wide range of stakeholders interviewed during the field research confirmed the relevance of the EU support to energy and transport, in particular. The transport initiatives contribute to trade facilitation in the region and the energy interventions were rightly focused on generation and connectivity at the regional level.</p>	<p>PIDA EU Communication on Interconnecting Africa 2006 RSP and RIP EASAI0 2008-2013, p.71 RIP 20014-2020, p.75 Creation of the Africa Investment Facility Action Fiche, 29 July 2015 Africa Investment Facility Indicative List of Priority Projects, 2016 Various interviews.</p>	
<p><i>I-3.1.3 Private sector engaged in regional infrastructure projects (e.g. through PPPs, feasibility studies)</i></p>		
<p>- The sample projects reviewed indicate limited engagement with the private sector in the preparation of infrastructure projects in the transport sector supported by the EU regional programme in EA. There were some exceptions in the projects considered for financing under the SADC PPDF, where the private sector had been active in the development of proposals e.g. North-South Corridor rail project. In general, the private sector is more engaged at the level of implementation (engineering and construction services) rather than in the preparation, planning or design of the project. For example, the action fiche for the Kigali-Gatuna project does not refer to private sector in terms of project preparation but</p>	<p>Sample project documentation - Action Fiche Kigali-Gatuna (2010) Action Fiche Maska Mbarara (2010), p.1. Interviews in COMESA, SADC and in Rwanda</p>	<p>Strong</p>

<p>in the area of implementation it is clear that there will be involvement of the business community in the region. This was confirmed by the participation of Rwandan firms in certain aspects of the project. The Uganda roads project (Masaka Mbarara) specifically refers to the involvement of the construction sector, which is a focus of a DFID-funded intervention in Uganda, and the shift in this regard from EDF 9 to EDF 10.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Both the benefits and challenges of engaging the private sector are reflected in the sample project reports, such as the monitoring report (2012) on the Mbarara-Katuna road (p.3) that refers to the threat of corruption and the lack of capacity among small-scale contracts that would be well placed to do the ongoing maintenance work. Private sector development in support of infrastructure projects is an area of interest for both the EU as well as other donors, such as DFID. The Africa Transport Evaluation (June 2016) noted that there is a particular value to be added from supporting the participation of SMEs in maintenance of roads but that this is becoming increasingly difficult with many contracts awarded to larger firms. Some governments in the region, such as Rwanda, have adopted specific approaches to encourage the development of local private sector capacity, including through a registration process that indicates the type of projects that match the experience of firms. 	<p>Evaluation of EU Support to the Transport Sector in Africa 2005-2013, June 2016 Monitoring report on the Mbarara-Katuna road project (2012), p.3 Interviews in Rwanda.</p>	
<p><i>I-3.1.4 Maintenance of new and existing infrastructure included in project design</i></p>		
<p>Summary: The ongoing challenge of maintenance of transport infrastructure in the EA-SA-IO region is recognized in the design of the sample projects reviewed during the desk study. It was also confirmed as a priority consideration by stakeholders interviewed during the field research. Maintenance remains key to sustaining the positive impact of infrastructure in terms of strengthening regional markets, particularly in the transport sector, and this is sufficiently highlighted in the design of the projects reviewed.</p>		<p>Strong</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There were mixed levels of information on the inclusion of provisions for maintenance in the sample project documentation. For example, the action fiche for the Kigali-Gatuna project does not specifically address maintenance concerns whereas the Uganda roads project (Maska-Mbarara) identifies maintenance as a risk and sets up a mitigation strategy that elevates the issue to a high level for attention. 	<p>Action Fiche Maska Mbarara, Action Fiche Kigali-Gatuna (2010), p.7.</p>	


<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintenance usually requires national level implementation and the role of regional institutions needs consideration in the design of both soft and hard infrastructure interventions. This has been taken into account under EDF11 in both the cross-region projects on transport and transit as well as that on rail. The former will address regulatory issues related to the harmonization of weight limitations for trucks in the tripartite area, for example. The rail project is aimed at improving this as a transport option for traded goods in the area. Both these interventions have potential implications for the maintenance of road networks by reducing the pressure placed on them. 	<p>RIP EASAI0 2014-2020, p.74 Action Document for East and Southern African (EA-SA) Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme, 2016 Interview with EU advisor at SADC</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The nature of the ICT and energy sectors results in fewer concerns about ongoing maintenance as sustainability is often structured in at the outset. The involvement of separate operators in these sectors also means that maintenance is treated differently. 	<p>Interview COMESA Infrastructure Interviews in Rwanda on energy</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A lack of resources within some national budgets for transport infrastructure maintenance remains a challenge in EASAI0. The NCR and KMR 2011 monitoring reports note that there are insufficient funds allocated by the Uganda Road Fund as well as other challenges related to capacity. There is now an informal initiative underway at the regional level in EA to exchange experiences between agencies responsible for maintenance and to share best practice with regards to the use of funding mechanisms, such as fees on road users, fuel levies and carbon taxes. 	<p>Monitoring Report NCR and Monitoring Report 2011 KMR Interview in Rwanda</p>	
<p>JC 3.2 EU regional support for trade-related infrastructure has strengthened regional markets for trade in EASAI0</p>		
<p>Summary response</p>	<p>Sources of information</p>	<p>Quality of evidence</p>
<p>I-3.2.1 Better facilitation of movement of cargo and people in EA-SA-IO through development of regional infrastructure (both hard and soft)</p>		
<p>Summary: The World Bank Doing Business Index shows that SADC remains the region in Sub-Saharan Africa with the most conducive business environment and progressive improvement in the ease of trading across borders. The EAC has however been gaining some ground, with many reforms undertaken by countries such as Rwanda and Kenya. Trade facilitation remains constrained for many countries in EASAI0, particularly smaller, landlocked economies. It is</p>		<p>Strong</p>

<p>difficult to track the direct contribution of EU funded activities to the improvements tracked by the broad indexes without a more detailed evaluation at project level.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The EA-SA-IO regions remain challenged when it comes to trading across borders and there has been little movement during the period under review in the World Bank index in this area. - The EAC is the focus for the transport project sample for this evaluation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - According to the World Bank, the EAC saw a steadily improving business environment in the 2000's and this narrowed the gap with SADC (which is the best ranked region in Africa). There has since been a small reversal with other regions overtaking EA countries in their improvements in the index. - Rwanda and Kenya were two of the fastest global movers on trade facilitation reforms between 2005 and 2013 but this has slowed in recent years. - It is worth noting that between 2006 and 2012 the EAC reduced the time to export by about a third and the time to import by nearly a half. There were 14 recorded reforms to trading across borders implemented by the EAC between 2004 and 2012. Trading across borders is the most popular area for reform in the EAC (relative to other doing business indicators) and there are well documented success stories in both the World Bank case studies as well as the research by TradeMark East Africa. - Tanzania saw significant improvements until 2012, which in part were attributed to stronger infrastructure linking to the port of Dar es Salaam. This remains a priority area for both the Tanzanian Government and the EAC through its corridor approach to development. - SADC has seen improvement in the area of trading across borders over time, particularly in Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar and SACU countries. Trade facilitation remains a particular challenge for the land-locked countries in the region that struggle with high costs and times for imports in particular. There are many nuances at country level that need to be considered in development of regional projects. <p>World Bank Doing Business Index – Regional Averages for Trading Across Borders Indicator – Distance to Frontier (100 represents the best performance) – Combination of own calculations and regional report information.</p>	<p>World Bank Doing Business Index – Regional Reports for EAC (2017, 2013, 2010), SADC (2017, 2014), TMEA website</p>	

Regional Reports	2010	2013	2017
EAC	37.8 (Av. Rank 149)	45.4 (Av. Rank 152.8)	52.81 (Av. Rank 133.6)
SADC	46.64 N/A	53.29 (Av. Rank 129 – 2014 regional report)	58.27 (Av. Rank 117.2)

<p>- Trade facilitation remains constrained for many countries in EASAIIO, particularly smaller, landlocked economies. Progress has stalled since 2013 when there had been high numbers of reforms, particularly in relation to cross border trade, according to the World Bank Doing Business Index. The Logistics Performance Index tells a more positive story with notable improvements in the ranking of a number of EAC members, including Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda (see graphs below), between 2007 and 2016. These changes are also reflected in other indicators related to trade facilitation, such as the OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators (see graphs below).</p>	<p>World Bank Logistics Performance Index 2017 OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators 2017</p>	
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Figure 1: OECD Trade Facilitation Indicator (TFI) scores, 2012 and 2015



Source: OECD, Trade Facilitation Indicators, 2017

Figure 2: Kenya, World Bank Group, International Logistics Performance Index, 2007-2016





Figure 3: Rwanda, World Bank Group, International Logistics Performance Index, 2007-2016



Source: World Bank Group, International Logistics Performance Index, 2017

Figure 4: Uganda, World Bank Group, International Logistics Performance Index, 2007-2016

<p>Uganda</p> <p>Source: World Bank Group, International Logistics Performance Index, 2017</p>		
<p>- The EAC has a strong agenda to promote the easier movement of people in the region, particularly workers and business people (Article 104 of the Treaty). This includes the negotiation and implementation of a number of specific agreements allowing for the trade in services among contracting parties. SADC has a Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons that has not yet entered into force (signed in 2005) and the visa requirements in the region continue to be identified as a challenge by the private sector. COMESA also has a Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Right of Establishment and Right of Residence that has not yet entered into force. COMESA is actively working on the development of a regional business visa as proposed by the COMESA Business Council. There remain significant political economy challenges to advancing the free movement of people in EA-SA.</p>	<p>EAC Treaty, EAC website - http://www.eac.int/sectors/immigration-and-labour</p> <p>SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (date)</p> <p>COMESA Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Right of Establishment and Right of Residence (date)</p>	

	ECDDPM research on political economy of regional integration in Africa – EAC and SADC reports (2016)	
<i>I-3.2.2 Improved access to network services supported by energy infrastructure for private sector in EA-SA-IO</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access to reliable and affordable electricity is one of the greatest concerns for the private sector in EASAIIO, especially manufacturing or industrial firms. Since 2010 the World Bank has measured the time and cost for small and medium sized businesses to get access to electricity. On the number of procedures and time taken to get electrified, most African countries are on par with global averages at around 5 procedures and 120 days. There is a significant challenge however with regards to the cost of electricity. In 2016 the cost measured as a percentage of income per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa was 3873%. - It is difficult to make generalisations for the whole of the EASAIIO region as each country has a different story with regards to its access network services like energy. There have been significant improvements in Botswana, Ethiopia and Mozambique, for example, but major problems remain for Burundi, South Sudan and Malawi (where less than 10% of the population have access to electricity). South Africa remains the outlier generating about two-thirds of Africa's total electricity. - A comprehensive report on Africa's power infrastructure in 2011 by the World Bank, found that power in Africa costs about double that of other parts of the world but is more unreliable. It also concluded that the electricity capacity in Africa has largely remained static with little significant increase over three decades. - EU supported regional interventions in the energy section in EASAIIO have focused on strengthening regional energy markets, including through interconnector projects and strengthening regulatory frameworks. It is difficult to show a direct link from these projects to improved access to energy but the indirect contribution is reflected in a more stable environment in EA in particular. This prioritisation was viewed by stakeholders interviewed as appropriate and efficient for regional funding, and was complementary to national interventions in some countries (e.g. Rwanda) on access to energy and distribution projects. 	<p>SAIIA research on Barriers to Business in SADC http://www.saiia.org.za/sadc-articles/sadc-business-barriers</p> <p>World Bank Doing Business Index 2016</p> <p>SE4ALL database</p> <p>World Bank - Africa's power infrastructure: investment, integration, efficiency by Anton Eberhard et al. (2011).</p>	Satisfactory

I-3.2.3 Reduced cost and time of transport along priority corridors in East Africa

- The following is a summary of the overall cost and time for trading across borders in the EAC as calculated by the World Bank Doing Business Index. It does not provide a breakdown on the specific costs for intra-regional trade or along specific corridors from this information.
- Information from the World Bank at a regional level is available from 2010 onwards. The measured time and cost to trade in the EAC largely remained consistent across the period under review. There was a reduction in the days taken to import but costs remained high in the region overall.

Time and Cost to Export:

Regional Reports	2010	2012	2014
Number of Documents	7.6 (range 5-9)	7.6 (range 6-9)	7.6 (range 7-9)
Time (Days)	25.4 (range 24-47)	29 (range 18-37)	26.4 (range 18-32)
Cost (US\$ per container)	2,506 (range 1,262-3,275)	2,486 (range 1,255-3,275)	2,459 (range 1,090-3,245)

Time and Cost to Import:

Regional Reports	2010	2012	2014
Number of Documents	8.2 (range 7-10)	8 (range 6-10)	9.8 (range 9-11)
Time (Days)	39.2 (range 25-71)	33.4 (range 21-54)	33.2 (range 26-46)

World Bank Doing Business Index - Regional Reports for EAC (2014, 2012, 2010)
Northern Corridor Transit and Transport Coordination Authority website – www.ttcanc.org
Northern Corridor Transport Observatory – www.top.ttcanc.org
Northern Corridor Integration Projects – www.nciprojects.org
Interviews in Rwanda (TMEA, consultants, Government, AfDB)
Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency
<http://centralcorridor-ttfa.org>

Satisfactory

Cost (US\$ per container)	3,282 (range 1,475-5,070)	3,296 (range 1,430-4,990)	3,350 (range 1,615-4,990)		
<p>Information sourced during the desk review indicates that in urban areas, such as Kampala in Uganda, there are significant fatalities on the roads and that there was a large increase during the period where statistics were available in studies accessed online. For example, the road fatalities in Kampala in 2007 were 342 (including pedestrians) and in 2010 they were 758 (Zanule dissertation 2015 for the University of Walden – accessed at http://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1368&context=dissertations).</p>					
JC 3.3 EU support ensured that sufficient mechanisms/structures were put in place to ensure sustainability					
Summary response			Sources of information		Quality of evidence
I-3.3.1 Institutional home and ownership established by regional interventions for the results achieved in supporting the preparation of bankable infrastructure projects (e.g. with PIDA or DMROs)					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - See I-3.1.1 above on the capacity of DMROs. - The sample projects were implemented at the level of national governments and did not appear to have direct involvement of either PIDA officials or the relevant DMROs (e.g. the EAC Secretariat). This is considered appropriate by many stakeholders who view the role of the DMROs as promoting priority projects, facilitating engagement between the countries involved and monitoring the impact on regional objectives. - Institutional ownership at a regional level can also rest with other organisations set up under DMROs (eg regional power pools, corridor authorities, river basin authorities) and with greater levels of technical capacity in specific sectors. 			<p>DMRO reports, Sample project documentation Interviews with DMROs.</p>		Satisfactory.
I-3.3.2 Champions for infrastructure projects identified by regional interventions and capacities developed to implement and monitor the results at both the regional and national level					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In East Africa there are numerous donors involved in supporting regional infrastructure initiatives and they carry out regular monitoring of various projects. TradeMark East Africa is a key organization in this regard as it brings together many of the development 			<p>Sample project documentation, TMEA website – www.trademarka.com</p>		Satisfactory

<p>partners under its umbrella. It has been a critical player in supporting the corridor approach for transport infrastructure and trade facilitation (see case study). Under EDF10 there was little specific engagement between EU regional programmes and the work of TMEA. There is potential for greater levels of cooperation under EDF11, for example on the Great Lakes project that will be the responsibility of the EUD in Rwanda.</p>	<p>Interviews in Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda</p>	
<p>- Rwanda and Uganda have been leading governments in East Africa that the EU has worked with on regional infrastructure projects. Both governments appear to be champions in promoting deepened integration in the EAC through the development of physical and soft infrastructure. Together with Kenya, they have made significant progress on a range of issues in sectors such as ICT and transport as well as on movement of people issues, through the Northern Corridor initiative.</p>	<p>Interviews in Rwanda</p>	
<p>- In SADC, South Africa has taken on the role of championing infrastructure as a key component of the 'developmental regional integration' model that is reflected in the TFTA structure, for example. South Africa is also the designated PIDA champion for the North-South Corridor. The Project Preparation Development Facility for SADC is housed at the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) in South Africa providing for potentially strong synergies. The DBSA would like to see some changes to the approach of the PPDF to allow it to play a greater role in financing some of the regional projects. Synergies were also possible with the EU-supported IIPSA Fund also housed at the DBSA.</p>	<p>PIDA Action Fiche on Infrastructure Investment Programme for South Africa, 2012 MOU between SADC and the DBSA, 2008 www.sadcppdf.org Interviews in Botswana and South Africa</p>	
<p>- Among the DMROs, COMESA has taken a lead in driving coordination under the TFTA, including on infrastructure issues. The SADC Secretariat is the designated lead DMRO on transport and has a dedicated official to lead on this process (who also currently chairs the SSATP board, providing a useful link to the continental agenda).</p>	<p>Interviews at COMESA and SADC</p>	
<p><i>I-3.3.3 Appropriate financing models recommended by regional interventions for the ongoing maintenance of physical infrastructure (e.g. user charges)</i></p>		
<p>- The regional projects supported by the EU have the potential to contribute to improvement in the maintenance of infrastructure in EASAIO but further consideration is required of the regional role in this regard given that maintenance is largely a domestic issue. The cross-region projects on soft infrastructure under EDF11 will indirectly address issues related to maintenance of road infrastructure in the Tripartite area.</p>	<p>Action Fiche Maska Mbarara, Monitoring Report NCR, Action Fiche Kigali-Gatuna (2010), Monitoring Report RKGCN Interview with EU Advisor at SADC</p>	<p>Satisfactory</p>

<p>- The sample project documents for the Uganda and Rwanda road interventions reflect concern about the need for ongoing maintenance of physical infrastructure. For example, the Kigali-Gatuna road project documentation indicates that the Government of Rwanda has in place plans to use various charges such as a carbon tax to supplement resources for the maintenance of transport infrastructure but capacity remains constrained.</p>	<p>Monitoring report for Kigali-Gatuna project (</p>	
<p>- The Uganda roads project documentation makes it clear that there are not enough resources allocated by government to maintenance and mitigation strategies were put in place as part of the project design (see above).</p>	<p>Action Fiche Maska Mbarara (2010) – p.7</p>	

EQ 4 Regional peace, security and stability

To what extent has regional-level EU support contributed to improved democratic governance, peace and security, and better management of migration – thereby contributing to a stable and peaceful region?

Rationale and coverage of the EQ

Rationale: Political cooperation (the democratic governance, peace and security nexus) is integral to regional support to EASAIIO under both the 10th and 11th EDF.

For *democratic governance*, EU commitments and policies are anchored in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, reaffirming the EU's role in promoting democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is another anchor, binding on EU institutions and on Member States when they implement Union law. In addition, the EU is party to international instruments such as the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

The 2012 EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy identifies how the EU intends to honour its Treaty obligation to advance democracy, the rule of law, and the universality and indivisibility of human rights. To implement the commitments made in this Strategic Framework, an Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2012-2014), also adopted in 2012, contained a set of 97 actions covering a broad range of human rights and democracy issues, to be implemented both by the EU and at the national level by the Member States. The Commission, with EEAS, has produced a “Toolbox” to apply a rights-based approach to development cooperation (2014), and a new Action Plan for the 2015-2019 period was approved in 2015.

Complementary to national and continental support, actions under EASAIIO regional support have aimed for the improvement and implementation of standards and behaviour change in democracy and human rights, especially in the areas of electoral cycles, human rights and government accountability to an engaged civil society and citizenry (regional knowledge sharing, peer emulation, the emergence of regional standards...).

For *peace and security*, EU commitments and policies include the comprehensive approach to conflict and crisis; commitments on maritime security; climate change and security; on women, peace and security; on children and armed conflict; on security system reform; demobilisation and reintegration; and small arms and light weapons, and the OECD Principles for engagement in fragile situations (which the EU endorsed).

The EU's regional cooperation aimed to target underlying causes of insecurity that had a regional dimension, as well as to manage the crises themselves.

Coverage: For *democratic governance*, the evaluation focuses on whether the regional EASAIIO programmes have been conducive to improvement and implementation of standards and

behaviour change, and their value added compared to national and continental support. *For peace and security* the evaluation focuses on whether the programme targeted causes of insecurity that had a regional dimension; or brought a regional angle to domestic peace and security issues; whether the African Peace and Security Architecture has been implemented by the concerned DMROs thanks to EU regional support and with what results; and whether relevant actions were based on updated analysis of context, flexible enough to respond to often fast-changing dynamics, and generally were in line with EU commitments in the area of development and security.

The EQ covers completed and ongoing actions, and preference is given to actions that are mature and documented (ROM report, mid-term review, evaluation...). Amounts disbursed, a diversity of themes (among the range of themes that political cooperation covers) and a diversity of ROs are also criteria for selection. In spite of its financial importance (first area of disbursement for the evaluation period), support to the African peace facility is not part of the evaluation (email correspondence with DEVCO D2). The resulting focus is on:

1. Support to the EAC electoral support programme, because electoral support is the bulk of EU regional support in the governance/peace area, and the EAC's (rather than SADC's) because it is the largest, and EAC member countries present a wide range of electoral situations.
2. Because of the amounts disbursed, maritime security. Maritime security is covered under JC 4.2 relating to "peace and security" rather than separately, to avoid a silo approach to security.

Sector policy dialogue is mainly covered under EQ7, but where there is a direct link between the EU-ROs policy dialogue and the indicators, it will be captured in EQ4.

EQ4 will (together with EQ1) inform and lead to recommendations for the detailed planning and implementation of future political cooperation programmes, e.g. under the 11th EDF.

Main projects examined under EQ4 are listed in Table 1, and Figure 1 summarises democratisation, peace and security allocations by theme.


Table 1. List of main projects examined under EQ4


EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO
10	2013	N.A.	Contribution to African Peace Facility (APF)*	€115m	€ 115m	€ 115m	AUC
11	2014	FED/2014/033-788	EAC Regional Electoral Support Programme	€ 5m	€ 2.1m	€ 1m	EAC
10	2011	FED/2011/023-107	Start-up project to promote regional maritime security (MASE)	€ 2m	€ 1.6m	€ 1.3m	IOC
10	2013	FED/2013/024-098	Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE)	€ 37.4m	€ 18.5m	€ 8.9m	IGAD

EDF	Year	Decision Number	Title	Allocated	Contracted	Paid	DMRO
10	2009	FED/2009/021-302	Regional Political Integration and Human Security Support Programme (RPIHSSP)	€ 4.9m	€ 4.2m	€ 3.8m	EAC
10	2011	FED/2011/022-832	Support to SADC Regional Political cooperation	€ 18m	€ 17.6m	€ 9.4m	SADC

* The APF extends beyond EASAI0 and some of its actions are continental, others are regional, and yet others are country-level. The APF covers (i) peace support operations which represent 90% of its funding (2004-2015 period) and includes operations such as the AU-led AMISOM in Somalia and AU-led RCI-LRA in and around Uganda, South Sudan, DRC and CAR, as well as in theatres beyond EASAI0; (ii) early response such as the €5m IGAD-led Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) for South Sudan; and (iii) capacity development such as support to AU Liaison Offices throughout the continent, the Amani Africa II programme to train the African Standby Force, and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Support Programmes I and II. The APF is the subject of a separate evaluation (2017) but is mentioned repeatedly under EQ4 and EQ6 given its importance in EU-Africa cooperation on peace, security and stability, and given that it funds some actions that are regional in nature and involve DMROs. This evaluation considers such actions, particularly APSA Support Programmes I and II, which are capacity development with components benefitting SADC, IGAD, COMESA and EAC (about €9.9m for 2011-2014, or €2.4m each on average).

Figure 1. Democratisation, peace and security allocations by theme, under EDF 10 and EDF 11 respectively






JC 4.1	<i>EU regional cooperation contributed to enhancing democratic governance in the region</i>	
Summary response	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
<p>Summary: EU regional support in matters of democratic governance is mainly geared toward strengthening the capacity of DMRO Secretariats. Based on interviews and available documents, there are specific instances of EU regional support contributing to policies, strategies and plans conducive to democratisation and human rights. Similarly, there are instances of EU regional support having led to enhanced capacity and engagement of regional organisations, government institutions, civil society and communities in matters of democratic governance. Beyond these outputs, and given the primacy of domestic/regional trends over development cooperation, the complex DMRO institution setup, and other forms of support (EU and non-EU), it is hard to attribute outcomes (democratisation, a better human rights situation, peace and security) to EU regional cooperation</p>		
I-4.1.1	Thanks to EU regional support, there are policies, strategies and plans in place (at regional organisation and country level) that are conducive to improved democratic governance	
<p>Based on available documents and interviews, there are specific instances of EU regional support contributing to policies, strategies and plans conducive to democratisation and human rights, as detailed below.</p> <p>However, it is important to underline that the evidence is patchy to document this indicator.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - For example, there is only one ROM report for the whole democratic governance, human rights, peace, and security theme, and this ROM highlights that output quality and potential impact are not captured by project monitoring systems: <i>“Stakeholders find the quality of outputs and their contribution to results relevant and useful. This successful feedback contrasts with the low capacity of the programme management to assess progress.”</i> - Interviews were conducted with 55 stakeholders, including about 45 knowledgeable about peace, security and stabilisation (others about the political dialogue, more general issues, or other themes). Only five were very knowledgeable about EDF10, but most were not, due to high turnover and the lack of documentation. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EDF 10 activities that relate to democracy in SADC countries align to the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and have contributed to increasing the SADC region’s capacity to conduct credible elections, both through the 2011 established SADC Electoral Advisory Council, and through the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Directorate of the Secretariat (Joint Progress Report on cooperation between SADC and EU, 2011). The same report also finds that <i>“through the Protocol on Gender and Development and its Gender Monitoring Tool, SADC States have made significant progress in furthering the principles of gender equality.”</i> The key results of the SADC Regional Political cooperation programme with regards to policies and plans have been: (i) revised principles for electoral observation, introducing post-electoral reviews, long-term observation, and extending composition from just officials to include parliamentarians and NSAs; (ii) strategies and mechanisms to prevent human trafficking; (iii) a disaster reduction 		

<p>preparedness strategy. These results have the potential to be “transformational” (interviews BOT08, BOT01, BOT02).</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As for the EAC Regional Electoral Support Project, it aims to develop the capacities of regional entities to support democratic governance (DMROs and beyond). As such, it targeted the EAC Secretariat, the EAC Forum of Electoral Commissions, and established a Democracy and Election Unit. 	<p>Cooperation between EU and ESA – IO Region, Joint Progress Report, 2011; Council Recommendation on the 2009 discharge (2009/COU/0205); Mutunga, 2014; Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, EUD to EAC, EUD to the AU</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EAC Regional Political Integration and Human Security Support Program (RPIHSSP) paved the way for the development of regional policies and initiation of strategies leading to the adoption of the EAC Principles of Election Observation and Evaluation; the validation of policy documents and discussion of regional standards, in particular the Draft Protocol on Good Governance (RPIHSSP ROM report, 2012). 	<p>Cooperation between EU and ESA – IO Region, Joint Progress Report, 2011; Council Recommendation on the 2009 discharge (2009/COU/0205); Mutunga, 2014; (RPIHSSP ROM report, 2012) Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, EUD to EAC, EUD to the AU</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The end-of-programme RISP 2 report, covering 2010-2013, states that RISP led to (in rather general terms), “recommendations on the EAC political integration; recommendations for the EAC Election Observer Missions; recommendations for good governance were made; and an EAC mechanism for assessing corruption proposed so as to enhance ethic and integrity” (RISP 2 report, 2016). 	<p>Cooperation between EU and ESA – IO Region, Joint Progress Report, 2011; Council Recommendation on the 2009 discharge (2009/COU/0205); Mutunga, 2014; RISP 2 report, 2016 Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, EUD to EAC, EUD to the AU</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In IGAD, the period saw the adoption of a Protocol on Democracy, Governance, and Elections; an IGAD Election Code of Conduct; and IGAD Guidelines for Election Observers, thanks to core EU support. 	<p>Cooperation between EU and ESA – IO Region, Joint Progress Report, 2011; Council Recommendation on the 2009 discharge (2009/COU/0205); Mutunga, 2014 Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, EUD to IGAD, EUD to the AU</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>

I-4.1.2	Thanks to EU regional support, there is enhanced capacity and engagement of regional organisations, government institutions, civil society and communities in matters of democratic governance	
Based on available documents and interviews (with limitations highlighted under I-4.2.2), there are instances of EU regional support having led to enhanced capacity and engagement of regional organisations, government institutions, civil society and communities in matters of democratic governance, provided below:	As detailed below.	Indicative but not conclusive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COMESA has established a network of civil society and private sector organizations through a process of accreditation to the COMESA Programme on Peace and Security; and a COMESA Inter-Parliamentary Forum (COMESA annual report 2014). 	DMRO website, accessed February 2017 EAMRs Djibouti (2011-2015) Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, COMESA, EUD to COMESA, EUD to the AU	Indicative but not conclusive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAC has established quarterly political dialogue with political parties, media, youth, women, academia, civil society and professional organisations, on issues of democratic governance, transparency, and accountability; as well as structured engagement with the youth through the Launch of the EAC Youth Ambassadors' Platform. The RPIHSSP ROM report, 2012, states that RPIHSSP (EAC) “<i>has had an excellent outreach towards target institutions and stakeholders (...), bringing together of all stakeholders (judiciary, national human rights institutions, electoral management bodies, political parties), sharing views and recommendations on good governance and political integration (...). As expressed by stakeholders, the exchanges facilitated are driving interesting effects at national level and regional level. An example of this is the getting together of political parties with similar ideologies, after participating together for the first time at the First Consultative Meeting for Political Parties in East Africa (2011)</i>”. Another document identifies results in enhanced capacity and engagement is the end-of-programme RISP 2 report, covering 2010-2013: they relate to the EAC Nyerere Centre for Peace Research, and include “<i>EAC students' knowledge on conflict, peace and security enhanced</i>”; “<i>Curriculum and 5 Courses developed</i>”; “<i>structured engagement with the youth through the Launch of the EAC Youth Ambassadors' Platform established</i>”; “<i>enhanced popularisation of EAC integration among students</i>”; “<i>the EAC Youth Ambassador for Tanzania held talk shows with the Voice of Africa Straight Talk Africa to popularize EAC Integration</i>”; etc. 	RPIHSSP ROM report, 2012; RISP 2-COMESA-EAC Action Document for EAC Regional Electoral Support Project DMRO website, accessed February 2017 EAMRs Djibouti and Tanzania (2011-2015) Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, EAC, EUD to EAC, EUD to the AU, East African Civil Society Forum	More than satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IGAD promoted democratisation, through election observation missions (e.g. South Sudan, 2011; Sudan, 2015; Uganda 2016; Djibouti 2016). IGAD engaged with NGOs and civil society in the region, on issues of democratic governance, parliaments and female participation and representation in politics, e.g. IGAD facilitated the agreement of a Regional Action Plan for implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820. 	DMRO website, accessed February 2017 Mo Ibrahim Index EAMRs Djibouti (2011-2015) Draft report, MASE evaluation, 2016 Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, IGAD, EUD to IGAD, EUD to the AU	More than satisfactory

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The key results of the SADC Regional Political cooperation programme with regards to capacity have been in regional mediation (training of 140 mediators that are now part of a SADC and AU pool including non-officials). 	<p>Joint Progress Report on cooperation between SADC and EU, 2011 Support to SADC Regional Political Cooperation Mapping of CSOs in SADC region, 25/02/2016 DMRO website, accessed February 2017 EAMRs Tanzania and Botswana (2011-2015) Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, SADC, EUD to SADC, EUD to the AU</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
I-4.1.3	Democratic governance has progressed in the region and there is evidence that EU regional support contributed to it		
	<p>Democracy has not markedly improved in the region over the period considered (2008-2015), whether one looks at all countries concerned theme by theme, or at all themes DMRO by DMRO.</p>	<p>As detailed below.</p>	<p>Strong</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Theme by theme, aggregated data show that political participation and civil society participation have generally improved in EASAI0, but that the space for civil society is sometimes shrinking (see Box 1 below) quality of election processes and government accountability has deteriorated – a paradox since elections processes that lack credibility usually dampen participation. National security has improved, but human rights have, overall, deteriorated (Table 2 below). This of course masks both some big improvements (civil society participation in Zimbabwe, national security in Uganda, rule of law in Comoros, elections in Kenya) and equally big deteriorations (elections in Burundi and DRC, rule of law and civil society in Burundi). 	<p>EU Annual Reports on human rights and Democracy, The Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, Institute for Security Studies, International Crisis Group, Mo Ibrahim Index on African Governance, PRIO, Uppsala database, all accessed February 2016</p>	<p>Strong</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> While in some EA-SA-IO countries there has been a clear decline in the last eight years in the number of reported deaths due to armed conflicts (e.g. Uganda and Burundi), the EASAI0 region is currently facing significant challenges for security and political stability, with over a dozen on-going conflicts, and three in EASAI0 led to over 1 300 battle-related casualties in 2016 (Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan) (Uppsala Conflict Database). Figure 2 shows that fatalities from conflicts in Sub-Sahara are split between the Horn and around Nigeria. 	<p>International Institute for Strategic Studies, iiss.org; Uppsala Conflict Database, both accessed February 2017</p>	

Figure 2. Fatalities from conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2015



Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, iiss.org

Box 1. Civil society engagement on democracy, peace and security

Civil society engagement is more likely in regions where there is a minimum of space for it, and where the capacities of CSOs are strong in evidence-based policy making, advocacy focused on agents of change in government, and political acumen more generally (Coffey, 2016). It appears to be weak in most countries of the EASAI region. According to the International Crisis Group, civil society engagement in the SADC processes in Madagascar (2009) and Zimbabwe (2008-2009) has been “at best tangential, confirming the gulf between the regional body and its citizens” (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. i). De Waal and Ibreck, 2016, find that while “every peace process in the region is accompanied by pressure from civil society actors for expedited progress towards an end to organized violence, and also for civil society representation in the peace talks”, “compared to the situation in the early 2000s, ... civil society actors are scrambling to be part of an agenda set by governments and inter-governmental organizations. Governments in the region have closed down most of the space for civil society, and the regional organizations have not compensated by opening up regional spaces

<p><i>for dialogue.</i>” Field visits and the EAMR for Botswana 2015 confirmed that the number of non-state actors dealing with regional integration and regional matters is limited, although that could be changing (e.g. SADC NGO Council; East African Civil Society Forum; Institute for Security Studies...).</p>								
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DMRO by DMRO, the picture is equally mixed (Table 2 below). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ It is not very encouraging in EAC and IGAD. Over 2008-2015, and except for accountability, which has not budged, all the main indicators of democracy (see Table 6) have deteriorated in EAC, calling for continued attention to these matters in the region. In IGAD, and in spite of a much-improved situation in Kenya since the 2008 electoral violence, and of the recent 2017 elections in Somalia that were deemed credible, IGAD remains marred by a poor elections record in some countries (Ethiopia, Djibouti). All the main indicators of democracy have deteriorated except political participation. Both EAC and IGAD now include South Sudan, which has spiralled into violence two years after its independence in 2011. ○ In COMESA countries, the picture is mixed, national security, accountability, and human rights being of particular concern, while there is progress in political and civil society participation. ○ All indicators have improved in SADC, except for accountability, which has deteriorated more than anywhere else and more than the sub-Saharan African average. 	<p>EU Annual Reports on human rights and Democracy, The Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, Institute for Security Studies, International Crisis Group, Mo Ibrahim Index on African Governance, PRIO, Uppsala database, all accessed February 2016</p>	<p>Strong</p>						
<p>Table 2. Progress in governance, human rights, peace and security, country by country, theme by theme, and DMRO by DMRO (change of score between 2008-2015)</p>								
	<p>Free and fair elections</p>	<p>Rule of law</p>	<p>Political participation</p>	<p>Civil society participation</p>	<p>Human Rights</p>	<p>Accountability</p>	<p>National Security</p>	<p>Cross-border tensions</p>
Angola	7.8	+0.6	+6.7	-17.8	-6	-4	3.5	0
Botswana	-3.7	-3.2	+0.8	+0.6	-1.3	-3.2	-0.1	0
Burundi	-38	-22.8	-8.4	-19.6	-7.8	-3.4	-16.5	0
Comoros	-14.5	+18.8	+6.6	+16.7	-9.8	-0.2	14.9	25
Djibouti	-10.4	+4.5	+7.1	+8.3	3.8	0.2	-6.1	25
DRC	-26.4	+5.4	+6.5	+5.3	-2.2	7	0.4	25
Eritrea	0	-14.1	+0.2	0.0	-0.7	-13.6	16.8	25
Ethiopia	-11.1	+1.6	-5.8	-14.9	3.7	15.4	8.6	25

Kenya	17.1	+8.5	+4.9	-8.3	-1.5	2.5	-9.5	-25
Lesotho	24	+5.0	+4.3	-14.2	4.4	4.3	-4.3	25
Madagascar	11.2	-1.3	+10.2	+17.3	-12	-9.5	3.2	0
Malawi	13.9	+5.0	+8.7	+3.6	10.8	-14.7	-4.8	-25
Mauritius	-3.2	-0.5	+1.5	+3.6	-0.9	-7.7	5	25
Mozambique	-4.7	-5.2	-8.9	-3.6	-7.5	-15.3	-4	25
Namibia	9.7	-4.0	+4.0	0.0	-0.2	-5.6	8.4	25
Rwanda	-6.9	-3.5	-6.0	+8.3	-2.5	9.6	-23	-25
Seychelles	-4.1	-1.0	+6.8	0.0	4.8	3	0.3	0
Somalia	0	-0.2	+3.3	+19.7	2.4	-1.1	-1.9	25
South Africa	-5.5	+3.9	+9.9	+12.5	0.3	-10.5	-6.5	25
South Sudan	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sudan	11.1	+2.6	+6.8	-7.8	-3	-0.5	-4	25
Swaziland	0	-5.5	-1.9	0.0	-3.2	-7.4	4.1	25
Tanzania	7.4	+0.1	+4.6	-12.5	-3.3	-2.5	0.2	0
Uganda	-3.2	-10.9	+3.0	0.0	-7	-4.8	19.1	50
Zambia	12.1	+4.0	-2.3	+4.2	-11	6.3	-1.5	25
Zimbabwe	8.4	+11.9	+6.8	+26.2	17.5	0.6	31.5	25
Country average	-3.4	0.0	+2.7	+1.0	-1.2	-2.1	1.3	13
Regional Economic Community (REC)								
COMESA	0.6	-1	2.2	1.7	-1.6	-2	-2.2	8.6
EAC	-4.7	-5.8	-0.4	-6.4	-4.4	0.2	-5.9	0
IGAD	-0.3	-3.4	1.6	-2.3	-1.5	-2.9	-1.4	19.2
SADC	3.1	1	3.8	1.7	-0.7	-4	2.4	13.3

<p><i>Source: Ibrahim Index of African Governance, accessed 2016. Note: Data not available for IOC.</i></p> <p><i>Definitions:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – <i>The free and fair elections score measures the extent to which executive and legislative elections are free and fair, including impartiality of electoral laws and framework</i> – <i>The rule of law score aggregates five indicators from eight data sources: judicial independence; judicial process; property rights; transfers of power; sanctions</i> – <i>The Political participation score measures the extent to which citizens are free to participate in the political process, join a political organisation, and choose whom to vote for</i> – <i>The Civil society participation score measures the extent to which Government enables the participation of civil society in the political process, allows NGOs to organise freely; and does not persecute or harass NGO employees</i> – <i>The Human rights score aggregates five indicators from seven data sources: freedom of expression; freedom of association and assembly; civil liberties; human rights conventions; human rights violations</i> – <i>The Accountability score aggregates five indicators from eight data sources: access to information; online services; public sector accountability and transparency; accountability of public officials; corruption in government; corruption and bureaucracy; diversion of public funds; and corruption investigation.</i> – <i>The National Security score aggregates six indicators from five data sources: Government involvement in armed conflicts; domestic armed conflict; violence by non-state actors; cross-border tensions; internally displaced persons; and political refugees.</i> – <i>The Cross-border tensions score measures the presence of cross-border tensions/ disputes over trade, borders or human rights, which could lead to active conflict or sanctions.</i> • <i>Full definitions and methodologies are available at http:// mo.ibrahim.foundation/iag/</i> 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is not possible to go beyond the outputs and contributions to outcomes above, and to <i>attribute</i> outcomes to EU regional support solely or specifically - given that international cooperation is only one element in the equation of democratisation, human rights, peace and security; and that moreover there are multiple forms of international cooperation in these areas, including multiple EU instruments supporting different parts of a very complex architecture for democracy, peace and security: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Subnational, national, regional and global trends trump the role of development cooperation in democracy, peace and security. This includes issues of political will, e.g. a lack of political will on the part of the top leadership of some EAC Member States on democracy matters is a limitation (e.g. interviews MN141, MN145). ➤ The EU is only one of Africa's three main development partners along with the US and the World Bank (it would be possible to consider the EU plus EU member state contributions, if there was joint programming in regional cooperation, i.e. joint objectives, joint approaches, and concerted programming). Regional support to democratisation, human rights, peace and security specifically, outside the EU's, includes significant support from the US, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and EU member states (notably Germany, Denmark, Norway, Austria, and the Netherlands), the UN, China, and Switzerland. 	<p>OECD database on official development aid, accessed February 2016</p> <p>Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, DMROs, EUD to DMROs, EUD to the AU</p> <p>EAC DEC1919788</p> <p>Thematic evaluation of the EC support to respect of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2011</p> <p>Joint Progress Report on cooperation between EU and SADC, 2011)</p> <p>10th EDF Mid-Term Review, 2011</p>	<p>Weak (for the reasons detailed in the left column)</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Moreover, regional cooperation is only one fragment of EU engagement in EASAI0 (see Table 1 in Annex 4/EQ6). This is particularly so in democracy, peace and security: for the period 2000-2010, regional organisations occupy the third place as recipients of the overall aid provided by the Commission in the field of human rights in Africa (9.6%). Furthermore, the AU, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are the main recipients, not the DMROs targeted by the EASAI0 RIPs. EU support to democratisation, human rights, peace and security other than the RIPs includes (i) the NIPs; (ii) the continental Intra-ACP Programme, which supports both the African Peace Facility (the main conduit for EU support to the African Peace and Security Architecture, with over €1.3bn spent since 2007, including support for the AU mission in Somalia, AMISOM, with over €575m as of 2015); (iii) the Development Cooperation Instrument, which supports the Global Public Goods and Challenges Programme, the Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities Programme, and the Pan-African Programme, which in turn co-funds the AU Support Programme; (iv) the EIDHR instrument; (v) the Instrument for Stability and Peace as a thematic tool providing a rapid response mechanism to address global security issues; vi) CFSP missions; etc. ➤ Furthermore, overlapping regional memberships, poor coordination among DMROs, the discrepancies in national implementation of regional decisions, the inequalities of capacity among DMROs, and the need for greater coordination and clarity of division of labour between the EU and DMROs, all make direct attribution of positive outcomes to EU regional support difficult. 	<p>European Court of Auditors, 2009 Council Recommendation on the 2009 discharge (2009/COU/0205)</p>		
<p>Table 3 below summarises documented instances of results from EU regional cooperation at both the output and outcome levels. The third column will remind the reader of the impact-level trend in the region concerned.</p>		<p>Mutunga, 2014 DMRO annual reports, 2008-2016, which were available 2013 Botswana EAMR International Crisis Group reports, 2008-2016 RPIHSSP ROM report, 2012; RISP 2-COMESA-EAC-IGAD-IOC end of programme report, 2016, for the period 2010-2013</p>	
<p>Table 3. Instances of EU regional contribution to democracy</p>			
	<p>At the output level: attribution</p>		<p>At the outcome level: contribution</p>
<p>C O M E S A</p>	<p>COMESA has established a network of civil society and private sector organizations through a process of accreditation to the COMESA Programme on Peace and Security; and a COMESA Inter-Parliamentary Forum (COMESA annual report 2014).</p>	<p>NA – Stakeholders across the continent question whether COMESA should be involved in peace and security at all but rather focus on economic integration (interviews, e.g. MN132).</p>	<p>Trends in accountability, and human rights being of particular concern, while there is progress in political and civil society participation.</p>

			Notable improvements EASAIO-wide include civil society participation in Zimbabwe, rule of law in Comoros, and elections in Kenya.		
E A C	<p>The Regional Political Integration and Human Security Support Program (RPIHSSP) paved the way for the development of regional policies and initiation of strategies leading to the adoption of the EAC Principles of Election Observation and Evaluation, and the Draft Protocol on Good Governance. The RPIHSSP also engaged the judiciary, national human rights institutions, electoral management bodies and political parties to agree standards of good governance, leading for example to the First Consultative Meeting for Political Parties in East Africa (2011).</p> <p>Creation of the Democracy and Election Unit of the EAC Secretariat; the EAC Forum of Electoral Commissions; the adoption of the EAC Principles of Election Observation and Evaluation; the development of a draft EAC Protocol on Good Governance</p> <p>Quarterly political dialogue with political parties, media, youth, women, academia, civil society and professional organisations, on issues of democratic governance, transparency, and accountability</p>	NA – a lack of political will on the part of the top leadership of some EAC Member States on democracy matters is a limitation (interviews MN141, MN145).	<p>Over 2008-2015, and except for accountability, which has not budged, all the main indicators of democracy have deteriorated in EAC, calling for continued attention to these matters in the subregion.</p> <p>Notable improvements EASAIO-wide include, elections in Kenya.</p> <p>Notable deteriorations EASAIO-wide include elections in Burundi, rule of law and civil society in Burundi, and civil war in South Sudan.</p>		

	Structured engagement with the youth through the Launch of the EAC Youth Ambassadors' Platform (interviews, RPIHSSP ROM report, 2012; RISP 2-COMESA-EAC-IGAD-IOC end of programme report, 2016, for the period 2010-2013)			
IGAD	Adoption of a Protocol on Democracy, Governance, and Elections; an IGAD Election Code of Conduct; and IGAD Guidelines for Election Observers IGAD promoted democratisation, through election observation missions (e.g. South Sudan, 2011; Sudan, 2015; Uganda 2016; Djibouti 2016). IGAD engaged with NGOs and civil society in the region, on issues of democratic governance, parliaments and female participation and representation in politics, e.g. IGAD facilitated the agreement of a Regional Action Plan for implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820.	NA – a lack of political will on the part IGAD Member States on democracy matters is a major limitation (interviews; FOI, n.d.). EOMs, however, are an entry point, and one of the most effective ways to influence the behaviour of candidates, parties, and electoral management bodies (Carothers, 1997).	In IGAD, All the main democracy indicators have deteriorated except political participation. Notable improvements EASAI0-wide include elections in Kenya and Somalia; deteriorations include civil war in South Sudan.	
SADC	The key results of the SADC Regional Political cooperation programme have been: (i) revised principles for electoral observation, introducing post-electoral reviews, long-term observation, and extending composition from just officials to include parliamentarians and NSAs); (ii) regional mediation (training of 140 mediators that are now part of a SADC and AU pool including non-officials; (iii) strategies and mechanisms to prevent human trafficking; (iv) a disaster reduction preparedness strategy. These results have the potential to be	EDF 10 activities that relate to democracy in SADC countries have contributed to increasing the SADC region's capacity to conduct credible elections, both through the 2011 established SADC Electoral Advisory Council, and through the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Directorate of the Secretariat (interviews; Joint Progress Report on cooperation between SADC and EU, 2011). SADC demonstrated its ability to contain (if not resolve) elections-	All indicators have improved in SADC, except for accountability, which has deteriorated more than anywhere else and more than the sub-Saharan African average. Notable improvements EASAI0-wide include civil society	

	<p>“transformational” (JC4.1/4.2, I-4.1.2, i4.2.2, interviews BOT08, BOT01, BOT02)</p>	<p>related crises, e.g. in Zimbabwe (2011 political crisis), Madagascar (2009-2011 political crisis), Lesotho (2014, crisis after parliament was prorogued by the prime Minister to avoid a no-confidence vote), and Tanzania (2015). In Madagascar, the international community was divided on the issues and sent contradictory signals between 2009 and 2012, when SADC facilitated a more convergent approach. After some false starts, SADC contributed to a breakthrough (2013-2014) in the Madagascar crisis.</p> <p>In Lesotho, a SADC Politics, Defence and Security Observation Mission was deployed in the run-up to the 2015 elections, which were violence-free, even though the security situation deteriorate later that year.</p> <p>In Tanzania, SADC deployed a Goodwill and pre-deployment assessment mission, and tensions around the elections did not erupt into violence.</p> <p>EU support to civil society in the SADC space is enhancing democratisation and inclusion of civil society e.g. a far reaching SADC civil society engagement strategy is prepared and being discussed and attracting support from the secretariat, member states</p>	<p>participation in Zimbabwe.</p> <p>Notable deteriorations EASAIIO-wide include elections in DRC.</p>		
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		<p>and development partners have put a lot of emphasis and pressure on involving civil society. The main challenge now is to make sure that civil society is ready to engage in its role – there is a planned support under the EDF 11 to support a 5 year plan by SADC-CNGO, the apex body (JC 4.1, i4.1.1 Interview BOT09 and Final SADC mechanisms of engagement with NSAs August 2015). « <i>“With EU core support, the SADC civil society engagement strategy has been developed. The Secretariat feared that member states would not accept the strategy but in reality the member states have been open especially after discussion on the content. There has been reluctance by some countries (e.g. Zimbabwe, Madagascar), yet when carefully introduced at country level, acceptance is high”</i> (BOT09)</p>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU’s regional electoral cooperation has demonstrated results, but at the output and outcome level (Box 2 below). 	<p>Box 2. The EU’s regional electoral cooperation</p> <p>1. Overall objective</p> <p>The EU has been and is one of the leading global actors in supporting fair and credible elections worldwide through (i) electoral assistance and (ii) electoral observation. At the regional level, this includes support to DMROs to promote DMRO-wide electoral standards, such as through support to DMRO capacity in electoral matters, experience-sharing across DMRO membership, DMRO observation missions, support to electoral observation by civil society organisations at regional level (e.g. SADC-wide), and any country-level electoral support, when connections are made with DMRO support.</p> <p>In the EASAIIO region, the EU has in particular supported a €4.9m Regional Political Integration and Human Security Support Programme (RPIHSSP), a €18m Support to SADC Regional Political cooperation, and a €5m EAC Regional Electoral Support Programme (from 2014) (see Table 1 for amounts paid, DMRO concerned,</p>			<p>Chiroro, 2010; EOM reports; EOM statements; Project documents; RPIHSSP ROM report, 2012; Tanzania EAMR, 2015; RISP 2 report, 2016</p>	

<p>and main themes). This is on top of on top of support to the AU and the African Governance Architecture, and on top of electoral expert missions (EEMs) and observation missions (EOMs) funded by the EIDHR. EOMs included Burundi, later withdrawn for lack of basic conditions, Tanzania (2015); Malawi, Maldives, Mozambique (2014), Kenya, Madagascar (2013), Malawi (2012), Sudan, Uganda, Zambia (2011), Burundi, Sudan, Tanzania (2010), Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa (2009), Angola, Maldives, Rwanda, and Zambia (2008).</p> <p>The theory of change underpinning EU electoral support generally is that increasing the capacity of electoral management bodies together with domestic and international scrutiny of the electoral process will give men and women, political parties, and civil society organisations the confidence to engage with electoral processes, making the elections more credible and the results more likely to be accepted. This in turn would positive state-society relations leading to more inclusive policies, stability and potential for development. The rationale for electoral observation specifically is that it leads to electoral reforms and to lower electoral violence in countries that experience it.</p> <p>The theory of change underpinning <i>regional</i> electoral support, specifically, is that countries from same DMRO act as peers and therefore have more influence than far-away countries and institutions with very different histories, traditions, interests and values. In other words, supporting DMROs in electoral matters has value-added compared to country-level, global-level, and AU-level electoral support.</p> <p>2. Significant change observed</p> <p><u>At the results level:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EU support, whether to electoral assistance and electoral observation is country-specific but often take place in and refer to DMRO-wide processes and standards. For example EU electoral support in Zambia contributed to a national electoral process that was transparent and well organised (“<i>A generally well administered election day and a highly competitive campaign despite the absence of a level playing field</i>”, according to the statement issued by the EOM). 2. The €9.4m Support to SADC Regional Political cooperation developed the capacities of the EAC Secretariat a (establishment of a Democracy and Election Unit), and established the EAC Forum of Electoral Commissions. 3. The €3.8m Regional Political Integration and Human Security Support Programme (RPIHSSP) paved the way for the development of regional policies and initiation of strategies leading to the adoption of the EAC Principles of Election Observation and Evaluation; the validation of policy documents and discussion of regional standards, in particular the Draft Protocol on Good Governance (RPIHSSP ROM report, 2012). The €1m EAC Regional Electoral Support Programme (RESP) started recently, in 2016, but has started its operations with deploying the EAC Observation Mission to Tanzania for the 2015 general elections (Tanzania EAMR, 2015) 		
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<p>4. RISP led to “recommendations on the EAC political integration; recommendations for the EAC Election Observer Missions; recommendations for good governance; and an EAC mechanism for assessing corruption proposed so as to enhance ethic and integrity” (RISP 2 report, 2016).</p> <p><u>At the outcome and impact levels:</u> Fair and credible elections can be attributed to a large number of factors, not least the legislation in place, the capacity of electoral management bodies and the behaviour of the candidates and their parties, and it would be impossible to isolate the specific contribution of the EU vis-à-vis other development partners and most importantly the domestic factors at play in each country of EASAI0. Moreover, attributing impact in areas (such as free and fair elections) where the underlying processes are complex and non-linear, and there is no counterfactual, is fraught with risk.</p> <p>It can, however, be said that there is plausible EU contribution to fairer and more credible elections in EASAI0:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Taking EASAI0 DMRO by DMRO, they all have improved electoral management bodies, protected from political interference, and able to make public reports available before and after a national election. A closer look reveals a lack of progress in the independence in IGAD’s EMBs, but all subindicators for all DMROs are otherwise travelling in the right direction (Global Integrity, 2008-2016). - Voter turnout (as a measure of the degree of participation of citizens in a the country’s management and their adherence to elections as an important and credible element of democracy) has increased in most countries of the region: Comoros (2010-2016); Maldives (2008-2013), Mozambique (2009-2014), Seychelles (2011-2015), Tanzania (2010-2015), Uganda (2011-2016), Zambia (2008-2011-2016) and Zimbabwe (2008-2013) (presidential elections, years in bracket indicating years presidential elections were held)³. In Uganda, for example, EU provided technical assistance to the Ugandan government and CSOs to follow-up on the recommendations of the 2011 EOM to Uganda, including on the need for legislative and institutional reforms, in time for the 2016 elections. - As for whether the elections themselves were credible, there was improvement in all regions except EAC (negative) and IGAD (negligible) (see Table 2 above, “Free and fair elections” column). <p>Stakeholders interviewed (DMROs, DMRO Member States, CSOs) found that EU electoral support has clearly contributed to this overall progress—crediting not only electoral support programmes but also other instruments, support to civil society, and political dialogue. In Zimbabwe, there was “<i>clear recognition from some sections of civil society of the positive role that EU assistance has played in voter education and in supporting local observer groups during elections</i>” (Chiroro, 2010).</p>		
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³ It has decreased in Burundi (2010-2015), Djibouti (2011-2016), Malawi (2009-2014), and Sudan (2010-2015).

<p>3. Explanatory factors for the change</p> <p>Several factors have been decisive for the impact of electoral support programmes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One has been the use of a mutually supportive cluster of activities including between political dialogue, support for legal sector development, capacity development of electoral management bodies, Parliament and civil society organisations; human rights actions; mediation. - There is also feedback indicating closer coordination EU with Member States, for example in Zambia where the EU and the UK co-funded electoral support, as well as a variety of initiatives to engage with national stakeholders beyond electoral management bodies (media, parties, civil society organisations). <p>4. Influence of EU support</p> <p>The EU is the not the only development partner in electoral support, but has developed trust and respect through consistent support, respected observation missions and expert missions. Follow-up of observation missions are work in progress, however, and there is still little being done to bring the experience up to the AU/DMRO level.</p> <p>5. Lessons learned</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EU Electoral support has rightly moved from a focus on election day to support to the whole electoral cycle, e.g. <i>“Key lessons learned call for a long term presence during the pre- and post-election period, in order to monitor critical phases of electoral processes that have so far evaded the scope of EAC observation—including internal party democracy, constituency delimitation, voter registration, candidate nomination, election campaigns, prosecution of electoral offences, and resolution of election disputes”</i> (Action document, EAC Regional Electoral Support Programme, 2014). - Observation mission contribute to credible elections, and therefore government legitimacy, although inclusive politics and services and government accountability also matter. Elections alone do not amount to a strong democracy, and electoral support to promote democracy is best accompanied with actions to promote citizen participation and government accountability. - Elections are not the panacea in post-crisis countries, and indeed can lead to significant upheaval (Burundi, DR Congo, Madagascar). 		
<p>JC 4.2 EU regional cooperation contributed to improved peace and security</p>		
<p>Summary: There are several areas where policies, strategies and plans conducive to peace and security, enhanced capacity and engagement can be attributed, directly or indirectly, to EU regional support. Similarly, regarding the capacity and engagement of regional organisations, government institutions, civil society and communities in matters of peace and security, there is evidence of direct contribution form EU regional support.</p> <p>Peace and security have not markedly improved in the region, and there is limited evidence that these outputs led to positive outcomes, except perhaps in IGAD, but the relative stability and sheer size of EU regional cooperation (compared to both other partners’ support and the DMROs’ own resources) mean that the counterfactual (no EU regional cooperation) would probably mean much more limited progress in producing these outputs and possibly in producing some of the outcomes (peace strengthened and crises averted).</p>		

I-4.2.1	Thanks to EU regional support, there are policies, strategies and plans in place (at regional organisation and country level) that are conducive to improved peace and security	
Based on available documents and interviews (with limitations highlighted under I-4.2.2), instances of EU regional support having led to policies, strategies and plans in place (at regional organisation and country level) that are conducive to improved peace and security are provided below.	As detailed below	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> COMESA has established a network of civil society and private sector organizations through a process of accreditation to the COMESA Programme on Peace and Security. 	DMRO website, accessed February 2017 EAMRs Djibouti (2011-2015) Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, COMESA, EUD to COMESA, EUD to the AU	More than satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> COMESA supports transnational cooperation through its <i>Trade for Peace</i> Project. 	DMRO website, accessed February 2017 Mutunga, 2014 Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, COMESA, EUD to COMESA	Weak
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Progress towards building the capacity of COMESA member states to establish sound laws, regulations and policies to prevent money laundering by building capacity of the member states to analyse, detect and track financial flows that relate to piracy and other transnational crimes, and also to investigate and prosecute financial crimes at all levels. Progress in Anti Money Laundering/Combating Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), with COMESA using recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force as the standard. Sensitisation of reporting entities including financial and non-financial sectors in 8/10 countries reaching over four hundred stakeholders—aiming to increase the volume and quality of suspicious transactions transmitted to the Financial Intelligence Units. Training of analysts from Financial Intelligence Units in 9/10 countries in techniques in order to improve the analysis of the Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) received and disseminate the intelligence to law enforcement agencies for investigation and prosecution” 	Draft evaluation, December 2016, MASE project Interviews, COMESA, EUD to COMESA, IGAD, EUD to IGAD	More than satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> With EU support, the EAC has established EACWARN, an early warning system that produces reports on the situation in its member states and various neighbouring countries to be used by decision-makers at the EAC and member states’ governments. EACWARN comprises a Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC) with a Situation Room and National Early Warning Centres (NEWCs). To exchange information and avoid duplication, EACWARN has been systematically engaging with other DMROs’ own early warning systems, for example COMWARN of COMESA on structural vulnerability assessment and CEWARN of IGAD. EACWARN also engages with EAC CSOs, academia and think tanks for 	APSA Assessments 2010-2016 International Crisis Group 2012, “Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (II): Southern Africa”, <i>Africa Report</i> , n° 191 Communication with EAC Secretariat	Strong

<p>purposes of information sharing as well as development of collaboration frameworks for data collection, analysis and reporting. EACWARN reports, for example, supported the work of the EAC <i>Panel of Eminent Persons</i> during their work in the crisis in Burundi in December 2014. EACWARN is fully connected to the AU's CEWS via an online portal</p>	<p>GIZ, 2017 African Peace Facility Annual Reports between 2009 and 2015 Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, COMESA, EAC, IGAD, EUDs to COMESA, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to SADC, EUD to the AU, East African Civil Society Forum, Institute for Security Studies</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAC has also involved civil society through the ongoing Inter-Burundian Dialogue, which is currently the main existing mechanism to negotiate a way out of the Burundi crisis 	<p>International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 10-14 Interviews, EAC, EUD to EAC</p>	<p>Strong</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU support has enabled EAC to engage CSOs and the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) in the development of the EAC CPMR Mechanism. For example, the EALA has picked up the work on a model bill on CSO-friendly environments, prepared by the East African Civil Society Forum. 	<p>Interviews, EAC, EUD to EAC, East African Civil Society Forum</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IGAD established a <i>Mediation Support Unit</i> in 2014, which has already been involved in mediation efforts in South Sudan. 	<p>Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and IGAD Security Program, 2012, Fighting terror through Justice. Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, IGAD, EUD to IGAD</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<p>The APF-funded APSA Support Programme includes capacity development support to SADC, IGAD, COMESA and EAC (for about €9.9m for 2011-2014, or €2.4m each on average). Beyond the 2013 APF evaluation which stresses that “the AU has primarily been responsible for delivering the APSA Support and Training Centres Programmes, including monitoring and oversight, at a time when its own capacity was relatively weak”, results from this support are very scarce, neither at the output level (plans, capacities, engagement with civil society) nor at the outcome level. The three meeting minutes in the team’s possession are dated 2013, 2014 and no information besides on disbursements and the reiteration that the APSA Support Programme “has improved collaboration between and among the AUC and RECs/RMs”. In fact, as the May 2014 meeting stresses, the APSA Support Programme still lacked a results framework. The APSA Support Programme II (July 2016) focuses on disbursements, cash flow issues, staff position funded, meetings held, trainings offered or attended, workshops, retreats, reports published and documents disseminated – but it does mention</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a few outputs in the area of AU Peace Support Operations Policies, Guidelines and SOPs (e.g. the Aide Memoire on the Protection of Civilians and the Revised Roadmap III on the African Standby Force. The 	<p><u>APSA Support Programme I</u> APSA I description APSA Support Programme I final report for 2011_2015 AU PSD narrative report budget APSA support programme I Financial report.pdf budget 2011_2012 APSA I Narrative report APSA support programme I workplan 2011 APSA I</p> <p><u>APSA Support Programme II</u> APSA II Financial report.pdf APSA II Narrative report.pdf</p>	<p>Weak except for SADC</p>

<p>African Union Quick Impact Project Policy and Guidelines and the ASF Assessment Report). These are the AU's, but can be adapted and adopted by each REC.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a few outputs for the EAC, where thanks to the APSA Support Programme which funded peace and security staff, staff were able to, for example, continue to produce policy briefs for decision makers and early warning and analysis reports, and finalise and validate a study on transnational organised crime and terrorism (this was before to the 2016 staff layoffs mentioned above). - A few outputs for IGAD, along similar lines: using staff supported under APSA, IGAD implemented ongoing activities, including coordinating planning and reports, and mobilising resources. IGAD's Early Warning and Response Mechanism continued to support local and cross-border projects and interventions with the APSA Support Programme Rapid Response. - SADC has fuller data on outcomes and outputs reached thanks to APSA Support Programme, e.g. Amani Africa II field training exercise conducted in October/November 2015; target for the SADC Standby Force to be fully operational met; target for the regional early warning system to be fully operational met; etc. <p>The 2014 APSA report by Prof. Laurie Nathan highlights that AU-REC coordination is particularly good with regards to the continental early warning system and African Standby Force—less so on the Panafrican network of Panels of the Wise (mediation), Peace Fund or Peace and Security Council.</p> <p>One of the areas funded by the APSA Support Programme is support to SADC, COMESA, EAC and IGAD Liaison Offices to the AU and the team's visits to Addis Ababa confirms that these have indeed helped collaboration between the AUC and RECs, but structural issues remain, such as the RECs' observer status in PSC meetings.</p> <p>Moreover, the APSA Support Programme along with other EU funding may have contributed to financial over-dependency on EU funds. Delays in APSA Support Programme payments has led several RECs to end staff contracts, as RECs were not able to prefinance the posts, due to membership fees beyond overdue by Member States.</p>	<p>CA APSA support programme II</p> <p><u>Other</u> AU 2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf APSA report 2010 report-of-the-apsa-assessment-study-july-oct-2010-eng.pdf APSA Final Report 27 April 2015.pdf APSA report 2015 20161110_apsa_impact_report_final.pdf</p>	
I-4.2.2	Thanks to EU regional support, there is enhanced capacity and engagement of regional organisations, government institutions, civil society and communities in matters of peace and security	
<p>Based on available documents and interviews (with limitations highlighted under I-4.2.2), instances of EU regional support having led to enhanced capacity and engagement of regional organisations, government institutions, civil society and communities in matters of peace and security (e.g. organisational reviews and trainings conducted; evidence of community participation in early warning and early response systems) are provided below.</p>	<p>African Peace Facility Annual Reports between 2009 and 2015; International Crisis Group, 2016, "The African Union and the Burundi Crisis: Ambition versus Reality, Crisis Group Africa Briefing, n° 122</p>	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security; reviewing and updating the EAC Regional Strategy for Peace and Security to include Maritime security; Human Trafficking; Cyber Crime; Genocide and Genocide ideology; Environmental crime interventions, among others. • Coordination of the National Counter Terrorism Agencies to enable them develop, share and define counter terrorism information, techniques and strategies; development of the EAC Cooperation Agreement on Countering terrorism; • Development and establishment of the 14 Centres of Excellence in the Policing function among the 5 Partner States of EAC; development of Policing Human Rights Standard Operating Procedures. 	<p>EAC Protocol on Peace and Security Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, EAC, EUD to EAC, East African Civil Society Forum, Institute for Security Studies</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IGAD agreed some important policies and standards in maritime security (IGAD 2030 Integrated Maritime Strategy; 2016 Djibouti Declaration on Maritime Safety and Security for EASAIIO or “Djibouti Code of Conduct”). Implementation is just starting but is on track, e.g. IGAD has led efforts in the establishment and operationalization of Maritime Security Coordination Committees (MSCC) structures in Somalia, specifically to manage and coordinate maritime security requirements inside Somalia and the Somali States making up federal Somalia. The MSCC reports six-monthly to the capacity building WG under the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia • On maritime security, the 2013 final narrative report on the MASE start-up project (RIP-funded) identifies a number of results in increasing the capacity of national criminal justice systems in Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius to prosecute piracy offences, for example: training for police on handovers of suspected pirates and Anti-Money Laundering; procurement for police of biometric data collection equipment to support the establishment of the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution and Investigation Coordination Centre and a dedicated training facility for police in Seychelles; essential trial support including funding for defence lawyers; support of reform of piracy related legislation in Somalia and the development of the Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy; and conduct of a Needs Assessment in Comoros. More recently, the draft MASE review (2016 manuscript) finds that MASE under COMESA “sensitized reporting entities including financial and non-financial sectors in eight of the ten countries reaching over four hundred representatives. It is expected that the sensitization will increase the volume and quality of suspicious transactions transmitted to the Financial Intelligence Units. The sensitization exercise was also an opportunity to identify challenges and capacity needs facing the respective countries and agrees on actions to be undertaken by respective stakeholders in order to strengthen the AML/CFT regimes.” Second, the programme trained analysts from FIUs in nine out of the ten countries on basic and strategic analysis techniques in order to improve and speedup the analysis of the Suspicious Transaction Reports received and disseminate the intelligence to the law enforcement agencies to trigger actual investigation and prosecution.” 	<p>IGAD 2030 Integrated Maritime Strategy; 2016 Djibouti Declaration on Maritime Safety and Security for EASAIIO Draft MASE review (2016 manuscript) Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, IGAD, EUD to IGAD</p>	<p>Strong</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> On civil society capacity and engagement, some EU-supported actions (RIP funding to be confirmed) seem to show some progress, in particular the on-going Inter-Burundian Dialogue with the support of EAC and neighbouring countries, which is currently the main existing mechanism to negotiate a way out of the Burundi crisis (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 10-14). Various EAMRs mention that CSOs were the primary beneficiaries or implementers of projects in the areas of migration, violence against women... (e.g. 2012 EAMR Tanzania). In SADC, the 2013 Botswana EAMR mentions that, <i>“thanks to the EU support, the SADC NGO Council has provided its inputs to the regional SADC strategy review, has provided a monitoring of the national implementation of regional political commitments.”</i> 	<p>International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 10-14 2012 EAMR Tanzania 2013 Botswana EAMR Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, EAC, EUD to EAC, SADC, EUD to SADC, East African Civil Society Forum, Institute for Security Studies</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Besides the above, some results in improving civil society capacity and engagement regarding peace and security, but they are hard to attribute to EU regional cooperation. For example, the Djibouti EAMR mentions an NGO forum under the IGAD umbrella, which brings together the region's NGOs. The COMESA annual report 2014 states COMESA has established a network of civil society and private sector organizations through a process of accreditation to the COMESA Programme on Peace and Security; and a COMESA Inter-Parliamentary Forum. The EAC holds quarterly political dialogue with political parties, media, youth, women, academia, civil society and professional organisations, on issues of democratic governance, transparency, and accountability (RISP 2/COMESA-EAC-IGAD-IOC end of programme report, 2016, for the period 2010-2013). But no indication in available documentation that these are thanks to EU regional cooperation. 	<p>RISP 2/COMESA-EAC-IGAD-IOC end of programme report, 2016, for the period 2010-2013 COMESA annual report 2014 Djibouti EAMR</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<p>I-4.2.3 Peace and security have improved in the region and there is evidence that EU regional support contributed to it</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cross-border tensions have lessened over 2008-2015 for all EASAIIO countries except three. SADC countries have improved national security. 	<p>Ibrahim Index, “Safety and Rule of Law” score, 2008-2015)</p>	<p>Strong</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> However, national security deteriorated in IGAD countries and EAC countries respectively, performing worse than Sub-Saharan Africa. As for personal safety, it has deteriorated in IGAD and SADC countries, and is unchanged for EAC. Several countries in the region still suffer from high levels of armed violence (Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan: over 1 300 deaths in 2016). 	<p>Uppsala Conflict Database; Ibrahim Index, “Safety and Rule of Law” score, 2008-2015)</p>	<p>Strong</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Civil society engagement regarding peace and security appears to be weak in most countries of the EASAIIO region. For example, according to the International Crisis Group, civil society engagement in the SADC processes in Madagascar (2009) and Zimbabwe (2008-2009) has been <i>“at best tangential, confirming the gulf between the regional body and its citizens”</i> (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. i). De Waal and Ibreck, 2016, find that while <i>“every peace process in the region is accompanied by pressure from civil society actors for expedited progress towards an end to organized violence, and also for civil society representation in the peace talks”</i>, <i>“compared to the situation in the early 2000s, when civil society was setting the agenda, ... civil society actors are scrambling to be part of an agenda set by governments and inter-governmental organizations. Governments in the region have closed down most of the space for civil society, and the regional organizations have not compensated by opening up regional spaces for dialogue.”</i> 	<p>De Waal and Ibreck, 2016 International Crisis Group, 2012, p. i) Ibrahim Index on African Governance, 2008-2015</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Peace and security have not markedly improved in the region, and because of the entrenched nature of most conflicts in the region, and the three factors detailed under indicator 4.1.3 (predominance of drivers of peace and security over the role of development cooperation; the fact that the EU is only one of several donors to Africa and RIP funding a sliver compared to overall EU support; and complex institution AU/DMRO setup), it is difficult to assess whether any evolution of the region's peace and security situation is attributable to EU regional support. 	<p>African Peace Facility Annual Reports between 2009 and 2015 APSA Assessments between 2010-2016 OECD database on official development aid, accessed February 2016 Interviews DEVCO, EEAS, DMROs, EUD to DMROs, EUD to the AU Joint Progress Report on cooperation between EU and SADC, 2011 10th EDF Mid-Term Review, 2011 European Court of Auditors, 2009 Council Recommendation on the 2009 discharge (2009/COU/0205)</p>	<p>Weak for the reasons indicated in the left column</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trying to isolate RIP funding for peace and security from APF funding is difficult given that APF funding has transited through RIP channels and that funds for the RECs have transited through the APF (see Table 4 below), and RO stakeholders interviewed have not been capable of distinguishing them. The reasons for channelling most APF funds intended for the RECs/RMs through the AU, particularly under EDF10, were clear and included the recognition that the AU and APSA were the overarching framework for the RECs' work in peace and security; and the promotion of better AU-REC collaboration. To decision to at the same time channel APF money through the RIPs was administrative, not substantive (money not taken from funds already allocated to RIP programmes) but has been puzzling to the AUC and RECs alike. Our finding is that the logic for channelling REC funding through the AUC remains strong, if AUC financial management and delegation capacities were to improve: the APF "has proved to be a successful instrument in providing predictable funding to the African Peace and Security Agenda" (Prof. Laurie Nathan, 2014) and is chronically under-funded, while RECs are chronically over-funded (see EQ7). However, the principle of subsidiarity should be adhered to whenever regional organisations or initiatives are better placed than the AUC to lead and manage programmes. From the 10th EDF RIPs, €115m were allocated to APF support, compared to €47m for non-APF democratisation, peace and security. APF funding, which has increased by 12% between EDF 10 and EDF 11 (to EUR 901 million), have funded Peace Support Operations (Somalia, DR Congo, Central African Republic and South Sudan) and capacity development programmes. In order to strengthen the flexibility of the APF in addressing urgent crises across Africa, early response mechanisms (ERM) have also been put in place with EU cooperation, both regional and continental. Of the 30 initiatives supported by ERMs funded under the APF since its creation in 2010 up to December 2015, 24 took place in the 	<p>Communication from EUD to the AU EDF10 RIPs EDF11 RIP</p>	<p>Strong</p>

<p>EA-SA-IO region (APF 2015 Annual Report, p.29-30). The role of DMROs in the development and the implementation of such initiatives remain altogether limited: 16 of these ERM initiatives were carried out with the African Union Commission (AUC), not DMROs, acting as the implementing partner. The remaining initiatives were implemented by IGAD (two in South Soudan, two in Somalia and one in Kenya), SADC (one in Madagascar in 2012), and EAC-COMESA (in Burundi in 2014). All in all, the bulk of RIP disbursements went to APF operations and the bulk of APF funds between 2004-2015 were allocated to Peace Support Operations (89% of EUR 1 550 million in disbursements) (APF 2015 Annual Report, p. 10-13)⁴. The main APF Peace Support Operations in the EASAIIO region took place in Somalia and the other in the border regions of Uganda, DR Congo, the Central African Republic and South Sudan. In these two cases, there have been important political and security achievements (the establishment of new Federal institutions in Somalia in 2012, the weakening of the Lord's Resistance Army), hampered however by recurrent internal crisis and important levels of violence in the last eight years.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If taking RIP and APF funding together given, given how they have been used interchangeably (see Table 4 below), the relative stability and sheer size of this combined regional cooperation (compared to both other partners' support and the DMROs' own resources) mean that the counterfactual (no EU regional cooperation) would probably mean much more limited progress in producing these outputs and possibly in producing some of the outcomes (peace strengthened and crises averted). 			
<p>Table 4. Peace and security funds going through the APF and to the RECs</p>			
	<p>Peace and security funds (EDF only) going through the APF, some of which being thereafter channelled to the EASAIIO RECs, e.g. 41% for 2016-2018, source EUD to the AU)</p>	<p>Peace and security funds (EDF only) going to the EASAIIO RECs</p>	<p>TOTAL</p>
<p>EDF10</p>	<p>751m (commitments, source : EU 2017)</p>	<p>64m (source : EDF10 RIPS), of which 42m committed (not counting</p>	<p>815m</p>

⁴ Concerning this particular point, a series of principles with the aim of ensuring financing of on-going Peace Support Operations were adopted in July 2015 by the Political and Security Council of the European Council such as launching Joint demarches to AU Member States, recalling also their collective commitment to gradually cover 25% of the AU Peace and Security budget by 2020.

		115m for APF, only transiting through the RIPs)																																																													
	92%	7%	100%																																																												
EDF11	1.586bn (commitments, source : EU 2017)	160m (source : EDF11 RIP)	1.746bn																																																												
	90%	9%	100%																																																												
TOTAL	1.8bn	224m	2.5bn																																																												
<p>Table 5 summarises GIZ findings on the quality and effectiveness of AU and REC involvement in preventative diplomacy, mediation, and peace support operations.</p> <p>Table 5. AU/REC involvement in preventative diplomacy, mediation, and peace support operation</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Country</th> <th>AU/REC involved in diplomacy</th> <th>AU/REC involved in mediation</th> <th>AU/REC involved in a peace support operation</th> <th>Effectiveness</th> <th>Quality</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td rowspan="4">Burundi</td> <td>AU (high)</td> <td>AU (med)</td> <td>AU (low)</td> <td rowspan="4">Partly unsuccessful</td> <td rowspan="4">High quality</td> </tr> <tr> <td>EAC (med)</td> <td>EAC (med)</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>ICGLR (med)</td> <td>COMESA (n/a)</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>ECCAS (low)</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>EASF (n/a)</td> <td></td> <td>EASF (n/a)</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ethiopia</td> <td>AU (n/a)</td> <td>AU (n/a)</td> <td>-</td> <td>Partly successful</td> <td>Medium quality</td> </tr> <tr> <td rowspan="2">Lesotho</td> <td>AU (med)</td> <td>SADC (med)</td> <td>SADC (med)</td> <td rowspan="2">Partly successful</td> <td rowspan="2">Medium quality</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SADC (med)</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td rowspan="2">Somalia (Al-Shabaab)</td> <td>AU (high)</td> <td>-</td> <td>AU (medium)</td> <td rowspan="2">Partly successful</td> <td rowspan="2">High quality</td> </tr> <tr> <td>IGAD (high)</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Somalia (federal)</td> <td>AU (high)</td> <td>IGAD (med)</td> <td>-</td> <td>Successful</td> <td>High quality</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>				Country	AU/REC involved in diplomacy	AU/REC involved in mediation	AU/REC involved in a peace support operation	Effectiveness	Quality	Burundi	AU (high)	AU (med)	AU (low)	Partly unsuccessful	High quality	EAC (med)	EAC (med)		ICGLR (med)	COMESA (n/a)		ECCAS (low)				EASF (n/a)		EASF (n/a)			Ethiopia	AU (n/a)	AU (n/a)	-	Partly successful	Medium quality	Lesotho	AU (med)	SADC (med)	SADC (med)	Partly successful	Medium quality	SADC (med)			Somalia (Al-Shabaab)	AU (high)	-	AU (medium)	Partly successful	High quality	IGAD (high)			Somalia (federal)	AU (high)	IGAD (med)	-	Successful	High quality	<p>GIZ, 2016, APSA Impact Report, The state and impact of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2015.</p>		<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
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governm ent)	IGAD (high)						
South Sudan (civil war)	AU (med)	AU (med)	-	Successful	Medium quality		
	IGAD (med)	IGAD (med)					
	ICGLR (med)						
Sudan (Darfur)	AU (high)	AU (med)	AU (med)	Partly successful	High quality		
	ICGLR (low)						
Sudan (opposition)	AU IGAD COMESA ICGLR	AU	-	Partly successful	High quality		
Tanzania	AU (high)		-	Partly successful	High quality		
	EAC (med)	EAC (low)					
	SADC (med)	SADC med)					
<p>GIZ, 2016, APSA Impact Report, The state and impact of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2015. Assessments of AU/REC interventions (high, medium, low) are GIZ's own.</p>							
<p>Table 6 below summarises documented instances of results from EU regional cooperation at both the output and outcome levels. The third column will remind the reader of the impact-level trend in the region concerned.</p> <p>Table 6. Examples of EU regional contribution to peace and security</p>						<p>APSA Assessments, 2010-2016, , which were available Mutunga, 2014 Draft evaluation, December 2016, MASE project) DMRO annual reports, 2008-2016, which were available 2013 Botswana EAMR International Crisis Group reports, 2008-2016</p>	
	At the output level		At the outcome level		For reference: trend 2008-2015 in the DMRO area regarding peace and security		
C O M E S A	<p>➤ COMESA has established a network of civil society and private sector organizations through a process of accreditation to the COMESA Programme on Peace and Security.</p>		NA		Lesser cross-border tensions, but deteriorated national security overall.		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ COMESA supports transnational cooperation through its <i>Trade for Peace</i> Project (interviews; Mutunga 2014). ➤ Progress towards building the capacity of COMESA member states to establish sound laws, regulations and policies to prevent money laundering by building capacity of the member states to analyse, detect and track financial flows that relate to piracy and other transnational crimes, and also to investigate and prosecute financial crimes at all levels. ➤ Progress in Anti Money Laundering/Combating Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), with COMESA using recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force as the standard. ➤ Sensitisation of reporting entities including financial and non-financial sectors in 8/10 countries reaching over four hundred stakeholders—aiming to increase the volume and quality of suspicious transactions transmitted to the Financial Intelligence Units. ➤ Training of analysts from Financial Intelligence Units in 9/10 countries in techniques in order to improve the analysis of the Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) received and disseminate the intelligence to law enforcement agencies for investigation and prosecution” (draft evaluation, December 2016, MASE project) 		<p>Notable improvements across the EASAIO region include national security in Uganda. Notable deteriorations across the EASAIO region include rule of law and civil society in Burundi.</p>		
E A C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ With EU support, the EAC has established EACWARN, an early warning system that produces reports on the situation in its member states and various 	<p>With EU support, EAC established (i) an EAC Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism,</p>	<p>No lessening of cross-border tensions, and deteriorated</p>		

	<p>neighbouring countries to be used by decision-makers at the EAC and member states' governments. EACWARN comprises a Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC) with a Situation Room and National Early Warning Centres (NEWCs). To exchange information and avoid duplication, EACWARN has been systematically engaging with other DMROs' own early warning systems, for example COMWARN of COMESA on structural vulnerability assessment and CEWARN of IGAD. EACWARN also engages with EAC CSOs, academia and think tanks for purposes of information sharing as well as development of collaboration frameworks for data collection, analysis and reporting. EACWARN reports, for example, supported the work of the EAC <i>Panel of Eminent Persons</i> during their work in the crisis in Burundi in December 2014. EACWARN is fully connected to the AU's CEWS via an online portal (communication with EAC Secretariat; GIZ, 2017).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ EAC has also involved civil society through the ongoing Inter-Burundian Dialogue, which is currently the main existing mechanism to negotiate a way out of the Burundi crisis (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 10-14). ➤ EU support has enabled EAC to engage CSOs and the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) in the development of the EAC CPMR Mechanism. For example, the EALA has picked up the 	<p>providing EAC Member States a framework and forum of consultation and cooperation for conflict prevention, management and resolution geared towards peaceful settlement of disputes; (iii) an EAC Peace Facility aimed at mobilizing and providing necessary resources to support the implementation peace and security interventions; (iii) a Mediation Support Standing Group comprising Partner States officials and EAC Staff has been trained in mediation skills for their readiness to support the work of the EAC Panel of Eminent Persons in preventive diplomacy as well as mediation; (iv) and an EAC <i>Panel of Eminent Persons (PEP)</i>, in 2012. The PEP has been active in Burundi since the beginning of 2015, jointly with COMESA Elders. EAC facilitation convened the inter-Burundian dialogue in Arusha in February 2017, although Government boycotted the talks. While the conflict in Burundi has not begun to find a solution, it has not led to mass violence either.</p>	<p>national security overall. Civil war in South Sudan from 2013.</p>		
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	<p>wok on a model bill on CSO-friendly environments, prepared by the East African Civil Society Forum.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Development of the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security; reviewing and updating the EAC Regional Strategy for Peace and Security to include Maritime security; Human Trafficking; Cyber Crime; Genocide and Genocide ideology; Environmental crime interventions, among others. ➤ Coordination of the National Counter Terrorism Agencies to enable them develop, share and define counter terrorism information, techniques and strategies; development of the EAC Cooperation Agreement on Countering terrorism; ➤ Development and establishment of the 14 Centres of Excellence in the Policing function among the 5 Partner States of EAC; development of Policing Human Rights Standard Operating Procedures. 				
<p>I G A D</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism's (CEWARN) is a well-established mechanism producing sensitive information and analysis to policy makers. CEWARN supported the mediation process in South Sudan; it also helped address pastoral conflicts in cooperation with local peace committees and the use of the CEWARN <i>Rapid Response Fund</i>. ➤ IGAD established a <i>Mediation Support Unit</i> in 2014, which is composed of one mediation expert who has already been 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ With EU support, IGAD has demonstrated its value-added compared to AUC, other regional bodies, and good offices of individual member states, e.g. mediation in South Sudan; security sector reform in Somalia. IGAD was involved in the Sudan peace process that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement under AU lead. In the phase that 	<p>Lesser cross-border tensions, but deteriorated national security overall. Civil war in South Sudan from 2013.</p>		

	<p>involved in mediation efforts in South Sudan.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ IGAD agreed some important policies and standards in maritime security (IGAD 2030 Integrated Maritime Strategy; 2016 Djibouti Declaration on Maritime Safety and Security for EASAIO or “Djibouti Code of Conduct”). Implementation is just starting but is on track, e.g. IGAD has led efforts in the establishment and operationalization of Maritime Security Coordination Committees (MSCC) structures in Somalia, specifically to manage and coordinate maritime security requirements inside Somalia and the Somali States making up federal Somalia. The MSCC reports six-monthly to the capacity building WG under the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia ➤ Increased capacity of criminal justice systems in Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius, and of EASAIO countries more generally, in maritime security matters (MASE reports and communication material listed in Annex B, interviews February 2017) 	<p>led to South Sudan’s independence, IGAD facilitated talks that helped deliver the related referendum. In addition, an IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism was deployed in South Sudan to assess the compliance with the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, and played a crucial role in monitoring breaches. <i>“Hard political realities explain IGAD failures in peace and security when they happen. But we can safely say that IGAD defused the South Sudan crisis several times thanks to EU and EU MS support.”</i> (MN133).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ At several critical points, IGAD has played a role in the restoration of stability in Somalia, notably contributing to installing the transitional government of President Yusuf, and the signing of the 2012 Memorandum of Understanding between the IGAD Joint Committee for the Grand Stabilization of South Central Somalia, which the UN welcomed as <i>“Stabilization of South</i> 			
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		<p><i>Central Somalia is a key component in the vision of the Federal Republic of Somalia as outlined in the President's six pillar policy and in the Prime Minister's stabilization plan"</i> (UN statement, 2012). The MoU encompasses reconciliation, support to local administrations, strengthening security capacities, establishing the rule of law and delivering assistance and basic services to priority communities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ IGAD has also demonstrated value in peace support operations. The IGAD Peace and Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) paved the way for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is heavily supported by the EU. ➤ IGAD plays a leadership role in maritime security (overall coordination of the EU-supported MASE programme), tackling both at-sea and inland enablers of transnational crime and piracy. ➤ IGAD promoted democratisation, including 			
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		<p>through election observation missions (e.g. South Sudan, 2011; Sudan, 2015; Uganda 2016; Djibouti 2016).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ IGAD engaged with NGOs and civil society in the region, on issues of democratic governance, parliaments and female participation and representation in politics, e.g. IGAD hosted the IGAD Women Parliamentary Conference in 2009 and facilitated the agreement of a Regional Action Plan for implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (ECDPM reports, APSA assessment 2016, interviews February 2017). 			
C R O S S - R E G I O N	<p>On maritime security, the MASE start-up project contributed to increasing the capacity of national criminal justice systems in Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius to prosecute piracy offences, for example: training for police on handovers of suspected pirates and Anti-Money Laundering; procurement for police of biometric data collection equipment to support the establishment of the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution and Investigation Coordination Centre and a dedicated training facility for police in Seychelles; essential trial support including funding for defence lawyers;</p>	NA	<p>Notable improvements across the EASAIO region include rule of law in Comoros</p>		

A L	support to reform of piracy related legislation in Somalia and the development of the Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy (2013 final narrative report, MASE start-up project)				
S A D C	<p>Thanks to EU regional cooperation and particularly the APSA Support Programmes, SADC established a regional early warning system; a regional peacekeeping centre; and the SADC Standby Force, to be part of the African Standby Force. The SADC Standby Force was deployed in DR Congo as part of the UN mission.</p> <p>The SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, responsible for promoting peace and security in the region, has mediation capacities, including the recently established Mediation Support Unit and a Panel of Elders to act as SADC mediators (interviews, Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI, 2015)</p> <p>In SADC, <i>"thanks to the EU support, the SADC NGO Council has provided a monitoring of the national implementation of regional political commitments"</i> (2013 Botswana EAMR)</p>	The SADC Standby Force defeated the M23 rebel group in DR Congo, paving the way for the 2013 peace agreement with M23.	Lesser cross-border tensions, and improved national security overall.		
Data on efficiency					
<p>Regarding the efficiency of EU regional cooperation in democratic governance, peace and security, it was limited and there is room for improvement. While it must be pointed out that progress towards these goals is usually not linear; that there are multiple pathways to successful outcomes; and that it is hard to say which is the most cost-effective, the EU is overall less results-oriented than other development partners, and its regional cooperation would therefore appear as efficient in terms of capacity of core staff, but less efficient compared to other development partners in terms of (for example) how many judges were trained, or standards domesticated. Details are provided below.</p>				As detailed below.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At a portfolio level, an overall lack of synergies of EU regional cooperation with efforts at the national level; overlapping regional memberships and mandates; and poor coordination across DMROs and with the AU have hampered efficiency. There is little evidence that EU regional cooperation has amounted so far to more than the sum of individual projects. The EU's limited resources for democratisation, peace and security (€42m under EDF10) perhaps went to the right activities and DMROs, efforts were 				Based on EQ6, including project documents; Report of the Technical Meeting on the APSA Support Programme And Training Centres Of Excellence Programme	More than satisfactory

<p>sometimes made to ensure synergies across the AU/DMROs (e.g. joint COMESA- EAC-IGAD electoral observation mission in Kenya, 2013; MASE programme for all DMROs) but could have been more systematic (e.g. five parallel regional organisations/initiatives in the Burundi crisis; duplications/lack of synergies between AMANI II, a training programme with a DMRO component, and APSA Support Programmes I/II). Coordination seems to have improved lately: <i>"I would favour working with the RECs through the AU. Now, we have discussions where AU-RECs and EU come together. So now we are not blind anymore"</i> (MN138).</p>	<p>Libreville, 27-29 May, 2014; ROM report 2016 on AMANI AFRICA II Support Programme; interviews, DMROs, EUDs to DMROs, EUD to the AU</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At a programme level, efficiency suffers from a lack of focus on expected results, which are not translated into quantitative targets. Monitoring is irregular and incomplete, especially at the outcome level, and does not serve as a management tool. 	<p>Project documents; interviews, DMROs, EUDs to DMROs, EUD to the AU</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At an administrative level, EU systems, cultures and behaviours do help the EU meets its fiduciary responsibilities, but within this full accountability do not empower staff to deliver more and better with their limited resources. In particular, regional EUDs seem understaffed with regards to the scope of their remit, and the EU is usually slower to disburse than EU Member States (but on par or faster, according to DMRO staff, with the USAID and the World Bank, where these are DMRO partners). 	<p>Project documents; interviews, DMROs, EUDs to DMROs, EUD to the AU</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As for the sustainability of EU capacity development efforts, it seems to be greater in democratic governance, peace and security than in other sectors. With the possible exception of democratic governance in EAC (poor sustainability of RPIHSSP results), the processes put in place under EDF10 were by and large still in place by the time of the evaluation (2017), and sometimes other development partners joined in co-funding (e.g. Norway on anti-piracy). 	<p>Project documents; interviews, DMROs, EUDs to DMROs, EUD to the AU, EU Member States</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A more efficient regional cooperation in democratic governance, peace and security would involve greater clarity on what each actor in the regional space (DMROs, crossborder initiatives, individual DMRO Member States, civil society platforms...) can help achieve with what support; considering the drivers greater democracy, peace and security <i>and</i> the main binding constraints thereon; and a much deeper dialogue with DMROs and other regional initiatives (e.g. the ICGLR) and their Member States on what is each DMRO's core business and not and what is the EU ready to support, over what length of time, with what exit strategy. There are six DMROs/regional initiatives in EASAI0, plus the AU, plus ECCAS and CEPGL that concern DR Congo, all with a mandate on peace and security: dialogue with donors that is not sufficiently joined-up across donors and insufficiently structured can only further prevent rationalisation by African leadership and maintain a proliferation of organisations which are not all equally effective. Stakeholders across the continent, for example, have emitted the opinion that COMESA should not be involved in peace and security but rather focus on economic integration (see also EQ6). 	<p>Based on EQ6, including project documents; interviews, DMROs, EUDs to DMROs, EUD to the AU</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<p>Data on gender</p>		

Another issue to consider is the regional cooperation's sensitivity to gender equality: it appears that gender issues are not central in programme and project documents on democracy, peace and security, except for SADC; and they are not central in implementation and reporting either: Table 7 summarises the extent of a gender perspective in project design, reporting, and quality of gender results – in key democracy, peace and security projects (2008-2015.) This is corroborated by interviews with Gender Officers in EAC and IGAD, who manage to mainstream gender in their respective organisations, but without specific EU support. It should be borne in mind however that this evaluation focuses on RIP (EDF) funding, but many EU actions outside of these projects, and indeed outside of EDF projects, have an important gender dimension. For example, Electoral Observation Missions usually have a strong focus on gender and their reports devote chapters to the participation of women; IfS projects often have a good gender marker (IfS evaluation, 2011); etc.

Interviews, DMROs, EUDs to DMROs
Project documentation.

Table 7. Gender perspective in project design, reporting, and quality of gender results – in key democracy, peace and security projects (2008-2015)

EDF	Year	Title/DMRO	Gender perspective in project design?	Gender perspective in reporting?	Quality of gender results (if any reported)
10	2011	Start-up Project to Promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE)/IOC	Explicit principle of “gender neutrality”	Yes, gender in ToRs for evaluation, but no gender consideration in evaluation itself.	Not applicable.
10	2013	Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE)/IGAD	Explicit principle of “gender neutrality”	Yes	Poor: “None of the MASE Result Area leading agencies have issued explicit instruction or offered guidance and support to their implementing partners on what is required to mainstream gender into MASE funded activities. Any gender mainstreaming that has occurred has been done under existing Standard Operating Procedures of the implementing agency or organisation e.g.

					INTERPOL or FAO. There is no consistent, uniform message being promulgated by the MASE programme to ensure gender issues are given appropriate priority and how each activity should approach gender mainstreaming. It is only Result 1.2 that has made attempt to ensure gender is addressed.” (December 2016 draft evaluation)		
10	2009	Regional Political Integration and Human Security Support Programme (RPIHSSP)/EAC	Targets (among others) women and youth.	Yes (ROM reports)	2012 ROM report gives RPIHSSP a gender marker of 1 (significant gender focus) but states It merely “follows the guidelines of the EAC gender officer” when there should be “more functional coordination among the EAC gender officer and the EAC Departments.”		
10	2011	Support to SADC Regional Political cooperation	The SADC RIP included the objective of raising awareness, cooperation and action against trafficking in persons, especially women and children	Not available	Not applicable		
11	2014	EAC Regional Electoral	Specific focus on	Not available	Not applicable		

		Support Programme	developing capacity and reporting relating to gender				
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EQ 5 Regional Natural Resource Management

Environmental governance – has regional-level EU support contributed to improved regional cooperation and harmonisation among Indian Ocean island states, and thereby led to more sustainable management of the region's important natural resources?

Rationale & Coverage of the EQ:

In EASAIIO, natural resources are the foundation for the livelihoods of the majority of the population and a major contribution to the region's economy. Improved management of natural resources holds a significant potential for contributing to economic growth. The current trend of widespread environmental degradation in EASAIIO is already negatively affecting economic development and livelihoods; and environmental degradation is a major obstacle for the attainment of food security and economic growth. Increased scarcity of productive natural resources (exacerbated by climate change), is also projected to contribute to increased conflict and migration. Many regionally important natural resources are transboundary (e.g. fish stocks, migratory species, water resources), and cannot be governed effectively at the national level, since actions in one country can affect the economic and livelihoods situation in other countries. Hence, there is a strong case for regional cooperation and integration in the management of transboundary natural resources and tackling of shared environmental challenges.

This EQ examines whether the regional support has contributed to establishing a viable framework for regional environmental management and co-operation, which can lead to a more sustainable and more productive management and utilisation of natural resources. EU's regional level support for sustainable natural resource management (NRM) under the 10th EDF (2007-2013) covered a diverse range of themes, i.e.: a) fisheries and aquaculture, b) ecosystem management (incl. biodiversity, wildlife, forests, coastal zones, reefs), c) climate change and resilience, d) water resources management, e) agriculture and livestock, food and nutrition security, f) renewable energy, and g) environmental monitoring. Under the 11th EDF (2014-2020), the planned regional programmes do not support renewable energy and environmental monitoring, but focuses on a) to e), above. As can be seen from the figure below fisheries and ecosystems (biodiversity) accounted for more than 50% of the NRM spending under the 10th EDF, but will consume around 49% of the planned NRM spending under the 11th EDF. In absolute terms, the funding has increased a bit for both areas; Biodiversity funding (committed amounts) is at EUR 29 million under the 10th EDF and 30 million under the 11th EDF, and fisheries funding (committed amounts) at EUR 36 million under the 10th EDF and 40 million under the 11th EDF. The two areas thus consistently remained major areas of intervention during the entire period under evaluation. The pattern has fluctuated for other areas of engagement with a significant increase in the support for agriculture and food security from being a small area to becoming a major focus area and vice-versa for climate change and resilience. Water resources management will remain at a somewhat lower level than the main areas of engagement.

Hence, to enable a more focused and in-depth analysis, which also brings out lessons which are of relevance to the new programmes under the 11th EDF, EQ5 mainly focuses on the management of ecosystems (marine and terrestrial), coastal zones and fisheries in the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa, as representative themes for analysing the support for NRM. All completed and ongoing regional programmes related to ecosystems, coastal zones and fisheries are included in the sample; and in addition, NRM related elements of the two major


climate change programmes are included in the sample. The total value of the programmes included in the sample is 76% of the total NRM funding allocated under the 10th EDF.

The programmes to be implemented under EDF11 have largely been designed, but not fully approved yet. In the case of IGAD, the two programmes initially planned - 1) Agropastoral resilience and 2) Ecosystem rehabilitation and NRM have been replaced with a decision to channel all of EU's support for IGAD through the multi-donor trust fund supporting IGAD. The EU support provided to the trust fund will focus on four selected transboundary areas – while the NRM elements are not yet specified, it is anticipated that resilience will a main focus and support the implementation of the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI).

Most of the major NRM programmes under the 10th EDF had not been completed yet at the time of the evaluation; some have been granted extensions due to delays in start-up and implementation (see EQ9 on efficiency); of the largest programmes, only the IGAD Inland Water Resources Management Programme had been completed by end 2016. The following were still ongoing, albeit scheduled for completion in 2017: 1) Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (BMP - IGAD); 2) Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II – cross-regional, implemented by IOC); and 3) Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO (ISLAND II – IOC). Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States (CMISBM (Biodiversité) - IOC) is scheduled for completion in end 2018.

Programme sample (biodiversity and fisheries programmes under the 10th EDF)	
BMP:	Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (FED/2012/023-700)
CMISBM: (Biodiversité)	Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States (FED/2012/022-995)
ISLANDS I & II: (ISIDSMS)	1) Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS) (FED/2009/021-331) 2) Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO (FED/2013/024-107)
SmartFish I & II:	1) Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (FED/2009/021-330) 2) Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)(FED/2013/024-111)

Figure 4: Allocation of regional funding for NRM for EASAI0 under the 10th and 11th EDF.



* Support to the IGAD under EDF11 is not included, as the proportion that will be allocated to NRM related activities under the trust fund is currently not specified.

EQ5 assesses not only results at the regional, sub-regional and transboundary levels, but also at the national level, since the implementation of regional agreements mainly takes place at the national level and requires harmonised frameworks and efforts. Ecosystem/biodiversity resources and especially fish stocks were a particularly prominent area of focus for the NRM-related support for the DMROs in EASAI0 under the 10th EDF. Moreover, the EQ examines to what extent the results of EU's support can and will be sustained by the DMROs and stakeholders in the medium-long term.

Regional NRM actions in EA-SA-IO

EDF10 (sample in bold):

- **Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (BMP, IGAD – EUR 14m)**
- Inland Water Resources Management (IGAD – EUR 14.7m)
- Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD – EUR 1.1m)
- Animal disease surveillance in support of trade (IGAD – EUR 6m)
- **Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States (CMISBM/Biodiversité), IOC – EUR 15m)**
- **Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS) (ISLANDS I, IOC – EUR 9.1m)**
- **Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO (ISLANDS II, IOC – EUR 7.5m)**
- **Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (SmartFish I, cross-regional, IOC – EUR 20m)**
- **Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II, cross-regional, IOC – EUR 16m)**
- Renewable energy (IOC – EUR 15m)
- Monitoring of Environment and Security in Africa (MESA, SADC – EUR 5m)
- Monitoring of Environment and Security in Africa (MESA, cross-regional, AU – EUR 5m)

EDF11 (planned):

- Lake Victoria Basin (EAC – EUR 20m)
- Fisheries/stock protection (EAC – EUR 10m)
- Agropastoral resilience (IGAD – EUR 15m)

- Ecosystem rehabilitation and NRM (IGAD – EUR 10m)
- CC and Disaster management (IOC – EUR 16m)
- Food security (IOC – EUR 17m)
- Food security (SADC – EUR 9m)
- Transboundary water management (cross-regional – EUR 22m)
- Contribution of sustainable fisheries to the blue economy (cross-regional – EUR 30m)
- Wildlife conservation (cross-regional – EUR 30m)

JC 5.1 <i>EU support contributed to the establishment of a regional policy and institutional framework, which is conducive for regional cooperation and management of natural resources</i>		
Summary response	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
<i>I-5.1.1 Regional institutional frameworks and coordination mechanisms are strengthened/established</i>		
<p>Summary: EU supported regional programmes have endeavoured to establish or strengthen regional mechanisms to promote cooperation and coordination. In some cases this has been successful, e.g. with re-establishing the IOC Coral Reef Facility (under ISLANDS); strengthening LVFO (Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization – under EAC), SWIOFC (South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission), and IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission) under SmartFish; and enhancing the coordination between IOC and fisheries commissions (under SmartFish). But, in other cases progress has been limited, e.g. with little progress on the establishing of the Western Indian Ocean Conservation Trust Fund (WIO CTF) and WIOCC (Western Indian Ocean Coastal Challenge) under ISLANDS. BMP established interstate agreements (IGAD, governments and implementing partners) for the management of three transboundary landscapes. It is still too early to assess the results of CMISBM, but the programme has reactivated a regional and national coral reef networks.</p>		
BMP:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BMP has promoted interstate cooperation vis-à-vis the management of three transboundary landscapes. A Transboundary Steering Committee has been established for BMP, and transboundary committees and tripartite agreements have been entered between the involved countries, IGAD and the implementing partners (IUCN ICRAF, HoA-REC&N) for three pilot transboundary landscapes. (see I-5.3.3) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA progress report 4 (Oct 2016 – Mar 2016) Interview 074 	Satisfactory
<i>BMP: Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (FED/2012/023-700)</i>		
CMISBM (Biodiversité):		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CMISBM aims at establishing a mechanism for regional harmonization of biodiversity policies and regulations vis-à-vis MEAs and focusing on migratory species and alien invasive species. But it is too early to assess the achievements/results in this regard. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Action fiche Interview 717 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CMISBM aims at strengthening and restructuring the regional Coral Reef Network (established with support from ISLANDS) as well as national coral reef networks (i.e. in IOC countries + Zanzibar), e.g. with a revision of the network's governance charter and training workshops. The regional network is part of the Regional Coral Reef Task Force established in 2011 under the Nairobi Convention (the Nairobi Convention is the main regional convention on marine and coastal biodiversity). The national networks became dormant after ISLANDS I and were revitalised by CMISBM. The national network in Madagascar comprises around 15 members: from GoM (e.g. Ministry of Environment), marine protected area (MPA) managers (24 of the 30 MPAs in Madagascar are managed by NGOs), and scientists. In Madagascar, the intention is to institutionalise the network and a decree being drafted in this regard. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workshop and meeting reports IOC annual report 2015 Interviews 025, 030, 703 	Strong
<i>CMISBM: Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States (FED/2012/022-995)</i>		
ISLANDS I and II (focus on coral reef flagship + other NRM elements):		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A Regional Facility for Coral Reefs (RFCR)/Coral Reef Network and associated national reef networks have been re-established and made operational under ISLANDS I with technical support and financing, e.g. for workshops. The Facility was initiated by the Seychelles, but its establishment and operation is spearheaded/led by Réunion. It provides a solid basis for the implementation of the marine programme of the IOC. This is the primary (but not the only) engagement of ISLANDS in biodiversity. Coral Reef related action was transferred from ISLANDS to CMISBM in mid-2015. • In Madagascar the intention is to institutionalise the national network and a decree is being drafted in this regard. The national network comprises members from GoM (e.g. Ministry of Environment), marine protected area (MPA) managers, and scientists. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme Estimate 1 (May 2012 – May 2013), Phase I • Programme Estimate no 2, (for 29 Dec 2015 –28 Jun 2017), Phase II • TA Final Report, Phase II • TA service contract no 270010 addendum 2, Phase I • 2015 ROM report, Phase I • IOC annual report 2015 • Interviews 025, 030 	<p>Strong</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISLANDS II provided short-term technical support to the launch of Western Indian Ocean Conservation Trust Fund (WIO CTF) and WIOCC (Western Indian Ocean Coastal Challenge) communication (Sep 2014). But, no further support to WIOCC in this regard was provided as the Seychelles did not submit a request and WIO CTF activities stopped. IOC is still pursuing WIOCTF (phase II), but the anchoring may not be with WIOCC as anticipated. Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) has since Apr 2015 been engaged to support the process. Progress remains limited, although there have since 2016 been signs of revitalisation of WIOCC under the Seychelles' presidency of IOC. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA Final Report, Phase II • Interviews 703, 717) 	<p>Strong</p>
<p><i>ISLANDS:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS) (FED/2009/021-331)</i> • <i>Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO (FED/2013/024-107)</i> 		
<p>SmartFish I and II:</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The extended geographical scope of SmartFish (20 countries) does not benefit from a single dedicated regional coordination institution, but all 5 RECs and IRCC (Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee for COMESA, EAC, IGAD, IOC) are members of the steering committee which helps ensuring coherence. SmartFish underpins the EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement) process. It is consistent with the strategic priorities of the strategic action plan of ACP, and strategies developed by RECs (SADC, IGAD and IOC) as it facilitates coordination and coherence of components related to fisheries governance, trade and monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish I • FAO Final Report, SmartFish I, FED/2009/021-330 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SmartFish has contributed to enhanced coordination of strategies and policies and links/cooperation between EASAI0 countries, RECs, Regional Fisheries Management Organisations/Regional Fisheries Bodies (RFMOs/RFBs), and AU. An example is the support for IOC coordination with IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission) and SWIOFC (South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission). The contribution to regional cooperation in relation to IOC, IOTC and LVFO (Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization – under EAC) is 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish I • 2012 ROM report, SmartFish I • FAO Final Report, SmartFish I • Mid-Term Evaluation, SmartFish II • Interview 002 	<p>Strong</p>

<p>significant (e.g. around monitoring, control and surveillance, see I-5.3.1). But the involvement of COMESA in SmartFish is weak.</p> <p>However, regional Fisheries Management Organisations/Regional Fisheries Bodies (RFMOs/RFBs) are still not fully linked to IOC/RECs and could still work more closely together.</p> <p>The project also strengthens national capabilities and capacity to participate effectively in regional fora and trade. SmartFish has improved the synergies between regional institutions and between levels of decisions (national versus regional). An example is strengthened cooperation between countries around IOTC by facilitation countries' preparation and participation in meetings and supporting the implementation of resolutions.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SmartFish strengthened existing structures, incl SWIOFC (South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission), IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission), Lake Fisheries Authorities (focusing on LVFO) For example, SmartFish assisted the process of shared fisheries management in Lake Kariba promoting dialogue, resolving disputes and promoting environmental sustainability – a high-level consultation on policy issues is planned by the two countries. (e.g. technical committee meetings (2010, 2012, 2014) between Zambia and Zimbabwe and technical documents, assessments). Some new structures were created, e.g. The Federation of Artisanal Fishers (IOC area) was created and made operational for the coordination of IOC initiatives re. small-scale fishery. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid-Term Evaluation, SmartFish II Workshop reports Interviews ZIMB15, ZIMB16 	More than satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The SmartFish II MTR found that the project should engage in: a) further improving multi-level governance processes; b) enhancing cooperation on fish trade and value addition; and c) strengthening mechanisms developed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid-Term Evaluation, SmartFish II 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some Phase I activities were found by the Mid-term Evaluation not to directly generate additional value through a regional approach, but rather addressed a series of coincident national needs through common activities. But the Mid-term Evaluation also found that SmartFish 1 focused on a) tuna and highly migratory species with a EASAI0 regional dimension, b) fisheries and aquaculture with a transboundary dimension (e.g. Victoria, Tanganyika, Kariba lakes), and c) resources where countries experience similar challenges (e.g. coastal resources like cucumber, octopus, small pelagic fish) and thus can benefit from tools developed regionally. Moreover, joint regional/transboundary surveillance is promoted in the Southwestern Indian Ocean and Lake Victoria. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish I 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are several RECs with overlapping mandates, but IOC is leading in terms of maritime experiences. The model with IOC implementing on behalf of all RECs has proven effective (as compared to implementation being shared by all RECs). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid-Term Evaluation, SmartFish II Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish I Interview 002 	Satisfactory
<p><i>SmartFish:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (FED/2009/021-330)</i> <i>Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)(FED/2013/024-111)</i> 		
<p>Other programmes:</p>		

<p><u>Inland Water Resources Management (Inland WRM) in the IGAD Region (FED/2009/021-334):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A water unit was created at the IGAD Secretariat. • IGAD is now building negotiations around the regional water policy established with Inland WRM support – this is unique for the IGAD region, 	<p>Interview 062</p>	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<p><i>I-5.1.2 Conducive regional policies, strategies and plans are put in place</i></p>		
<p>Summary: Some EU supported regional programmes have contributed to strengthening regional policy frameworks, e.g. by facilitating the elaboration of a draft regional IGAD biodiversity policy (under BMP), a regional IOC strategy for fisheries and aquaculture, a strategy was drafted for sustainable marine fisheries and regional integration in the Southwest Indian Ocean, a draft EAC aquaculture strategy and action plan, all under IOC. CMISBM is engaged in the development of regional protocols on a) invasive species, and b) endangered sharks and rays under the Nairobi Convention. ISLANDS supports the implementation of the Mauritius Strategy (ISLANDS).</p>		
<p>BMP:</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A final draft IGAD Regional Biodiversity Policy has been prepared with support from the project (officially adopted in 2016). A protocol for the policy is being developed; the draft protocol (scheduled to be ready in March 2017) will be validated and signed a legally binding for the 7 member states. Regional Biodiversity Policy provides the framework for regional cooperation on environmental management, livelihoods improvements, and benefit sharing. The project supported policy dialogue on conservation related issues. • Four policies are under development: a) integration of regional policy into national regulations, b) invasive species, c) wildlife conservation and anti-wildlife crime, and d) benefit sharing in relation to biodiversity resources. University of Pretoria won the tender in Oct 2016. • The extent to which it will be implemented is uncertain; biodiversity is not a high priority for IGAD for its MS, as there are many pressing socio-economic (incl. drought and food security) and security problems in the region. • Draft transboundary landscape management plans have been prepared for all three demonstration landscapes, but they have not yet been validated by the governments. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA progress report 4 (Oct 2015 – Mar 2016) • Action fiche • Interview 074 	<p>Strong</p>
<p><i>BMP: Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (FED/2012/023-700)</i></p>		
<p>CMISBM (Biodiversité):</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project promoted harmonisation of national policies and a regional mechanism for policy harmonisation. • The regional dimension of CMISBM is that the SWIO (South Western Indian Ocean) countries share the same ecosystems and challenges: a) marine fauna such as endangered sharks display transboundary movements, and b) invasive marine species are spreading in the region with ship traffic. • CMISBM is engaged in the development of a regional protocol and action plan on invasive species, which are informed by pilot activities in Madagascar, Mauritius (Rodrigues), and Kenya (Lamu). • CMISBM is working on a regional protocol for endangered sharks and rays under the Nairobi Convention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Logical Framework • Action fiche • IOC annual report 2015 • Interview 717 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

<i>CMISBM: Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States (FED/2012/022-995)</i>		
ISLANDS I and II (focus on coral reef flagship + other NRM elements):		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ISLANDS was a key element of the implementation of the IOC Development Plan 2013-2016. ISLANDS does not aim at developing new regional policies strategies per se, but at helping IOC countries implementing the SIDS Mauritius Strategy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ROM 2015, Phase II Action Fiche, Phase I Logical Framework, Phase II Action fiche, Phase II 	Indicative but not conclusive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National negotiators on UNFCCC were trained in relation to COP21 in Paris (2015). ISLANDS helped facilitating that an EU-IOC declaration on climate change was signed at COP21 in Paris (2015). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews 703, 715, 717 	Satisfactory
<p><i>ISLANDS:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS) (FED/2009/021-331)</i> <i>Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO (FED/2013/024-107)</i> 		
SmartFish I and II:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is not a single regional strategy or action plan on fisheries in the full EASAI0 Region, but rather a set of strategies for the individual RECs and regional fisheries bodies (RFBs), but these strategies are inconsistent. For example, inadequate harmonisation of fish trade rules between RECs limit regional trade and is to some extent encouraging illegal fish trade between some countries (e.g. illegal re-export from Zambia to DR Congo). IOC, SADC and COMESA have specific fisheries and aquaculture strategies, whereas EAC and IGAD integrate it into their NRM of food security strategies. It was not feasible for SmartFish to deliver an overarching regional strategy, a major reason being diverging interested of the countries in the region. Instead SmartFish seeks to promote a common ground in developing management strategies of specific fisheries and aquaculture; and harmonising sub-regional strategies (e.g. it reviewed the various sub-regional fisheries strategies and identified common grounds and gaps). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish I 2012 ROM report, SmartFish I FAO Final Report, SmartFish I Mid-Term Evaluation, SmartFish II 	More than satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional and sub-regional strategies and policies developed with SmartFish support: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A new regional IOC strategy for fisheries and aquaculture, “Stratégie régionale des pêches et de l’aquaculture de la Commission de l’Océan Indien 2015-2025”, was finalised with SmartFish II support and validated by the IOC Council of Ministers, but text details are still being discussed by the countries. A strategic framework for tuna fisheries has been prepared (supported by national reviews of coastal tuna fisheries). A strategy was drafted for sustainable marine fisheries (incl. tuna fisheries) and regional integration in the Southwest Indian Ocean (SWIO). A draft EAC aquaculture strategy and action plan (to be supported by EU under the 11th EDF: the EAC Lake Victoria fisheries project – SmartFish support the drafting of the project document). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid-Term Evaluation, SmartFish II FAO Final Report, SmartFish I Stratégie régionale des pêches et de l’aquaculture de la Commission de l’Océan Indien 2015-2025, IOC Budget Speech, Presentation of the Budget of the East African Community for the Financial Year 2016/2017 to the East African Legislative Assembly Interview 713 	Strong

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ An Aquaculture Protocol for Lake Tanganyika was developed and endorsed by the Lake Tanganyika Authority Council of Ministers in mid-2016. A similar protocol has been developed for Lake Kariba. It was not possible for FAO to support the development for more protocols as envisaged in the logframe since it is a process that takes a long time. Hence, a protocol was not developed for Lake Victoria due to technical constraints (a first draft was done), but the issues analysis has been carried out. ○ Some support was given to the development of a strategy and plan for Nile perch fisheries, which have been adopted by LVFO in 2016 (Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization). ○ Regional fish and fish product standards have been prepared and are awaiting approval by EAC and SADC. The process of ensuring COMESA acceptance of EAC's sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards (SPS) guidelines is ongoing, but is incomplete. ○ Support was provided for IOC's regional food security programme (Programme Régional de Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle) to that fish and fish products were reflected in the IOC food security and nutrition strategy, approved by the Council of Ministers in 2015. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● SmartFish is aligned with the 2009 IOC Regional Fisheries Strategy, a fisheries chapter in EPAs for ESA and SADC, as well as the SADC/COMESA/EAC Tripartite Summit decision for strengthening regional integration. SmartFish also tackles fisheries-food security; food security is a priority in the region and fisheries plays, and can further play, an important role. However, SmartFish is not providing specific support for EPA implementation, although it has arranged a meeting in 2015 on heavy metal contaminants in fish, which is affecting the access for SwordFish to the EU market. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 2012 ROM report, SmartFish I ● FAO Final Report, SmartFish I ● Mid-Term Evaluation, SmartFish II 	Satisfactory
<p><i>SmartFish:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● <i>Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (FED/2009/021-330)</i> ● <i>Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)(FED/2013/024-111)</i> 		
<p>Other programmes:</p>		
<p><u>Inland Water Resources Management (Inland WRM) in the IGAD Region (FED/2009/021-334):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A regional water policy was prepared with Inland WRM support and endorsed by the IGAD member states in 2015. ● A draft regional water protocol and a draft regional data-sharing policy and transboundary water were elaborated. 	Interview 062	Satisfactory
<p><i>I-5.1.3 National policies, plans and institutional frameworks are improved and harmonised</i></p>		
<p>Summary: Some EU funded regional programmes contributed to the harmonisation and strengthening of national policies in the region, especially in relation to fisheries e.g. fisheries governance strategies for Madagascar and Zanzibar, and harmonisation of fisheries policies in Lake Tanganyika countries (under SmartFish). CMISBM will provide support for the drafting of the Environment Code in Madagascar, but the funds have not yet been released. BMP and ISLANDS did not engage in national policy formulation, although BMP did carry out national policy assessment for 7 IGAD MS.</p>		

BMP:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All IGAD member states have environmental policies and institutional frameworks in place. However, there is a lack of consolidated national biodiversity policies. Moreover, the attention given to ecosystem functions in spatial planning is inadequate. A significant challenge is inadequate governance and policy implementation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Action fiche TA progress report 4 (Oct 2015 – Mar 2016) Monitoring report 1 (Nov 2013 – Aug 2014) 2015 ROM report 	Strong
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National policy assessments were carried out and validated at national workshops in the 7 IGAD MS. The assessments informed the IGAD Regional Biodiversity Policy. The project does not appear to have contributed to the elaboration of improved national policies and strategies as intended. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring report 3 (Jan – May 2015) 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A management plan has been drafted for the marine part of the Lower Awash – Lac Assal landscape (the Gulf of Tajoura, Djibouti) and is awaiting validation by the Government of Djibouti. Government of Djibouti staff have been trained on local marine area management. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews 064, 074 Training session briefly viewed 	Strong
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government staff have been trained, incl. local government staff in the three pilot landscapes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews 064, 074 	Satisfactory
<i>BMP: Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (FED/2012/023-700)</i>		
CMISBM (Biodiversité):		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CMISBM aims at promoting harmonisation of national policies (see I-5.1.2) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2015 ROM Report 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CMISBM will provide support for the drafting of the Environment Code in Madagascar. However, the funding has not yet been released and the process is thus on standby. Madagascar is committed to integrate natural capital in the national accounting by 2020, as per the Aichi targets under CBD. CMISBM has provided some regional opportunities for experience sharing (e.g. learning from Mauritius), carried out a study for Madagascar and Comoros and provided training on how to carry out the accounting. Accounting in the selected pilot site (Nosy Be) and at national level has not yet commenced, since the funding has not yet been provided. A study on the status of freshwater biodiversity in Mauritius (see I-5,2,1) helped identifying management and conservation issues and informed the Revised Biodiversity Act, so that freshwater biodiversity is covered, thereby filling a legal gap. Freshwater biodiversity is receiving less attention in Mauritius than marine and terrestrial biodiversity as it is not a source of revenue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview 025, 714 	Satisfactory
<i>CMISBM: Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States (FED/2012/022-995)</i>		
ISLANDS I and II (focus on coral reef flagship + other NRM elements):		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project is aligned with the Mauritius Strategy, IOC Strategic Objectives and the National Development Strategies. ISLANDS aims at addressing the insufficient and uncoordinated mainstreaming of the Mauritius Strategy into national policies and strategies by promoting inter-ministerial cooperation vis-à-vis addressing climate change adaptation – and help integrating climate change adaptation in national budgets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ROM 2015, Phase II Action Fiche, Phase I Interview 703 	Satisfactory

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISLANDS I promoted an integrated approach to addressing climate change, resilience and environmental sustainability in development planning. Trainings and tools were provided, incl. a training on systemic modernisation. The tools provided were used by the Government for drafting Madagascar's National Development Plan, but ISLANDS did not directly support the process. Axis number 5 in the plan is on natural capital and also covers disaster management/risk reduction. • A multi-stakeholder platform was established under ISLANDS I, but it was not invited as a group to contribute to the National Development Plan. • In general, ISLANDS provided training on tools, but did not support the actual implementation/use of the tools. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 023 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Coral Reef Facility has promoted multi-sectoral national dialogue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA service contract no 270010 addendum 2, Phase I • Programme Estimate no 2, (Dec 2015 – Jun 2017), Phase II 	Indicative but not conclusive
<p><i>ISLANDS:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS) (FED/2009/021-331)</i> • <i>Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO (FED/2013/024-107)</i> 		
<p>SmartFish I and II:</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequate legal and regulatory frameworks and weak governance have contributed to unsustainable use of fisheries resources, and aggravated poverty and food insecurity. This in turn has hampered the development of aquaculture, which can contribute to economic development and improving livelihoods. On the positive side, some countries have now included the need for fisheries management plans (FMP) in their fisheries laws. Fisheries management plans (FMP) have been, or are being, developed in the region, with support from SmartFish and others. More management plans are scheduled for development. But the implementation of fisheries management plans is lagging behind. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAO Final Report, SmartFish I 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SmartFish I reviewed the coherence and consistency between regional and national strategies and policies on fisheries and aquaculture. In 2012, 12 (out of 20) SmartFish countries had specific policies or strategies (although some were not up-to-date). 5 had development, poverty or NRM policies which also covered (or were applicable to) fisheries and aquaculture. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAO Final Report, SmartFish I 	More than satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fisheries policy documents were developed with SmartFish support and adopted for several countries, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ “National Good Governance Strategy for Fisheries” (passed in 2012) and a revision of the Law on Fisheries and Aquaculture; SmartFish also co-funded with FAO and COMESA the drafting of the Sector Policy for Fishing under CAADP (Madagascar) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II • Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish I • FAO Final Report, SmartFish I • Workshop reports • Interviews 014, 018, 068, 704, 712, 713 	Strong

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The demand for mud-crabs significantly increased with the entry of Chinese exporters buying live crabs for the East Asian market. GoM amended with SmartFish support the mud-crab legislation introducing increased minimum sizes (and market preference for large crabs), export quotas (but these seem to have been abandoned), closure during reproductive season). (I-5.3.2, 014) ○ A strategy to improve fisheries governance and management, Zanzibar (Tanzania) ○ Harmonisation of fisheries policies and regulations in Lake Tanganyika countries (Burundi, DRC, Tanzania, Zambia) ○ Sanitary and phytosanitary regulations for fish exports in Djibouti (validated in 2016); while Djibouti currently does not export fish, the Government wished to have the legal framework in place for future exports hoping Somali boats would land fish in Djibouti. ○ Support was also provided for the development of a national strategy on regional trade (Uganda) ○ Review of the fisheries regulation as a small contribution towards the elaboration of a new fisheries bill, which is being finalised with support from Norway (Mauritius) <p>The MTE of SmartFish I found a need to support countries in ensuring regional commitments in national policies. It is clear SmartFish has engaged in this.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● SmartFish diagnosed the analytical capacity and provided TA on how to upgrade the sanitary authority in Djibouti with a 3-week training on sanitary issues and official controls; however the training was too brief to sufficiently enhance the capacity and did not lead to any changes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interviews 018, 068 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● SmartFish supported selected ongoing processes related to fisheries management plans (FMP) at country level, including in Mauritius and Tanzania. Some high-value non-transboundary species were covered (octopus, sea cucumber, spiny lobster). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● FAO Final Report, SmartFish I 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The harmonisation of fish standards within REC areas has experienced some delays. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● FAO assessed under SmartFish the integration of fisheries in regional national food security strategies, and found it was often not mentioned even if an important protein source. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interview 713 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● SmartFish intended to support the development of business/sustainable financing plans for Competent Authorities on quality/safety certification, but they do not adhere to financial plans for political reasons, so instead laboratories were supported on business planning in 9 countries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Technical consultations I assisted in ensuring that the licencing and regulation regime for Lake Kariba (Zimbabwe, Zambia) was suitable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interviews ZIMB15, ZIMB16 	Satisfactory
<p><i>SmartFish:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● <i>Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (FED/2009/021-330)</i> ● <i>Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)(FED/2013/024-111)</i> 		

JC 5.2 EU support contributed to enhancing the knowledge base on ecosystem management		
Summary response	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
I-5.2.1 New knowledge has been generated (e.g. through studies, assessments, piloting)		
<p>Summary: EU funded regional programmes contributed with new knowledge on a broad range of topics in relation to biodiversity and fisheries. Studies, analyses and assessments were carried out, and some tools were developed. However, a couple of knowledge products were dropped or not finalised due to lack of interest from Government side or a lack of adequate consideration of territorial sensitivities.</p>		
BMP:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BMP had some activities on knowledge generation in relation to the pilot landscapes, i.e.: baseline surveys, assessments and censuses on physical, social and economic features, and identification of ecological attributes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Action fiche Interview 074 	Satisfactory
<i>BMP: Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (FED/2012/023-700)</i>		
CMISBM (Biodiversité):		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Education, information and knowledge tools were developed vis-à-vis biodiversity monitoring, management and use, incl. a regional marine species survey framework and a coral bleaching monitoring guide 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2015 ROM Report Workshop and meeting reports 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some studies and publications were made: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>The CBD and the Aichi Objective 2, Issues of Natural Capital Accounting for Sustainable Development in the Western Indian Ocean Region</i> (joint CMISBM and ISLANDS publication) <i>The CBD and the Aichi Objective 9, Implications for the Western Indian Ocean</i> <i>La CDB et l'Objectif d'Aichi 2</i> (CBD and Aichi objective 2) <i>Enjeux de la comptabilité du capital naturel pour le développement durable de la région océan Indien occidental</i> (Issues of natural capital accounting for sustainable development in the Western Indian Ocean region) Natural capital accounting for Francophone countries was transferred to CMISBM from ISLANDS, whereas Anglophone countries remained under ISLANDS. A study for Madagascar (St. Marie Island) and Comoros and provided training on how to carry out natural capital accounting. Accounting in the selected pilot site (Nosy Be) and at national level has not yet commenced, since the funding has not yet been provided (see I-5.1.3) A study on natural capital accounting in Rodrigues Island (Mauritius) A study on the status of freshwater biodiversity in Mauritius and Rodrigues, An overview of Marine Invasive Species in the WIO A study on invasive species in Lamu (Kenya) Reports on the state of national and regional reefs (work initiated under ISLANDS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Publications Study and mission reports OIC annual report 2015 Interviews 023, 025, 028, 030, 714, 717 	Strong
<i>CMISBM: Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States (FED/2012/022-995)</i>		
ISLANDS I and II (focus on coral reef flagship + other NRM elements):		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Studies and tools on coral reefs were developed, i.e.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> “Review of Coral Reef Ecosystem Management Approaches in the ESA IO” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA Final Report, Phase II 	Strong

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ “Coral Reefs and Men Facing the Climate Change for a Sustainable Development and the Upkeep of the Ecological and Ecosystem Services of the Coral Reefs of the South-West of the Indian Ocean” ○ “Analysis of Regional Network of Managers of Marine Protected Areas and Recommendations for Implementation and Operation of the Reef Network OI-IO” ○ “Review of Coral Reef Monitoring Activities in the Southwest Indian Ocean” ○ “Coral Reef Monitoring Manual - South-West Indian Ocean Islands” ○ Draft “Coral Reef Atlas and Outlook: South Western Indian Ocean Islands” targeting Marine Protected Areas managers. However, the coral reef atlas could not be completed and published since the mapping did not take into due consideration sensitivities related to sovereignty and conflicting territorial claims over Chagos Islands (Mauritius and UK) and Tomelin Islands (Mauritius and France) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interviews 702, 703, 704 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Analytical work has been carried out in relation to ecosystems natural capital accounting (ENCA): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The first SIDS Physical accounts for ENCA: “Experimental Ecosystems Natural Capital Accounts: Mauritius Case Study”, in partnership with Statistics Mauritius (in line with Aichi Target 2) ○ A joint IOC-CBD (Convention on Biodiversity) Secretariat publication: “Technical Series 77: Ecosystem Natural Capital Accounts: A Quick Start Package” ○ Wealth Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES) in Madagascar and Zanzibar was initiated in cooperation with World Bank. Baseline assessments and a roadmap were produced. ISLANDS did not fully engage in the valuation of ecosystem services in Madagascar, the this was already covered by the World Bank through WAVES. It was planned that ISLANDS would contribute by covering themes/gaps not addressed by WAVES, but this was not implemented before the support in relation to natural capital accounting for Francophone countries was transferred to Biodiversité ● A concern was that ENCA is expensive so IOC should have a clear vision on its use 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● TA Final Report, Phase II ● Interviews 023, 025 	Strong
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Madagascar/ISLANDS: A country profile and a vulnerability inventory and risk analysis have been prepared for Madagascar and the SWIO region. A national study on mainstreaming of DRR in the national budget was undertaken. Capacity development is planned to ensure that decision-makers can tap into the risk profiles for informed decision-making. 	Interview 028	Satisfactory
<p><i>ISLANDS:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● <i>Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS) (FED/2009/021-331)</i> ● <i>Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO (FED/2013/024-107)</i> 		
<p>SmartFish I and II:</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Analytical work was carried out and numerous publications were made, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ National baselines on the economic and social contribution of fisheries for 5 IOC countries – and a regional analysis. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II ● FAO Final Report, SmartFish I ● FAO SmartFish publications list 	Strong

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Assessment of best practices in sustainable financing for sector institutions. ○ Value chains analyses (VCA) for 4 artisanal fisheries (freshwater sardines; Nile tilapia; industrial tuna fishery by-catch/products; marine small pelagics and crabs). ○ National reviews of coastal tuna fisheries, e.g. documentation and analysis of economic contribution of tuna fisheries in the Seychelles. ○ Overview of training facilities for aquaculture and fisheries management in East Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Tanzania, Réunion, Uganda). ○ Assessment of status of fish fry fisheries in Lake Tanganyika and its impact on fish stocks. ○ Bio-economic analysis/studies of kapenta fisheries and the carrying capacity/extraction potential in Lake Kariba, to support the joint Zambia-Zimbabwe lake management process. A planned acoustic survey was cancelled/postponed ○ Studies and surveys on the extent and type of illegal fishing in Lake Kariba ○ Assessment of the contribution of fisheries, aquaculture and fish products to food security – and of the level of integration into national and regional food security and nutrition strategies and plans (20 countries, 4 RECs). Several of the policies did not refer to fisheries, especially not in the IGAD region, although the potential of fisheries is significant. ○ Post-harvest loss (PHL) assessments in Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania. ○ Feasibility study on PHL reduction from trawling in Kenya, Madagascar, Tanzania. ○ Livelihoods diversification study in Madagascar ○ A diagnosis and framework for economic intelligence (the Observatory on Fisheries and Aquaculture), but it was rejected by the Ministry of Fisheries rejected it. ○ Doing business guidelines for fisheries and aquaculture and trade events dropped due to lack of interest from the Ministry of Fisheries in Madagascar. ○ <u>Studies and capacity building</u> on quality control and food security with the Ministry of Agroindustry and Food Security, Mauritius. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interviews 018, 704, ZIMB15, ZIMB16) 	
<p><i>SmartFish:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● <i>Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (FED/2009/021-330)</i> ● <i>Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)(FED/2013/024-111)</i> 		
<p>I-5.2.2 Data collection and monitoring systems are strengthened and provide information for informed decision-making</p>		
<p>Summary: EU funded regional programmes (e.g. all four sample programmes) engaged in strengthening and harmonising environmental monitoring at regional and national levels. For example, BMP established a draft regional information system IGAD countries with inputs form harmonised national databases, and ISLANDS and CMISBM established a coral reef information system. SmartFish supported a number of monitoring systems at sub-regional and transboundary levels. The results achieved are unclear for CMISBM. The MESA programme is entirely focused on environmental monitoring in Africa and has achieved some tangible results, but only a small proportion of the programme is funded through the regional envelope (EDF10).</p>		

<p>Both IGAD and IOC regions lack harmonised biodiversity monitoring and exchange. Environmental monitoring at regional and national levels insufficient in IOC region (e.g. for Mauritius Strategy monitoring). Information and information sharing on fisheries at national and regional level of poor quality in EASAIIO.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action fiche, BMP • TA progress report 4 (Oct 2015 – Mar 2016), BMP • 2015 ROM report, CMIBSBM • Action fiche, Phase I • Final report, SmartFish I 	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<p>BMP:</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BMP initially aimed at developing and rolling out a shared regional database format on ecosystems and biodiversity – and framework agreements with various monitoring initiatives (incl. the EU funded MESA). However, a) unwillingness to share raw data, and b) in human and financial resources constraints at IGAD Sec has made this difficult to implement. So the concept was changed to a regional information system and national databases with common indicators – the draft platform is operational (due to partnership with BIOPAMA) - http://igad-rris.biopama.org/. The database will help user to identify biodiversity hotspots and potential conflicts with development projects. Trainings on data collection and hardware have been provided. • The regional portal has been developed and equipment provided. • The national biodiversity databases have been established at national institutions, which have been provided with equipment. • Expert training is planned, e.g. on harmonising the national databases and data sharing with the national CBD clearinghouses, and on regional data sharing. • BMP is supporting the integration of a biodiversity component in IGAD's regional geoportal. BMP and especially GIZ support for IGAD's geoportal are attempting to create a unified M&E data and document management system for IGAD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA progress report 4 (Oct 2015 – Mar 2016) • Action fiche • Interviews 062, 063, 074 	<p>Strong</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baseline data for conservation monitoring has been collected for the seascape of Tadjourah Gulf Lac Abbé landscape (Djibouti, IUCN) and Gambella National Park (Ethiopia, HoAREC&N). 56 GPS collars were fitted to monitor migration routes for key species (Gambella). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA progress report 4 (Oct 2015 – Mar 2016) • Monitoring report 3 (Jan – May 2015) 	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<p><i>BMP: Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (FED/2012/023-700)</i></p>		
<p>CMISBM (Biodiversité):</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The foundation was laid to data collection and management, e.g. regarding: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The establishment of a regional marine taxonomic/biodiversity database ○ Introduction of the "Pl@ntNet" plant recognition system/database, adoption of the Botanical Research and Herbarium Management System (BRAHMS) for the setting up of a regional virtual herbarium. Training have started in Mauritius, whereas Pl@ntNet has already been adopted by the University in Comoros. ○ Biodiversité is promoting the establishment of a regional database on coral reefs, incl. a common software (CRIS) and standards for harmonised national databases to feed the regional database. Training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Workshop and meeting reports • Mission reports • IOC annual report 2015 • Interviews 024, 030, 704, 717 	<p>Strong</p>

<p>has been provided on reef inventories and diving. It is planned to establish a served in each country for the national reef databases. A database was established for Madagascar and Comoros. However, Mauritius did not adopt it due to sovereignty issues. Réunion is instead proposing the BDROI database for the region, but it is not yet validated by Mauritius. Nonetheless, Mauritius has prepared a national chapter on the status of coral reefs to be included in the regional coral reef monitoring report, adapting Mauritius' own database.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The national reef network in Madagascar has not implemented the intended activities of checking and collecting data and carrying out national workshops, as no funding was provided for it; only regional level activities have been funded. The only activity carried out was the drafting of the national reef report. A small proposal (EUR 9,000) was submitted to ISLANDS (through the National ICZM Committee) in 2011 but no support was provided. Instead, the national committee relied on secondary data, provided by NGOs (e.g. World Conservation Society) and MPAs for the preparation of the national report. ○ Development and validation of an initial inventory on invasive marine species 		
<p><i>CMISBM: Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States (FED/2012/022-995)</i></p>		
<p>ISLANDS I and II (focus on coral reef flagship + other NRM elements):</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● ISLANDS established a Regional Coral Reef Observatory/Coral Reef Information System (CRIS) and revitalised the Coral Reefs Monitoring Network. This is programme 11 of 14 programmes under ISLANDS. ● A prototype web-based CRIS was established under ISLANDS I, with the plan to establish long-term management and hosting solutions under the IOC Marine Development Programme. Regional and national training was provided coral reef monitoring, GIS and habitat mapping. ● ISLANDS I provided capacity development for protected area managers (National Parks) and scientists on marine ecosystem management, e.g. on diving/snorkelling and reef monitoring. ● The reef monitoring was transferred to CMISBM (see above). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Annex 2 (logical framework), Programme Estimate 1 (May 2012 – May 2013), Phase I ● Programme Estimate 2 (May 2013 – Sep 2013, Phase I ● Programme Estimate no 2, (Dec 2015 – Jun 2017), Phase II ● Programme Estimate no 2, (for 29 Dec 2015 –28 Jun 2017), Phase II ● TA Final Report, Phase II ● Interviews 023, 030 	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● ISLANDS I aimed at establishing M&E system for the Mauritius Strategy at regional and national levels (piloting in 2 or more countries) and establishing a regional climate change observatory. However, the MTE found the UN DESA-facilitated process was top-down/centralised rather than country-driven. The intended integration of the regional climate change observatory in WIOCC (Western Indian Ocean Coastal Challenge) governance structures did is temporarily suspended due to the non-functionality of WIOCC (due to inadequate leadership from the Seychelles, albeit reportedly with signs that WIOCC will be revitalised). ● A country profile and a vulnerability inventory and risk analysis was prepared for Madagascar and the SWIO region. A national database with climate and risk data has been put in place jointly with the World Bank, UNSDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction) and ARCA. A national study on mainstreaming 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Action fiche, Phase I ● Annex 1: Description of the Action, MSI_M&E System: Monitoring and Evaluation system for the Mauritius Strategy for the Implementation of the Programme of Action for Small Island Developing States (BPoA/MSI), Phase I ● Enclosure 2, Annex 3, Organisation and Methodology, Phase I 	<p>More than satisfactory</p>

of DRR in the national budget was undertaken. Capacity development is planned to ensure that decision-makers can tap into the risk profiles for informed decision-making.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA Final Report, Phase II • Interview 028, 703, 717 	
<p>ISLANDS:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS) (FED/2009/021-331)</i> • <i>Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO (FED/2013/024-107)</i> 		
<p>SmartFish I and II:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some actions have focused on motioning, i.e.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Mainland Tanzania-Zanzibar cooperation on minimum requirements for monitoring of small pelagics fishing in deep sea fishing grounds. ○ Monitoring and publication (for transparency) of governance information such as fishing licenses, aquaculture concessions, fees paid, fines and penalties. Available info shared on social media, reviews of tuna news published on project website. ○ In Madagascar, a database covering traditional, artisanal and semi-industrial fisheries was put in place. ○ Baselines on economic information in support of economic intelligence units in 3 countries – but sometimes with insufficient national involvement, e.g. in the Seychelles, where the process was not appropriated by the Seychelles Fisheries Authority (SFA). In Madagascar, authorities rejected proposed support for enlarging shrimp economic intelligence unit. ○ A web-portal on fisheries data for South West Indian Ocean Fisheries: http://smartfish.d4science.org/v2/index.php ○ Support was provided to IOC countries in the reporting of tuna-fisheries bycatches (e.g. sharks and rays) ○ Support for improving the cost-effectiveness of Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO) fisheries monitoring was postponed. ○ Training provided on post-harvest loss assessment (PHLA), and a PHLA profiling system was piloted in Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania. A draft web-based data collection and information management system was established. ○ The Department of Fisheries in Djibouti was trained on data collection for stock assessments in 2014-2015, but the expert input was insufficient to enable the Department to carry out assessments (lack of human resources and equipment). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-Term Evaluation, SmartFish II • FAO Final Report, SmartFish I • Interviews 016, 018, 068 	More than satisfactory
<p>SmartFish:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (FED/2009/021-330)</i> • <i>Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)(FED/2013/024-111)</i> 		
<p>Other programmes:</p> <p>Monitoring of Environment and Security in Africa (MESA):</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews 703, 704, 718 	Satisfactory

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most of the funds did not come from the regional envelope (EUD 5mill was provided for AU and another 5mill for SADC under EDF10). • MESA provides capacity development and equipment for regional centres. • The marine component of MESA and the predecessor programme AMES (EDF9) were coordinated regionally (Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania, Mauritius) by the Mauritius Oceanographic Institute (MOI) with a grant provided via AU. IOC facilitated the access of MOI to the AU grant. MOI provided training for national stakeholders on monitoring of sea level rise, sea temperatures, waves and surge. Measuring stations, and equipment for analysing satellite imagery were procured by AU and MOI and installed in the participating countries. Charts were prepared identifying potential fishing zones and in Tanzania and Comoros pilots were implemented where fishermen were provided with GPS and data and this enabled them to get larger catches. A project for forecasting of coral bleaching event is being developed. MOI aspires to become a regional centre of excellence, and the engagement with MESA and IOC is contributing to increasing the capacity of MOI, e.g. with provision of equipment. 		
<p><i>I-5.2.3 Opportunities for regional sharing have been provided</i></p>		
<p>Summary: EU supported regional programmes aimed at promoting sharing of information, experiences and best practices through the establishment of networks and through workshops and events. Notable examples include the Coral Reef Facility/Network (under ISLANDS and CMISBM), and the African Network for Fish Technology and Safety (under SmartFish). CMISBM aims at establishing biodiversity thematic centres for exchange. Various regional trainings and meetings have provided opportunities for sharing. But the overall contribution to sharing appears somewhat modest.</p>		
<p>Overall, the sharing of biodiversity information and experiences in the IGAD and IOC regions is limited and insufficient.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action Fiche, BMP • 2015 ROM report, CMISBM 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<p>BMP:</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BMP aims at building mechanisms for cross-border collaboration and sharing, e.g. re information on biodiversity products and value chains. Networking between IGAD MS and BMP stakeholders was promoted through online tools (e.g. Dropbox, http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/). Overall the contribution to sharing appears somewhat modest and mainly related to the meetings and tripartite agreements for the landscape planning of the three pilot landscapes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action fiche • TA progress report 4 (Oct 2015 – Mar 2016) • Interview 074 	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<p><i>BMP: Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (FED/2012/023-700)</i></p>		
<p>CMISBM (Biodiversité):</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CMISBM aims at creating Biodiversity Thematic Centres for exchange of information and experience. • The coral reef network provides an opportunity for sharing (see below under ISLANDS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action fiche • OOC annual report 2015 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<p><i>CMISBM: Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States (FED/2012/022-995)</i></p>		
<p>ISLANDS I and II (focus on coral reef flagship + other NRM elements):</p>		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One of the purposes of the Coral Reef Facility/Coral Reef Network is to provide a platform for peer-to-peer exchange and skills transfer. A website was established (www.refresilience.com), but it is now not working. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA Final Report, Phase II 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A regional platform on financial protection mechanisms has been established, comprising government agencies (e.g. Ministries of Finance and disaster management and climate risk agencies), civil society and private sector (e.g. insurance companies) members. Capacities have been enhanced vis-à-vis financial protection against climate hazards and experiences have been exchanged on disaster management and climate risk at regional and international meetings. • In Madagascar, the plan is to establish a permanent national platform on disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. However, the budget from ISLANDS is insufficient and technical working groups at the country level also need financial support to be able to operate. • The DRR component of ISLANDS is led by Madagascar. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews 028, 030 	Satisfactory
<p><i>ISLANDS:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS) (FED/2009/021-331)</i> • <i>Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO (FED/2013/024-107)</i> 		
<p>SmartFish I and II:</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SmartFish has provided opportunities for sharing of lessons and networking, e.g. by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Supporting the participation of EASAI0 representatives in 3 NEPAD/NFFP pan-African meetings ○ Arranging workshops, e.g. on: fisheries management plans in the South Western Indian Ocean, training workshops on methodologies for post-harvest loss assessment based on experiences in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania ○ Establishing a regional network of experts on post-harvest losses ○ Support for the creation of the African Network for Fish Technology and Safety (ANFTS) incl. establishment of a web-based sharing platform on post-harvest losses, but the site remains incomplete. ○ A study tour on ecotourism and sustainable fisheries management to Madagascar. ○ Trade events, where fish traders could network ○ A regional meeting for professional fisheries organisations of IOC countries ○ A regional workshop on marine protected areas as a sustainable fisheries management tool ○ Technical consultations, workshops and trainings in relation to transboundary lakes (Lake Kariba, Lake Victoria) ○ Regional meetings for National Focal Points (NFPs) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish I • FAO Final Report, SmartFish I • Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II • Workshop reports • Interviews 068, ZIMB15, ZIMB16 	Strong
<p><i>SmartFish:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (FED/2009/021-330)</i> • <i>Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)(FED/2013/024-111)</i> 		

Other programmes:		
Inland Water Resources Management (Inland WRM) in the IGAD Region (FED/2009/021-334):		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inland WRM involved universities from IGAD MS (e.g. from Kenya and Ethiopia) in learning. Even when there are political issues between countries in relation to transboundary water, sharing at the lower levels worked well as many issues faced are similar or even shared, e.g. when there is no water on the Kenyan side, the pastoralists and animals go to Ethiopia. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview 062 	Satisfactory
I-5.2.4 Public awareness and access to information is enhanced		
Summary: EU supported regional programmes engaged in awareness raising for a range of audiences (incl. policy-makers, communities, women, men, youth, private sector), e.g. through trainings, school programmes, media, campaigns, events. ISLANDS and SmartFish reached a significant number of people through awareness raising activities.		
The level of awareness and skills are low among decision-makers at all levels in the IOC region.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2015 ROM report, CMISBM 	Satisfactory
BMP:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BMP aimed at producing awareness raising and educational materials, and carrying out environmental education and training, and organising exchange visits and study tours. For example, a short documentary was produced. A curriculum on marine conservation planning and management is being developed with the University of Khartoum and joint trainings are carried out with the Cousteau Society. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Action Fiche Interviews 062, 074 	Satisfactory
<i>BMP: Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (FED/2012/023-700)</i>		
CMISBM (Biodiversité):		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CMISBM aims at developing tools for education, information and awareness raising targeting decision-makers at regional, national, and community levels. The programme has reportedly already in its first 18 months of implementation contributed to raising awareness on biodiversity and ecosystem services at both policy level and community level. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2015 ROM report Action Fiche Interview 717 	Indicative but not conclusive
<i>CMISBM: Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States (FED/2012/022-995)</i>		
ISLANDS I and II (focus on coral reef flagship + other NRM elements):		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Awareness raising and educational activities were implemented and over 13,000 people were sensitised on sustainable development issues, e.g.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 94 articles published in regional and national media Sensitisation tools were developed targeting communities and authorities to enhance the implementation of the Lake Tanganyika fisheries management plan (with SmartFish) A regional course on marine and coastal resources management, delivered at the State University of Zanzibar (SUZA) in September 2015 in partnership with WIOMSA and CORDIO Western Indian Ocean eco-schools programme, delivered by NGOs: Madagascar National Parks and WWF MWIOPO (Madagascar), Reef Conservation (Mauritius) and ZAYEDES (Zanzibar). It has provided education on sustainable development (e.g. rainwater harvesting, composting) in 4 pilot 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ROM 2015, Phase II TA Final Report, Phase II Interview 023, 703, 704, 717 	Strong

<p>schools in Madagascar, and approx. 40 schools in Mauritius. 10,000 pupils have been reached. The eco-schools programme is widely seen as a significant success.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Three Youth Committees were established in Madagascar and trained on sustainable development. They carried out diagnoses in their respective areas. They were anticipated to draft project proposals with the support from international interns, but the process was unsuccessful. ○ A grant for the NGO CEDREFI who in cooperation with the Ministry of Fisheries engaged in awareness raising and promoting co-management of the Balaclava Marine Park, Mauritius (see I-5.3.2). Stakeholders were trained in basic data collection and monitoring, e.g. visual snorkelling inspections. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● ISLANDS aims at promoting inter-ministerial cooperation and to help integrating climate change adaptation in national budgets. For example, ISLANDS' work on natural capital accounting in Mauritius was not with the Ministry of Environment, but with the Ministry of Finance to create a broader awareness of the socio-economic implications of environmental degradation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interview 703 	Satisfactory
<p><i>ISLANDS;</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● <i>Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS) (FED/2009/021-331)</i> ● <i>Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO (FED/2013/024-107)</i> 		
<p>SmartFish I and II:</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Awareness raising activities have been implemented, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Sensitisation of youth on fisheries management, marine conservation, use of marine resources, value chains. Guide for teachers and students at primary and secondary schools, educators, trainers, NGOs. Musical and puppet show on ocean conservation (joint with ISLANDS), performed for 8000 children (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Réunion, Zanzibar, Kenya, Tanzania). ○ Sensitisation of fishing communities on sustainable use of lake resources, Lake Tanganyika and Lake Victoria (producers, traders, middlemen, retailers). Participatory videos (on resource co-management, hygiene, quality, storing and value addition, alternative livelihoods, dangers of using illegal fishing gear), sensitisation workshops, awareness sessions with schools and fish-mongers (focus on Burundi). ○ Awareness raising for fishermen and the wider public: publications, awareness campaign with NGOs, and a TV show, (Mauritius). ○ Trainings of trainers (ToT) on fish quality improvements for trainers (Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Burundi) ○ Sensitisation on the nutritional value of fish (Djibouti, Malawi, Zambia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya), aiming at enhancing fish proportion in diets. Outreach events and education activities for consumers (e.g. posters, flyers, cooking demonstrations, radio and TV programmes), policy workshops and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II ● FAO Final Report, SmartFish I ● Workshop reports ● Interviews 014, 018, 068, 704, 712 	Strong

<p>factsheets for policy-makers. Radio drama (Malawi). “Clean Fish Better Life” consumer education campaign, Lake Victoria (cook book, billboards, flyers, tablemats, local media and radio).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ “Fish 4 Trade” award events for trade and value chain innovations (Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania) ○ Training of 17,000 pupils in Madagascar on integrated rice farming-aquaculture to enhance food security and incomes. Demonstrations plots were established at schools and pupils were trained and in turn advised their parents on the fish-rice techniques. It is planned to also provide the training to parents’ associations. ○ A regional workshop on marine protected areas as a sustainable fisheries management tool – which generated recommendations for decisions-makers ○ Sensitisation activities often targeted not only fishermen, but also women and youth, incl. women traders and processors in relation to hygiene and value addition, and women and children in relation to health and nutrition. ○ Awareness and capacity was raised among members of 40 fishing communities (fishermen, children and women), and collectors/intermediaries (around 90% of all official collectors) on sustainable mud-crab production and improved handling to reduce losses, e.g. through comic, films, fact sheets (see I-5.3.2 and I-5.3.3). 		
<p><i>SmartFish:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (FED/2009/021-330)</i> • <i>Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)(FED/2013/024-111)</i> 		
<p>JC 5.3 EU support contributed to enhancing environmental governance (management, regulation, and enforcement)</p>		
<p>Summary response</p>	<p>Sources of information</p>	<p>Quality of evidence</p>
<p><i>I-5.3.1 National and regional level enforcement (control, surveillance, patrolling) is strengthened</i></p>		
<p>Summary: SmartFish was the only regional programme under EDF10 that significantly engaged in enforcement through several actions related to monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS). Joint inter-state MCS was a major area of interventions for SmartFish and significant improvements were achieved in relation to specific fisheries, examples include: Joint regional patrolling of marine fisheries and tuna vessel monitoring in the South West Indian Ocean (although the intensity of joint patrolling significantly dropped compared to EDF9 due to reduced funding and increase co-funding requirements), enhanced compliance with the IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission) resolution, and regional coordination of MCS in Lake Victoria. Regulation and enforcement was also improved at the national level, in particular in relation to combatting blast fishing in Tanzania, and community-based regulation and enforcement piloted in Lake Malawi and in relation to spiny lobster fisheries in Madagascar. However, progress on the enforcement element is lagging behind the monitoring and surveillance.</p>		
<p>While policy and legal frameworks are in place in many countries (e.g. in IGAD), implementation is lacking. Institutions often exist for enforcing fishery governance, but they often lack adequate support systems and enforcement is insufficient.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring report 3 (Jan – May 2015), BMP • FAO Final Report, SmartFish I 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2012 ROM report, SmartFish I • Interview 002 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BMP, CMISBM, ISLANDS did not engage in enforcement. 		Satisfactory
SmartFish I and II:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SmartFish supported joint regional monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) in marine fisheries in the South West Indian Ocean) with very good results. Overall, surveillance is good, but enforcement and sanctioning can still be improved. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ PRSP (Programme Régional de Surveillance des Pêches) under EDF9 and later SmartFish (result 5) funded a regional programme for fish surveillance (joint patrolling with shared resources and joint inspections of vessels). (participating countries: IOC MS, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique). SmartFish II established agreements in 2013 for joint patrolling for marine fisheries with Comoros, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius, Kenya and Zanzibar (direct grants from EU to the competent national authorities) – with an emphasis on tuna fisheries as the only major regional fishery (other fisheries are mainly national). ○ Regionalisation of assets allowed the deployment to zones previously impossible to patrol e.g. most joint mission used boats rented from the Government of Madagascar as cheaper than using boats from the other countries. More sea and air missions planned for 2016-2018 with assets provided by all IOC MS (except Réunion). ○ The indicators and targets for patrolling focused on the number/hours of inspections, but not on results in terms of number of offenses identified and acted upon. Many mission did not yield specific results, but may have had a deterring effect. Under PRSP, two vessels (from Thailand and Sri Lanka) were seized for illegal fisheries and the owners were fined; another vessel was fined for not being compliant with the IOTC resolution. Such tangible results seem not to have been achieved under SmartFish. ○ The joint patrolling mainly took place under the Plan Regional Surveillance des Pêches (PRSP) project under EDF9. Under SmartFish, the intensity of joint patrolling was reduced due to a reduced EU allocation and an increased demand for contributions from the Southwest Indian Ocean States. The governments should under SmartFish provide at least 20% of the funding for joint patrolling in cash, but the government contribution (e.g. from Madagascar) was reportedly higher, approx. 50%. The last grant received by Madagascar for joint surveillance was EUR 699,000 EUR for 3 years – the level of funding from PRSP was approximately 3 times higher. ○ An evaluation of the surveillance programme found that 100 days of surveillance annually was more than sufficient and that emphasis should rather be on improving the intelligence and control, which would also help targeting the patrolling better. ○ Consistent regional effectiveness in MCS and tuna management was achieved. The IOC Regional Plan of fisheries surveillance established under PRSP and further supported by SmartFish is efficient, but 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II • Agreements with Comoros, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius, Kenya, Zanzibar, SmartFish II • Agreements with Seychelles and Madagascar, SmartFish I • Workshop reports • EUD Mauritius EAMR 2013 • EUD Zambia EAMR 2015 • Interviews 002, 016, 018, 703, 704, 715 	Strong

<p>needs to be aligned with national MCS mechanisms to become fully operational. Strong political commitment from concerned countries is needed to revitalise the plan.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Establishment of a coastal state observer pool is almost completed. Staff from national authorities were trained as observers, who can work outside the national exclusive economic zone (e.g. as observers on patrols in other countries' exclusive economic zones); for example, 5 staff from Madagascar's Centre for Fish Surveillance were trained. ○ Themis, a functional regional vessel monitoring system (VMS) and data exchange on industrial tuna fishing vessels has been established with support from SmartFish and PRSP. The Terra Exchange Protocol was signed by the 5 IOC countries for the regional VMS under PRSP – it is planned to get Mozambique, Tanzania and Kenya to sign the protocol. Before, countries each had a national VMS but with the introduction of the regional VMS the countries can monitor all vessels in IOC waters. StarFISH information exchange database established (but its use by countries can be enhanced); it is the intention to connect the Starfish and the regional VMS systems. ○ SmartFish will (jointly with SWIOfish and WWF) contribute to the SWIOFC (South Western Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission) process on minimum (technical) terms and conditions (MITC) for licensing. Draft Technical terms and conditions for vessels and task force for facilitation have been accepted by the SWIOFC MS. A small coastal zone vessels licensing and registration pilot has been completed and district fisheries authorities are licensing and registering vessels. ○ Regional MCS meetings were conducted. ○ IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission) Inter-Agency MOU adopted. Countries supported by SmartFish have improved their IOTC submission, reporting and IOTC resolution compliance scores; evidence of improved management of tuna and tuna-like species. Monitoring of landings and transshipment still to be improved. SmartFish provided funds for IOTC, used for a) assigning trainers to MS to help them complete the information to be submitted to IOTC, b) engaging regional observers. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● SmartFish also engaged in monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) in marine fisheries at the national level with good results: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Blast fishing and the use of destructive fishing gear has been eliminated in several fisheries, organisation and planning of combating centralised and improved significantly. ○ National capacity to tackle IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing enhanced, e.g. with support to the establishment of the Tanzanian Multi-Agency Task Team on Environmental Crime (MATT) vis-à-vis addressing blast fishing, launched in June 2015. ○ SmartFish increased the capacity of the police and national coast guards, e.g. in Mauritius, to carry out surveillance. ○ Support has been provided for Somalia (jointly with UNODC, FAO, NGOs), policy decisions are pending. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II ● Workshop reports ● EUD Zambia EAMR 2015 ● Interviews 016, 018, 711 	<p>Strong</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Community-based regulation and enforcement was piloted in relation to spiny lobster fisheries in St. Luce, Madagascar (see I-5.3.2, I-5.3.3). Local stakeholders were engaged, incl. fishermen's associations, local police, the local department of the Ministry of Fisheries, and traditional authorities. Fishermen were organised in professional associations. Social conventions ("dina") were established to regulate the fishing (e.g. with a voluntary zone with seasonal closure) and validated by the Ministry of Justice to have legal force. The social convention is still being enforced and sanctions are being implemented. ○ In Madagascar, a database covering traditional, artisanal and semi-industrial fisheries was put in place. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● SmartFish significantly engaged in monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) in freshwater fisheries with very good results, especially on Lake Victoria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Illegal practices were deterred in 8 communities in Lake Tanganyika and Lake Victoria, but a need for additional patrol-related activities. The number of seized illegal equipment significantly increased and fish stock are showing signs of recovery in Lake Victoria. SmartFish has proved that illegal activities can be tackled with a limited budget with strong commitment and good coordination. ○ SmartFish established agreements for joint patrolling for Lake Victoria fisheries with Kenya and Tanzania. Transboundary patrols support for in Lake Victoria (but seemingly not in Kariba, Tanganyika, Malawi lakes) has been completed and commanders in Uganda and Tanzania are fully operational and capable. ○ Implementation of an effective MCS policy and an operational coercive mechanism both at national and regional level for Lake Victoria and other lakes remain a challenge. ○ Regional coordination of MCS in Lake Victoria (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda) was significantly strengthened. ○ Technical consultations and studies under SmartFish contributed to a suitable licencing and regulation regime for Lake Kariba. ○ A pilot project on vessel registration and licencing in Tanzania was awarded a prize. ○ A pilot on community-based enforcement (local permit and fining system, confiscation of illegal nets handled by Fish Conservation Committees) in Nkhata Bay, Lake Malawi. Illegal nets have been confiscated and culprits arrested, and permits issued so only local fishermen can operate. ○ Border fish inspectors from Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania were trained. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II ● Agreements with and Tanzania, SmartFish I ● Workshop reports ● Final report, RIPPLE Africa's Fish Conservation Project ● Interviews ZIMB15, ZIMB16 	<p>Strong</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 4000 people were trained on MCS since 2011 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A methodology drafted for MCS business and financing plans. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In 2007-14 DG Mare co-funded a regional action plan for surveillance and control. IOC ensured continuity through SmartFish II with a EUR 2M component on regional patrols and cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● EUD Mauritius EAMR 2014 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● SmartFish presented a framework for economic intelligence, the Observatory on Fisheries and Aquaculture, but the Ministry of Fisheries rejected it. Similarly, doing business guidelines for fisheries and aquaculture and trade events were dropped due to lack of interest from the Ministry. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interview 018 	<p>Indicative, but not conclusive</p>

<p><i>SmartFish:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (FED/2009/021-330)</i> • <i>Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)(FED/2013/024-111)</i> 		
<p><i>I-5.3.2 Public dialogue and private sector and civil society and participation in natural resource (incl biodiversity) management (planning, implementation) has increased</i></p>		
<p>Summary: ISLANDS and SmartFish have engaged the private sector and communities in several pilot actions related to protected areas management, management of coastal and inland fisheries, ecotourism, payment for ecosystem services, value addition, and alternative livelihoods. Private sector and civil society has mainly been involved in the EU supported regional programmes at the national and sub-national level and more rarely at the transboundary level. Overall, the results appear good with interest and proactive engagement from both the private sector and communities. BMP has engaged communities in the drafting of management plans for the three pilot landscapes as well as in ecosystem-based income generation. CMISBM is in the process of approving grant proposals received from national/regional/local NGOs, but this process is significantly delayed.</p>		
<p>BMP:</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The drafting of transboundary management plans for the three pilot landscapes is done through participatory processes with the involvement of local authorities and communities, although community appear not to have been sufficiently taken into consideration in the Boma-Gambella landscape. • BMP engages in ecosystem-based value chains and income generation opportunities for communities in the three pilot landscapes, e.g. sustainable whale-shark based ecotourism and training of fishermen on local marine area management in Djibouti (Lower Awash-Lac Assal landscape), and Biodiversity-based value chains (fish, honey, gum) and catchment protection measures in Kenya. • Due to inaccessibility of the Ethiopian side, the plans to establish a transboundary community-based protected area in the Lower Awash-Lac Assal landscape was cancelled, as was the planned date palm pilot side. • Due to insecurity, ICRAF has identified two local NGOs for the implementation in the Somali side of the Tana-Kipini-Laga Badana Bush Land and Seascape. • Implementation in the Boma-Gambella pilot site was managed by the regional academic network the Horn of Africa Regional Environment Centre and Network (HoA-REC&N). However, implementation in Bom-Gambella has experienced significant delays, and IGAD has in 2017 cancelled the contract with HoA-REC&N and requested that the Boma-Gambella component of BMP is cancelled due to administrative difficulties with Ethiopian Authorities (see I-5.3.3). 	<p>Interviews 062, 064, 066, 074</p>	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<p><i>BMP: Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (FED/2012/023-700)</i></p>		
<p>CMISBM (Biodiversité):</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Voluntary community-based two-month closure of octopus fishery was piloted with 7 communities in Morne-Bel Ombre-Souillac in Mauritius • A request for proposals from NGOs was launched, covering 4 themes: marine and terrestrial protected areas, megafauna (cetaceans), marine turtles, dry forests. However, the process has been significantly delayed (approval was scheduled to start in 2013) and the final list of accepted projects is still to be announced. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pilot synthesis report • Interviews 025, 028, 703, 717 	<p>More than satisfactory</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A proposal was submitted by the National Integrated Coastal Zone Management Committee (ICZM Committee) in Madagascar in 2014 on the transfer of the responsibility for marine resource management to communities, but its approval had not yet been formally communicated at the time of the evaluation mission. • Work is reportedly ongoing on transboundary conservation with community involvement in the management of a coastal and marine protected area shared by Kenya and Tanzania. 		
<i>CMISBM: Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States (FED/2012/022-995)</i>		
ISLANDS I and II (focus on coral reef flagship + other NRM elements):		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Private sector involved through public-private partnerships (PPP), such as waste recycling and reducing food waste with hotels, and disaster risk financing with insurance companies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA Final Report, Phase II 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Under ISLANDS I, the “Manzer Partazer” (eat and participate) initiative was launched in Madagascar and Mauritius, where food products which had not been sold and were approaching their expiry date were given to vulnerable people. In Madagascar, food products from Shoprite supermarkets were distributed by DHL to e.g. orphanages and associations. “Manzer Partazer” is still in operation without project support. However, the visibility of ISLANDS, IOC and EU’s contribution to “Manzer Partazer” in Madagascar was low. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 023 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISLANDS established eco-labs, which focused on creating recycling-based artisan livelihoods options (e.g. products made from plastic bags or fabric, or chairs made from tires). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA Final Report, Phase II • Interviews 023, 703, 717 	Strong
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISLANDS joined forces with the World Bank and UNSDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction) to implement financial protection mechanisms, in cooperation with African risk capacity institutions and a company that develops drought insurance products – three different models have been developed. While very relevant for Comoros and Madagascar, risk insurance related support is not relevant for Mauritius, where a national scheme is well established. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA Final Report, Phase II • Interviews 028, 703, 701, 702 	Strong
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A multi-stakeholder platform was established in Madagascar for exchange under ISLANDS I (see I-5.1.3). The environmental cells at the various ministries and departments were part of the platform, but the platform also mobilised the private sector and civil society. The platform is not operational anymore (see I-5.4.1). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 023 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community co-management of Balaclava Marine Park in Mauritius was promoted (see I-5.2.4). However, the project approval was significantly delayed, which meant that the project only had a short implementation period (Dec 2013-May 2014) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 704 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISLANDS supported IOC on the Inspired Generations (IG) programme, developed by the Youth Foundation for Sustainable Development (YFSD) to mobilise and enhance local and national authorities, private sector, NGOs, economic and social actors, student groups, academia, international development organisations) capacities to develop sustainable development strategies (also supported by CBD Sec). 9 Local Committees for Sustainable Development were established and 18 projects were certified. More than 2000 people mobilised, incl. 600 students. (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zanzibar). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA Final Report, Phase II 	Satisfactory

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An ecotourism pilot project was implemented in Rodrigues, Mauritius. A payment for ecosystem services (PES) scheme was set up to finance upper catchment rehabilitation and maintenance with funds generated from tourists visiting Ile aux Cocos and the Baie Malgache mangrove ecosystem. Fishermen were recruited after fishing season closure as guides and for other tourist services. Entrepreneurs would through PPP improve the services and facilities to justify increased entry fees. Local NGOs were engaged in restoration and scientific support services. A challenge is the need to increase the entry fee significantly and imposing an additional tax on tour operators and to get public acceptance of this. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA Final Report, Phase II 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A market-based mechanisms for environmental goods incl. PPP and offset schemes was designed in Seychelles, involving Seychelles National Parks Authority, hotels, CBOs and NGOs, with revenues reinvested in ecosystem services. An independent trust comprising these would be set up to manage the Morne Seychellois Park. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA Final Report, Phase II 	Indicative but not conclusive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In Comoros, ISLANDS supported the development of management plans of the future Bimbini marine park. The capacities were enhanced of Bimbini fishermen association in developing business plans and business management, and Bimbini Women Association in engaging in couture, handicrafts and improved stoves. Establishment of the Association of eco-tourism and hoteliers of Bimbini was also supported. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA Final Report, Phase II 	Satisfactory
<p><i>ISLANDS:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS) (FED/2009/021-331)</i> <i>Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO (FED/2013/024-107)</i> 		
SmartFish I and II:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public-private/public-community co-management initiatives have been implemented regarding: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Octopus in Rodrigues (Mauritius) and Pemba (Tanzania) and spiny lobster in St Luce (Madagascar). Local voluntary temporary no take zones established in cooperation with village fishing committees and NGOs; annual production has increased but community self-organisation remains a challenge vis-à-vis ensuring respect of minimum sizes (see I-5.3.1). Sea cucumber in Seychelles. MoU established between SFA (Seychelles Fishing Authority) and the Association of Members of AMSSI (Seychelles Sea-Cucumber Industry). Co-management was delayed due to 2015 general elections. Kapenta fisheries in Lake Kariba Compliance with management measures on Nile Perch Fishery in Lake Victoria through PPP, Uganda Sea cucumber in Madagascar, but the pilot was discontinued despite encouraging early results, due to SmartFish' time and funding constraints, insufficient national commitment to assign skilled staff. Community-based fisheries protection in Nkhata Bay, Lake Malawi, with a 4-month closed season for fisheries, discontinuation of destructive practices, and community-based enforcement in cooperation with local authorities (see I-5.3.1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II FAO Final Report, SmartFish I Workshop reports Final report, RIPPLE Africa's Fish Conservation Project Interview 018 	Satisfactory

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SmartFish engaged significantly in strengthening the private sector and value chains, e.g.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The first regional Federation of Artisanal Fishers (IOC region) has been created and made operational with SmartFish support. ○ Direct inputs were provided to improve processing and marketing for fish and fish products and to reduce post-harvest losses, e.g.: upgrading quality of octopus products in Rodrigues (Mauritius); improved post-harvest practices and product quality of women processors in Kiyindi (Uganda) incl the introduction of processing of fish by-products into edible powder (now available in supermarkets) ○ Enhancing value chain efficiency: rehabilitated mud-crab markets in Madagascar and fish market in Bujumbura (Burundi); fish labelling in Seychelles; initiation of an Electronic Fish Market Information System (EFMIS) in Uganda ○ Improving the handing along the mud-crab value chain and thereby reducing losses and increasing returns from mud-crab fisheries in Madagascar. SmartFish worked directly with fishermen in 40 communities and intermediates/middlemen. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II • Interviews 014, 018 	<p>Strong</p>
<p><i>SmartFish:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (FED/2009/021-330)</i> • <i>Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)(FED/2013/024-111)</i> 		
<p><i>I-5.3.3 Tangible improvements have been generated in relation to improved natural resource management, especially biodiversity management and introducing more sustainable fishing practices (e.g. through piloting at community level and with private sector)</i></p>		
<p>Summary: SmartFish has led to a number of specific improvements in specific fisheries, such as: reduced pressure on fish stocks, improved productivity, reduced losses, increased profitability and economic surpluses, and new sources of incomes form alternative livelihoods. SmartFish has also led to a reduction of certain destructive and illegal practices (e.g. blast fishing). Implementation of both BMP and CMISBM was significantly affected by delays. It is thus too early to fully assess the extent to which CMISBM will lead to tangible results. For BMP, tangible results will depend on the mobilisation future support to continue the processes initiated, but no such support is currently planned and the prospect of achieving tangible improvements uncertain (see I-5.4.1).</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The scope for synergies with EU's bilateral support for EASAIIO countries was in many countries limited under EDF10, since fisheries and biodiversity were in general not focal sectors for the bilateral support. • Involvement of non-DRMO EUDs in the regional programmes under both EDF10 and EDF11 was generally limited, and they have limited knowledge about the regional programmes operating in their countries. A notable exception is the preparation of the cross-regional wildlife programme under EDF11. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews 012, 013, 017, MN118, MN120, MN143, KE02 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<p>BMP:</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing demand for land, food and natural resources is eroding the resource base and thereby aggravating poverty. Capacities are insufficient to ensure biodiversity conservation and sustainable use of natural resources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action fiche 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The scope for achieving impact was negatively affected by design shortcomings, especially in relation to pilot landscape and site selection: 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action fiche 	<p>Strong</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Implementation in 2 landscapes (Tana-Kipini-Laga Badana Bush and Boma-Gambella) significantly hampered by insecurity, which is not conducive for establishment of protected areas (PA) and hampered cross-border coordination, especially in Somalia but also in South Sudan. Hence, implementation mainly takes place on the Kenyan and Ethiopian sides. ○ Boma-Gambella is the most important of the pilot sites from a biodiversity perspective; it is the location of the world's second-largest land migration (white-eared kob). However, the project did initially not cover the Gambella National Park and the communities selected were too far from Gambella National Park (GNP) to tackle threats to GNP, the impacts of conservation on livelihoods, or potential conflicts (human-wildlife conflicts, conflict between communities and Park Authorities. ○ In Lower Awash- Lac Assal, the initial implementation only focused on the terrestrial part of the landscape. Hence, there was insufficient potential for income/revenue generation (e.g. insufficient scope for ecotourism due to remoteness) and the biodiversity is not very high; the biodiversity as well as the livestock production is severely affected by the invasive shrub <i>Prosopis juliflora</i> which is spreading in the region. Most activities are implemented on the Djiboutian side due to the remoteness and inaccessibility of the Ethiopian side. The date palm pilot was dropped due to the inaccessibility and small size of the site (2.5 ha). The intended establishment of a transboundary community-based protected area was dropped due to the inaccessibility. Coverage was later expanded to the Gulf of Tadjoura in Djibouti (where the seasonal migration of whale sharks is a significant tourist attraction). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● TA progress report 4 (Oct 2016 – Mar 2016) ● Monitoring report 3 (Jan – May 2015) ● Monitoring report 2 (Sep – Dec 2014) ● Interview 011 ● Interviews 062, 064, 066, 074 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In the early stages of implementation there was a focus on sustainable development and rangeland management with less attention given to biodiversity conservation. This caused some confusion about the direction of the programme and some delay. The focus was re-oriented to be more in line with the Action Fiche. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interviews 064, 074 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● BMP promotes integrated and cooperative management (inter-state, and government-communities/civil society) and conservation of three transboundary landscapes/ecosystems; balancing conservation and livelihoods. Several trainings were carried out related to conservation, land use planning, biodiversity monitoring (see I-5.2.2), livelihoods. Start-up and implementation delayed in all 3 sites and progress has been slow. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Boma-Gambella Landscape (South Sudan and Ethiopia, impl. by HoAREC&N): The implementation has been seriously delayed. Integrated Land-use & Development Planning (ILDLP) process complex and time-consuming, not properly understood by stakeholders, and at risk of not being delivered or behind delivered too late to inform land allocations, which may be allocated to agricultural investors. HoA&REC had an agreement with African Parks Network (APN) to assist with programme management since HoA&REC had limited experience in this. APN lost the right to work in Ethiopia to issues with the Government of Ethiopia in relation to customs on the import of animal tracking collars. IGAD has in 2017 terminated the contract with HoAREC&N and requested that the Boma-Gambella component is cancelled. ○ Tana-Kipini-Laga Badana Bush Land and Seascape (Kenya and Somalia, impl. By ICRAF): unclear legal and institutional PA framework in Somalia, value chains activities in Somalia unrealistic. An 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Action fiche ● TA progress report 4 (Oct 2016 – Mar 2016) ● Monitoring report 3 (Jan – May 2015) ● Monitoring report 2 (Sep – Dec 2014) ● Interview 011 ● Interviews 062, 064, 066, 074 	Strong

<p>overall biodiversity action plan not achievable. BMNP/ICRAF contribution to country spatial planning process unclear. Implementation stalled by insecurity. The construction of dams in Ethiopia is a threat to the ecosystem, but very politically sensitive and difficult to address.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Lower Awash-Lac Assal Landscape (Ethiopia and Djibouti, impl. By IUCN): access, security and conditions limit options for tourism development, few NGO and private sector actors to support livelihood activities, options for ecosystem goods and services are limited, lack of PA authority and government staff involved in biodiversity conservation in Djibouti is a major constraint. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No funding is secured for the actual implementation of the management plans developed under BMP, leaving little scope for real impact. No follow-up programme is planned by neither IGAD nor EU. (see I-5.4.1). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Interviews with regional stakeholders (Djibouti) ● RIP 2014-2017 ● Interviews 062, 064, 066, 074 	Strong
<p><i>BMP: Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (FED/2012/023-700)</i></p>		
<p>CMISBM (Biodiversité):</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● CMISBM has been severely affected by delays (so it is premature to fully assess impacts and outcomes), incl.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Significant delays were experienced in the first year after arrival of the Team Leader (Apr 2014) due to long delays in getting guidelines and Programme Estimates (PE) validated by the EUD. The first operational PE (PE1) was signed in June 2015. ○ Implementation has been affected by a long gap period without a Team Leader; at the time of the evaluation mission, a Team Leader had still not been approved by the EUD, since the candidates proposed did not fully fulfil the formal requirements. ○ The call for NGO proposals process has been significantly delayed (initially scheduled for 2013) and the final list of accepted projects was still to be announced at the time of the evaluation mission. The implementation period will be reduced from 18 to 12 months unless the completion date is extended. ○ A proposal was submitted by the National Integrated Coastal Zone Management Committee (ICZM Committee) in Madagascar in 2014 had not yet been formally communicated at the time of the evaluation mission (see I-5.3.2). ● The implementation period was extended by one year, till Dec 2018. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Annual report (April 2014 – April 2015) ● Six-monthly report (Oct 2015 – April 2016) ● Interviews 025, 028, 703, 717 	Strong
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The call for proposals scheme aims at implementing tangible measures. The NGO projects are anticipated to lead to tangible results, e.g. in relation to community-based/local management of coral reefs (Madagascar) and protected areas (Tanzania). ● The project's specific objective is: To develop and strengthen national and regional capacity to manage the direct and indirect use of coastal, marine and island-specific ecosystems towards the sustainable conservation of biodiversity. The project also aims at building community-level capacities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Action fiche ● 2015 ROM report ● Interviews 025, 717 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The pilot community-based two-month closure of octopus fishery led to increased catches in Morne-Bel Ombre-Souillac, Mauritius (see I-5.3.2). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Pilot synthesis report 	Satisfactory
<p><i>CMISBM: Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States (FED/2012/022-995)</i></p>		

<p>ISLANDS I and II (focus on coral reef flagship + other NRM elements):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The design of ISLANDS II was overly complicated as it aimed at supporting the implementation of the entire Mauritius Strategy, which covers a broad range of climate change adaptation themes. ISLANDS II initially comprised of 14 main programmes and 5 small initiatives. The scope was narrowed to focus mainly on climate and disaster resilience (e.g. risk insurance), eco-schools, and eco-labs. The coral reef/biodiversity and ecosystems services related components were transferred to CMISBM. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annex 2 (logical framework), Programme Estimate 1 (May 2012 – May 2013), Phase I Programme Estimate 2 (May 2013 – Sep 2013, Phase I Programme Estimate no 2, (Dec 2015 – Jun 2017), Phase II Programme Estimate no 2, (for 29 Dec 2015 –28 Jun 2017), Phase II TA Final Report, Phase II Interviews 703, 717 	<p>Strong</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 19 coral reef pilot sites identified during Phase I for developing best practices in coral reef management, conservation and rehabilitation. Piloting of reef co-management, environmental management, revenue generation and livelihoods under the Regional Coral Reefs Facility was intended, but transferred to CMISBM. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Action Fiche, Phase II Annex 2 (logical framework), Programme Estimate 1 (May 2012 – May 2013), Phase I 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which the support for community co-management of Balaclava Marine Park in Mauritius (see I-5.2.4, I-5.3.2) led to more sustainable management of the biodiversity is unclear. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview 704 	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Protected area co-management, ecotourism and payment for environmental services piloted, but not at the transboundary level (see I-5.3.2). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I-5.3.2 	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacities were enhanced on management of marine protected areas e.g. vis-à-vis reef monitoring. (see I-5.2.2) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA Final Report, Phase II Programme Estimate no 2, (for 29 Dec 2015 –28 Jun 2017), Phase II Interviews 023, 030) 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “Manzer Partazer” has contributed to reducing food waste and provided food for vulnerable people, e.g. through orphanages and associations (see I-5.3.2). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview 023 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Eco-labs, contributed to enhancing recycling and provided artisan livelihoods options (see I-5.3.2). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA Final Report, Phase II Interviews 023, 703, 717 	<p>Strong</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The promotion of innovative financing for climate change adaptation investments has not produced good results, as it did not build on past experiences and existing elements. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews 703, 717 	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<p><i>ISLANDS:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS) (FED/2009/021-331)</i> 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO (FED/2013/024-107) 		
SmartFish I and II:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The wide geographic and thematic coverage (20 countries, marine fisheries, freshwater fisheries and aquaculture) posed a limitation on how deeply SmartFish could engage and achieve tangible impacts. As a result, some activities were seen as standardised and not fully adapted to the individual countries, although SmartFish to a large extent focused its efforts on specific countries and regions, e.g. the South West Indian Ocean and Lake Victoria and a few selected value chains. In EDF11, the division of regional support fisheries into two programmes, one on Lake Victoria inland fisheries with EAC, and one cross-regional on marine fisheries, the geographic and thematic coverage is more focused. However, the marine fisheries is being extended to also covering the Atlantic Ocean, which enhances the geographic coverage and brings in issues as the two oceans are different. 	Interviews 002, 014, 015, 016, 018, 703, 704, 713, 715, 717	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sustainable fisheries co-management was piloted and enhanced fisheries and processing was piloted (see I-5.3.2). Support has also been given to tuna fisheries in Comoros, FAD and DCP pelagic fisheries in Kenya, octopus in Madagascar. This has led to some tangible results, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased annual production and increased size of octopus, and reduced fishing effort in project sites (Rodrigues Island, Mauritius). Reduced post-harvest losses on mud-crabs from 32% to 17%. i.e. 600 tonnes of crabs annually corresponding to 2 million USD annual value (the SmartFish investment was USD 300,000), in Madagascar. Better quality crabs produced (bigger, healthier, higher value). The value of crab production of crab multiplied by 5 from 2013-2016, with the emergence of exports (Chinese traders) of live crabs EUR 6-7/kg) to Asian countries, which is more profitable than export of frozen crab (EUR 3/kg) to Europe – while this new market cannot be attributed to SmartFish, the improved quality contributed to obtaining better prices. Spiny lobster catches in Madagascar had dropped from 400 tonnes to 200 tonnes annually due to overexploitation, and demand had increased with the emergence of Chinese traders. SmartFish support to voluntary seasonal closure in St Luce (see I-5.3.2) has led to increased catches (monitored by Unité de Recherche Langustière). Alternative livelihoods were introduced during seasonal closure, incl. farming, fishing of fish species, handicraft production by women. Octopus had been overfished on Rodrigues Island (Mauritius) and catches dwindled from 6-700 tonnes to 200 tonnes annually. SmartFish helped introduce a closure period (see I-5.3.2) and catches, size of octopus and income generated have increased; in 2016 the catch was 450 tonnes. The closure is still being practiced. Is also being replicated in Pemba and Zanzibar (Tanzania) with SmartFish support. Good degree of replication of co-management and value-addition methods in adjacent areas – the methods promoted are simple and easily replicated. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I-5.3.2 MTE, SmartFish II FAO Final Report, SmartFish I Interviews 002, 014, 018, 704, 712, 713 	Strong

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Enhanced economic surpluses from octopus fishery in Rodrigues, small pelagics in Zanzibar and Lake Victoria, shrimp, lobster and crab fisheries in Madagascar, etc. – outweighing the costs of SmartFish by an estimated factor 3 or 4. • The MTE found that SmartFish has shown that starting simple is a good and cost-effective entry point to fisheries management, even if going against the predominant method of tackling the problem at a large scale using sophisticated tools – although upscaling to national level is a challenge. However, most pilots were at the national or local level, and not transboundary. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SmartFish promoted freshwater aquaculture in pilot sites in Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and marine aquaculture (rabbitfish) in Mauritius (training, provision of equipment) as well as other livelihoods alternatives (e.g. agro-forestry, farming, agro-processing for octopus fishermen in Rodrigues and island communities in Lake Victoria, ecotourism in Comores) to fisheries to reduce the pressure and dependency on declining fish stocks. Reportedly the reduced pressure of lagoon fishing and livelihoods improvements were significant. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAO Final Report, SmartFish I • Interviews 704, 713 	Satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The composition of by-catches to tuna fisheries (sharks and rays) has reportedly improved as a result of support for monitoring, control and surveillance. Moreover, blast fishing (Tanzania) has reportedly been reduced. (see I-5.3.1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term Evaluation, Phase II 	Indicative but not conclusive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SmartFish did not have a specific component on the marine environment and the link to the Nairobi Convention in this respect is not clear. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 002 	Indicative but not conclusive
<p><i>SmartFish:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (FED/2009/021-330)</i> • <i>Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)(FED/2013/024-111)</i> 		
<p>Other programmes:</p>		
<p><u>Inland Water Resources Management (Inland WRM) in the IGAD Region (FED/2009/021-334):</u></p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The IGAD component was significantly delayed due to a) difficulties with implementing EU procedures, b) frequent changes in TA team leaders (Inland WRM had four different team leaders), and c) issues with TA and regional sensitivities around water. Only EUR 900,000 had been spent by end 2013. Implementation accelerated significantly in the last two years. A no-cost extension was given till March 2015. By completion 60% (EUR 2.6m) had been spent. 	Interviews 062, 066	Satisfactory
<p>JC 5.4 EU support ensured that sufficient mechanisms/structures were put in place to ensure sustainability</p>		
<p>Summary response</p>	<p>Sources of information</p>	<p>Quality of evidence</p>
<p>I-5.4.1 Regional interventions have developed and implemented exit strategies in a timely manner and as an integrated part of their work plans</p>		
<p>Summary: The programmes and programme activities in general responded well to regional needs and priorities. However, the regional programmes have heavily relied on external technical assistance (short- and long-term). The involvement of regional and national stakeholders in planning and implementation has not always been sufficiently strong. Exit strategies and capacity-building for assuming leadership for the processes and results achieved by the programmes have not always been adequately in place. The prospect of achieving sustainability (and impact) is</p>		

<p>closely linked to the degree of continuity in EU support. There is a high degree of continuity in support for fisheries; Smartfish has built upon the results achieved and processes initiated under Régional de Surveillance des Pêches (EDF9) and earlier programmes; and with the two EDF11 programmes on Lake Victoria fisheries and marine fisheries there is a good degree future continuity. EU has also supported IOC on environment and biodiversity for a long period, but the continuity has been negatively affected by gaps (e.g. 4 year hiatus between between RECOMAP and ISLANDS I) where structure put in place have become dormant. In relation to climate change and disaster resilience, continuity is ensured with EU support for IOC under EDF11, but this is not the case for biodiversity, where the focus of the cross-regional programme on wildlife has a different focus than CMISBM. Similarly, no provisions have been made by IGAD and EU to ensure continuity, impact and sustainability of BMP.</p>		
<p>BMP:</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insecurity is a threat not only to implementation but also the sustainability in 2 pilot sites (see I-5.3.2, I-5.3.3). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA progress report 4 (Oct 2015 – Mar 2016) • Interviews 011, 074 	<p>Strong</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Progress and results is limited and sustainability is not ensured, e.g. in terms of regional, national and local stakeholders taken up leadership; implementation was mainly carried out by NIRAS, IUCN, ICRAF, Horn of Africa Regional Environment Centre and Network (HoA-REC&N). (see I-5.3.3). • Reliance on external experts (short and long-term) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA progress report 4 (Oct 2015 – Mar 2016) • Monitoring report 3 (Jan – May 2015) • Action fiche • Interview 011 	<p>Strong</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainability and impact is at risk, no funding is secured for the actual implementation of the management plans developed under BMP, leaving little scope for real impact or sustainability: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Without further support, it is unlikely the transboundary management plans developed under BMP will be implemented, and that significant tangible impacts (livelihoods or biodiversity related) and sustainability will be achieved, although there is some scope for replication in other sites. (see I-5.1.2, I-5.3.2, I-5.3.3). ○ Continuation and consolidation of the processes initiated under BMP (and Inland WRM) is not covered by the planned support for the IGAD Trust Fund under EDF11 nor in any other IGAD programmes. ○ Biodiversity protection and ecosystem management is not a priority in the IGAD region for neither IGAD nor the EU, and no attention is paid to biodiversity hotspots in the EDF11 support for IGAD. • The mobilisation and engagement of local stakeholders in planning without any support for implementation may have a negative impact as it could be a disincentive to engaging in future landscape planning or biodiversity conservation. • BMP is taking some action to enhance the likeliness of sustainability: 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RIP 2014-2017 • Interviews 011, 062, 063, 064, 065, 074 	<p>Strong</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Implementing partners have been requested to mobilise funding for continuation in their respective landscapes, but so far this has not happened, and the partners do not have a long-term presence in their respective sites; e.g. IUCN has no presence in Djibouti other than BMP. ○ A roundtable for donors is planned in mid-2017 to attract support. ● There are some opportunities for achieving partial sustainability: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ IGAD is with GIZ support planning a programme under IDDRSI, which will cover the transboundary landscape on the Djibouti-Somalia-Ethiopia border, so there is potential scope for replication of BMP experiences and the area could potentially be expanded to cover the terrestrial component of the Awash-Lac Assal pilot landscape. ○ The marine (Gulf of Tadjoura) component of the Awash-Lac Assal landscape will be taken over by a GEF marine project. ○ The Boma-Gambella landscape is mentioned as one possible landscape for support under component 4 of the new cross-regional wildlife conservation programme, but it is only one of several landscapes mentioned and the funding allocated (EUR 2.7m) is only sufficient to cover one or perhaps two landscapes. Moreover, IGAD has requested to cancel the Boma-Gambella component of BMP. ○ The cooperation with IUCN BIOPAMA will help ensuring sustainability of the database component of BMP; BIOPAMA 2 is just starting up. 		
<p><i>BMP: Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (FED/2012/023-700)</i></p>		
<p>CMISBM (Biodiversité):</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● An exit strategy and sustainability plan was found to be needed by ROM mission to ensure institutional and human capacities, leading role of partners and financial mechanisms, e.g. with the Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association (WIOMSA). ● There has been a reliance on external experts (short and long-term). ● EU has supported IOC on environment incl. biodiversity over a long period: PRE/COI (Programme Régional pour l'Environnement, EDF8), RECOMAP (EDF9), ISLANDS I, ISLANDS II and CMISBM). However, gaps in the support have negatively affected continuity (i.e. a 4-year hiatus between RECOMAP and ISLANDS I, delays and gaps in CMISBM (see I-5.3.3) and thus the ability to establish sustainable structures. For example, the regional coral reef network initiated under PRE/COI became dormant after RECOMAP until it was revitalised by ISLANDS I – and the national coral reef networks became dormant after ISLANDS I until it was revitalised by CMISBM. ● Biodiversity is not included in the planned EDF11 support for IOC leaving limited scope for continuity and achieving sustainability of the processes initiated under CMISBM. The coral reef network is unlikely to continue after the completion of CMISBM. ● The cross-regional programme on wildlife under EDF11 will in particular focus on trafficking of wildlife products and transboundary ecosystems on the African mainland, with little scope for ensuring continuity of CMISBM processes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 2015 ROM Report ● RIP 2014-2017 ● Interviews 025, 030, 702, 703, 704, 715) 	<p>Satisfactory</p>

<p><i>CMISBM: Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States (FED/2012/022-995)</i></p>		
<p>ISLANDS I and II (focus on coral reef flagship + other NRM elements):</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elements conducive for sustainability: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Phase II focused on consolidating Phase I results and designed with participation of partner countries and based on their needs. ○ High level of engagement of countries, stakeholder participation and capacity building – Good institutional strengthening opportunities were provided for IOC and IOC MS. ○ Phase out process has been considered: M&E systems will be integrated in national and regional frameworks; existence of regional technical committee and partnerships established in principle promote ownership. ○ The Nature Conservancy (TNC) is implementing two regional initiatives developed/strengthened under ISLANDS I. ○ Coral reef projects were jointly funded by CMISBM and all coral reef activities were handed over to CMISBM. ○ Further support for IOC is planned under EDF11 for disaster management and climate change, providing an opportunity to enhance results in ISLANDS II's core area of engagement (disaster resilience) and move towards sustainability. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2015 ROM Report, Phase II • 2012 ROM report, phase I • TA Final Report, Phase II • RIP 2014-2017 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Challenges for sustainability: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A partnership agreement was signed by TNC and IOC on sustaining the Reef Resilience Online platform (www.reefresilience.com), but it is now not working. ○ Reliance on external experts and project (short and long-term) and lack of in-house IOC counterpart. ○ Sustainability measures and continuity was not always established, e.g. the multi-stakeholder platform in Madagascar was not provided with funding under ISLANDS II and is thus not operational anymore. ISLANDS was also affected by the 4-year hiatus between RECOMAP and ISLANDS I (see CMISBM findings above). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2015 ROM Report, Phase II • 2012 ROM report, phase I • TA Final Report, Phase II • Interview 023, 702, 703, 704, 715 	<p>Satisfactory</p>
<p><i>ISLANDS:</i></p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS) (FED/2009/021-331)</i> • <i>Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO (FED/2013/024-107)</i> 		
<p>SmartFish I and II:</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elements conducive for sustainability: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Continuity in EU support: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EU has provided continuous support to fisheries management in the Southwest Indian Ocean, going further back than PRSP (Programme Régional de Surveillance des Pêches, EDF9), e.g. with the Tuna Tagging Project. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I-5.3.3 • Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II • 2012 ROM report, SmartFish • RIP 2014-2017 • Interviews 016, 703, 713, 704, 715 	<p>Strong</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The planned EDF11 programmes on marine fisheries (cross-regional like SmartFish) and inland fisheries in the Victoria Basin (EAC), ensure a good degree of continuity, which can help strengthening and deepening results achieved and moving towards sustainability ▪ Long-term engagement and continuity is important for results and their sustainability, e.g. it took 3-5 years of engagement before the Government of Mauritius agreed to sign the protocol on the regional VMS. The VMS protocol process was initiated under PRSP and completed under SmartFish II. ○ Good degree of replication by governments and users, albeit often with financial support from IOC (see I-5.3.3) ○ A business approach with significant engagement of private sector ○ Project activities identified and developed with countries and (sub)regional bodies ○ Synergies with other projects (FishGov, FishTrade, SWIOFish and other regional projects) could be further enhanced ○ Regional fisheries bodies are represented in the steering committee 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Challenges for sustainability: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Reliance on external experts and project management unit (short and long-term), with insufficient involvement of regional and national institutions in planning and implementation of activities ○ Technical organisations for fisheries (e.g. IOTC) in EASAIO generally have significant capacity constraints, which could hamper their ability to take over activities ○ IOC is not a technical organisation ○ Partner institutions rarely provide cofinancing ○ National fisheries agencies/directors not represented in the steering committee, and SmartFish has not always followed protocol and official communication channels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II • Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish I • Interview 002 	Satisfactory
<p><i>SmartFish:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (FED/2009/021-330)</i> • <i>Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)(FED/2013/024-111)</i> 		
<p><i>I-5.4.2 Regional interventions have established an institutional home for, and ownership of, the results achieved</i></p>		
<p>Summary: Regional and national institutions do generally not have the capacity or financial resources to assume leadership and ensure continuation and provision of services at the same level as by the programmes. The institutional anchoring of the processes is not always ensured. Stakeholder ownership is sometimes, but not always, in place, e.g. when the benefits at the national level are not clearly visible.</p>		
<p>Elections, political issues (e.g. issues related to territorial disputes see I-5.2.1) and in the case of Madagascar frequent senior staff and minister changes in ministries have caused delays, affected continuity, and rendered the implementation of some activities impossible.</p>	Interviews 017, 702, 703, 704, 713)	Satisfactory
<p>BMP:</p>		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The institutional home and ownership seems to be insufficient, e.g. IGAD has not taken initiative to ensure continuity and sustainability (See I-5.4.1), with the exception of the database component, which is integrated in IGAD's Geoportal (see I-5.2.2). Biodiversity appears not to a priority for IGAD for its MS, as there are so many pressing socio-economic (incl. drought and food security) and security problems in the region. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I-5.4.1 Interview 074 	Satisfactory
<i>BMP: Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (FED/2012/023-700)</i>		
CMISBM (Biodiversité):		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Elements conducive for sustainability: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> MoU with the Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association (WIOMSA) as implementing has worked well; WIOMSA contributes in kind: human resources, facilitation, technical experience and skills, and established networks. Biodiversity Thematic Centres have been created/strengthened – but mechanisms for future sustainment need to be identified. A decree is now being drafted to institutionalise the national network in Madagascar, but funding will be needed for it to operate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2015 ROM report Interview 025, 030 	Indicative but not conclusive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Challenges for sustainability: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Little ownership by countries due to: low engagement and visibility of project at the national level, e.g. funding for the reef monitoring was only provided for the regional level, not for the national level, neither by CMISBM nor ISLANDS (e.g. in Madagascar). Weak internal communication in project, implementation delays. This negatively affects sector coordination and project steering. IOC leadership not consolidated. Institutional capacity and regional financial resources are insufficient to ensure sustainability, e.g. the national reef committee in Madagascar has due to lack of funding not met since its establishment in 2015 but only communicated via email. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2015 ROM report RIP 2014-2017 Interview 030 	Satisfactory
<i>CMISBM: Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity management in the ESA IO Coastal States (FED/2012/022-995)</i>		
ISLANDS I and II (focus on coral reef flagship + other NRM elements):		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Elements conducive for sustainability: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Countries are generally committed and positively engaged in project steering committee Regional platforms led by countries (Coral Reef Facility led by Réunion) and intended to continue post-project, but some countries have performed better than others Phase I MTE finds that the setting up of regional flagship platforms (incl. Coral Reef Facility) is conducive for lasting effects Enhanced technical, managerial and financial capacities at regional and national levels Project falls well within IOC's mandate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2015 ROM, Phase II Mid-term Evaluation, Phase I 2012 ROM, Phase I Interviews 023, 025, 030 	Satisfactory

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Manzer Partazer (see I-5.3.2) is still in operation without project support, the coordinator has been recruited by DHL. ○ A national committee (comprising the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of vocational Training and Higher Education, NGOs) has been established for the eco-school programme (I-5.2.2) in Madagascar and is meeting regularly. ○ The eco-schools are being replicated in Madagascar: Parents finance other activities at the pilot schools, and the Lutheran Church Schools is interested in replicating the concept. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Challenges for sustainability: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Some activities slowed or stalled due to inadequate response by countries. ○ Modest level of demonstrable benefits at the country level. ○ Maintenance of the new services will be challenging for LDCs in the region. ○ Institutional capacity and regional financial resources are insufficient to ensure sustainability, e.g. the multi-stakeholder platform in Madagascar was not provided with funding under ISLANDS II and is thus not operational anymore ○ IOC is donor dependent. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 2015 ROM, Phase II ● 2012 ROM, Phase I ● Interview 023 	Satisfactory
<p><i>ISLANDS:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● <i>Support for the implementation of the Small Island Developing States 'Mauritius Strategy' in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS) (FED/2009/021-331)</i> ● <i>Phase II: Support Programme for the Implementation of the Mauritius Strategy for SIDS of the ESA-IO (FED/2013/024-107)</i> 		
SmartFish I and II:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Elements conducive for sustainability: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Significant private sector involvement – and direct economic benefits emanating from activities (see I-5.3.3) ○ Good involvement of NGOs that operate on the ground ○ SmartFish has made a significant contribution to enhancing institutional capacities ○ That EU has provided continuous support to fisheries management in the Southwest Indian Ocean, going further back than PRSP (EDF9) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● I-5.3.3 ● Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II 	Strong
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Challenges for sustainability: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ IOC lacks technical and financial capacity to provide services at the same level. ○ IOC does not have the mandate to provide services to non-IOC countries. ○ National institutions have not made plans to ensure post-project continuation ○ Unlikely that national fisheries departments will continue SmartFish activities ○ Weak institutional anchorage. Institutional anchorage of results at regional, national and local levels needed, e.g. for pilot projects. Institutional capacities needed to be strengthened so that they can implement without project support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 2012 ROM report, SmartFish I ● Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II ● RIP 2014-2017 ● Interviews 016. 703, 704, 715 	Strong

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Regional and national fisheries institutions do not have sufficient financial means for post-project continuation, as they heavily rely on irregular project financing. ○ Setting up of economic intelligence unit in Seychelles not successful as not adapted to the capacity of the Seychelles Fishing Authorities (SFA). ● The intensity of joint patrolling dropped significantly from PRSP to SmartFish due to a reduced budget from EU and a demand for co-funding from the IOC MS: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The programme ended in 2014, with the anticipation that the SWIO countries would continue with their own funding, although Madagascar received funding for post-2014 patrolling due to an inability to fund it with Government resources. ○ Tuna is a resource fished by international fleets (incl. EU vessels); the IOC MS are only getting 10% of the catch value of tuna, the main commercial fishery, and Comoros is not benefitting at all. The view of IOC MS (e.g. Mauritius) is that the costs of surveillance and enforcement is not solely the responsibility of the SWIO countries but also of the countries and companies owning the vessels, including EU and its MS (e.g. through license fees established on the basis of the economics of the resource and MCS needs). The VMS established with SmartFish support is one step in this direction. 		
<p><i>SmartFish:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● <i>Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (FED/2009/021-330)</i> ● <i>Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)(FED/2013/024-111)</i> 		
I-5.4.3 Regional interventions have identified champions and developed individual capacities to maintain and upscale the results achieved		
<p>Summary: technical skills have been improved, but not individual capacities are often still insufficient to assume leadership. Some national focal points do not have sufficient authority or commitment to mobilise and convene national stakeholders. Sustainability and replication is mainly taking place for initiatives where the private sector and community stakeholders have achieved immediate economic benefits from the EU support.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The National Focal Point (NFP) model used in IOC NRM projects has limitations, as the programmes' engagement in each country is overly dependent on a single individual's commitment, time, capacity, mandate, level of seniority/authority, communication skills, and convening power. NFPs are civil servants assigned in addition to their normal work responsibilities and do not always have sufficient time nor understanding of the programmes. NFP in some (but not all) countries do not have sufficient decision-power and commitment to convene the process. ● National governments do often not invest sufficient staff time to engage strongly in the programmes, and ownership appears patchy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● CMISBM 2015 ROM report ● Interviews 715, 717 	Satisfactory
<p>BMP:</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Technical skills of IGAD and implementing partner staff have been improved through on the job assistance, but not enough to lead the process. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● TA progress report 4 (Oct 2016 – Mar 2016) ● Interview 074 	Satisfactory
<p><i>BMP: Biodiversity Management Programme in the IGAD Region (FED/2012/023-700)</i></p>		

SmartFish I and II:		
<p>Elements conducive for sustainability:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SmartFish has made a significant contribution to enhancing human capacities through technical training • Where a value chains approach has been taken with involvement of the private sector and communities and where the stakeholders engaged have achieved immediate economic benefits, post-project continuation and spontaneous replication is taking place: e.g. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Octopus fisheries management on Rodrigues Island where closure is still being practiced, the practice has been spontaneously replicated by fishermen, and the Government is replicating the experience in other fisheries on Mauritius Island with its own resources. ○ Spontaneous replication of the closure and social conventions for spiny lobster in Madagascar. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II • Interviews 703, 704, 712, 713, 704, 715 	Satisfactory
<p>Challenges for sustainability:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insufficient attention given to developing the management and governance capacities of national civil servants. • Insufficient attention to human capacity development vis-à-vis tuna data collection and modelling • National experts were not sufficiently involved in programme planning and implementation. • Level of involvement of a country is dependent on the National focal points (NFP) level of commitment and proactiveness. As a result, several countries only had a modest involvement in SmartFish. • Lack of demand expressed by national institutions for training. • NFP has no authority unless when the NFP was the national fisheries director. • Long term training and skills transfer mechanisms were not established at country level, except for a recent proposal developed for Madagascar. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish II • Mid-term Evaluation, SmartFish I 	Satisfactory
<p><i>SmartFish:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (FED/2009/021-330)</i> • <i>Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (SmartFish II)(FED/2013/024-111)</i> 		

EQ 6 Coherence, complementarity and coordination

To what extent have EU interventions been coherent both with other EU actions in the region and with EU policies beyond development cooperation, complementary with those of Member States, and coordinated with those of the other development partners?

Rationale and coverage of the EQ:

As highlighted in EQ1, EU value added depends on intra-EU institutions and EU-Member States coordination. This evaluation question centres on the “3Cs” defined by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, reaffirmed in the 2006 “European Consensus for Development”, and to a large extent in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty:

1. Coherence of EU policies and interventions within the realm of development cooperation, as well as among all EU policies and interventions that are likely to affect the region (Table 1 below). Policy coherence for development (PCD) has special importance for the EU, as a first step on which to build complementarity with Member States and coordination with other development partners. (Note: coherence with national/regional priorities is covered under EQ1).
2. Complementarity of the EU regional support with interventions of the Member States: the obligation to ensure complementarity is a logical outcome of the fact that development cooperation is a shared competence between the EU and the Member States (Lisbon Treaty: “*The Union's development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement and reinforce each other.*”). Over time, the concept was linked to a better distribution of roles between the Commission and the Member States based on their respective strengths. This interpretation is also the basis for the Code of Conduct on Complementarity (2007) emphasizing the need for a “division of labour” between the various European actors in delivering aid.
3. Coordination with other development partners: in EU policy documents, the distinction is made between three levels of coordination: (i) policy coordination; (ii) operational coordination; and (iii) coordination in international forums.

The 11th EDF RIP (2014) reiterates the 3Cs throughout the document, and particularly intra-EU coherence (regional support coherence with global, continental and national). Recent communications reiterate the importance of the 3Cs, e.g. the 2016 Communication “Next steps for a sustainable European future”, noting that “*the 2030 Agenda will further catalyse a joined-up approach between the EU's external action and its other policies and coherence across EU financing instruments*”, and the 2016 Communication “Proposal for a new European Consensus on Development”, which reiterates a “*commitment to policy coherence for development, as an important contribution to the collective effort towards achieving broader policy coherence for sustainable development.*”

This evaluation question aims to draw overall findings on whether the 3Cs were implemented in practice, while noting sector specificities where useful. It aims to inform and lead to recommendations focused on ensuring the 3Cs are implemented in practice, to maximize both impact and efficiency of EU regional interventions.


<i>JC 6.1 The EU's regional cooperation was coherent with other EU policies, strategies and programmes impacting the EASAI0 region</i>		
Summary response	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
6.1.1. The EU's regional cooperation was coherent (in objectives, approaches and implementation) with other European Union policies and actions at the <i>country level</i> (development policies and beyond, including NIPs and projects)		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU as a wide range of policies, from development cooperation to CSDP missions, from trade to migration policies, and instruments. In a typical EASAI0 country, there is a need to manage in a mutually supportive way a range of strategies and over ten financial instruments (see Box 1 below for a list of EU initiatives in the Horn of Africa as of 2016). In addition, a subset of EASAI0 countries is under <i>several</i> RIPs (e.g. nine countries in SADC under EDF10; DR Congo under EDF11). Moreover, the traditional regional approach, based on the AU and DMROs as “building blocks” of the AU, is being challenged by a “new regionalism” (Vircoulon, 2017), that builds on “coalitions of the willing” rather than DMRO country groupings. This new regionalism is explicit in the 2016 Global Strategy: “<i>regional organisations do not address all relevant dynamics, and some reflect existing cleavages. We will therefore also act flexibly to help bridge divides and support regional players in delivering concrete results.</i>” This new regionalism seems to be more vibrant in West Africa and Central Africa (G5 Sahel for cooperation in security matters; Multinational Joint Task Force to fight Boko Haram; Centre for inter-regional coordination on maritime security in Central and West Africa) than in Eastern and Southern Africa, but can be found in the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, which has three windows that do not correspond to DMRO country groupings; the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR); the TKZ project in energy infrastructure, the Khartoum process on migration... Support to regional organisations (traditional regionalism) and support to regional initiatives outside of the latter are not necessarily contradictory unless their relationship is clear, which is not always the case. As mentioned by a senior EUD staff: “<i>At some point, we'll have to decide if we support regional organisations or regional cooperation itself.</i>” (MN139). Some instruments are managed centrally in Brussels, others from the EUD to the AU in Addis Ababa; yet others from regional EUDs; and some from national EUDs in countries that act as hubs for regional initiatives (e.g. Kenya, Rwanda). 	Interviews, EU website accessed April 2017, EU, 2013; EU, 2016; De Waal and Ibreck, 2016; Vircoulon, 2017	Strong
<p>Box 1. Continental, cross-regional, regional, and country-level cooperation in the Horn of Africa: multiple forms of engagement on peace and security</p> <p>The EU together with its Member States is the first contributor to development cooperation in the Horn of Africa, through a wide range of initiatives and instruments.</p> <p>Under EDF10, €645m were provided to regional organisations and initiatives, and €2bn to individual IGAD Member States. This is on top of €1.2bn assistance (since 2004) to peace support operations in Somalia, €760m in humanitarian assistance, support to migration-related projects; EUNAVFOR Atalanta counter piracy and EUCAP NESTOR for training national maritime security and law enforcement forces; and the co-chairing of the Horn group of Global Counter-Terrorism Forum.</p>	EU, 2013; EU, 2016; De Waal and Ibreck, 2016	More than satisfactory

At the continental level, the EU also supports the AU's Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the AU Border Programme. At the cross-regional level, the EU supports the Critical Maritime Routes Programme (MARSIC) based in Yemen.

This means there are a lot of EU interventions, all with different goals, principles of engagement and timelines, managed either by the EUDs or from Brussels. To note, however, that an approach to transition from Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions to other forms of EU engagement and notably development ones, is being piloted in Somalia.

- While the survey responses do not indicate greater coherence/incoherence at the country, continental or global level (see Figure 1), many interviews underlined that the lack of synergies between regional and country cooperation was the greatest limitation to the impact of regional cooperation. For example, it was felt that “We need to engage Africa governments on regional matters for our €1.3bn investment to be transformative» (MN114). “Coordination with EAC member countries is more important than inter-REC coordination. E.g. on regional value chains, we need country perspectives” (MN139).

Figure 1. Survey responses on the coherence of EU regional cooperation (2008-2015) with other EU policies and actions



Interviews DEVCO, COMESA, EAC, IGAD, EUDs to COMESA, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to SADC, EUD to the AUs, documentation, online survey, third party analysis

More than satisfactory

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First, MIPs were defined before the RIPs in spite of the 11th EDF guidelines for programming stipulating that the “<i>vision regarding the EU's relationship with, and support to, a partner country/region</i>”, which “<i>should guide all the EU's relations with that country/region, including its cooperation and assistance under different instruments</i>”, should be set out in the Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP). Moreover, a narrow interpretation of complementarity between national and regional programming led to sectors being chosen in a mutually exclusive way: whatever was picked up by a RIP was excluded from the MIP (alternative models include: a regional programme that has country components; very targeted regional programmes that deal with the same issues as national programmes but focus on cross-border issues/issues that are better addressed regionally). As a result, most NIPs/MIPs include little reference to regional challenges and opportunities, and nearly one in two NIPs/MIPs do not refer to their relevant RIPs. If European Court of Auditors (2009) found that “<i>specific efforts were being undertaken, in particular through regional seminars, to improve coherence between NIPs and RIPs</i>”, the SADC Joint Review (2011) finds “<i>there are very few instances where regional integration is considered as a strategic tool for assisting with the achievement of national objectives</i>” as well as a “<i>lack of coherence between national development plans and the RISDP, a factor that is indicative of the significant gap between policy decisions taken by SADC leaders, the domestication of these policies and the implementation of relevant actions at the national level.</i>” This was echoed in the field: “<i>We should define regional integration as the priority and impose that NIPs be aligned with the RIP</i>» (MN139). That being said, some NIPs give due consideration to regional matters: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - For example in Djibouti, for which there are links between the RIP and the NIP. The EUD to IGAD finds that coherence with the NIP is good (MN125). The NIP focuses on energy, water and sanitation, reflecting “<i>both national and regional priorities to enhance an easier access to drinkable water, waste water and solid waste treatment facilities, cheap and possibly renewable source of energy</i>” (MTR, 2012) - The 2011 SADC Joint Report also noted some MIPs that gave due consideration to regional issues: for example in Angola (capacity building for the SADC National Committee; demining linked to SADC demining activities) and Zambia (upgrading of the Lusaka to Chipata road; Support to actions against child trafficking and child labour). 	<p>MIPs, RIPs, interviews DEVCO, EEAS, COMESA, EAC, IGAD, EUDs to COMESA, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to SADC, EUD to the AUs, European Court of Auditors (2009), MTR (2012), Mamaty <i>et al.</i> (2012), SADC Joint Review (2011), online survey, third party analysis.</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Second, interviews with the ten EUDs visited showed that information on regional issues and programmes does not flow, except when personal relationships exist: e.g. « <i>We don't get any information from Addis. The focal point in EUD to AU should send something at least every three months. And I have been here 3.5 years</i>» (MN143). EUDs do not have a bird's eye view of all EU interventions in their country or region, which limits their ability to coordinate regional and country-level policy dialogue and interventions. Staffing is an issue: « <i>Looking at regional staffing is telling of the lack of importance given to regional matters. At the same time, we are too ambitious, with too many countries and too many issues. I would dispute the approach of 'bigger is better'</i> » (MN 143). 	<p>Interviews COMESA, EAC, IGAD, EUDs to COMESA, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to SADC, EUD to the AUs</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Third, key staff at the EUD to the AU feel they are receiving mixed messages from Brussels on the extent to which DMRO actions should be within the AU architecture at all (“<i>If Panfricanism is in our interest, then the EC should clearly tell regional and national EUDs. Or are we just experimenting, giving money through the Pan.Af Programme to see what happens...</i>” MN114). 	<p>Interviews EUD to the AUs</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Fourth, and most importantly, the country-level policy dialogue does not incorporate the EU's regional priorities: « <i>There is a perception that the regional programme is a separate pot of money that has nothing to do with national development plans of (COMESA) Member States</i> » (ZB02). “<i>Coordination with EAC member countries is more important than inter-REC coordination, for example on regional value chains, we need country perspectives. We should define regional integration as the priority and impose NIP being aligned with the RIP. But now, it is the reverse: NIP first, RIP second. This leaves us regional EUDs and regional organisations trying to get the interest of member countries.</i>” (MN139). 	<p>Interviews COMESA, EAC, IGAD, EUDs to COMESA, EUD to EAC, EUD to</p>	<p>Strong</p>

	IGAD, EUD to SADC, EUD to the AUs	
<p>Box 2. Increased attention to policy coherence in peace and security matters</p> <p>In peace and security matters, lack of coherence can easily lead to no results at all — or even do harm. And a lack of progress in one area — be it political, security, economic or social — risks reversing the whole transition process. For example, in Niger, improving livelihoods in the short term was a condition for restoring security, and at the same time security was needed to improve livelihoods.</p> <p>The coherence of policies for peace and security has long been the object of specific EU attention, as reflected in the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (EEAS and EC, 2013), which sets out several practical steps in carrying out a comprehensive approach: (i) develop a shared analysis, (ii) define a common strategic vision, (iii) focus on crisis prevention, (iv) mobilise the various strengths and capacities of the EU, (v) commit to the long term, (vi) link policies and internal and external actions, (vii) make better use of EU Delegations and (viii) work in partnership with other international and regional actors.</p> <p>The 2015 “European Agenda on Security” calls for a “more joined-up inter-agency and cross-sectorial approach.” The 2015 “European Agenda on Migration” spells out what such a “joined-up approach” means in tackling the refugee and migration crisis.</p> <p>The meaning and scope of the “comprehensive approach” has been expanded recently (EU Global Strategy, 2016), with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The resilience agenda and the SDGs clearly underpinning the EU's approach - Explicit links made between humanitarian, development, migration and peacebuilding actions - Clearer distinction of the different stages of the conflict cycle (prevention, response, stabilization, and avoidance of premature disengagement) and - Clearer levels of EU engagement (local, national, regional and global), with emphasis on the regional and international partnerships required - Promotion of more joined-up approaches e.g. joint analysis, joint risk assessment, multi-year programming. <p>Since the Lisbon Treaty, there have been serious efforts to bring development and CFSP approaches and instruments together with the creation of EEAS. This is leading, over time, to common standards with regards to the EU's role in the security and development nexus. For example, through joint conflict analysis across DEVCO and EEAS, feeding regional and bilateral programmes including in 2016 the strategy to support special measures for Sudan.</p> <p>In the Horn of Africa, a Strategic Review led to the three EU CSDP missions and operations (EUTM SOMALIA, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and EUCAP Nestor) to “<i>realign their actions in order to ensure as comprehensive an EU effort in the region as possible.</i>”</p>	Interviews; 2015 “European Agenda on Security”; 2015 “European Agenda on Migration”; EU Global Strategy, 2016; CSDP Annual Report, 2016.	Strong

6.1.2. The EU's regional cooperation was coherent (in objectives, approaches and implementation) with other European Union policies and actions across <i>regional</i> organisations and initiatives		
The EU's regional cooperation across regional organisations and initiatives lacks coherence. Inter-REC coordination is a wide subject, and should to a large extent be a matter for African leadership (MN139, MN113). This section focuses rather on whether the EU's support to different regional organisations ("traditional regionalism") and regional initiatives ("new regionalism") is coherent, and supports African efforts at better coordination. There are two issues, as follows.	As detailed below.	As detailed below.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> First, all but one (Mozambique) countries in EASAIIO are members of several EU-supported regional organisations, with some belonging to as many as five: Burundi and Rwanda belong to COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ICGLR and CEPGL, all supported by the EU; DR Congo to ECCAS, SADC, CEPGL (Table 2 below). Membership overlap combined with the fact that DMROs have comparable and usually expanding mandates (see Table in Chapter "Context") means that there is a risk of duplicating support for similar initiatives meant to benefit the same countries. "<i>We still need a mechanism to avoid double dipping by Member States</i>" (ZB02). "<i>We work on the same challenge in the same country through 3-4 different instruments at the same time. There is necessarily double dipping, and high transaction costs</i>" (MN153). "<i>The joke in Addis is that if you ask a DMRO if they do pottery, they will prepare a concept note for it</i>" (MN113). Beyond transaction costs, there is also a risk of built-in limit to effectiveness given that "<i>some regional organisations reflect existing cleavages</i>" (2016 Global Strategy). Moreover, not all regional organisations/initiatives perform equally well in every area of EU support (see EQ4 for example). 	Interviews COMESA, EAC, IGAD, EUDs to COMESA, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to SADC, EUD to the AU Online survey Mengistu 2015 DMRO mandates 2016 EU Global Strategy APSA Assessment reports 2010-2016	Strong


Table 2. Overlapping memberships in EASAI0

S.No.	Country/RECs	COMESA	ECOWAS	EAC	SACU	ECCAS	IGAD	AMU	CEN-SAD	SADC	CEPGL	MRU	UEMOA	IOC	CEMAC	Total Membership
		Recognized by AU								Other Blocs						
	Algeria							✓								1
	Angola					✓				✓						2
	Benin		✓						✓				✓			3
	Botswana				✓					✓						2
	Burkina Faso		✓						✓				✓			3
	Burundi	✓		✓		✓					✓					4
	Cameroon					✓									✓	2
	Cape Verde		✓													1
	Central African Republic					✓			✓						✓	3
	Chad					✓			✓						✓	3
	Comoros	✓												✓		2
	Republic of the Congo					✓									✓	2
	Côte d'Ivoire		✓						✓			✓	✓			4
	Democratic Republic of Congo	✓				✓			✓		✓		✓			4
	Djibouti	✓					✓		✓							3
	Egypt	✓						✓	✓							3
	Eritrea	✓						✓	✓							3
	Ethiopia	✓					✓	✓	✓							2
	Equatorial Guinea					✓								✓	✓	2
	Gabon					✓								✓		2
	Gambia		✓						✓							2
	Ghana		✓						✓							2
	Republic of Guinea		✓						✓			✓				2
	Guinea Bissau		✓						✓				✓			3
	Kenya	✓		✓			✓									3
	Lesotho				✓					✓						2
	Liberia		✓						✓			✓				3
	Libya	✓						✓	✓							3

<p>However, these efforts must be complemented by upstream efforts, in order to avoid duplication, achieve transformation beyond short-term results, and reduce transactions costs associated with addressing the same issues in the same regions through multiple, non-synchronised instruments. Many stakeholders interviewed felt that closing down the IRCC would probably lead to less inter-REC coordination unless there was new impetus in Addis, on the side of African leadership. The recently setup High-Level Group is more geared towards high-level DMRO-EU interaction than inter-DMRO coordination (see Box below). Failing such rationalisation by African leadership, the EU should at a minimum revise its rules of engagement with DMROs to avoid further contribution to mandate proliferation and overlaps.</p>		
<p>Box 3. The High-Level Group</p> <p>The Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee (IRCC, created under EDF) was discontinued at the end of EDF 10. It was partially replaced with a High-Level Group (HLG) for coordinating high-level DMRO-EU interaction. The idea was that the DMROs would organise their own inter-DMRO coordination on EU and other issues. So far they have not, and evaluators heard many nostalgic comments about how the IRCC allowed DMROs to formulate joint positions, coordinate trade negotiations, and generally meet each other more frequently, while now they were confined to the margins of HLG meetings. Others remember the IRCC infighting.</p> <p>The HLG has two levels: (1) technical experts and (2) chief executives of the DMROs. The relevant EUDs are represented in both. In 2015 the HLG met twice in Nairobi to prepare the EDF 11 RIP, and in 2016 twice again in Brussels (two technical meetings and one CEO session). In future, however, EUDs envisage meeting once a year. COMESA, like EAC, plans to take advantage of the new Technical Cooperation Facility to enhance inter-REC interaction (ZB01, ZB02).</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) promote the EU's policies and interests in conflict-affected countries and play an active role to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law. The first EUSR with a regional remit was deployed as early as 1996 (Great Lakes). Current EUSRs with a regional mandate include, for EASAI0, the EUSR for the Horn and the EUSR for Central Africa. Kempin and Scheler (2016) find that EU Special Representatives (EUSR) with regional remits “creates parallel structures, impedes the coherent implementation of policies, and generates tensions”. This has not been our finding: in the field, DMROs and other partners implementing RIP projects felt that EUSRs had strong potential value added, but that linkages with the regional EUSRs could be strengthened, and except for EAC, many had not been exposed to EUSR or their activities (interviews, February-April 2017). 	<p>Interviews EAC, IGAD, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to the AU; Kempin and Scheler (2016)</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For ECDPM (2016), “the cross-regional envelopes disconnected from DMRO mandates and responding to an EU-driven agenda, may not deliver the expected results, given the strong fragmentation of priorities” but the evaluation did not find evidence that cross-regional envelopes led to greater fragmentation: the cross-regional envelope on maritime security, for example, led to include all DMROs in maritime security issues. Another example was SmartFish, implemented by IOC on behalf of all five DMROs and covering 20 countries. All DMROs were represented in the steering committee, although their direct engagement varied. Relevant EAC institutions were directly engaged in actions related to managing fisheries in Lake Victoria, whereas the other DMROs were only involved to a more limited extent – especially in the case of COMESA. 	<p>Interviews EAC, IGAD, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to the AU; ECDPM (2016)</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<p>Continued EU effort to promote collaboration across DMROs, for which the AU is and remains a natural forum for coordination (beyond High-Level Group discussions). For example, Figure 2 shows the current constellation of mediation mechanisms: while some DMRO mediation mechanisms have shown their value added compared to that of the AU (see EQ4), they need to be coordinated to</p>	<p>Interviews COMESA, EAC, IGAD, EUD to COMESA, EUD to</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>

avoid competing against each other, which can weaken their legitimacy in the eyes of the parties to the conflict. Proper sequencing is of particular concern.

Figure 2. Mediation structures in the AU and DMROs



Source: AUC 2016, APSA Impact Report 2015

EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to SADC, EUD to the AU; APSA Assessment reports 2010-2016; Kagame Report “The Imperative to Strengthen our Union” (2016)

6.1.3. The EU’s regional cooperation was coherent (in objectives, approaches and implementation) with other European Union policies and actions at the *continental level* ((development policies and beyond, including the PanAfrican and intra-ACP programmes)

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All stakeholders during the evaluation adhere to the fact that the RECs are “building blocks of the AU”. Because some DMROs have a positive track record in some areas (see EQ2, EQ3, EQ4, EQ5), and because DMROs are in most instances closer to individual countries than the AU, support to regional goods, regional cooperation and regional integration cannot be managed <i>only</i> at a continental level. The evaluation validates that the EU supports both the AU and DMROs (“<i>the AU for us is a talk shop, as remote as the UN, whereas EAC is closer. It is your neighbour who can help, not a distant relative</i>”, MN145; “<i>It is good to have AU standards, but behaviour change happens only when REC-level standards e.g. in electoral matters</i>”, MN152). 	<p>Interviews EAC, IGAD, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to the AU.</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At the same time, this evaluation validates that the EU should continue supporting the AU’s policy-setting function. Whether or not all funding for regional integration should go through the AU (a view supported by at least one EUD staff as far as peace and security are 	<p>Interviews EAC, IGAD, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to the AU.</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>

<p>concerned⁵) or not, there is something incoherent in supporting the AU's policy-setting function but not linking EU support to regional organisations and initiatives to the AU (systematic references to AU policies and processes; spelling out of key relationships with the AU...). While the EDF 10 RIPs for EASAI0 clearly referenced the AU architecture as the overarching framework, the EDF11 RIP makes no such reference and juxtaposes descriptions of EU support to each DMRO.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An important point that has been debated over the past decade is what should the AUC and DMROs, respectively, focus on doing. This should in principle be decided by African leadership in Addis and not by the EU in Brussels, but in the absence of clarity in Addis, the EU should make sure it does no harm. The criteria for complementarity and subsidiarity agreed between the AU and RECs in peace and security matters leave room for interpretation⁶; the forum for such decision is only starting to emerge (e.g. RECs are observers in the AU's Peace and Security Council); and in most cases there are not clear decisions, e.g. trial and error will determine whether the AU or a DMRO will lead mediation in a given country. For example, negotiations around both the civil war in Sudan and the Sudan-South Sudan conflict have been under AU lead, but with strong support from Ethiopia, the IGAD Chair. IGAD has only a supporting role. This contrasts with South Sudan, where IGAD took early action and IGAD+ (IGAD plus the AU, EU, UN, US, China, UK and Norway) has established its role as lead. Outside of peace and security, there are several examples of EU regional cooperation funding projects that would be better handled at a lower level than currently the case), e.g. project pipelines for regional transport and energy projects for blending operations; supporting SMEs in export readiness). As above on the subject of coherence of EU support across regional organisations and initiatives, the EU should strive to avoid doing harm through <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) fuelling mandate inflation (ii) unpredictable funding, which is all the more damaging given over-dependency of both the AUC and most DMROs on EU funding (e.g. EAC's budget is 70% dependent on donor funding, but the peace and security department is 100% funded by the EU, MN139). In 2016, there was a breakdown in funding, which damaged AUC/DMRO capacity and credibility, and AUC/DMRO relations with the EU (no disbursement in 2016, due to AUC, DMRO and EU factors, which led to massive staff layoffs by DMROs). The evaluation therefore finds that unpredictability leads more to disruption than to emulation. It nuances the finding of ADE 2013 (evaluation of the APF), which had noted a certain overlap among instruments (“<i>at the same time as the APSA Support Programme being developed through APF, EU created another project for IGAD, COMESA and EAC to address the same issues</i>”), but that “<i>diversity of funding sources can ultimately work to the advantage of RECs</i>”: from AU perspective it has complicated efforts to implement the APSA Roadmap, but also led to additional challenges for DMROs (absence of disbursement in 2016 mentioned above). 	<p>Interviews COMESA, EAC, IGAD, EUD to COMESA, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to SADC, EUD to the AU 2008 MoU on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the AU, RECs and the coordinating mechanisms of the regional standby brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa; Kagame report 2016.</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <u>There are shifts</u> between AU and DMROs when it comes to African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) funding (see Table 5 in EQ4), and between the DMROs and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. It is manifest from field visits that EUD staff are not certain about the reason for such shifts and lack of clarity and are left speculating: “<i>this shift is probably driven by drive for results (“pragmatists vs. system-builders”)</i>” (MN150); “<i>These changes are an attempt to create some competition and therefore better results</i>” (MN151). At any rate, there is no evidence 	<p>RIPs; interview EUD to AU</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>

⁵ “The AU should keep the lead. EUDs should be involved with regional cooperation through the AU and not thru the RECs, so as to consolidate coherence. For example, maritime and counter-terrorism would be better placed under APSA, as they are continental issues” (MN151).

⁶ The principles of the “principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage, in order to optimise the partnership between the Union, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and Stability” (2008 “MoU on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the AU, RECs and the coordinating mechanisms of the regional standby brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa”) still leave room for interpretation, especially as the AU and RECs have a different track record across-regional themes and countries (see Table 7 in Desk Report, Volume 1 **TO UPDATE TABLE NUMBER ONCE FIXED**).

<p>that these changes are leading to better results – or are on track to. To the contrary, staff in both regional and national EUDs said it was leading to more fragmentation. One illustration of this was how EUD staff in countries visited, by their own admission, had little of any awareness of who was responsible for RIP components and (in the case of national EUDs) what regional EUDs were doing.</p>		
<p>Box 4. The EASAI0 RIPs and migration as a PCD priority</p> <p>The EU's 2015 report on PCD identifies four dimensions of PCD in the area of migration:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Migration policy to include development concerns 2. Links with other internal and external policies 3. Development cooperation with third countries not negatively impacted by migration management 4. Measures to increase the development impact of migration. <p>The EU 2015 report on PCD states that “<i>development issues are systematically included in bilateral and regional policy dialogues on migration to identify opportunities and coordinating initiatives for stronger coherence.</i>”</p> <p>EU regional cooperation with EASAI0 is concerned with migration insofar as the EDF11 RIP includes migration, and a significant portion of RIP funding is being diverted to the EUTF. This (and the wider EU response to migration) leads to some debates on whether development assistance is being “instrumentalised” to serve migration management (European Parliament, 2016) and on the right balance (i) between domestic EU priorities and external development and stability objectives, noting that Africa’s burden in terms of internally displaced persons and Africa-to-Africa migration is much bigger (e.g. 10 000 refugees in Kenya’s Dadaab agglomeration, including many third-generation refugees), and growing much faster, than migrants to Europe (IOM and UNHCR, 2016); (ii) between stopgap measures (e.g. border control) and long-term measures (e.g. local development that may stem migration); (iii) between the focus on the fight against illegal migration and on increasing the development impact of migration.</p> <p>These debates take place in regional dialogue processes such as (for migration issues) the Africa-EU Partnership, the Rabat Process, the Khartoum Process, and the EU-ACP Dialogue on Migration (EU 2015 report on PCD). They also require coordination with other actors working on migration, such as the UN and ECHO.</p>	<p>interviews (DEVCO, EUD to the AU); EU 2015 report on PCD; European Parliament, 2016; IOM and UNHCR, 2016.</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<p>6.1.4. The EU’s regional cooperation was coherent (in objectives, approaches and implementation) with other European Union policies and actions at the <i>global level</i> ((development policies and beyond)</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On trade, the 2013 evaluation finds that “<i>level of coherence between EU strategies at regional level and its strategies at national level varies. Particularly in Central Africa, this type of coherence appears to be insufficient, and complementarity between a RIP and the NIPs has remained a theoretical concept, with its practical application being insufficient.</i>” Our evaluation finds that ensuring measurable improvements in national compliance is challenging when reliable baselines and monitoring systems are weak (see JC 1.3). 	<p>EU 2013 Thematic Evaluation on Trade</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On peace, security and democracy, coherence with thematic instruments is sparse. Thematic instruments in these areas include the EIDHR and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The EIDHR has, among others, the objectives of “<i>enhancing the respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international and regional human rights instruments</i>” and “<i>supporting and strengthening the international and regional framework for the protection, promotion and monitoring of human rights, the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, and reinforcing an active role for civil society within these frameworks.</i>” (EIDHR, article 1, 2007-2013). References to regional standards and frameworks are therefore central, as are references to regional civil society <i>fora</i>. There are data supporting good 	<p>Interviews EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to AU ADE-PEM, draft manuscript, February 2017</p>	<p>Weak</p>

coherence between the EIDHR and EU support to the AU (ADE-PEM, draft manuscript, February 2017), but none on coherence between the EIDHR and the RIPs. Interviews mentioned NIP-EIDHR complementing each other but no RIP-EIDHR relationships.

- The IcSP works at different levels (community, national, cross-border, regional, international), focusing on conflict- or crisis-affected countries—therefore not on EASAIO as a whole. As noted above, for peace, security and stability, there is an internal coordination mechanism to ensure that development assistance instruments can integrate actions initiated under the IfS/IcSP. Main IcSP projects under EDF 11 are as below, benefitting mainly the Horn (and to a more limited extent Burundi and eastern DRC). One (under EDF10, not listed here) was directly related to DMROs (support to IGAD’s early warning system CEWARN). Several (under EDF10 and 11) are crossborder by nature (support to ICGLR; Burundi IDPs and returnees; and Sudan border issues). There are limited data available, but Landel Mills (draft manuscript, February 2017) notes “*the need for a clear strategic framework on the contribution the IcSP can make to the global and regional peace and security architecture*”, pointing to underutilisation of this instrument on regional matters. However, “*the restructuring into regional IcSP hubs is likely to enable greater coherence in coordination at a regional level*”, which could lead to greater coherence. Interviewees highlighted IcSP projects as being projects that did not involve EUDs sufficiently or sufficiently early, but could not provide examples of either coherence or incoherence.

Landel Mills, draft manuscript, February 2017

Table 3. List of IcSP projects in EASAIO under EDF 11 (as of May 2017)

Project name	Funding	Countries	Implementing partners
Support to Early Recovery and Socio-Economic Stability of the drought affected population in Ethiopia	11 000 000.00	Ethiopia	Care International UK LBG
Support to Early Recovery and Socio-Economic Stability of the drought affected population in Ethiopia	7 000 000.00	Ethiopia	The Save the Children Fund LBG
Somalia Stability Fund working towards a peaceful, secure, stable Somalia	5 500 000.00	Somalia	
Peace and Stability Quick Impact Fund Phase II: Promoting Security and Stability at the Sudan-South Sudan Border and other Conflict Areas within South Sudan	4 080 000.00	South Sudan	IOM
Promoting Peace over Natural Resources in West and Central Darfur and West Kordofan	3 430 000.00	Sudan	UNDP

Support to displaced and those returning to Burundi	2 000 00 0.00	Burundi	International Rescue Committee UK		
Providing Local Infrastructure and Empowerment for Cross Border Peace and Cooperation within Pastoralist and Sedentary Communities	2 000 00 0.00	Sudan	IOM		
Project supporting the displaced and those returning to Burundi, reinforcing the post-crisis situation and conflict prevention through community stabilising initiatives	2 000 00 0.00	Burundi	International Organization for Migration		
Supporting state formation, political dialogue and a peaceful political transition in Somalia	1 999 99 9.00	Somalia	Intergovernmental Authority on Development		
Youth Employment and Peacebuilding Initiative	1 628 85 1.00	Somalia	Peace Direct		
Secure Economies and Diversified Livelihoods for Peaceful Coexistence in South Darfur and South Kordofan (SEED)	1 500 00 0.00	Sudan	Stichting Care Nederland		
Support to the Somali Security Architecture	1 500 00 0.00	Somalia	Fourth Freedom Forum Inc Non-Profit Corp		
Building Peace from the Bottom Up: Reinforcing Local Actions for Peace in the Kivus	1 499 96 5.81	Democratic Republic of the Congo	International Alert		
Support to Democratisation Processes in Sudan through Capacity-Building of National Elections Commission and Contribution to an Inclusive Political Participation - Phase II	1 150 00 0.00	Sudan	IOM		
Improving livelihoods, social peace and stability in the Abyei Area	1 100 00 0.00	South Sudan	UN Food and Agriculture Organization		

I love my country: Strategic Communications for Peacebuilding in South Sudan	1 086 574.00	South Sudan	Search for Common Ground		
VIJANA TUNAWWEZA: Youth, we can	981 137.89	International Alert			
Support for the independence and mobilisation of the young people of Goma on political and economic issues for a new leadership	949 187.69	Institut Interculturel dans la Region des Grands Lacs Pole Institute			
Support to peace efforts and reconciliation through dialogue in Darfur	800 000.00	Sudan	UNDP		
Strengthening youth involvement in conflict prevention in areas affected by the Lord's Resistance Army conflict in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	792 620.50				
Young Burundian Refugees for Information, Dialogue and Peaceful Coexistence	791 480.85	Internews Europe			
Services in support to reconciliation activities for South Sudan	783 500.00	South Sudan	Transtec SA		
Strengthening Systems of Peace in South and West Kordofan	200 000.00	Sudan	Search for Common Ground		
On infrastructure, the EU regional support to EASAIIO is clearly aligned to the broader continental agenda set out in the EU Africa Infrastructure Partnership and is also coherent with the position taken by the EU Member States participating in the G20. At a global level the				EU Africa Infrastructure Partnership G20 Africa Partnership	More than satisfactory

<p>G20 has consistently voiced support for more investment in African infrastructure and has most recently launched the G20 Africa Partnership, championed by Germany as the current President of the Group⁷.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Global Public Goods and Challenges thematic programme (GPCC 2014-2017) targets issues that are best addressed globally or at the multiregional level (although it may be used for country specific programmes). It focuses on environment and climate change; sustainable energy; □ human development; food and nutrition security and sustainable agriculture; □ migration and asylum. Based on available data, no direct coordination and synergies between the regional support for biodiversity and climate change and the Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources (ENRTP) and GPCC thematic programme were identified – but no issues with incoherence were found either. On migration, the evaluation team did not come across any GPCC-financed project in EASAI0. 	<p>ESA-IO MTR, 2012 Thematic evaluations 2008-2017 Global Goods MIP 2014-2017</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most of the ten EUDs visited felt insufficiently informed of Brussels-managed global initiatives (the IfS/IcSP was cited several times). 	<p>Interviews EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to IOC, EUD to AU</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<p><i>JC 6.2 The EU's regional cooperation strategies (2008-2015) were complementary to EU Member States' interventions and coordinated with other development partners</i></p>		
<p>Summary response</p>	<p>Sources of information</p>	<p>Quality of evidence</p>
<p>6.2.1. Existence of formal and informal mechanisms to ensure complementarity with Member States and coordination with other development partners 6.2.2 Evidence of the effectiveness of these mechanisms</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are formal and informal mechanisms to ensure the complementarity of regional programming with that of Member States and coordination with other development partners. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> At HQ level, these include EDF committees and MS consultations prior to project approval. At regional and global level, these include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU dialogue processes with the AU, UN, DMROs and Regional Mechanisms; EU dialogue processes with MS and CSOs (e.g. the informal EU Task Force on UNSC 1325, bringing together representatives of the EU Member States and the EU services relevant to UNSCR 1325 implementation, with the participation of regional and international organisations, as well as CSOs); Other donor dialogue processes with the AU, UN, DMROs and Regional Mechanisms, and CSOs DMRO-level coordination processes: while coordination by DMROs themselves tends to be weak, donors to DMROs made concerted attempts to coordinate. Support to several DMROs is provided through joint financing arrangements and/or joint partnership arrangements⁸, which bring the EU, EU Member States and other development partners together (see Table below). Details are provided below, DMRO by DMRO. Multi-country donor meetings such as the 2012 Horn of Africa Initiative Donors' Conference; The IRCC was meant (<i>inter alia</i>) to ease coordination within the ACP, with pan-African programmes, and with other 	<p>Interviews COMESA, EAC, IGAD, EUD to COMESA, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to SADC ESA-IO MTR, 2012; EAMR Mauritius, 2014; Mamaty <i>et al.</i>, 2012; MASE final evaluation, draft 2016, and as detailed below</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>

⁷ Fact sheet on G20 Africa Partnership available at http://www.bmz.de/de/zentrales_downloadarchiv/g20/2017_03_Fact_Sheet_G20_Africa_Partnership.pdf.

⁸ For example, the Joint Financing Arrangement to support IGAD brings together Denmark, Switzerland, Austria and Norway. The EU is not part of it because IGAD failed to pass the pillar assessment in its entirety, but they all coordinate as part of a Joint Partnership Agreement.

development partners.		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> COMESA: The level of ambition in terms of establishing a free trade area and the even more ambitious aim of a COMESA customs union put a heavy demand on coordinated action. However, while there is good coordination of donors at the country level in Zambia, this has not extended to the regional space. COMESA does not have a formalised mechanism for regular engagements with the development partners that support its activities. There are <i>ad hoc</i> attempts to ensure coherence but these are usually based around specific projects. COMESA has only recently set up a resource mobilisation unit that will be responsible for aspects of donor coordination. Moreover, donor coordination at the level of COMESA member states on regional matters is weak. Coordination with country-level actions is both crucial (economic integration is at the centre of COMESA's mandate) and challenging (notably because of COMESA's wide and diverse membership; e.g. the member states have very different interests and for some (e.g. Mauritius) the customs union is not wanted (ZB01, ZB02). 	Interviews, COMESA and EUD to COMESA, EUD to Zimbabwe	More than satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAC: Support to EAC is coordinated. Development partners supporting EAC are few (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, US and the European Union as of April 2017) and there are several coordination groups on regional matters, notably the coordination mechanisms for the EAC Partnership Fund, a basket fund with annual contributions from Development Partners aimed at supporting EAC projects and programmes geared towards regional integration. Note: there is a separate fund for Trade Mark East Africa. However, coordination with development partners in EAC member states appeared as a crucial –and missing—link, e.g. on regional value chains, e.g. on consulting national EUDs and embassies as regional programmes are identified and formulated. 	Interviews EAC, EUD to EAC and Tanzania, EUD to Kenya	More than satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IGAD: Not many development partners support IGAD, and support to IGAD also appears to be coordinated, if not without challenges (most development partners are in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, not Djibouti; e.g. the migration coordination group meets in Addis Ababa; the IGAD Partners' Forum is managed by the Italian Embassy in Addis-Ababa). The EU, EU Member States and USAID all support IGAD's ongoing efforts to meet all the EU pillars, which shows convergence of objective, but operational coordination is weak: the IGAD Secretariat has been subjected to five assessments over the past few years (self-assessment of IGAD capacity, supported by the EU; EU pillar assessment; USAID assessment focused on risk and risk management; assessment by Joint Funding Arrangement partners; Germany assessment). 	Interviews IGAD, EUD to IGAD and Djibouti, EUD to Kenya, EUD to AU	More than satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IOC: Support to regional integration has been well harmonised with that of other EU member states. At the operational level, there are instances of both duplications and synergies with other development partners, e.g. fisheries. 	Interviews IOC, EUD to IOC, EUD to Madagascar	More than satisfactory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SADC: Coordination is framed by the SADC "Windhoek Declaration" (2006) on coordination of SADC development partners. Coordination of support to both SADC and SDAC civil society is good across development partners, and the EU has been a driver of such coordination. Donor coordination for all SADC programmes takes place through Thematic Groups and the SADC-ICP Coordination Forum. The SADC/ICP platform meets once a year – it serves to update progress on the RISDP (2015-2020) and is chaired by SADC&EU and highly inclusive - attended by all relevant international cooperating partners. There is room, however, to make the dialogue more strategic and move focus away from the operational level. 	Interviews SADC, EUD to SADC, EUD to Zimbabwe	More than satisfactory
<p>6.2.3 Degree of convergence/divergence and synergies between the EU regional cooperation and regional efforts of other development partners, including Member States</p>		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In line with the mid-term reviews of the 10th EDF support to the EASAIIO region, this evaluation confirms that there is a convergence of objectives, and complementarities, between the regional support of the EU, EU Member States and other development partners, thanks to coordination at DMRO level. 	<p>ESA-IO MTR, 2012; EAMR Mauritius, 2014; Mamaty <i>et al.</i>, 2012: MASE final evaluation, draft 2016, and as detailed below</p>	<p>As detailed below</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In COMESA, there are no conflicting objectives across EU actions, but coordination with country-level actions is both crucial (economic integration is at the centre of COMESA's mandate) and challenging (notably because of COMESA's wide and diverse membership). 	<p>Interviews, COMESA and EUD to COMESA, EUD to Zimbabwe</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In EAC, there are no conflicting objectives across EU actions but there were calls to prioritise regional integration and align NIPs to these rather than define regional programmes second. 	<p>Interviews EAC, EUD to EAC and Tanzania, EUD to Kenya</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In IGAD, there are no conflicting objectives across EU actions but there are conflicting messages being sent around whether EU wishes to further empower IGAD; most support will be channelled via int'l agencies, with limited scope for enhancing IGAD's management and coordination capacity. 	<p>Interviews IGAD, EUD to IGAD and Djibouti, EUD to Kenya, EUD to AU</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In IOC, there are no conflicting objectives or duplications across EU actions, but rather instances of lack of synergies, e.g. with national programmes in fisheries. <i>Vis-à-vis</i> continental and other regional programmes, IOC support programmes are complementary, given that small islands matters are distinct from mainland Africa's and therefore the agendas pursued by SADC and COMESA, e.g. in transport infrastructure, natural resources, and climate change. As such, sub-regional programmes for the Indian Ocean add significant value. 	<p>Interviews IOC, EUD to IOC, EUD to Madagascar</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In SADC, there are no conflicting objectives across EU actions but as elsewhere, with the EU Trade Related Facility, and as elsewhere, coordination will be needed to avoid overlap with other EU-supported regional programmes, especially given overlapping membership. 	<p>Interviews SADC, EUD to SADC, EUD to Zimbabwe</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<p>Beyond this coordination at the policy/strategic level and the absence of incoherence, coordination at the operational level, varies. :</p>	<p>As detailed below</p>	<p>As detailed below</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are <i>some</i> examples of convergence and synergies at the operational level, in fisheries (see Box 5); as well as between SmartFish and the EPAs (e.g. SmartFish brought countries together so they could develop a shared position for EPA negotiations): 	<p>Interviews IOC, EUD to IOC, EUD to Madagascar</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<p>Box 5. Operational synergies in fisheries</p> <p>In the case of SmartFish, synergies were achieved with a number other programmes (funded by the World Bank, WWF, Norad, SIDA, Danida, France, DfID, USAID, and FAO among others), for example in relation to work on fisheries management plans, where there was a connection to the South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Project (SWIOFP) and the support provided by the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF)-Nansen project to SWIOFC (South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission). Another example is synergies with FAO-IGAD Fish Trade Project</p>		

<p>(FIFT) on post-harvest loss reduction activities (see SmartFish 1 MTE). But the MTE of SmartFish II find that the synergies could be further enhanced (see I-5.4.1). Besides SmartFish, the 2014 Mauritius EAMR says: <i>“Complementarity is also being developed between the component “Risk Transfer Mechanism for Natural Disasters” of the ISIDSMS programme and the World Bank initiative funded by the intra-ACP EDF (EUR 907,000) through the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery.”</i></p>		
<p>In the area of infrastructure, the EU has worked closely with the development finance institutions of a number of EU Member States to implement projects. For example, KfW takes the lead with regards to energy projects in East Africa on behalf of the EU. There is strong convergence with other development partners in the energy sector, including the African Development Bank, and the value addition provided by EU regional funding was recognised by stakeholders. One interviewee in Rwanda (RWD10) suggested that the <i>“The EU could champion ‘knowledge work’ in the area of infrastructure analysis at both the national and regional levels.”</i> This would assist other development partners who are not able to provide grants for these types of activities.</p>	<p>Interviews with EUD Kigali, KfW, African Development Bank</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • However, in the words one EU Member State, <i>“EU coordination with other development, partners is ‘good enough’, especially on political/policy level, although it could be improved at operational level (MN122). This is echoed by a survey response (EUD): “Instead of complementarity, there is duplication due to the fact that there is no appropriate donor coordination at RECs level. RECs tend to propose the same activities to more than one donor.”</i> This is also echoed in the region: <i>“There is a bewildering number of regional initiatives supported by donors bilaterally, through the RECs and in other ways. There is very little information on them; no one has an overview. It is very difficult to coordinate and act strategically without this” (ZIM02).</i> • In particular, there is little coordination across development partners in preparing regional strategies, notably with AfDB and the World Bank (interviews). In the area of peace and security for example, ISS (2016) find that in capacity development, the EU, NATO and the UN have largely uncoordinated activities. For example, both the UN and the EU assess APSA achievements and further needs for capacity development, together with the AU, using two different frameworks: respectively the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme and the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security. As Pirozzi and Miranda (n.d.) note: <i>“A common process on this 61 issues would have been highly beneficial to increase the flow of information and the coordination of initiatives in support to the APSA and its components. This missed opportunity could be a lesson learned for the next revision of joint action plans.”</i> 	<p>Interviews COMESA, EAC, IGAD, EUD to COMESA, EUD to EAC, EUD to IGAD, EUD to SADC Online survey ISS (2016) Pirozzi and Miranda (n.d.)</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>

EQ 7 Efficiency

To what extent has the EU contributed to leveraging DMRO member states' funding and to improving DMROs' operational management?

Rationale & coverage of the EQ:

Rationale: The mid-term reviews of the 10th EDF support to the EASAIIO region highlighted a number of shortcomings in the efficiency of the support for DMROs and regional integration which have also been raised by other observers at the EUDs and elsewhere, highlighting:

- Difficulty in building sustainable institutional capacity of the DMROs with an over-reliance on external funding and insufficient attention on efficient operations;
- The introduction of potential distorting factors such as a tendency to draw the DMROs into mini-project implementation units;
- Complicated implementation modalities that incurred high transaction costs.

Coverage and focus of the EQ:

The EQ focusses on the period from the start of the 10th EDF and comprises all 5 DMROs. Specifically, the EQ will assess:

- Capacity – Whether institutional strengthening has led to greater operational capacity to programme and implement projects – and how the EU has contributed;
- Value for money – whether the EU support has led to DMROs improving their procurement practices
- Internal EU efficiency – whether the EU support itself has been efficient and streamlined.

The focus is on “performance” efficiency whereas “allocative” efficiency is treated in EQ1 in terms of relevance (selection of the right objectives) and in EQ2 to 5 in terms of selection of the right strategy and outputs to contribute towards (given the objectives). The context chapter (volume 1) provides information on the contribution of member states to the financing of the DMROs (both in terms of their core budget and their programmatic budget). This reflects the sustainability of the DMROs but can also be seen in the light of long term efficiency in the sense that ultimately the aim is to reach a situation that leads to withdraw of EU cooperation support.

JC 7.1 EU support has contributed to the DMROs having greater operational capacity and increasing in efficiency																																										
Summary response	Sources of information	Quality of evidence																																								
<p>7.1.1 The rate of completion of programming and project preparation has increased indicating greater administrative efficiency</p> <p>7.1.2 The rate of disbursement has increased indicating greater financial efficiency</p>																																										
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The rate of completion of programming and project preparation and also the rate of disbursement has increased during the EDF10 and also the EDF 11 but with a long interruption between the two EDF cycles meaning that a trend of continuous increase is not apparent. The trend for EDF 10 is stronger for EA-IO than for SADC. The EA-IO benefitted from the fact that COMESA was approved for undertaking contribution agreements and could undertake expenditure on behalf of all the DMROs under the RIP, whereas there were long delays in reaching pillar assessment for SADC. Whilst the increases in programming and disbursement during the EDF periods indicate that the teething problems experienced at the start were being solved, this might to some extent be a reflection of understanding the EU support requirements rather than as a true measure of increasing internal efficiency. 	<p>CRIS inventory 2007-2016</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive (the data is strong as it comes from CRIS and has been checked during inventory analysis but link between spending and efficiency is not clear cut)</p>																																								
<p style="text-align: center;">Allocation, contracting and disbursement EDF 10 and 11</p> <table border="1"> <caption>Estimated data from the chart 'Allocation, contracting and disbursement EDF 10 and 11'</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>Euro (millions) Allocated</th> <th>Euro (millions) Contracted</th> <th>Euro (millions) Disbursed</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>2009</td><td>120</td><td>110</td><td>100</td></tr> <tr><td>2010</td><td>50</td><td>40</td><td>30</td></tr> <tr><td>2011</td><td>40</td><td>30</td><td>20</td></tr> <tr><td>2012</td><td>380</td><td>350</td><td>230</td></tr> <tr><td>2013</td><td>280</td><td>230</td><td>150</td></tr> <tr><td>2014</td><td>10</td><td>10</td><td>10</td></tr> <tr><td>2015</td><td>20</td><td>20</td><td>20</td></tr> <tr><td>2016</td><td>50</td><td>50</td><td>50</td></tr> <tr><td>2017</td><td>340</td><td>340</td><td>340</td></tr> </tbody> </table>			Year	Euro (millions) Allocated	Euro (millions) Contracted	Euro (millions) Disbursed	2009	120	110	100	2010	50	40	30	2011	40	30	20	2012	380	350	230	2013	280	230	150	2014	10	10	10	2015	20	20	20	2016	50	50	50	2017	340	340	340
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


	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The disbursement started relatively swiftly as COMESA had a contribution agreement in place, expenditure continues some years after the end of the EDF 10 (2013) 		
COMESA	<p>The disbursements do not show a steady pattern or reveal an increasing capacity to implement. This is partly because the disbursement shows a release related to a contribution agreement but with implementation still being needed.</p>	CRIS records	Strong (based on CRIS data)
	Some of the slow disbursement is also linked to the strategy of tying project funding to compliance and to the fiduciary controls especially for the RISIM expenditure (e.g. on reducing the expenditure on workshops and travel)	COMESA clearing House (interview) Ministry of Commerce (interview)	Strong (variety of opinion agrees)
	The work envisaged by the African Capacity Building Forum was delayed by 2 years by relatively small bureaucratic obstacles that could have been sorted out if there had been a more dynamic management. Management capacity is a main factor for low efficiency.	African Capacity Building Forum interview (Harare), World Bank	More than satisfactory (variety of opinion agrees)
	The private sector needs to be much more involved in defining and directing the projects that are financed – at the moment the available channels and mechanisms are weak.	Interviews with ZIMtrade, Ministry of Industry and Commerce	More than satisfactory (variety of opinion agrees)
	A key bottleneck in projects is the tension in sharing resources between national agencies. It is mistaken to assume this can be coordinated by the bodies themselves, it is not working in practice and it is leading to inefficiency.	Interviews with Ministry of Industry and Commerce	More than satisfactory (variety of opinion agrees)
	The absorption of programme staff into the core staff of COMESA has led to some increase in capacity but there is also a threat that increasing the salary roll leaves too few resources on the core budget for operational expenses.	Interviews with COMESA staff	Strong (variety of opinion agrees)
EAC	EAC	CRIS data	Strong (based on CRIS data)

	<p>Disbursements 2008-2016 EAC</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>Disbursement (EAC)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>2008</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>2009</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>2010</td><td>1,700,000</td></tr> <tr><td>2011</td><td>850,000</td></tr> <tr><td>2012</td><td>450,000</td></tr> <tr><td>2013</td><td>1,100,000</td></tr> <tr><td>2014</td><td>1,300,000</td></tr> <tr><td>2015</td><td>1,150,000</td></tr> <tr><td>2016</td><td>900,000</td></tr> </tbody> </table> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Although the disbursements have been relatively steady, the volume is much less than for the other DMROs 	Year	Disbursement (EAC)	2008	0	2009	0	2010	1,700,000	2011	850,000	2012	450,000	2013	1,100,000	2014	1,300,000	2015	1,150,000	2016	900,000			
Year	Disbursement (EAC)																							
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2015	1,150,000																							
2016	900,000																							
	<p>Disbursements 2008-2016 IGAD</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>Disbursement (IGAD)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>2008</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>2009</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>2010</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>2011</td><td>1,000,000</td></tr> <tr><td>2012</td><td>3,500,000</td></tr> <tr><td>2013</td><td>8,500,000</td></tr> <tr><td>2014</td><td>11,000,000</td></tr> <tr><td>2015</td><td>14,000,000</td></tr> <tr><td>2016</td><td>1,000,000</td></tr> </tbody> </table> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There does appear to be a steady increase in the funds being disbursed through IGAD; one of the frustrations of IGAD that now that this capacity has been built up, the majority of funds are being directed towards international organisations. 	Year	Disbursement (IGAD)	2008	0	2009	0	2010	0	2011	1,000,000	2012	3,500,000	2013	8,500,000	2014	11,000,000	2015	14,000,000	2016	1,000,000		<p>Partnership fund reporting on priority 4 institutional strengthening</p> <p>Interviews EAC, EUD</p> <p>CRIS records</p> <p>Interviews with IGAD staff</p>	<p>Strong (absent in documents)</p> <p>Strong (variety of opinion agrees)</p> <p>Strong (data based)</p>
Year	Disbursement (IGAD)																							
2008	0																							
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
	<p>Since IGAD did not pass the pillar assessment, EU support is not provided to the JFA (Joint Financing Agreement – basket fund) used by other donors (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Netherlands). So EU is providing its support as grants, delegation agreements or PEs (programme estimates), not to IGAD itself but to partners (e.g. EU MS, international organisations, or contracts with international companies)</p>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> For IGAD it is noted that one of the bottlenecks is the EDF procedures and it is added “As usual in the case of programmes estimates managed by IGAD, the execution rate is very low and mainly used for administrative costs (salaries), while the main activities of the projects are under executed.” It has been suggested that the EU’s Emergency Trust Fund for Africa is used as a channel to speed up implementation and already now 50% of the IGAD envelope has been committed via the trust fund. 	<p>Action Fiche, TAF II 2012</p>	<p>Strong (variety of opinion agrees and figures provided)</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A key concern in IGAD (as for many DMROs) is that many project staff, (technical and support) are funded by donors – around 220-250. IGAD depends on TA teams for programme management. This means that programme technical staff generally leave IGAD after programme completion and the lessons and results are thus not fully internalised. A related challenge is that each programme has its own administrative staff, such as financial officers, and carry out their own procurements and accounting instead of doing this centrally, but they do report on financial matters to the Office of the Finance Director, where a permanent staff member responsible for all projects. IGAD is good at retaining programme administrative staff and using them in new programmes, but technical staff is not retained to the same degree, and IGAD does not have the capacity fully absorb and internalise the skills and lessons achieved, and key documents on results and studies are not fully retained. 	<p>Interviews with donors and IGAD staff Staff records</p>	<p>Strong (variety of opinion agrees and staff records)</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is an overload of assessments. Six assessments were carried out in 2016 of IGAD’s managerial and financial management capacities, incl.: the EU pillar assessment, IGAD did a self-assessment of its capacity supported by EU, USAID did a financial risk assessment, Germany did a programme-specific assessment, and the JFA (Joint Financing Agreement) partners did an assessment related to the basket funding. IGAD wanted to do a single assessment, but USAID and EU had to do their own assessments, even if similar. 	<p>Interviews with donors and IGAD staff Assessment reports</p>	<p>Strong (variety of opinion agrees)</p>

IOC	<table border="1"> <caption>Disbursements 2008-2016 IOC</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>Disbursement (Million USD)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>2008</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>2009</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>2010</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>2011</td><td>20.5</td></tr> <tr><td>2012</td><td>7.0</td></tr> <tr><td>2013</td><td>7.5</td></tr> <tr><td>2014</td><td>11.0</td></tr> <tr><td>2015</td><td>11.5</td></tr> <tr><td>2016</td><td>3.5</td></tr> </tbody> </table>	Year	Disbursement (Million USD)	2008	0	2009	0	2010	0	2011	20.5	2012	7.0	2013	7.5	2014	11.0	2015	11.5	2016	3.5	CRIS records	Strong (CRIS data)
	Year	Disbursement (Million USD)																					
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> For its relatively small size the IOC has a strong disbursement record, however this is more a reflection of its programme management structures and set up than its core capacities. 																							
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The main problem in IOC on expenditure and its efficiency (apart from difficulties with using the EU procedures) is that consultation mechanisms are weak. Although there might be delays and complications in asking each country and implementing agency to comment it is vital that the relevant stakeholders are consulted. An example is the insurance scheme for the disaster risk reduction programme. In Mauritius: most private property is insured by the private sector and individuals; the type of disaster typically faced does not lead to the need for large scale humanitarian assistance and the government has contingencies budgets for coping where necessary; the policy of government is to self-insure: what is needed is preventative infrastructure to reduce flooding. For all these reasons the project is problematic and such concerns could have been pointed out in advance if the consultation was in place. <i>“All the money on the studies is lost?”</i>. 	Interviews with the ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Strong (variety of opinion agrees from different ministries)																					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Another problem in the IOC member states is that they are very far from COMESA and SADC and the communication is difficult consultation is not enough with just a single collective workshop or meeting. 	Interviews with the ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	More than satisfactory (variety of opinion agrees)																					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implementation is often done by TA packages, when they leave the capacity leaves with them. The implementing agencies do not have the resources to carry out the projects – they have been designed at a level and rate of implementation that is beyond the implementing agent and national focal point (this is particularly the cases where the ministry involved has 	(Interview Ministry of Environment, ISLANDs project staff)	Strong (variety of opinion agrees)																					

	to implement using EDF procedures. (Interview Ministry of Environment, ISLANDs project staff)		
SADC	 <p>The payments (Euro) show a very late start with 10th EDF starting in 2008 but the first significant disbursements only being made in 2012 due in part delays and related to the late start of the contribution agreement.</p>	CRIS data Interviews with SADC secretariat/EUD	Strong (data based)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The rate of expenditure has been low and there is a considerable implementation gap as projects under the 10th EDF are still being implemented. There are a number of reasons for this, the contribution agreements took a long time to launch and there were considerable teething problems in part because SADCs own systems had just been changed, were not streamlined and well understood within the organisation. The SADC systems were not used to dealing with the volume of funding and strict interpretation of adherence to the procedures. 	Interviews with SADC secretariat, EUD ICDP 6 monthly report April 2016	Strong (variety of opinion and reports)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The demand driven approach on training and capacity development and implementation of programmes has not worked as well as expected. There appears to be demand only for per diems with people being rotated to take advantage of the per diem without regard for the impact on training or the implementation of agreed work plans. The capacity development has been less efficient for this reason. 	Interviews with SADC secretariat, EUD, TA staff	Indicative but not conclusive

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> One of the constraints (and assumptions) behind the regional steering groups (high level group and technical inter-DMRO consultation forum) is that the SADC secretariat has historically engaged in an administrative rather than advisory role. Staff particularly if not from the very top management are not empowered (or in some cases equipped with the “think tank” skills) to discuss wider issues that affect member states. The discussion and dialogue centres on administration of the EU support. 	Interviews with SADC secretariat, EUD, GIZ	More than satisfactory (variety of opinion agrees)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The considerable volume of TA under the CBRI and similar efforts to improve the strategic, administrative and financial management of SADC are demonstrating that they cannot substitute the presence of operational management by core staff – procedures and systems are created but the human resource challenges remain and if the systems are more complex they could even worsen performance. (there has been capacity development for 20 years+) – SADC secretariat does not have the capacity to design, support and overview the technical assistance being provided. The provision of 19 professional staff and 12 support staff on a withdrawing basis and now taken over by SADC is a positive development that has increased capacity. 	Interviews with SADC secretariat, EUD KPMG Report commissioned in 2013 (Assessment of the causes of low absorption capacity of ICP funds – summarised in ICDP 6 monthly report April 2016)	Strong (variety of opinion agrees, reporting)
<p>General considerations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU has supported a range of capacity development support programmes in all the DMROs to promote efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and monitoring and coordination of treaty provisions and policy organ decisions. Whilst there is strong evidence of EU support being provided, it is less apparent how well it has worked so far e.g. in EAC, IOC, SADC, IGAD it was noted that constant support is needed to avoid underspending on the 11th EDF. 	CRIS records EUD interviews EAMR (Tanzania, Mauritius, Botswana, Djibouti)	Indicative but not conclusive (evidence of underspending is strong)	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU trust fund is also being used for the cross-regional envelope (60% of the €25m funding for migration programme) which is an indication that the DMROs (as a group) are not yet capable of managing the funds available. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAMR, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, Djibouti, Mauritius 2010-2015 DEVCO, EASAIIO status report 28 October 2016 	<p>Indicative but not conclusive (might be other reasons for the transfer of funds)</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The critique of the programme management set ups is that much of the capacity developed within the programmes will disappear when the programmes disappear. The EU support where the programme management was run by programmes staffed by temporary staff has not led to permanent capacity development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EUD interviews Interviews with programme staff and core secretariat staff 	<p>More than satisfactory (variety of opinion agrees and staff have left)</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The main issue affecting efficiency is the quality of management at the secretariat (and also at member state level) – the SADC (and it is also the same with other DMROs) staff seconded from members states often have high technical skills (e.g. in trade facilitation) but not in programme management. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with programme staff and core secretariat staff 	<p>More than satisfactory (variety of opinion agrees)</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity of staff at the operational level (below director) are often more effective than at the management level in part because the higher levels are not appointed by member states and not by merit. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EUD interviews Interviews with programme staff and core secretariat staff 	<p>More than satisfactory (variety of opinion agrees)</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity development needs to be more rigorous, much can be learned from applying continuing professional development approaches to the regional organisations and engaging with their human resources function instead of endless workshops (USAID) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with USAID, Zimbabwe, EUD, World Bank 	<p>More than satisfactory (variety of opinion agrees)</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are capacity constraints at the secretariat mainly linked to management level inefficiency and capacity constraints at the member state level mainly linked to the conditions of service 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with programme staff DMRO secretariats 	<p>More than satisfactory (variety of opinion agrees)</p>


<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The survey of EUDs should a mixed view on the extent to which DMROs had put EU support to good use in developing capacity. One comment from a respondent was “EU support is mainly used for empire building”. <div data-bbox="138 312 1014 839"> <p>To what extent have DMROs put to good use the EU support for the development of human resources, management and IT systems, and planning, implementing and monitoring processes?</p>  <table border="1"> <caption>Data from chart: To what extent have DMROs put to good use the EU support for the development of human resources, management and IT systems, and planning, implementing and monitoring processes?</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Extent</th> <th>Count (approx.)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>not at all</td> <td>2.0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>only to a limited extent overall</td> <td>3.0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>to a reasonable extent in key areas</td> <td>3.0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>to a high extent overall</td> <td>1.0</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div>	Extent	Count (approx.)	not at all	2.0	only to a limited extent overall	3.0	to a reasonable extent in key areas	3.0	to a high extent overall	1.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Survey of EUDs 	<p>Indicative not conclusive</p>
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to a reasonable extent in key areas	3.0											
to a high extent overall	1.0											
<p>7.1.3 The new regional steering committees are operating as intended</p>												
<p>SADC viewpoint</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SADC – the EAMR notes that the 11th EDF coordination arrangements are simpler than before. But it also notes that the SADC engagement with member states and the international community is ad hoc and without strategic vision. And, that more attention is needed to ensure complementarity between SADC and COMESA on future and on-going trade programmes. SADC -EAMR notes that “The main remaining obstacle is to transform the existing 'information-sharing' platforms into real coordination groups where division of labour can be tabled under SADC leadership (lack of willingness on the part of SADC for political considerations; lack of capacity on the part of some development partners to engage in policy dialogue)”. 	<p>EAMR, Botswana, 2015 EAMR, Tanzania, 2015 Technical Inter-DMROs consultation forum, April 2016, June 2016, May 2015 High level Group Minutes, November 2016, June 2015, December 2014</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>										
<p>EAC viewpoint</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAC – EAMR notes that a more results orientated approach is needed in the cooperation programme (including reporting high level results to the steering committees) The EAC Secretariat plans to take advantage of the new Technical Cooperation Facility to enhance inter-REC interaction. 	<p>EAMR, Tanzania, 2015 Interviews EUD, EAC secretariat staff</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>										

<p>COMESA viewpoint</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The COMESA Secretariat (like EAC) plans to take advantage of the new Technical Cooperation Facility to enhance inter-REC interaction • For COMESA in particular the earlier IRCC was found a better instrument to coordinate and allowed more frequent meetings and exchange of viewpoints. 	<p>Interviews EUD, COMESA secretariat staff</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<p>IOC viewpoint</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The high level and technical groups do not substitute for consultation – consultation needs to be much more detailed and at the level of a specific project or intervention. 	<p>Interviews with Ministry of Economic and Finance, Mauritius</p>	<p>More than satisfactory (supported by a variety of opinion)</p>
<p>IGAD viewpoint</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The decision making is scattered with difficult locations for EUD and AU and IGAD depending on the topic. Coordination is needed, so far the high level and technical groups are not providing a framework that can lead to better coordination. 	<p>Interviews with EUD and IGAD secretariat staff</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<p>DMROs general viewpoint</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The technical-inter DMRO was set up to fill a gap at the operational coordination level for the RIP implementation. , it is light in that it does not set up a permanent secretariat but makes use of existing DMRO facilities. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The first technical inter-DMRO meeting to support the High Level Group was convened by IOC in April 2016 and followed up by a second in June 2006. It was proposed to have 2 meetings per year on a rotating basis. The technical meeting is especially relevant for the formulation of cross regional envelope projects. It was noted that some action documents were prepared without DMRO involvement. The technical meeting provided an opportunity to discuss the views around the use of IMF AFRITACS and ensure that misunderstandings were managed and did not grow ○ The high level group dealt with the need to find sustainable solutions for financing of the DMROs. The DMROs also noted their concerns about the direct access principle and the danger of undermining the coordinating role of the DMROs. ○ The action points are noted in the minutes of the technical inter-DMRO but not in a very clear way and do not appear to be followed up on systematically at the next meeting under matters arising. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical Inter-DMROs consultation forum, April 2016, June 2016, May 2015. High level Group Minutes, November 2016, June 2015, December 2014 	<p>Strong (supported by a variety of opinion and reporting sources)</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As the two levels (High level group and technical group) tend to have the same agendas, EUD representatives are instructed to convey the same messages at both. ‘There was no discussion on in-depth issues, such as <i>real</i> regional integration (EAC interviews) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview with EAC and EUD (Tanzania) 	<p>More than satisfactory (supported by a variety of opinion)</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Too much diplomacy and not enough truth. (quotation from survey) – it seems the majority of EUD respondents are not aware of how well the groups are performing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey of EUDs 	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>



JC 7.2 EU support has contributed to the DMROs having improving value for money and procurement practices			
Summary response	Sources of information	Quality of evidence	
7.2.1 Improved financial management and procurement systems have introduced and are operational			
COMESA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The results of a pillar assessment are mainly positive: An effective and efficient internal control system is in place (pillar 1), accurate, complete and reliable accountancy system is in place (pillar 2); high quality external audit is undertaken (pillar 3); appropriate procedures are used for grant management (pillar 4); appropriate and efficient procurement procedures are in place (pillar 5); measures are in place to ensure that sub-delees use appropriate procedures (pillar 7). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The is a roadmap of recommended activities that need attention have gradually been dealt with and the outstanding grants manual was completed in January 2017 <p>In the 2007 audit of procurement it was noted that the procedures lead to long delays – this has to some extent been improved although there are still complaints about lengthy procedures.</p>	<p>Final pillar assessment , COMESA, December 2014</p> <p>Internal Audit report on procurement June 2007</p> <p>Grants manual 2007</p>	Strong (externally validated)
EAC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The results of an “internal” pillar assessment are mixed: An effective and efficient internal control system is not in place (pillar 1), accurate, complete and reliable accountancy system is in place (pillar 2); high quality external audit is undertaken (pillar 3); appropriate and efficient procurement procedures are not in place (pillar 5); measures are in place to ensure that sub-delees use appropriate procedures (pillar 7). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EUD is reviewing the internal pillar assessment to see if complies with EU standards Pillar assessments failed in 2008 and 2012 and an independent audit of RISPII in 2014 revealed ineligible expenditure However there is a roadmap of activities that need attention from earlier assessments and also the internal assessment (2015) – EAC claim that they have now implemented the recommendations. It appears that in that only 24% of the approved budget was released (USD 2.14m out of more than USD 9m approved). The expenditure was USD 2.12m). (revised summary narrative for FY 2015/16). This suggests a weakness in planning and budgeting lead to the setting of unrealistic priorities. <p>The annual report of 2013 notes that an institutional review was done and will be available march 2015 [it was not possible to obtain a copy, apparently it is still highly sensitive]</p>	<p>Final pillar assessment , EAC, 2015</p> <p>Revised summary narrative for FY 2015/16</p> <p>EAC Annual report, 2013</p> <p>Interviews EAC, EUD</p>	Strong (externally validated)

<p>IGAD</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The results of a pillar assessment were mixed but mainly negative: An effective and efficient internal control system is in place (pillar 1), accurate, complete and reliable accountancy system is not in place (pillar 2); high quality external audit is undertaken (pillar 3); appropriate procedures were not in use for grant management (pillar 4); appropriate and efficient procurement procedures were not in place (pillar 5); measures are not in place to ensure that sub-deleegees use appropriate procedures (pillar 7). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The EU has funded self-assessment (2015) provides information that was used to develop a plan to increase efficiency. IGAD is actively implementing the pillar assessment recommendations (with assistance from EU funded TA) ○ The EAMR notes that in 2014 there were a number of financial management problems which have hampered progress e.g. the MASE Regional Project on Maritime Safety (37.5 Mi Eur - PIR 10th EDF), coordinated by IGAD, was signed in June 2013, but the activities assigned to IGAD (Outcome 1) have not been undertaken efficiently due the financial problems. It is noted that the EUD needs to take over the task of preparing bidding documents (from 2014 a procurement unit was established in IGAD). ○ As the pillar assessment is not yet passed, the EU does not contribute to the Joint Financing Agreement like other donors (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands). ○ Multiple assessments have been done by different donors EU accepts IGAD reports and do not ask for separate reports which increases reporting efficiency. 	<p>Final report, pillar assessment IGAD, October 2016 Self Assessment report, IGAD, August 2015 EAMR, Djibouti, 2015, 2014 Interviews IGAD, EUD</p>	<p>Strong (externally validated)</p>
<p>IOC</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A pillar assessment has not been done but a study was conducted (Moore Stephens) that simulates aspects of a pillar assessment. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ According a capacity assessment in 2010 (financed by the EU), IOC financial management and procurement systems and practices were satisfactory although it was noted at the time that there was not sufficient staff in the procurement section – staff have since been added. <p>From 2013 a series of improvements were put in place consolidating all IOC accounts for a better reporting system using the new accounting software SAGE-PASTEL, international standards; the preparation of financial statements according to international standards and, the development of a three-year budget of IOC. These improvements are clearly linked to EU support as acknowledged by IOC</p>	<p>Moore Stephens, IOC capacity assessment, 2010 Website: http://commissionoceanindien.org/a-propos/restructuration-et-renforcement/ accessed 10 December 2016 Interviews IOC, EUD</p>	<p>Strong (externally validated)</p>

<p>SADC</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The results were mixed but mainly positive An effective and efficient internal control system is not in place (pillar 1), accurate, complete and reliable accountancy system is in place (pillar 2); high quality external audit is undertaken (pillar 3); appropriate procedures were in use for grant management (pillar 4); appropriate and efficient procurement procedures are were not in place (pillar 5). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> However there is a roadmap of activities that need attention – it is not monitored as such, although the recommendations were appreciated The EAMR (2015) notes that “while the Secretariat has taken some measures to already address some of the main issues in 2015, it still needs to address some of them in a more systemic manner”. The EUD is in close contact with SADC to follow up on the non-compliance with pillar 1 and the implementation of the roadmap. An EU capacity development programme is assisting. There is likely to be a highly problematic situation with the TRF programme where the projects will be implemented using SADC rules by member states who are not conversant with the rules and unlikely to be able to adhere to the standard of record keeping. A design mechanism for avoiding this problem has not yet been thought out. EAMR (2015) notes that 60% of the expenditure is now through contribution agreements 	<p>PWC, Final Pillar Assessment, SADC, March 2015 EAMR, Botswana, 2015 Interviews, SADC Interviews with GIZ, EUD</p>	<p>Strong (externally validated) with particularly strong evidence of EU support to the continuous improvement of financial management.</p>										
<p>Overall The survey of EUDs tended to show a mixed picture with a slight positive leaning (depending on the DMRO and the EUD opinion) as shown below – this broadly supports the qualitative analysis presented above.</p>  <table border="1"> <caption>Has the DMRO has introduced improved financial management and procurements systems that are operational and improving performance?</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Category</th> <th>Score (approx.)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Unsatisfactory (no action has taken place, fin. management & procurement not functioning well)</td> <td>0.8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Moderately Unsatisfactory (systems only partially introduced where justified)</td> <td>3.0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Moderately Satisfactory (systems introduced where justified, likely work but not yet fully operation)</td> <td>1.8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Highly Satisfactory (systems introduced where justified, operational and already showing benefits)</td> <td>0.8</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Category	Score (approx.)	Unsatisfactory (no action has taken place, fin. management & procurement not functioning well)	0.8	Moderately Unsatisfactory (systems only partially introduced where justified)	3.0	Moderately Satisfactory (systems introduced where justified, likely work but not yet fully operation)	1.8	Highly Satisfactory (systems introduced where justified, operational and already showing benefits)	0.8	<p>Survey of EUDs</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive (not enough answers)</p>
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Highly Satisfactory (systems introduced where justified, operational and already showing benefits)	0.8												

7.2.2 Value for money studies are undertaken and show that unit costs are under control and within benchmark figures (presence of financial report on procurement practice and results)

COMESA	<p>COMESA – there are indications of improving value for money:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ the procurement practices according to the pillar assessment should lead to satisfactory value for money <p>The RIIP is cost conscious e.g. a) on testing the purpose and suitability of participants for workshops and ensuring that trade fair participation is endorsed by ZIMtrade rather than being ad hoc, b) 10 people shared 6 people's per diem so that more could benefit from attending a trade fair, c) when it was found that another project had already developed a suitable guideline for grading hides and skins, the RISIM project instead used the funds for disseminating the guidelines and training people in its use</p>	<p>Final pillar assessment , COMESA, December 2014</p> <p>Interviews MIC (Zimbabwe), Ministry of Enterprises and SMEs, Guideline on grading of hides and skins)</p>	More than satisfactory
EAC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are still issues with obtaining value for money: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The procurement practices according to the pillar assessment were seriously defective. Cases were found that were described as “highly suspicious” and procedures were not followed in other cases <p>An independent audit of RISPII in 2014 revealed ineligible expenditure</p>	<p>Final pillar assessment , EAC, 2015</p> <p>Interviews EAC, EUD</p>	Indicative but not conclusive
IGAD	<p>IGAD</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The procurement practices according to the pillar assessment were defective e.g. no procurement plan was in place and external observers did not attend tender committees – however there have been strong efforts made to improve performance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Action fiche on Strengthening the ability of IGAD to promote resilience in the Horn of Africa” notes that IGAD requires- « improved procurement, accounting and financial systems, through staff training and the procurement of the required equipment and software »; <p>The joint financing agreement by other donors indicates a degree of confidence by others in the new systems.</p>	<p>Final pillar assessment , IGAD, 2016</p> <p>EU, Action fiche “Strengthening the ability of IGAD to promote resilience in the Horn of Africa”</p> <p>Interviews IGAD, EUD, GIZ</p>	Indicative but not conclusive

<p>IOC</p>	<p>IOC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The information from a capacity assessment in 2010 indicates that value for money should be obtained as adequate procurement and cost control systems were in place. There were some departures from procedures noted (e.g. tenders not launched by the correct unit in IOC). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The main issue for IOC has been the disruption due to EU procedures which have led to ineligible expenses and great inefficiency in operations. ○ The factors that appear to influence the effectiveness and efficiency of projects and lead to unnecessary costs include: i) a fictional or not highly justified regional element; ii) a mismatch between the capacity of the implementing agent and the choice of using a project management unit or relying fully on the national focal point; iii) an overly complicated design and/or implementation arrangement; iv) changes in the partner priorities (e.g. after elections or change in staff); v) difficult to implement EDF procedures (as noted elsewhere) (interviews IOC, MFED, implementing partners) ○ ISLAND become more efficient as a project through: i) simplification to a core area of work that has traction and support in the region (DRR); ii) a link established to a wider global framework (Sendai) <p>Where a one size fits all approach for all the countries in a regional block is used there is wastage e.g. in Mauritius the regional communication strategy on energy efficiency was not needed as the work had already largely been done; similar for the reports on regulatory frameworks</p> <p>There are a number of incorrect assumptions that have led to long delays and inefficiency including: i) assumptions about the capacity of the secretariats (IOC apart from the charge d'mission seconded by the member states is mainly composed of secretarial staff), ii) assumptions about the capacity of NGOs to respond to call for proposal both within energy and bio-diversity.</p> 	<p>Moore Stephens, IOC capacity assessment, 2010 Interview, Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities) Interviews IOC, EUD</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
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<p>SADC</p>	<p>SADC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The procurement practices according to the pillar assessment should lead to satisfactory value for money. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ It was noted that the procurement filing system could be improved and that the threshold of USD 200 for open bidding was too low and led to inefficiency ○ EAMR notes only 1.25% of ineligible expenditure over a 2 year implementation based on an external verification mission. ○ A special audit was demanded by the EU under the terms of the contribution agreement even though annual audits had been carried out. The initial findings found some \$1m of ineligible expenditure which was reduced to €0.3m and finally led to a return of €0.1m. Although €0.1 is considerable as a proportion of the total expenditure it is small and indicates that there has been value for money in terms of adhering to procedures and abiding by the checks and balances put in place. <p>A cost conscious approach has been used in the programmes e.g. in getting the disaster reduction strategy signed by using a side event where ministers were already gathered in Mauritius in December 2016, this saved large expenditure on travel and also reduce the potential for long delay</p>	<p>PWC, Final Pillar Assessment, SADC, March 2015 EAMR, Botswana, 2015 Interviews SADC secretariat, EUD, RPC staff</p>	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
<p>○</p>			
<p>General observation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generally, across the DMROs, the EU support through technical assistance, the pillar assessment process and vigilant scrutiny has contributed towards obtaining value for money and downward pressure on unit costs. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ This has also led to greater confidence by DMRO member states (at least in the case of COMESA which accounts for many of the countries). There are a number of examples of improved value for money noted in the DMRO by DMRO assessment above. ○ There are still ineligible expenses in most of the DMROs although caused mainly by missing documentation than arising from inefficient procurement. ○ Meetings and regional events (travel and subsistence expenditure) account of a very large percentage of the EU support. ○ Meetings are a necessary and essential part of regional integration however, it is not always that the right people meet. The possibilities of using video conferencing has been considered and is difficult for multi-country events and in areas where the quality of internet connection is weak. However, there are opportunities to explore it in greater depth. 	<p>Interviews EUDs (Botswana) and DMROs , GIZ</p>	<p>Strong (supported by a variety of opinion)</p>

<i>JC 7.3 EU support has been efficient in its delivery</i>		
Summary response	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
7.3.1 EU rules and procedures are leading to greater efficiency in the DMRO operations		
<p>Summary</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In general, and across all the DMROs that use EU rules and procedures, the efficiency has been low and the rules and procedures appear to have had a negative effect on the pace and quality of work. This is largely because the spending organisations are not able to adhere the rules and procedures in practice in part because they differ from their own systems and especially in the degree of strictness of interpretation of the rules. There is a lack of compatibility between the EU systems and approaches to financial management and those of its partners. These observations hold for the direct use of EU rules and procedures but also in some cases for the use of COMESA or SADC rules under contribution agreements as in the case of contribution agreements, there is a EU scrutiny of how well the expenditure is documented which is usually far more demanding than the internal (or even external) audit scrutiny under the DMRO management. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The frustration over the rules and procedures undermines not all the efficiency in creating results but also, equally worryingly, creates mistrust and a poor cooperation environment between the EU and the DMROs and spending organizations. ○ A considerable portion of the funding at regional level is for travel and per diems. Per diems – in all DMROs and countries the practice of paying per diems is reported as having a destructive effect: i) it is expensive, ii) it encourages poor institutional practice and distorts incentives, iii) it encourages unnecessary travel and it sometimes leads to a rotation of staff instead of encouraging continuity. It is noted that other donors such as USAID and GIZ do not provide per diems. ○ Many other donors either provide their assistance in kind (e.g. GIZ and USAID) often through technical assistance contracts that then have the financial management responsibility or alternatively through a basket fund type of arrangement (as in the joint financing agreement of IGAD) where the funds are in practice supervised by technical assistance staff. These arrangements have heavy transaction costs but not as large it seems as those that arise when an EU audit finds ineligible costs (due to missing documentation). 	<p>Interviews in the EUDs and DMROs (all) (Continued instances of ineligible expenses which are leading to long delays and diversion of senior management time.)</p>	<p>Strong (supported by a variety of opinion and continued problems with ineligible expenses)</p>

<p>COMESA</p>	<p>COMESA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COMESA as the first DMRO to use contribution agreements has been the DMRO least directly affected by EU rules and procedures, as the EU contribution agreement allowed COMESA rules and procedures to be used. This, partly as a result of EU support to administration and finance staffing in COMESA, has led to COMESA being able to channel and implement a considerable volume of funding for regional integration (not only within COMESA but also other DMROs). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ COMESA was an early adopter of the contribution agreement and through the IRCCC was able to channel funds to IGAD, IOC and EAC under the contribution agreement. This allowed relatively efficient use of funds given the alternative of using EU procedures. However, it was noted by a number of institutions that the COMESA rules and procedures themselves are not easy and lead to delays e.g. with the COMESA clearing house in Zimbabwe – in essence the problem is that for relatively small amounts the implementing agencies (e.g. ZIMtrade) have to become familiar with COMESA rules and regulations. ○ Where there was national implementation by a country eligible for budget support then the efficiency was noted as being particularly high (e.g. implementing the RISIM projects in the Dept. of Trade in Mauritius) because the implementing agency did not have to use different rules. 	<p>Interview, Dept of International Trade, Mauritius, Ministry of Finance and Economics Interviews, COMESA clearing house (Harare) Interviews COMESA, EUD, ZIMtrade</p>	<p>More than satisfactory (supported by a variety of opinion)</p>
<p>EAC</p>	<p>EAC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most of the EU support for the EAC under EDF 10 (€11m) was channelled through the COMESA-administered RISP 2 grants programme (2011-2013) - <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The COMESA administered funding operated in parallel to the EAC Partnership Fund, the vehicle for donor support established in 2006. ○ According to the EAC, ‘upon completion of RISP 2, the European Union joined the EAC Partnership Fund as a contributing member for the RISP 3 programme’. ○ According to the EUD, ‘most of RISP 3 (a €4,5m financing agreement signed in March 2014) goes through Programme Estimates, one of which finances Partnership Fund implementation (as earmarked support)’. <p><i>The EUD and certain other development partners believe that donor support should focus on technical and high-level capacity building activities, and that the Partnership Agreement is not conducive to this</i></p> 	<p>Interviews EUD, EAC EAC Partnership Fund documents</p>	<p>More than satisfactory (supported by a variety of opinion)</p>

<p>IGAD</p>	<p>IGAD</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> As IGAD has not yet passed the pillar assessments, the EU has not joined the joint financing agreement this in itself sets up transaction costs for IGAD. The main effort now is on passing the pillar assessment so that internal IGAD rules and procedures can be used. There is little evidence that the EU rules and procedures themselves have created greater efficiency although they might (because of their greater rigour) have led to an improved culture for documentation. 	<p>Pillar assessments (several) Interviews EUD, IGAD</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>
<p>IOC</p>	<p>IOC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The view of most IOC and also national implementing staff is that the EU rules and procedures are too inflexible and too inflexibly interpreted and that as a result the entire programme of support becomes rules focused and not results focused. And that results are lost because of the focus on the rules e.g. the absence of boarding cards and the resulting ineligible expenses means that the organization is buried in administration to obtain the cards and the participants have a negative view of cooperation with the EU. Although there is training provided, the implementing agencies do not always have the volume of expenditure and continuity of staff to justify full competence in new rules all the time (especially where they are significantly different in logic from their own rules) cannot be expected to be able to command other institutions that are involved for example in workshops. The view of the EUD is that the rules cannot be changed or compromised and interpretation has been checked with head office and that training is available. 	<p>Interviews with Finance and administration staff IOC Interview with EUD Interviews with implementing agents (many)</p>	<p>More than satisfactory (supported by a variety of opinion)</p>

SADC	<p>SADC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There were long delays in the start of the EDF 10 awaiting the expected approval of the use of contribution agreements. These delays led great inefficiency as funds were available but the expenditure could not start due to delays in the pillar assessment (instead of accepting the situation and going ahead with the use of EU procedures). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Towards the end of EDF 10, these problems were resolved and currently there is a dual situation of use of EU rules and procedures for some expenditure and other expenditure covered by a contribution agreement. 	Interviews EUD, SADC	More than satisfactory (supported by a variety of opinion)
7.3.2 The new approach of using contribution agreements are working as intended and creating efficient results			
	<p>COMESA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In COMESA the contribution agreements appear to have worked better than in the case of SADC although they are not without challenges (mainly associated with high transaction costs for small projects and implementing parties having to become familiar with new procedures for small expenditure). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In part this might be due to the fact that they have been operational for longer and the “starter” problems have been ironed out. ○ The COMESA clearing house led to ZIMTRADE spending USD 20,000 in talks and discussions to get USD 18,000 in funding – this application of the contribution agreement was not found efficient. The projects are: i) too thinly spread; ii) not sufficiently linked to a regional rationale; iii) do not look a full value chain. However in the case of ZIMstatistics the process was found to be very efficient results with minimum delay in procurement of survey logistics and consultancy input, this was probably because the clearing house procured all the goods and services and provide support in kind rather than cash. 	Interviews COMESA secretariat Interviews ZIMtrade and Zimstatistics	More than satisfactory

<p>SADC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The contribution agreements are clearly in the long term the right direction to go but it has not been an easy process for SADC and initially might even have caused additional inefficiencies. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The final evaluation of REIS noted that <i>“the Contribution Agreement ended up by creating an extra layer of reporting rather than simplifying the utilisation of EU resources to boost implementation of SADC regional economic integration activities... Take for example the case of REIS planning and reporting formats. [despite the contribution agreement] they differ from those used in the SADC PPRM M&E system despite the fact that REIS was conceived as part of SADC’s institutional structures. It is understood that the SADC M&E system was designed when implementation of the REIS programme had already commenced. However, to ensure that REIS does not work in parallel with the SADC planning and reporting procedures, the REIS formats should have been fully integrated as part of the SADC reporting system. For the purpose of reporting to EU and Steering Committee on planned activities and progress made, REIS management could have just extracted components of REIS interventions from the SADC/PPRM existing records. Thereafter, prepare relevant narrative and matrix summaries of planned activities and progress achieved, which would have substantially lessened the current reporting burden that has been expressed by REIS management as a major concern.”</i> ○ The contribution agreements were based on the use of SADC systems which were not suitable because they had just been changed prior to the contribution agreement and were not tested (in effect they had been taken from different sets of rules often from the internet and were not compatible across different areas). Also, the culture of how strictly the rules were interpreted and adhered to within SADC (and even internal and external auditing) was not as stringent as the auditor employed by the EUD. There were two different sets of assumptions. A lot of energy and a stop in work resulted from the subsequent investigations into ineligible expenses. ○ The pillar assessments are valuable and have contributed to ensure that support is efficient, however the accuracy and influence of the pillar assessments over future practice is over estimated. Even the systems are in place and good enough, this is not necessarily a good enough indication that the systems will be used satisfactorily in the future. Management and internal accountability weaknesses can often lead to the conditions not being in place for effective use of the contribution agreement. 	<p>REIS final evaluation November 2016). Interviews EUD, Botswana Interviews SADC, secretariat</p>	<p>More than satisfactory (a variety of opinion and documents)</p>
<p>Summary</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The contribution agreements have a potentially important and constructive effect in that they can lead to strengthening of the internal systems rather than obliging the DMROs (and the implementing agents) to become experts in EU (and all other donor systems). • However experience has shown that whilst these positive effects can and do take place they are not without challenges. The first challenge is that the DMRO’s own systems when pillar assessed might be suitable in theory but are not sufficiently well carried out in practice, this still potentially leaves a fiduciary risk. A second challenge is that DMRO’s own systems are themselves not efficient and lead to slow execution that is not particularly cost effective. This is a challenge that has been experienced in SADC. A third and perhaps the most problematic challenge is that where execution is through national organisations (in countries not eligible for budget support) the implementing organisation will need to use the DMRO systems. This is what is occurring for example in RSIM in Zimbabwe and also what will need to happen for the TRF in SADC. 	<p>Discussion with DMROs, implementing agencies and EUDs</p>	<p>Strong (a variety of sources in clear agreement)</p>

7.3.3 The EU support has not created any harmful effects		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Widening the regional integration agenda</u> - There is some evidence and a body of opinion that the volume and design of the EU support has led to a widening of the agenda of the secretariats and worked against the prioritisation and focussing of the activities of the DMROs. This is noted as a negative evolution from the 10th to the 11th EDF. It is noted that the regional programmes especially the EDF 11 with its cross regional envelope has worked against the concentration strategy and widened the range of skills needed at the secretariat and the EU delegations. The concentration of focus areas in the EDF 11 bilateral support (the NIPs) combined with the later formulation of the RIP led to the tendency to include in the RIP many non-focus areas such as support to food security and NRM that were previously part of the bilateral cooperation. These two factors have combined to make the RIP less concentrated that was the original intention 	EUD delegation Botswana	Indicative but not conclusive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Fuelling the regional bureaucracies</u> - without really knowing if it is helping regional integration. The concept of “regional ownership” is being misinterpreted and becomes an excuse for over channelling of funds. There is not enough attention being placed on the private sector which is the stakeholder that is in reality making the most progress in regional integration. (a typical quote from the survey done is “the EU support is being used for empire building”). 	World Bank, Zimbabwe Dfid, Zimbabwe Survey of EUDS	Indicative but not conclusive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Complexity of the some of the projects</u> – the level of ambition and the complexity of some of the projects (such as the earlier phases of the ISLANDS project in the Indian Ocean region) has distracted the secretariats and the implementing organisation at the national level. The projects are based on too optimistic assumptions on the capacity and collective willingness of the members states and in consequence are too complex to implement efficiently and end up reducing the credibility of regional efforts to promote integration. 	Interviews with DMROs and technical assistance staff	More than satisfactory

EQ 8 Regional integration prospects

To what extent has the EU support enabled the DMROs and their partners at national level to better realise regional policy objectives?

Rationale & Coverage of the EQ:

The mid-term reviews of the 10th EDF support to the EASAIIO region highlighted a number of shortcomings in the strategy and approach to support for regional integration including:

- Over-reliance on DMRO secretariats with support going beyond their technical capacity to absorb
- Channelling resources through DMROs without respecting the principle of subsidiarity
- Complicated implementation modalities

In response, strategies were adopted to: i) provide funding direct to relevant national organisations (direct access); ii) use a performance based allocation (known as variable geography); iii) use a technical assistance facility to assist in programming (by DMROs, national implementing bodies, EU delegations) as well as policy advice and analytical work on broader regional integration issues; iv) provide support to institutional capacity strengthening for the DMROs under the sub-regional envelopes as a cross-cutting measure. A recent study (ECDPM, June 2016) suggests that these changes respond mainly to aid management issues and the study throws doubt on whether they will have the intended impact on the achievement of regional objectives.

Another observation was that there was multiple and overlapping membership of the DMROs, low levels of ownership by member countries and, a lack of strategic clarity of the objectives of the regional organisations. These factors made it difficult for the EU support to be fully effective. They also made it more difficult for the DMROs and member countries to benefit from the EU's unique experience and knowledge of regional integration processes. Within the EC there are also voices that question whether, without a credible process for reshaping, the present set-up and composition of the DMROs are sufficiently clear and well-conceived to make support to regional integration likely to succeed or even meaningful.

Issues that have also been raised in connection with the strategic relevance (EQ1) and future prospects (EQ8) include:

- Is significant progress in regional integration possible? Are the EU interventions too ambitious or too vulnerable to being thwarted at national level? (closely linked to EQ8)
- Is a more radical approach required? Have the EU failed to understand the true risk involved? (closely linked to EQ 1)
- Does the EU have the capacity to be able to manage projects of such complexity and ambition? (closely linked to EQ7)

The findings of this evaluation question and the one on strategic relevance and efficiency will combine with insights from other questions to allow conclusions to be formed where relevant.

Coverage and focus of the EQ:

The EQ focusses on the period since the end of the mid-term review of the 10th EDF and comprises all 5 DMROs. Specifically, the EQ will assess:

- Policy – whether EU political and policy dialogue has added value in opening a debate on and clarifying the strategic objectives of the DMROs [this links to topics covered in EQ 1]
- Ownership –whether the ownership and commitment to the regional integration objectives and structures by member states is increasing – and how the EU has contributed.
- Modalities – whether the new implementation modalities appear to be proving more efficient and whether the new procedures have clarified the roles of DMROs, national implementing partners and the EUDs. Another way of phrasing this is: Are the new strategies and approaches of the 11th EDF likely to enable the DMROs and their partners at national level to better realise the regional policy objectives compared to these of the 10th EDF (including infrastructure related objectives)?

Expected recommendations: EQ 8 will inform and lead to recommendations for either continuing with the new approaches introduced by the 11th EDF or for introducing adjustments or revisiting the entire scale and approach of the support. It will also potentially provide recommendations for consideration by the DMROs and their member states.

<i>JC 8.1 The policy dialogue with the EU is leading to clearer set of strategic regional objectives for the DMROs</i>			
Summary response	Sources of information	Quality of evidence	
18.1.1 EU policy dialogue has initiated a debate and analysis on the purpose, level of ambition and prioritisation of roles and functions for the DMROs			
COMESA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy dialogue: The policy dialogue seems to have deteriorated from 2013 to 2015. Whereas in 2013 it was noted (EAMR) that policy dialogue in preparation of the 11th EDF was intensive and constructive in 2015 it was noted that dialogue with COMESA showed ups and downs with it proving difficult to organise bi-monthly portfolio meetings and the discussion on the preparation of new programmes under EDF 11 reached a stalemate. Dialogue agenda with COMESA is on putting more focus on implementation at member state level. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COMESA Annual report, 2015 • EAMR, Zambia, 2013, 2015 • Interview EUD, COMESA 	Satisfactory
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political/policy dialogue - At the nation state level, there are considerable dysfunctions in the trade and economic integration environment (e.g. the use of statutory instruments in Zimbabwe, the presence of vested interest and the unequal access to finance within the country which favours some against others) which severely impact any measure to improve the enabling environment. Analysis of the political economy is needed to assist in understanding how to proceed and to take best advantage of entry points that might arise from change and transition processes as are occurring in Zimbabwe. Shared analysis with other donors is not available except on an anecdotal level. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews DfID, USAID EUD • https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2016/08/07/zim-sa-trade-war-threatens • Tutwa Consulting Group, South Africa – Zimbabwe trade war: time for WTO intervention? http://www.tutwaconsulting.com/south-africa-zimbabwe-trade-war-time-for-wto-intervention/ • http://ceas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/zambia/press_corner/all_news/news/2016/20160505_en.htm • https://ceas.europa.eu/sites/ceas/files/eu_quarterly_final_3.pdf • 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political dialogue - Politics is at the heart of some of the actions that impede regional integration and render the EU support less effective. Political dialogue is called for but in this case at the national level. The EUD in Zimbabwe is aware of the situation and the political dimensions. However the situation in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa and the degree of influence of the EU makes it questionable if much could be achieved through political dialogue at least with the current tools and mechanisms in place. 		
EAC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy dialogue: The EAMR notes that the sector dialogue is formalistic and limited to the secretariat tasks. There is little traceability, mention or acknowledgement or reference to the EU contribution to policy advice on regional integration in official despite the large volume of support and the rationale that the EU provides a model (or elements of a model) for the EAC. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAC 2030 Vision, February 2016 • 4th EAC development strategy 2011/12 (2011) • EAMR, Tanzania, 2015 	Satisfactory

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy/ political dialogue – is not judged as sufficient due to lack of capacity at the EAC itself (the EU desk officer position has been vacant for some time) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews TZ01 	
IGAD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy dialogue: Dialogue with the secretariat is often on financial and operational issues – however, dialogue is taken with the members states and other donors on strategic matters. The need for stronger policy dialogue with IGAD is noted. There is also transition in policy dialogue from EUD Ethiopia to EUD Djibouti. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMR, Djibouti, 2015 • Interview 060,061 	Satisfactory
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political dialogue mainly takes place with IGAD management and MS at regular meetings in Addis Ababa. The EUD and IGAD occasionally meet at the high level as a side event to AU meetings, but this has not taken place for some time. Issues that have been covered include Somalia and regional security and more recently the situation in South Sudan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews : 060, 061, 063, 069 • Press release of political dialogue 2010 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political dialogue -The IGAD self-assessment in 2015 found that there is a lack of political dialogue between IGAD and its MS. Council of Ministers discussions focus on specific issues, e.g. the situation in Somalia, but not on regional integration. It is hoped that the new treaty and the enhanced mandate of IGAD (e.g. becoming a community) will facilitate such dialogue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 069 • Press release of political dialogue 2010 • https://igad.int/attachments/802_IGAD_-_EU%20JOINT%20COMMUNIQUE.pdf (2014) 	
IOC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy dialogue: The appreciation by the IOC of the links to the EU seems high as evidenced in a number of documents and their website, however on an operational level the policy dialogue has to some extent collapsed to a discussion on ineligible expenses and EU rules and procedures. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IOC, Booklet on the IOC, November 2013 • EAMR, Mauritius, 2015, 2014 • Interviews, IOC and EUD 	Satisfactory
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy dialogue: The first high level meeting between IOC and EUD took place in November 2016. The main topics discussed were: relations and record keeping; IOC policy vision of being a REC and EU support for this; EU visibility; preparation of action documents for the cross regional envelopes; EPA preparations; IOC salary grids; ineligible expenses. The topics appear quite low level and operational (e.g. on boarding cards) but also reflect issues that in reality are holding up the overall cooperation. The discussion on salary grids noted that whilst the IOC was free to adjust salary grids, the EU was not obliged to increase its payments accordingly which can also be interpreted as a message for IOC member states to take more responsibility for bearing the costs of IOC. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minutes of the first high level meeting IOC-EUD November 2016 	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4th Political dialogue took place January 2016, the aim of the dialogue was to exchange information, foster mutual understanding and facilitate the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agenda. The dialogue included issues on regional integration such as the EPA but did not (at least as recorded by press release) touch on the issue of member state commitments (in terms of contribution and compliance). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> http://www.govmu.org/English/News/Pages/Fourth-Political-Dialogue-between-EU-and-Mauritius.aspx 	
SADC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy dialogue: EAMR notes that during programming (2014-2015), the Delegation ensured regular consultations with civil society and non-state actor's representatives. It is particularly noted that « sound strategy around migration » was initiated and the EUD assisted with a mapping of civil society actors. EAMR notes that poor preparation of meetings reduces the value of the policy dialogue (which could indicate reluctance to dialogue or at least a perception that not enough is gained by it) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAMR, Botswana, 2015 Interviews EUD, SADC 	Satisfactory
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy dialogue is improving compared with 2015 e.g. a topic introduced is the importance of the private sector and simpler arrangements for NSA participation– it is crucial that for policy dialogue that a common ICP position is put forward – the SADC/ICP platform is useful in that regard. One of the drivers for the ICP platform from the SADC side is resource mobilisation (currently the platform is being used by SADC to mobilise resources for the industrialisation strategy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SADC/ICP mins of meeting October 2016 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy dialogue still appears focused on technical matters and not well informed by political economy analysis and an advocacy plan for addressing remaining issues that are amenable to policy dialogue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAMR, Botswana, 2015 Interviews EUD, SADC 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political dialogue – under article 8 of the Cotonou, political dialogue is held between EU and Botswana and the agenda does include regional integration i.e. EPA and SADC. The political dialogue has helped pave the way for more detailed policy level dialogue on the role of civil society – in part by reducing mis-conceptions on role of civil society. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/976/Botswana%20and%20the%20EU Botswana political dialogue 2015 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political dialogue - There is also a detailed political dialogue with SADC specifically which notes trade and regional stability related issues (minutes of meeting). Substantial topics beyond the operational aspects of SADC/EU cooperation are covered but without being highly contentious or raising issues on compliance and gradual increase in member state contributions. There seems to be more conditions attached by SADC (e.g. complete and unconditional removal of sanctions on Zimbabwe) than by the EU. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> http://www.sadc.int/files/1314/4602/0061/Communiqu.pdf (SADC 2015 political dialogue) 	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political dialogue - Sweden supported SADC for a long time but left, apparently because there was a mix of political compromise and low capacity and it was not at all clear how to break through this – the political dialogue was not able to find a solution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview Dfid, Zimbabwe • SABES (Zimbabwe) 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political dialogue - other donors find policy dialogue with SADC difficult, one reason might be that SADC reflects rather than leads member state opinion. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview Dfid, USAID, Zimbabwe 	
<p>General: Policy dialogue</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy dialogue and the HLG discussions are more about management of EU assistance than about the real policy level issues such as how to deal with overlapping membership and fostering a more coherent basis for collective action. The incentives for the EC and EUDs is to ensure a smooth disbursement and there is a tension between achieving expected disbursement and ensuring high quality projects and policy dialogue. It does not seem that the DMROs value the policy dialogue. • According to the WTO aid for Trade 4th global report EU provides “60% of global support on trade facilitation and had reaffirmed its commitment to continue doing so” – in the 5th global report EU is noted as the second largest aid for trade (after Japan) one could note here that the influence of EU seems to be low given this proportion. It appears that DMROs do not find EU policy dialogue highly valuable. Often it is associated with control of projects and supervision of financial management. • Non State actors are important in the policy dialogue, there are variable results. Much more rigorous advocacy design and impact analysis is needed to effectively engage civil society and private sector <p>The survey of EUDs (shown below) appears to confirm the finding above that the policy dialogue has not reached its potential in terms of supporting and triggering transformative change.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High level Group Minutes, November 2016, June 2015, December 2014 • ECDPM, Prospects for supporting regional integration effectively, June 2016 • WTO 4th Global Review on aid for trade 2011, 5th Global review on aid for trade 2013 • Survey of EUDs, 2017 	<p>Satisfactory</p>


<p style="text-align: center;">Has policy dialogue between the EU and the REC/DMRO initiated a debate and analysis on the purpose, level of ambition and prioritisation of roles and functions for the DMROs?</p> <table border="1"> <caption>Survey Results Data</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Category</th> <th>Count</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Unsatisfactory (policy dial. has not taken place or has not been effective in...)</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Moderately Unsatis.(policy dial. had little or only minor effect on roles and functions of...)</td> <td>5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Moderately Satis.(some influence on roles and functions of the DMRO, but more...)</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Highly Satisfactory (regular, constructive, influential, with strong participation)</td> <td>0</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Category	Count	Unsatisfactory (policy dial. has not taken place or has not been effective in...)	3	Moderately Unsatis.(policy dial. had little or only minor effect on roles and functions of...)	5	Moderately Satis.(some influence on roles and functions of the DMRO, but more...)	1	Highly Satisfactory (regular, constructive, influential, with strong participation)	0		
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<p>General: Political dialogue There are potentially important instruments related to article 8 of Cotonou. Political dialogue between EU (and member states) and the partner country although this also touches regional aspects such as EPA and SADC (Botswana) and EPA and trade issues (Mauritius). There are official political dialogues with the DMROs such as EAC (over and above the political dialogue with Tanzania) and also with IGAD, SADC, IoC. However, it does not appear at least from officially available information that the contentious issues of a political economy nature are identified in advance, messages and advocacy devised and the issues dealt with at the dialogue and this was generally confirmed in discussions with the EUD. The dialogue serves mostly to cement good relations and provide a favourable context and then when needed on very particular issues such as the instability in Burundi or situation in South Sudan the political dialogue is used to provide supportive messages to the DMROs. There might be an under use of the political dialogue instrument but first there needs to be a clearer understanding of the underlying factors influencing regional integration and the development/design of a set of constructive and well-founded advocacy messages.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Press releases on political dialogues (Zambia, Botswana, EAC, Tanzania, Mauritius, IGAD, SADC, IOC) 	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>										

I 8.1.2 Analytical work is available on the options for regional integration, the implications of the subsidiarity principle and achievable levels of ambition			
I 8.1.3 Changes have occurred in the prioritisation and regional strategies of the DMROs which set realistic ambitions (DMRO workplans and strategies – complemented by interviews)			
COMESA:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis: The MTS undertook a series of background analysis as the basis for the 2016-2020 strategy e.g. stakeholder analysis which helps to identify areas of intervention to speed up implementation of decisions and legal instruments. A SWOT/PEST and balanced scorecard analysis was also undertaken in support of the strategy. For example this led to an aid for trade strategy that focuses only those aspects that are of a regional nature thus being complementary to member state strategies. A series of studies were undertaken under a 2010 agreement with the African Capacity Building Foundation (although highly delayed as it only started in 2014) • Prioritisation: There is evidence of EU support to the MTS plan itself (in the file properties the EUD is noted). In support of prioritisation, a gap analysis of 18 member states on CMR, CTN and CET compliance was carried in 2014 with EU support. Not clear if has led to highly prioritised or overly comprehensive approach. • Evidence of EU support to implementation: it seems EUD was quite involved in the MTS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COMESA Medium term strategic plan 2016-2020, November 2016 • Aid for Trade Strategy, June 2009 • Interviews COMESA, EUD 	Satisfactory (although EU contribution indicative but not conclusive)
EAC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis: the institutional review document is missing and has not been made public by the EAC due it appears to internal disagreement on the content. There is a considerable body of analysis and the Trade mark East Africa organisation has developed for the region a strong and highly prioritised set of actions (although this analysis is not directly EU supported. Analytical work of varying quality is available on options for regional integration but it is not used effectively as it is not disseminated or brought into strategic discussions. • Prioritisation: A 2030 Vision for EAC has been recently produced. The document is reasonably concise and backed up with quantitative analysis and data. [It is not clear if there was any EU involvement in this document]. The 2030 vision for EAC has an important section on visions of the partner states which was itself derived from the 4th EAC development strategy 2011/12 (2011). A relatively sophisticated M&E strategy also for the strategy is put forward but not yet implemented. The subsidiarity principle is being raised in discussions especially regarding the roles of EAC and AU. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAC 2030 Vision, February 2016 • Trade mark East Africa https://www.trademarkea.com/ accessed 30 December 2016 • Interviews EUD,EAC 	Indicative but not conclusive

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of EU support to implementation: The regional programme allowed EU to support EAC based (peer review) observation mission for the Tanzania elections. 		
IGAD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis: A number of sub-strategies have been developed such as the environment strategy (2007); Pastoral areas and livestock development strategy ((2013-17); Conflict Early Warning and Response Strategy CEWARN (2012-2019); Climate predictions and applications strategy (2011); Drought disaster resilience and sustainability strategy (2013).The EU has funded a number of institutional assessments and self-assessments including the latest self assessment (2015). The purpose of the self-assessment was to: provide a general assessment of IGAD's organizational structure and capacity to take on its mandate and implement programmes and analyse and assess, as systematically and objectively, the performance of the organization in terms of delivering results within its mandate. • Prioritisation: The IGAD strategy 2016-2020 notes "IGAD's Heads of State and Government decided to implement the current Minimum Integration Plan (MIP) as a guiding and dynamic strategic framework for the economic and social integration." The minimum integration concept is sound given the need to prioritise on the most import aspects. • Evidence of EU support to implementation: EUD is supporting IGAD on the issue of migration and the development of a protocol for free movement and labour mobility and also climate change and environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IGAD strategy 2016-2020 • Self-Assessment report, IGAD, August 2015 	Satisfactory
IOC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis: Strategies have been developed in areas such as connectivity, transport and energy. E.g the duplication of the Mauritius national energy efficiency programme which IOC is promoting among members. • Prioritisation: The 4 main areas of IOC appears well prioritised: diplomacy and political cooperation, (ii) economy and trade, (iii) environment and sustainable management of natural resources and (iv) human development. The contribution of the EU to IOC strategy and institutional strengthening is highlighted by the IOC's own documents • Evidence of EU support to implementation: there seems to be a strong acceptance of EU support and involvement. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Website: http://commissionoceanindien.org/a-propos/ accessed 10 December 2016 	
SADC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis: EUD has assisted to bring civil society representatives to the SADC steering committee and has promoted the adoption of a civil society engagement framework. This is especially important as noted a number of observers that regional integration in Africa is "a highly state-centric 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMR, Botswana, 2015 • Erasmus,G., EPA BRIDGES AFRICA VOLUME 3 - NUMBER 3 How can the 	Indicative but not conclusive

	<p>endeavour, with a top-down approach which contrasts markedly with that of, for example, East Asia. Here the private sector actively engages and in most cases drives the integration agenda, while regional production networks encourage the establishment of "deep" regional integration arrangements that go beyond reducing tariffs. The greater depth of such regional arrangements generates bigger increases in trade among the members" (Erasmus, 2014).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prioritisation: The EAMR notes that while the 10th EDF regional programme supports clear sectors of concentration, the 11th EDF RIP opens the door to a numerous range of sectors: food security, agriculture, biodiversity, natural resources management, transport, energy, water, ICT, trade, private sector, migration, human trafficking, piracy, peace stability. This new development will require staff reinforcement and efficient networking between Delegations and NAOs. • Evidence of EU support to implementation Prioritisation of areas of support are evident in action documents (i.e. the 4 areas of: Industrial Development and Market Integration; Infrastructure in Support of Regional Integration; Peace and Security Co-operation; and Special Programmes of Regional Dimension) but an analysis of the role of SADC secretariat particularly when it comes to implementing projects is not very clear. Often the lack of capacity to implement projects is emphasised as weakness that needs to be addressed and in the past many programme staff have been funded on a withdrawing basis whilst this practice has changed with the EDF 11 there is not a clear or evident analysis of what minimum roles and tasks the SADC secretariat should carry out given limited resources. • Evidence of EU support to implementation: the main intervention appears to be on the issue of non-state actors. EU also supported the comprehensive review of the RISDP resulted in the re-prioritisation of SADC's focus areas and programmes. The approval of the revised RISDP marked a new impetus in the development agenda of SADC. It has identified four priority areas which are more attainable. 	<p>EPA promote deeper regional integration in Southern Africa? 9 April 2014</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action document for capacity Action Document for Integrated Institutional Capacity-Building for the SADC Secretariat and National Stakeholders, RSO/FED/038-898) • Action document for capacity Action Document for Integrated Institutional Capacity-Building for the SADC Secretariat and National Stakeholders, RSO/FED/038-898, SADC-CNGO interview 	
<p><u>General summary:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis There appears to have been a considerable amount of analysis – the issue is the ownership of it and the extent to which it has been used to inform decision making and planning. The EU 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High level group June 2016 • IGAD strategy 2016-2020 	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>

<p>has promoted closer engagement with non-state actors with some success although progress is slow and a recent set of articles indicates that the DMROs and non-state actors are not yet working together as well as they could (ECDPM, Great Insights, August 2016). National EPA implementation plans are being developed – these provide a concrete entry point for significant trade and regional integration reforms. The EPAs also provide an opportunity to prioritise – especially as they are legally binding. A study (ECDPM 2008) notes that negotiations on EPAs have been difficult. One of the divergences has been that for the EU, EPAs are seen as fostering development through trade liberalisation and the creation of the right policy framework to attract investment. The study notes that ACP countries tend to consider trade liberalisation and regional integration as necessary, yet far from sufficient, conditions to foster development and alleviate poverty. These discussions provide a forum for policy dialogue that demands that countries and regional organisations are well prepared and have solid analysis available to support their negotiating positions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prioritisation: There are in general a lot of strategies across the DMROs but less evidence of them being monitored and implemented in practice As an example that also pertains to other regional organisations: the IGAD 2016-2020 strategy notes “The multiple and confusing membership creates duplication and sometimes competition in activities. RECs have transformed by highlighting their core competencies to more accurately reflect the needs of the member states and address the Member states priority needs in each region. With the existing structure of the RECs which is far from ideal, with many overlaps in membership, members states see each of the different RECs as important to them for very different and specific reasons and not for all the proposed integration goals of that REC and that of the AUC”. These statements from IGAD itself echo other analysis on the political economy. Overall it seems that the strategies and action plans are aspirational and highly ambitious, easy to sign up to but also easy to avoid implementing. IGAD’s minimum integration plan is a step towards focussing on the most immediate and realistic goals. A balance clearly has to be struck between strategies that are aspirational and not binding in terms of member commitment and less ambitious step by step actions where member commitment is in place. • Evidence of EU support to implementation: From the documentation it is not clear what the role of the EU has been in the formulation of background analysis – to some extent ownership will require a low profile from donors such as the EU. [due to the need for a deliberately low profile, evidence of EU support is generally more apparent from the interviews]. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Woolfrey, political economy of regional integration in Africa, 2016 • AUC, Status of Integration in Africa, 2013 • ECDPM, EPA negotiations and regional integration in Africa – building or stumbling blocks, 2008 • (ECDPM, Great Insights, August 2016) • Gribaldi,I, EPAs as agents of change, presentation to HLG meeting, June 2016 • Survey of EUDs 	
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<p>The survey of EUDs (shown below) appears to show that EU support has been limited in its influence on prioritisation and regional strategies. It is noteworthy that most EUDs “do not know” indicating a limited feedback and also possibly too high a workload to do other than react.</p>  <table border="1"> <caption>Has the EU support led to changes in the prioritisation and regional strategies of the DMROs leading to the setting of realistic ambitions?</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Response</th> <th>Count</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>I do not know</td> <td>8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>not at all</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>only to a limited extent</td> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>to some extent</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>to a high extent</td> <td>0</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Response	Count	I do not know	8	not at all	2	only to a limited extent	4	to some extent	0	to a high extent	0		
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JC 8.2 Ownership by member countries of the DMROs and their objectives is increasing

Summary response	Sources of information	Quality of evidence
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I-8.2.1 Member states are more actively involved in and cooperating in domesticating regional agreements and implementing agreed national actions

<p>Level of compliance</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Under TAF a study was undertaken in 2010 on “Coherence of National Development Plans with the Regional Agenda” which confirmed the need for concerted effort in integrating the national development planning processes into RISDP formulation and implementation, and into other elements of the regional integration process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TAF II programme estimate March 2014 TAF I, EASIO, 11th EDF 	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> COMESA MTS notes although COMESA is host to model laws, frameworks and protocols, the implementation/domestication of these is however slow partly because of low levels of commitment and ownership of the regional integration agenda. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> COMESA Medium term strategic plan 2016-2020, November 2016 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The level of implementation of trade agreements is low and a major impediment to increasing inter-regional trade (only 11%, compared to 21% in Latin America, 50% in Asia and 70% in Europe) reducing tariffs (8.7% within Africa compared to international levels of 2.5%) and transport costs (double other continents). (UNCTAD and others). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNCTAD policy brief No. 34, July 2015 	


	<p><u>Summary:</u> Most analysis points to major gaps in the compliance with regional agreements. Although the situation varies across the different DMROs, in general the level of compliance and monitoring of member state implementation is weak.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	
Compliance, monitoring and mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ WTO notes the absence of « a legally binding mechanism with sanctions for non-compliance that would help to fully exploit economies of scale related to economic integration » 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ WTO EAC Trade policy review 2012 	More than satisfactory
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Engagement of the IMF regional technical assistance centres for east and south Africa (AFRITACs) is a measure that can potentially contribute to the fulfilment of national commitments in the regional agendas and an example of innovative initiatives to promote national ownership (noted in the Inter-DMRO consultation discussions). The AFRITACs agenda is also an indication that the DMRO-led efforts are not enough. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Technical Inter-DMROs consultation forum, June 2016 	
	<p><u>Summary:</u> A number of monitoring mechanisms have been planned (e.g. the TCM of SADC) but they do not seem operational. The EAC market score card and the COMESA M&E systems are a good start but have not yet translated into powerful tools for monitoring compliance in domesticating regional agreements and implementing agreed national actions</p>		
COMESA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COMESA has a reputation for rather low transposition in many areas. This is only recently being addressed systematically, but the efforts are still fragmented. While COMESA's official M&E unit is not yet fully functioning, compliance is being measured on several fronts: tariff compliance under the FTA, customs harmonisation, and overall compliance with all regional agreements. COMESA's new automation system will facilitate this, including in terms of member reporting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interviews COMESA ▪ Website COMESA 	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COMESA has a publicly available M&E and status follow up which can measure compliance which is partly functioning. The RISIM grants are set up so that after a first starter grant, the subsequent calls are dependent on the degree of compliance with some 21 indicators. As a consequence, Zimbabwe as it has not proven compliance has only received the first call, whereas Mauritius which is largely in compliance has accessed all the relevant calls. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ http://comstat.comesa.int/cscapne/primary-indicators (accessed 30 December 2016) ▪ Interviews EUD, DMROs (Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mauritius) 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whereas the system of relating grants to compliance is fundamentally good, the 21 indicator system is quite complex to measure. Attention is given to situation of each country for example in the case of Mauritius only 11 of the indicators are relevant and it is judged on the basis of compliance with these. Zimbabwe was deemed to have zero compliance because although they claimed compliance, proof was not furnished. An example of the complexity that was provided was compliance with electrical standards where Zimbabwe under the bureau of standard had issued the standards but because the bureau does not gazette (it is deemed to be self-gazetting in Zimbabwe) it was not possible for Zimbabwe to furnish proof by providing a gazetted set of standards. Furthermore it was not widely appreciated by stakeholders that RISIM was dependent on compliance. This tended to remove the element of incentive. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bureau of Standards (Zimbabwe) ▪ Interviews EUD, DMROs (Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mauritius) 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compliance. Mauritius is complying with COMESA indicators. For trade the 3 most important ones are CFTA, Customs union and the trade in services. Eritrea, DRC and Ethiopia are the 3 states most behind in the compliance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interview International Trade Division (Mauritius) ▪ Interviews EUD, DMROs (Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mauritius) 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is little sanctioning which is allowing proxy and highly unpredictable trade wars to foster which is crippling the private sector (<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interviews USAID, DfID (Zimbabwe) ▪ Tutwa Consulting Group, South Africa – Zimbabwe trade war: time for WTO intervention? 	
<p>EAC</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAC common market score card notes (2016) reforms undertaken since 2014 have reduced the number of non-conforming measures to 59 in 2016, down from 63 in 2014. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EAC Common market Score Card 2014, 2016 ▪ Interviews (Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda) 	


	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The de Jure and de facto compliance levels are quite different – the score card system which is independently carried out is helping to create a more realistic picture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews (Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda) 	
IGAD/ IOC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IGAD and IOC do not have strong trade compliance mechanisms because these areas are taken up COMESA, EAC and SADC and most countries are members of one these 3. Compliance is less of an issue in the infrastructure and peace/stability areas where IGAD in particular is active. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Madagascar) 	
SADC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SADC has been planning to establish a Trade Monitoring and Compliance Mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the Free Trade Area, with a specific mechanism for identifying and eliminating non-tariff barriers. This mechanism has the potential to facilitate movement of goods and will lead to increased trade. The mechanism has now completed the first annual cycle of reporting, verification and country cross referencing. EU support has been indirect but nevertheless important. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> www.SADC.int accessed 30 December 2016 Interviews (Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mauritius) 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prioritisation of areas of support are evident in action documents (i.e. the 4 areas of: Industrial Development and Market Integration; Infrastructure in Support of Regional Integration; Peace and Security Co-operation; and Special Programmes of Regional Dimension) but an analysis of the role of SADC secretariat particularly when it comes to implementing projects is not very clear. Often the lack of capacity to implement projects is emphasised as weakness that needs to be addressed and in the past many programme staff have been funded on a withdrawing basis whilst this practice has changed with the EDF 11 there is not a clear or evident analysis of what minimum roles and tasks the SADC secretariat should carry out given limited resources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Action document for capacity Action Document for Integrated Institutional Capacity-Building for the SADC Secretariat and National Stakeholders, RSO/FED/038-898) Interviews (Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mauritius) 	

<p>Challenges, levels and prospects of cooperation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNCTAD policy brief notes: “The low rate of implementation of regional trade agreements in Africa is a major obstacle to fully harnessing the potential of regional trade for development. Being realistic in terms of setting objectives and deadlines for targets in regional trade agreements is a necessary condition for enhancing the implementation of commitments in Africa. Due to the overlapping memberships of RECs, member States are faced with conflicting commitments, which make implementation challenging” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNCTAD policy brief No. 34, July 2015 http://www.economist.com/news/21693562-africas-internal-trade-deals-look-good-paper-pity-they-are-rarely 	<p>More than satisfactory</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Action fiche on Strengthening the ability of IGAD to promote resilience in the Horn of Africa (2011) notes that IGAD has been less effective in ensuring effective coordination of the implementation of a region-wide strategy for increasing resilience in the IGAD region. It is noted that since the setting up of Committee of Directors in November 2014, internal cohesion, coordination and steering has improved significantly, but still needs much more consolidation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Action fiche on “Strengthening the ability of IGAD to promote resilience in the Horn of Africa” IGAD strategy 2011-2015, 2011 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A range of assessment conclude that due to irregular policy organ meetings coupled with persistent delays in the payment of contributions from its own member states, IGAD acts with insufficient policy direction and financial support, and as a consequence, reliance on donor funding has increased rapidly 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Byiers, B. (2016). The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa: Intergovernmental Authority on Development. ECDPM Mamo, D..F., Compliance of IGAD member states with counter terrorism measures in Africa, 2016 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A recent study notes a number of challenges to comply with IGAD counter terrorism arrangements: i) tension between states and lack of trust in sharing information and long running rivalries; ii) competing domestic interests and overlapping memberships; iii) competition for hegemony; iv) geopolitical position of the Horn of Africa and external interests. 		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • While political appointments to the IGAD Secretariat and the distribution of IGAD 'specialized institutions' among Member States is criticized as inefficient and dispersed, it also reflects the reality of inter-state bargaining and can be seen as raising member state ownership of the IGAD agenda. Multiple membership leads to a complex entanglement of commitments. Multiple membership also leads to a high burden of participation. • The strategy of using national focal points with a lead country taking the coordination role sometimes works as in the case of Madagascar for the DRR project but often it does not as in the case of the Western Indian Ocean Coastal Challenge project where Seychelles is the lead. The duty of the national focal point is described "a one liner" and often based on flawed assumptions that: i) the project is a priority of the national agency; ii) the national agency can coordinate and "has the upper hand with" other ministries; iii) the national agency has the capacity and resources. The chain of command is too long - it goes from EU - to- IOC -to- Ministry of Foreign Affairs -to- national agency. "Everyone is involved and in essence nobody does it". • In IOC, the idea that a member state is part of the steering committee or highest organ of the DMROs is not enough to obtain ownership. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Finance and Economy (Mauritius) 	
	<p><u>Summary:</u> It would appear that the DMROs do not find that the timing is right for prioritising monitoring of compliance. Countries have different interests and there is no mechanism in place to support the weaker countries who might lose out to countries that have a stronger industrial or agricultural base. The current membership of the DMROs is broad and shallow whereas what seems to be working better is cooperation that is deep and cohesive (an example is the greater progress made by the EAC in establishing a common market).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	
	<p>The survey of EUDs found that only to a limited extent do the member states get actively involved in domesticating agreements. This broadly agrees with the findings from other sources above.</p>	<p>Survey of EUDs</p>	


	<p>Are member states, since 2013, are more actively involved in and cooperating in domesticating regional agreements and implementing agreed national actions?</p>  <p>It was noted as a comment that the compliance varies; “Some member states are domesticating regional commitments and implementing agreed national actions (examples Mauritius, Kenya,) and some not (examples DR Congo, Eritrea)”</p>		
<p>I-8.2.2 Member states are increasingly holding DMROs accountable</p>			
<p>Planning and strategy involvement</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The COMESA MTS plan notes that: i) the MTS itself has been formulated with broad consultation with member states as well as other RECS and the African Union commission; ▪ DMROs are providing support to members states to develop their capacity which is a major impediment to effective governance e.g. The COMESA annual report 2015 notes that USD 0,68m were spent on member state capacity development ▪ EAMR notes that the EUD make efforts to share information with the national level delegations which while positive suggests that SADC is not fully living up to its task in this area. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ COMESA Medium strategic plan 2016-2020, November 2016 ▪ COMESA annual report 2015 ▪ Action fiche, TAF II, 2012 ▪ TAF II, SADC programme estimate March 2014 ▪ EAMR, Botswana, 2015 ▪ SADC, EUD interviews 	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>

	<p><u>Summary:</u> It appears that member states are involved in the planning and development of strategy but the sharing of information is not sufficient. A number of observers have noted a tendency for member states to agree with plans and strategies that are highly ambitious and aspirational rather than take a negative stance and lower ambitions. Unrealistic strategies also lead to a situation where no country is able to comply and thus removes the exposure and likely burden of having to comply. EU capacity development support appears mostly aimed at the DMROs rather than at the national level which is responsible for implementation.</p>		
<p>Involvement of private sector and civil society in holding regional bodies to account</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Uganda East African Business Council vice chairman Kassim Omary said: “It is of utmost importance to measure the extent to which the EAC partner states are translating the Common Market Protocol into policies that support actualisation of free movement of people and workers, goods, services, and the rights of establishment and residence within the EAC Partner States”. ▪ Trade agents within COMESA/SADC/EAC countries have the possibility to report online any NTB at: www.tradebarriers.org ▪ COMESA, EAC and SADC have set up a website to register and report on NTB complaints. The site is up to date with some 512 complaints where the vast majority were resolved, The status reports on NTB was last done in 2007 (which could potentially give a strong baseline) ▪ A first case of court action being brought against a member state (<i>Mauritius</i>) by the private sector for non-compliance occurred in late 2012 and was considered “landmark case” because it opens doors to the public to have recourse to the COMESA Court to help settle business disputes (although in this cases the process revealed weaknesses in the recourse procedures). ▪ EU have promoted involvement of NSAs by EUD to encourage greater ownership of regional integration among the public at large 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • https://www.trademarka.com/news/eac-common-market-scorecard-launched/ accessed 23 December 2016 • http://www.tradebarriers.org/resolved_complaints • https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/5318-the-role-of-national-courts-in-ensuring-comesa-member-states-compliance-with-regional-integration-obligations.html accessed 20 December 2016 • EAMR, Botswana, 2015 	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>

	<p><u>Summary:</u> the involvement of the private sector and civil society is a promising path for increasing the accountability of the DMROs if not to the member states then at least to the private sector and civil society that is meant to benefit. The EU has assisted this process most notably in SADC but also in EAC (via support to TradeMark East Africa which although not directly financed by the EU works in harmony with the EU and is financed by EU members states)</p>														
	<p>The Survey found that member states were not highly active in holding DMROs to account – although it varied between DMROs with COMESA noted as one of the DMROs where member states voice their concerns</p>  <table border="1"> <caption>Is there a trend of member states increasingly holding DMROs accountable?</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Response</th> <th>Count</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>I do not know</td> <td>7</td> </tr> <tr> <td>not at all</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>only to a limited extent</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>to some extent</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>to a high extent</td> <td>0</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Response	Count	I do not know	7	not at all	2	only to a limited extent	2	to some extent	3	to a high extent	0	<p>Survey of EUDS</p>	
Response	Count														
I do not know	7														
not at all	2														
only to a limited extent	2														
to some extent	3														
to a high extent	0														
<p>I-8.2.3 Members states increasing perceive regional integration as providing tangible benefits</p>															
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EAC The strides taken by the EAC to have a Customs Union Protocol in force and a Community Law – the Customs Management Act — made it attractive to other countries such Rwanda and Burundi to accede the Treaty in 2006 and for South Sudan to join in 2016. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Makame, A. 2012. The East African integration: Achievement and challenges. GREAT Insights, Volume 1, Issue 6. August 2012. Maastricht: ECDPM 	<p>satisfactory</p>												

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ TradeMark East Africa documents a number of success stories related to reduction in the time for import and export of goods. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • https://www.trademarka.com/ 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ IGAD - The IGAD strategy 2011-2015 notes the comparative advantage of IGAD as: i) support of member states, ii) political clout to work collectively. This is shown by regular use of IGAD as a vehicle for addressing regional problems and concerns such as the Sudan and Somalia Peace Processes, regular participation of all countries in IGAD meetings, financial contributions and setting up political instruments such CEWARN an ICPAC. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IGAD strategy 2011-2015 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ IOC - It is clear from a variety of sources that the member states find regional integration vital to their economies. On the other hand the member states in the islands do appear or feel that they benefit from COMESA and SADC – the reforms are taking far too long (interview IOC) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • http://www.commissionoceanindien.org/accueil/ • Interviews IOC 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There is a strong perception of benefits for certain projects (Metisse, MASE, DRR and SMART fish) - these projects are patient, have exploited a good timing and are sensitive to issues of sovereignty. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMR, Mauritius, 2015 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The benefits of regional integration and cooperation have not been evident apart from a few flagship projects (MASE, MATISSE, SMARTFISH) –(i8.2.3, interviews EUD) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High level Group June 2016 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EPAs- The 3 EPAs (SADC, ESA, and EAC) are having an effect of increasing the perception of regional integration as worthwhile as it strengthens ties with the largest export market for most of the countries. Noted that EPAs will only lead to benefits if they successfully promote reforms; support trade facilitation; lead to economic integration and foster private sector development. The principle of mutual self interest is pursued 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with DMROs, EUDs 	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There are tangible benefits felt by the private sector and civil society such as visa free travel, less custom harassment for cross border informal traders and easier trade and transport conditions. It is not always clear how the public sector in the respective countries gains. However it is reported (EAC score card 2016) by small businesses that the EAC certificate of origin is not recognised at border posts which reduces considerably the benefits to these businesses of a customs union 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAC Common market Score Card 2014, 2016 	
<p><u>Summary:</u> The member states potentially derive benefits from the DMROs as noted by the interest of countries to join but their interests are different and not necessarily compatible with each other e.g. within regional conflict in South Sudan the interests of Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda are quite different. Kenya engages with IGAD to gain benefits on issues related to security but engages with EAC to gain benefits related to economic integration. It appears that DMROs with few members and a more narrow purpose are more likely to deliver tangible benefits that work in the interest of all e.g. IOC and EAC. Externally based incentive such as the EPAs are reported to be having a positive effect on the perception of benefits and the incentive to advance regional integration among member states. However, an overriding effect is that in many cases the trade, transport and other benefits that could arise have not yet taken place because the systems to make them work are not functioning and the members states themselves are not in full compliance with regional agreements. There is a vicious circle where the incentive to comply is not strong enough because the benefits are not arising and the benefits are not arising because of inadequate compliance.</p>		
<p>The survey indicated a mixed response where some countries e.g. Mauritius, Kenya and Egypt had a high appreciation of the benefits but others not.</p>	<p>Survey of EUDs</p>	

<p>Is there a trend of members states increasingly perceiving regional integration as providing tangible benefits?</p>  <table border="1"> <caption>Data for regional integration benefits chart</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Response</th> <th>Count</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>I do not know</td> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>not at all</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>only to a limited extent</td> <td>5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>to some extent</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>to a high extent</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Response	Count	I do not know	4	not at all	3	only to a limited extent	5	to some extent	1	to a high extent	1		
Response	Count													
I do not know	4													
not at all	3													
only to a limited extent	5													
to some extent	1													
to a high extent	1													
<p>JC 8.3 The new implementation modalities are having their intended effects</p>														
<p>Summary response</p>	<p>Sources of information</p>	<p>Quality of evidence</p>												
<p>I-8.3.1 National implementing partners are responding to the direct access implementing modality by identifying and preparing appropriate projects</p>														
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The second EASAI0 status report by the EC (2016) notes “implementation of the programmes committed until February 2017 (see diagram below) is for approximately 40% entrusted to international organisations, while regional organisations implement directly ca. 30% of the funds so far committed. Implementation of the remaining 30% is equally distributed over the EC, EU Member State agency and national authorities in the region”. This implies 10% for the member state level and a direct access (defined as beyond the DMROs) of 70%. 	<p>DEVCO, EASAI0 status report 28 October 2016</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>												

RIP							
envelo							
programme		EC	IO	MS	NAO	RAO	Total
EAC	Elections					€5,000,000	€5,000,000
IGAD	Free movement		€3,000,000			€2,000,000	€10,000,000
IGAD	Resilience	€1,900,000		€2,700,000		€400,000	€5,000,000
IOC	Capacity building					€5,000,000	€5,000,000
SADC	Agri policy		€6,200,000			€2,800,000	€9,000,000
INFRA	Energy market					€7,000,000	€7,000,000
INFRA	TTF					€18,000,000	€18,000,000
X-REG	Migration		€15,000,000				€15,000,000
X-REG	EPA Mauritius				€7,000,000		€7,000,000
X-REG	EPA Zimbabwe	€2,500,000			€4,500,000		€7,000,000
X-REG	Nile basin			€10,000,000			€10,000,000
X-REG	Wildlife	€10,000,000	€20,000,000				€30,000,000
		€14,400,000	€49,200,000	€12,700,000	€11,500,000	€40,200,000	€128,000,000
		11.25%	38.44%	9.92%	8.98%	31.41%	100.00%

- Most of the direct access funding is distributed to international organisations and not member states.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IGAD- The EAMR notes that there is little interaction between national and regional projects - The main activities carried out relate mainly to coordination, workshops and training. To date, there has been little interaction between national and regional projects, which makes it necessary to further involve IGAD member states in order to better coordinate national components in regional projects. 	EAMR, Djibouti 2015 Interviews IGAD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are strong indications that the DMROs were not in agreement with the principle of direct access and there is also a strong nostalgia for the IRCCC 	Interviews DMROs, EUDs

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little direct evidence was found that the benefits of direct access allow the DMROs to focus on their core roles of coordination, guidance and supervision – however as the large project teams are dismantled in SADC and COMESA in particular, it is plausible that there will be greater focus on non-programmatic activities. 			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct access will only deliver the intended benefits if the national incentives to make the project work as intended are in place (for example if implementation of single electronic window is supported by the national customs office) 			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The approach of direct access was tested by moving project management and implementation tasks from DMROs to stronger national bodies more used to project management – (ECDPM p 25) – it is basically still too early to tell how well it is working. 	<p>ECDPM, Discussion paper 192, Prospects for supporting regional integration effectively, June 2016 Interviews with DMROS, EUDs</p>		
I-8.3.2 DMROs are responding to the performance based allocation by early identification and preparation of appropriate projects			
COMESA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The resumption of the dialogue on those issues needs special attention in 2016 though the autocratic management style of the COMESA SG makes progress quite difficult. The more and more the SG is isolated within the Secretariat and his colleagues, even the senior ones, refuse to take initiatives and responsibilities as they feel that whatever they do is never approved by the SG, who is centralizing even minor issues becoming therefore a bottleneck rather than a facilitator within its own organization. • Preparation of regional programmes under EDF 11 is delayed due to internal strife between management in the COMESA Secretariat and lack of strategic positioning. Moreover, COMESA remains too dependent on donors' contributions for its operational functioning and as a consequence is reluctant to focus EDF 11 funds on concrete integration activities. COMESA Member States complained in Ministerial meetings about the ineffectiveness of the Secretariat and for that refused to increase the contributions to the Secretariat, implicitly expecting donors to continue funding at past levels, and pushing COMESA to focus its efforts on maintaining the status quo. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMR, Zambia, 2015 • DMROs, EUDs (Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe) 	Indicative but not conclusive
EAC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the EAC other donors are increasingly moving funding previously channeled through the Secretariat directly to Member States. This goes beyond the 'direct access' approach envisaged in the EDF, but has similar aims, including in addressing compliance issues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DMROs, EUDs (Tanzania) 	

<p>IGAD</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ IGAD is potentially the DMROs most affected by direct access. The support under EDF11 has been completely refocused compared to EDF10, but the support for IDDRSI is an IGAD priority. Support under EDF11 will be provided to the Trust Fund and supporting the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI). The bulk of the funding will not be provided to IGAD itself, but to international partners, such as EU MS agencies (e.g. GIZ, Austria) and UN agencies (e.g. ILO). However, this approach with reduced implementation by IGAD itself will reduce the leverage on IGAD and most likely also IGAD's ownership of EU support. EU has asked IGAD to fast track the Trust Fund development. ▪ The two initially planned NRM programmes with IGAD under EDF11 will not be pursued, instead the entire support will be provided to the trust fund. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DMROs, EUDs (Djibouti,) 	
<p>IOC</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ AFRITAC have used a strategy to build the capacity directly at the national and sub regional level by engaging with specialised regional bodies – the international organisations are responding more than the national ones. ▪ The AFRITAC approach according to budget statements shows 12% of expenditure on TA, capacity and training was regional and 88% national. However, the national efforts have a regional effect in that countries that have similar systems and levels of compliance will find it easier to integrate regionally ▪ Direct access is potentially easier if the country (like Mauritius) has budget support. However it is not always clear if the funds get transferred to the operational department and provide additionality. In the case of the Dept. of Trade the funds were not passed over as such but the achievement of the indicators (compliance with COMESA indicators) allowed the release of funds to the treasury ▪ The ICZM secretariats can work together without a regional projects. They were set up in the 1970s and each have their own strategy for mobilising resources. They are an example of national institutions that can help on complex issues. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dept. Of International Trade, Mauritius • DMROs, EUDs (Mauritius) • AFRITAC South, Independent Mid-Term Evaluation Phase I: June 2011 to April 2014) • AFRITAC interviews, Mauritius 	

<p>SADC</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SADC -The 10th EDF Contribution Agreements are mid-term in implementation (RPC/REIS) and show delays, mainly due to absorption capacities and late recruitment of staff; the later contracted contribution agreements (TRF) are slowly coming up to speed. There is a continued concern in the implementation of ongoing programmes mainly due irregular exchanges with the Secretariat and unclear management arrangements within the organisation. • Lower level regional bodies such as river commissions, trade corridor bodies offer opportunities for practical advancement of regional integration. (GIZ) • The new implementation modalities of direct access are not easy due to the financial rules and regulations. The TRF shows the difficulty of using contribution agreements because it implies that countries have to be familiar with SADC rules. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EAMR, Botswana, 2015 • GIZ (Botswana) • DMROs, EUDs (Botswana, Zambia,) • 	
<p>I-8.3.3 EU support (at national and regional delegation level) combined with the technical assistance facility has led to high quality analysis and actions being prepared (review of individual action documents – complemented by interviews with EUDs and QSG responses)</p>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A significant proportion of the policy dialogue and capacity development provided by the EU is directed towards faster disbursement rather than necessarily better projects • A deeper political economy analysis is needed to ensure that the interventions and projects pursued have the true support of the relevant actors • Not clear if the EU support has tackled the compliance issue • The COMESA secretary general and others have noted that the new arrangements for developing the RIPS were likely to lead to chaos because of too many parties being involved (EUDs and national authorities) and unclear roles (and a practice of the DMROs acting on consensus). • Most donors work with the DMROs not through them and do not channel funds mainly because of the bureaucratic obstacles 	<p>Interviews with DMROs and donors (USAID, GIZ, DfID)</p>	<p>Indicative but not conclusive</p>	

Annex 5: Survey Questionnaire

1. ADE has been contracted by the European Commission to conduct the Regional EA-SA-IO Evaluation.

ADE has been contracted by the European Commission to evaluate the EU's Cooperation with the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region (2008-2015). In this connection, we would appreciate if you would please answer this survey as this will be an important source for our findings and recommendations.

This survey is being sent to:

- 1) Regional EU Delegations;
- 2) EU Delegation of Member country;
- 3) Duly Mandated Regional Organisations (DRMOs);
- 4) DMRO Member country;
- 5) Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).

Your answers should be based on your opinions and perceptions. They will be treated in an aggregate manner. Quotes used, if any, will be anonymous.

PLEASE COMPLETE THE QUESTIONNAIRE BY [DATE TO BE INSERTED – SET AS 2 WEEKS AFTER THE RELEASE DATE]

Practical guidance:

- This questionnaire has a majority of closed questions and should take approximately 20 minutes to complete.
- You can save the questionnaire as a draft by pressing "Resume later" and then continue to work on it at another convenient time.
- When you have completed the questionnaire, please do not forget to press "Submit". You can print a version of your completed questionnaire.

For any question or additional information please contact Victoria De Bauw on victoria.debauw@ade.eu or by phone: +32(0)10454510

On behalf of the evaluation team, we would like to thank you for your support.

2. Identification

* 1. Please specify your category

- Regional EUD
- EUD of a Member Country
- DMRO
- Member Country
- CSO

* 2. Please specify the country in which you are operating.

3. Strategic relevance

Evaluation question: To what extent was the EA-SA-IO regional programme (EDF 10/11) - as a whole - well informed and strategic in its response to partner organisations/countries' needs and priorities and to the EU's own strategic priorities?

* 1.

EU EA-SA-IO policies and strategies reflected a realistic, well-documented analysis of continental, regional and national strategies and priorities.

1. highly accurate/realistic 2. reasonably accurate in the most important areas 3. somewhat accurate 4. not at all

Looking back, how accurate were the EU analyses (eg, of regional and national priorities) underpinning EDF 10 and EDF 11?

* 2. To what extent were DRMOs (RECs) involved in the analysis and design of EDF 10 and EDF 11?

to a high extent to a reasonable extent in key areas only to a limited extent not at all

* 3. To what extent did the resulting programmes address RECs' pressing needs?

to a high extent to a reasonable extent in key areas only to a limited extent not at all

* 4. To what extent were partner country representatives involved in the relevant analysis and design of EDF 10 and EDF 11?

to a high extent to a reasonable extent in key areas only to a limited extent not at all

* 5. To what extent did the resulting programmes address partner countries' pressing needs?

to a high extent to a reasonable extent in key areas only to a limited extent not at all

* 6. How accurate have the risk assessments and risk management strategies proven to be in EDF 10 and in EDF 11 to date?

very accurate	reasonably accurate in the most important areas	somewhat accurate	not accurate at all
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 7. To what extent have the regional strategies and programmes (EDF 10-11) reflected EC policies and EU strategic interests?

to a high extent	to a reasonable extent in key areas	only to a limited extent	not at all
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 8. How effectively have the EU regional support programmes implemented EU guidelines on human rights, good governance, democracy, gender, environment and climate change?

highly effectively	reasonably effectively in priority areas	only to a limited extent	not at all
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 9. How extensively has the EU marshalled specific EU expertise to address problems in priority areas?

it regularly sends the right experts and gives the right advice	sometimes it secures the necessary experts/advice	only to a limited extent	not at all
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 10. To what extent do EU EDF activities complement - not duplicate - other donors' activities?

to a high extent	to a moderate extent	only to a limited extent	not at all
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

11. Please provide examples/comments to illustrate your responses

4. Regional Economic integration

Evaluation question: To what extent has EU regional-level support in Eastern and Southern Africa and IO since 2008 facilitated progress towards regional market development/integration?

* 1.

To what extent has EU regional support led to enhanced capacity in regional organisations to manage regional and multilateral trade negotiations?

to a high extent overall	to a reasonable extent in key areas	only to a limited extent overall	not at all
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 2.

To what extent has EU regional support led to progress in EPA negotiations and their related implementation tasks?

to a high extent overall	to a reasonable extent in key areas	only to a limited extent overall	not at all
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 3.

To what extent has EU regional support led to progress in regional trade negotiations?

to a high extent overall	to a reasonable extent in key areas	only to a limited extent overall	not at all
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 4.

To what extent has EU regional support led to measurable progress in the harmonisation of laws and regulations in compliance with regional trade agreements?

to a high extent overall	to a reasonable extent in key areas	only to a limited extent overall	not at all
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 5.

To what extent has EU regional support focused on reinforcing the capacity, confidence and trust necessary for cohesive, coordinated regional action on trade and economic issues?

to a high extent overall	to a reasonable extent in key areas	only to a limited extent overall	not at all
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 6.

To what extent have DMROs put to good use the EU support for the development of human resources, management and IT systems, and planning, implementing and monitoring processes?

to a high extent overall to a reasonable extent in key areas only to a limited extent overall not at all

* 7.

To what extent has EU regional support contributed to reducing the time and cost of border crossing in this region?

to a high extent to a reasonable extent only to a limited extent not at all

* 8.

To what extent has EU regional support improved conditions for women border traders?

to a high extent to a reasonable extent only to a limited extent not at all

* 9.

To what extent has EU support helped to improve cooperation among the various authorities at the border?

to a high extent overall to a reasonable extent in key areas only to a limited extent overall not at all

* 10.

To what extent has EU support advanced the implementation and enforcement of food and other product safety and quality regulations, good practices and infrastructure?

to a high extent overall to a reasonable extent in key areas only to a limited extent overall not at all

* 11.

To what extent has this improved local companies' ability to meet EU import requirements?

to a high extent overall to a reasonable extent in key areas only to a limited extent overall not at all

* 12.

To what extent has EU regional support contributed to fully operational regional SME frameworks?

to a high extent overall to a reasonable extent in key areas only to a limited extent overall not at all

* 13.

To what extent has EU support contributed to harmonised regional and national SME policies?

to a high extent overall to a reasonable extent in key areas only to a limited extent overall not at all

* 14.

To what extent has EU regional support improved SME export readiness?

to a high extent overall to a reasonable extent in key areas only to a limited extent overall not at all

* 15.

To what extent has EU support enhanced the regional Business Councils' effectiveness?

to a high extent overall to a reasonable extent in key areas only to a limited extent overall not at all

16. Please provide examples/comments to illustrate your responses

5. Regional Infrastructure

Evaluation question: To what extent has regional-level EU support since 2008 contributed to improved regional trade-related infrastructure connectivity in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean states?

* 1.

To what extent has EU regional support led to enhanced capacity in regional organisations for the preparation of regional infrastructure project proposals?

to a high extent

to some extent

only to a limited extent

not at all

* 2.

To what extent has EU regional support led to the design of feasible trade-related regional infrastructure projects aligned with continental and regional (EA-SA-IO) infrastructure development priorities, such as those in PIDA?

to a high extent

to some extent

only to a limited extent

not at all

* 3.

Are there examples of private sector participation in regional infrastructure projects that received EU regional support?

Yes

No

If yes, please illustrate

* 4.

Are there examples of bankable and high quality regional infrastructure projects that have been prepared with EU regional support, and that include provision for the maintenance of the infrastructure?

Yes

No

If yes, please illustrate

* 5.

To what extent has EU regional support led to establishment of institutional homes for the preparation of regional infrastructure project proposals?

to a high extent

to some extent

only to a limited extent

not at all

* 6.

To what extent has EU regional support led to the development of capacity to monitor regional infrastructure projects?

to a high extent

to some extent

only to a limited extent

not at all

* 7.

Are there examples of appropriate financing models recommended for the ongoing maintenance of regional infrastructure with EU regional support?

Yes

No

If yes, please illustrate

8. Please provide examples/comments to illustrate your responses

6. Regional peace, security and stability

Evaluation question: To what extent has regional-level EU support contributed to improved democratic governance, peace and security, and better management of migration – thereby contributing to a stable and peaceful region?

- * 1. To what extent has EU regional support led to policies, strategies and plans being in place (at regional organisation and country level) that are conducive to improved democratic governance?

to a high extent

to some extent

only to a limited extent

not at all

- * 2. To what extent has EU regional support led to enhanced capacity and engagement of regional organisations, government institutions, civil society and communities in matters of democratic governance?

to a high extent

to some extent

only to a limited extent

not at all

- * 3. Are there examples/qualitative evidence that EU regional support has contributed to improved democratic governance, where it has improved?

Yes

No

If yes, please illustrate

- * 4. To what extent has EU regional support led to policies, strategies and plans being in place (at regional organisation and country level) that are conducive to improved peace and security (including maritime security)?

to a high extent

to some extent

only to a limited extent

not at all

- * 5. To what extent has EU regional support led to enhanced capacity and engagement of regional organisations, government institutions, civil society and communities in matters of peace and security (including maritime security)?

to a high extent

to some extent

only to a limited extent

not at all

* 6. Are there examples/qualitative evidence that EU regional support has contributed to improved peace and security (including maritime security), where they have improved?

Yes

No

If yes, please illustrate

7. Please provide examples/comments to illustrate your responses

7. Regional natural resources management

Evaluation question: Environmental governance – has regional-level EU support contributed to improved regional cooperation and harmonisation among Indian Ocean island states, and thereby led to more sustainable management of the region’s biodiversity and fisheries?

- * 1. How has IOC and IGAD performance developed in terms of promoting regional cooperation and coordination vis-à-vis NRM, incl. biodiversity, and fisheries?

Highly Satisfactory (performance has improved significantly)	Moderately Satisfactory (performance has improved to some degree)	Moderately Unsatisfactory (performance is unchanged)	Unsatisfactory (performance has declined)
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

- * 2. Have the EU funded regional NRM programmes with IOC and IGAD contributed to improved regional and national policies, strategies and plans vis-à-vis NRM, incl. biodiversity and fisheries?

Highly Satisfactory (significant contribution to improvement)	Moderately Satisfactory (moderate contribution or only moderate improvements)	Moderately Unsatisfactory (limited contribution to improvements)	Unsatisfactory (no contribution to improvements noted)
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

- * 3. Have the EU funded regional NRM programmes contributed to improved regional and national NRM monitoring, incl. biodiversity and fisheries?

Highly Satisfactory (significant contribution to improvement)	Moderately Satisfactory (moderate contribution or only moderate improvements)	Moderately Unsatisfactory (limited contribution to improvements)	Unsatisfactory (no contribution to improvements noted)
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

- * 4. Has SmartFish contributed to improved regional and national enforcement (control, surveillance, patrolling) at the regional and national levels vis-à-vis fisheries?

Highly Satisfactory (significant contribution to improvement)	Moderately Satisfactory (moderate contribution or only moderate improvements)	Moderately Unsatisfactory (limited contribution to improvements)	Unsatisfactory (no contribution to improvements noted)
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

- * 5. Have the EU funded regional NRM programmes with IOC and IGAD contributed to enhanced participation of the private sector and civil society vis-à-vis biodiversity and fisheries?

Highly Satisfactory (significant contribution to improvement)	Moderately Satisfactory (moderate contribution or only moderate improvements)	Moderately Unsatisfactory (limited contribution to improvements)	Unsatisfactory (no contribution to improvements noted)
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 6. Have the EU funded regional NRM programmes with IOC and IGAD lead to tangible improvements in the management and protection of biodiversity and fisheries (at both country-specific and transboundary levels)?

Highly Satisfactory (significant contribution to improvement)	Moderately Satisfactory (moderate contribution or only moderate improvements)	Moderately Unsatisfactory (limited contribution to improvements)	Unsatisfactory (no contribution to improvements noted)
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

7. Please provide examples/comments to illustrate your responses

8. Coordination, complementary and coherence.

Evaluation question: To what extent have EU interventions been complementary with those of Member States, coordinated with those of the other development partners, and coherent both with other EU actions in the region and with EU policies beyond development cooperation?

- * 1. Were there mechanisms in place, formal or informal, to ensure the EU regional support's complementarity with Member States and coordination with other development partners, over 2008-2015, and were they effective?

to a high extent	to some extent	only to a limited extent	not at all
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

- * 2. To what extent is there coherence between the EU regional cooperation and regional cooperation of other development partners (e.g. EU member states, development banks, UN, non-traditional donors)?

to a high extent	to some extent	only to a limited extent	not at all
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

- * 3. To what extent is there coherence between the EU regional cooperation and regional cooperation of other development partners (e.g. EU member states, development banks, UN, non-traditional donors)?

	to a high extent	to some extent	only to a limited extent	not at all
At the country level (coherence with EU policies on development, trade, agriculture, fisheries, migration, maritime security, and with the Horn and Central Africa strategies...)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
At the continental level (coherence with EU continent-wide cooperation, including the Africa-EU Strategic partnership, support to the AU, the intra-ACP and PanAf programmes...)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
At the global level (coherence with global EU policies on development, trade, agriculture, fisheries, migration, maritime security...)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 4. Where is there scope for improved coherence?

5. Please provide examples/comments to illustrate your responses

9. Efficiency

Evaluation question: To what extent has the EU support been efficient in supporting the DMROs and the achievement of regional policy objectives?

- * 1. Are the high level group and the technical meetings of inter-DMRO forum operating as intended and adding value to the DMRO and the EU support programme?

to a high extent

to some extent

only to a limited extent

not at all

- * 2. Has the DMRO has introduced improved financial management and procurements systems that are operational and improving performance?

Highly Satisfactory (systems introduced where justified, operational and already showing benefits)

Moderately Satisfactory (systems introduced where justified, likely work but not yet fully operation)

Moderately Unsatisfactory (systems only partially introduced where justified)

Unsatisfactory (no action has taken place, fin. management & procurement not functioning well)

- * 3. In your opinion has there been improvement in the value for money obtained by the new programme (i.e. since EDF 11, starting from 2014)?

Highly Satisfactory (strong evidence of improved value for money)

Moderately Satisf. (evidence of improved value for money but still scope for greater cost control)

Moderately Unsatisf. (some action taken but improvements not evidence and not yet institutionalised)

Unsatisfactory (no improvements noted)

4. Please provide examples/comments to illustrate your responses

10. Regional integration prospects

Evaluation question: To what extent has the EU support enabled the DMROs and their partners at national level to better realise regional policy objectives?

- * 1. Has policy dialogue between the EU and the REC/DMRO initiated a debate and analysis on the purpose, level of ambition and prioritisation of roles and functions for the DMROs?

Highly Satisfactory (regular, constructive, influential, with strong participation)	Moderately Satis.(some influence on roles and functions of the DMRO,but more needed to gain clarity)	Moderately Unsatis.(policy dial. had little or only minor effect on roles and functions of the DMRO)	Unsatisfactory (policy dial. has not taken place or has not been effective in initiating a debate)
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- * 2. Are studies and analytical work available on the options for regional integration, the implications of the subsidiarity principle and achievable levels of ambition?

Highly Satisfactory (high quality studies have been carried out and are influencing practice)	Moderately Satis.(Studies have been carried out which identify options that are being considered)	Moderately Unsatis.(some work or considerations have been undertaken but not yet internalised)	Unsatisfactory (no studies or relevant analytical work has been taken)
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- * 3. Has the EU support led to changes in the prioritisation and regional strategies of the DMROs leading to the setting of realistic ambitions?

to a high extent	to some extent	only to a limited extent	not at all
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- * 4. Are member states, since 2013, are more actively involved in and cooperating in domesticating regional agreements and implementing agreed national actions?

to a high extent	to some extent	only to a limited extent	not at all
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- * 5. Is there a trend of member states increasingly holding DMROs accountable?

to a high extent	to some extent	only to a limited extent	not at all
------------------	----------------	--------------------------	------------

- * 6. Is there a trend of members states increasingly perceiving regional integration as providing tangible benefits?

to a high extent	to some extent	only to a limited extent	not at all
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* 7. Are national implementing partners responding to the direct access implementing modality by identifying and preparing appropriate projects?

to a high extent

to some extent

only to a limited extent

not at all

* 8. Are DMROs responding to the performance based allocation by early identification and preparation of appropriate projects?

to a high extent

to some extent

only to a limited extent

not at all

* 9. Has EU support and the technical support facility led to high quality analysis and actions being prepared?

to a high extent

to some extent

only to a limited extent

not at all

10. Please provide examples/comments to illustrate your responses

11. Conclusion

This survey is now finalised.

We would like to thank you for your time and participation to this survey.

Best regards.

Annex 6: Survey Results

The survey aimed at quantifying perceptions from different constituencies. The target participant groups were:

- The EU Delegations and DMROs – survey #1
- The partners (private sector, implementing partner, organisations) – survey #2, #3 and #4.

Survey#1 to EU Delegations and DMROs

The survey #1 to EU Delegations and DMROs has been launched during the Desk phase, with the support of the Evaluation Unit.

The questionnaire was closely linked to the evaluation questions.

The team has designed the questionnaire so that it did not require more than 20 minutes of respondents' time. It included mostly closed questions, although also leaving space for open responses for respondents willing to clarify their response. The questionnaire has been distributed by e-mail, through the on-line survey tool SurveyMonkey.

The survey has been sent to 32 persons: 5 Regional EU Delegations, 5 DMROs and 22 EU Delegations. The reply rate to the survey was 44% (14 complete responses over 32). The analysis of the results is provided below.

Survey #2, #3 and #4 to partners

The surveys #2, #3 and #4 to partners have been launched during the field phase.

The questionnaire to partners was separated in three thematic pillars: economic integration/infrastructure, natural resources management and peace & security.

The questionnaire has been distributed by e-mail, through the on-line survey tool SurveyMonkey.


The survey#1 has been sent to 27 relevant partners in economic integration and infrastructure. The reply rate to the survey has been limited, 15% (4 over 27). The analysis of the results is provided below.

The survey#2 has been sent to 19 relevant partners in natural resources management. The reply rate to this survey was of 21% (4 complete responses over 19). The analysis of the results is provided below.

The survey#3 has been sent to 2 relevant partners in peace and security. No partner replied to the survey.

Survey#1 to EU Delegations and DMROs – Final results

Question 1: Please specify your category




Question 2: Please specify the country in which you are operating

Madagascar
Burundi
Namibia
Tanzania
Zambia (& COMESA Member States)
Zambia
DR CONGO
Lesotho
Botswana
Zimbabwe
Eritrea
Uganda
Ethiopia
Swaziland

Strategic relevance


Question 3: Looking back, how pertinent were the EU analyses (e.g. of regional and national priorities) underpinning EDF 10 and EDF 11?



Open answers:

Often driven by regional organisations, who wish to cover all sector without prioritising
EU analyses based on context and strategic plans of beneficiaries
To understand my position I was previously based in the regional Delegation in Botswana so I have the view of both sides. There was no linkage at all between the national and regional programming in particular since the instructions of the regional programming were send much later. We had proposed to attend all the validation workshops on the national programme to at least ensure a regional dimension to the national programmes but the mission budget was refused.
Programming is disconnected from national reality


Question4: To what extent were DRMOs (RECs) involved in the analysis and design of EDF 10 and EDF 11?



Open answers:

it was very much driven by the EAC in our case
DMROs defined their priorities in response to EU orientation guidelines. RIP jointly developed by EU and DMROs.
The question is not clear. Do you refer to the national level (not at all) or their own programme, which I cannot judge since the regional programming started after I had left the regional Delegation. I am not aware that Lesotho has been involved in the regional programming exercise.
The IRCC did work extensively with RECs on design of both EDFs. This is one of the reasons why IRCC was established after the EDF 9 fragmented design and implementation.
They are mostly concerned with the managing of financial resources


Question5: To what extent did the resulting programmes (EDF10/11) address RECs' critical needs?



Open answers:

The 11th EDF clearly respond to the EAC Secretariat needs. Not only the critical ones
In the case of RECs in Eastern Africa-Southern Africa-Indian Ocean, support in terms of institutional capacity of the RECs secretariat and implementation of regional integration programme
I have only limited anecdotal evidence from previous contacts in SADC that they are very unsatisfied, but have no real evidence to judge if they are correct.
The end result is a compromise. The RECs involved are very different, in terms of mandate, capacity, etc. For example the EDFs focussed on economic integration, whereas for example the needs of IGAD would also be in the area of crisis, disaster areas.
They are mostly concerned with the managing of financial resources


Answer 6: To what extent were partner country representatives involved in the relevant analysis and design of EDF 10 and EDF 11?



Open answers:

my impression is that the involvment of the Partners States remained "formal"
no sufficient consultations with stakeholders in Member States in the design of programmes
COMESA was not proactive in consulting/involving its MS and other stakeholders in the 11th EDF programming process
We do not recall that they were contacted in DR Congo
See above. I am not aware of any Lesotho participation.
The Gov of Eritrea was always informed about the facilities, due to their lack of capacity their involvement is limited.
Mainly the REC secretariats were involved.
Marginal to their real national strategies


Question 7: To what extent did the resulting programmes (EDF 10/11) address partner countries' critical needs?



Open answers:

Weak capacity of the Secretariat to represent the PS
In the case of COMESA with 19 Member States, focus is at regional level.
Lesotho has the problem that it is an 'island' within South Africa. Since South Africa cannot access EDF money the potential of regional cooperation is greatly diminished. This is relevant in particular since two of the focal sectors are water and energy where cooperation with SA would be natural.
Countries in the EA-IO-SA are very different from each other, so it is not possible to address for example the needs of a country like Eritrea alongside the needs of for example Kenya.
Delegations and HQs do a good identification job


Question 8: How pertinent have the risk assessments and risk management strategies proven to be in EDF 10 and in EDF 11 to date?



Open answers:

We have no information on this subject
Risk management strategies were not very prominent.
No information on them


Question 9: To what extent have the regional strategies and programmes (EDF 10/11) reflected EC policies and EU strategic interests?



Open answers:

Namibia is not a regional Delegation and resources allocated to it are hardly sufficient to deal with national/bilateral issues, let alone dealing with regional/multilateral issues
As a regional institution, EU should have regional integration as focal sector in all national programs. not sure we have been able to have an EU strategic interest in the EAC region
Regional strategies and programmes make reference to EC policies and EU strategies. They are also prepared on the basis of EDF orientations guidelines
Focus mostly on trade/economic integration
It goes without saying that the policies of the European Union must be fully integrated into these regional projects. We look after it when we are involved.
The programme followed the European integration model (FTA-CU-Internal Market)
Delegations and HQs do a good identification job


Question 10: How effectively have the EU regional support programmes (EDF10/11) implemented EU guidelines on human rights, good governance, democracy, gender, environment and climate change?



Open answers:

EU has supported programmes related to gender mainstreaming, climate change and democracy (Monitoring of elections, etc)
We have no information on this subject
I had put a lot of effort to get a political cooperation programme with SADC off the ground. This required a lot of 'personal contact and efforts. Unfortunately this was not maintained by the Delegation and we have lost great opportunities for close cooperation on sensitive fields.
Only environmental programmes were part of the EDFs.
Delegations and HQs do a good identification job


Question 11: How extensively has the EU marshalled specific EU expertise to address problems in priority areas?



Open answers:

Expertise provided in Namibia is usually highly appreciated by the Government
Development and EU internal policies are still delinked and we are not able to sell the EU integration experience. we normally sell our expertise through framework contractors and experts who have not this knowledge
For the Eastern African - Southern Africa, EU support the establishment of an Inter-Regional Coordination Committee whose one of the tasks was to provide specific EU expertise.
We could and should do more, working with other DGs beyond DEVCO (SANCO, TAXUD, ENTRE...)
We have no information on this subject
Under the relatively capable technical leadership from COMESA not so much outside expertise was required.
Delegations and HQs do a good identification job

Question 12: To what extent do EU EDF activities complement - not duplicate - other donors' activities?




Open answers:

EU and MS engaged in a joint programming of assistance to Namibia and also coordinate with non-EU development partners
Coordination is very complicated. difficult to take into account the numerous national activities (from different donors) which have a direct regional impact
Instead of complementarity, there is duplication due to the fact that there is no appropriate donor coordination at RECs level. RECs tend to propose the same activities to more than one donor.
Not many donors supporting COMESA as such, but trade facilitation is a very "crowded market" for donors in the region
We have no information on this subject
There were not so many other donor programmes, especially in the beginning under EDF 10. Later that increased (TradeMark, etc)
We all dwell on the same priorities

Regional Economic Integration


Question 13: To what extent has EU regional support led to enhanced capacity in regional organisations to manage regional and multilateral trade negotiations?



Open answers:

despite the fact that this was the major objective of EU cooperation in the past, the EAC Secretariat still is very weak
EU financed additional staff as Chief Technical Advisor for EPA negotiations, experts for the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area and for the trade in Services
IRCC; RISP
There is a particular involvement of the EU on the economic integration components of the regional programs which support the guidance of international bodies dealing with multilateral trade
The problem is that there is a belief in the region (even once stated publically by the previous ES of SADC) that one can be member of multiple free trade areas and customs union. This is of course not possible but because none of them are really one or the other it works for them on paper at least. We have never called their bluff. Proposals from the Botswana Delegation to actually make this more visible were not entertained by HQ.
In the Eritrean context the actions of the government in many cases are secretive such as the activities on trade related negotiations.
A lot of technical support was provided to the EPA negotiations, which benefitted the overall capacity of mainly COMESA in trade negotiation. Not so much for the other RECs.
RISM


Question 14: To what extent has EU regional support led to progress in EPA negotiations and their related implementation tasks?



Open answers:

The regional support has not per se helped EPA negotiations - But funds are available under the regional envelope to support EPA implementation - there is no added value in putting these funds under the regional envelope
good negotiations with EAC Secretariat, but now TZ is refusing to sign and the Secretariat has little to say
EPA negotiation process was mainly funded by the EU
very few progress as regards the regional ESA EPA negotiations process; regional negotiations are now stalled
The European Union accompanies the negotiations through these regional or even national programs
It is difficult to predict what would have happened without the considerable support that was provided, but most likely progress would have even been less.
EBA status kills EPA in Ethiopia and other LDC countries


Question 15: To what extent has EU regional support led to progress in regional trade negotiations?



Open answers:

Example include the consolidation of the COMESA Free Trade Area, the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area
The European Union directly or indirectly supports the actions of African sub-regional bodies through regional programs
Completing the FTA and moving from FTA to Customs Union was the main subject of support.
RISM


Question 16: To what extent has EU regional support led to measurable progress in the harmonisation of laws and regulations in compliance with regional trade agreements?



Open answers:

Are these then applied?
Through the Regional Integration Support Mechanism Programme (9th and 10th EDFs)
RISP
The European Union directly or indirectly supports about subjects like OHADA implementation by regional programs
This was a main component of the programme, and was partly achieved.
RISM


Question 17: To what extent has EU regional support focused on reinforcing the capacity, confidence and trust necessary for cohesive, coordinated regional action on trade and economic issues?



Open answers:

Capacity of the secretariat more than capacity of PS, the ones supposed to integrate
The IRCC project which was intended to ensure regional coordinated action among the 4 RECs in the ESA-IO region has come to an end without a successor mechanism in place.
RISP; RISM
The way we have split the region in different EPA configurations has certainly made regional integration more problematic
IRCC was created to stimulate coordination between RECs. Although effective coordination proved cumbersome, the fact that they sat together and worked together within IRCC/EDF has been at the origin of the establishing the Tripartite SADC/COMES/EAS FTA.


Question 18: To what extent have DMROs put to good use the EU support for the development of human resources, management and IT systems, and planning, implementing and monitoring processes?



Open answers:

Efforts to reach Contribution Agreement eligibility were supported by the EU: COMESA has now systems, processes and procedures that are of international standards
RISP
There are no IGAD or COMESA activities in the country.
EU support is mostly used by DMROs for empire building

Question 19: To what extent has EU regional support contributed to reducing the time and cost of border crossing in this region?




Open answers:

A lot remains to be done and work is envisaged under the 11th EDF through a regional Trade Facilitation programme)
Difficult to attribute any related progress directly to EU cooperation with COMESA
This often depends on the involvement of the Member States themselves

Tariffs were reduced in the FTA but NTBs increased. Also one-stop-border-post were not that effective. But without support provided to ASYCUDA+++ perhaps crossing time would have increased.

Corridors

Question 20: To what extent has EU regional support improved conditions for women border traders?



Open answers:


Through the support to the Simplified Trade Regime for Small Scale Cross-border Traders who are in majority women

RISP; RISM

The gender dimension is often taken into account in regional and national programs

Programmes to facilitate cross-border exchanges for small traders, including women, were not very effective.


Question 21: To what extent has EU support helped to improve cooperation among the various authorities at the border?



Open answers:

Work envisages under the 11th EDF (Regional Trade Facilitation programme being formulated)
RISM; RISP
Corridors


Question 22: To what extent has EU support advanced the implementation and enforcement of food and other product safety and quality regulations, good practices and infrastructure?



Open answers:

EU national programmes have/are being useful, but not because it was coming from a regional envelope
No support in Namibia for this
Effective support to the SPS and SQA programmes (development of standards, establishment of laboratories, etc)
RISP; RISM


Question 23: To what extent has this improved local companies' ability to meet EU import requirements?



Open answers:

EU national programmes have/are being useful, but not because it was coming from a regional envelope
Whenever specific programmes addressed these issues


Question 24: To what extent has EU regional support contributed to fully operational regional SME frameworks?



Open answers:

Development of SME strategy both at regional and national levels
RISP; RISM
We have no information on this subject
Do they exist?


Question 25: To what extent has EU support contributed to harmonised regional and national SME policies?



Open answers:

No support in Namibia to harmonise SME policies
EU supported alignment of national SME policies to regional policy
RISP/TCF; RISM
We have no information on this subject


Question 26: To what extent has EU regional support improved SME export readiness?



Open answers:

RISM; RISP
We have no information on this subject
Whenever specific programmes addressed these issues

Question 27: To what extent has EU support enhanced the regional Business Councils' effectiveness?




Open answers:

We have no information on this subject
EDF support was not targeted towards Business Councils

Regional infrastructure


Question 28: To what extent has EU regional support led to enhanced capacity in regional organisations for the preparation of regional infrastructure project proposals?



Open answers:

EU support an Projects preparation and Implementation Unit for the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite. Similar support is being planned under 11th EDF
We have no information on this subject
PIDA


Question 29: To what extent has EU regional support led to the design of feasible trade-related regional infrastructure projects aligned with continental and regional (EA-SA-IO) infrastructure development priorities, such as those in the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)?




Open answers:

One such example is the Zambia-Tanzania-Kenya Power Interconnector Project
We have no information on this subject
PIDA

Question 30: Are there examples of private sector participation in regional infrastructure projects that received EU regional support?




Question 31: Are there examples of bankable and high quality regional infrastructure projects that have been prepared with EU regional support, and that include provision for the maintenance of the infrastructure?




Open answers:

Prepared but not with regional support
No regional infrastructure projects with maintenance components in Namibia during the last 5 years
No for Zimbabwe
The pre-feasibility study on railway re- construction, which study was financed from EDF 10 TCF, finally ended up in a non-bankable option selected by the Government of Eritrea.
Several roads projects (e.g. Kampala Bypass)

Question 32: To what extent has EU regional support led to establishment of institutional homes for the preparation of regional infrastructure project proposals?




Question 33: To what extent has EU regional support led to the development of capacity to monitor regional infrastructure projects?



Open answers:

Not in Eritrea.
Learning by doing...

Question 34: Are there examples of appropriate financing models recommended for the ongoing maintenance of regional infrastructure with EU regional support?




Open answer:

Toll fee, levy on fuel

Regional peace, security and stability


Question 35: To what extent has EU regional support led to policies, strategies and plans being in place (at regional organisation and country level) that are conducive to improved democratic governance?




Open answers:

RPIHSSP programme?
Not really focus of attention. Rather a national issue

Question 36: To what extent has EU regional support led to enhanced capacity and engagement of regional organisations, government institutions, civil society and communities in matters of democratic governance?




Question 37: Are there examples/qualitative evidence that EU regional support has contributed to improved democratic governance, where it has improved?



Open answers:

Support to the elections process through monitoring missions
For instance election monitoring by SADC
observation missions, mediations


Question 38: To what extent has EU regional support led to policies, strategies and plans being in place (at regional organisation and country level) that are conducive to improved peace and security (including maritime security)?



Open answers:

Maritime security
APSA support programme; MASE programme; CPMR (9th EDF)
No for Zimbabwe
Cross border actions


Question 39: To what extent has EU regional support led to enhanced capacity and engagement of regional organisations, government institutions, civil society and communities in matters of peace and security (including maritime security)?



Open answers:

Martime security
CPMR, APSA support programme, MASE

Question 40: Are there examples/qualitative evidence that EU regional support has contributed to improved peace and security (including maritime security), where they have improved?



Open answers:

SADC support to Lesotho intervention in 2014.
MASE

Regional natural resources management


Question 41: How has IOC and IGAD performance developed in terms of promoting regional cooperation and coordination vis-à-vis NRM, incl. biodiversity, and fisheries?



Open answers:

What is NRM?
Not relevant for Zimbabwe
They become large inefficient cummulation of vested interest


Question 42: Have the EU funded regional NRM programmes with IOC and IGAD contributed to improved regional and national policies, strategies and plans vis-à-vis NRM, incl. biodiversity and fisheries?



Open answers:

Not relevant for Zimbabwe
No NRM projects in Eritrea.
I suppose you mean 'natural resources management'?


Question 43: Have the EU funded regional NRM programmes contributed to improved regional and national NRM monitoring, incl. biodiversity and fisheries?



Open answers:

Not relevant for Zimbabwe
Programmes are not sustainable unless taken over by national authorities/programmes


Question 44: Has SmartFish contributed to improved regional and national enforcement (control, surveillance, patrolling) at the regional and national levels vis-à-vis fisheries?



Open answers:

Not relevant for Zimbabwe


Question 45: Have the EU funded regional NRM programmes with IOC and IGAD contributed to enhanced participation of the private sector and civil society vis-à-vis biodiversity and fisheries?



Open answers:

Not relevant for Zimbabwe
Not in Eritrea.

Question 46: Have the EU funded regional NRM programmes with IOC and IGAD lead to tangible improvements in the management and protection of biodiversity and fisheries (at both country-specific and transboundary levels)?




Open answers:

Not relevant for Zimbabwe
Programmes are not sustainable unless taken over by national authorities/programmes

Coordination, complementarity and coherence


Question 47: Were there mechanisms in place, formal or informal, to ensure the EU regional support's complementarity with Member States and coordination with other development partners, over 2008-2015, and were they effective?



Open answers:

Consultative fora were organised between the RECs and Member States by the Interregional Coordinating Committee
Mostly informal and donors-led (COMESA not proactive); not many donors supporting COMESA (EU by far the largest)
Yes, this was most often done through intra-donor groups
There was a development partners forum with SADC and various subgroups which functioned to a various level of satisfaction.
Different decision making processes... programmes respond to different incentives


Question 48: To what extent is there coherence between the EU regional cooperation and regional cooperation of other development partners (e.g. EU member states, development banks, UN, non-traditional donors)?



Open answers:

Difficulty to get the information
Donor consultations are recommended to avoid duplication and inconsistency between donors
Unless done at HQs level?

Question 49: In the country where you are, was the EU's regional co-operation 2008-2015 coherent (in objectives, approaches and implementation) with other EU policies and actions?



Open answers:

There are very few regional programmes implemented in Namibia and the Delegation is not involved in their day to day management
Many EU-funded programmes/instruments at different level increasing the risk for overlaps and the need therefore for strong coordination; regional cooperation with COMESA globally in line with EU strategic policy priorities at continental/ACP level (migration, peace & security, EPA...)
Coherence efforts are made at these various levels
Many initiatives are launched outside of national programme priority areas without consultation with the delegation. This create confusion and the impression that the EU could finance everything even if we have focal sectors. Even more so in a small country with no MS and limited other donors were the pressure on the EU Delegation for funding is enormous.
Regional cooperation activities in Eritrea are very limited that is why the coherence is also limited.
Thanks to the identification work done by Delegations and HQs


Question 50: Where is there scope for improved coherence?

Open answers:

Of course, coherence will improve once coordination/communication will be in place between all these different instruments and processes
/
They should be aligned with priority sectors of the NIP rather than contributing to the proliferation in the number of individual non-aligned projects
RIP programmed before NIPs
Further exchange of experiences across delegations in the regions to replicate best practices
Regional integration not reflected in the National Indicative programmes
Rationalize/reduce the number of EU instruments/envelopes/programmes at regional/continental/global level
Regular donor dialogue at the regional and national levels should be maintained
Yes, more controls at central EU level on what the Delegation is requested and what support is given to the country. Now every unit is its own kingdom and the Delegations just have to comply. The old fashioned DG VIII desk as a filter for everything could prevent many problems and embarrassments.
better coordination between financial instruments
timing and coordination
Regional Cooperation activities should be in place first.
yes
No with existing organisation and interests to keep separate boxes

Efficiency


Question 51: Are the high level group and the technical meetings of inter-DMRO forum operating as intended and adding value to the DMRO and the EU support programme?



Open answers:

We are not directly involved - we just started receiving the minutes of the decisions taken merely process oriented meetings
In the EA-SA-IO region, the meetings have facilitated the programming, implementation and monitoring of a joint RIP
it is a lighter version of the old IRCC; however, there is a lot of competition/lack of proper coordination among the ROs in the ESA-IO region
Too much diplomacy and not enough truth.


Question 52: Has the DMRO has introduced improved financial management and procurements systems that are operational and improving performance?



Open answers:

This is evidenced by the eligibility to Contribution Agreement and successful assessment for the 6-Pillar. However enforcement and adherence to rules has to be improved.
COMESA successfully passed the 6 pillars assessment (first RO in the region to do so), but there are recommendations to be followed up
It used to but I hear SADC has slipped back.
Still incredibly inefficient...

Question 53: In your opinion has there been improvement in the value for money obtained by the new programme (i.e. since EDF 11, starting from 2014)?




Open answers:

How can you tell since programme are starting being presented to AAP
EDF 11 programmes still under identification and formulation process
too early to say; implementation has not started yet
The way we do our programming makes it impossible to integrate the national and regional (and for that matter continental) programmes. We should accept that this is not possible if we do not want to change the sequencing (national is the most important since most of the money is there but ideally it would be the other way around.) If we don't want to change we better stop pretending.
No programmes implemented yet in Zimbabwe
Not noticeable, as far as I know

Regional integration prospects


Question 54: Has policy dialogue between the EU and the REC/DMRO initiated a debate and analysis on the purpose, level of ambition and prioritisation of roles and functions for the DMROs?



Open answers:

EAC Secretariat is a secretariat; vision is very limited as well as their legitimacy to undertake policy dialogues
COMESA not very keen to raise the dialogue beyond programme/operational issues; overdependence of COMESA on EU funding creates a relatively "unhealthy" partnership
Eritrea is suspended from IGAD and its membership in COMESA is not active either.
In my humble experience


Question 55: Are studies and analytical work available on the options for regional integration, the implications of the subsidiarity principle and achievable levels of ambition?



Open answers

There are plenty of studies: they are not implemented, though


Question 56: Has the EU support led to changes in the prioritisation and regional strategies of the DMROs leading to the setting of realistic ambitions?



Open answers:

We like them because they use the same language as ours. However they are not intending to transfer any power to the regional body and as such we support them as equal while their actual agendas are not. This leads to a lot of misunderstanding and disappointment on both sides.
They have been call to attention with the reduction of their control over the financial envelopes


Question 57: Are member states, since 2013, are more actively involved in and cooperating in domesticating regional agreements and implementing agreed national actions?



Open answers:

I suppose t[his] question refers to the partner country
Some member states are domesticating regional commitments and implementing agreed national actions (examples Mauritius, Kenya,) and some not (examples DR Congo, Eritrea
RISM and RISP3 TCF programmes
No MS present in Lesotho.
Not noticeable


Question 58: Is there a trend of member states increasingly holding DMROs accountable?



Open answers:

review of audit reports (examples of leading countries Uganda, Kenya, Egypt)
COMESA MS not very happy with the way the Secretariat is managed
They have been call to attention with the reduction of their control over the financial envelopes


Question 59: Is there a trend of members states increasingly perceiving regional integration as providing tangible benefits?



Open answers:

in some sectors
Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius
Not in Eritrea.
All joke about it


Question 60: Are national implementing partners responding to the direct access implementing modality by identifying and preparing appropriate projects?



Open answers:

This is illustrated by the participation to call for proposals under the Regional Integration Support Mechanism
Yes, under RISM and RISP3/TCF programmes
They should be informed of ongoing consultations
Not in Ethiopia, in any case


Question 61: Are DMROs responding to the performance based allocation by early identification and preparation of appropriate projects?



Open answers:

Delayed in projects preparation
There is no project with the DMROs in Eritrea.
But i doubt it


Question 62: Has EU support and the technical support facility led to high quality analysis and actions being prepared?



Open answers:

We are not aware/copied of what is being done
Ongoing design studies (funded by IRCC and the reigonal TCF) in support of the new 11th EDF regional COMESA programmes
At least not visibly on the ground.
Only while Consultants are there doing the work

Question 63: Is there evidence that the new approach of the EDF 11 has led to greater efficiency?



Open answers:


Too early to say. as it was programmed, i cannot see this new approach
too early to say (implementation has not started yet)
Too soon to say
Too confusing, too many envelopes, too many priorities

Survey#2 to partners in Economic Integration and Infrastructure – Final results


Question 1: Please specify the country in which you are operating

South Africa
Botswana - SADC region
Madagascar
Tanzania


Question 2: How effectively have the EU regional support programmes (EDF10/11) implemented EU guidelines on human rights, good governance, democracy, gender, environment and climate change?



Question 3: How extensively has the EU marshalled specific EU expertise to address problems in priority areas?




Question 4: To what extent do EU EDF activities complement - not duplicate - other donors' activities?




Open answer:

EU encourages discussions of EDF activities in open fora


Question 5: To what extent has EU regional support led to progress in EPA negotiations and their related implementation tasks?



Question 6: To what extent has EU regional support led to progress in regional trade negotiations?




Question 7: To what extent has EU regional support led to measurable progress in the harmonisation of laws and regulations in compliance with regional trade agreements?




Open answer:

Close work with regional economic communities in this are


Question 8: To what extent has EU regional support focused on reinforcing the capacity, confidence and trust necessary for cohesive, coordinated regional action on trade and economic issues?



Question 9: To what extent have DMROs put to good use the EU support for the development of human resources, management and IT systems, and planning, implementing and monitoring processes?




Question 10: To what extent has EU regional support contributed to reducing the time and cost of border crossing in this region?




Open answer:

Despite best efforts, this is a very challenging area and better coordination of various activities is required overall

Question 11: To what extent has EU regional support improved conditions for women border traders?




Question 12: To what extent has EU support helped to improve cooperation among the various authorities at the border?




Open answer:

I have a sense that these areas are supported by EU, but better communication is required if this is the case.

Question 13: To what extent has EU support advanced the implementation and enforcement of food and other product safety and quality regulations, good practices and infrastructure?




Question 14: To what extent has this improved local companies' ability to meet EU import requirements?




Open answer:

Better interaction with private sector companies is required


Question 15: To what extent has EU regional support contributed to fully operational regional SME frameworks?




Question 16: To what extent has EU support contributed to harmonised regional and national SME policies?



Question 17: To what extent has EU regional support improved SME export readiness?




Question 18: To what extent has EU support enhanced the regional Business Councils' effectiveness?



Open answer:

There has been limited direct support, however, indirect support through RECs is sometimes very cumbersome


Question 19: Are there examples of private sector participation in regional infrastructure projects that received EU regional support?



Open answers:

The EIB has been active in this area
METISS project


Question 20: Are there examples of appropriate financing models recommended for the ongoing maintenance of regional infrastructure with EU regional support?




Open answer:

Chile may be an interesting model to look at more closely


Question 21: Were there mechanisms in place, formal or informal, to ensure the EU regional support's complementarity with Member States and coordination with other development partners, over 2008-2015, and were they effective?



Question 22: To what extent is there coherence between the EU regional cooperation and regional cooperation of other development partners (e.g. EU member states, development banks, UN, non-traditional donors)?



Question 23: In the country where you are, was the EU's regional co-operation 2008-2015 coherent (in objectives, approaches and implementation) with other EU policies and actions?



Question 24: Where is there scope for improved coherence?


With greater consultation, dialogue and information sharing, there should be better coordination
There is always scope for improvement
At all levels and to start with national level
Better and closer coordination with other development partners and the regional institutions

Survey#3 to partners in Natural Resources Management- Final results

Question 1: Please specify the country in which you are operating

Regional programme covering 24 countries in the ESA and IO region
Madagascar
Mauritius
Kenya and Malawi

Question 2: How effectively have the EU regional support programmes (EDF10/11) implemented EU guidelines on human rights, good governance, democracy, gender, environment and climate change?




Open answers:

I can only probably comment on impact on environment and climate change and I would say 'reasonably effective'

Implementation of EU supported grants has adequately considered aspects of gender, environment and climate change in the target countries in EA and SA.


Question 3: How extensively has the EU marshalled specific EU expertise to address problems in priority areas?



Open answers:

I have seen little evidence of this
 During proposal development and during implementation relevant experts have interacted with the implementation team in the target countries


Question 4: To what extent do EU EDF activities complement - not duplicate - other donors' activities?



Open answers:

I think there is really poor coordination between donors as a whole in the ESA and IO region. Lots of duplication and inefficiencies.
 Again, replying from teh environmental sector.
 In most cases EU EDF activities complements other donor activities.

Question 5: How has IOC and IGAD performance developed in terms of promoting regional cooperation and coordination vis-à-vis NRM, incl. biodiversity, and fisheries?




Open answers:

I think that the IGAD Biodiversity Programme has helped in this regard but the programme was poorly designed and would have been able to be much more effective in this regard had the design flaws been corrected. There is duplication of efforts between IGAD, EAC and IOC eg on the establishment of biodiversity databases and you often find donors, including the EU running programmes to establish separate databases and mechanisms for all these institutions, rather than encouraging these institutions that share a number of member states to come together in joint efforts.

Do not know what IGAD stands for or the programme. But answering for IOC alone, I would say 'moderately satisfactory'

The IGAD supported Biodiversity Management Programme (BMP) active in Somalia and Kenya has brought different people (policy makers, farmers and professional) together and hence contributed to regional cooperation


Question 6: Have the EU funded regional NRM programmes with IOC and IGAD contributed to improved regional and national policies, strategies and plans vis-à-vis NRM, incl. biodiversity and fisheries?



Open answers:

In the case of IGAD the EU funded BMP has addressed this to some extent.
I have no idea what IGAD is or does.
The project is in its first phase so not much has been achieved in improving regional and national policies. Strategies and plans.


Question 7: Have the EU funded regional NRM programmes contributed to improved regional and national NRM monitoring, incl. biodiversity and fisheries?



Open answers:

BIOPAMA observatories funded by EDF 10 is an attempt at this and had made some headway
Not much has been achieved for similar reasons as in 2 above.


Question 8: Has SmartFish contributed to improved regional and national enforcement (control, surveillance, patrolling) at the regional and national levels vis-à-vis fisheries?



Open answer:

The IGAD BMP project did not address this area.


Question 9: Have the EU funded regional NRM programmes with IOC and IGAD contributed to enhanced participation of the private sector and civil society vis-à-vis biodiversity and fisheries?



Open answers:

Speaking only with experience with IGAD I would say that there has been too little focus on this, the efforts remain very state led and not sufficiently participatory
I do not know the IGAD. But generally speaking (for the Republic of Mauritius), there is little private sector and civil society involvement in programmes. I think this is a regional comment as well.
On biodiversity management the private sector has been involved example in the supply of bee hives for the honey value chain.


Question 10: Have the EU funded regional NRM programmes with IOC and IGAD lead to tangible improvements in the management and protection of biodiversity and fisheries (at both country-specific and transboundary levels)?



Open answers:

I do not know IGAD. There is a long way to go to protect biodiversity and fisheries in the region, especially in the lagoon. It is also not clear to me if we are talking of terrestrial, marine, or all biodiversity.
Management of biodiversity in the hotspots targeted by the project has improved to some extent. This include increasing awareness on the importance of biodiversity management


Question 11: Were there mechanisms in place, formal or informal, to ensure the EU regional support's complementarity with Member States and coordination with other development partners, over 2008-2015, and were they effective?



Open answers:

I see little evidence of this and a lot of duplication of effort. See response to a previous question. Formal mechanisms were in place to ensure complementarity with member states and coordination with other development partners. In most cases grants were addressing issues related to the country's priorities


Question 12: To what extent is there coherence between the EU regional cooperation and regional cooperation of other development partners (e.g. EU member states, development banks, UN, non-traditional donors)?



Open answer:

There are usually meetings among donors within a member state where areas of collaboration and complementarity are discussed and taken into account when developing project proposals.

Question 13: In the country where you are, was the EU's regional co-operation 2008-2015 coherent (in objectives, approaches and implementation) with other EU policies and actions?



Question 14: Where is there scope for improved coherence?

Open answers:

I am sufficiently informed to respond

I don't know

Involvement of civil society in the development of programmes and identification of priority areas. Governments do not always know the needs or extent of the needs of on the ground issues, or there are other motivations involved (not necessarily bad motivations, but they are not gauged properly)

At the country level

Annex 7: List of persons met

The following annex includes all the persons that have been interviewed during the evaluation.

Belgium

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
Al-Utaibi	Janet	DEVCO D1	Programme officer
Barbedo	Joao	EEAS	Desk Officer Zambia - Deputy Head of Division, Southern Africa
Bento Pais	Rosario	DEVCO B2	Head of Unit
Bochu	Claude	EEAS	International Relations Officer, Pan-African Affairs
Bolly	Jean-Louis	DEVCO Evaluation Unit	Evaluation officer – Evaluation manager
Boutillier	Clément	DEVCO Fragility Unit 07	Policy Officer
C. Morinière	Lezlie	ECHO SAIO	Evaluation Team Leader
Cardona	Francesca	EEAS	Desk Officer Burundi
Carpenter	Douglas	EEAS	Deputy Head of Division – Desk RDC / Great Lakes
Dali	Maddalena	DG Clima	Policy Officer - Policy development in the area of adaptation to climate change
Davoux	Dominique	DEVCO C1	Geographical programming, sector approach/budget support, support to delegations
De Peyron	Kristin	EEAS	Head of Division
Di Stefano	Fabio	EU delegation Tanzania and EAC	Head of section, infrastructure and regional cooperation
Giribaldi	Irène	DEVCO D2	Deputy Head of Unit
Hagstrom	Camilla	DEVCO D2, Migration	Head of section, migration and asylum
Hoefkens	Ivo	DEVCO D2	Head of Sector "Regional Programme" - COMESA, SADC & Fisheries
Hoekstra	Ruth	DEVCO C4	Policy Officer
Jenny	Joëlle	EEAS	Director
Kaspar	Martin	DG Clima	Policy officer - Climate finance
Kratochvil	Cornelia	EEAS	Conflict Prevention, peacebuilding and mediation
Krissler	Dietmar	EEAS East Africa, Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean	Deputy Head of Division

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
Mecseký	Dora	EEAS Central Africa and Great Lakes	Desk Officer Central Africa regional integration and economic issues, bilateral relations with Gabon
Melendro Arnaiz	Fermin	DEVCO D1	Head of Unit
Missinne	Bart	DEVCO C2	Head of Forestry sector
Musillo	Benedetta	DEVCO Evaluation Unit	Evaluation co-ordinator - Evaluation manager
Pennington	Mike	DEVCO D1	Deputy Head of Unit
Pougin de la Maisonneuve	Axel	DG Trade	Trade Affairs Manager, South Africa and EU -SADC EPA
Ramos	Athanassios	DG Trade	Trade Affairs Manager, East Africa
Saintraint	Antoine	DEVCO C5	Programme manager – EU Policy – Water
Seinen	Anne Theo	DG Env	Policy officer - Biodiversity integration
Sgobbi	Alessandra	DG Clima	Policy officer
Tasso Villalonga	Joaquin	EEAS	Deputy Head, Pan-African Affairs Division
Van Houwelingen	Heino	EEAS	Policy officer
Vassiliou	Pantealis	EEAS East Africa	International Aid & Cooperation Officer
Viallon	Isabelle	DEVCO C1	Fisheries, aquaculture
Wallef	Lionel	DEVCO C5	Head of quality management - Transports
Wattellier	Emilie	DEVCO D3	Planning and Programming Officer, Head of Sector EDF Programming

Botswana

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
Bingandadi	Lovemore	SADC Secretariat	EU Technical Advisor
Chaitezvi	Charles	SADC Trade Related Facility Programme	Coordinator/Team Leader
Chen	Lynette	NEPAD Business Foundation	CEO
Chirambo	Kondwani	SADC Secretariat	Programme Coordinator, Regional Political Cooperation Programme
Coetzee	Alwyn	PPDF	/
Cornet	Jocelin	EUD	First secretary Development Cooperation
Ditlako	Abie	SADC Council of NGOs	Executive Director

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
Gall	Alstair	USAID	Consultant
Lebotse	Patience	Business Botswana/ SADC Private Sector Forum	Executive Coordinator and Communications Officer
Loeser	Birgit	CSDP	/
Madelung	Philip	GIZ	Programme Manager, Cooperation for the Enhancement of SADC Regional Economic Integration (CESARE)
Maharaj	Arlene	PPDF	/
Michel	Rosalie	SADC secretariat	M&E officer
Mokoena	Mapolao	SADC Secretariat	Senior Programme Officer – Transport Directorate of Infrastructure and Services
Mtonakutha	Sadwick	TIFI, SADC Secretariat	Acting Director/Senior Programme Officer – Macroeconomic Policies and Convergence
Namalomba	Weston	SADC secretariat	Audit Compliance Officer
Pamacheche	Fudzai	SADC secretariat	Programme Officer, TRF
Rudy	Rob	DFID	Trade Advisor
Rusike	Malvern	USAID	Former Technical Advisor under the Regional Political Cooperation Programme (REIS) on Finance and Investment
Samusodza	Cleophas	SADC Secretariat	Finance Officer
Schaef	Thomas	GIZ	Country Director
Taylor	John	EUD	Trade advisor
Weenink	Irma	PPDF	/
Wentworth	Lesley	NEPAD Business Foundation	SABF Coordinator
Wilke	Marie	GIZ	CESARE Programme Officer

Djibouti

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
A. Rayaleh	Houssein	IUCN	Project technical advisor of IGAD Biodiversity Management Programme
A.Roble	Abdi	IGAD	Coordinator – Development

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
			Partners
Abdalla	Elsadig	IGAD	Director Economic Cooperation and Social Development
Abdoulkarim	Mahmoud	IGAD	Accountant
Alwan	Fathia	IGAD	Head of Health and Social Development
Busuri	Abdullahi	IGAD	Program Manager Information and Documentation
Carton	Said	IGAD	Migration expert
d'Urso	Giuseppina	EUD	Food Security and Environment officer – Cooperation department
Daher Elmi	Houssein	IGAD	Natural resources and energy - Programme manager
Dahir Had	Ali	IGAD	Director Administration & Finance
Darar Djibril	Ahmed	SmartFish	Marin biologist
Darroze	Serge	IGAD	Technical assistant, Team Leader
De Ruyt	Isabelle	EUD	International aid cooperation officer
Geysen	Patrick	EUD	First Counselor Head of Political Section
Hersi	Ahmed	IGAD	Regional Coordinator – Maritime Security ESA-IO Region
Huguet	Eric	Embassy of France	Domestic security officer
K.Kosgel	Antony	IGAD	Human resource & administration officer
Kulach	Adam	EUD	Head of delegation
Lassen	Peter	Embassy of Denmark	Counsellor
Legawork	Assefa	IGAD	Peace & Security Programme Officer
Lemma	Bogale	IGAD	Procurement specialist
Mawango	Fred	IGAD	Water resources management Technical assistant
Mohammed	Hodan	IGAD	IRCC Program Assistant
Mohammed Ali	Khola	EUD	International Cooperation officer – Operational department
Moussa	Mohammed	IGAD	Director Agriculture and Environment
Puig Vara	Jose	EUD	Head of Cooperation
Suard	Anne	Embassy of France	First counsellor
Tesfay	Hadera	IGAD Secretariat	Gender programme officer

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
Tewolde	Gebremeskel Redda	IGAD	Director of Peace & Security
Vega Esposito	Alberto	IGAD	Principal advisor to IGAD Secretariat
Wogayehu	Anduaem	IGAD	IRCC 2 PE3 Accountant
Zeid El-Hassan	Abu	IGAD	Head of IGAD liaison office to AU

Ethiopia

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
Bam	Sivuyile	African Union Commission	Head of Peace Support Operations Division
Barugahare	Josephat	African Union Commission	Officer
Bedzigui	Yann	Institute for Security studies	Analyst
Bengtsson	Camilla	Embassy of Sweden	Head of Cooperation
Bursvik	Eva	Embassy of Sweden	Head of regional trade support
Burylo	Anna	EUD	Head of Cooperation
Carreras Sequeros	Francisco	EUD	Head of Cooperation
Choge-Nyangoro	Elizabeth	African Union Commission	Expert on Regional Mechanisms
Clausin	Thorsten	EUD	Head of Peace and Security Section
Davis	William	UNECA	Regional Integration and Trade Division
Deman	Jacques	EUD	/
Desta	Aklilu	Embassy of Sweden	Peace & Security Programme officer
Gotero	Soteri	UNECA	Head of Infrastructure and Industrialisation section
Hendrix	Ron	EUD	Programme manager, Migration, mobility, employment and higher education
Holm	Gunnar Andreas	Embassy of Norway	Counsellor
Ikome	Francis	UNECA	/
Kaba Wheeler	Mahawa	African Union Commission	Gender and Development Directorate
Kararach	George	UNECA	/
Kategekwa	Joy	UNCTAD	Director, Regional Office
Kiringi	Stephen	UNECA	DDG Trade and Investment
Lassen	Peter	Danish Embassy	Counselor
Legawork	Assefa	IGAD	Peace & Security Programme

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
			officer
Luke	David	UNECA	Regional Integration and Trade Division
Lundberg	Maria	Embassy of Sweden	Peace & Security First secretary
Magnus	André	Embassy of Sweden	Counsellor
Maher	Peter	EUD	EU Advisor
Mevel	Simon	UNECA	Regional Integration and Trade Division
Molders	Steven	EUD	Programme manager, Cooperation section
Mutahi	Kagwe	IGAD	Programme officer, IGAD Liaison Office to the AU
Nardi	Pietro	EUD	Programme manager, Cooperation Section
Paez	Laura	UNECA	Head of investment section
Sebahizi	Prudence	African Union Commission	Head of CFTA unit
Sirengo	Ethel	EAD	Programme officer, EAC Liaison Office
Sodipo	Babajide	African Union Commission	Regional Trade Advisor
Sunth	Hemant	UNECA	Programme Management Officer
Suominen	Heini	UNECA	Regional Integration and Trade Division
Tekaligne	Yishak	Ministry of Trade, Trade Relations & Negotiations Directorate General	Director Bilateral and Regional Trade Negotiations
Zampetti	Luca	EUD	Head of political section
Zeid El-Hassan	Abu	IGAD	Head of IGAD Liaison Office
Zewdie	Ephraim	EUD	Economist, Regional integration and infrastructure team

Kenya

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
Andiva	Barnabas	Competition Authority	Participant in RISM focus group
Baroud	Jean-Pierre	EUD	Peace and Security senior officer
Buzzard	Candice	USAID	Deputy Head of USAID Regional office
De Boers	Vincent	EUD	Head of Macroeconomics and governance section

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
Gautsch	Klaus	EUD	Rural Development Programme Manager
Habers	Erik	EUD	Head of Cooperation section
Kamajugo	Richard	Trade Mark East Africa	Director
Kapkirwok	Jason	Trade Mark East Africa	Director
Kigamisa	Joseph	KEPHIS	Participant in RISM focus group
Kimari	Timothy	National Treasury	Participant in RISM focus group
Matete	George	AU-IBAR	Coordinator, "Enhancing Somali Livestock Trade"
Mochorwa	Bernard	Immigration Authority	Participant in RISM focus group
Mungai	John	EUD	Programme manager, regional trade programmes
Mungai	Dedan	Kenya Fisheries Service	Participant in RISM focus group
Ndungu	Michael	Ministry of Trade	RISM coordinator
Ng'eno	Nehemiah	EAC Secretariat	EAC Advisor
Ng'eno	Roselyn	Kenya Investment	Participant in RISM focus group
Nouala	Simplice	AU-IBAR	Head of animal production office
Pambo	Kennedy	National Treasury	Participant in RISM focus group
Priestley	Mark	TMEA	Senior Director
Stanton	David	Trade Mark East Africa	DG
Tkach	Andrew	Aga Khan University	Director, Communications Programme for Environmental Issues 'Giving Nature a Voice'
Tretton	Walter	EUD	Head of Infrastructure section
Wahome	Erastus	National Treasury	Senior Deputy Director, financial & sectorial affairs department
Wamwayi	Henry	AU-IBAR	Project Coordinator
Yatich	Thomas	EUD	Programme manager, regional wildlife component (EDF11)

Madagascar

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
Andriamiarinosy	Mbolatiana	ICZM Committee	Technical Secretary to the National ICZM Committee, Deputy Focal Point to the IOC Islands Project
Andrianantenaina	Heritiana	Fisheries Monitoring and Surveillance Centre	Financial and Administrative Officer
Arsonina	Bera	Ministry of Environment and Forests	National Focal Point
Bezandry,	Robert	Ministry of Trade	Accountant of the Santatra Project
De Lambeterie	Damien	Blueline	CEO
de Padoue Ranaivoseheno	Louis Antoine	Naval Forces	Director of Defence, MASE National Focal Point
Filazana Tsoarina	Oberlin	PFNOSCM (Madagascar's National Civil Society Organisations' Platform)	General Secretary
Fourgon	Didier	WWF	Programme Coordinator
Garnaud	Benjamin	World Bank	Senior Natural Resources Management Specialist for the IO
Gonon	Xavier	CMA Conseils	/
Kasprzyk	Zbigniew	IOC SmartFish	Ocean Consultant, Expert
Maurille Rakotomahefa	Bruno	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Director of the Office Supporting the National Authorization Officer at the Ministry of Finance and Budget
Muhgirwa	Louis	FAO	/
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SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
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Rabarijaona	Lalanirina Vololomiora	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	National Focal Point SADC
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Mauritius

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Bussier	Gérard P.	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development	Director
Caine	Horatio	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and International Trade	Intern
Cayron	Geneviève	IOC, Energies	Administration and Finance Expert
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SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
Cushmajee	Vicky	IOC, Administration and Finance Department	Chief of Administration and Finance
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Gowrydoss	S.	Ministry of Defence	Assistant permanent secretary
Gujadhur	Subhas	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and International Trade	First Secretary
Gungadeen	S.	Ministry of Ocean Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries, Shipping and Outer Islands	Assistant permanent secretary
Gunpath	M.	Ministry of Defence	Permanent Secretary
Hoefkens	Ivo	DEVCO D2	Head of Sector, Regional Programmes, Eastern and Southern Africa, Indian Ocean
Hurbungs	M.	Ministry of Ocean Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries, Shipping and Outer Islands	Assistant Director of Fisheries
Jhugroo	Premhans	Ministry of Defence	Senior Chief Executive
Kan Oye	Fong Weng-Poorun	Ministry of Ocean Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries, Shipping and Outer Islands	Senior Chief Executive
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		Disaster and Beach Management	
Kawal	Jeeten	IMF	/
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Rwanda

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Tanzania

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Tindamanyire	Donald	EAC Customs Directorate	Customs valuation, tariffs, Rules of Origin expert
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Zambia

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Zimbabwe

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Majuru	Allan	Zim Trade	Director: Client Service Delivery

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	FUNCTION
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Mugaga	Christopher	Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce	Chief Executive Officer
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Author	Year	Title
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ACP Group of States - European Commission		Intra-ACP Cooperation - 11th European Development fund - Strategy paper and indicative programme 2014-2020
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Adnan Awad	2016	Coastal, Marine and Island specific biodiversity management in ESA-IO coastal states - Workshop on Marine Invasive Species - Survey Scoping and Planning
AEEP Secretariat		The Africa-EU Energy Partnership : Success stories
AFD		AFD and East Africa - Partnering for regional development
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African Development bank group		Eastern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper 2011-2015
African Development bank group		Southern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper 2011-2015
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African Development bank group		The African Development Bank Group in Southern Africa - Fostering Growth and Integration
African Development bank group	2003	Proposal for the Establishment of a Nepad Support Unit
African Union	2009	Minimum integration programme (MIP)
African Union	2015	Annual report of the Chairperson on the activities of the African Union Commission covering the period January to December 2014
African Union	2016	Programmes of Action for the implementation of the Sendai framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2020 in Africa, in line with the Africa Regional Strategy for disaster Risk Reduction

Author	Year	Title
African Union Commission	2013	Status of integration in Africa (SIA IV)
African Union Commission (AUC), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)	2016	Africa Regional Integration Index
African Union Commission, NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, UN Economic Commission for Africa, and UN World Food Programme.	2014	The cost of hunger in Africa : Social and economic impact of child undernutrition in Egypt, Ethiopia, Swaziland and Uganda – Regional report
African Union, African Development Bank Group, Nepad		Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) - General Terms of Reference
African Union, African Development Bank Group, Nepad		Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa Interconnecting, integrating and transforming a continent
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Ah-Peng C., Staménoff P., Bardat J., Hedderson T., Marline L., Wilding N., Strasberg D.	2014	Fascicule de formation à destination des acteurs de la biodiversité de la région océan Indien - Initiation à l'étude des bryophytes des îles du Sud Ouest de l'océan Indien
ALANET Global	2016	Evaluation du prolongement de la réhabilitation du Corridor Sud (Carrefour d'Arta-Guélibé sur 10.2km) – Rapport définitif
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Author	Year	Title
Assembly of Heads of state and government	1996	Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (Igad)
Baker P., Luff D., Sunassee A.	2016	Study on the Impact of the Interim Economic Partnership Agreement on the ESA signatory countries and the setting up of an EPA fund as a vehicle for financing the implementation of the iEPA Trade related, Fisheries and Development Component – Final report
Benny Bytebier & Denis Filer	2015	WIO Regional Brahms Training Workshop - Training report and Recommendations
Beyens Yolaine	2012	Smartfish Meeting report No 034-draft : Burundi TOT in Fish Handling, Hygiene and Processing
Bruce Byiers	2016	The political economy of regional integration in Africa : Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) report
C. Breuil	2016	Leçons apprises par le Programme SmartFish de ses expériences de projets pilotes portant sur la gestion de pêcheries spécifiques
Carlos Calcopietro and Catherine Bouveyron	2011	Facilitation services in support to the four regional authorising officers and four regional delegations of the ESA-IO region : Annexes
COMESA		COMESA Gender Manuals
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COMESA		Inter-governmental authority on development, financial statements
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COMESA		Malawi Regional Integration Implementation Programme (RIIP) – Fact sheet
COMESA		Seychelles Regional Integration Implementation Programme (RIIP) – Fact sheet
COMESA	1993	COMESA Treaty
COMESA	2002	COMESA Gender Policy
COMESA	2003	COMESA Secretariat organisation structure Council approved
COMESA	2007	Audit Report on Procurement
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Author	Year	Title
COMESA	2009	COMESA Annual Report 2009
COMESA	2009	Report and Financial Statements Year Ended 31st December 2008
COMESA	2010	10th EDF Regional Integration Support Programme Continuation (RISP 2) – Workplan and Budget
COMESA	2010	COMESA Annual Report 2010
COMESA	2010	Internal Audit Report on Regional Integration Support Programme Continuation
COMESA	2010	Medium Term Strategic Plan Towards an Integrated and Competitive Common Market 2011 - 2015
COMESA	2011	10th EDF Regional Integration Support Programme Continuation (RISP 2) – workplan and budget (COMESA-EAC-IGAD-IOC)
COMESA	2011	Regional Integration Support Programme Continuation (RISP 2) – Narrative Report
COMESA	2012	10th EDF Regional Integration Support Programme Continuation (RISP 2) – workplan and budget
COMESA	2012	Annual report 2011 Harnessing Science and Technology for Development
COMESA	2012	Annual report for the 10th EDF Regional Integration Support Programme Continuation (RISP II)
COMESA	2012	Regional Integration Support Programme Continuation, consolidated financial statements
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COMESA	2013	10th EDF Regional Integration Support Programme – Second Phase (RISP 3) – Workplan for 2014
COMESA	2013	10th EDF Regional Integration Support Programme Continuation (RISP 2) – Consolidated workplan and budget
COMESA	2013	COMESA Regional gender mainstreaming strategy 2013-2017 – Working draft
COMESA	2013	COMESA Success Stories 2013
COMESA	2013	Enhancing Intra-COMESA Trade through Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development.
COMESA	2013	Report for the 10th EDF Regional Integration Support Programme Continuation (RISP 2) – Annual progress report
COMESA	2013	RISP 3 : COMESA intervention framework
COMESA	2014	Annual report 2014 "Inclusive and Sustainable Industrialization"
COMESA	2014	Council approved organisation structure of COMESA Secretariat
COMESA	2014	Rapport Annuel 2014 "Pour une industrialisation inclusive et durable"

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COMESA	2015	10th EDF Regional Integration Support Programme – Second Phase (RISP 3) – Workplan for 2015
COMESA	2015	COMESA Secretariat organisation structure of the office of the assistant secretary general (administration and finance)
COMESA	2015	COMESA Secretariat organisation structure of the office of the assistant secretary general (programmes)
COMESA	2015	COMESA Secretariat organisation structure of the office of the assistant secretary general
COMESA	2016	10th EDF Regional Integration Support Programme – Second Phase (RISP 3) – Annual Report
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COMESA	2016	10th EDF Regional Integration Support Programme (RISP 3) – Revised Work Programme 2016, CA Rider
COMESA	2016	Annual Report 2015 "Inclusive and Sustainable Industrialization"
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COMESA	2016	COMESA and USAID discuss implementing \$77 million Partnership Agreement - e-COMESA newsletter 503
COMESA	2016	COMESA Gender and social affairs division, Strategic plan : 2017-2021
COMESA	2016	COMESA Gender Policy – final draft
COMESA	2016	COMESA to chair International Network on Small Hydro Power - e-COMESA newsletter 502
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COMESA	2016	European Union Support to COMESA Regional Economic Integration under European Development Funds (EDF) 9, 10 and 11
COMESA	2016	Institutional and governance structures for the implementation of the COMESA Treaty and Council decisions
COMESA	2016	Medium-Term Strategic Plan 2016-2020 In pursuit of Regional Economic Transformation and Development
COMESA	2016	Report for the Thirty-Second Meeting of the Trade and Customs Committee

Author	Year	Title
COMESA	2016	Report for the twelfth meeting of the ministerial committee of COMESA Fund
COMESA	2016	Report of the thirty sixth meeting of the Council of Ministers
COMESA	2016	RISM Progress Report
COMESA	2016	RISM Progress Report
COMESA	2016	Seventh call for submissions under the COMESA Adjustment Facility (CAF)
COMESA Aid for Trade Unit	2009	COMESA Aid for Trade Strategy
COMESA-EAC-SADC	2009	First joint COMESA-EAC-SADC NTBs meeting : Report
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Commission de l'Océan Indien & Fonds Français pour l'Environnement Mondial	2016	Annexe 1 – Formulaire de demande d'appui pour une opération d'échange de bonne pratique de GIZC – Stéphanie Sorby
Commission de l'Océan Indien & Fonds Français pour l'Environnement Mondial	2016	Annexe 1 – Formulaire de demande d'appui pour une opération d'échange de bonne pratique de GIZC – Association Tsanga Tsanga Mahaso
Commission de l'Océan Indien & GDZCOI	2015	Projet de gestion durable des zones côtières des pays de la COI : appui aux innovations locales et aux partenariats
Commission de l'Océan Indien & GDZCOI	2016	Annexe 1 – Formulaire de demande d'appui pour une opération d'échange de bonne pratique de GIZC – V.O.I Mamelohonko
Commission de l'Océan Indien & GDZCOI	2016	Annexe 1 – Formulaire de demande d'appui pour une opération d'échange de bonne pratique de GIZC – LMMA Ambinanibe
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI)		La CDB et l'Objectif d'Aichi 2 Enjeux de la comptabilité du capital naturel pour le développement durable de la région océan Indien occidental
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI)		La CDB et l'Objectif d'Aichi 9 Les implications pour l'Océan Indien occidental
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI)	2007	Arrangement Administratif entre la COI et les pays membres
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI)	2009	Stratégie régionale des pêches et de l'aquaculture de la Commission de l'Océan Indien 2009-2014

Author	Year	Title
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI)	2010	Rapport Annuel 2009
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI)	2011	Rapport Annuel 2010
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI)	2012	Rapport Annuel 2011
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI)	2013	Manuel des procédures de gestion administrative et financière des projets (Système de contrôle Interne) - Volume 1 Gestion des Achats
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI)	2013	Note de synthèse du Plan de Développement Stratégique 2013-2016 et du Plan d'Actions Prioritaires 2013-2015
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI)	2013	Rapport Annuel 2012
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI)	2014	Rapport Annuel 2013
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI)	2015	Rapport Annuel 2014
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI)	2015	Stratégie régionale des pêches et de l'aquaculture de la Commission de l'Océan Indien 2015-2025
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI)	2016	Rapport Annuel 2015
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI) - CNRO	2015	Atelier de regroupement et de formation des membres du réseau national récif corallien de Madagascar - Rapport final
Communauté Européenne, Republic of Mauritius	2007	Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013
Communauté Européenne, République de Djibouti	2007	Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013
Communauté Européenne, République de Madagascar	2007	Document de stratégie pays et programme indicatif national pour la période 2008-2013
Consortium of DRN, ADE, ECO, NCG, ECORYS-NEI	2007	Evaluation of the Commission's support to Southern African Development Community – SADC. Regional Level Evaluation. Synthesis report. Volume 1.
Consortium of DRN, ADE, ECO, NCG, ECORYS-NEI	2007	Evaluation of the Commission's support to Southern African Development Community – SADC. Regional Level Evaluation. Synthesis report. Volume 2.
Consortium of DRN, ADE, ECO, NCG, ECORYS-NEI	2008	Evaluation of the Commission's support to the Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. Regional Level Evaluation. Final Report. Volume I.

Author	Year	Title
Consortium of DRN, ADE, ECO, NCG, ECORYS-NEI	2008	Evaluation of the Commission's support to the Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. Regional Level Evaluation. Final Report. Volume II.
Consortium of DRN, ADE, ECO, NCG, ECORYS-NEI	2008	Evaluation of the Commission's support to the Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. Regional Level Evaluation. Final Report. Volume III.
Consortium of Landell Mills, Proman, Agrotec	2014	Coastal, Marine and Island specific biodiversity management in ESA-IO coastal states - Mission report September 2014
Consortium of Landell Mills, Proman, Agrotec	2015	Coastal, Marine and Island specific biodiversity management in ESA-IO coastal states - STE 13 Mission report. The status of freshwater biodiversity in Mauritius and Rodrigues. A desktop review
Consortium of Landell Mills, Proman, Agrotec	2015	Coastal, Marine and Island specific biodiversity management in ESA-IO coastal states - Mission report: an overview of Marine Invasive Species in the WIO
Consortium of Landell Mills, Proman, Agrotec	2016	Coastal, Marine and Island specific biodiversity management in ESA-IO coastal states - Mission report in Zanzibar Tanzania
Consortium PARTICIP-ADE-DIE-DRNECDPM-ODI	2012	Thematic Evaluation of the Visibility of EU external action 2005-2010
Consulting BASE	2013	Independent Interim Evaluation of East AFRITAC. Volume I: Main Report
Consulting BASE	2015	Independent Interim Evaluation of AFRITAC South
Council of the European Union	2005	Council regulation (EC) No 2173/2005 of 20 December 2005 on the establishment of a FLEGT licensing scheme for imports of timber into the European Community
Council of the European Union	2005	Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Member States meeting within the Council the European Parliament and the Commission. The European Consensus on Development
Council of the European Union	2011	Council conclusions on the Horn of Africa
Council of the European Union	2014	Council conclusions on a rights-based approach to development cooperation, encompassing all human rights
Council of the European Union	2014	EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea
Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund	2014	Ecosystem profile Madagascar and Indian Ocean islands

Author	Year	Title
D'Annunzio R., Lindquist E.J., MacDicken K.G	2010	Global forest land-use change from 1990 to 2010 : an update to a global remote sensing survey of forests
Debela Fituma Mamo	2016	Compliance of IGAD member States with counter terrorism measures in Africa
Delegation in Botswana	2011	External Assistance Management Report Botswana 2011
Delegation in Botswana	2012	External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Delegation: Botswana - Final Report
Delegation in Botswana	2014	External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Botswana 2014
Delegation in Botswana	2015	External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Botswana 2015
Delegation in Djibouti	2014	External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Djibouti 2014
Delegation in Djibouti	2015	External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Djibouti 2015
Delegation in Mauritius	2014	External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Mauritius 2014
Delegation in Mauritius	2015	External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Mauritius 2015
Delegation in Tanzania	2014	External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Tanzania 2014
Delegation in Tanzania	2015	External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Tanzania 2015
Delegation in Zambia	2014	External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Zambia 2014
Delegation in Zambia	2015	External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) Zambia 2015
Delegation in Zambia / COMESA	2010	External Assistance Management Report Zambia 2010
Delegation in Zambia / COMESA	2011	External Assistance Management Report Zambia 2011
Delegation of the European Union to Mauritius	2017	Technical assistance to the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) for the implementation of a regional fisheries strategy for the ESA-IO Region (IOC/SMARTFISH II) – Inception report
Deloitte	2009	Rapport des vérificateurs au comptes au Président du Conseil de la Commission de l'Océan Indien - Annexe 1
Deloitte	2010	Rapport des vérificateurs au comptes au Président du Conseil de la Commission de l'Océan Indien - Annexe 1
Deloitte	2011	Rapport des vérificateurs au comptes au Président du Conseil de la Commission de l'Océan Indien - Annexe 1

Author	Year	Title
DFID	2012	DFID Africa Regional Programme
Dr. Soobaschand Sweenarain	2013	Market study on by-catch from the industrial tuna fisheries in the indian ocean
Dr. Soobaschand Sweenarain	2016	Effects of climate change and variability on the artisanal fisheries of the member-States of the Indian Ocean Commission – Final report
Dr. Soobaschand Sweenarain	2016	Note de réflexion sur les enjeux de la chaîne de froid dans la pêche traditionnelle des pays moins avancés de la Commission de l’Océan Indien [Comores & Madagascar]
DRN	2012	Evaluation Methodology & Baseline Study of European Commission Technical Cooperation Support, Final report
Du Preez Familie Trust	2012	Smartfish Meeting report No 019 : Joint Operational Training LVFO - SOPs
EAC		Summary progress narrative for the period July 2015-June 2016
EAC	2006	EAC Development Strategy 2006-2010 Deepening and Accelerating Integration
EAC	2011	4th EAC Development Strategy (2011/12 - 2015/16) Deepening and Accelerating Integration
EAC	2012	East African Community Trade Report 2012
EAC	2013	Audited financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2013
EAC	2013	Consolidated EAC Donor Work Plan 2013/14
EAC	2013	East African Community Trade Report 2013
EAC	2014	East African Community Annual Report 2013-2014
EAC	2015	Presentation of the budget for the East african Community for the financial year 2015/2016 to the East African Legislative Assembly – Budget speech
EAC	2016	East African Community Vision 2050
EAC	2016	Presentation of the budget for the East african Community for the financial year 2016/2017 to the East African Legislative Assembly – Budget speech
EAC	2016	Report of the Committee on general purpose on the EAC budget estimates for revenue and expenditure for the FY 2016/2017
EAC Secretariat		Annual operation plan 2016/2017 : Budget for FY 2016/17 for East African Community
EAC Secretariat	2012	Smartfish Meeting report No 016 : Experts meeting to update and improve EAC SPS Vol. III Fish and Fisheries
EAC Secretariat	2013	EAC Regional Integration Support Programme RISP 2012 – Workplan

Author	Year	Title
East African Community	2007	Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community
East African Community	2012	The East African Community Protocol on Good Governance (Draft)
East African Community	2014	The East African Community Communication Policy and Strategy
Ecorys	2016	Evaluation of EU support to transport sector in Africa 2005-2013 - Synthesis
EGEVAL	2013	Evaluation of the European Union's Support to Integrated Border Management (IBM) and fight against Organised Crime (OC)
EGEVAL	2013	Summary: Evaluation of the European Union's Support to Integrated Border Management (IBM) and fight against Organised Crime (OC)
Erik Hempel	2012	Smartfish Meeting report No 032 : National Working Group for Regional Trade Strategy Development
Ernst&Young	2007	Développement de la Gestion Financière pour le Secrétariat de la Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI) dans le cadre des besoins procéduraux du « Contribution Agreement » - 1ère Phase. Rapport de diagnostic
Ernst&Young	2013	Institutional Assessment of SADC Secretariat - Draft Report
Ernst&Young	2016	Final Pillar Assessment Questionnaire for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development
Ernst&Young	2016	Final Pillar Assessment Questionnaire for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development part 2
Ernst&Young	2016	Final Pillar Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development
Ernst&Young	2016	Final Pillar Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Annexes 5-8
Ernst&Young	2016	Pillar Assessment IGAD
Ernst&Young	2016	The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Final Report 12 October 2016 Pillar Assessment IGAD
EU Delegation to Botswana and SADC	2016	Mapping of SADC-wide Non State Actors for the 11th European Development Fund
EU Pan-Africa Facility		Programme on global public goods and challenges 2014-2020 : Multi-annual indicative programme 2014-2017
EUD Ethiopia - Head of Delegation	2011	Note for the attention of Ms Fabienne Levy Head of Unit DEVCO G2

Author	Year	Title
EuropeAid	2008	Reforming technical cooperation and project implementation units for external aid provided by the European Commission - A backbone strategy
EuropeAid - DEVCO	2008	European Community - Southern African Region. Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013
EuropeAid - DEVCO	2008	Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean - European Community. Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013
EuropeAid - DEVCO	2008	Work Plan - A backbone strategy : Reforming technical cooperation and project implementation units for external aid provided by the European Commission
EuropeAid - DEVCO	2011	Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the regions. Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change
EuropeAid - DEVCO	2013	Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE)
EuropeAid - DEVCO	2013	Terms of reference for a pillar assessment contracted by the European Commission
EuropeAid - DEVCO	2014	Action document for EAC Regional Electoral Support Project
EuropeAid - DEVCO	2014	Pan-African programme 2014-2020 - Multiannual indicative programme 2014-2017
EuropeAid - DEVCO	2015	Action Document for Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF) 1 EA-SA-IO Regional Programme
EuropeAid - DEVCO	2015	Regional Indicative Programme for Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (EA-SA-IO)
European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)	1998	L'avenir de la COI Réflexion stratégique sur la coopération régionale dans les dix prochaines années
European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)	2012	GREAT insights thematic focus : Trade and Development making the link
European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)	2016	Regional Integration Dynamics in Africa
European Commission		Action Fiche for IGAD - Rider to Financing Agreement N° 9349/REG "IGAD Livestock Policy Initiative"
European Commission		Annex II to financing agreement N°21330 - Technical and administrative provisions- Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (IRFS)/ CRIS Code: 21330

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European Commission		Annex II to financing agreement N°22995 - Technical and administrative provisions - Coastal, Marine and Island Specific Biodiversity Management in the ESA-IO coastal states
European Commission		Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA Group
European Commission		Financing agreement between the European Commission and the East African Community : Regional Integration Support Programme 3 (RISP) – EAC Component EDF X
European Commission		INTRA-ACP - Monitoring for Environment and Security in Africa (MESA) – CRIS N° ACP/IPS – Intra ACP/FED/022-553
European Commission		New EU support for renewable energy and livestock in East and South Africa and the Indian Ocean – Press release
European Commission	1999	Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part
European Commission	2006	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Strategy for Africa: An EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa
European Commission	2007	Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the regions. Strategy for the Outermost Regions: Achievements and Future Prospects
European Commission	2008	Commission staff working document accompanying the communication on regional integration for development in ACP countries
European Commission	2009	Action Fiche for Implementing the SIDS MS in the ESA-IO region (ISIDSMS)
European Commission	2009	Action Fiche for the Eastern and Southern Africa – Indian Ocean (ESA_IO) region for support to the Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee (IRCC)
European Commission	2009	Annex II to financing agreement N°21334 - Technical and administrative provisions - Inland Water Resources Management Programme in the IGAD Region CRIS Decision No. FED / 2009 / 021 - 334
European Commission	2009	Annual Action Programme - (RISP) Continuation of the Regional Integration Support Programme

Author	Year	Title
European Commission	2009	Annual Action Programme - Continuation of Support to the Secretariat of the Inter-Regional Co-ordinating Committee (IRCCa-) 9 ACP RSA 40
European Commission	2009	Annual Action Programme - Rwanda: Entretien périodique de la section Kigali Gatuna du Corridor Nord et Appui à l'entretien routier
European Commission	2009	Annual Action Programme - Rwanda: Entretien périodique de la section Kigali Gatuna du Corridor Nord et Appui à l'entretien routier - Avenant n°1 à la convention de financement
European Commission	2009	Annual Action Programme - Uganda: Northern Corridor Road Improvement Project: Mbarra-Ntungamo - Katuna
European Commission	2010	Agreement establishing a framework for an Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, on the one part, and the East African Community partner States on the other part
European Commission	2010	Action Fiche - Supplementary funding to Northern Corridor Road (NCR) Improvements project: Masaka-Mbara and Mbara-Katuna sections
European Commission	2010	Action Fiche and Technical Administrative Provisions for Kigali-Gatuna road
European Commission	2010	Action Fiche for Development of dryland forests and biodiversity in the Horn of Africa Region
European Commission	2010	Action Fiche for Development of renewable energies in the Horn of Africa Region
European Commission	2010	Agreement amending for the second time the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part
European Commission	2010	Fiche d'action pour le programme de relance de la CEPGL (Burundi, RDC, Rwanda)
European Commission	2011	Annex II to financing agreement N°23041 - Technical and administrative provisions - Renewable energy development and energy efficiency improvements in IOC member countries (FED/2011/023-041)
European Commission	2011	Commission Staff working paper - impact assessment accompanying the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and social committee and the committee of the regions : Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change
European Commission	2011	Evaluation of the crisis response and preparedness components of the European Union's instruments for stability (IFS) : Overall programme-level evaluation

Author	Year	Title
European Commission	2012	Action Fiche : Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO– SmartFish II CRIS reference: FED/2012/024-111
European Commission	2012	Action Fiche for biodiversity management in the IGAD Region
European Commission	2012	Action Fiche : Support to the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) initiative
European Commission	2012	Annex 1 - Timeframe - Biodiversity Management in the Horn of Africa
European Commission	2012	Annex 2 - Logframe - Biodiversity Management in the Horn of Africa
European Commission	2012	Annex II to financing agreement - Technical and administrative provisions - Biodiversity Management in the Horn of Africa
European Commission	2012	Annex II to financing agreement N°23700 - Technical and administrative provisions - Biodiversity Management in the Horn of Africa
European Commission	2012	Annex II to financing agreement N°24111 - Phase II: Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO (IRFS) – SmartFish II
European Commission	2012	Commission Decision revising the 10th European Development Fund allocation for the Pacific ACP Region and adopting an addendum to the Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for 2008-2013 between the European Union and the Eastern and Southern Africa - Indian Ocean (ESA – IO) ACP Region as a result of the Mid-Term Review - draft
European Commission	2012	Financing Agreement between European Commission and the East African Community : Technical cooperation facility I - Special Conditions
European Commission	2012	The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations
European Commission	2014	Action Document for " Pan African Statistics"
European Commission	2014	Action Document for "AfricaConnect II"
European Commission	2014	Action Document for "African Union Research Grants II (AURG II)"
European Commission	2014	Action Document for "Harmonisation of Higher Education in Africa"
European Commission	2014	Action Document for "Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) Support Mechanism II and Communication Strategy"
European Commission	2014	Action Document for "Pan-African Financial Governance Programme"

Author	Year	Title
European Commission	2014	Action Document for "Support to Africa Transport Policy Programme (SSATP) - Development Plan 2014-2018 (SSATP-DP3)"
European Commission	2014	Action Document for "Support to the Pan African Masters Consortium in Interpretation and Translation (PAMCIT)"
European Commission	2014	Action Document for "The African Union Capacity in Election Observation (AUCapEO)"
European Commission	2014	Action Document for 'EU-Africa Infrastructure Support Mechanism'
European Commission	2014	Action Document for Contribution to the African Legal Support Facility
European Commission	2014	Action Document for Support to Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue
European Commission	2014	Commission Implementing Decision of 20.11.2014 on the Annual Action Programme 2014 for the Pan-African Programme to be financed from the general budget of the European Union
European Commission	2014	Commission staff working document tool-box a rights-based approach, encompassing all human rights for EU development cooperation
European Commission	2015	Economic Partnership Agreements between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the SADC EPA States, Of The Other Part
European Commission	2015	Action Document for "Enhancing African capacity to respond more effectively to transnational organised crime (TOC)"
European Commission	2015	Action Document for "Strengthening the African Human Rights System"
European Commission	2015	Action Document for "Support Measures – Annual Action Plan 2"
European Commission	2015	Action Document for "Enhancing civil society's role in Pan-African issues"
European Commission	2015	Action Document for "Intra-Africa Academic Mobility Scheme"
European Commission	2015	Action Document for EGNOS in Africa Support Programme
European Commission	2015	Action Document for the "Contribution to the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) – Phase 2"
European Commission	2015	Action Document for the African Union Support Programme III
European Commission	2015	Action Document for the GMES and Africa Support Programme

Author	Year	Title
European Commission	2015	Action Document for the Pan-African Support to the EGS-OAGS Partnership (PanAfGeo)
European Commission	2015	Commission Implementing Decision of 13.11.2015 on the Annual Action Programme 2015 for the Pan-African Programme to be financed from the general budget of the European Union
European Commission	2015	Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the Eastern African Community (EAC)
European Commission	2015	Initial Action Document for Cross-Regional Wildlife Conservation Programme in Eastern, Southern and Horn of Africa
European Commission	2016	ACP member states and EU budget support eligibility
European Commission	2016	Action Document for Cross-Regional Wildlife Conservation in Eastern, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean
European Commission	2016	Africa Investment Facility Indicative List of Priority Projects (comparison with AfIF pipeline)
European Commission	2016	Commission Decision of 2.3.2016 on the individual measure in favour of Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean to be financed from the 11th European Development Fund
European Commission	2016	Overview of economic partnership agreements
European Commission - High representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy	2013	Joint Communication to the Council: A Strategic Framework for the Great Lakes Region.
European Commission - High representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy	2013	Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council : The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises
European Commission, COMESA, EAC, IGAD, IOC	2011	Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO region, Joint Progress Reprt (10th EDF Mid-Term Review) 2011 Final Version
European Commission		Financing Agreement between the European Commission and the Intergovernmental authority development, Improving animal disease surveillance in support of trade in Intergovernmental Authority Development member States
European Community, Ethiopia	2007	Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013
European Community, Republic of Botswana	2007	Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013

Author	Year	Title
European Community, Republic of Kenya	2007	Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013
European Community, Republic of Rwanda	2007	Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013
European Community, Republic of Tanzania	2007	Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013
European Community, Zambia	2007	Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008-2013
European Court of Auditors	2009	Effectiveness of EDF support for regional economic integration in East Africa and West Africa
European Court of Auditors	2010	Special Report No 18/2009 - Effectiveness of EDF support for Regional Economic Integration in East Africa and West Africa
European Development Fund	2013	Appendix 1 to TAPs – One Stop Inspection stations (OSIS). Logical Framework Matrix
European Development Fund	2014	ESA-IO Region – Regional Integration Support Programme (RISP) 3 – Programme Estimate No.1
European Development Fund	2014	ESA-IO Region – Regional Integration Support Programme (RISP) 3, Programme Estimate No.1 - Narrative report
European Development Fund	2015	ESA-IO Region – Regional Integration Support Programme (RISP) 3 – Programme Estimate No.2
European Development Fund	2015	ESA-IO Region – Regional Integration Support Programme (RISP) 3 – RIDER No.1, Programme Estimate No.2
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)	2012	Briefing Paper 32012 : The African Peace Facility
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)	2012	The African Peace Facility – Briefing paper
European Union		Integrated Institutional Capacity-Building for the SADC Secretariat and National Stakeholders (IICB)
European Union		Support towards industrialisation and the productive sectors (SIPS) in the SADC region
European Union	2013	Decision FED/2011/21334 Inland Water Resources Management including WMO and IGAD components
European Union	2017	Action Document for the Support to Improving the Business Environment in the SADC Region
European Union	2017	Action document on enhancing cooperation and dialogue in support of the SADC regional integration agenda : the SADS-EU dialogue facility
European Union, Ethiopia	2014	National Indicative Programme for Ethiopia 2014 to 2020
European Union, Republic of Botswana	2014	11th EDF - National Indicative Programme (2014-2020) for co-operation between the Republic of Botswana and the European Union

Author	Year	Title
European Union, Republic of Kenya	2014	EU-Kenya Cooperation - 11th European Development Fund National Indicative Programme 2014-2020
European Union, Republic of Mauritius	2016	11th European Development Fund (2014-2020) - National Indicative Programme for the Republic of Mauritius
European Union, Republic of Rwanda	2014	National Indicative Programme for the period 2014-2020
European Union, Republic of Zambia		11th European development fund - National Indicative Programme (2014-2020) for co-operation between the Republic of Zambia and the European Union
European Union, Republic of Zimbabwe	2015	11th European development fund - National Indicative Programme (2014-2020) for co-operation between the European Union and the Republic of Zimbabwe
European Union, United Republic of Tanzania	2014	National Indicative Programme for United Republic of Tanzania 2014 to 2020
EY	2015	EU Pillars Assessments : Become eligible for EU budget implementation under the indirect management mode
FAO	1993	Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
FAO	2014	The state of world fisheries and aquaculture: Opportunities and challenges
FAO	2015	First technical progress report - SmartFish Phase II
FAO	2016	Second technical progress report - SmartFish Phase II
Florian Lepoigneur	2016	Le troisième câble sous-marin de fibre optique déployé début 2019
Fredrik Soderbaum, Therese Brolin	2016	Support to regional cooperation and integration in Africa : What works and why ?
General Secretariat of the Council	2014	The Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership
General Secretariat, Indian Ocean Commission	2015	Report for the 10th EDF Regional Integration Support Programme Continuation (RISP 2) – IOC RISP Annual progress report
Gerard Domingue, Florian Giroux	2014	Smartfish Meeting report No 088 Capacity building and Strengthening of the implementation of IOTC Conservation and management Measures Madagascar
Gift Chirozva	2013	A User's Guide: COMESA Financial Stability Assessment Handbook
GIRIBALDI Irene	2016	EPAs as a driver for change

Author	Year	Title
High Level Committee	2014	Draft - Next steps of the approval of the RIP and identification and formulation of projects Key milestones
High Level Committee	2014	Draft Mandate of the High Level Committee of the 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programme for the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Regions
High Level Committee	2014	Draft Minutes of the First High Level Committee of the 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programme for the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean (EA-SA-IO) regions, 13-14 March 2014, Brussels
High Level Committee	2014	Eastern Africa Southern Africa Indian Ocean 11th EDF Regional programming, High Level Committee Meeting - Technical Preparatory meeting Agenda
High Level Committee	2014	Eastern Africa Southern Africa Indian Ocean 11th EDF Regional programming, High Level Committee Meeting Agenda
High Level Committee	2014	High Level Committee 13-14 March 2014 - Participants
High Level Committee	2014	Joint Conclusions from the first meeting of the High Level Committee of the 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programme for the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region 13-14 March 2014, Brussels
High Level Committee	2014	Joint Conclusions from the second meeting of the High Level Committee of the 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programme for the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region 10-11 December 2014, Gaborone
High Level Committee	2014	Mandate of the High Level Committee of the 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programme for the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Regions
High Level Committee	2014	RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE set up for the Regional Indicative Programme for the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean regions of the 11th European Development Fund
High Level Committee	2015	11th EDF Regional Indicative Programme: High Level Group Technical Meeting - Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, Indian Ocean, Brussels, 3rd June 2015
High Level Committee	2015	Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, Indian Ocean DMROs Only Technical Meeting Nairobi, Kenya, 4-5 May 2015 Provisional Agenda
High Level Committee	2015	Establishment of a regional energy market in the Eastern and Southern African region - Executive Summary

Author	Year	Title
High Level Committee	2015	Joint Conclusions from the third meeting of the High Level Committee of the 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programme for the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region 4-5 June 2015, Brussels
High Level Committee	2015	Joint Conclusions of the technical meeting of the High Level Committee of the 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programme for the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region Nairobi, Kenya, 05-06 May 2015
High Level Committee	2015	Joint Conclusions of the Technical Meeting of the High Level Group of the 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programme for the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Region, Nairobi, Kenya, 05-06 May 2015
High Level Committee	2015	Pipeline 2014-2015
High Level Committee	2015	Terms of Reference for The Inter-DMROs Consultation Forum
High Level Committee	2015	Tripartite (COMESA, EAC and SADC) Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme (T3FP) - Executive Summary
High Level Committee	2016	Africa Investment Facility (AfIF)
High Level Committee	2016	EASAIIO RIP Financial overview table June 2016
High Level Committee	2016	Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, Indian Ocean High Level Group Meeting Brussels, 9 November 2016 Agenda
High Level Committee	2016	Joint Conclusions of the High Level Group of the 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programme for the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Region, 9 November 2016, Brussels
High Level Committee	2016	Joint Operational Conclusions of the Senior Technical Experts Meeting of the 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programme for the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Region, Brussels, 16-17 June 2016
High Level Committee	2016	Possible actions for consideration in EPA roadmap
High Level Committee	2016	Progress in implementing the RIP EA-SA-IO
High Level Committee	2016	Revised Appendix: Africa Investment Facility Indicative List of Priority projects
High Level Committee	2016	Soft Infrastructure
High Level Committee	2016	Status report November 2016 Implementation RIP EA-SA-IO 2014-2020

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High Level Committee	2016	Technical Inter-DMROs Consultation Forum General Secretariat, Indian Ocean Commission, 4-5 April 2016 Conclusions and Recommendations
HTSPE	2017	Institutional capacity development programme (ICDP) : Technical assistance to the southern African Development Community (SADC) secretariat - Interim progress report No.6
IGAD		Overview of on-going EU-funded projects financed under the 10th and 11th EDF
IGAD		The European Union Emergency trust fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa : Action Fiche for the implementation of the Horn of Africa Window
IGAD	2007	IGAD Environment and Natural Resources Strategy
IGAD	2007	InterGovernmental Authority on Development - Annual Report 2007
IGAD	2009	2009 Annual Report
IGAD	2011	2011 Annual Report Promoting Peace and Human Security through Regional Integration and Development
IGAD	2011	Annex 2: Logic Model for IGAD Strategy Implementation Plan (2011-2015)
IGAD	2011	Annex 3: Performance Measurement Framework (PMF) for IGAD Strategy Implementation Plan (2011- 2015)
IGAD	2011	Annex 4: Risk Register
IGAD	2011	IGAD Annual Report and Financial Statement for the year Ended December 31 2011
IGAD	2011	IGAD Regional Strategy Implementation Plan 2011 - 2015 Annex 1: Programmes and projects Fact Sheets
IGAD	2011	IGAD Strategy
IGAD	2011	IGAD Strategy Implementation Plan 2011-2015
IGAD	2012	Budget Proposals for 2013
IGAD	2012	Striving for a Peaceful and Prosperous Region - Annual Report 2012
IGAD	2012	The CEWARN 2012-2019 Strategy Framework
IGAD	2013	Building Capacities for Regional Stability and Prosperity - Annual Report 2013
IGAD	2013	IGAD Centre for Pastoralist Areas and Livestock Development (ICPALD) Strategic Plan 2013-2017
IGAD	2013	InterGovernmental Authority on Development Program Budgets for the Financial Year 2013 Annex IV

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IGAD	2014	IGAD Operational plan 2014, Fostering Resilience, Regional Integration and Peace for Sustainable Development
IGAD	2014	Intergovernmental Authority on Development – approved budget for 2014
IGAD	2014	Safeguarding the Environment for Food Security - Annual Report 2014
IGAD	2014	Technical assistance to the biodiversity management programmes in the Horn of Africa - BMP Monitoring Report n°1
IGAD	2015	Comprehensive final implementation report for the Inland Water Resources Management Programme (INWRMP)
IGAD	2015	Draft rules of procedure for the negotiation committee on the IGAD regional water resources protocol
IGAD	2015	IGAD BMP Newsletter
IGAD	2015	IGAD Regional water resources policy
IGAD	2015	Institutional strengthening Action Programme 2016-2020 (ISAP III 2016-2020)
IGAD	2015	Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), IDDRSI - Platform Coordination Unit (PCU), IGAD Secretariat, Work Plan January - December 2015
IGAD	2015	Intergovernmental Authority on Development Self-Assessment Final Report
IGAD	2016	IGAD Donor Mapping
IGAD	2016	IGAD Institutional strengthening Action Programme III (ISAP III 2016-2020) : ISAP III 2017 - Workplan Narrative
IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC)	2011	Strategy and Implementation Plan 2011-2015
IGAD IDDRSI	2013	The IDDRSI Strategy
IMANI Consult	2014	Supporting the implementation of the Regional Integration Agenda – Achieving Compliance in the Member States of EAC, ECOWAS and SADC
Imani Development	2016	COMESA The evaluation of the Regional Integration Support Programme
IMF	2015	IMF Response to Recommendations of the External Evaluation of AFRITAC South
INCAS Consulting	2011	Evaluation of the Crisis response and Preparedness components of the European Union's Instruments for Stability

Author	Year	Title
Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)	2017	Concept Note for consultation: Contribution of sustainable fisheries to the blue economy of Eastern Africa-Southern Africa-Indian Ocean region under the 11th EDF – RIP transversal envelope 2014-2020 – Memorandum of Comments and proposals
International Economics Consulting	2014	Evaluation of the Regional Integration Support Mechanism – Final report
International Economics Consulting	2014	Evaluation of the Regional integration Support Mechanism (RISM) – Final Report
IOC		Smartfish Programme Publications
Jan Vanheukelom, Bruce Byiers, San Bilal and Sean Woolfrey (ECDPM)	2016	Political economy of regional integration in Africa: What drives and constraints regional organisations? – Synthesis report
Josph Ngwawi	2014	Resetting SADC priorities – RISDP review
Justus Rutaisire	2015	Smartfish Meeting report No 101 Development of a business plan for Kigembe fish laboratory - Rwanda and training of staff in basic laboratory procedures and practices
KPMG	2016	Diagnostic et recommandations Amélioration de la gestion financière de la Commission de l'Océan Indien
Landell Mills Consortium		Coastal, marine and island specific biodiversity management in ESA-IO coastal States : Supplement to six-monthly report
Landell Mills Consortium		Coastal, marine and island specific biodiversity management in ESA-IO coastal States : Six-monthly report
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Leadley, P.W., Krug, C.B., Alkemade, R., Pereira, H.M., <i>et al.</i>	2014	Progress towards the Aichi Biodiversity Targets : An assessment of biodiversity trends, policy scenarios and key actions
LEGROS Damien	2012	Smartfish Meeting report No 029 Smartfish trade event report
Lloyd Sachikonye & Rudo Chitiga	2014	An evaluation of the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) project
Malagasy government		Le coût de la faim en Afrique : l'incidence sociale et économique de la malnutrition chez l'enfant à Madagascar

Author	Year	Title
Mauritius Marine Conservation Society	2015	Gestion de la biodiversité marine et côtière, spécifique aux Iles et aux Etats côtiers de la région AOA-OI - Sensibilisation de sept (7) communautés villageoises de la zone du Morne – Bel Ombre – Souillac en vue d'une clôture pilote volontaire de deux (2) mois de la pêche du poulpe - Rapport final de synthèse et recommandations en vue d'une extension éventuelle à d'autres zones
Medicine Masiwa		The Regional Integration Support Programme (REIS) moves towards the half-way mark : achievements and way forward
Moore Stephens	2010	Capacity Assessment of the General Secretariat of the Indian Ocean Commission to manage efficiently and effectively Development Projects
Moore Stephens LLP	2015	Pillar assessment of the East African Community – Final report
Nancy Birdsall	2004	Underfunded regionalism in the developing world
National Implementation Team (NIT) in Ethiopia		The cost of hunger in Africa : implications for the growth and transformation of Ethiopia – the social and economic impact of child undernutrition in Ethiopia
National Implementation Team (NIT) in Malawi		The cost of hunger in Malawi : implications on national development and vision 2020 – the social and economic impact of child undernutrition in Malawi
National Implementation Team (NIT) in Rwanda		The cost of hunger in Rwanda : implications on national development and vision 2020 – The social and economic impact of child undernutrition in Rwanda
National Implementation Team (NIT) in Uganda		The cost of hunger in Rwanda : implications on national development and prosperity – The social and economic impact of child undernutrition in Uganda
OBURA David	2016	Coral Bleaching Monitoring Guide Western Indian Ocean - 2016
OECD, WTO	2011	Aid for Trade at a glance 2011 : Showing results
OECD, WTO	2015	Aid for Trade at a glance 2015 : Reducing trade costs for inclusive, sustainable growth
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region of Africa	2013	A framework of hope: The Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region
PARTICIP GmbH Germany	2012	Evaluation Methodology & Baseline Study of European Commission Technical Cooperation support – Final report
Particip, Ade, DIE, DRN, ECDPM, ODI	2012	Summary: Thematic Evaluation of the Visibility of EU external action 2005-2010

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Peter Chibatamoto (SADC CNGO)	2015	Evaluation of the Regional Economic Programme (March 2013-June2015)
Pinto Consulting GmbH	2016	Final Evaluation of the SADC Regional Economic Integration Support (REIS) Programme – Final report
Prishnee Bissessur, Leïticia Dimba	2015	Coastal, Marine and Island specific biodiversity management in ESA-IO coastal states - Mise en œuvre et déploiement du dispositif de reconnaissance des plantes "Pl@ntNet" à l'île Maurice - Rapport final
PWC	2015	Pillar Assessment of Southern African Development Community Secretariat
RMIFC Madagascar	2017	Regional maritime information fusion center of Madagascar presentation
Robert J. Scholes, Wolfgang Kuper, Reinette Biggs		Africa environment outlook – Our environnement, our wealth. Chapter 7 : Biodiversity
RUKERA TABARO Simon	2014	Smartfish Meeting report No 016 Fish Quality, Hygiene, Promotion and Marketing training to fishers, fish farmers & fish & fishproducts traders
S.S Purmah	2011	Trade facilitation implementation in Republic of Mauritius
SADC		SADC Mechanism for Engagement with Non State Actors (NSAs) – Powerpoint presentation
SADC		Summary of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
SADC	1992	Treaty of the Southern African Development Community
SADC	2001	Protocol on politics, defence and security co-operation
SADC	2001	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
SADC	2001	SADC Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
SADC	2005	Protocol on the facilitation of movement of persons
SADC	2008	Report of the Executive Secretary - Activity Report of the SADC Secretariat For the period August 2007 to July 2008
SADC	2008	SADC Protocol on Gender and Development
SADC	2010	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on politics, defence and security cooperation
SADC	2011	Report of the Executive Secretary - Activity Report of the SADC Secretariat 2010-2011
SADC	2012	Report of the Executive Secretary - Activity Report of the SADC Secretariat 2011-2012

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SADC	2015	Revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2015-2020 and the role of the private sector – SADC Business Forum
SADC	2015	SADC Success stories
SADC	2016	Declaration of the fifth high level meeting on disaster risk reduction: Mauritius declaration on the implementation of the Sendai Framework in Africa
SADC	2016	Meeting from the SADC-ICP dialogue platform: Record
SADC	2016	Meeting of ministers responsible for Disaster Risk Management: Record
SADC	2016	SADC disaster preparedness and response strategy and fund
SADC & Development Bank of Southern Africa	2014	SADC project preparation and development facility (PPDF): Appraisal report
SADC & Development Bank of Southern Africa	2017	Project preparation and development facility (PPDF): Progress report No.5
SADC & Development Bank of Southern Africa	2017	Project preparation and development facility (PPDF): Progress report No.3
SADC & SADC CNGO		Proposed common Programme of Action between the SADC Secretariat and the SADC Council of NGOs (CNGO)
SADC CNGO		Strategic plan 2016-2020 - Consolidating civil society voices: Reclaiming space in regional integration and development
SADC CNGO	2015	Policy brief - Supporting strategic engagement between civil society and SADC member states: mainstreaming regional integration through SADC National Committees
SADC DFRC (Development Finance Resource Center)	2010	2009 Annual Report
SADC DFRC (Development Finance Resource Center)	2014	2013 Annual Report
SADC DFRC (Development Finance Resource Center)	2015	2014 Annual Report
SADC DFRC (Development Finance Resource Center)	2016	2015 Annual Report
SADC Policy Analysis & Dialogue Programme	2012	SADC Think Tank Conference on Regional Integration 10th August 2012, Maputo (Mozambique) Conference Report and Policy Papers

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SADC, SARDC	2016	SADC Gender and Development Monitor 2016 : Tracking progress on implementation of the SADC Protocol on gender and development
Sanoussi Bilal and Corinna Braun-Munzinger (ECDPM)	2008	EPA negotiations and regional integration in Africa : Building or stumbling blocs
SCOTT Lucy	2015	Annex 4. Report of the Marine Taxonomic Database Expert meeting
Secrétariat Général	2010	Annex 5 - RISP III Budget du Secrétariat Général de la COI pour l'exercice 2010
Secrétariat Général	2010	Annex 5 - RISP III Budget du Secrétariat Général de la COI pour l'exercice 2011
Secrétariat Général	2010	Annex 5 - RISP III Budget du Secrétariat Général de la COI pour l'exercice 2012
Secrétariat Général	2010	Annex 5 - RISP III Budget du Secrétariat Général de la COI pour l'exercice 2013
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity.	2014	Global Biodiversity Outlook 4: A mid-term assessment of progress towards the implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity.	2014	Global Biodiversity Outlook 4: Summary and Conclusions
Smartfish	2014	Smartfish Meeting report No 073 Training of Trainers for Fish Quality and Marketing - Bahir Dar, Ethiopia
Smartfish Secretariat	2011	Smartfish Meeting report No 002 Dagaa Value Chain Study Workshop
Smartfish Secretariat	2012	Smartfish Meeting report No 018 Preparation for EPA Negotiations - Meeting to discuss a common negotiating position
Smartfish Secretariat	2012	Smartfish Meeting report No 024-draft Regional Workshop on MPA's as a management tool for sustainable fisheries
Smartfish Secretariat	2012	Smartfish Meeting report No 027 Workshop on grant application for joint fisheries patrol

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Smartfish Secretariat	2014	Smartfish Meeting report No 087 Actes de la première rencontre des organisations professionnelles de pêcheurs des pays de la COI
Smartfish Secretariat	2015	Smartfish Meeting report No 104 Final Report RIPPLE Africa's Fish Conservation Project
Smartfish Secretariat	2017	Situation des activités de Smartfish à Madagascar au 30/01/2017
Soobaschand Sweenarian	2014	Regional comprehensive and integrated capacity building strategy framework for the implementation of the Mauritius strategy
Souther Africa Trust	2015	Taking SADC to the people : Report on the proposed SADC mechanism for engagement with non-state actors in line with Treaty Provisions (article 5 (2), 16A and 23)
Stradevco	2012	Plan d'actions prioritaires (PAP) 2013-2015
Stradevco	2012	Plan de développement stratégique 2013-2016
Stradevco	2012	Plan de développement stratégique 2013-2016 (version provisoire)
Suez Environnement	2012	Wikti™ : Achieve operational excellence in your water and sanitation services
Suhling, F., Samways, M. J., Simaika, J. P., Richter, O., Marais, E., Martens, A., Kipping, J.	2010	Dragonfly diversity from the Cape to the Kavango. In : Biodiversity in Southern Africa 2: Patterns and Processes at regional scale pp.64-69
T. Gondokondo, J. Madzongwe and B. Msimanga	2014	PPDF : Early review report
Talma Jude	2012	Smartfish Meeting report No 013 Tanzania Joint Committee Meeting for grant application for Joint Fisheries Surveillance
The Marine Parks and Reserves Unit, United Republic of Tanzania, and the Kenya Wildlife Service, Republic of Kenya		A proposed marine transboundary conservation area between Kenya and Tanzania
The World Bank / East African Community Secretariat	2014	East African Common market scorecard 2014 : tracking EAC compliance in the movement of capital, services and goods
The World Bank / East African Community Secretariat	2016	East African Common market scorecard 2016 : tracking EAC compliance in the movement of capital, services and goods

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UNCTAD	2015	Making regional trade work for Africa : Turning words into deeds
UNECA	2010	Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV : Enhancing Intra-African trade
UNEP		State of biodiversity in Africa
UNEP	2012	Global Environment Outlook 5: Environment for the future we want
UNEP	2016	Global Environment Outlook 6 : Regional assessment for Africa
UNEP-WCMC	2016	The state of biodiversity in Africa. A mid-term review of progress towards the Aichi Biodiversity Targets
Union Européenne, République de Djibouti	2014	Programme Indicatif National pour la période 2014-2020
Union Européenne, République de Madagascar	2015	11ème Fonds Européen de Développement - Programme Indicatif National (2014-2020) pour une coopération entre l'Union Européenne et la République de Madagascar
United Nations		United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
United Nations Secretariat	2014	Draft outcome document of the third International Conference on Small Island Developing States
USAID		USAID Southern Africa Regional Development Cooperation Strategy 2011-2016
WARD Ansen		Smartfish Meeting report No 034-draft Training for Fish Quality Improvement: Training of Trainers June 2012, Zambia and Zimbabwe
WARD Ansen	2012	Smartfish Meeting report No 065 Training for Fish Quality Improvement: Training of Trainers Forwksshop Mangoshi Malawi, December 2012
WARD Ansen	2013	Smartfish Meeting report No 066 Training for Fish Quality Improvement: Training of Trainers Workshop
WARD Ansen	2013	Smartfish Meeting report No 071 Border Fish Inspectors Training Workshop
WARD Ansen	2014	Smartfish Meeting report No 074 Training of Trainers for Fish Quality and Marketing - Djibouti City, Djibouti

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WIOMSA	2016	Coastal, Marine and Island specific biodiversity management in ESA-IO coastal states - Feasibility studies towards the development of a regional marine biodiversity database Final report
World Bank	2010	Doing business in the East African Community 2010 : Comparing regulation in 5 economies
World Bank	2013	Doing Business 2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises
World Bank	2013	Doing business in the East African Community 2013, Smarter regulations for Small and Medium-size Enterprises : Comparing business regulations for domestic firms in the East African Community and with 185 economies
World Bank	2013	Regional profile: Southern African Development Community. Doing business 2014
World Bank	2014	Regional profile: East african Community (EAC). Doing business 2014
World Bank	2016	Regional profile 2016: East african Community (EAC). Doing business 2016 : Measuring regulatory quality and efficiency
World Bank	2017	Regional profile 2017: Southern African Development Community. Doing business 2017
World Bank	2017	Regional profile 2017: East African Community. Doing business 2017
World Bank and the international finance corporation	2010	Doing business in the East African Community 2012 : Comparing regulation for domestic firms in the EAC and with 183 economies
World Trade Organization	2012	Trade policy Review, Report by the Secretariat of the East African Community
World Trade Organization	2013	Fourth global review of Aid for Trade 2013 connecting to Value Chains – Summary report