



External Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development (2009-2016)

Final Report – Volume II: Annexes

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the European Commission*

International
Cooperation and
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*The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view,
which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission
or by the authorities of the concerned countries.*

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The evaluation is being managed by the
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- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking”, COM (2016) 87 final.

Common Fisheries Policy (2013 reform):

- Regulation (EU) no 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 December 2013 of the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No. 1954/2003 and (EC) No. 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No. 2371/2002 and (EC) No. 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC.

Country by Country Reporting:

- Directive 2013/34/EU on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of businesses
- Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1910 of 28 October 2016 on the equivalence of the reporting requirements of certain third countries on payments to governments to the requirements of Chapter 10 of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (Text with EEA relevance).

Raw Materials Initiative (RMI):

- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “The raw materials initiative — meeting our critical needs for growth and jobs in Europe” COM (2008) 699 final;
- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Tackling the Challenges in Commodity Markets and on Raw Materials”, COM(2011) 25 final.

¹ We only list in this section the main texts of the selected policies. Several other documents related to these policies were analysed as part of the analysis of selected policies under Level 2 of the evaluation. See individual policy reports in Annex 9 for further details.

Inventory of documents

Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM):

- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility”, COM (2011) 743 final.

Digital Single Market (DSM) Strategy:

- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe”, COM (2015) 192 final, 06.05.2015.
- SWD (2015) 100 final “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe – Analysis and Evidence”, 06.05.2015; and various related Regulations, Directives and Decisions.

Review of the EU Blue Card directive:

- Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment, COM (2016) 378 final.

Responsible sourcing of minerals originating in conflict affected and high-risk areas:

- Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council “Responsible sourcing of minerals originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas Towards an integrated EU approach”, JOIN(2014) 8 final, 5 March 2014;
- Regulation 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.

A policy framework for climate and energy in the period 2020-2030:

- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030”, Brussels, 22.1.2014. COM (2014) 15 final.

Fourth Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Package:

- Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and amending Directive 2009/101/EC;
- Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information accompanying transfers of funds and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 (Text with EEA relevance).

ANNEX 2: EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

In this Annex, we present the evaluation framework which has been slightly reviewed during the Desk Phase, mainly in order to reflect the changes in the Intervention Logic (IL) of the EU PCD approach as presented in Chapter 2 of the Desk Report (see revised IL in Figure 1 below).

One key finding of the Desk Phase that led to changes to the IL is that the PCD mechanisms could be classified into two clusters:


- **Policy-making mechanisms**, which mainly consist of the IA and ISC activities. These two mechanisms are not specific to PCD. Rather, they have been in place within the Commission since long before the PCD concept was introduced and their overall objective is to ensure, *inter alia*, the inclusion of all services in the policy formulation process. In the context of the EU PCD approach, the use of these PCD mechanisms allows DG DEVCO to participate and contribute to policy-making led by other DGs, in order to ensure that the interests and needs of developing countries are taken account of. As such, these are considered main mechanisms, as they contribute directly to the main output of PCD (“New initiatives take account of development objectives, and their likely impact in developing countries is assessed”). As shown in Figure 1 below, in addition to the IA and ISC, policy-making mechanisms also include one PCD-specific mechanism – the PCD Work Programme – but this mechanism is essentially a one-off activity: it has only been used once for the period 2010-2013.
- **Awareness-raising mechanisms**, which essentially consist of PCD-specific activities coordinated by the PCD Team within DG DEVCO (other actors, such as PCD focal points in the line DGs and EU Member States (EUMS), are also involved). These include: the PCD Biennial Report, PCD Training, the CWP Screening, Consultations with Developing Countries, EUD Reporting, and EUMS Informal Network. During the Inception Phase, it had been assumed that some of these activities directly influenced policy-making (CWP screening), served the purpose of monitoring (PCD Biennial Report, EUD Reporting), or increased expertise (PCD Training, EUMS Informal Network). During the Desk Phase, it has become clear that all activities undertaken by the PCD Team are of an awareness-raising nature, and as such, (i) do not directly contribute to policy-making and (ii) do not directly contribute to monitoring.

This finding has led to the adjustment of the IL whereby:

- (i) Awareness-raising mechanisms are now considered to support mechanisms to policy-making mechanisms, but do not contribute directly to changes in policies (i.e., they do not contribute directly to the main output of PCD);
- (ii) The notions of “monitoring” and “increased expertise” have been toned down and mainstreamed under “awareness-raising”, given the nature of the activities; and
- (iii) The “knowledge-sharing” cluster, which contains activities that do not depend exclusively on the actions of the Commission, has been placed outside the operational framework of the EU’s approach to PCD.

Another key finding of the Desk Phase that led to modifications to the IL is the importance of external factors – particularly international commitments – during policy formulation: the inclusion of development considerations in non-development EU policies is often the result of exogenous factors. In these cases, the contribution of these external factors compared to that of PCD mechanisms can be subject to discussion.

Figure 1: Refined Intervention Logic of PCD



As the result of the above changes to the IL, the Evaluation Framework has been adjusted as follows:

- **EQ 3:** This question focuses on the efficiency of selected activities. Based on the findings during the desk phase described above, indicators under JC 3.1 in the revised evaluation framework now focus on the adequacy of each set of mechanisms (policy-making and awareness-raising) based on a qualitative assessment of individual activities.
- **EQ 4:** This question focuses on PCD awareness-raising mechanisms and how they might influence policy-making. Given the revised IL, this question has been reformulated in two main ways:
 - The notion of improved monitoring has been deleted, and the focus is now placed on raised awareness and increased expertise (these changes have also been reflected in the Judgment Criteria, leading for the removal of original JC 4.1 which focused on monitoring).
 - The assumption is now that PCD specific mechanisms might indirectly influence policy-making, which has been reflected in the second part of the question, and which is now captured under J.C 4.2 which now reads “Raised awareness and increased expertise on PCD have indirectly influenced policy-making”.

EQ 4 Inception Report	EQ 4 Desk Report
To what extent has the EU PCD approach led to improved monitoring, raised awareness and increased expertise on PCD?	To what extent has the EU PCD approach (PCD specific mechanisms) led to raised awareness on PCD, which in turn has <i>indirectly</i> influenced policy-making?

- **EQ 5:** This question focuses on how PCD mechanisms actually influence existing or planned policies / initiatives. Given the changes introduced in the IL, more focus is now placed on the policy-making mechanisms (IA and ISC activities):
 - Under JC 5.1, new indicators have been developed related to these two policy-making mechanisms, given the central role that they play in achieving the main outputs of PCD;
 - Under JC 5.2, indicators have been simplified and more focus is now placed on the contribution of PCD mechanisms in relation to other external factors to the Commission (EP, international commitments, etc.);
 - Original JC 5.3 which used to focus on a “loop” between the various outputs of PCD (policy-making, awareness-raising, monitoring, knowledge-sharing) has been removed since the indirect contribution of the awareness-raising to policy-making is now tested under JC 4.2.

Besides the changes mentioned above which are the direct results of the changes introduced to the IL, other minor changes have been introduced to the Evaluation Framework:

- **EQ 1:** This question linked to the relevance criteria focuses on the extent to which the EU PCD approach and its operational framework respond to evolving needs. The following minor changes have been introduced:
 - Under JC 1.1 which focuses on the evidence of the need for PCD, new I 1.1.2 now focuses on the references to the need for PCD in EU overarching policy documents as opposed to sector policy Communications as per the original indicator. The assessment of sector policy Communications seems rather linked to issues of coherence and are now assessed under EQ 2 / JC 2.1 (see below);
 - Under JC 1.2 which focuses on the evidence of the need for purpose built PCD mechanisms at the EU level, more emphasis has been placed on stakeholders’ views;
 - Under JC 1.3 which focuses on the adaptation of the EU PCD approach to evolving needs, indicators have been streamlined and strengthened in order to better reflect and

present “evolving challenges and changing needs in the international context” (new I 1.3.1), potential changes that “do not further the needs of stakeholders” (new I 1.3.3) and the views of stakeholders (new I 1.3.4).

- **EQ 2:** This question linked to the coherence criteria focuses on the extent to which the EU PCD approach is aligned with wider (sector) EU policy, and evolving international obligations of the EU. The following minor changes have been introduced:
 - Under JC 2.1 which used to be called “The PCD approach is reflected as a priority in wider EU policy and DEVCO policy”, the reference to “DEVCO policy” has been removed in the title of the JC, in order to put more emphasis on the coherence of PCD with EU non-development sector policy (the essence of coherence). In the same vein, I 2.1 has been modified and now exclusively focuses on references to PCD in EU sector policy documents (as opposed to overarching EU policy documents, which are now treated under JC 1.1 as described above);
 - Under JC 2.2 which focuses on the alignment of the PCD approach with development priorities (including the Post 2015 Development Agenda / SDGs), the scope of I 2.2.2 has been broadened to the “general adaptations of PCD mechanisms to MDGs/SDGs” and does not only limit the analysis to the “Share of PCD Council Conclusions clauses/recommendations referring to development commitments which have been acted upon through effective changes in PCD operational framework” as per the original indicator.
- **EQ 3:** In addition to the changes made to the indicators under JC 3.1 and JC 3.6 as described above, minor changes have been made to indicators under other JCs:
 - Under JC 3.2 which focuses on the resources of PCD, the focus on human resources has been maintained, and it has been decided to replace the focus on “financial” resources by “material” (IT systems, Database) under I 3.2.2;
 - Under JC 3.3 which focuses on “institutional support, set-up and procedures, and adequate organisational structures to implement PCD”, it has been decided to remove indicators linked to (i) hierarchical levels of PCD focal point (original I 3.3.3) and (ii) average turnover of staff (original I 3.3.4) and rather add an indicator “specific PCD related meetings at management level of above” due to available sources of information. Other indicators have been reformulated under JC 3.3 without altering the original spirit of the JC (original I 3.3.2 or redundancies and synergies has been integrated under JC 3.1 and the qualitative assessment of activities);
 - Under JC 3.4, no changes were made;
 - Under JC 3.5 (cooperation and coordination between EU institutions and with non-EU institutions), the 3 original indicators have been mainstreamed into 2 indicators (I 3.5.1 now focuses on EU stakeholders, while I 3.5.2 now focuses on developing countries).
- **EQ 6:** This question focuses on the extent to which the EU PCD approach created additional value beyond what could be achieved by the EUMS acting independently. The following minor changes have been introduced:
 - Under JC 6.1 “PCD objectives could not be achieved by Member States without the EU’s PCD approach”, I 6.1.1 now focuses on Stakeholders opinions on the added value of PCD mechanism;
 - Under JC 6.2 “The EU PCD approach has enabled the EU and EUMS to create links, avoid fragmentation and foster cooperation with the international community (UN, OECD) on development issues”, one original indicator (I 6.2.2 Explicit reference in literature to comparative advantage of actions of EU versus other development partners) has been deleted as it was deemed to be already captured in I 6.2.1 (Reference to the EU PCD approach informing and influencing dialogue in international fora on development or development-related issues during the period under evaluation) which has been kept intact;

- Under JC 6.3 “The EU PCD approach contributes to reinforcing EUMS’ own PCD”, no changes were made;
- Under JC 6.4 “The EU PCD approach reinforces EUMS’s priorities and commitments regarding poverty reduction in developing countries”, it has been specified in the JC title that this JC would be answered “with respect to selected case studies”. Moreover, original I 6.4.1 (Explicit reference to EU’s PCD approach reinforcing EUMS commitments and priorities towards poverty reduction in developing countries during the period under evaluation) has been removed as it is already captured in the 2 other indicators under this JC.
- **EQ 8:** no changes were made to this Evaluation Question.

We present below the full revised evaluation framework for all EQs, including the reviewed **EQ7**, which has been specifically developed and approved during the last stage of the Desk Phase.

Criteria		EQ1	Levels
Relevance		To what extent do the EU PCD approach and its operational framework respond to evolving needs?	1, 2, 3
Rationale		<p>This question focuses on the relevance of PCD by studying the relationship between the needs for PCD (including the needs of the final beneficiaries of PCD: the partner countries) and the objectives of PCD. In answering this question, we will therefore seek to provide evidence for the need for PCD, as well as investigate if the PCD approach has adapted to evolving needs and to institutional changes at the Commission level. As all evaluation questions, this question will provide explanatory factors when the findings are negative, such as blocking factors in the case of relevance.</p> <p>The question will also contribute (as an explanatory factor only) to the assessment of efficiency and effectiveness, as it will look at the relevance of PCD mechanisms and objectives (including expected outputs).</p>	
Coverage and method		<p>The question will be answered based upon the documentary analysis which will be triangulated with interviews and surveys to targeted stakeholders (Commission, EEAS, Council, EP, EUMS, CSOs), and with stakeholders' responses to the OPC of this evaluation and the OPC consultation that took place in 2016 for the new Development Consensus which includes specific questions on the relevance of PCD²). Where possible, this question will also draw on the responses to interviews to be carried out during 8 field visits to developing countries. The documents to be analysed are detailed further under the column "Sources".</p>	
Judgement Criteria		Indicators	Tools
JC 1.1	Evidence of the need for PCD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 1.1.1 Reference to the need for PCD in literature / international fora on development and development-related issues. ▪ I 1.1.2 Reference to the need for PCD in EU overarching policy documents (PCD specific, Development Consensus, PCD Council Conclusions) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary analysis ▪ Targeted Interviews with PCD Unit staff, DGs (relevant to development challenges), EEAS, EP (Rapporteur on PCD), Council (CODEV and COREPER) and CSOs (as identified in the Consultation Strategy) ▪ OPC ▪ Field visits
JC 1.2	Evidence of the need for purpose built PCD mechanisms at the EU level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 1.2.1 Number/nature of PCD mechanisms and nature of their mandate ▪ I 1.2.2. Stakeholders' views confirm that the EU's approach to PCD needs PCD specific-mechanisms to be implemented. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary analysis ▪ Targeted Interviews with PCD Unit staff, DGs (relevant to development challenges), EEAS, EP (Rapporteur on PCD), Council (CODEV and COREPER) and CSOs (as identified in the Consultation Strategy). ▪ Commission Survey.
		Sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Literature / conclusions from international fora on development and development-related issues ▪ EU policy documents and sector policy Communications
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PCD Commission communications and PCD related Council conclusions³ ▪ Responses to surveys and questionnaires.

² 2016 Report of Consultation on the new Consensus for Development.

³ E.g.: 2009 'PCD policy framework for a whole-of-the-Union approach', 2012 Council Conclusions 'Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change', 2015 Council Conclusions on PCD Report; 2007 Council Conclusions on PCD, EU Consensus on Development 2005 and 2016; list is not exhaustive.

Judgement Criteria		Indicators	Tools	Sources
JC 1.3	The EU PCD approach has adapted to evolving needs (including the needs of the final beneficiaries of PCD: partner countries).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 1.3.1 Identification of evolving challenges and changing needs in the international context ▪ I 1.3.2 Changes (or lack thereof) in organisational structures and/or functioning of PCD mechanisms in response to new needs and/or demands of stakeholders. ▪ I 1.3.3 Number/nature of changes in the functioning of PCD mechanisms that do not further the needs of stakeholders. ▪ I 1.3.4 Documentary evidence and stakeholders' views confirm that organisational structures and/or the functioning of PCD mechanisms have adapted to new needs and/or demands of various stakeholders during the period 2009-2016 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary analysis ▪ Targeted Interviews with PCD Unit staff, DGs (relevant to development challenges), EEAS, EP (Rapporteur on PCD), Council (CODEV and COREPER) and CSOs (as identified in the Consultation Strategy). ▪ Commission Survey. ▪ EUMS Survey. ▪ OPC ▪ Field visits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PCD Commission communications and PCD related Council conclusions ▪ Responses to surveys and questionnaires. ▪ PCD Biennial Reports. ▪ Country Strategy Papers
JC 1.4	The EU PCD approach has evolved in response to institutional changes at the Commission level (e.g. creation of EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 1.1.4.1 Changes (or lack thereof) in the roles of various Commission services involved in the implementation of PCD following institutional changes at the Commission level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary analysis ▪ Targeted Interviews with PCD Unit staff, DGs (relevant to development challenges), EEAS, EP (Rapporteur on PCD), Council (CODEV and COREPER) and CSOs (as identified in the Consultation Strategy). ▪ OPC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DGs mission statements and organisational structure
Feasibility / Challenges		n/a		

Criteria		EQ2	Levels	
Coherence		To what extent is the EU PCD approach aligned with wider EU policy and evolving international obligations of the EU?	1, 2, 3	
Rationale		This question focuses on the coherence of PCD by looking at the extent to which the EU PCD approach is coherent with wider EU policy and international obligations. This will include taking due consideration of the context of the MDGs and the successor SDGs (in effect from 2015).		
Coverage and method		The question will be answered based upon the documentary analysis of the principal EU policy documents on PCD, as well as the EU's development policy and international commitments on development. The desk analysis will also be triangulated with interviews and surveys to targeted stakeholders (Commission, Council, EEAS, EP, EUMS, CSOs), and also with stakeholders' responses to a previous OPC (Consultation on new Consensus for Development) and the OPC required for this evaluation. The policy documents to be analysed are detailed further under the column "Sources".		
Judgement Criteria		Indicators	Tools	Sources
JC 2.1	The EU PCD approach is reflected as a priority in wider EU policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 2.1 References to PCD approach/objectives in EU sector policy documents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Documentary analysis OPC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Core EU documents such as TEU and TFEU and in overarching EU policy documents
JC 2.2	The EU PCD approach has been aligned with development priorities identified during the period 2009-2016 (including the Post 2015 Development Agenda / SDGs).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 2.2.1 Reference to international development commitments priorities (e.g. MDGs for 2009-2015, and SDGs since 2016) in PCD Council Conclusions I 2.2.2 Adaptation (or lack thereof) of PCD mechanisms to MDGs / SDGs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Documentary analysis Targeted Interviews with PCD Unit staff, DGs (relevant to development challenges), EEAS, EP (Rapporteur on PCD), Council (CODEV and COREPER) and CSOs (as identified in the Consultation Strategy). OPC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PCD Commission communications and PCD related Council conclusions UN MDGs Action Plan and SDGs Agenda. Responses to questionnaires. PCD Biennial Reports
Feasibility / Challenges		n/a		

Criteria		EQ3	Level	
Efficiency		To what extent are PCD inputs and activities adequate to implement the EU PCD approach?	1	
Rationale		<p>This question will address the efficiency of implementation of PCD mechanisms. This question will look at the resources (human/financial: funds, expertise, time) with which the policy is being implemented. The focus of this question will be placed on the adequacy of inputs and activities. Adequacy can be broken down in 2 core elements: resource efficiency, and organisational efficiency such as synergies/redundancies. We will seek to identify to what extent the PCD institutional processes have capitalized on synergies and avoided redundancies /efficiencies at the input / activity level. This will include testing the main <i>assumptions</i> in the IL, specifically: (i) There are necessary incentives and structures for PCD (political will and institutional support); (ii) Organisational structures and individual expertise are sufficient; (iii) PCD enhances effective cooperation and coordination between EU institutions.</p> <p>The second level of efficiency according to its usual definition (comparison between results and inputs) will be assessed under EQ4 and EQ5.</p>		
Coverage and method		<p>The question covers the level of inputs and their relation to the PCD mechanisms and activities identified in the operational framework of the IL. The question will be answered based on documentary analysis and interviews to key Commission staff within DEVCO (PCD Unit and thematic/regional units) and interviews to targeted DGs, EEAS, the EP and Council. It will also rely on responses to the Commission Survey and Desk analysis of PCD related Council Conclusions and Biennial Reports. The interviews will be triangulated with surveys to targeted stakeholders (EUMS, CSOs).</p>		
Judgement Criteria		Indicators	Tools	Sources
JC 3.1	PCD's set of activities is adequate to reach PCD expected outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 3.1.1 Adequacy of PCD policy-making mechanisms (PCD non-specific mechanisms): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▫ Qualitative assessment of IAs ▫ Qualitative assessment of ISC ▪ I 3.1.2 Adequacy of PCD awareness-raising mechanisms (PCD specific mechanisms): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▫ Qualitative assessment of selected activities (summary of Annex 7) ▪ I 3.1.3 Number of redundancies/synergies within/ between activities with respect to their contribution to output achievement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary analysis ▪ Interviews with DGs, SECGEN, and PCD Unit/EEAS staff. ▪ Inventory Tool 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Responses to interviews and surveys. ▪ Inventory of activities. ▪ Documents and records of IAs and ISC (CISNET database)
JC 3.2	The resources available to implement PCD are adequate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 3.2.1 Actual level of human resources (staffing and expertise) compared to stakeholders' perception of needs ▪ I 3.2.2 Actual level of material resources (IT systems, databases) compared to stakeholders' perception of needs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interviews to targeted DGs, SECGEN, EEAS, and DEVCO staff (PCD Unit as well as thematic/regional units). ▪ Commission Survey ▪ EUD Survey. ▪ Desk analysis. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Responses to interviews and surveys. ▪ Inventory of activities. ▪ Internal PCD Unit documents and minutes of activities ▪ Internal job descriptions, organisational charts, etc.

Judgement Criteria		Indicators	Tools	Sources
JC 3.3	There is sufficient institutional support, set-up and procedures, and adequate organisational structures to implement PCD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.3.1 Reference to PCD in Commissioners statements / declarations I 3.3.2 Number of specific PCD-related meetings at management levels or above I 3.3.3 Number of PCD-related processes standardised within the PCD Unit, DEVCO/NEAR and other DGs, and the EEAS I 3.3.4 Number of organisational structures established within each service to promote PCD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with DGs, SECGEN, and PCD Unit/EEAS staff. Inventory Tool. Documentary analysis. Commission Survey. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Responses to interviews and surveys. Inventory of activities. Internal PCD Unit documents and minutes of organised activities. Standard Operating Procedures and Internal guidelines/Mission statements/Management plans.
JC 3.4	There is clarity within EU institutions with regards to the modus operandi of each PCD mechanism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.4 Level of knowledge/awareness of the modus operandi of PCD mechanisms by Commission services and staff, the EEAS and the Council. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews to targeted DGs, SECGEN, and PCD Unit/EEAS staff. Commission Survey. EUD Survey 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Responses to interviews and surveys.
JC 3.5	The functioning of the selected PCD mechanisms enhances effective cooperation and coordination between EU institutions and with non-EU institutions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.5.1 Number of PCD mechanisms that involve coordination with EU stakeholders (EUMS, EP, Council, EEAS, EESC, CSOs) I 3.5.2 Number of PCD mechanisms that involve coordination cooperation and coordination with developing countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Documentary analysis. Targeted interviews PCD Unit, DGs, EP, Council, EEAS. Commission, EUMS and EUD Survey; OPC Interviews with EU CSOs and institutions (i.e. OECD, EESC), and in developing countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PCD related documents for selected mechanisms. Responses to surveys and questionnaires. Documents and records of PCD Unit.
JC 3.6	PCD inputs and activities have adapted to adequately implement the EU PCD approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.6.1 Nature of changes of inputs and activities under PCD Policy-making mechanisms over time I 3.6.2 Nature of changes of inputs and activities under PCD Awareness raising mechanisms over time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All of the above 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All of the above
Feasibility / Challenges		Rotation of Commission staff responsible for PCD within each DG (PCD focal point) might represent a challenge for at least some of the targeted interviews. However, the evaluation team has foreseen to fill any gap with the responses to the Commission Survey.		

Criteria		EQ4	Level
Effectiveness Efficiency	To what extent has the EU PCD approach (PCD-specific mechanisms) led to raised awareness on PCD, which in turn has indirectly influenced policy-making?		2
Rationale	<p>This question will focus on three of four PCD outputs: improved monitoring, raised awareness and increased knowledge on PCD at the efficiency and effectiveness levels. The fourth output of PCD “New initiatives taking into account development objectives and their impact in developing countries assessed” which can be also considered as the main output of the PCD policy will be addressed in EQ5.</p> <p>At the efficiency level, EQ4 will seek to address how inputs have converted into outputs. At the effectiveness level, this question will seek to assess for each of the three outputs to what extent the objectives have been achieved. The question will also intend to identify changes in non-development policies resulting from the achievement of the three outputs. Unlike the relevance criteria which focused on the <i>needs</i> for PCD, the effectiveness criteria will look at the actual changes/effects that can be attributed to the intervention. The main <i>assumption</i> to be tested is that there is a consistent understanding and shared commitment of PCD among EC services.</p>		
Coverage and method	<p>This question will cover the three clusters of PCD mechanisms identified in the IL (monitoring, awareness-raising and knowledge-sharing), and in particular examine a group of mechanisms selected for closer review (at least 1 for each cluster – see section 3.3).</p> <p>The question will be answered based on the desk analysis of the selected mechanisms, as well as using feedback from interviews with staff in the relevant Commission DGs. The desk analysis will be triangulated with interviews and surveys of targeted stakeholders (EEAS, Council, EP, EUMS, CSOs)</p>		
Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Tools	Sources
JC 4.1	<p>The EU PCD approach has led to raised awareness and increased expertise on PCD</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 4.1.1 Frequency/timely production of biennial report, screening, EUD reporting, etc. ▪ I 4.1.2 Number and nature of awareness-raising actions implemented (disaggregated by topic, stakeholder, year), number of people trained (disaggregated by topic, stakeholder, year) ▪ I 4.1.3 Suitability (stakeholder coverage, content, perceived benefits, etc.) of the awareness-raising and training activities ▪ I 4.1.4 Level of knowledge of the modus operandi of PCD mechanisms by non-EU stakeholders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary analysis. ▪ Targeted interviews PCD Unit, DGs, EP, Council, EEAS. ▪ Commission, EUMS and EUD Survey. ▪ OPC. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PCD related documents for selected mechanisms. ▪ Responses to surveys and questionnaires. ▪ Documents and records of PCD Unit.
JC 4.2	<p>Raised awareness and increased expertise on PCD have indirectly influenced policy-making</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 4.2.1 Number of changes introduced in policy that can be linked to the PCD awareness-raising mechanisms (per selected policy) ▪ I 4.2.2 Number of changes of behaviour and practices that can be linked to increased awareness and knowledge 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary analysis. ▪ Targeted interviews EU CSOs and institutions (i.e. OECD, EESC). ▪ Interviews and focus group in developing countries ▪ OPC. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PCD related documents for selected mechanisms. ▪ Responses to surveys and questionnaires. ▪ Documents and records of PCD Unit.
Feasibility / Challenges	n/a		

Criteria	EQ5	Level
Effectiveness Efficiency	To what extent has the EU PCD approach influenced existing or planned policies/initiatives likely to affect developing countries so that they take into account development objectives?	2
Rationale	<p>This question will address the results of the employment of PCD mechanisms and achievement of PCD objectives at the output level for the output “New initiatives taking into account development objectives and their impact in developing countries assessed”. The question intends to identify changes in non-development policies due to the utilisation of PCD mechanisms. The main assumptions to be tested are that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The PCD process contributes to enhance and reinforce PCD in EU’s policy making; ▪ There is a consistent and shared commitment to PCD among Commission services; ▪ PCD enhances effective cooperation and coordination between EU institutions and with non-EU institutions <p>Positive cases of synergies and elimination of inconsistencies in non-development policies will be identified. Two kinds of possible failures will also be identified: (i) those policies and initiatives which have not been (or only marginally) influenced by PCD mechanisms. This inventory will come from the analysis undertaken at level 2. Explanatory factors for the lack of outputs will be provided; (ii) missed opportunities for policies and initiatives issued during the evaluation period (2009 – 2016) which have not been touched upon by PCD mechanisms but which would have benefitted from the PCD approach in a development perspective. Reasons behind these second missed opportunities will be presented. This question will also help to build evidence for the assessment of the second part of efficiency (input-output relationship); and for the assessment of the contribution of PCD on selected case studies to be further analysed at the level of outcomes and impact.</p>	
Coverage and method	<p>The question will be answered based on the analysis of selected non-development policies (see section 3.4). However, for the first JC of the question (JC5.1) the intention will be to include all policies identified in the Mapping of policies/initiatives (Annex 3) which have required an IA. The question will be answered based on the desk analysis of the selected initiatives (selection as proposed in section 3.4) and interviews with staff from the relevant DGs and EEAS. It will also build on the information regarding IAs for each policy/initiative listed in the Mapping of policies/initiatives (Annex 3).</p> <p>Preliminary data collection has been carried out in anticipation of the desk analysis. The evaluation team has created a Matrix Tool for the mapping of policies/initiatives that integrates non-development policies likely to affect developing countries for the period under evaluation. The classification and criteria applied to these policies have allowed the identification of a group of policies within each PCD challenge area relevant to developing countries (section 3.4). Moreover, the Matrix Tool contains information on IAs for each policy mapped. IAs will be screened for identification of development issues taken in consideration and the Matrix Tool will be completed during the Desk Phase. In order to establish the influence of PCD mechanisms in the selected policies/initiatives, the following steps will be carried out: (i) assess whether the policies are consistent⁴ with development objectives, (ii) determine if they identify synergies and avoid potential areas of conflict; and (iii) establish if changes to the policy have been influenced by a PCD approach.</p> <p>The desk analysis will also be triangulated with surveys to targeted stakeholders (EUMS, CSOs).</p>	

⁴ The definition of consistent here refers to the fact that the policy does not contradict the interests of developing countries. It is understood as a first step before creating synergies towards the achievement of a common objective.

Judgement Criteria		Indicators	Tools	Sources
JC 5.1	Commission policy proposals likely to affect developing countries take account of development objectives in the impact assessments (IAs) and ISC process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 5.1.1 Percentage of IAs that take account of impact in developing countries I 5.1.2 Percentage of IA's Inter-Service Steering Groups to which DEVCO participates I 5.1.3 Percentage of IAs for which the IA Board commented on development issues I 5.1.4 Qualitative assessment of IAs assessing the economic, social or environmental impacts in developing countries (per selected policy)/number of missed opportunities⁵ identified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Documentary analysis. Matrix of policies Tool. Targeted interviews to relevant DGs and EEAS Field visits Selected non-development policies overview and mapping tools. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CWP screening documents PCD 2010-2013 Work Plan IA of policies identified in Mapping 2009 IA Guidelines. 2015 Better Regulation Guidelines. Policy documents for selected non-development policies (i.e. final texts, IAs, proposals, roadmaps, draft working documents). Documents and records of IAs and ISC (databases SECGEN and CISNET) for each of the selected non-development policies. Responses to questionnaires.
JC 5.2	EU non-development policies likely to affect developing countries take account of development objectives due to PCD mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 5.2.1 Development objectives, needs or issues particular to developing countries addressed by the selected policies / missed opportunities I 5.2.2 Contribution of PCD mechanisms (per selected policy) or other factors external to the Commission (EP, international commitments) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Documentary analysis. Targeted interviews to relevant DGs and EEAS 	Same sources as above, plus: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Impact Assessment Board (IAB) opinion/Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) opinion Minutes of PCD ISG meetings Minutes of other mechanisms to trace the influence of PCD mechanisms. PCD Biennial Reports Reports from EU Delegations Reports from CSOs Responses to interviews
JC 5.3	The treatment of cross-cutting issues ⁶ has improved in the EU non-development policies taking account of development objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 5.3.1 Number and nature of specific cross-cutting issues linked to developing countries that (i) are considered in the selected policy; (ii) could have been considered in the selected policy (missed opportunities) 	As above	As above
Feasibility/Challenges		Triangulation will rely on differentiated surveys addressed to stakeholders at the EU institutional level but also contrasted with PCD Biennial Reports and responses to CSOs Survey. Rotation of Commission staff responsible for PCD within each DG (PCD focal point) might represent a challenge for targeted interviews. The criteria used for the selection of policies for closer review (section 3.4) include the existence of available information of the use of PCD mechanisms, which could bias towards positive results. To overcome this challenge, some of the criteria used for the selection are non-exclusive. Furthermore, the evaluation team will identify other cases of missed opportunities through the use of the Matrix tool and the IAs.		

⁵ Missed opportunities for policies and initiatives issued during the evaluation period (2009-2016), which have not been touched upon by PCD mechanisms, but which would have benefitted from the PCD approach in a development perspective. Reasons behind these second missed opportunities will be presented.

⁶ Such as: human rights, gender equality, democracy, good governance, children's rights, indigenous people's rights, environment and climate change sustainability, and combating HIV/AIDS.

Criteria		EQ6	Levels	
EU Added Value	To what extent has the EU PCD approach created additional value beyond what could be achieved by the EUMS acting independently?		1, 2, and 3	
Rationale	<p>This question will build evidence for the assessment of the EU added value criterion. We propose that the EU added value test is performed on the basis of the following 3 criteria in the context of this evaluation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effectiveness: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▫ PCD objectives (“existing or planned EU policies/ initiatives likely to affect developing countries so that they take account of development objectives”) could not be achieved by Member States without the PCD approach; ▫ The EU PCD approach has enabled the EU and its Member States to create links, avoid fragmentation and foster cooperation with the international community (UN, OECD) on development issues; ▪ Efficiency: The EU PCD approach contributes to reinforce EUMS’ own PCD; ▪ Synergy: The EU PCD approach reinforces EUMS’s priorities and commitments regarding poverty reduction in developing countries. 			
Coverage and method	The question has a global reach and will be answered via documentary analysis, surveys and targeted interviews especially with EEAS and EUMS stakeholders.			
Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Tools	Sources	
JC6.1	PCD objectives (“existing or planned EU policies/ initiatives likely to affect developing countries so that they take account of development objectives”) could not be achieved by Member States without the EU’s PCD approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 6.1.1 Stakeholders responses and documentary evidence confirm that the added value of/benefits provided by the EU’s PCD approach to achieve PCD objectives could/would not be achieved/not have been achieved independently by EUMS in terms of influence, expertise, or scope of engagement. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary analysis ▪ Targeted Interviews with PCD Unit staff, Council (CODEV and COREPER). ▪ EUMS Survey 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PCD-related Commission communications and PCD related Council conclusions ▪ COREPER Council reports ▪ Biennial Reports. ▪ Responses to surveys and questionnaires.
JC6.2	The EU PCD approach has enabled the EU and EUMS to create links, avoid fragmentation and foster cooperation with the international community (UN, OECD) on development issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 6.2.1 Reference to the EU PCD approach informing and influencing dialogue in international fora on development or development-related issues (e.g. migration, security, peace, etc.) during the period under evaluation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary analysis. ▪ Targeted Interviews with PCD Unit staff, DGs (DEVCO/NEAR and these relevant to development challenges), EEAS, EP (Rapporteur on PCD), Council (CODEV and COREPER) and CSOs (as identified in Consultation Strategy). ▪ EUMS Survey. ▪ Commission Survey. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PCD-related Commission communications and PCD related Council conclusions ▪ UN MDGs Action Plan and SDGs Agenda and related documents. ▪ Responses to surveys and questionnaires. ▪ Literature / conclusions from international fora on development and development-related issues

Judgement Criteria		Indicators	Tools	Sources
JC 6.3	The EU PCD approach contributes to reinforcing EUMS' own PCD.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 6.3.1. Number of EUMS that have adopted PCD mechanisms influenced by the EU PCD approach. ▪ I 6.3.2. Frequency and nature of EUMS participation and coordination with the Commission through PCD mechanisms. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary analysis. ▪ Targeted Interviews with PCD Unit staff. ▪ EUMS Survey. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PCD Unit documents (minutes of meetings and related documents). ▪ COREPER Council reports ▪ Biennial Reports. ▪ Responses to surveys and questionnaires.
JC 6.4	The EU PCD approach reinforces EUMS's priorities and commitments regarding poverty reduction in developing countries (with respect to selected case studies).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 6.4.1. Number and nature of PCD mechanisms reinforcing EUMS commitments and priorities towards poverty reduction in developing countries (with respect to selected case studies). ▪ I 6.4.2. Evidence of synergies or avoided contradictions between selected EU non-development policies and EUMS development-related actions in developing countries (field phase selected case studies). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Documentary analysis. ▪ Targeted Interviews with PCD Unit staff, EEAS, EP (Rapporteur on PCD), Council (CODEV and COREPER), EU Delegations. ▪ EUMS Survey. ▪ EUD Survey. ▪ Field visits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PCD Commission communications and PCD related Council conclusions. ▪ UN MDGs Action Plan and SDGs Agenda and related documents. ▪ Biennial Report. ▪ Responses to surveys and questionnaires. ▪ EUDs Reports and Country Strategy Papers (CSP) of selected countries for field phase.
Feasibility / Challenges		Triangulation will rely on interviews and differentiated surveys addressed to stakeholders at the EU institutional level and EUMS.		

Criteria		EQ7	Level		
Impact		To what extent have changes in the design and implementation of EU policies and initiatives brought about by incorporating a PCD approach influenced outcomes and impacts in developing countries?	Level 3		
Rationale		As defined in the Inception Report the impact evaluation criterion will look at the outcomes and impacts in developing countries resulting from the changes in EU's policies and actions brought about by incorporating a PCD approach. The selection criteria for the analysis of impact based on specific case studies contemplates the "availability of concrete PCD outputs to be able to explore further causality links to outcome and impact". In order to carry out the assessment at the impact level, the team applied a broader definition of PCD in order to consider that development considerations / development friendliness / development cooperation objectives / development-related clauses contained in a policy constitute a distinctive element of the main PCD output as set in the IL of the EU's approach to PCD regardless of an explicit link with PCD mechanisms, as well as consider the potential impact of development activities foreseen at the implementation level of the policy			
Coverage and method		<p>We propose to conduct the impact assessment via two main tools for each of the selected policies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A meta-analysis of existing impact studies of the selected policy with a focus on the impact on selected countries; and ▪ A qualitative (and quantitative when appropriate) assessment of the impact of the policy based on field visits and stakeholder interviews. 			
Judgement Criteria		Indicators	Tools	Sources	Countries proposed
JC 7.1	The Common Fisheries Policy (2013 reform) has had positive development outcomes and impacts in selected countries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 7.1.1 Extent of SFPAs' contribution to the local economy in the selected countries ▪ I 7.1.2 Extent of SFPAs' contribution to employment in the selected countries ▪ I 7.1.3 State of fish stocks covered by the SFPAs and presence of positive/negative externalities of SFPAs on food security in the selected countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Meta-analysis of existing studies complemented with quantitative analysis ▪ Interviews in the field 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Employment Statistics ▪ Existing Literature ▪ Persons to be interviewed in the field will be presented in the desk report. 	Senegal, Mauritania
JC 7.2	The Generalized Scheme of Preferences Regulation contributes to poverty eradication by expanding exports from the selected countries to the EU. ⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 7.2.1 Changes in exports of selected countries caused by the GSP ▪ I 7.2.2 Changes in employment and incomes at sector level ▪ I 7.2.3 Presence of positive / negative externalities linked to GSP-induced exports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Meta-analysis of existing studies complemented with quantitative analysis ▪ Interviews in the field 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Trade Statistics ▪ Existing Literature ▪ Persons to be interviewed in the field will be presented in the desk report. 	Vietnam, Mozambique
JC 7.3	The EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking is likely to contribute to development objectives by engaging in and benefiting local	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 7.3.1: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on the reduction of Illicit Trade between the selected country and the EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Meta-analysis of existing studies ▪ Field visits/ Interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Existing Literature ▪ Persons to be interviewed in the field will be 	Kenya, Burkina Faso

⁷ The review team assumes a link between increased trade (increased exports from developing countries) and poverty eradication as stated in the policy objectives.

	communities from wildlife conservation in selected countries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 7.3.2: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on the Livelihood of local communities ▪ I 7.3.3: Likely of occurrence of other positive / negative externalities linked to EUAP against wildlife trafficking 		presented in the desk report.	
JC 7.4	The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) contributes to poverty reduction by facilitating the legal migration of third country residents towards the EU and promoting social and economic development in selected countries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I.7.4.1 ▪ Extent of contribution of financial remittances ▪ I.7.4.2. Extent of contribution of socialremittancesI.7.4.3 Extent of improvement of social and economic conditions upon return I.7.4.4 Unintended effects of border management measures and unintended effects of other measures facilitating migration ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Meta-analysis of existing studies complemented with quantitative and qualitative analysis ▪ Interviews in the field 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Migration statistics (WB and national statistics) ▪ Existing studies, reports, academic papers on MPs for Cape Verde and Armenia, ▪ Stakeholders to be interviewed. 	Cape Verde, Armenia.
Feasibility / Challenges		Limited availability of evidence on impact and difficulties in establishing a direct causal link with PCD mechanisms. The complexity involved in isolating the expected effects of an EU non-development policy incorporating a PCD approach (at the level of outcomes and impact) represents the main challenge on the assessment of PCD impact. Therefore, the assessment is based on specific case studies and relies on a qualitative assessment and desk review.			

Criteria		EQ8	Levels	
Sustainability		To what extent is the PCD approach sustainable?	1, 2 and 3	
Rationale		<p>PCD is a long-term process which requires continuous political backing. We will therefore assess if the political commitment is sustainable, if PCD mechanisms have become a permanent part of policy-making process. In the context of this evaluation, sustainability will therefore look at the following issues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is adequate political will, organisation knowledge and continuous learning to ensure sustainability of PCD at EU policy-making level The mechanisms have become embedded/permanent part of policy formulation process⁸. <p>As such, the question will test the assumption “PCD is mainstreamed into the policy making processes and thinking of the relevant actors”.</p>		
Coverage and method		The question will be answered based on interviews to staff and stakeholders in the relevant DGs, Council, EP, CSOs and documentary analysis. Triangulation will be done with Commission/EEAS, EUD and EUMS surveys.		
Judgement Criteria		Indicators	Tools	Sources
JC 8.1	There is adequate political will and continuous learning to ensure sustainability of PCD at EU policy-making level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 8.1.1 Reference in political statements (from both the EU and EUMS) expressing support for PCD. I 8.1.2 Number of good practices and lessons learned, and number of resulting changes in the organisation framework (per activity, per output) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Documentary analysis Interviews Commission Survey EUMS Survey OPC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political statements from EU and EUMS PCD Commission communications and PCD related Council conclusions. Responses to surveys and questionnaires.
JC 8.2	The EU’s PCD mechanisms have become embedded / a permanent part of policy formulation process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 8.2.1 Number/nature of mechanisms that have been embedded / have become a permanent part of the policy formulation process. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Documentary analysis Interviews Commission Survey OPC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PCD Commission communications and PCD related Council conclusions. Documents and records of PCD Unit. Responses to surveys and questionnaires.
Feasibility / Challenges		The feasibility for this question is medium, based on availability and access to documents, Commission staff to be interviewed and responsiveness to surveys. Triangulation will rely on differentiated surveys addressed to stakeholders at the EU institutional level.		

⁸ Please see Council Conclusions on Policy Coherence for development of 12 December 2013: Council noted that PCD needed to be anchored more strongly in areas beyond external action and within the debates on global challenges and the post-2015 framework, “with a view to mainstreaming PCD in policy formulation and development processes beyond 2015”.

ANNEX 3: INDICATOR-LEVEL ANALYSIS

1 EQ1 RELEVANCE: TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE EU PCD APPROACH AND ITS OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK RESPOND TO EVOLVING NEEDS?

Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Findings	Strength of evidence /sources ⁹
JC 1.1: Evidence of the need for PCD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 1.1.1 Reference to the need for PCD in literature/international fora on development and development-related issues. 	<p>The EU’s approach to PCD during the first part of the period of evaluation has been framed within the EU’s commitment to the MDGs. The Doha declaration called for international financial and development institutions “<i>to continue to enhance policy coherence for development</i>” and called “<i>on all countries whose policies have an impact on developing countries to increase their efforts to formulate policies consistent with the objectives of sustained growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development of developing countries</i>”. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda committed the international community to pursue policy coherence and an enabling environment for sustainable development. This Action plan recognized “<i>the importance of policy coherence for sustainable development</i>” and called “<i>upon countries to assess the impact of their policies on sustainable development</i>”. The adoption of the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development has called for “policy coherence for sustainable development” under Goal 17, targets “17.13 Enhance global macroeconomic stability, including through policy coordination and policy coherence; 17.14 Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development”.</p>	<p>Strong – documentary sources are numerous and objective and are supported by the views of the majority of stakeholders</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 1.1.2 Reference to the need for PCD in EU overarching policy documents (PCD specific, Development Consensus, PCD Council Conclusions). 	<p>The EU’s targeted approach to PCD as expressed in several Commission Communications and Council Conclusions since 2005 has reflected the need to respond to the EU’s international commitment to MDGs. The Council has acknowledged the impact of EU non-aid policies as a potential positive contribution: by identifying specific areas EU policies could be steered to create synergies with development policy objectives. The 2006 European Consensus on Development re-affirmed the EU’s commitment towards a PCD targeted approach. The 2010 EU’s PCD whole-of-the-Union approach was operationalized as part of the EU action plan to support the achievement of the MDGs. The 2011 Agenda for change further confirmed PCD as relevant to support efforts of developing countries in the reduction of poverty and in face of new global challenges. In the context of the discussions for the</p>	<p>Strong – documentary sources are numerous and objective and are supported by the views of the majority of stakeholders</p>

⁹ The following ranking of evidence has been used:

- **Strong:** Documentary / qualitative /factual evidence which is confirmed by the majority of stakeholders interviewed
- **More than satisfactory:** Qualitative evidence confirmed by the majority of stakeholders
- **Indicative but not conclusive:** No hard evidence, but views expressed by a clear majority of stakeholders
- **Weak:** There is no triangulation and / or evidence is limited to some single source / disagreements between stakeholders interviewed

Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Findings	Strength of evidence /sources ⁹
		post-2015 framework, the Communication A Decent Life for All, considered that PCD should play a role on implementing the framework. The Council Conclusions on a new global partnership for poverty eradication and sustainable development reaffirmed PCD as means of implementation of a post-2015 development agenda. The new European Consensus on development reflects a paradigm-shift in development cooperation following the adoption of the 2030 Agenda on SDG. The new Consensus re-affirms the EU's commitment to PCD and states its fundamental role as part of the EU's contribution to achieving the SDGs and to the broader objective of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD).	
JC 1.2: Evidence of the need for purpose built PCD mechanisms at the EU level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 1.2.1 Number/nature of PCD mechanisms and nature of their mandate 	The Commission has used existing policy-making mechanisms (non-PCD specific mechanisms) such as IA and ISC for promoting policy coherence for development at the early stages of policy formulation. Mechanisms to promote awareness on PCD (PCD specific mechanisms) have also been put in place: First the EU Members States Network on PCD and the Biennial Report with its initial aim to track progress of PCD within the Commission and EU Members States, followed by the Screening for PCD relevance of the CWP. At a second stage, training activities and EU Delegations reporting on PCD have been established. In addition, there is a mechanism for consultation with developing countries (ACP countries) under article 12 of the Cotonou agreement; and there used to be a formal ISG on PCD.	Strong – documentary sources are numerous and objective and are supported by the views of the majority of stakeholders
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 1.2.2. Stakeholders' views confirm that the EU approach to PCD needs PCD specific-mechanisms to be implemented. 	PCD specific mechanisms are not used to their full potential; according to stakeholders, the concept of policy coherence for development is not yet well owned by staff in DGs other than DG DEVCO, and EU Delegations need further awareness on their role of promoting PCD.	Indicative but not conclusive – this is mainly relying on views of stakeholders and mixed views have been expressed
JC 1.3: The EU PCD approach has adapted to evolving needs (including the needs of the final beneficiaries of PCD: partner countries).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 1.3.1 Identification of evolving challenges and changing needs in the international context. 	As mentioned above, the EU's approach to PCD has been framed first by the context of the MDGs and then by the 2030 Agenda on SDG. In between, contextual changes demanding action of the EU to address security concerns have also occurred. In the context of global shocks, and political and social conflict in some regions (i.e. Southern Neighbourhood), the importance of the security-development nexus as well as that of the migration-development nexus have come to the forefront. In this context, the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS) intends to combine internal and external policies to respond to conflicts and crises; according to the new Consensus on development the EUGS will consider SDGs as a cross-cutting dimension. It is yet to see how the EU's approach to PCD will align with new priorities at the centre of the external action.	More than satisfactory – this is based on documentary sources and most stakeholders interviewed confirmed the view expressed by the evaluation team
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 1.3.2 Changes (or lack thereof) in organisational structures and/or functioning of PCD 	The Council and the EP have called to further reinforce policy -making mechanisms such as IA and ISC for the promotion of PCD; to broaden the base on PCD awareness; to further reinforce consultation with partner countries; to involve EU Delegations to promote	More than satisfactory – this is based on documentary sources and

Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Findings	Strength of evidence /sources ⁹
	mechanisms in response to new needs and/or demands of stakeholders.	dialogue on PCD at the partner country level and provide feedback on the impact of EU policies. With the introduction of the 2015 BR Guidelines, revised IA guidelines and a specific Tool on Developing Countries have been added. PCD training has targeted EU Delegations and there is an online PCD training tool since 2016. In 2010 article 12 of the Cotonou agreement between the EU and ACP countries was modified and explicitly refers to the commitment to address PCD. Since 2014 EU Delegations participate in a PCD yearly reporting exercise. Furthermore, the Juncker Commission is intended to promote coherence. The creation of working groups of Commissioners has seen the establishment of a group of Commissioners involved in external relations chaired by the HR/VP. There is no evidence so far how this change particularly relates to PCD.	most stakeholders interviewed confirmed the view expressed by the evaluation team
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I.1.3.3. Number/nature of changes in the functioning of PCD mechanisms that do not further the needs of stakeholders. 	The formal ISG on PCD created in 2006 is no longer active. Some coordination activities undertaken by the PCD Team with FPs are on an informal capacity, such as the Screening of the CWP for PCD relevance. The screening exercise has no longer a follow up mechanism and only happens at the beginning of the year. Since 2013 there is not a targeted PCD work-programme.	More than satisfactory – this is based on documentary sources and most stakeholders interviewed confirmed the view expressed by the evaluation team
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I.1.3.4 Documentary evidence and stakeholders' views confirm that organisational structures and/or the functioning of PCD mechanisms have adapted to new needs and/or demands of various stakeholders during the period 2009-2016 	Council Conclusions on PCD confirm strengthening of IA and ISC have adapted to the demand of stakeholders to better assess the impacts of EU policies likely to affect developing countries (revised 2009 IA Guidelines, 2015 Better Regulation Guidelines and Better Regulation Toolbox's Tool #30 Developing Countries). Also, the Council has acknowledged with satisfaction the establishment of regular reporting of PCD issues by EU Delegations. Throughout the period the Council has recognized contribution made by the Biennial Report in reporting on progress at the EU level and in Member States. Though a monitoring mechanism on PCD at the Commission and EU level, nor at the EU Delegations level exists yet. PCD role within the broader approach of PCSD has not yet been operationalized as it was the case in the context of the MDGs.	More than satisfactory – as above
JC 1.4: The EU PCD approach has evolved in response to institutional changes at the Commission level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I.1.4.1 Changes (or lack thereof) in the roles of various Commission services involved in the implementation of PCD following institutional changes at the Commission level 	There is no evidence that the creation of the EEAS has signified an evolution in the implementation of the EU's approach to PCD. The Council and EP have called for coordinated efforts and close cooperation between the EEAS, the Commission and the EU Member States to strengthen PCD. Beyond an emerging EU Delegations Reporting exercise, no concrete actions to assess the impact of EU policies at the partner country level have been made. It is not yet clear from the standpoint of development policy and in the context of SDGs, how the EU's approach to PCD will align with the new priorities at the centre of the EUGS. The coordination role of the EEAS on PCD is yet to be clarified given institutional changes and stakeholders demands on reporting on impact at the country level.	Strong – no objective changes took place in response to institutional changes and this is acknowledged by most stakeholders

2 EQ2 COHERENCE: TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE EU PCD APPROACH ALIGNED WITH WIDER EU POLICY AND EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE EU?

Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Findings	Strength of evidence /sources
JC 2.1: The EU PCD approach is reflected as a priority in wider EU policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 2.1.1 References to PCD approach/objectives in EU sector policy documents 	The alignment of EU sector policies with PCD seems heterogeneous across sectors. Some policy areas due to their external dimension and EU’s international commitments have a track record of including PCD into their specific sectors. For instance, Trade and Migration have usually reflected a PCD approach within their policies, a finding which is also reflected in the analysis of EQ5. Other sectors have gradually introduced a PCD approach into their policies, for instance Fisheries and Agriculture. Other sectors, not fully address a PCD approach despite the external effects of their policy areas.	Strong – this finding is based on documentary sources that can be easily verified
JC 2.2: The EU PCD approach has been aligned with development priorities identified during the period 2009-2016 (including the Post 2015 Development Agenda / SDGs).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 2.2.1 Reference to international development commitments priorities (e.g. MDGs for 2009-2015, and SDGs since 2016) in PCD Council Conclusions 	The EU PCD approach has been aligned to the EU’s international commitment to poverty eradication and sustainable development in the context of the MDGs and the post 2015 context on SDG, but also with respect to other international commitments on migration, trade, peace and stability, and climate change.	Strong – this finding is based on documentary sources that can be easily verified
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 2.2.2: Adaptation (or lack thereof) of PCD mechanisms to MDGs / SDGs 	In the context of the MDGs the EU responded with a PCD targeted and strategic approach with a PCD Work-programme covering five challenge areas, adopting a “whole of the Union approach”. The post-2015 framework includes a broader concept of PCSD and in the view of stakeholders from different sectors the role of the EU’s PCD commitment in the new SDG context is not yet clear, it has not been operationalized.	Strong – this finding is based on documentary sources that can be easily verified. Views expressed by stakeholders were coherent for the most part.

3 EQ3 EFFICIENCY: TO WHAT EXTENT ARE PCD INPUTS AND ACTIVITIES ADEQUATE TO IMPLEMENT THE EU PCD APPROACH?

Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Findings	
JC 3.1: PCD's set of activities is adequate to reach PCD expected outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.1.1 Adequacy of PCD policy-making mechanisms (PCD non-specific mechanisms) 	The PCD Policy-making mechanisms (IAs and ISC) are considered as reasonably adequate to reach PCD expected outputs.	More than satisfactory – This is a somewhat subjective issue and different views have been expressed. The evaluation team has formed its judgement mainly based on a qualitative assessment of the mechanisms, which conclusions might not be shared by all parties.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.1.2 Adequacy of PCD awareness-raising mechanisms (PCD specific mechanisms) 	With regards to PCD Awareness-raising mechanisms, there are found to be reasonably adequate overall, with varying degree of adequacy per mechanism since strengths, weaknesses and areas for improvement exist for virtually all mechanisms, depending on their level of standardization/ formalization.	More than satisfactory – as above
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.1.3 Number of redundancies / synergies within/between activities with respect to their contribution to output achievement 	Selected activities paint a mixed picture in terms of synergies and redundancies. Awareness-raising mechanisms act as <i>support mechanisms</i> to the policy-making mechanisms towards output achievement.	More than satisfactory – as above
JC 3.2: The resources available to implement PCD are adequate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.2.1 Actual level of human resources (staffing and expertise) compared to stakeholders' perception of needs 	Overall, the adequacy of the actual level of human resources available to implement PCD is difficult to assess. Analysis of current level of human resources against perception of needs at the level of activities suggest that policy-making mechanisms do not necessarily possess adequate resources while awareness-raising mechanisms (PDC Team) possess sufficient resources but these resources could be used more efficiently.	More than satisfactory – as above
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.2.2 Actual level of material resources (IT systems, databases) compared to stakeholders' perception of needs 	The single most important limitation in with regards to material resources is the poor visibility of the PCD Team in terms of upcoming legislative proposals: given the absence of a long-term Commission Workplan (as was the case in the past, e.g. at the time when the PCD Work Programme 2010-2013 was prepared), the PCD Team is not aware of all Commission initiatives and hence cannot engage in effective awareness-raising / lobbying in order to ensure certain initiatives are considered for PCD Work.	More than satisfactory – as above

<p>JC 3.3: There is sufficient institutional support, set-up and procedures, and adequate organisational structures to implement PCD</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.3.1 Reference to PCD in Commissioners statements / declarations 	Commissioners for Development have in several occasions reaffirmed the EU’s commitment for PCD in public statements and declarations, and making it a priority of their mandates.	Strong – this finding is based on documentary sources that can be easily verified
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.3.2 Number of specific PCD-related meetings at management levels or above within DG DEVCO 	<u>The highest number of Jour-Fixe meetings and Management meetings including PCD issues in their agenda have taken place in 2011 compared to those taking place in a later period.</u> Available evidence suggests that a total of 52 meetings where PCD has been part of the agenda have taken place during the evaluation period (there is incomplete evidence for the period 2009-2010).	Strong – this finding is based on documentary sources that can be easily verified
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.3.3 Number of PCD-related processes standardised within the PCD Unit, DG DEVCO/NEAR and other DGs, and the EEAS. 	PCD-related processes paint a mixed picture in terms of their level of standardisation. IA and ISC activities processes are fully standardized as they are part of the policy-making process of the Commission. The Biennial Report, EU Delegations Reporting, the Informal EU Member States PCD Network, and the PCD training are highly standardized activities within DG DEVCO.	Strong – this is a factual assessment, and most EU stakeholders expressed this view
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.3.4 Number of organisational structures established within each service to promote PCD 	The PCD Team within DG DEVCO is the only true organisational structure that has been established to promote PCD within the Commission.	Strong – this is a factual assessment, and most EU stakeholders expressed this view
<p>JC 3.4: There is clarity within EU institutions with regards to the modus operandi of each PCD mechanism.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.4 Level of knowledge/awareness of the modus operandi of PCD mechanisms by Commission services and staff, the EEAS and the Council. 	Interviews suggest a lack of understanding of the extent of the commitment contained in article 208 (1) - TFEU.	Strong – the interview process and survey answers point to a lack of common understanding
<p>JC 3.5: The functioning of the selected PCD mechanisms enhances effective cooperation and coordination between EU institutions and with non-EU institutions.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.5.1 Number of PCD mechanisms that involve coordination with EU stakeholders (EUMS, EP, Council, EEAS, EESC, CSOs) 	One important and positive feature of PCD mechanisms is that they often involve coordination with EU stakeholders, hence promoting and fostering inter-institutional cooperation.	Strong – most EU stakeholders expressed this view
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 3.5.2 Number of PCD mechanisms that involve cooperation and coordination with developing countries 	Only a limited number of PCD mechanisms involve cooperation and coordination with developing countries. Consultation with ACP countries under the consultation mechanism set out in article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement provides an opportunity to promote the coherence of EU policies which might affect the interests of the ACP countries. The mechanism has been significantly underused during the evaluation period despite constant calls from the Council to involve partner countries on PCD dialogue.	Strong – most developing countries stakeholders / civil society expressed this view

<p>JC 3.6: PCD inputs and activities have adapted to adequately implement the EU PCD approach</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 3.6.1 Nature of changes of inputs and activities under PCD Policy-making mechanisms over time 	<p>There is some evidence that PCD policy-making mechanisms have adapted: The IA activity was modified on two occasions during the period. However, the usefulness of these improvements is not possible to ascertain.</p>	<p>More than satisfactory – This is a somewhat subjective issue and different views have been expressed. The evaluation team has formed its judgement mainly based on a qualitative assessment of the mechanisms, which conclusions might not be shared by all parties.</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I 3.6.2 Nature of changes of inputs and activities under PCD Awareness raising mechanisms over time 	<p>There is however limited evidence of adaptation of PCD awareness-raising mechanisms during the evaluation period. PCD training has been tailored to address the specific role of EU Delegations in the promotion of PCD.</p>	<p>More than satisfactory – as above</p>

4 EQ4 EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE EU PCD APPROACH (PCD-SPECIFIC MECHANISMS) LED TO RAISED AWARENESS ON PCD, WHICH IN TURN HAS INDIRECTLY INFLUENCED POLICY-MAKING?

Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Findings	Strength of evidence /sources
JC 4.1: The EU PCD approach has led to raised awareness and increased expertise on PCD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 4.1.1 Frequency/timely production of biennial report, screening, EUD reporting, etc. 	The following awareness-raising activities have been largely implemented in a timely manner: (i) Biennial reports; (ii) Coordinating and consulting with EUMS. For other selected activities, sufficient frequency and timeliness is more difficult to ascertain. These include: Organising and participating in PCD training activities; EU Delegations reporting; PCD CWP Screening / PCD Work-programme 2010-2013; Consultation with developing partner countries.	Strong – this is a factual assessment, and most EU stakeholders expressed this view
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 4.1.2 Number and nature of awareness-raising actions implemented (disaggregated by topic, stakeholder, year), number of people trained 	The only true awareness-raising actions implemented during the review period are: (i) 11 informal EUMS meetings; (ii) 11 training actions. No other actions are known to the evaluation team, hence suggesting a limited number and coverage of awareness-raising activities. It should also be noted that over the course of 2016, DG DEVCO – specifically the PCD team – developed an E-learning tool on PCD for DGs, EU Delegations, EUMS and the wider public.	Indicative but not conclusive – records provided by the EU were not exhaustive
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 4.1.3 Suitability (stakeholder coverage, content, perceived benefits, etc.) of the awareness-raising and training activities 	Awareness-raising actions are not entirely suitable for both endogenous (the nature of the activities) and exogenous (external context) factors.	Indicative but not conclusive – as above
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 4.1.4 Level of knowledge of the modus operandi of PCD mechanisms by non-EU stakeholders. 	There is no common understanding of the PCD concept among stakeholders.	Strong – except for a small majority of interviewed parties, most stakeholders do not know PCD
JC 4.2: Raised awareness and increased expertise on PCD have indirectly influenced policy-making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 4.2.1 Number of changes introduced in policy that can be linked to the PCD awareness-raising mechanisms (per selected policy). 	There is no evidence that the PCD awareness raising mechanisms have had a direct impact on policy-making as demonstrated in EQ5. For the 13 policies selected under level 2, the most important factors contributing to PCD are: (i) political will from the onset of the policy; (ii) policy-making mechanisms such as the IA and the ISC. While there might be an indirect link between awareness-raising mechanisms and actual policy changes, this link could not be established by the evaluation team.	Strong – in most cases reliable sources are available
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 4.2.2 Number of changes of behaviour and practices that can be linked to increased awareness and knowledge 	Limited number of changes. The following potential positive contributions of the PCD Team to changes of behaviour and practices are: (i) PCD Team actively participated in the production of the BR toolbox (although there is limited evidence that the Toolbox has led to actual changes of behaviour and practices); PCD team is actively lobbying with the RSB in order to ensure that developing countries impact are actually systematically included (although this is a recent initiative with no results to show for).	Strong – based on documentary evidence / most EU stakeholders expressed this view

5 EQ5 EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE EU PCD APPROACH INFLUENCED EXISTING OR PLANNED POLICIES/INITIATIVES LIKELY TO AFFECT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SO THAT THEY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES?

Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Findings	Strength of evidence /sources
JC Commission policy proposals likely to affect developing countries take account of development objectives in the impact assessments (IAs) and ISC process	5.1: I 5.1.1 Percentage of IAs that take account of impact in developing countries	Based on the analysis of IAs of policies identified in the “Mapping of PCD policies and initiatives” (see Inception Report), 46.3% of IAs included explicit references of the policies’ likely impacts in developing countries, 19.5% of IAs that mentioned impacts on developing countries, but in a limited fashion or not explicitly enough; and 34.1% IAs that did not include any references to impacts on developing countries.	Strong – this is based on a statistical assessment which is coherent with similar studies carried out by civil society
	I 5.1.2 Percentage of IA’s Inter-Service Steering Groups to which DEVCO participates	Based on the analysis of IAs of policies identified in the “Mapping of PCD policies and initiatives” (see Inception Report), DG DEVCO was invited to participated in only 53.6% of IA’s Inter-Service Steering Groups.	Strong – this is based on a statistical assessment
	I 5.1.3 Percentage of IAs for which the IA Board commented on development issues	Based on the analysis of IAs of policies identified in the “Mapping of PCD policies and initiatives” (see Inception Report), the RSB/IA Board commented on development issues 22% of the time (9 IAs out of 41).	Strong – this is based on a statistical assessment
	I 5.1.4 Qualitative assessment of IAs assessing the economic, social or environmental impacts in developing countries (per selected policy)/ number of missed opportunities ¹⁰ identified	Out of the 13 selected policies, the following metrics can be reported: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 3 IAs are of high-quality and are extensive; ▪ 1 IA does address potential impacts of selected options on conflict-affected regions/countries but is potentially not as detailed as it could have been; ▪ 2 IAs have limited coverage of impacts on developing countries but this is justified in some cases by the nature of the policy; ▪ 4 policies have no IA but this is justified; ▪ 3 IAs do not assess the impact on developing countries and can be considered to be missed opportunities. 	Strong – this is based on an in-depth assessment which has for the most part been validated during stakeholder’s interviews

¹⁰ Missed opportunities for policies and initiatives issued during the evaluation period (2009-2016), which have not been touched upon by PCD mechanisms, but which would have benefitted from the PCD approach in a development perspective. Reasons behind these second missed opportunities will be presented.

Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Findings	Strength of evidence /sources
JC 5.2: EU non-development policies likely to affect developing countries take account of development objectives due to PCD mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 5.2.1 Development objectives, needs or issues particular to developing countries addressed by the selected policies / missed opportunities¹¹ 	<p>One of the key findings of the evaluation with regards to effectiveness of PCD mechanisms is that there is a very high degree of correlation between the availability / quality of the impact assessment (the extent to which the IA takes considers the impact of the policy on developing countries) and the actual inclusion of development objectives / considerations in the final draft of the policy.</p>	<p>Strong – this is based on an in-depth assessment which has for the most part been validated during stakeholder’s interviews</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 5.2.2 Contribution of PCD mechanisms (per selected policy) or other factors external to the Commission (EP, international commitments) 	<p>Political will and coherence with international agreements seem to play a more important role than PCD mechanisms, although there is some evidence of marginal contribution of PCD mechanisms.</p>	<p>Strong – this is based on an in-depth assessment which has for the most part been validated during stakeholder’s interviews</p>
JC 5.3: The treatment of cross-cutting issues ¹² has improved in the EU non-development policies taking account of development objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 5.3.1 Number and nature of specific cross-cutting issues linked to developing countries that (i) are considered in the selected policy; (ii) could have been considered (missed opportunities) 	<p>The treatment of cross-cutting issues in developing in the selected policies is heterogeneous. 7 of the 13 selected policies directly address cross-cutting issues in developing countries. Policies that have strong development considerations or objectives also tend to consider cross-cutting issues.</p>	<p>Strong – this is based on an in-depth assessment which has for the most part been validated during stakeholder’s interviews</p>

¹¹ Those policies and initiatives which have not been (or only marginally) influenced by the use of PCD mechanisms. This inventory will come from the analysis undertaken at level 2. Explanatory factors for the lack of outputs will be provided.

¹² Such as: human rights, gender equality, democracy, good governance, children’s rights, indigenous people’s rights, environment and climate change sustainability, and combating HIV/AIDS.

6 EQ6 EU ADDED VALUE: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE EU PCD APPROACH CREATED ADDITIONAL VALUE BEYOND WHAT COULD BE ACHIEVED BY THE EU MEMBER STATES ACTING INDEPENDENTLY?

Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Findings	Strength of evidence /sources
JC 6.1: PCD objectives (“existing or planned EU policies/ initiatives likely to affect developing countries so that they take account of development objectives”) could not be achieved by Member States without the EU PCD approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 6.1.1 Stakeholders responses and documentary evidence confirm that the added value of/benefits provided by the EU PCD approach to achieve PCD objectives could/would not be achieved/not have been achieved independently by EU Member States in terms of influence, expertise, or scope of engagement. 	<p>The common position of the EU and its Members States in putting forward key global issues such as PCD has been recognised as instrumental in the 2012 OECD DAC peer review.</p> <p>As per findings of the EU Members States survey, stakeholders recognise that an EU PCD approach is necessary to establish a common base for PCD, as it represents an institutional and political engagement of the EU that reinforces PCD at different levels. The EU being a major player in development (size, geographical reach and partnership dimension), its role to promote PCD is significant, since individual EU Member States could only achieve little if they were to act alone.</p> <p>Stakeholders point out to the fact that even though many policy areas remain an exclusive competence of Member States and national implementation remains their domain, there are other policy areas that because of its “high impact on development (i.e., trade, agriculture, security, and migration),” it would be difficult to implement without a unified PCD approach.</p>	Indicative but not conclusive – based on OECD assessment and views of stakeholders
JC 6.2: The EU PCD approach has enabled the EU and EU Member States to create links, avoid fragmentation and foster cooperation with the international community (UN, OECD) on development issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 6.2.1 Reference to the EU PCD approach informing and influencing dialogue in international fora on development or development-related issues (e.g. migration, security, peace, etc.) during the period under evaluation. 	<p>The Council Conclusions of the period under evaluation and even before show that the commitment to PCD has been brought forward in positions adopted by the Council and presented on behalf of the EU and its Member States at international conferences, in which they reaffirmed that the Union was firmly resolved to play a major role within the United Nations in general, and committed the EU Member States and the Commission to strengthen PCD to support developing countries achieving the MDGs, or adopted common positions in which PCD is seen as an element to achieve MDGs and other development objectives.</p>	More than satisfactory – this is based on documentary sources and stakeholders interviewed
JC 6.3: The EU PCD approach contributes to reinforcing EU Member States’ own PCD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 6.3.1. Number of EU Member States that have adopted PCD mechanisms influenced by the EU PCD approach. 	<p>By 2007, 27 EU Member States at the time were using a total of 91 PCD-promoting mechanisms: 33 explicit policy statements or laws; 48 administrative or institutional mechanisms; and 10 knowledge- input and -assessment tools. In 2015, the Biennial Report recorded that from 25 EU Members States, 13 had a legal basis for PCD, all implying a legal commitment obliging their governments to pursue PCD objectives and requiring all policy initiatives to take into consideration the objectives of development</p>	Indicative but not conclusive – this is mainly relying on Biennial reports but stakeholders views are mixed

Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Findings	Strength of evidence /sources
		cooperation. In addition, 18 Member States had a political commitment on PCD, and 20 reported having PCD coordination mechanisms. Evidence based on EU Member States survey confirms the relative influence of the EU PCD approach in the adoption of PCD mechanisms by EU Member States.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 6.3.2. Frequency and nature of EU Member States participation and coordination with the Commission through PCD mechanisms. 	The coordination with EU Members States on PCD issues started in 2005 with the PCD informal Network which meets on a yearly basis, sometimes twice a year. From an attendance rate to meetings of 9 EU Member States, it has increased over the years to reach more than 20 attending at a given time. Also, in 2005 the Council instructed the Commission to monitor progress in the EU and all Member States on PCD and to report it every 2 years. The number of EU Member States contributing each time to the Biennial Reports ranges from 21 to 28.	Strong: based on assessment of documentary evidence and stakeholders views
JC 6.4: The EU PCD approach reinforces EU Member States' priorities and commitments regarding poverty reduction in developing countries (with respect to selected case studies)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 6.4.1. Number and nature of EU PCD mechanisms that contribute to reinforce EU Member States commitments and priorities towards poverty reduction in developing countries (with respect to selected case studies). 	The inclusion of M&D pillar in GAMM has fostered cooperation and coordination in that area with respect to specific actions previously agreed by EU Member States participating in the MPs Regarding SFPAs on-site presence of a fisheries attaché representing DG MARE potentially contributes to enhancing coherence with development cooperation activities in the fisheries sector. Trade policy is an exclusive competence of the EU. Therefore, the contribution of the PCD to EU added value in relation to the GSP is an issue of secondary importance. With regards to the EU Action Plan against wildlife trafficking, there is limited evidence in the field indicating that EU PCD mechanisms reinforce EU Member States commitments and priorities in developing countries. At a general level, EU Member States survey show mixed responses: On one end stakeholders consider EU PCD approach reinforces their priorities and commitments regarding poverty reduction in developing countries. On the other end stakeholders consider commitment to poverty reduction stems from their own development cooperation priorities.	Indicative but not conclusive – this is mainly based on limited findings during field visits and views of stakeholders are mixed.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 6.4.2. Evidence of synergies or avoided contradictions between selected EU non-development policies and EU Member States development-related actions in developing countries (field phase selected case studies). 	There is limited evidence on synergy between EU and EU Member States actions regarding the field case studies analysed, a few examples indicate that EU Member States have joined efforts and created synergies due to the nature of the intervention analysed (i.e. M&D pillar of Mobility Partnerships; SFPAs). However, taken as a whole, evidence suggests that these examples are not necessarily part of an overall strategy based on PCD.	Indicative but not conclusive – this is mainly based on limited findings during field visits and views of stakeholders are mixed.

7 EQ7 IMPACT: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE CHANGES IN THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EU POLICIES AND INITIATIVES BROUGHT ABOUT BY INCORPORATING A PCD APPROACH INFLUENCED OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?

Judgement Criteria	Findings	Strength of evidence /sources
JC 7.1: The Common Fisheries Policy (2013 reform) has had positive development outcomes and impacts in selected countries	Overall, the evolution of successive protocols over time suggests that the SFPA (Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement) instrument can be considered to have progressively incorporated a PCD approach, with a certain degree of success in terms of impact. The SFPA’s most evident impact is its contribution to improving fisheries governance. Moreover, while the SFPA can be said to have contributed to the local economy and to employment in both selected countries, these impacts have been relatively limited. These positive (but limited) impacts should however be pondered by that fact that development considerations that have been progressively incorporated into the SFPAs were not so much the result of PCD mechanisms but rather the result of the negotiations and dialogue with Senegal, which led the EU to better take into account potential impacts of the SFPA on the country and in general development considerations.	Strong – findings have been endorsed by EU Delegations of the selected countries
JC 7.2: The Generalized Scheme of Preferences Regulation has contributed to poverty eradication by expanding exports from the selected countries to the EU	The GSP’s overall performance in terms of outcome achievement – measured by its effect on exports, output and investment – is considered as mixed for Mozambique and for Vietnam. In terms of impact achievement (employment for instance), GSP’s contribution appears to be quite limited in both countries. GSP being a policy instrument dedicated to poverty reduction and sustainable development, it should come as no surprise that, de iure, it has been in line with the principles of PCD. However, policy coherence (or rather, policy parsimony) within the EU’s trade policies could be an issue due to the overlap of different preference instruments, and casts doubt on the relevance of individual instruments at least for certain countries. In addition, despite the overall embeddedness of the GSP into the developmental agenda, in practice the GSP has not been used as an element in a comprehensive developmental policy but “just” as a trade preference regime in isolation (a GSP without complementary adequate support to enhance productivity, at least in LDCs like Mozambique with clear supply capacity constraints, does not provide this; it therefore lacks an important developmental element, which points to limited performance in terms of the PCD concept.).	Strong – findings have been endorsed by EU Delegations of the selected countries
JC 7.3: The EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking is likely to contribute to development objectives by engaging in and benefiting local communities from wildlife conservation in selected countries	With respect to the PCD dimension, since most EU actions at the level of the selected countries can only be indirectly linked to the EUAP against wildlife trafficking (since these actions are often implemented in the context of traditional development cooperation (led by DG DEVCO without any concrete involvement of DG Environment), the “PCD” content of the EU Action Plan against wildlife trafficking does not appear to be very prominent. Besides, very few stakeholders on the ground (including EUD staff) were even aware of the existence of the EUAP against wildlife trafficking, suggesting that the EUAP against wildlife trafficking is more of a communication tool on EU development assistance linked to wildlife trafficking than a policy with clear and measurable effects and impacts.	Strong – findings have been endorsed by EU Delegations of the selected countries

Judgement Criteria	Findings	Strength of evidence /sources
<p>JC: 7.4: The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) has contributed to poverty reduction by facilitating the legal migration of third country residents towards the EU and promoting social and economic development in selected countries</p>	<p>The actions implemented under the M&D pillar of the MPs with Cape Verde and Armenia, under the GAMM's framework, have been rather limited in terms of scope, size of budget allocation, and continuity compared to the other pillars of the MPs (Legal migration, Border management and irregular migration, International protection and asylum). Actions aimed at reducing remittance transaction costs, promote diaspora investment, diaspora skills transfer, skills matching-schemes, pre-departure measures, and reintegration, have had limited scope. There are no circular labour migration schemes in place, only a Visa facilitation Agreement for both countries for short stay visits. Therefore, in terms of impact, the contribution of the GAMM appears to be quite limited when it comes to development.</p>	<p>Strong – findings based on documentary evidence, stakeholders' views, and findings have been endorsed by EU Delegations of the selected countries.</p>

8 EQ8 SUSTAINABILITY: TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE PCD APPROACH SUSTAINABLE?

Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Findings	Strength of evidence /sources
JC 8.1: There is adequate political will and continuous learning to ensure sustainability of PCD at EU policy-making level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 8.1.1 Reference in political statements (from both the EU and EU member States) expressing support for PCD 	<p>The Council has reaffirmed in several Conclusions in different policy areas – not only in PCD specific Council Conclusions but mainly in the areas of Migration, Trade and Security (see indicators I 6.2.1 and I 2.2.1) – its commitment to the promotion of PCD in the policies that the EU implements, strengthening the coherence and enhancing the linkages between development and migration, trade, environment, and conflict and crisis situations. The Council has acknowledged as well the need to account for synergies between climate objectives and the SDGs, of which PCD is an integral element. Also, the commitment to coherence of the EU’s common agricultural policy and agricultural trade policy with respect to development policy has been reaffirmed at the highest level.</p> <p>However, stakeholders consider that unless there is a clear and concrete definition of the EU’s approach to PCD in the wider context of the SDG Agenda and that of PCSD, the leading and positive role of the EU in the promotion of PCD can be compromised.</p>	<p>Strong – this finding is based on documentary sources that can be easily verified and stakeholders’ views</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 8.1.2 Evidence of good practices and lessons learned, and number of resulting changes in the organisation framework (per activity, per output) 	<p>Awareness-raising mechanisms: EU Members States Network, the Biennial Reports, the EU Delegations reporting and the training activities have been a good step to coordinate and promote a PCD approach at the EU level. However, these activities have no direct influence in the main output, and their use could be improved.</p> <p>Policy-making mechanisms: IA and ISC constitute essential tools for policy-making. The IA guidelines were improved in 2009 to incorporate a development dimension and the 2015 BR Guidelines include a specific Tool 30 on how to identify impacts in Developing Countries.</p> <p>However, there are changes that may lead to PCD being less sustainable: the lack of formal follow-up to the PCD Screening of the CWP, the fact that there is no longer a formal ISG on PCD, and the lack of a PCD strategic framework for the new SDG Agenda as there was for the MDGs (PCD Work-programme 2010-2013) to guide the work of the EU regarding PCD in the post-2015 context.</p>	<p>Strong: based on assessment of documentary evidence and stakeholders’ views</p>
JC 8.2: The EU’s PCD mechanisms have become embedded / a permanent part of policy formulation process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I 8.2.1 Number/nature of mechanisms that have been embedded / have become a permanent part of the policy formulation process. 	<p>The only mechanisms that are embedded in the policy-making process are the IA and ISC. These are non-specific PCD mechanisms that are employed to promote PCD from the onset of the policy formulation process. However, they are not used to their full potential.</p>	<p>Strong: based on assessment of documentary evidence and stakeholders’ views</p>

ANNEX 4: ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED ACTIVITIES (8 REPORTS)

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Activity Assessment Tool

Impact Assessments (IAs)

1 INTRODUCTION

The Commission's Impact Assessment (IA) system was introduced in 2003, replacing and integrating all sectoral assessments of direct and indirect impacts of proposed measures into one global instrument¹³. It was further reviewed in 2009 and 2015. The purpose of IAs is to contribute to the decision-making processes by systematically collecting and analysing information on planned interventions and estimating their likely impact. An IA is required for Commission initiatives that are likely to have significant economic, social or environmental impacts. These can be¹⁴:

- Legislative proposals;
- Non-legislative initiatives (e.g. financial programmes, recommendations for the negotiations of international agreements);
- Implementing and delegated acts.

The IA activity involves a wide range of stakeholders:

- IAs are carried out by **Commission services**: the IA work is coordinated by an Inter-Service Steering Group (ISG) set up by the Commission and consisting of the DG responsible for the relevant policy initiative (which leads the IA process), as well as other selected line DGs, Commission services (e.g. the Secretariat General, the Legal Service, etc.) and the EEAS.
- External inputs from stakeholders, whether in the context of a public consultation process (mandatory part of an IA process) or through targeted consultations, also feed into the analysis. For selected policies, the IA process may for example include specific consultations with stakeholders such as **EU Member States, third countries (e.g. developing countries) and CSOs**.
- The findings of the IA process are summarised in an IA report and the quality of each report is checked by an independent body, which issues opinions. This independent body was the **Impact Assessment Board**, created in 2006, until it was replaced by the **Regulatory Scrutiny Board** following the introduction of Better Regulation Guidelines in 2015.
- IA reports are published with the proposals or with acts adopted by the Commission, and sent to the EU law-makers, the **European Parliament** and the **Council**, to consider as they decide on whether to adopt the proposed law.

The Commission's IA system is not a PCD-specific mechanism (i.e. not created for the specific purpose of promoting PCD) but constitutes a general tool used at the inception of the policy-making process, and as such it is acknowledged to be a central instrument to implement the EU's approach to PCD: "*IAs allow ex-ante assessments of policy proposals and can help ensure that possible impacts on developing countries are taken into account at an early stage of the preparation of a political initiative*"¹⁵.

¹³ COM (2002) 276 final "Communication from the Commission on impact assessment", 5 June 2002.

¹⁴ https://ec.europa.eu/info/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/impact-assessments_en.

¹⁵ 2015 EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development.

2 QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT

2.1 Detailed description of the activity

Since the introduction of the IA system in 2003, IA guidelines have been revised several times. Two specific sets of guidelines have been in effect during the evaluation period (2009-2016):

- **The 2009 revised IA Guidelines**, adopted in January 2009¹⁶;
- **The 2015 Better Regulation Package**, adopted by the Commission on 19 May 2015 and consisting of (i) the Better Regulation Guidelines¹⁷ and (ii) its accompanying Better Regulation Toolbox¹⁸, which includes a specific tool on how to assess the likely effects of policy initiatives on developing countries (Tool#34: Developing Countries¹⁹).

We describe below the main features and implications of these guidelines in the context of PCD, as well as the role played by the various stakeholders during the IA process.

2.1.1 The 2009 IA guidelines

The Commission revised its IA guidelines in 2009, based on an external evaluation of the Commission's IA completed in 2007²⁰ and the experience to date of Commission services and the IA Board.

In relation to PCD, the most significant development is the introduction of a new section on international impacts. This section specifies that “*every IA should establish whether proposed policy options have an impact on relations with third countries*” and that in particular IAs should look at four types of impacts, one of them being the impacts on developing countries²¹ – in this regard the guidelines mention that “*initiatives that may affect developing countries should be analysed for their coherence with the objectives of the EU development policy. This includes an analysis of consequences (or spill-overs) in the longer run in areas such as economic, environmental, social or security policy*”.

Although “international impacts” (including impacts on developing countries as mentioned above) are not put on the same level as the three main dimensions of impacts to be assessed by IAs (i.e. economic, social and environmental impacts), the 2009 IA guidelines put them at the same level as other specific or sectoral impacts to be examined by IAs – such as impacts on fundamental rights, on consumers, on SMEs, etc. – which were already identified in earlier versions of the guidelines and therefore already considered as mandatory.

Based on this, the lists of key questions mentioned in the IA guidelines to guide Commission staff in the identification of the potential impacts of the policy (cf. section 8.2, Tables 1-3) include a number of questions specifically related to the impacts on developing countries or one EU development policy²². Some guidance is also provided in section 8.8 of the guidelines’

¹⁶ SEC(2009) 92 “Impact Assessment Guidelines”, 15 January 2009.

¹⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/toc_guide_en.htm.

¹⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/toc_tool_en.htm.

¹⁹ Formerly Tool #30. In 2017 new tools were added to the Toolbox and Tool #30 became Tool #34.

²⁰ The Evaluation Partnership (2007) “Evaluation of the Commission’s Impact Assessment System”, April 2007.

²¹ The three other types of international impacts to be looked at according to the guidelines include: the competitiveness of European businesses; trade relations with third countries; and impact on WTO obligations.

²² For example, in terms of economic impacts: Does it affect (...) EU/EC development policy? Does it affect developing countries at different stages of development (least developed and other low-income and middle-income countries) in a different manner? Does the option impose adjustment costs on developing countries? Does the option affect goods or services that are produced or consumed by developing countries?

annexes, which discusses (briefly) the various areas in which EU policies may affect developing countries and also highlights the possibility of unintended impacts. Finally, the guidelines refer to a separate “guidance document” that had been prepared at the time by DG DEV and made available on its website (cf. footnote 36 on page 42). This short document, which aimed at “complement[ing] the main text of the IA guidelines”, provided further “guidance for identifying impacts of EU policy decisions or proposals on developing countries”, e.g. in terms of possible areas of impact, countries that are going to be affected, mitigating measures, consultations with developing countries, etc.; it also used the reform of the EU sugar regime as an example to demonstrate which potential impacts on developing countries could be identified for this particular policy.

These various changes responded to requests from the European Parliament and the Council to strengthen the external dimension of IA and to improve and make better use of the IA process to evaluate the impact of EU policies on developing countries²³, thereby sharpening IAs as a PCD instrument. However, in spite of these positive developments – in particular the explicit requirement in the revised guidelines for IAs to look at impacts on developing countries – evidence suggests that efforts to assess development impacts remained low. Indeed, the analysis of IA reports produced in the years following the introduction of the guidelines shows that in practice only a limited number of IAs for initiatives with potential impacts on developing countries actually assessed, or even mentioned, those impacts²⁴.

PCD biennial reports during the period suggested that this unsatisfactory record may be attributed, at least partly, to the lack of a “specific methodology to measure impact on development objectives and on partner countries”²⁵ and came to the conclusion that it was necessary not only to raise the profile and awareness of the PCD requirement in the IA Guidelines, but also to strengthen analytical capacity for assessing development impacts of non-development policies, by providing more practical guidance and additional relevant resources²⁶. In this context, the review of IA guidelines as part of the Better Regulation Agenda (see following sub-section) was considered by stakeholders as an opportunity “to make the requirement to analyse impacts on developing countries more explicit in the Guidelines and provide clearer guidance in the technical section on how to assess them”²⁷.

2.1.2 The 2015 Better Regulation Package

As mentioned above the 2015 Better Regulation package consists of two main elements: (i) the Better Regulation Guidelines and (ii) the Better Regulation Toolbox.

The Better Regulations Guidelines includes a specific chapter which serve as “Guidelines on Impact Assessment” (Chapter III)²⁸. This Chapter includes several mentions of developing

²³ 2009 EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development.

²⁴ See section 3.5.1 of the main report for the detailed analysis, based on both the findings of CONCORD Denmark/Global Focus, which carries out since 2009 a yearly screening of the Commission’s IAs to analyse whether these sufficiently assess potential impacts on developing countries, as well as the evaluation team’s own analysis of a smaller sample of IAs on policies mentioned in PCD Biennial Reports, in the PCD CWP screening or in the PCD Work Plan 2010-2013.

²⁵ 2011 EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development.

²⁶ 2013 EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development.

²⁷ 2013 EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development. See also the 2013 Council Conclusions on PCD, in which the Council “calls for strengthening the development dimension of [tools such as IAs] in the context of the review of their respective guidelines” and the European Parliament resolution of 7 June 2016 on the EU 2015 PCD Report, in which the EP “hopes that the Better Regulation Package and its guidelines will improve this situation by taking development and human rights into account in all [IAs] and by enhancing transparency”.

²⁸ The Better Regulation Guidelines have a much broader scope than the 2009 IA guidelines, as they also include guidelines on: planning; preparing proposals, implementation and transposition; monitoring; evaluation and fitness checks; and stakeholder consultation.

countries, stressing *inter alia* that developing countries can be among stakeholders affected by the policies (see sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2) and listing impacts on developing countries among potentially disproportionate impacts that should be identified during the IA process (see section 2.3).

However, the Guidelines are not explicit about the requirement to analyse impacts on developing countries: while the final section of the Guidelines (Section 4 “From impact assessment to policy-making”) does mention that in order to verify regulatory fitness policy-makers should cross-check if there is scope to modify some of the legal provision so as to reduce (among other things) any potential negative impacts on developing countries, the summary table on “Key requirements” does not list the analysis of impacts on developing countries among elements that “must be included in the final IA Report” – it only lists environmental, social and economic impacts (the three main impact dimensions to be assessed as part of the IA, as was the case in the previous guidelines), and additionally, impacts on SMEs and on competitiveness. Finally, it can be noted that the Guidelines do not mention PCD at all.

Comparatively, the Toolbox puts more emphasis on the assessment of impacts on developing countries, in particular through the inclusion of a specific tool on this subject: Tool #34 “Developing countries”. This tool was developed by DG DEVCO following a high-level expert workshop in 2013 and consultation with Commission services (the PCD team contributed to its development). It aims at providing specific guidance on how to assess policy initiatives’ impacts on developing countries and covers a number of aspects such as: the concept of PCD and the legal obligation set by Article 208(1) of the TFEU; example of measures known to have impacts on developing countries; methods for qualitative/descriptive as well as quantitative assessment of impacts; mitigating measures to minimise negative impacts; and the provision of links to further information sources and background material. The Tool also acknowledges that developing countries are very heterogeneous and that as a general rule, the focus should be put primarily on the impacts on LDCs and other countries most in need.

Other tools in the Toolbox also address impacts on developing countries. For example, Tool #16 “Identification / screening of impacts” lists developing countries among categories of potentially affected groups, lists impacts in developing countries in its overview of key impacts to be screened, and includes in its table of key questions to guide the assessment of significant impacts several specific questions related to developing countries as well as a specific question on PCD (“Does [the policy option] comply with the obligation of Policy Coherence for Development?”)²⁹. Furthermore, Tool #26 “External Trade and Investment”³⁰ includes a specific section “Could developing countries be affected?” (section 3.6), which (i) mentions PCD and explicitly refers to the legal obligation set by Article 208(1) of the TFEU; and (ii) provides some guidance on how to determine if EU trade policies are likely to have an impact developing countries, particularly LDCs and other countries most in need.

However, it is important to note that the two documents differ in nature: while the Better Regulation Guidelines are considered as a set of mandatory requirements and obligations, the Toolbox is considered as advisory in nature and not binding, as explicitly clarified in both documents:

- Chapter 1 of the Guidelines specifies that: “The main guidelines set out the mandatory requirements and obligations for each step in the policy cycle while the Toolbox provides additional guidance and advice which is not binding unless expressly stated to be so.”

²⁹ The questions related to developing countries were already included in the 2009 guidelines and have not been modified, but the question on PCD was not included in the previous guidelines and has been added.

³⁰ Initially Tool #22. In 2017 new tools were added in the Toolbox and Tool #22 became Tool #26.

- The introduction to the Toolbox document³¹ specifies that the “Toolbox complements the main guidelines on Better Regulation” and “provides more specific and operational guidance to those involved with the various Better Regulation instruments”. The tools included in the Toolbox “are advisory in nature and following them is not compulsory except in a few cases (such as the format of documents submitted to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board) which have been identified in the main Better Regulation Guideline”.

In this context, it appears that the most significant provisions on the assessment of policy initiatives’ impacts on developing countries – e.g. the explicit reference to the legal obligation set by Article 208(1) of the TFEU to ensure PCD – were included in the document that is considered as advisory/not-binding (the Toolbox), while the one document that is considered as a set of mandatory requirements and obligations (the guidelines) clearly puts less emphasis on the analysis of impacts on developing countries and is not fully explicit about its requirement (it can in fact be argued that the 2009 guidelines were more explicit about the requirement to analyse impacts on developing countries as part of the IA process).

This casts doubt as to whether IA guidelines were indeed strengthened from a PCD perspective through the introduction of the Better Regulation package, as was anticipated by stakeholders. The introduction of Tool #34 “Developing Countries” is certainly notable – and in itself an improvement from the guidance document that was made available at the time of the 2009 guidelines – but this tool remains advisory in nature and it is not clear how much it is used in practice by stakeholders involved in the IA process. The analysis of IA reports published after the introduction of Better Regulation³² does not provide any evidence that the revised guidelines and toolbox have contributed to improving the likelihood that IA reports explicitly discuss impacts on developing countries.

2.1.3 Role of stakeholders

As mentioned earlier, a wide range of stakeholders are involved in the IA process.

At the Commission level, while the DG responsible for the relevant policy initiative leads the IA work, the process is steered by an ISG, which consists of the lead DG as well as selected other line DGs and Commission services (e.g. the Secretariat General, the Legal Service, etc.). This provides the opportunity to DG DEVCO (and therefore indirectly to the PCD team and thematic experts within DG DEVCO), when it is invited to participate in the IA’s ISG, to provide comments on development issues and if relevant, point out likely impacts of the policy initiative on developing countries that had not been considered.

DG DEVCO is however not always invited to participate in the IA’s ISG and therefore in related ISC consultations, which limits its ability to ensure that impacts on developing countries are systematically taken into account in the policy making process. Our analysis of IA reports for policy initiatives mentioned in PCD Biennial Reports, in the PCD CWP screening or in the PCD Work Plan 2010-2013 shows that even for policy initiatives that have been identified as being PCD-relevant / as having potential effects on developing countries, DG DEVCO is not systematically invited to participate in the IA’s SG³³. However, the analysis of IA reports for PCD-relevant policies during the evaluation period also revealed the following³⁴:

³¹ http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/br_toolbox_en.pdf.

³² See Annex 3, and specifically indicator I 5.1.1.

³³ See section 3.5.1 for the quantitative analysis, and Annex 8 for the detailed IA analysis table.

³⁴ Idem.

- The involvement of DG DEVCO in the IA process does not appear to guarantee that impacts on developing countries will be considered: a few IAs for which DEVCO was involved that do not mention the potential impacts of the policy on developing countries were identified.
- At the same time, the non-involvement of DEVCO in the IA process does not mean that the IA will not consider impacts on developing countries: several IAs for which DEVCO was not involved that nevertheless mention/discuss the potential impacts of the policy on developing countries were identified.

The second finding above is positive, as it could suggest that the concept of PCD has been mainstreamed – at least some extent – in other DGs or Commission services and therefore that implementation of the PCD approach does not have to rely only on the intervention of DG DEVCO. At the same time, the level of detail of the assessment of impacts varies greatly from one IA to another: even in those cases where the IA considered impacts on developing countries without DG DEVCO being involved, the IA still might have benefitted from the input of DG DEVCO, to improve from a brief mention of potential impacts towards a more detailed assessment of these impacts.

As consulting interested parties is an obligation for every IA – as explicitly stated in both the 2009 guidelines and the 2015 Better Regulation guidelines and toolbox – the IA process also involves consultations with other stakeholders outside the Commission. In addition to mandatory open public consultations³⁵, the IA process may also include targeted consultations with selected stakeholders such as, *inter alia*, **Member States, third countries (e.g. developing countries) or CSOs**. However, it is not clear if this mechanism has been used to its full potential during the evaluation period. Based on IA reports, it appears that only a limited number of IAs for PCD-relevant policies included targeted consultations in/with developing countries (outside of open public consultations). Furthermore, some stakeholders e.g. the European Parliament have often expressed the view that along with developing countries, CSOs should also be more involved in the IA process³⁶.

Another important stakeholder in the IA process is the **Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB; formerly IA Board)**, which examines all IA reports and issues opinions on their quality: a positive opinion is needed from the Board for an initiative accompanied by an IA to be tabled for adoption by the Commission; in case of a negative opinion, the draft report must be reviewed and resubmitted to the Board. In this context, the Board provides a central quality control and support function for Commission IAs and therefore can play a role in ensuring that impacts on developing countries are considered in the IA and thereby that a PCD approach is applied.

Our analysis of IA reports for policies identified as being PCD-relevant shows that the RSB/IA Board occasionally provided comments on development issues and every time it did, the final version of the IA report did indeed discuss, at least to some extent, impacts on developing countries³⁷. However, in the majority of cases, the Board did not address development issues, which for some policies resulted in missed opportunities as the final IA reports did not take account of impacts on developing countries.

³⁵ One of the key requirements of the Better Regulation guidelines for IAs is to conduct “A 12-week internet-based public consultation covering all of the main elements of the IA as part of a broader consultation strategy to target relevant stakeholders and evidence.” (cf. introduction of Chapter III).

³⁶ One specific comment from the European Parliament was that CSOs and other stakeholders should be consulted at an earlier stage of the process for them to effectively contribute: in this context, it can be noted that the provision in the Better Regulation IA guidelines for public consultation on the Roadmap – i.e. on the Inception IA, for policies that require an IA – was welcomed by the European Parliament, as it “*opens up opportunities for external stakeholders, including developing countries and civil society, to give their views and actively participate*” (EP resolution of 7 June 2016 on the EU 2015 Report on PCD).

³⁷ See section 3.5.1 for the quantitative analysis, and Annex 8 for the detailed IA analysis table.

This led many stakeholders to consider that it was essential for the EU's approach to PCD to be effective that the RSB/IA Board plays a bigger role in ensuring that possible impacts on developing countries are considered in IAs. In the 2016 report on its yearly screening of IAs prepared by the Commission, Global Focus (formerly CONCORD Denmark) stressed for example that *“the IA Board must ensure that the IA guidelines are respected and resubmit any IA that fails to consider the potential impact on developing countries to the [IA's ISG] for further analysis”*³⁸. Efforts towards this objective are ongoing, as DG DEVCO has started to engage with the Board on the possibility to systematically consider the possible impacts on developing countries when reviewing draft IA reports. Related to the above, it has also been debated whether the Board has the adequate expertise to fully take on this role. The European Parliament underlined for example that *“the IA Board of the Commission needs adequate expertise in development policies in order to live up to their responsibility to verify the quality of impacts assessments in terms of PCD”*³⁹. This view was also reflected by the civil society and in this regard CONCORD Europe recommended in 2014 that *“The IA Board should include development specialists, in order to increase the development expertise on that body”*⁴⁰.

After adoption of the concerned policy initiative by the Commission, the IA reports – together with the policy proposals – are transmitted to the **European Parliament** and to the **Council** to consider as they decide on whether to adopt the proposed law, which provides them with an opportunity to comment on development issues and possible impacts on developing countries, and propose related amendments to the policy proposals. However, this is to some extent limited by both institutions' limited capacity to conduct their own IA work: in this context, it can be noted that in its *“Proposal for an Inter-institutional Agreement on Better Regulation”*⁴¹, the Commission called again upon the EP and the Council to carry out their own IAs on any substantial amendments they raise during the legislative process.

2.2 Strengths

The main strengths of the IA activity as a PCD mechanism are the following:

- The IA activity is a fully standardised and formalised process within the Commission since the introduction of the Commission's IA system in 2003.
- IAs are widely acknowledged by stakeholders to be the most critical tool for promoting PCD in new policy initiatives or proposals for policy revision and ensuring that impacts on developing countries are taken into account at the early stages of the policy making process. Although it is not a PCD-specific mechanism, the IA activity is directly linked to the main output of PCD as defined in the IL⁴².
- As demonstrated above, there have been continuous efforts during the evaluation period to improve the IA mechanism through the revision of its guidelines and the creation of additional tools and resources to guide the assessment of impacts on developing countries. Indeed, the 2009 IA guidelines were an improvement over previous guidelines, by stating explicitly that IAs should look at impacts on developing countries, and the 2015 Better Regulation package made further progress by providing more detailed methodological guidance on the assessment of these impacts.

³⁸ Global Focus (2016) *“Impact Assessments prepared by the European Commission still disregard Developing Countries”*. Available here: http://www.globalfokus.dk/images/Politik/PCD/IA_analysis_2016_pdf.pdf.

³⁹ European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2012 on the EU 2011 Report on PCD (2012/2063(INI)).

⁴⁰ CONCORD Europe (2014) *“Contribution to the European Commission consultation on the Impact Assessment guidelines revision”*, Policy paper: reaction, September 2014.

⁴¹ COM(2015) 216 final.

⁴² I.e. *“New initiatives take account of development objectives, and their likely impact in developing countries assessed”*.

- The IA activity involves a wide range of stakeholders – including, at least potentially, developing countries – and therefore can benefit in principle from the input, views and feedback of numerous stakeholders on the likely effects of EU policies on developing countries.

2.3 Weaknesses

The main weaknesses of the IA activity as a PCD mechanism are the following:

- In spite of the various improvements brought about by the revision of relevant IA guidelines and tools, evidence suggests that during the evaluation period only a limited number of IAs for initiatives with potential impacts on developing countries actually assessed, or even mentioned, those impacts⁴³. Although the 2009 IA guidelines explicitly stated that IAs should look at impacts on developing countries, it appears that this provision did not enjoy much traction in practice; and while many stakeholders hoped that the 2015 Better Regulation package would improve the situation, the analysis of IA reports published after its introduction does not provide any evidence that it has been the case.
- With respect to the 2015 Better Regulation guidelines and Toolbox that are currently in effect, two aspects can be highlighted:
 - One specific weakness is that the most significant provisions on the assessment of policy initiatives' impacts on developing countries were included in the document that is considered as advisory/not-binding (the Toolbox), while the document that is considered as a set of mandatory requirements and obligations (the Guidelines) clearly puts less emphasis on the analysis of impacts on developing countries and is not fully explicit about the requirement to analyse those. This might be one reason why there is no evidence of an improvement in the share of IAs taking account of impacts on developing countries following the introduction of the Better Regulation Guidelines and the specific Tool #34 “Developing Countries”.
 - Although Tool #34 is a clear improvement over tools and guidance documents provided earlier for the assessment of impacts on developing countries (and it is positive that it was included directly in the Better Regulation package, rather than as a separate document), (i) it is not clear whether this tool is used in practice by Commission services (as highlighted above, one issue might be that the tool is included in the document that is considered as advisory/not binding – the toolbox – rather than in the document defining mandatory requirements – the guidelines); (ii) the tool is only a guidance document and as such cannot be expected to resolve on its own the general issue of the specific technical and methodological challenges often experienced in assessing the impacts of complex EU internal policies on third countries and specifically developing countries (analysing the impacts of a policy such as the CAP requires for example a complex methodology, and stakeholders acknowledged that the main reason why the impacts of the CAP on developing countries were not assessed in detail was the difficulty to define a methodology on how to do this⁴⁴).
- There is overall a high degree of heterogeneity in the coverage and level of detail of the assessment of impacts from one IA to another – including for policies that do take account of the policy's impact on developing countries: some IA reports only mention or briefly discuss these impacts, while some provide a very detailed assessment. While methodological challenges might partly be the reason for this, it should be noted that conducting a thorough IA requires important resources and it is not clear to which extent

⁴³ See section 3.5.1 for the detailed quantitative analysis.

⁴⁴ See Policy Report on the 2013 CAP reform. It has been reported that DG DEVCO had attempted to develop a quantitative impact assessment model at the IA stage, but that the results of the analysis were ultimately considered to be not robust enough to be included in the final version of the IA.

these resources are available (within both the lead DG and DG DEVCO, when it is invited to participate in the IA's ISG).

- The IA activity remains a politicised process, where dominant actors push their agenda and appear to often have pre-determined solutions, which can limit opportunities to effectively address PCD issues⁴⁵.

2.4 Opportunities for improvement

The main opportunity for improvement would be to provide more clarity as to when and to what extent impacts on developing countries should be assessed as part of IAs. As mentioned above, one issue currently is the ambiguity of the Better Regulation package: while the Toolbox (which is a not-binding/advisory document) explicitly mentions the legal obligation set by Article 208(1) of the TFEU to ensure PCD and includes several related provisions in particular as part of Tool #34, the guidelines (which define the mandatory requirements) are less explicit about the requirement to take account of impacts on developing countries. The fact that there is also a lack of clarity with respect to the exact implications of the legal obligation set by Article 208(1) of the TFEU⁴⁶ only further complicates the issue. Ultimately, this is partly a question of political will: if the Commission is dedicated to ensuring that all IAs on policies with potential impacts on developing countries do systematically “take account of” these impacts, it would be necessary to make this requirement more explicit and clarify the extent to which these impacts are expected be analysed. One option could be to make it a requirement to systematically include in IA reports a section dedicated to the impacts on developing countries (or at least on third countries), even if obviously for some policy initiatives the section would simply consist of a single sentence stating that no impacts are expected.

Another opportunity for improvement would be for the RSB to play a greater role in ensuring that for policies that are likely to have impacts on developing countries, these impacts are systematically assessed in the corresponding IA reports. As mentioned earlier, DG DEVCO has started to engage with the Board on the possibility to systematically consider possible impacts on developing countries when reviewing draft IA reports. In addition, as suggested by some stakeholders it might be beneficial for the RSB to include development specialists in order to increase the development expertise on that body.⁴⁷

Finally, there is a lack of synergy between PCD-specific mechanisms – in particular the CWP screening – and the IA activity, as evidenced by: (i) the fact that DG DEVCO was not systematically invited to participate in the IA's ISG for policy/initiatives identified as being PCD-relevant in the PCD CWP screening (or in the PCD Workplan); and, to some extent⁴⁸, (ii) the limited number of policies already identified as being PCD-relevant in the PCD CWP screening (or in the PCD Workplan) for which impacts were not assessed in the corresponding IAs. It appears that the PCD CWP screening has been carried out in total isolation of the IA activity, in the sense that PCD CWP screening results do not appear to have influenced the IA activity. Strengthening the link between the PCD CWP screening exercise and the IA activity could contribute to improving the likelihood that impacts on developing countries are indeed assessed in IAs. However, ultimately it is a matter of improving the PCD CWP screening

⁴⁵ See for example European Parliament's Committee on Development (2016) “EU Policy Coherence for Development: The challenge of sustainability”, Workshop Report, 22 March 2016.

⁴⁶ I.e. a lack clarity as to what “take account of the objectives of development cooperation” entails exactly, in terms of the level of detail to which impacts on developing countries should be discussed or assessed as part of the IA.

⁴⁷ Although only brief CVs of current RSB members are available online, it appears that none of them are development specialists.

⁴⁸ As shown earlier, the unsatisfactory record in terms of the share of PCD-relevant policies for which the IA assesses impacts on developing countries is most likely the result of several factors.

activity rather than improving the IA activity (see Activity Assessment Tool on the PCD CWP screening for a more detailed discussion).

3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IAs are widely acknowledged by stakeholders to be the most critical tool for promoting PCD in new policy initiatives or proposals for policy revision, and ensuring that impacts on developing countries are taken into account at the early stages of the policy making process. Additionally, the IA process is also fully standardised and formalised and involves the input and consultation of a wide range of stakeholders.

There have been continuous efforts during the evaluation period to improve the IA mechanism through the revision of its guidelines and the creation of additional tools and resources to guide the assessment of impacts on developing countries. The 2009 IA guidelines were an improvement over previous guidelines, in particular due to the explicit provision that every IA should establish whether proposed policy options have an impact on relations with third countries, and in particular look at impacts on developing countries (the 2009 guidelines also provided some guidance on the assessment of impacts on developing countries, although it remained limited). The 2015 Better Regulation package – consisting of Guidelines and an associated Toolbox – made further progress, in particular by providing more detailed methodological guidance on the assessment of impacts on developing countries through the inclusion of Tool “Developing Countries” in the Toolbox.

However, during the period of evaluation only a limited number of IA reports for initiatives with likely impacts on developing countries actually assessed or even mentioned those impacts, suggesting that the various improvements brought about by the revision of relevant guidelines and tools did not enjoy much traction in practice. With respect to the Better Regulation package currently in effect, one issue is its ambiguity: while the Toolbox (which is a non-binding/advisory document) explicitly mentions the legal obligation set by Article 208(1) of the TFEU to ensure PCD and includes several related provisions in Tool #34, the guidelines (which define the mandatory requirements) are less explicit about the requirement for IAs to assess impacts on developing countries. Furthermore, although Tool #34 is an improvement over previous guidance documents, (i) it is not clear whether this tool is used in practice by Commission services and (ii) the tool is only a guidance document and as such cannot be expected to resolve on its own the general issue of the technical and methodological challenges often experienced in assessing the impacts of complex EU internal policies on third countries and specifically developing countries. Finally, one other constraint might be insufficient resources within Commission services (both at the level of the lead DG and of DG DEVCO, when invited to participate in the IA’s ISG) to conduct thorough IAs.

The main opportunity for improvement would be to provide more clarity as to when and to what extent impacts on developing countries should be assessed as part of IAs. Ultimately, this a question of political will: if the Commission is dedicated to ensuring that all IAs on policies with potential impacts on developing countries do systematically “take account of” these impacts, it would be necessary to make this requirement more explicit and clarify the extent to which these impacts in developing countries are expected to be analysed. Another opportunity for improvement would be for the RSB to systematically check, when reviewing draft IA reports, that potential impacts on developing countries have been assessed: DG DEVCO has started engaging with the RSB in this regard and for the RSB to effectively play this role, it might also be beneficial to increase the development expertise on that body.

Appendix 1: Summary of additional findings with respect to EQ3

Table 1: Overview of other relevant findings for EQ3

<p>Redundancies / synergies within the activity / with other activities with respect to their contribution to output achievement (Indicator I 3.1.3)</p>	<p>There is a clear synergy with the inter-service consultation (ISC) mechanism as the final step of the IA procedure relies on ISC: indeed, as per the Better Regulation IA guidelines once the Board has issued a positive opinion, the IA report is submitted to inter-service consultation together with the accompanying policy initiative.</p> <p>There is however a lack of synergy between PCD specific mechanisms – in particular the CWP screening – and the IA activity, as evidenced by: (i) the fact that DG DEVCO was not systematically invited to participate in the IA’s ISG for policy/initiatives identified as being PCD-relevant in the PCD CWP screening (or in the Biennial Reports or in the PCD Workplan); and, to some extent, (ii) the limited number of policies already identified as being PCD-relevant in the PCD CWP screening (or in the PCD Workplan) for which impacts were not assessed in the corresponding IAs.</p> <p>The IA activity plays a specific role and no redundancies have been identified with other PCD activities.</p>
<p>Actual level of human resources (staffing and expertise) or material resources against stakeholder’s perception of needs (Indicator I 3.2.1 and 3.2.2)</p>	<p>Conducting a thorough IA requires important resources and it is not clear to which extent these resources are available (within both the lead DG and DG DEVCO, when it is invited to participate in the IA’s ISG).</p>
<p>Are processes standardised within the PCD Unit, DEVCO/NEAR and other DGs, and the EEAS? (Indicator I 3.3.3)</p>	<p>The IA activity is fully standardised and formalised within the Commission since the introduction of the IA system in 2003. However, DG DEVCO is not systematically invited to participate in the IA’s ISG, even for policies that have been identified as PCD-relevant.</p>
<p>Does the activity involve coordination with EU stakeholders (EUMS, EP, Council, EEAS, EESC, CSOs)? (Indicator I 3.5.1)</p>	<p>The IA activity involves systematic coordination with the EP and the Council: after adoption of the concerned policy initiative by the Commission, the IA reports – together with the policy proposals – are transmitted to the EP and to the Council to consider as they decide on whether to adopt the proposed law.</p> <p>Depending on the policy initiative, the IA process may include targeted consultations with EUMS and CSOs (in addition to mandatory open public consultations, through which both EUMS and CSOs can also provide their feedback and input).</p> <p>The IA activity can also involve coordination with EEAS, when EEAS is among the Commission services invited to participate in the IA’s ISG.</p>
<p>Does the activity involve cooperation and coordination with developing countries? (Indicator I 3.5.2)</p>	<p>Depending on the policy initiative, the IA process may include targeted consultations with developing countries (in addition to mandatory open public consultations, through which developing countries can also provide their feedback and input).</p>
<p>Nature of changes over time of inputs and of the activity itself (Indicators I 3.6.1 and I 3.6.2)</p>	<p>The IA activity was modified on two occasions during the period: (i) in 2009, with the adoption of the 2009 revised IA Guidelines and (ii) in 2015, with the adoption of the Better Regulation Package. The exact nature of changes introduced by these revised guidelines is described in detail above.</p>

Appendix 2: Mentions of the activity in PCD Biennial Reports, PCD Council Conclusions and EP resolutions on PCD

Table 2: Mention of IAs in PCD Biennial Reports

2009 PCD Report	<p>Section 2.3.2 “Revision of the IA guidelines”</p> <p>“The Commission uses impact assessment to identify likely consequences of its policy initiatives or legislative proposals in the economic, environmental and social fields. The 2007 PCD report suggested using them to get a clearer idea of how developing countries may be affected. The Commission therefore took the opportunity to revise the IA guidelines to strengthen their external dimension and to sharpen them as a PCD instrument.</p> <p>The revised IA guidelines applicable since January 2009, put the Commission in a better position to ensure Policy Coherence for Development, in so far as they call for a more in-depth analysis of possible the ways in which EU policy initiatives might affect developing countries. The guidelines state that ‘initiatives that may affect developing countries should be analysed for their coherence with the objectives of EU development policy. This includes an analysis of consequences (or spillovers) in the longer run in areas such as economic, environmental, social or security policy.’ Such an analysis has to differentiate between countries at different stages of development. According to the new guidelines the impact on commitments arising from the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement must also be checked. The annexes to the guidelines include a specific section on assessing impacts on developing countries. In addition, specific guidance is given for identifying possible consequences on developing countries, including in the areas of employment, food security, and natural resources stocks.</p> <p>These changes by the Commission also responds to requests from the European Parliament and the Council to strengthen the external dimension of IA and to improve and make better use the IA process to evaluate the impact of EU policies on developing countries.”</p> <p>Section 2.6 “Conclusions & outstanding issues”:</p> <p>“The EU and developing countries could for instance better use the consultation mechanisms provided for in the impact assessment guidelines (...) and strengthen them if necessary.”</p> <p>Section 4.1.2 “Understanding the impact of EU policies other than aid”:</p> <p>“A framework for assessing PCD-sensitivity in EU policy: Such a framework should allow for systematic exploration of the effects, positive or negative, that EU policies other than aid might have on development, and more specifically on the achievement of the MDGs. This is at the heart of the <u>impact assessment process</u> which is used in EU policymaking. While very often the emphasis is on the potential negative impact, the framework also encourages the identification of possible synergies, potential positive impacts on development, in addition to the core sector objective of the policies. (...)”.</p>
2011 PCD Report	<p>Section 2.1.2:</p> <p>“The European Commission uses the Impact Assessment process to identify likely consequences of its policy initiatives or legislative proposals in the economic, environmental and social fields and to ensure the production of better and more coherent policies. In 2009, the European Commission revised its guidelines to strengthen their external dimension and - among other objectives - to sharpen them as a PCD instrument. Impact assessments are also increasingly under scrutiny from the civil society and stakeholders. In spite of this significant progress, the implementation of this new requirement has proven difficult. While the European Court of Auditors has noted that impact assessment has been effective in supporting decision-making in the EU institutions, and that the Commission’s IA reports have complied with the requirements of the guidelines, the Commission will continue to strengthen its approach to assessing the external dimension of its policies.”</p> <p>Section 3.2 “Impact Assessment carried out by the European Commission”:</p> <p>“(…) The guidelines stress the need to measure impact outside the EU and to include this evidence in the ex-ante analysis. The table indicating the impacts that should be considered includes impacts on third countries and international relations and refers clearly to the impact on EU development policy, preferential trade agreements, adjustment costs for developing countries and most importantly, to possible impacts on goods or services that are produced or consumed by developing countries”. (<i>excerpt of the table concerning third countries and international relations, from the 2009 IA guidelines</i>).</p> <p>“The Commission’s Secretariat General, the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation - Europe Aid as well as the Directorate-General for Trade have been assisting with the</p>

application of the Treaty obligation, and the efforts to assess external impacts and especially impacts on developing countries on a case by case basis. In addition to the general reference in the Impact Assessment Guidelines, it is felt by some that there is a need for a specific methodology to measure impact on development objectives and on partner countries⁴⁹”.

Part III “Lessons Learned and challenges ahead” / Section 1.2:

“The European Commission will continue its work to improve Impact Assessment process and instruments for policy initiatives and proposals with an impact on EU external relations or development policy and/or development in partner countries.”

2013
PCD
Report

Section 4.2 “Impact Assessments”:

“(…) IAs have great potential to strengthen PCD at a very early stage of the preparation of a political initiative. In the last revision of the IA Guidelines in 2009, a new section on assessing impacts on developing countries was added, together with upgraded guidance in the annexes. Initiatives that may affect developing countries should be analysed for their consistency with EU development policy objectives. This includes analysis of longer-term consequences (or spill-overs) in areas such as economic, environmental, social and security policy.

Despite this requirement, in the two years that followed this reform only a small number of IAs on initiatives with a potential impact on developing countries actually included analysis of those aspects. This poor record — criticised in a report by the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development (CONCORD) in autumn 2011 — shows that PCD and development objectives are not yet given sufficient weight in the IA process. The Commission is therefore looking at ways of raising the profile and awareness of the PCD requirement in the IA Guidelines and strengthening analytical capacity for assessing development impacts of non-development policies.

An opportunity to do so has arisen with the Commission’s review of the IA Guidelines (as announced in its Communication on EU Regulatory Fitness), which will be completed in 2014. The objective in terms of promoting PCD is to make the requirement to analyse impacts on developing countries more explicit in the Guidelines and provide clearer guidance in the technical section on how to assess them.”

Part III “Lessons Learned and outstanding issues” / Section 46.2:

“The Impact Assessment remains the main tool for promoting PCD in new policy initiatives or proposals for policy revision. The review of the Impact Assessment guidelines in 2013/2014 and the growing attention to Impact Assessment analysis in the European Parliament are opportunities for ensuring that development impacts are taken into account.”

“The European Commission continues to work on strengthening the practical guidance and multiplying resources for better measuring and taking into account development impacts in these assessments.”

2015
PCD
Report

Section 1.3 “European Commission: Mechanisms and Tools”:

“[IAs] are prepared for all Commission initiatives that are expected to have significant economic, social or environmental impacts. They provide decision-makers with evidence on the need for EU action and the advantages and disadvantages of different policy choices. IAs allow ex-ante assessments of policy proposals and can help ensure that impacts on developing countries are taken into account at an early stage of the preparation of a political initiative.

The Commission has laid down Guidelines to set quality standards and give general guidance to the Services carrying out IA work. When these Guidelines were reviewed in 2009 a new section on assessing impacts on developing countries was introduced. However, the number of efforts to assess development impacts remained low. This may have been because, unlike other EU policies, specific guidance on how to assess these types of impacts was not provided.

Following a high-level expert workshop in 2013 and consultation with Commission services, specific and operational guidance is now provided on how to systematically assess the effects of possible new policies on developing countries. This new toolkit is part of the new Impact Assessment Guidelines, which have become part of the Better Regulation Guidelines⁵⁰ adopted by the Commission on 19 May 2015. The specific guidance covers a number of aspects including: whether the proposed initiative is likely to affect developing countries; how to determine the appropriate level of analysis; how to assess the impacts on developing countries (descriptive or in-depth analysis); and provision of links to further information sources and background material⁵¹.

⁴⁹ An assessment of EC Impact Assessments conducted by CONCORD Denmark and presented in November 2011 affirms that out of 77 IAs potentially relevant for the developing countries (out of the total 164 IA the Commission has conducted from 2009 to 2011) only 7 IAs have any content actually assessing the consequences for developing countries.

⁵⁰ SWD (2015) 111 final, 19.5.2015.

⁵¹ See in particular Tool #30 on developing countries of the Better Regulation “Toolbox” annexed to the Guidelines.

Reply from Finland:

“Finland emphasizes the role of the Commission with its resources to conduct impact assessments of the new initiatives and proposals, and to pay attention to the impact on developing countries.”

“Impact assessments are crucial to evaluate possible impacts of new EU initiatives on developing countries. Therefore, development issues need to figure more prominently in the revised EC Impact Assessment guidelines.”

Reply from Germany:

“Impact assessments done by the European Commission on new policy initiatives or legislative proposals can be a very powerful PCD tool. It would be of interest if the EU shared information on impact assessments that analyze the impact of non-aid policies on developing countries.”

Reply from Ireland:

“Ireland looks forward to the implementation of the Guidelines on Better Regulation at EU level, and more robust scrutiny of the impacts on developing countries in future impact assessments.”

Table 3: Mention of IAs in PCD Council Conclusions

2009 PCD Council Conclusions	“The Council welcomes the increased emphasis on PCD in the European Commission, the better use of the inter-service consultation mechanism and <u>the strengthening of the development dimension of the impact assessment tool</u> as important instruments to improve PCD”.
2012 PCD Council Conclusions	N.a.
2013 PCD Council Conclusions	“The EU's impact assessments, sustainable impact assessments and evaluations can play an important role in ensuring ex-ante mainstreaming of PCD and in assessing results. The Council calls for strengthening the development dimension of these tools in the context of the review of their respective guidelines”.
2015 PCD Council Conclusions	“Furthermore, the Commission's Better Regulation Package contains revised Impact Assessments guidelines and a "Tool Box" for assessing potential impacts of future EU initiatives on developing countries at an early stage of the preparation of an initiative. The Council encourages the Commission to share its first experiences of the application of impact assessments when available and to present concrete proposals on how to advance coherence in all EU policy areas with a clear goal to contribute to sustainable development.”

Table 4: Mention of IAs in European Parliament resolutions on PCD

2010 EP resolution	68. “Welcomes the mechanisms to enhance PCD within the Commission, namely (...) the Impact Assessment process, (...); asks, however, which criteria DG Development used when deciding to overturn incoherent policy initiatives (...); calls for the information gathered in the Impact Assessments to be made available to the European Parliament in a more comprehensible form, and for the European Parliament, the national parliaments and the parliaments of the developing countries to be more closely involved in these mechanisms;” 71. “Asks the Commission to start the impact assessments earlier, i.e. before the drafting process of policy initiatives is already far advanced and to base them on existing or specially conducted evidence-based studies, and to systematically include social, environmental and human rights dimensions, since a prospective analysis is most useful and practical given the lack of data and the complexities of measuring PCD; asks the Commission to include the results of the impact assessments in the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)’s Regional and Country Strategy Papers, together with suggestions for a follow-up;” 72. “Expresses its concern that, out of 82 [IAs] conducted in 2009 by the Commission, only one was dedicated to development; stresses the need for a systematic approach to PCD performance measuring; therefore calls on the Commission to give to its unit for forward-looking studies and policy coherence in DG DEV a central role in enhancing the consideration of PCD;”
2012 EP resolution	10. “Insists that the questions regarding the economic, environmental and social impacts of policies inside and outside of the EU laid down in the Impact Assessments Guidelines from 2009 are answered in the Commission's impact assessments (...); asks the Commission also to complete the impact assessments in advance of the corresponding policy proposal in order to ensure that civil society organisations (CSOs) and other relevant stakeholders can participate in the process, thereby also creating an added value in terms of capacity;”

2014 EP resolution	<p>11. “Underlines that the Impact Assessment Board of the Commission and the similar institution to be set up by Parliament need adequate expertise in development policies in order to live up to their responsibility to verify the quality of impacts assessments in terms of PCD;”</p> <p>6. “(...) emphasises the need to improve the Commission’s impact assessment system by featuring PCD explicitly and ensuring that development becomes a fourth central element of the analysis, alongside the economic, social and environmental impacts;”</p>
2016 EP resolution	<p>10. “Regrets the fact that although impact assessments represent a significant tool for achieving PCD, assessments of development impacts remain few in number and do not properly address the potential impact on developing countries; hopes that the Better Regulation Package and its guidelines will improve this situation by taking development and human rights into account in all [IAs] and by enhancing transparency; calls on the Commission systematically to consult human rights organisations at an early stage of the policymaking process and to put in place stronger safeguards and mechanisms in order to better balance stakeholders’ representativeness; welcomes the public consultation on the roadmap, which is aimed at determining the outcome and impact of PCD on developing countries and which opens up opportunities for external stakeholders, including developing countries and civil society, to give their views and actively participate; further welcomes the field phase of the roadmap and the case studies, which could contribute effectively to an accurate evaluation of the impact of PCD; considers it necessary to undertake more systematic ex-post assessments during EU policy implementation;</p>

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Activity Assessment Tool

Inter-service Consultation process (ISC)

1 INTRODUCTION

The ISC process has been identified as a Commission policy-making mechanism relevant to enhance PCD together with impact assessments and inter-service groups.⁵² Inter-Service Consultations precede, as a rule, the political decision-making process. The Commission's Rules of Procedure establish internal coordination and cooperation among Commission services when preparing and implementing decisions.⁵³ Close cooperation among services is essential from the moment a proposal is conceived right up to when it is presented to the Commission. Also, the ISC process reflects the collective responsibility of the services.⁵⁴

In the assessment of the ISC we consider two distinct aspect of the process:

- The “informal” ISC process which can start at the very early stage of policy formulation and which consists of informal discussions and consultations among Commission services on the policy orientation and content, and which can run all along the overall ISC process. This process does not rely on a clear set of rules, but rather on informal personal contacts of staff in charge of developing a policy proposal across DGs.
- The “formal” ISC process which can be described as the last stage of the decision-making process and which consists of structured and recorded discussions across Commission services, with a clear set of rules.

Both through its informal and formal aspects, the ISC offers an opportunity to ensure that PCD is taken into consideration from the beginning of the policy-making process, with respect to those policy proposals considered as PCD relevant. This Commission general coordination mechanism allows other DGs to express opinion in their area of expertise and check for coherence and consistency with other policies. As a non-specific PCD mechanism, it allows DG DEVCO to bring forward development objectives, so these can be considered within non-development policies likely to affect developing countries, as well as to point out possible incoherencies/synergies with respect to those objectives. Therefore, the participation of DG DEVCO in the ISC process has a potential for contributing in the mainstreaming of PCD into policy making. Since 2014 an Inter-Service consultation can only be launched with the prior agreement of the responsible Commissioner, the relevant Vice-President(s) and the First Vice-President in charge of Better Regulation, Interinstitutional Relations, the Rule of Law and Charter of Fundamental Rights.⁵⁵

2 QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT

2.1 Detailed description of the activity

Through the ISC process, policy makers become more aware of the complexities of DGs' areas of competence. The lead DG for the policy/initiative is responsible for identifying which other DGs need to be consulted during the policy-making process. The Rules of Procedure establish in Article 23 the requirement for cooperation and coordination between Commission services: *“1. In order to ensure the effectiveness of Commission action, departments shall work in close cooperation and in coordinated fashion from the outset in the preparation and implementation of Commission decisions.”*

⁵² COM(2009) 458 final, Policy Coherence for Development - Establishing the policy framework for a whole-of-the-Union approach, 15.9.2009, p.11. See also Annex 2 in this activity report.

⁵³ Article 23 of Rules of Procedure, Commission Decision amending its Rules of Procedure, 24.02.2010, (2010/138/EU, Euratom).

⁵⁴ Revised guide to inter-service consultation, SEC (2009) 780, 10.06.2009.

⁵⁵ The Working Methods of the European Commission 2014-2019, C(2014) 9004 , 11.11.2014.

2. *The department responsible for preparing an initiative shall ensure from the beginning of the preparatory work that there is effective coordination between all the departments with a legitimate interest in the initiative by virtue of their powers or responsibilities or the nature of the subject.*
3. *Before a document is submitted to the Commission, the department responsible shall, in accordance with the implementing rules, consult the departments with a legitimate interest in the draft text in sufficient time.”*

Inter-service coordination is vital if the policy objectives set by the Commission are to be achieved and it reflects its collective responsibility. The formal inter-service consultation is initiated by the lead service once a proposal (usually for adoption by the Commission) has reached a sufficiently advanced stage within that service, working previously in liaison with other DGs (informal part of the ISC process) and once the Impact Assessment has been approved by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (before IA Board). The lead department seeks the formal opinion of all other Directorates-General and services with a legitimate specific interest in the proposal. Inter-service meetings or bilateral contacts (informal part of the ISC process) with the services most closely concerned with the policy proposal precede the formal ISC process and it is important they occur at the earliest stages. The aim of the whole process is to achieve a proper balance between transparency and efficiency. Consultation of certain services is obligatory depending on the subject: the Legal Service, the SG, DG ADMIN, DG BUDG, DG COMM and OLAF. The result of the ISC process can lead to: a) agreement, if the service consulted agrees to the proposal without any comments; b) a favourable opinion, subject to comments being taken into account, if the department consulted agrees to the proposal subject to its comments being taken into account by the lead service; and c) a negative opinion. The ISC process also foresees a Fast-Track procedure when the SG decides that an inter-service coordination meeting on a given measure counts as a formal inter-service consultation if the services most directly affected are represented at the meeting.⁵⁶

The Working Methods of the European Commission 2014-2019 have established well-defined priority projects under the political steering of the six Vice-Presidents regarding the 10 policy areas of the Juncker Political Guidelines. Inter-Service Consultations are launched at the initiative of a Commissioner in agreement with the Vice-President with whom he/she has been asked to liaise closely in his/her work. For key initiatives of the Commission Work Programme, Inter-Service groups, chaired by the Secretariat-General, should be established in order to prepare drafts, including the relevant Impact Assessment. All services with a legitimate interest in the draft text need to be included in the Inter-Service Consultation. Also, the 2015 Better Regulation Guidelines establish that the formal inter-service consultation should check how the RSB's comments have been integrated and check the quality of the drafting of the proposal.

The available evidence shows that DG DEVCO has not always been involved on ISC process regarding policy proposals identified as PCD relevant.⁵⁷ Stakeholders interviewed have pointed out to the fact that unless DG DEVCO is invited to participate by the lead service, in some cases it has been difficult to follow up the moment when policy proposals start an inter-service group prior to the formal ISC process, and therefore it becomes difficult for DG DEVCO to express their interest on the policy proposal from an early stage. Also, a stakeholder raised the issue that even following a formal ISC process represents a task that requires additional human resources, and if DG DEVCO has not been included from the early stages prior to the ISC formal process, it becomes difficult to react in the short time frame of the formal ISC process. The available evidence of ISC records for selected policies, shows that in some cases the early

⁵⁶ Revised guide to inter-service consultation, SEC (2009) 780, 10.06.2009.

⁵⁷ See activity report on IA.

involvement of DG DEVCO in the ISC process has allowed it to contribute and strengthen the development considerations of certain policies.⁵⁸ Also, the evidence available shows that development considerations are not necessarily raised by DG DEVCO but instead by other services involved in the ISC process.⁵⁹ For other cases, a balance regarding political priorities had to be reached and development considerations might not necessarily have been at the forefront in the current context when security concerns are a priority. Or the position of the lead service had to prevail in the trade-off and balance of interests regarding respective policy areas. As for the new working methods of the Commission, available ISC records show the use of a fast-track ISC procedure, and the clear political steer on certain policy priorities.

2.2 Strengths

Transparency: The ISC process within the Commission allows other DGs to be part from an early stage of the policy-making process in a structured and formal manner, with a clear set of rules.

Relevant for promoting PCD from an early stage: The ISC offers an opportunity to point out potential incoherencies and/or synergies of a policy with respect to diverse policy objectives. In addition, it reflects the collective responsibility of the different services with respect to Commission decisions.

Self-standing mechanism: ISC process as part of the policy-making process within the Commission, constitutes a self-standing mechanism capable of influencing the decision-making process so as to result with a policy that takes account of development objectives.

2.3 Weaknesses

Not part of an integrated/unified policy-making database system: Even though the formal ISC process is supported by a well-defined and established database-system (DECIDE, former CIS-NET), stakeholders have pointed out the difficulty in identifying the moment when an inter-service group is established for a respective policy proposal listed in the Commission Work Programme unless their service is invited from the early stages of the informal part of the process. This difficulty prevents a service from expressing their interest from the early stages of drafting the proposal or contributing to the IA prior to the ISC formal process. Therefore, if a policy proposal of the Commission Work Programme has been screened as PCD relevant, in the absence of an integrated alert system that informs when is the lead service about to initiate an inter-service group for drafting the proposal or the respective IA, DG DEVCO has no means to ensure the respective follow up and consequent participation in an inter-service group regarding the said proposal.

Up to the lead service to decide participants: Unless DG DEVCO is invited to participate in the ISC process by the lead service, DG DEVCO cannot express opinion on the policy proposal.

Limited time to provide input: Sometimes, when considered for the ISC, DG DEVCO only gets notified once the formal process has been launched, and not during the informal part of the process when the discussions and drafting of policy proposal takes place, leaving the relevant thematic unit with little time to react during the formal stage of the ISC.

Expertise and availability of human resources: Technical expertise and sufficient human resources might represent a challenge for DG DEVCO when participating in ISC processes regarding other policy areas.

⁵⁸ For instance, in the cases of the Communications on the GAMM and the EUAP against Wildlife Trafficking.

⁵⁹ For instance, the review of the EU Blue Card directive.

Politicised process: ISC is part of a collective policy-making process in which services bring up their own agenda, and even when they aim to achieve win-win situations, trade-offs have to be made and the political decision might not be transparent enough when dealing with sensitive information.

2.4 Opportunities for improvement

To ensure that PCD is taken into consideration from the early stages of the ISC process since the beginning of informal discussions and coordination stage, this mechanism could be used in combination with other PCD specific mechanisms such as the CWP screening for PCD relevance. In absence of an alert system or early warning system informing when exactly a policy proposal listed in the CWP will start with an inter-service group for drafting the proposal or the respective IA, stakeholders involved in the promotion of PCD within each service could have a more active role in liaising with DG DEVCO to ensure its participation in the ISC process regarding those policies listed as PCD relevant.⁶⁰ As the CWP screening for PCD relevance is shared with the Focal Points of Commission services, these stakeholders are aware of which policies are potentially relevant for PCD. Therefore, they could keep their respective services informed of DG DEVCO's potential interest in contributing to the ISC process for those policy proposals. On the other hand, those services that consider that their policy proposals are relevant for PCD or likely to affect developing countries could actively look for DG DEVCO's contribution from an early stage to enhance their non-development policies and make them development-friendly.

3 CONCLUSIONS

The ISC process is a self-standing mechanism that reflects collective responsibility for policy-making within the Commission. It offers an opportunity to ensure that PCD is taken into consideration from an early stage, with respect to those policy proposals considered as PCD relevant. As a coordination mechanism for policy-making it allows DG DEVCO to bring forward development objectives so that these can be considered within non-development policies likely to affect developing countries, as well as to point out possible incoherencies/synergies with respect to those objectives. Hence to ensure DG DEVCO's contribution in the ISC process it is important to combine it with specific PCD mechanisms such as the CWP screening for PCD relevance and strengthen the collaboration with PCD Focal Points in Commission services. On the other hand, if DG DEVCO only gets notified once the formal process has been launched, and is not included from the early stages of informal discussions regarding the policy proposal, it offers limited time to provide input. Also, technical expertise and sufficient human resources might represent a challenge for DG DEVCO when participating in ISC processes regarding other policy areas. Furthermore, the ISC process remains a politicised process. In the collective policy-making process Commission services bring up their own agenda, and even when they aim to achieve win-win situations, trade-offs have to be made.

⁶⁰ Minutes of meetings of the ISG on PCD show that during the period 2010-2012, PCD Focal Points within the Commission reported on the stages of policy-making regarding policy proposals identified as PCD relevant following the PCD screening exercise of the CWP.

Appendix 1: Summary of additional findings with respect to EQ3

<p>Number of redundancies / synergies within the activity / with other activities with respect to their contribution to output achievement (Indicator I 3.1.3)</p>	<p>There is synergy with the IA process as the inter-service consultation (ISC) mechanism follows afterwards. The IA report is submitted to inter-service consultation together with the accompanying policy initiative.</p> <p>There is lack of synergy with the CWP screening undertaken by the PCD team within DG DEVCO. DG DEVCO is not systematically invited to participate in the ISC process for all policy proposals identified as being PCD-relevant in the PCD CWP screening. ISC is a general process for policy-making within the Commission and no possibility for redundancies exist with other PCD related activities.</p>
<p>Actual level of human resources (staffing and expertise) or material resources against stakeholder's perception of needs (Indicator I 3.2.1 and 3.2.2)</p>	<p>Only possible to establish with findings of Surveys. However, some stakeholders interviewed have pointed out the lack of human resources to follow up all ISC processes given the high volume of policy proposals in certain areas.</p>
<p>Are processes standardized within the PCD Unit, DEVCO/NEAR and other DGs, and the EEAS? (Indicator I 3.3.3)</p>	<p>ISC process is fairly standardized within the Commission as it is a general process for policy-making within the Commission.</p>
<p>Does the activity involve coordination with EU stakeholders (EUMS, EP, Council, EEAS, EESC, CSOs)? (Indicator I 3.5.1)</p>	<p>The ISC process is an internal process that only involves the Commission services (DGs) and the EEAS. The main stakeholders for the ISC (as a PCD mechanism) are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Line DGs, which launch ISCs on policy proposals that are likely to affect developing countries; 2. DG DEVCO, when invited to comment for the ISC by the leading service; 3. Thematic experts of DG DEVCO in charge of contributing to the comments on the policy proposal; 4. PCD Unit, which initially points out to the relevance of a PCD approach for policy proposals when screening the CWP, and by sharing this information with other DGs contributes eventually to DG DEVCO being invited to comment and participate in the ISC process; 5. Other DGs invited to comment on the policy proposal.
<p>Does the activity involve cooperation and coordination with developing countries? (Indicator I 3.5.2)</p>	<p>N/A.</p>
<p>Nature of changes over time of inputs and of the activity itself (Indicators I 3.6.1 and I 3.6.2)</p>	<p>The ISC process since 2014 requires first political validation by the responsible Commissioner and Vice-Presidents before it can be launched.</p>

Appendix 2: Mentions of the activity in PCD Biennial Reports, PCD Council Conclusions and EP resolutions on PCD

Table 1: Mention of ISC process in PCD Biennial Reports

2009 PCD Report	<p>In 2008, the Commission took its PCD work further by sharpening, and making better use of Inter-service consultation (ISC) and Impact assessments (IA), both of which are powerful mechanisms to promote PCD.</p> <p>Every year, the Commission adopts hundreds of new legislative proposals and policy initiatives, which undergo IA and ISC. In an effort to identify the initiatives which will affect developing countries, the Commission now regularly establishes an informal PCD workplan (...) This PCD planning list has been an important step forward. It allows the Commission to use the ISC and IA in a much more effective and strategic way and to concentrate its efforts on those initiatives with the biggest impact on developing countries.</p>
2011 PCD Report	<p>The establishment of the European External Action Service on 1 January 2011 has provided a good opportunity to ensure greater coherence and consistency of EU external action and to strengthen PCD. The Commission includes the EEAS in its inter-service consultation procedures on an equal basis to Commission services.</p> <p>As part of the Commission's decision-making procedures, services are consulted on all policy proposals in order to allow relevant DGs to comment on anything that might concern their area of expertise and to check for coherence and consistency. This provides an additional working-level opportunity to screen policy proposals that may have an impact on development policies and suggest modifications to proposals to improve PCD. The EEAS is consulted on policy proposals relevant to their area of competence.</p>
2013 PCD Report	No specific mention.
2015 PCD Report	<p>The Commission's key role in initiating the EU policy process requires comprehensive internal coordination between services as well as with the European External Action Service (EEAS). Since PCD encompasses a wide range of policy areas, effective coordination between the parties involved is essential. The Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) coordinates different networks including coordination within DG DEVCO; Inter-Service groups with other Commission services and the EEAS;</p> <p>All Commission initiatives and major programmes are subject to inter-service consultation. They are checked by central services for regularity and legality as well as for compliance with the rules so as to ensure the achievement of policy objective in each sector identified. Furthermore, during the Budget setting process checks and verifications on policy coherence between different policy areas are examined. The Programme Statements supporting the annual Draft Budget are one of the ways of ensuring policy complementarities and coherence.</p>

Table 2: Mention of ISC process in PCD Council Conclusions

2007 PCD Council Conclusions	<p>PCD requires, in addition to political commitments, a clear approach providing adequate information on the impact of other policies on developing countries, appropriate fora for dialogue across policy areas, sufficient expertise and enhanced accountability and transparency.</p>
2009 PCD Council Conclusions	<p>The Council welcomes the increased emphasis on PCD in the European Commission, the better use of the inter-service consultation mechanism and the strengthening of the development dimension of the impact assessment tool as important instruments to improve PCD and the regular screening of the Commission Legislative and Work Programme from a PCD perspective</p>
2012 PCD Council Conclusions	No specific mention.
2013 PCD Council Conclusions	No specific mention.
2015 PCD Council Conclusions	<p>The Council favourably notes the new institutional organisation of the Commission as a policy coherence instrument in itself.</p> <p>(...)</p> <p>The new universal framework for sustainable development calls for more coherence between different policy areas and EU actors, requiring further coordination,</p>

dialogue and joint work at all levels within and between EU institution services, Council formations and working parties.

Table 3: Mention of ISC process in European Parliament resolutions on PCD

2010 EP resolution	Welcomes the mechanisms to enhance PCD within the Commission, namely the inter-service consultation system, the Impact Assessment process, the Sustainability Impact Assessment, the Inter-service Quality Support Group and, where appropriate, the Strategic Environmental Assessment; asks, however, which criteria DG Development used when deciding to overturn incoherent policy initiatives and asks for greater transparency as regards the outcome of inter-service consultations (...)
2012 EP resolution	No specific mention.
2014 EP resolution	Proposes that an arbitration system be established, to be operated by the President of the Commission, to bring about PCD, and that in the event of divergences among the various policies of the Union, the President of the Commission should fully shoulder his political responsibility for the overall approach and have the task of deciding among them on the basis of the commitments accepted by the Union with regard to PCD; takes the view that, once the problems have been identified, consideration could be given to a reform of the decision-making procedures within the Commission and in interdepartmental cooperation;
2016 EP resolution	No specific mention.

Appendix 3: Evidence available on ISC Records for Selected Policies during Desk Phase

PCD-related policy/initiative	Lead Service	Availability ISC records
Common Agricultural Policy (reform 2013)	DG AGRI	Not available.
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Regulation	DG MARE	Not available.
Common Fisheries Policy reform	DG MARE	Not available.
Country by Country Reporting	DG FISMA	Received.
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism	DG JUST	Not available.
Generalised Scheme of Preferences	DG TRADE	Not available.
Trade for All Communication	DG TRADE	Not available.
Responsible sourcing of mineral originating in conflict affected and high risk areas	DG TRADE / EEAS	Not available.
Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe	DG CNECT	Not available.
Raw Materials Initiative	DG GROW	Received.
EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking	DG ENV	Received.
A policy framework for climate and energy period 2020-2030	DG CLIMA	Not available.
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility	DG HOME	Received.
Review of the EU Blue Card directive	DG HOME	Received.

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Activity Assessment Tool

Biennial Report

1 INTRODUCTION

The EU Biennial reports on PCD can be described as narrative style reports compiling self-reported information on policy initiatives of the various DGs on their PCD related work. PCD Reports have taken place since 2007 on a regular basis (although the 2017 PCD report will not be released) and involve the contribution of several stakeholders at different levels of interaction. Already in 2005, in the context of supporting the MDGs, the Council instructed the European Commission to monitor progress in the EU and all Member States on the EU's commitments on PCD and to report it every two years. Biennial reports are the result of the following mandates in Commission Communication and Council Conclusions:

- **COM (2005) 134 final Policy Coherence for Development: Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals:** “To further enhance EU policy coherence in the specific context of supporting the MDGs, the Commission will compile a mid-term EU Policy Coherence for Development Report, between now and the next international MDG Review, where progress on the coherence commitments proposed in this Communication will be reviewed.” (p.19).
- **Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council on “Millennium Development Goals: EU Contribution to the Review of the MDGs at the UN 2005 High Level Event”, 24 May 2005 , doc. 9266/05** “The Council invites the Commission to monitor and regularly report on the implementation of these EU commitments on MDGs, including annual reports on the follow up of the EU commitments on financing and on the effectiveness of aid, and a biennial report on Policy Coherence for Development.”
- **Conclusions of the 2756th Council meeting (Ministers) on General Affairs and External Relations - on External assistance in 2005, 17 October 2006:** “Invites the Commission in the 2007 Annual Report to (...) include a more explicit description of implementation and effects of the Paris Declaration as well as, based on the biennial EU PCD report, a summary of achievements as regards the policy coherence for development (PCD) commitments”.

2 QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT

2.1 Detailed description

Every 2 years since 2007, the PCD Team within DG DEVCO spends about one third of its internal staff resources on the production of the EU PCD Biennial Reports. Reports have been produced in 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015. The production process of the Biennial Report is composed of the following steps:

- **Sending of Questionnaire:** As a first step of the report production process, the PCD Team sends out a structured questionnaire / a request for contribution to other line DGs (and EEAS since its creation) and to EU Member States. The questionnaire requests stakeholders to report on their PCD work per PCD Challenge area⁶¹ in a narrative format covering organisational commitments (horizontal PCD priorities) and policy commitments (thematic PCD priorities), with varying degrees of freedom (some years, the questionnaire was very structured, while other years the contribution was asked in a more flexible format);
- **Feedback from DGs/EEAS:** DGs are normally given a few months' time to fill-out the structured questionnaire and send back their contribution to the PCD Team. Usually the

⁶¹ The questionnaires for the 2009 report requested the information based on the 12 policy areas/commitments. Questionnaires for the 2011, 2013 and 2015 reports are based on the 5 challenge areas.

information is compiled within each DG by the PCD focal point. The contribution from each DG is usually sent in a structured and edited way, so that most of the content can be almost directly integrated into the report;

- **Feedback from EU Member States:** EU Member States questionnaires follow a similar structure as those sent to the DGs, but the focus is rather on EU Member States' initiatives and institutional framework in favour of PCD. While the rate of responses from EU Member States is rather high (the vast majority of EU Member States provide the requested answers to the PCD Team), it should be noted that "half of the Member States consider their reporting to the EU (for the Biennial PCD report) as a reporting obligation."⁶²
- **Compilation of feedback from PCD Team:** On the basis of the contributions received by the PCD Team from other DGs and EU Member States, the PCD Biennial report is produced: the production process itself consists of structuring and editing the various contributions received, requesting additional information to the DGs, EU Member States, etc.
- **Informal PCD network of EU Member States:** During the meetings of the informal network of member states, discussions on the content /preparation of the Biennial Report take place on a regular basis. Hence, at the margin the Informal Network of Member States supports / assists the EU PCD Team with the production of the report.
- **Publication of the report and answers from the Council/EP:** Once the draft report is completed, the report is shared with all Commission services for formal approval as a staff working document. The report is then shared with other EU institutions: the EP and the Council, and in return formal answers / comments to the Biennial Report are published every year by the Council in "PCD Council Conclusions" (see Table 2 in Annex 2) and by the European Parliament (see Table 3 in Annex 2);
- **Civil society:** the civil society organisation Concorde publishes its own PCD Biennial report, although it is not a direct response to the PCD Biennial report

2.2 Strengths

The main strengths of the Biennial Report are the following:

- **Level of detail:** The well-structured and formalized process through which the Biennial Report is produced (whereby the PCD focal point of each DG or EU Member States compiles information/progress of the PCD work of the DG or Member State in a structured and systematized way) allows the Commission to attain what the Evaluation team considers to be a high-level of detail and exhaustiveness on PCD initiatives being undertaken by the various DGs and Member States. During the Evaluation process, the evaluation team was able to appreciate the usefulness of the report as a source of information for the review of selected policies, which speaks to the quality of the PCD report.
- **Usefulness for awareness-raising and visibility:** As a result of the above and given that the PCD report is produced in a structure and formalized way, the content of the report is of high quality, presented in a professional and standardized manner. The report can therefore be used for various applications: it can be used as a basis for awareness-raising presentations on PCD⁶³, it can also be used as a visibility tool among the international fora⁶⁴, or as an online publication to raise-awareness on the EU PCD Approach.

⁶² 2015 PCD Report, Section on Reporting obligations on PCD, page 24

⁶³ The PCD Team has reported that material from the PCD Biennial Report has been used on several occasions in the context of awareness-raising presentations on the EU's PCD.

⁶⁴ It has come to the attention of the Evaluation Team that the 2015 Biennial Report was distributed as visibility/promotion material by the Commission in the context of meetings linked to EU's participation in the negotiations of the SDGs agenda at the end of 2015.

- **Coordination / collaboration of a wide variety of actors:** Another strength of the Biennial Report is the high number of stakeholders that it involves at various levels, hence providing a useful framework for a structured debate on PCD. Indeed, the main stakeholders of the PCD Biennial Reports are:
 1. The Council, who requested the Commission to monitor and regularly report on the implementation of these EU commitments on MDGs in 2005;
 2. EU Member States, which were involved in providing information for the Biennial Reports;
 3. The Commission services and EEAS, which were the main contributors to the Biennial Reports.
 Furthermore, in its dissemination the Biennial Report is of special attention to the following main stakeholders:
 1. The European Parliament, which throughout the evaluation period has become increasingly attentive to PCD and is publishing a response to the PCD Biennial Reports since 2011;
 2. Partner countries, who could have an interest in PCD as the process might be relevant to them;
 3. CSOs active on PCD;
 4. Think tanks and research institutes that follow EU PCD work.

2.3 Weaknesses

The main weaknesses of the Biennial Report are the following:

- **Perceived as a reporting obligation:** As mentioned above, “half of the Member States consider their reporting to the EU (for the biennial PCD report) as a reporting obligation.” The format of the Biennial Report (long and narrative), as well as the important contribution needed by DGs/EU Member States are two features contributing to this perception among stakeholders.
- **Time consuming to produce:** Preparation of the biennial report is the single most time-consuming task of the PCD Team. The PCD Team estimates that the production of the biennial report consumes about one third of its total human resources;
- **Limited usefulness for monitoring:** These reports mainly constitute a source of awareness-raising on PCD for the Commission, EEAS, EP, Council, EU Member States and civil society but it is not useful as a monitoring tool of PCD. This view has been expressed by several stakeholders:
 - **The Council** expressed this view for the first time in the 2012 PCD Council Conclusions stating that “The Council looks forward to receiving in 2013 the fourth biennial PCD Report, which should include an independent assessment of progress, including qualitative and quantitative consequences and costs of policy incoherence. It encourages the Commission to build on the PCD Work Programme for 2010-2013 and, with a view to a more evidence-based approach, to further improve monitoring, implementation and follow-up. Relevant baselines, indicators and targets should also be developed including for measuring the impact of PCD in a way which demonstrates clear development results.”⁶⁵ In the 2013 PCD Council Conclusions, this view is reiterated: “The Council also believes that further progress is needed on several issues covered in the 2012 Council Conclusions on issues such as measuring PCD and on promoting a more evidence-based approach, including through the quantification of the costs of

⁶⁵ Council conclusions on Policy Coherence for Development, 3166th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 14 May 2012, Point 10 (page 2)

incoherencies for selected cases, and underlines that further work is needed to move towards a more focused, operational and results-oriented approach to PCD⁶⁶.”

- **The European Parliament** raised similar concerns echoing the views of the Council. In its Resolution dated October 2012, the EP “Welcomes the Commission's third biennial report on PCD 2011, but agrees with the Council on the need to include an independent assessment of progress, including qualitative and quantitative consequences and costs of policy incoherence in future reports; suggests that future reports should also include a comprehensive overview of PCD-related results of the country-level dialogues, in order to make the voices of citizens of developing countries heard”⁶⁷. Furthermore, in its explanatory statement accompanying the 2015 resolution, the EP stated: “The Commission's report in itself is a useful tool for raising awareness about PCD, but the report would be even more useful if it addressed PCD progress in a more analytical way.”⁶⁸

2.4 Opportunities for improvement

As stated in a number of EP Resolutions and PCD Council Conclusions (see Annex 2), the single most important opportunity for improvement for the Biennial Report is that **it evolves towards a tool that is not only useful for awareness-raising, but also for monitoring of progress of PCD**. However, the evolution of the PCD Biennial Report towards a monitoring / progress-assessment tool (as opposed to a purely awareness-raising tool) would require that other PCD mechanisms evolve / materialize first. For instance, the existence of a PCD work-programme (a list of future policies considered to be PCD relevant) against which progress could be tracked is a prerequisite for a monitoring report to be produced. Hence, the improvement of the PCD Biennial report should not be considered in isolation but rather in conjunction with other PCD mechanisms.

3 CONCLUSIONS

The well-structured and formalized process through which the Biennial Report is produced allows the Commission to publish a report that contains a high-level of detail and exhaustiveness on PCD initiatives being undertaken by the various DGs and EU Member States, since PCD is a shared responsibility. The report can therefore be used for various applications: it can be used as a basis for awareness-raising presentations on PCD, it can also be used as a visibility tool among the international fora, or as an online publication to raise-awareness on the EU's approach to PCD. Another strength of the Biennial Report is the high number of stakeholders that it involves at various levels, hence providing a useful framework for a structured debate on PCD. However, the PCD Biennial is often perceived as a reporting obligation by stakeholders contributing to its development, and suffers from a major flaw in terms of its content: it constitutes a source of awareness-raising on PCD for the Commission, EEAS, EP, Council and civil society but is not useful as a monitoring tool of PCD commitments. Hence the single most important opportunity for improvement for the Biennial Report is that **it evolves towards a tool that is not only useful for awareness-raising, but**

⁶⁶ Council conclusions on policy coherence for development Foreign Affairs (Development) Council meeting. Brussels, 12 December 2013, Point 7 (page 2).

⁶⁷ European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2012 on the EU 2011 Report on Policy Coherence for Development (2012/2063(INI)), Point 14.

⁶⁸ European Parliament resolution of 7 June 2016 on the EU 2015 Report on Policy Coherence for Development (2015/2317(INI)) (<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-2016-0165+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN#title2>), Section 1.

also for monitoring of progress of PCD commitments. However, the evolution of the PCD Biennial Report towards a monitoring / progress-assessment tool (as opposed to a purely awareness-raising tool) would require that other PCD mechanisms evolve / materialize first. For instance, the existence of a PCD work-programme against which progress could be tracked is a prerequisite for a monitoring report to be produced.

Appendix 1: Summary of additional findings with respect to EQ3

<p>Number of redundancies / synergies within the activity / with other activities with respect to their contribution to output achievement (Indicator I 3.1.3)</p>	<p>The Biennial Report is linked to the following activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Informal Network of Member States assists to some extent with the production of the report; ▪ Training: material from the Biennial Report can be useful input as training material; ▪ EUD Reporting: the report summarized information contained in the EUD reports. <p>However, and given its awareness-raising purpose, the Biennial report doesn't seem to directly contribute to other PCD mechanisms (ISC, IA, screening, etc.)</p>
<p>Actual level of human resources (staffing and expertise) or material resources against stakeholder's perception of needs (Indicator I 3.2.1 and 3.2.2)</p>	<p>Preparation of the biennial report is the single most time-consuming task of the PCD Team. The PCD Team estimates that the production of the Biennial consumes about two thirds of its total human resources the years the report is due (since the report is produced every 2 years, this means about one third of total resources over the evaluation period).</p>
<p>Are processes standardised within the PCD Unit, DEVCO/NEAR and other DGs, and the EEAS? (Indicator I 3.3.3)</p>	<p>The well-structured and formalized process through which the Biennial Report is produced (whereby the PCD focal point of each DG compiles information of the PCD Work of the DG in structured and systematized way) allows the Commission to attain what the Evaluation team considers to be a high-level of detail and exhaustiveness on PCD initiatives being undertaken by the various DGs. During the Evaluation process, the Evaluation Team was able to appreciate the usefulness of the report as a source of information for the review of the selected policies, which speaks to the quality of the PCD report.</p>
<p>Does the activity involve coordination with EU stakeholders (EUMS, EP, Council, EEAS, EESC, CSOs)? (Indicator I 3.5.1)</p>	<p>Another strength of the Biennial Report is the high number of stakeholders that it involves at various levels, hence providing a useful framework for a structured debate on PCD. Indeed, the main stakeholders of the PCD Biennial Reports are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Council, who requested the Commission to monitor and regularly report on the implementation of these EU commitments on MDGs in 2005; 2. EUMS, which were involved in the providing information for the Biennial Reports; 3. The Commission services and EEAS, which were the main contributors to the Biennial Reports. <p>Furthermore, in its dissemination the Biennial Report is of special attention to the following main stakeholders:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The European Parliament, which throughout the evaluation period has become increasingly attentive to PCD and is publishing a response to the PCD Biennial Reports since 2011; 2. Partner countries, who could have an interest in PCD as the process might be relevant to them; 3. CSOs active on PCD; 4. Think tanks and research institutes that follow EU PCD work.
<p>Does the activity involve cooperation and coordination with developing countries? (Indicator I 3.5.2)</p> <p>Nature of changes over time of inputs and of the activity itself (Indicators I 3.6.1 and I 3.6.2)</p>	<p>The production of the Biennial Report does not involve cooperation with developing countries although the content of the EUD reporting is summarized in the report.</p> <p>The structure of the Biennial Report has not evolved in a significant way during the period.</p>

Appendix 2: Mentions of the activity in PCD Biennial Reports, PCD Council Conclusions and EP resolutions on PCD

Table 1: Mention of PCD Biennial Report in PCD Biennial Reports

2009 PCD Report	<p>Introduction, page 3: the present 2009 PCD report provides a basis for assessing PCD progress in the EU and serves as an information tool to generate debate and to obtain feedback from EU stakeholders</p> <p>Section 2.3 on PCD Promotion within the Commission, page 3: The preparation of the 2007 PCD report was instrumental in raising awareness, enhancing understanding and increasing ownership of PCD in the Commission and the Member States. Its publication has been recognised by the Member States as a major achievement. However, the Netherlands found that drawing operational conclusions from the evidence provided was difficult and did not encounter sufficiently broad support from Member States and Commission. Section 2.4 on PCD Promotion at EU level/Role of the Council/Presidency and the European Parliament, page 19: Other mechanisms to promote PCD are the present report, joint meetings both of Council working groups and at the ministerial level, and the informal EU PCD network of the EU Member States</p>
2011 PCD Report 2013 PCD Report	<p>Paragraph 46.5: “After 4 EU PCD reports it is important to move beyond simple self-reporting on progress and to increase the use of independent assessments and existing development friendliness ranking and indexes in the biennial PCD report”</p> <p>4.7. Independent assessments: One of the key criticisms of the 2011 PCD Report focused on the issue of ‘self-reporting’. In response to the request in the Council conclusions of 14 May 2012 that ‘the fourth biennial PCD Report, [...] should include an independent assessment of progress’ as well as to demands in the EP Resolution, this section cites several examples of independent PCD assessments that could be used to enrich future reporting.</p>
2015 PCD Report	<p>Reporting obligations on PCD, page 24: Half of the Member States consider their reporting to the EU (for the biennial PCD report) as a reporting obligation.</p>

Table 2: Mention of PCD Biennial Report in PCD Council Conclusions

2005 PCD Council Conclusions	<p>The Council invites the Commission to monitor and regularly report on the implementation of these EU commitments on MDGs, including annual reports on the follow up of the EU commitments on financing and on the effectiveness of aid, and a biennial report on Policy Coherence for Development.</p>
2007 PCD Council Conclusions	<p>The Council welcomes the submission by the Commission of the first EU biennial report on the application of PCD, which was prepared in close collaboration with all Member States. The report provides valuable information on progress made by the EU in promoting a higher degree of policy coherence and contains a comprehensive list of outstanding issues for further action. It gathers different pieces of information on PCD under a single umbrella, establishing links between development and other policy areas for which information was until now fragmented.</p>
2009 PCD Council Conclusions	<p>6. The Council welcomes the submission of the second PCD report building upon the findings and recommendations of the first EU biennial report in 2007. The 2007 and 2009 PCD biennial reports, as well as the 2007 OECD Peer Review of European Community Aid⁷ also provide useful recommendations on how to improve the EU approach to PCD.</p>
2012 PCD Council Conclusions	<p>The Council welcomes the third biennial EU 2011 PCD report stating progress and providing useful insight into the EU and its Member States’ efforts to promote PCD. The Council welcomes the increased engagement and capacity to enhance PCD of some Member States and calls on the EU and its Member States to further improve their approach to PCD, building on the findings and suggestions of the report. The Council especially notes the need for a more evidence-based approach and for improving coordination mechanisms and implementation within the EU institutions and the Member States. The Council invites the Commission to make proposals in this regard.</p> <p>The Council looks forward to receiving in 2013 the fourth biennial PCD Report, which should include an independent assessment of progress, including qualitative and quantitative consequences and costs of policy incoherence. It encourages the</p>

Commission to build on the PCD Work Programme for 2010-2013⁷ and, with a view to a more evidence-based approach, to further improve monitoring, implementation and follow-up. Relevant baselines, indicators and targets should also be developed including for measuring the impact of PCD in a way which demonstrates clear development results."

2013 PCD Council
Conclusions

The Council welcomes the **fourth biennial EU PCD** report,¹ taking stock of progress made and providing information on the efforts of the EU and its Member States to promote PCD in policy and in practice. The Council also welcomes the increased political engagement and institutional capacity to enhance PCD in some Member States and in the European Parliament and highlights the importance of disseminating and discussing the report within the EU institutions and in the Member States beyond the development community.

The Council also believes that further progress is needed on several issues covered **in the 2012 Council Conclusions on issues such as measuring PCD and on promoting a more evidence-based approach, including through the quantification of the costs of incoherencies for selected cases, and underlines that further work is needed to move towards a more focused, operational and results-oriented approach to PCD.** Specific attention is required regarding the quality of targets and indicators. The EU's impact assessments, sustainable impact assessments and evaluations can play an important role in ensuring ex-ante mainstreaming of PCD and in assessing results. The Council calls for strengthening the development dimension of these tools in the context of the review of their respective guidelines.

2015 PCD Council
Conclusions

In this context, the Council welcomes the **fifth biennial PCD** report as an important tool for monitoring progress made on PCD since 2013 both at EU level and in the Members States.

Recognising the pivotal role of EU delegations and Member State embassies, the Council notes with satisfaction the establishment of regular monitoring and reporting of PCD issues by delegations and calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to further improve ongoing efforts.

In this context, the Council invites the Commission and the EEAS, in close consultation with other partners, to present concrete proposals on how to better integrate PCD into the EU approach to implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and calls for this new approach to be mainstreamed across the EU institutions. **Future PCD reporting should reflect the new approach and lessons learnt of implementation challenges and of past reporting exercises.** The Council looks forward to the next PCD report.

Table 3: Other important mentions of PCD Biennial Report

<p>European Parliament resolution of 18 May 2010 on the EU Policy Coherence for Development and the ‘Official Development Assistance plus’ concept (2009/2218(INI))</p>	<p>1. Welcomes the increased attention and commitment to PCD by the Commission, the Council and the Member States, as demonstrated by the biennial reporting;</p> <p>73. Calls on the Commission to involve the European Parliament in the process of the Commission’s PCD report, e.g. in terms of the questionnaire, better timing, and taking account of Parliament’s own initiative reports;</p> <p>81. Suggests drafting a biennial EP report on PCD; suggests to all its committees that they draft reports that address their respective development perspectives;</p>
<p>European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2012 on the EU 2011 Report on Policy Coherence for Development (2012/2063(INI))</p>	<p>14. Welcomes the Commission's third biennial report on PCD 2011, but agrees with the Council on the need to include an independent assessment of progress, including qualitative and quantitative consequences and costs of policy incoherence in future reports; suggests that future reports should also include a comprehensive overview of PCD-related results of the country-level dialogues, in order to make the voices of citizens of developing countries heard;</p>
<p>European Parliament resolution on the EU 2015 Report on Policy Coherence for Development (2015/2317(INI))</p>	<p>Considers that the mechanisms that have been used by some EU delegations to provide feedback to the Commission’s 2015 PCD Report should be extended to all EU delegations, and that this should become a yearly exercise; calls on the EU delegations to ensure that PCD is on the agenda of the respective bilateral meetings and joint assembly meetings, as well as of the yearly meeting of EU Heads of Delegations in Brussels;</p> <p>Explanatory Statement The Commission's report in itself is a useful tool for raising awareness about PCD, but the report would be even more useful if it addressed PCD progress in a more analytical way. Concrete recommendations on how to tackle PCD challenges should be an integral part of the report. Raising awareness about PCD should also be the responsibility of EU leaders, as it is a highly political issue. Therefore, the Rapporteur calls for a European Council meeting on PCD before the publication of the next Commission's report in 2017. A European Summit on PCD would serve two main objectives: it would raise awareness of PCD by fostering an inter-institutional debate within the EU (Commission, EEAS, Council, EP) and at the national level (all ministries). In preparation for the summit, the Commission and the EEAS should deliver a paper to the EU heads of state and government with concrete recommendations on how to operationalise the implementation of PCD. This process should be inclusive, involving civil society organisations and think tanks. The second objective of the European Summit on PCD would be to define more clearly the responsibilities of each EU institution in achieving the PCD commitment. The Council has also a role to play in strengthening PCD by bringing the issue out of the development and foreign affairs silos to other formations of the Council.</p>
<p>European Parliament resolution of 7 June 2016 on the EU 2015 Report on Policy Coherence for Development (2015/2317(INI))</p>	<p>18. Stresses the need for the EU to invest more resources in evidence-based analysis of PCD; calls on the Commission to identify incoherencies without delay and produce an analysis of their cost, as well as to develop adequate monitoring and progress-tracking mechanisms on PCD; also calls on the Commission to include in its analysis proposals on how to avoid and deal with incoherencies between different policies; further stresses the need to improve PCD referencing in programming documents;</p>

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PCD Training Activities

1 INTRODUCTION

PCD training within the Commission and the EEAS has been identified as essential to create awareness on PCD issues and the EU's PCD agenda. DG DEVCO is responsible for developing targeted training courses on PCD since 2010. In 2016 an e-learning tool on PCD was launched.

2 QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT

2.1 Detailed description of the activity

The PCD Team within DG DEVCO is in charge of organising PCD training activities for the Commission services as well as for the EEAS. The training is scheduled within the training programme of the Commission and the module covers a 2 to 3 hours course. A total of 11 trainings on PCD have been recorded for the evaluation period. The available evidence shows that a majority of participants have included DG DEVCO staff.⁶⁹ Also, specific training sessions for staff of EU Delegations have been organised in Brussels given the need to strengthen the role of EU Delegations in the promotion of PCD. The training activities were aimed at enhancing knowledge on PCD and potentially contributing to awareness-raising. In 2016 an e-learning tool on PCD was launched.⁷⁰ This tool was developed for the use of DGs, EU Delegations, EU Member States and the wider public. The EP has called in successive occasions on the importance of developing training courses on PCD to teach how to incorporate PCD in different fields of political action and specifically for staff within non-development services.

The PCD team has provided training on PCD for the following main stakeholders:

1. Commission Services, for staff of line DGs, EEAS and DG DEVCO;
2. EU Delegations, for the Heads of Delegations;
3. EUMS, for officials of national governments of EUMS.

2.2 Strengths

Structured activity: The training modules and the e-learning tool are part of a structured process within the Commission. Courses are available within the Commission official training programme and are scheduled every year, with relevant material, with an expert from the PCD team in charge of giving the course, and with the possibility to reinforce the knowledge acquired through an e-learning tool.

In house expertise: The training has been developed and is given by staff within the PCD team of DG DEVCO which allows to have first-hand knowledge on PCD.

2.3 Weaknesses

Limited outreach: The evidence available shows that the training courses have not been successful in reaching a great number of participants from other Commission services; the main attendance has been from DG DEVCO and the EEAS.

⁶⁹ See Annex 3 in this activity report.

⁷⁰ It was launched in December 2016 and by March 2017, 35 staff members had passed/were taking the course.

Feedback on training activities by stakeholders: There is no sufficient evidence at this stage that could allow the evaluation team to assess if the expertise of the attendees on PCD has improved after following a training module. The only feedback corresponds to one module for which the participants considered as overall good but too short to cover the topic for a first time.⁷¹

2.4 Opportunities for improvement

There is no feedback as this stage from the Surveys. However, the EP and the Council have pointed out the need to broaden the base for awareness-raising and reach out to different policy actors and services.

3 CONCLUSIONS

The importance of developing training courses on PCD has been widely recognized in order to broaden the expertise on PCD within non-development services, and relevant stakeholders involved in promoting PCD. The main strength of this activity is that it constitutes part of a structured process within the Commission as it is part of its official training programme, occurs at least once a year, and relies on in house expertise. The main weakness identified is its limited outreach beyond DG DEVCO and EEAS staff.

⁷¹ Feedback for training module given on 25.10.2012.
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Appendix 1: Summary of additional findings with respect to EQ3

Number of redundancies / synergies within the activity / with other activities with respect to their contribution to output achievement (Indicator I 3.1.3)	Aims to create awareness in a targeted way and could have synergies with other awareness raising activities. However, as it is not possible to identify with precision the role or position of the staff enrolled in training, it becomes difficult to assess the specific contribution to other outputs.
Actual level of human resources (staffing and expertise) or material resources against stakeholder's perception of needs (Indicator I 3.2.1 and 3.2.2)	Only possible to establish with findings of Surveys.
Are processes standardized within the PCD Unit, DEVCO/NEAR and other DGs, and the EEAS? (Indicator I 3.3.3)	Usually takes place twice a year, happens within the Commission general training activities, and the material is fairly standard.
Does the activity involve coordination with EU stakeholders (EUMS, EP, Council, EEAS, EESC, CSOs)? (Indicator I 3.5.1)	Training activities have mainly been directed to Commission and EEAS staff, but also EU Member States officials have participated.
Does the activity involve cooperation and coordination with developing countries? (Indicator I 3.5.2)	N/A.
Nature of changes over time of inputs and of the activity itself (Indicators I 3.6.1 and I 3.6.2)	Since 2016 there is an e-learning tool on PCD. At the request of stakeholders, specific training was organised also for EU Delegations.

Appendix 2: Mentions of the activity in PCD Biennial Reports, PCD Council Conclusions and EP resolutions on PCD

Table 1: Mention of Training activities in PCD Biennial Reports

2011 PCD Report	<p>Within the European Commission, the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation - Europe Aid provides concrete guidance to other services on how to take into account development objectives in policy-making (especially in the context of Impact Assessments) on a case by case basis. It will continue to improve its analytical capacity and to exchange on good practices and methodologies with Member states and other stakeholders.</p> <p>- Moreover, to make the most of the knowledge sharing, it would be useful to develop a library of PCD narratives and "stories" that can be used for further awareness-raising and training and that will help provide the right incentive for other actors to get involved.</p>
2013 PCD Report	<p>Training is needed to raise awareness among policy-makers across policy areas of the existence of, and requirement for, a PCD approach. The Commission launched a first round of internal PCD training courses in 2012 and has continued to deliver the training in 2013. The training is aimed at staff in Brussels and from EU Delegations and is open to Member State officials. The Commission and the EEAS also actively support Member States' own PCD training efforts.</p>
2015 PCD Report	<p>Following a PCD reporting exercise concluded during the first half of 2014 and involving reports from 41 EU delegations covering 62 partner countries, the Commission took steps to strengthen the monitoring of country-level PCD issues and the capacity of delegations to contribute to PCD, e.g. via the organisation of targeted training on PCD and initiating steps for a regular PCD reporting mechanism from EU delegations.</p> <p>Delegations capacity and needs on PCD: Most delegations indicated that they have limited capacity to work specifically on PCD-related issues, mainly due to high workload and human resources constraints. A majority also saw a need for specific training on PCD and/or regular updates on EU policies that are relevant for PCD.</p> <p>Follow-up: As a follow-up to this reporting exercise the Commission took steps to strengthen the monitoring of country-level PCD issues and the capacity of delegations to contribute to PCD including: - targeted training sessions on PCD for Heads of Cooperation, when meeting in Brussels, and to develop a PCD e-learning training course with a specific module dedicated to the work in delegations;</p>

Table 2: Mention of Training activities in PCD Council Conclusions

2015 PCD Council Conclusions	<p>The Council invites the Commission to continue developing effective and coordinated training tools so as to raise awareness across different policy actors and to help facilitate the sharing of good practices between Member States.</p>
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Table 3: Mention of Training activities in European Parliament resolutions on PCD

2010 EP resolution	<p>Asks the Commission to involve the EU Delegations in its PCD work by appointing PCD focal points responsible for PCD in each Delegation to monitor the impact of EU policy at partner-country level; asks for inclusion of PCD in staff training; calls on the Commission to publish annually the results of field consultations to be conducted by EU delegations; to this end, calls on the Commission to ensure that the EU delegations have sufficient capacity to broadly consult local governments, parliaments and to guarantee opportunities for active participation by non-state actors and civil society on the issue of PCD;</p>
2012 EP resolution	<p>Suggests making PCD a clear priority for the EEAS and the Delegations by further strengthening the EU's policy dialogue with CSOs, local parliaments and other stakeholders, by asking them to gather evidence on lack of either inconsistency or coherence, by improving the PCD references in programming documents and making them operational, and by developing a training programme, together with DG DEVCO, for all new EEAS staff to ensure that they are able to understand and</p>

	apply PCD ; points out that adequate resources to fulfil this task must be allocated to the Delegations and the headquarters;
2014 EP resolution	Stresses the need to make proper arrangements for teaching about how to incorporate PCD into the various fields of political action , teaching being the key element to increase the awareness of European citizens in connection with ‘2015 – European Year for Development’; asks the Commission and the EEAS to provide specific training on PCD and development impact to staff in non-development services ;

Appendix 3: Overview of PCD Training Activities (2010-2016)

Table 4: Overview of PCD Training Activities (2010-2016)

	COMM	DEVCO DEL	DEVCO HQ	EAC	EASME	ECHO	EEAS	EMPL	ENER	ESTAT	FPI	GROW	HOME	Member State	MOVE	ELARG/NEAR	RTD	SG	SRSS	TRADE	EP	Total of trainees
02/06/2010	Training for Finnish officials in Helsinki - No list of participants available.																					-
01/09/2011	Training for EU Heads of Delegation - No list of participants available.																					-
27/02/2012			19				12															31
25/10/2012		1	3													1						5
21/03/2013	1	2	5											5								13
21/11/2013		1	2				1							3								7
19/03/2014			5		1				1					2								9
01/02/2015	Workshop for EU DEL in the framework of the DEVCO Days - No final list of participants available - Around 10 participants.																					-
09/03/2015		2	4			1								2								9
07/12/2015			1	3						1		1	1	1		5	1	1	3			18
07/06/2016			7				1			1			6								2	17
Total of trainees	1	6	46	3	1	1	13	1	1	1	1	1	1	18	1	1	5	1	1	3	2	109

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Activity Assessment Tool

CWP screening for PCD relevance

1 INTRODUCTION

The screening exercise of the CWP to identify policy proposals that are relevant for PCD is carried out by the PCD team at DG DEVCO, with the involvement of other Commission services. This screening exercise is a collaborative process within the PCD inter-service group with the purpose of identifying at an early stage those Commission initiatives that could potentially have an impact on developing countries. It aims to concentrate efforts on those initiatives and at the same time to enhance ownership and increase awareness of PCD issues.

2 QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT

2.1 Detailed description of the activity

The PCD screening exercise, based on the annual Commission Work Programme, intends to contribute in delivering more development-friendly policies and ensuring that development objectives are taken into account in other policies. The list of policies resulting from the PCD screening exercise should allow timely and proactive intervention with respect to inter-service consultations. This list has also been circulated informally to EU Member States since 2014. Apart from this annual screening, there is no other overview of PCD relevant policies available within the Commission.

The screening of the CWP has not always been carried out in a systematic way. The available evidence on the elaboration of screening lists, and minutes of meetings of the ISG on PCD, indicate that the participation of the FPs of Commission services in the follow up of the listed initiatives has not occurred on a regular basis. At the early stages of the period under evaluation the process appears as more structured and with clear involvement of Commission services. There was even a specific PCD work programme for the years 2010-2013 but the screening exercise continued to point out relevant policy proposals each year. The collaborative process of the screening exercise has been possible due to the PCD inter-service group. Stakeholders have confirmed that there are no specific guidelines to establish the PCD relevance of policy proposals and that the exercise is mainly done based on the thematic expertise of the PCD team members and that of FPs from DG DEVCO thematic units and from other Commission services. As the CWP screening for PCD relevance is shared with the Focal Points of Commission services, these stakeholders potentially contribute to create awareness within their respective services on which policies are relevant for PCD. The PCD inter-service group has been used as a follow-up mechanism regarding the policies screened for PCD relevance in the CWP screening.⁷² However, it should be noted that while there used to be a formal ISG on PCD, it has become dormant: there is currently only an informal ISG on PCD.

The main stakeholders for the CWP Screening for PCD relevance are:

- 1) DG DEVCO, in charge of coordinating the screening list and distributing it to the DGs relevant to the 5 PCD challenge areas;
- 2) PCD team and FP at thematic units in DG DEVCO;
- 3) The Commission services, especially the DGs whose policies are likely to affect or contribute to development cooperation objectives;
- 4) FP at Commission services, in charge of promoting awareness on PCD within their services;

⁷² Minutes of meetings of the ISG on PCD show that during the period 2010-2012, PCD Focal Points within the Commission reported on the stages of policy-making regarding policy proposals identified as PCD relevant following the PCD screening exercise of the CWP.

- 5) EU Member States, for 2015: in 2015 DEVCO shared the results of the CWP Screening with the EUMS for their information.

2.2 Strengths

Collaborative process at the planning stage of policy proposals: As the CWP screening for PCD relevance requires the participation of FPs and is shared with the Commission services, these stakeholders can take an active role and create awareness on the importance that their respective services take account of development considerations from an early stage of policy-making for those policies.

Strategic identification: The identification of a group of policies for PCD relevance allows to concentrate efforts and target IAs and the ISC process in a more strategic way. Commission services become aware of which policies are potentially relevant for PCD; therefore, they have a clear indication of DG DEVCO's potential interest in contributing to the ISC process for those policy proposals.

2.3 Weaknesses

Lack of clear guidelines to establish the PCD relevance of policy proposals: In absence of a clear procedure for all stakeholders involved on how or why policies are identified as PCD relevant, it becomes difficult to promote ownership on this PCD mechanism.

Relies on ISG on PCD to be effective: Since there is no longer a formal ISG on PCD, the task to follow up or track policy proposals identified as PCD relevant becomes rather difficult and DG DEVCO could potentially not be invited to participate in the ISC process and/or the IA would miss the possibility of taking into account likely impacts in developing countries.

2.4 Opportunities for improvement

The screening of the CWP for PCD relevance could potentially strengthen the use of the ISC process and of the IAs to promote PCD if it occurred within a formal ISG on PCD. The latter would allow to follow up the policy proposals identified as PCD relevant and prompt the other Commission services to take account of development objectives for the identified policies from the early stages of policy-making.

3 CONCLUSIONS

The PCD screening exercise aims to prompt a timely and proactive intervention with respect to ISC and IAs regarding those policies identified as PCD relevant. When conducted within a formal ISG group for PCD it offers a strategic and collaborative process that follows up on the actions taken by other Commission services with respect to the identified policies. However, given that there are no clear guidelines on how the policies are identified as PCD relevant and that the ISG group is no longer formal, the activity risks of being ineffective and failing to promote ownership of the PCD screening list and the mechanism itself.

Appendix 1: Summary of additional findings with respect to EQ3

<p>Number of redundancies / synergies within the activity / with other activities with respect to their contribution to output achievement (Indicator I 3.1.3)</p>	<p>There is a lack of synergy between the CWP screening undertaken by the PCD team within DG DEVCO and the ISC process. The identification of policy proposals in the PCD CWP screening should lead to DG DEVCO being invited to participate in ISC process; however, this does not happen systematically. Also, there is a lack of synergy with the ISG on PCD and coordination with FP as these activities should also lead to DG DEVCO's participation in ISC process.</p>
<p>Actual level of human resources (staffing and expertise) or material resources against stakeholder's perception of needs (Indicator I 3.2.1 and 3.2.2)</p>	<p>Only possible to establish with findings of Surveys.</p>
<p>Are processes standardized within the PCD Unit, DEVCO/NEAR and other DGs, and the EEAS? (Indicator I 3.3.3)</p>	<p>PCD CWP screening occurs on a yearly basis and involves the collaboration of the PCD Team within DG DEVCO and FP within Commission services. However, the decision-making process to establish on which basis policy proposals are PCD relevant is not standardized.</p>
<p>Does the activity involve coordination with EU stakeholders (EUMS, EP, Council, EEAS, EESC, CSOs)? (Indicator I 3.5.1)</p>	<p>PCD CWP screening involves the PCD Team at DG DEVCO and FP within Commission services. In one occasion, the results of the screening exercise have been communicated to EU Members States.</p>
<p>Does the activity involve cooperation and coordination with developing countries? (Indicator I 3.5.2)</p>	<p>N/A.</p>
<p>Nature of changes over time of inputs and of the activity itself (Indicators I 3.6.1 and I 3.6.2)</p>	<p>N/A.</p>

Appendix 2: Mentions of the activity in PCD Biennial Reports, PCD Council Conclusions and EP resolutions on PCD

Table 1: Mention of CWP screening in PCD Biennial Reports

2009 PCD Report	<p>Every year, the Commission adopts hundreds of new legislative proposals and policy initiatives, which undergo IA and ISC. In an effort to identify the initiatives which will affect developing countries, the Commission now regularly establishes an informal PCD workplan, which lists all those EU policy initiatives and legislative proposals that are likely to have significant impact on developing countries. In 2008, 26 initiatives were identified and 37 in 2009.</p> <p>This PCD planning list has been an important step forward. It allows the Commission to use the ISC and IA in a much more effective and strategic way and to concentrate its efforts on those initiatives with the biggest impact on developing countries. In addition, this exercise of jointly identifying the relevant initiatives with the responsible civil servants has proved to be a very useful process for enhancing ownership and increasing awareness of PCD issues. (p.12-13)</p>
2011 PCD Report	<p>In order to guide its own work on PCD and to inspire the work of the other European institutions and Member States, the European Commission drew up in 2010 a PCD Work Programme for the period 2010-2013, identifying the priority issues and outlining how the EU through all its instruments and processes can contribute to development objectives. The PCD Work Programme was based initially on the Commission Annual Work Programme, which provides an overview of the strategic initiatives due to be adopted in the following year(s), identifying the initiatives relevant to the issue of PCD and setting out several targets and indicators related to the selected initiatives. This provides a scoreboard for tracking progress towards the identified PCD objectives. The Work Programme focuses on the five priority issues identified in 2009 by the Commission and Council on top of the twelve priority policy areas indicated in the 2005 Council Conclusions on PCD. Member States supported the move towards focusing EU PCD work on a limited number of challenges (covering the relevant areas) in order to concentrate efforts and resources in the coming years. However, the need for more concrete baselines and targets within the PCD Work Programme 2010-2013 has been felt by different Member States (such as Spain for example). A review and an update would thus be appropriate and useful in order to further increase the Programme's objectivity and efficacy. (p.12)</p>
2013 PCD Report	<p>In 2010, the Commission responded to calls for a more pragmatic approach and more systematic measurement of PCD by publishing a PCD Work Programme. Presented as a Staff Working Document, the Policy Coherence for Development Work Programme 2010-13 is structured around the five priority areas (trade and finance, climate change, food security, migration and security). It guides the work of the Commission and the HR and serves as a reference for Member States' PCD work. It translates the political principle of PCD into an operational framework, with specific steps to address, through concrete policy initiatives, processes and financial means, the priority areas in a development-friendly manner. The Work Programme does not provide a comprehensive list of all initiatives that might be relevant for development, but rather focuses on planned initiatives and processes that stand out for their potential as 'PCD catalysts'.(p.23-24)</p>
2015 PCD Report	<p>Screening of PCD relevant policy initiatives: DG DEVCO periodically monitors the Work Programme of the Commission to identify key policy initiatives that can have an impact on developing countries. A list of PCD-relevant initiatives mainly within the five key PCD challenges identified is established with the support of other Commission services within the PCD inter-service group. (p.21)</p>

Table 2: Mention of CWP screening in PCD Council Conclusions

2009 PCD Council Conclusions	<p>The Council welcomes the increased emphasis on PCD in the European Commission, the better use of the inter-service consultation mechanism and the strengthening of the development dimension of the impact assessment tool as important instruments to improve PCD and the regular screening of the Commission Legislative and Work Programme from a PCD perspective.</p>
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2012 PCD Council Conclusions	It encourages the Commission to build on the PCD Work Programme for 2010-2013 and, with a view to a more evidence-based approach, to further improve monitoring, implementation and follow-up.
2013 PCD Council Conclusions	The Council reiterates its decision to focus in the immediate future on five PCD challenges: trade and finance, climate change, food security, migration and security. In that context, the Council calls on the Commission and the EEAS to develop, in cooperation with Member States, an overview of forthcoming policy proposals and initiatives relevant to PCD on the basis of the annual Commission's work programmes to be shared with the relevant Council bodies starting in early 2014 and onwards.
2015 PCD Council Conclusions	No specific mention.

Table 3: Mention of CWP screening in European Parliament resolutions on PCD

2010 EP resolution	Welcomes the PCD Work Programme 2010- 2013 as a guideline for the EU institutions and Member States, and acknowledges its role as an early warning system for upcoming policy initiatives; welcomes also the interlinkages between the different policy fields;
2012 EP resolution	Agrees with the Commission that in the preparation of the next rolling PCD Work Programme, a wider discussion with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and Member States and all relevant stakeholders, for example NGOs and CSOs, is needed; agrees that fewer indicators, together with more precise and better monitoring, can lead to a more operational framework and easier monitoring
2014 EP resolution	No specific mention.
2016 EP resolution	No specific mention.

Appendix 3: Evidence available regarding ISC Records for Selected Policies during Desk Phase

PCD-related policy/initiative	Lead Service	Status ISC records
Common Agricultural Policy (reform 2013)	DG AGRI	Not available.
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Regulation	DG MARE	Not available.
Common Fisheries Policy reform	DG MARE	Not available.
Country by Country Reporting	DG FISMA	Received.
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism	DG JUST	Not available.
Generalised Scheme of Preferences	DG TRADE	Not available.
Trade for All Communication	DG TRADE	Not available.
Responsible sourcing of mineral originating in conflict affected and high risk areas	DG TRADE / EEAS	Not available.
Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe	DG CNECT	Not available.
Raw Materials Initiative	DG GROW	Received.
EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking	DG ENV	Received.
A policy framework for climate and energy period 2020-2030	DG CLIMA	Not available.
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility	DG HOME	Received.
Review of the EU Blue Card directive	DG HOME	Received.

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Activity Assessment Tool

Consultation with Developing Country Partners

1 INTRODUCTION

Since 2005 and throughout the period of evaluation the EU has clearly recognised the importance of considering developing countries' perspective when taking account of the likely impacts of EU policies on developing countries (see Table 2 – Appendix 2). In the context of the EU's commitment towards the achievement of the MDGs, the Council invited the Commission to further reinforce, amongst others, consultations with developing countries during policy formulation.⁷³ The PCD Biennial Reports indicate a limited use of the consultation procedure as set under article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement.⁷⁴ However, on different levels and to varying degrees line DGs and the Commission overall have worked in dialogue with partner countries regarding PCD relevant thematic areas (i.e. CAP reform 2013, Trade SIAs, GAMM bilateral and regional policy dialogues). The present assessment focuses exclusively on the consultation mechanism set out in the Cotonou Agreement to promote the coherence of EU policies that might affect the interests of the ACP countries.⁷⁵ This consultation procedure was considered during the first years covered by the evaluation period as a PCD “organisational mechanism”⁷⁶, but under the revised IL for this evaluation this activity has been placed outside the operational framework of the EU's approach to PCD under the cluster knowledge-sharing, since it does not depend exclusively on the action of the Commission but still could have an indirect influence in the expected outputs.

2 QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT

2.1 Detailed description of the activity

The EU's approach to PCD considers that partner country perspectives are an important element for the promotion of PCD. The Consultation with developing countries has been established under the legal umbrella of the Cotonou Agreement article 12 with respect to ACP countries. This legal framework can be used to prevent or stop incoherencies, with respect to development objectives, of EU policies affecting ACP countries. Article 12 of the revised Cotonou Agreement recognises that EU's policies can support the development priorities of ACP States and that it shall inform the ACP Secretariat of planned proposals which might affect the interests of the ACP States.

The procedure establishes that the EU must inform ACP countries in advance of the adoption of those proposals, and that the ACP side, at their own initiative, may request further information. Consultations are to be held promptly before any final decision is made. Afterwards, the ACP group can transmit requests for amendment in writing. The only documented case regarding the use of this mechanism refers to the February 2009 formal consultation under article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement that took place at the request of the ACP countries in the context of a meeting of the Joint ACP-EU Subcommittee on Trade

⁷³ Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council-On Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals: EU Contribution to the Review of the MDGs at the UN 2005 High Level Event– Annex I (doc. 9266/05, 24 May 2005).

⁷⁴ The Cotonou Agreement signed between ACP countries and the EU has as its primary objective poverty reduction and sustainable development. It is the most comprehensive partnership agreement with developing countries, including 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.

⁷⁵ Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States of the other part (signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000); Agreement amending for the second time the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as first amended in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005, (signed in Ouagadougou on 22 June 2010).

⁷⁶ PCD Biennial Report 2007 (CSWP SEC(2007) 1202 p. 25-51) and PCD Biennial Report 2009 (CSWD SEC (2009) 1137 final p.4-23).

Cooperation. The ACP group expressed concern regarding five EU policy proposals that could have impacts on their export of certain products to the EU. These proposals dealt with the use of pesticides, nickels substances, fisheries cold chain requirements, the renewable energy directive and the FLEGT licensing system. The Commission reassured via an agreement that ACP countries would be taken into consideration in the preparation and implementation of those measures.⁷⁷ Two other consultations have reportedly taken place at the initiative of the EU in July 2009 and February 2010.⁷⁸ The EU updated the ACP group on trade negotiations in Central and South America, and the ACP Chair of the Committee of Ambassadors addressed their concerns to the Commission's Director-General of Trade. The response of the Commission argued how ACP interests had been taken into account during negotiations.

It has been widely accepted that, during the evaluation period, Consultation with developing countries under the mechanism established under Article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement has been underused. Also, it is important to note that consultations can take place without necessarily referring to this legal procedure as there exists an open political dialogue with developing countries in certain areas such as Agriculture, Trade and Migration.⁷⁹ Moreover, within the context provided by the 2015 Better Regulation Guidelines other opportunities for public consultation to stakeholders on EU's policy-making exists, including and being extensive to developing countries. Also it is important to note that since 2011, EU Delegations have been called to play a major role on consultation with developing countries and to strengthen dialogue with them to better assess the impact of EU policies at country level.⁸⁰ And that there have been suggestions to improve this mechanism in order to include the involvement of the EP, and that of a PCD Standing Rapporteur from ACP countries in the context of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly.⁸¹ Therefore, the main stakeholders for the consultation mechanism here identified are:

1. The Commission;
2. Developing countries' governments (particularly ACP countries);
3. European Parliament;
4. DGs leading the policy proposal;
5. EEAS.

2.2 Strengths

Legal framework: The Cotonou Agreement provides a specific legal framework for the Commission and ACP countries to identify and promote the coherence of EU policies which might affect the interests of ACP countries.

Point out incoherencies at an early stage: This consultation mechanism provides an additional opportunity to policy-makers to consider potential impacts on developing countries at an early stage of policy-making taking into account the concerns raised directly by ACP countries.

⁷⁷ 2009 PCD Biennial Report, CSWD SEC (2009) 1137, p.17; 2011 PCD Biennial Report, (SEC(2011) 1627 final), p.21.

⁷⁸ 2013 CONCORD Cotonou Working Group Briefing Paper, Policy Coherence for Development, ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, 25th Session, Brussels 15-19 June.

⁷⁹ 2013 CONCORD Cotonou Working Group Briefing Paper; 2009 PCD Biennial Report, CSWD SEC (2009) 1137, p.22; 2012 EP Resolution on the EU's PCD Report; CONCORD 2011 Spotlight Report on EU PCD, p. 17.

⁸⁰ See table 2 in this report.

⁸¹ 2012 EP Resolution on the EU's PCD Report.

Political dialogue and clear steps: Article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement provides in no uncertain terms the opportunity for political dialogue and coordination on PCD between the EU and ACP countries and even goes beyond by establishing the formal steps to be followed.

Self-standing mechanism: In its current legal umbrella under the Cotonou Agreement, this consultation mechanism allows ACP countries to initiate a formal procedure at their own initiative to question the coherence of EU policy proposals with respect to development objectives.

Source for knowledge-sharing: The feedback from ACP countries under this consultation mechanism potentially provides direct information at country level of likely impacts of EU policies on developing countries, and on potential incoherencies with ACP countries' development priorities under the Cotonou agreement.

2.3 Weaknesses

Low awareness: on the potential of its use by the EU and the ACP countries, especially as a self-standing mechanism to promote PCD at the initiative of ACP countries.

Lack of clarity on stakeholders' involvement: No clear role of EU Delegations on the promotion and use of this consultation mechanism by developing countries (ACP ones) despite the request of several Council conclusions and EP resolutions on PCD asking for an active role of EU Delegations in strengthening dialogue with partner countries on PCD issues.⁸²

Potential overlapping: with other consultation procedures represents a risk for this specific consultation mechanism of being subsumed under general consultation procedures under 2015 Better Regulation Guidelines, or under other existing political dialogues on specific areas, undermining the position of ACP countries with respect to possible incoherencies of EU policies with respect to PCD.

Lack of identification of specific areas of concern for PCD: As development priorities evolve as well as the specific areas of concern for ACP countries, it might represent a challenge for Commission services and the EEAS to establish which EU policies might be more relevant for ACP countries regarding PCD, and regularly communicate them as established in article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement.

2.4 Opportunities for improvement

As mentioned above, the consultation mechanism prescribed by article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement has been clearly underused despite its aim of promoting an inclusive dialogue with partner countries on PCD regarding EU policies and its potential of pointing out possible incoherencies in this regard at early stages of policy making. Creating awareness about this consultation mechanism among ACP countries and therefore promoting its use, could be improved by the active involvement of EU Delegations on PCD dialogue with partner countries, the promotion of PCD issues within the Joint Parliamentary Assembly in the framework provided by the Cotonou Agreement, and by envisioning the support of the EU for the creation of the role of a PCD rapporteur within the ACP Secretariat, especially in the context of the new Agenda on SDGs. Also, another opportunity for improvement could be to strengthen the

⁸² See Annex 2 in this activity report.

collaboration on PCD issues through the ACP Secretariat and the respective services of the Commission and the EEAS. Finally, in order to create awareness among Commission services regarding the potential of the use of this specific mechanism and to avoid being undermined in favour of other general consultation mechanisms, the inclusion of a specific provision in the Better Regulation Guidelines making reference to the existence of this specific mechanisms for ACP countries, should be considered.

3 CONCLUSIONS

The EU has clearly expressed its commitment to the inclusion of developing countries' perspectives on PCD regarding EU policies.⁸³ This specific mechanism on Consultation with developing countries under article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement, which involves ACP countries, has been significantly underused during the evaluation period despite constant calls from the Council to involve partner countries on PCD dialogue. The legal framework of article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement provides the opportunity to receive first hand feedback at country level from developing countries themselves at the early stages of EU's policy-making process; and therefore, better assess the impact that those EU policies might have in developing countries. However, the usefulness of this mechanism is limited if ACP countries are not fully aware of its potential to promote PCD, and if the EU does not regularly inform ACP countries on EU policies which might affect development objectives as stated in the said article 12. Nevertheless, there exist opportunities for improvement for this self-standing mechanism regarding ACP countries; and these are mainly linked to the role of EU Delegations on promoting PCD dialogue with partner countries, and to the need to strengthen cooperation on PCD between the EU institutions and the ACP Secretariat and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly within the framework provided by the Cotonou Agreement.

⁸³ See here Annex 2 on PCD Council Conclusions, EP Resolutions, and EU PCD Biennial Reports.

Appendix 1: Summary of additional findings with respect to EQ3

<p>Number of redundancies / synergies within the activity / with other activities with respect to their contribution to output achievement (Indicator I 3.1.3)</p>	<p>This specific consultation mechanism on PCD issues regarding ACP countries under article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement could potentially overlap with general consultation procedures under 2015 Better Regulation Guidelines, or under other existing political dialogues on specific areas. On the other hand, it has been reported that the only time a consultation procedure under article 12 of the Cotonou agreement was brought forward, the Commission reached an agreement in order to take into account the concerns of ACP countries. As for the general consultation procedures under Better Regulation Guidelines there is no evidence of when and how developing countries' concerns are taken into account regarding specific PCD issues.</p>
<p>Actual level of human resources (staffing and expertise) or material resources against stakeholder's perception of needs (Indicator I 3.2.1 and 3.2.2)</p>	<p>N/A. Only possible to establish with findings of Surveys.</p>
<p>Are processes standardized within the PCD Unit, DEVCO/NEAR and other DGs, and the EEAS? (Indicator I 3.3.3)</p>	<p>No evidence available on how this specific mechanism has been standardised within the Commission. The reported cases on the use of this mechanism identify different instances on the side of the ACP group: the Joint ACP-EU Subcommittee on Trade Cooperation and the ACP Chair of the Committee of Ambassadors. It is not clear if apart from DG DEVCO, DG Trade and the EEAS (EU Delegations), other instances might have a central role with respect to article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement.</p>
<p>Does the activity involve coordination with EU stakeholders (EUMS, EP, Council, EEAS, EESC, CSOs)? (Indicator I 3.5.1)</p>	<p>The mechanism mainly involves Commission services and the EEAS. However, participation of the EP has been called in the context of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly to include the work of the EP Standing Rapporteur on PCD, as well as the request to be informed when procedures under article 12 of the Cotonou agreement take place.</p>
<p>Does the activity involve cooperation and coordination with developing countries? (Indicator I 3.5.2)</p>	<p>The consultation mechanism on PCD issues under article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement specifically refers to ACP countries.</p>
<p>Nature of changes over time of inputs and of the activity itself (Indicators I 3.6.1 and I 3.6.2)</p>	<p>The activity has been underused during the evaluation period and the available evidence does not allow to trace nature of changes of inputs. Article 12 of the Cotonou agreement was modified in the 2010 revision of the agreement. The new version expressly acknowledges that the 'coherence' which the article addresses is coherence for development and recognises that other EU policies can support the development priorities of ACP countries in line with the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement.</p>

Appendix 2: Mentions of the activity in PCD Biennial Reports, PCD Council Conclusions and EP resolutions on PCD

Table 1: Mention of Consultation with DCs in PCD Biennial Reports

2009 PCD Report	<p><i>Partner country perspective: “The Cotonou Agreement, which links the EU to 79 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, is probably the only international agreement, with a specific PCD article. Article 12 sets up a consultation mechanism to promote the coherence of Community policies which might affect the interests of the ACP countries. The Community must inform the ACP countries in due time of its intentions, whenever possible in advance of the adoption of such decisions.” p.17</i></p> <p><i>While the EU has made great efforts to better assess the impacts of its own initiatives on developing countries with a view to bringing them into line with development objectives, the role of developing countries in these processes has been limited. While some developing countries play an active role, others find it more difficult due to their capacity constraints. The EU should therefore support these countries in identifying EU policy and legislative proposals that might affect them, assess the possible impacts and find ways to address their development concerns. The EU and developing countries could for instance better use the consultation mechanisms provided for in the impact assessment guidelines, the Cotonou Agreement and possibly also the AU-EU Partnership and strengthen them if necessary (p.22)</i></p>
2011 PCD Report	<p><i>Public stakeholder consultations: At several stages in the preparation of any policy proposal by the European Commission, its services gather information as well as the views and positions of the stakeholders. This can be done through targeted consultations of various groups of stakeholders, but is also often accompanied by an open public consultation, accessible to any actor in or outside the EU, individual, institution or organisation. All ongoing and recently closed consultations on European Commission initiatives are regularly published and updated. These consultations represent an additional way of making the voice of developing countries heard during the process of policy-making and they have been increasingly used by civil society organisations to raise issues pertaining to PCD and put them on the EU political agenda. One example is the large number of responses made to the consultation on the future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) post-2013.9 (p.14)</i></p> <p><i>At international level: Both the European Commission and Member States seek to intensify the dialogue with partner countries on the synergies between EU policies and development cooperation programmes. Institutional arrangements such as the Joint-Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adopted at the Second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in December 2007 are increasingly used to promote PCD by both the EU and partner countries. The JAES provides an opportunity to bring about synergies between policies and to avoid negative impacts of policies on developing countries thanks to a regular dialogue among a range of stakeholders. In addition, the revised Cotonou Agreement contains a specific article on PCD (Article 12) which sets up a consultation mechanism to promote the coherence of EU policies which might affect the interests of the ACP countries. The EU has to inform the ACP countries in advance of the adoption of new initiatives. On the other hand, ACP countries can request a consultation that has to take place before any final decision is made. The first formal consultation took place in February 2009 at a meeting of the Joint ACP-EU Subcommittee on Trade Cooperation. The ACP Group had requested information on five European Commission initiatives dealing with the use of pesticides, nickel substances, fisheries cold chain requirements, the renewable energy directive and the FLEGT licensing system. An agreement was reached to take into account the concerns of the ACP States in the preparation of those measures and in their implementation. (p.21)</i></p>
2013 PCD Report	<p><i>Fourth, cooperation and consultation with developing countries is instrumental in informing the policy process. Similarly, NGOs and civil society can play an important role in relaying bottom-up information on the impact of EU policies on development objectives. (p.19)</i></p> <p><i>Feedback from partner countries and the role of EU Delegations: Both the Agenda for Change and the PCD Council conclusions of 14 May 2012 suggest a stronger role for EU Delegations and for PCD dialogue in partner countries. The lack of feedback and, often, partner countries’ lack of interest in discussing PCD are constant challenges both for the EU internally and for promoting coherence in partner countries. Article</i></p>

	<p><i>12 of the Cotonou Agreement encourages dialogue on PCD issues with and among partners, but few countries take advantage of this opportunity for consultation and policy discussion. This is quite surprising, as many of the priority PCD themes such as trade, agriculture and security are constantly — but separately — at the heart of bilateral policy dialogue. There is a need for a more systematic gathering of feedback from developing countries on priority issues, more country-level studies and information on ongoing PCD-relevant thematic dialogues with partners and stakeholders. (p.26)</i></p> <p><i>The process of preparation for the CAP after 2013 proposal has been a positive example in terms of ensuring the right conditions for taking into account development cooperation objectives and contributions from development stakeholders, and for addressing PCD issues: (...) In line with the Article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement, ACP countries were consulted and various meetings at technical and ambassadorial level were organised with them. (p.109).</i></p>
2015 PCD Report	<p>No specific mention on Consultation with developing countries.</p> <p><i>Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs) are a trade-specific policy analysis tool for the prior assessment of the economic, social and environmental implications of all trade deals (...) In particular, careful attention has been given to strengthening the consultation of stakeholders in both the EU and partner countries (p.15-16).</i></p>

Table 2: Mention of Consultation with DCs in PCD and MDGs Council Conclusions

2005 MDG Council Conclusions	<p><i>In accordance with the December 2004 Council Conclusion, the Council invites the Commission to further reinforce its existing instruments notably its Impact Assessment tool and consultations with developing countries during policy formulation, and consider new ones when necessary in support of a strengthened Policy Coherence for Development.</i></p>
2007 PCD Council Conclusions	<p><i>The Council invites Member States and the Commission to strengthen dialogue with developing countries, at national, regional and global level, on the effects of EU policies as well as on the relevance of PCD to developing countries' own policies; to that end, the Commission and Member States should better integrate the PCD approach into Country and Regional Strategy Papers (CSPs and RSPs).</i></p> <p><i>The Council underlines the importance of establishing a constructive and fruitful exchange with non-state actors, both in the EU and in developing countries on PCD-related issues.</i></p>
2009 PCD Council Conclusions	<p><i>The Council welcomes the Commission suggestion to approach PCD in a more targeted, strategic and partnership-oriented way, including inter alia strengthening EU dialogue with partner countries on PCD issues (...).</i></p> <p><i>The Council agrees that the PCD work programme should have as objectives to: (...) facilitate engagement in and inclusion of PCD in dialogue with partner countries around the selected priority areas.</i></p>
2012 PCD Council Conclusions	<p><i>The Council stresses in particular the need to include the issues of PCD systematically in the regular dialogue with partner countries to better assess the impact of EU policies at country level and the interaction with partner countries' policies. EU Delegations have a crucial role in this regard.</i></p>
2013 PCD Council Conclusions	<p><i>The Council recalls that the role of EU Delegations is essential in providing feedback on issues relating to PCD (...). This includes a strengthened dialogue with local stakeholders regarding the impact of EU policies.</i></p>
2015 PCD Council Conclusions	<p><i>2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (...) To implement this agenda at the national and global level, all countries will take ownership and will need to consider how policies in all areas can contribute to sustainable development and act accordingly. In this context, the Council invites the Commission and the EEAS, in close consultation with other partners, to present concrete proposals on how to better integrate PCD into the EU approach to implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and calls for this new approach to be mainstreamed across the EU institutions.</i></p>

Table 3: Mention of Consultation with DCs in European Parliament resolutions on PCD

<p>2010 EP resolution (on the EU PCD and the ‘Official Development Assistance plus’ concept)</p>	<p><i>Asks for institutional clarification regarding the Commission's Communication on Policy Coherence (COM(2009)0458) concerning an enhanced partnership and dialogue with the developing countries on the topic of PCD; asks whether this enhanced partnership would also include a mechanism for advising developing countries what they themselves can do to promote PCD and a plan for capacity building at country level to perform PCD assessments.</i></p>
<p>2012 EP resolution (on the EU 2011 Report on PCD)</p>	<p><i>20. Recalls the paramount importance of Article 12 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement and the obligation for the Commission to regularly inform the Secretariat of the ACP Group of planned proposals which might affect the interests of the ACP States; calls on the Commission to inform Parliament when such procedures are undertaken;</i></p> <p><i>105. Reiterates that the creation of a Standing Rapporteur for PCD from the ACP countries in the context of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly would facilitate the coordination with, and work of, the EP's Standing Rapporteur on PCD and the relevant department of the Commission and Council, and would help to eliminate obstacles to PCD within developing countries themselves;</i></p>
<p>2014 EP resolution (on the EU 2013 Report on PCD)</p>	<p><i>Points out the importance of the role of the European External Action Service in implementing PCD, in particular the role of the EU Delegations in monitoring, observing and facilitating consultations and dialogue with stakeholders and partner countries on EU policy impacts in developing countries; stresses that a wider discussion with all relevant stakeholders, such as NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs), is needed;</i></p>
<p>2016 EP resolution (on the EU 2015 Report on PCD)</p>	<p><i>hopes that the Better Regulation Package and its guidelines will improve this situation by taking development and human rights into account in all impact assessments and by enhancing transparency; (...) welcomes the public consultation on the roadmap, which opens up opportunities for external stakeholders, including developing countries and civil society, to give their views and actively participate;</i></p>

Appendix 3: Cotonou Agreement Article 12 - Versions

Table 4: Consultation mechanism with DCs – Cotonou Agreement

<p>2000 Cotonou Agreement article 12 – Coherence of Community policies and their impact on the implementation of this Agreement</p>	<p><i>Without prejudice to Article 96, where the Community intends, in the exercise of its powers, to take a measure which might affect the interests of the ACP States, as far as this Agreement’s objectives are concerned, it shall inform in good time the said States of its intentions. Towards this end, the Commission shall communicate simultaneously to the Secretariat of the ACP States its proposal for such measures. Where necessary, a request for information may also take place on the initiative of the ACP States. At their request, consultations shall be held promptly so that account may be taken of their concerns as to the impact of those measures before any final decision is made... (...)</i></p>
<p>2010 Revised Cotonou Agreement Article 12 is replaced by the following: “Article 12 Coherence of Community policies and their impact on the implementation of this agreement”</p>	<p><i>The Parties are committed to addressing policy coherence for development in a targeted, strategic and partnership-oriented way, including strengthening dialogue on issues of policy coherence for development. The Union acknowledges that Union policies, other than development policy, can support the development priorities of ACP States in line with the objectives of this Agreement. On this basis the Union will enhance the coherence of those policies with a view to attaining the objectives of this Agreement. Without prejudice to Article 96, where the Community intends, in the exercise of its powers, to take a measure which might affect the interests of the ACP States, as far as this Agreement’s objectives are concerned, it shall inform in good time the ACP Group of its intentions. To this end, the Commission shall regularly inform the Secretariat of the ACP Group of planned proposals and communicate simultaneously its proposal for such measures. Where necessary, a request for information may also take place on the initiative of the ACP States. At their request, consultations shall be held promptly so that account may be taken of their concerns as to the impact of those measures before any final decision is made. After such consultations have taken place, the ACP States and the ACP Group may, in addition, transmit their concerns in writing to the Community as soon as possible and submit suggestions for amendments indicating the way their concerns should be met. If the Community does not accede to the ACP States’ submissions, it shall advise them as soon as possible giving its reasons. The ACP Group shall also be provided with adequate information on the entry into force of such decisions, in advance whenever possible.’... (...)</i></p>

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Activity Assessment Tool

EU Delegations Reporting

1 INTRODUCTION

Since 2014 EU Delegations (EUD) have been reporting to the Commission on PCD with the intent to strengthen the monitoring of country-level PCD issues and the capacity of delegations to contribute to PCD. EUD have the possibility to identify EU policies' effects on the PCD challenge areas at the level of the partner countries and to provide feedback. The rationale is that EUD also could foster PCD dialogue within the third countries among partner country government, donor agencies, MS representatives and local CSOs.

2 QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT

2.1 Detailed description⁸⁴

Since 2014, the PCD Team within DG DEVCO compiles yearly reports received from EU Delegations (EUD) based on specific questionnaires on PCD issues. Follow-up notes to EUD are produced based on answers received (notes were produced for the 2014 and 2015 exercise while notes for the 2016 one is currently being produced). This activity is carried out according to the following steps:

- **Sending of structured questions:** As a first step, the PCD Team sends out structured questions to EUD in developing countries. The nature of the questions has slightly evolved over since 2014: for the first exercise a long list of issues (cross-cutting and thematic) allowed for a fairly large degree of freedom for EUD respondents, while in the two following exercises the questions were more structured and focused on 2 key issues (i) one question focused on the impact of internal EU policies at the country level; (ii) the other question focused on the formal or informal dialogues of the EUD with the government and civil society (including private sector) of the country on issues of relevance to PCD.
- **Feedback from DGs/EEAS:** EUD are normally given a few months' time to fill-out the structured questionnaire and send back their contribution to the PCD Team. The number of responses received was so far: for the first exercise (2014): 41 EUD; for the second exercise (2015): 50 EUD. It should be noted that as of the second exercise (2015) PCD Reporting by EUD became part of the External Assistance Management Report (EAMR).
- **Compilation of feedback from PCD Team:** On the basis of the contributions received by the PCD Team, a follow-up note to Heads of Delegations is produced: for the first exercise, the note was produced in October 2014, for the second exercise the note was produced in August 2016. **Hence, the main output of the exercise is an awareness-raising note to EUD.** The content of the note to Heads of Delegations appears to be two-fold:
 - 1) On the one hand, it provides structured information on PCD in order to **raise awareness about the EU PCD Approach** This is done *inter alia* by (i) providing general information about the PCD commitment, forwarding council decisions or parliament resolutions on PCD (as part of the 2014 exercise); (ii) presenting the questionnaire summary findings in order to highlight the specific thematic issues of interest to developing countries having taken part in the exercise.
 - 2) It also serves to remind EUDs of their responsibilities with regards to PCD issues and *inter alia* the need to strengthen dialogue on PCD at country level (highlighted in the 2014 note) and monitor the impact of PCD in their country (highlighted in the 2015 note).

⁸⁴ This section is based on a systematic review of the following documents: correspondence between the Commission and EUDs on PCD issues, answers from EUDs to the questionnaires, notes from the Commission following responses from EUDs.
EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT ANNEX 4.7: EU DELEGATIONS REPORTING PAGE 104

2.2 Strengths

The main strengths of the Biennial Report are the following:

- **Structured process:** The well-structured and formalized process through which the EUD reporting happens allows the Commission to collect answers in a systematised manner. During the Evaluation process, the Evaluation Team was able to access all data linked to this exercise in a structured fashion.
- **Coordination / collaboration of a wide variety of actors:** Another strength of the EUD Reporting is that it provides in theory a structured framework and an opportunity for **discussions and awareness-raising** on PCD at the country level. The main stakeholders for the EU delegations reporting are:
 - Commission HQs/EEAS, which have the mandate to ensure EU delegations' reporting on PCD becomes a regular exercise;
 - EU Delegations which are active in developing countries identifying EU policies' synergies with developing country's context and the work of donor agencies and other EUMS, and promoting PCD dialogue at the country level;
 - Developing countries' governments and local stakeholders such as CSOs;
 - Donor agencies and EUMS (Embassies);
 - PCD Team which coordinates and consolidates the country reports.

We should however note that the extent to which the country level stakeholders are involved in answering the questions or in PCD Dialogue in general is difficult to ascertain.

2.3 Weaknesses

The main weaknesses of the EUD reporting are the following:

- **Time Efficiency:** Despite that “structured process” followed by the PCD Team, important delays are experienced collecting and analysing EUD feedback. For instance, it took more than a year to collect and process data for the first exercise from the date of official communication to the Delegations to the date the follow up note with the main findings was sent back to EUDs)⁸⁵.
- **Absence of PCD focal points in EUDs:** EUDs do not necessarily have a PCD focal point, and as a result the report can be handled by officers working for different services within the EUDs (sometimes an officer from the EEAS, and sometimes the Commission representative of DG DEVCO in the Delegation). Since the issues they handle on a daily basis are different (one deals at the political level, the other at the operational level - programmes implementation) the quality and nature of the reports can vary given the perspective of the person who provides the input.
- **Quality of the answers:** Inter alia as a result of the above, the quality and nature of the answers provided varies greatly across EUDs, and the content is sometimes very general or even anecdotal. While the PCD Team has done a good job at trying to synthesize the answers and draw constructive lessons from the highly heterogeneous contributions received, there is an intrinsic challenge to the survey exercise;
- **Limited usefulness for monitoring:** As a result of the above, the EUD Reporting has limited use in terms of monitoring PCD at the partner country level:
 - On the one hand, the format of the reporting and the quality of the answers received is too general and does not really allow EUD to report on specific issues from year to year.

⁸⁵ Note for the attention of EU Heads of Delegations *The role of EU Delegations in PCD-request for follow up*, dated 31.07.2013; Note for the attention of EU Heads of Delegations, *The role of EU Delegations in PCD-Main findings of the reporting exercise and intended follow up*, dated 24.10.2014.

- On the other hand, it is not clear how specific issues / concerns raised by EUDs with respect to PCD are actually followed-up / taken-up by the PCD Team, other Commission services and the EEAS.

2.4 Opportunities for improvement

The main opportunity for improvement of the EUD Reporting is linked to the overall issue of the monitoring of progress for PCD, and more specifically at partner country level. As stated in a number of EP Resolutions and PCD Council Conclusions, the single most important opportunity for improvement for the Biennial Report is that **it evolves towards a tool that is not only useful for awareness-raising, but also for monitoring of progress of PCD**. The evolution of the PCD Biennial Report towards a monitoring / progress-assessment tool (as opposed to a purely awareness-raising tool) would create an opportunity for the EUD Reporting to become an input to the overall monitoring exercise, as opposed to an awareness raising-mechanism as it is now.

3 CONCLUSIONS

The well-structured and formalized process through which the EUD Report is produced allows the Commission to publish a note that contains (i) awareness-raising information to EUDs, and (ii) a reminder of their responsibilities towards PCD (structured dialogue of PCD at the partner country level, and monitoring of impact of PCD). However, the process is not time efficient. Also, inter alia given the absence of a PCD focal point at the level of the EUD, the EUD Report is of limited usefulness for monitoring and it is not clear how specific issues / concerns raised by EUD are actually followed-up / taken-up by the PCD Team, other Commission services and the EEAS. Hence an opportunity for improvement of the EUD Reporting is linked to the overall issue of the monitoring of progress for PCD. The evolution of the PCD Biennial Report towards a monitoring / progress-assessment tool (as opposed to a purely awareness-raising tool) would create an opportunity for the EUD Reporting to become an input to the overall monitoring exercise, as opposed to an awareness raising-mechanism as it is now.

Appendix 1: Summary of additional findings with respect to EQ3

<p>Number of redundancies / synergies within the activity / with other activities with respect to their contribution to output achievement (Indicator I 3.1.3)</p>	<p>The EUD Reporting is linked to the following activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Training: issues raised by EUD can be followed-up by trainings on PCD issues. ▪ Biennial Report: The Biennial Report summarizes information contained in the EUD reports and hence the EUD Report can be considered as an input to the Biennial Report. <p>However, and given its awareness-raising purpose, the EUD Reporting doesn't seem to directly contribute to other PCD mechanisms (ISC, IA, screening, etc.)</p>
<p>Actual level of human resources (staffing and expertise) or material resources against stakeholder's perception of needs (Indicator I 3.2.1 and 3.2.2)</p>	<p>The Evaluation Team did not gather reliable data on the human resources required for the production of the EUD Report. However, and given the limited number of questions and responses, it is assumed that the production of the EUD Report requires limited resources from the PCD Team.</p>
<p>Are processes standardised within the PCD Unit, DEVCO/NEAR and other DGs, and the EEAS? (Indicator I 3.3.3)</p>	<p>The well-structured and formalized process through which the EUD reporting happens allows the Commission to collect answers in a timely and systematised manner. During the Evaluation process, the Evaluation Team was able to access all data linked to this exercise in a timely and structured fashion.</p>
<p>Does the activity involve coordination with EU stakeholders (EUMS, EP, Council, EEAS, EESC, CSOs)? (Indicator I 3.5.1)</p>	<p>Another strength of the EUD Reporting is that it provides a structured framework for discussions and awareness-raising on PCD at the country level. The main stakeholders for the EU delegations reporting are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Commission HQs/EEAS, which have the mandate to ensure EU delegations' reporting on PCD becomes a regular exercise; ▪ EU Delegations which are active in developing countries identifying EU policies' synergies with developing country's context and the work of donor agencies and other EUMS, and promoting PCD dialogue at the country level; ▪ Developing countries' governments and local stakeholders such as CSOs; ▪ Donor agencies and EUMS (Embassies); ▪ PCD Unit which coordinates and consolidates the country reports.
<p>Does the activity involve cooperation and coordination with developing countries? (Indicator I 3.5.2)</p>	<p>The production of the EUD report provides an opportunity to involve cooperation with developing countries although the degree of cooperation of local stakeholders (besides the EUD) is difficult to assess.</p>
<p>Nature of changes over time of inputs and of the activity itself (Indicators I 3.6.1 and I 3.6.2)</p>	<p>The structure of the EUD report has somewhat during the period: for the first exercise a long list of issues (cross-cutting and thematic) allowed for a fairly large degree of freedom for EUD respondents, while in the two following exercises the questions were more structured and focused on 2 key issues (i) one question focused on the impact of internal EU policies at the country level; (ii) the other question focused on the formal or informal dialogues of the EUD with the government and civil society (including private sector) of the country on issues of relevance to PCD.</p>

Appendix 2: Mentions of the activity in PCD Biennial Reports, PCD Council Conclusions and EP resolutions on PCD

Table 1: Mention of EUD Reporting in PCD Biennial Reports

2013 PCD Report	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Executive summary: The lack of feedback from partner countries and the need for more PCD dialogue with them, as highlighted in previous editions of this report, are currently being addressed by the Commission and the HR, notably through EU Delegations around the world. ▪ Introduction: The report is organised broadly in two main sections, looking first at PCD cross-cutting issues and then at thematic issues. The first part highlights advances in promoting PCD, such as the setting-up of PCD training, the ongoing work to include development aspects in the Commission’s impact assessments and the reinforced PCD role of EU Delegations. ▪ Section 4.6 Feedback from partner countries and the role of EU Delegations, page 26: Both the Agenda for Change and the PCD Council conclusions of 14 May 2012 suggest a stronger role for EU Delegations and for PCD dialogue in partner countries. The lack of feedback and, often, partner countries’ lack of interest in discussing PCD are constant challenges both for the EU internally and for promoting coherence in partner countries. Article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement encourages dialogue on PCD issues with and among partners, but few countries take advantage of this opportunity for consultation and policy discussion. This is quite surprising, as many of the priority PCD themes such as trade, agriculture and security are constantly — but separately — at the heart of bilateral policy dialogue. There is a need for a more systematic gathering of feedback from developing countries on priority issues, more country-level studies and information on ongoing PCD-relevant thematic dialogues with partners and stakeholders. EU Delegations need to be better informed about the PCD agenda and work, and authorised to conduct effective multi-stakeholder dialogues on key PCD issues and inform headquarters of impacts of EU policy observed at country level. In response to this need, the Commission and the HR are working to improve awareness of the PCD approach and provide information and basic PCD training to staff in EU Delegations, and exploring Delegations’ capacity to improve country-level dialogues on PCD and gather information on country-level impacts of EU policies. A joint HR/Commission letter sent to EU Delegations in July 2013 requested initial reports on PCD processes and priority PCD issues at country level by the end of January 2014. Following this first round of reporting, consideration will be given to more regular PCD reporting from Delegations, ways of integrating the results of country-level analysis into biennial reporting, and follow-up in the form of case/country studies where relevant.
2015 PCD Report	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Executive summary: EU delegations play a pivotal role providing feedback on the impact of EU policies on partner countries and in identifying challenges on policy coherence. Following a PCD reporting exercise concluded during the first half of 2014 and involving reports from 41 EU delegations covering 62 partner countries, the Commission took steps to strengthen the monitoring of country-level PCD issues and the capacity of delegations to contribute to PCD, e.g. via the organisation of targeted training on PCD and initiating steps for a regular PCD reporting mechanism from EU delegations. ▪ Section 1 on Promoting Policy Coherence for Development, page 18: In its conclusions on the 2013 PCD report of December 2013, the Council also called for more progress on PCD at country level through a reinforced role for EU delegations and additional progress on monitoring and promoting a more evidence-based approach. The Council also called for the EU to lead on policy coherence in the global discussions on the Post-2015 framework. ▪ Section 1 on EU delegations reporting on PCD, page 18: EU delegations play a pivotal role in identifying challenges for PCD and providing feedback on the impacts of wider EU policies on our partner countries. In order to reinforce the role of delegations and to strengthen country-level dialogue on PCD, in July 2013 the Commission and the EEAS, on behalf of the High Representative, jointly asked Heads of Delegation to report on a number of PCD issues. Reports from 41 EU

delegations were received covering 62 partner countries allowing the identification at country and regional level of common challenges for PCD.

Awareness of the PCD concept: Overall, the reports reveal a good level of awareness on PCD in EU delegations, but also that PCD issues are seldom discussed with Member States, the partner governments or civil society at country level, which may point to a low level of awareness of PCD in general. The same can be said of other donors.

Delegations capacity and needs on PCD: Most delegations indicated that they have limited capacity to work specifically on PCD-related issues, mainly due to high workload and human resources constraints. A majority also saw a need for specific training on PCD and/or regular updates on EU policies that are relevant for PCD.

Main PCD issues mentioned: PCD challenges most frequently raised were in the areas of trade and finance, fisheries, food security, and migration. In the area of trade and finance main issues brought up were market access (Generalised Scheme of Preferences; Everything But Arms; Rules of Origin), EPA implementation, non-tariff barriers to trade (in particular EU Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary requirements), the impact of the liberalisation of the sugar regime, conditions of service provision under Free Trade Agreements and illicit financial flows. Regarding fisheries and food security, the negotiations and implementation of the Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPA) and the implementation of the EU Regulation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, as well as the biofuels/food security/land use nexus were often mentioned. On migration, in particular, the EU visa policy and labour market access and remittances policies came up often. A number of EU delegations reported synergies between different policies in favour of development, often supported by funds for capacity building (fisheries) and Aid for Trade.

Follow-up: As a follow-up to this reporting exercise the Commission took steps to strengthen the monitoring of country-level PCD issues and the capacity of delegations to contribute to PCD including:

- targeted training sessions on PCD for Heads of Cooperation, when meeting in Brussels, and to develop a PCD e-learning training course with a specific module dedicated to the work in delegations;
- setting up a regular reporting mechanism from delegations on PCD and encouraging delegations to engage in regular discussions on PCD with partner countries and to strengthen dialogue and follow.

Table 2: Mention of EUDs role/EUD Reporting in PCD Council Conclusions

2012 PCD Council Conclusions	The Council stresses in particular the need to include the issues of PCD systematically in the regular dialogue with partner countries to better assess the impact of EU policies at country level and the interaction with partner countries' policies. EU Delegations have a crucial role in this regard.
2013 PCD Council Conclusions	The Council recalls that the role of EU Delegations is essential in providing feedback on issues relating to PCD and encourages the Commission and the EEAS to continue their efforts and report further on PCD processes and initiatives at country level. This includes a strengthened dialogue with local stakeholders regarding the impact of EU policies. Designating PCD focal points in EU Delegations could be useful in this regard.
2015 PCD Council Conclusions	Recognising the pivotal role of EU delegations and Member State embassies, the Council notes with satisfaction the establishment of regular monitoring and reporting of PCD issues by delegations and calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to further improve ongoing efforts.

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Activity Assessment Tool

Informal EU Member States PCD Network

1 INTRODUCTION

As part of the joint engagement of the EU and EU Member States to promote PCD, exchanges between the Commission and EU Member States have taken place through the *Informal EU Member States PCD Network* since 2005. This network has been used also as a tool for the preparation of PCD Biennial Reports and PCD related discussions aimed at promoting learning on PCD issues within the EU, sharing information and providing feedback as EU development policy is a shared competence.

It should be noted that in parallel to the EU Member States informal network steered by the Commission, there exist other networks in which EU Member States also participate on an individual capacity:

- **A PCD Community of Practice** organized by ECDPM with only a few Member States participating;
- **Informal Network of National Focal Points for Policy Coherence** organized by the OECD. The OECD also participates in “missions to OECD members and partner countries” such as the meeting of “EU PCD Focal Points Meeting” coordinated by DG DEVCO (PCD Team).

Therefore, there are three instances in which EU Member States participate. The focus of this report is the *Informal EU Member States PCD Network* organized by the Commission and steered by the PCD Team at DG DEVCO. Networks organized by the OECD/ECDPM are considered outside of the scope of the evaluation.

2 QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT

2.1 Detailed description⁸⁶

The qualitative assessment of this activity is based on interviews with stakeholders as well as the systematic review of the agendas and minutes of the following meetings that took place during the Evaluation period which have been summarized in Annex 1. Interviews with stakeholders and the review of the documents provide the following information of the activity:

- **Agenda:** One of the most prominent items of the agenda are discussions around the PCD Biennial period (presentations of progress on preparations, presentations of the content of the report) and the PCD Work Programme / screening by thematic area. Other topics covered were presentations on inter alia: assessing or measuring PCD by the OECD (2010), Member States (2014) or ECDPM (2015); promoting PCD at the national level; or exchange of views with Concorde on the future of PCD. Discussions on other thematic discussions on various technical issues (for instance the New European Consensus and PCD/PCSD was featured on the agenda of the June 2016 meeting) were also featured in the agendas.
- **Attendance:** Detailed attendance was not available for all meetings. Available information shows that between 11 and 16 Member States attended the meetings, and that between 4 and 9 DGs including DEVCO and EEAS were present at the meetings. OECD, Concorde and ECDPM were also very often present.

⁸⁶ This section is based on a systematic review of the agendas and minutes of the meetings that took place during the Evaluation period which have been summarized in Annex 1 of this report.

2.2 Strengths

The main strengths of the Informal Member States PCD Focal Points Network are the following:

- **Structured process:** The organisation of the meetings seems to be systematized and structured, and most of the meetings' agenda and minutes are documented by the PCD Team.
- **Coordination / collaboration with member states:** Another strength of the Informal EU Member States PCD Focal Points Network is that it provides a structured framework for discussions and awareness-raising on PCD for EUMS.

2.3 Weaknesses

The main weaknesses of the *Informal EU Member States PCD Network* are the following:

- **High turnover of EUMS PCD focal points / variable political commitment:** Stakeholders interviewed mentioned the high rotation of FP in EUMS and how political commitment varied according to the priorities of the government in turn.
- **Partial overlap with the Biennial Report:** As mentioned above, the Informal EU Member States PCD Focal Points Network spends much time discussing issues that are already covered by the PCD Biennial Report, which could raise a potential issue of redundancy between the 2 PCD specific mechanisms.
- **Resource efficiency:** The Evaluation Team did not gather reliable data on the human resources required for the preparation and organisation of the Informal Member States PCD Focal Points Network. However, given that (i) some years up to 2 meetings are organised, (ii) the activity is potentially partially overlapping with the Biennial Report, resource-efficiency for this activity might be an area for further investigation.
- **Effectiveness is difficult to assess:** the only tangible output of this activity are the minutes of the meetings which represent insufficient evidence to allow an assessment of the effectiveness of the activity.

2.4 Opportunities for improvement

Given the inherent difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of this activity, it does not seem appropriate at this stage to identify opportunities for improvement. The EU Member States survey undertaken as part of the Evaluation of the EU's PCD might provide more insight into this awareness-raising activity.

3 CONCLUSIONS

One of the most prominent item on the agenda of the meetings of the *Informal EU Member States PCD Network* are discussions and presentations around the period of preparation of the PCD Biennial report and the PCD Work Programme / screening by thematic area. The main strengths of this activity are (i) the structured process by which the meetings are organized by the PCD Team, and (ii) the fact that these meetings provide a structured framework for discussions and awareness-raising on PCD for EU Member States. The main weaknesses are: (i) the high turnover of EU Member States PCD focal points which undermines the level of technical discussions; (ii) the partial overlap of the activity with the Biennial Report since the network spends much time discussing issues that are already covered by the PCD Biennial Report; and (iii) the inherent difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of the activity since the

only tangible output are the minutes of the meetings (hence, it does not seem appropriate at this stage to identify opportunities for improvement; and the EU Member States survey undertaken as part of the Evaluation of the EU's PCD might provide more information on potential improvements).

Appendix 1: Overview of meetings of the Informal EU Member States Network

Date	EUMS/Countries Focal Points present	Commission services present	Other stakeholders present	Title of Meeting
24/04/2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Austria ▪ Finland ▪ France ▪ Germany ▪ Hungary ▪ Ireland ▪ The Netherlands ▪ Portugal ▪ Romania ▪ Sweden ▪ UK 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DG AGRI ▪ DG ENV ▪ DG INFSO ▪ RELEX ▪ DG RTD ▪ DG SANCO ▪ DG TRADE ▪ DG DEV 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ECDPM 	Meeting of the PCD Informal Network of Member States
24/02/2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Attachment with participants not provided 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Attachment with participants not provided 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ECDPM 	Enhancing coherence of policies for development Working seminar on indicators and impact evaluation
13/09/2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Austria ▪ Belgium ▪ Czech Republic ▪ Denmark ▪ Finland ▪ France ▪ Germany ▪ Hungary ▪ Ireland ▪ Italy ▪ Poland ▪ Portugal ▪ Sweden ▪ The Netherlands ▪ UK 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DG DEV ▪ DG AIDCO ▪ DG AGRI ▪ DG CLIMA ▪ DG COMP ▪ DG EMPL ▪ DG ENV ▪ DG MARE ▪ DG MARKT ▪ DG RTD ▪ DG SANCO ▪ DG TAXUD ▪ DG TRADE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ OECD ▪ CFSI ▪ Concord ▪ ECDPM ▪ Evert Vermeer Foundation⁸⁷ ▪ WWF 	PCD Network Meeting
28/09/2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Austria ▪ Belgium ▪ Czech Republic ▪ Denmark ▪ Germany ▪ Ireland ▪ Lithuania ▪ The Netherlands ▪ Poland ▪ Portugal ▪ Sweden 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DG DEVCO ▪ DG AGRI ▪ DG CLIMA ▪ DG TRADE ▪ DG ENV ▪ DG MARE ▪ EEAS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ OECD ▪ Concord ▪ Evert Vermeer Foundation ▪ ECDPM 	EU PCD informal expert meeting
20/09/2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Belgium ▪ Cyprus ▪ Denmark ▪ Finland ▪ France ▪ Germany ▪ Ireland ▪ Latvia ▪ Slovenia ▪ Spain 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DG DEVCO ▪ DG TRADE ▪ DG TAXUD ▪ DG HOME ▪ EEAS ▪ DG ENTR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ OECD ▪ ECDPM 	EU PCD informal expert meeting

⁸⁷ Later changed into Max van der Stoel Foundation.

Date	EUMS/Countries Focal Points present	Commission services present	Other stakeholders present	Title of Meeting
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sweden ▪ The Netherlands ▪ UK ▪ Swizerland 			
22/04/2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overview participants not provided 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DG DEVCO • DG ENER 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concord 	PCD Network Meeting
27/01/2014⁸⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Switzerland ▪ The Netherlands ▪ Finland 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DG DEVCO ▪ DG MARE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ OECD 	PCD Network Meeting
21/10/2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Switzerland ▪ Austria ▪ Belgium ▪ Czech Republic ▪ Germany ▪ Denmark ▪ Estonia ▪ Spain ▪ Finland ▪ France ▪ Lithuania ▪ Luxembourg ▪ Latvia ▪ Malta ▪ The Netherlands ▪ Poland ▪ Portugal ▪ Sweden ▪ Slovenia ▪ UK 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DG DEVCO ▪ Commission services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ OECD ▪ Concord 	Informal Expert Group of PCD Focal Points
25/02/2015⁸⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Switzerland ▪ EUMS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DG HOME ▪ DG DEVCO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ OECD ▪ ECDPM ▪ CGD 	Informal Expert Group of PCD Focal Points
02/12/2015⁹⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EUMS ▪ Switzerland 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DG DEVCO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ OECD 	PCD Informal Expert Group
22/06/2016⁹¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EUMS ▪ Switzerland 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DG DEVCO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ OECD 	PCD Informal Expert Group

Source: Minutes of Meetings and Lists of participants - PCD team.

⁸⁸ No participants list, information was extracted from the minutes of the meeting.

⁸⁹ No participants list, information was extracted from the minutes of the meeting.

⁹⁰ Idem.

⁹¹ Idem.

Appendix 2: Summary of additional findings with respect to EQ3

<p>Number of redundancies / synergies within the activity / with other activities with respect to their contribution to output achievement (Indicator I 3.1.3)</p>	<p>One of the weakness of the Informal Member States PCD Focal Points Network is its partial overlap with the Biennial Report: As mentioned above, the Informal Member States PCD Focal Points Network spends much time discussing issues that are already covered by the PCD Biennial Report, which could raise a potential issue of redundancy between the 2 PCD specific mechanisms.</p>
<p>Actual level of human resources (staffing and expertise) or material resources against stakeholder's perception of needs (Indicator I 3.2.1 and 3.2.2)</p>	<p>The Evaluation Team did not gather reliable data on the human resources required for the preparation and organisation of the Informal Member States PCD Focal Points Network. However, given that (i) some years up to 2 meetings are organised, (ii) the activity is potentially partially overlapping with the Biennial Report, resource-efficiency for this activity might be an area for further investigation.</p> <p>Moreover, Stakeholders interviewed mentioned the high rotation of FP in EUMS and how political commitment varied according to the priorities of the government in turn.</p>
<p>Are processes standardised within the PCD Unit, DEVCO/NEAR and other DGs, and the EEAS? (Indicator I 3.3.3)</p>	<p>The organisation of the meetings seems to be systematized and structured, and most of the meetings' agenda and minutes are documented by the PCD Team.</p>
<p>Does the activity involve coordination with EU stakeholders (EUMS, EP, Council, EEAS, EESC, CSOs)? (Indicator I 3.5.1)</p>	<p>Detailed attendance was not available for all meetings. Available information shows that between 11 and 16 Member States attended the meetings, and that between 4 and 9 DGs including DEVCO and EEAS were present at the meetings. OECD, Concorde and ECDPM were also very often present.</p>
<p>Does the activity involve cooperation and coordination with developing countries? (Indicator I 3.5.2)</p>	<p>No</p>
<p>Nature of changes over time of inputs and of the activity itself (Indicators I 3.6.1 and I 3.6.2)</p>	<p>There was no obvious change recorded during the period for this activity. The changes in participation of DGs / Member States cannot be analysed with sufficient accuracy based on data made available to the Evaluation Team.</p>

Appendix 3: Mentions of the activity in PCD Biennial Reports, PCD Council Conclusions and EP resolutions on PCD

Table 1: Mention of EU Member States Network in PCD Biennial Reports

2007 PCD Report	A series of mechanisms have also been setup to promote PCD at EU level, viz: – The PCD Network, created on the initiative of the EU Directors-General for Development, is an informal forum for exchanges of information between Commission and Member States. It held its first meeting in November 2005, and has met again three times in 2006 (May, July, November) and so far once in 2007 (May). The attendance rate has constantly increased, starting from nine Member States in 2005 and going up to 19 in 2007 (p.38).
2009 PCD Report	The informal PCD network of EU Member States met on several occasions, to ensure exchanges between the Member States on PCD issues and to give advice with regard to preparation of the PCD report (p.16).
2011 PCD Report	Coordination of the Informal Member States PCD Network, page 13: An informal PCD network composed of EU Member States' PCD contact points meets on average twice a year on invitation by the European Commission, to discuss PCD experiences and to give advice with regard to preparation of the different PCD reports. Representatives from the European Parliament Development Committee (DEVE) are also invited to join the meeting in the interest of better coordination as are representatives from the OECD and the civil society. The network of PCD contact points in Member States is also instrumental in sharing information and providing feedback on important PCD issues, and plays an important role in the monitoring of EU action on PCD between the EU and the national level and in coordinating the Member States' contributions to the biennial report.
2013 PCD Report	The PCD team also organises the PCD networks (internally, at inter-service level and informally with Member States) (p.38).
2015 PCD Report	The Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) coordinates different networks including coordination (...) and with Member States in informal meetings of PCD focal points. (p.13). Regular exchanges between the Commission and Member States – twice yearly in informal expert meetings with National PCD Focal Points and ad hoc contacts – aim to promote learning and ensure coherence throughout the EU. This is particularly relevant as development policy is a parallel competence between the EU and its Member States. (p.14)

ANNEX 5: ANALYSIS OF IMPACT ASSESSMENTS ON POLICIES MENTIONED IN PCD DOCUMENTS

The evaluation team carried out an assessment of Commission IAs, using as a sample the IAs of policies identified in the “Mapping of PCD policies and initiatives” included in Annex 3 of the Inception Report, i.e. all the policies that have been identified as being PCD-relevant by PCD awareness-raising mechanisms during the evaluation period⁹². Based on this methodology, a total of 54 PCD-relevant IAs were identified⁹³, including 41 IAs that had been carried out in the 2009-2016 period⁹⁴.

Tables 1-3 below present an overview of the findings with respect to indicators 5.1.1 to 5.1.3, while Table 4 presents the detailed analysis of all IAs. The analysis of results is included in section 3.5.1 of the report.

Table 1: IAs taking account of impacts in developing countries (related to Indicator 5.1.1)

Explicit reference in IAs of policies' likely impacts in developing countries	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total	Share
Yes	4	3	2	3	3	1	0	3	19	46.3%
Yes, but in limited fashion or not explicitly enough	0	0	3	0	1	0	1	3	8	19.5%
No	3	0	0	0	6	1	1	3	14	34.1%
Total	7	3	5	3	10	2	2	9	41	100%

Table 2: Involvement of DG DEVCO in IAs' Inter-Service Steering Group (related to Indicator 5.1.2)

Involvement of DG DEVCO in IA Steering Group	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total	Share
Yes	5	1	3	3	4	2	1	3	22	53.7%
No	2	2	2	0	6	0	1	6	19	46.3%
Total	7	3	5	3	10	2	2	9	41	100%

Table 3: IAs for which the RSB or IA Board commented on development issues (related to Indicator 5.1.3)

Comments from RSB / IA Board on development issues	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total	Share
Yes	1	0	2	2	2	0	1	1	9	22.0%
No	6	3	3	1	8	2	1	8	32	78.0%
Total	7	3	5	3	10	2	2	9	41	100%

⁹² As specified in the Inception Report, the “Mapping of PCD policies and initiatives” gathers all the policies and initiatives mentioned in PCD CWP screening documents, in the Biennial Reports, or in the PCD Work Programme.

⁹³ The number of IAs is much lower than the number of policies/initiatives identified in the Mapping because the Mapping also included a high number of non-legislative initiatives or implementing acts, that did not require an IA. Also, for some policies that consisted of a package of legislative proposals (e.g. the Digital Single Market Strategy package), we considered the various IA reports produced for each individual proposal as one single IA.

⁹⁴ For some policies mentioned in the Mapping, the corresponding IAs were actually finalised in the period from 2005 to 2008 (this is the case for example for some policies that were mentioned *a posteriori* in PCD Biennial Reports published during the evaluation period).

Table 4: Detailed analysis of IAs mentioned in PCD documents

No. ⁹⁵	Year	Policy initiative	PCD Screening ⁹⁶	Biennial Reports ⁹⁷	PCD WP ⁹⁸	Lead DG	Other DGs/ EC services involved ⁹⁹	I 5.1.1 Explicit reference in IAs of policies' likely impacts in developing countries	I 5.1.2 DEVCO in ISG ¹⁰⁰	I 5.1.3 RSB/ IA Board comments on development issues	(Potential) missed opportunities ¹⁰¹
78	2009	Communication "Demonstrating Carbon Capture and Geological Storage (CCS) in emerging developing countries: financing the EU-China Near Zero Emissions Coal Plant project"	Yes	No	N.a.	ENV	AIDCO, ECFIN, ENTR, RTD, RELEX, SEC GEN and TREN	Yes. This Communication supplements another Communication on financing low carbon technologies (in preparation), by covering in greater detail carbon capture and storage technologies and focusing on China as a case study for cooperation with emerging developing countries. In this context, the impact of the policy on developing countries can be considered to be analysed throughout the report.	Yes	Yes, marginally. The IA Board did not make any specific comments related to development issues but noted that the IA "should make clear to what extent what is proposed will be duplicated in co-operation with other developing countries that rely heavily on coal (e.g. India, South Africa, Ukraine) and if so what are the plans and financial means available for investment in these countries". According to the IA, some of the main comments provided by other DGs following the presentation of IA findings were related to "the decision to focus in the Communication and impact assessment on cooperation with China and to take forward cooperation on CCT and CCS with other emerging and developing countries".	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which clearly took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries, the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.
92	2009	Communication on agricultural product quality policy	Yes	No	N.a.	AGRI	SG, SJ, ENV, ENTR, TRADE, MARE, REGIO, SANCO, MARKT, RTD, COMP, DEV, ECFIN, TAXUD	Yes. The impact on developing countries is considered in several sections of the IA report, such as Annex B on Geographical Indications (which mentions that GIs protection for developing countries a dilemma with both potential for positive and negative outcomes) and in particular Annex D on certification schemes (which discusses the impact of private standards / certification schemes on farmers and producers in developing). In Annex D, the (economic, social and environmental) impacts on developing countries are assessed for each proposed option. Under social impacts, the IA report also assesses for each proposed option its "contribution to EU development policy".	Yes	No. The IA Board did not make any specific comment related to development issues. The IA Board commented on the need for the report to clarify the extent to which the criteria proposed to ensure coherence take into consideration the priorities in other EU policy fields - but under "other EU policy fields", the IA Board cited environment, fisheries and animal welfare as examples - not development.	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries, the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.

⁹⁵ Number of the policy in the "Mapping of PCD policies and initiatives" included in Annex 3 of the Inception Report.

⁹⁶ Mention of the policy in CWP screening for PCD relevance.

⁹⁷ Mention of the policy in PCD Biennial Reports.

⁹⁸ Mention of the policy in the PCD Work Programme 2010-2013.

⁹⁹ I.e. other DGs and Commission services involved in the IA's Inter-service Steering Group (ISG).

¹⁰⁰ Involvement of DG DEVCO (or DEV or AIDCO, in the case of policies prepared before the creation of DG DEVCO) in the IA's ISG.

¹⁰¹ As part of this exercise, only IA documents (i.e. IA reports and comments from the RSB/IA Board) were analysed, which is why we refer to **potential** missed opportunities. Determining if the policies were indeed missed opportunities would require further analysis of the corresponding policies.

No. ⁹⁵	Year	Policy initiative	PCD Screening ⁹⁶	Biennial Reports ⁹⁷	PCD WP ⁹⁸	Lead DG	Other DGs/ EC services involved ⁹⁹	I 5.1.1 Explicit reference in IAs of policies' likely impacts in developing countries	I 5.1.2 DEVCO in ISG ¹⁰⁰	I 5.1.3 RSB/ IA Board comments on development issues	(Potential) missed opportunities ¹⁰¹
92	2010	Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on agricultural product quality schemes	Yes	No	N.a.	AGRI	SG, SJ, ENV, ENTR, TRADE, MARE, REGIO, SANCO, MARKT, RTD, COMP, DEV, ECFIN, TAXUD	Yes. 2 IAs were carried out: 1 on "Traditional Specialities Guaranteed" (TSG) and 1 on "Geographical Indications" (GIs). The first IA on TSG does not mention developing countries at all; there are only 2 brief mentions of the economic impacts on international/third countries. However, the second IA on GIs addresses the impact of the policy on developing countries in various sections of the report. In particular, under section 6 "Impact of options" for most of the proposed options a specific sub-section on "developing countries" is included.	Yes	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which to some extent took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries (at least for GIs), the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.
118	2009	Communication on investing the development of Low Carbon Technologies (SET-Plan)	Yes	No	N.a.	TREN (now ENER), ECFIN, RTD	JRC, ENV, ENTR, REGIO, SG, COMP, DEV, INFSO, TAXUD, RELEX, TRADE, AGRI	No. The IA does not discuss the impact of the policy on developing countries (or even third countries in general).	Yes	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	Yes. Based on the analysis of the IA, which did not consider the impact on developing countries, this policy could possibly be a missed opportunity. It can be noted that this policy is related to policy No. 78 (see above), which focused on China as a case study for cooperation with emerging developing countries, and for which the IA took account of impacts in developing countries. Nevertheless, impacts on developing countries could still have been addressed in the IA of this new policy.
121	2009	Financial markets for the future Package: - Recommendation on remuneration policies in the financial services sector - Recommendations as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies	Yes	No	N.a.	MARKT	EMPL, ENTR, TAXUD, ECFIN and COMP + SG, Legal Service	No. The IA does not discuss the impact of the policy on developing countries (or even third countries in general). At the same time, it is not clear what impact the policy could possibly have on developing countries.	No	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues (although the IA Board recommended to strengthen the analysis of "international aspects", this referred to the interplay between the policy and other initiatives outside the EU and implications of the policy for the supply of directors in the EU).	No. The IA does not consider the impact on developing countries at all; however, although the policy was deemed PCD-relevant as part of the CWP screening, it is not clear what direct impact these 2 recommendations could possibly have on developing countries: in this context, we do not consider the policy to be a missed opportunity. (The only aspect that could perhaps have been discussed in the IA is the indirect positive impact (benefit) of this policy for developing countries, i.e. the reduction

No. ⁹⁵	Year	Policy initiative	PCD Screening ⁹⁶	Biennial Reports ⁹⁷	PCD WP ⁹⁸	Lead DG	Other DGs/ EC services involved ⁹⁹	I 5.1.1 Explicit reference in IAs of policies' likely impacts in developing countries	I 5.1.2 DEVCO in ISG ¹⁰⁰	I 5.1.3 RSB/ IA Board comments on development issues	(Potential) missed opportunities ¹⁰¹
											of the risk of future (global) financial crises: this would highlight the coherence between this policy and development objectives.)
122	2009	Communication on European financial supervision	Yes	No	N.a.	MARKT	ECFIN, SG, SJ, ENTR, EMPL, COMP, SANCO	No. The IA does not discuss the impact of the policy on developing countries (or even third countries in general). The IA does include a section on "Coherence" which aims to "examine the extent to which options match the overarching objectives of EU policy" but does not include references to the EU's development objectives.	No	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	No. The IA does not consider the impact on developing countries at all; however, although the policy was deemed PCD-relevant as part of the CWP screening, it is not clear what impact the policy could possibly have on developing countries: in this context, we do not consider the policy to be a missed opportunity. (The only aspect that could perhaps have been discussed in the IA is the indirect positive impact (benefit) of this policy for developing countries, i.e. the reduction of the risk of future (global) financial crises: this would highlight the coherence between this policy and development objectives.)
124	2009	Communication on combating HIV/AIDS in the European Union and neighbouring countries, 2009-2013	Yes	No	N.a.	SANCO	ADMIN, AIDCO, DEV, EAC, ECHO, EMPL, ELARG, ENV, INFISO, SG, RELEX, RTD and TRADE	Yes. The geographical scope of the policy includes the EU but also neighbourhood countries. In the context, the impact of the policy on neighbourhood countries – which include some developing countries – is discussed in the IA report (although the focus is on the impact on EUMS). The impact of the policy on countries outside this geographical scope is not discussed. However, the section "External policy dimension" mentions several other initiatives financed by the Commission to address HIV/AIDS in other regions, including specifically in developing countries: it is the only section of the IA report which explicitly refers to developing countries.	Yes	No. The IA Board did not make specific comments related to development issues. The IA Board only commented (on the first draft of the IA report) that the report should be more explicit about complementarities with programmes in other geographical areas such as Africa.	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which to some extent took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries (de facto it took into account the impact of the policy on neighbouring countries, which include developing countries; also, the report mentioned related initiatives in other regions), the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.
178	2010	Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment	Yes	No	Yes	JLS	EMPL, AGRI, RELEX + SG, Legal Service	Yes. Under section "Problem definition", the IA includes a specific sub-section 2.2.4 "Limited contribution of EU legal migration policies to the development of third countries", which mentions inter alia that "sending countries are typically developing countries with high rates of unemployment and surpluses in labour supplies,	No	No. The IA Board provided consolidated comments on the legal migration package which included 3 related Directives on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals: (i) the Directive on seasonal workers; (ii) the	No. Based on the analysis of the IA, which took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries, the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.

No. ⁹⁵	Year	Policy initiative	PCD Screening ⁹⁶	Biennial Reports ⁹⁷	PCD WP ⁹⁸	Lead DG	Other DGs/ EC services involved ⁹⁹	I 5.1.1 Explicit reference in IAs of policies' likely impacts in developing countries	I 5.1.2 DEVCO in ISG ¹⁰⁰	I 5.1.3 RSB/ IA Board comments on development issues	(Potential) missed opportunities ¹⁰¹
								which temporary migration towards the EU could somewhat relieve". For each proposed policy option, the "contribution to the development of third countries", "impacts on third countries" and "Impacts on third country seasonal workers (including impacts on social inclusion and fundamental rights" are discussed and assessed in specific lines of the "assessment of policy options" tables (Section 5 of the IA report).		Directive on intra-corporate transferees; (iii) the Directive on trainees. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues on the IA for this specific Directive (the only comment related to developing countries concerns the IA of the Directive on trainees).	
179	2010	Directive on conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer	Yes	No	Yes	JLS	TRADE, EMPL, RELEX + SG	Yes. The only explicit reference to developing countries in the IA report can be found in the section on the "Scope of the problem", in which it is stated that "Given that intra-corporate transferees carry out time-limited assignments usually followed by a return to the country where their permanent employer is based and that according to available data, they are more likely to come from developed countries than from developing countries, brain drain does not appear to be an issue". However, for each proposed policy option the "impacts on third countries" is assessed in a specific line of the "Analysis of impacts" tables (Section 5 of the IA report). In this context, it is again stated several times that ICTs' source countries are mainly developed and emerging countries, and therefore the risk of brain drain is limited.	No	No. The IA Board provided consolidated comments on the legal migration package which included 3 related Directives on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals: (i) the Directive on seasonal workers; (ii) the Directive on intra-corporate transferees; (iii) the Directive on trainees. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues on the IA for this specific Directive (the only comment related to developing countries concerned the IA of the Directive on trainees).	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which to some extent took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries (although the IA report argues that the impact on developing countries will be limited because ICT source countries are mainly developed and emerging countries, it is at least discussed in the report), the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.
183	2009	Regulation on the European Earth observation programme (GMES) and its initial operations (2011–2013)	Yes	Yes	Yes	ENTR (now GROW)	ENV, BUDG, RTD, AGRI, ESTAT, JRC, RTD, TAXUD, DEV, AIDCO, ECHO, INFOS, TREN, RELEX, MARE, REGIO, JLS	Yes. Although the IA report does not include a specific section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries (or third countries in general), it includes a few considerations on possible impacts on developing countries, in particular Africa (even though it is mostly from the perspective of the EU, focusing on EU's credibility in its partnership with Africa): - In the section analysing the impact of Option 0 (baseline scenario), the IA notes that if the EU did not move forward with operational GMES services before 2014, this would limit its credibility within the "GMES and Africa" partnership because "in the field of Earth observation, the EU will only be a credible partner for developing countries if GMES delivers operational services in addition to existing research projects". - In the section analysing the impact of Option 3 (the preferred option, according to the IA), the IA report notes that "EU financing of operational services would constitute a political message of	Yes	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which to some extent took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries, the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.

No. ⁹⁵	Year	Policy initiative	PCD Screening ⁹⁶	Biennial Reports ⁹⁷	PCD WP ⁹⁸	Lead DG	Other DGs/ EC services involved ⁹⁹	I 5.1.1 Explicit reference in IAs of policies' likely impacts in developing countries	I 5.1.2 DEVCO in ISG ¹⁰⁰	I 5.1.3 RSB/ IA Board comments on development issues	(Potential) missed opportunities ¹⁰¹
								paramount importance also for the external relations of the EU, and would reinforce the credibility of the EU as a partner in the GEOSS and the strategic EU-Africa partnership". Furthermore, in the section on the "Consistency with other EU policies" (section 3.4), the IA report notes that "GMES should be a tool for cooperation actions linked to development, humanitarian aid and emergency situations worldwide, and more specifically with Africa", thereby highlighting the coherence between the policy and the EU development objectives.			
198	2011	Country by Country Reporting - Directive on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings	No	Yes	Yes	MARKT	SG, SJ, ECFIN, ENTR, ESTAT, TAXUD, EMPL, TRADE, SANCO	Yes. Part II of the IA focuses exclusively on "financial disclosures on a country-by-country basis" which is the also the basis for the "development" element of the Directive: Chapter 9 of the Directive which aims at increasing transparency of the payments made by the (EU) mining and logging industries to governments (of resources rich developing countries). Based on independent assessment of the IA by the evaluation team, it appears that the level of detail and quality of the assessment of the potential impact of CBCR on developing countries is very high. In particular, all policy options were assessed against the policy objective of "increased transparency" which was the main interest of resources rich developing countries.	No	Yes. The IA Board issued two opinions. In its second opinion, the IA Board commented that the IA report should consider implications on development cooperation and "should make a further effort to be more specific about the benefits of the initiative (e.g. <u>increased social responsibility in developing countries</u> , more stable operational environment for MNCs) and on this basis, demonstrate better the effectiveness and efficiency of the preferred option".	No. Based on the analysis of the IA, which took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries, the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.
211-217	2011	Common Agricultural Policy towards 2020 Regulations on: - establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy - establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) - on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) - on the financing, management and monitoring of the	Yes	Yes	Yes	AGRI	The Inter-Service Steering Group involved participants from 21 DGs (including DG DEVCO).	Yes, but limited. The potential implications of the CAP reform from a PCD perspective were taken into account by the IA that evaluated the policy proposals. The IA report includes several explicit references to the policy's likely impacts in developing countries and it includes a specific Annex (Annex 12 "The Common Agricultural Policy and Development") which explicitly mentions PCD and discusses the impact of the CAP reform on world markets, in particular developing countries' markets. Annex 12 states that „the form and the extent in which the CAP would affect developing countries are not clearly established (...) Changes on world market prices would influence the terms of trade of developing countries, but impacts would differ according to the trade profile of the country (...) Greater market orientation will ensure that impacts are generally minimised and in any case not exacerbated. However, these impacts should be assessed on a case by case basis, as the economic, social, cultural and demographic heterogeneity among and within developing countries, as well	Yes	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	No. Given that the IA considered – at least to some extent – the potential impacts of the policy on developing countries, the CAP reform does not appear to be a "missed opportunity".

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		common agricultural policy - determining measures on fixing certain aids and refunds related to the common organisation of the markets in agricultural products						as the multitude of factors that affect food security policies and situations in the short-, medium- and long-term, make generalisations difficult.” As for domestic support, “impacts will vary depending on the commodity, from country to country and from group to group (e.g. consumer vs. producer; urban vs. rural).” As for Export Subsidies, “(...) On the one hand, EU subsidised products may negatively impact on local farmers by making their production less profitable. On the other hand and in the short-term, it may be favourable to consumers who benefit from access to lower-priced imports”. Overall, Annex 12 is not so much an impact assessment but rather a broad discussion paper: in this context, we consider that the IA took account of impacts in developing countries in a limited fashion.			
220	2011	Proposal for a Regulation on the Common Fisheries Policy [repealing Regulation (EC) N° 2371/2002] (2012 Reform of the CFP)	Yes	Yes	Yes	MARE	BUDG, TRADE, ELARG, SJ, JRC, SANCO, AGRI, DEV, ESTAT, ECFIN, COMP, REGIO, RTD, ENV, EMPL, ENTR and SG	Yes. The IA explicitly analyses all four policy options against their economic, social and environmental impact to third countries, and considers for each option the external dimension. The IA mentions a weak link between Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) and sustainable fishing in third countries and lack of governance in the Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). The preferred policy option, which constituted the base for the new CFP regulation, provides that agreements on the EU contributions to the third countries, particularly the sectoral fisheries, are negotiated based on first, the third country's need regarding fisheries policy development and second, its capacity to absorb the support given its institutional and macro-economic situation. With the reform, the EU will take into consideration the legitimate aspirations of the developing countries' capacity on fishing according to the available fishing opportunities. The instrument is based on the bilateral agreements and type of catch on the EEZ of third countries. Promotion of economic integration of EU operators in the third countries by promoting the use of port facilities, landing catches in the country, and employment of local fishermen is also taken into account. The IA also mentions explicitly the economic impact of the CFP on third countries. It states that since FPA contribution would be a combination of earmarked and non-earmarked amounts, it would be possible to adjust the percentage earmarked for policy support, taking into account	Yes	Yes. The IA Board can be considered to have commented on development issues, as both opinions of the IA Board commented that the IA report "should improve the analysis of the external aspects of the Common Fisheries Policy", in particular in relation to the problems in implementing FPAs with third countries (which include many developing countries). In particular, the IA Board commented in its second opinion that the report should better assess the expected impacts of the proposed changes on, inter alia, the macroeconomic stability of the third countries.	No. Based on the analysis of the IA, which took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries, the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.

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								each country's absorption capacity. Except for countries that depend largely on FPA revenues, the budgetary situation could be neutral. Macroeconomic stability would be damaged if the EU contribution is not kept as ordinary public receipt.			
229	2011	Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims, repealing Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA	Yes	Yes	N.a.	JLS	RELEX, DEV, AIDCO, EMPL, SANCO + SG and SJ	<p>Yes, but limited. Although the IA report does not include a specific section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries or third countries in general, one of the operational objectives of the policy is to reduce vulnerability factors in countries of origin. In this context, most proposed policy options (if one excludes Option 1 "Status Quo") include preventive measures in countries of origin and the impact of these measures in the countries of origin (which comprise many developing countries) is discussed in the IA report.</p> <p>For example, with regards to Option 4 (the option recommended by the IA) the IA report states that "preventive measures have a specific positive impact on third countries, as a consequence of programmes aimed at poverty reduction, empowerment of women, reduction of vulnerability of children and targeted groups, especially the most at risk of poverty, the unemployed, those at risk as a consequence of armed conflicts".</p> <p>It can be noted however that the section on "Consistency of the objectives with other EU policies and horizontal objectives" (3.2) does not explicitly mention development objectives.</p>	Yes	No. The IA Board did not make specific comments related to development issues. (The IA Board commented that the IA report should more explicitly deal with cross-cutting issues, in particular pay greater attention to the gender dimension of trafficking, but there is no specific reference to development/developing countries)	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which to some extent took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries, the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.
231	2011	Communication - A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050	No	Yes	N.a.	CLIMA	ENER, MOVE + other DGs not specified	<p>Yes, but limited. Although the IA report does not include a specific section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries or third countries in general, the IA report includes several references to developing countries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In section 2 "Problem definition" the developing countries' ETS carbon price differentials, GHG emissions evolution and projections, as well as the level of action required from developing countries, are mentioned; - In section 5 "Analysing the impact of different scenarios", and specifically sub-section 5.1 "Action in a global context", the IA report recalls the EU stated objective of reducing deforestation as part of a co-ordinated global action, in particular within developing countries, and with respect to emissions of agriculture development notes that aid policies by the EU will need to further address this issue in both tropical and temperate developing countries. 	No	No. The IA Board did not make specific comments related to development issues. (IA Board comments obviously refer to global decarbonisation targets / GHG reduction objectives given the topic of the policy, but there is no specific reference to development aspects or developing countries)	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which to some extent considered the impact of the policy on developing countries (at least in terms of looking at the policy in a global context), the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.

No. ⁹⁵	Year	Policy initiative	PCD Screening ⁹⁶	Biennial Reports ⁹⁷	PCD WP ⁹⁸	Lead DG	Other DGs/ EC services involved ⁹⁹	I 5.1.1 Explicit reference in IAs of policies' likely impacts in developing countries	I 5.1.2 DEVCO in ISG ¹⁰⁰	I 5.1.3 RSB/ IA Board comments on development issues	(Potential) missed opportunities ¹⁰¹
								Furthermore, in the section summarising the findings of the stakeholder consultation (sub-section 1.4, the IA report notes that "In the context of helping developing countries to cope with the challenges resulting from climate change, most of the organised stakeholders prioritise supporting the countries that generate the most pollution, while individuals bring forward the need to support countries most likely to suffer from climate change".			
244	2012	Proposal for a regulation concerning customs enforcement of intellectual property rights	Yes	No	N.a.	TAXUD	MARKT, TRADE, SG, DEV, LS, AGRI, HOME, COMP, JRC, SANCO, OLAF and ENTR	<p>Yes. Although the IA report does not include a specific section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries or third countries in general, it assesses the impact of the policy in relation to the specific issue of transit of medicines across the EU territory towards third countries and in particular in terms of access to medicines for developing countries.</p> <p>In section 2.1. "Policy context", the IA notes that certain instances of detentions by customs authorities of shipments of generic medicines in transit through the EU, which occurred at the end of 2008, have given raise to concerns among certain stakeholders and that it was claimed that "such measures could hamper legitimate trade in generic medicines, thus contradicting the EU commitment to facilitating access to medicines in the developing world" (this also triggered WTO disputes against the EU). In section 2.3 "Medicines in transit through the EU territory", the IA also noted that the several contributions addressed this issue and "requested a broader re-examination of the approach of the EU towards intellectual property and access to medicines in developing countries and expressed their view that revisions to the Regulation should ensure that access to affordable, safe and effective medicines is prioritized above commercial interests of pharmaceutical companies to enforce its private intellectual property rights in these countries.</p> <p>In this context, in the section on the analysis of impacts (section 6) a specific sub-section (6.4.1 "Situations in which customs are competent to act might be affecting the smooth transit of medicines across the EU territory towards third countries") assesses the impacts of policy options in this regard. Regarding the baseline scenario/option (no action taken), the IA notes that the lack of clarity concerning certain provisions of the current Regulation – which led to unjustified detentions by EU customs of goods in transit that</p>	Yes	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which to some extent took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries (by analysing the specific impact of the policy on access to medicines for developing countries), the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.

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								are not destined for the EU and the initiation of dispute settlement proceedings against the EU before the WTO – would remain, and that "as the dispute related to transiting generic medicines, the EU's policy of ensuring access to medicines for developing countries could be put unnecessarily into question." The IA report then assesses how the 2 other policy options would help addressing the problem of detentions of medicines in transit.			
245	2013	Directive amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards disclosure of nonfinancial and diversity information by certain large companies and groups	Yes	No	N.a.	MARKT	SANCO, ENTR, ESTAT, EMPL, TRADE, ENV, DEVCO , ENER, RTD, JUST, HOME, EEAS + SG, LS	<p>Yes. The IA report has a specific section on the analysis of impacts of the preferred options on "third countries and international aspects" (6.2.5), but it does not include any specific reference to developing countries or development issues. However, the impact on developing countries is discussed in other sections of the report:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In Section 3.3 "Which stakeholders are affected and how", the IA report noted that if information is not available, companies cannot be held fully accountable for their impact on society and that "this case is made in particular with regard to some EU companies having operations in developing countries, where national legal frameworks may include weak or no legal obligations to disclose information". The IA report added that "although some evidence suggests that the largest European companies are more likely to have a human rights policy than their competitors in other developed countries, some NGOs have referred to cases of alleged negative impacts EU companies may have on human rights and the environment in their operations in developing countries". - In relation to the above, the section on the analysis of social impacts of preferred policy options (6.2.1) argues that "the proposed policy would require a significant number of large firms to develop, often for the first time, policies and strategies to manage or mitigate negative social impacts" and that at the same time "firms would be encouraged to better identify potential risks relating to human rights, particularly in the case of those companies operating in third countries where legal requirements regulating social impacts are weak or weakly enforced". <p>Finally, it can be noted that for each proposed policy option, the "Coherence with other EU legislation" is assessed but no reference is made to development policies/objectives.</p>	Yes	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which to some extent took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries, the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.

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248	2012	Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) Regulation: Regulation on applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences	Yes	Yes	Yes	TRADE	AGRI, BUDG, ECOFIN, EMPL, ENTR, ENV, MARE, DEVCO , RELEX (now EEAS), European Anti-Fraud Office, Eurostat and SG.	Yes. The GSP regulation, even though it was developed under the leadership of DG Trade (and not DG DEVCO) is largely a development policy. The beneficiaries of the GSP scheme are developing countries. As such, it is not surprising that the IA took account of development objectives and discussed impacts on developing countries: - The IA identifies the following objectives having a positive impact on beneficiaries: (i) Poverty eradication by expanding exports from beneficiaries; (ii) Sustainable development and good governance through the GSP+ and the linked international standards. - The IA identifies the positive impact of GSP+ to the ratification of the 27 international conventions linked to the programme. - However, the IA briefly assesses the impact of preferential imports, but from the perspective of the EU as importer (preferential imports represent 5% of total EU imports). Economic impact from the perspective of the exporting country was not carried out for all three-tariff preference (general arrangements, GSP+, and EBA).	Yes	Yes. The IA Board issued two opinions. As mentioned earlier, the GSP regulation is largely a development policy and the beneficiaries of the GSP scheme are all developing countries. In this context, most comments from the IA Board are intrinsically related to development issues, even if it is often implicit. Among other things, it can be noted that: - In its first opinion, the IA Board commented that "different distributional impacts across industries and/or EU and <u>beneficiary countries</u> [<i>i.e. developing countries</i>] should also be more extensively analysed when significant". - In its second opinion, the IA Board commented that: (i) "eligibility criteria are found problematic because they fail "to ensure that all the world's poorest countries can qualify" but annex 5 argues that GSP+ should remain a tool addressing the specific needs of "the vulnerable" as opposed to those of the "poorest" (i.e. the beneficiaries of the separate EBA regime)", (ii) "the summary impact tables should be clearer, explaining which diverse impacts are included under the "economic" column and breaking down the country groupings into more detailed sets ("EU," "non-GSP," "GSP," "GSP+" and "EBA" countries) so as to more transparently reflect the different distributional impacts".	No. GSP does not constitute a missed opportunity: even though it is always possible to identify elements/aspects of the IA that could have gone further in terms of assessment the impact of the policy on developing countries (e.g., rules of origin are not covered in the IA and one could argue that for each of the three-tariff preference, the IA should have compared complexity in ROs with utilization of the preferences), it should also be recognized that since the GSP regulation is essentially the unilateral granting of tariff exemptions to developing countries, it is reasonable for the IA to focus mostly on the impact of EU countries (under the reasonable assumption that "no harm" can be done to developing countries). Nevertheless, an assessment of the impact on beneficiary countries, among other assessments, would have added value to the IA.
266	2013	Regulation laying down provisions for the management of expenditure relating to the food chain, animal health and animal	Yes	Yes	Yes	SANCO	BUDG, AGRI + SG, Legal Service	No. The IA report does not include a section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries or third countries in general. Developing countries are not mentioned at all. Although section 2.3 ("Who is affected by the current policy?") lists among the categories of	No	No. The IA Board did not make any specific comments related to development issues. (The IA Board commented that the IA should "demonstrate the need (...) to finance training	Yes. Based on the analysis of the IA, which does not appear to have properly considered the impact on developing countries, this

No. ⁹⁵	Year	Policy initiative	PCD Screening ⁹⁶	Biennial Reports ⁹⁷	PCD WP ⁹⁸	Lead DG	Other DGs/ EC services involved ⁹⁹	I 5.1.1 Explicit reference in IAs of policies' likely impacts in developing countries	I 5.1.2 DEVCO in ISG ¹⁰⁰	I 5.1.3 RSB/ IA Board comments on development issues	(Potential) missed opportunities ¹⁰¹
		welfare, and relating to plant health and plant reproductive material, amending Council Directives 98/56/EC, 2000/29/EC and 2008/90/EC, Regulations (EC) No 178/2002, (EC) No 882/2004 and (EC) No 396/2005, Directive 2009/128/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 and repealing Council Decisions 66/399/EEC, 76/894/EEC and 2009/470/EC ("feed and food expenditure")						<p>stakeholders affected by EU measures implemented under the food safety policy (i) "trading partners and competent authorities in third countries as they have to comply with the EU's import conditions for live animals, animal products and products of animal origin, the EU provisions and pay for export controls and issuance of phytosanitary certificates, and have to perform controls prior to export to the EU" as well as (ii) "consumers outside the EU", the impact of the new proposed policy options on these categories of stakeholders is not explicitly discussed in the report.</p> <p>The only relevant element in the IA report is the discussion on training programmes in third countries, in particular the Better Training for Safer Food programme, which covered EUMS but also targeted third countries. The IA report argues that the new multi-financial framework should continue spending limited and targeted EU feed and food budgets in programmes in third countries "where a clear case can be made that the programmes would not be otherwise developed, and there is a clear benefit for the EU" (§2.5) and specifically, that BTSF funding should continue as "for a relatively small amount of spend, BTSF offers an easy and effective way to disseminate information on the enforcement of food and feed safety to all Member States and to third countries" and "to remove this funding would leave a gap in training which is highly unlikely to be filled elsewhere, and risks reducing the knowledge of enforcement officers over time, ultimately impacting negatively on the enforcement of food and feed controls" (§5.5 on the analysis of impacts of "Option 4: Stop all EU Action"). However, the discussion appears to focus on the impacts on the EU and is not sufficient to consider that the impacts of the proposed policy on developing countries were assessed.</p>		activities for third countries. However, as a response, the revised version of the report cited the "need to prevent the entrance into or the spread within the EU borders of diseases and pests from neighbours countries", suggesting that the initial comment was not related to development issues).	policy could be a missed opportunity.
267	2013	Regulation on Animal Health	Yes	Yes	Yes	SANCO	SG, SJ, AGRI, COMP, ENTR, ENV, RTD, MARKT, MARE, OLAF, TRADE, RELEX, ELARG	No. The IA report does not include a section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries or third countries in general. Developing countries are not mentioned at all. Although section 2.3 ("Who is affected by the current policy?") mentions that "trading partners and competent authorities in third countries are affected by the EU's import conditions for live animals, animal products and products of animal origin", the impact of the new proposed policy	No	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	Yes. Based on the analysis of the IA, which does not appear to have properly considered the impact on developing countries, this policy could be a missed opportunity.

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								options on these categories of stakeholders is not explicitly discussed in the report. It appears that there was potential to discuss the possible impacts of the policy on developing countries considering that in the section on the "Problem definition", the IA report acknowledges that "the time spent by the concerned parties understanding animal health import conditions represents an administrative burden for business operators and competent authorities in both MS and third countries which has the potential to be reduced through simplification, harmonisation of the controls, and the introduction of electronic forms" and that Annex II "Key Messages from the evaluation of the Community Animal Health Policy (CAHP)" mentions that "the evaluation has highlighted the many linkages inherent in the policy e.g. between what happens in third countries, what happens at EU borders and what actions are taken to secure animal health status within the EU" and that according to the evaluation specific actions which could be considered for the future include "providing specific support to third countries to assist them in upgrading their animal health status to meet EU and international (OIE) requirements".			
268	2013	Regulation on official controls and other official activities performed to ensure the application of food and feed law, rules on animal health and welfare, plant health, plant reproductive material, plant protection products and amending Regulations (EC) No 999/2001, 1829/2003, 1831/2003, 1/2005, 396/2005, 834/2007, 1099/2009, 1069/2009, 1107/2009, Regulations (EU) No 1151/2012, [...] /2013, and Directives 98/58/EC, 1999/74/EC, 2007/43/EC, 2008/119/EC, 2008/120/EC and 2009/128/EC (Official controls Regulation)	Yes	Yes	Yes	SANCO	AGRI, BUDG, ENV, ENTR, RTD, TAXUD, TRADE, DEVCO, MARE, LS, JUST + SG	No. The IA report does not include a section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries or third countries in general. Developing countries are not mentioned at all. It can be noted that although section 2.3 "Parties affected" notes that "businesses (both in the EU and <u>in third countries exporting to the EU</u>) will also be affected by changes aimed at improving the efficiency of the control system as a whole, and in particular of the import controls", the impact of the new proposed policy options on businesses in third countries is not explicitly discussed in the report. It appears that there was potential to discuss in the IA report the possible impacts of the policy on developing countries considering that for example Annex XX ("Consultation of the competent authorities in the MS on the impacts of the different options regarding the revision of Directive 96/23/EC – Questionnaire and results of the consultations) shows that the specific requirements for third countries were discussed during the stakeholder consultations.	Yes	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	Yes. Based on the analysis of the IA, which does not appear to have properly considered the impact on developing countries, this policy could be a missed opportunity.

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269	2013	Regulation on protective measures against pests of plants	Yes	Yes	Yes	SANCO	AGRI, BUDG, ENV, ENTR, RTD, TAXUD, TRADE, LS and SG	No. The IA report does not include a section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries or third countries in general. The only mention of developing countries relates to the fact that in the past two decades the production of various crops has moved from the EU to developing countries and that "this process will be enhanced if no action is taken" (Annex VIII, p. 108). It appears that there was potential to discuss in the IA report the possible impacts of the policy on developing countries considering that Annex X ("Summary of the opinions of stakeholders and Member States") shows that "several stakeholders stressed the need to better support developing countries in setting up proper phytosanitary systems".	No	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	Yes. Based on the analysis of the IA, which does not appear to have properly considered the impact on developing countries, this policy could be a missed opportunity.
270	2013	Regulation on the production and making available on the market of plant reproductive material (Plant Reproductive Material Law)	Yes	Yes	Yes	SANCO	AGRI, TRADE, ENV and SG	No. The IA report does not include a section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries or third countries in general. Developing countries are not mentioned at all. Although the IA report notes in section 2.4 "Who is affected, in what way and to what extent?" that "changes to the EU PRM marketing legislation will have consequences worldwide" (including on agricultural stakeholders and consumers outside the EU, because, as the EU is the world leader in PRM production and export) and that the "EU has an important role to play in global food security and thus in avoiding food crises", impacts on third countries are not properly assessed. The report does assess the impact of proposed policy options on trade with third countries, but it is clearly from perspective of the EU, i.e. it assesses the impact on the EU.	No	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	Yes. Based on the analysis of the IA, which did not consider at all the impact on developing countries (although the IA report acknowledges that changes to the EU PRM marketing legislation will have consequences worldwide), this policy could possibly be a missed opportunity.
322	2012	Directive amending Directive 98/70/EC relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (Impact assessment on indirect land use change related to biofuels and bioliquids)	No	Yes	Yes	ENER / CLIMA	ENV, MOVE, ENTR, ECFIN, AGRI, DEVCO, TRADE and JRC	Yes. Although the IA report does not include a specific section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries (or third countries in general), the impact on developing countries is discussed in a few instances: - Under the analysis of social impacts for option A (section 5.2.4), the IA report states: "Development objectives in third countries are difficult to assess, as such impacts are dependent on local factors. However, the current framework, which is continued under option A allows for a range of crops typically grown in developing countries to be supplied to the EU, as they typically fulfil the sustainability criteria." - Under the analysis of social impacts for option C1 (section 5.4.4), which foresees measures	Yes	Yes. The IA Board provided two opinions on the IA report. In its first opinion on the first draft of the IA report, the IA Board – although it did not mention explicitly developing countries or refer to development objectives – commented that the relationship between existing and proposed EU measures and global green house gas emissions should be clearly explained (which involves "identifying the effect of EU action on emission levels in	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which to some extent took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries, the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.

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								aimed at reducing deforestation in biofuel producing countries including the reduction of waste of agricultural products at farm level and post harvest in particular for developing countries, the IA states: "Reducing deforestation may also have positive impacts on the short term economic and social growth of developing countries". Furthermore, Annex VIII ("Interactions between existing legislation and indirect land use change") highlights the interaction of the policy with development policies (section 17.2.5) noting that "under its development policy, the EU is committed to increasing expenditure on demanded agricultural research, extension and innovation by 50% by 2015" and that "although not aimed only at yield increases, development policy reduces indirect land-use change by improving agricultural productivity, especially by stepping up research to improve the productivity and sustainability of agriculture in developing countries".		third countries"), and that the assessment of impacts should be strengthened significantly, in particular in relation to, <i>inter alia</i> , third countries.	
325	2013	Directive amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, in view of the implementation by 2020 of an international agreement applying a single global market-based measure to international aviation emissions	Yes	Yes	Yes	CLIMA	SG, Legal Service, EEAS, ENTR, MOVE, and TRADE.	Yes, but limited. Developing countries are only mentioned in the IA report in the context of the discussion on possible exemptions from the EU ETS of routes to and from "developing" countries, as proposed by the ICAO Council. A Specific Annex (Annex X) presents different options to define these exemptions (based in particular on different possible definitions for "developing countries", e.g. all countries, which are not high-income countries; only LDCs, etc.) and assesses the impact of these options – however, the focus is clearly on the impact on the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS rather than the actual impact on developing countries or the overall development impact.	No	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which to some extent took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries (in the context of the discussion on possible exemptions from the EU ETS of routes to/from developing countries), the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.
346	2013	Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, including terrorist financing Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on information	Yes	Yes	N.a.	MARKT	HOME, JUST, SG, TAXUD, SJ, FPI, and ENTR	No. The IA report does not include a specific section on the development impact of the policy. The only reference to developing countries in the IA report is made in relation to a specific risk resulting from the "Enhanced information requirements for electronic transfers", which is described as "low impact": "One-off costs: Low impact: Inclusion of beneficiary information is not expected to result in significant additional costs as it is already included in most fund transfers. Concerns have been expressed about potential initial difficulties in the case of PSPs, who operate globally and also in developing countries. In case of slower adaptation in	No	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	Yes. Based on the very limited and not fully explicit analysis of the impact of the policy in the IA, and in light of the mention in the 2015 Biennial Report that the development dimension of money laundering could have been "demonstrated more clearly" in the Fourth AMLD and Second Transfer Regulation which furthermore points to the "divergent views on how to

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		accompanying transfers of funds						<p>developing countries, it may be necessary to suspend business relationships with PSPs in those countries, leading to potential serious costs" (linked to this are also ongoing costs, also described as low impact but with no mention of developing countries: "Ongoing costs: Low impact: Increased costs to be expected due to incomplete information about the beneficiary (payment will be either rejected or more information from the payee's institution requested). However, evidence supplied by external consultants responsible for reviewing the FTR suggests that rejection of transfers does not seem to be common practice of PSPs, as issues around missing information tend to be resolved in a different way (e.g. requests for complete information, dialogue with counterparts, etc.).". However, the IA report does not elaborate further on this and does not explain what concrete impacts this could cause in developing countries. We note that this issue of increased transfer costs stemming from enhanced information requirement is of the same nature as the one mentioned in the 2013 Biennial Report: however, this risk is considered as low in the IA and is not addressed extensively, nor are other development related risks / issues.</p> <p>The IA argues that in terms of impacts on third countries (the IA does not explicitly mention developing countries in this instance) "strengthening the EU system should ensure that the proceeds of corruption, which drain away wealth and resources from third countries, and the proceeds from all other predicate offences are less easily processed through the EU financial system".</p> <p>Based on the above, we do not consider the IA report to explicitly mention the policy's impact in developing countries.</p>			find the right balance between transparency requirements and the reduction of administrative burdens in the financial service market or data protection", the evaluation team will investigate if the 4th AML package can be considered as a missed opportunity for PCD.
361	2013	EU-China Investment Agreement: Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations on an investment agreement between the European Union and the People's Republic of China	Yes	Yes	N.a.	TRADE	AGRI, BUDG, CLIMA, COMP, DEVCO, ECFIN, EDUC, EMPL, ENER, ENTR, ENV, SANCO, HOME,	<p>Yes. The economic, environmental, social and human rights impacts of the policy on China are assessed in the IA report.</p> <p>The IA report also notes that "regulatory changes to the investment conditions as well as the use of MFN clauses mean that bilateral market access concessions may in effect benefit third countries as well" but concludes that "overall the economic effects on third countries are small".</p>	Yes	Yes. The IA Board commented inter alia that the IA report "should emphasise the problems under the existing bilateral arrangements to ensure respect for and effective implementation of social and environmental standards, and upholding standards of corporate social responsibility", that "the discussion on the integration of	No. Based on the analysis of the IA, which clearly took into account the impact of the policy on China, the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.

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							INFSO (now CNECT), MARKT, JUST, MARE, MOVE, RTD, TAXUD, ESTAT + Legal Service, SG and EEAS			social and environmental standards in the negotiations and their role for EU-China investment relations should be strengthened" and that the IA report should "provide more complete references to published studies that support the arguments presented (e.g. regarding social standards and human rights) or present diverging views".	
362	2013	EU-Myanmar Investment Agreement: Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations on an agreement between the European Union and Myanmar/Burma on investment protection	Yes	Yes	N.a.	TRADE	AGRI, BUDG, CLIMA, COMP, DEVCO , ECFIN, EDUC, EMPL, ENER, ENTR, ENV, SANCO, HOME, INFSO (now CNECT), MARKT, JUST, MARE, MOVE, RTD, TAXUD, ESTAT + SJ, SG and EEAS	Yes. The economic, environmental, social and human rights impacts of the policy on Myanmar/Burma are assessed in the IA report. The IA report also discussed the impacts on other developing countries' investment in Myanmar/Burma (section 6.1.3.1, § Impact on third countries), noting that "possible trade and investment diversion effects are likely to be limited to export-oriented production sectors – such as textiles and garments – where new EU investors could become competitors to developing countries' investors" but also that "these potential trade diversion effects would anyway take place as a result of the Everything But Arms (EBA) benefits reinstatement to Myanmar/Burma which will attract EU investors, interested to manufacture in Myanmar/ Burma to then re-export duty-free quota-free to the EU". The IA report concludes that "due to the huge investment needs in the country in all sectors of activity, risks of crowding out appear very limited".	Yes	Yes. The IA Board commented inter alia that the IA report "should present in greater detail under the baseline scenario the outlook for (...) compliance with labour standards in Myanmar/Burma" and that "the risk of any (unintended) significant impacts on other developing countries [such as spill-over or demand-substitution effects] should be assessed."	No. Based on the analysis of the IA, which clearly took into account the impact of the policy on Myanmar/Burma, the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.
365	2014	A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 up to 2030 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions	Yes	No	N.a.	SG	AGRI, BUDG, COMM, CLIMA, CNECT, COMP, ECFIN, EAC, EMPL, ELARG, ENTR, ENV, DEVCO , SANCO, HOME, ECHO, MARKT, JRC, JUST, MARE, MOVE, REGIO, RTD,	No. The only reference to impacts on developing countries is in the summary of replies to the public consultation on the Green Paper (section 7.5), which mentions that "According to NGOs, international credits led to dubious environmental impacts in developing countries", without providing any additional detail. Considering that the IA report is only "quoting" NGOs in this instance and that this point is not discussed at all in the report (e.g. in the section on the analysis of impacts which includes a subsection on the "Use of international credits"), it is not sufficient to consider that the IA report explicitly mentions impacts on developing countries. In general, the IA report is focused on the impacts on EU Member States and does not consider	Yes	No. The IA Board did not make any specific comments related to development issues.	Yes. Based on the analysis of the IA, which did not consider at all the impact on developing countries (although section 2.5 "Who is affected" acknowledges that there is a third country dimension, and some stakeholders mentioned possible impacts on developing countries), this policy appears to be a missed opportunity.

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							TAXUD, TRADE, BEPA, SJ and EEAS	impacts on third countries, although section 2.5 "Who is affected" acknowledges that there is a third country dimension.			
371	2014	Regulation on organic production and labelling of organic products, amending Regulation (EU) No XXX/XXX of the European Parliament and of the Council [Official controls Regulation] and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007	No	Yes	N.a.	AGRI	SANCO, ENTR, ENV, DEVCO, ESTAT, TAXUD, RTD, JRC, MARE, TRADE, CLIMA + SG, Legal Service	Yes. For each proposed policy option, the impact analysis includes a sub-section on "international impacts" which for several options - namely Options 2.A, 3 and 3.B - explicitly addresses impacts on developing countries. The discussion on the impacts of Option 3 on developing countries is in particular detailed, and refers to a specific Annex (Annex 12), which includes a more in-depth analysis of the possible impacts of the implementation of the compliant regime for developing countries.	Yes	No. The IA Board did not make any specific comments related to development issues. It can be noted however that the IA Board commented that the IA report "should make greater effort to indicate which (...) third countries are likely to be most affected (such as (...) disadvantaged areas, or least developed countries)".	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries, the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.
420	2015	Digital Single Market (DSM) Package ¹⁰²	Yes	Yes	N.a.	CNECT	7 different IAs were carried out and the composition of the Inter-Service Steering Group varied for each IA. DEVCO was not involved in any of the ISGs.	No. None of the 7 IA reports mention possible impacts of the policy on developing countries or development objectives. Developing countries are not mentioned at all. Most of the IA reports state that none of the proposed policy options would have any impact on third countries. In cases where the IA report acknowledges that the proposed policy might affect third countries / third country traders (e.g. the Regulation on addressing geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on place of residence or establishment or nationality within the Single Market), the report only states that impacts are likely to be small and does not address these possible impacts in further detail. Some of the IA reports include specific sections on "Coherence with other [EU] policies", but the EU's development policy is not considered in this context.	No	No. None of the opinions issued by the RSB as part of the 7 IAs included comments on development issues.	Yes. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which did not consider at all the possible impacts on developing countries or possible synergies with EU's development policy (in spite of the fact that: the DSM strategy was included in the priority list of the 2015 PCD CWP screening; some of the proposed policies do appear to have possible impacts on third countries; and the Communication on the DSM Strategy (COM(2015) 192 final) stated that a completed DSM can "contribute to delivering the post-2015 development agenda"), this policy could possibly be a missed opportunity.
421	2015	Regulation setting up a Union system for supply chain due diligence self-certification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating in	Yes	Yes	N.a.	TRADE	SG, SJ, DEVCO, EMPL, ENTR, ENV, EEAS, Eurostat, DIGIT, MARKT,	Yes, but limited. The IA does not include a specific section on the likely impacts of the policy in developing countries nor explicitly refers to impacts on developing countries, but does mention in Section 5 "Analysis of impact (including on SMEs" some potential impacts of selected options on conflict-affected regions/countries (which in practice, as clarified	Yes	Yes. The first IA Board opinion required a more detailed analysis on various aspects, notably the situation and impacts on the countries: the IA Board commented inter alia that the report "should provide a more focused and a clearer	No. Given that the IA considered – at least to some extent – the potential impacts of the policy on developing countries, the policy does not appear to be a "missed opportunity".

¹⁰² Regulation on ensuring the cross-border portability of online content services in the internal market; Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market; Regulation laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of television and radio programmes; Directive establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (Recast); Regulation establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications; - Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 as regards rules for wholesale roaming markets; Regulation on addressing geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers' nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the internal market and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC; Regulation on the use of the 470-790 MHz frequency band in the Union; Regulation concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications).

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		conflict-affected and high-risk areas					TAXUD, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments	in other sections of the IA report, largely consist of developing countries). However, the analysis of the specific impacts in the DRC or in the Great Lakes region is almost inexistent, and the details of the analysis are not fully explained in the IA. The IA details expected general impacts for each possible option, but this remains quite vague and insufficiently grounded.		presentation of the main problems to be addressed, in particular the extent to which EU companies are implicated in the financing of armed groups (...) and "should more fully assess the impacts on business/ SMEs, and on the conflict regions, for example, the risk that legitimate mining and export of minerals may be unintentionally affected". The second Board opinion repeated similar recommendations, noting that "the report should better assess the impact that these measures may have on the relevant conflict regions, including on local communities".	However, the policy appears to have been only marginally influenced by PCD. The initial regulation was taking more into account the lessons learnt from the Dodd Frank Act implementation, but got changed into a mandatory approach tackling largest companies to implement the OECD guidance, instead of a support to DRC export. The level of the regulation, tackling downstream level in Europe, is also quite far from the actual issues that the policy tries to solve.
422	2016	Regulation on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 for a resilient Energy Union and to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement and amending Regulation No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council on a mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and other information relevant to climate change	Yes	Yes	Yes	CLIMA	SG, Legal Service (SJ), AGRI, COMP, ECFIN, ENER, ENV, GROW, JRC, MOVE, REGIO, RTD, TAXUD, TRADE	No. The IA report does not include a section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries or third countries in general. Developing countries are not mentioned at all in the report. The report only analyses the impacts of the policy on the EU and EUMS.	No	No. The IA Board did not make any specific comments related to development issues.	Yes. Based on the analysis of the IA, which did not consider at all the impact on developing countries (even if it is not clear what impact the policy could have on developing countries – or third countries in general – because it is essentially an internal policy, the issue could at least be addressed), this policy could possibly be a missed opportunity.
423	2016	Regulation on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry into the 2030 climate and energy framework and amending Regulation No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council on a	Yes	Yes	N.a.	CLIMA	SG, SJ, AGRI, JRC, COMP, ECFIN, ENER, ENV, GROW, MOVE, REGIO, RTD, TAXUD, TRADE	No. The IA report does not include a section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries or third countries in general. Developing countries are not mentioned at all in the report. The report only analyses the impacts of the policy on the EU and EUMS.	No	No. The IA Board did not make any specific comments related to development issues.	Yes. Based on the analysis of the IA, which did not consider at all the impact on developing countries (even if it is not clear what impact the policy could have on developing countries – or third countries in general – because it is essentially an internal policy, the issue could at least be addressed),

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		mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and other information relevant to climate change									this policy could possibly be a missed opportunity.
425	2016	Renewable Energy Package: new Renewable Energy Directive and bioenergy sustainability policy for 2030 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast)	Yes	Yes	Yes	ENER	SG, SJ, BUDG, AGRI, CLIMA, CNECT, COMP, ECFIN, EMPL, ENV, FISMA, GROW, JRC, JUST, MOVE, REGIO, RTD, TAXUD	Yes, but limited. The IA report includes only one explicit reference to developing countries in Section 7 "Comparing the options", which states the following regarding the Baseline scenario (Option 1): "Other environmental impacts related to biodiversity, and soil and water quality can be partly addressed through policies promoting sustainable forest management in the EU and beyond. These include EU policy on biodiversity (and particularly the Birds and Habitats Directives), as well as Member States' policies on sustainable forest management. EU action towards developing countries, including the FLEGT action plan, has a potential to encourage sustainable forest management in developing countries." In addition, the detailed assessment of impacts (section 5.3.1.2) includes a specific sub-section on "Impacts in third countries", which notes that "impact of third countries depends on how the policy options would [influence] biofuels/ feedstock international trade flows" and states the following: "Under option 2B (full phase out), these imports of crop-based biofuels are expected to be discontinued, with resulting negative impacts in the short term on trading partners in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil) and Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia). On the other hand, a more gradual reduction of crop-based biofuels would allow the agricultural producers in third countries to adjust to the new market reality." Other possible impacts of the policy on third countries are mentioned in various other sections of the report, without explicitly referring to developing countries.	No	No. The IA Board did not make any specific comments related to development issues.	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which to some extent took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries (although the analysis is very limited), the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.
429	2016	Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches	Yes	N.a.	N.a.	FISMA	ECFIN, TAXUD, SG, SJ, COMP, JUST, TRADE, GROW, DG Digital Economy	Yes. Section 2.4 of the IA report explicitly mentions developing countries among "affected stakeholders", stating the following: "Third countries (except tax havens) are affected in a similar way to Member States. According to the IMF, tax base spill-overs are particularly marked when it comes to developing countries". The IA report includes a specific section on "impacts on third countries" (section 5.5) which mentions that "a transparency initiative in the EU	No	No. The IA Board did not make any specific comments related to development issues. (The IA Board did comment that "the report should better frame the tax transparency issue into the wider international context", but specified that "it should elaborate on the views of third	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries, the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.

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							and Society, JRC	addressing the operations of MNEs is bound to have ramifications beyond the EU" and goes on to discuss the specific case of developing countries. In this context, the report notes that "developing countries tend to derive a greater proportion of their revenue from corporate tax than developed countries (in extreme cases, up to 90%)"and therefore "the sums lost from corporate tax avoidance are proportionately larger for developing countries (relative to their overall revenues) than in developed countries", and also that "developing countries are generally reported as being less effective than developed countries in recovering their fair share of taxes" and "weak administrative capacities to manage complex tax regimes and to deal with profit-shifting by MNEs can lead to huge revenue losses". The IA report draws several conclusions on the impact of the policy on developing countries including, inter alia, that "for developing countries, access to further information on corporate income tax by MNEs operating on their territory could assist tax authorities in these countries address their tax gap" and argues that "public disclosure of country-by-country reporting could reinforce the EU's commitment to assisting developing countries raise additional tax revenues for development purposes – an aim outlined in the UN Financing for Development Conference in July 2015".		countries, <u>in particular non-developing countries</u> ".)	
437	2016	Review of Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment ("EU Blue Card" Directive)	Yes	Yes	Yes	HOME	DEVCO , EAC, EEAS, EPSC, JUST, NEAR, RTD, CNECT, GROW, ECFIN, EMPL, EPSC, SG, SJ, JRC, RTD, SANTE and TRADE	Yes . The IA report of the policy proposal for the new EU Blue Card Directive includes references to the social and economic impacts of the policy in developing countries. The Annexes of the IA develop the topics of brain drain regarding health care workers, ethical recruitment from developing countries, as well as develops the topic on circular migration (annex 8); remittances (annex 14); and asylum seekers (annex 16). For each of the proposed legislative policy options, the IA report includes: a sub-section on "Impacts on third countries", which briefly mentions impacts on developing countries (e.g. for the legislative option on which the preferred option is based: "Facilitated access to long-term residence status combined with circular mobility rights would bring benefits for developing countries from 'brain gain' and increased remittance payments"), as well as sub-section on "Impacts on third country national HSW".	Yes	No . There is no explicit mention in the RSB opinions to development issues relative to developing countries regarding migration or highly skilled professionals such as brain drain.	No . Based on the analysis of the IAs, which took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries, the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.

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								Both categories of impacts are taken into account in the comparison of the policy options packages (section 7).			
440	2016	Regulation laying down rules on the making available on the market of CE marked fertilising products and amending Regulations (EC) No 1069/2009 and (EC) No 1107/2009	Yes	N.a.	N.a.	GROW	ENV, SANTE, AGRI, TRADE, SG and Legal Service	<p>Yes, but limited. Two IAs were undertaken: one overall IA ("main IA report") and one separate IA on the specific case of cadmium in phosphate fertilisers ("separate IA report").</p> <p>The main IA report does not include a section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries or third countries in general. The only explicit references to developing countries are found in Annex I, which discusses i.a. the "increasing demand for inorganic fertilisers to feed the world" and notes that "consumption of inorganic fertilisers has moved from industrial countries to developing countries" and that the FAO has "recently predicted an increase of 69% in fertiliser demand in developing countries to meet the expected 60% increase in food production by 2050". Annex I also notes developing countries' investment in (inorganic) nitrogen fertiliser production, which is driven by a "strong desire to optimise the use of local resources and to reduce their reliance on imports". However, there are no mentions of the actual impacts of the policy on developing countries.</p> <p>While the separate IA report does not include a section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries (or third countries in general) either, it does include a relevant discussion on the impacts of one policy option (Option 4) on specific developing countries. For example, the report states that "in the absence of decadmiation at industrial scale and at reasonable costs, the consequences of a reduction of the EU limit will be very negative for a broad range of phosphates producing countries in Northern Africa, who effectively will not be able to export to the EU anymore" and notes the following: "countries such as Morocco and Tunisia are covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (...) without proven feasibility of decadmiation, both could see their exports of phosphates to the EU being severely limited, which are today significant sources of revenues. This would be contrary to the ENP objectives". The report also notes that "implementation of stringent limits for cadmium in phosphate fertilisers would constitute a clear signal from the EU to phosphates producing countries to invest in decadmiation technologies" but that "third</p>	No	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	No. Based on the analysis of the IAs, which to some extent took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries (although the analysis is limited), the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.

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								countries mining phosphates with high cadmium content would face some structural disadvantage due to the costs associated with decadmiation". Although the report is focused on the impact on the EU and EUMS, one can consider that the impacts on developing countries have therefore been taken into account at least to some extent.			
445	2016	Decision on the participation of the Union in the Partnership for Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean Area (PRIMA) jointly undertaken by several Member States	Yes	N.a.	N.a.	RTD	AGRI, BUDG, CLIMA, CNECT, DEVCO, EEAS, ECHO, ENV, GROW, HOME, JRC, MARE, NEAR, REGIO, RTD, SANTE, SG and SJ	Yes. According to the PRIMA Proposal and its Addendum, the PRIMA Joint Programme involves 11 EUMS as well as 8 third countries from the Mediterranean area. In this context, the likely economic, environmental and social impacts of the policy on these third countries - many of which developing countries - are discussed and analysed throughout the report. The IA report notes that "international cooperation in R&I is a key aspect of the EU's global commitments and has an important role to play in the EU partnership with developing countries, which are often disproportionately affected by global challenges". In addition, the IA report highlights the coherence of the policy with EU external development policy, stating that "the PRIMA Joint Programme also fits clearly into the EU's efforts to achieve the post-2015 Development Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and, more specifically, SDG #2 "End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture" and SDG #6 "Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all".	Yes	Yes. In its first opinion, the IA Board commented that the report should "explain how this initiative can be one important element, among others, contributing to addressing major societal issues, and clarify how and to what extent resolving the problem(s) tackled by this initiative contributes to addressing broader challenges such as food and water security or economic development in the Mediterranean region".	No. Based on the analysis of the IA, which took into account the impact of the policy on developing countries (namely those involved in the PRIMA Joint Programme), the policy does not appear to be a missed opportunity.
446	2016	Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)	Yes	N.a.	N.a.	TAXUD	CNECT, COMP, ECFIN, ENV, FISMA, GROW, JUST, RTD, TRADE, JRC, SG and SJ	No. The IA report does not include a section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries or third countries in general. Developing countries are not mentioned at all in the report. Although it is implied in the IA report that the policy would impact third countries / third-country companies with branches located in the EU, the impacts on third countries are not discussed in the report.	No	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	Yes. Based on the analysis of the IA, which did not consider at all the impact on developing countries (even if it is not clear whether the policy could have an impact on developing countries, it could still be addressed, given that it is acknowledged that the policy would impact on third countries or at least their companies), this policy could possibly be a missed opportunity.

No. ⁹⁵	Year	Policy initiative	PCD Screening ⁹⁶	Biennial Reports ⁹⁷	PCD WP ⁹⁸	Lead DG	Other DGs/ EC services involved ⁹⁹	I 5.1.1 Explicit reference in IAs of policies' likely impacts in developing countries	I 5.1.2 DEVCO in ISG ¹⁰⁰	I 5.1.3 RSB/ IA Board comments on development issues	(Potential) missed opportunities ¹⁰¹
448	2016	Regulation setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering, technical assistance and transit of dual-use items (recast)	Yes	N.a.	N.a.	TRADE	ENER, TAXUD, JRC, GROW, SANTE, HOME, RTD, CNECT, DEVCO , COMP, DIGIT, EMPL, ESTAT, Legal Service, SG, EEAS	<p>Yes, but not explicit enough. The IA report does not include a section addressing the impact of the policy on developing countries (or third countries in general) and developing countries are not mentioned at all in the report.</p> <p>However, the IA report discusses several potential impacts of the policy on third countries, which would be particularly relevant for developing countries. Section 1.4, which lists affected stakeholders, indeed notes that "third countries may also have an interest in the initiative, as it will affect bilateral trade and/or security (for ex. the export of dual-use items for military applications in one country may cause concerns in another country)", that "exports of dual-use items may also affect fundamental rights, in particular those of people in third countries, such as the right to life and the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, the right to security, to health and to academic freedom" and that "cyber-surveillance technology creates new risks to specific human rights , and civil society in third countries – and in particular human rights activists and dissidents - may also benefit from enhanced controls".</p> <p>In the comparison of policy options (chapter 6), the IA report notes that option 4 (which combined with option 3 is the "preferred option" according to the report) "would have a significant positive impact on (...) human rights: it appears as an indispensable condition to prevent human rights violations resulting from the export of EU items in third countries".</p> <p>Finally, Annex 3 ("Who is affected by the policy and how?") details several impacts of specific actions of recommended options 3 and 4 on third countries.</p>	Yes	No. The IA Board did not make any comment related to development issues.	No. Based on the analysis of the IA, which took into account and discussed several impacts on third countries that would be particularly relevant in the case of developing countries (although the IA report never explicitly refers to developing countries), the policy does not appear to qualify exactly as a "missed opportunity". It seems however that the policy would have benefitted from being more influenced by the PCD approach so that impacts on developing countries are more clearly identified.

ANNEX 6: MAIN EU POLICIES ON PCD

Table 1: Evolving Union/Community policies with respect to PCD

Policy	Reference	Assessment
Overarching policy documents TEU, TFEU, PCD specific Communications, Development Consensus		
Treaty of Maastricht Article 130v Treaty of Maastricht on European Union (signed on 7 February 1992, entered into force on 1 November 1993)	Article 130v The Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 130u in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.	The coherence obligation for all EU policies (Community policies at that time) so they take account of development objectives was first introduced in 1992.
TEU article 21 (3) Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Treaty of Lisbon, (signed on 13 December 2007, entered into force on 1 December 2009, 2016/C 202/1)	Article 21 3. The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union's external action covered by this Title and by Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and of the external aspects of its other policies. The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.	This is the general and legally binding obligation on coherence of the areas of the EU's external action (including development cooperation), and between EU external policies with other EU internal policies.
TFEU article 208 (1) Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Treaty of Lisbon, (signed on 13 December 2007, entered into force on 1 December 2009, 2016/C 202/1)	Article 208 1. Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. The Union's development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement and reinforce each other. Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. 2. The Union and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent international organisations.	The EU legal and binding obligation of policy coherence for development (PCD) was reinforced in the Treaty of Lisbon. It has kept the same wording than the original 1992 text with the three main elements: All policies that the EU implements, likely to affect developing countries, shall take account of development cooperation objectives.
COM(2004)150 final Translating the Monterrey Consensus into practice: the contribution by the European Union (05.03.2004)	“The importance of coordination of aid policies for better policy coherence, and for the emerging European identity in the External Action of the Union, has also often been emphasized. The coordination process should be pragmatic, should take place in the partner country as far as possible and should focus on systematic information sharing in order to identify opportunities for complementarity between Community and bilateral aid” ¹⁰³ “Without coordination of development cooperation policy and programmes within the Union that support and interplay with other external actions, a crucial opportunity for policy coherence towards developing countries, and for strengthening the external identity of the Union in the world, is lost”. ¹⁰⁴ “The EU should take initiatives to jointly develop key inputs for the multi-annual programming process, such as analysis of the political situation,	Following the Monterrey Consensus, the EU acknowledged the importance of the coordination and coherence of its development policy to reinforce its external action identity. While focusing on the complementarity of the EU and the Member States as donors to further the MDGs commitments. It also recognized the role of

¹⁰³ COM(2004)150 final, p.9.

¹⁰⁴ COM(2004)150 final, p.12.

Policy	Reference	Assessment
	<p>macroeconomic and social context, the partner country's policy agenda, the coherence of all EU policies affecting the partner country, the donor matrix and performance indicators. These elements should, once adopted, be used as key inputs for the respective bilateral programming processes for the Member States and for Community aid. The process should take place in the field, be undertaken under the leadership of the partner country wherever possible and be open for participation by other donors that share the EU's policy perspective."¹⁰⁵</p>	<p>"the coherence of all EU policies affecting the partner country" as part of its development efforts.</p>
<p>COM(2004) 383 final The Social Dimension of Globalization - the EU's policy contribution on extending the benefits to all 18.5.2004</p>	<p>"As a precondition to achieve these objectives EU policy coherence shall be strengthened. Continued attention will be given to the need to ensure that domestic and external EU policies are conducive to the agreed international commitments and do not undermine the objectives of EC development cooperation. The implications of other EU policies (e.g. trade, agricultural and fisheries policy, migration policy, policies on environment, food safety regulations, research, information and communication technologies; EU security strategy, fight against drugs, money laundering, human trafficking, international terrorism) on developing countries will be continuously assessed."¹⁰⁶</p> <p>"The EU should also aim to speak more consistently with one voice in the whole range of UN fora and other international organizations dealing with social and economic issues in order to ensure policy coherence".¹⁰⁷</p> <p>"The leverage of the EU to promote a model of development which fully integrates the social dimension would be considerably increased by a unified presence in the institutions of multilateral economic governance. This means speaking with one voice, pursuing a common position through qualified majority voting and voting as a group".¹⁰⁸</p>	<p>The EU further reaffirmed its commitment to focus its international development assistance on helping developing countries to achieve the MDGs based on EU's policy coherence and committed to assess the implications of other EU policies (domestic and external) on developing countries.</p>
<p>COM(2005) 134 final Policy Coherence for Development: Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals (12.04.2005)</p>	<p>The Commission acknowledged that better development cooperation, more finance and improved aid delivery was not in itself sufficient to enable developing countries reaching the MDGs by 2015.</p> <p>The Commission re-stated that the effective improvement in the coherence of developed countries' policies could contribute to achieve the MDGs. Therefore, it proposed that as a way to improve such progress, the EU could consider the challenge of how non-aid policies can assist developing countries in attaining the MDGs:</p> <p>"Within the broad context of EU policy making coherence is a multidimensional commitment which needs to take place within the overall framework of the EU sustainable development strategy. Non-development policies should respect development policy objectives and development cooperation should, where possible, also contribute to reaching the objectives of other EU policies. In general – and including in the context of the forthcoming development policy review - this broad definition applies. However, within the specific framework of this Communication a more targeted approach is adopted. When exploring ways to accelerate progress towards achieving MDGs the EU is committed to look beyond the frontiers of development cooperation, and consider the challenge of how non-aid policies can assist developing countries in attaining the MDGs.</p> <p>The impact of EU non-aid policies on developing countries should not be underestimated, and neither should their potential to make a positive contribution to the development process in these countries..."¹⁰⁹</p> <p>The Commission identified priority areas for which attaining synergies with development policy objectives were considered relevant and had a direct relationship with one or more MDGs, and invited the Council, the</p>	<p>The EU's targeted approach to PCD reflected the need to respond to the EU's international commitment and engagement in the achievement of the MDGs, and in face of the recognition that development cooperation per se was not sufficient to reach such commitment.</p> <p>Following the EU's full commitment expressed in 2004 to the achievement of the MDGs, the Commission decided that to accelerate the progress it needed to build on a PCD approach. The impact of EU non-aid policies was regarded as a potential positive contribution, and by identifying specific areas EU</p>

¹⁰⁵ COM(2004)150 final, p.15.

¹⁰⁶ COM(2004) 383 final, p.14.

¹⁰⁷ COM(2004) 383 final, p.20.

¹⁰⁸ COM(2004) 383 final, p.21.

¹⁰⁹ COM(2005) 134 final, p.3-4.

Policy	Reference	Assessment
	<p>EP and the EESC to accept the commitments as a joint engagement of the EU and its Member States to effectively deliver in those areas for the timeframe 2005-2015.¹¹⁰</p> <p>The EU Commitments on Policy Coherence for Development were later confirmed by the Council with respect to 12 policy areas (see Council Conclusions below).</p> <p>The Communication also highlighted the use of the Impact assessment tool in a more systematic way “with the aim to ensuring that policy coherence for development becomes the business not just of development policy makers but also of policy makers in non-development policy areas”. Finally, it proposed to monitor progress on the EU coherence commitments in the context of the MDGs through the elaboration of a mid-term EU Policy Coherence for Development report.¹¹¹</p>	<p>policies could be steered to create synergies with development policy objectives.</p> <p>The systematic use of the Impact assessment tool was envisioned for all policy-makers to ensure a PCD approach. Also important was the use of a mid-term report to monitor progress of the EU commitments on PCD.</p>
<p>Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council- On Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals: EU Contribution to the Review of the MDGs at the UN 2005 High Level Event-Annex I (doc. 9266/05, 24 May 2005)</p>	<p>In 2005 in the context of the MDGs the EU committed itself to assist developing countries in achieving them and building on the existing Treaty obligation for PCD. The EU (Community at the time) agreed to promote and enhance Policy Coherence for Development in the context of the Global Partnership for Development under MDG 8. The Council established specific commitments in 12 policy areas, inviting the Commission and the Member States to pursue its work on Policy Coherence for Development on the basis of these commitments.</p> <p><u>EU’s Commitments on Policy Coherence for Development</u>¹¹²</p> <p>i. Trade: The EU is strongly committed to ensuring a development-friendly and sustainable outcome of the Doha Development Agenda and EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The EU will further improve its Generalised System of Preferences, with a view to effectively enhancing developing countries’ exports to the EU. The EU will continue to work towards integrating trade into development strategies and will assist developing countries in carrying out domestic reforms where necessary.</p> <p>ii. Environment: The EU will lead global efforts to curb unsustainable consumption and production patterns. The EU will assist developing countries in implementing the Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), and will work to ensure that the capacities of developing countries are taken into account during MEA negotiations. The EU will continue to promote pro-poor environment-related initiatives and policies, and will strengthen the integration of environmental and climate change concerns into its own policies.</p> <p>iii. Climate Change: The EU recognizes that one of the greatest environmental and development challenges in the twenty-first century is that of mitigation and adapting to climate change, and that lasting progress in achieving the MDG’s will be enhanced by the success of the international community in implementing the Kyoto Protocol and reinvigorating the international negotiations to ensure a post 2012 arrangement in the context of the UN climate change process. In this context, the EU reconfirms its commitment to the Kyoto Protocol and its determination to develop a medium and long-term EU-strategy to combat climate change, consistent with meeting the 2 degree objective as outlined in the European Council’s conclusions of the 23rd of March 2005.</p> <p>iv. Security: The EU will treat security and development as complementary agendas, with the common aim of creating a secure environment and of breaking the vicious circle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and political structures. The EU will enhance its policies in support of good and effective governance and the prevention of state fragility and conflict,</p>	<p>The EU’s targeted approach to PCD as a joint engagement of the EU and the Member States ensured PCD’s relevance to the EU’s international commitment undertaken under the Global Partnership for Development in the context of the MDGs. The EU commitments on PCD responded to the policy priorities supported by the EU and identified as areas in which EU policies could contribute to achieve MDGs.</p>

¹¹⁰ COM(2005) 134 final, p.4.

¹¹¹ COM(2005) 134 final, p.19.

¹¹² Annex I - doc. 9266/05, 24 May 2005.

Policy	Reference	Assessment
	<p>including by strengthening its response to difficult partnerships/failing states. The EU will strengthen the control of its arms exports, inter alia, with the aim of avoiding that EU-manufactured weaponry be used against civilian populations or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in developing countries. The EU will promote cooperation in fighting corruption, organized crime and terrorism.</p> <p>v. Agriculture: The EU will continue its efforts to minimise the level of trade distortion related to its support measures to the agricultural sector, and to facilitate developing countries' agricultural development.</p> <p>vi. Fisheries: The EU will continue to pay particular attention to the development objectives of the countries with which the Community will engage into bilateral fisheries agreements. Within the context of the new EU policy on fisheries partnership agreements with third countries which is being implemented since 2003, the EU will continue to encourage the conclusion of fisheries agreements in order to contribute towards rational and sustainable exploitation of the surplus of coastal States' marine resources to the mutual benefit of both parties.</p> <p>vii. Social dimension of globalisation, employment and decent work: The EU will contribute to strengthening the Social Dimension of Globalisation with a view to ensure maximum benefits for all, both men and women. The EU will promote employment and decent work for all as a global goal.</p> <p>viii. Migration: The EU will promote the synergies between migration and development, to make migration a positive factor for development.</p> <p>ix. Research and innovation: The EU will promote the integration of development objectives, where appropriate, into its RTD and innovation policies, and will continue to assist developing countries in enhancing their domestic capacities in this area. The EU supports global, regional and national efforts in research for development to address the special needs of the poor in the areas of health, including prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, agriculture, natural resource and environmental management, energy, in particular renewable energy and energy efficiency, and climate.</p> <p>x. Information society: The EU will address the digital divide by exploiting the potential of Information and Communication Technologies as a development tool and as a significant resource for attaining the MDGs.</p> <p>xi. Transport: The EU will address the special needs of both land-locked and coastal developing countries by promoting the inter-modality issues for achieving network interconnectivity as well as security and safety issues.</p> <p>xii. Energy: The EU is strongly committed to contribute to the special needs of developing countries by promoting access to sustainable energy sources and by supporting establishing interconnection of energy infrastructures and networks.</p>	
<p>The European Consensus on Development, Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: 'The European Consensus' (2006/C 46/01)</p>	<p>The Consensus includes several provisions focusing on PCD and confirms the EU and its member states commitment to promote the PCD approach to support development objectives in the context of the MDGs.</p> <p>PART I: The EU Vision of Development Common objectives</p> <p>5. The primary and overarching objective of EU development cooperation is the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).</p> <p>7. We reaffirm our commitment to promoting policy coherence for development, based upon ensuring that the EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries, and that these policies support development objectives.</p> <p>9. We reaffirm our commitment to promoting policy coherence for development, based upon ensuring that the EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries, and that these policies support development objectives.</p>	<p>The 2006 European Consensus on Development re-affirmed the EU's commitment towards a PCD targeted approach so non- development policies could contribute to the achievement of MDGs. In addition to highlighting priority areas of action for PCD, it clarified that the commitment that EU policies likely to affect developing countries shall take account of development cooperation objectives, also included ensuring that these EU</p>

Policy	Reference	Assessment
	<p>Policy coherence for development (PCD) 35. The EU is fully committed to taking action to advance Policy Coherence for Development in a number of areas. It is important that non-development policies assist developing countries' efforts in achieving the MDGs. The EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. To make this commitment a reality, the EU will strengthen policy coherence for development procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels, and secure adequate resources and share best practice to further these aims. This constitutes a substantial additional EU contribution to the achievement of the MDGs.</p> <p>Furthermore, paragraphs 36 to 38 confirmed that the EU commitments on PCD were among others: a pro-poor completion of the Doha Development Round and EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), reduction of trade distorting measures supporting the agricultural sector, development objectives of the countries with which the Community has or will agree fisheries agreements, security and development, social dimension of globalisation, promoting employment and decent work for all, migration as a positive factor for development, curbing unsustainable consumption and production patterns, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and promotion of pro-poor environment-related initiatives, and climate change.</p> <p>PART II: The European Community Development Policy “This second part of the European Consensus on Development sets out the renewed European Community Development Policy, which implements the European vision on development... clarifies the Community's role and added value and how the objectives, principles, values, policy coherence for development and commitments defined in this common vision will be made operational at Community level (...). It shall be taken into account in other Community policies that affect developing countries, to ensure policy coherence for development.”</p> <p>44. The Community will also promote policy coherence for development, based upon ensuring that the Community shall take account of development cooperation objectives in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries...</p> <p>47. On behalf of the Community, the Commission will aim to provide added value through the following roles: (...)</p> <p>49. ... with the support of Member States, ensuring policy coherence for development in Community Actions, in particular where Community policies have significant impacts on developing countries, such as trade, agriculture, fisheries and migration policies, and promoting this principle more widely. Drawing on its own experiences, and exclusive competence in trade, the Community has a comparative advantage in providing support to partner countries to integrate trade into national development strategies and to support regional cooperation whenever possible.</p> <p>3.2 Areas for Community Action: Trade and regional integration; environment and the sustainable management of natural resources (including genuine sustainable forest management and adaptation to Climate Change); Infrastructure, Communications and transport (Including ICT to bridge the digital divide); Water and energy; Rural development, territorial planning, agriculture and food security; Governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms; Conflict prevention and fragile states; Human development; Social cohesion and employment (including promotion of ILO standards).</p>	<p>policies supported development objectives. Therefore, the Consensus reached by the EU and its member states confirmed a PCD approach from a focus on the “process” of coherence towards an “output” of coherence.</p> <p>Moreover, the Consensus makes explicit reference to PCD in several of its provisions and acknowledges that PCD contributes to the added value of EU (Community) action on development cooperation.</p> <p>Finally, the Consensus mentioned the mechanisms with which PCD would be promoted within the EU: a Working Programme, a reinforced impact assessment tool and consultations with developing countries during policy formulation and implementation. It also envisioned the creation of new tools necessary to support PCD.</p>

Policy	Reference	Assessment
	<p>3.5 Policy coherence for development (PCD)</p> <p>109. The Commission and Member States will prepare a rolling Work Programme on the implementation of the May 2005 Council conclusions on PCD. This Work Programme will propose priorities for action; define roles and responsibilities of Council, Member States and Commission and set out sequencing and timetables, with the aim of ensuring that non-aid policies can assist developing countries in achieving the MDGs. The Commission will reinforce its existing instruments, notably its impact assessment tool and consultations with developing countries during policy formulation and implementation, and considering new ones where necessary in support of a strengthened PCD.</p> <p>110. Notwithstanding making progress on other PCD commitments, urgent attention will be given to commitments and actions on migration (...).</p>	
<p>COM(2009) 458 final Policy Coherence for Development - Establishing the policy framework for a whole-of-the-Union approach (15.9.2009)</p>	<p>In the context of the financial crisis and globalization, and the recognition that ODA such be complemented by other means to improve the developing world, the Commission proposed a more strategic and systematic approach to PCD: a “whole-of-the-Union approach to PCD” in order to harness the development potential of EU policies.</p> <p>“it is now time for the EU to take a more strategic, systematic and partnership oriented approach to PCD. The EU should obviously continue to take account of development objectives in all the policies that might affect developing countries by making use of all the instruments that were established or strengthened to promote PCD. However, the political focus should be on a few key priorities”.¹¹³</p> <p>“the EU should work on PCD as part of the 'whole of the Union approach by establishing a policy framework to better harness other policies and non-ODA financial flows to development objectives (...) Three key lessons need to be learned from past experiences and to be taken into account in adjusting PCD to the changing political reality...focus on a few PCD priorities and to pro-actively take account of development objectives in formulating its selected initiatives... do more to mobilise non-ODA resources and to better harness the potential of these public and private financial flows for development... the EU should strengthen its dialogue with developing countries on PCD issues”.¹¹⁴</p> <p>To guide the selection of priority areas the Commission established that:</p> <p>“...in so far as PCD is about minimizing the negative impact of EU policy decisions and legislative initiatives on developing countries and about enhancing their tie-ins with development objectives. The priority issues should obviously be important to developing countries, and be relevant for the attainment of the MDGs. At the same time, these initiatives should offer sufficient concrete opportunities to make them more development friendly and contribute to a development prone policy or legislative framework. Finally, priority issues should be linked to a long-term-agenda. This is important because experience shows that enhancing the coherence of policies with development objectives needs a considerable investment of time and effort starting with the identification of possible impacts on developing countries, coordinating EU efforts and creating the necessary political momentum”.¹¹⁵</p> <p>The Communication also reaffirmed that to promote PCD the use of the existing instruments by the Member States and the Commission was necessary: including inter-service consultations, impact assessments and</p>	<p>In the context of the financial crisis and the recognition that ODA such be complemented by other means, but also given the context of globalization, the Commission proposed a whole-of-the-Union approach to PCD in order to harness EU policies to development objectives.</p> <p>The approach to PCD aimed to be targeted and strategic, with the political focus on a few key priorities, not only aiming at minimising the negative impact of EU policy on developing countries but also aiming at enhancing their links with development objectives. This approach called on strengthening the use of existing instruments to enhance PCD, such as inter-service consultations, impact assessments and inter-service groups that could generate sufficient knowledge and identify policy options. Also, the approach called for more participation of developing countries on PCD issues through consultation procedures.</p>

¹¹³ COM(2009) 458 final, p.7.

¹¹⁴ COM(2009) 458 final, p.7-8.

¹¹⁵ COM(2009) 458 final, p.8.

Policy	Reference	Assessment
	<p>inter-service groups, to generate the necessary knowledge and identify policy options.</p> <p>Another important aspect to be consider as strategic PCD approach was the consultation with developing countries: “Developing countries are becoming increasingly interested in broader EU policies, as evidenced by the recent request to hold formal consultations on PCD issues, as provided for in Article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement (...) The revised Commission guidelines for Impact Assessment underline the importance of ensuring that stakeholders in developing countries are informed about forthcoming initiatives which are of relevance for them and of involving them actively in the consultation process. (...) The EU will build on this interest and consult developing countries on PCD priority issues to assess what impacts EU policies might have on their capacity to achieve the MDGs”.¹¹⁶</p> <p>Five priority areas were confirmed later by the Council (see below).</p>	
<p>2009 Council Conclusions on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) - 2974th External Relations Council meeting (17 November 2009)</p>	<p>The Council agreed that a more focused, operational and results-oriented approach to PCD would effectively advance this commitment within the EU:</p> <p>“8. The Council welcomes the Commission suggestion to approach PCD in a more targeted, strategic and partnership-oriented way, including inter alia strengthening EU dialogue with partner countries on PCD issues (...)”¹¹⁷</p> <p>The Council agreed that establishing the policy framework for a whole-of-the-Union approach could contribute to further harnessing the synergies of relevant policies and instruments contributing to development objectives, and proposed the areas on which a EU PCD work programme for 2010-2013 could be established:</p> <p>9. The Council welcomes the initial selection of five priority issues where the EU will take account of development objectives in a more pro-active way as part of a more focused and evolving approach to PCD. It underlines that over the years priority issues may evolve.</p> <p>11. The Council agrees that the PCD work programme should outline the respective roles of the EU Institutions and the Member States, and should focus on the following five priority issues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. Trade and finance II. Addressing climate change III. Ensuring global food security IV. Making migration work for development V. Strengthening the links and synergies between security and development in the context of <p>The Council agreed that the PCD work programme should have as objectives to: outline how the EU would address the five priority issues, create a political momentum from all relevant policy areas with an impact on the five priority issues, establish a clear set of objectives, targets and gender disaggregated indicators to measure progress in the selected priority areas and facilitate engagement in and inclusion of PCD in dialogue with partner countries around the selected priority areas.</p>	<p>The EU’s PCD whole-of-the-Union approach was confirmed by the Council as a policy framework to include five priority areas and issues aimed at creating synergies of EU policies contributing to development objectives. It was envisioned to engage other policy areas and establish specific targets within a timeframe so progress could be measured.</p>
<p>COM 2010 (159) A twelve-point EU action plan in support of the Millennium Development Goals 21.4.2010</p>	<p>The action plan outlined medium-term actions that the EU would undertake to support to the achievement of MDGs by the 2015 target. It contained specific actions prioritizing MDGs, Aid Effectiveness, Financing for Development, Aid for Trade, and Policy Coherence for Development. The action plan confirmed the EU’s commitment to be “a driving force for global development by showing how its promises are kept. The EU has every interest to ensure that a strong political and</p>	<p>The EU’s PCD whole-of-the-Union approach was operationalized in 2010 as part of the EU action plan to support the achievement of the MDGs. PCD was</p>

¹¹⁶ COM (2009) 458 final, p.7,11.

¹¹⁷ 2974th External Relations Council meeting, 17 November 2009.

Policy	Reference	Assessment
<p>SWD SEC(2010)421 Policy Coherence for Development Work Programme 2010- 2013</p>	<p>financial focus on the MDGs is maintained in the policies of donors and partner countries alike. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty marks a new era in EU Development policy, with the EU and its Member States set to coordinate their policies more closely.”¹¹⁸</p> <p>The Policy Coherence for Development Work Programme 2010-2013 was established as one of the main elements of the action plan with the objective to be used as a tool proactively and at the early stages of EU decision-making to guide on the broad range of decisions that could affect developing countries beyond development assistance. It set targets and indicators of progress to implement the EU commitments on PCD across a whole range of policies impacting five global challenges: trade and finance, climate change, food security, migration, and security.¹¹⁹</p> <p>The Communication renewed the commitment of the EU to support MDGs “by making other policies beyond aid more supportive of development objectives” and recognized that since 2007 “the EU has put in place ex ante and ex post mechanisms to this end, including impact assessments which look into the external impact of policy proposals.”¹²⁰</p> <p>A separate SWD established the details of the PCD Work Programme:</p> <p>“... (PCD) work programme translates this political principle into an operational framework involving concrete steps to enhance the coherence of EU policies with development objectives (...) outlines how the EU will address, through relevant policies, processes and financial means, five global challenges in a development-friendly manner: trade and finance, climate change, global food security, migration and security. (...) does not provide a comprehensive list of all the initiatives that might be relevant for development but rather focuses on those initiatives and processes planned that stand out for their catalytic potential to promote PCD. (...) The Commission, for its part, will focus its PCD work on the initiatives identified in the work programme. Through inter-service consultations and impact assessments (including trade sustainability assessments) it will ensure that development objectives are taken into account and reconciled with other EU objectives.”¹²¹</p>	<p>considered as a main element to materialize the EU’s commitment regarding the MDGs. PCD’s implementation through concrete steps at the early stages of EU decision-making, specifically IA and ISC process, was regarded as essential to enhance the coherence of other EU policies and their own objectives with EU development objectives.</p>
<p>COM (2011) 637 final Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change (13.10.2011)</p>	<p>The Agenda for Change aimed at focusing and concentrating on new global challenges in the context of global shocks, political instability, and social unrest in North Africa and the Middle East. The EU committed to continue evaluating the impact of EU policies on development objectives, to strengthen its country-level dialogue on PCD, and to continue promoting PCD in global fora.</p> <p>“There will be no weakening of the EU’s overarching objective of poverty elimination in the context of sustainable development, as set out in the European Consensus on Development” (...) The EU is at the forefront of the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) agenda and will continue to evaluate the impact of its policies on development objectives.”¹²²</p> <p>The Agenda for Change also highlighted the importance of the security-development nexus to create a more coherent approach to peace, state-building and poverty reduction, and the underlying causes of conflict in developing countries. It also highlighted the importance of the migration-development nexus.¹²³</p>	<p>Once again, PCD was considered relevant to enable the support towards the efforts of developing countries in the reduction of poverty and in face of new global challenges. In the context of global shocks, and political and social conflict in some regions, the importance of the security-development nexus was highlighted as well as that of the migration-development nexus.</p>

¹¹⁸ COM 2010 (159), p.4

¹¹⁹ COM 2010 (159), p.8

¹²⁰ COM 2010 (159), p.8

¹²¹ SWD SEC(2010) 421, p.4

¹²² COM (2011) 637 final, p.5.

¹²³ COM (2011) 637 final, p.10.

Policy	Reference	Assessment
<p>COM(2013) 92 final A decent life for all: Ending poverty and giving the world a sustainable future (27.2.2013)</p>	<p>The Agenda also identified the need for differentiated partnerships establishing as priority countries those in Sub-Saharan Africa, EU Neighbourhood and Fragile States.¹²⁴</p> <p>In the context of the MDG target year of 2015 and a future framework post 2015, this policy establishes the basis for a discussion for an overarching framework after reaching the MDGs. The Communication acknowledges that poverty eradication and sustainable development represent a major and interlinked global challenge, and that a review of MDGs and the work on elaborating SDGs would need to be brought together in one overarching framework.¹²⁵</p> <p>The policy considered that such framework should draw from the experience of the MDGs and the work stemming from Rio+20 conference on Sustainable Development, and respond to a context of major shifts in the global economic and political balance, increased global trade, ecosystem degradation, climate change and depletion of natural resources, technological change, economic and financial crises, increased consumption and price volatility of food and energy consumption, population changes and migration, violence and armed conflict and natural and man-made disasters, and increased inequalities.¹²⁶</p> <p>As part of the elements to implement a post 2015 framework, the policy states as essential country ownership and accountability, but recognises that some countries will continue to need support and that: “...beyond aid, Policy Coherence for Development plays a major role in eliminating poverty and achieving sustainable development. Strong consideration of the role of these policies should therefore be given due place in the future framework (...) To be achievable, the overarching framework should be accompanied by an effort to ensure that all resources are mobilised and harnessed effectively, alongside a commitment by all countries to pursue a comprehensive approach to these resources and coherent and appropriate policies.”¹²⁷</p>	<p>As part of the elements for an overarching framework to follow after the achievement of the MDGs, the EU considered that PCD should be given due place to implement the framework, as it played a major role in poverty reduction and achieving sustainable development.</p>
<p>Council Conclusions on A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015 (26 May 2015, doc. 9241/15)</p> <p>COM(2015) 44 final A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015 (5.2.2015)</p>	<p>In these conclusions, the Council further developed the EU’s position on a post 2015 agenda on sustainable development, called for a shared responsibility to address global challenges through an integrated approach taking into consideration the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development and poverty eradication in a balanced manner.</p> <p>The Council called for policy coherence at all levels and reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to PCD: “The EU and its Member States are committed to Policy Coherence for Development as a key contribution to the collective effort towards achieving broader policy coherence for sustainable development.” And recognised that all developed, upper-middle-income countries and emerging economies have a responsibility to assess “the impact that their policies have in poorer countries”.</p> <p>The Communication on which the Council Conclusions are based, set out the European Commission's views on the overarching principles and main components for the post-2015 development agenda. As examples on which the EU could draw for experience on implementing policies that reflect key principles of the agenda it mentions Europe 2020 Strategy, Policy Coherence for Development, and the 7th Environment Action Programme.¹²⁸ It also established that the success of such an agenda required “policy</p>	<p>The EU reaffirmed that PCD should be a means of implementation of a post-2015 development agenda, involving policy coherence at all levels requiring that countries at all levels of development assessed the impact their policies have in poorer countries.</p> <p>The Communication established that the EU’s approach to PCD meant both addressing possible negative impacts of domestic policies on third countries and fostering synergies across economic, social and environmental policy areas.</p>

¹²⁴ COM (2011) 637 final, p.9.

¹²⁵ COM(2013) 92, p.7.

¹²⁶ COM(2013) 92, p.3.

¹²⁷ COM(2013) 92, p.14.

¹²⁸ COM(2015) 44 final, p.4.

Policy	Reference	Assessment
	<p>coherence at all levels to ensure that government policies support poverty reduction and sustainable development”.¹²⁹</p> <p>In the Communication PCD is considered as a means of implementation of the framework, given the increasingly interlinked world. It specifically referred to the need for all countries to “systematically to take into account the impact, both positive and negative, that their policies can have on other countries. To this end, all developed, upper-middle income countries and emerging economies should commit to set up systems to assess the impact of adopting new policies on poorer countries.” And further stated that the EU’s PCD legal commitment meant “both addressing possible negative impacts of domestic policies on third countries and fostering synergies across economic, social and environmental policy areas.”¹³⁰</p>	
<p>The New European Consensus on Development: Our World, our Dignity, our Future, as adopted by the Council at its 3540th meeting held on 19 May 2017 (doc9459/17)</p> <p>2016 COM (2016) 740 final Proposal for a new European Consensus on Development: Our World, our Dignity, our Future (22.11.2016)</p>	<p>The new European consensus for development has been adopted in 2017 as the EU’s response to the UN 2030 agenda for sustainable development. The EU and its Member States have agreed on the main principles that will guide the common approach to cooperation with developing countries for the next 15 years and on the strategy for reaching the SDGs.</p> <p>1. THE EU’S RESPONSE TO THE 2030 AGENDA</p> <p>6. The purpose of this Consensus is to provide the framework for a common approach to development policy that will be applied by the EU institutions and the Member States while fully respecting each other’s distinct roles and competences. It will guide the action of EU institutions and Member States in their cooperation with all developing countries. Actions by the EU and its Member States will be mutually reinforcing and coordinated to ensure complementarity and impact.</p> <p>7. The EU and its Member States must respond to current global challenges and opportunities in the light of the 2030 Agenda. They will implement the 2030 Agenda across all internal and external policies in a comprehensive and strategic approach, integrating in a balanced and coherent manner the three dimensions of sustainable development, and addressing the inter-linkages between the different SDGs as well as the broader impacts of their domestic actions at international and global level. Implementation will be closely coordinated with that of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and other international commitments, including the New Urban Agenda.</p> <p>9. The EU Global Strategy sets out a vision for the EU’s engagement in the world, through a range of policies. It highlights the important role of the 2030 Agenda, which has the potential to trigger the necessary transformation in support of EU values and the objectives of EU external action. The SDGs will be a cross-cutting dimension of all the work to implement the EU Global Strategy. This Consensus will contribute to the achievements of the priorities of EU external action, including through support to resilience at all levels. In doing so, the EU and its Member States will foster a dynamic and multidimensional approach to resilience, to deal with vulnerability to multiple inter-related risks.</p> <p>10. This Consensus is the cornerstone of the EU’s development policy, which is part of the overall EU response to the 2030 agenda. The primary objective of EU development policy, as laid down in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, is the reduction and, in the long-term, the eradication of poverty. The EU and its Member States will apply the principle of policy coherence for development (PCD), and will take into account the objectives of development cooperation in all external and internal policies that they implement and that are likely to affect developing countries. PCD is a fundamental part of the EU’s</p>	<p>The new Consensus reflects a paradigm shift in development cooperation following the adoption of the 2030 Agenda on SDG. It acknowledges the global challenges as complex and interconnected, and the universality of the SDGs. The EU affirms with the new consensus its commitment to lead the implementation of the SDGs, based on common objectives, self-reliance, mutual interest and shared responsibility across countries at all stages of development.</p> <p>The new Consensus reaffirms the EU’s commitment to PCD and states its fundamental role as part of the EU’s contribution to achieving the SDGs and to the broader objective of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD).</p> <p>The Consensus states that the EU and its Member States will apply the principle of PCD taking into account the objectives of development cooperation in all external and internal policies likely to affect developing countries. Efforts on PCD will be applied across all policies and all</p>

¹²⁹ COM(2015) 44 final, p.3.

¹³⁰ COM(2015) 44, p.6.

Policy	Reference	Assessment
	<p>contribution to achieving the SDGs.</p> <p>4. STRENGTHENING APPROACHES TO IMPROVE EU IMPACT</p> <p>4.2. Policy Coherence for Development to achieve the SDGs</p> <p>108. Sustainable development is at the heart of the EU project and firmly anchored in the Treaties, including for its external action. The EU and its Member States are committed to ensuring development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Ensuring policy coherence for sustainable development as embedded in the 2030 Agenda requires taking into account the impact of all policies on sustainable development at all levels –nationally, within the EU, in other countries and at global level.</p> <p>109. The EU and its Member States reaffirm their commitment to Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which requires taking into account the objectives of development cooperation in policies, which are likely to affect developing countries. This is a crucial element of the strategy to achieve the SDGs and an important contribution to the broader objective of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD). The 2030 Agenda provides a new impetus for the EU and its Member States for formulating and implementing mutually reinforcing policies.</p> <p>110. The Consensus will guide efforts in applying PCD across all policies and all areas covered by the 2030 Agenda, seeking synergies, including notably on trade, finance, environment and climate change, food security, migration and security. Particular attention will be given to combatting illicit financial flows and tax avoidance, and to promoting trade and responsible investment.</p> <p>111. Delivering on the new universal framework for sustainable development in the field of development cooperation is a shared responsibility of all stakeholders. Sustainable development requires a holistic and cross-sector policy approach and is ultimately an issue of governance, which needs to be pursued in partnership with all stakeholders and on all levels. The EU and its Member States will, therefore, promote whole-of-government approaches and ensure the political oversight and coordination efforts at all levels for SDG implementation. In order to better support policy formulation and decision-making they will ensure the evidence base of policy impacts on developing countries by consultations, stakeholder engagement and ex-ante impact assessments and ex-post evaluations of major policy initiatives. Ongoing EU action towards sustainable global supply chains, such as in the timber and garment sectors, illustrate the added value of pursuing a coherent approach. Policy initiatives should, wherever relevant, indicate how they contribute to sustainable development in developing countries. This is also instrumental for improving the EU and its Member States' monitoring and reporting on PCD.</p> <p>112. Given the universality of the 2030 Agenda, the EU and its Member States will also encourage other countries to assess the impact of their own policies on the achievement of the SDGs, including in developing countries. The EU and its Member States will moreover strengthen their dialogue with partner countries on policy coherence and support partner countries in their own efforts to put in place enabling frameworks for policy coherence for sustainable development. They will take the lead in promoting policy coherence at international fora such as the UN and the G20, as part of their overall support of the 2030 Agenda in their external action.</p>	<p>areas covered by the 2030 Agenda, seeking synergies, notably on trade, finance, environment and climate change, food security, migration and security.</p> <p>It further establishes that policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) requires taking into account the impact of all policies on sustainable development at all levels –nationally, within the EU, in other countries and at global level. And that the EU and its Member States will support partner countries to establish their own frameworks for policy coherence for sustainable development.</p>

Table 2: Reference to PCD in Council Conclusions

Council Conclusion	Reference
PCD Specific	
<p>16238/1/04 Presidency Conclusions of the European Council (16/17 December 2004, doc. 16238/1/04 dated 1 February 2005, p.21):</p>	<p>“65 The European Council called, in the framework of achieving the MDGs, for further strengthening of policy coherence for development by making wider and more systematic use of existing mechanisms for consultation and impact assessment and procedures to screen all relevant policies for their impact on developing countries.”</p>
<p>9266/05 Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council- On Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals: EU Contribution to the Review of the MDGs at the UN 2005 High Level Event (24 May 2005)</p>	<p>“18. The EU recognises the importance of non-development policies for assisting developing countries in achieving the MDGs. Building on the existing Treaty obligation for the Community, the EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. The EU will make a specific effort to promote and enhance Policy Coherence for Development in the context of the Global Partnership for Development under MDG 8 and in support of the partner countries’ own policies and in compliance with international obligations.”</p> <p>“19. The EU is committed to the implementation of the objectives contained in the Commission's Communication on Policy Coherence for Development dealing with the areas of Trade, Environment, Security, Agriculture, Fisheries, Social dimension of globalisation, employment and decent work, Migration, Research and innovation, Information society, Transport and Energy, as well as Climate Change as listed in the Annex to these Council Conclusions. The Council invites the Commission and the Member States to pursue its work on Policy Coherence for Development on the basis of the commitments contained in the Annex to these Conclusions. The EU confirms its engagement to effectively deliver on these commitments against the background of the given MDG framework between now and 2015.”</p> <p>“20. The Council will assess existing internal procedures, mechanisms and instruments to strengthen the effective integration of development concerns in its decision making procedures on non-development policies. In accordance with the December 2004 Council Conclusion, the Council invites the Commission to further reinforce its existing instruments notably its Impact Assessment tool and consultations with developing countries during policy formulation, and consider new ones when necessary in support of a strengthened Policy Coherence for Development. The Council calls on EU Member States and the Commission to strengthen policy coherence for development procedures, instruments and mechanism and secure adequate resources in their respective administrations, looking at the best practices developed by some Member States.”</p> <p>“33. The Council invites the Commission to monitor and regularly report on the implementation of these EU commitments on MDGs, including (...) and a biennial report on Policy Coherence for Development.”</p>
<p>2005 Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council on accelerating progress towards attaining the MDGs: EU contribution to the review of the MDGs at the UN 2005 High Level Event - 24 May 2005</p>	<p>The EU recognises the importance of non-development policies for assisting developing countries in achieving the MDGs. Building on the existing Treaty obligation for the Community, the EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. The EU will make a specific effort to promote and enhance Policy Coherence for Development in the context of the Global Partnership for Development under MDG 8 and in support of the partner countries’ own policies and in compliance with international obligations.</p> <p>The EU is committed to the implementation of the objectives contained in the Commission's Communication on Policy Coherence for Development dealing with the areas of Trade, Environment, Security, Agriculture, Fisheries, Social dimension of globalisation, employment and decent work, Migration, Research and innovation, Information society, Transport and Energy, as well as Climate Change as listed in the Annex to these Council Conclusions</p> <p>The Council will assess existing internal procedures, mechanisms and instruments to strengthen the effective integration of development concerns in its decision making procedures on non-development policies.</p> <p>The Council calls on EU Member States and the Commission to strengthen policy coherence for development procedures, instruments and mechanism and secure adequate resources in their respective administrations, looking at the best practices developed by some Member States.</p>

Council Conclusion	Reference
	<p>The Council invites the Commission to monitor and regularly report on the implementation of these EU commitments on MDGs, including annual reports on the follow up of the EU commitments on financing and on the effectiveness of aid, and a biennial report on Policy Coherence for Development.</p> <p>In accordance with the December 2004 Council Conclusion, the Council invites the Commission to further reinforce its existing instruments notably its Impact Assessment tool and consultations with developing countries during policy formulation, and consider new ones when necessary in support of a strengthened Policy Coherence for Development.</p>
<p>2007 Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) - 20 November 2007</p>	<p>The Council recalls the EU commitment to strengthening Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), as expressed in the 2005 EU Joint Development Policy Statement ‘The European Consensus on Development’, as well as the EU overall objective of improving the coherence, efficiency and visibility of the Union’s external policies. The Council emphasises that EU policies other than development can make a substantial contribution in assisting developing countries’ efforts in their poverty reduction strategies and in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)</p> <p>The Council notes with satisfaction that a number of organisational PCD mechanisms have been put in place at Council, Member State and Commission levels, but acknowledges the Report’s finding on the need to pursue efforts to ensure that EU’s commitments continue to be met. The Council invites all parties to develop and improve such mechanisms and use them in a more systematic manner, when necessary PCD requires, in addition to political commitments, a clear approach providing adequate information on the impact of other policies on developing countries, appropriate fora for dialogue across policy areas, sufficient expertise and enhanced accountability and transparency.</p> <p>At Commission level, while a number of PCD mechanisms are already in place, the Council encourages the Commission to use PCD instruments in a systematic way and continue its efforts to ensure that development concerns are taken into account in the preparation and implementation of policies; in particular asks the Commission to improve and better use the Impact Assessment process to evaluate the impact of EU policies on developing countries.</p> <p>The revised Impact Assessments guidelines should give more attention to the external impacts on developing countries.</p> <p>The Council underlines the role it has assigned to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) in its Rules of Procedure, in particular Article 19 (1), in ensuring the consistency of the Union’s policies and actions. In this context, COREPER should continue to be the main forum for ensuring PCD, while efforts to enhance policy coherence should start at national level and furthered at Council Working Parties Within the Council, noting that PCD is not yet systematically pursued at the different stages of the decision making process, the Council invites future Presidencies, with the support of the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) and the Commission, with due respect to their respective competences, to continue their efforts to ensure that development concerns are taken into account across the relevant policies. Experience has shown that the screening of Council agendas and joint meetings of different Council bodies are often useful procedures to be encouraged.</p> <p>The Council recalls its invitation to each Presidency to carry out an update of the PCD rolling Work Programme, in light of the EU and the international agenda, to serve as a check list for PCD. This work should be done with the assistance of the GSC and the Commission and in accordance with these Conclusions as well as the Council Conclusions of October 2006.</p>
<p>2009 Council Conclusions on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) - 18 November 2009</p>	<p>Council welcomes the initial selection of five priority issues where the EU will take account of development objectives in a more pro-active way as part of a more focused and evolving approach to PCD. It underlines that over the years priority issues may evolve.</p> <p>The Council welcomes the Commission suggestion to approach PCD in a more targeted, strategic and partnership-oriented way, including inter alia strengthening EU dialogue with partner countries on PCD issues, which is presented in its Communication ‘Policy Coherence for Development - Establishing the policy framework for a whole-of-the-Union approach’⁸. The Council recognises that this work could contribute to further harnessing the synergies of relevant policies and instruments contributing to development objectives, including by contributing to OECD/DAC9 discussions on the concept of a “whole of the country” approach.</p> <p>The Council welcomes the increased emphasis on PCD in the European Commission, the better use of the inter-service consultation mechanism and the strengthening of the development dimension</p>

Council Conclusion	Reference
<p>Council conclusions on Policy Coherence for Development, 14 May 2012</p>	<p>of the impact assessment tool as important instruments to improve PCD and the regular screening of the Commission Legislative and Work Programme from a PCD perspective</p> <p>EU efforts on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) aim to enhance the coherence of EU policies with development objectives, in particular poverty eradication, as well as the impact of our external assistance. Further progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and the general need for increased development effectiveness call for enhanced efforts by all stakeholders and for development-friendly policies in a broad range of areas beyond aid. Finally, PCD is essential for the credibility of the EU as a global actor, and hence, a strong EU leadership on PCD issues at high levels of all parts of the EU and in Member States is important.</p> <p>The Council reiterates that COREPER will continue to be the main forum for ensuring policy coherence for development, as already expressed in its Conclusions of 2006.</p> <p>The Council stresses in particular the need to include the issues of PCD systematically in the regular dialogue with partner countries to better assess the impact of EU policies at country level and the interaction with partner countries' policies. EU Delegations have a crucial role in this regard.</p> <p>The Council notes that close cooperation between the European External Action Service and the European Commission is necessary to ensure greater consistency of EU external action and PCD.</p>
<p>Council conclusions on Policy Coherence for Development, 12 December 2013</p>	<p>In 2013, the Council noted that PCD needed to be anchored within debates on global challenges and the post-2015 framework, "with a view to mainstreaming PCD in policy formulation and development processes beyond 2015".</p> <p>The Council reiterates its decision to focus in the immediate future on five PCD challenges: trade and finance, climate change, food security, migration and security. In that context, the Council calls on the Commission and the EEAS to develop, in cooperation with Member States, an overview of forthcoming policy proposals and initiatives relevant to PCD on the basis of the annual Commission's work programmes to be shared with the relevant Council bodies starting in early 2014 and onwards.</p> <p>The EU's impact assessments, sustainable impact assessments and evaluations can play an important role in ensuring ex-ante mainstreaming of PCD and in assessing results. The Council calls for strengthening the development dimension of these tools in the context of the review of their respective guidelines.</p> <p>The Council encourages the Commission and the EEAS to further develop the PCD knowledge base, through increased research efforts on PCD, including through continued work with the OECD on relevant methodologies and indicators, and through thematic PCD case or country studies as well as independent evaluations and assessments</p> <p>The Council recalls that the role of EU Delegations is essential in providing feedback on issues relating to PCD and encourages the Commission and the EEAS to continue their efforts and report further on PCD processes and initiatives at country level. This includes a strengthened dialogue with local stakeholders regarding the impact of EU policies.</p> <p>Designating PCD focal points in EU Delegations could be useful in this regard.</p> <p>The Council notes that, in the context of EU external action, close cooperation between the EEAS, the European Commission and EU Member States is necessary to strengthen PCD.</p>
<p>Council conclusions on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD): 2015 EU Report, as adopted by the Council at its 3420th meeting, 26 October 2015</p>	<p>The Council favourably notes the new institutional organisation of the Commission as a policy coherence instrument in itself. Furthermore, the Commission's Better Regulation Package contains revised Impact Assessments guidelines and a "Tool Box" for assessing potential impacts of future EU initiatives on developing countries at an early stage of the preparation of an initiative. The Council encourages the Commission to share its first experiences of the application of impact assessments when available and to present concrete proposals on how to advance coherence in all EU policy areas with a clear goal to contribute to sustainable development.</p> <p>The Council invites the Commission to continue developing effective and coordinated training tools so as to raise awareness across different policy actors and to help facilitate the sharing of good practices between Member States</p> <p>In this context, the Council invites the Commission and the EEAS, in close consultation with other partners, to present concrete proposals on how to better integrate PCD into the EU approach to implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and calls for this new approach to be mainstreamed across the EU institutions. Future PCD reporting should reflect the new approach and lessons learnt of implementation challenges and of past reporting exercises. The Council looks forward to the next PCD report.</p>

Council Conclusion	Reference
	<p>Recognising the pivotal role of EU delegations and Member State embassies, the Council notes with satisfaction the establishment of regular monitoring and reporting of PCD issues by delegations and calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to further improve ongoing efforts.</p> <p>It also looks forward to the results of the first independent and comprehensive evaluation of PCD at EU level which will be crucial for providing further guidance in this regard.</p>
Challenge area: Trade and Finance	
<p>Council Conclusions on Supporting developing countries in coping with the crisis of 18 May 2009, 2943rd External relations Council meeting.</p>	<p>The Council conclusions promoted a position for the UN High-level Conference on World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development countries based on PCD to ensure that measures to tackle the economic and financial crisis took full account of their impact on developing countries. “The Council recalls the importance of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and calls on all donors and international organizations to ensure that the measures to tackle the economic and financial crisis take full account of their impact on developing countries, especially the poorest and most vulnerable.”</p>
<p>Council conclusions on the EU and Responsible Global Value Chains, as adopted by the Council at its 3462nd meeting held on 12 May 2016</p>	<p>The Council fully supports the Leaders' Declaration at the 2015 G7 Summit, recognising the joint responsibility of governments and business to foster responsible supply chains, and jointly advance the understanding of due diligence. The Council also supports the G20 Leaders' acknowledgment of the importance of fostering safer and healthier workplaces including within sustainable global supply chains (2015 Antalya Summit). The Council recalls that the EU and its Member States will further promote a transparent, cooperative and fair international tax environment in line with the principles of good governance. Financial transparency should be enhanced, this could include related exchanges in this respect between relevant authorities.</p> <p>The Council underlines the key role of the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, including the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, and recalls its conclusions of 26 May 20152, particularly highlighting the need for the promotion of policy coherence, enabling policy frameworks and mobilisation of the private sector. The Council also recalls the Agenda for Change3, which focuses EU trade and development policy on Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and countries most in need, including in the form of trade preferences or Aid for Trade.</p> <p>The Council encourages the Commission and the Member States to continue the work on Policy Coherence for Development as provided by Article 208 TFEU in internal and external policies. Synergies between development cooperation, environmental policy and trade tools must be sought, notably to unpack their full combined potential and contribute to the implementation of, and progress on, TSD chapters and other provisions relevant to sustainable development, so as to maximise the development impact. This includes capacity building, political dialogue and the participation of civil society, social partners, and other stakeholders. The Council looks forward to the upcoming review of the Joint EU Aid for Trade Strategy to enhance synergies in the area of trade and development, notably with a view to achieving the related Sustainable Development Goals.</p> <p>The Council supports efforts undertaken in promoting responsible supply chains through initiatives such as an EU Garment Initiative and through initiatives in the agricultural sector such as the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan (FLEGT), Amsterdam Declarations on deforestation and on sustainable palm oil supply, as well as in other sectors. The Council strongly encourages the Commission and Member States to share best practices, including the promotion of new and innovative approaches, and to scale up such initiatives and expedite their delivery. The development of a Public-Private Partnership on Responsible Mineral Sourcing and other initiatives concerning the responsible sourcing of minerals in conflict-affected and high-risk areas, are useful tools in this regard</p>
<p>Council Conclusions of 21 December 2010 on trade policy, welcoming the Communication on “Trade, Growth and World Affairs: Trade Policy”.</p>	<p>In 2010 the Council Conclusions on EU’s trade policy, growth and world affairs, the EU committed for a successful and balanced conclusion of the Doha Development Round, to strongly support development objectives, by intensifying efforts within the framework of PCD, and committed to the reform of the GSP.</p>
Challenge area: Food Security	
<p>Council conclusions on Food and Nutrition Security in external assistance, 28 May 2013</p>	<p>The Council recalls EU policies on food security, humanitarian food assistance, resilience, social protection, policy coherence for development, and other relevant EU policies, and its invitation in May 2010 to the Commission to develop a Communication on nutrition and a food security implementation plan.</p>

Council Conclusion	Reference
	<p>The Council recalls the target set out in the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the proportion of people suffering from hunger. The Council also recognises the critical importance of nutrition for the achievement of all MDGs, particularly those on child and maternal health. While welcoming the reduction in the global rates of undernourishment between 1990 and 2012, progress in tackling hunger is slow and the MDG hunger target is off-track. The Council emphasises the need to reach and indeed surpass the MDG hunger target, and the need to ensure that hunger, and food and nutrition security, are well reflected in the elaboration of the post-2015 agenda.</p> <p>The Council stresses that good governance for food and nutrition security at all levels is essential, and that coherence between policies should be pursued in cases of negative effects on food and nutrition security. The Council emphasises in particular the governance and security of land tenure and use rights. The Council welcomes the adoption by the Committee on World Food Security last year of Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, and encourages countries to implement them.</p>
<p>Council conclusions on food and nutrition security, 20 June 2016</p>	<p>Recognise rural transformation as a critical process to create decent jobs, raise income and economic growth, and achieve food security and nutrition objectives in the long-term, especially for women and youth. This also has significant linkages with addressing economic inequality, migration and urbanisation. More work is needed to create the conditions for sustainable investment, in infrastructure and development in rural areas. Climate change, in particular, must be taken into account and sustainable strategies be developed to counter it. Furthermore, transboundary health threats such as anti-microbial resistance, is a factor to be followed closely.</p> <p>Ensure continued investment in research and innovation, including digitalisation, and increase action to enhance the impact of this investment. The Council encourages the EU and its Member States to work together to accelerate farmers' access to innovation and strengthen partnerships between European and partner research institutions for long term effectiveness.</p> <p>Further improve EU and Member States coordination and coordination with other donors in tackling food and nutrition security challenges as well as agricultural development. In this respect, the Council encourages further work on Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and Joint Programming⁵. The Council calls on EU Member States to pursue concrete initiatives or actions – including joint work on analysis, policy dialogue, monitoring and evaluation, and on improving results frameworks – in at least five partner countries over the next reporting period.</p>
<p>Challenge area: Climate Change and Environment</p>	
<p>Conclusions 118th Environment Council meeting: Rio+20 towards achieving sustainable development by greening the economy and improving governance, 31 October 2011</p>	<p>“CONFIRMING that Rio+20 should focus on strengthening the coherence and enhancing the linkages between the environmental, economic and social dimensions of sustainable development and contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015”</p>
<p>Council conclusions on climate change of 11 October 2016.</p>	<p>Following the Paris Agreement,¹³¹ the Council Conclusions on climate change stressed the need to scale up resources in developing countries, in particular LCDs and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and recognized the need to account for synergies between climate objectives and the SDGs.</p>
<p>Council of the European Union of 24 June 2014: Conclusions on the EU Climate Diplomacy COP 21.</p>	<p>Also, the Council has previously underlined that as part of the EUGS the EU would address the potentially destabilising effects of climate change, including on migration, food security, reliable access to resources, water and energy, spread of epidemic diseases, and social and economic instability.</p>
<p>Challenge area: Migration</p>	
<p>Council Conclusions of 19 July 2013 “Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of Governments of the Member States meeting</p>	<p>Regarding international migration, in 2013 the Council adopted conclusions in view of the UN High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, and welcomed the Commission’s communication “Maximising the Development Impact of Migration” which is based on a PCD approach.</p> <p>Well managed migration and mobility is a prerequisite for maximising the benefits and minimising the challenges of migration, is harnessing a positive impact on progress towards sustainable</p>

¹³¹ 21st Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Council Conclusion	Reference
<p>within the Council on the 2013 UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development and on broadening the development-migration nexus</p>	<p>economic, social and environmental development of both low- and middle-income countries of origin and destination;</p> <p>Migration and mobility have contributed to the achievement of many of the Millennium Development Goals; progress towards sustainable development would sensibly benefit from a greater attention to migration in national planning and well-managed migration;</p> <p>Importance of ensuring respect for and protection of the human rights of all migrants to achieve sustainable development in all its dimensions; and that the impact of respecting human rights goes far beyond the individual migrant, as it also benefits both the home society and the society in which migrants live and work.</p> <p>In line with existing commitments under the Policy Coherence for Development agenda and the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, the EU remains committed to maximising the impact of migration to the EU for the development of countries of origin by continuing work on current priority areas including remittances, brain drain and circular migration;</p>
<p>Council conclusions on migration in EU development cooperation, 12 December 2014</p>	<p>The Council recalls the significance of migration as one of the five priority areas under the EU’s commitments on Policy Coherence for Development. The Council reaffirms that, in order to enhance the development potential of migration, policy coherence should be pursued within a wide range of internal and external policy areas, including policies in partner countries. In particular, there is a need for a more systematic incorporation of the development dimension in migration policies. The Council also recalls that enhanced coherence and coordination is required between the external dimension of migration policy and the development and external affairs agendas in order to better address the challenges and opportunities presented by migration.</p> <p>The Council recalls the significant contribution that development cooperation can provide to responding to political and economic instability and addressing human rights’ violations, fragility, conflict, environment vulnerability, unemployment and extreme poverty, which can be root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement.</p> <p>The Council calls upon the Commission, in close cooperation with the EEAS, to provide guidance on how to incorporate and strengthen the migration dimension in both policy dialogue and programming. It underlines the need for continued efforts to strengthen the evidence base by improving migration related data collection and analysis, including on the impact of migration on development, and to reinforce the capacity to use acquired knowledge in policy formulation and implementation extreme poverty, which can be root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement.</p>
<p>2016 Council Conclusions on the EU’s approach to forced displacement and development</p>	<p>The 2016 Council Conclusions on the EU’s approach to forced displacement and development, making reference to broadening the scope of the migration-development nexus, recognised that, comprehensive and coherent approaches are needed to address the root causes through long-term development support but also that the EU will work with host government to implement plans and policies for the inclusion of forced displaced people, and that UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting on Refugees and Migrants of September 2016 represented “an opportunity for political, developmental and humanitarian actors to commit to a more coherent and holistic global approach to forced displacement, as part of the broader migration agenda.”</p>
<p>Challenge area: Security</p>	
<p>Council conclusions of 12 May 2014 on the EU’s comprehensive approach</p>	<p>The Council conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach focused on regional strategies implemented in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel region and the Gulf of Guinea, framing the EU’s engagements across many policy areas, and suggested taking forward commitments on PCD to enable smooth transitioning of CSDP missions and operations and handing responsibility to the countries.</p>
<p>Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence of 14 November 2016</p>	<p>The Council has expressed that the SDGs will be a crosscutting dimension of the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (EUGS), but it is yet to see how the EU’s approach to PCD will align with new priorities at the centre of the external action.</p>
<p>Council conclusions on the Global Strategy on the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy 17 October 2016.</p>	<p>“The EU will continue to develop the external dimension of European security policy and to add to the policy coherence between the internal and external security of the Union.(...) To this aim the EU will also take further steps to increase collaboration with partner countries on capacity building in support of security and development.(...) The EU will work to strengthen its response to international terrorism through multilateral cooperation, political dialogue and concrete support to</p>

Council Conclusion	Reference
	<p>third countries. The necessary coherence between internal and external policy will be ensured in the course of this work.”</p> <p>“The implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development offers an opportunity to strengthen the security-development nexus. The Sustainable Development Goals represent an opportunity to catalyse coherence between the internal and external dimensions of EU policies.”</p> <p>“The EU will work with third partners to implement the Partnership Framework approach with a view to improved migration management, reduced flows of irregular migration and increased returns. Our approach aims at addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, by building strong partnerships with countries of origin, transit and host third countries, making full use of existing policies, processes and programmes.”</p> <p>“The work on implementing the EU Global Strategy will provide the framework for the EU's external relations, including CFSP for years to come. Implementing the Strategy across the range of policy fields will enable the European Union to confront challenges and crises in a more effective and joined up way. Work started in 2016 on follow up initiatives aimed to make the EU's external action more credible, responsive and joined-up, notably in the fields of resilience building and an integrated approach to conflict and crisis, Security and Defence, as well as strengthening the link between internal and external policies, with attention to migration and counterterrorism, which will continue throughout 2017 and beyond.”</p>

Table 3: Alignment of EU policies and priorities with PCD

Policy	Key features related to PCD
Challenge area: Trade and Finance	
<p>COM(2015) 497 final Trade for All - Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy, 14.10.2015</p>	<p>The Communication makes an explicit reference to the need for PCD by pointing out to the fact that trade and investment initiatives should contribute to sustainable growth and job creation, and minimize any negative impact on LDCs.</p> <p>“In line with the principle of policy coherence for development, the EU needs to make sure that its trade and investment initiatives contribute to sustainable growth and job creation and minimize any negative impact on LDCs and other countries most in need. This is particularly relevant with regard to TTIP, given that the EU and the US are the world’s two most important markets for developing countries’ goods and services.” (p.16)</p> <p>And lists a series of commitment in this regard: “The Commission will: undertake a mid-term review of the GSP by 2018, notably learning from the main achievements under the GSP+ scheme. The review would also provide an opportunity to take stock of lessons learnt on preferences for goods and consider similar preferences in services for LDCs to the EBA scheme, in line with the recent waiver for LDCs on services agreed at the WTO; review, together with EU Member States, the 2007 joint EU ‘Aid for trade’ strategy (26) to enhance the capacity of developing countries to make use of the opportunities offered by trade agreements, in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; propose, in the context of TTIP and other negotiations on regulatory issues, options that reinforce broader international regulatory cooperation and have positive spillovers in third countries, in particular in developing countries; undertake an in-depth analysis of the possible effects of new FTAs on LDCs in sustainability impact assessments, with a view to designing flanking measures when necessary; and continue supporting a meaningful LDC package in the context of the conclusion of the Doha round and push in the G20, the WTO and other multilateral fora for close monitoring of the effect of third countries’ protectionist measures on LDCs and how to remove them”. (p.16).</p> <p>The Communication also recognizes the “coherence across policy areas” and the need of the EU to “speak with one voice and ensures that all EU Member States, people and companies are treated equally.” (p.26).</p>
<p>COM(2012) 22 final Trade, growth and development Tailoring trade and investment policy for those countries most in need, 27.1.2012 CSWD {SEC(2012) 87 final} Trade as a driver of development</p>	<p>Communication proposes concrete ways to enhance synergies between trade and development policies.</p> <p>Effective trade policy is critical in boosting growth and jobs in Europe and abroad and in projecting EU values and interests in the world. It can also be a powerful engine for development, in line with the EU principle of Policy Coherence for Development³. Effective development policy is essential in helping create better conditions for trade and investment in developing countries, as well as to ensure equitable distribution of their benefits for poverty eradication. The "Agenda for Change"⁴ Communication promises greater support to enhance the business environment, to promote regional integration and to help harness the opportunities that world markets offer, as a driver for inclusive growth and sustainable development. The EU is guided in all its external action by the core values underlying its own existence, including the respect and promotion of human rights (p.3)</p> <p>The EU must focus its efforts on the poorest and most vulnerable countries and make sure those efforts are tailored to their needs and constraints, while ensuring coherence and complementarity between trade, development and other policies. 4.1.1. The Commission has proposed a reform of the GSP scheme to make sure corresponding preferences benefit those countries most in need More focused preferences (p.9)</p> <p>EU blending mechanisms can be used to leverage domestic and foreign investment in developing countries (...). Greater coherence is also needed with trade and investment agreements. (p.12)</p> <p>Trade as a driver of development: Links to the Commission's Policy Coherence for Development Work Programme 2010-2013 contains a section on IPR, include the following three targets.</p>
Challenge area: Food Security	
<p>COM(2010) 672 final The CAP towards 2020: Meeting the food, natural resources and territorial</p>	<p>In setting out the future of the CAP reform, the 2010 Communication CAP towards 2020: Meeting the food, natural resources and territorial challenges of the future, EU agriculture policy expressly recognised its alignment with EU’s international trade and PCD commitments, and also called for strengthening rural development policy and other EU policies.</p>

Policy	Key features related to PCD
challenges of the future 18.11.2010	<p>“The primary role of agriculture is to supply food. Given that demand worldwide will continue rising in the future, the EU should be able to contribute to world food demand. Therefore, it is essential that EU agriculture maintains its production capacity and improves it while respecting EU commitments in international trade and Policy Coherence for Development”</p> <p>“For the sake of efficiency, it will be essential to strengthen the coherence between rural development policy and other EU policies, while also simplifying and cutting red tape where possible. To this end, a common strategic framework for EU funds may be envisaged”</p>
COM(2009)163 final: Commission Green Paper on the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy; Brussels, 22.4.2009; Section 5.8, page 22	The 2009 Commission Green Paper on the Reform of the CFP, the external dimension of the EU’s fisheries policy, included an explicit recognition that the principal objective for activities under the external dimension of the CFP should be to extend the principles of sustainable and responsible fisheries internationally, within the aims of the good governance of the sea and on the sustainable development of coastal regions. The Green Paper further emphasised the coherence of the CFP with other EU policies highlighting that EU development and environment policies had a particular role in the CFP’s external component.
Challenge area: Climate Change and Environment	
SWD(2013) 138 final, Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration 16.4.2013 , Accompanying the Communication An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change	<p>This Staff Working Paper aims to provide an overview of the research and data currently available on the inter-linkages between migration, environmental degradation and climate change. It also provides an overview of the many initiatives of relevance for the topic which are already being taken by the EU in various policy fields, and analyses on-going debates on policy responses at EU and international level. The paper is produced as a response to a request made by the European Council to the Commission in the Stockholm Programme for 'an analysis of the effects of climate change on international migration, including its potential effects on immigration to the European Union.</p> <p>However, given the strong evidence that most migration which is primarily driven by environmental change is likely to occur within the Global South, much of the analysis of the paper and many of its recommendations are of specific relevance for EU policies with an external focus, including on development, foreign policy and humanitarian aid.</p> <p>While the SWD addresses the interlinkages between migration, environment degradation and climate change, it limits the relationships to development and humanitarian aid policies. And only refers to the need to strengthen policy coherence at the EU level in a parallel way given that “recommendations are of specific relevance for EU policies with an external focus, including on development, foreign policy and humanitarian aid.”</p>
Challenge area: Migration	
The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, document 17024/09, 2.12.2009: published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2010/C 115/01).	<p>In the 2009 Stockholm Programme the European Council recognised “the need for increased policy coherence at European level in order to promote the positive development effects of migration within the scope of the EU’s activities in the external dimension and to align international migration more closely to the achievement of the MDGs”.</p> <p>The European Council also recognised “the need to find practical solutions which increase coherence between migration policies and other policy areas such as foreign and development policy and policies for trade, employment, health and education at the European level”.</p>
COM(2011) 248 final, Communication on Migration, 4.5.2011	<p>The communication makes reference to specific actions to be taken in order to improve an update the EU’s migration policy framework. Some references to “coherence” are made:</p> <p>“More coherence is needed between visa policy and other EU policies, such as trade and research policies.”</p> <p>“The EU needs to strengthen its external migration policies. There is a need for partnerships with third countries that address the issues related to migration and mobility in a way that makes cooperation mutually beneficial. In developing such a policy, migration issues should be integrated into the overall EU’s external relations to promote EU’s interest and needs. Special attention should be given to the relationship between migration and climate change. Consistency between internal and external policies is essential to produce sound results as is coherence and complementarity between Union and Member States’ actions.”</p>
COM(2011) 743 final, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, Annex Conclusions of the CSWP on Migration and Development, 18.11.2011	<p>A explicit reference to PCD is made in the Annex Conclusions of the CSWP on Migration and Development:</p> <p>“Development objectives are being taken into account more and more in the EU and partner countries’ migration policies. At the same time, the migration dimension is increasingly being taken into account within development strategies. The EU will continue to promote the Policy Coherence for Development agenda, with a view to identifying and addressing possible inconsistencies in the</p>

Policy	Key features related to PCD
COM(2013) 292 final, Maximising the Development Impact of Migration. The EU contribution for the UN High-level Dialogue and next steps towards broadening the development-migration nexus, 21.5.2013	<p>legislation and policies of the EU and its Member States and to reinforcing capacity and mechanisms in non-EU countries in this domain.”</p> <p>This communication reaffirms the compromise of the Commission in promoting PCD regarding its external migration policy and the development-migration nexus. The Communication states the following:</p> <p>“Effective policy coherence is of key importance for effective integration of migration into development policies and should be pursued at and between all relevant levels, including national frameworks such as the PRSPs, but also at regional, local and multilateral levels. The EU itself can provide a good example of how regional cooperation can promote Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) on migration. The obligation for PCD is embedded in the EU Treaty and a number of operational tools have been developed to implement this, including bi-annual reporting”. “under the GAMM and the Agenda for Change, the Commission will promote migration governance and effective policy coherence at all levels, to harness the potential of migration and mobility as development enablers”.</p>
COM(2015) 240 final, A European Agenda on Migration, 13.5.2015	<p>The Agenda makes no explicit mention of PCD but affirms a commitment towards a coherent approach in line with the GAMM, though in the context of new challenges to be addressed by EU migration policy due to the severe migratory crisis. The Agenda proposes 4 pillars for a “coherent and comprehensive approach to reap the benefits and address the challenges deriving from migration”.</p>
COM(2016) 385 final Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration 7.6.2016	<p>Building on the GAMM and the Agenda on Migration, this recent communication makes explicit references on how coherence for development with respect to migration policy should be shaped, and reverts the directionality of the ‘migration-development nexus’ by referring on how development policy can help the EU agenda on migration policy.</p> <p>There is an explicit reference on PCD but from the perspective of EU migration policy:</p> <p>“Increasing coherence between migration and development policy is important to ensure that development assistance helps partner countries manage migration more effectively, and also incentivizes them to effectively cooperate on readmission of irregular migrants. Positive and negative incentives should be integrated in the EU's development policy, rewarding those countries that fulfil their international obligation to readmit their own nationals, and those that cooperate in managing the flows of irregular migrants from third countries, as well as those taking action to adequately host persons fleeing conflict and persecution. Equally, there must be consequences for those who do not cooperate on readmission and return. The same should be true of trade policy, notably where the EU gives preferential treatment to its partners: migration cooperation should be a consideration in the forthcoming evaluation of trade preferences under "GSP+”.</p> <p>Even though considered potentially effective, and building on their positive impact on migration, neighbourhood, development and trade are not the only policies that are relevant to support the compacts. No policy areas should be exempted from this approach²⁶. All EU policies including education, research, climate change, energy, environment, agriculture, should in principle be part of a package, bringing maximum leverage to the discussion”</p>
Challenge area: Security	
A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe”, presented at the EU summit on 28 June 2016	<p>The Strategy set the common vision regarding the EU external policy.</p> <p>The following statements establish the interlinkages of security and other areas:</p> <p>The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory. Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders.</p> <p>The EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, and foster human security through an integrated approach. Implementing the ‘comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises’ through a coherent use of all policies at the EU’s disposal is essential. But the meaning and scope of the ‘comprehensive approach’ will be expanded.</p> <p>We must become more joined up across our external policies, between Member States and EU institutions, and between the internal and external dimensions of our policies. This is particularly relevant to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, migration, and security, notably counter-terrorism. We must also systematically mainstream human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institutions”</p>

Table 4: Alignment of the EU’s approach to PCD with international commitments

Policy	Reference
<p>Communications (on MDGs, SDGs)</p> <p>COM(2005) 134 final Policy Coherence for Development: Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals (12.04.2005)</p>	<p>The Commission acknowledged that better development cooperation, more finance and improved aid delivery was not in itself sufficient to enable developing countries reaching the MDGs by 2015.</p> <p>The Commission re-stated that the effective improvement in the coherence of developed countries’ policies could contribute to achieve the MDGs. Therefore, it proposed that as a way to improve such progress, the EU could consider the challenge of how non-aid policies can assist developing countries in attaining the MDGs:</p> <p>“Within the broad context of EU policy making coherence is a multidimensional commitment which needs to take place within the overall framework of the EU sustainable development strategy. Non-development policies should respect development policy objectives and development cooperation should, where possible, also contribute to reaching the objectives of other EU policies. In general – and including in the context of the forthcoming development policy review - this broad definition applies. However, within the specific framework of this Communication a more targeted approach is adopted. When exploring ways to accelerate progress towards achieving MDGs the EU is committed to look beyond the frontiers of development cooperation, and consider the challenge of how non-aid policies can assist developing countries in attaining the MDGs.</p> <p>The impact of EU non-aid policies on developing countries should not be underestimated, and neither should their potential to make a positive contribution to the development process in these countries...”</p> <p>The Commission identified priority areas for which attaining synergies with development policy objectives were considered relevant and had a direct relationship with one or more MDGs, and invited the Council, the EP and the EESC to accept the commitments as a joint engagement of the EU and its Member States to effectively deliver in those areas for the timeframe 2005-2015.</p>
<p>COM(2013) 92 final A decent life for all: Ending poverty and giving the world a sustainable future(27.2.2013)</p>	<p>The EU’s approach to PCD was fully aligned with the priorities established in the EU’s common position envisioned for the discussion on the SDGs framework - this common position established that PCD should play a major role in the new SDG framework given that the EU was already committed to greater coherence, mainstreaming and integration of sustainable development in EU policies at large.</p> <p>In the context of the achievement of the MDGs and the establishment of a post 2015 framework, the Communication proposed a common EU approach for the EU’s engagement in the discussion regarding the SDGs (UN Open Working Group on SDGs) and the challenges of eradicating poverty and ensuring sustainability. It recognised the need to address these challenges together by all countries, and proposed several principles for an overarching framework for post-2015 considering its three dimensions: economic, social, environmental. The Communication proposed that the new post-2015 framework should cover basic human development, drivers for sustainable and inclusive growth and development, structural transformation of the economy needed for the creation of productive capacities and employment, transition to an inclusive green economy capable of addressing climate challenges, and the sustainable management of natural resources. Also, it proposed that the framework should address justice, equality and equity, as well as the empowerment of women and gender equality. This Communication expressly mentioned that “Beyond aid, Policy Coherence for Development plays a major role in eliminating poverty and achieving sustainable development. Strong consideration of the role of these policies should therefore be given due place in the future framework.”</p> <p>It also acknowledged that “The EU will continue to pursue the sustainable development, including by implementingRio+20 commitments through a range of overarching policies, in particular through its overarching strategy for smart, inclusive and sustainable growth - Europe 2020. This covers, inter alia, resource efficiency, low carbon economy, research and innovation, employment, social inclusion and youth. The implementation and regular review of the Europe 2020 Strategy, which builds on the integrative approach initiated by the EU Strategy for Sustainable Development, should contribute to greater coherence, mainstreaming and integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development in EU policies at large. Sustainable development objectives will be made operational through a range of key policies under preparation, including the reform of the Common Agricultural and the Common Fisheries Policies...”</p>

Policy	Reference
COM(2014) 335 final, A decent Life for all: from vision to collective action, 2.6.2014	<p>The Communication explicitly mentions PCD.</p> <p>“The EU remains committed to ensuring increased Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), taking account of development objectives in those policies which are likely to affect developing countries. (...) As another example for PCD, a new global partnership should foster strengthened dialogue and cooperation among states and other relevant stakeholders to create an enabling environment for enhancing the benefits of international migration for human development through action in areas such as reducing the costs of migration and remittance transfers or combating discrimination of migrants. The EU will continue efforts to partner with developing countries to maximise the development impact of migration in the context of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.”</p>
COM(2015) 44 final A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015 (5.2.2015)	<p>The EU reaffirmed that PCD should be a means of implementation of a post-2015 development agenda, involving policy coherence at all levels requiring that countries at all levels of development assessed the impact their policies have in poorer countries.</p> <p>The Communication established that the EU’s approach to PCD meant both addressing possible negative impacts of domestic policies on third countries and fostering synergies across economic, social and environmental policy areas.</p> <p>The Communication, set out the European Commission's views on the overarching principles and main components for the post-2015 development agenda. As examples on which the EU could draw for experience on implementing policies that reflect key principles of the agenda it mentions Europe 2020 Strategy, Policy Coherence for Development, and the 7th Environment Action Programme. (p.4). It also established that the success of such an agenda required “policy coherence at all levels to ensure that government policies support poverty reduction and sustainable development”.</p> <p>In the Communication PCD is considered as a means of implementation of the framework, given the increasingly interlinked world. It specifically referred to the need for all countries to “systematically to take into account the impact, both positive and negative, that their policies can have on other countries. To this end, all developed, upper-middle income countries and emerging economies should commit to set up systems to assess the impact of adopting new policies on poorer countries.” And further stated that the EU’s PCD legal commitment meant “both addressing possible negative impacts of domestic policies on third countries and fostering synergies across economic, social and environmental policy areas.”</p>
Council Conclusions (MDGs, SDGs)	
Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council, 24 May 2005, doc. 9266/05	<p>Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council adopted a position on the EU Contribution to the Review of the MDGs for the UN 2005 High Level Event, in which they reaffirmed that the Union was firmly resolved to play a major role within the United Nations in general, and committed the EU Member States and the Commission to strengthen PCD to support developing countries achieving the MDGs.</p>
Council Conclusions on the Overarching Post 2015 Agenda, 25 June 2013	<p>The EU and its Member States reaffirm their commitment to the Millennium Declaration and the outcome document of the 2010 Summit on the MDGs and stress that they remain committed to doing their utmost to help achieve the MDGs by 2015, including through the implementation of the Agenda for Change. The EU and its Member States also call on all partners to redouble their efforts to support the achievement of the MDGs</p> <p>The United Nations Special Event to follow up on efforts made towards achieving the MDGs’ (New York, September 2013), which should strengthen the impetus for the achievement of the MDGs and provide further guidance for the elaboration of an overarching post-2015 framework.</p> <p>The Council further emphasised that Policy coherence at all levels and, in particular, Policy Coherence for Development, need to be enhanced across all sectors, including in their measurability, to better achieve poverty eradication and sustainable development</p>
Council Conclusions of 14 June 2010, on “The MDGs for the UN High Level Plenary Meeting in New York and beyond - Supporting the achievement of the MDGs by 2015”.	<p>The Council acknowledged that more work was needed in order to achieve the MDGs specifically with regard to Sub-Saharan Africa and LDC countries with special attention to countries in situation of conflict and fragility.</p>

Policy	Reference
<p>Council Conclusions on A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015 (26 May 2015, doc. 9241/15)</p>	<p>In these conclusions, the Council further developed the EU’s position on a post 2015 agenda on sustainable development, called for a shared responsibility to address global challenges through an integrated approach taking into consideration the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development and poverty eradication in a balanced manner.</p> <p>The Council called for policy coherence at all levels and reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to PCD:</p> <p>“The EU and its Member States are committed to Policy Coherence for Development as a key contribution to the collective effort towards achieving broader policy coherence for sustainable development.” And recognised that all developed, upper-middle-income countries and emerging economies have a responsibility to assess “the impact that their policies have in poorer countries”.</p> <p>The Conclusions also related this position to other events: Third International Financing for Development Conference in July in Addis Ababa (the "Addis Ababa Conference, as well as the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.</p>

ANNEX 7: MAIN UN RESOLUTIONS AND DOCUMENTS

Table 1: Alignment of EU’s PCD approach with international commitments

UN Resolutions	Key features related to PCD	Assessment
<p>Development priorities</p> <p>Resolution A/RES/55/2 adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Millennium Declaration, 18 September 2000.</p> <p>Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)</p>	<p>Adopted in 2000, the MDGs established the shared responsibility of developed and developing countries towards the achievement of reduction of poverty by establishing a series of goals and later specific targets. The following provisions related to this effect are:</p> <p>“We recognize that, in addition to our separate responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As leaders, we have a duty therefore to all the world’s people, especially the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to whom the future belongs.”</p> <p>“Shared responsibility. Responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally. As the most universal and most representative organization in the world, the United Nations must play the central role”</p> <p>The principle behind what came to be known as <i>Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development</i>, was “To develop strong partnerships with the private sector and with civil society organizations in pursuit of development and poverty eradication.”</p>	<p>Then MDGs declaration committed developed and developing countries to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty and setting out a series of time-bound targets - with a deadline of 2015.</p> <p>The global partnership recognized in MDG 8 served as the basis for the EU’s action on supporting the efforts of developing countries to achieve the MDGs. These efforts were not limited to ODA but with the Doha declaration it became explicit that the commitment also involved policy coherence for development and formulating policies consistent with poverty reduction and sustainable growth and development.</p>
<p>Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development, final text of agreements and commitments adopted at the International Conference on Financing for Development Monterrey, Mexico, 18-22 March 2002, United Nations 2003</p>	<p>Some of the main commitments leading to a call on international coordination and coherence of the Monterrey Consensus are identified here:</p> <p>“3. Mobilizing and increasing the effective use of financial resources and achieving the national and international economic conditions needed to fulfil internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, to eliminate poverty, improve social conditions and raise living standards, and protect our environment, will be our first step to ensuring that the twenty-first century becomes the century of development for all.</p> <p>4. Achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, demands a new partnership between developed and developing countries. We commit ourselves to sound policies, good governance at all levels and the rule of law. We also commit ourselves to mobilizing domestic resources, attracting international flows, promoting international trade as an engine for development, increasing international financial and technical cooperation for development, sustainable debt financing and external debt relief, and enhancing the coherence and consistency of the international monetary, financial and trading systems.</p> <p>5. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 exacerbated the global economic slowdown, further reducing growth rates. It has now become all the more urgent to enhance collaboration among all stakeholders to promote sustained economic growth and to address the long-term challenges of financing for development. Our resolve to act together is stronger than ever.</p> <p>8. In the increasingly globalizing interdependent world economy, a holistic approach to the interconnected national, international and systemic challenges of financing for</p>	<p>The 2002 Monterrey Consensus called for a coherent and coordinated approach to fulfil international agreed development goals including MDGs. The Consensus focused on mobilizing financing for development, but also called for coherent action given economic globalization and inter-dependency. In addition, it called for coherence at the operational and international levels to meet the MDGs of sustained economic growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development.</p> <p>The Consensus was updated in 2008 (Doha) and 2015 (Addis Ababa).</p>

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	<p>development - sustainable, gender-sensitive, people-centred development - in all parts of the globe is essential. Such an approach must open up opportunities for all and help to ensure that resources are created and used effectively and that strong, accountable institutions are established at all levels. To that end, collective and coherent action is needed in each interrelated area of our agenda, involving all stakeholders in active partnership.</p> <p>10. In our common pursuit of growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development, a critical challenge is to ensure the necessary internal conditions for mobilizing domestic savings, both public and private, sustaining adequate levels of productive investment and increasing human capacity. A crucial task is to enhance the efficacy, coherence and consistency of macroeconomic policies. An enabling domestic environment is vital for mobilizing domestic resources, increasing productivity, reducing capital flight, encouraging the private sector, and attracting and making effective use of international investment and assistance. Efforts to create such an environment should be supported by the international community.</p> <p>52. (...) With the same purpose, efforts should be strengthened at the national level to enhance coordination among all relevant ministries and institutions. Similarly, we should encourage policy and programme coordination of international institutions and coherence at the operational and international levels to meet the Millennium Declaration development goals of sustained economic growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development.”</p>	
<p>Doha Declaration of financing for development, final text of agreements and commitments adopted at the Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus Doha, Qatar, 29 November - 2 December 2008, United Nations 2009.</p>	<p>The follow up to the Monterrey consensus reaffirmed its holistic approach, the need to mobilize financial resources for development and the effective use for the global partnership for sustainable development, including the support of the achievement of the MDGs. It also recognised the context created by the systemic impact of the financial crisis, terrorism threats, economic globalization and interdependence.</p> <p>The commitment of international coherence and coordination for development was explicitly broadened to include coherence of the policies of developed countries:</p> <p>“70. We encourage better coordination and enhanced coherence among relevant ministries in all countries to assist in the formulation and effective implementation of policies at all levels. We also encourage international financial and development institutions to continue to enhance policy coherence for development, taking into account diversified needs and changing circumstances. In order to complement national development efforts, we call on all countries whose policies have an impact on developing countries to increase their efforts to formulate policies consistent with the objectives of sustained growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development of developing countries.”</p>	<p>The EU’s approach to PCD during the first part of the period of evaluation has been framed within the EU’s commitment to the MDGs. The Doha declaration called for international financial and development institutions to commit to policy coherence for development; and explicitly called developed countries to increase efforts for coherence of their policies with poverty eradication, sustained growth and development when these policies had an impact on developing countries.</p>
<p>2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (Addis Ababa Action Agenda) The final text of the outcome document adopted at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13–16</p>	<p>The commitments leading to the coherence of policies in the three dimensions of sustainable development in a global partnership and explicitly stating the need to assess the impact of policies on sustainable development are related to the following provisions:</p> <p>“5. Solutions can be found, including through strengthening public policies, regulatory frameworks and finance at all levels, unlocking the transformative potential of people and the private sector, and incentivizing changes in financing as well as consumption and production patterns to support sustainable development. We recognize that appropriate incentives, strengthening national and international policy environments and regulatory frameworks and their coherence, harnessing</p>	<p>In addition to reaffirm the commitments of the Monterrey Consensus, this action agenda committed to pursue policy coherence and an enabling environment for sustainable development at all levels and by all actors in the global partnership for sustainable development. It recognised the need to enhance policy coherence across all three dimensions of sustainable</p>

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<p>July 2015) and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 69/313 of 27 July 2015</p>	<p>the potential of science, technology and innovation, closing technology gaps and scaling up capacity-building at all levels are essential for the shift towards sustainable development and poverty eradication.</p> <p>9. (...) At the same time, national development efforts need to be supported by an enabling international economic environment, including coherent and mutually supporting world trade, monetary and financial systems, and strengthened and enhanced global economic governance. Processes to develop and facilitate the availability of appropriate knowledge and technologies globally, as well as capacity-building, are also critical. We commit to pursuing policy coherence and an enabling environment for sustainable development at all levels and by all actors, and to reinvigorating the global partnership for sustainable development.</p> <p>103. Monterrey emphasized the importance of continuing to improve global economic governance and to strengthen the United Nations leadership role in promoting development. Monterrey also emphasized the importance of the coherence and consistency of the international financial and monetary and trading systems in support of development. Since Monterrey we have become increasingly aware of the need to take account of economic, social and environmental challenges, including the loss of biodiversity, natural disasters and climate change, and to enhance policy coherence across all three dimensions of sustainable development. We will take measures to improve and enhance global economic governance and to arrive at a stronger, more coherent and more inclusive and representative international architecture for sustainable development, while respecting the mandates of respective organizations. We recognize the importance of policy coherence for sustainable development and we call upon countries to assess the impact of their policies on sustainable development.</p> <p>113. Building on the vision of the Monterrey Consensus, we resolve to strengthen the coherence and consistency of multilateral financial, investment, trade, and development policy and environment institutions and platforms, and increase cooperation between major international institutions, while respecting mandates and governance structures. We commit to taking better advantage of relevant United Nations forums for promoting universal and holistic coherence and international commitments to sustainable development.”</p>	<p>development and the need to “take account of economic, social and environmental challenges, including the loss of biodiversity, natural disasters and climate change”. It finally acknowledged the importance of policy coherence for sustainable development. This Action plan called “upon countries to assess the impact of their policies on sustainable development”.</p>
<p>Resolution A/RES/70/1 adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015- Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015)</p>	<p>The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development follows on from and seeks to build on the MDG and sets out 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets for all countries to achieve by 2030.</p> <p>Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) is recognized under goal 17, systemic issues.</p> <p>The 17 SDGs are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all 	<p>The adoption of the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development has called for “policy coherence for sustainable development” under Goal 17. Following the adoption of the 2030 Agenda on SDG, the new European Development Consensus reaffirms the EU’s commitment to PCD and states its fundamental role as part of the EU’s contribution to achieving the SDGs and to the broader objective of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD).</p>

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	<p>Goal 7 Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all</p> <p>Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all</p> <p>Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation</p> <p>Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries</p> <p>Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable</p> <p>Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns</p> <p>Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts (acknowledging that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change).</p> <p>Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development</p> <p>Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss</p> <p>Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels</p> <p>Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development.</p>	
Challenge area: Trade and Finance		
<p>United Nations High-level Conference on World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development – 1-3 June 2009</p> <p>Outcome of United Nations Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development</p>	<p>In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the international community called for joint efforts to ensure developing countries coped with the situation:</p> <p>“4. Developing countries are now bearing the brunt of this crisis, for which they are least responsible. The ongoing food and fuel crises have only compounded the effect of the financial and economic collapse, and exacerbated the burdens and sorrows of the developing world. Nonetheless, the destiny of developed and developing countries in an interdependent world and a globalised economy is inextricably linked. Therefore, short-term stabilization measures must protect the poor, and long-term measures must ensure sustainable financial flows while simultaneously reducing the likelihood of future crises.</p> <p>6. This Conference represents the beginning of an ongoing and concerted engagement of the entire global community with the pillars of our financial architecture. We stand at the crossroads of growth and development; and at the threshold of a new era of global fiscal responsibility and people-centred progress. The bedrock ethics and values of our common humanity must also inform our global financial interactions, and cannot be sacrificed on the altar of reckless speculation or onerous conditionality. Our continued pursuit of profit and economic growth must be leavened by our collective responsibilities in the satisfaction of human needs, the realization of human rights and the achievement of human security.</p> <p>26. Globalization and free trade have been important drivers, among other factors, for economic growth and prosperity, and the global recovery from this financial and economic crisis, and our future global resilience, require a speedy conclusion of the WTO Doha Round and provision of much needed trade finance. The crisis has also emphasized the importance of achieving the true development outcome of the Doha Round. We therefore reiterate our commitment to an early</p>	<p>The Conference recognized the interdependence of the developed and developing countries and the effects of the crisis on the latter. The international community called for actions in diverse areas but mainly linking for instance commitments to the Doha Round, the elimination of agricultural export subsidies, to the support to developing countries. The Council conclusions on the related topic of the Conference promoted a position based on PCD to ensure that measures to tackle the economic and financial crisis took full account of their impact on developing countries (Council Conclusions on Supporting developing countries in coping with the crisis of 18 May 2009, 2943rd External relations Council meeting).</p>

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	<p>conclusion to the Doha Round that places the needs of the developing countries at the centre, to implement duty-free and quota free-access to least developed countries, to the principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries, to the elimination of agricultural export subsidies, as agreed in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, and other trade distorting agricultural subsidies, and to meeting our existing aid for trade pledges. We agree to explore the possibility to bring forward the implementation of already agreed measures to support the most vulnerable developing countries. We undertake to resist protectionist tendencies and rectify any protectionist measures already taken. In this context, we reiterate the importance of monitoring and reporting on new barriers to trade and investments. We should also resist unfair treatment of migrant labourers and the imposition of undue restrictions on labour migration.”</p>	
Challenge area: Food Security		
<p>Resolution A/RES/64/159 64/159. The right to food adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2009</p>	<p>Recognizing that the complex character of the global food crisis, in which the right to adequate food is threatened to be violated on a massive scale, is a combination of several major factors, such as the global financial and economic crisis, environmental degradation, desertification and the impacts of global climate change, as well as natural disasters and the lack in many countries of the appropriate technology, investment and capacity-building necessary to confront its impact, particularly in developing countries, least developed countries and small island developing States</p> <p>1. Reaffirms that hunger constitutes an outrage and a violation of human dignity and therefore requires the adoption of urgent measures at the national, regional and international levels for its elimination;</p> <p>2. Also reaffirms the right of everyone to have access to safe, sufficient and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, so as to be able to fully develop and maintain his or her physical and mental capacities;</p> <p>18. Stresses the need to make efforts to mobilize and optimize the allocation and utilization of technical and financial resources from all sources, including external debt relief for developing countries, and to reinforce national actions to implement sustainable food security policies;</p> <p>20. Stresses that all States should make all efforts to ensure that their international policies of a political and economic nature, including international trade agreements, do not have a negative impact on the right to food in other countries;</p>	<p>In addressing the food crisis, the UNGA recognized the interrelated factors stemming from different areas and called for countries to make efforts to ensure their policies do not have a negative impact in the right to food of other countries.</p>
Challenge area: Climate Change and Environment		
<p>21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in from 30 November to 13 December 2015 in Paris UNFCCC - FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1- Conference of the Parties Decision 1/CP.21 – Adoption of the Paris Agreement Paris Agreement 12 December 2015</p>	<p>The Paris Agreement (UNFCCC - FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1- Conference of the Parties Decision 1/CP.21) establishes under articles 9 and 10 that developed country Parties shall provide financial resources and mobilise climate finance to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation, and promote cooperative action in technology development and transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.</p> <p>Article 2.2. This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.”</p>	<p>The international commitments (the EU has completed ratification of the Paris Agreement) regarding the developed countries responsibilities towards developing ones on mitigation and adaptation point out/suggest to the need for PCD approach.</p>

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	<p>Article 9 1. Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention. 2. Other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily. 3. As part of a global effort, developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds, through a variety of actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties. Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts.</p> <p>Article 10 1. Parties share a long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology development and transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 2. Parties, noting the importance of technology for the implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions under this Agreement and recognizing existing technology deployment and dissemination efforts, shall strengthen cooperative action on technology development and transfer.</p> <p>Developed country Parties shall provide transparent and consistent information on support for developing country Parties provided and mobilized through public interventions biennially</p>	
<p>UN General Assembly Resolution 69/314 on Tackling Illicit Trafficking in Wildlife, adopted by the General Assembly on 30 July 2015</p>	<p><i>“Emphasizing that the protection of wildlife must be part of a comprehensive approach to achieving poverty eradication, food security, sustainable development, including the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, economic growth, social well-being and sustainable livelihoods,</i></p> <p>3.<i>Urges</i> Member States to take decisive steps at the national level to prevent, combat and eradicate the illegal trade in wildlife, on both the supply and demand sides, including by strengthening the legislation necessary for the prevention, investigation and prosecution of such illegal trade as well as strengthening enforcement and criminal justice responses, in accordance with national legislation and international law, acknowledging that the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime can provide valuable technical assistance in this regard;”</p> <p>Already in 2012, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development Rio+20 recognised that addressing the economic, social and environmental impacts of illicit trafficking in wildlife required action on both the supply and demand sides.</p>	<p>In 2015 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 69/314 on tackling illicit trafficking in wildlife, recognising that it contributes to damage to ecosystems and rural livelihoods, including those based on ecotourism; undermines good governance and the rule of law and in some cases; threatens national stability and requires enhanced regional cooperation and coordination in response. It also emphasized that wildlife protection required a comprehensive approach to achieving poverty eradication, food security, sustainable development, including the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, economic growth, social well-being and sustainable livelihoods.</p>
<p>UN Conference on Sustainable Development Rio+20 – Outcome document Resolution A/RES/66/288 The future we want, adopted by the General Assembly on 27 July 2012</p>	<p>“1. We, the Heads of State and Government and high-level representatives, having met at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 20 to 22 June 2012, with the full participation of civil society, renew our commitment to sustainable development and to ensuring the promotion of an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable future for our planet and for present and future generations. 2. Poverty eradication is the greatest global challenge facing the world today and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development. In this regard, we are committed to freeing humanity from poverty and hunger as a matter of urgency.</p>	<p>Rio+20 confirmed the engagement of the international community on an integrated approach to sustainable development in its three dimensions. The EU’s position for this conference was an approach focused on strengthening the coherence and enhancing the linkages between the environmental, economic and</p>

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	<p>3. We therefore acknowledge the need to further mainstream sustainable development at all levels, integrating economic, social and environmental aspects and recognizing their interlinkages, so as to achieve sustainable development in all its dimensions. 4. We recognize that poverty eradication, changing unsustainable and promoting sustainable patterns of consumption and production and protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and social development are the overarching objectives of and essential requirements for sustainable development. We also reaffirm the need to achieve sustainable development by promoting sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth, creating greater opportunities for all, reducing inequalities, raising basic standards of living, fostering equitable social development and inclusion, and promoting the integrated and sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystems that supports, inter alia, economic, social and human development while facilitating ecosystem conservation, regeneration and restoration and resilience in the face of new and emerging challenges. 5. We reaffirm our commitment to make every effort to accelerate the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. 6. We recognize that people are at the centre of sustainable development and, in this regard, we strive for a world that is just, equitable and inclusive, and we commit to work together to promote sustained and inclusive economic growth, social development and environmental protection and thereby to benefit all.</p> <p>13. We recognize that opportunities for people to influence their lives and future, participate in decision-making and voice their concerns are fundamental for sustainable development. We underscore that sustainable development requires concrete and urgent action. It can only be achieved with a broad alliance of people, governments, civil society and the private sector, all working together to secure the future we want for present and future generations.</p> <p>40. We call for holistic and integrated approaches to sustainable development that will guide humanity to live in harmony with nature and lead to efforts to restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem.</p> <p>C. Environmental pillar in the context of sustainable development</p> <p>87. We reaffirm the need to strengthen international environmental governance within the context of the institutional framework for sustainable development in order to promote a balanced integration of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development, as well as coordination within the United Nations system.</p> <p>89. We recognize the significant contributions to sustainable development made by the multilateral environmental agreements. (...) We encourage parties to multilateral environmental agreements to consider further” The Conference also adopted ground-breaking guidelines on green economy policies</p>	<p>social dimensions of sustainable development, and on contributing the achievement of the MDGs by 2015 (Conclusions 118th Environment Council meeting: Rio+20 towards achieving sustainable development by greening the economy and improving governance, 31 October 2011).</p>
<p>Challenge area: Migration UN Declaration of the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, Resolution 68/4 adopted by the General Assembly on 3 October 2013</p>	<p>1. Recognize that international migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, and in this regard, recognize that international migration is a cross-cutting phenomenon that should be addressed in a coherent, comprehensive and balanced manner, integrating development with due regard for social, economic and environmental dimensions and respecting human rights;</p>	<p>The UNGA declaration recognized the interlinkages of international migration and development, and called for a coherent, comprehensive approach to integrate social, economic, environmental, and</p>

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	<p>2. Acknowledge the important contribution made by migrants and migration to development in countries of origin, transit and destination, as well as the complex interrelationship between migration and development;</p> <p>3. Decide to work towards an effective and inclusive agenda on international migration that integrates development and respects human rights by improving the performance of existing institutions and frameworks, as well as partnering more effectively with all stakeholders involved in international migration and development at the regional and global levels;</p> <p>31. Call upon all relevant bodies, agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system, other relevant intergovernmental, regional and sub-regional organizations, including the International Organization for Migration and other Global Migration Group members, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on International Migration and Development, within their respective mandates, to strengthen their collaboration and cooperation to better and fully address the issue of international migration and development, in order to adopt a coherent, comprehensive and coordinated approach, and to consider migration issues in their contributions to the preparatory process that will establish the post-2015 development agenda;</p>	<p>human rights dimensions in addressing migration.</p>
<p>Resolution 2014A/RES/69/229 on International migration and development adopted by the General Assembly on 19 December 2014</p>	<p>Recognizes that international migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, and in this regard, recognizes that international migration is a cross-cutting phenomenon that should be addressed in a coherent, comprehensive and balanced manner, integrating development with due regard for social, economic and environmental dimensions and respecting human rights;</p> <p>3. Also recognizes the need to strengthen synergies between international migration and development at all levels, including the global, regional, national and local levels, as appropriate;</p> <p>4. Acknowledges the complexity of migratory flows and that international migration movements also occur within the same geographical regions, and in this context, calls for a better understanding of migration patterns across and within regions, regardless of the level of development;</p> <p>5. Reaffirms the need to promote and protect effectively the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all migrants, regardless of their migration status, especially those of women and children, and to address international migration through international, regional or bilateral cooperation and dialogue and through a comprehensive and balanced approach, recognizing the roles and responsibilities of countries of origin, transit and destination in promoting and protecting the human rights of all migrants, and avoiding approaches that might aggravate their vulnerability;</p> <p>Expresses concern about legislation adopted by some States that results in measures and practices that may restrict the human rights and fundamental freedoms of migrants, and reaffirms that, when exercising their sovereign right to enact and implement migratory and border security measures, States have the duty to comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law, in order to ensure full respect for the human rights of migrants;</p> <p>7. Recognizes the need for international cooperation to address, in a holistic and comprehensive manner, the challenges of irregular migration to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration, with full respect for human rights;”</p>	<p>The resolution reiterated the approach to the nexus migration and development, but further recognized the need to strengthen synergies between the two areas. I also called for a balance approach when exercising migratory and border security measures.</p>

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<p>UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting on Refugees and Migrants Resolution A/RES/71/ adopted by the General Assembly on 19 September 2016 - New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants</p>	<p>“7. Large movements of refugees and migrants have political, economic, social, developmental, humanitarian and human rights ramifications, which cross all borders. These are global phenomena that call for global approaches and global solutions. No one State can manage such movements on its own. Neighbouring or transit countries, mostly developing countries, are disproportionately affected. Their capacities have been severely stretched in many cases, affecting their own social and economic cohesion and development. In addition, protracted refugee crises are now commonplace, with long-term repercussions for those involved and for their host countries and communities. Greater international cooperation is needed to assist host countries and communities.</p> <p>11. We acknowledge a shared responsibility to manage large movements of refugees and migrants in a humane, sensitive, compassionate and people-centred manner. We will do so through international cooperation, while recognizing that there are varying capacities and resources to respond to these movements. International cooperation and, in particular, cooperation among countries of origin or nationality, transit and destination, has never been more important; “win-win” cooperation in this area has profound benefits for humanity. Large movements of refugees and migrants must have comprehensive policy support, assistance and protection, consistent with States’ obligations under international law. We also recall our obligations to fully respect their human rights and fundamental freedoms, and we stress their need to live their lives in safety and dignity. We pledge our support to those affected today as well as to those who will be part of future large movements.</p> <p>12. We are determined to address the root causes of large movements of refugees and migrants, including through increased efforts aimed at early prevention of crisis situations based on preventive diplomacy. We will address them also through the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflict, greater coordination of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts, the promotion of the rule of law at the national and international levels and the protection of human rights. Equally, we will address movements caused by poverty, instability, marginalization and exclusion and the lack of development and economic opportunities, with particular reference to the most vulnerable populations. We will work with countries of origin to strengthen their capacities.”</p>	<p>The resolution established a series of commitments towards refugees and migrants, and recognized that the migratory crisis required a global approach addressing the root causes. The 2016 Council Conclusions on the EU’s approach to forced displacement and development, adopted for its position at the UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting on Refugees and Migrants, “a more coherent and holistic global approach to forced displacement, as part of the broader migration agenda.”</p>
Challenge area: Security		
<p>Resolution S/RES/2253 (2015) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7587th meeting, on 17 December 2015</p>	<p>“Recognizing that development, security, and human rights are mutually reinforcing and are vital to an effective and comprehensive approach to countering terrorism, and underlining that a particular goal of counter-terrorism strategies should be to ensure sustainable peace and security”.</p>	<p>The Security Council established a series of measures to combat terrorism, and recognizing it as a threat to international peace and security, acknowledged that collective efforts required a comprehensive approach including development measures.</p>
Other areas		
<p>UNGA Resolution A/RES/70/125 on Outcome document of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on the overall review of the implementation of the</p>	<p>This resolution called mainly on the following commitments with respect to the digital divide and developing countries: “5. We recognize that increased connectivity, innovation and access played a critical role in enabling progress on the Millennium Development Goals, and we call for close alignment between the World Summit on the Information Society process and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable</p>	<p>The 2015 UNGA Resolution on information society recognized that increased connectivity and innovation played a critical role to enable progress of MDGs and highlighted the cross-cutting</p>

UN Resolutions	Key features related to PCD	Assessment
<p>outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society, adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 2015</p>	<p>Development highlighting the crosscutting contribution of information and communications technology to the Sustainable Development Goals and poverty eradication, and noting that access to information and communications technologies has also become a development indicator and aspiration in and of itself.”</p> <p>“6. We express concern, however, that there are still significant digital divides, such as between and within countries and between women and men, which need to be addressed through, among other actions, strengthened enabling policy environments and international cooperation...”</p> <p>“12. We commit to harnessing the potential of information and communications technologies to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and other internationally agreed development goals, noting that they can accelerate progress across all 17 Sustainable Development Goals. We accordingly call upon all Governments, the private sector, civil society, international organizations, the technical and academic communities and all other relevant stakeholders to integrate information and communications technologies into their approaches to implementing the Goals...”</p> <p>“30. We recognize that a lack of access to affordable and reliable technologies and services remains a critical challenge in many developing countries, particularly African countries, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States and middle-income countries, as well as countries in situations of conflict, post-conflict countries and countries affected by natural disasters. All efforts should be deployed to reduce the price of information and communications technologies and broadband access, bearing in mind that deliberate interventions, including through research and development and technology transfer on mutually agreed terms, may be necessary to spur lower-cost connectivity options.”</p> <p>“31. In building the information society, States are strongly urged to take steps with a view to the avoidance of, and refrain from, any unilateral measure not in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations that impedes the full achievement of economic and social development and hinders the well-being of the people of the affected countries.”</p> <p>“52. ...We reiterate our belief that a global culture of cybersecurity needs to be promoted and developed and that cybersecurity measures should be implemented in cooperation with all stakeholders and international expert bodies in order to foster trust and security in the information society.”</p> <p>“61. We recognize that there is a need to promote greater participation and engagement in the Internet governance discussions of Governments, the private sector, civil society, international organizations, the technical and academic communities and all other relevant stakeholders from developing countries, particularly African countries, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States and middle-income countries, as well as countries in situations of conflict, post-conflict countries and countries affected by natural disasters. We call for strengthened, stable, transparent and voluntary funding mechanisms to this end.”</p>	<p>contribution of ICT to poverty eradication and SDGs, calling for action to bridge digital divides between developed and developing countries, as well as the gender digital divide, through strengthened enabling policy environments and international cooperation. The UNGA resolution also recognized the critical importance of particularly including developing countries in the digital economy. Fixed and wireless broadband, mobile Internet, smartphones and tablets, cloud computing, open data, social media and big data are understood to be significant enablers of sustainable development. But also, cyber-security and further divides that can emerge in the future could slow sustainable development and threaten development benefits.</p>

ANNEX 8: SUMMARY TABLE – OVERVIEW OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE 13 POLICIES SELECTED FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS UNDER LEVEL 2

This Annex consists of a summary table providing an overview of the analysis of the 13 policies selected for further analysis under Level 2, per relevant indicator (see below).

No	Selected Policy	I 5.1.4 Qualitative assessment of IAs assessing the economic, social or environmental impacts in developing countries / number of missed opportunities identified	I 5.2.1 Development objectives, needs or issues particular to developing countries addressed by the policy / missed opportunities ¹³²	I 5.2.2 Contribution of PCD mechanisms or other factors external to the Commission (EP, international commitments)	I 5.3.1 Number and nature of specific cross-cutting issues linked to developing countries that (i) have been considered; (ii) could have been considered (missed opportunities)
1.	Common Agricultural Policy (2013 reform) ¹³³	Given that the IA considered – at least to some extent – the potential impacts of the policy on developing countries, the CAP reform does not appear to be a “missed opportunity”. However, a critical analysis of the reform process shows that while development concerns were indeed present at the technical preparatory stage of the policy process (i.e. during stakeholder consultations in preparation of the IA as well as in the IA), they disappeared early on in the political decision-making procedure and were not much reflected in the final regulations through specific clauses to mitigate these impacts.	The impact of the 2013 CAP reform on developing countries was never a top priority for policy makers. The focus was rather on the efficiency of the EU internal market via inter alia the “greening” of the CAP and the deepening of the market-oriented reforms (reduction of export subsidies, decoupling of subsidies) that had been achieved under the previous reforms. As such, regulations linked to the 2013 CAP Reform do not include any explicit clauses/measures to mitigate effects on developing countries, nor do they include any reference neither to developmental issues nor to food security.	There is no evidence that PCD mechanisms such as the IA, or the ISC consultations played a major role in the setting up of the 2013 CAP reform. This can be explained partly by the fact that the impact of a policy on developing countries is difficult to establish in the absence of a reliable impact assessment methodology. In fact, it has been reported that DEVCO had attempted to develop a quantitative impact assessment model at the IA stage, but that the results of the analysis were ultimately considered to be not robust enough to be included in the final version of the IA.	An indirect link could be established between the CAP reform and the following cross-cutting issues: environment and climate change sustainability. Although these cross cutting measures focused on the EU internal market, they nonetheless have an impact also on developing countries because by reducing the intensity of production they reduce supply, while the measures addressing climate change contribute to attain that global challenge.
2.	Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) Regulation ¹³⁴	The GSP regulation, even though it was developed under the leadership of DG Trade (and not DEVCO) has a primary development objective ¹³⁵ . As such it is not surprising that the Impact Assessment took account of development objectives.	The GSP Regulation addresses 2 main development objectives, needs or issues particular to development: (i) Sustainable development through reduction or elimination of EU import tariffs, incentivising exports from beneficiary countries and reducing the transactional costs. (ii) Respect of fundamental international conventions through the ratification and implementation by beneficiary countries of 27 international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance	Given the strong political will from the onset of the formulation process to address development considerations, the need for PCD mechanisms was arguably not as strong as for other purely internal policies that do not have an obvious development dimension. Nevertheless, there is some evidence of the contribution of PCD mechanisms at the formulation process: Interviews with stakeholders confirmed that DG DEVCO was involved at the policy formulation stage and submitted written comments to the proposal regulation.	The GSP directly addresses cross-cutting issues in developing countries through the ratification and implementation by beneficiary countries of 27 international conventions on: Human and labour rights; and environmental protection and good governance. This applies exclusively to GSP+ under Art 9.1 (b) of the regulation.

¹³² Those policies and initiatives which have not been (or only marginally) influenced by the use of PCD mechanisms. This inventory will come from the analysis undertaken at level 2. Explanatory factors for the lack of outputs will be provided.

¹³³ Regulation No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005; Regulation No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008; Regulation No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009; Regulation No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007.

¹³⁴ Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008.

¹³⁵ The objective of GSP is not only developmental: GSP also supports EU businesses’ competitiveness by lowering the costs of imported components.

No	Selected Policy	I 5.1.4 Qualitative assessment of IAs assessing the economic, social or environmental impacts in developing countries / number of missed opportunities identified	I 5.2.1 Development objectives, needs or issues particular to developing countries addressed by the policy / missed opportunities ¹³²	I 5.2.2 Contribution of PCD mechanisms or other factors external to the Commission (EP, international commitments)	I 5.3.1 Number and nature of specific cross-cutting issues linked to developing countries that (i) have been considered; (ii) could have been considered (missed opportunities)
3.	“Trade for All” Communication ¹³⁶	No impact assessment has been carried out for this policy given its nature (enunciation of a set of principles rather than tangible policy measures). As such, the absence of Impact Assessment does not constitute a missed opportunity.	Explicit references to development objectives, needs or issues particular to developing countries are made in relation to the implementation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). This also applies inter alia to the Generalised System of Preferences, Aid for Trade, and improving transparency and countering illicit cross-border flows and tax evasion. Further references are found in relation to the Commission's Better Regulation Package, containing revised Impact Assessments guidelines and a "Tool Box" for assessing potential impacts of future EU initiatives on developing countries at an early stage of the preparation of an initiative. Given the above, the content of the Trade for All Communication does not constitute a missed opportunity.	The initial decision to include development considerations in the Communication was politically motivated and not directly linked to PCD mechanisms. However, findings from interviews suggest that during the ISC, DEVCO made several amendments to the Communication in order to strengthen its development considerations. Indeed, the Trade for All Communication reasserts the importance of values such as social and environmental standards in the context of trade agreements, both of which could potentially be detrimental to development objectives. From this perspective, there is some evidence of the influence of PCD mechanisms (ISC).	The Communication is closely linked to the following cross-cutting issues of human rights, gender equality, democracy, good governance, children's rights, indigenous people's rights, environment and climate change sustainability, not only in the EU but also in developing countries.
4.	EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking ¹³⁷	Policy has not required an IA as the purpose of the Communication is to set out strategic orientations. Nevertheless, the ISC process has involved an inter-service group with DGs DEVCO, HOME, TAXUD, TRADE, JUST, the SG and the EEAS. Interviews with stakeholders confirmed that the needs of developing countries have been considered all along the policy making process, as they are part of the root causes of wildlife trafficking (i.e. poverty). A supporting SWD accompanying the policy identifies the impact of wildlife trafficking in the EU and in developing countries. In this regard, the SWD explicitly refers to the economic impact of wildlife trafficking on tourism and government revenue in source countries.	The EUAP against Wildlife Trafficking includes specific provisions related to the needs of developing countries as source countries of wildlife trafficking, and are aimed at the involvement of local communities in wildlife conservation, providing them with alternative livelihoods, and aimed at strategic support and coordination with developing countries. Needs of developing countries are addressed in pillar one – prevention – since issues such as poverty, conflict, are part of the root causes of wildlife trafficking. No specific reference to “indigenous people's rights” is mentioned, even though that the consultation process pointed out to the “adverse effects of actions supporting the combat against wildlife crime on Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs)”. The	Despite specific provisions related to the needs of source countries of wildlife trafficking, and the policy's overall objective of sustainable development, it has not been possible to establish the specific contribution of PCD mechanisms. Findings from interviews confirmed that even though wildlife trafficking had been a concern for a while, it had reached a momentum given the growing levels of poaching and its relationship with fuelling illicit transactions. There had been a recognition of the need to involve local communities to address the root causes of wildlife trafficking. In addition, there had been external factors pushing for a comprehensive approach (pressure to take action since Rio+20 and UNGA Resolution 69/314 on tackling illicit traffic of wildlife); and given a report	Environment sustainability is at the heart of the EUAP against Wildlife Trafficking, as well as good governance since “trafficking is strongly linked to corruption and illicit money flows, for instance through money laundering, and affects the rule of law and good governance negatively”. No specific reference to “indigenous people's rights” is mentioned despite the fact that indigenous peoples might rely on wildlife for their own livelihoods, their traditional knowledge and tenure over wildlife resources.

¹³⁶ Communication “Trade for All – Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy”, COM(2015) 497 final.

¹³⁷ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2016) 87 final.

No	Selected Policy	I 5.1.4 Qualitative assessment of IAs assessing the economic, social or environmental impacts in developing countries / number of missed opportunities identified	I 5.2.1 Development objectives, needs or issues particular to developing countries addressed by the policy / missed opportunities ¹³²	I 5.2.2 Contribution of PCD mechanisms or other factors external to the Commission (EP, international commitments)	I 5.3.1 Number and nature of specific cross-cutting issues linked to developing countries that (i) have been considered; (ii) could have been considered (missed opportunities)
			stakeholder interviewed confirmed that no specific mention of indigenous peoples had been made as there had been a preference for a wider approach extensive to all local communities.	from UNODC, 2014 EP resolution, and recent link of wildlife trafficking to security and financing of terrorism.	
5.	Common Fisheries Policy (2013 reform) ¹³⁸	The IA accompanying the Proposal for the CFP reform explicitly analyses four policy options against their economic, social and environmental impact to third countries, and considers for each option the external dimension.	The CFP details specific objectives related to the needs of developing countries particularly of those third countries EEZ. The external dimension of the CFP is based on obtaining fishing rights from either FPAs “All FPAs negotiated since 2004 have not only a commercial dimension but also a development dimension”. “The latest generation of FPAs has contributed to improving the implementation of fisheries policies in partner countries, through support of activities in areas such as science, monitoring, control and surveillance, as well as infrastructure. In addition, they provided a transparent legal framework for the EU external fleet to fish in third country waters and allow control of its the presence and activities there.”	The contribution of PCD mechanisms to the CFP reform is difficult to assess with certainty since many provisions contained in the reform and notably FPA related clauses were actually already being implemented long before the formulation of the regulation, and as such 2013 reform policy often “formalized” practices that were already in place. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that PCD mechanisms played a formal role during the process. The Impact Assessment which laid the foundation for the policy choice did take into account the development impact of the CFP, and the subsequent ISC gave the opportunity to DG DEVCO to voice a positive opinion on the retained policy option (with minor comments).	The 2013 CFP reform inherently takes into account the following cross-cutting issues in developing countries: good governance, environment.
6.	Country by Country Reporting ¹³⁹	Part II of the Impact Assessment focuses exclusively on “financial disclosures on a country-by-country basis” which is the also the basis for the “development” element of the Directive: Chapter 9 of the Directive which aims at increasing transparency of the payments made by the (EU) mining and logging industries to governments (of resources rich developing countries). Based on independent assessment of the IA by the evaluation team, it appears that the level	The development objectives, needs or issues particular to developing countries (resources rich developing countries in this specific case) are clearly addressed by the policy in Chapter which introduces a new obligation for listed and large non-listed extractive and logging companies to report all material payments to governments broken down by country and by project, when these payments have been attributed to a specific project. While the negative opinion expressed by DG DEVCO	PCD mechanisms such as the Impact Assessment and Inter-Service Consultations played an important “technical” role during the policy formulation process as explained above. However, it appears that the decision to include a CBCR Chapter in the Financial Directive was made well before these PCD mechanisms were launched. Factors such as political will and the external context seem to have played a major role in the inclusion of	Cross cutting issues are an inherent aspect of the CBCR Chapter. In terms of direct contribution to cross-cutting issues, the policy objective of CBCR is to increase transparency in resources rich countries and as such is closely linked to the cross-cutting issue of good governance in developing countries. In terms of indirect contribution to cross-cutting issues, and given the poor working condition prevailing in the mining sector, increased transparency in extractive industries could also have

¹³⁸ Regulation (EU) no 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 December 2013 of the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No. 1954/2003 and (EC) No. 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No. 2371/2002 and (EC) No. 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC.

¹³⁹ Directive 2013/34/EU on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of businesses + Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1910 of 28 October 2016 on the equivalence of the reporting requirements of certain third countries on payments to governments to the requirements of Chapter 10 of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (Text with EEA relevance).

No	Selected Policy	I 5.1.4 Qualitative assessment of IAs assessing the economic, social or environmental impacts in developing countries / number of missed opportunities identified	I 5.2.1 Development objectives, needs or issues particular to developing countries addressed by the policy / missed opportunities ¹³²	I 5.2.2 Contribution of PCD mechanisms or other factors external to the Commission (EP, international commitments)	I 5.3.1 Number and nature of specific cross-cutting issues linked to developing countries that (i) have been considered; (ii) could have been considered (missed opportunities)
		of detail and quality of the assessment of the potential impact of CBCR on developing countries is very high. In particular, all policy options were assessed against the policy objective of “increased transparency” which was the main interest of resources rich developing countries	might suggest that the policy option retained could have gone further in terms of addressing the needs of developing countries, a number of other elements suggest that the introduction of the CBCR Chapter in the Directive is actually a case of best practice in terms of exploiting synergies during the formulation of non-development policies.	the CBCR Chapter in the Financial Directive	potential benefits on other issues such as: human rights, children’s rights, indigenous people’s rights, environment and climate change sustainability.
7.	Raw Materials Initiative (RMI) ¹⁴⁰	No IA was conducted for the RMI, but both the 2008 and 2011 Communications and various related official documents by the EP and Council make reference to development issues in countries of origin for the EU supply chains, in relation to governance in particular, as well as agriculture and food crises. Some specific countries with security risks have been identified in relations to the Critical Raw Material.	The two communications of 2008 and 2011 define some general expected results in terms of development. The 2008 RMI communication makes reference to supporting developing countries (inter alia the first pillar of the RMI “Access to raw materials on world markets at undistorted conditions” includes references to development and the needs of developing countries). The 2011 Communication includes further references to development objectives and an element of the strategy outlined in the Communication is the need for transparency and a “raw materials diplomacy” anchored in wider policies towards third countries to promote good governance, non-proliferation and regional stability, among others.	The RMI is mentioned in the 2008CWP screening, but the 2010 CWP screening did not include the 2011 RMI communication and research undertaken by the evaluation team did not confirm the contribution of PCD mechanisms / DG DEVCO to the development of the policy. DG DEVCO however commented on the policies as part of the ISC. Other internal and external contributing factors not directly linked to the EU PCD approach might have played a role in ensuring the developmental nature of the policy: (i) the Commission is generally committed to supporting respect for international CSR instruments; (ii) the 2011 RMI communication makes direct reference to several international instruments that aim to improve governance, transparency and accountability (EITI, OECD, Kimberley process), illustrating some external coherence.	The following cross-cutting issues have been mentioned in the Communications and in the RMI Strategic Implementation Plan: good governance, human rights, combating child labour, and environmental protection. It is not clear however to what extent corporate social responsibility is actually supported. Also, the issue of climate change and what it entails in terms of demographics and access to materials is not clearly included, as well as issues such as forced labour, and gender perspective on material exploitation. A missed opportunity could be the promotion of responsible supply chain to the EU as a comparative advantage owing the various regulations, and hence providing some level of guarantee, in terms of market access and mitigation of harmful / abusive practices.

¹⁴⁰ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “The raw materials initiative — meeting our critical needs for growth and jobs in Europe” COM (2008) 699 final; and Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Tackling the Challenges in Commodity Markets and on Raw Materials”, COM(2011) 25 final.

No	Selected Policy	I 5.1.4 Qualitative assessment of IAs assessing the economic, social or environmental impacts in developing countries / number of missed opportunities identified	I 5.2.1 Development objectives, needs or issues particular to developing countries addressed by the policy / missed opportunities ¹³²	I 5.2.2 Contribution of PCD mechanisms or other factors external to the Commission (EP, international commitments)	I 5.3.1 Number and nature of specific cross-cutting issues linked to developing countries that (i) have been considered; (ii) could have been considered (missed opportunities)
8.	Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) ¹⁴¹	Policy has not required an IA as the purpose of the Communication is to set out strategic orientations. The ISC process reflects DG DEVCO's specific contribution in the CSWP Migration and Development accompanying the proposal, which defines the approach, scope and depth of what is referred to as "migration and development", one of the four pillars of the GAMM with respect to third countries.	The GAMM as the overarching framework of the EU External Migration Policy addresses the EU's migration challenges but taking also into consideration those priorities of partner countries. Throughout the text, references to development considerations and third countries needs are present given that the rationale behind the GAMM involves an approach in partnership with third countries in order to address migration and mobility issues. The fourth pillar of the GAMM focuses on "maximising the development impact of migration".	The ISC process suggests some evidence of the contribution of PCD mechanisms at the formulation process as DEVCO was involved in the preparation of the CSWP on Migration and Development. However, a strong political will to address development considerations with respect to the GAMM appears as a continuum at the highest level, and suggests a major role on the PCD approach of the policy.	The GAMM addresses "human rights of migrants" as a cross-cutting dimension," mentioning the need to protect and empower "vulnerable migrants, such as unaccompanied minors, asylum-seekers, stateless persons and victims of trafficking". The GAMM also states that "addressing environmentally induced migration, also by means of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change" should be considered as part of the global approach. No specific reference to "gender equality" despite having been set as a target in the PCD Work-programme 2010-2013 under the PCD area of Migration.
9.	Digital Single Market (DSM) Strategy ¹⁴²	Missed opportunity: With respect to the specific example of EECC, there have been no references to PCD by either the Commission (in the proposal for a Regulation), the EUMS (in the context of COREPER) or explicitly within the IA to the policy's likely economic, social or environmental impacts in developing countries. The only indirect reference can be found in the IA executive summary concerning the preferred option: "... <i>the telecoms regulatory framework for electronic communications will continue to be based on the principles of access arrangements based on competition principles. It is not expected to have any effect on third countries.</i> "	Missed opportunity initially, but improvement during implementation: The minimal reference to the "post-2015 development agenda" in the DSM Strategy suggests that PCD was not a high political priority at the policy's inception. Similarly, there were no references to PCD during the Council's deliberations in welcoming the DSM policy. However, the more extensive references to the SDGs and the Digital4Development approach in the Commission's 2017 DSM Mid-Term Review ¹⁴³ suggest a heightened political commitment to PCD.	No evidence of PCD mechanism initially, but improvement during implementation: As confirmed by interviews with DG CONNECT and DG DEVCO, the DSM's contribution to development policy was considered during the DSM Mid-Term Review, but not during the formulation of the policy.	While the economic, social and environmental impacts might be indirect, EECC is an example of the cross-cutting issue of good governance as a "regulatory model" that includes "the telecom framework" that the DSM Mid-Term Review cites as "a strong reference point for many outside Europe who see the need for a stable and predictable legal framework to address the complexities of the digital economy and society". digital economy and society".

¹⁴¹ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility", COM (2011) 743 final.

¹⁴² Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, "A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe", COM (2015) 192 final, 06.05.2015, and accompanying SWD (2015) 100 final "A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe – Analysis and Evidence", 06.05.2015; and various related Regulations, Directives and Decisions.

¹⁴³ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Mid-Term Review on the Implementation of the Digital Single Market Strategy, A Connected Digital Single Market for All, COM (2017) 228 final.

No	Selected Policy	I 5.1.4 Qualitative assessment of IAs assessing the economic, social or environmental impacts in developing countries / number of missed opportunities identified	I 5.2.1 Development objectives, needs or issues particular to developing countries addressed by the policy / missed opportunities ¹³²	I 5.2.2 Contribution of PCD mechanisms or other factors external to the Commission (EP, international commitments)	I 5.3.1 Number and nature of specific cross-cutting issues linked to developing countries that (i) have been considered; (ii) could have been considered (missed opportunities)
10.	Review of the EU Blue Card directive ¹⁴⁴	The IA of the policy proposal includes references to the social and economic impacts of the policy in developing countries. The Annexes of the IA develop the topics of brain drain regarding health care workers, ethical recruitment from developing countries, as well as develops the topic on circular migration (annex 8); remittances (annex 14); and asylum seekers (annex 16). Regarding coherence with other EU policies no reference to PCD is made. However, when referring to expected impacts the IA takes into consideration development issues regarding the migration-development nexus such as “brain drain”, “brain gain”, “remittances” and “circular migration”. No specific mention on gender, despite the fact that promotion of gender balance within EU migration policies and programmes was established as a priority within the PCD Work-Programme 2010-2013.	The proposal for a new EU Blue Card Directive while being specifically designed to regulate legal migration within the EU, as it deals with highly skilled migrant workers from third-countries, it includes specific provisions regarding ethical recruitment from developing countries, in clear reference to the issue of “brain-drain”. The policy proposal has no specific measures to address gender balance. Findings from interviews point out that the proposal addresses the issue by recognising access to the labour market to the accompanying spouse and even lowering the required salary threshold. Stakeholders such as the CoR, the EESC, and the EP refer as a missed opportunity the inclusion of asylum seekers within the scope of the proposal, which is limited to those who have been already granted international protection. ISC process and IA confirm that this issue was left to political steer.	The policy proposal is still pending debate in the EP as part of the co-decision legislative process to approve the new Directive. The available evidence suggests that the IA and the ISC process have to a certain extent enabled the inclusion of development considerations in the proposal with respect to developing countries. However, there is no conclusive evidence of the influence of a PCD approach. The participation of DG DEVCO in this process has not been crucial and some of the development considerations have been the contribution of other DGs, or had been already taken into account in the former Directive. Findings from interviews indicate that despite the widely acknowledged migration-development nexus, when it comes to legal migration within the EU, a balance regarding political priorities has to be reached and development considerations might not necessarily be at the forefront in the current context.	Migration per se has become a cross-cutting issue in the context of the MDGs and SDG. ¹⁴⁵ The policy proposal makes no specific reference to “gender equality” despite having been set as a target in the PCD Work-programme 2010-2013 under the PCD challenge area of Migration.
11.	Responsible sourcing of mineral originating in conflict affected and high-risk areas ¹⁴⁶	The IA does mention in Section 5 “Analysis of impact (including on SMEs)” some potential impacts of selected options on conflict-affected regions/countries (which in practice, as clarified in other sections of the IA report, largely consist of developing countries). However, the analysis of the specific impacts in the DRC or in the	The Regulation includes general references to development objectives but they remain all quite general and theoretical. “Accompanying measures” appear quite limited. It can be noted however that the Regulation, while not explicitly referring to PCD, includes a reference to the need to ensure policy coherence.	The need for PCD, in particular in linking security with development objectives and in facilitating coordination between stakeholders is highlighted in the PCD Work Programme 2010-2013. It is not clear however to what extent it influenced the policy.	Some amendments by the EP to the regulation reinforced the aspect of gender mainstreaming / attention to sexual and gender-based violence. The issue of SGBV, which is related to conflict dynamics, as well as the role of women in the mining sector, has however not been properly tackled.

¹⁴⁴ Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment, COM (2016) 378 final.

¹⁴⁵ UN Declaration of the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, Resolution 68/4 adopted by the General Assembly on 3 October 2013; UN Declaration on International Migration and Development, Resolution 69/229 adopted by the General Assembly on 19 December 2014; UN Declaration on SDG: Transforming our World –The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Resolution 70/1 adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015.

¹⁴⁶ Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council “Responsible sourcing of minerals originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas Towards an integrated EU approach”, JOIN(2014) 8 final, 5 March 2014; and Regulation 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.

No	Selected Policy	I 5.1.4 Qualitative assessment of IAs assessing the economic, social or environmental impacts in developing countries / number of missed opportunities identified	I 5.2.1 Development objectives, needs or issues particular to developing countries addressed by the policy / missed opportunities ¹³²	I 5.2.2 Contribution of PCD mechanisms or other factors external to the Commission (EP, international commitments)	I 5.3.1 Number and nature of specific cross-cutting issues linked to developing countries that (i) have been considered; (ii) could have been considered (missed opportunities)
		Great Lakes region is almost inexistent, and the details of the analysis are not fully explained in the IA. The IA details expected general impacts for each possible option, but this remains quite vague and insufficiently grounded.	In the Communication, a whole section is dedicated to accompanying measures, but only a small section concerns support to development in affected countries, and to the implementation of due diligence.	The changes in the policy mostly came from the Parliament positions, as well as from advocacy work by the civil society organizations to make the regulation mandatory, and not directly from PCD mechanisms. External coherence also contributed to influencing the policy: the Regulation replicates to a lighter extent the US approach from the Dodd Frank Act and the OECD guidance.	Governance over natural resources can relate to other cross-cutting issues, such as environment (cf. the involvement of the EU on DRC national parks for example, or the effects of the climate change on demographics and conflict dynamics), protection and provision of livelihoods for IDPs, child labour.
12.	A policy framework for climate and energy in the period 2020-2030 ¹⁴⁷	There are no systematic references to developing countries in the IA accompanying the Communication “A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 up to 2030”. As said before, in the current EU climate and energy policy framework, objectives have often an internal market dimension – i.e. the required energy infrastructure often has a European dimension. The EP regrets “that although impact assessments represent a significant tool for achieving PCD, assessments of development impacts remain few in number and do not properly address the potential impact on developing countries”	Development objectives particular to developing countries are taken into account in relation to the production of biofuels. As for climate policies, the references to development objectives are scattered in terms of the financial commitments from developed countries. With the exception of the production of biofuels, the EU climate and energy policy does not comprehensibly integrate development objectives concerning the needs of developing countries. The current EU climate and energy framework 2020-2030 “integrates” policy objectives – such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, securing energy supply and supporting competitiveness mostly for/within the EU.	There is no conclusive evidence that would suggest an active role and contribution of PCD mechanisms for this specific policy. However, the absence of contribution of PCD mechanisms during the formulation of the <i>2020-2030 framework for climate and energy policies</i> does not necessarily point out to a systemic problem of a lack of considerations of development objectives in climate change and environmental policies of the EU, as evidenced by recent developments and stakeholders feedback.	The 2030 framework for climate and energy policies aims to reach a low-carbon economy and stimulate demand for new technologies, boost research, development and innovation, and new opportunities for jobs and growth. As such, this addresses the cross-cutting issues of environment and climate change sustainability. While the policy might have an indirect effect in developing countries, the focus of the policy is the EU internal market.
13.	Fourth Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Package ¹⁴⁸	Based on the very limited analysis of the impact of the policy on developing countries in the IA, and in light of the mention in the 2015 Biennial Report that the development dimension of money laundering could have been “demonstrated more clearly” in the Fourth AMLD and Second Transfer	The Fourth AMLD and Second Transfer Regulation makes very little explicit reference to development objectives, needs or issues particular to developing countries in selected non-development policy proposals/initiatives. Reasons for the non-inclusion could not be investigated during the desk phase as it	Given the absence of explicit reference to development needs in the IA or policy documents, the evaluation team assumes that no changes seeking to take into account development objectives introduced which do not result from purpose-built PCD mechanisms.	The Fourth AMLD and Second Transfer Regulation inherently strengthens good governance in the EU and in developing countries, although this cannot directly be linked to the EU PCD Approach.

¹⁴⁷ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030”, Brussels, 22.1.2014. COM (2014) 15 final.

¹⁴⁸ Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and amending Directive 2009/101/EC; and Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information accompanying transfers of funds and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 (Text with EEA relevance).

No	Selected Policy	I 5.1.4 Qualitative assessment of IAs assessing the economic, social or environmental impacts in developing countries / number of missed opportunities identified	I 5.2.1 Development objectives, needs or issues particular to developing countries addressed by the policy / missed opportunities ¹³²	I 5.2.2 Contribution of PCD mechanisms or other factors external to the Commission (EP, international commitments)	I 5.3.1 Number and nature of specific cross-cutting issues linked to developing countries that (i) have been considered; (ii) could have been considered (missed opportunities)
		Regulation which furthermore points to the “divergent views on how to find the right balance between transparency requirements and the reduction of administrative burdens in the financial service market or data protection”, the evaluation team will investigate if the 4th AML package can be considered as a missed opportunity for PCD.	was not possible for the evaluation team to collect ISC records or to meet with the leading DG (see the request for further information sent to DG JUST on 30 May 2017).		

ANNEX 9: COUNTRY NOTES (8 REPORTS)

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Case study: Common Fisheries Policy (2013 reform) Country note: Mauritania

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Rationale for selection of the country

The external dimension of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) provides a framework for the activities of European Union (EU) vessels fishing outside EU waters. This includes bilateral fisheries agreements, which define the rights of access of the EU fleet to fish resources in third country waters: they can be reciprocal agreements based on an exchange of fishing possibilities, or can involve a financial compensation paid to the third country in return for access to its fish resources, as is the case for bilateral fisheries agreements with developing countries in Africa and Oceania.

Criticised for the ‘fish, pay and go’ attitude, in particular in relation to developing countries, these bilateral agreements have been reshaped into Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) by the 2002 CFP reform, to include a development dimension, e.g. through clauses related to monitoring, local processing and employment of local crew. Further revision of the agreements was introduced by the 2013 CFP reform¹⁴⁹, which renamed them Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs) and brought several principles into law: the agreements should be of mutual benefit to the EU and to the third country concerned; the standards for EU vessels fishing in EU waters should also apply to fishing outside EU waters; the agreements can target only surplus of the allowable catch. SFPAs are a tool for improving fisheries governance in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of coastal state partner countries; they aim to ensure the sustainable exploitation of resources, whilst at the same time supporting the partner countries’ capacity to develop their fishing sector.

In order to assess whether the latest CFP reform has had positive development outcomes and impacts, the case studies will therefore specifically look at the development impacts of SFPAs, by focusing on two specific SFPAs that were concluded following the reform. Considering that there are two main types of agreements (1. tuna agreements, which allow EU vessels to pursue migrating tuna stocks as they move along the shores of Africa and through the Indian Ocean; 2. mixed agreements, which provide access to a wide range of fish stocks in the partner country’s EEZ), it was decided to select the two following countries:

- **Mauritania:** the EU-Mauritania SFPA is the largest active mixed-species agreement – and largest SFPA overall – in terms of financial contribution;
- **Senegal:** the EU-Senegal SFPA is the second largest active tuna agreement in terms of financial contribution¹⁵⁰.


¹⁴⁹ As part of this Evaluation and in this country note, we refer to the latest CFP reform as the “2013 reform” based on the date of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, but this Regulation – and therefore the new CFP – is in fact effective from 1 January 2014.

¹⁵⁰ The largest active tuna agreement is the EU-Seychelles SFPA, but since the Seychelles is a (upper) middle income country it has been decided to rather select Senegal as a case study country.

1.2 Hypotheses to be tested

SFPAs signed between the EU and developing countries are expected to have a number of economic, social and environmental impacts in the partner countries. Figure 1 below presents a simplified intervention logic of SFPAs at the country level, highlighting the key expected development outcomes and impacts of SFPAs in partner countries as well as associated transmission mechanisms and causal links.

Figure 1: Simplified intervention logic of SFPAs at the partner country level



The case studies aim to verify the hypotheses underlying the causal links and transmission mechanisms identified in Figure 1 and to assess the achievement of the SFPAs' anticipated development outcomes and impacts in the selected countries. For this purpose, it was agreed that the case studies would focus on three main indicators:

- 1) Extent of SFPAs' contribution to the local economy in the selected countries;
- 2) Extent of SFPAs' contribution to employment in the selected countries; and
- 3) State of fish stocks covered by the SFPAs and presence of positive/negative externalities of SFPAs on food security in the selected countries.

The three indicators are in line with the three impacts identified in Figure 1 and their respective contributing outcomes. We provide below further detail on the hypotheses to be verified and our general approach to measure the three indicators.

Extent of the SFPAs' contribution to the local economy in Mauritania

In all SFPAs, the EU pays the partner country a financial contribution composed of two distinct parts:

1. Compensation for the access rights provided to EU vessels to exploit the fishing opportunities defined in the Protocol; and
2. Sectoral support for the partner country, with the aim of promoting the implementation of a sustainable fisheries policy in the partner country.

The compensation for the access rights is paid into a Public Treasury account and contributes to the local economy by providing predictable revenues for the national budget. It can be noted that this compensation paid by the EU comes in addition to the fees paid by EU vessel owners for the fishing authorisations (licences) issued under the SFPAs. In the case of the SFPAs with Mauritania, the compensation for access rights paid by the EU is currently set at 57.5 million EUR per year, while fees due by vessel owners can potentially amount up to 37 million EUR per year if fishing opportunities under the SFPAs are fully exploited.

Sectoral support is considered an important tool for achieving the objectives of improving partner countries' fisheries governance and fostering the economic development of their fisheries sector. According to SFPAs' provisions, the Joint Committees shall establish a multiannual sectoral programme in the form of a matrix in line with the partner countries' needs and priorities for the fisheries sector. Actions financed under the sectoral support may include for example: Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) activities; scientific research on fish stocks; support to laboratories/food safety (exports); support to shipyards; infrastructure linked to fisheries activities/sector (e.g. support to develop industries ashore involved in the processing of marine products); or support to (local) artisanal fishing. In a recent report¹⁵¹, the European Court of Auditors argued however that the Commission's control of sectoral support actions has been limited and the actions actually implemented by the partner countries were in some cases different from those agreed.

In the case of the SFPAs with Mauritania, the financial contribution for sectoral support amounts to 4.125 million EUR per year for 4 years and in the new Protocol, specific provisions relating to the implementation and monitoring of the sectoral support have been introduced: the Protocol states *inter alia* that financial support cannot be used to cover the operating expenses of the beneficiaries, that technical support is to be administered by an implementation unit subject to an annual external audit, that for each project included in the programming a series of indicators showing the impact on the fisheries sector shall be defined, and that monthly meetings shall be organised to monitor implementation. The proposed set up is the first of its kind: the current Protocol with Senegal, which was concluded earlier, does not include similar provisions.

In addition to the above, most SFPAs contain provisions on the promotion of cooperation among economic operators but the level of implementation of these clauses appears to differ widely depending on the countries. With respect to the SFPAs with Mauritania, Protocol *inter alia* encourages relations between enterprises in the "technical, economic and commercial spheres" and lists possible areas of cooperation e.g. development of the Nouadhibou Free Zone, port management, development of industry related to fishing, vocational training, sale of fishery products, aquaculture (Article 7).

¹⁵¹ European Court of Auditors (2015) "Are the Fisheries Partnership Agreements well managed by the Commission?", Special Report.

The case study aims to assess the SFPA's contribution to the local economy in Mauritania, with a specific focus on the impact of the SFPA's sectoral support component (considering, when available, the specific indicators of projects included in the programming) and of other relevant provisions of the SFPA, in particular landing obligations.

Extent of the SFPA's contribution to employment in Mauritania

SFPAs are expected to contribute to job creation in partner countries in two main ways:

- (i) Direct employment on board EU vessels engaged in fishing under SFPAs and their management; and
- (ii) Employment in downstream processing of fishery products generated.

EU vessels frequently operate by choice with crew from SFPA partner countries or other third countries within the region of operation. Furthermore, the granting of fishing authorisations in most SFPAs carries a condition that the vessel operators recruit a minimum number of crew per vessel (or a percentage) of nationals of the partner country¹⁵². In the case of the SFPA with Mauritania, the Protocol states that the minimum number of Mauritanian fishermen to be taken on board EU vessels shall be: 1 per vessel for tuna seiners, 3 per vessel for pole and line tuna vessels, 60% of the crew for shrimp vessels and demersal species (rounded downwards, officers not being included), 60% of staff involved in production duties (factory, packaging and freezing) for all pelagic trawlers.

Employment in downstream processing is expected to be generated by SFPAs mainly in tuna processing. The EU vessels operating under SFPAs in the Atlantic Ocean tuna fisheries exclusively supply cannery operations and only about 20% of Atlantic catches enter EU processing establishments: the balance is processed in the region, in canneries based in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal¹⁵³. In the absence of a tuna processing establishment in Mauritania, the SFPA with Mauritania is however not expected to generate employment in tuna processing in Mauritania.

SFPAs can nevertheless also generate employment in the processing of non-tuna species, in case there are establishments processing such species in the partner countries¹⁵⁴. With respect to the SFPA with Mauritania, the current protocol entails a landing obligation for demersal fishing vessels and for the non-freezer pelagic fleet and these landings can provide inputs to local processing establishments (it can be noted however that under the terms of the Protocol, the ship owners shall decide on the destination of their vessels' production: it may be processed, stored under customs control, sold in Mauritania or exported).

In order to verify that the SFPA with Mauritania does contribute to employment in Mauritania, the case study aims to estimate the number of jobs created in Mauritania that can be linked to SFPAs, based on the two categories defined above. At the same time, the case study also considers and assesses other possible indirect impacts on employment in the fisheries sector in Mauritania and at the port of Nouadhibou (e.g. transshipment, supply, repair and maintenance services).

¹⁵² For tuna vessels – which may not visit the third country concerned – the requirement can be widened to nationals of ACP countries.

¹⁵³ Goulding I. (2016) “Research for PECH Committee – Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements on Employment in the EU and in Third Countries”, European Parliament, July 2016.

¹⁵⁴ One example of such establishment is the Frescomar plant in Cape Verde, which not only processes tuna but also small pelagic fish species – e.g. mackerel – and has generated more than 800 jobs (it appears however that with respect to small pelagic fish the facility is not supplied by EU vessels).

State of fish stocks covered by the SFPAs and presence of positive/negative externalities of the SFPAs on food security in Mauritania

One of the main objectives of SFPAs is to ensure sustainable exploitation of marine resources and the key sustainability principle of SFPAs is that the fishing opportunities negotiated in the protocols should only allow EU vessels to fish surplus resources¹⁵⁵.

In this context, the evaluation sought to collect updated information on the state of fish stocks in Mauritania, relying on the work carried out by the Joint Scientific Committee linked to the SFPAs, which compiles and analyses data on the fishing effort and on catches and is to produce annual stock assessment reports. It can be noted however that past studies have highlighted that the surplus concept has proven very difficult to implement in practice, due precisely to a lack of reliable information on fish stocks (also because scientific coordination is lacking for straddling small pelagic stocks present in Moroccan, Mauritanian and Senegalese waters) and on the fishing effort of domestic fish fleets, or other foreign fleets which have also been granted access by the partner countries¹⁵⁶. Furthermore, in the context of SFPAs the very notion of surplus in the partner country's waters is in fact questionable if applied to highly migratory or straddling stocks that cover different EEZs.

Sustainable fishing is also closely linked to food security. While SFPAs aim to contribute positively to food security, critics have argued that they may have a negative impact when resources targeted under the access agreements are key to food security, i.e. small pelagic stocks such as the round sardinella caught off the coast of Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal. In this context, the case studies aim to assess the existence of possible externalities of SFPAs on food security in the two selected countries. This is in particular relevant in the case of Mauritania: indeed, while all small pelagic species – deemed essential for the Senegalese artisanal fishery and local food consumption – have been excluded from the scope of the SFPAs with Senegal, the SFPAs with Mauritania allows EU vessels to catch this resource.

2 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE LINK BETWEEN THE EU POLICY AND THE COUNTRY

As mentioned in previous sections, the main link between the 2013 CFP reform and Mauritania is the current SFPAs between the EU and Mauritania and specifically the latest four-year Protocol, which entered into force in November 2015. Under this Protocol, the EU fleet is allowed to fish in Mauritanian waters for shrimp, demersal fish, tuna and small pelagic fish, up to a total of 287,050 tonnes a year. The key features of the SFPAs are presented in Table 1 below.

¹⁵⁵ Article 31 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013.

¹⁵⁶ See for example European Court of Auditors (2015).

Table 1: Summary of key features of current SFPA with Mauritania

Duration of the Agreement	6 years renewable (30.11.2006 – 29.11.2012; 30.11.2012 – 29.11.2018)	
Nature of the FPA	Multi-species agreement	
Duration of the Protocol	4 years (from 16.11.2015 to 15.11.2019)	
Fishing opportunities (vessels authorised to fish & reference tonnage or total allowable catch)	1. Fishing vessels specialising in crustaceans other than spiny lobster and crab	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maximum 5,000 tonnes / year; ▪ Maximum 25 vessels
	2. Black hake non-freezer trawlers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maximum 6,000 tonnes/year; ▪ Maximum 6 vessels.
	2a. Black hake freezer trawlers ¹⁵⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Main target species: black hake, maximum 3,500 tonnes/year; ▪ Secondary species: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▫ Squid: maximum 1,450 t/year ▫ Cuttlefish: maximum 600 t/year; ▪ 25% by-catch allowed for demersal fish other than black hake
	3. Vessels fishing for demersal species other than black hake with gear other than trawls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maximum 3,000 t; ▪ Maximum 6 vessels.
	4. Tuna seiners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reference tonnage 12,500 tonnes; ▪ Maximum 25 vessels
	5. Pole-and-line tuna vessels and surface long-liners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reference tonnage 7,500 tonnes; ▪ Maximum 15 vessels
	6. Pelagic freezer trawlers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maximum 225,000 tonnes; ▪ Maximum 19 vessels
	7. Non-freezer pelagic vessels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maximum 15,000 tonnes/year, deducted from category 6 above; ▪ Maximum 2 vessels
8. Cephalopods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No fishing opportunities granted under the current protocol 	
Financial contribution by the EU as compensation for access rights	57.5 million €/year ¹⁵⁸	
Financial contribution by the EU for sectoral support	4.125 million €/year	

3 FINDINGS (AT OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS LEVELS)

3.1 Country level outcomes

3.1.1 Revenues for the national budget

The compensation for access rights paid by the EU amounts to 57.5 million EUR per year according to the current version of the Protocol and is by far the largest financial contribution related to access rights of all active SFPAs concluded by the EC with partner countries¹⁵⁹. In accordance with the Protocol, this financial contribution is paid into a Mauritanian Public Treasury account (in full regardless of the fishing opportunities used) and provides a substantial long-term revenue stream for the country, accounting for about 5.2% of the national budget in 2017¹⁶⁰.

¹⁵⁷ This category was not included in the initial version of the Protocol but was added following a revision of the Protocol in March 2017 (Commission Decision (EU) 2017/451 of 14 March 2017).

¹⁵⁸ The compensation for access rights paid by the EU was initially set at 55 million EUR per year but later increased to 57.5 million EUR per year following revision of the Protocol in March 2017 and introduction of category 2a.

¹⁵⁹ The second largest SFPA in terms of financial contribution by the EU is the SFPA with Morocco, which entails a total financial contribution by the EU of 30 million EUR per year, of which 16 million EUR are paid as compensation for access rights.

¹⁶⁰ According to the Amending Finance Law 2017 (“*Loi de Finances Rectificative – Budget de l’État pour l’Année 2017*”), the state budget for the year 2017 amounted to 487 billion Ouguiya, equivalent to 1.11 billion EUR.

In accordance with the latest reform of the CFP, payments by the EU as compensation for access rights are now decoupled from sectoral support payments¹⁶¹, which means that the significant delays in the implementation of sectoral support (see section 3.1.2) have not affected the timely payment of the access rights component. At the same time, while sectoral support payments are conditional upon the realisation of the actions agreed, there are no restrictions for the partner country as regards the use of access rights funds, which strictly govern access to the national fishing areas. In this context, although the compensation for access rights clearly has a significant impact for the country, in the absence of concrete information on how funds were used its effect in terms of development outcomes is difficult to ascertain.

As mentioned earlier, access rights payments by the EU come in addition to the fees payments by EU vessel owners, which are also made to a Mauritanian Public Treasury account. These fees are calculated based on catches made and due to under-utilisation of fishing opportunities (see Table 2 in section 3.1.2), the total fees paid by EU vessel owners have been lower than anticipated, amounting to 16.4 million EUR in 2016 and 10.0 million EUR in 2017¹⁶².

3.1.2 Economic development of the fisheries sector

The conditions laid out in recent protocols of the SFPA appear to have been effective in minimising the potential negative impacts of EU vessels' activity in Mauritanian waters on the economic development of the Mauritanian fisheries sector:

- Stakeholders interviewed during the field mission, including economic operators, stressed that one key positive development of the current SFPA is the exclusion of cephalopods (in particular octopus) from the scope of the agreement. In the 2013-2014 protocol, fishing opportunities under the cephalopods category (which was used at an average rate of 93% in the 2008-2012 protocol) were indeed withdrawn from the protocol due to the application of the surplus concept and the national authorities' decision to reserve cephalopods for the national fleet. As shown in Table 1 above, this decision was reaffirmed in the 2015-2019 protocol, as no fishing opportunities were granted for the cephalopods category. Octopus fishery is indeed considered as a strategic segment of the Mauritanian fisheries sector: it has a leading role in seafood exports from Mauritania and is a key activity of the national fleet, in particular artisanal fishermen (according to the 2015 national fisheries strategy¹⁶³, 90% of the artisanal fleet's capacities target octopus, while stakeholders interviewed in the field estimate the share of octopus fishery in artisanal fishing at around 75-80%). In this context and amid concerns over the fragility of the state of octopus stocks, the exclusion of cephalopods from the scope of the agreement is regarded as key in preserving the interests of national fishermen¹⁶⁴.
- Likewise, stakeholders considered that the authorised fishing areas defined for EU vessels in the protocol have been effective in minimising adverse impacts on the activities of the Mauritanian fleet. Authorised fishing areas have indeed generally been pushed further out

¹⁶¹ Article 32 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013.

¹⁶² Source: Ministry of Fisheries and the Marine Economy (MPEM).

¹⁶³ MPEM (2015) « Stratégie Nationale de Gestion Responsable pour un Développement Durable des Pêches et de l'Economie Maritime 2015-2019 », February 2015.

¹⁶⁴ Some economic operators regretted however that the cephalopods data sheet is still included in the 2015-2019 protocol (albeit blank), suggesting that this fishing opportunity could be reopened in the future. Furthermore, it can be noted that some categories authorise cephalopods as by-catches (category 1) or secondary species (new category 2a – although this concerns squid and cuttlefish; octopus is not authorised). The economic operators propose to specify in the fisheries law that the exploitation of octopus is exclusive to the national fleet in order to safeguard the interests of national small-scale fisheries.

with a view to (i) preventing interaction between EU vessels and Mauritanian ones, in particular the artisanal fleet, but also (ii) ensuring a better protection of fish species for which concern had been expressed as part of scientific stock evaluations (e.g. sardinella) and reducing by-catch levels, thereby improving the sustainability of stocks exploitation. Stakeholders consider that these measures contributed to preserving the economic (and environmental) sustainability of the national fisheries sector (although it can be noted that the stricter conditions might also have made fishing opportunities under the SFPA less attractive to EU vessels and contributed to their overall under-utilisation).

On the other hand, if potential negative effects appear to have been mitigated well, the positive effects of the SFPA on the economic development of the national fisheries sector appear to have been rather limited:

- In accordance with the provisions of the Protocol, part of the catches by EU vessels in Mauritanian waters is landed in Mauritania at the Port of Nouadhibou. Indeed, Chapter V specifies that both the demersal fleet and the non-freezer pelagic fleet are subject a landing obligation (other EU vessels – i.e. tuna vessels and vessels fishing for crustaceans – are not subject to any landing obligation). However, Chapter V also mentions that the ship owners shall decide on the destination of their vessels' production: it may be processed, stored under customs control, sold in Mauritania or exported. In practice, it appears that all the fish landed by EU vessels – with the exception of the 2% pelagic catches levied as “fees in kind” to contribute to the policy of fish distribution to people in need¹⁶⁵ – is in fact transhipped and exported: catches by EU vessels therefore currently do not supply any downstream processing industry in Mauritania¹⁶⁶.
- In the absence of a downstream processing industry supplied by catches of EU vessels, the economic benefits of the above-mentioned landing obligations for Mauritania are restricted to additional port taxes and the development of relevant services at the Port of Nouadhibou, e.g. transhipment, storage, supply, repair and maintenance services. These economic benefits at the Port of Nouadhibou appear to have been so far less significant than anticipated under the current protocol, due to under-utilisation of fishing opportunities. As shown in Table 2 below, while fishing opportunities for demersal species can be considered to have been fully utilised in the first two years of implementation of the protocol, the fishing opportunities for pelagic vessels have so far recorded relatively low utilisation rates, with category 6 being used at only 60% in 2016 and 9% in the first half of 2017, and category 7 not being used at all (the remaining fishing categories – i.e. crustaceans, tuna vessels – have also recorded low utilisation rates but as mentioned above vessels fishing under these categories are not subject to any landing obligation and their activities do not have any impact on the Port of Nouadhibou). As mentioned earlier, the overall low utilisation rates might be the result of the more restrictive technical conditions that were introduced and possibly made the fishing opportunities less attractive for EU vessels.

¹⁶⁵ See sections 3.2.3 and 3.3 for more details on this mechanism.

¹⁶⁶ This situation is the result of several factors including the poor business environment in Mauritania – which has not been conducive to investment by European companies to set up their own processing establishments on-site in Mauritania – as well as the weak infrastructure and public service deficiencies in the country. The low level of prices on the Mauritanian market and the perceived unreliability of potential clients also explain why EU operators are not selling their catches locally. At the same time, the only significant fish processing activity currently existing in Mauritania is a fishmeal export-oriented industry, whose rapid and poorly controlled expansion is causing serious concerns due to its potential negative effects on the sustainable exploitation of pelagic resources and on food security (see section 3.2.3 for more details). As stated above, it appears that EU vessels are not supplying this industry.

Table 2: Utilisation rates of SFPA fishing opportunities by EU vessels (2016-2017)

Fishing category	t max / year	Catches		Utilisation rates	
	2015-2019	2016	2017*	2016	2017*
1. Crustaceans	5,000	937	581	19%	12%
2. Black hake non-freezer trawlers	6,000	6,032	3,434	101%	57%
2a. Black hake freezer trawlers	3,500	-	0	-	0%
3. Demersal species other than black hake	3,000	2,788	1,075	93%	36%
4. Tuna seiners	12,500	5,560	232	44%	2%
5. Pole-and-line tuna vessels and surface long-liners	7,500	3,288	1,939	44%	26%
6. Pelagic freezer trawlers	225,000	135,967	20,117	60%	9%
7. Non-freezer pelagic vessels	15,000	0	0	0%	0%
8. Cephalopods	0	-	-	-	-

* Partial year: data for 2017 was only available for the 1st semester of the year

Source: Joint Scientific Committee annual report, October 2017.

- The provision on the cooperation of economic operators (Article 7) does not appear to have gained much traction in practice. There is little interaction between EU and Mauritanian economic operators (apart from relations between EU vessels and their local consignees) and no evidence of know-how transfer. On a more general level, some stakeholders regretted that successive fisheries agreements and protocols have so far not led to the emergence of industries ashore processing marine products caught by EU vessels. Interviews in the field revealed however that a Dutch company that owns pelagic vessels fishing under the SFPA has set up a joint venture with a Mauritanian partner to invest in the construction of a plant that would process on-site in Nouadhibou some of the pelagic fish caught by its vessels. This investment was apparently planned for several years now but according to some stakeholders, construction of the plant could be finalised later this year and would create more than 200 jobs.
- The impact of the SFPA's sectoral support on the economic development of the fisheries sector is difficult to ascertain:
 - First of all, it can be noted that the share of sectoral support was significantly reduced in the two latest protocols. While the sectoral support component accounted for 21% of the total SFPA contribution by the EU in the 2008-2012 protocol (for a total of 65 million EUR/year), it was reduced to only 4% in the 2013-2014 protocol (3 million EUR/year) and accounts for 6.7% of the total financial contribution in the current 2015-2019 protocol (4,125 million EUR/year). Comparatively, this share is much lower than in SFPAs with other countries: for example, under the current protocol of the SFPA with Morocco 14 million EUR out of the total financial contribution of 30 million EUR (i.e. 47%) are earmarked for sectoral support. In its recent evaluation of the management of SFPAs by the Commission¹⁶⁷, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) noted that Mauritania was the only exception to the positive trend of increasing the share of the total EU financial contribution to go to sectoral support. The ECA argued that reducing the share of the sectoral support component and therefore increasing proportionally the access rights component – for which partner countries have limited transparency or reporting obligations – was not consistent with the development objective of SFPAs. In

¹⁶⁷ European Court of Auditors (2015) "Are the Fisheries Partnership Agreements well managed by the Commission?", Special Report.

its response, the Commission pointed out that the sectoral support component was reduced at the explicit request of the Mauritanian authorities and that this was not the Commission's initial objective.

- At the same time, the slow implementation of sectoral support actions under recent protocols highlights the challenge in increasing the share of the sectoral support component. The implementation of sectoral support has indeed experienced significant delays: at the time of the field mission in Mauritania, the implementation of the sectoral support under the 2008-2012 and 2013-2014 protocols had just been completed and the programming of sectoral support under the 2015-2019 protocol was still ongoing. These delays were the result of several factors including the substantial size of the sectoral support component under the 2008-2012 protocol, the limited disbursement capacity of the Ministry, as well as the improvement of the conditionality of sectoral support, through the introduction of more explicit conditions in the 2013-2014 protocol¹⁶⁸. In general, in spite of improvements over time, the monitoring of the implementation of sectoral support actions appears to remain challenging for the Commission.
- While most actions funded under the sectoral component appear to have focused on areas such as maritime surveillance, scientific research, environmental protection, or strengthening the capacity of key institutions, it also included some actions that could have an effect on the economic development of the sector:

 - Under the 2008-2012 protocol, sectoral support included actions aimed at upgrading the infrastructure of artisanal fishing ports in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou, e.g. by setting up facilities (ice factories, cold storage rooms, sale outlets complying with safety and hygiene standards), providing equipment, etc. The impact of these actions on the economic development of the sector is difficult to assess, but it can be noted that according to stakeholders, developments at the artisanal fishing port of Nouakchott had the indirect effect of attracting other private investors to set up additional ice factories. In addition, support was provided to ONISPA¹⁶⁹, the National Office for Health Inspection of Fishing and Aquaculture products (actions included *inter alia* training of staff on health inspection, provision of equipment, support to accreditation of laboratories to ISO 17025) and to sector-specific training institutes such as ENEMP¹⁷⁰ and CASAMPAC¹⁷¹ (e.g. to carry out training of fishermen and training on fish conservation techniques). These actions – in particular the support to ONISPA and its laboratories, which play a key role for Mauritanian fishery exports – are also considered to have contributed positively to the economic development of the sector, even though their impact is, likewise, difficult to measure.
 - Sectoral support under the 2013-2014 protocol was entirely dedicated to co-financing the construction of a new artisanal fishing port in Tanit¹⁷². As evidenced by the feedback from public sector stakeholders, the construction of this new port is considered as strategic by Mauritanian authorities but some level of concern was expressed by other stakeholders about certain aspects of the project, such as the fact that no management model is in place yet, the apparent lack of consultation with the

¹⁶⁸ In particular, the 2013-2014 protocol specified that the first payment under the protocol was made conditional on the absorption of the balance from the previous protocol, and the disbursement of the sectoral support component was linked to the implementation of the agreed actions.

¹⁶⁹ Office National d'Inspection Sanitaire des Produits de la Pêche et de l'Aquaculture.

¹⁷⁰ Ecole Nationale d'Enseignement Maritime et des Pêches.

¹⁷¹ Centre d'animation sociale à l'apprentissage des métiers de la pêche.

¹⁷² The total project cost is estimated at 70 million EUR and the EU contributed funds amounting to 6 million EUR through the sectoral support component of the 2013-2014 protocol.

artisanal fishing sector, or the selected location of the port¹⁷³. In any case, construction of the port is not yet finalised (Mauritanian authorities hope that the port can be completed later this year and would like sectoral support under the next protocol to further provide co-financing to finalise works), therefore no effect on the economic development of the sector can be claimed at this stage.

- With respect to the 2015-2019 protocol, Annex 2 identifies four intervention priorities for sectoral support under that protocol, one of them being “Development infrastructures”, which as indicated in the protocol could entail “providing support for developing industries ashore involved in the processing of marine products”. However, as mentioned earlier the programming of sectoral support under that protocol is not yet finalised: what exact actions will be implemented is therefore not known and their anticipated impact cannot be assessed.

3.1.3 Direct employment on board EU vessels

Based on data provided by DG MARE (see Table 3 below), EU vessels fishing in Mauritanian waters under the current protocol are estimated to employ a total of around 600 Mauritanian seamen (575 in 2016 and 624 in 2016), with pelagic freezer trawlers accounting for the largest total of Mauritanian seamen employed (392 in 2016 and 372 in 2017).

Table 3: Overview of Mauritanian seamen employed by EU vessels fishing under the SFPA

Fishing category	Number of vessels		Number of Mauritanian seamen	
	2016	2017	2016	2017
1. Crustaceans*	6	9	51	75
2. Black hake non-freezer trawlers	4	4	41	41
2a. Black hake freezer trawlers	0	6	0	59
3. Demersal species other than black hake	6	4	41	38
4. Tuna seiners**	21	21	(at least) 11	(at least) 11
5. Pole-and-line tuna vessels and surface long-liners	14	16	39	44
6. Pelagic freezer trawlers***	12	13	392	372
TOTAL	53	61	575	624

* For this category figures are yearly averages, as the number of vessels fishing crustaceans – and therefore also the total number of Mauritanian seamen on board these vessels – varies from one 2-month period to another.

** The EU tuna purse seine fleet consists of 11 Spanish seiners and 10 French seiners. Data could only be obtained for the 11 Spanish tuna seiners, which each employ one Mauritanian fisherman on shore.

*** For this category, employment of Mauritanian fishermen is based on a on board / on shore rotation system.

Source: DG MARE

As only partial data could be collected¹⁷⁴, it was not possible to fully assess whether or to what extent EU vessels complied with provisions specified in the protocol as regards the signing-on

¹⁷³ In this regard, it can be noted that a previous study on possible landing sites identified the selected location as not adequate if the port was to benefit the population. Linked to this, there is concern that this the new port would mostly benefit the fishmeal industry, which as mentioned earlier is rapidly expanding and is considered to be a potential threat to sustainable exploitation of small pelagic resources and to food security (fishmeal plans mostly process sardinella, which might be overexploited and is key to food security).

¹⁷⁴ In addition to the unavailability of data for the 10 French tuna seiners, it was also not possible to collect data on the total number of seamen employed by shrimp vessels, demersal vessels and pelagic trawlers (for which the requirements in terms of signing-on of Mauritanian seamen are expressed as a percentage of the crew or staff).

of Mauritanian fishermen¹⁷⁵, but feedback from stakeholders suggests that EU vessels have generally been complying with these provisions and that complaints from Mauritanian authorities about this are rare¹⁷⁶.

The SFPA therefore had a clear effect in generating employment for a substantial number of Mauritanian seamen on board EU vessels (in the absence of an SFPA, it is possible that some of these positions would have been created anyway, should some EU vessels enter into private arrangements with Mauritanian authorities and should these arrangements include specific provisions on employment of Mauritanian, but in that scenario the number of EU vessels – and therefore the number of jobs created – would almost certainly be much lower¹⁷⁷). At the same time, it can be argued that the effect is somewhat limited, relative to the size of the fisheries sector in Mauritania: it is indeed estimated that the Mauritanian fishing industry directly employs 42,000 to 43,000 people including 80% in the artisanal fishing sector¹⁷⁸.

3.1.4 Other employment generated by the SFPA

As mentioned earlier, EU vessels fishing under the SFPA are currently not supplying any downstream processing industry in Mauritania, therefore the SFPA did not generate any employment in the processing of marine products so far. However, as mentioned earlier a Dutch company that owns pelagic vessels fishing under the SFPA is investing in the construction of a plant that would process on-site in Nouadhibou some of the pelagic fish caught by its vessels: once this plant is operational, it is estimated by stakeholders that it would create more than 200 jobs.

The SFPA can also be said to have an indirect effect on job creation in a number of areas:

- As mentioned earlier, the SFPA's landing obligations for certain segments of the EU fleet have generated additional activity at the Port of Nouadhibou e.g. in terms of transshipment, supply, repair and maintenance services, which in turn has contributed to job creation. While this effect on job creation is generally hard to quantify, stakeholders interviewed at the Port of Nouadhibou during the field mission confirmed that transshipment is carried out by Mauritanian labour force and mentioned that while there used to be only one local company providing supply services to fishing vessels, a second one was created in 2014. The latest ex post and ex ante evaluation of the SFPA's protocol¹⁷⁹ (which assessed the 2013-2014 protocol) estimated that a total of 17 indirect jobs could be attributed to the SFPA in this area (3 in supply and maintenance services and 14 in discharge and

¹⁷⁵ As mentioned in section 1.2, the 2015-2019 protocol states that the minimum number of Mauritanian fishermen to be taken on board EU vessels shall be: 1 per vessel for tuna seiners, 3 per vessel for pole and line tuna vessels, 60% of the crew for shrimp vessels and demersal species (rounded downwards, officers not being included), 60% of staff involved in production duties (factory, packaging and freezing) for all pelagic trawlers.

¹⁷⁶ In accordance with the protocol if a fishing vessel fails to comply with the requirements stated in the Protocol, the vessel owner must pay a fine and the fines collected are used to fund the training of Mauritanian fishermen at the National college for maritime and fisheries education (ENEMP).

¹⁷⁷ The SFPA has a number of advantages for EU shipowners, one of them being to provide a clear and transparent framework for their activities, with legal certainty and reliable operating conditions. EU shipowners have generally expressed a preference for SFPAs over private arrangements, even at the cost of an increase in their contribution to access rights: it is anticipated that if private arrangements with Mauritanian authorities was the only option to fish in Mauritanian waters, this fishing area would be significantly less attractive to the EU fleet.

¹⁷⁸ Source: Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC).

¹⁷⁹ Cofrepeche, NFDS, Poseidon et MRAG (2014) "Évaluation rétrospective et prospective du protocole de l'accord de partenariat dans le secteur de la pêche entre l'Union européenne et la République islamique de Mauritanie".

transshipment services), but feedback from stakeholders suggests that the actual figure might be much higher.

- The SFPA's "fees in kind" provision – which was first introduced in the 2013-2014 protocol and specifies that EU pelagic freezer trawlers and shrimp-fishing vessels (in the case of by-catches) shall contribute 2% of their pelagic catches to the policy of fish distribution to people need – has thereafter been extended by Mauritanian authorities to all foreign vessels fishing in Mauritanian waters and led to the creation of the *Société Nationale de Distribution de Poisson* (SNDP). SNDP started its operations in 2014 and currently distributes more than 9,000 tons of fish per year at low, affordable prices (equivalent to 0.11 EUR/kg) through 73 distribution outlets spread across the country, each employing at least 3 persons. SNDP estimates that overall it provides jobs to more than 500 people, including 64 permanent staff on long-term contracts. Although SNDP is only partly supplied by fish caught by EU vessels¹⁸⁰ (and notwithstanding the concerns about SNDC's operations detailed in section 3.3), given the role played by the SFPA in introducing the 2% levy on pelagic catches the SFPA can be considered to have contributed – indirectly and only in part – to this employment generation.
- Actions funded under the sectoral support component do not appear to have had much effect in terms of job creation, but as mentioned earlier one indirect effect of developments at the artisanal fishing port of Nouakchott was to attract new private investors to set up additional ice factories at the port, which in turn generated employment. In general, stakeholders argue that sectoral support contributes to creating a favourable environment for the Mauritanian fisheries sector to attract investors, which ultimately can contribute to job creation.

3.1.5 Improved fisheries governance

The SFPA instrument itself contributes positively to fisheries governance in Mauritania by providing a uniform and transparent framework for the activities of EU vessels in Mauritanian waters, with clearly defined technical conditions. In addition, several specific provisions of the protocol can be considered to contribute to improving fisheries governance in Mauritania, although some challenges remain:

- With a view to promote transparency, the current protocol specifies that "Mauritania undertakes to make public any public or private agreement granting access to its EEZ by foreign vessels"¹⁸¹. While a few other SFPAs also include provisions aimed at promoting transparency, the protocol with Mauritania can be considered one of the most far reaching in this regard, by providing a list of the information to be made public, as well as an obligation for Mauritania to report yearly on "the number of fishing authorisations for each fishing category granted to vessels flying the flag of other third countries, the corresponding volumes of catches authorised, actual catch numbers, and the conditions for providing such vessels with access to Mauritania's fishing zone"¹⁸². These provisions have indeed encouraged Mauritanian authorities to raise the level of transparency with regards to the other fishing access agreements in place, but it can be noted that the information on these agreements does not appear to be publicly available yet and the Fisheries Transparency Initiative¹⁸³, in which Mauritania is very active, is still in its early stages.

¹⁸⁰ The share of fish supplied by EU vessels in the total volumes distributed by the SNDP has also declined over the years: according to the SNDP, it was only 18% in 2017, down from 25% in 2016.

¹⁸¹ Article 1 of the Protocol, §6.

¹⁸² Article 1 of the Protocol, §7.

¹⁸³ The Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI) is a global multi-stakeholder initiative that seeks to increase transparency and participation in fisheries governance for the benefit of a more sustainable management of marine fisheries. See: <http://fisheriestransparency.org/>.

- The protocol includes a non-discrimination clause, which specifies that “all technical measures regarding the conservation, development and management of resources, as well as the financial arrangements, fees, public financial contribution and other rights also included relating to the issuing of fishing authorisations as specified for each fishery (...) shall apply to all foreign industrial fleets operating in the Mauritanian fishing zones under technical conditions similar to those applicable to the EU fleets.”¹⁸⁴ One of the anticipated effects of this clause was to foster the sustainable management of fishing resources and to influence positively fisheries agreements concluded by Mauritania with other partners, with standards set by the SFPA having a ripple effect on the conditions set out in other agreements. This has worked to some extent but there still exist some agreements concluded by Mauritania with other partners that can be considered inconsistent with the conditions and sustainability principles set out in the SFPA¹⁸⁵.
- The protocol provides for the setup of an independent Joint Scientific Committee (JSC), which meets at least once a year to review all relevant and available information on catches, effort and stock status of the fisheries covered by the protocol, and also consider resolutions of the regional fisheries organisations. This mechanism (which is not in place for other fisheries agreements concluded by Mauritania with third countries) was acknowledged by all stakeholders to be a key positive outcome of the SFPA in terms of fisheries governance, as it ensures transparency on the implementation of the agreement and allows the provision of independent scientific advice. According to IMROP¹⁸⁶, which is in charge of the scientific monitoring of fishing activities in Mauritania, recommendations from the JSC are generally followed, citing as an example the case of cephalopods, which were deemed as over-exploited by the JSC and thereafter excluded from the scope of the SFPA. Representative from the national fishing sector noted that the JSC reports were also useful to them, as it allows them to challenge the government if it grants to other foreign vessels access to resources that are considered overexploited by the JSC.
- The protocol provides for the establishment of a system for scientific observation on board EU vessels, according to which scientific observers shall ensure that EU vessels operating in the Mauritanian fishing zone comply with the terms of the protocol¹⁸⁷. Given the high number of vessels authorised to fish under the SFPA, it is not possible for observers to cover all vessels (as is for example foreseen under the SFPA with Senegal) but the protocol specifies that for each fishing category at least two vessels per year shall be designated to board observers. Some challenges were however experienced in the implementation of this system, in particular with respect to pelagic vessels: the 2017 JSC annual report¹⁸⁸ mentioned indeed that some pelagic shipowners (both from the EU and non-EU fleets) have refused to take observers on board and that it affected the collection of data for this particular fishery (for which there is precisely uncertainty about the state of fish stocks). In general, the Ministry of Fisheries has the objective to have observers cover 25% of all vessels fishing in Mauritanian waters (with of focus on vessels targeting cephalopods), but this objective proves difficult to attain given the limited number of available observers and the reluctance from some shipowners to take observers on board.

¹⁸⁴ Article 1 of the Protocol, §5.

¹⁸⁵ For example, while authorised fishing areas for EU pelagic vessels have been pushed further out to protect pelagic stocks and limit interactions with the national fleet, Mauritanian authorities recently signed agreements that authorise some foreign pelagic vessels to fish closer to the coast; Mauritanian authorities however argue that the concerned vessels are of a different type (smaller vessels), therefore it is not the exact same segment and the corresponding agreements do not contravene the non-discrimination clause.

¹⁸⁶ Mauritanian Institute of Oceanographic Research and Fisheries (*Institut Mauritanien de Recherche Océanographique et des Pêches*).

¹⁸⁷ Chapter X of the Annex to the protocol.

¹⁸⁸ Rapport de la Réunion annuelle du Comité Scientifique Conjoint relatif à l’Accord de pêche signé entre la République islamique de Mauritanie et l’Union européenne, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, 03 au 05 octobre 2017.

Furthermore, the largest share of actions funded under the sectoral support component were in areas relevant for fisheries governance e.g. MCS, scientific research, and environmental protection. Under the 2008-2012 protocol¹⁸⁹, support was in particular provided to the institution in charge of maritime surveillance and control, DSCPM¹⁹⁰ (it was the main beneficiary of sectoral support under that protocol, which financed 100% of its investment budget; actions included the acquisition of surveillance vessels, equipment, etc.), as well as to IMROP (financing of stock assessment survey, acquisition of equipment, etc.) and to the Banc d'Arguin National Park (e.g. conservation projects and acquisition of vessels for maritime surveillance). Like all sectoral support actions, their exact impact is difficult to measure in the absence of indicators, but these actions can be considered to have contributed to enhancing the overall fisheries governance capacity.

Overall, the SFPAs can be considered to have contributed positively to fisheries governance in Mauritania. Over time, successive protocols have adapted and aligned with national laws and policies. Stakeholders at the Ministry in charge of Fisheries mentioned that fishing quotas were discussed for the first time in Mauritania in the context of fisheries agreements with the EU. Since then, fishing quotas have progressively been generalised in access rules, as evidenced by the current national fisheries strategy for the 2015-2019 period, which confirmed the introduction of quota-based fisheries management.

One area of concern expressed by some stakeholders is that all SFPAs are negotiated bilaterally although they concern straddling stocks shared between several countries in the sub-region, which could potentially affect (sub-)regional fisheries governance. In this regard, countries in the sub-region have expressed the wish to negotiate future SFPAs as a regional bloc, specifically through the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC). While this makes sense, one challenge has been to identify the entity that would have a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the sub-region, as the SRFC does not have the political mandate to do so.

3.1.6 Sustainable fishing in the country's EEZ

As established in the CFP, the key sustainability principle of SFPAs is that the fishing opportunities negotiated in the protocols should only allow EU vessels to fish surplus resources. However, as mentioned earlier the surplus concept is very difficult to apply in practice due to a lack of reliable information on fish stocks and the notion of surplus in the partner country's waters is in fact questionable if applied to highly migratory or straddling stocks that cover different EEZs.

In its latest annual report dated October 2017¹⁹¹, the JSC did not recommend any change to the catch levels defined in the protocol. The analysis of data compiled on the state of fish stocks shows however that some species under the demersal (e.g. white grouper) and pelagic (e.g. sardinella and horse mackerel) fisheries are currently considered as overexploited (see Table 4 below). In this context, the JSC generally recommended a precautionary approach and called

¹⁸⁹ We only address here the 2008-2012 protocol because as mentioned earlier, sectoral support under the 2013-2014 protocol was entirely dedicated to co-financing the construction of a new artisanal fishing port and sectoral support under the 2015-2019 protocol has not started yet.

¹⁹⁰ Delegation responsible for fisheries surveillance and protection in Mauritania (*Délégation à la Surveillance des Pêches et au Contrôle en Mer*). The functions of the DSCPM have however in the meantime been transferred to a new structure, the "Garde-Côtes Mauritanienne" (GCM – Mauritanian Coastguard), which was set up in 2012.

¹⁹¹ Rapport de la Réunion annuelle du Comité Scientifique Conjoint relatif à l'Accord de pêche signé entre la République islamique de Mauritanie et l'Union européenne, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, 03 au 05 octobre 2017.

for further analysis and research, given the current lack of reliable data for both demersal and pelagic stocks and therefore relative uncertainty of assessment results.

With respect to tuna species, the JSC refers to the findings and management measures of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), which is the intergovernmental organisation responsible for the management and conservation of tunas and tuna-like species in the Atlantic Ocean, including stocks assessments and definition of catch levels (both the EU and Mauritania are contracting parties). As shown in Table 4, the latest ICCAT stock assessments identified one of the three main tuna species (bigeye tuna) as being overexploited and therefore reduced the corresponding TAC; for the two other main species (skipjack and yellowfin), TAC levels were maintained.

Table 4: Summary of findings and recommendations of the latest JSC annual report

Species / Fishing category	Assessment on the state of stocks	Main recommendation
Crustaceans (Cat. 1)	Based on FAO a (2017) ¹⁹² : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deep water shrimp: <u>not fully exploited</u> Coastal shrimps: <u>fully exploited</u> 	The JSC recommends not to modify the catch limit levels set in the protocol.
Black hake (Cat. 2 and 2a)	Based on FAO a (2017): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Black hake: <u>fully exploited</u> 	The JSC considers that an increase of the fishing effort and of catches should not be envisaged. The JSC also recommends monitoring by-catches of black hake by the pelagic fleet to quantify its impact on the stock of black hake (since these by-catches are much higher than the catches of black hake trawlers).
Demersal fishery, other than black hake (Cat. 3)	Based on FAO a (2017) and with respect to the main fish stocks of high commercial value: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Large-eye dentex (Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal): <u>not fully exploited</u> Bluespotted seabream (Mauritania, Senegal): <u>fully exploited</u> Red pandora (Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia): <u>fully exploited</u> White grouper (Mauritania): <u>overexploited</u>. 	The JSC recommends favouring a precautionary approach given the uncertainty as to the state of these fisheries. The JSC also recommends strengthening data collection on species newly targeted by EU vessels, such as Atlantic pomfret.
Tuna (Cat. 4 and 5)	Based on the latest stock assessments carried out by ICCAT ¹⁹³ : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Skipjack tuna: <u>not overfished and no undergoing overfishing</u> (although there is uncertainty in the assessment results); Yellowfin tuna: <u>possibly overfished, but no undergoing overfishing</u>¹⁹⁴; Bigeye tuna: <u>overfished and undergoing overfishing</u>. 	The JSC only recommends applying ICCAT's management measures and recommendations, which have been: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Skipjack tuna: favour a precautionary approach, i.e. catch and effort levels shall not exceed levels of previous years; Yellowfin tuna: maintain catch levels at the current TAC; Bigeye tuna: the TAC was significantly reduced in 2016 (from 85,000t in the previous period to 65,000t) to allow recovery of the stock.
Small pelagic fishery (Cat 6 and 7)	Based on FAO b (2017) ¹⁹⁵ : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sardine: <u>not fully exploited</u>; Sardinella: <u>overexploited</u>; Horse mackerel: <u>overexploited</u>; Mackerel: <u>fully exploited</u>. 	The JSC stresses that the assessment of small pelagic stocks is faced with a lack of reliable and representative data. This has been an issue for several years and is the result of the weak coverage of sampling, both at sea (observers onboard vessels) and on-shore (sample of landings). In this context, the JSC's main recommendation is to better constrain pelagic shipowners to take scientific observers on board and to increase the scientific sampling of landings.

¹⁹² FAO a (2017) « Rapport du Groupe de travail FAO/COPACE sur l'évaluation des ressources démersales - sous-groupe Nord », Tenerife, Spain, 6-15 June 2017.

¹⁹³ ICCAT (2016) Report of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS), Madrid, Spain, 3 to 7 October 2016.

¹⁹⁴ According to ICCAT (2016), "there is a 45.5% chance the stock was healthy in 2014, a 41.2% probability the stock was overfished and a 13.3% chance the stock was both overfished and undergoing overfishing".

¹⁹⁵ FAO b (2017) « Rapport du Groupe de Travail de la FAO sur l'évaluation des petits pélagiques au large de l'Afrique nord-occidentale », Nouadhibou, Mauritania, 22-27 May 2017.

Overall, the Ministry of Fisheries considers that the latest protocols have generally contributed to a reduction of fishing capacities and effort, which in turn reduced the pressure on fish stocks. Furthermore, feedback from stakeholders suggests that EU vessels generally complied well with technical conditions set in the protocol (e.g. several stakeholders mentioned that while there had been many instances of other foreign vessels fishing beyond their authorised fishing areas, EU vessels appeared to have complied with their respective authorised fishing areas).

3.2 Country level impacts

3.2.1 Contribution to the local economy

The analysis of the various economic effects of the SFPAs on Mauritania (sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2) paints a mixed picture:

- The EU's financial contribution as compensation for access rights contributed to the local economy by providing a substantial long-term revenue stream for the country. Set at 57.5 million EUR per year under the current protocol, it is by far the largest financial contribution related to access rights of all active SFPAs and accounted for about 5.2% of the Mauritanian national budget in 2017 (this financial contribution by the EU comes in addition to the fees paid by vessel owners, which amounted to 16.4 million EUR in 2016 and 10.0 million EUR in 2017). This financial contribution by the EU clearly is an important source of revenue for the country and has a substantial impact; however, in the absence of information on how funds are used (contrary to the sectoral support, the compensation for access rights is not subject to any reporting obligation) its concrete development impact – besides contributing to stabilising the revenue side of the state budget – is difficult to assess.
- Recent protocols appear to have been effective in mitigating the potential negative impact of EU vessels' activity on the economic development of the Mauritanian fisheries sector, e.g. by excluding cephalopods from the scope of the agreement and pushing further out authorised fishing areas.
- On the other hand, the economic benefits for Mauritania resulting from the EU vessels' activity in the country's waters appear to be relatively limited. In accordance with SFPAs' landing obligations for certain segments of the EU fleet, part of the catches by EU vessels is landed in Mauritania, but it appears that all the fish landed by EU vessels – with the exception of the 2% pelagic catches levied as “fees in kind” – is in fact transhipped and exported. Landing obligations therefore generate economic activity at the Port of Nouadhibou in terms of transhipment, supply and maintenance services (as well as additional port taxes) but catches by EU vessels do not supply any downstream processing industry in Mauritania. In general, there is little interaction between EU and Mauritanian economic operators (apart from relations between EU vessels and their local consignees) and no evidence of know-how transfer.
- The implementation of sectoral support has experienced significant delays. Only the sectoral support provided under the 2008-2012 protocol can be considered to have had an impact yet, since sectoral support under the 2013-2014 protocol was entirely dedicated to co-financing the construction of a new artisanal fishing port that is not finalised yet, and sectoral support under the 2015-2019 protocol has not started yet. Actions undertaken under the 2008-2012 protocol, such as the upgrading of infrastructure at artisanal fishing ports, the support to ONISPA, or the training of fishermen and other economic operators, can be considered to have had an indirect effect on the economic development of the sector – however this impact is difficult to measure.

Based on the above, the SFPA can be considered to have positively contributed to the local economy, but outside of direct financial contributions the economic impacts of the SFPA appear to have been relatively limited.

3.2.2 Contribution to employment

As shown in sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4, the SFPA has contributed to employment in Mauritania in two ways:

- Direct employment on-board EU vessels, with the employment of around 600 Mauritanian seamen on the EU fleet under the current Protocol;
- Indirect contribution to job creation in a number of areas: for example, the SFPA's landing obligations for certain segments of the EU fleet have generated additional activity at the Port of Nouadhibou in terms of transshipment, supply and maintenance services, which in turn has contributed to job creation in this area. Indirect effects on job creation appear however to have been limited.

The SFPA however did not generate any employment in the processing of marine products, as EU vessels are currently not supplying any downstream processing industry in Mauritania (this could change in the future once construction of the processing plant mentioned in section 3.1.4 is finalised).

In sum, the SFPA clearly contributed to employment, however SFPA's impact and contribution can be considered as rather limited, relative to the size of the fisheries sector in Mauritania.

3.2.3 Sustainable exploitation of marine resources and avoiding negative effects on food security

As shown in sections 3.1.5 and 3.1.6, the SFPA can be considered to have contributed positively to the sustainable exploitation of marine resources in Mauritania:

- The SFPA contributes positively to fisheries governance in Mauritania by providing a uniform and transparent framework for the activities of EU vessels in Mauritanian waters. In addition, the protocol includes several specific provisions that have a positive impact on overall fisheries governance (e.g. the provision promoting transparency in the sector; the non-discrimination clause; the set up of an independent Joint Scientific Committee, which reviews regularly data on catches, effort and stock status; and the establishment of a system for scientific observation on board EU vessels), even though some challenges still exist in the application of some of these provisions (e.g. some agreements recently concluded by Mauritania with other partners appear to be inconsistent with the conditions and sustainability principles set out in the SFPA; implementation of the scientific observation scheme has apparently experienced difficulties with regards to pelagic vessels).
- The SFPA's sectoral support component – which for the largest part consisted of actions in areas such as monitoring, control and surveillance; scientific research; and environmental protection – can also be considered to have contributed to enhancing the overall fisheries governance capacity, even though its exact impact is difficult to measure in the absence of indicators.
- The surplus concept is very difficult to apply in practice due to a lack of reliable information on fish stocks and the fact that species covered by the SFPA include highly migratory species or straddling stocks shared with neighbouring countries. In its latest annual report, the JSC did not recommend a change in the catch limits defined in the protocol, but since a

few species under the demersal and pelagic fisheries were assessed to be currently overexploited, a precautionary approach was recommended. Overall, it appears however that the latest protocols have generally contributed to a reduction of fishing capacities and effort, which in turn reduced the pressure on fish stocks.

In order to minimise potential negative impacts on food security, a “fees in kind” provision was included in recent protocols. In the current protocol, the provision specifies that pelagic freezer trawlers and shrimp-fishing vessels (in the case of by-catches) “shall contribute to the policy of fish distribution to people in need, at the rate of 2% of their pelagic catches which have been transhipped or unloaded following a voyage”¹⁹⁶. All the catches collected under the fees in kind provision are taken over by the SNDP and in accordance with Mauritanian legislation, passed to the people in need through SNDP’s distribution network. Although several concerns have been identified with regards SNDP’s operations (see discussion in section 3.3 below), this mechanism is considered to have had some impact on food security and the “fees in kind” provision, if only by setting aside part of the catches for human consumption, can be considered to have contributed to mitigating at least partly potential negative effects of the SFPA on food security.

According to stakeholders, the main threat to food security in Mauritania is in fact the rapidly expanding fishmeal export-oriented industry, which is supplied by national and foreign chartered vessels and processes small pelagic fish (in particular sardinella) into fishmeal and also fish oil. This industry has expanded dramatically in the last 5-6 years, motivated by high fishmeal prices and a global demand driven by the aquaculture sector: in 2015, there were 24 flour plants in operation and stakeholders interviewed in the field estimated that there is a total of about 40 plants today. The rapid and poorly controlled expansion of this industry is causing serious concerns, due to its potential negative effects on the sustainable exploitation of pelagic resources (there is already concern that sardinella might be overexploited) and on food security, as the industry absorbs most of small pelagic fish catches (according to the SFPA’s ex post and ex ante evaluation report, 75-83% of catches supply the fish flour plants while only 8-13% is for human consumption; the balance is used as supply of bait) and sardinella in particular is key to food security in Mauritania. As mentioned earlier, it appears however that EU vessels are not supplying this industry.

3.3 Unintended outcomes and impacts

One unintended effect of the SFPA has been the extension by Mauritanian authorities of the 2% levy on pelagic catches (the “fees in kind” provision, which was first introduced in the 2013-2014 protocol) to all foreign vessels fishing in Mauritanian waters¹⁹⁷, and the subsequent set up and expansion of the SNDP. Since it started operations in 2014, SNDP has been supported by AECID (the Spanish Cooperation Agency for International Development) and the volumes of fish distributed by the company have grown significantly along with its distribution network: SNDP currently distributes more than 9,000 tons of fish per year through 73 distribution outlets spread across the country. In parallel with the expansion of SNDP’s activities, the share of fish supplied by EU vessels in the total volumes distributed by the SNDP has declined over the years: according to the SNDP, it was only 18% in 2017, down from 25% in 2016.

¹⁹⁶ Chapter III of the Annex, Section 2 “Fees in kind”.

¹⁹⁷ Mauritanian authorities plan to also extend this requirement to the national fleet, but the effect would in any case be more limited as the national fleet mostly targets cephalopods.

As mentioned earlier, SNDP's activities have had a number of outcomes and impacts (e.g. effects on food security and fish consumption, at least in some of the regions; job creation) and given the role played by the SFPA in introducing the 2% levy on pelagic catches in Mauritania, the SFPA can be considered to have contributed to them (indirectly and only in part, as SNDP is only partly supplied by fish caught by EU vessels). However, a 2016 study financed by the Commission¹⁹⁸ identified several deficiencies affecting the implementation of SNDP's operations, e.g. *inter alia*:

- Lack of targeting in the distribution of fish: the study found that eligibility criteria were not clearly defined and that in most sites fish is distributed on a “first-come, first-served” basis, with the final beneficiaries not necessarily being those targeted by the programme;
- Development of parallel markets that the poor cannot access: according to the study, there is a lack of control of quantities distributed, which favours diversion and the illegal sale of fish through national or international channels;
- Questionable sanitary conditions (e.g. problems maintaining the cold chain of frozen products and distribution conditions that are often very basic) and related health risks for consumers;
- Potential negative effects on the private trade of fish and meat (according to the study, the sale of fish at very low, administered prices has effects on market prices for fish and possibly meat, although the effects vary from one region to another: in some regions, SNDP's sale of fish competes with existing private distribution channels but at much lower prices).

According to AECID, the study was carried out in the early stages of the development of SNDP's activities and several deficiencies have been resolved in the meantime: sanitary conditions have much improved as a result of additional investments and training on hygiene, as well as the control of quantities distributed. AECID acknowledges however that the targeting of beneficiaries remains a challenge: SNDP and AECID are currently working with various organisations to better target beneficiaries of the programme based on existing registries of vulnerable populations. Finally, both SNDP and AECID doubt that SNDP's sale of fish competes with existing private distribution channels as it is not the same species that are being sold (SNDP mostly sells horse mackerels, while private distribution channels sell sardinella; the 2016 study argued however that there could still be a substitution effect), or that it has effects on market prices (should there be an effect, it would be minimal according to AECID).

4 CONCLUSIONS

The SFPA, through its successive protocols, has proved to evolve over time to better take into account the interests of Mauritania and its fisheries sector, and to ensure sustainable exploitation of resources. In particular, the conditions laid out in recent protocols (authorised species and fishing areas) appear to have been effective in mitigating potential negative impacts on the economic development of the Mauritanian fisheries sector.

In terms of SFPA's contribution to (positive) development outcomes and impacts, the assessment is however more mixed:

- The SFPA's most evident impact is its contribution to improving fisheries governance. The SFPA provides a transparent framework for EU vessels' activities in Mauritanian waters and contributes to regular monitoring of the state of fish stocks. The ripple effect on other agreements signed by Mauritania with other partners is however not always evident.

¹⁹⁸ DAI (2016) « Étude préliminaire du système de distribution mis en œuvre par la Société Nationale de Distribution du Poisson (SNDP) en Mauritanie », European Commission's Advisory Service in Social Transfers project (ASiST), Final report, October 2016.

- While the SFPA can be said to have contributed to the local economy and to employment in Mauritania, these impacts have been relatively limited. Aside from the EU's substantial financial compensation (for which the partner country has no reporting obligation and therefore whose development impact is difficult ascertain), economic effects are limited and mainly consist of generating additional activity at the port. The SFPA's contribution to employment mainly consists in the employment of Mauritanian seamen onboard EU vessels, which relative to the size of the sector can be considered as limited. EU vessels are (currently) not supplying any downstream processing industry in Mauritania.
- Sectoral support – which is considered as a key tool for achieving SFPAs' development objectives – has experienced significant delays in its implementation. In general, while the sectoral support component appears to have had positive effects, its exact impact is difficult to measure in the absence of indicators.

Coordination and coherence with development cooperation is to some extent ensured by the on-site presence of a fisheries attaché representing DG MARE in the EU Delegation. The fisheries attaché plays a direct role in monitoring the implementation of the protocols and can coordinate on the ground with colleagues at the EU Delegation in charge of development cooperation, with a view to ensure for example the complementarity and consistency between sectoral support actions and development cooperation projects. However, ensuring PCD in the field, once SFPA protocols have been negotiated and agreed, remains a very challenging exercise – and the challenges are often linked to the very different processes underlying the design of (i) SFPAs (which are the result of a commercial negotiation) and (ii) development cooperation policy, as well as the different procedures used by DG MARE and DG DEVCO.

In this regard, it can be noted that the implementation of sectoral support under the SFPA presents some inconsistency with EU's development policy in Mauritania, considering that the EU recently stopped providing budget support in Mauritania due to the country's failure to comply with the eligibility criteria defined in DG DEVCO's Budget Support Guidelines. While SFPA sectoral support and budget support under the EDF share the same concept (payments are disbursed directly to public authorities in the partner countries based on the progress achieved in a number of previously defined areas), the procedures and conditions for payment of sectoral support are different from those for EDF budget support. In Mauritania, provisions related to the implementation and monitoring of sectoral support have been strengthened in the current protocol (and were in fact considered at the time the most advanced of all SFPAs in this regard); however, these provisions remain relatively generic and most elements serve as guidance and are not binding. In comparison, EDF budget support is guided by a normative reference framework, with detailed guidelines, clear eligibility criteria and safeguards. Having such a reference framework, which defines clear rules that cannot be negotiated, would be beneficial to improve the control of sectoral support as the instruments to do so currently appear to be lacking. In this context, SFPA sectoral support could benefit from drawing on DG DEVCO's Budget Support Guidelines.

Overall, the SFPA, through its successive protocols, can be considered to have incorporated over time a PCD approach, although it appears that it was not so much the result of PCD mechanisms but rather the result of the negotiations and dialogue with Mauritania, which led the EU to better take into account potential impacts of the SFPA on the country and in general development considerations.

ANNEXES:

ANNEX 1: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Institutions	Persons met
Delegation of the European Union to Mauritania	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Eric LUNEL, Fisheries Attaché Ms. Barbara DEQUINZE, Premier Secrétaire, Team Leader 'Croissance Inclusive et Durable' Mr. Philippe LE CLERC, Attaché – Chargé de Programmes Développement rural – Sécurité Alimentaire Mr. Enrico COLOMBO, Team Leader 'Secteurs Sociaux & Coordination de l'Aide'
Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Economy (<i>Ministère de la Pêche et de l'Économie Maritime – MPEM</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dr. Mohamed Ely BARHAM, Directeur de la Programmation et de la Coopération Ms. Azza Ahmed Cheikh Ould Jiddou, Conseillère technique Mr. Sidi Ali Ould Sidi BOUBAR, Directeur Général de l'Exploitation des Ressources Halieutiques (DG-ERH) Ms. Bowb El KHALESS, Directrice du Développement et de la Valorisation des Produits (DDVP) Mr. Lamine CAMARA, Directeur de l'Aménagement des Ressources et des Études (DARE) Mr. Mohamed Elmoctar TOLBA, Directeur Adjoint de la Marine Marchande (DMM)
Office National d'Inspection Sanitaire des Produits de la Pêche et de l'Aquaculture (ONISPA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dr. Aly Ould Yahya DARTIGE, Directeur
Société Mauritanienne pour la Commercialisation de Poisson (SMCP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Abdoulaye Mamadou BA, Directeur Général de la
Marché au Poisson de Nouakchott	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Mohamed ould Mohamed MAHMOUD, Directeur général
Société Nationale de Distribution de Poissons (SNDP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Moctar Ould BOUCEIF, Directeur Général
Mauritanian Coastguard (<i>Garde Côtes Mauritanienes – GCM</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CF Sid Ahmed BECHIR, Commandant adjoint, Mr. MedbLemine LEFDEL, Chef Service Contrôle CC Ahmed MOULAYE, Chef Service Opérations
Institut Mauritanien de Recherches Océanographiques et de Pêches (IMROP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Mohamed El Hafedh Ould EJIWEN, Directeur général Mr. Mahfoudh Ould TATEB, Directeur Adjoint
Autonomous Port of Nouadhibou	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Sadegh Ould BABA, Directeur de l'Exploitation Mr. Bouba MAAZOUZ, Conseiller Directeur Général
AECID – Spanish Cooperation Agency for International Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ms. Lierni GALDOS
Fédération Nationale de Pêche (FNP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Mohamed Mahmoud SADEGH, Secrétaire Général Mr. Mohamed Ould Saleck, Représentant Section Sud Mr. Ahmed Salem VALL KHAR, Représentant Nouakchott Mr. Abdou Karim DIEYE Mr. Mohamed Salem BOYE Mr. Boubacar SY, Directeur Général PAM Export Mr. Sid'Ahmed ABEID, Président de la Section Pêche Artisanale et Côtière
Fédération Nationale de la Pêche Artisanale (FNPA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Abderrahmane Cherif BOUHABOUENY, Directeur Exécutif

ANNEX 2: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC.

Council Regulation (EC) No 1801/2006 of 30 November 2006 on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania:
Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania

Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for a period of four years, 1.12.2015.

Commission Decision (EU) 2017/451 of 14 March 2017 approving, on behalf of the European Union, certain amendments to the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania

Bouzouma M., Corte, A., Daniel, P., 2016. Rapport de la Réunion annuelle du Comité Scientifique Conjoint relatif à l'Accord de pêche signé entre la République islamique de Mauritanie et l'Union européenne. Nouakchott, Mauritanie, 05 au 07 septembre 2016. Rapports des Comités Scientifiques Conjoints. Bruxelles, 72 p. + Annexes.

CAPE (2016) "Accord de Partenariat de Pêche RIM-UE 2015-2019 : Principaux enjeux de gouvernance et de durabilité », January 2016.

Cervantes, A. M. Bouzouma, et S. des Clers (eds.) 2017. Rapport de la Réunion annuelle du Comité Scientifique Conjoint relatif à l'Accord de pêche signé entre la République islamique de Mauritanie et l'Union européenne. Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Espagne, 03 au 05 octobre 2017. Rapports des Comités Scientifiques Conjoints. Bruxelles, 69 p. + Annexes.

Cofrepeche, NFDS, Poseidon et MRAG (2014) "Évaluation rétrospective et prospective du protocole de l'accord de partenariat dans le secteur de la pêche entre l'Union européenne et la République islamique de Mauritanie", Final Report, January 2014.

DAI (2015) « Etude sur l'évolution des pêcheries de petits pélagiques en Afrique du Nord-Ouest et impacts possibles sur la nutrition et la sécurité alimentaire en Afrique de l'Ouest », European Commission, Final Report, 15.07.2015.

DAI (2016) « Étude préliminaire du système de distribution mis en œuvre par la Société Nationale de Distribution du Poisson (SNDP) en Mauritanie », European Commission's Advisory Service in Social Transfers project (ASiST), Final report, October 2016.

European Court of Auditors (2015) "Are the Fisheries Partnership Agreements well managed by the Commission?", Special Report.

Goulding I. (2016) "Research for PECH Committee – Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements on Employment in the EU and in Third Countries", European Parliament, July 2016.

ICCAT (2016) Report of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS), Madrid, Spain, 3 to 7 October 2016.

MPEM (2015) « Stratégie Nationale de Gestion Responsable pour un Développement Durable des Pêches et de l'Economie Maritime 2015-2019 », February 2015.

WWF (2017) "Is Europe ready to lead on international fisheries governance?", 21 June 2017.

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Case study: Common Fisheries Policy (2013 reform) Country note: Senegal

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Rationale for selection of the country

The external dimension of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) provides a framework for the activities of European Union (EU) vessels fishing outside EU waters. This includes bilateral fisheries agreements, which define the rights of access of the EU fleet to fish resources in third country waters: they can be reciprocal agreements based on an exchange of fishing possibilities, or can involve a financial compensation paid to the third country in return for access to its fish resources, as is the case for bilateral fisheries agreements with developing countries in Africa and Oceania.

Criticised for the ‘fish, pay and go’ attitude, in particular in relation to developing countries, these bilateral agreements have been reshaped into Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) by the 2002 CFP reform, to include a development dimension, e.g. through clauses related to monitoring, local processing and employment of local crew. Further revision of the agreements was introduced by the 2013 CFP reform, which renamed them Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs) and brought several principles into law: the agreements should be of mutual benefit to the EU and to the third country concerned; the standards for EU vessels fishing in EU waters should also apply to fishing outside EU waters; the agreements can target only surplus of the allowable catch. SFPAs are a tool for improving fisheries governance in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of coastal state partner countries; they aim to ensure the sustainable exploitation of resources, whilst at the same time supporting the partner countries’ capacity to develop their fishing sector.

In order to assess whether the 2013 CFP reform has had positive development outcomes and impacts, the case studies will therefore specifically look at the development impacts of SFPAs, by focusing on two specific SFPAs that were concluded following the reform. Considering that there are two main types of agreements (1. tuna agreements, which allow EU vessels to pursue migrating tuna stocks as they move along the shores of Africa and through the Indian Ocean; 2. mixed agreements, which provide access to a wide range of fish stocks in the partner country's EEZ), it was decided to select the two following countries:


- **Mauritania:** the EU-Mauritania SFPA is the largest active mixed-species agreement – and largest SFPA overall – in terms of financial contribution;
- **Senegal:** the EU-Senegal SFPA is the second largest active tuna agreement in terms of financial contribution¹⁹⁹.

¹⁹⁹ The largest active tuna agreement is the EU-Seychelles SFPA, but since the Seychelles is a (upper) middle income country it has been decided to rather select Senegal as a case study country.

1.2 Hypotheses to be tested

SFPAs signed between the EU and developing countries are expected to have a number of economic, social and environmental impacts in the partner countries. Figure 1 below presents a simplified intervention logic of SFPAs at the country level, highlighting the key expected development outcomes and impacts of SFPAs in partner countries as well as associated transmission mechanisms and causal links.

Figure 1: Simplified intervention logic of SFPAs at the partner country level



The case studies aim to verify the hypotheses underlying the causal links and transmission mechanisms identified in Figure 1 and to assess the achievement of the SFPAs' anticipated development outcomes and impacts in the selected countries. For this purpose, it was agreed that the case studies would focus on three main indicators:

- 1) Extent of SFPAs' contribution to the local economy in the selected countries;
- 2) Extent of SFPAs' contribution to employment in the selected countries; and
- 3) State of fish stocks covered by the SFPAs and presence of positive/negative externalities of SFPAs on food security in the selected countries.

The three indicators are in line with the three impacts identified in Figure 1 and their respective contributing outcomes. We provide below further detail on the hypotheses to be verified and our general approach to measure the three indicators.

Extent of the SFPAs' contribution to the local economy in Senegal

In all SFPAs, the EU pays the partner country a financial contribution composed of two distinct parts:

1. Compensation for the access rights provided to EU vessels to exploit the fishing opportunities defined in the Protocol; and
2. Sectoral support for the partner country, with the aim of promoting the implementation of a sustainable fisheries policy in the partner country.

The compensation for the access rights is paid into a Public Treasury account and contributes to the local economy by providing predictable revenues for the national budget. It can be noted that this compensation paid by the EU comes in addition to the fees paid by EU vessel owners for the fishing authorisations (licences) issued under the SFPAs and for their actual catches. In the case of the SFPAs with Senegal, the compensation for access rights paid by the EU amounts to a total of 4.94 million EUR over the 5-year period, while levies due by vessel owners are estimated in the Agreement to amount to a total of 5.24 million EUR over the same period.

Sectoral support – which comes in addition to and complements activities financed by EU development cooperation funds – is considered an important tool for achieving the objectives of improving partner countries' fisheries governance and fostering the economic development of their fisheries sector. According to SFPAs' provisions, the Joint Committees shall establish a multiannual sectoral programme in the form of a matrix in line with the partner countries' needs and priorities for the fisheries sector. Actions financed under the sectoral support may include for example: Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) activities; scientific research on fish stocks; support to laboratories/food safety (exports); support to shipyards; infrastructure linked to fisheries activities/ sector (e.g. support to develop industries ashore involved in the processing of marine products); or support to (local) artisanal fishing. In a 2015 report (which covered the years up to 2014)²⁰⁰, the European Court of Auditors argued however that the Commission's control of sectoral support actions has been limited and the actions actually implemented by the partner countries were in some cases different from those agreed²⁰¹.

In the case of the SFPAs with Senegal, the financial contribution for sectoral support amounts to 750,000 EUR per year for five years and the Protocol includes provisions relating to the implementation and monitoring of the sectoral support (e.g. submission of annual achievement reports, payments based on a detailed analysis of the outcomes, etc.), albeit not as detailed as those found in SFPAs concluded more recently (e.g. the SFPAs with Mauritania).

In addition to the above, most SFPAs contain provisions on the promotion of cooperation among economic operators but the level of implementation of these clauses appears to differ widely depending on the countries. With respect to the SFPAs with Senegal, the relevant provisions encourage in broad terms the economic integration of European operators in the local fishing sector: the Protocol encourages *inter alia* the creation of joint ventures and “the exchange of information on fishing techniques and gear, preservation methods and the industrial processing of fisheries products” (Article 10). Furthermore, the Protocol includes provisions on transshipment and landings, which in particular impose landing of part of the

²⁰⁰ European Court of Auditors (2015) “Are the Fisheries Partnership Agreements well managed by the Commission?”, Special Report.

²⁰¹ It can be noted however that the SFPAs with Senegal was not among those analysed by the Court: as specified in the report, the Court examined four SFPAs in force at the time of the audit: Mauritania, Madagascar, Mozambique and the Seychelles.

catches in Dakar in order to foster local socio-economic activity (Chapter IV of the Annex, Section 3).

The case study aims to assess the SFPA's contribution to the local economy in Senegal, with a specific focus on the impact of the SFPA's sectoral support component and of other relevant provisions of the SFPA, in particular landing obligations.

Extent of the SFPA's contribution to employment in Senegal

SFPAs are expected to contribute to job creation in partner countries in two main ways:

- (iii) Direct employment on board EU vessels engaged in fishing under SFPAs and their management; and
- (iv) Employment in downstream processing of fishery products generated.

EU vessels frequently operate by choice with crew from SFPA partner countries or other third countries within the region of operation. Furthermore, the granting of fishing authorisations in most SFPAs carries a condition that the vessel operators recruit a minimum number of crew per vessel (or a percentage) of nationals of the partner country²⁰². In the case of the SFPA with Senegal, the Protocol states that for EU fishing vessels operating under the Protocol (tuna seiners, pole-and-line vessels, and deep-sea demersal trawlers), at least 20% of the seamen signed on during the fishing season in the Senegalese fishing zone shall be from Senegal or possibly from an ACP country and that “vessel owners shall endeavour to sign on Senegalese seamen” (Senegalese crew are generally appreciated and hence embarked in large numbers on many fleets).

Employment in downstream processing is expected to be generated by SFPAs mainly in tuna processing. The EU vessels operating under SFPAs in the Atlantic Ocean tuna fisheries exclusively supply cannery operations and only about 20% of Atlantic catches enter EU processing establishments: the balance is processed in the region, in processing establishments based in Ghana (2 canneries), Côte d'Ivoire (3 canneries) and Senegal (1 cannery)²⁰³. At the time of the ex-ante evaluation of the SFPA, the cannery in Senegal was supplied by both the Senegalese fleet and EU pole and line vessels operating in the region to produce frozen whole tuna, loins and canned products. Landing or transshipping of tunas at an operational base in third countries is a common practice, driven by the strategies of tuna business operators to undertake as much processing as possible in lower cost locations. Furthermore, while tuna fishing opportunities under the SFPAs are generally not linked to any specific landing obligation in the partner countries, one exception is the products of the pole and line vessels fishing under the SFPA with Senegal: the SFPA's protocol specifies that these vessels shall land their catches in the Port of Dakar.

With respect to non-tuna fishing products, the SFPA with Senegal does not entail any landing obligation for hake (the only non-tuna species covered by the SFPA) and is not anticipated to generate employment in downstream processing.

In order to verify that the SFPA with Senegal does contribute to employment in Senegal, the case study aims to estimate the number of jobs created in Senegal that can be linked to SFPAs,

²⁰² For tuna vessels – which may not visit the third country concerned – the requirement can be widened to nationals of ACP countries.

²⁰³ Goulding I. (2016) “Research for PECH Committee – Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements on Employment in the EU and in Third Countries”, European Parliament, July 2016.

based on the two categories defined above. At the same time, the case study also considers and assesses other possible indirect impacts on employment in the fisheries sector in Senegal and at the Port of Dakar (e.g. transshipment, supply, repair and maintenance services).

State of fish stocks covered by the SFPAs and presence of positive/negative externalities of the SFPAs on food security in Senegal

One of the main objectives of SFPAs is to ensure sustainable exploitation of marine resources and the key sustainability principle of SFPAs is that the fishing opportunities negotiated in the protocols should only allow EU vessels to fish surplus resources²⁰⁴.

In this context, the evaluation sought to collect updated information on the state of fish stocks in Senegal, relying on the work carried out by the Joint Scientific Committee linked to the SFPAs, which compiles and analyses data on the fishing effort and on catches and is to produce annual stock assessment reports. It can be noted however that past studies have highlighted that the surplus concept has proven very difficult to implement in practice, due precisely to a lack of reliable information on fish stocks (also because scientific coordination is lacking for straddling small pelagic stocks present in Moroccan, Mauritanian and Senegalese waters) and on the fishing effort of domestic fish fleets, or other foreign fleets which have also been granted access by the partner countries²⁰⁵. Furthermore, in the context of SFPAs the very notion of surplus in the partner country's waters is in fact questionable if applied to highly migratory or straddling stocks that cover different EEZs (with respect to tuna species, it can be noted however that national quotas are determined in the region by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)²⁰⁶: in this context, the "surplus" for tuna species in Senegalese waters was determined by the fact that the national fleet is not able to fish the entire national quota allocated by ICCAT and this decision was taken by national authorities).

Sustainable fishing is also closely linked to food security. While SFPAs aim to contribute positively to food security, critics have argued that they may have a negative impact when resources targeted under the access agreements are key to food security, i.e. small pelagic stocks such as the round sardinella caught off the coast of Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal. In this context, the case studies aim to assess the existence of possible externalities of SFPAs on food security in the two selected countries. In the case of the SFPAs with Senegal, all small pelagic species – deemed essential for the Senegalese artisanal fishery and local food consumption – have been excluded from the scope of the SFPAs therefore no significant impacts on food security are anticipated, but the case study aims to verify this hypothesis.

²⁰⁴ Article 31 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013.

²⁰⁵ See for example European Court of Auditors (2015).

²⁰⁶ ICCAT is the intergovernmental organisation responsible for the conservation of tunas and tuna-like species in the Atlantic Ocean, including stocks assessments and definition of catch levels. Both the EU and Senegal are contracting parties.

2 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE LINK BETWEEN THE EU POLICY AND THE COUNTRY

As mentioned in previous sections, the main link between the 2013 CFP reform and Senegal is the current SFPA between the EU and Senegal, which covers the period from November 2014 to November 2019 and allows EU vessels to fish in the Senegalese waters. The Agreement and Protocol were negotiated in accordance with the requirements of the reformed CFP. The Protocol offers fishing possibilities for tuna and includes a limited access to black hake, a deep demersal resource. The key features of the SFPA are presented in Table 1 below.

Table 5: Summary of key features of current SFPA with Senegal

Duration of the Agreement / Protocol	5 years renewable (20.11.2014 – 19.11. 2019)	
Nature of the FPA	Tuna Fishery Agreement, with a limited demersal component (hake)	
Fishing opportunities (vessels authorised to fish & reference tonnage / total allowable catch)	Tuna	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 36 vessels (28 freezer tuna seiners and 8 pole-and-liners); ▪ Reference tonnage: 14,000 t/year;
	Hake	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 2 vessels (2 trawlers); ▪ Total allowable catch: 2,000 t/year.
Financial contribution by the EU as compensation for access rights	Total for the five-year period: 4,940,000 EUR (Per year: decreasing – 1,808,000 to 1,668,000 EUR / year).	
Financial contribution by the EU for sectoral support	Total for the five-year period: 3,750,000 EUR (Per year: 750,000 EUR)	

This new SFPA replaces the previous framework agreement, which was adopted in 1980 and was one of the first bilateral fisheries agreements ever concluded by the EU. The latest protocol, covering the period from July 2002 to June 2006, was the sixteenth since the entry into force of the 1980 Framework Agreement: this mixed Protocol established fishing opportunities for crustaceans, small pelagic species, demersal species and tuna. The Protocol however expired in 2006 and was not renewed, amid *inter alia* concerns over possible overexploitation of fisheries resources. When negotiations for a new Agreement and Protocol resumed in 2013-2014, the Senegalese government expressed the wish not to open negotiations on non-tuna species that were thought to be fully exploited or under threat of overexploitation, which is why the current SFPA is essentially a tuna agreement with only a small demersal component (hake).

3 FINDINGS (AT OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS LEVELS)

3.1 Country level outcomes

3.1.1 Revenues for the national budget

The compensation for access rights paid by the EU amounts to a total of 4.94 million EUR over a period of 5 years. In accordance with the protocol, this financial contribution is paid in annual tranches²⁰⁷ into a Senegal Public Treasury account and provides the country with a predictable revenue stream for the duration of the protocol.

Due to the limited scope of the ongoing protocol, access rights payments made under the current SFPA with Senegal are however much lower than those under mixed species SFPAs, including past SFPAs with Senegal (which, before 2006, were mixed species agreements). Accordingly,

²⁰⁷ As specified in the Protocol (Article 3), the annual amount as financial compensation for access to resources amounts to EUR 1,058,000 for the first year, EUR 988,000 for the second year, for the third year and for the fourth year and EUR 918,000 for the fifth year. These annual amounts cannot be decreased; however, if catches by EU vessels exceed the annual reference tonnage (for tuna) or the total allowable catch (for hake), the Protocol provides for an increase of the compensation for access rights.

the compensation for access rights of the current SFPA with Senegal has a much more limited economic impact: for example, while the compensation for access rights under the SFPA with Mauritania accounted for about 5.2% of the country's national budget in 2017 and therefore can be said to have a substantial impact, the compensation under the Senegal SFPA only accounted for about 0.02% of Senegal's national budget in 2017²⁰⁸.

Furthermore, while sectoral support payments are conditional upon the realisation of the actions agreed, there are no restrictions for the partner country as regards the use of access rights funds, which strictly govern access to the national fishing areas²⁰⁹. In the absence of concrete information on how funds were used, the effect of the compensation for access rights in terms of development outcomes is impossible to ascertain.

As mentioned earlier, access rights payments by the EU come in addition to the fees payments by EU vessel owners. These fees are calculated based on catches made and were estimated in the protocol to potentially amount up to 5.24 million EUR over the 5-year period. However, due to under-utilisation of fishing opportunities (see Tables 2 and 3 below), the total fees paid by EU vessel owners have been so far lower than anticipated, amounting to a total of 0.75 million EUR in 2015 and 0.76 million EUR in 2016²¹⁰.

Table 6: Overview of the utilisation of SFPA's fishing opportunities by EU vessels (2015-2016)

Fishing category	Available fishing authorisations	Fishing authorisations issued	Number of vessels active in Senegal's EEZ	
			2015	2016
Tuna seiners	28	21	9	8
Tuna pole-and-liners	8	8	8	8
Demersal trawlers (hake)	2	2	2	2

Source: Joint Scientific Committee annual reports 2016 and 2017.

Table 7: Utilisation rates of SFPA's fishing opportunities by EU vessels (2015-2016)

Fishing category	Reference tonnage or total allowable catch / year (tons)	Catches in Senegal's EEZ (tons)		Utilisation rates (%)	
		2015	2016	2015	2016
Tuna vessels	14,000	6,379	7,711	45.6	55.0
<i>Tuna seiners</i>	-	772	1,424	-	-
<i>Tuna pole-and-liners</i>	-	5,607	6,287	-	-
Demersal trawlers (hake)	2,000	1,492	173	74.6	8.6

Source: Joint Scientific Committee annual reports 2016 and 2017.

3.1.2 Economic development of the fisheries sector

The conditions laid out in the new protocol appear to have been effective in minimising the potential negative impacts of EU vessels' activity in Senegalese waters on the economic development of the national fisheries sector:

- While past fisheries agreements with Senegal covered a wide range of species, it has been agreed to restrict the scope of the new SFPA to only two species, which are not considered as endangered and are not extensively targeted by the national fleet (and in particular not targeted at all by artisanal fishermen), namely tuna species and deep-water hake:

²⁰⁸ According to the 2017 Finance Law, Senegal's national budget for 2017 amounted to 3,360 billion XOF, equivalent to 5.13 billion EUR.

²⁰⁹ In accordance with the 2013 reform of the CFP, the payments by the EU as compensation for access rights are now decoupled from sectoral support payments.

²¹⁰ Source: Ministry of Fisheries and the Marine Economy (MPEM). The amounts include both the flat-rate advance fees and the balance payments made based on actual catches.

- With respect to tuna species, management and conservation of the resources in the sub-region is under the responsibility of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). It can be noted that tuna catches by EU vessels under the SFPAs are counted against the fishing quota defined for the EU by ICCAT; in other words, catches of tuna by EU vessels in Senegalese waters do not have any impact on the fishing quota defined for Senegal and the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) of the national tuna fleet (there is a Senegalese industrial fleet targeting tuna but its size is relatively limited).
 - With respect to deep-water hake, the current protocol only provides for a limited access, with a relatively low TAC and only two vessels authorised to fish. As highlighted in the ex-ante evaluation of the protocol²¹¹, the hake resource was not specifically targeted by the national fleet or by any foreign fleet at the time of the negotiation of the protocol. Since then, a national fleet targeting hake has emerged: according to the Ministry of Fisheries, the SFPAs have in fact contributed to this development, as the inclusion of a fishing opportunity for hake in the protocol led to increasing knowledge on the availability of this resource.
- Other resources such as coastal demersal species, deep demersal species other than hake, small pelagic species and crustaceans – which had been included in past protocols but are key resources for the national fleet (in particular small pelagic species, which are deemed essential for artisanal fishermen) and thought to be under threat of overexploitation – have been excluded from the scope of the new protocol.
- Authorised fishing zones defined in the protocol appear to have been effective in limiting interaction between EU vessels and national fleet. It appears that EU tuna vessels are fishing in different zones than the national fleet, and although the Joint Scientific Committee (JSC) mentioned that EU and Senegalese demersal trawlers targeting hake might be fishing in the same areas²¹², no interactions were reported (at the same time, as shown in Table 3 above EU demersal waters have not been much active in Senegalese waters in the first 2 years of the protocol).
- Overall, national stakeholders acknowledged that the scope and conditions of the new SFPAs have been an improvement over past protocols in terms of safeguarding the interests of the national fisheries sectors and protecting the resources. Representatives of both the industrial and the artisanal fishing sectors confirmed that the activity of EU vessels in Senegalese waters under the SFPAs are not affecting their own fishing activities (mainly because most of the national fleet targets different species, but even tuna vessels shipowners mentioned that they are not negatively impacted).

On the other hand, if potential negative effects appear to have been mitigated well, the positive effects of the SFPAs on the economic development of the national fisheries sector appear to have been rather limited:

- The “transshipment and landings” provision²¹³ has had some positive economic effects, but these have been more limited than anticipated:
 - First, it can be noted that the provision only includes a landing obligation for one segment of the EU fleet, namely tuna pole-and line vessels. Tuna seiners and demersal trawlers must report their catches in Senegalese waters, but have no obligation to land at the Port of Dakar; they only have the obligation to carry out transshipments in Senegalese waters at the Port of Dakar.

²¹¹ Cofrepeche, NFDS, Poseidon et MRAG (2013) “Évaluation rétrospective et prospective du protocole de l'accord de partenariat dans le secteur de la pêche entre l'Union européenne et la République du Sénégal”.

²¹² « Rapport de la Réunion annuelle du Comité Scientifique Conjoint relatif à l'Accord de pêche signé entre la République du Sénégal et l'Union européenne », Madrid, 09-11 October 2017.

²¹³ Chapter IV, Section 3 of the Annex to the protocol.

- In practice, all the catches landed by EU tuna seiners and demersal trawlers at the Port of Dakar are only transhipped and redirected to other destinations – namely to the EU or other locations in West Africa in the case of tuna and to the Port of Cadiz in Spain in the case of hake (in both cases, the main reason why these vessels are not effectively landing their catch in Dakar appears to be that their products can fetch higher prices in the aforementioned destinations; with respect to tuna seiners, part of their catch is landed and processed in the region but they favour Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, where the national legislations are in general perceived as more favourable to encourage landings and the local canneries offer better prices). Only some by-catches of demersal trawlers are effectively landed at the port and sold on the national market to local fishmongers (*mareyeurs*). Catches by EU tuna seiners and demersal trawlers therefore do not supply any downstream processing industry in Senegal; however, they generate economic activity at the Port of Dakar in terms of transshipment, supply and maintenance services (as well as additional port taxes). This applies in particular to tuna seiners, which are active across the East Atlantic region and are also fishing in the waters of neighbouring countries under other SFPAs (e.g. in Mauritania and Cape Verde), and do not only tranship at the Port of Dakar catches made in Senegalese waters but also catches from other EEZs in the East Atlantic region. As shown in Table 4 below, a total of 13,708 t of tuna were transhipped in 2016 by EU seiners at the Port of Dakar, up from 4,882 t in 2015. It can be noted that even though the protocol of the previous FPA with Senegal expired in June 2006, the Port of Dakar remained after 2006 a transshipment (and temporary storage) zone for tuna caught in the region by EU tuna seiners. This means that in the absence of an SFPAs with Senegal, some of the tuna caught by EU seiners in the East Atlantic region would still be transhipped at the Port of Dakar (in particular because of the current SFPAs with Mauritania), but the SFPAs can still be considered to have contributed to increasing the volumes of tuna transhipped at the Port.

Table 8: Overview of tuna landed or transhipped by seiners at the Port of Dakar (2015-2016)

	2015	2016
Total tuna landed or transhipped by EU seiners ²¹⁴ (tons)	4,882	13,708
Total tuna landed or transhipped by foreign seiners (tons)	30,677	29,168
Share of EU seiners in total tuna landed or transhipped (%)	15.9	47.0

Source: Joint Scientific Committee annual reports 2016 and 2017.

- With respect to pole-and-line vessels, which as mentioned above are the only EU vessels subject to a landing obligation:

 - First, it can be noted that the 8 EU pole-and-line vessels currently fishing under the SFPAs are based in Dakar and were already landing their catches at the Port of Dakar prior to the SFPAs. Indeed, Dakar has been for several decades a base for EU pole-and-liners, which played a crucial role in the supply of local canneries and other national tuna processing plants. That is why, following the non-renewal of the Protocol in 2006, the Senegalese authorities invoking exceptional circumstances have continued through a private arrangement to authorise EU tuna pole-and-liners to fish in Senegal’s EEZ, with the obligation to land all their catches in Dakar²¹⁵. However, this specific arrangement was deemed in contradiction with local regulations and it became increasingly difficult to justify its exceptional nature.

²¹⁴ Includes the 8 EU seiners that have been fishing in Senegal’s EEZ in 2016 (see Table 2), as well as 3 other seiners that had not been active in Senegal’s EEZ.

²¹⁵ The number of EU pole-and-line vessels based in Dakar has however decreased in the period during which there was no SFPAs in place: while there were 15 pole-and-liners based in Dakar when the Protocol expired in June 2006, there are only 8 left since 2010.

- In this context, the current SFPAs made it possible to regularise the situation of these 8 pole-and-liners and ensure the continuation of their operations and landings of tuna at the Port of Dakar. The EU tuna pole-and-line vessels do not only fish in Senegalese waters but also in the EEZ of neighbouring countries (in particular Mauritania) and as shown in Table 5 below the total landings of these vessels at the Port of Dakar have been on the rise in recent years (at the same time, the ex-ante evaluation report mentions that the 8 EU pole-and-line vessels landed a total of 12,500t at the Port of Dakar in 2011, which would suggest that landings by pole-and-liners have only barely returned to their 2011 level).

Table 9: Landings by EU tuna pole-and-liners at the Port of Dakar, 2013-2016

	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total tuna landed by EU pole-and-line vessels (t)	6,321	5,629	8,156	11,574

Source: Ministry of Fisheries.

- One of the main objectives of Senegal in signing this new SFPAs was to ensure a steady supply of raw materials to the tuna processing industry in Dakar, and specifically the main cannery SCASA²¹⁶, which was acquired in late 2012 by South Korean investor Dongwon Group (the State retained 10% of the shares of the company). At the time, Dongwon expressed the intent to increase significantly the capacity of the cannery with the objective to process 80 t of tuna per working day, i.e. a volume of 30,000 t / year: this objective could only be achieved through an increase of the quantities of tuna landed in Dakar. However, since 2015 the cannery is no longer supplied by the EU pole-and-liners, because shipowners and SCASA could not agree on the price of tuna. Dongwon has in the meantime set up its own fishing fleet in Senegal through the creation of CAPSEN²¹⁷, which owns 3 tuna seiners (under Senegalese flag) that fish not only in Senegalese waters but also in the EEZs of neighbouring countries such as Mauritania and Cape Verde. Today, SCASA is exclusively supplied in raw material (tuna) by its sister company CAPSEN.
- Following the above and contrary to what was anticipated, EU pole-and-line vessels do not supply any downstream processing industry in Senegal; all the tuna catch of EU pole-and-line vessels is re-exported (one stakeholder suggested that EU pole-and-liners might be selling their catch to Senegalese establishments that re-export it as tuna loins to the EU: should this be the case, the pole-and-liners could be said to at least supply a local semi-processing industry). Otherwise, landings by EU pole-and-line vessels have had similar effects than the transshipments of EU seiners and demersal trawlers, in the sense that they also contributed to generate economic activity at the Port of Dakar in terms of transshipment, supply and maintenance services (as well as additional port taxes). Furthermore, part of the by-catches of EU pole-and-line vessels (e.g. mackerel, horse mackerel, little tunny) is sold to local fishmongers, and stakeholders mentioned that the landings of EU pole-and-line vessels have contributed to maintaining the activity of fishmongers at the port.
- The provision on the cooperation of economic operators (Article 10) does not appear to have gained much traction in practice. There is little interaction between EU ship owners / vessels fishing under the SFPAs and Senegalese economic operators (apart from relations between EU vessels and their local consignees, the latter mentioning that the absence of SFPAs between 2006 and 2014 has been a loss of income for them) and no evidence of

²¹⁶ Société de Conserverie en Afrique Société Anonyme.

²¹⁷ Compagnie Africaine de Pêche au Sénégal.

know-how transfer (e.g. “exchange of information on fishing techniques and gear, preservation methods and the industrial processing of fisheries products” as suggested in the provision). In general, the direct impact of the EU vessels’ presence in Senegalese waters on the national fishing sector is difficult to ascertain: as an example, during interviews representatives of the local fishing industry indicated that they are not negatively affected by the activities from EU vessels, but at the same time pointed out that they do not see how they benefit from it: they consider that in their case the impact is nil.

- With respect to the impact of the sectoral support component on the economic development of the fisheries sector:
 - One of the three strategic pillars under the sectoral support component is the support to the artisanal fishing sector, which accounts for about half of the overall budget²¹⁸. The largest share of actions financed under this pillar focus on the upgrading of landing infrastructure (including construction of new fishing wharves), but it also includes the establishment of a disaster fund (to finance insurance for seamen, vessels and equipment) or the acquisition of vehicles for the competent authority to carry out health inspections. In addition, actions financed under the pillar dedicated to strengthening maritime surveillance and fighting against IUU fishing (see section 3.1.6) can also be considered to contribute positively to the sustainable development of the sector.
 - The impact of these actions on the economic development of the sector is however difficult to measure in the absence of (impact-level) indicators; it can also be mentioned that stakeholders of the artisanal fishing sector have pointed out that they have not been much consulted in the selection and definition of these actions. Furthermore, although the protocol specifies that Senegal shall present every year an annual achievement report setting out how the projects implemented with sectoral financial support have progressed, it appears that no such report was available by the time of the field mission²¹⁹ (this does not mean however that there has not been any monitoring of the sectoral support: for example, as pointed out by DG MARE, the Joint Committee of April 2017 was presented the state of play of the implementation of the first tranche of sectoral support and also agreed on the reprogramming of the second tranche of the support).
 - In any case, the implementation of sectoral support by the Senegalese beneficiaries has experienced delays: at the time of the field mission, the implementation of the first and second instalments (out of five) was still ongoing²²⁰. On a more general level, it can be noted that the annual sectoral support amount is rather limited and therefore can objectively only have a limited impact on the overall fisheries sector of Senegal.

3.1.3 Direct employment on board EU vessels

As mentioned in section 1.2, the protocol specifies that for all categories of vessels “at least 20% of the seamen signed on during the fishing season in the Senegalese fishing zone shall be

²¹⁸ According to the latest version of the sectoral support programming matrix, support to the artisanal fishing sector accounted for 1.72 million EUR out of the total 5-year budget of 3.75 million EUR. The two other strategic pillars are: (i) maritime surveillance and the fight against Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing (ii) scientific research.

²¹⁹ In June 2018, DG MARE indicated however to the evaluation team that the EU received on 22 May and 7 June 2018 full reports from Senegal on the implementation of the first and second tranches of sectoral support.

²²⁰ In accordance with the 2013 reform of the CFP, payments by the EU as compensation for access rights are now decoupled from sectoral support payments, which means that the delays in the implementation of sectoral support have not affected the timely payment of the access rights component.

from Senegal or possibly from an ACP country”²²¹. While no data could be obtained on the exact number of Senegalese seamen employed onboard EU vessels currently fishing in Senegal’s EEZ under the SFPA, feedback from stakeholders suggests that EU vessels have complied with the minimum levels defined in the protocol²²² and even exceeded those, as Senegalese crew are generally appreciated and hence embarked in large numbers on many fleets. For example, data shared by the local consignee representing the two EU deep-sea demersal trawlers targeting hake suggests that more than 50% of the seamen signed on the two vessels were Senegalese (data provided for one of the EU demersal trawlers showed that out of the total 24 seamen employed onboard the vessel 14 were Senegalese (i.e. 58%), and the consignee indicated that the figures were similar on the other demersal trawler).

3.1.4 Employment in downstream processing of fishery products

As mentioned in section 3.1.2, it was anticipated that landings of EU tuna vessels (specifically pole-and-line vessels) would ensure a steady supply of raw materials to the SCASA tuna cannery and support the expansion of the cannery’s capacity, which in turn would generate employment. Feedback from stakeholders suggests that jobs have indeed been created: while the 2013 ex-ante evaluation report estimated that the cannery employed at the time around 220 people, according to SCASA’s sister company CAPSEN (the shipowner that is currently supplying the cannery with tuna) the cannery now employs up to 700 people. However, as mentioned earlier since 2015 EU vessels are no longer supplying the cannery. In this context, it is not clear if, and to what extent, the SFPA can be considered to have contributed to these jobs being created.

While EU pole-and-line vessels stopped supplying the tuna cannery, they appear however to be selling their catch to Senegalese establishments that produce tuna loins for export to the EU: this may have generated employment in these semi-processing establishments, although no data could be obtained in this regard.

Finally, the EU demersal trawlers are not supplying any downstream industry in Senegal: hake is frozen at sea and landed at the Port of Cadiz in Spain.

3.1.5 Other employment generated by the SFPA

As mentioned in section 3.1.2, the SFPA’s “transshipment and landings” provision generated additional activity at the Port of Dakar e.g. in terms of transshipment, supply, repair and maintenance services, which in turn has contributed to job creation. While this effect on job creation is generally hard to quantify, stakeholders agreed that the activity of EU vessels at the port contributed to generating employment, with a local consignee pointing out for example that each landing or transshipment at the port can provide work for up to 150-200 young people.

In addition, although the effect is once again difficult to assess, some stakeholders pointed out that the sale of by-catches by EU pole-and-line vessels to local fishmongers has contributed to preserving the activity of fishmongers at the port, the number of which had significantly declined over the years.

²²¹ Chapter V of the Annex to the Protocol.

²²² The fisheries attaché at the EU Delegation in Senegal pointed out that the 2017 Joint Committee meeting’s report concluded that the minimum level of Senegalese seamen has been respected by EU vessels’ owners.

3.1.6 Improved fisheries governance

The SFPA instrument itself contributes positively to fisheries governance in Senegal by providing – in contrast to other similar fishing agreements concluded by Senegal with other partners but also to the arrangement that authorised EU tuna pole-and-liners to fish in Senegal’s EEZ following the non-renewal of the Protocol in 2006 – a uniform and transparent framework for the activities of EU vessels in Senegalese waters, with clearly defined technical conditions.

In addition, several specific provisions of the protocol can be considered to contribute to improving fisheries governance in Senegal:

- The protocol provides for the setup of Joint Scientific Working Group (later renamed Joint Scientific Committee – JSC), which shall convene regularly to “examine all scientific issues relating to the implementation of the protocol”²²³. The JSC meets in particular once a year to review all relevant and available information on catches, effort and stock status of the fisheries included in the protocol (covering not only the activities of EU vessels but also the activities of the national fleet and other foreign vessels). This mechanism can be considered as a key positive outcome of the SFPA in terms of fisheries governance, as it ensures transparency on the implementation of the agreement and allows the provision of independent scientific advice.
- The protocol provides for a scheme of observers on board EU vessels to monitor the vessels’ fishing activities within the framework of the SFPA²²⁴. This scheme is funded by annual flat-rate financial contributions paid by EU vessels fishing under the SFPA²²⁵. One initial issue at the start of the scheme has been the funding of observers’ salaries: although the protocol specified that the salary and social contributions of observers shall be borne by Senegal, an agreement was eventually found for sectoral support funds to cover this cost. The Fisheries Protection and Surveillance Directorate (DPSP²²⁶) confirmed that the observer scheme is now fully operational and covers all EU vessels fishing in Senegalese waters under the SFPA. On the other hand, there are currently no observers on national vessels (e.g. national vessels targeting hake), which as highlighted in JSC’s annual reports affects to some extent the analysis of data on the state of fish stocks.
- The protocol includes a non-discrimination clause, which specifies that “Senegal undertakes not to grant more favourable conditions than those laid down in this Agreement to segments of other foreign fleets present in its waters whose vessels have the same characteristics and target the same species as those covered by this Agreement.”²²⁷ One of the anticipated effects of this clause is to foster the sustainable management of fishing resources and to influence positively fisheries agreements concluded by Senegal with other partners, with standards set by the SFPA having a ripple effect on the conditions set out in other agreements. At the same time, no concrete examples of such a ripple effect were identified in the case of Senegal yet, so the impact of this provision cannot be ascertained yet.

Furthermore, two of the three strategic pillars of the sectoral support component, accounting for about half of the overall budget, focus on areas that are relevant for improving fisheries governance: (i) maritime surveillance and the fight against IUU fishing (ii) scientific research. The first pillar aims at supporting the MCS activities of the DPSP and includes actions such as the acquisition of vehicles for inspection on land, financing surveillance patrols, and the

²²³ Article 5 of the Protocol.

²²⁴ Chapter III, Section 5 of the Annex to the protocol.

²²⁵ As specified in the protocol, the financial contribution amounts to 400 EUR per year for tuna vessels and 100 EUR per year for demersal trawlers.

²²⁶ Direction de la Surveillance et de la Protection des Pêches.

²²⁷ Article 3 of the Agreement.

acquisition of a software for satellite-based vessel monitoring system (VMS); the second pillar aims at supporting the activities of the Oceanographic Research Centre of Dakar-Thiaroye (CRODT²²⁸) and actions include the training of scientific observers/scientists, the upgrading of a research vessel, the financing of stock assessments or the upgrading of the CRODT's IT system. While the impact of sectoral support actions is generally difficult to measure (and it can be noted that sectoral support funds under this protocol have been lower than in past protocols thereby limiting the extent of support), the above-mentioned actions appear to complement well the objectives and provisions of the SFPA and they can be considered to contribute to enhancing the overall fisheries governance capacity.

One area of concern expressed by some stakeholders is however that all SFPAs are negotiated bilaterally although they concern straddling stocks shared between several countries in the sub-region, which could potentially affect (sub-)regional fisheries governance. In this regard, countries in the sub-region have expressed in July 2017 the wish to negotiate future SFPAs as a regional bloc, specifically through the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC). While stakeholders agree that this makes sense and would increase governance and transparency in the sector at regional level, one challenge has been to identify the entity that would have a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the sub-region, as the SRFC does not have the political mandate to do so (hence no formal request was made to the EU yet, according to DG MARE).

3.1.7 Sustainable fishing in the country's EEZ

As established in the CFP, the key sustainability principle of SFPAs is that the fishing opportunities negotiated in the protocols should only allow EU vessels to fish surplus resources. However, as mentioned earlier the surplus concept is very difficult to apply in practice due to a lack of reliable information on fish stocks and the notion of surplus in the partner country's waters is in fact questionable if applied to highly migratory or straddling stocks that cover different EEZs.

In its latest annual report dated October 2017²²⁹, the JSC did not recommend any change to the catch levels defined in the protocol. The JSC noted however that the stock of black hake is fully exploited at the level of the sub-region and recommended adopting a precautionary approach and not increasing fishing efforts and catch levels in the Senegal fishing area. In addition, the JSC recommended to maintain the biological rest foreseen in the protocol for black hake to protect juvenile fish.

At the time of the conclusion of the agreement, concern had been expressed by CSOs about the inclusion of the hake fishing opportunity in the protocol, but at least based on the available data, no overexploitation of the stock has been reported so far. In any case, as mentioned earlier this specific fishing opportunity only provided a limited access and has not been used much by EU vessels (with in particular very limited catches in 2016), so the direct impact of EU vessels' activity on the resource is thought to have been limited.

With respect to tuna species, the JSC refers to the findings and management measures of ICCAT. As shown in Table 6, the latest ICCAT stock assessments identified one of the three main tuna species (bigeye tuna) as being overexploited and therefore reduced the corresponding TAC; for the two other main species (skipjack and yellowfin), TAC levels were maintained.

²²⁸ Centre de Recherches Océanographiques de Dakar-Thiaroye.

²²⁹ « Rapport de la Réunion annuelle du Comité Scientifique Conjoint relatif à l'Accord de pêche signé entre la République du Sénégal et l'Union européenne », Madrid, 09-11 October 2017.

Table 10: Summary of findings and recommendations of the latest JSC annual report

Fish species	Assessment on the state of stocks	Main recommendation
Black hake	Based on a sub-regional stock assessment undertaken by the FAO in 2017 ²³⁰ : The stock is <u>fully exploited</u> . The level of catches in 2016 is not sustainable in the short term.	Given (i) the uncertainty with respect to the assessment of black hake stocks, (ii) the lack of a sufficiently robust data collection system to analyse the impact of all fleets on stock dynamics, and (iii) the increased interest currently shown by some fleets and on some markets, the JSC recommends <u>adopting a precautionary approach and not increasing fishing efforts and catch levels in the Senegal fishing area</u> .
Tuna species	Based on the latest stock assessments carried out by ICCAT ²³¹ : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Skipjack tuna: <u>not overfished and no undergoing overfishing</u> (although there is uncertainty in the assessment results); ▪ Yellowfin tuna: <u>possibly overfished, but no undergoing overfishing</u>²³²; ▪ Bigeye tuna: <u>overfished and undergoing overfishing</u>. 	The JSC only refers to ICCAT's management measures and recommendations, which have been the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Skipjack tuna: favour a precautionary approach, i.e. catch and effort levels shall not exceed levels of previous years; ▪ Yellowfin tuna: maintain catch levels at the current TAC; ▪ Bigeye tuna: the TAC was significantly reduced in 2016 (from 85,000t in the previous period to 65,000t) to allow recovery of the stock.

3.2 Country level impacts

3.2.1 Contribution to the local economy

The analysis of the various economic effects of the SFPA on Senegal (sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2) paints a mixed picture:

- The EU's financial contribution as compensation for access rights contributes to the local economy by providing the country with a predictable revenue stream for the duration of the protocol. However, due to the limited scope of the ongoing protocol, this financial contribution is relatively low (and much lower than compensation for access rights of past SFPAs with Senegal, which were mixed species agreement): it only accounted for about 0.02% of Senegal's national budget in 2017 and therefore its impact can be considered minimal. Likewise, the fees levied on EU vessels have been relatively low, compounded by the fact that there has been so far an under-utilisation of fishing opportunities.
- The new protocol appears to have been effective in mitigating the potential negative impact of EU vessels' activity on the economic development of the Senegalese fisheries sector, by restricting the scope of fishing opportunities to only two species (tuna and hake). Species considered as key resources for the national fleet and thought to be under threat of overexploitation (e.g. coastal demersal species, deep demersal species other than hake, small pelagic species and crustaceans) have been excluded from the scope of the protocol. In general, the conditions laid out in the protocol (e.g. authorised fishing areas) appear to have limited competition or conflicts between the EU fleet and the national fleet.
- On the other hand, the economic benefits for Senegal resulting from the EU vessels' activity in the country's waters appear to be relatively limited:
 - The "transshipment and landings" provision contributed to generating port taxes and economic activity at the Port of Dakar in terms of transshipment, supply and maintenance services (as well as sales of by-catches through local fishmongers) but catches by EU vessels currently do not supply any downstream processing industry in Senegal. Only

²³⁰ FAO (2017) « Rapport du Groupe de travail FAO/COPACE sur l'évaluation des ressources démersales - sous-groupe Nord », Tenerife, Spain, 6-15 June 2017.

²³¹ ICCAT (2016) Report of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS), Madrid, Spain, 3 to 7 October 2016.

²³² According to ICCAT (2016), "there is a 45.5% chance the stock was healthy in 2014, a 41.2% probability the stock was overfished and a 13.3% chance the stock was both overfished and undergoing overfishing".

one segment of the EU fleet is subject to a landing obligation and this concerns 8 pole-and-liners that are in fact based in Dakar and were already fishing in Senegal's EEZ under a private arrangement and landing their catch at the Port of Dakar (the SFPA however enabled to regularise the situation of these vessels). Furthermore, one of the main objectives of Senegal in signing this new SFPA was to ensure a steady supply of raw materials to the main tuna cannery; however, since 2015 the cannery is no longer supplied by the EU pole-and-liners, because no agreement could be reached on the price of tuna. As a result, just like the other segments of the EU fleet, catches of the EU pole-and-liners are now fully re-exported (albeit apparently in part through Senegalese (semi-processing) establishments that produce tuna loins).

- There is currently little interaction between EU and Senegalese economic operators (apart from relations between EU vessels and their consignees) and no evidence of know-how transfer. At the same time, it can be acknowledged that the SFPA provides in general a good framework for cooperation and dialogue between the EU and Senegal in the fisheries sector: the enhanced collaboration between the two sides on fisheries matters has the potential to translate over time to economic benefits for Senegal on several levels, including potentially in the area of trade, considering that the EU is a significant market for Senegal's exports of fishery products (in 2017, Senegal exported 46,448 t of fishery products to the EU accounting for a total value of 213.8 M EUR²³³).
- The impact of the sectoral support component on the economic development of the sector is difficult to measure in the absence of (impact-level) indicators.

Based on the above, the SFPA can be considered to have positively contributed to the local economy, but the overall economic impact of the SFPA appears to have been relatively limited.

3.2.2 Contribution to employment

The most tangible contribution to employment of the SFPA is the direct employment of Senegalese seamen on board EU vessels. While no data could be obtained on the exact number of Senegalese seamen employed, it appears that EU vessels have complied with the minimum levels defined in the protocol and even exceeded those, as Senegalese crew are generally appreciated and hence embarked in large numbers on many fleets.

In addition, the SFPA can be said to have had an indirect effect on job creation in a number of areas (e.g. in relation to transshipment services at the port), but this effect is difficult to measure. Since EU vessels are no longer supplying the tuna cannery, it is not clear if, and to what extent, the SFPA can be considered to have contributed to the creation of jobs at the cannery.

In sum, the SFPA clearly contributed to employment, but even in the absence of detailed data on the employment of Senegalese seamen on board EU vessels, the SFPA's impact and contribution appears to be rather limited, relative to the size of the fisheries sector in Senegal²³⁴.

²³³ Source: Eurostat Comext database.

²³⁴ It is indeed estimated that Senegal's fisheries sector provides jobs for up to 600,000 people, including 63,000 direct jobs (fishers) for Senegalese nationals (Source: Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission).

3.2.3 Sustainable exploitation of marine resources and avoiding negative effects on food security

As shown in sections 3.1.5 and 3.1.6, the SFPA can be considered to have contributed positively to the sustainable exploitation of marine resources in Senegal:

- The SFPA contributes positively to fisheries governance in Senegal by providing a uniform and transparent framework for the activities of EU vessels in Senegalese waters. In addition, the protocol includes several specific provisions that have a positive impact on overall fisheries governance (e.g. the non-discrimination clause; the set up of an independent Joint Scientific Committee, which reviews regularly data on catches, effort and stock status; and the establishment of a scheme of observers on board EU vessels). Furthermore, actions funded under the sectoral support component can also be considered to have contributed to enhancing the overall fisheries governance capacity, even though their exact impact is difficult to measure.
- The surplus concept is very difficult to apply in practice due to a lack of reliable information on fish stocks and the fact that species covered by the SFPA include highly migratory species or straddling stocks shared with neighbouring countries. In spite of challenges related to the lack of reliable data, the regular review of data on catches, effort and stock status by the JSC appears to be helpful in monitoring the sustainable exploitation of resources. In its latest annual report, the JSC did not recommend a change in the catch limits defined in the protocol but recommended a precautionary approach for hake.

The SFPA does not appear to have negative effects on food security as the fish species covered by the current protocol (tuna and hake) are not consumed by the local population and as mentioned earlier some of the by-catches of EU vessels (e.g. horse mackerels, mackerels or little tunny) are sold on the national market. The only potential negative effect would come from the catches of live bait (sardinella) by pole-and-line vessels, but these catches are small²³⁵ and are considered to have a minimal impact.

3.3 Unintended outcomes and impacts

No specific unintended outcomes or impacts of the SFPA were identified during the field mission (apart from the recent emergence of a national fleet targeting specifically hake, as was mentioned earlier).

²³⁵ According to the 2017 JSC annual report, EU-pole-and-line vessels caught a total of 298t of live bait (sardinella juveniles) in 2016.

4 CONCLUSIONS

The current SFPA is an improvement over the previous agreement with respect to better taking into account the interests of Senegal and its fisheries sector, and to ensuring sustainable exploitation of resources. The conditions laid out in the new protocol (in particular in terms of authorised species) appear to have been effective in mitigating potential negative impacts on the economic development of the Senegalese fisheries sector.

In terms of SFPA's contribution to (positive) development outcomes and impacts, the assessment is however more mixed:

- The SFPA's most evident impact is its contribution to improving fisheries governance. The SFPA provides a transparent framework for EU vessels' activities in Senegalese waters and contributes to regular monitoring of the state of fish stocks. The ripple effect on other agreements concluded by Senegal with other partners or on other fishing activities in Senegal's EEZ is however not always evident.
- While the SFPA can be said to have contributed to the local economy and to employment in Senegal, these impacts have been relatively limited. Due to the limited scope of the agreement, the compensation for access rights is relatively small and has a minimal impact. Since EU vessels are no longer supplying the tuna cannery (although one of the main objectives of Senegal in signing this new SFPA was precisely to ensure a steady supply of raw materials to cannery), the SFPA's economic benefits mainly consist in the generation of economic activity at the Port of Dakar (e.g. transshipment, storage and supply services; sale of by-catches on the local market). The SFPA's contribution to employment consists in the employment of Senegalese seamen onboard EU vessels and some indirect effects on job creation: the impact can be considered as limited, relative to the size of the sector.
- Sectoral support – which is considered as a key tool for achieving SFPAs' development objectives – was allocated a smaller budget than in past protocols (due to the limited scope of the current protocol) and has experienced some delays in its implementation. In general, while the sectoral support component appears to have had positive effects, its exact impact is difficult to measure in the absence of (impact-level) indicators.

With respect to sectoral support, one improvement over the previous agreement that can however be highlighted is the fact that access rights and sectoral support payments are now decoupled, in accordance with the 2013 CFP reform which introduced this principle. In practice, this means that disbursements under the sectoral support component no longer has fixed payment dates (as is the case with the access rights component) but rather shall be conditional upon the achievement of specific results. This new approach has contributed to improving the governance of sectoral support, as the application of conditionality allowed for better monitoring of the implementation of sectoral support actions through, which can be considered as a positive evolution from a PCD perspective.

Coordination and coherence with development cooperation is to some extent ensured by the on-site presence of a fisheries attaché representing DG MARE in the EU Delegation. The fisheries attaché plays a direct role in monitoring the implementation of the protocols and can coordinate on the ground with colleagues at the EU Delegation (and in Brussels) in charge of development cooperation at national and regional levels²³⁶, with a view to ensure for example the complementarity and consistency between sectoral support actions and development

²³⁶ The fisheries attaché based in the EU Delegation to Senegal has a regional responsibility, covering not only the SFPA with Senegal but also the ones with Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau.

cooperation projects. However, ensuring PCD in the field, once SFPA protocols have been negotiated and agreed, can still be a challenging exercise.

Overall, the evolution of successive protocols over time suggests that the SFPA instrument can be considered to have progressively incorporated a PCD approach, although it appears that it was not so much the result of PCD mechanisms but rather the result of the negotiations and dialogue with Senegal, which led the EU to better take into account potential impacts of the SFPA on the country and in general development considerations.

ANNEXES:

ANNEX 1: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Institutions	Persons met
Delegation of the European Union to Senegal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mr. Arnaud APPRIOU, Fisheries Attaché ▪ Ms. Cécile TASSIN-PELZER, Chef de Coopération Sénégal et Gambie, Premier Conseiller ▪ Mr. Stéphane MEERT, Premier Conseiller – Développement rural et Environnement ▪ Mrs. Rokhayatou FALL, Programme Manager
Ministry of Fisheries and the Maritime Economy (<i>Ministère de la Pêche et de l'Économie Maritime – MPEM</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Dr. Mamadou GOUDIABY, Directeur des Pêches Maritimes ▪ Dr. Diène NDIAYE, Directeur des Industries de Transformation de la Pêche ▪ Capitaine Mamadou NDIAYE, Directeur de la Protection et de la Surveillance des Pêches ▪ Dr. Papa Namsa KEITA, Conseiller Technique Chargé des Industries
Centre de Recherches Océanographiques de Dakar-Thiaroye (CRODT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Dr. Massal FALL, Directeur
Agence Nationale des Affaires Maritimes (ANAM)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mr. Serigne TALL, Officier Principal des Affaires Maritimes – Chef de service gestion flottes
Bureau Opérationnel de Suivi (BOS) du Plan Sénégal Emergent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mr. Khalil Rahmane NDIAYE, Expert in Aquaculture and seafood products
Groupement des Armateurs et Industriels de la Pêche au Sénégal (GAIPES)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ms. Fatou NIANG, Vice-Présidente du GAIPES / Directrice Générale de la Société de Pêche et d'Armement Sénégalais (SOPASEN) ▪ Mr. Dougoutigui COULIBALY, Secrétaire Général ▪ Mr. Alassane DIENG, Secrétaire général Adjoint ▪ Mr. SARR, Directeur général HISPASEN ▪ Mr. KANDÉ, Directeur général de société ▪ Mr. Jules Bernard COLY, Directeur général TUNASEN
Fédération Nationale des Groupements d'Intérêt Economique de Pêche du Sénégal (FENAGIE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mr. Abdoulaye SAMBA, Spécialiste en organisation communautaire
Association pour la Promotion et la Responsabilisation des Acteurs de la Pêche Artisanale Maritime (APRAPAM)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mr. Gaoussou GUEYE, Président ▪ Mr. Lamine GUËYE, Chargé de Programme
Compagnie Africaine de Pêche au Sénégal (CAPSEN) / Dongwon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mr. Jae-Sung SHIN, COO ▪ Mr. Kwabena Adams BLOGNAN, Fisheries Team / Manager
Socotra S.a.r.l (Consignee of EU shipowners)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mr. El Hadji SAMBA DIEYE, Directeur Général ▪ Mr. Momo KONTE, Directeur Shipping
Greenpeace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Dr. Ibrahima CISSE, Senior Oceans Campaign Manager

ANNEX 2: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC.

Agreement on a Sustainable Fisheries Partnership between the European Union and the Republic Of Senegal, Official Journal of the European Union, 23.10.2014.

Cervantès A., Fall M., White C., Sow F. N., Fernández-Peralta L., Thiam N., Jouffre D. 2017. Rapport de la réunion annuelle du Comité Scientifique Conjoint relatif à l'Accord de pêche signé entre la République du Sénégal et l'Union européenne. Madrid, Espagne, 09 février, 10 et 11 octobre 2017. Rapports des Comités Scientifiques Conjoints. Bruxelles, 60p. + Annexes.

Cofrepeche, NFDS, Poseidon et MRAG (2013) “Évaluation rétrospective et prospective du protocole de l'accord de partenariat dans le secteur de la pêche entre l'Union européenne et la République du Sénégal”

European Court of Auditors (2015) “Are the Fisheries Partnership Agreements well managed by the Commission?”, Special Report.

Fall M., Balguerias E., Daniel, P., Sano B.-S., Diédhiou A., 2016. Rapport de la réunion annuelle du Comité Scientifique Conjoint relatif à l'Accord de pêche signé entre la République du Sénégal et l'Union européenne. Dakar, Sénégal, 29 février, 01 et 02 mars 2016. Rapports des Comités Scientifiques Conjoints. Bruxelles, 62 p. + Annexes.

Goulding I. (2016) “Research for PECH Committee – Impact of Fisheries Partnership Agreements on Employment in the EU and in Third Countries”, European Parliament, July 2016.

ICCAT (2016) Report of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS), Madrid, Spain, 3 to 7 October 2016.

WWF (2017) “Is Europe ready to lead on international fisheries governance?”, 21 June 2017.

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Case study: Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) Country note: Mozambique

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	Africa, Caribbean, Pacific	IMF	International Monetary Fund
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunities Act	LDC	Least Developed Country
DFQF	Duty Free, Quota Free	MFN	Most Favoured Nation
EBA	Everything But Arms	NTM	Non-Tariff Measures
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement	ODA	Official Development Assistance
EU	European Union	PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
EUR	Euro	RoO	Rules of Origin
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment	SADC	Southern African Development Community
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade
GSP	Generalised System for Preferences	TRF	Trade-Related Facility
HHI	Herfindahl-Hirschman Index	USD	United States Dollar
HS	Harmonised System	WTO	World Trade Organisation

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Rationale for selection of the country

The selection of countries for the case studies has been based on a number of inclusion/exclusion and selection criteria in order to limit subjectivity and achieve “representativeness” to the extent possible.²³⁷ This has involved the *exclusion* of countries covered by case studies in the ongoing GSP mid-term evaluation (Development Solutions 2017b), those covered in the Joint Staff Working Document accompanying the Commission’s 2016 report on the GSP, which covered all GSP+ countries (European Commission 2016), and those which offer limited scope for generalisation of findings, e.g. because of a very particular economic structure, size, etc. It has likewise involved the *inclusion* of countries at different developmental stages, i.e. covered by different GSP arrangements (notably, EBA and Standard GSP which offer the largest variance), as well as at least one African country. The application of the inclusion and exclusion criteria narrowed the universe of countries for selection to an African EBA beneficiary. Applying the selection criteria – high absolute export values under the GSP; high share of GSP eligible exports in total exports to the EU; and overall high share of GSP preference utilisation – to these countries, Mozambique was chosen as the case study country.²³⁸

1.2 Hypotheses to be tested

Put simply, the logic of the EU GSP with regard to supporting the economic development of beneficiary countries is that by providing preferential access to the EU market for exports from these countries their exports to the EU will expand and, to the extent that these exports will not merely be diverted from other export markets, this will also lead to an increase in total output, creating additional employment (which will, in turn, contribute to economic growth, reduced poverty and sustainable development).²³⁹ In the longer term, expanded production will foster investment, as well as have positive spillovers to non-exporting sectors, with positive long-term effects on economic growth and social development. A more detailed presentation of this intervention logic focusing on the effects on beneficiary countries,²⁴⁰ which also applies to Mozambique, is presented in Annex 1.

Applying the reconstructed (simplified) intervention logic, a number of hypotheses whose testing constitutes the core of the case study work have been formulated. These focus, as mentioned in the Detailed Field Methodology, on the following indicators: (1) the extent to which the GSP impacts on exports from the case study countries (outcome; see section 3.1); and (2) the extent to which increased exports lead to increased employment and/or incomes

²³⁷ Given the extremely low “sample” size of two countries out of a universe of 80 GSP beneficiary countries (in 2017), real representativeness can obviously not be aspired to.

²³⁸ Senegal and Malawi also meet the selection criteria well. However, Senegal was selected for another case study of the evaluation. Between Mozambique and Malawi, Mozambique was selected both for practical reasons (organisation of meetings) and because the value of exports under the GSP is substantially higher. A more detailed explanation of the selection process is provided in Annex 2 of the Detailed Field Methodology, 29 November 2017.

²³⁹ Preamble recital (7) of *Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, OJ L 303/1 of 31.10.2012* (“2012 GSP Regulation”).

²⁴⁰ The GSP also has other objectives; for a more comprehensive intervention logic of the current GSP Regulation, see Development Solutions (2017a).

(impact; see section 3.2). In addition, the third indicator assessed is the presence of positive or negative externalities or unintended effects generated by the GSP (see section 3.3). More details on the methodological approach taken for each hypothesis are provided in Annex 2, which also addresses its limitations – notably the impossibility to assess the GSP effect on economic growth and poverty, the restriction of the statistical analysis to descriptive statistics, and the limitations inherent in a single-case study approach.

1.2.1 Hypotheses on outcome achievement

The first main hypothesis regarding outcome achievement to be reviewed in the case study²⁴¹ is that, if the GSP has been effective, exports from Mozambique to the EU should have grown faster than exports to the world (*hypothesis 1*). This can be tested through an analysis of trade statistics but needs to be complemented by a qualitative assessment of the causal link between the preferences offered under the GSP and export performance. Specifically, the following hypotheses regarding this link have been considered during field work: First, a necessary condition for the GSP to contribute to higher exports is that the preferences granted under the GSP are actually used. The corresponding hypothesis is that a higher preference utilisation leads to better export performance (*hypothesis 1.1*). In addition to preference utilisation, a second hypothesis on the causal link is that preferences under the GSP must not have been annulled by other barrier to market entry: If NTMs have remained stable or decreased over time, exports from the beneficiary country to the EU under the GSP have increased (*hypothesis 1.2*). While these two hypotheses can be addressed to some extent through statistics, a key input from stakeholder consultations during the field visit has concerned the identification of reasons for low or high preference utilisation and the actual importance of NTMs for Mozambique's exporters to the EU.

The second main hypothesis on outcome achievement relates to production output and states that the more a sector exports under the GSP, the faster its total output grows (*hypothesis 2*), provided that the preferences do not only lead to trade diversion (*hypothesis 2.1*). While this can also be assessed, to a certain extent, through available statistics on sectoral output in Mozambique, it has been considered important to complement data analysis with qualitative information provided by stakeholders on specific cases where increased exports have led to higher output. The same approach – a combination of available statistics and stakeholder contributions – has been taken for the corresponding hypotheses on investment, i.e. that higher exports lead to higher investment both by existing firms (*hypothesis 4*) and new investors (*hypothesis 5*).

1.2.2 Hypotheses on impact achievement

As the causal chain from the GSP to poverty reduction is long, and attribution difficult to ascertain, the GSP's impact achievement is primarily measured through employment effects induced by higher exports, output and investment, and no hypothesis has been formulated regarding the GSP effect on poverty or growth. The corresponding hypothesis to be tested is that the more a sector exports under the GSP the faster its employment grows (*hypothesis 3*). Similar to the effect on output and investment, this has been assessed through available statistics on sectoral employment in Mozambique complemented with qualitative information on specific

²⁴¹ Other hypotheses are that total exports from Mozambique should be higher than in the absence of the GSP, and that sectors benefitting from the GSP show better export performance than sectors not benefitting. However, the first alternative hypothesis is difficult to assess without a more sophisticated economic model which cannot be developed given the resources available, and the latter cannot be tested due to the fact that the EU GSP preferences for Mozambique cover essentially all trade.

cases where increased exports have led to higher employment (or wages) as provided by stakeholders during the field visit.

Finally, with regard to export diversification two hypotheses are tested, addressing the geographical and product dimensions of diversification, respectively, which are important transmission mechanisms for competitiveness. The hypotheses are that, as a result of the GSP the concentration of export markets, as well as of the product composition of exports, should have decreased over time, i.e. the corresponding HHIs should have declined (*hypothesis 6/7*). For testing the hypotheses, the same combination of statistical analysis and stakeholder interviews as for the employment effect has been applied.

1.2.3 Determining unintended effects

For the determination of unintended effects, no hypotheses have been formulated but an inductive approach has been taken, relying on the identification of any such effects in the literature consulted, complemented with open interview questions during the field visit.

2 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE COUNTRY CONTEXT AND LINK WITH EU POLICIES AND INITIATIVES

Following independence from Portugal in 1975, Mozambique endured a civil war until 1992, which damaged the economy, but reconstruction since 1992 has resulted in economic recovery. Real annual GDP growth averaged around 8% over the two decades after the civil war and around 7% over the period 2010-2015. This growth was largely driven by sound macroeconomic management, export-led and large-scale FDI projects, relative political stability and significant donor support (WTO 2017: 7). FDI inflows have been mostly in the extractive industry (notably aluminium, coal and gas) and rose from about USD 592 million in 2008 to its historic peak of USD 6.1 billion in 2013; declining prices of commodities such as aluminium and coal in international markets have contributed to the decline of FDI inflows to USD 3.7 billion in 2015 (WTO 2017: 21). Despite this drop, FDI still play a significant role in the economy. For instance, in 2014 alone it accounted for one third of GDP and financed 85% of the current account deficit (WTO 2017: 21).

The Mozambican economy faces risks and challenges that include (i) the volatility of international commodity prices, (ii) inflation (despite the recent policy measures that resulted in the drop from 26% in Nov 2016 to 7% in Nov 2017; Walker et al. 2017) and (iii) prolonged lack of access to the international financial market (World Bank 2017). Following the disclosure in April 2016 of secret and illegal loans to the Government of Mozambique, financial support from the IMF and other development partners was suspended and had a negative impact on key government expenditures, access to credit in the international market and ultimately on economic growth (the World Bank states that Mozambique economic slowdown has shifted the economy from a fast-growing to a modest growing).

There has been limited structural change of the economy over the period 2008-2015. While the share of the manufacturing sector declined 3 percentage points (p.p.) to 10%, the agricultural sector's share dropped nearly 3.9 p.p. to 25.2%. These have been contrasted by the rise of the share of the mining sector by 4.1 p.p. to 5.6% (Walker et al. 2017).

Monetary and exchange rate policies were implemented to achieve price stability and reduce exchange rate volatility. However, balance-of-payments pressures have led to major depreciation of the metical. Over the year 2015, the currency depreciated by 64.5% against the

US dollar and 28% against the South African rand. The Bank of Mozambique used international reserves on the open market to contain the depreciation of its currency.²⁴²

Trade performance has also improved alongside the general economic reconstruction since the end of the civil war. Trade in goods and services rose from 68% of GDP in 2008 to nearly 102% of GDP in 2015; and the trade deficit declined, after reaching the peak of 51% of GDP in 2012, to about 46% of GDP in 2015 (WTO 2017: 14). Nevertheless, the export base of Mozambique is very limited. In 2000, crustaceans and cash crops accounted for 80% of total exports, but the introduction of FDI-related goods in the export structure became significant by 2015 with aluminium, coal, natural gas and heavy sands now accounting for 70% of total exports (Republic of Mozambique/Ministry of Industry and Commerce 2016). The main trading partners of Mozambique are South Africa, the Netherlands, China, India, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and the USA.

Mozambique is a founding Member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and a signatory of its Free Trade Area, which has been in place since 2000, although and full implementation only started in 2015 (99.6% of duties on goods imported into Mozambique from SADC Members are zero); it has ratified the SADC Protocol on Trade in Services (2012); and it plays a significant role as a transport corridor for SADC's landlocked countries e.g. Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Mozambique is also eligible to benefit from various unilateral trade preferences offered by WTO Members to Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

Mozambique has been trading with the EU under preferential trade agreements for a long time. It was eligible to export under the GSP since before its independence,²⁴³ and has been benefitting from duty-free quota-free export to the EU since the GSP Everything But Arms (EBA) arrangement was introduced in 2001.²⁴⁴ In addition to being covered by the GSP, it is an ACP country and therefore benefitted from the preferential trade arrangements under the Lomé Convention and Cotonou Agreement. While the Cotonou Agreement expired in December 2007, market access under the Agreement's preferential terms was de facto extended under the Market Access Regulation,²⁴⁵ as Mozambique was one of the countries having initialled the EPA. However, as the EU considered that Mozambique had not taken the necessary steps towards ratification of the EPA, preferential access under the Market Access Regulation was withdrawn as of 01 October 2014.²⁴⁶ Since then, Mozambique's preferential access to the EU market was only under the EBA arrangement. However, as Mozambique was one of the six SADC countries to sign an EPA with the EU on 10 June 2016, the new Market Access Regulation²⁴⁷ has granted preferential access to exports from Mozambique again since 28 July

²⁴² Bank of Mozambique, <http://www.bancomoc.mz/> [accessed on 16 January 2018]

²⁴³ Regulation (EEC) No 2767/72 of the Council of 19 December 1972 establishing in respect of certain products falling within Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff a scheme of generalized preferences in favour of developing countries, OJ L 296/91 of 30.12.1972 appears to have been the first GSP Regulations including Mozambique among the eligible territories.

²⁴⁴ Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, OJ L 346/1 of 31.12.2001 (the "2001 GSP Regulation").

²⁴⁵ Council Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007 of 20 December 2007 applying the arrangements for products originating in certain states which are part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States provided for in agreements establishing, or leading to the establishment of, Economic Partnership Agreements, OJ L 348/1 of 31.12.2007.

²⁴⁶ Regulation (EU) No 527/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007 as regards the exclusion of a number of countries from the list of regions or states which have concluded negotiations, OJ L 165/59 of 18.06.2013.

²⁴⁷ Regulation (EU) 2016/1076 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 applying the arrangements for products originating in certain states which are part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific

2016, in addition to the EBA, so that exporters can now export to the EU under three regimes: ACP/EPA, GSP/EBA, and most-favoured nation (MFN) non-preferential access.²⁴⁸

A number of non-trade EU policies are also important when assessing the impact of the GSP in Mozambique and issues of PCD. These include the EU's Common Fisheries Policy, the Sugar Policy and the EU's development cooperation; these are discussed below to the extent that they have impacted on the performance of Mozambique's exports to the EU.

3 FINDINGS AT OUTCOME AND IMPACT LEVELS INCLUDING UNINTENDED EFFECTS

3.1 Country level outcomes

3.1.1 GSP effect on Mozambique's exports

Hypothesis 1: If the GSP has been effective, exports from Mozambique to the EU have grown faster than exports to the world.

Exports from Mozambique to the EU increased from USD 580 million in 2001 to more than USD 2 billion in 2007. Since then, they have remained flat, with dips during the global financial crisis and a new declining trend since 2014 (Figure 2). Exports to the world meanwhile increased from USD 830 million in 2001 to USD 3.1 billion in 2007, and then continued to grow rapidly after a 2-year contraction during the financial crisis, reaching a maximum of USD 6.27 billion in 2014, before dropping sharply again to USD 7.17 billion in 2016. As the development of exports to the EU²⁴⁹ and total exports was roughly parallel over the period 2001 to 2007, the share of exports to the EU27 in total exports remained stable, at about 70%, but then dropped more or less continuously to less than 40% in 2012, and has remained between 30% and 40% since (Figure 3). This pattern also applies if extractives such as mineral fuels (27), and precious minerals and gold (71) are excluded.

Nevertheless, for two specific sectors an effect of the GSP on exports can be found. The first one is sugar. Preferences on sugar imports (HS 1701) from LDCs were gradually liberalised in the 2001 GSP Regulation, with duties and quotas abolished over the period 2006 to 2009.²⁵⁰ Although Mozambique had already been a beneficiary under the EU's Sugar Protocol,²⁵¹ which granted tariff-free access to some ACP countries and India within a certain quota, during the liberalisation period sugar exports from Mozambique to the EU27 clearly outperformed total exports both to the EU and to the world, as well as Mozambique's total sugar exports (Figure 5). This led to a rapid increase in the share of sugar exports in total exports to the EU27 (Figure 4). As both before and after the transition period sugar exports did not behave differently from

(ACP) Group of States provided for in agreements establishing, or leading to the establishment of, economic partnership agreements (recast), OJ L 185/1 of 08.07.2016. This Regulation repealed Council Regulation (EC) No 1528/2007 of 20 December 2007.

²⁴⁸ This will continue to apply in the foreseeable future. Although the 2012 GSP Regulation provides that, generally, a country that "benefits from a preferential market access arrangement which provides the same tariff preferences as the scheme, or better, for substantially all trade" is not eligible to benefit from the GSP (Article 4(1)(b)), this provision does not apply to LDCs (Article 4(2)).

²⁴⁹ All EUMS except Croatia

²⁵⁰ Article 9.4 stated that "Common Customs Tariff duties on the products of tariff heading 1701 shall be reduced by 20 % on 1 July 2006, by 50 % on 1 July 2007 and by 80 % on 1 July 2008. They shall be entirely suspended as from 1 July 2009." Also see Article 11 of the 2008 GSP Regulation.

²⁵¹ For a more detailed analysis of the EBA and reforms of the EU sugar market on sugar producing countries, see Kopp, Prehn, and Brümmer (2016).

other exports, the increased share of sugar exports in total exports to the EU remained high, and significantly higher its share in total exports to the world.

Figure 2: Mozambique's exports to the EU27 and World, 2001 to 2016 (USD million)





Figure 3: Share of Mozambique's exports to the EU27 in total exports from Mozambique, 2001 to 2016 (%)



Source: Author's calculations based on UN COMTRADE (mirror data).

It therefore appears that the EU tariff preferences have indeed led to a permanent increase in Mozambique's sugar exports to the EU – although exports have decreased since 2014 (Figure 6); according to Mozambique's Association of Sugar Producers (APAMO) this was primarily due to El Niño-related droughts and diseases. The importance of preferences in re-developing the sugar sector after the civil war was also confirmed by sector stakeholders who also highlighted the crucial importance of the EU's Accompanying Measures, from which Mozambique benefitted as a Sugar Protocol country, for the socially inclusive reconstruction of the sector. While this indicates a high level of EU policy coherence, a clear attribution of the sector's successful export performance to the preferences available under the EBA following the 2001 GSP Regulation is not possible. Indeed, to the extent that data are available, exports until 2014 took place under the ACP Sugar Regime, not under the EBA (Figure 6).

Figure 4: Share of Mozambique's sugar exports in total exports to the EU27 and World, 2001 to 2016 (%)





Figure 5: Annual average growth of Mozambique's sugar and total exports to the EU27 and world, 2002 to 2014 (%)



Source: Author's calculations based on UN COMTRADE (mirror data).

The second sector where EU preferences have played a pivotal role on Mozambican exports is aluminium, which is by far the country’s largest export to the EU, accounting for more than 60% of total export value in recent years (down from 80% until 2010); the EU is also practically the only market for Mozambique’s aluminium production.²⁵² The aluminium smelter started operations in 2000, with an initial capacity of 250,000 tons per year, which was more than doubled in 2004. Rapidly increasing exports to the EU at the start of the 2000s until 2007 reflect this increase in output (*Figure 7*); since then, export volumes have remained stable – the smelter is operating at full capacity – with fluctuations in value largely reflecting changing world market prices (in particular the sharp drop during the global financial crisis 2008-09). As stated by Mozal during the consultations, preferential access to the EU market was one of the key factors for establishing the smelter in Mozambique and has remained essential for the company’s profitability in most years since it was established, notably so in recent years characterised by low world market prices for aluminium and extremely low margins.

Figure 6: EU imports of sugar (HS 1701) from Mozambique, 2001 to 2016 (EUR million)





Figure 7: EU imports of aluminium (HS 7601) from Mozambique, 2001 to 2016 (EUR million)



Source: Author’s calculations based on COMEXT.

Based on these data, the first hypothesis is not generally confirmed: despite the preferences accorded under the GSP, Mozambique’s exports to the EU have overall performed less well than Mozambique’s total exports – although there are exceptions for a few (important) sectors such as sugar and aluminium, for which EU tariff preferences have been of prime importance. Nevertheless, even for these sectors the added value of the GSP, as opposed to other preference regimes, has been limited as these were traditionally exported under the ACP preferences, and the EBA was used only after the expiry of the ACP regime in the autumn of 2014, thus providing only a residual role to the GSP (see below).

To put this finding into the context of wider research, the literature on the impact of the GSP – and notably the EBA – on exports is divided. A number of studies have found that preference regimes, including the EU’s preference regimes for LDCs, increase exports from the beneficiary

²⁵² A sizeable share is nominally exported to Singapore; according to Mozal, the only aluminium producer in Mozambique, most of these exports are then re-exported to the EU from Singapore, which is the location of Mozal’s marketing division.

countries.²⁵³ Other studies, however, found that the impact on exports were limited.²⁵⁴ Possible reasons for this divergence of findings include the different research designs – the literature usually applies a gravity model approach comprising all exporters to the EU –, but also the different periods considered. In any case, the finding of the limited effect of EU preferences on Mozambique’s exports in most sectors calls for a further analysis into the reasons for the disappointing performance of exports to the EU, using both the hypotheses already formulated (hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2) and potential other explanations.

Hypothesis 1.1: The higher the preference utilisation, the better is the export performance.

Until 2013/14, the GSP played only a residual role for Mozambique’s exports to the EU, as most goods were exported under the Lomé and Cotonou (ACP) regimes:²⁵⁵ GSP preference utilisation, measured as actual imports under the GSP compared to GSP eligible imports,²⁵⁶ was 5% and lower until 2013 but then increased to almost 100%, in particular in 2015 and 2016, as the ACP regime had expired in late 2014 (*Figure 8*; also see the corresponding figures for sugar and aluminium above).²⁵⁷ Exports under the new Market Access Regulation since July 2016 have already picked up, accounting for almost 5% of total 2016 exports to the EU (see Table 11 in Annex 5), indicating that a large share of exports in future will be using EPA preferences rather than EBA. This was also confirmed by stakeholders met and is expected to be supported by the measures foreseen under the EPA Implementation Plan currently being developed.

Looking at the utilisation of preferences combined, this was almost 100% in 2001 and 2002, and again from 2008, suffering however from a significant drop in the interim period, with a low of 32% in 2004.²⁵⁸ Based on the pattern of preference utilisation the ACP import regime was the preferred choice for Mozambique’s exporters, leaving only a subsidiary role for the GSP. In addition, although almost 100% of export value utilised preferences, “almost half of all import flows from Mozambique does not utilise preferences” (Nilsson and Dotter 2012: 5) – in particular, small-scale exports hardly make use of them: the average value of exports not utilising preferences in 2010 was EUR 400, compared to an average value of preference-utilising exports of EUR 163 thousand (Nilsson and Dotter 2012: 18). Entities consulted in Mozambique also confirmed that preferences are used primarily by the small number of large exporters. This might have important implications for the expected knock-on effects of preference regimes: if preference utilisation is restricted to large exporters, then employment generation and economic diversification are likely to be more limited than if preferences were also used by small and medium sized exporters.

²⁵³ See for example Davies and Nilsson (2013) and the literature referred to there. Some studies, however, also find that particularly ACP countries have lost competitiveness on the EU market; see e.g. Cardamone and Scoppola (2012).

²⁵⁴ Early examples of such studies are Stevens and Kennan (2001) and Cernat, et al. (2003). Babarinde and Faber (2007) found that the EBA had no observable impact on the exports of African LDCs.

²⁵⁵ The vast majority of imports until 2013 were eligible both under the GSP and ACP regimes; see Table 11 in Annex 5.

²⁵⁶ It should be noted that the actual utilisation of preferences may be lower as the COMEXT database registers an import as being under a preference regime upon the request by the trader to import under the preferential regime. If on arrival EU customs authorities do not allow entry under the preference regime (e.g. due to issues with the certificate of origin), the import will actually take place under MFN but still be registered under preference regime in COMEXT. See Cirera and Alfieri (2012: 3).

²⁵⁷ This is in line with the findings in OECD (2005: 40ff). Note that an analysis of preference utilisation for sugar imports, which would have been interesting given the sector’s export performance, has not been possible as the vast bulk of sugar imports is registered in the COMEXT database as “unknown” in terms of eligibility and actual import regime.

²⁵⁸ The reasons for this drop in preference utilisation could not be established.

Figure 8: Preference utilisation rates, Mozambique's export to EU27, 2001 to 2016 (%)





Figure 9: Share of EU27 zero-duty imports from Mozambique's, 2001 to 2016 (%)



Source: Author's calculations based on COMEXT, see Table 11 in Annex 5.

Finally, it should be noted that a non-negligible, and increasing, share of EU imports from Mozambique is duty free under MFN; this has reached more than 20% in 2016 (Figure 9). Thus, since 2001, except for the period of low preference utilisation 2003 to 2008 almost all of Mozambique's exports to the EU entered at zero tariffs.

Preference utilisation rates show that the GSP is the preference regime of last resort for Mozambique's exporters. It has been used only whenever other preference regimes were not available; its actual use has thus largely been restricted to 2015 and 2016. It is therefore difficult to test the hypothesis that higher GSP preference utilisation leads to better export performance. However, looking from a slightly wider angle, combining GSP and ACP preference utilisation, the correlation between preference utilisation and export performance is limited, and the hypothesis therefore not confirmed: in the period 2001 to 2016 the strongest export performance to the EU was until 2007, i.e. when preference utilisation was comparatively low.

These findings call for further research into, first, the reasons for the GSP being used less than other preference regimes and, second, other explanatory factors for weak export performance in recent years despite the high preference utilisation. While the second issue is addressed further below, regarding the first one it is generally stated that, if exporters have the choice between different preference regimes, they use the "most favourable treatment" considering all costs and benefits (DG Trade 2004: 4; also see OECD 2005: 36). The benefit accorded by a preference regime is usually measured through the preference margin, i.e. other things being equal a trader will choose the preference regime that offers the lowest tariff. The cost is assessed by addressing a variety of factors including the strictness of rules of origin (RoO), the compliance costs in relation to meeting rules of origin requirements, and the fact that many exporters in developing countries are small, with the relative compliance costs being more burdensome for small export volumes.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁹ OECD (2005: 38 & 44) found that these factors – the size of the preference margin, the size of exporters – are significant factors in explaining the utilisation of preferences both for the Standard GSP and the EBA. The same study also estimated the ad valorem equivalent compliance cost for agricultural products to be 2.9% for the Standard GSP and 10.9% for EBA, showing the particular difficulties faced by LDCs in meeting administrative and RoO requirements. Note however, that the authors of the study themselves consider the cost estimate for EBA to be excessive. Other studies have found compliance costs with preference schemes to be in the range of 4% to 8.2% (Carrere and de Melo 2004; Manchin 2005; Francois, Hoekman, and Manchin 2006), mostly attributable to administrative compliance costs in particular in relation to RoO.

In the case of Mozambique, benefits under the ACP and GSP/EBA regimes are largely identical and could therefore not explain the limited use of the GSP.²⁶⁰ Likewise, the size distribution of exporters cannot help to explain difference in use between the two regimes. Regarding the costs, it is generally found that the Cotonou Agreement has less stringent RoO and is therefore preferred over the GSP (Bureau, Chakir, and Gallezot 2007; Demaria, Drogué, and Rau 2015). Stakeholders met in Mozambique could not confirm, however, that explicit cost-benefit considerations guided exporters' choice of the preference regime and rather stated that the ACP regime had traditionally been used before the EBA came into existence and then was continued to be used as it was well known to traders. Differences in RoO between the two regimes played little role given the nature of Mozambique's exports to the EU, i.e. mostly primary products that are wholly obtained in Mozambique anyway.

Hypothesis 1.2: If NTMs have remained stable or decreased over time, exports from the beneficiary country to the EU under the GSP have increased.

Data and specific research/literature on the extent of or changes over time to NTMs, and specifically in relation to Mozambique are not available. During the field visit, stakeholders stated that, while standards and quality requirements in the EU are strict, these in general have not been made more difficult over time. Also, larger exporters to the EU are typically (part-) owned by EU investors and therefore know the requirements in the EU and how to meet them. Technical measures and RoO also do not seem to have been abused with protectionist intent – only one example that was perceived as motivated by capping imports from Mozambique was mentioned.²⁶¹ Some questions on RoO compliance have also been raised by EU authorities over the years, according to the Mozambican General Directorate of Customs, but neither have these requests increased over the years, nor has ever any verification visit been received; all requests could be addressed satisfactorily in writing.²⁶²

On the other hand, it was also stated that technical barriers as well as the requirement to obtain certificates of origin act as an important barrier for companies considering to start exporting to the EU. One of the reasons for this is a lack of proper communication of the requirements associated with exporting under preferential arrangements, coupled with the lack of understanding of international trade procedures by many Mozambican companies. Thus, public announcements of preferential regimes are often perceived by businesses as a possibility to export to the EU with no (procedural) strings attached; when companies are then confronted with the administrative requirements they tend to prefer other export markets. The entry of new exporters to the EU has thus been limited, and the lack of EU support in coping with technical and RoO requirements has not helped in this process.²⁶³ This however appears to be addressed now in the context of EPA implementation support.

²⁶⁰ However, this is not to say that substantive RoO requirements could not have a subduing effect on exports from Mozambique. One example provided in the literature is the dual transformation requirement for garments (which requires that yarn from which the fabric is made from which the garments are produced is also must also be made in the exporting country), which compares unfavourably with the single transformation rules under the AGOA Special Rule (see de Melo and Portugal-Perez 2014). In this context, the low level of garments exports from Mozambique to the EU is noteworthy.

²⁶¹ This concerned catfish exports which have faced problems in the EU due to alleged concentrations of mercury; at the same time, however, oil from catfish has not faced similar issues. This has given rise to the suspicion by Mozambican fishery companies that the restrictions on catfish meat exports (where Mozambique's market share in the EU is about 15%, according to information provided by interviewees) are used as a TBT to limit imports.

²⁶² There have been cases where the same request was repeatedly made by the EU to the Mozambique's Directorate General of Customs even after the latter had submitted written responses. This may possibly be due to perceived weak credibility of local institutions by EU customs authorities.


²⁶³ Although the EU has supported the national standards institute, INNOQ, in successive projects since 2010, no specific support related to achieving accreditation for product certification for exports has been included in these projects, according to INNOQ.

Other explanations for stagnating exports to the EU

The literature mentions a number of factors determining weak export performance under preference regimes. These include, among others, preference erosion and supply side capacity constraints, including lack of awareness for the availability of preferences, as well as demand side factors.²⁶⁴

Preference margins of the GSP/ACP regime vs. MFN rates have not only remained stable but increased for Mozambique. In other words, preference erosion does not appear to have affected Mozambique, despite the frequent concerns over preference erosion in the literature.²⁶⁵ Depending on the methodology applied, preference margins are in the range of 3% to 7% until about 2007, and 5% to 10% since then (Figure 10).²⁶⁶ The increase in preference margins since 2007 reflects the increasing preferences for sugar imports from Mozambique (and other LDCs).

Figure 10: Preference margins for imports from Mozambique to the EU, at HS subheading (6-digit) level, 2001 to 2015 (percentage points)



Note: Data represent the averages of weighted average tariffs within subheading, across all subheadings; weighted by import value from Mozambique.

Source: Author's calculations based on UNCTAD TRAINS.

Constrained supply side capacity is another reason frequently cited for explaining limited export performance in the presence of preferences. For example, a recent study of EBA trade preferences and aid to ACP countries over the period 1995 to 2013 showed that EBA preferences are not associated with an increase in exports (as the beneficiary countries are already benefitting from Cotonou preferences), but that official development assistance (ODA) to “EBA-eligible countries has a robust and positive effect on exports, whereas the average effect of ODA given to ACP countries is not significant” (Gradeva and Martínez-Zarzoso 2016: 1147). This supports the general finding – made in other, previous studies – that supply side constraints are the binding constraint for export performance, not market access issues (see e.g. Faber and Orbie 2009).

Such supply side constraints are clearly evident in Mozambique as well and have been confirmed by all stakeholders met during the field mission. The type of constraints ranges from the lack of export-capable firms, weaknesses in the national quality infrastructure and issues in trade facilitation and logistics in general to sector-specific problems like limited stocks and diseases in the prawn sector and limited marketing and branding of cashew nuts. Limited awareness among businesses for EBA was also reported as an issue.

Support by the EU to address these issues and complementing the EBA objectives was very limited until recently. For example, it was stated that there was never any communication

²⁶⁴ Of course there are other factors as well, such low as demand in the preference granting importing country compared to other export markets, or low demand for the goods which a beneficiary country can export. While an incorporation of such other factors would be desirable for obtaining more robust results, a more comprehensive research design has not been possible under the current project due to time and resource constraints.

²⁶⁵ See for example OECD (2005) or Francois, Hoekman, and Manchin (2006).

²⁶⁶ These data are roughly in line with preference margins calculated by Cirera and Alfieri who report roughly stable margins over the period 2001 to 2007, fluctuating between 5% and 7% (Cirera and Alfieri 2012: 4).

campaign aimed at businesses on the EBA (also see above on the mis-communication of preference regimes).²⁶⁷

Third, changes in demand in the EU market as well as on other markets have also impacted on Mozambican exports. For example, cotton exports to the EU, which in the early 2000s were in the range of EUR 10 million per year dropped as a consequence of the textile industry crisis and globally low cotton prices. Also, non-EU markets (in particular Asian markets) have become more attractive, at least for certain sectors, due to rapidly growing demand there. For example, it was stated that exporting prawns to China is now more profitable than to the EU, which has led to a shift away from exporting to the traditional EU markets. Likewise, exports of cashew nuts are not directed to the EU due to higher demand and better sales conditions in other markets, such as the USA; in addition to EU buyers traditionally buying not from African sources but from Vietnam and other Asian countries.²⁶⁸

Overall, exports to the EU (and globally) have not increased more due to a number of factors, mostly related to the limited productive capacity of Mozambique and limitations in the trade infrastructure. The number of exporters to the EU has remained largely stable, with few new entrants registered as a result of limited firm capacity, as well as the lack of proper communication/ explanation of the EU preference regimes, but also the fact that EU markets have become less attractive in relation to other markets in recent years. Lack of complementary support by the EU to overcome supply side constraints has also contributed to the largely stagnating nature of exports to the EU.


3.1.2 Effects on Mozambique's output

Hypothesis 2: The more a sector exports under the GSP, the faster its total output grows.

Statistics on Mozambican firms' output or turnover by export status are not available. Aggregated statistics (as well as statistics by broad sector²⁶⁹) are however available from the National Statistical Institute (INE) for the period 2006 to 2014 (*Figure 11*).

These show a clear upward trend for total turnover across all businesses as well for average firm turnover (the latter resulting from the fact that the number of firms remained almost constant over the period). Comparing these figures with the data on exports (see *Figure 2*) shows a clear correlation.

Figure 11: Turnover of Mozambican firms, 2006-2014



Source: Author's calculations based on Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2009-2016).

There is thus some indication – albeit far from conclusive, given the very rough nature of the analysis – that higher exports have indeed led to higher turnover.

²⁶⁷ This appears to be different now for the EPA, where support for the EPA implementation plan is being designed. Also, EPA related support has been already available regionally under the SADC Trade Related Facility (TRF) but has hardly been utilised by Mozambique due to difficulties in accessing TRF funds.

²⁶⁸ At the same time, it should be noted that the EU's MFN tariffs on cashew nuts are zero, i.e. the GSP provides no preference.

²⁶⁹ Among goods sectors, the available national statistics distinguish between (1) agriculture, forestry and fishery; (2) extractives; and (3) manufacturing industries. See e.g. Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2016).

Hypothesis 2.1: Preferences under the GSP do not only lead to trade diversion but also trade creation

As the analysis for hypothesis 1 on the effect of the GSP on exports has shown Mozambique’s exports to the rest of the world have grown faster, over the past 15 years, than exports to the EU, leading to a declining share of the latter in total exports (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 above).

There is thus no indication that the GSP, or the EU’s preferences for imports from Mozambique in general, have led only to trade diversion.


3.1.3 Effect of exporter profits and investment

Hypotheses 4 and 5: The more a sector exports under the GSP, and the higher export revenues are, the higher is investment in the sector, both for expansion of existing firms and new firm establishment.

Higher profits for exporters benefitting from the GSP could come from higher quantities exported at the same price (the volume effect) and/or the ability to charge higher prices on the EU market (the price effect). Unfortunately, statistics on Mozambican firms’ profits by export status are not available. However, the apparent limited impact of the GSP on Mozambique’s export volumes (see section 3.1.1) would prevent any volume effect on profits. With regard to the price effect, previous research on the level of pass-through of the rent generated by the preferences to exporters has yielded controversial findings. For example, the GSP Evaluation 2010 found that the rent stemming from preferences is shared roughly equally between exporters and importers (Gasiorek et al. 2010: 83ff). In contrast, Cirera and Alfieri’s study of the effect of EU trade preferences for Mozambique found that exporters are not able to capture the additional price margin associated with preferences (Cirera and Alfieri 2012).

Regarding investment, some statistics are available from the National Statistical Institute for the period 2006 to 2014, although these do not differentiate exporters from non-exporting firms (*Figure 12*). The overall data show a clear upward trend for investment by Mozambican firms over the period (in local currency). Comparing these figures with the data on exports (see *Figure 2*) shows another clear correlation, which is prima facie evidence that higher exports have indeed led to higher investment. At the same time, given that the number of firms has increased very little, this investment comes from existing firms, not new firm creation, which may have consequences for the scope of export and economic diversification.

Figure 12: Investment of Mozambican firms, 2006-2014



Source: Author’s calculations based on Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2009-2016).

Research into the effect of preference regimes on investment is limited. Most studies analyse the impact of reciprocal trade agreements, rather than unilateral preference regimes. They also generally focus on the impact of such agreements on FDI (rather than domestic investment). Also, no study addressing Mozambique in particular could be identified.

Among the cross-country studies reviewed, the GSP Evaluation 2010 (Gasiorek et al. 2010: 97ff) as well as Cardamone and Scoppola (2012) show a positive impact of preferences on FDI. Cardamone and Scoppola find that tariff liberalisation by the EU under preferential agreements on average has a positive impact on FDI into host countries, including for low-income countries,

but that this effect is higher under reciprocal agreements than under unilateral preference regimes, because high tariffs in the partner country have a subduing effect on FDI – this would mean that the GSP is a sub-optimal policy instrument for encouraging FDI in developing countries like Mozambique. Another finding in the same direction is that deep agreements covering investment provisions have a positive impact on FDI; as, by definition, a unilateral preference scheme like the GSP does not have any rules on investment, it cannot specifically foster FDI.

Stakeholders confirmed that in most cases investments, even if aimed at exporting to the EU, were not driven by the preferences available but raw materials or production conditions in Mozambique – primarily in fishing, extractives, and various agricultural sectors. Two important exceptions to this, as mentioned above, are the sugar and aluminium sectors – although regarding the former there was no agreement among stakeholders on the actual importance of the EU preferences for the sector’s development. A shortcoming is that the government has no investment policy that would be based on the preferences available – although the fact that the country benefits from DFQF access to the EU (as well as the preferences under AGOA) are used for investment attraction –, and the EU has not provided any support in this regard.

Overall, the impact of the GSP on investment in Mozambique was limited (following from the limited effect on exports). In the two sectors where the GSP has had an important impact on exports, a similarly strong impact on investment can be found, however. No link between the GSP and investment policy appears to exist, and no support has been provided by the EU in this regard.

3.2 Country level impacts

3.2.1 GSP effect on employment

Hypothesis 3: The more a sector exports under the GSP the faster its employment grows.

As with investment, some statistics are available from the National Statistical Institute for the period 2006 to 2014 regarding employment and labour costs/wages, but because these do not differentiate exporters from non-exporting firms they can only provide a very rough idea on employment effects. Based on these data (*Figure 13*), employment has more or less steadily, and substantially, increased over the period; the correlation with export growth (*Figure 2* above) is evident. The level of wages has however stagnated since 2009.

The two sectors where export growth can be attributed to EU trade preferences (though not necessarily the EBA, as discussed above), sugar and aluminium, together employ slightly less than 50,000 persons directly, about 7% of total formal employment. The number of direct jobs in the sugar sector rose from 25,000 in 2011²⁷⁰ to 30,000 in 2015²⁷¹ and 41,500 today, according to APAMO.

In sum, therefore, the EU preference regimes have considerably contributed to employment generation in Mozambique, at least in the sectors where exports have been found to have been impacted on by the preferences.

²⁷⁰ https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/aap-sugar-mozambique-af-20111220_en.pdf [accessed on 28 March 2018].


²⁷¹ www.speed-program.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/2015-SPEED-Presentation-025-Sugar-in-Mozambique-Balancing-Competitiveness-with-Protection-EN.pdf [accessed on 28 March 2018].

3.2.2 GSP and export diversification

Hypotheses 6/7: As a result of the GSP the concentration of export markets, as well as of the product composition of exports, should have decreased over time, i.e. the corresponding HHIs should have declined

The literature on the impact of the GSP and other unilateral preference regimes on export diversification does not provide clear results. A number of studies find no or very limited effects on export diversification. Gamberoni finds that the EBA has no effect on beneficiaries' export patterns (Gamberoni 2007). Cipollina et al. find that EU preferences primarily increase exports at the intensive margin but tend to increase specialisation of exports, rather than promote diversification, for certain sectors, in particular leather and footwear, and wood (Cipollina, Laborde, and Salvatici 2010). Similarly, the 2010 GSP evaluation found only a marginal effect of the GSP on export diversification (Gasiorek et al. 2010: 59ff). Conversely, Persson and Wilhelmsson find that the EU GSP increases the range of export products to the EU, in contrast to the Lomé and Cotonou arrangements (Persson and Wilhelmsson 2016).

Figure 13: Employment and labour costs of Mozambican firms, 2006-2014



Source: Author's calculations based on Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2009-2016).

For Mozambique, preliminary results of the 2017 GSP evaluation find only a limited increase in export diversification in terms of products, with the number of tariff lines exported to the EU increasing from 312 (average over the period 2011 to 2013) to 351 (2014 to 2016) (Development Solutions 2017b: 216). In line with this, the HHI decreased from 0.52 to 0.4 (at the CN 8-digit level) and 0.53 to 0.42 (at the HS Chapter level) (Development Solutions 2017b: 222), reflecting a moderate diversification of exports to the EU between the two periods.

Based on descriptive statistics for Mozambique, export concentration both in terms of sectors (*Figure 14*) and markets (*Figure 15*) has reduced since the early 2000s. However, in terms of sectoral concentration, the level of diversification of Mozambique's exports to the world was higher than its exports to the EU27 (*Figure 14*).

Some diversification has taken place in the two sectors where the GSP has had an impact, but this diversification has been limited and has taken a long time to materialise. In the cotton value chain, some yarn exports under the GSP have recently been registered, albeit at modest levels (about EUR 2 million in 2015/16). Likewise, in the aluminium sector, exports of cables and wires have started since 2014, rising to about EUR 25 million in 2016. This follows a commitment made by Mozal to sell 50,000 tonnes of aluminium domestically to Midal. That such diversification has taken place is a result of decisions by national players; stakeholders stated that no EU push or support for this diversification took place (neither in the cotton value chain nor in aluminium). The overall perception among stakeholders is that, despite the two positive examples (which have remained limited in scope), export diversification has not been achieved.

Figure 14: Index of sectoral HHI (HS 2-digit level) of Mozambique's exports to the EU27 and World, 2001-2016 (2001 = 100)





Figure 15: HHI by destination of Mozambique's exports (EU27 counted as one market), 2001-2016




Source: Author's calculations based on UN COMTRADE (mirror data).

In sum, at first sight the hypothesis appears to be confirmed: over time, Mozambique's exports have diversified both in terms of markets and sectors. However, the level of attribution to the GSP is not clear, as both exports to the EU and exports to the world have diversified, and the latter even more than the former; there is no clear pattern that would differentiate the concentration of exports to the EU from exports elsewhere, which could either mean that the GSP has had no effect on export composition or that the diversification induced by the GSP affects all exports alike, regardless of the destination. However, in view of the limited effect that the GSP appears to have had on export volumes (see section 3.1.1), the former interpretation appears more likely. The level of diversification in the two sectors where the GSP has impacted on exports remains limited, despite some promising recent developments.

Finally, considering that export diversification is also a measure of competitiveness, another indicator for competitiveness is productivity. Some national statistics on this are available (Figure 16). These show that while the average number of employees per firm has increased – in line with growing overall employment and a largely stagnating number of firms – turnover per employee, a simple measure of labour productivity, has shown a declining trend. This is worrying, as it indicates that Mozambique's competitiveness has decreased over time. Considering the results on the limited effectiveness and impact of the EBA in Mozambique, it would thus seem that the EBA has also not contributed to a strengthening of competitiveness. This raises some concerns about the suitability of the GSP as a developmental instrument (at least for Mozambique).

Figure 16: Average size and labour productivity of Mozambican firms, 2006-2014



Source: Author's calculations based on Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2009-2016).

3.3 Unintended outcomes and impacts

The GSP – not only the GSP+ but also the Standard GSP and the EBA, which also establish a certain floor for the respect of **fundamental social, human rights and labour norms** by beneficiary countries – has been criticised in the literature for failing to live up to the established standards. For example, Vogt has argued that:

“despite recent reforms to the labour conditionality of the EU GSP programme, many countries in which the government either commits serious violations of fundamental labour rights or fails to protect against such violations by private actors (by adopting appropriate laws and enforcing them when breached) continue to benefit. [...] This is in part due to the European Commission’s clear preference that enforcement actions under the GSP programme should be avoided, even long after dialogue and cooperative mechanisms have failed to produce concrete results” (Vogt 2015).

Similarly, Évora (2015) found that removal of GSP preferences from Cambodia due to human rights violations in the sugar industry would have been in line with WTO law, while Montera (2013) and Beke and Hachez (2015) have critically discussed the human rights and social concerns over the withdrawal and restoration of GSP eligibility for Myanmar, finding that the EU is reluctant to withdraw GSP preferences and even investigate alleged human rights violations, and that the withdrawal of preferences is an ineffective instrument to achieve compliance with norms if not accompanied by other measures Beke and Hachez (2015: 23f).²⁷²

For Mozambique, no negative social impacts or labour right violations in connection with the GSP could be identified.²⁷³ The two sectors where EU trade preferences have been found to have had an impact are rather characterised by active measures to ensure that benefits also accrue to members of local communities. In the sugar sector, an outgrower scheme has been implemented with the support of the Sugar Protocol Accompanying Measures, which is widely considered as successful, as it has helped a large number of farmers benefit from sugar production and outputs. This is a good example of how trade preferences granted by the EU were complemented with support aimed at ensuring that higher exports are distributed in a socially inclusive way (although these cannot be attributed to the GSP, they constitute a positive example of policy coherence). Similarly, Mozal has a preference regime in place which favours local suppliers over international ones (in procurement scoring, local suppliers get a 30% preference), as well as a formalised approach for community development (again, no attribution to the GSP nor, in this particular case, to any EU policy is possible).

Studies on the **environmental effects** of the GSP focus on the GSP+ arrangement, as this incorporates specific requirements which beneficiary countries must meet in terms of ratification and implementation of core international conventions. In Mozambique, negative environmental impacts could arise in both the aluminium and sugar sectors, but environmental NGOs contacted to discuss any such potential negative implications stated that they had no comments to make.

No unintended social or environmental impact from the EU’s trade preferences could be identified.

²⁷² Also see e.g. the recent European Parliamentary Research Service’s Briefing “Human rights in EU trade policy. Unilateral Measures” (Zamfir 2017) and the debate on trade preferences for Pakistan, <https://www.eureporter.co/frontpage/2018/02/06/european-values-in-question-with-the-abuse-of-trade-preferences-in-favour-of-pakistan/>.

²⁷³ NGOs in Mozambique invited for interviews stated that they had no comments to make.

4 CONCLUSIONS

Bearing in mind the limitations of the analysis, the main conclusions presented here address outcome achievement, impact achievement, unintended effects, and policy coherence in the context of the GSP and its use by Mozambique.

Outcome achievement. Overall, the effect of the GSP on Mozambique's exports was limited: despite the preferences accorded under the EBA, exports to the EU have overall performed less well than Mozambique's total exports – although there are exceptions for a few (important) sectors such as sugar and aluminium, for which EU tariff preferences have been of prime importance. Nevertheless, even for these sectors the added value of the GSP, as opposed to other preference regimes, has been limited as these were traditionally exported under the ACP preferences, and the EBA was used only after the expiry of the ACP regime in the autumn of 2014, thus providing only a residual role to the GSP. In those few sectors where EU trade preferences – although not necessarily the GSP – have positively impacted on exports, both turnover and investment have benefitted as well.

The reasons for Mozambique's limited export performance to the EU (and globally) are varied, mostly related to the limited productive capacity of Mozambique and limitations in the trade infrastructure. The number of exporters to the EU has remained largely stable, with few new entrants registered as a result of limited firm capacity, as well as the lack of proper communication/ explanation of the EU preference regimes, but also the fact that EU markets have become less attractive in relation to other markets in recent years. Lack of complementary support by the EU to overcome supply side constraints, deal with the GSP associated rules of origin and other market access requirements has also contributed to the largely stagnating nature of exports to the EU. In sum, therefore, limited PCD has contributed to the limited effectiveness of the GSP regime in Mozambique.

Impact achievement. The EU preference regimes have considerably contributed to employment generation in Mozambique, at least in the sectors where exports have been found to have been impacted on by the preferences. Mozambique's exports have also diversified both in terms of markets and sectors. However, the level of attribution to the GSP is not clear, as both exports to the EU and exports to the world have diversified, and the latter even more than the former; there is no clear pattern that would differentiate the concentration of exports to the EU from exports elsewhere. It would appear that the GSP's effect on export composition has been rather limited: The level of diversification in the two sectors where the GSP has had an impact on exports remains limited, despite some promising recent developments. Overall, thus, the impact of the EU preference regimes on Mozambique's development has been limited, and the EBA's impact even more so, given the residual role it has played.

Unintended effects. Given the limited effect of the GSP on exports, no unintended effects, in particular no unintended social or environmental impact, could be identified.

GSP and policy coherence. With the GSP being a policy instrument dedicated to poverty reduction and sustainable development, it should come as no surprise that, *de iure*, it has been in line with the principles of PCD. However, policy coherence (or rather, policy parsimony) within the EU's trade policies could be an issue due to the overlap of different preference instruments, and casts doubt on the relevance of individual instruments at least for certain countries, such as Mozambique. As the OECD has remarked already in 2005: "the needs that the GSP aims to satisfy [...] are covered by other schemes" (OECD 2005: 29). Indeed, the redundancy between the GSP and other ACP preference regimes has meant that the GSP has

hardly been used in the past, almost only when the ACP preferences were withdrawn. In the future, the redundancy of preference instruments is to continue, with the EBA competing with the EPA. In the best case, the EBA could be interpreted as an “insurance policy” for Mozambican exports to be used when other preferences fall away; in the worst case, it could have a deterrent effect for exporters by making the regulatory regime for exporting to the EU unnecessarily complicated. Thus, although the different preference regimes available for Mozambican exports are not incoherent, a more lenient approach would enhance clarity of the export regime (and could be achieved e.g. by removing Article 4(2) of the GSP Regulation).

In addition, despite the overall embeddedness of the GSP into the developmental agenda, in practice the GSP (or EBA, in the case of Mozambique) has not been used as an element in a comprehensive developmental policy but “just” as a trade preference regime in isolation. Research has shown that successful diversification requires a coherent strategic approach. For example, Collier and Venables (2007) note that for “Africa to diversify its exports into manufacturing may require a catalyst to create clusters of activity and lift them to threshold productivity levels.”²⁷⁴ A GSP without complementary adequate support to enhance productivity, at least in LDCs like Mozambique with clear supply capacity constraints, does not provide this; it therefore lacks an important developmental element, which points to limited performance in terms of the PCD concept. As stakeholders in Mozambique stated, the EBA has been a missed opportunity for the country’s export development and diversification. Now, in the context of the signing of the EPA, there is however hope for a shift towards a more comprehensive and integrated trade and development agenda, which will require the EU’s support for trade facilitation and strengthening supply-side capacity in Mozambique. The fact that this comes in the context of the EPA, and not the EBA, is another indication of the residual role of the latter.

²⁷⁴ Along the same lines, Francois et al. have argued that:

“Considering the systemic downsides, limited benefits, and historical inability of many poor countries in Africa and elsewhere to use preferences, a decision to shift away from preferential ‘trade as aid’ toward more efficient and effective instruments to support poor countries could both improve development outcomes and help strengthen the multilateral trading system [...]. More effective integration of the poorest countries into the trading system requires instruments aimed at improving the productivity and competitiveness of firms and farmers in these countries. Supply constraints are the primary factors that have constrained the ability of many African countries to benefit from preferences” (Francois, Hoekman, and Manchin 2006: 214).

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Reconstruction of the GSP Intervention Logic

A first source for the reconstruction of the GSP intervention logic has been a review of the EU's official texts, i.e. the GSP regulations – notably the latest version of 2012²⁷⁵ – as well as other Commission documents. These documents state the objectives of the GSP as well as provide some indications for the intervention logic, although the latter is not explicitly and comprehensively developed.

The 2012 GSP Regulation puts the GSP into the context of the EU's overarching policy objectives of fostering “the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty” (Preamble, recital (3)). Recital (4) reaffirms these objectives, adding the promotion of good governance, and emphasises the need for the EU's commercial policy “to be consistent with and to consolidate the objectives of the Union policy in the field of development cooperation.”²⁷⁶ The Commission's 2011 impact assessment also refers to these objectives but adds another one which is not related to development. The three general objectives are:

1. To contribute to poverty eradication by expanding exports from countries most in need (G-1);
2. To promote sustainable development and good governance (G-2);
3. To ensure a better safeguard for the EU's financial and economic interests (G-3)” (European Commission 2011: 18).

The third objective does not directly refer to the effect of the GSP in beneficiary countries and is therefore not further pursued in this country note. However, it should be noted that the objective constitutes a potential area of conflict with the developmental objectives – as preferences offered to exporters in the beneficiary countries might negatively affect producers in the EU – which is not further addressed in the Commission's hierarchy of GSP objectives, and might constitute an issue from a PCD perspective.

The causal link between the preference regime established under the GSP and the GSP's objectives is set out as follows in the 2012 GSP Regulation (the 2008 Regulation had not provided any intervention logic):

“By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be reinvested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on helping developing countries having greater development, trade and financial needs” (Preamble, recital (7)).

The intervention logic set out in the 2012 Regulation was further explained in the Commission's impact assessment undertaken in preparation of the Regulation. This stated that:


“Development and poverty reduction are complex goals, which necessitate many building blocks to be achieved. The scheme is one of those many blocks. While, on its own, the scheme will not directly reduce poverty, its preferences can help developing countries boost exports and develop new industries – a factor which, given an adequate political and economic context, can contribute significantly towards development and poverty reduction” (European Commission 2011: 5)

²⁷⁵ Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, OJ L 303/1 of 31.10.2012 (“2012 GSP Regulation”).

²⁷⁶ Recital (4) of the 2012 GSP Regulation literally follows recital (3) in its predecessor, the 2008 GSP Regulation; Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised preferences for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007, OJ L 211/1 of 06.08.2008.

This causal chain implies that tariff preferences granted by the EU lead to increased export revenues in beneficiary countries which are then invested for developmental purposes and economic diversification, ultimately leading to poverty reduction, good governance and sustainable development (Figure 17²⁷⁷). The Commission’s intervention logic is not quite clear, however, to what extent the GSP plays a role in relation to the final objectives – development and poverty reduction – as it states on the one hand that the GSP will not directly reduce poverty, being only one of many building blocks towards these objectives, but on the other hand claims that it can contribute “significantly” to these objectives.

Figure 17: Simplified GSP intervention logic derived from Commission documents



Source: Prepared by the author based on the 2012 GSP Regulation and European Commission (2011).

Observers and researchers have over time developed their own interpretations of the GSP impacts and intervention logic. Most academic research focusses on the impact of trade preferences on exports.²⁷⁸ For example, Persson and Wilhelmsson (2016) focus on the two anticipated impacts of trade preferences on beneficiary country exports, stating that originally the various preferential trade arrangements of the EU aimed at both expanding and diversifying exports of the beneficiary countries, but that over time the focus shifted to the quantitative objective, while neglecting diversification.

Evaluations of the EU GSP have prepared somewhat more elaborated intervention logics. For example, the 2010 GSP mid-term evaluation stated that the GSP’s objective was “to encourage greater growth of developing country exports in existing products (the intensive margin), and through diversifying into new products (the extensive margin), consequently contributing to the development process” (Gasiorek et al. 2010: 13), and listed a number of other areas against which to measure the “success” of the GSP, including economic growth, sustainable development, poverty reduction, without providing a particular order.²⁷⁹ The currently ongoing

²⁷⁷ The distinction and demarcation of “outcomes” and “impacts” is admittedly subjective.


²⁷⁸ See, for example, Persson (2012), and Persson and Wilhelmsson (2016), and the literature surveyed there.

²⁷⁹ Gasiorek et al. (2010: 13). The authors then briefly address the causal mechanism:

“The core mechanism transmitting these beneficial effects is preferential access to markets, which may lead to higher levels of exports and consequently imports. This can enable countries to develop better and/or more industries, leading to increases in productivity, competitiveness and possibly diversification. It may also encourage more investment. This may be related to the stability and time frame of the preferential regime, which are also related productivity and diversification issues. Each of the positive impacts noted above may enable the economy to become more productive and increase levels of growth, thus increasing aggregate income per capita. The relationship between this transmission mechanism, poverty and sustainable development is therefore highly complex. For example, even where increased exports may lead to higher growth rates, this may not necessarily lead to a reduction in poverty as the impact of trade on poverty depends on the availability of relevant

Mid-Term Evaluation of the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) provides a comprehensive intervention logic, which not only addresses the effects in developing countries but also operational and international issues which the 2012 GSP Regulation aims to address (Development Solutions 2017a). The intervention logic distinguishes three separate causal chains – although there are some cross-linkages – leading to the three general objectives of poverty eradication, promotion of sustainable development and good governance, and safeguarding EU financial and economic interests (Figure 18). The key transmission mechanism for the first objective is, as in the Regulation, the increase in exports and export diversification (although the two are not put in relation to each other, as the Regulation does, but rather placed at the same level in the objective hierarchy); the link from these two “expected results” to the “long-term impact” of poverty eradication is not further specified; in fact, most objectives in the evaluation’s intervention logic address operational issues.

Figure 18: Intervention logic of the 2017 GSP Mid-Term Evaluation



Source: Development Solutions (2017a: 30) with annotations by the author.

For the present case study contributing to the PCD evaluation, a causal chain focussing on the intended economic (and social) effects of the GSP on the selected case study countries has been reconstructed based on the implicit intentions and logic in the official documents and the logics constructed in secondary sources. This focusses on the first general objective, “poverty eradication” and is applicable to all GSP beneficiary countries.²⁸⁰


The purpose of this reconstruction is to make the causal chain as explicit as possible and also list key assumptions that need to be fulfilled in order for the logical chain to work. This level of explicitness allows to derive clear hypotheses to be tested both through data and document analysis and consultations with stakeholders during the field visits.

transmission mechanisms (see McCulloch, Winters and Cirera (2002)). This is because changes in trade can impact on consumption choices, on relative prices therefore inducing sectoral reallocation with consequent distributional effects, and on revenue from trade taxes. The greater engagement in international trade also raises issues of diversification versus specialisation, which are in turn often related to vulnerability, as well as issues of the geographical concentration of economic activity (economic geography) and long-run spillover effects.” Gasiorek et al. (2010: 13f)

²⁸⁰ As mentioned above, the third objective is not directly relevant for beneficiary countries and is therefore not further addressed in this note. The second objective – support to sustainable development and good governance – is discussed further below.

Figure 19 provides a graphical summary of the GSP intervention logic focussing on economic and social development of beneficiary countries. Preferences accorded by the EU GSP will, if utilised by exporters in beneficiary countries (assumption A) and if there are no non-tariff barriers to EU market access (assumption B), lead to an increase in the volume of “traditional exports” (an increase “at the intensive margin”) which will translate into higher exporter profits (the volume effect of GSP preferences). The GSP preferences will also lead, if the rent arising from the preference margin is not fully captured by importers (assumption C) lead to higher margins and hence profits for exporters (the price effect of the preferences). Higher profits will then, if the preferences are predictable and stable and the investment environment is sufficiently enabling (assumption E), lead to increased investments – both reinvestments by existing exporters and greenfield investment by new investors (including foreign investors) lured into the sector by the increased profits. These new investments will further expand output and exports of the existing export products, both to the EU (thus creating a virtuous circle) and to new geographical markets, provided that economies of scale or productivity-enhancing investments result in increased competitiveness of exporters (assumption G). If investments are aimed at research and development or innovation, and if there are no barriers to market access (assumption H), export diversification into new products will occur. Furthermore, both increased investments per se and export diversification will lead to stronger economic growth which will, if inclusive growth mechanisms are in place in the beneficiary country (assumption J), contribute to poverty reduction. As can be seen, the causal chain from granting preferences under the GSP to poverty reduction is indeed long.

Figure 19: The constructed GSP intervention logic focusing on economic (and social) impact in GSP beneficiary countries



Source: Prepared by the author.

There is, however, a short-cut, both in terms of the causal chain and in terms of the time required from preferences being granted to have an impact on poverty: An increase in the volume of exports to the EU will, if this is not entirely the result of diversion of exports to other markets (assumption D), lead to an increase in total output of the exported goods. An increase in

production, in turn, will result in increased employment (alternatively: wages), which then will result in poverty reduction, if the additional employment and wages are decent (assumption I).

The second dimension (or general objective) which the GSP aims at in beneficiary developing countries is the promotion of sustainable development and good governance. However, unlike for the economic and poverty objective, a clear causal chain that would be applicable to all GSP countries (or the scheme in general) is not provided in the official documents, nor in the secondary literature reviewed. Indeed, it would seem difficult to construct a general causal chain or intervention logic for this objective. The main reason for this is that the 2012 GSP Regulation (as well as its predecessor) de facto establishes two different regimes with regard to the promotion of sustainable development and good governance.

Under the first regime, the GSP+ establishes explicit conditions for beneficiary countries in terms of meeting 27 international conventions which address non-economic development issues (human rights, social, environmental, and good governance).²⁸¹ The logic behind this would thus be that the prospect of benefitting from higher preferences for GSP eligible countries under the GSP+ arrangement leads them to adopt and subject themselves to the monitoring mechanisms established under the 27 conventions, thereby ensuring that minimum human rights, social/labour, and environmental standards are kept.

Under the second regime, which comprises the Standard GSP and EBA, only economic criteria play a role for eligibility and level of preferences. Merely a residual role remains for aspects of good governance and sustainable development in the form of a possible temporary withdrawal of preferences if a beneficiary country “seriously and systematically” violates core human rights and labour conventions, exports goods made by prison labour, shows “serious” shortcomings in customs control related to drug trafficking, engages in “serious and systematic” unfair trading practices or infringements against regional or international agreements on the use of fishery resources (Article 19.1), or fails to comply with GSP rules of origin (Article 21).²⁸² Thus, although the GSP sets a minimum floor for GSP beneficiary countries to respect certain human rights, labour and selected environmental (only those related to fisheries) standards, there is no positive causal chain whereby the GSP would lead Standard GSP or EBA beneficiary countries to promote sustainable development and good governance.

As neither of the countries selected for case studies is a GSP+ beneficiary, no causal chain for the non-economic (i.e. human rights, environmental and good governance) impact of the GSP has been prepared. The assessment of such impact could instead be undertaken at two levels: First, it could be addressed in part under the assumption that an inclusive growth mechanism needs to be in place in the beneficiary country to translate employment gains into poverty reduction, if a comprehensive concept of poverty is applied; however, this would seem to slightly deviate from the Commission’s conceptualisation, which explicitly distinguishes poverty eradication from sustainable development and good governance. Second, non-economic effects of the GSP in the beneficiary country can be addressed as unintended effects or externalities (both positive and negative) of the GSP. It is this latter approach that the evaluation takes.

²⁸¹ See Article 15 of the 2012 GSP Regulation. The conventions are listed in Annex VIII of the Regulation.


²⁸² These rules also apply to GSP+ beneficiaries.

Annex 2: Methodological approach and data collection

Overview of methodological approach. A comprehensive evaluation of the GSP would require that the level of achievement of all outcomes and impacts as well as the validity of the assumed linkages in the intervention logic are assessed. However, due to resource constraints a selective approach has to be applied, which distinguishes three levels of scrutiny (Figure 20): First, the “short-cut” causal chain from GSP preferences to employment creation in the beneficiary countries constitutes the subject of the “core analysis” (green background in the figure). It focuses, as mentioned in the Detailed Field Methodology, on the following indicators: (1) the extent to which the GSP impacts on exports from the case study countries (outcome); and (2) the extent to which increased exports lead to increased employment and/or incomes (impact). In addition, the third indicator to be assessed in the core analysis – which, lying outside of the intervention logic, cannot be represented in Figure 20 – is the presence of positive or negative externalities generated by the GSP.

The core analysis is complemented with a second, “subsidiary analysis” to provide some insights into the likely further outcomes and impacts of the GSP in the beneficiary country (red background), and, third, a cursory review of existing secondary sources addressing the remaining outcomes and impacts.

Figure 20: Methodological framework for the GSP case study



Source: Prepared by the author.

Analytical tools and process. Both core and subsidiary analysis are based on a mix of document and data analysis (light blue objects in Figure 20) and stakeholder contributions collected during the field visit (dark blue objects in Figure 20). Statistical data analysis is restricted to those data which are readily available – in principle trade data, as well as national production and employment data where available at disaggregated (at least sectoral) levels; it is also restricted to descriptive statistical analysis – econometric models that would allow for a

more robust analysis and isolation of the effect of different explanatory variables on the outcome or impact of the GSP could not be developed due to resource constraints.

Data collection and analysis follows a two-stage process: first, documents and statistical data are collected and analysed. The findings, and gaps in information availability then determine the scope of data and information collection, and the types of questions to be asked to stakeholder during the field visits, i.e. the second stage. Thus, the tasks for the field visit are to:

- Determine evidence for effects for which no statistics are available;
- Check the validity of key assumptions, hypotheses and causal links; and
- Identify and assess externalities of the GSP in the beneficiary country.

The interview guide prepared for the field visit (see Annex 6) is structured according to these tasks.

Data and information sources. For the outcome and impact achievement indicators, primary statistical data constitute the first information source, complemented by findings in the existing literature, most notably evaluations and impact assessments of the GSP.²⁸³ Trade data sources used are TARIC and UNCTAD TRAINS for tariffs, and COMEXT for EU imports²⁸⁴ as well as UN COMTRADE for comparisons of the case study country's exports to the world and the EU countries.²⁸⁵ Production, employment and investment data are taken from national statistics – in Mozambique the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, INE) –, complemented, to the extent available, by data provided by stakeholders during the field visits. Semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, using the attached interview guide, constitute the third source of information.

Specific indicators and data used. The specific *indicators at outcome and impact levels* are measured as follows for Mozambique and Vietnam (numbers refer to the numbers in Figure 20 above):

1. *Exports to the EU:* (a) Growth of total exports to the EU over the period 2001 to 2016²⁸⁶ in comparison with growth of exports to the world. Underlying hypothesis (1): If the GSP has been effective, exports to the EU have grown faster than exports to the world; (b) For Vietnam, in addition a cross-sector comparison can be done because unlike in Mozambique, where all virtually exports are exempted from duties in the EU, in Vietnam under the Standard GSP certain sectors are not covered, and some sectors graduated from or de-graduated to the GSP (footwear and leather goods from Vietnam graduated in 2009 and de-graduated in 2014). Underlying hypothesis (1a): Exports of sectors/products covered by the GSP perform better than non-covered sectors/products.
2. *Production output:* (a) Growth in total output and output by sector over the period 2001 to 2016. Underlying hypothesis (2): The more a sector exports under the GSP the faster its total output grows;

²⁸³ The key sources are Gasiorek et al. (2010); European Commission (2011); Development Solutions (2017b).

²⁸⁴ Imports by the EU as reported in COMEXT are taken as a proxy for exports from the beneficiary country to the EU.

²⁸⁵ As Mozambique's reported data in COMTRADE (especially those at sector level) are somewhat erratic and hence appear to be unreliable, mirror data, i.e. import data reported by Mozambique's trading partners, are used. To ensure consistency throughout the period, imports of the EU27 countries have been used for the purpose of the statistical analysis across the whole period considered.

²⁸⁶ The period 2001 to 2016 is the overall period of analysis. For some variables, data are available not for all years in the period.

- (b) Evidence/examples of exporting producers growing faster than other producers, based on stakeholder information.
3. *Employment*: (a) Growth in total employment and employment by sector over the period 2000 to 2016. Underlying hypothesis (3): The more a sector exports under the GSP the faster its employment grows;
(b) Evidence/examples of exporting producers hiring more workers than other producers, based on stakeholder information.
- 4./5. *Investment*: (a) Value of investment by existing firms, and new business establishment by sector over the period 2000 to 2016. Underlying hypothesis (4/5): The more a sector exports under the GSP, and the higher export revenues are, the higher is investment in the sector – both for expansion of existing firms and new firm establishment;
(b) Evidence/examples of investment activity in exporting sectors compared to other sectors, based on stakeholder information.
6. *Geographical export diversification*: (a) Evolution of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of exports by destination country over the period 2001 to 2016. Underlying hypothesis (6): If the GSP has contributed to increased competitiveness, then the concentration of export markets should have decreased over time, i.e. the HHI should decline;²⁸⁷
(b) Evidence/examples of new export markets having been entered into as a result of increase competitiveness achieved through the GSP, based on stakeholder information.
7. *Export product diversification*: (a) Evolution of the HHI of exports by sector (at HS 2-digit levels), over the period 2001 to 2016. The HHI of exports to EU is compared to the HHI of total exports. Underlying hypothesis (7): If the GSP has contributed to export product diversification, then the HHI of exports should have declined over time;
(b) Evidence/examples of new export products having been introduced thanks to the GSP regime, based on stakeholder information.

For the *assessment of the validity of key assumptions*, the following indicators and data are used (letters refer to the numbers in Figure 20 above):

- a. *High preference utilisation rate*: (a) Evolution of preference utilisation rates by sector (at HS 2-digit levels), over the period 2001 to 2016, vs. exports to the EU. Underlying hypothesis (1.1): The higher the preference utilisation, the better the export performance;
(b) Identification of reasons for low preference utilisation: (b1) low preference margins (hypothesis: the lower the preference margin, the lower preference utilisation). This is assessed by regressing preference utilisation against preference margins (at HS 2-digit levels) over the period 2001 to 2016; (b2) problems related to rules of origin (RoO) – both substantive rules and administrative/procedural requirements and compliance costs related to obtaining certificates of origin; (b3) limited awareness about the GSP; and (b4) other reasons. Items (b2) to (b4) are investigated based on stakeholder interviews.
- b. *Absence of NTBs*: (a) Non-tariff measures introduced or removed by the EU on imports from the case study countries over the period 2001 to 2016, based on the TARIC

²⁸⁷ Note that there is a partial contradiction between this hypothesis and the one under number 1 above, which states that the share of exports to the EU should have increased if the GSP is successful – which would mean, *ceteris paribus*, an increase in concentration.

database. Underlying hypothesis (1.2): If NTMs have remained stable or decreased over time, exports from the beneficiary country to the EU under the GSP have increased. (b) Evidence/examples of NTBs – both in Mozambique and in the EU – affecting exports to the EU, based on stakeholder information.

- d. GSP leads to trade creation, *not merely trade diversion*: Growth of total exports to the rest of the world over the period 2001 to 2016. Underlying hypothesis (2.1): If the GSP has been effective, exports to the non-EU countries have also grown.

The *determination and assessment of externalities* is addressed qualitatively, based on literature review and stakeholder consultations during the field visit.

Limitations of the approach. The methodological approach taken has a number of limitations. First, like other evaluations of the GSP, the highest impact level – i.e. the effects of the GSP on economic growth and poverty in beneficiary countries – is not assessed. However, a credible poverty impact assessment would constitute a major research project of its own for which resources are simply not available in the context of the present evaluation; in addition, such an assessment would appear to be outside of the scope of the present evaluation of the EU's policy coherence for development. Furthermore, even the official intervention logic expressed in Commission documents states that the impact of the GSP on poverty reduction is only indirect.

Second, as mentioned above, the statistical analysis is restricted to descriptive statistics – econometric models that would allow for a more robust analysis and isolation of the effect of different explanatory variables on the outcome or impact of the GSP could not be developed due to resource constraints.

Third, an inherent shortcoming of the case study approach is that no cross-country comparison can be undertaken (typical tools like gravity models can therefore not be applied); this requires a more qualitative analytical approach which leads to less precise findings in terms of outcome and impact achievement but at the same time allows to highlight the causal links.

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Annex 4: List of persons met

Institution	Person(s) met
EU Delegation	Kaluwa Vergamota, Attaché, Private Sector and Trade
Ministry of Industry and Trade	Esmeralda Matias Patrício, Head of Department, Regional Integration and Specialised Organisations, National Directorate of External Relations
Ministry of Fisheries	Carlos Riquixo, Deputy-Director, National Institute of Fisheries Inspections Elsa Maperre, Technician, Policy Directorate
Revenue Authority (AT)	Suzana Raimundo, Head, Directorate of Studies and Policies José Cumbe, Head of Regional Integration Department Ilcer Doce, Head of Section, Rules of Origin
Investment and Export Promotion Agency (APIEX)	Lourenço Sambo, Director General
National Standards and Quality Institute (INNOQ)	Geraldo Luísa Albasini, Director-Geral Adjunto
Confederation of Business Associations of Mozambique (CTA)	Mateus Chale, Vice-President of Fiscal and Customs Policy and International Trade Orzendio Zimba, Advisor
Confederation of Business Associations of Mozambique (CTA)	Muzila Wagner C. João Nhatsave, Vice-President of Agro-Negotiations and Fisheries
Association of Industrial Producers of Prawns (AMAPIC)	
Pescamar (prawn fishing)	
Association of Sugar Producers of Mozambique (APAMO)	João Jeque, Director Executivo
Mozambique Cotton Association (AAM)	Francisco Ferreira dos Santos, Administrador
jfs Holding (cotton production, various services)	
Association of Cashew Producers (AICAJU)	Gonçalo Correia
CondorAnacardium (cashew processor)	
South 32 - Mozal (aluminium smelter)	Philip Roos, Superintendent Finance Business Partnership

Annex 5: Supporting tables

Table 11: EU27 imports from Mozambique by import regime, 2001-2016 (EUR '000)

Eligibility	Actual import regime	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
Total imports		519,912	583,101	596,711	838,632	1,017,268	1,283,076	1,393,499	868,542	675,633	1,391,512	1,318,624	1,245,268	1,320,307	1,362,197	1,428,738	1,323,032	
ONLY MFN	MFN ZERO	41,819	25,198	23,988	20,638	24,083	29,893	36,968	52,821	42,254	131,496	103,158	138,291	192,494	212,929	252,761	288,417	
	MFN NON ZERO	50	0	0	0	3,604	5	0	0	0	427	15	1	38	0	0	4	
	UNKNOWN	14	1	13	3	3	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
ONLY GSP	MFN ZERO	0	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	MFN NON ZERO	0	0	3	66	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10,101	32,664	5,916	
	GSP ZERO	2	0	5	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	253,307	1,139,352	965,402	
	UNKNOWN	0	0	0	0	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
ONLY PREFEREN- CES	MFN ZERO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	MFN NON ZERO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	PREFERENCE ZERO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,984	61,384	
	PREFERENCE NON ZERO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	UNKNOWN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
GSP AND PREFEREN- CES	MFN ZERO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,228	0	0	0	0	0	
	MFN NON ZERO	14,340	5,629	269,441	544,210	591,939	629,726	421,189	29,728	6,938	5,723	7,574	6,251	30,810	36,904	0	0	
	GSP ZERO	581	3,124	58	340	170	1,068	1,930	21,539	33,325	42,871	54,713	51,611	54,835	40,027	0	0	
	PREFERENCE ZERO	461,797	537,849	296,353	262,126	385,178	602,361	891,473	699,184	567,880	1,210,823	1,149,481	1,047,079	1,036,482	807,812	0	0	
	PREFERENCE NON ZERO	220	0	0	77	5	317	528	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	UNKNOWN	31	69	140	89	0	65	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	1,058	11,177	6,710	11,082	12,237	19,630	41,411	65,270	25,235	172	456	2,036	5,649	1,119	977	1,910	
Shares (%)	GSP+ACP eligible/total	91.7	93.8	94.9	96.2	96.1	96.1	94.4	86.4	90.0	90.5	92.1	88.7	85.0	84.3	82.0	73.4	
	EPA eligible/total	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	4.6	
	GSP pref utilisation	0.1	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	2.9	5.5	3.4	4.5	4.7	4.9	25.5	97.2	99.4	
	ACP pref utilisation	96.9	98.4	52.4	32.5	39.4	48.9	67.8	93.2	93.4	96.1	94.6	94.8	92.4	70.4	
	EPA pref utilisation	100.0	100.0
	MFN zero-duty imports/total	8.0	4.3	4.0	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.7	6.1	6.3	9.4	8.1	11.1	14.6	15.6	17.7	21.8	
	All zero-duty imports/total	97.0	97.1	53.7	33.8	40.2	49.4	66.8	89.1	95.2	99.5	99.4	99.3	97.2	96.5	97.6	99.4	

Source: Author's calculations based on COMEXT.

Annex 6: Interview guide for Mozambique

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Case study: Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP)

Interview Guide Mozambique

A. Introductory issues

- a. Establish name, position, organisation and contact details of interview partner.
- b. Determine and note if interview partner is aware, and has an understanding, of PCD.
- c. Explain purpose of the interview.

B. Issues to be covered specifically with the EU Delegation

- a. How do you see the role of EU Delegations in reporting/monitoring issues of coherence or incoherence as requested by the Council in PCD Council Conclusions?
What are your views on the PCD chapter of the External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)? (i.e. in terms of usefulness, follow up, resources allocated (time, expertise), feedback from EEAS/DG DEVCO, feedback from partner country)
Besides the PCD chapter of the EAMR report, do you report on PCD issues in other ways and do you receive feedback from the Commission?
Does the partner country raise (or has raised in the past) PCD related issues with respect to EU policies?
- b. Has the distribution of roles between DG DEVCO and the EEAS since the creation of the latter had an impact on the EU's PCD approach?
Have development objectives and priorities changed in any way in a broader agenda (reinforced/undermined), for instance with respect to the EU's Foreign and Security Policy?
How does the EU Delegation "balance out" political and development objectives?

B. Evidence for GSP effects for which no/limited statistics are available

Do you have any data or information on the performance of businesses exporting under the GSP in comparison with other businesses that do not export under the GSP, or not export at all with regard to:

- a. **The level of production/output:** are exporting firms growing faster and more stable, or are the exposed to additional risks and volatility? What are the reasons?
- b. **The level of employment:** are exporting businesses (under the GSP) hiring more and/or paying higher wages, or not? What are the reasons? What explains the stagnation of wages and the continued growth of employment?
- c. **Investment activity:** Are exporting businesses (under the GSP) investing more than non-exporting businesses? Are investments primarily by existing firms or new firms? What is the role of foreign investment (and does FDI primarily come from the EU or other countries)?

Could you name examples of investment projects specifically aimed at exporting under the GSP/to the EU?

- d. Do you have any evidence/could you name examples of **new export markets** which firms have entered into as a result of increase competitiveness achieved through the GSP? Please provide as much detail as possible.
- e. Do you have any evidence/could you provide examples of **new export products** having been introduced thanks to the GSP regime? For example, have exporters diversified into other exports related to those originally exported (such as new varieties, added value products)? Please provide as much detail as possible.
- f. Overall, do you consider that the GSP has led to an increase in the **competitiveness** of businesses or, vice versa, cemented existing production and export patterns – or has it had no effect at all? If possible, provide examples or evidence to support your argument.

C. Validity of GSP key assumptions, hypotheses and causal links

- a. On **preference utilisation**: What are the reasons for the drop in combined GSP/ACP preference utilisation in 2003-2007?
 Why was the ACP regime preferred over the GSP as long as it was available? What are the benefits of exporting to the EU under the GSP compared to exports under ACP and MFN, and, what, if any, are the added costs or complications? If possible, provide specific examples and/or cost/benefit considerations.
 Do you have examples/other evidence that preferences are primarily used by large exporters? What are the specific constraints that small exporters are facing in relation to using preferences offered by the GSP? Are RoO issues related to the rules themselves (such as cumulation, value addition requirements, etc.) or the administration of the rules (such as certification requirements, non-acceptance of documents provided, etc.)? Have rules of origin under the GSP become simpler over time/stayed the same/become more difficult to comply with?
 What is the probability for the GSP becoming replaced by the MAR/EPA regime, considering market access conditions (incl. differences in rules of origin), level of preferences and compliance costs?
- b. Are **non-tariff barriers** such as product safety standards, quality requirements, or any other TBT and SPS issues negatively affecting exports to the EU? Are exports under the GSP affected differently than exports under MFN? Do you have the feeling that non-tariff barriers are used by the EU on purpose to reduce imports from Mozambique?
- c. Are there any **other factors** (originating in the EU) which make exporting to the EU under GSP difficult, or prevent it altogether? Which ones?
 Provide examples of capacity constraints impacting on export performance – be as precise as possible!
 Please provide specific examples of complementary aid by the EU to strengthen productive capacity, and the effects that this aid has had on exports.
- d. What in your view explains the fact that exports performed well during 2003-08 when combined preference utilisation was lower than before and after? Is it possible that the GSP and other preference regimes act as a “safety net” which is used if “normal” exports are not performing well?
- e. In general, why have exports to the EU fallen behind exports to other destinations? Which other factors can explain this?

D. Externalities and unintended effects of the GSP

If any of the following effects are found, state *how* the GSP has contributed to it:

- a. Are you aware of any **human rights or labour rights related impacts** induced by the GSP? Which ones?
For example: Have there been incidences of forced labour and or child labour in exporting businesses? Displacements of persons to make way for exporting businesses/farms? Violations of worker rights? Are there indications that exporting businesses promote human/worker rights? Has the government taken steps to strengthen human/worker rights?
- b. Are you aware of any **social impacts** induced by the GSP? Which ones?
For example, have social standards been established, have increased exports led to better working conditions or, to the contrary, been based on exploitation or violation of social standards; have exports in sectors with low standards been benefitted more than in others?
- c. Are you aware of any **environmental impacts** induced by the GSP? Which ones?
For example, has growth in environmentally damaging or friendly sectors been encouraged, have environmentally friendly/sustainable production practices been promoted? Has the country developed, implemented or strengthened (or conversely, weakened) any laws, standards or guidelines for sustainable use of resources?
- d. Are you aware of any impacts of the GSP on **governance** in Mozambique? Which ones?
For example, have trade support services (e.g. quality infrastructure, certification issues, including certificates of origin), and trade facilitation (e.g. customs procedures) improved as a result of the GSP? Has the GSP has effects on wider business governance/the business environment? Has transparency and predictability of government decisions improved or worsened as a result of the GSP?
- e. Are you aware of any **regional impacts** induced by the GSP? Which ones?
For example, have exports induced by the GSP affected specific concentrated areas (either those already well developed or under-developed), leading to widening (or reduced) disparities across regions?
- f. Are there any **other unintended effects or externalities** – either positive or negative – that you are aware of? Which ones?
For example, effects on security, public health, cultural norms?

E. Concluding questions

- a. In the absence of the EU GSP, how would Mozambique's exports – both to the EU and total exports – be affected in your view? Please substantiate.
- b. Do you consider that the GSP is a useful instrument by the EU to foster economic development in Mozambique?
- c. Which alternative or complementary policies or measures to GSP – being trade/commercial policies, or other policies – have been applied, or would you recommend?
- d. Are you aware of any EU policies which would counter the effects of the GSP?
- e. What are your recommendations for improving the EU GSP and enhancing the Union's policy coherence for development?

Evaluation of the European Union’s Policy Coherence for Development

Case study: Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) Country note: Vietnam

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	Africa, Caribbean, Pacific	HS	Harmonised System
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations	IMF	International Monetary Fund
CPTPP	Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership	LDC	Least Developed Country
EBA	Everything But Arms	MFN	Most Favoured Nation
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement	MUTRAP	Multilateral Trade Assistance Project
EU	European Union	NTM	Non-Tariff Measures
EUR	Euro	PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
EVFTA	EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement	RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment	RoO	Rules of Origin
FTA	Free Trade Agreement	SMEs	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
GSO	General Statistical Office	USD	United States Dollar
GSP	Generalised System for Preferences	VCCI	Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry
HHI	Herfindahl-Hirschman Index	WTO	World Trade Organisation

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Rationale for selection of the country

The selection of countries for the case studies has been based on a number of inclusion/exclusion and selection criteria in order to limit subjectivity and achieve “representativeness” to the extent possible.²⁸⁸ This has involved the *exclusion* of countries covered by case studies in the ongoing mid-term evaluation of the EU Generalised System for Preferences (GSP) (Development Solutions 2017b), those covered in the Joint Staff Working Document accompanying the Commission’s 2016 report on the GSP, which covered all GSP+ countries (European Commission 2016), and those which offer limited scope for generalisation of findings, e.g. because of a very particular economic structure, size, etc. It has likewise involved the *inclusion* of countries at different developmental stages, i.e. covered by different GSP arrangements (notably, Everything But Arms, EBA, and Standard GSP, which offer the largest variance). The selection was done first for the Standard GSP arrangement. Applying the three selection criteria, India was ranked first, followed by Vietnam. However, given the very large size of India and the fact that exports under GSP have a very limited importance in relation to the economy, India has been excluded and the second ranked country, Vietnam, has been selected.

1.2 Hypotheses to be tested

Put simply, the logic of the EU GSP with regard to supporting the economic development of beneficiary countries is that by providing preferential access to the EU market for exports from these countries their exports to the EU will expand and, to the extent that these exports will not merely be diverted from other export markets, this will also lead to an increase in total output, creating additional employment (which will, in turn, contribute to economic growth, reduced poverty and sustainable development).²⁸⁹ In the longer term, expanded production will foster investment, as well as have positive spillovers to non-exporting sectors, with positive long-term effects on economic growth and social development. A more detailed presentation of this intervention logic focusing on the effects on beneficiary countries,²⁹⁰ which also applies to Vietnam, is presented in Annex 1.

Applying the reconstructed (simplified) intervention logic, a number of hypotheses whose testing constitutes the core of the case study work have been formulated. These focus, as mentioned in the Detailed Field Methodology, on the following indicators: (1) the extent to which the GSP impacts on exports from the case study countries (outcome; see section 3.1); and (2) the extent to which increased exports lead to increased employment and/or incomes (impact; see section 3.2). In addition, the third indicator assessed is the presence of positive or negative externalities or unintended effects generated by the GSP (see section 3.3). More details on the methodological approach taken for each hypothesis are provided in Annex 2, which also addresses its limitations – notably the impossibility to assess the GSP effect on economic

²⁸⁸ Given the extremely low “sample” size of two countries out of a universe of 80 GSP beneficiary countries (in 2017), real representativeness can obviously not be aspired to.

²⁸⁹ Preamble recital (7) of *Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, OJ L 303/1 of 31.10.2012* (“2012 GSP Regulation”).

²⁹⁰ The GSP also has other objectives; for a more comprehensive intervention logic of the current GSP Regulation, see Development Solutions (2017a).

growth and poverty, the restriction of the statistical analysis to descriptive statistics, and the limitations inherent in a single-case study approach.

1.2.1 Hypotheses on outcome achievement

The first main hypothesis regarding outcome achievement to be reviewed in the case study²⁹¹ is that, if the GSP has been effective, exports from Vietnam to the EU should have grown faster than exports to the world (*hypothesis 1*). In addition, for Vietnam a cross-sector comparison can be done because under the Standard GSP certain sectors are not covered, and some sectors graduated from or de-graduated to the GSP (footwear and leather goods from Vietnam graduated in 2009 and de-graduated in 2014). The corresponding hypothesis is that exports of sectors/products covered by the GSP perform better than non-covered sectors/products (*hypothesis 1a*). These two hypotheses can be tested through an analysis of trade statistics but this needs to be complemented by a qualitative assessment of the causal link between the preferences offered under the GSP and export performance. Specifically, the following hypotheses regarding this link are considered during field work: First, a necessary condition for the GSP to contribute to higher exports is that the preferences granted under the GSP are actually used. The corresponding hypothesis is that a higher preference utilisation leads to better export performance (*hypothesis 1.1*). In addition to preference utilisation, a second hypothesis on the causal link is that preferences under the GSP must not have been annulled by other barriers to market entry: If non-tariff measures (NTMs) have remained stable or decreased over time, exports from the beneficiary country to the EU under the GSP have increased (*hypothesis 1.2*). While these two hypotheses can be addressed to some extent through statistics, a key input from stakeholder consultations during the field visit concerns the identification of reasons for low or high preference utilisation and the actual importance of NTMs for Vietnamese exporters to the EU.

The second main hypothesis on outcome achievement relates to production output and states that the more a sector exports under the GSP, the faster its total output grows (*hypothesis 2*), provided that the preferences do not only lead to trade diversion (*hypothesis 2.1*). While this can also be assessed, to a certain extent, through available statistics on sectoral output in Vietnam (available for 2012 to 2016), it is important to complement it with qualitative information by stakeholders on specific cases where increased exports have led to higher output. The same approach – a combination of available statistics and stakeholder contributions – is taken for the corresponding hypotheses on investment, i.e. that higher exports lead to higher investment both by existing firms (*hypothesis 4*) and new investors (*hypothesis 5*).

1.2.2 Hypotheses on impact achievement

As the causal chain from the GSP to poverty reduction is long, and attribution difficult to ascertain, the GSP's impact achievement is primarily measured through employment effects induced by higher exports, output and investment, and no hypothesis has been formulated regarding the GSP effect on poverty or growth. The corresponding hypothesis to be tested is that the more a sector exports under the GSP the faster its employment grows (*hypothesis 3*). Similar to the effect on output and investment, this will be assessed through available statistics on sectoral employment in Vietnam complemented with qualitative information on specific cases where increased exports have led to higher employment (or wages) as provided by stakeholders during the field visit.

²⁹¹ Another hypothesis could be that total exports from Vietnam should be higher than in the absence of the GSP. However, this alternative hypothesis is difficult to test without a more sophisticated economic model which cannot be developed given the resources available.

Finally, with regard to export diversification two hypotheses are tested, addressing the geographical and product dimensions of diversification, respectively, which are important transmission mechanisms for competitiveness. The hypotheses are that, as a result of the GSP the concentration of export markets, as well as of the product composition of exports, should have decreased over time, i.e. the corresponding Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHIs) should have declined (*hypothesis 6/7*). For testing the hypotheses, the same combination of statistical analysis and stakeholder interviews as for the employment effect is applied.

1.2.3 Determining unintended effects

For the determination of unintended effects, no hypotheses are formulated but an inductive approach is taken, which relies on the identification of any such effects in the literature consulted, complemented with open interview questions during the field visit.

2 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE COUNTRY CONTEXT AND LINK WITH EU POLICIES AND INITIATIVES

Vietnam is a lower-middle-income country with a population of about 94 million, a gross domestic product (GDP) in 2017 of USD 216 billion (current prices), thus resulting in a GDP per capita of USD 2,600 (or close to USD 6,900 at purchasing-power parity).²⁹² Vietnam has been one of the world's fastest growing economies with real per capita GDP growth averaging 6.9% per annum year in own-currency terms since 1990, and only a modest slowdown to 6.0% since 2010. In international purchasing power terms, Vietnam's performance is even more remarkable, with growth in USD since 1990 averaging 14.1%, slowing only to 10.1% since 2010. With population growth of 1.5% over the whole 1990-2016 period, slowing to 1.2% since 2010, this total GDP gain translates into only modestly discounted per capita income gains. This performance has enabled Vietnam to reduce the percentage of its population living in extreme poverty from 50% in the early-1990s to 3% today. The IMF Fall 2017 World Economic Outlook projects this growth to be sustained, with projected real GDP growth through 2022 of 6.2%.

Vietnam is still in the midst of structural adjustments to move from a state-run economy to a privately organized economy. Agriculture still employs almost half the labour force, though it exhibits significantly lower labour productivity than the industry and services sectors: agriculture accounted for under 20% of GDP in 2013; meanwhile, the industrial sector accounted for 38.3% and construction and the service sector, 43.3%, with a roughly similar share of total employment. Accordingly, Vietnam retains considerable potential to realize productivity gains from industrialisation.

Vietnam ran an external goods trade deficit of USD 3.8 billion in 2015, after three years of surplus. While exports more than doubled from 2010 to 2015 (from USD 72 billion to USD 162 billion), imports have increased almost at the same pace, rising from USD 85 billion in 2010 to USD 166 billion in 2015). Both Vietnam's shares of global imports and exports have shown an upward trend, reflecting the relatively stronger domestic growth, compared to the flat performance in the global economy, and Vietnam's export-oriented growth strategy.

Vietnam's top exports are electrical and electronic equipment (USD 79.6 billion in 2016, 36.2% of total exports), footwear (USD 18.4 billion/8.4%), and machinery (USD 15.1 billion/6.9%),

²⁹² IMF, *World Economic Outlook Database* (October 2017), <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/index.aspx>.

while its top export partners are the United States (21%), the EU (19%), ASEAN (11%), China (10%), and Japan (9%), based on 2015 exports reported by Vietnam.²⁹³

Vietnam has a relatively open goods trade regime with a simple average applied tariff of 9.5% in 2014. Moreover, it has made significant commitments under its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in January 2007, binding 100% of its tariff lines with an average bound tariff of 11.5%. In terms of trade agreements, Vietnam has been a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 1995 and is actively engaged in trade liberalisation. It has free trade agreements with an increasing number of other countries, including Japan, the Eurasian Economic Union, South Korea and Chile. It has also participated in the negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – now the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – and is working towards a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) from within ASEAN. Through ASEAN, it also has trade agreements with a number of other countries, including China. Importantly, it has also concluded negotiations of a free trade agreement with the EU in late 2015 (see below).

As regards the microeconomic policy framework, notwithstanding its ongoing reforms, Vietnam remains a difficult place with which to trade, ranking 94th on the World Bank's 2018 Doing Business scoreboard; generally, however, the business environment has improved substantially, with the overall Doing Business rank improving from 90th in DB2016 to 68th in DB2018.²⁹⁴

Vietnam has been trading with the EU under preferential trade agreements for a long time. It was eligible to export under the GSP since at least 1972²⁹⁵ and has been a beneficiary of the Standard GSP since 2001 – which means a more limited product coverage and duty rebates as opposed to duty-free imports for products considered as sensitive by the EU, compared to the Everything But Arms arrangement from which least developed countries benefit. Bilateral trade (as well as investment) relations have strengthened particularly since diplomatic relations were established in 1996. In 2004, the EU and Vietnam concluded bilateral negotiations in the context of Vietnam's accession to the WTO and an Early Harvest Agreement “which enabled mutual market access for the two sides' companies three years before Vietnam became an official member of the WTO” (Delegation of the European Union to Vietnam 2016: 10). At present, Vietnamese exporters can export to the EU under two regimes, the GSP as well as most-favoured nation (MFN) non-preferential access. Negotiations on the EU-Vietnam FTA (EVFTA) started in 2012 and were completed in December 2015; ratification of the Agreement has been delayed by legal issues²⁹⁶ – but once completed and application of the FTA has started, as per Article 4(1)(b) of the 2012 GSP Regulation, Vietnam will cease to be a beneficiary of the GSP regime.

²⁹³ International Trade Centre, *Trade Map*, <https://www.trademap.org>. Exports by product based on mirror data.

²⁹⁴ World Bank, *Doing Business*, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/vietnam>.

²⁹⁵ *Regulation (EEC) No 2767/72 of the Council of 19 December 1972 establishing in respect of certain products falling within Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff a scheme of generalized preferences in favour of developing countries*, OJ L 296/91 of 30.12.1972 included South Vietnam.

²⁹⁶ The main legal issue arises from the 16 May 2017 ruling of the European Court of Justice on the FTA with Singapore, according to which non-direct ('portfolio') investment and investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms are shared competences, on which the EU shares decision-making powers with Member States, which implies that the EU-Vietnam FTA would either have to be ratified at both EU and Member State levels or, alternatively, that provisions in the FTA touching upon shared competences would have to be transferred into a separate agreement; see <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-eu-vietnam-fta> [accessed 07 March 2018].

The EU has also provided ample trade and investment related support to Vietnam, notably under the four generations of the Multilateral Trade Assistance Project (MUTRAP). The last phase of this ran from 2012 to early 2018 and had a total budget of EUR 16.5 million; it aimed at furthering “Vietnam’s integration into the global, ASEAN and sub-regional trading systems as well as enhance EU-Viet Nam trade and investment relations, as means to maximize the benefits for the country’s economic development, inclusive growth, and poverty reduction.”²⁹⁷

3 FINDINGS AT OUTCOME AND IMPACT LEVELS INCLUDING UNINTENDED EFFECTS

3.1 Country level outcomes

3.1.1 GSP effect on Vietnam’s exports

Hypothesis 1: If the GSP has been effective, exports from Vietnam to the EU have grown faster than exports to the world.

Exports from Vietnam to the EU increased steeply from USD 1.9 billion in 2001 to USD 34.6 billion in 2016, with the only year of contraction in that period being 2009, during the global financial crisis (Figure 2). Exports to the world meanwhile increased from USD 10.3 billion in 2001 to USD 176.9 billion in 2016. The share of exports to the EU27²⁹⁸ in total exports declined between 2001 and 2005, from 18.4% to 13.4%, but has since shown an upward trend, suspended during the global financial crisis, reaching 19.6% in 2016 (Figure 3).

Figure 21: Vietnam’s exports to the EU27 and World, 2001 to 2016 (USD million)





Figure 22: Share of Vietnam’s exports to the EU27 in total exports from Vietnam, 2001 to 2016 (%)



Source: Author’s calculations based on UN COMTRADE (mirror data).

Based on these data, the first hypothesis is tentatively confirmed: Vietnam’s exports to the EU have overall performed better than Vietnam’s total exports, except during the global financial crisis.

This finding is in line with analyses in the literature, which generally find that preference regimes increase exports from the beneficiary countries.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁷ Annex to Financing Agreement No DCI-ASIE/2011/022-818, p. 6.

²⁹⁸ All EU MS except Croatia

²⁹⁹ See for example Davies and Nilsson (2013) and the literature referred to there.

Hypothesis 1a: If the GSP has been effective, exports of Vietnamese sectors/products covered by the GSP have performed better than non-covered sectors/products.

Both GSP-eligible and ineligible imports by the EU27 from Vietnam have steeply increased since 2001. However, as Figure 23 shows, ineligible imports, which were significantly lower than GSP-eligible imports in the early 2000s, have overtaken GSP-eligible imports and are now substantially higher.³⁰⁰ The difference in performance becomes particularly clear when imports under the MFN and GSP regimes are indexed (Figure 24).³⁰¹

Figure 23: EU 27 imports from Vietnam, by eligibility regime, 2001 to 2016 (EUR million)






Figure 24: Index of GSP-eligible, GSP-utilised, and non-GSP-eligible imports from Vietnam by EU27, 2001 to 2016 (2001 = 100)



Source: Author's calculations based on COMEXT.

The export performance of Vietnamese footwear and leather articles (GSP Sector XII) is of particular interest, as these were under the GSP regime until 2008, were then graduated from 2009 to 2013 and de-graduated again from 2014 onwards. It is therefore interesting compare the sector's performance during the three periods. As Figure 25 shows, footwear and leather product imports from Vietnam only lightly increased until 2008, and then showed a largely static trend during the MFN period (shown in red), before rapidly increasing since de-graduation in 2014. While this performance over time indicates that the lack of GSP preferences during the period 2009 to 2013 held back exports to the EU, this finding is not conclusive as previously the performance of

Figure 25: EU27 imports of leather and textiles goods from Vietnam, 2001-2016 (EUR million)



Source: Author's calculations based on COMEXT.

³⁰⁰ The figure is slightly distorted as footwear imports from Vietnam were not eligible under GSP from 2009 to 2013, explaining the drop from 2008 to 2009 and the steep increase from 2013 to 2014. However, adjusting for this change in the composition in the two import categories by excluding footwear exports from the analysis does not change the overall finding that GSP-eligible imports grew at a slower pace than ineligible imports from Vietnam; see annex 5.

³⁰¹ Of course, performance judged by an index depends on the setting of the base year for the index. However, the only base year for which the index of recent GSP imports outperforms MFN inputs is 2013; for all other base years, MFN-imports have outperformed GSP imports.

the sector was also rather static: the average annual increase in imports over the period 2005 to 2008 was 2.9%, which dropped to an average annual contraction during the MFN period of -0.9%; and it is only since 2014 that imports increased at an annual average rate of 19.6%. There thus appear to be factors other than the GSP explaining the stagnating exports until 2013; this also seems to be indicated by the fact that textile imports from Vietnam, which benefitted from GSP preferences without interruption, also started to increase faster after 2013. Sector representatives referred to rising labour costs, increasing competition from other countries,³⁰² increasing demands regarding standards and labels, including those established by corporate clients, and complicated rules of origin (RoO) – it should be noted that most inputs for shoes are imported into Vietnam – as major problems in the sector; in addition, the graduation was also described as a major issue.

The simplification of GSP RoO in 2010, applicable since 2011,³⁰³ and the 2012 GSP Regulation, in force since 2014, could be an important factor in boosting exports since then.³⁰⁴ This would then indicate that the simplification of RoO in combination with the preferences under the GSP have enabled Vietnam to expand both leather and textiles exports. Indeed, representatives of both sectors stated that the GSP was an important driver for exports to the EU.

Stakeholders mentioned another factor contributing to sharply increasing exports from Vietnam, i.e. increased investment by China in Vietnamese production capacity to avoid anti-dumping duties levied by the EU and the USA. Products mentioned include certain electronics, solar panels and costume or “imitation” jewellery.

The share of Vietnam’s exports destined to the EU has increased in recent years; although this cannot conclusively be attributed to the GSP, the simplification in RoO in 2010 appears to have had an important effect on exports at least from some important sectors, such as textiles and footwear and leather. On the other hand, Vietnam’s MFN exports have clearly outperformed GSP eligible exports since 2001. This points to the fact that factors other than the GSP have an important impact on Vietnam’s export performance.

Hypothesis 1.1: The higher the preference utilisation, the better is the export performance.

GSP preference utilisation, measured as actual imports under the GSP compared to GSP eligible imports,³⁰⁵ has been comparatively high since 2001, never falling below 50% (Figure 8). Although there was a declining trend between 2002 and 2010, when utilisation rates fell from almost 70% to about 50%, since then utilisation has increased again, stabilising at just below 60% in the most recent years.

³⁰² Cambodia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Ethiopia (all of which are GSP beneficiaries) have been mentioned by sector representatives.

³⁰³ The GSP rules of origin were simplified and made less strict in *Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code*, OJ L 307/1 of 23.11.2010.

³⁰⁴ Note, however, that stakeholders met in Vietnam highlighted the fact that EU rules of origin are more complicated than those in other FTAs, and that in particular the “yarn forward” rule for textiles products (which requires that textiles must be made by yarns produced in Vietnam in order to be eligible under the GSP) has led to a limited use of the GSP in that sector. Similarly, for fishery products it was stated that the requirements established under the RoO in terms of vessel ownership and registration are difficult to implement in practice.

³⁰⁵ It should be noted that the actual utilisation of preferences may be lower as the COMEXT database registers an import as being under a preference regime upon the request by the trader to import under the preferential regime. If on arrival EU customs authorities do not allow entry under the preference regime (e.g. due to issues with the certificate of origin), the import will actually take place under MFN but still be registered under preference regime in COMEXT. See Cirera and Alfieri (2012: 3).

Finally, it should be noted that significant, and increasing, share of EU imports from Vietnam is duty free under MFN; this has reached and remained at about 60% since 2012 (Figure 9). Adding the GSP zero duty imports, the share of zero duty imports from Vietnam has increased from less than 30% in 2001 to about 70% in recent years.

Figure 26: GSP preference utilisation rate and GSP non-zero duty imports by EU 27 from Vietnam's, 2001 to 2016 (%)





Figure 27: Shares of EU27 zero-duty imports from Vietnam, 2001 to 2016 (%)



Source: Author's calculations based on COMEXT.

In sum, while preference utilisation has varied little over time, exports have increased steeply. The hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor rejected.

Hypothesis 1.2: If NTMs have remained stable or decreased over time, exports from Vietnam to the EU under the GSP have increased.

Data and specific research/literature on the extent of or changes over time to NTMs, and specifically in relation to Vietnam are not available. During the field visit, stakeholders stated that, while standards and quality requirements in the EU are strict, these in general have not been made more difficult over time; rules of origin have in fact been simplified and been made less strict, and their role as a non-tariff barrier has thus decreased over time. As mentioned above, this might explain for example the sharp increase in exports of footwear products in recent years.

However, stakeholders mentioned a number of remaining trade irritants under the GSP. For example, cumulation was reported as an issue: here, the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) has requested that extended cumulation with South Korea be applied,³⁰⁶ in view of the increasing investment in Vietnam by Korean firms which also source inputs from Korea. Likewise, some sector stakeholders noted that RoO were still too strict (such as the yarn-forward rule in textiles).

In addition, NTMs in the EU affect businesses in Vietnam differently. In particular, SMEs were reported by stakeholders to often struggle with complying with RoO and EU standards and technical regulations. However, the EU has also provided support to Vietnamese businesses, notably under the MUTRAP programme, to increase their capacity for meeting the EU market access requirements. In addition, the GSP RoO regime which has required that certificates of

³⁰⁶ Letter by the VCCI to the EU Delegation in Vietnam dated 23 January 2018, on file with the author.

origin be issued by the VCCI has ensured that SMEs were closely linked to the Chamber and received assistance from it.³⁰⁷

Overall, the hypothesis is confirmed: to the extent that NTMs (notably RoO) have been reduced in the EU, Vietnamese exports have increased. In addition, the EU has provided support to Vietnamese firms in meeting EU market access requirements.

3.1.2 Effects on Vietnam's output

Hypothesis 2: The more a sector exports under the GSP, the faster its total output grows.

Statistics on Vietnamese firms' output or turnover by export status are not available. Statistics on production of selected goods (as well as production statistics by sector) are however available from Vietnam's General Statistical Office (GSO). Although a comprehensive analysis of the correlation between output and exports is not possible within this paper, a brief graphical correlation analysis of the shoe and textile sectors does suggest that Vietnamese output and exports to the EU are indeed positively correlated (*Figure 28* and *Figure 29*); in particular, the graduation period for footwear and leather articles appears to have reduced output of shoes, at least initially. Nevertheless, the degree of correlation varies considerably across the two sectors, being strong for textiles but less so for footwear (*Figure 29*).

Figure 28: Index of output of, and EU imports from, Vietnam, shoe and textiles sectors, 2001 to 2016 (2001 = 100)





Figure 29: Correlation of output and import indices, shoe and textiles sectors, 2001 to 2016



Source: Author's calculations based on COMEXT and GSO data.

In sum, there is some indication – albeit far from conclusive, given the very rough nature of the analysis – that higher exports have indeed led to higher output.

Hypothesis 2.1: Preferences under the GSP not only lead to trade diversion but also trade creation.

As the analysis for hypothesis 1 on the effect of the GSP on exports has shown, Vietnam's exports to the rest of the world have grown, over the past 15 years, at about the same rate as exports to the EU (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 above).

There is thus no indication that the GSP has led only to trade diversion.

³⁰⁷ This might no longer be the case under the EVFTA, which moves towards a system of self-certification known as the Registered Exporter regime (REX).


3.1.3 Effect of exporter profits and investment

Hypotheses 4 and 5: The more a sector exports under the GSP, and the higher export revenues are, the higher is investment in the sector, both for expansion of existing firms and new firm establishment.

Higher profits for exporters benefitting from the GSP could come from higher quantities exported at the same price (the volume effect) and/or the ability to charge higher prices on the EU market (the price effect). Unfortunately, statistics on Vietnamese firms' profits by export status are not available. However, the apparent limited impact of the GSP on Vietnam's export volumes (see above) would prevent any volume effect on profits. With regard to the price effect, previous research on the level of pass-through of the rent generated by the preferences to exporters has yielded controversial findings. For example, the GSP Evaluation 2010 found that the rent stemming from preferences is shared roughly equally between exporters and importers (Gasiorek et al. 2010: 83ff).

Regarding investment, some statistics are available from the GSO, although these do not differentiate exporters from non-exporting firms (Figure 12). The overall data show a clear upward trend for investment in Vietnam since 2001 (in local currency). Comparing these figures with exports to the EU shows a clear correlation, which is prima facie evidence that higher exports have indeed led to higher investment; however, establishing a causal link between exports under GSP preferences and investment levels is difficult, as GSP exports stayed largely flat during much of the period, only increasing substantially since 2013.

Figure 30: Index of investment and exports to EU27, Vietnam, 2001-2016 (2001 = 100)



Source: Author's calculations based on GSO data (investment) and COMEXT (exports).

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that foreign direct investment (FDI) – which tends to be particularly export-driven – increased more than domestic investment. The EU is Vietnam's third largest source of FDI; the EU contributed USD 1.55 billion in 2015, after ASEAN (USD 3.95 billion) and Korea (USD 2.68 billion). The United States ranked 13th, with USD 218 million. It is possible that the GSP attracted investment from the EU that would not otherwise have been undertaken. This was also confirmed by some stakeholders met during the field mission which stated that FDI is mostly export-oriented (e.g., FDI in textiles account for 62% of sector exports) and some sectors, in turn, are dominated by FDI (for example, FDI in the footwear and leather sector accounts for 80% of capacity). It should also be noted that the MUTRAP programmes provided investment-related support.

Research into the effect of preference regimes on investment is limited. Most studies analyse the impact of reciprocal trade agreements, rather than unilateral preference regimes. They also generally focus on the impact of such agreements on FDI (rather than domestic investment).

Among the cross-country studies reviewed, the GSP Evaluation 2010 (Gasiorek et al. 2010: 97ff) as well as Cardamone and Scoppola (2012) show a positive impact of preferences on FDI. Cardamone and Scoppola find that tariff liberalisation by the EU under preferential agreements on average has a positive impact on FDI into host countries, but that this effect is higher under reciprocal agreements than under unilateral preference regimes, because high tariffs in the partner country have a subduing effect on FDI – this would mean that the GSP is a sub-optimal

policy instrument for encouraging FDI in developing countries like Vietnam. Another finding in the same direction is that deep agreements covering investment provisions have a positive impact on FDI; as, by definition, a unilateral preference scheme like the GSP does not have any rules on investment, it cannot specifically foster FDI.

The increase in exports from Vietnam has gone hand in hand with an increase in investment. Also, FDI tends to go into export-oriented sectors. Thus, to the extent that the GSP has led to increased exports (see above), and also given the fact that some FDI has specifically aimed at providing EU markets, it can be concluded that the GSP has indeed led to higher FDI and investment in general. This was also facilitated by the trade and investment support provided by the EU under the MUTRAP programmes. Nevertheless, the GSP as such provides no specific facilitation of investment.


3.2 Country level impacts

3.2.1 GSP effect on employment

Hypothesis 3: The more a sector exports under the GSP the faster its employment grows.

As with investment, some statistics on employment are available from the GSO for the period 2005 to 2016, but because these do not differentiate exporters from non-exporting firms they can only provide a very rough idea on employment effects of the GSP. Based on these data (Figure 13), employment has more or less steadily, and substantially, increased over the period, from about 43 million in 2005 to about 53 million in 2016 – this is equivalent to an average annual growth rate of 2.0%; the positive correlation with export growth (Figure 2 above) is evident, although the average annual growth rate of exports was much higher: total exports grew on average at 19.3% over the period 2005 to 2016, and exports to the EU at 23.5%. Thus, much of Vietnam’s export success has been made possible by a combination of increases in employment and labour productivity; the latter grew four-fold (in local currency) over the period (Figure 13), or at an average annual rate of 13.3%.

Figure 31: Employment and labour productivity of Vietnamese firms, 2005-2016



Source: Author’s calculations based on GSO data.

Representatives of the Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) confirmed the important and positive role that trade has for employment in Vietnam but also stated the difficulty in establishing direct causality between increased employment and any particular trade regime such as the EU GSP. In addition, stakeholders from various sectors confirmed that further increases in productivity are now required in order to retain competitiveness, and that future increases in employment would be likely slower than in the past.

Although the significant employment growth in Vietnam cannot be attributed to the GSP (alone), the causal chain from preferences to higher exports and higher employment makes it highly probable that the GSP indeed contributed to higher employment in the country – all the more so as labour-intensive sectors such as food and agriculture, footwear and leather goods, and garments, benefitted more from the GSP than capital intensive sectors such as electronics. Nevertheless, stakeholders also stated that the development model supported by the GSP – i.e.

the focus on labour-intensive primary and light manufacturing sectors – has now become obsolete, with the country turning towards more capital and research/innovation intensive sectors with complex international production patterns and value chains (mostly electronics), where the EU does not apply tariffs, thereby also rendering the GSP increasingly obsolete for Vietnam.

3.2.2 GSP and export diversification

Hypotheses 6/7: As a result of the GSP the concentration of export markets, as well as of the product composition of exports, should have decreased over time, i.e. the corresponding HHIs should have declined.

The literature on the impact of the GSP and other unilateral preference regimes on export diversification does not provide clear results. A number of studies find no or very limited effects on export diversification. Cipollina et al. find that EU preferences primarily increase exports at the intensive margin but tend to increase specialisation of exports, rather than promote diversification, for certain sectors, in particular leather and footwear, and wood (Cipollina, Laborde, and Salvatici 2010). Similarly, the 2010 GSP evaluation found only a marginal effect of the GSP on export diversification (Gasiorek et al. 2010: 59ff). Conversely, Persson and Wilhelmsson find that the EU GSP increases the range of export products to the EU, in contrast to the Lomé and Cotonou arrangements (Persson and Wilhelmsson 2016).

For Vietnam, preliminary results of the 2017 GSP evaluation find a clear increase in export diversification in terms of products, with the number of tariff lines exported to the EU increasing from 412 (average over the period 2011 to 2013) to 523 (2014 to 2016) (Development Solutions 2017b: 218). Nevertheless, the HHI did not change (at the CN 8-digit level), respectively slightly increased from 0.16 to 0.18 (at the HS Chapter level) (Development Solutions 2017b: 224), reflecting a slight concentration of exports to the EU between the two periods, although starting from a fairly diversified baseline.

Using descriptive statistics for Vietnam based on UN COMTRADE, export diversification both in terms of sectors and markets has shown an uneven trend since the early 2000s. Sectoral diversification of both exports to the EU27 and total exports slightly increased until 2010 but since then has sharply reduced, with Vietnam's exports to the EU being less diversified than exports to the world (Figure 14).³⁰⁸ Diversification of export markets steadily increased until 2013 but since then the trend has been reverted, and concentration has increased (Figure 15).

The hypothesis cannot be confirmed: Vietnam's exports have concentrated, rather than diversified, since 2010 (in terms of products) respectively 2013 (in terms of export markets). Although other factors are likely to have contributed this, it would seem to indicate that the structure of preferences accorded under the GSP has lost relevance for Vietnam as a motor for development. The EVFTA addresses this, however, by expanding EU market access for Vietnamese goods and services.

³⁰⁸ Note that data in Figure 14 for the EU27 seem to contradict the findings in the GSP evaluation by indicating that concentration has increased much more than indicated there.

Figure 32: Sectoral HHI (HS 2-digit level) of Vietnam's exports to the EU27 and World, 2001-2016





Figure 33: HHI by destination of Vietnam's exports (EU27 counted as one market), 2001-2016



Source: Author's calculations based on UN COMTRADE (mirror data).

3.3 Unintended outcomes and impacts

The GSP – not only the GSP+ but also the Standard GSP and the EBA, which also establish a certain floor for the respect of **fundamental social, human rights and labour norms** by beneficiary countries – has been criticised in the literature for failing to live up to the established standards. For example, Vogt has argued that:

“despite recent reforms to the labour conditionality of the EU GSP programme, many countries in which the government either commits serious violations of fundamental labour rights or fails to protect against such violations by private actors (by adopting appropriate laws and enforcing them when breached) continue to benefit. [...] This is in part due to the European Commission's clear preference that enforcement actions under the GSP programme should be avoided, even long after dialogue and cooperative mechanisms have failed to produce concrete results” (Vogt 2015).

Similarly, Évora (2015) found that removal of GSP preferences from Cambodia due to human rights violations in the sugar industry would have been in line with WTO law, while Montera (2013) and Beke and Hachez (2015) have critically discussed the human rights and social concerns over the withdrawal and restoration of GSP eligibility for Myanmar, finding that the EU is reluctant to withdraw GSP preferences and even investigate alleged human rights violations, and that the withdrawal of preferences is an ineffective instrument to achieve compliance with norms if not accompanied by other measures Beke and Hachez (2015: 23f).³⁰⁹

Studies on the **environmental effects** of the GSP focus on the GSP+ arrangement, as this incorporates specific requirements which beneficiary countries must meet in terms of ratification and implementation of core international conventions.

For Vietnam, social and human rights concerns are relevant. For example, the European Parliament's public information has stated that “Vietnam is a politically repressive state, with widespread human rights abuses. For this reason, many stakeholders oppose closer ties between

³⁰⁹ Also see e.g. the recent European Parliamentary Research Service's Briefing “Human rights in EU trade policy. Unilateral Measures” (Zamfir 2017) and the debate on trade preferences for Pakistan, <https://www.eureporter.co/frontpage/2018/02/06/european-values-in-question-with-the-abuse-of-trade-preferences-in-favour-of-pakistan/>.

the EU and Vietnam.”³¹⁰ Although these comments were made in relation to the EVFTA, they could also call into question the existence of preferences under the GSP. At the same time, business stakeholders in Vietnam stated that socially (and environmentally) accountable production standards are difficult to meet and expensive, thus negatively affecting cost competitiveness of Vietnamese companies. It should be noted, however, that this argument fails to see that other countries exporting to the EU, as well as EU producers, are subjected to the same standards.

The social and human rights track record of the GSP in Vietnam is difficult to assess: on the one hand, the GSP has contributed to economic growth, employment creation and has thus helped lift many Vietnamese out of poverty. Furthermore, the comments made by stakeholders on the difficulty and cost of meeting EU social and environmental standards shows that these standards are taken seriously by Vietnamese companies, thereby improving the implementation of such standards in the country. On the other hand, the fact that the Standard GSP only establishes a minimum threshold for respect for human rights, social and environmental norms has not promoted observance of human and social rights in Vietnam. However, it should also be noted that the EVFTA establishes a stronger framework, both in terms of thresholds to be met and the institutional monitoring framework.

4 CONCLUSIONS

Bearing in mind the limitations of the analysis, the main conclusions presented here address outcome achievement, impact achievement, unintended effects, and policy coherence in the context of the GSP and its use by Vietnam.

Outcome achievement. The GSP’s overall performance in terms of outcome achievement – measured by its effect on exports, output and investment – is considered as mixed. Despite the relatively limited scope of the GSP for Vietnam, both in terms of product coverage and in terms of duty reductions, the preference regime has had a positive impact on Vietnam’s exports to the EU: these have overall performed better than Vietnam’s total exports, except during the global financial crisis of 2008-09. An important factor has been the simplification of RoO, at least from some sectors, such as textiles and footwear and leather. In addition, the EU has provided support to Vietnamese firms in meeting EU market access requirements.

On the other hand, Vietnam’s exports to the EU under the MFN regime have clearly outperformed GSP eligible exports since 2001. This leads to two conclusions: First, factors other than the GSP have had an important impact on Vietnam’s export performance. Second, sectors not covered by the GSP have been more important for Vietnam’s economic growth and development than the GSP sectors. In fact, stakeholders stated that the focus of the GSP on agri-food and labour intensive light manufacturing industries, as well as the in-built “tariff escalation” and stringent rules of origin, standards requirements, and other NTMs for value added products have limited the benefits of the GSP. (It can, however, be noted that rules of origin have in fact been simplified and been made less strict, and their role as a non-tariff barrier has thus decreased over time. This could ultimately lead to higher preference utilisation rates and therefore a greater impact of GSP.)

³¹⁰ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-eu-vietnam-fta>.

The increase in exports from Vietnam has gone hand in hand with an increase in output and investment. Also, FDI tends to go into export-oriented sectors. Thus, to the extent that the GSP has led to increased exports, and also given the fact that some FDI has specifically aimed at providing EU markets, it can be concluded that the GSP has indeed led to higher FDI and investment in general. This was also facilitated by the trade and investment support provided by the EU under the MUTRAP programmes. Nevertheless, the GSP as such provides no specific facilitation of investment.

Impact achievement. Employment in Vietnam has grown strongly. Although this growth cannot be attributed to the GSP, the causal chain from preferences to higher exports and higher employment makes it highly probable that the GSP indeed contributed to higher employment in the country – all the more so as labour-intensive sectors such as food and agriculture, footwear and leather goods, and garments, benefitted more from the GSP than capital intensive sectors such as electronics. Nevertheless, stakeholders also stated that the development model supported by the GSP – i.e. the focus on labour-intensive primary and light manufacturing sectors – has now become obsolete, with the country turning towards more capital and research/innovation intensive sectors with complex international production patterns and value chains, which are less supported by the GSP, thereby also rendering the GSP increasingly obsolete for Vietnam.

On the other hand, Vietnam's exports have concentrated, rather than diversified, since 2010 (in terms of products) respectively 2013 (in terms of export markets). Although other factors are likely to have contributed this, it would seem to indicate that the structure of preferences accorded under the GSP has lost relevance for Vietnam as a motor for development. The EVFTA addresses this, however, by expanding EU market access for Vietnamese goods and services.

Unintended effects – social, human rights and environmental effects. The social and human rights track record of the GSP in Vietnam is difficult to assess: on the one hand, the GSP has contributed to economic growth, employment creation and has thus helped lift many Vietnamese out of poverty. Furthermore, the comments made by stakeholders on the difficulty and cost of meeting EU social and environmental standards shows that these standards are taken seriously by Vietnamese companies, thereby improving the implementation of such standards in the country. On the other hand, the fact that the Standard GSP only establishes a minimum threshold for respect of human rights, social and environmental norms has not promoted observance of human and social rights in Vietnam. However, it should also be noted that the EVFTA establishes a stronger framework, both in terms of thresholds to be met and the institutional monitoring framework.

GSP and policy coherence. With the GSP being a policy instrument dedicated to poverty reduction and sustainable development, it should come as no surprise that, *de iure*, it has been in line with the principles of PCD. Nevertheless, despite the overall embeddedness of the GSP into the developmental agenda, in practice the GSP has not been used as an element in a comprehensive developmental policy but “just” as a trade preference regime in isolation.

In this context, complaints made by some Vietnamese stakeholders during the field mission about the limited scope (in terms of product coverage) and extent (in terms of duty rebates), which allegedly create unfair competition from LDCs (which benefit from zero-duty access to the EU market), are understandable but rather seem to indicate that the GSP as a preference regime with a developmental objective is fully in line with PCD concept: according to a developmental approach, the level of unilateral preferences provided by the EU should be

proportionate to the developmental level and capacities of the beneficiary country; i.e. LDCs should have a more preferential access to the EU than more developed countries like Vietnam. However, largely as a result of the constraints set by the WTO Enabling Clause, on which the GSP is based, the GSP appears to be a too broad instrument as it distinguishes only three classes of countries (each covered by one of the GSP sub-regimes). This calls for more fine-tuned arrangements on a regional or bilateral basis, as indeed has been the EU policy in recent years: Both the conclusion of EPAs with ACP countries and the EVFTA are examples of this policy, and appear to have taken lessons from the shortcomings of the GSP, also in terms of the disconnect between trade preferences and developmental support, as well as ensuring coherence with human rights, social and environmental norms.

Overall then, the new trends point to an increasingly residual role for the GSP, which, in line with the PCD concept, should continue to be developmentally oriented. Nevertheless, critics have pointed to the fact that the 2012 “GSP reform appears to be driven by commercial interests to which developmental considerations have been subordinated” (Siles-Brügge 2014: 50), e.g. by catering to the interest of EU businesses by devising mechanisms for fast and comprehensive graduation. This entails the risk for the GSP of becoming obsolete as a policy instrument; for Vietnam, the GSP will in any case be a thing of the past once the EVFTA is applied.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Reconstruction of the GSP Intervention Logic

A first source for the reconstruction of the GSP intervention logic has been a review of the EU's official texts, i.e. the GSP regulations – notably the latest version of 2012³¹¹ – as well as other Commission documents. These documents state the objectives of the GSP as well as provide some indications for the intervention logic, although the latter is not explicitly and comprehensively developed.

The 2012 GSP Regulation puts the GSP into the context of the EU's overarching policy objectives of fostering “the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty” (Preamble, recital (3)). Recital (4) reaffirms these objectives, adding the promotion of good governance, and emphasises the need for the EU's commercial policy “to be consistent with and to consolidate the objectives of the Union policy in the field of development cooperation.”³¹² The Commission's 2011 impact assessment also refers to these objectives but adds another one which is not related to development. The three general objectives are:

1. To contribute to poverty eradication by expanding exports from countries most in need (G-1);
2. To promote sustainable development and good governance (G-2);
3. To ensure a better safeguard for the EU's financial and economic interests (G-3)” (European Commission 2011: 18).

The third objective does not directly refer to the effect of the GSP in beneficiary countries and is therefore not further pursued in this country note. However, it should be noted that the objective constitutes a potential area of conflict with the developmental objectives – as preferences offered to exporters in the beneficiary countries might negatively affect producers in the EU – which is not further addressed in the Commission's hierarchy of GSP objectives, and might constitute an issue from a PCD perspective.

The causal link between the preference regime established under the GSP and the GSP's objectives is set out as follows in the 2012 GSP Regulation (the 2008 Regulation had not provided any intervention logic):

“By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be reinvested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on helping developing countries having greater development, trade and financial needs” (Preamble, recital (7)).

The intervention logic set out in the 2012 Regulation was further explained in the Commission's impact assessment undertaken in preparation of the Regulation. This stated that:


“Development and poverty reduction are complex goals, which necessitate many building blocks to be achieved. The scheme is one of those many blocks. While, on its own, the scheme will not directly reduce poverty, its preferences can help developing countries boost exports and develop new industries – a factor which, given an adequate political and economic context, can contribute significantly towards development and poverty reduction” (European Commission 2011: 5)

³¹¹ Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, OJ L 303/1 of 31.10.2012 (“2012 GSP Regulation”).

³¹² Recital (4) of the 2012 GSP Regulation literally follows recital (3) in its predecessor, the 2008 GSP Regulation; Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised preferences for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007, OJ L 211/1 of 06.08.2008.

This causal chain implies that tariff preferences granted by the EU lead to increased export revenues in beneficiary countries which are then invested for developmental purposes and economic diversification, ultimately leading to poverty reduction, good governance and sustainable development (Figure 17³¹³). The Commission’s intervention logic is not quite clear, however, to what extent the GSP plays a role in relation to the final objectives – development and poverty reduction – as it states on the one hand that the GSP will not directly reduce poverty, being only one of many building blocks towards these objectives, but on the other hand claims that it can contribute “significantly” to these objectives.

Figure 34: Simplified GSP intervention logic derived from Commission documents



Source: Prepared by the author based on the 2012 GSP Regulation and European Commission (2011).

Observers and researchers have over time developed their own interpretations of the GSP impacts and intervention logic. Most academic research focusses on the impact of trade preferences on exports.³¹⁴ For example, Persson and Wilhelmsson (2016) focus on the two anticipated impacts of trade preferences on beneficiary country exports, stating that originally the various preferential trade arrangements of the EU aimed at both expanding and diversifying exports of the beneficiary countries, but that over time the focus shifted to the quantitative objective, while neglecting diversification.

Evaluations of the EU GSP have prepared somewhat more elaborated intervention logics. For example, the 2010 GSP mid-term evaluation stated that the GSP’s objective was “to encourage greater growth of developing country exports in existing products (the intensive margin), and through diversifying into new products (the extensive margin), consequently contributing to the development process” (Gasiorek et al. 2010: 13), and listed a number of other areas against which to measure the “success” of the GSP, including economic growth, sustainable development, poverty reduction, without providing a particular order.³¹⁵ The currently ongoing

³¹³ The distinction and demarcation of “outcomes” and “impacts” its admittedly subjective.


³¹⁴ See, for example, Persson (2012), and Persson and Wilhelmsson (2016), and the literature surveyed there.

³¹⁵ Gasiorek et al. (2010: 13). The authors then briefly address the causal mechanism:

“The core mechanism transmitting these beneficial effects is preferential access to markets, which may lead to higher levels of exports and consequently imports. This can enable countries to develop better and/or more industries, leading to increases in productivity, competitiveness and possibly diversification. It may also encourage more investment. This may be related to the stability and time frame of the preferential regime, which are also related productivity and diversification issues. Each of the positive impacts noted above may enable the economy to become more productive and increase levels of growth, thus increasing aggregate income per capita. The relationship between this transmission mechanism, poverty and sustainable development is therefore highly complex. For example, even where increased exports may lead to higher growth rates, this may not necessarily lead to a reduction in poverty as the impact of trade on poverty depends on the availability of relevant transmission mechanisms (see McCulloch, Winters and Cirera (2002)). This is because changes in

Mid-Term Evaluation of the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) provides a comprehensive intervention logic, which not only addresses the effects in developing countries but also operational and international issues which the 2012 GSP Regulation aims to address (Development Solutions 2017a). The intervention logic distinguishes three separate causal chains – although there are some cross-linkages – leading to the three general objectives of poverty eradication, promotion of sustainable development and good governance, and safeguarding EU financial and economic interests (Figure 18). The key transmission mechanism for the first objective is, as in the Regulation, the increase in exports and export diversification (although the two are not put in relation to each other, as the Regulation does, but rather placed at the same level in the objective hierarchy); the link from these two “expected results” to the “long-term impact” of poverty eradication is not further specified; in fact, most objectives in the evaluation’s intervention logic address operational issues.

Figure 35: Intervention logic of the 2017 GSP Mid-Term Evaluation



Source: Development Solutions (2017a: 30) with annotations by the author.

For the present case study contributing to the PCD evaluation, a causal chain focussing on the intended economic (and social) effects of the GSP on the selected case study countries has been reconstructed based on the implicit intentions and logic in the official documents and the logics constructed in secondary sources. This focusses on the first general objective, “poverty eradication” and is applicable to all GSP beneficiary countries.³¹⁶


The purpose of this reconstruction is to make the causal chain as explicit as possible and also list key assumptions that need to be fulfilled in order for the logical chain to work. This level of explicitness allows to derive clear hypotheses to be tested both through data and document analysis and consultations with stakeholders during the field visits.

trade can impact on consumption choices, on relative prices therefore inducing sectoral reallocation with consequent distributional effects, and on revenue from trade taxes. The greater engagement in international trade also raises issues of diversification versus specialisation, which are in turn often related to vulnerability, as well as issues of the geographical concentration of economic activity (economic geography) and long-run spillover effects.” Gasiorek et al. (2010: 13f)

³¹⁶ As mentioned above, the third objective is not directly relevant for beneficiary countries and is therefore not further addressed in this note. The second objective – support to sustainable development and good governance – is discussed further below.

Figure 19 provides a graphical summary of the GSP intervention logic focussing on economic and social development of beneficiary countries. Preferences accorded by the EU GSP will, if utilised by exporters in beneficiary countries (assumption A) and if there are no non-tariff barriers to EU market access (assumption B), lead to an increase in the volume of “traditional exports” (an increase “at the intensive margin”) which will translate into higher exporter profits (the volume effect of GSP preferences). The GSP preferences will also lead, if the rent arising from the preference margin is not fully captured by importers (assumption C) lead to higher margins and hence profits for exporters (the price effect of the preferences). Higher profits will then, if the preferences are predictable and stable, and the investment environment is sufficiently enabling (assumption E), lead to increased investments – both reinvestments by existing exporters and greenfield investment by new investors (including foreign investors) lured into the sector by the increased profits. These new investments will further expand output and exports of the existing export products, both to the EU (thus creating a virtuous circle) and to new geographical markets, provided that economies of scale or productivity-enhancing investments result in increased competitiveness of exporters (assumption G). If investments are aimed at research and development or innovation, and if there are no barriers to market access (assumption H), export diversification into new products will occur. Furthermore, both increased investments per se and export diversification will lead to stronger economic growth which will, if inclusive growth mechanisms are in place in the beneficiary country (assumption J), contribute to poverty reduction. As can be seen, the causal chain from granting preferences under the GSP to poverty reduction is indeed long.

Figure 36: The constructed GSP intervention logic focusing on economic (and social) impact in GSP beneficiary countries



Source: Prepared by the author.

There is, however, a short-cut, both in terms of the causal chain and in terms of the time required from preferences being granted to have an impact on poverty: An increase in the volume of exports to the EU will, if this is not entirely the result of diversion of exports to other markets (assumption D), lead to an increase in total output of the exported goods. An increase in production, in turn, will result in increased employment (alternatively: wages), which then will result in poverty reduction, if the additional employment and wages are decent (assumption I).

The second dimension (or general objective) which the GSP aims at in beneficiary developing countries is the promotion of sustainable development and good governance. However, unlike for the economic and poverty objective, a clear causal chain that would be applicable to all GSP countries (or the scheme in general) is not provided in the official documents, nor in the secondary literature reviewed. Indeed, it would seem difficult to construct a general causal chain or intervention logic for this objective. The main reason for this is that the 2012 GSP Regulation (as well as its predecessor) de facto establishes two different regimes with regard to the promotion of sustainable development and good governance.

Under the first regime, the GSP+ establishes explicit conditions for beneficiary countries in terms of meeting 27 international conventions which address non-economic development issues (human rights, social, environmental, and good governance).³¹⁷ The logic behind this would thus be that the prospect of benefitting from higher preferences for GSP eligible countries under the GSP+ arrangement leads them to adopt and subject themselves to the monitoring mechanisms established under the 27 conventions, thereby ensuring that minimum human rights, social/labour, and environmental standards are kept.

Under the second regime, which comprises the Standard GSP and EBA, only economic criteria play a role for eligibility and level of preferences. Merely a residual role remains for aspects of good governance and sustainable development in the form of a possible temporary withdrawal of preferences if a beneficiary country “seriously and systematically” violates core human rights and labour conventions, exports goods made by prison labour, shows “serious” shortcomings in customs control related to drug trafficking, engages in “serious and systematic” unfair trading practices or infringements against regional or international agreements on the use of fishery resources (Article 19.1), or fails to comply with GSP rules of origin (Article 21).³¹⁸ Thus, although the GSP sets a minimum floor for GSP beneficiary countries to respect certain human rights, labour and selected environmental (only those related to fisheries) standards, there is no positive causal chain whereby the GSP would lead Standard GSP or EBA beneficiary countries to promote sustainable development and good governance.

As neither of the countries selected for case studies is a GSP+ beneficiary, no causal chain for the non-economic (i.e. human rights, environmental and good governance) impact of the GSP has been prepared. The assessment of such impact could instead be undertaken at two levels: First, it could be addressed in part under the assumption that an inclusive growth mechanism needs to be in place in the beneficiary country to translate employment gains into poverty reduction, if a comprehensive concept of poverty is applied; however, this would seem to slightly deviate from the Commission’s conceptualisation, which explicitly distinguishes poverty eradication from sustainable development and good governance. Second, non-economic effects of the GSP in the beneficiary country can be addressed as unintended effects or externalities (both positive and negative) of the GSP. It is this latter approach that the evaluation takes.

³¹⁷ See Article 15 of the 2012 GSP Regulation. The conventions are listed in Annex VIII of the Regulation.


³¹⁸ These rules also apply to GSP+ beneficiaries.

Annex 2: Methodological approach and data collection

Overview of methodological approach. A comprehensive evaluation of the GSP would require that the level of achievement of all outcomes and impacts as well as the validity of the assumed linkages in the intervention logic are assessed. However, due to resource constraints a selective approach has to be applied, which distinguishes three levels of scrutiny (Figure 20): First, the “short-cut” causal chain from GSP preferences to employment creation in the beneficiary countries constitutes the subject of the “core analysis” (green background in the figure). It focuses, as mentioned in the Detailed Field Methodology, on the following indicators: (1) the extent to which the GSP impacts on exports from the case study countries (outcome); and (2) the extent to which increased exports lead to increased employment and/or incomes (impact). In addition, the third indicator to be assessed in the core analysis – which, lying outside of the intervention logic, cannot be represented in Figure 20 – is the presence of positive or negative externalities generated by the GSP.

The core analysis is complemented with a second, “subsidiary analysis” to provide some insights into the likely further outcomes and impacts of the GSP in the beneficiary country (red background), and, third, a cursory review of existing secondary sources addressing the remaining outcomes and impacts.

Figure 37: Methodological framework for the GSP case study



Source: Prepared by the author.

Analytical tools and process. Both core and subsidiary analysis are based on a mix of document and data analysis (light blue objects in Figure 20) and stakeholder contributions collected during the field visit (dark blue objects in Figure 20). Statistical data analysis is restricted to those data which are readily available – in principle trade data, as well as national production and employment data where available at disaggregated (at least sectoral) levels; it is also restricted to descriptive statistical analysis – econometric models that would allow for a

more robust analysis and isolation of the effect of different explanatory variables on the outcome or impact of the GSP could not be developed due to resource constraints.

Data collection and analysis follows a two-stage process: first, documents and statistical data are collected and analysed. The findings, and gaps in information availability, then determine the scope of data and information collection and the types of questions to be asked to stakeholder during the field visits, i.e. the second stage. Thus, the tasks for the field visit are to:

- Determine evidence for effects for which no statistics are available;
- Check the validity of key assumptions, hypotheses and causal links; and
- Identify and assess externalities of the GSP in the beneficiary country.

The interview guide prepared for the field visit (see annex 6) is structured according to these tasks.

Data and information sources. For the outcome and impact achievement indicators, primary statistical data constitute the first information source, complemented by findings in the existing literature, most notably evaluations and impact assessments of the GSP.³¹⁹ Trade data sources used are TARIC and UNCTAD TRAINS for tariffs, and COMEXT for EU imports³²⁰ as well as UN COMTRADE for comparisons of the case study country's exports to the world and the EU countries.³²¹ Production, employment and investment data are taken from national statistics –Vietnam's General Statistics Office –, complemented, to the extent available, by data provided by stakeholders during the field visits. Semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, using the attached interview guide, constitute the third source of information.

Specific indicators and data used. The specific *indicators at outcome and impact levels* are measured as follows for Mozambique and Vietnam (numbers refer to the numbers in Figure 20 above):

1. *Exports to the EU:* (a) Growth of total exports to the EU over the period 2001 to 2016 in comparison with growth of exports to the world. Underlying hypothesis (1): If the GSP has been effective, exports to the EU have grown faster than exports to the world;

(b) For Vietnam, in addition a cross-sector comparison can be done because unlike in Mozambique, where all virtually exports are exempted from duties in the EU, in Vietnam under the Standard GSP certain sectors are not covered, and some sectors graduated from or de-graduated to the GSP (footwear and leather goods from Vietnam graduated in 2009 and de-graduated in 2014). Underlying hypothesis (1a): Exports of sectors/products covered by the GSP perform better than non-covered sectors/products.
2. *Production output:* (a) Growth in total output and output by sector over the period 2001 to 2016. Underlying hypothesis (2): The more a sector exports under the GSP the faster its total output grows;

(b) Evidence/examples of exporting producers growing faster than other producers, based on stakeholder information.

³¹⁹ The key sources are Gasiorek et al. (2010); European Commission (2011); Development Solutions (2017b).

³²⁰ Imports by the EU as reported in COMEXT are taken as a proxy for exports from the beneficiary country to the EU.

³²¹ We use mirror data, i.e. imports reported by Vietnam's trading partners, as these tend to be more reliable than export data; a comparison at total export/levels has been undertaken and showed no major discrepancies. To ensure consistency throughout the period, imports of the EU27 countries have been used for the purpose of the statistical analysis across the whole period considered.

3. *Employment*: (a) Growth in total employment and employment by sector over the period 2001 to 2016. Underlying hypothesis (3): The more a sector exports under the GSP the faster its employment grows;
(b) Evidence/examples of exporting producers hiring more workers than other producers, based on stakeholder information.

- 4./5. *Investment*: (a) Value of investment by existing firms, and new business establishment by sector over the period 2001 to 2016. Underlying hypothesis (4/5): The more a sector exports under the GSP, and the higher export revenues are, the higher is investment in the sector – both for expansion of existing firms and new firm establishment;
(b) Evidence/examples of investment activity in exporting sectors compared to other sectors, based on stakeholder information.

6. *Geographical export diversification*: (a) Evolution of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of exports by destination country over the period 2001 to 2016. Underlying hypothesis (6): If the GSP has contributed to increased competitiveness, then the concentration of export markets should have decreased over time, i.e. the HHI should decline;³²²
(b) Evidence/examples of new export markets having been entered into as a result of increase competitiveness achieved through the GSP, based on stakeholder information.

7. *Export product diversification*: (a) Evolution of the HHI of exports by sector (at HS 2-digit levels), over the period 2001 to 2016. The HHI of exports to EU is compared to the HHI of total exports. Underlying hypothesis (7): If the GSP has contributed to export product diversification, then the HHI of exports should have declined over time;
(b) Evidence/examples of new export products having been introduced thanks to the GSP regime, based on stakeholder information.

For the *assessment of the validity of key assumptions*, the following indicators and data are used (letters refer to the numbers in Figure 20 above):

- a. *High preference utilisation rate*: (a) Evolution of preference utilisation rates by sector (at HS 2-digit levels), over the period 2001 to 2016, vs. exports to the EU. Underlying hypothesis (1.1): The higher the preference utilisation, the better the export performance;
(b) Identification of reasons for low preference utilisation: (b1) low preference margins (hypothesis: the lower the preference margin, the lower preference utilisation). This is assessed by regressing preference utilisation against preference margins (at HS 2-digit levels) over the period 2001 to 2016; (b2) problems related to rules of origin (RoO) – both substantive rules and administrative/procedural requirements and compliance costs related to obtaining certificates of origin; (b3) limited awareness about the GSP; and (b4) other reasons. Items (b2) to (b4) are investigated based on stakeholder interviews.

- b. *Absence of NTBs*: (a) Non-tariff measures introduced or removed by the EU on imports from the case study countries over the period 2001 to 2016, based on the TARIC database. Underlying hypothesis (1.2): If NTMs have remained stable or decreased over time, exports from the beneficiary country to the EU under the GSP have increased.

³²² Note that there is a partial contradiction between this hypothesis and the one under number 1 above, which states that the share of exports to the EU should have increased if the GSP is successful – which would mean, *ceteris paribus*, an increase in concentration.

(b) Evidence/examples of NTBs – both in Vietnam and in the EU – affecting exports to the EU, based on stakeholder information.

- d. GSP leads to trade creation, *not merely trade diversion*: Growth of total exports to the rest of the world over the period 2001 to 2016. Underlying hypothesis (2.1): If the GSP has been effective, exports to the non-EU countries have also grown.

The *determination and assessment of externalities* is addressed qualitatively, based on literature review and stakeholder consultations during the field visit.

Limitations of the approach. The methodological approach taken has a number of limitations. First, like other evaluations of the GSP, the highest impact level – i.e. the effects of the GSP on economic growth and poverty in beneficiary countries – is not assessed. However, a credible poverty impact assessment would constitute a major research project of its own for which resources are simply not available in the context of the present evaluation; in addition, such an assessment would appear to be outside of the scope of the present evaluation of the EU's policy coherence for development. Furthermore, even the official intervention logic expressed in Commission documents states that the impact of the GSP on poverty reduction is only indirect.

Second, as mentioned above, the statistical analysis is restricted to descriptive statistics – econometric models that would allow for a more robust analysis and isolation of the effect of different explanatory variables on the outcome or impact of the GSP could not be developed due to resource constraints.

Third, an inherent shortcoming of the case study approach is that no cross-country comparison can be undertaken (typical tools like gravity models can therefore not be applied); this requires a more qualitative analytical approach which leads to less precise findings in terms of outcome and impact achievement but at the same time allows to highlight the causal links.

Annex 3: List of persons met

Institution	Person(s) met
EU Delegation	Magdalena Ciesielska, First Secretary, Deputy Head of Trade and Economic Affairs Mathieu Penot, Project contact & Programme Manager Le Ky Anh, Trade Specialist & Economist
Ministry of Industry & Trade (MOIT)	Le Huu Phuc, Director General of International Cooperation Department
Ministry of Finance, General Department of Vietnam Customs (GDVC)	Duong Van Tam, Deputy Director of International Cooperation Department Dang Thi Hai Binh, Deputy Team Leader, Customs Control and Supervision Department Duong Thi Khuyen, Official of Legal Department Pham Thi Bich Thao, Official of Import-Export Tax Department (HS classification) Dang Ngoc Huy, Official of International Cooperation Department
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	Pham Phu Binh, International Cooperation Department
Vietnam Standards & Consumers Association (VINASTAS)	Tran Van Hoc, Chairman, Research, Development Support for Standards & Conformance and Member of the Executive Board Le Quoc Bao, Standards Expert
Vietnam Chamber of Commerce & Industry (VCCI)	Tran Thi Thu Huon, Director, Center for Certifying Commercial Documents
Vietnam Textile & Apparel Association	Dr. Truong Van Cam, Vice Chairman and General Secretary
Vietnam Electronics Industries Association (VEIA)	Luu Hoang Long, Chairman
Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters & Producers (VASEP)	Nguyen Hoai Nam, Deputy General Secretary Le Hang, Deputy Director
Vietnam Leather, Footwear and Handbag Association (Lefaso)	Le Xuan Duong- Director Cap Thi Phuong Anh – Secretariat Officer
Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL)	Le Dinh Quang, Deputy Director, Industrial Relations Department

Annex 4: List of documents consulted

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Annex 5: Supporting tables and figures

Table 12: EU27 imports from Vietnam by import regime, 2001-2016 (EUR million)

Eligibility/regime used	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
ONLY GSP	3,637.2	3,674.3	3,628.2	3,991.2	4,129.5	4,983.0	5,429.9	5,969.2	3,564.5	4,341.2	5,034.6	5,240.1	5,364.2	9,370.4	11,755.8	12,671.6
GSP NON ZERO	2,031.8	2,071.1	2,037.0	2,138.8	2,133.3	2,488.2	2,605.6	2,986.1	1,194.5	1,380.2	1,605.4	1,620.4	1,646.7	3,658.4	4,745.3	5,111.3
GSP ZERO	319.6	509.7	474.1	481.1	522.9	636.8	733.0	819.4	707.3	870.1	1,047.2	1,202.7	1,307.2	1,718.6	2,106.8	2,241.3
MFN NON ZERO	1,285.4	1,093.0	1,116.7	1,370.9	1,472.7	1,855.6	2,087.1	2,142.9	1,650.2	2,065.5	2,334.2	2,375.3	2,368.8	3,896.5	4,771.5	5,140.8
MFN ZERO	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	2.2	4.1	20.7	12.5	25.5	47.8	41.6	41.5	49.5	56.1	58.7
UNKNOWN	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.2								47.3	76.1	119.5
ONLY MFN	845.1	732.5	904.6	1,176.4	1,393.2	1,830.6	2,367.7	2,579.9	4,226.2	5,230.3	7,887.0	13,271.4	15,816.4	12,754.9	18,174.5	20,326.2
MFN NON ZERO	22.1	26.2	34.1	77.2	116.5	7.3	7.4	27.2	1,948.4	2,123.0	1,898.7	2,161.3	2,247.1	66.0	45.0	83.2
MFN ZERO	823.0	706.2	870.3	1,098.9	1,276.6	1,823.2	2,360.3	2,552.6	2,277.8	3,107.3	5,988.3	11,110.1	13,569.3	12,688.6	18,129.2	20,242.2
UNKNOWN	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1								0.3	0.2	0.9
ONLY PREFERENCES		1.5	1.4													
MFN NON ZERO		1.4	1.4													
PREFERENCE NON ZERO		0.0														
PREFERENCE ZERO		0.1														
UNKNOWN	2.8	20.5	7.7	9.9	8.2	37.6	64.0	31.7	17.1	15.2	23.7	29.8	20.5	20.1	19.6	29.6
UNKNOWN	2.8	20.5	7.7	9.9	8.2	37.6	64.0	31.7	17.1	15.2	23.7	29.8	20.5	20.1	19.6	29.6
Total	4,485.1	4,428.9	4,541.8	5,177.5	5,531.0	6,851.2	7,861.6	8,580.8	7,807.8	9,586.8	12,945.3	18,541.3	21,201.2	22,145.5	29,949.9	33,027.4

Source: Author's calculations based on COMEXT.

Figure 38: EU 27 imports from Vietnam (excl. GSP Section XII), by eligibility regime, 2001 to 2016 (EUR million)





Figure 39: Index of GSP-eligible, GSP-utilised, and non-GSP-eligible imports (excl. GSP Section XII) from Vietnam by EU27, 2001 to 2016 (2001 = 100)



Source: Author's calculations based on COMEXT.

Figure 40: GSP preference utilisation rate and GSP non-zero duty imports by EU 27 from Vietnam's, 2001 to 2016 (%) – excl. GSP Section XII imports





Figure 41: Shares of EU27 zero-duty imports from Vietnam, 2001 to 2016 (%) – excl. GSP Section XII imports



Source: Author's calculations based on COMEXT.

Annex 6: Interview guide for Vietnam

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Case study: Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) Interview Guide Vietnam

Introductory issues

- a. Establish name, position, organisation and contact details of interview partner.
- b. Determine and note if interview partner is aware of, and has an understanding of, PCD.
- c. Explain purpose of the interview.

A. Issues to be covered specifically with the EU Delegation

- a. How do you see the role of EU Delegations in reporting/monitoring issues of coherence or incoherence as requested by the Council in PCD Council Conclusions?
 - What are your views on the PCD chapter of the External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)? (i.e. in terms of usefulness, follow up, resources allocated (time, expertise), feedback from EEAS/DG DEVCO, feedback from partner country)
 - Besides the PCD chapter of the EAMR report, do you report on PCD issues in other ways and do you receive feedback from the Commission?
 - Does the partner country raise (or has raised in the past) PCD related issues with respect to EU policies?
- b. Has the distribution of roles between DG DEVCO and the EEAS since the creation of the latter had an impact on the EU's PCD approach?
 - Have development objectives and priorities changed in any way in a broader agenda (reinforced/undermined), for instance with respect to the EU's Foreign and Security Policy?
 - How does the EU Delegation "balance out" political and development objectives?

B. Evidence for GSP effects for which no/limited statistics are available

Do you have any data or information on the performance of businesses exporting under the GSP in comparison with other businesses that do not export under the GSP, or not export at all with regard to:

- a. The **level of production/output**: are exporting firms growing faster and more stable, or are the exposed to additional risks and volatility? What are the reasons?
- b. The **level of employment**: are exporting businesses (under the GSP) hiring more and/or paying higher wages, or not? What are the reasons? What explains the stagnation of wages and the continued growth of employment?
- c. **Investment activity**: Are exporting businesses (under the GSP) investing more than non-exporting businesses? Are investments primarily by existing firms or new firms? What is the role of foreign investment (and does FDI primarily come from the EU or other countries)?
Could you name examples of investment projects specifically aimed at exporting under the GSP/to the EU?

- d. Do you have any evidence/could you name examples of **new export markets** which firms have entered into as a result of increase competitiveness achieved through the GSP? Please provide as much detail as possible.
- e. Do you have any evidence/could you provide examples of **new export products** having been introduced thanks to the GSP regime? For example, have exporters diversified into other exports related to those originally exported (such as new varieties, added value products)? Please provide as much detail as possible.
- f. Overall, do you consider that the GSP has led to an increase in the **competitiveness** of businesses or, vice versa, cemented existing production and export patterns – or has it had no effect at all? If possible, provide examples or evidence to support your argument.

C. Validity of GSP key assumptions, hypotheses and causal links

- a. On **preference utilisation**: To what extent did the removal of GSP preferences for footwear and leather goods from 2009 to 2013 cause a contraction in exports to the EU. How did producers/exporters react (e.g. changes in output volume, diversion to other export markets, changes in production e.g. towards other products or increased productivity/higher margin production)
What are the reasons for the steep increase in footwear and leather goods exports since 2013?
What are the benefits of exporting to the EU under the GSP compared to exports under MFN, and, what, if any, are the added costs or complications? If possible, provide specific examples and/or cost/benefit considerations.
Do you have examples/other evidence that preferences are primarily used by large exporters? What are the specific constraints that small exporters are facing in relation to using preferences offered by the GSP? Are RoO issues related to the rules themselves (such as cumulation, value addition requirements, etc.) or the administration of the rules (such as certification requirements, non-acceptance of documents provided, etc.)? Have rules of origin under the GSP become simpler over time/stayed the same/become more difficult to comply with?
- b. Are **non-tariff barriers** such as product safety standards, quality requirements, or any other TBT and SPS issues negatively affecting exports to the EU? Are exports under the GSP affected differently than exports under MFN? Do you have the feeling that non-tariff barriers are used by the EU on purpose to reduce imports from Vietnam?
- c. Are there any **other factors** (originating in the EU) which make exporting to the EU under GSP difficult, or prevent it altogether? Which ones?
Provide examples of capacity constraints impacting on export performance – be as precise as possible!
Please provide specific examples of complementary aid by the EU to strengthen productive capacity, and the effects that this aid has had on exports.
- d. In general, why have exports to the EU not increased faster than exports to other destinations? Which other factors can explain this?

D. Externalities and unintended effects of the GSP

If any of the following effects are found, state *how* the GSP has contributed to it:

- a. Are you aware of any **human rights or labour rights related impacts** induced by the GSP? Which ones?

For example: Have there been incidences of forced labour and or child labour in exporting businesses? Displacements of persons to make way for exporting businesses/farms? Violations of worker rights? Are there indications that exporting businesses promote human/worker rights? Has the government taken steps to strengthen human/worker rights?

- b. Are you aware of any **social impacts** induced by the GSP? Which ones?
For example, have social standards been established, have increased exports led to better working conditions or, to the contrary, been based on exploitation or violation of social standards; have exports in sectors with low standards been benefitted more than in others?
- c. Are you aware of any **environmental impacts** induced by the GSP? Which ones?
For example, has growth in environmentally damaging or friendly sectors been encouraged, have environmentally friendly/sustainable production practices been promoted? Has the country developed, implemented or strengthened (or conversely, weakened) any laws, standards or guidelines for sustainable use of resources?
- d. Are you aware of any impacts of the GSP on **governance** in Vietnam? Which ones?
For example, have trade support services (e.g. quality infrastructure, certification issues, including certificates of origin), and trade facilitation (e.g. customs procedures) improved as a result of the GSP? Has the GSP has effects on wider business governance/the business environment? Has transparency and predictability of government decisions improved or worsened as a result of the GSP?
- e. Are you aware of any **regional impacts** induced by the GSP? Which ones?
For example, have exports induced by the GSP affected specific concentrated areas (either those already well developed or under-developed), leading to widening (or reduced) disparities across regions?
- f. Are there any **other unintended effects or externalities** – either positive or negative – that you are aware of? Which ones?
For example, effects on security, public health, cultural norms?

E. Concluding questions

- a. In the absence of the EU GSP, how would Vietnam's exports – both to the EU and total exports – be affected in your view? Please substantiate.
- b. Do you consider that the GSP is a useful instrument by the EU to foster economic development in Vietnam?
- c. Which alternative or complementary policies or measures to GSP – being trade/commercial policies, or other policies – have been applied, or would you recommend?
- d. Are you aware of any EU policies which would counter the effects of the GSP?
- e. What are your recommendations for improving the EU GSP and enhancing the Union's policy coherence for development?

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Case study: EU Action Plan Against Wildlife Trafficking Country note: Burkina Faso

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Rationale for selection of the country

The EU Wildlife Action Plan 2016 – 2020 is a far-reaching plan to address wildlife trafficking within the EU and strengthen the EU's role in the fight against these illegal activities globally, through 32 measures, divided over three priority areas: prevention, enforcement and cooperation. It forms part of the EU's response to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and in particular to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 15, which calls for urgent action to end poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna and address both demand and supply of illegal wildlife products.³²³ Burkina Faso was selected as a case study to gather field evidence on the (potential /future) impact of the EUAP against wildlife trafficking for three reasons.

- First, the conservation of Burkina Faso's fauna habitat is of great importance to the survival of large mammals in West Africa³²⁴, and that it hosts many endangered species that are potentially subject to international traffic³²⁵. Burkina Faso is one of the countries that host the WAP Complex, which is the major complex of protected areas in West Africa. The WAP complex is known to house a large variety of fauna, including protected species such as elephants, lions, endangered species such as subspecies of giraffes specific to the region, Cheetah, Lycaon, Manatee, and species becoming more and more rare like Cobe Defassa, Damalisque, Réduunca, Golden Jackal, Otter with white cheeks, Panthers, etc.³²⁶. Hence, the objective of the EUAP against wildlife trafficking is of high relevance to Burkina Faso.
- Second, savannah Protected Areas (Pas) of Burkina Faso have received significant support, particularly from the EU since the early 2000, and the EU effort today is focused on the WAPOK complex (W, Arly, Pendjari, Oti Monduri, Keran in Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger and Togo). For this reason, much can be learned about the impact of previous EU actions, and the potential impact of future EU actions that can be linked to the EUAP against wildlife trafficking.
- Third, the headquarters of the West African Monetary Union (WEAMU) are located in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. As mentioned in the EUAP against wildlife trafficking, since the EU attempts to foster dialogue with regional organisations in the areas of wildlife conservation / trafficking, Burkina Faso appears to be a good case for assessing and drawing lessons on cooperation with regional organisations, especially given the efforts of the EU to build the capacity of WEAMU in dealing with wildlife preservation and trafficking.

³²³ EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking (COM(2016) 87 final) , page 5

³²⁴ LARGER THAN ELEPHANTS, Inputs for an EU strategic approach to wildlife conservation in Africa – Regional Analysis – West Africa, page 343

³²⁵ According to the field interviews, an estimated 750 elephants were poached on the Burkina Faso side of the WAP complex (the number was extrapolated based on the number of carcasses found).

³²⁶ Final Evaluation of the regional Project Park W. ECOPAS, November 2008. According to some observers (IUCN, for instance), the complex was threatened with extinction in the 1990s, before the implementation of programs and projects of various donors, including EU through its ECOPAS program.

1.2 Hypotheses to be verified during the field mission

It should be noted that the EUAP against wildlife trafficking has two distinct features:

- On the one hand, it is a recent communication tool (published in 2016) that crystallizes EU philosophy and lessons learned from *past* interventions linked to wildlife preservation and trafficking. In this context, one of the objectives of the field mission is to assess the extent to which EU actions, including *past* actions, are coherent with the EUAP, and vice versa (the extent to which lessons from past actions are reflected into the EUAP);
- On the other hand, the EUAP should also inform future project design and planning. In this context, we also attempt to understand if the EUAP against wildlife trafficking has influenced the design of *future* projects (i.e. those that have been designed after the Communication was issued), and how.

Bearing the above considerations in mind, the focus of the field mission has been placed on 3 key areas of the EUAP whose actions are implemented directly at the level of developing countries:³²⁷

- The engagement of rural communities in the management and conservation of wildlife, and activities aimed at supporting the development of sustainable and alternative livelihoods for communities living in and adjacent to wildlife habitats (linked to Actions 4 and 5 of the EUAP against wildlife trafficking)³²⁸;
- Reducing corruption and strengthening enforcement and the rule of law (linked to Action 8 and 25 of the EUAP against wildlife trafficking)³²⁹;
- Status of cooperation between the EU and developing countries (both in terms of support programmes, and improved coordination to address wildlife trafficking, linked to Actions 26, 27, 28 and 30)³³⁰.

In each of the three key areas, we attempt to assess the contribution of past and future EU actions to achieving the objective (impact) of preserving endangered species and reducing wildlife trafficking, in order to assess the impact indicator “I 7.3.4: *Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on the reduction of Illicit Trade between the selected country and the EU*”.

2 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE LINK WITH EU POLICY(ES) / INITIATIVE(S) IN THE COUNTRY

The main actors involved in EU supported programs / projects of wildlife trafficking and conservation are³³¹:

- The EU: as presented in Table 1 below, the EU has been a major actor through a series of programs and projects over the last 20 years. Interviews on the ground have confirmed the central role played by the EU in the area of wildlife conservation over the last decades.

³²⁷ Please refer to the methodological note of the field mission as approved by DG DEVCO for additional information

³²⁸ I 7.3.1: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on the Livelihood of local communities

³²⁹ I 7.3.2: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on corruption and the capacity of enforcement and judiciary in developing countries.

³³⁰ I 7.3.3: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on cooperation between the EU and developing countries (both in terms of support programmes, and improved coordination to address wildlife trafficking).

³³¹ The vast majority of the actors listed have been interviewed during the field visit of the evaluation team to Burkina Faso.

- The Ministry in charge of Environment, Green Economy and Climate Change (MEEVCC, for “*Ministère de l’environnement, de l’économie verte et du changement climatique*”);
- The National Bureau of Protected Areas (OFINAP, for “*Office National des Aires Protégées*”), an autonomous body under the MEEVC in charge of managing selected protected areas;
- The Permanent Secretariat of the National Counsel for Environment and Sustainable development (« *Secrétariat Permanent du Conseil National pour l’Environnement et le Développement Durable (SP/CONEDD)* »), an inter-agency network in charge of issues linked to sustainable development;
- The West African Monetary Union (WEAMU) Commission, who is trying to establish itself as a regional coordinating body at the level of the transnational WAPOX complex;
- The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), who played a central role in the implementation of the EU-funded PAPE project;
- International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) who is currently managing, on behalf of the EU, the MIKE and BIOPAMA projects (see table below), and who will also play a central role on the regional aspect of the upcoming EU-funded PAPBIO programme (support to WEAMU to establish itself as a coordination body);
- *Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH*, the German Development Agency who is currently implementing conservation projects on the WAP complex and who will implement the conservation component of the upcoming EU-funded PAPBIO at the level of the WAP complex;
- *A number of local and international NGOs that have worked on Component 3 (activities linked the involvement / livelihood of adjacent populations) of the EU-funded PAPE programme, inter alia* SNV (the Dutch Development Agency); GRET (an international development NGO), in collaboration with AFAUDEB (*Association Faune et développement au Burkina, a local NGO*); RONGEAD (an international development NGO), etc.

Table 1: EU Programmes / Projects in the area of wildlife trafficking and conservation

Action	Period	Budget	Line of funding	Overall objective
ECOPAS	2001-2008	24 M EUR (global amount)	PIR (7 th EDF), PIN Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger	The overall objective of ECOPAS was to reverse the processes of degradation of natural resources and to preserve biological diversity in the regional protected area complex for the benefit of populations. Its specific objective has been to Promote resources conservation and management with the support of the populations and institutions concerned, through a regional policy coordination process leading to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Valorisation of natural resources in order to generate more benefits from their sustainable exploitation; - Setting up mechanisms for equitable distribution of public / private benefits and riparian populations in protected areas.
PAPE	2012-2016	23,42 M EUR (global amount)	PIR	The overall goal is to contribute to the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services for sustainable development in West Africa. The specific objective is to sustainably strengthen the conservation of the WAP complex ecosystems in a regional perspective and optimize the benefits for the local population
BIOPAMA	2011-2017; 2017-2023		ACP Group, 10 th EDF and 11 th EDF	The Programme BIOPAMA aims to address threats to biodiversity in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, while reducing poverty in communities in and around protected areas. Specifically, the programme will enhance existing institutions and networks by making the best available science and knowledge available for building capacity to improve policies and better decision-making on biodiversity conservation, protected areas management and access and benefit sharing.
MIKE / MIKES	2014-2018	12,3 M EUR	ACP Group, 10 th EDF	The overall objective of the MIKES Project is to reduce illegal killing of elephants and other CITES-listed flagship species and the illegal trade in their products.

		(global amount)		
PAPBIO	2018-2022	65 M EUR (global amount)	PIR, EDF	11th
Law enforcement and combating wildlife and forest crime Global Programme	2018 onwards	49,1 M EUR (global amount)	GPGC	
				<p>The overall objective of the program is to promote endogenous, sustainable and inclusive economic development that responds to the challenges of climate change.</p> <p>The specific objective is to achieve integrated protection of diversity and fragile ecosystems and enhanced resilience to climate change.</p> <p>As part of Result 1 (“Wildlife and forest law enforcement in targeted countries and international coordination improved / Result 1.1: Capacities to combat IWFC strengthened across the entire criminal justice chain”, the following activities will be implemented at the level of Burkina Faso according to DG DEVCO: Using the ICCWC Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit, assess country’s capabilities in relation to relevant legislation, law enforcement measures, prosecutorial and judicial capacities, factors that drive offences, the effectiveness of preventive measures, and the availability and use of data; produce NWFC Action Plans produced and then implement priority components thereof; Although the priority components to be implemented will vary from country to country, the range of possibilities could include 1) form/strengthen interagency committees, 2) support the development and expansion of comprehensive border control and anti-smuggling strategies, 3) strengthen legislative frameworks, 4) build capacity in specialized investigative techniques such as risk profiling, covert investigations, controlled deliveries, anti-money laundering and asset recovery, 5) Anti-corruption measures or 6) raise awareness of prosecutors and judiciary on wildlife crime.</p>

The vast majority of EU support to Burkina Faso on the issue of conservation and combating poaching and illegal traffic of protected species has been channelled via the PAPE programme and relied on international, regional and national institutions, as well as local NGOs and partners, each making use of its own resources and means within the framework of the budget allocated by the EU. The PAPE programme was structured in three components /results:

- *Result 1: The regional institutional framework for the conservation of protected areas is strengthened for a concerted and harmonized management of protected areas of the WAP complex, with a budget of 2.5M € carried and implemented by WEAMU, designated as "coordinator" through a General Coordination Office (BCG).*
- *Result 2: Coordinated management of protected areas of the WAP complex and their animal and plant resources more effective and viable at the level of national institutions.* The R2 accounted for almost 2/3 of the operational budget (€ 10.7 million) and was carried out under the responsibility and in direct agreement with UNDP, which has a Technical Coordination Office (TCO), with the contribution of national institutions in charge of PA management in each country.
- *Result 3: Negative pressures exercised by the attenuated populations, with a cost-benefit balance favourable to these, aimed at the attenuation of the pressures by the local populations and development of activities compatible with the conservation, present a budget of 4, € 7m (after an increase of € 2m). It was directly piloted and implemented by the Delegation of the European Union.*

While it was difficult to compile precise data linked to wildlife trafficking and poaching, due to lack of documented data on the issue, interviews with stakeholders on the ground have confirmed that the poaching of endangered species including elephants is still an ongoing problem in Burkina Faso (according to interviews with the MIKES projects, around 750 elephants were poached at the level of the WAP project between 2013 and 2015).

3 FINDINGS (AT OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS LEVELS) INCLUDING UNINTENDED EFFECTS)

3.1 Country level outcomes

In this section, we assess the extent to which the above-mentioned programmes as well as other EU actions have been effective and have contributed to the over impact of the EUAP in three key areas linked to Indicators I 7.3.1, I 7.3.2, and I 7.3.3 as defined in the methodology.

I 7.3.1: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on the Livelihood of local communities

As outlined in Table 2, all large scale regional EU conservation interventions (ECOPAs, PAPE, PAPBIO) possess workstreams aimed at improving livelihood and involvement of adjacent populations, which is coherent and in-line with the commitments approach of the EUAP against wildlife trafficking in Actions 4 and 5.

Table 2: Key features of EU programmes in Burkina Faso in the area of involvement of local population / livelihood

Programme	Features (narrative description of the component, budget, etc)
ECOPAS	Under ECOPAS, the concern about involving adjacent populations to the Park W was addressed mainly under Outcome 9 - <i>Populations and individuals of the peripheral zones of the W are engaged in the conservation and the management of the natural resources</i> - and, incidentally, under Outcome 10 - <i>Local resource management capacities are created</i> - and Result 11 - <i>Protected areas and natural resources are valued in a sustainable way for the benefit of the people and conservation</i> .
PAPE	In the framework of PAPE, the involvement of the populations bordering the Parks was taken into account in Outcome 3 - <i>"The negative pressures exerted by the populations are mitigated, with a positive cost-benefit balance in their favour"</i> . This component has been implemented by national and international NGOs through 5 actions / projects designed for the populations and / or peripheral areas of the Park, all for an approximate value of 5 million euro.
PAPBIO	In the draft of the PAPBIO, the concern about involving the peripheries and the populations neighbouring the Parks is integrated in Component 1 of the Programme - <i>Sustainable management of protected areas and peripheral areas</i> . This component aims three outcomes: (1) Socio-economic and sectoral activities in the territories concerned are coordinated in an integrated way; (2) Effective protected area management systems are developed and operational; (3) Riparian populations are associated with an integrated management of natural resources system and derive a lasting sustainable benefit. 36 million euros are dedicated to this component.

According to the Final Evaluation of the PAPE programme *"The expected result of Component 3 is the mitigation of negative human pressures on protected areas (PAs), apart from the effects of surveillance and law enforcement under the second result. This component was implemented by the Delegation of the European Union in Burkina Faso in the form of a call for proposals to NGOs.... The set-up of this component has allowed a certain efficiency and effectiveness of the actions carried out by these NGOs since these NGOs carried out actions directly linked to their know-how, which has allowed them to capitalize on their distinct know-how, presence and of their knowledge of the field. Therefore, this component of the programme offered more sustainability and capitalization (before and after the PAPE programme) (...), and despite their very limited scale, these achievements are concrete, participatory, implicit, although sometimes presenting some technical and strategic gaps due, in general, to inadequate monitoring and technical support of umbrella NGOs. Component 3 of the PAPE seems to have built some mobilization-awareness and accountability of NGOs and local communities, essential partners for the sustainability of actions on the periphery of PAs. This has resulted in enhanced skills and recognized involvement of local people and civil society in general in the shared governance of PAs... Despite the absence of communication between the programme*

components (especially between activities in the protected areas and activities carried out by NGOs in adjacent areas), there was a relative complementarity-synergy between the activities in the peripheral zone under Component 3 and those developed in the central zone (PA) to achieve to a certain extent a reduction of anthropogenic pressures and increase the benefits of local populations. However, the indicators are not measurable, and the achievements still need to be strengthened”.

Hence it appears that while activities targeting local populations in areas adjacent to the protected areas did show a certain degree of efficiency, it is impossible to measure their impact on conservation, poaching and wildlife trafficking. Indeed, the project activities aimed at reducing the pressure of the adjacent populations on the resources of the protected areas (PAs), by keeping these populations away if necessary from the PAs or at least, by reorienting them towards activities less harmful for the PAs, assisting them to make the most of the resources of the Park or by restoring the transhumance corridors in order to avoid degradation of the PAs. Therefore, while these activities might have had a positive socio-economic impact on adjacent populations (the socio-economic impact of the projects has not been measured by the programme, so definite evidence is unfortunately not available), it is difficult to infer a clear link / impact between livelihood projects as implemented near the WAPO complex and reduction in wildlife trade, although the majority of stakeholders interviewed assumed an indirect positive impact.

There is indication that the design of EU-funded actions in the area of livelihood/involvement of adjacent populations under the upcoming PAPBIO (2018-2022) will attempt for a more integrated approach and a more robust link between conservation activities at the level of the protected areas, and activities targeting adjacent populations. This is reflected inter alia by the fact that the same organisation - GIZ - which has been entrusted with the management of the protected areas will also be responsible for the coordination of the livelihood component, hence ensuring greater synergy and hopefully more direct impact of such activities to the overall objective of conservation and reduction in wildlife trade as laid out in the EUAP against wildlife trafficking.

I 7.3.2: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on corruption and the capacity of enforcement and judiciary in developing countries

EU action with respect to this indicator can be summarized as follows:

- The vast majority of EU-funded actions related to enforcement is done via the MIKE (Monitoring of the Killing of Elephants) programme which has been active in Burkina Faso since the early 2000. It is through this programme that estimates/surveys of the elephant population including the number of killings on the WAP complex have been carried out. Besides, since 2014, funding has also been allocated by the EU to the related sub-project MIKES (Minimizing the Killing of Endangered Species), which focuses on improving the capacity and performance of enforcement patrol staff at the WAP.
- It was originally foreseen that anti-poaching activities would be implemented under the PAPE programme. However, this failed to materialize in practice and the PAPE final evaluation report notes the overall insufficient achievement in this area, inter alia due to the fact that it was not foreseen for the EU “*to directly finance anti-poaching in phase 1 for reasons of national prerogative and non-substitution to the sovereign missions of the States (whereas this was financed under ECOPAS) while the States did not grant funding for anti-poaching activities (besides staff)*”.

- It is not clear to what extent other EU-funded activities (such as BIOPAMA or SOS) address the issue of corruption and the capacity of enforcement and judiciary. Besides, the analysis of the portfolio under the National Indicative Program (NIP) does not indicate any funding of actions related to the issue.
- Finally, interviews on the ground suggest that the Organisation Eagle³³² (Eco-Activists for Governance and Law Enforcement) intends to open a representation in Burkina Faso in the (near) future, on the base of an agreement convened with the MIKE programme, although there is no indication that this will be funded by the EU. This might signal an increased will from the international community to tackle corruption and build the national capacity of law enforcement, including the judiciary power in Burkina Faso.

Unfortunately, and as pointed out in the PAPE final evaluation report, there exists no reliable data with regards to poaching and wildlife trafficking in Burkina Faso and legal enforcement (number of court cases, penalties, etc.) During field interviews, it has been suggested by MIKES representatives that 750 Elephants had been poached on the WAP complex in Burkina Faso between 2013 and 2015 (estimated based on the actual number of carcasses found). Given the absence of actual on legal enforcement, it is therefore impossible to infer the actual impact of previous EU funded actions linked to governance / law enforcement. Despite these inherent limitations, the following should be considered:

- Most stakeholders recognize that the mere presence of EU conservation projects in protected areas creates a deterrent effect. Hence one can therefore reasonably assume that EU actions have an overall positive effect on enforcement;
- Some stakeholders suggest, on the one hand, that the Burkina Faso Judiciary has become increasingly strict / severe in punishing poachers, although this could not be verified. On the other hand, interviews with other stakeholders have revealed that challenges in terms of law enforcement remain very high at both the national and regional level.³³³

In terms of future actions defined under the Regional Indicative Programme under EDF 11, anti-poaching activities are clearly mentioned under the PAPBIO action document³³⁴, although the exact budget dedicated to these activities remains unclear.³³⁵ Hence, there might be a need to clarify the amount / size /nature of activities linked to corruption and the capacity of enforcement and judiciary when finalizing the scoping of the PAPBIO programme, in order to achieve a greater level of coherence of RIP actions with the EUAP against wildlife trafficking. Finally, we also note that in the framework of the “Law enforcement and combating wildlife and forest crime” global programme funded under the EU Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) programme³³⁶, activities are foreseen using the ICCWC Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit (to *inter alia* assess country’s capabilities in relation to relevant legislation, law enforcement measures, etc.). However, stakeholders in Burkina Faso were not aware of such activities, nor is it clear when this programme will materialize on the ground.

³³² <http://www.eagle-enforcement.org/crisis>

³³³ See for instance the study on legal compliance conducted by WEAMU in 2014 (“Etude la discordance des textes législatifs et règlementaires sur la gestion des aires protégées du complexe transfrontalier W-Arly-Pendjari-Oti Kéran Mandouri (Complexe WAPO) et harmonisation des stratégies de conservation »)

³³⁴ See for instance R6: Cooperation in the fight against environmental crime is strengthened and the safety of conservation areas ensured.

³³⁵ A figure of 5 M EUR is mentioned in the document “ANNEX 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2017 (part 2), Action Document for Reinforcing security by combating wildlife and forest crime”, but this figure is not mentioned in the PAPBIO action document.

³³⁶ https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/tags/gpgc_en

I 7.3.3: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on cooperation between the EU and developing countries (both in terms of support programmes, and improved coordination to address wildlife trafficking)

Technical Cooperation

The three project components under the PAPE were mostly implemented independently from one another, although the regional organisation WEAMU was closely entrusted with the global coordination of the project. In practice, the PAPE programme was merely the aggregation of 3 contractually autonomous components. Mixed results have been achieved under PAPE:

- Under Result 1, the regionalization of the PAs has taken a small step forward under the PAPE, but WAEMU did not gain any legitimacy in its role of regional political leader on conservation. Moreover, this component has also failed in terms of financial sustainability.
- Under Result 2, sustainable and structuring improvements of the conservation areas were achieved: permanent water points, tracks, monitoring stations, life bases, and other infrastructure important for ecosystems and conservation were financed. The strengthening of skills was also achieved although it was not capitalized by the countries (due staff turnover). There have also been worthy attempts to harmonize methodologies and tools for ecological monitoring and monitoring but too little capitalization of ECOPAS assets (including ULM, studies, etc.). A regional aerial inventory was carried out (with MIKE resources) to improve WAP-wide regional knowledge. It is also worth mentioning the creation of knowledge exchange platform, the establishment of a network of personal contacts between managers of protected areas, recognized as very positive by all participants, which has contributing to build a certain technical regionality. Finally, each conservation unit now recognizes the interdependence (technical and ecosystem) of the units with one another, which has materialized through block-planning and WAP-wide planning. However, the strategic and physical adjustments to foster regionality (Niger-Burkina regional track, crossing works between the Burkina-Niger and Burkina-Benin countries passages on the Pendjari and Mekrou planned in the CF) still do not exist. In addition to end-of-project skills are no longer available in protected areas, and the communication system at the regional and intra-block level is not operational.
- Under Result, 3, and as mentioned above, a certain extent of reduction of anthropogenic pressures and increase the benefits of local populations was achieved, although the link with other programme components was not explicit.

Past deficits in coordination described above (between components, between the regional and national dimensions) have been recognized by all actors and the structuring of the upcoming EU programme indicates that some concrete steps have been taken to foster improved coordination and aid effectiveness which is one of the stated objectives of the EUAP against wildlife trafficking. Indeed, the design of the new PAPBIO shows several improvements that could directly contribute to more effectiveness:

- Under the regional component (previously known as Result 1), the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), who is also in charge of coordinating the MIKE and BIOPAMA programmes funded by the EU, will provide technical assistance to WAEMU. Besides, the regional aspect of anti-poaching features as one of the stated focus areas of the new programme under the responsibility of WEAMU/IUCN, although the operationalisation of these aspects still needs to be developed;
- The other programme components (management of protected areas, and the involvement of adjacent populations previously known as Results 2 and 3) will both be managed by GIZ in the WAP complex, which will hopefully create synergies and inter-linkages between

activities targeting adjacent populations and the management of the Pas, one of the weaknesses of the PAPE (see above). GIZ has been active in the WAP complex for several decades, including in anti-poaching / governance related actions and it is a fair assumption that the choice of partners by the EU will lead to improved coordination and effectiveness in conservation efforts.

While the above described adjustments in terms of structuring and coordination, the upcoming programme seem to be coherent with the actions laid out in the EUAP against wildlife trafficking, potential impact on wildlife trafficking could be maximized by:

- Ensuring that the wildlife trafficking /governance dimension is fully reflected into the final project documents, notably with clear budgets and indicators;
- Engaging / collaborating with other actors specialized in enforcement, such as the Organisation Eagle³³⁷ (Eco-Activists for Governance and Law Enforcement).

Political Dialogue / Cooperation in the wider sense

Besides cooperation between the EU and Burkina Faso / WAEMU taking place in the context of technical assistance projects such as the one described above, it is also important to consider how the issue of wildlife trafficking is addressed and structured at the political level, and how wildlife trafficking influences cooperation in the broader sense between the EU and Burkina Faso.

Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to this question, and information on the ground rather suggests the absence of a structured and permanent political dialogue on the issue of wildlife trafficking. Besides, a detailed review of the National Indicative Programme / Regional Indicative programme indicates that the wider issue of wildlife trafficking is not taken into account / considered as an important factor shaping cooperation.

Nevertheless, interviews with stakeholders do suggest that a certain level of political dialogue takes place on an *ad-hoc* basis. For instance, political dialogue has taken place at the initiative of the EUD Delegation in the context of *inter alia*:

- Harmonization of positions of the 2 parties in relation of COP 17
- The issue of the import ban of hunting trophies into the EU
- The decision by the government of Burkina Faso to allow fishing activities in protected areas once the PAPE programme came to an end.

Based on the above, it appears that a more structured form of political dialogue as foreseen in the EUAP against wildlife trafficking would be relevant for Burkina Faso.

3.2 Country level impacts / I 7.3.4: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on the reduction of Illicit Trade between the selected country and the EU

According to the MIKE programme, the elephant population in the WAP complex has roughly doubled between 2003 and 2015, and most stakeholders agree that EU assistance has contributed to this impact achievement³³⁸. However, no reliable data on poaching or wildlife trafficking exists and therefore it is not possible to know with certainty if poaching / wildlife

³³⁷ <http://www.eagle-enforcement.org/crisis/>

³³⁸ Stakeholders also point out that private hunting concessions are well managed in Burkina Faso and have also contributed to the preservation of certain species such as lions and elephants.

trade has decreased over the period. The estimated 750 poached elephants in the WAP complex between 2013 and 2015 (combined with testimonies from a number of stakeholders including the legal department of the Ministry of Environment who described a number of recent court cases of illegal traffic of wildlife derived products) do in any case confirm that the problem still exists. In terms of the potential contribution of EU projects /actions to the decrease in poaching and wildlife trade, the following can be said:

- It is difficult to infer a clear link / impact between livelihood EU financed projects as implemented near the WAPO complex and reduction in wildlife trade (although the majority of stakeholders met did suspect an indirect positive impact);
- Most stakeholders recognize that the presence of conservation projects staffs in protected areas might create a deterrent effect, regardless of whether or not these activities are clearly linked to enforcement. Hence one can therefore reasonably assume that EU conservation actions have an overall positive effect on enforcement and reduction of poaching, although the lack of sustainability of these actions does hinder the lasting nature of these potential impacts.

Going forward and given indications that future activities (*inter alia* under the PAPBIO) will go one step further and also tackle the aspect of enforcement /corruption / anti-poaching as per the EUAP against wildlife trafficking. It is assumed that the impact of EU assistance will continue to have a positive impact on conservation and the reduction of poaching / wildlife trafficking.

3.3 Unintended outcomes and impacts

There are two potential unintended negative outcomes and impacts linked to the EUAP against wildlife trafficking:

- Private hunting concessions represent an important share of the protected areas of the WAP complex and are considered by some stakeholders as playing an important positive role of wildlife conservation. The EU has recently decided to issue a ban on the import of lion hunting trophies into the EU, and some parties feel that this could negatively impact tourism, revenues and therefore conservation efforts in the hunting concessions.
- Some research suggests that the effect of livelihood projects is unclear and might be counterproductive in some cases³³⁹. Since no robust impact monitoring mechanism was put in place under the PAPE, it is impossible to know with certainty the long term (positive or negative) impact of these activities.

4 CONCLUSIONS COVERING THE ELEMENTS CONFIRMING OR NOT CONFIRMING THE DESK PHASE HYPOTHESIS

According to the MIKE programme, the elephant population in the WAP complex has roughly doubled between 2003 and 2015, and most stakeholders agree that EU assistance (implemented before the publication of the Communication *EUAP against wildlife trafficking*) through its support to the management of protected areas has clearly and directly contributed to this achievement³⁴⁰. However, no reliable data on poaching or wildlife trafficking exists and therefore it is not possible to know with certainty if poaching / wildlife trade has decreased over the period. The estimated 750 poached elephants in the WAP complex between 2013 and 2015

³³⁹ https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/import/downloads/technical_brief_short.pdf

³⁴⁰ Stakeholders also point out that private hunting concessions are well managed in Burkina Faso and have also contributed to the preservation of certain species such as lions and elephants.

does in any case confirm that the problem still needs to be addressed, and therefore that the *EUAP against wildlife trafficking* is very relevant to the challenges faced by Burkina Faso.

The EU Approach to wildlife conservation in Burkina Faso over the last 20 years was reasonably coherent with the approach subsequently laid out in the *EUAP against wildlife trafficking* with some limitations:

- All large scale regional EU conservation interventions (ECOPAs, PAPE, PAPBIO) have possessed workstreams aiming at improving livelihood and involvement of adjacent populations, and while these activities did have certain degree of efficiency and success, it is impossible to determine their impact on conservation, poaching and wildlife trafficking;
- It was originally foreseen that enforcement / anti-poaching activities would be implemented under the EU-funded PAPE programme. However, this failed to materialize in practice and the PAPE final evaluation report notes the overall insufficient achievement in this area, inter alia due to the fact that it was not foreseen for the EU “*to directly finance anti-poaching in phase 1 for reasons of national prerogative and non-substitution to the sovereign missions of the States (whereas this was financed under ECOPAS) while the States did not grant funding for anti-poaching activities (besides staff)*”.
- There has been an ongoing effort by the EU to improve coordination of technical cooperation projects in the area of wildlife conservation through the choice of strategic partners (through a constant engagement with the most relevant regional and international organisations, as well as local and international NGOs specialised in the subject matter) with mixed results. Moreover, even if some political dialogue takes place on an *ad-hoc* basis, it remains unclear how the issue of wildlife trafficking is addressed and structured at the political level of EU – Burkina bilateral cooperation.

Despite these limitations, most stakeholders recognize that the presence of EU conservation projects in protected areas have had a deterrent effect on poaching and wildlife trafficking, regardless of whether or not these activities are clearly linked to enforcement and anti-trafficking. Hence one can therefore reasonably assume that EU conservation actions have had an overall positive effect on Burkina Faso’s sustainable development and on wildlife trafficking (although the lack of sustainability of these actions does hinder the lasting nature of these impacts).

Given the perceived positive impact of past EU actions (as summarized above) implemented before the the publication of the Communication *EUAP against wildlife trafficking*, and based on the positive perception of stakeholders concerning future actions that can be indirectly linked to the *EUAP against wildlife trafficking*, it seems reasonable to assume that EU action will continue to have a positive impact on the conservation of Burkina Faso’s wildlife, with limited unforeseen or unexpected negative consequences. Moreover, this impact could be further maximized by:

- Ensuring that the wildlife trafficking / enforcement / governance dimension is fully reflected into the final PAPBIO / RIP project documents, notably with clear budgets and indicators (at the moment, there is not explicit reference to the *EUAP against wildlife trafficking* in project documents, and actors on the ground are not aware of its existence);
- Establishing a more structured form of political dialogue with Burkina Faso / WAEMU on the issue of wildlife trafficking.

ANNEX 1: DATA COLLECTION METHODS USED (ITS LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS)

Qualitative feedback and stakeholders' viewpoints were the main source of information given the lack of quantitative and reliable data on:

- Poaching and wildlife trafficking
- Impact of past EU Actions

ANNEX 2: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Name	Status and organization
Emilie VAN DER HENST	Senior Policy Officer - EU Development Cooperation and Funding Programmes WWF European Policy Office
Alain PEIGNÉ	Chargé de Programmes Section Développement Rural et Environnement Délégation de l'Union européenne au Burkina Faso
Sebastien REGNAUT	Coordinateur Régional Programme Aires Protégées et Biodiversité Afrique Centrale et Occidentale IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature)
Philippe BOUCHÉ	Programme MIKE / ex-PAPE/PNUD
Benoît DOAMBA	Directeur de la faune et des ressources cynégétiques / Point focal CITES BURKINA FASO Ministère de l'environnement, de l'économie verte et changement climatique (MEEVCC)
Gontrant SOME	Directeur du développement institutionnel et des affaires juridiques Ministère de l'environnement, de l'économie verte et changement climatique (MEEVCC)
Awa HETIE	Direction du Développement institutionnel et des affaires juridiques Ministère de l'environnement, de l'économie verte et changement climatique (MEEVCC)
Jean Robert ROUAMBA	Direction du Développement institutionnel et des affaires juridiques Ministère de l'environnement, de l'économie verte et changement climatique (MEEVCC)
Lamoussa HEBIE	Directeur general Office National des Aires Protégées du Burkina Faso (OFINAP)
Claire KABORE	Représentante du Gret au Burkina Faso
Alexis KABORE	Coordonnateur AFAUDEB
Johel KORAHIRE	Secrétariat Permanent du Conseil National pour le Développement Durable (SP/CONEDD)
Somanegré NANA	Secrétariat Permanent du Conseil National pour le Développement Durable (SP/CONEDD) Point Focal du Burkina Faso à la Convention sur la Diversité Biologique
Amadé OUEDRAOGO	Secrétariat Permanent du Conseil National pour le Développement Durable (SP/CONEDD)
Cheikh Tidiane KANE	Chargé de la Gestion des Aires Protégées Commission de l'UEMOA
Jules GAYE	Représentant pays du RONGEAD BFA

ANNEX 3: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

- Larger than Elephants: Inputs for an EU Strategic Approach to Wildlife Conservation in Africa - Regional Analysis, May 2016 (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/larger-elephants-inputs-eu-strategic-approach-wildlife-conservation-africa-regional-analysis_en)
- EU Action Plan against wildlife trafficking One year after - Overview of actions and initiatives taken by the EU Member States and the European Commission, February 2017 (ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/Achievements_WAP_overview.pdf)
- EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking (COM(2016) 87 final), February 2016 (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/WAP_EN_WEB.PDF)
- WWF's analysis of the EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking, WWF Position Paper, April 2016 (http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_analysis_on_eu_action_plan_against_wildlife_trafficking_april_2016.pdf)
- Evaluation finale et prospective du programme régional Parc W / ECOPAS, novembre 2008
- European Union – West Africa Regional Indicative Programme 2014 – 2020 signed on 06 July 2015
- European Union – Burkina Faso National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2014-2020, signed on 17 September 2014
- Evaluation finale et prospective du programme PAPE (Programme d'appui aux Parcs de l'Entente), Final report, April 2017
- Suivi / Évaluation des projets de la composante 3 du programme PAPE (Programme d'appui aux Parcs de l'Entente) « Relations entre les populations et la conservation du complexe WAP (Parcs W, Arly, et Pendjari) » ---- SUIVI-ÉVALUATION ET CAPITALISATION D'EXPÉRIENCES ---- Rapport de Mission IV 29 septembre – 1er octobre 2016, Rapport provisoire
- Fiche d'Action du Programme d'appui pour la préservation de la biodiversité et les écosystèmes fragiles, à la gouvernance environnementale et au changement climatique en Afrique de l'Ouest (Numéro CRIS : ROC/FED/039-269, Financé par le 11e Fonds européen de développement), provided in February 2018 by the EU Delegation to Burkina Faso
- ANNEX 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2017 (part 2), Action Document for Reinforcing security by combating wildlife and forest crime, provided in February 2018 by DG DEVCO
- Etude la discordance des textes législatifs et règlementaires sur la gestion des aires protégées du complexe transfrontalier W-Arly-Pendjari- Oti Kéran Mandouri (Complexe WAPO) et harmonisation des stratégies de conservation, WEAMU, 2014

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Case study: EU Action Plan Against Wildlife Trafficking Country note: Kenya

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Rationale for selection of the country

The EU Wildlife Action Plan 2016 – 2020 is a far-reaching plan to address wildlife trafficking within the EU and strengthen the EU's role in the fight against these illegal activities globally, through 32 measures, divided over three priority areas: prevention, enforcement and cooperation. It forms part of the EU's response to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and in particular to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 15, which calls for urgent action to end poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna and address both demand and supply of illegal wildlife products.³⁴¹ Kenya was selected as a case study to gather field evidence on the (potential /future) impact of the EUAP against wildlife trafficking for the following reasons³⁴²:

- Due to its strategic location, the Horn of Africa has been identified as both a source and transit route for illegal wildlife trade in ivory, rhino horn, live animals, shark fins, corals and other wildlife products between Africa, the Middle East and Asia.
- More specifically, Kenya seems to be at the centre of trafficking operations. The April 2013 issue of *Africa Geographic* states that Kenya is a principal exit point for ivory leaving Africa, and this is acknowledged by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Interpol.
- The majority of recent large seizures of illicit ivory made anywhere in the world were exported from either Kenya or Tanzania, largely through the massive container ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. Since ivory comes from many places and is distributed to buyers across Asia, these ports represent a vital checkpoint in the trafficking network.

1.2 Hypotheses to be verified during the field mission

It should be noted that the EUAP against wildlife trafficking has two distinct features:

- On the one hand, it is a recent communication tool (published in 2016) that crystallizes EU philosophy and lessons learned from *past* interventions linked to wildlife preservation and trafficking. In this context, one of the objectives of the field mission is to assess the extent to which EU actions, including *past* actions, are coherent with the EUAP, and vice versa (the extent to which lessons from past actions are reflected into the EUAP);
- On the other hand, the EUAP should also inform future project design and planning. In this context, we also attempt to understand if the EUAP against wildlife trafficking has influenced the design of *future* projects (i.e. those that have been designed after the Communication was issued), and how.

³⁴¹ EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking (COM (2016) 87 final), page 5

³⁴² LARGER THAN ELEPHANTS | Inputs for an EU strategic approach to wildlife conservation in Africa – Regional Analysis – Eastern Africa, Box 2, page 138

Bearing the above considerations in mind, the focus of the field mission has been placed on 3 key areas of the EUAP whose actions are implemented directly at the level of developing countries:³⁴³

- The engagement of rural communities in the management and conservation of wildlife, and aimed at supporting the development of sustainable and alternative livelihoods for communities living in and adjacent to wildlife habitats (linked to Actions 4 and 5 of the EUAP against wildlife trafficking) - *I 7.3.1: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on the Livelihood of local communities*
- Reducing corruption and strengthening the rule of law (linked to Action 8 and 25 of the EUAP against wildlife trafficking) - *I 7.3.2: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on corruption and the capacity of enforcement and judiciary in developing countries*
- Status of cooperation between the EU and developing countries (both in terms of support programmes, and improved coordination to address wildlife trafficking, linked to Actions 26, 27, 28 and 30) - *I 7.3.3: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on cooperation between the EU and developing countries (both in terms of support programmes, and improved coordination to address wildlife trafficking)*

In each of the three key areas, we attempt to assess the contribution of past and future EU actions to the objective (impact) of preserving endangered species and reducing wildlife trafficking, in order to assess the impact indicator “*I 7.3.4: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on the reduction of Illicit Trade between the selected country and the EU*”.

2 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE LINK WITH EU POLICY(ES) / INITIATIVE(S) IN THE COUNTRY

The EU’s investments in wildlife conservation in Kenya are mainstreamed into infrastructure, agriculture and resilience to climate shocks. These are core sectors in the National Indicative Programme (NIP). Wildlife conservation is therefore not a core sector of concentration in the NIP, although projects like conservation agriculture and rehabilitation and conservation of forested areas provide habitats and connectivity for wildlife. Some of the habitats restored or rehabilitated are national reserves and parks jointly managed by the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) and Kenya Forest Service (KFS). This is different for other donors. USAID for example have played a more important role than the EU, inter alia through the direct support to Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS), the state agency placed under the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, that has the mandate to conserve and manage wildlife in Kenya, and to enforce related laws and regulations. Nevertheless, the EU has still carried out a number of projects in the field of wildlife conservation as laid out in Table 1.

Table 1: EU Programmes / Projects in the area of wildlife trafficking and conservation

Action	Period	Budget / Overall objective Funding
Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF)		10 th EDF

Established through a financing agreement between the Government of Kenya (GoK) and the European Union (EU), later in 2007 mandated to receive grants from multiple donors. Over four phases lasting two decades, implemented approximately 800 community-based socio-economic and environmental projects.

³⁴³ Please refer to the methodological note of the field mission as approved by DG DEVCO for additional information

			<p>Specially, some projects addressed human-wildlife conflicts through supporting the construction of wildlife barriers by forest adjacent communities. The impacts of these on both livelihoods and conservation were apparent through enabling communities to grow crops without massive wildlife depredation, greater protection of forests and, enhanced community ownership of wildlife and forest resources.</p>
Cross-Regional Wildlife Conservation in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean	2018-2024?	EUR 32 450 000 under 11 th EDF	<p>The overall objective of this six-year programme is to stop the illegal killing and trafficking of protected wildlife species in Southern and Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean through improved management of shared ecosystems in addition to tackling illegal killing of wildlife by strengthening law enforcement capacity and cross-border collaboration and enhancing anti-trafficking efforts.</p> <p>This will be achieved through the implementation of three complementary specific objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Specific objective 1: Wildlife law enforcement capacity and cross-border collaboration in selected transboundary ecosystems is strengthened; ▪ Specific objective 2: anti-trafficking efforts are enhanced; ▪ Specific Objective 3: the sustainable management of Transfrontier Conservation Areas is promoted and strengthened.
<p>MIKE / MIKES³⁴⁴</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Minimizing the Illegal Killing of Elephants and other Endangered Species (MIKES) (2014-2018) ▪ MIKE 3.0 (2013-2014) — funded by the European Union under the Strategic Cooperation Agreement between the European Commission and UNEP of the European Union's Thematic Programme on the Environment and Natural Resources (ENRTP). ▪ MIKE Phase II (2006-2012) — an initiative of the ACP Secretariat funded by the European Union. ▪ MIKE Phase I (2001-2004) 			<p>The overall goal of MIKE is to provide information needed for elephant range States to make appropriate management and enforcement decisions, and to build institutional capacity within the range States for the long-term management of their elephant populations. MIKES leverages the strong foundation established and successes that have been achieved by MIKE but with an expanded focus to include: a) other CITES-listed flagship species threatened by international trade; b) initiatives aimed at minimising the impact of poaching and the illegal trade on the target species, in particular through efforts to strengthen the capacity and capabilities of law enforcement agencies to combat poaching at both site and national levels; c) piloting of the MIKE Programme's successful adaptive management and monitoring approaches in selected sites in the Caribbean and Pacific regions. The MIKES Project was launched in 2014 and will conclude in 2018. MIKES is funded by the European Union's 10th European Development Fund through EuropeAid and with the support of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP).</p> <p><u>List of current MIKE sites in Kenya:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Meru National Park ▪ Mount Elgon National Park ▪ Samburu-Laikipia ▪ Tsavo Conservation Area
Reinforcing security by combating wildlife and forest crime	GPGC	43,5 M EUR	<p>The specific objective is to reduce wildlife and forest crime in and between a series of strategic countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The project will target a selection of regions and countries known to be heavily involved in, or impacted by, the increasingly well organised illegal wildlife trade, resulting in increased insecurity in countries of origin. Of these, Kenya has been identified as one of key source, transit or consumer countries eligible for support under this project alongside about 20 other countries globally. The specific objective will be achieved through the following results and activities which respond to the Problem Analysis and the Lessons Learnt:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Result 1: Wildlife and forest law enforcement in targeted countries and international coordination improved ▪ Result 2: Contribution of civil society to the fight against wildlife and forest crime increased
BIOPAMA	2011-2017; 2017-2023	ACP Group, 10 th EDF and 11 th EDF	<p>The Programme BIOPAMA aims to address threats to biodiversity in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, while reducing poverty in communities in and around protected areas. Specifically, the programme will enhance existing institutions and networks by making the best available science and knowledge available for building capacity to improve policies and better decision-making on biodiversity conservation, protected areas management and access and benefit sharing.</p>

³⁴⁴ <https://cites.org/eng/prog/mike/proj>
 EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S
 POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT

We note that interviews with stakeholders during the field mission in Nairobi (19-23 March 2018) allowed the evaluation to gather feedback on past projects (implemented before the EUAP against wildlife trafficking was published) as well as discuss the potential impact of ongoing projects such as MIKE/MIKES and the Cross-Regional Wildlife Conservation in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean, the later which can be directly linked to the EUAP against wildlife trafficking (the programmatic documents of these projects make clear and explicit reference to the EUAP against wildlife trafficking). Other future EU projects that might be implemented at the level of Kenya (such as the global programme “Reinforcing security by combating wildlife and forest crime” under the GPGC) were at early stages of development and were not known to stakeholders on the ground. Projects under GPGC have therefore been excluded from the analysis presented below.

3 FINDINGS (AT OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS LEVELS) INCLUDING UNINTENDED EFFECTS)

3.1 Country level outcomes

In this section, we assess the extent to which the above-mentioned projects / programmes as well as other EU actions have been effective and have contributed to the overall impact of the EUAP in three key areas linked to Indicators I 7.3.1, I 7.3.2, and I 7.3.3 as defined in the methodology.

I 7.3.1: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on the Livelihood of local communities

The involvement of local communities in the conservation of wildlife is not a new concept in Kenya, although human-wildlife conflicts persist, and Kenya possesses a long experience in this area:

- Conservancies managed by communities make up as much as 4% or more of Kenya (against 8% for national parks) land mass. GoK has also established the Kenya Wildlife Conservancies Association to spearhead community and private sector interests in conservation;
- The involvement of communities in wildlife conservation efforts is foreseen in the national legislation since the enactment of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act of 2013 (Section 39);
- A number of local and international non-governmental organizations active in Kenya have extensive experience in this field. Way back in the early 2000s, for instance, the local organization African Conservation Centre (ACC) set up a scheme whereby local community “scouts” were hired in the areas later established as conservancies in order to inter alia combat poaching and wildlife trafficking.

The specific involvement of the EU with respect to this indicator can be traced back to the following projects:

- Under the Community Development Trust Fund, past interventions have focused on mitigating human-wildlife conflicts, eco-tourism development and, improvement of livelihoods and conservation of wildlife and forest resources.

- Under the ongoing Cross-Regional Wildlife Conservation in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (PIR EDF 11), through “Result 1.3: Community participation in, and support for, law enforcement and anti-poaching in the selected MIKES focal sites strengthened” and “Result 3.6: Capacity of communities living in or near TFCAs to support long-term sustainable ecosystem management and wildlife conservation strengthened and incentivised through livelihood development and benefit sharing” targeted local communities living in or adjacent to trans frontier conservation areas are jointly with civil society organizations are implementing 11 grants across EAC, SADC and IGAD including the following 3 projects benefiting Kenya:
 - Initiative for Conservation of Mara-Serengeti Transboundary Ecosystem;
 - Strengthening Community Support for Law Enforcement and Anti-Poaching Efforts in the Greater Kilimanjaro Trans Frontier Conservation Area (TFCA);
 - Greater Kilimanjaro Initiatives to enhance community participation in sustainable conservation of the trans-frontier ecosystem and wildlife.

Based on the above, it appears that supporting the livelihood of local communities in areas adjacent to protected areas and involving these communities into conservation efforts as foreseen in the EUAP against wildlife trafficking was already featured in actions that have been taking place in Kenya since the early 2000. Under the 10th EDF, EU has supported Kenya to construct touristic infrastructure in Tsavo, Mt. Kenya and Aberdares National Parks. Moreover, current EU actions funded under the Cross-Regional Wildlife Conservation in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (RIP EDF 11) appear to be increasingly focused on wildlife conservation and enforcement (whereas past EU actions supporting local communities were more generic/ focused on livelihood).

I 7.3.2: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on corruption and the capacity of enforcement and judiciary in developing countries

Following the sharp increase in poaching in 2012-2013³⁴⁵ when 302 and 384 elephants were poached during the two years respectively - 30 rhinos killed in 2012 and 59 were in 2013³⁴⁶ (well before the EUAP against wildlife trafficking was published by the EU), the Government of Kenya took major steps in order to reduce the illegal killings of wildlife species and especially elephants:

- At the policy level, the government enacted new wildlife legislation greatly enhancing penalties for wildlife-related crime, invested more heavily in community engagement and cross-border cooperation, enhanced advocacy leading to the closing of major domestic ivory markets in China and Europe.
- In terms of implementation, stakeholders in Kenya have confirmed that penalties associated with wildlife crime have become much more severe as a result of government actions.
- The above measures have resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of poached elephants in Kenya, down from 390 in 2013 to only 46 last year according to KWS (Forbes Magazine, Jan 5 2018³⁴⁷), although some problems subsist.

³⁴⁵ Weru, S. (2016). Wildlife protection and trafficking assessment in Kenya: Drivers and trends of transnational wildlife crime in Kenya and its role as a transit point for trafficked species in East Africa. TRAFFIC.

³⁴⁶ KWS annual reports 2013/2014.

³⁴⁷ <https://www.forbes.com/sites/insideasia/2018/01/05/china-bans-ivory-why-2018-is-the-year-of-the-elephant/#596a6de41e93> [downloaded 30 April 2018]

It should be noted that the above government led measures have been supported by donor intervention specifically linked to enforcement, inter alia EU's support to UNODC' Container Control Programme (CCP) was developed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Customs organization (WCO) for the purpose of assisting governments to establish effective controls over the flow of sea containers traded through their ports and dry-ports. This goal is achieved through developing the resources and professional skills of the existing border control agencies to correctly identify containers of risk amongst the licit trade in sea containers. Under this project and with additional (to funding under the MIKES programme) support through ongoing the cross-regional wildlife conservation programme, UNODC will strengthen detection and interdiction efforts to target trafficking of wildlife and forest products at ports, borders and airports in selected countries. The initiative supports the establishment of dedicated multi-agency Port Control Units (PCUs), staffed by enforcement officers (trained on detection and identification) drawn from agencies with trade, border and security mandates i.e. Customs, Police, Port Authority, and importantly, the PCUs will also include officers from national Wildlife and/or Forest Authorities.³⁴⁸

With regards to the role of the EU with respect to corruption / enforcement, the following should be noted:

- Since 2002, the EU has been active through the MIKE programme (funded by the EU and implemented by CITES) which focuses on monitoring and reporting the illegal killing of elephants through the collection of data on the number of carcasses in key sites in Kenya (hence strictly speaking, MIKE does not focus on enforcement). Since 2014, the EU has introduced the MIKES project (under MIKE) which goes beyond data collection and monitoring and attempts to minimize the killing of endangered species via actions such as capacity building of patrol rangers, training, etc.
- Enforcement is a key focus of the Cross-Regional Wildlife Conservation in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean recently launched with EU support of 30 million EUROS, notably:
 - Specific objective 1: “Wildlife law enforcement capacity and cross-border collaboration in selected transboundary ecosystems is strengthened”: under this objective which will be implemented by CITES, the following results have been defined:
 - Result 1.1: Wildlife law enforcement capacity and anti-poaching activities strengthened in high priority focal sites for MIKE and other relevant sites situated on international borders
 - Result 1.2: Mechanisms and capacity for adjacent countries to collaborate in joint law enforcement and anti-poaching operations strengthened in transboundary ecosystems that incorporates a MIKES focal site and if relevant non-MIKES focal sites.
 - Specific objective 2: “Anti-trafficking efforts are enhanced”: under this objective which will be implemented by UNODC, the following results have been defined:
 - Result 2.1: Border controls strengthened through the extension of UNODC Container Control Programme (CCP) activities to new ports, air cargo terminals and border points in key strategic locations and the continued support to established port control units.
 - Result 2.2: Capacities to combat wildlife and forest crime strengthened across the entire criminal justice chain through an array of tools, and capacity building measures.

³⁴⁸ Cross-Regional Wildlife Conservation in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean programme document, page 8

Based on the above, it appears that the Government of Kenya and other donors were already very active in the area of enforcement of wildlife crime before the EUAP against wildlife trafficking was published, with a certain degree of success given the fall in poaching since 2012-2013. In 2016, and for the fifth consecutive year, the number of illegal killings fell below the number of natural deaths reported³⁴⁹. Kenya lost fewer rhinos and elephants to poachers in 2017 compared to the previous year, according to Save the Rhino, quoting the Cabinet Secretary in the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife³⁵⁰. Recently, and in line with the approach laid out in the EUAP against wildlife trafficking, the EU has taken a more proactive approach, building on and expanding on past EU led (MIKE) and UNODC initiatives, adopting a three-pronged approach-wildlife law enforcement, enhancing anti-trafficking efforts and strengthening institutions at the regional level to tackle trafficking across borders and putting communities at the frontline to stem trafficking of wildlife at the source and transit routes.

I 7.3.3: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on cooperation between the EU and developing countries (both in terms of support programmes, and improved coordination to address wildlife trafficking)

Technical Cooperation

With regards to technical cooperation between the EU and Kenya on issues linked to wildlife crime, the following should be noted:

- The EU is implementing its technical cooperation projects mainly through recognized inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations (among which include *inter alia* CITES, UNODC, WWF, etc.) rather than through national agencies or the regional organizations (no government agency in Kenya and no regional organization receive direct funding from the EU). This approach has been continued under the Cross- Regional Wildlife Conservation Programme which is been implemented by UNODC (objectives 1 and 2) and directly by the EU Delegations (EUD) in beneficiary under objective 3 (11 grants awarded to NGOs to promote the involvement of local communities across EAC, SADC and IGAD). Government lead agencies and the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife were eligible as part of consortia applying for grants under the Cross-Regional Wildlife Conservation Programme, but they did not participate in submission of applications. Nonetheless, Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) is benefiting indirectly because they are working closely with: i) the UNODC in detecting and identifying trafficked wildlife products through the ports of Nairobi and Mombasa; and ii) International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), OIKOS East Africa and Vi Agroforestry in the Greater Kilimanjaro and Mara-Ngorongoro-Serengeti Ecosystems. These projects at landscape level build synergies, complementarity and closely collaborate with national level agencies responsible for wildlife conservation.
- The EU is a sitting member of the Development Partners Coordination Group, the Development Partner Wildlife Issues Group and, Technical Committee on Conservation chaired by the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife. The main objective of this committee is to ensure that technical assistance provided by the donor community is allocated and implemented effectively (maximizing synergies and minimizing overlaps).

³⁴⁹CITES (2017). 2016 trends in African elephant poaching released – CITES MIKE programme.https://cites.org/eng/news/pr/2016_trends_in_African_elephant_poaching_released_%E2%80%93_CITES_MIKE_programme_03032017 [downloaded 30 Mar 2018]

³⁵⁰https://www.savetherhino.org/latest_news/blog/1791_kenya_poaching_stats_out [downloaded 30 March 2018]

Political Dialogue / Cooperation in the wider sense

Besides cooperation between the EU and Kenya taking place through non-governmental organizations, it is also important to consider how the issue of wildlife trafficking is addressed and structured at the political level, and how wildlife trafficking influences cooperation in the broader sense between the EU and Kenya.

Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to this question, and information on the ground rather suggests the absence of a structured and permanent political dialogue on the issue of wildlife trafficking locally (dialogue is rather done at the international level in the context of conventions such as CITES) partly because wildlife is not a sector of concentration in Kenya. Besides, a detailed review of the National Indicative Programme (NIP) indicates that the wider issue of wildlife trafficking is not *directly* considered as an important factor shaping cooperation at the national level (the EUD should consider highlighting in its NIP the proportion / amount of funds that are *indirectly* related to wildlife conservation in the projects supporting forestry, agriculture, sustainable infrastructure related areas. Direct engagement with the wildlife sector should also be accorded higher priority in the NIP).

Nevertheless, interviews with stakeholders do suggest that the political dialogue taking place in the context of international conventions has been successful in achieving key objectives, the most recent one being the ban of ivory trade by China, which according to government agencies was the result of inter alia EU – Kenya high-level political lobbying. This is a major achievement with potential long-term positive impact for Kenya and other African countries since China is widely believed to be the world's largest consumer of ivory, both legal and illegal, and it plays a major role in the yearly slaughter of some 30,000 African elephants by poachers. Ivory is in demand for intricate carvings, trinkets, chopsticks, and other items.³⁵¹ Attention is however gradually shifting to other countries especially those neighbouring China. EU's participation in the Giants Summit held in Laikipia, ivory crush by President Kenyatta and jointly leading and collaborating in ensuring wildlife is given attention in UNEA and CITES as deepening political dialogue at the national level.

3.2 Country level impacts

Given the active role of the Kenyan government combatting wildlife crime (especially since 2012-13), the active presence of other international donors, and the existence of a structured dialogue at the international level (all of which predate the EUAP against wildlife trafficking), it is difficult, at this point in time of the state of implementation of the EUAP to ascertain that it will have a sizeable impact in Kenya, or the magnitude of any such impact, but with implementation of the ongoing actions and strengthening political dialogue, there is potential to attribute some level of impact to the EUAP in future. The greatest contribution that implementing EUAP will have is in helping address the supply, transit and the demand side of the fight against wildlife trafficking.

Besides, while EU technical assistance which to date has been limited in size will scale up in the next years in areas directly linked to the EUAP against wildlife trafficking (involvement of local communities, and enforcement for instance), it will be very challenging to measure the impact of this technical assistance given: (i) the illicit nature of wildlife trade and the absence

³⁵¹ See for instance <https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/wildlife-watch-china-ivory-ban-goes-into-effect/>

of reliable data; (ii) technical challenges linked to measuring impact of livelihood and enforcement projects; (iii) the multitude of interventions of both the government of Kenya and other donors in this sector.

In any case, given the number of other donors active in this field (USAID, UNDP-GEF), the active role of the Government of Kenya, multiplicity of conservation NGOs and community initiatives, the impact directly attributable to the EUAP is likely to be very difficult to measure and to attribute to the EU.

Nevertheless, it is of utmost importance that the EU puts in place strong M&E frameworks for its technical assistance interventions.

3.3 Unintended outcomes and impacts

The evaluation team identified a limited number of unintended outcomes or consequences likely to be linked to the EUAP against wildlife trafficking. One potential unintended impact is weakening of government institutions through loss of staff and the continued modality of grant funding to NGOs, despite requirements for NGOs to partner and synergize with government agencies.

4 CONCLUSIONS COVERING THE ELEMENTS CONFIRMING OR NOT CONFIRMING THE DESK PHASE HYPOTHESIS

The EU has chosen to approach wildlife conservation with a regional lens. This is in line with the EU Action Plan and the Larger than Elephants strategic approach. EU investments and political dialogue are therefore concentrated at this level: addressing the regional sources, transit routes and demand for trafficking of wildlife products. This approach enables national institutions to collaborate across borders in the effort to stem wildlife trafficking. This, EU's role and niche, permits other donors and actors to participate and engage at trans-frontier and regional level by building on EU's supported actions.

For this reason, and wildlife being not a sector of concentration in the Kenyan NIP, EU has rather mainstreamed wildlife conservation in ongoing infrastructure, agriculture and resilience to climate shocks programmes. Donors such as USAID, UNDP and the World Bank have *directly* supported Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), the state agency placed under the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife that has the mandate to conserve and manage wildlife in Kenya, and to enforce related laws and regulations. Actions laid out in the EUAP against wildlife trafficking are not revolutionary in the context of Kenya although they are in line with current best-practice:

- The involvement of local communities (including promotion of alternative livelihood) in the conservation of wildlife is not a new concept in Kenya, and Kenya possesses a long experience in this area, notably through the support of internationally recognized and specialized NGOs over the last 20 years and beyond. This experience will inform community engagement at the trans-frontier conservation level;
- In terms of enforcement, the Government of Kenya's actions pre-dating the EUAP against wildlife trafficking have been effective: following the sharp increase in poaching in 2012-2013³⁵², the Government of Kenya took major steps in order to reduce the illegal killings of

³⁵²Weru, S. (2016)

wildlife species and especially elephants (strengthened policy framework, harsher penalties for poachers, training of judiciary, etc.) and the elephant population is stable today.

- Nonetheless, the EU has several complementary actions under its NIP which do support the KWS, including construction of touristic infrastructure (KWS are part of the implementing agencies)³⁵³ and rehabilitation of biodiverse habitats (Kenya's water towers).³⁵⁴

In the context of the Regional Indicative Programme 2014-2020 (11th EDF), EU support to wildlife conservation has sharply increased and this can be *indirectly* linked to the EUAP against wildlife trafficking, since the RIP makes ample reference to the EUAP, and all actions foreseen in the context of the RIP are fully coherent with the EUAP against wildlife trafficking. EU actions funded under the RIP are ongoing and are mainly implemented through the following actors:

- Actions related to enforcement are being implemented by the inter-governmental organizations CITES, UNODP and Commission of Migratory Species (CMS), building of existing programmes like MIKE and MIKES previously funded by the EU;
- Actions related to the involvement of local communities are being implemented by international and local NGOs, expanding on programmes and approaches that have started long before the publication of the EUAP against wildlife trafficking.

It should be noted that the EU's choice of implementing partners under the RIP 2014-2020 *de facto* leaves out the Government of Kenya and the EAC Secretariat as *direct* beneficiaries (since the channeling of funds is done only through inter-governmental organizations and NGOs), which could have the unintended negative effect of weakening government institutions vis-à-vis other actors – by encouraging staff losses in pursuit of better terms and reducing negotiating ability, for example. However, the EU Delegation pointed out that their actions engage with and even strengthen the EAC Secretariat and Kenyan Government indirectly through the various projects e.g. the Commission of Migratory Species/UNODC project and civil society organizations grants working with KWS.

Despite the sharp increase in EU funded projects in the area of wildlife conservation as described above (which is praised by all local stakeholders), it is unlikely that the EUAP against wildlife trafficking as such will have a sizeable and measurable impact on Kenya's development for the following reasons:

- First of all, most EU actions deriving from the EUAP against wildlife trafficking are rather limited in size compared to actions being implemented in parallel by the Government of Kenya or other donor agencies;
- Since most actions build on existing efforts pre-dating the EUAP against wildlife trafficking, it will be impossible to “isolate” the exact contribution of EU efforts;
- It is not yet possible to know precisely if Kenya will benefit from other EU funded support linked to the EUAP against wildlife trafficking since non EDF EU programming from which Kenya could benefit (GPGC) is still at early design stage.

However, the EU delegation pointed out that the EU's investments through the cross-regional wildlife programme will provide institutional mechanisms for other donors to address wildlife trafficking at the regional level.

³⁵³ EU contributes 13M€ under the 10th EDF to support Kenya Wildlife Service in the construction of 78 km of all-weather gravel roads in Aberdares National Park, 28 km of bitumen roads in Mt. Kenya National Park and an improved road and steel bridge over the Galana river in Tsavo East National park

³⁵⁴ EU contributes 31M€ under the 10th EDF to the Water Towers programme in Mount Elgon and Cherangani Hills.

Nonetheless, it could be a good idea for the EU Delegation to review its indicators for measuring and attributing impact to the EUAP, in particular with the implementing partners of the grants and the Delegation Agreement with UNODC. In addition, the EU Delegation could consider whether it would be possible to better report its NIP actions in order to highlight the contributions to wildlife conservation.

ANNEX 1: DATA COLLECTION METHODS USED (ITS LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS)

Qualitative feedback and stakeholder's viewpoints were the main source of information given the lack of quantitative and reliable data on:

- Poaching and wildlife trafficking
- Impact of past EU Actions

ANNEX 2: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Name	Status and organization
Myra Bernardi	Delegation of the European Union to Kenya Team Leader; Rural Development & Food Security
Thomas Yatich	Delegation of the European Union to Kenya Programme Manager, Environments, Natural Resources and Climate change
Dave Henson	CITES/MIKE Programme regional coordinator
Thea Carroll?	MIKE Coordinator
Javier Montano	UNODC / Regional Coordinator, Container Control Programme/ Cross-Regional Wildlife Conservation in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean
Washington Ayiemba	UNDP Programme Officer / Energy Environment and Climate Change
Brad Arsenault	USAID Deputy Director/ EA Operations and Environment Office
James Njogu	Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) Head of CITES Convention
Samuel Kasiki	Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) Deputy Director, Biodiversity Research
Lucy Waruingi	African Conservation Center Executive Director
Dr. Eustus Kanga	Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife Deputy Director, Wildlife Conservation
Patrick Omondi	Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife Deputy Director
Taye Teferi	TRAFFIC Policy and Oartnership Coordinator
Ashley Baker	IFAW Deputy Vice President, Institutional Giving
Steve Njumbi	IFAW Programme Officer
James Isiche	IFAW Director, Eastern Africa Regional Office
Philip Muruthi	AWF Vice President, Species Conservation
Per Karlsson	AWF Program Design Manager
Didi Wamukoya	AWF Legal Adviser
Fiesta Warinwa	AWF Director, Policy Engagement
Andrea Athanas	AWF Program Design

ANNEX 3: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

- Larger than Elephants: Inputs for an EU Strategic Approach to Wildlife Conservation in Africa - Regional Analysis, May 2016 (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/larger-elephants-inputs-eu-strategic-approach-wildlife-conservation-africa-regional-analysis_en)
- EU Action Plan against wildlife trafficking One year after - Overview of actions and initiatives taken by the EU Member States and the European Commission, February 2017 (ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/Achievements_WAP_overview.pdf)
- EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking (COM(2016) 87 final), February 2016 (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/WAP_EN_WEB.PDF)
- WWF's analysis of the EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking, WWF Position Paper, April 2016 (http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_analysis_on_eu_action_plan_against_wildlife_trafficking_april_2016.pdf)
- United Nations Development Programme. Project Document for Nationally Implemented Projects Financed by the GEF Trust Fund: Combating Poaching and Illegal Wildlife Trafficking in Kenya through an Integrated Approach
- EC Project No. FED/2014/342-884 (UNEP Project No: XT 6020-14-03). Minimising the Illegal Killing of Elephants and other Endangered Species (MIKES).Progress Report March 2016 – February 2017. Prepared by: Cites Secretariat- Mike Central Coordination Unit. Nairobi, Kenya, March 2017.
- National Strategy For Combating Wildlife Trafficking. The White House. February 11, 2014.
- Parry-Jones, R. and Allan, C. 2017. Wildlife Crime Initiative Annual Review July 2016 – June 2017. WWF and TRAFFIC, Gland, Switzerland.
- WWF/TRAFFIC (2015). Strategies for Fighting Corruption in Wildlife Conservation: A Primer. A publication of the WWF and TRAFFIC Wildlife Crime Initiative.
- KWS Annual Report 2013
- KWS Annual Report 2014
- Lucy Vigne and Esmond Martin, 2017. Decline In The Legal Ivory Trade In China In Anticipation Of A Ban Save the Elephants, Nairobi Kenya. ISBN 978-9966-100-47-4
- Esther Marijnen. The 'green militarisation' of development aid: the European Commission and the Virunga National Park, DR Congo. Third World Quarterly, 2017. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1282815>
- European Union – East Africa Regional Indicative Programme 2014 – 2020
- European Union – Kenya National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2014-2020
- ANNEX 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2017 (part 2), Action Document for Reinforcing security by combating wildlife and forest crime, provided in February 2018 by DG DEVCO

Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Case study: Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) Country note: Armenia

1 INTRODUCTION

The evaluation on the EU's Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) requires for the assessment at the impact level, the availability of concrete PCD outputs to be able to explore further causality links to outcome and impact. The development considerations contained in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) constitute a PCD output, according to the IL of the EU's approach to PCD. The case study will look at the outcomes and impacts in a developing country resulting from the changes in a EU policy and actions brought about by incorporating a PCD approach.

1.1 Rationale for selection of the country

The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) constitutes the overarching framework of the EU External Migration Policy and defines how the EU conducts its policy dialogues and cooperation with non-EU countries in the area of migration, based on four equally important objectives (GAMM four pillars):

- better organising legal migration, and fostering well-managed mobility;
- preventing and combatting irregular migration, and eradicating trafficking in human beings;
- maximising the development impact of migration and mobility, and
- promoting international protection and enhancing the external dimension of asylum.

Among the different mechanisms and tools to implement the GAMM, Mobility Partnerships (MP) with selected countries constitute a specific framework for bilateral cooperation with the EU in the areas of legal migration, development, border control, and international protection.³⁵⁵ The aim of the MPs has been to make the most of the opportunities and benefits that migrants, country of origin and receiving country can derive from the management of migration flows and at the same time promoting positive outcomes for the development of the country of origin. MPs as an open political framework, comprise a series of reciprocal commitments which in turn translate into projects initiatives covering the four main objectives of the GAMM. The selection of Armenia as a case study relies on the following:

- is one of the EU Eastern Partnership countries that has signed two legal agreements with the EU within the MP framework: the Visa Facilitation Agreement and the Readmission Agreement, both in force since 2014. Given that it has been quite a few years since the implementation of the first actions under this MP it was expected that there would be enough evidence available on the impact of actions under the objective of migration and development (M&D).
- Armenia is a landlocked country located in the Caucasus region, with two of its borders closed, historically has a diaspora spread around the world, and has relied over the years on migration as a development resource.³⁵⁶ It has become a destination country for forced displaced people in the last few years. Despite its classification as a lower middle-income country, poverty affects about 30 per cent of the population, and the country relies heavily on remittances.

³⁵⁵COM(2011) 743 final, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.

³⁵⁶ OECD- CCRC Armenia Interrelations between Public Policies, Migration and Development in Armenia 2017 OECD Development Pathways, p.35, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264273603-en>; <https://www.adb.org/countries/armenia/poverty>; Black, Richard, et al. (2007) Understanding Migration as a Driver of Poverty Reduction in Europe and Central Asia, Working Paper C9, Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty.

1.2 Hypotheses to be verified during the field mission

One of the policy objectives of the GAMM is based on the premise that good governance of migration and mobility has a developmental potential and can bring benefits to partner countries: increasing migrant households well-being thanks to opportunities abroad such as acquiring new skills and work experience; fostering more foreign direct investment through diaspora communities; enhancing transfer of remittances, know-how and innovations; countering brain drain and promoting brain circulation.³⁵⁷ This has been identified as the M&D pillar of the GAMM. The MP as an implementation tool based on reciprocity, involves specific commitments for each partner country reflecting the four pillars underlined in the GAMM, including the M&D pillar. These four pillars are reflected in MPs in four areas: a) mobility, legal migration and integration, b) border management (i.e. readmission agreements), c) migration and development (i.e. diaspora, mitigate brain drain, support voluntary return and re-integration) and d) asylum and international protection (i.e. legislation, support measures).

The specific commitments undertaken under the MP with Armenia are set out in the *Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Armenia*, listed here in Annex 3.³⁵⁸ In this case study we assess the contribution of the GAMM to the economic and social development of Armenia in terms of the framework of the MP specific commitments and the projects implemented and recorded in the Scoreboard for Armenia (see Annex 5), focusing mainly on the assessment of the M&D pillar. However, as the review of relevant literature suggests that some of the measures aimed at regulating legal migration could limit the potential improvement of migration opportunities,³⁵⁹ the indicators for the case study cover not only the potential benefits of economic and social remittances, but also consider measures in place such as readmission agreements and visa facilitation agreements to assess possible unintended effects.

Therefore, the extent of the contribution and impact of the GAMM on the development of Armenia will be analysed in terms of the outcomes of specific actions of the MP, considering economic and social remittances, and potential unintended effects due to border management. Also, as the GAMM aims to have a balanced approach to migration management and development, we consider the priority given to the M&D pillar compared to the other pillars and its influence on other actions:

1.7.4.1 Extent of contribution of financial remittances

This indicator will consider evidence on:

- Flows of remittances from EU – share of country’s GDP (source WB, national statistics);
- Share of households receiving financial remittances (through official channels);
- Existence of mechanism for low cost transfer of remittances;
- Diaspora investments – share of total FDI.

1.7.4.2. Extent of contribution of social remittances

The transfer of knowledge and skills has been regarded as social remittances with which migrants also contribute to their countries’ development. The notion also implies that the circulation of ideas, skills, and social capital contribute to local development processes.³⁶⁰ This indicator will consider evidence on:

- Existence of skills matching schemes and mechanisms prior to departure according to the country of destination;
- Existence of skills matching schemes and mechanisms for returnee migrants according to the local labour market;
- Existence of mechanisms to promote the participation of highly qualified migrants to provide training, transfer competencies upon return in national institutions;

³⁵⁷ (COM(2011) 743 final, p.6

³⁵⁸ Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and Armenia, Brussels, doc. 14963/11, ADD 1, 6 October 2011.

³⁵⁹ Reslow N., (2015) EU “Mobility” Partnerships: An Initial Assessment of Implementation Dynamics Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 2, Pages 117-128 ISSN: 2183-2463 Doi: 10.17645/pag.v3i2.398

³⁶⁰ Lacroix, Th., Levitt, P. and Vari-Lavoise, I. (2016), Social remittances and the changing transnational political landscape, *Comparative Migration Studies*, 4:16. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-016-0032-0>

- Engagement of diaspora in skills and knowledge transfers schemes, engagement of diaspora associations assisting local communities and creating business opportunities within the partner country.

1.7.4.3 Extent of improvement of social and economic conditions upon return

The reintegration of migrants who decide to return to their countries of origin can have an effect on the development of their countries when the opportunities to reintegrate to the labour market and the incentives to return exist. This indicator will consider evidence on:

- Economic and living conditions of returnee migrants, portability of social security rights.
- Measures to support returnee migrants, skills matching schemes and support for entrepreneurship (existence of measures, programmes and number of migrants attended), number of matching skills services and migrants attended

1.7.4.4 Unintended effects of border management measures and unintended effects of other measures facilitating migration

This indicator considers evidence on:

- Readmission agreements and number of readmitted migrants per year, existence of measures to support returned irregular migrants;
- Visa facilitation schemes and beneficiaries per year and type;
- Recruitment in vulnerable sectors, existence of framework for ethical recruitment and promotion of training in national institutions.
- Border infrastructure and measures (EU IBM standards)
- Changes in local legislative framework on migration and mobility, including asylum legislation
- Asylum infrastructure

2 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE LINK WITH EU POLICY(ES) / INITIATIVE(S) IN THE COUNTRY

2.1 Country context

Armenia is a landlocked mountainous country in the Caucasus region, east of Turkey and north of Iran. The country has also borders with Georgia to the north and Azerbaijan to the east. With a population just below 3 million people, the country has one of the highest emigration rates in the world, with about 30% of the population living outside the country.³⁶¹ Armenia has recently transitioned from a semi-presidential system to a parliamentary one. In April 2017 elections took place to elect a new parliament which will elect the next president this year. The country sustains since its independence a geopolitical conflict with Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, despite the 1994/95 ceasefire agreements tension in the conflict zone continues.³⁶²

The country has had a slow growth since 2014 and is vulnerable to external conditions. Armenia relies heavily on mineral resources, agriculture and remittances. The mining sector is the fastest growing part of Armenia's economy, in 2016 the mining industry contributed about 5% to country's GDP. The country has significant deposits of gold, copper, molybdenum as well as smaller deposits of zinc, lead, iron and silver.³⁶³ For 2016 the GDP was of USD 10.5 billion,

³⁶¹ <http://www.gov.am/en/demographics/>

³⁶² <https://www.osce.org/mg/108427>

³⁶³ <http://www.gov.am/en/armeniaeiti/>

remittances were about 1.3 billion, 12.64% of GDP, while FDI accounted for 3% of the GDP.³⁶⁴ In 2014 Armenia was ranked among the top 10 remittances recipients among middle income countries with an amount equivalent to 17.9 per cent of its GDP, below Moldova and above countries such as El Salvador and Honduras.³⁶⁵ While the country has traditionally high rates of seasonal labour migration and a sizeable diaspora around the world, more recently it has seen rising numbers of labour migrants and Syrian refugees.³⁶⁶ According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in Armenia, there are 19,955 “people of concern”: refugees, asylum-seekers and persons in a refugee-like situation, including displaced people of Armenian background from Azerbaijan, refugees and asylum-seekers from Iraq, Ukraine and Iran and smaller numbers of refugees from some African countries.³⁶⁷

Poverty still affects a large proportion of the population. Poverty reduction has not resulted in a larger middle class, instead the size of the moderately poor and vulnerable has grown. According to a 2017 study on multidimensional poverty, monetary poverty affects nearly 30 per cent of the population (living below the national poverty threshold), and the absolute number of individuals living in households deprived in each dimension of nonmonetary poverty is quite large. Almost 1.2 million experience deprivations in the labour dimension, the biggest contributor to multidimensional poverty in Armenia, second most important deprivation is housing, and more than 1 million individuals report multiple deprivations.³⁶⁸

Employment

According to the ILO, in Armenia 33.6% of the employed labour force is active in the agriculture sector (mainly semi-subsistence farms), whereas 15.8% is employed in the industry against a 50.6% in the services sector. The National Statistics Service (ArmStat) recorded an unemployment rate of 18.5% for 2015 of the labour force and oscillated between 16.5% and 19% in 2017, while the average salary is just over EUR 320³⁶⁹. The share of long term unemployment (unemployed for a year or longer) in total unemployment is of 60%. The youth unemployment rate reaches 36.3% (young population between the ages of 15 and 24 years old), being the share of unemployment in rural areas much higher among this group.³⁷⁰ Unemployment is also related to over-education and/or holding degrees which have now become obsolete, suggesting that education systems may not be keeping up with an evolving economy, failing to equip young people with sufficient skills and the quality of education needed for the labour market.³⁷¹ The unemployment rate by educational attainment according to the NSS 2015 survey is 17.9% among those holding tertiary and post-graduate level, 21.5% among secondary specialised -vocational, and 17.8% among those who have completed general

³⁶⁴ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/armenia/overview>; <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/051/index.html>

³⁶⁵ World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016, 3rd Edition, p.41.

³⁶⁶ IOM, The sustainable development goals and labour mobility case study Armenia pp.71-84 in 2017 International Organization for Migration (IOM) ‘Migration in the 2030’. Agenda https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/Migration%20in%20the%202030%20Agenda.pdf; <http://www.un.am/en/agency/UNHCR>

³⁶⁷ http://www.un.am/up/library/UNHCRArmeniaFactSheetDec2015_Eng.pdf

³⁶⁸ Martirosova, D. et al, 2017, The many faces of deprivation: a multidimensional approach to poverty in Armenia (English). Poverty and Equity Global Practice Working Paper Series; no. 117. Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group., p.28. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/655651504248170530/The-many-faces-of-deprivation-a-multidimensional-approach-to-poverty-in-Armenia>

³⁶⁹ National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia, Armstat (<http://www.armstat.am/en/?nid=12&id=08001&submit=Search>).

³⁷⁰ www.ilo.org/ilostat; www.armstat.am/file/article/15_trud_2016_8.pdf

³⁷¹ World Bank, Armenia Systematic Country Diagnostic “Future Armenia” Key Findings, June 2017, Country Diagnostic 2017 <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/528851497370212043/Armenia-SCD-External-170613-with-full-pics-Nistha-update.pdf>.

secondary. The highest unemployment is to be found in Yerevan, (30.2% in 2015), Kotayk and Shirak *marzes*.³⁷²

Migration

Migration has allowed to extend the labour market beyond national borders and constitutes a way to help Armenian households to cope with lower incomes and avoids raising unemployment. Annually around 30,000 people emigrate, driven mainly by a small labour market and poverty. The high dependence on remittances in a relatively large number of households in urban areas other than Yerevan, makes those areas more vulnerable to fall into extreme poverty if remittances were to dry up.³⁷³ Emigration represents both an economic and political challenge. It leads to atrophy of agriculture and dying off of rural areas, and to the further shrinking of the domestic market, leading to a cycle of lower growth pushing more migration. A recent household survey found out that unemployment is one of the main motives to emigrate among migrants households (46.7%), and the need to obtain an income for the household (33.3%).³⁷⁴ Unemployed Armenians or those who have a very low income, working in the agricultural sector, migrate as seasonal workers to Russia for work in the construction sector, usually between the months of March and November. About 92% migrants go to Russia, the economic factors, market size, unemployment level and size of wages in Russia favour the decision.³⁷⁵ Geographic closeness and easiness to travel, allows migrants flexibility to react on Russian economic dynamics, as well as the fact that the country is more familiar to Armenians and most possible migrants speak also Russian.³⁷⁶ Labour migration to Russia is mainly irregular, people are mainly engaged in the informal employment sector and lack effective protection for social rights.³⁷⁷

The total amount of remittances received in Armenia in 2015 was of 1.491 billion of USD, that amounted to 14.7 per cent of the GDP (see Annex 4). With respect to FDI and ODA, the volume of remittances has remained much higher compared to either of these flows for the period 2008 – 2016; in 2013 FDI represented 3.11 per cent of the GDP while remittance flows amounted to 19.71 per cent. In 2015 FDI was of 1.60 per cent of GDP and remittances represented 14.7 per cent of GDP. Remittances at its highest have been 22 times the amount of ODA flows in 2013, and on average remittances have been 13 times higher than ODA during the period 2008-2016 (see Annex 4). The main source countries of remittances to Armenia are Russia (~ 60% of the total), followed by the USA (fluctuating between 10 to 15%),³⁷⁸ Kazakhstan, Germany and France. Remittances are mainly directed at consumption, covering expenses for services and goods of prime necessity (food, clothes, utility payments), and scarcely used as productive investments.³⁷⁹ For instance, remittances have a little effect on the agricultural sector, as they are not being used to diversify into different farming activities or non-agricultural businesses.³⁸⁰ Migrants work abroad in employment for which they are overqualified and on return to

³⁷² National Statistical Service (Armstat) Republic of Armenia, Labour Market in the RA of 2016, Main results of the labour force survey 2015.

³⁷³ Martirosova, D. et al., op.cit.p.22.

³⁷⁴ Triennial Monitoring (2015-2017) of the External Migration Situation in the RA through Sampling Study, Armenian-Russian (Slavonic) University, with support from EU-funded project 'Support to Migration and Border Management in Armenia' (MIBMA, Armenian-Russian (Slavonic) University -ICMPD 2016.

³⁷⁵ Idem.

³⁷⁶ Hrant Mikaelyan, Migration of population of Armenia: Economic factors, March 2015, Caucasus Institute, Yerevan http://ci.am/wp-content/uploads/policy-brief-03_2015_en.pdf.

³⁷⁷ Aleksanyan A. (2015) Labor Migration of Armenians into Russia: Problems and Prospects. Mir Rossii, vol. 24, no 2, pp. 105–128, <http://ysu.am/files/Labor-Migration-of-Armenians-into-Russia.pdf>


³⁷⁸ World Bank, Bilateral remittance matrices 2010-2016, (accessed 15th of April 2018)

³⁷⁹ Armenia Migration Policy Strategy and National Action Plan.

³⁸⁰ OECD- CCRC Armenia Interrelations between Public Policies, Migration and Development in Armenia 2017 OECD Development Pathways, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264273603-en>

Armenia, experience the same scenario. Also, it has become difficult to retain human capital as youth unemployment pushes the more qualified ones to go abroad to study or look for opportunities to work.³⁸¹ A recent OECD study concluded that even though migration contributes to the development of Armenia, the potential of migration has not been fully exploited. Migration still needs to be integrated into development strategies.³⁸²

Figure 1: Origin of remittance inflows into Armenia³⁸³



2.2 EU cooperation in Armenia

Armenia is part to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) joint initiative created in 2009 involving the EU, EU Member States and five other Eastern European countries: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Belarus and Azerbaijan. The EaP, a specific dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in which Armenia has been part since its launching in 2004, focuses on the promotion of democracy, prosperity, stability, and strengthening the state and societal resilience. At the bilateral level, the new EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) replacing the 1999 EU-Armenia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, was signed following the Eastern Partnership Summit on November 2017. This partnership based on political and economic cooperation takes into account Armenia's other international commitments. Armenia is member to the Eurasian Economic Union. In February 2018 the EU and Armenia signed a Partnership Priorities setting the joint policy priorities for the next years which will guide EU financial assistance until 2020, also in line with the CEPA, including four main areas of cooperation, among them mobility and people-to-people contacts.³⁸⁴ The CEPA was ratified by the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia in April 2018.

The 2020 deliverables of the joint EU-EaP key priorities, includes specific actions towards progress on 'Visa Liberalisation Action Plans and effective and balanced implementation of Mobility Partnerships'.³⁸⁵ The EU is Armenia's second trading partner after Russia, accounting for around 22% of Armenia's total trade. Since 1 January 2014, Armenia has benefitted from the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP+). As per 2016 data, the EU continues to be Armenia's biggest export market with metals and diamonds among the top exports to the EU. The EU's exports to Armenia consist of machinery and transport equipment, miscellaneous

³⁸¹ IOM, The sustainable development goals and labour mobility Case Study Armenia, pp. 71-84, in 2017 International Organization for Migration (IOM) Migration in the 2030 Agenda, https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/Migration%20in%20the%202030%20Agenda.pdf

³⁸² OECD- CCRC Armenia, op.cit.

³⁸³ World Bank, Bilateral remittance matrices 2010-2016, (accessed 15th of April 2018)

³⁸⁴ https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/4080/EU-Armenia%20relations

³⁸⁵ SWD (2016) 467 final Joint Staff Working Document Eastern Partnership

manufactured articles and chemicals. The EU is also negotiating with Armenia a comprehensive EU-Armenia Air Transport Agreement.³⁸⁶

The EU provides Armenian companies with funding, training, and export support to new markets through the EU4Business initiative. In the area of research and innovation, the EU contributes through the Horizon 2020 programme, in which Armenia can participate since November 2016. In the period 2015-2017, 1,300 students and academic staff from Armenia will have studied or taught in Europe and some 580 European students and staff will have gone to Armenia as part of the Erasmus+ programme. 25 scholarships have been awarded to Master students and two to doctoral candidates from Armenia supported by Erasmus Mundus Joint Master's Degree programmes.

In the area of conflict resolution, the EU, including through its Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, supports and complements the efforts of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group to facilitate the peaceful settlement of the conflict of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.³⁸⁷

The MP and the Eastern Partnership

Armenia was the third country of the Eastern partnership countries to sign a MP with the EU and EU Members States. The MP signed in 2011 offers a complete framework for bilateral cooperation with the EU covering mobility, migration and asylum issues. The Visa Facilitation Agreement and the Readmission Agreement entered into force in January 2014. The EU Members part to the MP are Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Sweden. The Mobility Partnership is conceived as a long-term co-operation framework in line with the Global Approach to Migration and based on political dialogue and cooperation,

The MP between the EU and Armenia was negotiated considering the priority objectives of the GAMM:

- 1) Mobility, Legal Migration and Integration;
- 2) Migration and Development; and
- 3) Border Management, Identity and Travel Documents, Fight against Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Human Beings
- 4) Asylum and international protection

With respect to these priorities, the partners to the MP agreed on a number of specific topics for each priority (Table 1 in Annex 2), and on specific actions to be implemented by each partner identified in the four areas (Table 2 in Annex 2).

2.3 MP stakeholders and implementation

The EU-Armenia MP involves the following government departments and agencies:
On the side of the EU and EU Member States: The implementing authorities involve the Ministries of Foreign Affairs; the Ministries of Interior; OFFI; GIZ; among others. At the level of the EU, the involved stakeholders are DG HOME, DG NEAR, the EU Delegation in Yerevan, ETF, and FRONTEX.

³⁸⁶ <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/armenia/>

³⁸⁷ https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eap_summit_factsheet_armenia_eng_print.pdf

On the side of Armenia:

The State Migration Service (SMS) created in 2010 within the Ministry of Territorial Administration is the central authority responsible for developing and implementing migration policy. The ministry of Diaspora created in 2008, is responsible of promoting links with the Diaspora and promoting Armenian culture within the Diaspora. The National Security Services (NSS) are competent in the area of migration and border management, The border Guard Troops are in charge of border management, and work with the Border Management Information System (BMIS); the Armenian Police; National Statistical Service (ArmStat); Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MLSA), the State Employment Service Agency (SEA) in charge of Migration Resource Centres, was established in 2010 and provides reintegration services to potential and returning migrants. The SEA is also competent for making labour arrangements with other countries, but this function has not yet been implemented.

Also, international organisations are involved in the implementation of the MP with Armenia, among them IOM and ICMPD.

The provisions of the MP have not established a particular mechanism for monitoring its implementation and assessment of the impact of the actions undertaken. In the MP joint declaration, the partners agree to conduct an evaluation ‘whenever appropriate’.³⁸⁸ To monitor implementation of the MP, a Scoreboard records the state of implementation of the actions undertaken by the EU Member States participating in the partnership. The MP did not establish how the actions would be financed though it did establish that they would be implemented subject to the partners’ available financial means. This Scoreboard is not centrally managed neither by the EU Delegation, nor the Commission or the partner country (as it is the case with Moldova). The International centre (ICPMD) is responsible for updating the Scoreboard from time to time based on a compilation of information sent by different stakeholders, but does not consistently record information on results achieved, and does not track lessons learned nor impact.

As a result, the available information on the actions undertaken under the MP and the results obtained are limited. The Scoreboard for the EU-Armenia MP registers a total of 56 projects and political processes, of which 19 are still on-going. Within these projects the highest number of actions corresponds to those focused on management of migration flows and border management. With respect to the M&D pillar, 14 projects have taken place of which 5 are still ongoing. In addition, 3 projects under the Legal migration pillar also include a component on M&D. However, the funds allocated are marginal compared to those allocated to the other components of the projects. Evidence on the completed projects was insufficient, and the few information available has been gathered during the field mission.

Figure 2 Projects implemented under the MP EU-RA





Figure 3 Actions undertaken per pillar MP EU-RA



Source: Scoreboard MP EU Armenia, last updated December 2017 (Pillar II Migration & Development includes actions undertaken within projects of Pillar I Legal migration).

³⁸⁸ Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and Armenia, Brussels, 6 October 2011, doc. 14963/11, ADD 1

3 FINDINGS (AT OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS LEVELS INCLUDING UNINTENDED EFFECTS)

3.1 Country level outcomes

Based on the available evidence, the prior desk review and the stakeholder's interviews, we provide below, an assessment based on the indicators agreed and validated in the methodology presented during the Desk Phase of the evaluation.

Indicator I.7.4.1 Extent of contribution of financial remittances

During the period 2008-2016 the highest amount of remittances in a given year has been of USD 2.1 billion and the lowest of USD 1.4 billion. At its highest remittances have represented 19.71 % of the country's GDP (in 2013) and for 2016 they represented 12.64% of Armenian's GDP.

The volume of remittances is much higher compared to other external flows such as FDI and ODA. At its highest FDI was of 8.7% of GDP (in 2009) while remittances represented 15.61% of GDP. And at its lowest FDI was of 1.60 % of GDP (in 2015) and remittances represented 14.7 % of GDP for that same year.

Stakeholders point out that remittances in Armenia are mainly destined to education, health and household income support, and that there are not enough regulatory incentives to use them as productive investments (access to further loans, administrative burdens to initiate small business, no tax reduction to start-ups, etc). A recent EU report on the development of small and medium enterprise in Armenia³⁸⁹, identifies high commercial interest rates (ranging between 8% and 12%) and strict conditions around the provision of collateral and/or guarantees for financing, as barriers for SME development in Armenia.

Under the Targeted Initiative for Armenia (TIA), the component on accessible information for remittance transfers was implemented and the website allows comparing different channels and costs for money transfers. The website (sendmoneyarmenia) is active in the webpage of the SMS and ICPMD, organisation that has taken over the role of updating and improving it via the EU funded project MIBMA. Through a feasibility study on improving costs of remittances transfers to Armenia, the Armenian Remittances Unified System (ARUS) could significantly reduce the current costs.

Despite the fact that remittances are a very important contribution to Armenia's economy, not much has been done in order to maximise its potential and direct it towards productive investments. Stakeholders agree that there is still a need to find ways of closer coordination among different institutions at the local level, including the Ministry of Diaspora to attract diaspora investment. But also the involvement of other ministries is needed to promote facilities for migrants to be able to use remittances in productive investments.

If the study commissioned by ICPDM on the ARUS system is taken into consideration, there is a good possibility that the measures proposed will have a positive impact.

³⁸⁹ http://www.eu4business.eu/files/medias/country_report_armenia.pdf

Indicator I.7.4.2 Extent of contribution of social remittances

Under the ETF project ‘Recognition of academic and professional qualifications and exchange of information on European Qualification Framework and national qualification legislation; social protection of legal migrants’ a framework was developed to match qualifications recognition with the labour market opportunities. A survey was completed after the project, but no significant impact was found regarding returnees and their opportunities to use the skills acquired abroad once in Armenia.³⁹⁰

Also, the project ‘Strengthening Evidence-Based Management of Labour Migration in Armenia’ aimed at enhancing management of the labour migration flows from Armenia to EU countries. The project directed at private employment agencies attempted to create a networking mechanism between private recruiting companies to generate skills-matching schemes to promote circular migration. Even though the project succeeded in consolidating information through the ULISSES system on labour demand in EU countries, the project once completed has not continued nor has there been ownership by the local services. As in the case of Cape Verde, the effective implementation of training and skill matching schemes prior to departure from Armenia, require the implementation of bilateral agreements on circular migration which at the moment are not fully in force. Existing studies acknowledge that circular migration can help to mitigate “brain drain” and to promote “brain gain”, as returning workers bring with them new knowledge and skills.³⁹¹

Stakeholders interviewed considered that there is an important need to continue training and developing the skills for Armenia’s human capital more in line with the new technologies. Student mobility seems to work well as there are established EU programmes which allow this exchange, however young professionals find better work opportunities abroad, and not necessarily in EU Member States.

Regarding diaspora skills transfer, the TIA project created synergies with IOM “Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals” regional project and was able to involve 8 diaspora members in short training courses during 2016 reaching about 20 to 30 people in each course. There were a range of topics covered in the arts, tourism, social media and economics. According to stakeholders interviewed the initiative has not been replicated, and there is no specific structure at the local level that has taken ownership to promote this scheme in order to involve diaspora members in accordance to the needs of certain areas of expertise required in Armenia.

Indicator I.7.4.3 Extent of improvement of social and economic conditions upon return

Through the TIA project the Referral Centre for Reintegration (RCR) was established to provide assistance and guidance to those who returned voluntarily or involuntarily to Armenia and are in need to be supported in the adaption process. The RCR serves as a clear entry point for all returning migrants, provides general counselling on legal, social and health assistance, and vocational training. The assessment of needs is based on the individual conditions of the

³⁹⁰ ETF (2015) Migrant Support Measures from an employment and skills perspective (MISMES), Armenia case study, prepared by Sona Kalantaryan, from the Migration Policy Centre of the Migration Policy Centre of the European University Institute (EUI).

³⁹¹ Towards sustainable migration: interventions in the countries of origin 2017 Italian Centre for International Development (ICID), p.41, http://www.icid.info/public/icid/files/Reports/Towards_sustainable_migration_2017Int.pdf

returned migrant or its family. During the implementation period 2012-2016, a total of 964 persons applied to the centre.

Available evidence on the economic and living conditions of returnee migrants is very limited. Stakeholders interviewed have confirmed that most of returned migrants face very difficult situations. Under the M&D pillar the projects carried out by Caritas contain actions mainly destined to support returned migrants, either through a one-time support to assist them in their health or housing needs, or even in their reinsertion to an economic activity. Regarding the latter Caritas implements a revolving fund for the support of entrepreneurial initiatives of returned migrants.

Within the TIA project (which had an overall budget of EUR 3 million for all the components for all the Pillars) few actions have been implemented addressing the reintegration of returnees by supporting entrepreneurial activities. For instance, the component implemented by GIZ with a budget of EUR 100,000 benefited a small number of beneficiaries with 13 grants no higher than EUR 10,000 for diaspora organisations promoting small business. After evaluating 5 envisaged micro-projects, 3 projects were finally selected:³⁹²

- “Aleppo” Compatriotic Charitable NGO - Project on traditional Armenian carpet making. As a result, 28 women (natives and returnees) participated in the trainings through May-August 2016.
- “Sahman” NGO - Established 7 family businesses in the border village of Berkaber (greenhouse, lavash production, micro rabbit farming, dried fish production, organic fertilizers production, chicken Incubator, animal feed production). The project also included branding the village products by creating a logo and training all producers to use that logo on all the products.
- Society for Orphaned Armenian Relief (SOAR) SOAR Belgium - Vocational and “life skills” providing training for at-risk youth between the ages of 16 and 19 to increase their employability. Overall 25 youngsters from different child care institutions and disadvantaged families participated in the trainings.

The component implemented by OFFI supported returnees with assistance for 16 individual grants, benefiting 55 family members. According to the TIA Final Report 15 business were still performing, and *‘the post-award field visits and the interviews with the grantees proved that the impact of the program was very tangible, as it enabled the migrants to earn their minimum daily living, to solve their (and also their family member’s) unemployment issues and prevented them from migrating again to EU member states or to any other country.’*³⁹³ During the extension of OFFI component, the project RPRAM, although with a low budget, supports 30 grants for small businesses between EUR 5,000 and EUR 2,000, 20 individuals have benefited from vocational training. The grants are given by a selection committee and the business plans and follow-up process is supervised by 3 different service providers. This project is supported by the MPF (only for 1-year implementation up to 500,000 EUR).

A current ongoing project implemented by the Swedish employment service with Armenia’s SEA is iMigrantArmenia aiming at promoting the creation of innovative business models and start-ups in migrants’ communities of return, mainly in Aragatsotn and Shirak regions. Through an IT online platform labour migrants, diaspora and potential investors will be linked to invest in community development projects. The SEA will integrate the tool into its own IT platform. In addition, an online evaluation tool for companies looking for investments will be added to the system. So far 25 specialists of the SEA of Aragatsotn and Shirak Local Centres as well as

³⁹² Targeted Initiative for Armenia (TIA), Strengthening Armenia’s Migration Management Capacities, with Special Focus on Reintegration Activities in the Framework of the EU-Armenia Mobility Partnership, Final Narrative Report period 2012-2016.

³⁹³ TIA Final Report, p. 8.

30 specialists from the local centres and Yerevan in 2018 have received training and capacity building. Also, in a round of 12 workshops, 45 specialists have received training to support and guide the circular labour migrants contributing to local centres of Gyumri, Maralik, Artik, Ashotsk, and Amasia (Shirak region), Ashtarak, Aparan, Tsaghkahovit, and Talin (Aragatsotn region), focusing on the repatriation of their skills, experience and financial capital to Armenia and their communities.³⁹⁴

Through the reintegration component of TIA, vocational education and training (VET) courses were imparted to 80 beneficiaries throughout the duration of the project. Also, Armenian language courses for 4 children took place to facilitate their reintegration into the educational system.

The TIA project's final narrative report does not include a proper assessment of the impact of this flag-ship project and no further funding is envisioned for its follow up. The TIA's Referral Centre for Reintegration (RCR) appears to be a positive initiative for capacity building at the level of government institutions providing a structure to facilitate the return and reintegration of Armenian returnees. It works in close collaboration with the SEA, OFFI and Caritas Armenia to coordinate support for individual cases. But despite these results, there is limited information as to impact, and the cases of returnees by far exceeds the number of people reached with assistance. For instance, the number of returnees via readmission (involuntary return) for the period 2012-2017 was of 2223, the highest numbers were from EU Member States.³⁹⁵

3.2 Country level impacts

Armenia still relies heavily on remittances, and these are mainly coming from Russia. The 2017 OECD-CRRC study refers that 31.1% of the country's population had migrated by 2015, and Russia has received 56% of Armenia's emigrants. Among the EU Member States, Germany and France are the main senders of remittances. But, to establish a direct link between actions implemented under the MP and the flow of remittances is quite difficult. The actions aimed to reduce transaction costs or promote diaspora investments have been very limited.

With respect to actions undertaken regarding social remittances (diaspora skills transfer, skills matching-schemes, pre-departure measures), these have had limited scope. Regarding skills matching schemes, these have not been part of a continuous process, and in absence of circular migration schemes it is not possible to establish a significant impact. On the other hand, facilitating young students and professionals mobility has the potential for significant impact in Armenia's human capital.

Even though the support reintegration measures for returned people through the RCR are in place, the needs exceeds the financial support available. Regarding support for entrepreneurial initiatives of returned migrants, these have been limited but the initiative is replicated among different stakeholders implementing this type of action and has the potential to have a broader impact if funding is made available.

³⁹⁴ <http://employment.am/en/index.html>

³⁹⁵ State Migration Service statistics.

3.3 Unintended outcomes and impacts

Indicator I.7.4.4 Unintended effects of border management measures and unintended effects of other measures facilitating migration

Regarding the objectives of the MP on mobility and border management, there have been significant results. However, regarding the visa facilitation agreement, stakeholders expressed that with respect to specific EU Member States, Armenians have difficulties to access to the different visa services in place as these have been outsourced to private companies and there is no unified criteria in the handling of applications. Also, stakeholders interviewed mentioned the great migratory pressure for people to go abroad due to unemployment, the closing of two of Armenia's borders, and for young families concerned with the geopolitical conflict due to forced conscription. However, stakeholders confirm that there are positive outcomes due to the visa facilitation, but there is still work to be done to promote mobility in specific areas, especially apprenticeship programmes on technical skills. Moreover, as circular migration is not in place through bilateral agreements, the opportunities to promote skills transfer schemes are lost. The fact that circular labour migration occurs mainly towards countries lacking a strong enforcement on social rights, puts labour migrants in a vulnerable situation.

Regarding the readmission agreement, a specific government structure is set in place (RCR) and cooperates well with other stakeholders providing assistance on reintegration measures but still requires financial support to be fully effective. The significant number of EU Member States' requests for readmission and the number of returned migrants exceeds by far the capacity and financial assistance than can be provided by projects being led by Caritas, OFFI or the SEA.

With respect to asylum measures, Armenia reacted promptly to the situation of Syrian refugees with the support of the UNHCR through several projects. According to UNHCR about 17,000 persons fled the conflict in Syria and sought protection in Armenia. But more refugees continue to arrive as a consequence of the Syrian conflict; and also in the context of the escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the early days of April 2016, due to which vulnerable families displaced from the said region sought protection in Armenia (2,247 persons - around 681 families). Therefore, the needs to integrate refugees and create sources of income for them in Armenia are great, considering the already difficult situation due to unemployment in Armenia. The EU funded MIBMA project is trying to address the need for housing through plans for new refugee/asylum facilities but still needs support from EU Member States.

4 CONCLUSIONS COVERING THE ELEMENTS CONFIRMING OR NOT CONFIRMING THE DESK PHASE HYPOTHESIS

- The inclusion of a specific objective on M&D within the GAMM, mainly a migration management policy, has led to consider the inclusion of specific M&D actions within the MP with Armenia. At the level of implementation, the PCD approach has influenced to a certain extent the MP. However, it is not possible to determine the extent of the impact of the M&D actions of the MP. The results obtained are so limited that no significant impact can be observed from them.
- The M&D pillar compared to the other pillars (i.e. Legal migration, and irregular migration and border management), appears unbalanced in terms of number of projects, amounts allocated and results achieved.
- There is a close coordination of various donor stakeholders in the area of migration management in Armenia and synergies with other projects have been sought.
- However, the few M&D actions and pilot projects undertaken in the framework of the MP have not been sufficiently monitored or evaluated and the opportunity to build on already successful initiatives has been lost.
- The fragmented nature of the intervention (MP) given the various stakeholders involved in the implementation, and the lack of locally centralised management of information on the actions undertaken does not allow the effective and comprehensive assessment of Armenia's priorities.
- Some local stakeholders have pointed out that actions related to effective circular migration, knowledge and skills transfer, and productive investments are still needed.
- Actions under the M&D pillar would require to be further promoted with the participation of all stakeholders under a more structured dialogue on migration based on a transversal approach. The active involvement of a Migration expert at the EU Delegation in the management of the MP could enhance EU action and improve coordination among Commission services and the EEAS. Also, the management and ownership of the Scoreboard by Armenia could improve coordination at the local level.
- The refugee situation in the country and the need to support the development of Armenia's human capital are priorities to be taken into account in future actions.

ANNEX 1: DATA COLLECTION METHODS USED (ITS LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS)

The desk review has not provided sufficient quantitative and reliable data on the impact of the actions implemented under the M&D pillar; sources available on MPs contained qualitative data or analysis at the policy strategic level. Stakeholders' views and sources of information collected during the field mission to Armenia have been the main available evidence.

ANNEX 2: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

List of stakeholders interviewed Armenia	
Name	Position and institution
Gagik Yeganyan	Head of Service, State Migration Service, Ministry of Territorial Administration and Development
Haykanush Chobanyan	Head of External Relations Division, State Migration Service
Gagik Torosyan	Head of Labour Migration, State Employment Agency
Naira Bubushyan	Chief Specialist of the Employment Division, International Relations department, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs- MLSA
Ilona Ter-Minasyan	Head of Office, IOM Mission to Armenia
Carel Hofstra	Team Leader, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, ICMPD Office in Armenia
Lilit Stepanyan	Head of the Migration and Integration Strategic Direction, CARITAS Armenia, Project Manager for Migration and Development and Assistance to Syrian Armenian Refugees
Heghine Manasyan	Executive Director, Caucasus Research Resource Center - CRRC Armenia
Matthias Kiesler	Ambassador, Embassy of Germany
Rodolphe Courpied-Rollet,	Consul, Embassy of France
Claire Le Flécher	First Counsellor, Embassy of France
Ani Šaginjanová	Deputy Head of Mission and Consular Affairs, Embassy of Czech Republic
Karine Simonyan	Advisor and Project Officer, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – GIZ
Naira Petrosyan	Project Officer, EU funded project ‘Reintegration policy for returning Armenian migrants’ Office Français de l’immigration et de l’intégration -OFFI
Sirarpi Grigoryan	Manager, OFFI, Embassy of France
Vardouhie Mikayelyan	Reinsertion Officer, OFFI, Embassy of France
Per Lindberg	Project Manager, ‘Strengthening current and future employment and self-employment in Armenia – iMigrant.Armenia.EU’ Swedish Public Employment Service - Arbetsförmedlingen
Irina Movsesyan	International Cooperation Officer Education, HHRR, Youth and Migration, Cooperation Section, EU Delegation

ANNEX 3: EU- ARMENIA MP COMMITMENTS

Table 1: Priorities MP EU-Armenia

Priorities	Specific topics
Priority 1: Mobility, legal migration and integration	<p>1. Promote a better framework for legal and labour mobility, including through the facilitation of temporary and circular migration</p> <p>2. Enhance the capacity to monitor migration, in particular by strengthening Armenia's capacity to manage migration</p> <p>3. Inform potential migrants on opportunities for legal migration including labour migration to the EU, opportunities for studying in the Member States; to explore the possibilities of promoting labour migration and developing legal frameworks relating to employment conditions for migrants, while matching labour market opportunities</p> <p>4. Implement pre-departure training, especially in the area of vocational education and training and language training; to promote or establish exchange programmes and joint programmes in the area of vocational education and training and higher education, academic and professional mobility schemes (Bologna Process), recognition of academic and professional qualifications (Lisbon Convention)</p> <p>5. Social protection of legal migrants and members of their families, negotiation and signature of bilateral agreements on social protection;</p> <p>6. Deepen the dialogue on visa issues and to improve the consular capacities (Member States' diplomatic missions in Armenia)</p>
Priority 2: Migration and development	<p>7. Prevent, reduce and counteract the negative effects of the brain drain and brain waste, return policies targeting particularly skilled Armenian migrants, ethical recruitment; recognition of skills and qualifications, develop labour-matching tools, enhance exchange of students, researchers and specialists, training and temporary exchange and work programmes, assistance of ETF;</p> <p>8. Promote and support voluntary return and sustainable reintegration of returning migrants, specific joint programmes offering training, possibilities to improve migrants' employment qualifications and assistance in finding jobs; provide joint specific programmes devoted to protection of and assistance for vulnerable categories of returning migrants; develop entrepreneurship and build a legal framework in the field of small and medium enterprises;</p> <p>9. Enhance cooperation with Armenian communities abroad and strengthen links with Diaspora; support programmes for Diaspora's investment, cheap and secure transfer of remittances and maximize their development impact; cooperate on field of double taxation and portability of rights; involve Diaspora in sustainable return or circular migration activities</p>
Priority 3: Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, security of identity and travel documents, border management	<p>10. Enhance efforts to fight further irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, strengthen implementation of the integrated border management, improvement of border surveillance and border management capacities and cross-border cooperation, strengthen security of travel documents, identity documents and residence permits, and fully cooperate on return and readmission;</p> <p>11. Develop effective mechanisms and concrete initiatives for preventing and combating irregular migration</p> <p>12. Broaden further the application of readmission procedures, notably through the conclusion and effective implementation of the EU-Armenia Readmission Agreement, intensify cooperation with EU Member States by concluding agreements on border cooperation, and implementing joint specific programmes;</p> <p>13. Enhance security of identity documents, facilitate authentication of citizens through introduction of the fingerprints searching systems, multifunctional electronic identification cards.</p> <p>14. Improve joint fight against irregular immigration, cross border crime, improve operational interoperability between border guard organisations (RA and FRONTEX)</p>
Priority 4: Asylum and international protection	<p>15. Strengthen capacity of Armenia's government to implement an asylum policy and provide international protection according to best international standards.</p> <p>16. Facilitate reception of asylum seekers and submission of asylum requests through simplified procedures, in particular for those with special needs.</p>

Table 2: Proposed actions under the MP EU - Armenia

Area of initiatives	Proposed Actions
I) Mobility, legal migration and integration	Objective: To support the capacity to monitor migration, in particular by strengthening Armenia's capacity to manage migration.
	a) EU proposal to support the reinforcement of Armenia's migration management capacities, in particular through the establishment and regular updating of a detailed migration profile of Armenia, including provision of capacity building, to assist Armenian decision-makers to define and implement the most appropriate policies in close coordination with other partners;
	b) Proposal by Bulgaria, France, the Netherlands, Romania and Sweden to strengthen the administrative capacity of Armenia for the management of the migration processes, notably by sharing experience in the area of legal and labour migration, training of officials on drafting of strategic documents in the area of migration and integration, management of legal and labour migration;
	Objective: Informing potential migrants about ways of legal migration to the European Union and legal employment in the Member States, as well as about the risks of illegal migration; to implement pre-departure training; to promote student and professional exchanges; recognition of academic and professional qualifications and exchange of information on European Qualification Framework and national qualification legislation; social protection of legal migrants.
	c) Proposal by France to promote circular mobility of young professionals and students;

	<p>proposal by Italy, Poland and Sweden to share information on possibilities of migration through legal channels, including circular migration;</p> <p>proposal by Romania to inform potential migrant workers from Armenia on legal migration opportunities and risks related to irregular immigration;</p> <p>proposal by Romania to implement "pre-departure training" programs and promote joint study programs based on the Bologna system to facilitate the recognition of studies and diplomas in Romania and Armenia;</p> <p>proposal by Italy to disseminate, through local authorities in Armenia, the Armenian Embassy and Armenian migrant associations in Italy, a handbook on immigration and integration in the country;</p> <p>facilitation of outward mobility for legally residing Armenians in Germany;</p> <p>d) With the support of ETF, collection of selected labour market information and implementation of research, including elaboration and analysis of data, on migration and skills, facilitating recognition of qualifications and matching between skills and available jobs/vacancies, as well as raising awareness on the importance of the system of Validation of Non Formal and Informal Learning among individuals and labour market institutions to better use the skills acquired by returning migrants;</p> <p>e) Proposal by Bulgaria to negotiate bilateral agreements in the area of social security and management of labour migration;</p>
<p>II) Migration and development</p>	<p>Objective: To promote the positive synergies between migration and development, to prevent, reduce and counteract the negative effects of the brain drain and brain waste; to facilitate the smooth reintegration into Armenia's labour market of Armenian citizens returning home and the recognition of skills and qualifications acquired abroad for their own benefit and the development of Armenia, particularly by promoting migrants entrepreneurship.</p> <p>a) Proposal by France to support measures aiming at fully using migrants' skills and professional qualifications acquired abroad for the benefit of Armenia's development;</p> <p>b) Proposal by Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the EU to facilitate, with the support of ETF, the smooth reintegration into Armenia's labour market of Armenian citizens returning home, notably through the setting up of a sustainable program for short term assistance and long term reintegration actions, including support to migrant entrepreneurs and creation of micro businesses, support to the return of experts and highly skilled migrants, recognition of skills and promotion of medical assistance and social reintegration programmes;</p> <p>c) Proposal by Germany to continue to promote well informed and cost-effective remittances' channels with the aim of better contributing to the development of migrants' country of origin;</p> <p>d) Sharing experiences and exchange good practices in the field of employment and education policies, including the linkage, with the support of ETF, between future labour market and labour migration policies and Vocational Education and Training policies;</p> <p>e) Proposal by Romania to foster cooperation between NGOs, in particular diaspora associations, and state institutions in Romania and Armenia in order to facilitate the reintegration of repatriated persons in Armenia's national education system and labour market;</p>
<p>III) Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, identity and travel documents' security, border management</p>	<p>Objective: To develop effective mechanisms and concrete initiatives for preventing and combating irregular immigration, effectively implement readmission procedures, enhance the security of identity documents and improve border surveillance and border management capacities</p> <p>(a) Proposal by Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and the EU to support measures aiming at sharing the practical aspects of return policies, including exchanging best practices on readmission processes;</p> <p>b) Proposal by Belgium and Poland to share knowledge and best practices on enhancing administrative competences and structures in combating trafficking in human beings;</p> <p>c) Proposal by Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Poland and the EU to support the reinforcement of Armenia's border surveillance and border management capacities, including information exchange and risk analyses aiming at improving the efficiency of border control, provision of equipment and training, and activities in the field of research and development related to border management;</p>
<p>IV) Asylum and international protection</p>	<p>Objective: To strengthen the capacity of Armenia's government to implement an asylum policy and provide international protection according to best international standards.</p> <p>a) EU support to building the capacity of Armenia's government to implement an asylum policy, including international protection, according to best international standards;</p> <p>b) Proposal by Sweden to organise, within the framework of the Söderköping Process, a workshop on the European Asylum Curriculum (EAC) and, subsequently, a preliminary study on the possible transfer of the European Asylum Curriculum (EAC) to Armenia and other Eastern Partnership countries;</p> <p>c) proposal by Poland to share knowledge on Countries of Origin Information systems;</p>

ANNEX 4: ARMENIA REMITTANCES DATA

Table 3

Inflow of Remittances by BoP, mln US dollars	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Remittances to RA	1,781	1,286	1,484	1761.7	1909.3	2159.6	2025.9	1430.4	1330.1	1494.6
Net compensation of employees	814	636	768	768.5	817.2	939.2	891.7	638.1	586.9	652.5
Compensation of employees	1,048	819	989	989.7	1052.3	1209.4	1148.3	821.8	755.8	840.3
Net income of seasonal workers received from works classified as services	-	-	-	153.3	163.0	187.3	177.9	127.3	117.1	130.2
Gross income of seasonal workers received from works classified as services	-	-	-	197.4	209.9	241.3	229.1	163.9	150.8	167.6
Personal transfers	837	602	661	790.0	843.8	963.9	909.7	649.1	608.7	680.9
Capital transfers	130	48	55	49.8	85.4	69.2	46.7	15.9	17.5	31

Source: Central Bank of Armenia, last updated March 2018.³⁹⁶

Table 4

Armenia Financial Flows

(millions of US\$, current prices)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
FDI, net inflows (BoP)	944	760	529	653	497	346	404	178	338
Migrant remittance inflows	1904.07	1439.81	1669.34	1798.62	1914.98	2192.19	2078.62	1491.48	1382.33
ODA - DAC disbursements	210.06	235.93	206.52	181.86	106.83	98.50	98.88	65.84	143.82

Source: WB World Development Indicators, last updated 3 March 2018; OECD.Stat last updated 20 December 2017

Figure 4





Figure 5



Source: Own elaboration, based on WB World Development Indicators and OECD.Stat.

³⁹⁶ <https://www.cba.am/en/SitePages/statexternalsector.aspx>

ANNEX 5: LIST OF ONGOING PROJECTS FUNDED UNDER MP EU-ARMENIA

N°	GAMM Pillar	Title of the initiative	Origin Initiative	Implementing Body	Implementation period	Funding source
1	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration II. Migration and development III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, border management	Targeted initiative for Armenia: "Strengthening Armenia's migration management capacities, with special focus on reintegration activities, in the framework of the EU-Armenia Mobility Partnership".	FR - coordination BE, BG, CZ, DE, NL, PL, RO, ARM partners	Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration (OFII), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, BAMF (Federal office for Migration and Refugees), State Migration Service of Armenia	December 2012 - September 2016	EU TP Migration & Asylum
2	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration II. Migration and development III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, border management	Reintegration policy for returning Armenian migrants.	FR	Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration (OFII), State Migration Service of Armenia	Nov 2016 - Mar 2018	Mobility Partnership Facility (MPF), AMIF strand
3	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	Programme of cooperation in the fields of culture, education and science between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Armenia, signed in Bucharest, on 8th of september 2011	RO	Ministry of Education, Research, Youth and Sports and the Agency for Credits and Scholarships RO, Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of	2013-2017	
4	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	Bilateral agreement between Armenia and France on exchange of students and young professionals, signed in 2016 and ratified in early 2017	OFII (Fra)	OFII		
5	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration ; II. Migration and development	Strengthening Armenia's labour migration management towards enhanced democracy and good governance.	IOM	IOM Armenia	July 2015-July 2016	Romanian ODA
6	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	Recognized, Protected, Realized	Caritas Armenia	Caritas Austria, Caritas Lebanon	January 2017 – December 2019	EU
7	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	Sustainable Reintegration after Voluntary Return (SRAVR)	Caritas Armenia	Caritas Belgium		FEDASIL, EU Return Fund
8	II. Migration and development	Returning Experts Programme: promotion of knowledge transfer to countries of origin	DE	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Centrum für Internationale Migration und Entwicklung (CIM), Frankfurt, Germany	May 2013-December 2015	BMZ
9	II. Migration and development	Mitigating social consequences of labour migration and maximizing migrants involvement in local development" -	UNICEF ARMENIA	UNICEF ARMENIA	December 2012 - December 2015	EU Co-funding
10	II. Migration and development	Young Experts Scheme (YES) Armenia	EU Delegation	Centre for Strategic Initiatives under the Gov't of Armenia	December 2017-Dec. 2018	EU
11	III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, border management	Gradual implementation of the working arrangement between Frontex and the National Security Council of Armenia signed in February 2012.		Frontex, National Security Council of the Republic of Armenia	2013-2015 but aimed at sustainable partnership	FRONTEX
12	III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, border management	Eastern Partnership – Integrated Border Management – Capacity Building Project.	Frontex. Project partners: WCO, IOM (Co-beneficiaries). Others, such as: EU MS, ICMPD, FRA, UNODC, UNHCR, EASO, IACA, EUBAM	Frontex, Armenian Border and Customs Authorities	July 2014 - December 2018	ENPI
13	III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, border management	"Bagratashen-Sadakhlo Integrated Border Management Project".	UNDP Armenia - partners: ICMPD and Border management agencies of the EU	Delgation of the EU to Armenia, National authority responsible for IBM	2014-2015 (18 months)	ENPI and Armenia
14	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration; III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, border management	Support to Migration and Border Management in Armenia" (MIBMA)	ICMPD Project partner - UNDP	ICMPD	2016-2018	EU - ENPI
15	III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, border management	Fostering capacities and cooperation on IBM among Eap training institutions	ICMPD (AM, BG, BY, GE, HU, MD, PL, SK)	ICDPM, Ministry of Interior HU Ministry of Interior, Service of National Security of the Republic of Armenia	09.2017 - 04.2018	MPF (EU ISFB)
16	II. Migration and development	Strengthening current and future employment and self-employment programmes through sustainable value chain management systems under the Migration Resource Centres and Local Centres of the State Employment Agency	SE	Arbetsförmedlingen (Swedish Public Employment Service), RA: Labour Migration Unit of the SEA, Community Development Department under the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Development, Ministry of Economic Development and Investments	2017-2018	MPF

N°	GAMM Pillar	Title of the initiative	Origin initiative	Implementing Body	Implementation period	Funding source
17	II. Migration and development	Migration and Development (reintegration of Armenian returnees from EU Member States)	Caritas Armenia	Caritas Armenia, and partners State Migration Service, State Employment Agency; OFII, IOM	2016-2018 (3rd stage)	Caritas Austria (donor); Government of Lichtenstein (back donor)
18	III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, identity and travel documents' security, border management	Building Local Capacities to Reduce Irregular Migration and Trafficking	Caritas Armenia	Caritas Armenia, "House of Abundance" Community Center NGO, "Crossing Roads" Social NGO, "Gegharkunik Human Rights Protection Center" NGO	January 2016 – December 2018	Secours Catholique/ Caritas France, Caritas Spain, Catholic Relief Services
19	III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, identity and travel documents' security, border management	Strengthening the collaboration of Caritas members in the Euro-Mediterranean region to combat human trafficking	Caritas	Caritas Armenia, Caritas Albania, Caritas Bulgaria (Ruse), Caritas Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Caritas Romania (Bucharest), Caritas Kosovo, Caritas Lebanon Migrant Center (CLMC), Caritas Turkey, Caritas Ukraine and SCCF	January 2017 – December 2019	Caritas France

Source: Scoreboard MP EU-RA Ongoing projects, last update December 2017.

ANNEX 6: LIST OF COMPLETED PROJECTS FUNDED UNDER MP EU-ARMENIA

N°	GAMM Pillar	Title of the initiative	Origin of initiative	Implementing body	Implementation period	Funding source
1	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	"Support the State Migration Service for strengthening of migration management in Armenia"	Sweden - Poland	Swedish Migration Board (leader) with Poland's Migration Policy Department, Ministry of Territorial Administration Armenia, State Migration Service	September 2012 - February 2014	EU - ENPI
2	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	"Strengthening Evidence-Based Management of Labour Migration in Armenia"	IOM - ICHD	IOM, and International Center for Human Development (ICHD)	January 2011 - December 2013	EU TP Migration & Asylum Cofunding
3	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	Support Armenian authorities and social partners organisations in developing and implementing a system for validation of non-formal and informal learning on the basis of a National Qualifications Framework.	European Training Foundation (ETF)	European Training Foundation (ETF)	2013-2014	ETF
4	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	Conference on "People's skills and the global approach to migration and mobility (GAMM)	European Training Foundation (ETF)	European Training Foundation (ETF)	Oct-13	ETF
5	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	Center for International Migration and Development (CIM) expert on labour migration	DE	GIZ, CIM, State Employment Agency Armenia	Spring 2013 - Spring 2015	BMZ
6	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	Promoting Integration of Syrian Armenians (PISA)		Austrian Red Cross	2015-2017	EU
7	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	Support the state migration service for strengthening of migration management in Armenia	Armenia-Sweden Twinning Project	MIGRATIONSVERKET	2012-2015	EU
8	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	Strengthening capacities in Armenia's migration management	EU, German Ministry for ECD		2013-2015	GIZ
9	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	Supporting establishment of effective readmission management in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia	Governments of Switzerland, Belgium and IOM Development Fund		2013-2014	UN
10	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	Economic Integration of Syrian Refugees in Armenia	GIZ		2015-2017	DE
11	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	Migrants' rights in Practice IOM	European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals and Polish Ministry of Interior and Administration		2011-2014	UN
12	I. Mobility, legal migration and integration	Reintegration Policy for Returning Migrants from EU Member States	FR - coordination BE, BG, CZ, DE, NL, PL, RO, ARM partners	Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration (OFII), Targeted Initiative Armenia (TIA)	December 2016 – September 2017	EU -MPF
13	II. Migration and development	Technical Assistance to the Armenian Government to initiate labour migration arrangements	IOM		2010-2014	UN
14	II. Migration and development	Migration and Higher Education -Building Skills and Capacity	EU-Tempus, IOM		2011-2014	UN
15	II. Migration and development	"Return Assistance in Armenia - Cooperation OFII - BAMF" (RACOB):	DE: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), OFII	BAMF, OFII, Local Partners Armenia: Association Arménienne d'Aide Sociale (AAAS), Fondation Franco-Arménienne pour le développement (FFAD)	November 2012 - December 2014	EU Co-funding
16	II. Migration and development	Measures to Enhance the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration of Migrants with a Chronic Medical Condition Residing in the EU (AVRR-MC)	IOM, European Return Fund		2013-2014	NE
17	II. Migration and development	Maximising the social and economic impact of Migration for a better future in Armenia	CISP		2013-2017	EU
18	II. Migration and development	Mitigating social consequences of labour migration and maximizing migrants involvement in local development	UNICEF		2012-2015	EU
19	II. Migration and development	"Support of circular migration and re-integration process in Armenia"	CLOVEK V TISNI OPS (People in Need Czech Republic)	People in Need	January 2013 - July 2015	EU Co-funding

N°	GAMM Pillar	Title of the initiative	Origin of initiative	Implementing body	Implementation period	Funding source
20	II. Migration and development	CASCADE—Exploring the Security-Democracy Nexus in the Caucasus Project / WP 3 Migrations, Mobilities and Poverty	ICHD	ICHD Armenia	February/2014 - February/2017	EU
21	III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, border management	Short-term technical assistance to the Police Judicial Cooperation in the Investigation of Human Trafficking			Mar-12	TAIEX -EU
22	III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, border management	"Supporting the establishment of effective readmission management in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia"	IOM	IOM Armenia	2013 - 2015	EU Co-funding
23	III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, border management	Bavra-Ninotsminda Integrated Border Management Project.	UNDP	EU delegation in Georgia	2011-2012	ENPI and Armenia
24	III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, border management	Provision of equipment and infrastructure for BCPs Bagratashen-Sadakhlo between Armenia and Georgia and enhancement of their capacities	UNDP	EU delegation in Armenia	2012 - 2015	EU and Armenia
25	III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, border management	"Preventing irregular migration from Armenia to the Kingdom of Belgium by raising awareness of potential migrants"	State Migration Service of the Ministry of Territorial Administration of the RA, BE Immigration Service of the	ICHD Armenia	01.11.2012 - 30.04.2013	Belgian Immigration Office
26	III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, border management	Strengthening Capacities of Armenian National Security Service and Border Guards in their Response to Migration Crisis Project	IOM	IOM-Armenia	July 2015 - July 2017	IOM Development Fund
27	III. Fight against irregular immigration and trafficking in	"Eastern Partnership - Integrated Border Management Capacity Building" Project	FRONTEX	FRONTEX, IOM, World Customs Organization (WCO), ICMPD	July 2014-July 2017	EU
28	IV. Asylum and international protection	Asylum System Quality Initiative in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus"	UNHCR		2013 - 2014	
29	IV. Asylum and international protection	Refugee integration through education and self-reliance opportunities	UNHCR	UNHCR-Armenia, KASA Swiss Humanitarian Foundation	1 January 2017- 31 December 2017	UNHCR
30	IV. Asylum and international protection	Monitor the situation of refugees and asylum-seekers, preparing ad hoc report outlining evidence based gaps in the field	UNHCR	UNHCR-Armenia, Ombudsmen's Office	1 January 2017- 31 December 2017	UNHCR
31	IV. Asylum and international protection	Improving Refugee Reception and Promoting Integration of PoCs in Armenia	UNHCR	UNHCR-Armenia, Armenian Red Cross Society	1 January 2017- 31 December 2017	
32	IV. Asylum and international protection	Quality Initiative in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus	UNHCR	UNHCR-Armenia	1 January 2017- 31 December 2017	UNHCR
33	IV. Asylum and international protection	Access to the territory	UNHCR	UNHCR-Armenia	1 January 2017- 31 December 2017	UNHCR
34	IV. Asylum and international protection	Judicial engagement	UNHCR	UNHCR-Armenia	1 January 2017- 31 December 2017	UNHCR
35	IV. Asylum and international protection	Prevention and reduction of statelessness and protection of stateless persons	UNHCR	UNHCR-Armenia		
36	IV. Asylum and international protection	Social-Healthcare Services for Refugees, Asylum Seekers; Emergency Response for Displaced Syrian Person	UNHCR	UNHCR-Armenia, Mission Armenia NGO	1 January 2017- 31 December 2017	UNHCR
37	II. Migration and development	Migration and Development (reintegration of Armenian returnees from EU Member States)	Caritas Armenia	State Migration Service, State Employment Agency; OFII, IOM	2010 – 2012 (1st stage) 2013-2015 (2nd stage)	Caritas Austria (donor); Government of Lichtenstein (back donor)

Source: Scoreboard MP EU-RA Completed projects, last update December 2017 including UNHCR actions on Asylum & International protection and UN agencies funded projects (projects funded by non-EU donors are not included).

ANNEX 7: LIST OF PROJECTS AREA OF MIGRATION – ALL DONORS

All Donors Project Inventory Migration Management in Armenia - Current Projects, Programmes and Activities

No	Organization	Project / Programme Activity	Migration Management sub areas	Period	Donor	Implementing Partner, Partner Organizations
1.	IOM	<i>"Strengthening Capacities of Armenian National Security Service and Border Guards in their Response to Migration Crisis" Project</i>	Technical Cooperation on Migration Management and Capacity Building	July 2015-July 2016	IOM Development Fund	National Security Service, Border Guard Troops
2.	IOM	<i>Fostering Economic and Social Benefits of Migration in the South Caucasus</i>	Migration and Economic/Community Development	May 2015–September 2015	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation(SDC)	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MLSA)
3.	FRONTEX	<i>"Eastern Partnership - Integrated Border Management Capacity Building" Project</i>	Technical Cooperation	July 2014-July 2017	EU	IOM,World Customs Organization (WCO), ICMPCD
4.	IOM	<i>"Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals Enhancing Government and Institutional Capacity by Linking Diaspora to Development" Regional Project (TRQN III)</i>	Migration and Development	December 2012 – December 2015	Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs	IOM
5.	IOM	<i>"Return and Emigration of Asylum-Seekers Ex Belgium (REAB) Programme"</i>	Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration	Ongoing since 1984	Belgian Ministry for Social Integration	IOM Brussels
6.	IOM	<i>"Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration from Belgium – plus " Project</i>	Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration	Ongoing	EU Return Fund	Regional Project - IOM Brussels
7.	IOM	<i>Canada Visa Application Center Programme</i>	Facilitated Movements and Resettlement	Ongoing	Citizenship and Immigration - Canada	IOM Mission in Armenia
8.	IOM	<i>"Micro-Enterprise Development programme"</i>	Migrant Integration, Migration and Development	Ongoing	UNHCR, UNDP, IOM, Japanese Government, WFP	IOM Mission in Armenia
9	UNHCR	<i>Social-Healthcare Services for Refugees, Asylum Seekers; Emergency Response for Displaced Syrian Person</i>	Forced Migration due to the conflict on the country of origin	1 January 2017- 31 December 2017	UNHCR	Mission Armenia NGO
10	UNHCR	<i>Refugee integration through education and self-reliance opportunities</i>	Forced Migration due to the conflict on the country of origin	1 January 2017- 31 December 2017	UNHCR	KASA Swiss Humanitarian Foundation
11	UNHCR	<i>Monitor the situation of refugees and asylum-seekers, preparing ad hoc report outlining evidence based gaps in the field of refugee protection</i>	Forced Migration due to the conflict on the country of origin	1 January 2017- 31 December 2017	UNHCR	Ombudsman
12	UNHCR	<i>Improving Refugee Reception and Promoting Integration of PoCs in Armenia</i>	Forced Migration due to the conflict on the country of origin	1 January 2017- 31 December 2017	UNHCR	Armenian Red Cross Society
13	UNHCR	<i>Quality Initiative in Eastern Europe and South Caucuses</i>	Forced Migration due to the conflict on the country of origin	1 January 2017 - 31 December 2017	UNHCR	UNHCR
14	UNHCR	<i>Access to the territory</i>	Forced Migration due to the conflict on the country of origin	1 January 2017- 31 December 2017	UNHCR	UNHCR
15	UNHCR	<i>Judicial Engagement</i>	Forced Migration due to the conflict on the country of origin	1 January 2017- 31 December 2017	UNHCR	UNHCR
16	UNHCR	<i>Prevention and reduction of statelessness and protection of stateless persons</i>	Technical assistance in migration/asylum management	1 January 2017- 31 December 2017	UNHCR	UNHCR

No	Organization	Project / Programme Activity	Migration Management sub areas	Period	Donor	Implementing Partner, Partner Organizations
17	International Center for Human Development	<i>CASCADE—Exploring the Security-Democracy Nexus in the Caucasus Project / WP 3 Migrations, Mobilities and Poverty</i>	Labour Migration Management	From February 2014 – February 2017	EU	FMSH, UoB, FRIDE, SIPRI, FSU JENA, IGRAS, CNIS, GFSIS
18	OFII	<i>Reintegration Policy for Returning Migrants</i>	Return and Reintegration	December 2016 – September 2017	EU	SMS, MFA, MoFD, MLSA, SEA, MF, MEDI, MES, MJ, MH, Police of RA; local authorities
19	ICMPD	<i>Support for Migration and Border Management in Armenia (MIBMA)</i>	Migration and Border Management	January 2016 – December 2018	EU - ENPI	UNDP
20	Caritas Armenia	<i>Migration and Development</i>	Migration and Development	2010 – 2012 , 2013-2015 , 2016-2018	Caritas Austria (donor); Government of Lichtenstein (back donor)	SMS Armenia, SEA Armenia; OFII, IOM
21	Caritas Armenia	<i>Recognized, Protected, Realized</i>	Migrant Integration	January 2017 – December 2019	EU	Caritas Austria, Caritas Lebanon
22	Caritas Armenia	<i>Sustainable Reintegration after Voluntary Return (SRAVR)</i>	Return and Reintegration	Since 2006	Caritas Belgium, EU Return Fund	FEDASIL
23	Caritas Armenia	<i>Strengthening the collaboration of Caritas members in the Euro-Mediterranean region to combat human trafficking</i>	Counter- trafficking	January 2017 – December 2019	Caritas : Albania, Bulgaria (Ruse), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Romania (Bucharest), Kosovo, Turkey, Ukraine, SCCF and Caritas Lebanon Migrant Center (CLMC),	Caritas France
24	Caritas Armenia	<i>Building Local Capacities to Reduce Irregular Migration and Trafficking</i>	Counter- trafficking	January 2016 – December 2018	“House of Abundance” Community Center NGO, “Crossing Roads” Social NGO, “Gegharkunik Human Rights Protection Center” NGO	Secours Catholique/ Caritas France, Caritas Spain, Catholic Relief Services

Source: IOM-Armenia, last update February 2017

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Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development

Case study: Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) Country note: Cape Verde

1 INTRODUCTION

The evaluation on the EU's Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) requires for the assessment at the impact level, the availability of concrete PCD outputs to be able to explore further causality links to outcome and impact. The development considerations contained in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) constitute a PCD output, according to the IL of the EU's approach to PCD. The case study will look at the outcomes and impacts in a developing country resulting from the changes in a EU policy and actions brought about by incorporating a PCD approach.

1.1 Rationale for selection of the country

The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) constitutes the overarching framework of the EU External Migration Policy and defines how the EU conducts its policy dialogues and cooperation with non-EU countries in the area of migration, based on four equally important objectives (GAMM four pillars):

- better organising legal migration, and fostering well-managed mobility;
- preventing and combatting irregular migration, and eradicating trafficking in human beings;
- maximising the development impact of migration and mobility, and
- promoting international protection and enhancing the external dimension of asylum.

Among the different mechanisms and tools to implement the GAMM, Mobility Partnerships (MP) with selected countries constitute a specific framework for bilateral cooperation with the EU in the areas of legal migration, development, border control, and international protection.³⁹⁷

The aim of the MPs has been to make the most of the opportunities and benefits that migrants, country of origin and receiving country can derive from the management of migration flows and at the same time promoting positive outcomes for the development of the country of origin. MPs as an open political framework, comprise a series of commitments which in turn translate into projects initiatives covering the four main objectives of the GAMM. In the MP with Cape Verde participate five EU Member States: Portugal, Spain, France, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands). The selection of Cape Verde as a case study relies on the following:

- was one of the first countries to sign a MP in 2008 (the only Sub-Saharan country so far to have signed a MP as this are mainly focused on EU Neighbourhood countries), and has also signed two legal agreements with the EU within this framework: the Visa Facilitation Agreement and the Readmission Agreement, both in force since 2014. Given that it has been quite a few years since the implementation of the first actions under this MP it was expected that there would be enough evidence available on the impact of actions under the objective of migration and development (M&D).
- Cape Verde is a small island state, it is located in the Sub-Saharan region, has historically relied on migration given that its diaspora exceeds the size of its resident population, and

³⁹⁷COM(2011) 743 final, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.

has relied over the years on migration as a development resource.³⁹⁸ It has also become a destination country for migration flows from ECOWAS countries. Despite its classification as a lower middle-income country and sound economic policies and good governance, poverty affects a third of Cape Verde's population, and the country relies heavily on remittances. As the general framework of the GAMM considers as one of its priorities to maximise the development impact of migration and mobility, this country case can provide lessons on the actions under the MP focusing on M&D.

1.2 Hypotheses to be verified during the field mission

One of the policy objectives of the GAMM is based on the premise that good governance of migration and mobility has a developmental potential and can bring benefits to partner countries: increasing migrant households well-being thanks to opportunities abroad such as acquiring new skills and work experience; fostering more foreign direct investment through diaspora communities; enhancing transfer of remittances, know-how and innovations; countering brain drain and promoting brain circulation.³⁹⁹ This has been identified as the M&D pillar of the GAMM. The MP as an implementation tool based on reciprocity, involves specific commitments for each partner country reflecting the four pillars underlined in the GAMM, including the M&D pillar. These four pillars are reflected in MPs in four areas: a) mobility, legal migration and integration, b) border management (i.e. readmission agreements), c) migration and development (i.e. diaspora, mitigate brain drain, support voluntary return and re-integration) and d) asylum and international protection (i.e. legislation, support measures).

The specific commitments undertaken by Cape Verde and each EU Member State under the MP are set out in the *Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde*, listed here in Annex 3.⁴⁰⁰ For this country case study we assess the contribution of the GAMM to the economic and social development of Cape Verde in terms of the framework provided by the specific commitments set out in the MP, and the implemented projects recorded in the Scoreboard for Cape Verde's MP (see Annex 5), focusing mainly on the assessment of the M&D pillar. However, as the review of relevant literature suggests that some of the measures aimed at regulating legal migration could limit the potential improvement of migration opportunities,⁴⁰¹ the indicators for the case study cover not only the potential benefits of economic and social remittances, but also consider measures in place such as readmission agreements and visa facilitation agreements to assess possible unintended effects.

Therefore, the extent of the contribution and impact of the GAMM on the development of Cape Verde will be analysed in terms of the outcomes of specific actions of the MP, considering economic and social remittances, and potential unintended effects due to border management. Also, as the GAMM aims to have a balanced approach to migration management and

³⁹⁸ Resende-Santos, J. (2016), Cape Verde: Rethinking Diaspora in Development Policy. *Int Migr*, 54: 82–97.

doi:10.1111/imig.12212.

³⁹⁹ (COM(2011) 743 final, p.6

⁴⁰⁰ Council of the European Union, *Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde*, 9460/08, Brussels, 21 May 2008.

⁴⁰¹ Brandao, F. and Zoomers, (2012) Europe's mobility partnerships with migrant-sending countries in the global south: A view from Cape Verde, in *European Migration and Asylum Policies: Coherence or Contradiction? An interdisciplinary evaluation of the EU programmes of Tampere (1999), The Hague (2004), Stockholm (2009)*, Publisher: Éditions Bruylant, Editors: C. Gortázar, M.-C. Parra, B. Segaert & C. Timmerman (Eds, pp.287-295); A. Pina-Delgado, J. (2013), *The Current Scheme to Manage Migration between Europe and Cape Verde: Promoter of Development or Tool for Border Closure?*. *Popul. Space Place*, 19: 404–414. doi:10.1002/psp.1781; Van Stokkum, L. (2015), *More mobility for development: Policy Coherence for Development in practice: making the EU Mobility Partnership a tool for development in Cape Verde*, FMS, Netherlands.

development, we consider the priority given to the M&D pillar compared to the other pillars and its influence on other actions:

1.7.4.1 Extent of contribution of financial remittances

This indicator will consider evidence on:

- Flows of remittances from EU – share of country's GDP (source WB, national statistics);
- Share of households receiving financial remittances (through official channels);
- Existence of mechanism for low cost transfer of remittances;
- Diaspora investments – share of total FDI.

1.7.4.2. Extent of contribution of social remittances

The transfer of knowledge and skills has been regarded as social remittances with which migrants also contribute to their countries' development. The notion also implies that the circulation of ideas, skills, and social capital contribute to local development processes.⁴⁰² This indicator will consider evidence on:

- Existence of skills matching schemes and mechanisms prior to departure according to the country of destination;
- Existence of skills matching schemes and mechanisms for returnee migrants according to the local labour market;
- Existence of mechanisms to promote the participation of highly qualified migrants to provide training, transfer competencies upon return in national institutions;
- Engagement of diaspora in skills and knowledge transfers schemes, engagement of diaspora associations assisting local communities and creating business opportunities within the partner country.

1.7.4.3 Extent of improvement of social and economic conditions upon return

The reintegration of migrants who decide to return to their countries of origin can have an effect on the development of their countries when the opportunities to reintegrate to the labour market and the incentives to return exist. This indicator will consider evidence on:

- Economic and living conditions of returnee migrants, portability of social security rights.
- Measures to support returnee migrants, skills matching schemes and support for entrepreneurship (existence of measures, programmes and number of migrants attended), number of matching skills services and migrants attended

1.7.4.4 Unintended effects of border management measures and unintended effects of other measures facilitating migration

This indicator considers evidence on:

- Readmission agreements and number of readmitted migrants per year, existence of measures to support returned irregular migrants;
- Visa facilitation schemes and beneficiaries per year and type;
- Recruitment in vulnerable sectors, existence of framework for ethical recruitment and promotion of training in national institutions.
- Border infrastructure and measures (EU IBM standards)
- Changes in local legislative framework on migration and mobility

⁴⁰²Lacroix, Th., Levitt, P. and Vari-Lavoise, I. (2016), Social remittances and the changing transnational political landscape, *Comparative Migration Studies*, 4:16. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-016-0032-0>

2 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE LINK WITH EU POLICY(ES) / INITIATIVE(S) IN THE COUNTRY

2.1 Country context

Cape Verde is an archipelago composed of 10 islands (only 9 are inhabited) off the coast of West Africa, in the area of the Sahel.⁴⁰³ The archipelago is situated in the Atlantic Ocean about 450 km west of Senegal, approximately 2890 km from Portugal and 2600 km from Brazil. It has a land area of 4,033 km², and an Economic Exclusive Zone of about 700,000 Km². This small island state with a population of 530,931⁴⁰⁴ people (46.4 per cent of whom are under 25) graduated from least developed country (LDC) status on 1 January 2008 due to its sound economic policies and good governance.⁴⁰⁵ It is now classified as a lower-middle income developing economy with a per capita GDP of €2,800 per year.⁴⁰⁶ Between 2002 and 2015, absolute poverty rates fell considerably, from approximately 57.6 per cent to 35.0 per cent. However, inequality is still persistent and highly concentrated in rural areas. A third of the country's population lives below the absolute poverty threshold, and urban relative poverty has increased since 2007.⁴⁰⁷ Cape Verde has a multiparty parliamentary democracy, and a new government has been elected following the 2016 national elections. The country ranks 3rd among all African countries in the 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance; and ranked number 38 out of 176 countries in the 2016 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. Cape Verde has a small public administration and insufficient administrative resources.⁴⁰⁸

Moreover, Cape Verde has limited natural resources and little arable land, besides being prone to drought. Therefore, the country is highly dependent on cereal imports such as rice and wheat, mainly from Spain and Portugal. Despite a broad macro-economic stability, given the sharp fall in crop production since 2014 due to drought the food security situation has deteriorated for more than 5% of the population, mainly rural families.⁴⁰⁹ The geographical fragmentation of islands, with a scattered population and the distance between islands, adds costs to its insularity. Praia, the most populated city and capital, is located on the island of Santiago in the Sotavento Islands at a distance of 200 Km from Mindelo, the second largest city which is also the principal port, located on the island of Sao Vicente in the area of the Barlavento islands.

⁴⁰³ The *Barlavento islands* (northern island group) are: Santo Antao, Sao Vicente, Santa Luzia, Sao Nicolau, Sal, Boa Vista; and the *Sotavento islands* (southern island group) are: Maio, Santiago, Fogo, and Brava.

⁴⁰⁴ The most recent population estimate corresponds to Cabo Verde's INE 2016 Inquérito Multi-Objectivo Contínuo – Estatísticas das famílias e condições de vida, http://ine.cv/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/imc-2016-condicoes_vida-1.pdf

⁴⁰⁵ African Development Bank (2012), Cape Verde: A success story <https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Cape%20Verde%20-%20A%20Success%20Story.pdf>; UNGA Resolution 59/209 on Cape Verde's graduation from the category of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to the category of Middle-Income Country (MICs). Graduation was based on (i) progress recorded in per capita income and (ii) human capital formation, while the criteria of (iii) reducing the economic vulnerability index was left out due to the country's structural vulnerability.

⁴⁰⁶ https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s322_e.pdf; <https://data.worldbank.org/country/cabo-verde>

⁴⁰⁷ III Inquérito Às Despesas e Receitas Familiares (Household Survey) 2015, www.ine.cv, Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde; <http://ine.cv/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/apresentacao-resultados-preliminares-18-novembro-2016.pdf>. The number of Cape Verdeans living in poverty by 2015 is 179,184 of an estimated total population for that year of 511,254. In 2007 urban relative poverty amounted to 13,2% and in 2015 to 15,0% of the urban population. <http://ine.cv/publicacoes/resultados-do-iii-inquerito-as-despesas-e-receitas-familiares-2015/>

⁴⁰⁸ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/january/tradoc_156540.pdf pg.15

⁴⁰⁹ <http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=CPV>

Insularity and migration

The scarcity of natural resources and the insularity of the country have been identified as the most natural salient characteristics to explain Cape Verde's two important features in the country's development path and history: structural economic vulnerability and high rates of emigration.⁴¹⁰ Migration is deeply rooted as a personal development strategy in Cape Verdean society.⁴¹¹ Despite a steady decrease in emigration flows, Cape Verde remains a country of emigration to the point that the number of Cape Verdeans in the diaspora exceeds the country's population. During the period 1970–1975 the net migration rate was of -19.1 migrants per thousand inhabitants decreasing to -5.1 migrants per thousand inhabitants for the period 2005–2010.⁴¹² During the period 2009–2014 an estimated of 16,420 Cape Verdeans left the country, more than 3 per cent of the country's population, and most of them aged between 15–24 years old.⁴¹³ Unemployment rate for 2016 was at 15 per cent, particularly prevalent among youth between 15 and 24 years old (41 per cent). Women (17.4 per cent) continue to be more affected by unemployment than men (12.9 per cent). Underemployment rate is currently at 26.2 per cent.⁴¹⁴

Education and migration

Cape Verde's Human Development Index value for 2015 was 0.648—placing the country in the medium human development category—ranking in the 122nd place out of 188 countries and territories.⁴¹⁵ Since its independence in 1975, Cape Verde has faced limited educational opportunities and education has been a top priority of successive governments. The implementation of universal access to education from independence onwards has resulted in Cape Verde attaining one of the highest literacy rates on the continent.⁴¹⁶ By 2016 the literacy rate in Cape Verde was 87.6%, being higher in urban areas (90.8%) than in rural ones (80.9%); and youth literacy rate (15–24 years) reached 98.6%. However, quality of education remains a major challenge and one major push factor for emigrating. The number of Cape Verdeans that left to pursue higher education studies abroad during the period 1997–2003 was of 5,382.⁴¹⁷ Data on skilled migration from 2009 suggest that almost 40 per cent of Cape Verdean university graduates living abroad would have not pursued tertiary education had they not migrated.⁴¹⁸ For instance, Cape Verdean doctors have always graduated abroad and continue to do so as this career choice has only become available locally since 2015.⁴¹⁹ It is estimated that at least 36 per

⁴¹⁰ African Development Bank (2012), Cape Verde: A success story, p.4

⁴¹¹ African Development Bank, op.cit, p. 5; IOM (2010) Migration Profile of Cabo Verde 2009/ Migração em Cabo Verde Perfil Nacional 2009, p.21, http://www.iomdakar.org/profiles/sites/default/files/Cape%20Verde_MP.pdf

⁴¹² IOM, op. cit., p.21. The former Institute of Communities estimated 600,000 Cape Verdeans living in the diaspora, see Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme Cape Verde-EU 2008–2013, Annex 4, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/csp-nip-cap-verde-2008-2013_fr.pdf

⁴¹³ According to the INE during the period 2009–2014 an estimated of 16,420 Cape Verdeans left the country (INE 2015, Inquérito Multi-objetivo Contínuo 2014 Estatísticas das Migrações, p.35, http://ine.cv/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Migracoes2014_Rev1.pdf)

⁴¹⁴ INE (2017) Estatísticas do emprego e mercado de trabalho em CV- IMC 2016 , <http://ine.cv/quadros/estatisticas-do-emprego-mercado-trabalho-cv-imc2016-2/>, http://ine.cv/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/dados-trabalhador_1.pdf

⁴¹⁵ UNDP Human Development Report 2016. The HDI assesses progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/CPV.pdf

⁴¹⁶ African Development Bank, op.cit, p.36. INE (2016) Inquérito Multi-Objectivo Contínuo – Estatísticas das famílias e condições de vida, http://ine.cv/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/imc-2016-condicoes_vida-1.pdf.

⁴¹⁷ IOM, op.cit., p.22. It is estimated that among the Cape Verdean diaspora in OECD countries 11 per cent of these emigrants have a higher education level.

⁴¹⁸ see ICPDM-OIM (2010) Inventory of Institutional Capacities and Practices - The Cape Verdean Experience p.6 of 24, in MTM A Dialogue in Action -Linking Emigrant Communities for More Development Inventory of Institutional Capacities and Practices, Joint ICPDM-IOM Project, http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iom_icmpd_inventory_en.pdf

⁴¹⁹ The first experience of pre-graduate medical education in Cape Verde only began in October 2015, with major support from the Faculty of Medicine of Coimbra (FMUC), Portugal. A 2017 study has pointed out to the lack of local post-graduate medical

cent (5,927.62) of Cape Verdeans from the total that have left the country during the period 2009-2014 have done so to continue further education.⁴²⁰ In the 2017-2018 World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report, Cape Verde ranks 86th in the pillar of higher education and training, below countries such as Moldova and Tunisia. These ratings are a result of low enrolment rates in tertiary education, low availability of high-quality professional training services, and low industry investment in staff training and employee development. In the innovation pillar the country ranks 98th due to weak quality of scientific research institutions and low availability of scientists and engineers. The Global Competitiveness Report identifies inadequately educated workforce among the top five most problematic factors for doing business in Cape Verde and the quality of education as inadequate to meet the needs of a competitive economy.⁴²¹

Economic remittances and financial flows

Cape Verde's economy has been vulnerable to the global financial crisis, in particular to economic shocks in European economies and given the fixed exchange rate with the euro.⁴²² The financial crises have had a negative impact on the country's main sources of external finance, mainly tourism inflows, migrant remittances, FDI (since 2009 FDI contracted, reversing the positive trend of the previous years) and financial aid.⁴²³ According to the African Development Bank (AfDB) the 2008 global crisis impacted the economy through a dwindling tourism revenue (7 per cent decrease in 2009) and FDI (40 per cent decrease in 2009), thereby decelerating GDP growth to between 4.5 per cent and 5 per cent in 2009.⁴²⁴ The economy returned to modest growth in 2010 (up 1.5 per cent) and 4 per cent growth in 2011, in part due to higher tourism receipts and a public investment programme, mainly supported by concessional lending.⁴²⁵ The GDP growth averaged 1.8 per cent between 2010-2015, and by 2016 registered 3.8 per cent growth.⁴²⁶ Debt sustainability has become critical, public debt rose to 130 per cent of GDP at the end of 2016.⁴²⁷ Migrant remittances have continued to represent an important contribution to Cape Verde's GDP (about 9 per cent of the GDP). Remittance deposits alone represent 55 per cent of the total stock of bank deposits in Cape Verde.⁴²⁸ The EU is the main source of remittances (an average of 81 per cent for the period 2007-2017).⁴²⁹ For instance Portugal generates 30 per cent of migrants' remittances.⁴³⁰ With respect to FDI and

training in Cape Verde, the progressive feminization of the medical workforce, and the fact that all active physicians in 2014 will be already retired by 2053. Based on secondary data on Cape Verdean doctors, from July 1975 until December 2014, the study determined that 94.3 per cent of physicians graduated mainly from 5 of the 17 countries that contributed to the training of Cape Verdean doctors. The graduates' main places of training were Cuba (47.1 per cent), Portugal (19.5 per cent), and Brazil (19 per cent). The study illustrates the importance of international collaboration in sustaining the medical workforce in Cape Verde; see Delgado A.P., Tolentino A.C. and Ferrinho P. (2017) "The evolution of the medical work-force in Cape Verde since independence in 1975", *Human Resources for Health Journal* 15:5, doi: [10.1186/s12960-017-0180-9](https://doi.org/10.1186/s12960-017-0180-9)

⁴²⁰ INE 2015, Inquérito Multi-objectivo Contínuo 2014 Estatísticas das Migrações , p.38 http://ine.cv/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Migracoes2014_Rev1.pdf

⁴²¹ World Economic Forum (2014) The 2017- 2018 World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report, <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index-2017-2018/countryeconomy-profiles/#economy=CPV>

⁴²² The Cabo Verdean Escudo (CVEsc) is pegged to the euro at a fixed exchange rate of €1 to CVEsc 110.265.

⁴²³ Monitoring the progress of graduated countries Cape Verde, Committee for Development Policy Expert Group Meeting Review of the list of Least Developed Countries New York, 16-17 January 2011, CDP2012/EGM/12, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc_documents/capeverde_monitoring_report_2012.pdf

⁴²⁴ African Development Bank, op.cit, p. 5

⁴²⁵ Trade Policy Review 2015 Cabo Verde, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s322_e.pdf ; UNDP Common Country Programme for Cape Verde 2012-2016, <https://www.un.org/files/CAPEVERDECCPD202012-2016-English.pdf>

⁴²⁶ <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/cape-verde/cape-verde-economic-outlook/>

⁴²⁷ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/caboverde/overview>

⁴²⁸ Banco de Cabo Verde, see Annex 4.

⁴²⁹ Banco de Cabo Verde, see Annex 4.

⁴³⁰ Monitoring the progress of graduated countries Cape Verde, Committee for Development Policy Expert Group Meeting Review of the list of Least Developed Countries New York, 16-17 January 2011, CDP2012/EGM/12, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc_documents/capeverde_monitoring_report_2012.pdf

ODA, the volume of remittances has remained higher compared to either of these flows for the period 2011 – 2016; and since 2014 remittance flows have been higher than both FDI and ODA (Table 5 – Annex 4).

2.2 EU intervention in Cape Verde

The EU is a strategic partner for Cape Verde. Further to being a member of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (Cotonou Agreement), Cape Verde signed a Special Partnership with the EU, ratified by the EU Council at the end of 2007. The Special Partnership, a mechanism for political dialogue and promotion of policy convergence, is based on six pillars: Good governance; Security and stability (through actions implemented on a cross-border and regional basis in particular, in the areas of the fight against transnational organised crime, efficient management of migration flows and maritime security); Regional integration; Technical and Regulatory Convergence; Knowledge-based Society; and The fight against poverty, and development. In the framework of this cooperation, a Mobility Partnership between the country, the EU and 5 EU Member States (Portugal, Spain, France, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands) followed in 2008.⁴³¹ Cape Verde also has a Fisheries Agreement with the EU since 2007, for which a new Protocol was signed in 2014.⁴³² This fisheries agreement allows 71 EU vessels, mainly from Spain, Portugal and France, to fish for tuna and similar species in Cape Verdean waters. Furthermore, the country enjoys since 2012 preferential treatment under GSP+. The EU is Cape Verde's main trading partner, representing 97% of total exports in 2016 and 75% of imports.⁴³³

The European Development Fund (EDF) is the main source of technical and financial cooperation with Cape Verde. The new EU-Cape Verde Budget Support programme was signed at the end of 2016, and is financed under the 11th EDF, for the period 2016-2020. Cape Verde has been integrated into the Macaronesia cooperation programme, which benefits the EU's outermost regions in the North Atlantic (Madeira, Azores and Canary Islands) under the cross-border cooperation programme Spain-Portugal co-financed by the ERDF. Also, Cape Verde is one of the beneficiaries of the EU's regional cooperation with Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP).

The MP and the Special Partnership

With respect to the 2008 Mobility Partnership (MP), this was conceived as an open-ended, long-term framework based on a political dialogue subject to evolve over time.⁴³⁴ The MP was negotiated under the framework of the previous Global Approach to Migration (GAM) and was considered as a pilot MP since Cape Verde became the first African country to enter into a MP with the EU. Also, the MP took into account the framework provided by the second pillar (Security and Stability) of the Special Partnership already signed in 2007. The Security and Stability pillar of the Special Partnership was set to cover mainly the following areas of:

⁴³¹ Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde, 9460/08, Brussels, 21 May 2008. Initial members were Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg and France. Netherlands joined at a later stage.

⁴³² Official Journal of the European Union, Protocol Between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for by the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Cape Verde, L 369/3, 24.12.2014.

⁴³³ SWD(2018) 25 final, 19.1.2018, The EU Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance ('GSP+') assessment of Cabo Verde covering the period 2016 – 2017, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/january/tradoc_156540.pdf pg.15

⁴³⁴ Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde, 9460/08, p 6.

- a) Security and action to tackle transnational organised crime (cooperation on counter-terrorism, human trafficking and the smuggling of immigrants, illegal trafficking in drugs, arms, money-laundering), whilst promoting respect for human rights;
- b) Effective management of migration, including improving the contribution of the Cape Verdean diaspora to the development of the country (remittances) and action to tackle illegal migration; and
- c) Maritime safety.⁴³⁵

Therefore, the 2008 MP between the EU and Cape Verde was negotiated considering actions focused on similar priorities as those of the Special Partnership signed in 2007:

- 1) Mobility, Legal Migration and Integration;
- 2) Migration and Development; and
- 3) Border Management, Identity and Travel Documents, Fight against Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Human Beings

With respect to these three main priorities, the partners to the MP also agreed on a number of specific topics for each priority (Table 1 in Annex 2). Moreover, the MP included an Annex setting the specific actions to be implemented by each partner identified in further six main areas (Table 2 in Annex 2). During the field mission, stakeholders confirmed that the MP priorities at the time focused on security and mobility issues and responded to a specific context within the existing Special Partnership.

2.3 MP stakeholders and implementation

The MP involves different government departments and agencies both on the side of the EU and EU Member States but also on the side of Cape Verde. The EU Member States partners to the MP with Cape Verde are Portugal, Luxembourg, Spain, France, The Netherlands. Within EU Member States the implementing authorities involve the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (PT, LU, NL); the Ministries of Interior (PT, FR); the SEF (Foreigners and Borders Service), Instituto Camões, ACIDI (Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e Diálogo Intercultural) and the Ministry of Health on the side of Portugal; the National Guard (Guardia Civil), the Borders and Customs Office (Jefatura Fiscal y de Fronteras) and AECID (Agency for Cooperation and Development) on the side of Spain; the Department for Immigration and Integration of France (OFFI); and Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) on the side of the Netherlands. At the level of Cape Verdean authorities, stakeholders involve the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate General of Communities, Consular Affairs and Migration, Ministry of Education, Family and Social Inclusion, General Directorate of Immigration (DGI), the National Police, the Institute of Employment and Vocational Training (IEFP), Municipal authorities and focal points for emigration. International organisations involved in the implementation comprise the IOM and ICMPD. At the level of the EU, the involved stakeholders are DG HOME, DG DEVCO, the EU Delegation in Praia, FRONTEX, and the Common Visa Centre in Praia.

There has been continuous effort from stakeholders to implement the MP but certain areas have been only covered at the beginning of the period of implementation while others have continued to receive attention, such as the ones related to the pillars on legal migration and border management. Also, some stakeholders interviewed during the field mission have confirmed that their level of commitment has declined in time, especially with respect to the M&D pillar. Some EU Member States have been more active than others in the implementation of the M&D actions, such is the case of Portugal and Luxembourg. Others have confirmed that their area of

⁴³⁵ COM(2007) 641 final, on the future of relations between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde, Brussels, 24.10.2007.

focus in Cape Verde is not migration but others areas such as gender or promotion of culture (language). Also, it is important to note that Cape Verde has limited institutional capacity, its small public administration and few financial resources have constrained the follow up on their priorities.

The provisions of the MP have not established a particular mechanism for monitoring its implementation. The only mention within the text of the MP refers to its implementation at the operational level by the Local Monitoring Group already set up for the Special Partnership (which consists of meetings at the political level), and “if appropriate” the partners will make an evaluation of the MP.⁴³⁶ However, stakeholders interviewed have confirmed that the MP is rarely discussed and lacks a proper coordination structure which can integrate all stakeholders, especially involving all institutions of the partner country to discuss achievements of the actions undertaken and set an agenda of priorities.

To monitor implementation of the MP, a Scoreboard is used to establish the state of implementation of the actions undertaken by the EU Member States participating in the partnership. The MP did not establish how the actions would be financed though it did establish that they would be implemented within the limits of the partners’ available financial means. This Scoreboard is updated from time to time but does not consistently record information on results achieved, and does not track lessons learned nor impact. Moreover, the handling of the Scoreboard is not centrally managed neither by the EU Delegation, nor the Commission or the partner country. The ‘ad-hoc’ responsibility in the case of Cape Verde has been given to ICPMD, institution that has the task to compile and gather the information from the different stakeholders involved in the implementation of actions.

As a result, the available information on the actions undertaken under the MP and the results obtained is scattered, limited and partial. A 2012 inventory elaborated at the EU Delegation in Praia contained summary information on results for 11 projects related to actions under the MP financed by the EU and EU Member States partners to the MP. However, this information is not fully replicated in the Scoreboard of the MP updated in 2017 (Annex 5). The Scoreboard includes 41 actions, a combination of projects and political processes, of which 3 are yet to be confirmed and 17 are still on-going. Within a total of 38 actions implemented, the highest number corresponds to those focused on management of migration flows and border management. With respect to the M&D pillar, 7 actions have taken place of which 2 are still ongoing and the rest were completed during the period 2007-2012. There is only available data for 3 of these projects, and the information was mainly gathered during the field mission.

Figure 1 Actions implemented under the MP EU-CV





Figure 2 Actions undertaken per pillar MP EU-CV



Source: Scoreboard MP EU Cape Verde, last updated February 2017.

⁴³⁶ Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Cape Verde, 9460/08, p.6.

The 3 projects under the M&D pillar for which there is available information are:

1) Strengthening of Cape Verde's capacities in migration management (2,000,000 EUR) – 2011-2014:

The project had three main objectives and different implementing partners:

A. Social economic insertion of migrants returning from EU Member States to Cape Verde; implemented by Department for Immigration and Integration (OFFI) OFFI/ France; MFA Luxembourg.

B. Support to local authorities to fight illegal immigration; implemented by: Immigration and Borders Service (SEF) / Portugal

C. Support to data gathering on migration trends in Cape Verde, implemented by IND / The Netherlands.

Component A is related to M&D, it focused on social economic insertion of migrants returning from EU Member States to Cape Verde. The project established a network of 15 operators at the level of local authorities trained on reintegration measures and supporting the creation of small businesses. A focal point was established within the Centre for Migrant Support in the Origin Country (CAMPO) – no longer active— within the Ministry of Communities (now a Directorate General within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Information sessions took place in Paris, Marseille and Nice among Cape Verdean diaspora to promote return. Also, the project financed visits of local authorities to OFFI Dakar and the visit of OFFI General Director to Cape Verde. The goal was to reach 100 projects but only 25 initiatives were selected to receive support such as elaboration of a business plan, 23 were finally supported. The final evaluation on the project determined that this component was partially accomplished, the rate of unsuccessful projects was high and many faced constraints. The evaluation established that the project had not made an adequate assessment of the local context to establish the business plans of the supported projects, especially of those in the agricultural sector.⁴³⁷

2) Strengthening the capacity of Cape Verde to Manage Labour and Return Migration within the Framework of the Mobility Partnership established with the EU – CAMPO project, implemented by Portugal (IPAD) (1,000,000 EUR) – 2009-2011:

The aim of the project was to provide assistance to migrants in the pre-departure and re-integration phases. One of the components was related to M&D. This component focused on the involvement of Cape Verdean diaspora to transfer skills and knowledge, and on the support to reintegration activities via entrepreneurship projects of returned migrants. As a result, different information sessions to promote migrants' entrepreneurship initiatives as part of re-integration processes took place in Spain and Portugal. Also, 18 highly qualified diaspora members carried out 41 training missions coordinated by CAMPO centre. With respect to the creation of small enterprises, from 60 applications received only 20 were pre-selected. Finally, only 3 projects benefited from 10,000 EUR grants each to support the creation of small businesses: 2 restaurants and 1 poultry farm project. Additionally, the project aimed to continue with the work of the CAMPO centre providing information to potential migrants; 7500 consultations were carried out and more than 23 000 visits were registered on the CAMPO website. The main users of the consultations were students. Currently the CAMPO website is

⁴³⁷ Relatório de Avaliação Final do Projeto Europeu Reforço das Capacidade de Cabo Verde na Gestão das Migrações CES Centro de Estudos Sociais da Universidade de Coimbra, Laboratório Associado (CES), 2015, p. 44, 47-49; Les Missions de l'OFFI en 2013, 12.03.2104 rapport d'activité, p.50-51. http://www.ofii.fr/IMG/pdf/Rapport_activite_Missions_VERSION_internet.pdf.

not active and the support structure transferred to the Ministry of Communities has limited institutional capacity and resources.⁴³⁸

3) DIAS de Cabo Verde Diaspora for development (580,954.66 EUR) – 2007-2009:

This project implemented by the IOM aimed to foster links between the Cape Verdean Diaspora and the development of potential economic sectors in the country. It mainly focused on the transfer of skills and knowledge from highly skilled Cape Verdeans in the diaspora. The project carried out 28 training missions of diaspora members, lasting no longer than 3 weeks each. The project was able to benefit 648 Cape Verdeans through trainings mainly in the areas of health, IT, community development, management, and maths. The diaspora members were recruited via the IOM offices in Italy, Portugal, and The Netherlands, and the trainings covered 6 islands in Cabo Verde. From the 28 professionals that carried out the missions, and the end of the project 7 had returned and were working in Cape Verde.⁴³⁹

Further to this information, during the period 2008-2016 the EU has funded 17 projects in the area of migration (Annex 6). From these projects, only 4 are related to M&D: 2 have a regional scope and are not country specific, and the other 2 projects only included 1 component related to M&D.

3 FINDINGS (AT OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS LEVELS INCLUDING UNINTENDED EFFECTS)

3.1 Country level outcomes

Based on the available evidence, the prior desk review and the stakeholders' interviews, we provide below and assessment based on the indicators agreed and validated in the methodology presented during the Desk Phase of the evaluation.

Indicator I.7.4.1 Extent of contribution of financial remittances

At an overall level, Cape Verde continues to rely on financial flows from abroad and remittances are the second key contributor to Cape Verde's economy. As per data of the Banco de Cabo Verde, remittances have accounted between 8 to 10.9 per cent of the Cape Verde's GDP during the period 2007-2017; and the amount of personal remittances has been higher than the amount of FDI inflows and ODA at various times, especially in the last four years (Annex 4). More than 80 per cent of remittance inflows to Cape Verde originate in the EU (see Table 3 in Annex 4). Stakeholders point out to the fact that remittances are not purely financial but also these are in kind (food and consumer goods) which are then traded in the informal market representing an important share in the country's economy. Remittances are mainly destined to education, health and household income support. Also, it is important to consider that the costs of remittance transfers continue to be high in Sub Saharan countries, for sending US\$ 200 inclusive of fees and charges the cost reaches and average of 9.1 per cent.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁸ CAMPO (Centro de Apoio ao Migrante no País de Origem (CAMPO) em Cabo Verde) a Portuguese initiative created in 2008 was continued under the MP with support from the EU. Relatório Final Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e Diálogo Intercultural Portugal period 2007-2009, p.65

⁴³⁹ Final Narrative and Financial Report of the project DIAS de Cabo Verde, 2010.

⁴⁴⁰ The cost of sending money to LMICs is well above the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target of 3 percent. Migration and Remittances: Recent developments and outlook, WB Migration and Development Brief 28, October 2017, p.4. <http://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Migration%20and%20Development%20Report%202012-14-17%20web.pdf>

Even though the M&D pillar of the GAMM recognises the role of remittances in development, the actions undertaken under the MP with Cape Verde are not fully related to reduction of the costs of economic remittances nor to its use in productive sectors. On the other hand, the presence of Cape Verdeans abroad (diaspora is bigger than the country's population), and the fact that remittances constitute one of the three key contributions to Cape Verde's economy has been a constant well before the negotiation of the MP. Stakeholders interviewed have confirmed that there have been limited actions to promote the use of remittances on productive investment; though remittances constitute at least 50 per cent of the country's bank deposits. Nor there have been actions to reduce the cost of transactions, which affects greatly Cape Verde given that it has a small banking sector and money transfers have to pass through several correspondent international banks before they reach local banks. One stakeholder pointed out that enforcement of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) legislation in the United States have affected remittances transactions from that country to Cape Verde.

Indicator I.7.4.2 Extent of contribution of social remittances

The skills transfer activities implemented under the MP can broadly be classified in pre-departure measures including skills-matching schemes, and diaspora skills transfer. The implementation of skills matching schemes and mechanisms prior to departure has mainly consisted on the information and consultation actions aimed to potential migrants carried under the CAMPO project which ended in 2011. The project aimed to facilitate information on available jobs/vacancies to promote legal migration channels. However, for an effective implementation of training and skill matching schemes prior to departure, bilateral agreements on circular migration would need to be implemented based on quotas (existing bilateral agreements with Portugal, Spain and France are not fully in force). Existing studies acknowledge that circular migration can help to mitigate “brain drain” and to promote “brain gain”, as returning workers bring with them new knowledge and skills.⁴⁴¹ Stakeholders interviewed considered that the developmental potential of Cape Verde relies on circular migration, as there is an important need to continue training and developing the skills of the country's human capital.

On the other hand, prospective students were the main beneficiaries on pre-departure measures (access to information) and has had an effect on students' mobility, mainly facilitated by Portugal. Portugal allocates 20 scholarships per year and has a quota of 200 places in public universities reserved for Cape Verdean students. This is significant, considering that the first Higher Education Institute in Cape Verde was created in 1995 and the first public university started to function in 2006. The first experience of pre-graduate medical education in Cape Verde only began in October 2015, with major support from the Faculty of Medicine of Coimbra (FMUC), Portugal. Before, Cape Verdean doctors have mainly trained in Cuba, Portugal and Brazil.⁴⁴² Moreover, given that medical training at the post-graduate level is inexistent in Cape Verde, Portugal has continued to support the training of specialists in Cape Verde's hospitals. Under the framework of the MP it was possible to train health professionals in the hospitals of Santa Maria and San João, and training of vascular access surgeons with a Portuguese nephrologist expert.

⁴⁴¹ Towards sustainable migration: interventions in the countries of origin 2017 Italian Centre for International Development (ICID), p.41, http://www.icid.info/public/icid/files/Reports/Towards_sustainable_migration_2017Int.pdf

⁴⁴² Delgado A.P., Tolentino A.C, and Ferrinho P. (2017) “The evolution of the medical work-force in Cape Verde since independence in 1975”, *Human Resources for Health Journal* 15:5, doi: [10.1186/s12960-017-0180-9](https://doi.org/10.1186/s12960-017-0180-9)

Regarding diaspora skills transfer, the CAMPO project involved 18 diaspora members in 41 training missions but there is no evidence available on the areas of training or beneficiaries. The DIAS de Cabo Verde project implemented 28 training missions of short duration, an online data base was created so high skilled professionals could upload their CVs; it received 165 profiles and 104 professionals applied. The database was transferred to the Ministry of Communities. According to the Final Narrative Report of the DIAS project, from the 28 high skilled migrants involved in the training missions 7 of them returned to Cape Verde and were working with or for the beneficiary institution, among them a qualified nurse working for the University of Cape Verde. The report points out that beneficiary institutions considered that the 3 weeks the missions were insufficient for assimilation of the trainings and in some cases the training missions had to be adjusted since the trainers were not adequate for the higher level of expertise required by the institution. This project represented the first chance for Cape Verde to mobilize its diaspora abroad. According to the narrative report: *“This initiative has been an important trust-building process that produced a deep impact on the diaspora of the participating countries as well as on the relevant actors in Cape Verde at both local and central level, triggering a change in the approach, vision, and attitude from both ends. Yet, this is a long-term process that still requires much work to consolidate”*.⁴⁴³

These pilot projects took place between 2008 - 2011, and since then no specific structure has been in charge of promoting the participation of highly qualified Cape Verdeans in skills transfer programmes. The CAMPO centre was transferred to the Cape Verdean authorities but due to lack of resources and limited institutional capacity the centre is not fully active.

Indicator I.7.4.3 Extent of improvement of social and economic conditions upon return

Available evidence on the economic and living conditions of returnee migrants is very limited. An ethnographic study based on 26 returnees established that the majority of returnees are retired people being house construction the most important investment, while in urbanised areas common investments are grocery shops or small scale transport businesses, already saturated market niches.⁴⁴⁴ To a lesser extent returnees were also labour migrants that had accumulated enough savings nearly over two decades to set up successful businesses, and highly educated returnees. The study also confirmed that being an unsuccessful returnee without savings carries a heavy stigma as it can be associated to deportation due to criminal activity, and not necessarily to cases of forced returns due to undocumented residence status.⁴⁴⁵

With respect to portability of social security rights, according to a 2010 IOM Inventory, Cape Verde has signed social security bilateral agreements with France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, but these are not necessarily linked to the MP.⁴⁴⁶ Under the MP, a couple of projects have been implemented addressing the reintegration of returnees by supporting business plans. For instance under the project Strengthening of Cape Verde’s capacities in migration management– 2011-2014, the component implemented by OFFI supported technical assistance for 25 business plans. The project’s evaluation considered

⁴⁴³ Final Narrative and Financial Report of the project DIAS de Cabo Verde, 2010

⁴⁴⁴ Akesson, L. (2011) Making migrants responsible for development: Cape Verdean Returnees and Northern Migration Policies, Africa Spectrum, 41:1, 61-83.

⁴⁴⁵ Akesson, L. (2011) Making migrants responsible for development: Cape Verdean Returnees and Northern Migration Policies, Africa Spectrum, 41:1, 61-83.

⁴⁴⁶ ICPDM-OIM (2010) Inventory of Institutional Capacities and Practices - The Cape Verdean Experience, in MTM A Dialogue in Action -Linking Emigrant Communities for More Development Inventory of Institutional Capacities and Practices, Joint ICPDM-IOM Project, http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iom_icmpd_inventory_en.pdf

that this particular component had not been efficient, and a careful consideration of Cape Verde's context had been absent when elaborating the business plans. The evaluation also concluded that as a pilot project the impact depended on long term funding for similar projects, but also noted the high failure rate of the entrepreneurial projects supported, 14 out of 25 business initiatives had significant difficulties or were inactive.⁴⁴⁷ Furthermore, The evaluation also concluded that even though the project had provided capacity building a the level of government institutions with planning tools and structures to implement policies to support return and reintegration of Cape Verdeans returnees, technical assistance and further financing was needed to continue to support the structures created within the Ministry of Communities such as focal points in CAMPO and RENEM (Network of Focal Points for Emigration).⁴⁴⁸ The CAMPO project also supported 3 entrepreneurial initiatives financing returnee beneficiaries with a grant of 10.000 EUR from an initial pre-selection of 20 (total applicants were 60). A project addressed to women and funded by AECID (Spain) reached 25 beneficiaries with micro-credits, but there is limited information as to impact.

Given that Cape Verdeans also migrate due to health reasons, additional measures to support returnees have been the installation of a haemodialysis unit and the creation of an oncology surveillance platform with the support of Portugal. Also, considering the high levels of unemployment affecting the young population in Cape Verde, Luxemburg has supported the creation and equipment of vocational schools, developed the curricula and supported the IEFP to promote employment.⁴⁴⁹

3.2 Country level impacts

The high levels of remittances compared to lower levels of FDI and decreasing levels of ODA disbursements during the period 2007-2016 show that Cape Verde still relies heavily on remittances. In 2014 remittances doubled ODA-DAC disbursements and tripled them in 2016 (see Table 5 – Annex 4). Stakeholders have confirmed the key role of remittances in Cape Verde's development since the country's independence. Since the year of implementation of the MP (2008) the levels of remittance flows from the EU have slightly increased. However, it is difficult to establish a direct link between actions implemented under the MP and the flow of remittances, as these were not aimed to reduce transaction costs or promote diaspora investments. Moreover, stakeholders interviewed consider that the only way to promote effective use of remittances and diaspora involvement is through the creation of financial instruments which in turn could be used for productive investments in the country. Stakeholders have pointed out that the assumption that the MP would create a chain reaction to attract sources of financing such as diaspora investment to level reduced ODA is yet to be seen.

The actions undertaken with respect to social remittances (diaspora skills transfer, skills matching-schemes, pre-departure measures) within the pilot projects CAMPO and DIAS in the framework of the MP have been of limited scope. The fact that they have not been part of a continuous process, and in absence of circular migration schemes it is not possible to establish a significant impact. On the other hand, facilitating the transfer of skills and knowledge through student mobility and highly qualified professionals appears to have the potential for significant impact in the country's human capital as the case of health professionals illustrates in the previous section.

⁴⁴⁷ CES, Relatorio de Avaliação Final do Projeto Europeu Reforço das Capacidade de Cabo Verde na Gestão das Migraçãoe, Centro de Estudos Sociais da Universidade de Coimbra, Laboratório Associado (CES), 2015, p.10.

⁴⁴⁸ CES, op.cit., p. 44, 47-49; Les Missions de l' OFFI en 2013, 12.03.2104 rapport d'activité, p.50-51. http://www.ofii.fr/IMG/pdf/Rapport_activite_Missions_VERSION_internet.pdf.

⁴⁴⁹ Scoreboard for Cape Verde's MP.

As the specific actions related to reintegration have been limited to pilot projects and there has been no follow up on the few entrepreneurial initiatives supported, the assessment of impact is not possible. Stakeholders interviewed considered that there are no adequate structures and resources available at the moment for a proper implementation of re-integration activities. This would need to be addressed at some point given the existing readmission agreement with the EU, potentially affecting migrants of Cape Verdean nationality residing in EU Member States without authorisation, but also third country nationals migrants holding a Cape Verdean visa or residence permit and residing or entering EU Member States without authorisation. This would be the case for instance of ECOWAS migrants that have previously resided in Cape Verde before entering the EU. It is important to highlight that under the ECOWAS Protocol of Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment, there has been a significant immigration of ECOWAS nationals to Cape Verde, mainly from Guinea Bissau, Senegal and Nigeria; but also there are an important number of migrants from PALOP countries, especially São Tomé e Príncipe.⁴⁵⁰ Data from 2010 suggests that more than half reside without a valid residence permit in Cape Verde.⁴⁵¹

3.3 Unintended outcomes and impacts

Indicator I.7.4.4 Unintended effects of border management measures and unintended effects of other measures facilitating migration

Regarding the objectives of the MP on mobility and border management, there have been significant results: two legal agreements with the EU have come into force, one on short stay visas (Visa facilitation) and the other one on readmission (Readmission of persons residing without authorisation); the establishment of a Common Visa Centre in Praia (CCV); and a series of capacity building actions leading to the improvement of Cape Verde's institutional and legal framework on migration, and on border management and security, have taken place over the years (see Annex 5).

Regarding the visa facilitation agreement and the CCV, stakeholders confirm that these are positive outcomes but in order to have a positive impact there is still work to be done to promote mobility in specific areas, such as apprenticeship programmes on technical skills or academic exchanges of short duration. A stakeholder mentioned that the mobility of entrepreneurs travelling back and forward to the EU had improved thanks to the agreement. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that there is a great migratory pressure. The CCV represents 19 countries of the Schengen area, and handles about 60 cases per day. In 2017 the CCV received 15,908 applications and granted 11,413 short stay visas. Some of the EU Member States partners in the MP and participating in the CCV have high level of visa refusals (63 per cent of visa requests in one case). Portugal administers the CCV and receives the majority of requests; in 2017 it received 12,975 visa requests for Portugal of which 74 per cent were granted.

As for the legal agreement on readmission, this is not yet fully implemented. A stakeholder on the side of EU Member States has mentioned that there a significant number of pending requests

⁴⁵⁰ The economic growth over the last two decades and the growing tourism sector attracted cheap but also qualified labour, mainly in the construction sector, from other ECOWAS member states since the beginning of the new millennium. See Jung, P. 2015 Migration, Remittances and Development: A case study of Senegalese labour migrants on the island Boa Vista, Cape Verde, *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos* [Online], 29 | 2015, DOI : 10.4000/ cea.1800. See INE(2015), Inquérito Multi-objectivo Contínuo 2014 Estatísticas das Migrações, http://ine.cv/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Migracoes2014_Rev1.pdf

⁴⁵¹ Varela O. and Barboza C., Migration in Cape Verde Islands: Legal and Policy Framework, *European Scientific Journal* May 2014 /SPECIAL/ edition ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431.

of readmission. Cape Verde has not yet envisioned a support framework for readmitted persons, and it is not clear how this would be financed. And the country has a weak institutional capacity to handle the procedure.

Also, stakeholders have pointed out that no progress on circular migration has been made, despite existing bilateral agreements with Portugal, Spain and France, except for the case of students mobility mainly facilitated by Portugal.

Stakeholders have pointed out that at the overall level, the MP with the EU has had an indirect positive impact on Cape Verde's perception as secure and stable. With respect to the other pillars of the MP, securitization issues have worked well, and there is ongoing collaboration with partners on border control, and issue of importance for countries with presence in the North Atlantic Macaronesia region. However, not enough focus has been given to legal migration nor to the pillar on M&D. Stakeholders interviewed considered that to promote legal migration and prevent irregular migration, but also to promote development, circular labour migration needed to be implemented. Also, with respect to the legal framework in the area of migration, this has been improved and it is expected that capacity building at the institutional level will have a positive impact in local services for both emigrants and immigrants but this could be hampered due to weak institutional capacity and lack of resources.

4 CONCLUSIONS COVERING THE ELEMENTS CONFIRMING OR NOT CONFIRMING THE DESK PHASE HYPOTHESIS

- The inclusion of a specific objective on M&D within the GAMM, mainly a migration management policy, has led to the inclusion of specific M&D actions within the MP with Cape Verde. Therefore, at the level of implementation, the PCD approach has influenced to a certain extent the MP. However, it is not possible to determine the extent of the impact of the M&D actions of the MP. The results obtained are so limited that no significant impact can be observed from them. Also, the few M&D actions and pilot projects undertaken in the framework of the MP have not been sufficiently monitored or evaluated.⁴⁵²
- The M&D pillar of the MP with Cape Verde, when compared to the other pillars (i.e. Legal migration, and irregular migration and border management), appears unbalanced in terms of number of projects, amounts allocated and results achieved. The involvement of various stakeholders in the MP with uneven level of continuous commitment and diverse priorities, together with a lack of unified understanding and participation in each of the pillars, remains a challenge in the balance of actions undertaken.
- Despite the above limitations, the MP has provided a structured political framework to foster cooperation on migration management issues between EU Members States and Cape Verde based on agreed priorities. Stakeholders have confirmed that EU and Member States assistance under the MP has been fundamental to manage border security, foster mobility, and improve the institutional capacity and legal framework in the area of migration in Cape Verde. However, local stakeholders have pointed out that now that the institutional and legal framework is in place a next step in the MP is to promote further M&D actions related to circular migration, knowledge and skills transfer, and productive investments.

⁴⁵² At the time of drafting the CN there was an ongoing evaluation on MPs including Cape Verde and Moldova, but it has not yet been finalised and our evaluation team has had no access to its preliminary findings. The evaluation being conducted by the University of Maastricht will be the first external evaluation on MPs since implementation started - 10 years ago.

- As no structured monitoring mechanism exists in place to assess the impact of the different actions undertaken under the MP, the opportunity to learn lessons from pilot projects (i.e. CAMPO, DIAS) and replicate best practices is missed. In absence of such mechanism the opportunity to create further synergies among the different stakeholders and reinforce the coherence of future actions towards a common objective could also be lost.
- Given that the continuous political dialogue between the EU and Cape Verde on the Special Partnership also includes the MP, this structure could contribute to re-evaluate the priority concerns of Cape Verde with respect to MP commitments. However, the fragmented nature of the intervention (MP) given the various stakeholders involved in the implementation, and the lack of locally centralised management of information on the actions undertaken does not allow the effective and comprehensive assessment of Cape Verde's priorities.
- Actions under the M&D pillar would require to be further promoted with the participation of all stakeholders under a more structured dialogue on migration based on a transversal approach and considering the specific immediate and long-term needs of Cape Verde. The active involvement of a Migration expert at the EU Delegation in the management of the MP could enhance EU action and improve coordination among Commission services and the EEAS.
- The drought affecting the country and the need to support the development of Cape Verde's human capital are priorities to be taken into account in future actions.

ANNEX 1: DATA COLLECTION METHODS USED (ITS LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS)

The desk review has not provided sufficient quantitative and reliable data on the impact of the actions implemented under the M&D pillar; most of the sources available on the MP contained qualitative data or analysis at the policy strategic level. Stakeholders views and sources of information collected during the field mission have been the main available evidence.

ANNEX 2: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

List of stakeholders interviewed Cape Verde	
Name	Position and institution
Estevão Tavares Vaz	Director of Communities, Consular Affairs and Migration, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros e Comunidades de Cabo Verde
Edna Maria Monteiro Marta	MP coordinator, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros e Comunidades de Cabo Verde
Carmem Barros	Directora, Direção Geral da Imigração de Cabo Verde
Ana Cristina Lopes Semedo	Directora, Departamento de Estudos Económicos e Estatísticas do Banco de Cabo Verde (BCV)
Maria Fernanda Tavares Fernandes	Coordinator of the EU-CV Special Partnership Unit and Former Minister of Communities, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros e Comunidades de Cabo Verde
Quelita Goncalves	Officer in charge, IOM Cabo Verde
Josefina Chantre Fortes	President, A-RAMAO-Associação das Mulheres da África Ocidental, Célula de Cabo Verde, and Member of the Comissão Nacional para os Direitos Humanos e Cidadania
José Viana	President, Plataforma das Comunidades Africanas em Cabo Verde
Saidy Ban Gura	President General Assembly, Plataforma das Comunidades Africanas em Cabo Verde
Filipa Ponces	Counsellor Embassy of Portugal, Director of the Common Visa Centre Praia
Helena Guerreiro	Head of Cooperation, Embassy of Portugal in Cape Verde
Alejandra García Fuertes	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Spain in Cape Verde
Jaime Puyoles Garcia	General coordinator for Cooperation, AECID, Embassy of Spain in Cape Verde
Angèle da Cruz	Head of Cooperation, Embassy of Luxembourg in Cape Verde
Jorge Wahnnon	Project officer, Embassy of Luxembourg in Cape Verde
Carole Blin	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of France in Cape Verde
Ulrich Weins	Head of Political Section, EU Delegation in Cape Verde
Jose R. Leon Lora	Head of Cooperation Section, EU Delegation in Cape Verde
Virginia Mulas	Press and Information Officer- Political Section, EU Delegation in Cape Verde
Ana Sofia Silva	Program Manager Cooperation Section, EU Delegation in Cape Verde
Oleg Chirita	Programme Coordinator Global Initiatives, ICMPD
Robert Rybicki	Policy officer MP Cape Verde, General Affairs, A3 International Coordination, DG HOME

ANNEX 3: EU- CAPE VERDE MP COMMITMENTS

Table 1: Priorities under the MP between the EU and Cape Verde

Priorities	Specific topics
Priority 1: Mobility, legal migration and integration	<p>1) Promote a better framework for legal mobility, supported by a strengthening of information, integration and protection measures for migrants, while exploiting existing labour market opportunities, and reducing the risks linked to illegal migration and trafficking in human beings;</p> <p>2) Inform potential migrants about legal migration channels to the EU, employment opportunities in the Member States on the basis of national labour market situations, and the dangers of illegal migration and illegal work;</p> <p>Provide information about the labour market situation in Cape Verde;</p> <p>Promote pre-departure training and support measures for temporary workers and encourage circular migration of workers;</p> <p>3) Strengthen Cape Verde's institutional and administrative capacity to manage migration, including in the areas of asylum and refugee protection, through training and the exchange of experts and best practices. The emphasis will be placed on legislative actions, institutional and operational development, and the promotion of migration policies;</p> <p>4) Improve the social protection of legal migrants;</p> <p>5) Develop a dialogue on short-stay visa issues to facilitate the mobility of certain categories of person;</p>
Priority 2: Migration and development	<p>6) Foster cooperation with Cape Verdean communities abroad by strengthening links with the diaspora, and assist the diaspora in their efforts to contribute to the development of Cape Verde;</p> <p>Contribute to the reform of the financial sector in order to create favourable conditions for investment by the diaspora in their country of origin, facilitate transfers by migrants and encourage the introduction of financial products adapted to the needs of migrants and of transfer beneficiaries with a view to increasing the impact of such transfers on the development of Cape Verde and encouraging the use of such transfers for investment purposes;</p> <p>7) Mitigate the adverse effects of the emigration of highly qualified persons and develop appropriate responses, in particular through temporary or permanent return policies aimed specifically at highly qualified Cape Verdean migrants and European nationals of Cape Verdean origin;</p> <p>Promote the temporary migration of highly qualified Cape Verdean citizens for the purpose of improving their qualifications, and facilitate the recognition of skills and qualifications;</p> <p>Foster exchanges of students, researchers and specialists and develop training and temporary work programmes;</p> <p>8) Support voluntary return and the lasting reintegration of returning migrants by putting in place the appropriate mechanisms;</p> <p>Inform Cape Verdean citizens abroad about the labour market situation, employment prospects and business opportunities in their home country, as well as about return possibilities;</p> <p>Strengthen cooperation on training of migrant workers who are prospective returnees;</p> <p>Contribute to the development of entrepreneurship and strengthen the legal framework for investment and business; and</p> <p>Promote reflection on the social dimension of migration in the country of origin;</p>
Priority 3: Border management, identity and travel documents, fight against illegal migration and trafficking in human beings	<p>9) Step up efforts to combat illegal migration and trafficking in human beings, as well as strengthening air and sea border management capacities;</p> <p>Improve the security of travel documents, identity documents and residence permits; develop Cape Verde's capabilities in relation to surveillance and search and rescue at sea;</p> <p>10) Facilitate twinning projects and initiatives by Member States in the area of border management, taking into account the role of the Frontex agency (the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) as a facilitator and/or coordinator of operational cooperation on security management at borders between Member States and third countries;</p> <p>11) Within the framework of a working arrangement, promote the development of extensive operational cooperation between the Frontex agency and the Cape Verdean authorities, represented by the Cape Verdean National Police, with the aim of combating illegal immigration and related cross-border crime by means of border controls, as well as reinforcing security at the borders between the Member States of the European Union and Cape Verde;</p> <p>12) Develop a dialogue on the question of the readmission of persons residing without authorisation, in order to ensure efficient cooperation for their return;</p> <p>13) Carry out information and warning campaigns to make the population aware of the risks associated with illegal immigration and of the dangers of exploitation and trafficking in human beings;</p>

Table 2: Proposed actions under the MP between the EU and Cape Verde

Area of initiatives	Proposed Actions
1. Monitoring and awareness of migration flows	<p>Objective: Analyse migration flows to determine needs and enhance the efficiency of migration policies</p>
	<p>(i) Proposal to draw up and regularly update a detailed migration profile of Cape Verde to assist decision-makers in Cape Verde to define and implement the most appropriate policies and to help the various donors to support those efforts in the best possible way. The document will provide a clearer insight into the migration phenomena affecting Cape Verde and their impact on the country's development, and into the situation of the Cape Verdean population or people of Cape Verdean origin living abroad, particularly in the EU.</p>
2. Employment, management and facilitation of legal migration and integration	<p>Objective: Develop employment opportunities in Cape Verde and abroad, facilitate and properly manage legal emigration of Cape Verdean citizens, in particular for the purpose of employment, and improve the integration of Cape Verdean migrants in their host societies</p>
	<p>(i) Based, inter alia, on the experience gained when establishing the "Centro de Apoio ao Migrante no País de Origem" (CAMPO), proposal by the Portuguese Republic to develop, with the support of the Community and other interested Member States and in conjunction with the Cape Verdean authorities, the activities of CAMPO, whose role could consist of providing information to prospective migrants on legal migration opportunities in the participating Member States and on employment opportunities in both Cape Verde and those Member States, pre-departure preparation and training services, and information and assistance services to Cape Verdean migrants wishing to return to their country of origin to pursue employment or self-employment there (support for economic and social reintegration).</p> <p>(ii) Proposal by the Portuguese Republic to continue to promote the admission of certain categories of Cape Verdean worker, particularly on a temporary basis and with a view to circular migration, through the signing of a new protocol on migration questions with the government of Cape Verde extending the scope of the Protocol on the temporary migration of Cape Verdean workers to work in Portugal, signed by the two parties on 18 February 1997.</p> <p>(iii) Proposal by the Portuguese Republic to develop a bilateral cooperation instrument between the Portuguese Republic's Institute for Employment and Vocational Training (IEFP) and its Cape Verdean counterpart, with the aim of simplifying and boosting the efficiency of worker migration procedures.</p> <p>(iv) Proposal by the Kingdom of Spain to launch, for the benefit of Cape Verde, a schools/workshops programme aimed at facilitating the integration of apprentices, particularly through training actions tailored to the Cape Verdean labour market, to meet labour needs identified by that country. Other interested Member States and the European Community could join the programme if they so wished. The Kingdom of Spain also proposes to support the development of business initiatives by women.</p> <p>(v) Proposal by the French Republic to open a certain number of professional activities to Cape Verdean migrants and no longer to maintain objections based on the employment situation in the sectors concerned. The opening up of the labour market in this respect will be a component of the bilateral agreement on concerted management of migratory flows.</p> <p>(vi) Proposal by the signatory Member States to foster the development of existing partnerships between the University of Cape Verde and higher education institutions in the EU, and to foster the conclusion of similar partnerships with other institutions, notably with a view to promoting exchanges of students and teaching staff, particularly through the award of grants. The European Community would support those efforts under existing programmes supporting cooperation between higher education institutions. The Member States concerned would facilitate the issue of residence permits for the purpose of such exchanges, with due regard for the existing Community rules.</p> <p>(vii) Proposal by Cape Verde and the Member States concerned to explore the possibility of developing, within the appropriate fora, a dialogue on issues relating to the integration and treatment of third-country nationals residing on the territory of the Signatories.</p> <p>(viii) Proposal by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to study the possibility of setting up an initiative on temporary circular migration with Cape Verde.</p> <p>(ix) Proposal by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to develop and strengthen the "Migrer les yeux ouverts" ["Migrating with open eyes"] programme to familiarise future Cape Verdean migrants under family reunification with the social, linguistic and other realities of life in Luxembourg.</p> <p>(x) Proposal by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to offer twinning between partner universities.</p>
3. Mobility and short-stay visas	<p>Objective: Facilitate mobility between Cape Verde and the European Union by means of short-stay visas</p>
	<p>(i) Proposal by the European Commission to submit a recommendation to the Council of the European Union with a view to obtaining negotiating directives for a facilitation agreement concerning the issue of short-stay visas. This initiative falls within the wider context of a dialogue on visa matters to be held in the joint working party in charge of following up on this Declaration.</p> <p>(ii) Proposal by the Portuguese Republic to set up a Common Visa Application Centre for short-term visas in Praia.</p>
4. Links between migration and development, diasporas, money transfers	<p>Objective: Encourage the Cape Verdean diaspora to contribute to the development of their country of origin, in particular through transfers of money and skills, and facilitate circular and/or return migration to mitigate the effects of the emigration of highly qualified persons</p>
	<p>(i) Proposal by the Portuguese Republic to continue its support for the activities of the Instituto das Comunidades in migration and development matters, particularly through the "DIAS de Cabo Verde" project, which aims to foster circular migration of highly qualified migrants and is already co-financed by the European Community under the Aeneas Programme. The project would enable the development of circular migration by supporting partnerships between institutions in Cape Verde and the countries of emigration. The Kingdom of Spain</p>

	<p>proposes to contribute to these efforts through its support for the "Mobilising Cape Verdean Skills Abroad" programme, managed by the Instituto das Comunidades.</p> <p>(ii) Proposal by Cape Verde and the participating Member States to foster cooperation and partnerships between their hospital and research institutions, particularly with a view to strengthening the capacities of the Cape Verdean institutions, reducing the effects of the lack of qualified staff in the field of health in Cape Verde and encouraging exchanges of staff. In this context, a proposal by the Kingdom of Spain to launch a programme to strengthen the capacities of the Cape Verdean national health system, and a proposal by the Portuguese Republic to support the Cape Verdean national health system in the fields of haemodialysis and oncology.</p> <p>(iii) Proposal by the French Republic to develop, within the framework of a bilateral agreement on concerted management of migratory flows, a co-development programme for the benefit of Cape Verde under which Cape Verdean migrants legally established in France and French citizens of Cape Verdean origin could contribute, through transfers of money, skills or other resources, to the development of Cape Verde and carry on economic activities there on the basis of experience already acquired in other countries.</p> <p>(iv) The programme would have five parts: • Promoting the reduction of the cost of money transfers; • Promoting productive investment; • Mobilising the skills of elites within the diaspora; • Support for local development projects; • Support for young people's initiatives.</p>
<p>5. Asylum and immigration</p>	<p>Objective: Assist Cape Verde to establish an asylum system which meets international standards</p>
	<p>(i) Proposal that Cape Verde ratifies and fully implements the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.</p> <p>(ii) Proposal by the Portuguese Republic to provide Cape Verde with technical assistance and expertise to establish an asylum system which meets international standards, drawing on European experience in this area.</p>
<p>6. Cooperation on border management, identity and travel documents, and the fight against illegal migration and trafficking in human beings</p>	<p>Objective: combat illegal migration and trafficking in human beings and improve border management and document security</p>
	<p>(i) Proposal that Cape Verde take steps to ensure effective implementation of the United National Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and its Protocols on smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons, as well as compliance with its international obligations in relation to rescue at sea.</p> <p>(ii) Proposal that the operational arrangement that the Frontex agency and Cape Verde, represented by the Cape Verdean National Police, have mutually agreed to conclude, should cover activities in the field of information exchange and risk analysis, training, research and development, coordination of joint operational measures, and an active discussion on the improvement of technical equipment and technology at borders, while examining the scope for increased cooperation in the area of joint return operations, best practices and improvement of operational interoperability between the border guard organisations of the Member States and Cape Verde.</p> <p>(iii) Joint proposal by the Frontex agency and Cape Verde that the "Frontex Common Core Curriculum for Border Guard Basic Training" and the advanced training programme on the falsification of documents be implemented by the Cape Verdean National Police, and that provision be made for the improvement of both instruments on an ongoing basis.</p> <p>(iv) Proposal by the European Community and the Member States concerned to facilitate the establishment of police cooperation with Cape Verde and, in particular, between Cape Verde and Europol (the European Police Office) in terms of exchange of information on the fight against networks engaged in smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings.</p> <p>(v) Pursuant to the provisions of Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement, proposal by the European Commission to submit a recommendation to the Council of the EU with a view to obtaining negotiating directives for an agreement on readmission of persons residing without authorisation covering third-country nationals and stateless persons.</p> <p>(vi) Proposal by the Portuguese Republic to undertake projects aimed at strengthening the capacities of the Cape Verdean authorities, particularly in the following areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening the system for recording information on entries, exits and stays of foreigners on Cape Verdean territory (including a system for registering and issuing residence permits); • Continuing the installation of a more effective control system at the air borders; Introducing biometric features in travel documents; • Trainer training actions in the area of air and sea border control, documentary fraud, fingerprints and police control and investigation techniques; • Information and awareness-raising campaigns about the dangers of trafficking in human beings. <p>(vii) Proposal by the Kingdom of Spain to strengthen the capacities of Cape Verde in relation to maritime security in its maritime zone and, in particular, to vessel inspection, surveillance and search and rescue at sea. It will contribute to sea patrol and surveillance operations against illegal migration flows with Cape Verde and will offer air resources and training courses for pilots and maintenance staff. Additionally, the Kingdom of Spain proposes to continue the "Seahorse" project, in particular by setting up a cooperation centre in Cape Verde. Lastly, in the context of police cooperation, it proposes that the telecommunications capacities of the Cape Verdean authorities be improved and that training actions continue to be undertaken in various fields for the benefit of the Cape Verdean authorities.</p> <p>(viii) Considering the humanitarian tragedy associated with illegal migration, the Kingdom of Spain proposes the strengthening of the National Red Cross Society in Cape Verde.</p> <p>(ix) Proposal by the Kingdom of Spain to reinforce the capacity of the Ministry of Defence in respect of new information and communication technologies.</p> <p>(x) Proposal by the French Republic to cooperate with Cape Verde on security (fight against drugs trafficking and illegal immigration) and training in document control, and to step up its contribution to border management efforts coordinated by the Frontex agency.</p>

ANNEX 4: CAPE VERDE REMITTANCES DATA

Table 3

Migrant remittances towards Cabo Verde, EU and EURO area

	Total remittances		migrant		EU remittances CV		% Total amount		% of GDP	
	CVE millions	% GDP	EURO Area	European Union	EURO Area	European Union	EURO Area	European Union	EURO Area	European Union
2007	10,159.02	8.30%	7,806.73	8,229.35	77%	81%	6.40%	6.70%		
2008	10,920.05	8.10%	8,486.67	9,007.12	78%	82%	6.30%	6.70%		
2009	10,740.73	7.90%	8,161.72	8,775.37	76%	82%	6.00%	6.50%		
2010	11,065.72	8.00%	8,336.27	8,913.32	75%	81%	6.00%	6.40%		
2011	14,212.28	9.60%	10,956.04	11,792.66	77%	83%	7.40%	8.00%		
2012	14,423.27	9.60%	11,129.49	11,856.50	77%	82%	7.40%	7.90%		
2013	13,740.27	8.90%	10,350.29	11,089.10	75%	81%	6.70%	7.20%		
2014	14,764.29	9.60%	11,133.10	11,981.39	75%	81%	7.20%	7.80%		
2015	17,263.97	10.90%	12,861.94	13,865.95	75%	80%	8.10%	8.70%		
2016	17,840.25	10.90%	14,340.81	15,114.20	80%	85%	8.80%	9.30%		
2017	17,444.42	10.20%	12,716.97	13,457.86	73%	77%	7.40%	7.80%		

Source: Banco de Cabo Verde based on data commercial banks; last updated March 2018.

Table 4

Total Amount Migrant Remittances inflows Cabo Verde % GDP	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Remittances CVE millions	10,159.02	10,920.05	10,740.73	11,065.72	14,212.28	14,423.27	13,740.27	14,764.29	17,263.97	17,840.25	17,444.42
% GDP	8.30%	8.10%	7.90%	8.00%	9.60%	9.60%	8.90%	9.60%	10.90%	10.90%	10.20%

Source: Banco de Cabo Verde

Table

Cape Verde Financial Flows

(millions of US\$, current prices)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
FDI, net inflows (BoP)	191.76	210.90	126.00	116.20	102.25	128.01	89.30	180.59	96.07	114.22
Migrant remittance inflows	138.87	155.11	136.75	130.95	176.77	177.95	175.97	196.79	200.83	220.72
ODA - DAC disbursements	114.16	162.72	161.92	247.56	220.00	218.36	217.49	179.88	104.40	75.86

Source: WB World Development Indicators, last updated 3 March 2018; OECD.Stat last updated 20 December 2017

Figure 3





Figure 4



Source: Own elaboration, based on WB World Development Indicators and OECD.Stat.

ANNEX 5: LIST OF PROJECTS FUNDED UNDER MP EU-CAPE VERDE PERIOD 2008-2016

No.	GAMM Pillar	Main areas	Origin of the initiative	Project description	Implementing body	Start date	Status
1	Pillar 1	VISA	Commission	Mise en œuvre de l'accord de facilitation en matière de délivrance des visas de court séjour (Gabinete de Apoio ao Imigrante - gestion de l'immigration et de l'intégration au niveau municipal)	ICMPD and General Directorate of Immigration (DGI) CV	2017	Ongoing
2	Pillar 1	VISA	Portugal, Belgique, Luxembourg	Centre commun de demande de visas	Ambassade du Portugal	2010	Ongoing
3	Pillar 1	LABOUR MIGRATION	Portugal	Signature d'un nouveau protocole bilatéral sur la migration temporaire des travailleurs	Ministère des Affaires étrangères (PT)	2007	Ongoing
4	Pillar 1	PROFESSIONAL TRAINING	Portugal	Formation de formateurs dans le domaine du contrôle des frontières aériennes et maritimes, de la fraude documentaire, des empreintes digitales, et des techniques de contrôle et d'investigation policières.	Instituto Camões et SEF		Ongoing
5	Pillar 1	PROFESSIONAL TRAINING	Luxembourg	CVE/071 Appui à la Formation Professionnelle : Projet d'appui généralisé au système de la formation professionnelle au Cap Vert	Ministère des Affaires étrangères (LU)	2007	Completed
6	Pillar 1	PROFESSIONAL TRAINING	Frontex	Coopération avec Frontex dans le domaine de la formation	Frontex	2014	Completed
7	Pillar 1	PROFESSIONAL TRAINING	Frontex, CV	Mise en œuvre du "Frontex Common Core Curriculum for Border Guard basic training"	Frontex, Police Nationale CV		Ongoing
8	Pillar 1	EDUCATION	Espagne	Programmes d'écoles - ateliers.	CV: IEPF (Institut d'Emploi et Formation Professionnelle) ES: AECID		TBC
9	Pillar 1	EDUCATION	Luxembourg	CVE/059 Ecole Hôtelière et de Tourisme : Construction et équipement de la première Ecole Hôtelière au Cap Vert et développement de 6 curriculums	Ministère des Affaires étrangères (LU)	2006	Completed
10	Pillar 1	EDUCATION	Luxembourg	CVE/077 Programme d'appui à la politique sectorielle en éducation / formation / emploi	Ministère des Affaires étrangères (LU)	2016	Completed
11	Pillar 1	EDUCATION	Portugal	Développement des partenariats universitaires existants et facilitation de la conclusion de nouveaux partenariats	Instituto Camões		Ongoing
12	Pillar 1	EDUCATION	France	Examen des possibilités de dialogue sur les questions relatives à l'intégration. L'accord franco-capverdien de gestion concertée des flux migratoires prévoit la création d'un groupe de travail au sein du comité de suivi de l'accord pour faciliter le dialogue sur les questions d'intégration.	Ministère de l'Intérieur (FR)		Ongoing
13	Pillar 2	READMISSION	Portugal	Mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de readmission des personnes en séjour irrégulier	SEF (Service des Etrangers et des Frontières du Portugal)	2012	Ongoing
14	Pillar 2	BORDER MANAGEMENT	Portugal	Renforcement du système d'enregistrement des informations relatives aux entrées et sorties d'étrangers	SEF (Service des Etrangers et des Frontières du Portugal)		Ongoing
15	Pillar 2	BORDER MANAGEMENT	Frontex	Participation aux activités conjointes et autres activités coordonnées par Frontex	Frontex	2015	Completed
16	Pillar 2	BORDER MANAGEMENT	Frontex	Participation du Cap-Vert aux activités analytiques menées par la Communauté de l'information de l'Afrique Frontex (AFIC)	Frontex		Completed
17	Pillar 2	BORDER MANAGEMENT	Espagne	Poursuite du projet Seahorse	Guardia Civil. Jefatura Fiscal y de Fronteras	2006	Completed
18	Pillar 2	BORDER MANAGEMENT	Frontex	Échange de pratiques exemplaires et mise en réseau avec des organisations partenaires communautaires et non membres de l'UE dans le domaine du contrôle des frontières aériennes	Frontex		TBC
19	Pillar 2	BORDER MANAGEMENT	Frontex	Signature et mise en œuvre de l'arrangement opérationnel entre Frontex et le Cap Vert	Frontex	2011	Ongoing
20	Pillar 2	DOCUMENT SECURITY	Portugal	Implémentation du SNIAC –CV (système National d'identité) - Conception et design de les documents d'identité (passeport, carton unique de citoyen, titre de résidence) et création de 42 postes pour récolter data biométrique	NOSI, IPAD	2010	Completed

No.	GAMM Pillar	Main areas	Origin of the initiative	Project description	Implementing body	Start date	Status
21	Pillar 2	DOCUMENT SECURITY	Portugal	Programme PASSE: installation d'un système de contrôle plus efficace aux frontières aériennes.	SEF (Service des Etrangers et des Frontières du Portugal)		Completed
22	Pillar 2	SMUGGLING / TRAFFICKING OF HUMAN BEINGS	Portugal	Campagnes d'information et de sensibilisation aux dangers de la traite des êtres humains	SEF (Service des Etrangers et des Frontières du Portugal)	2008	Completed
23	Pillar 2	MARITIME SECURITY	Espagne	Renforcement des capacités en matière de sécurité maritime	Ministère du Développement (ES)		Ongoing
24	Pillar 2	CRIME/ CYBERCRIME	Portugal	Programme de renforcement de capacités des institutions de la sécurité et de l'ordre publiques de CV	Ministère de l'Intérieur (PT)		Ongoing
25	Pillar 2	CRIME/ CYBERCRIME	Espagne	Programme de renforcement de capacités des institutions de la sécurité et de l'ordre publiques de CV / Strengthening the capacities of public security institutions of Cape Verde		2008	Completed
26	Pillar 3	DIASPORA	Portugal	Projet DIAS de Cabo Verde	IPAD, ACIDI, IOM	2007	Completed
27	Pillar 3	DIASPORA	Luxembourg	Appui au développement de la finance inclusive au Cap Vert	Ministère des Affaires étrangères (LU)	2012	Completed
28	Pillar 3	LABOUR MIGRATION	France	Cartes compétences et talents	Ambassade de France à Praia		TBC
29	Pillar 3	LOCAL/REGIONAL SUPPORT	Portugal	Soutien au sein de l'hémodialyse et l'oncologie / installation d'une unité d'hémodialyse et Création d'une plate-forme de surveillance du cancer	Ministères de la santé (PT et CV)	2010	Ongoing
30	Pillar 3	LOCAL/REGIONAL SUPPORT		Soutien au programme de "Mobilisation des compétences capverdiennes à l'étranger pour le développement socio-économique du Cap Vert"			Ongoing
31	Pillar 3	LOCAL/REGIONAL SUPPORT	Espagne	Développement d'entreprises émanant de femmes	AECID, IEFP		Completed
32	Pillar 3	REINTEGRATION	Espagne, Portugal	CAMPO project - Développement d'un Centre d'information sur la migration légale et encouragement de la réintégration sur le marché du travail au CV	Cape Verde, Espagne, Portugal		Completed
33	Pillar 3	TRANSFER OF REMITTANCES	France	Programme de développement solidaire: réduction des coûts de transferts d'argent; promotion de l'investissement productif; mobilisation des compétences des élites; soutien à des projets de développement local; appui aux initiatives de la jeunesse.	Ministère de l'Intérieur/ Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (FR)	2008	Completed
34	Pillar 4	INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION	Pays-Bas	Mise en place d'une évaluation des besoins afin de tracer les problèmes et les besoins du Cap-Vert en matière d'asile et de migration	Ministère des Affaires étrangères (NL)	2009	Completed
35	Pillar 4	INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION	Portugal	Assistance technique et expertise en vue de la mise sur pied d'un système d'asile conforme aux normes internationales et tirant parti de l'expérience européenne en ce domaine.	SEF (Service des Etrangers et des Frontières du Portugal)		Ongoing
36	HORIZONTAL ACTIVITIES	MONITOR/ MANAGEMENT OF FLOWS	France	Signature d'un accord franco capverdien de gestion concertée des flux migratoires et de développement solidaire (coopération policière)	Ministère de l'Intérieur (FR)	2011	Ongoing
37	HORIZONTAL ACTIVITIES	MONITOR/ MANAGEMENT OF FLOWS	Portugal, Pays-Bas, France, Luxembourg	Renforcement des capacités du Cap-Vert en matière de gestion des migrations	SEF (cooperation with OFII, IND and LUX)	2005	Completed
38	HORIZONTAL ACTIVITIES	MONITOR/ MANAGEMENT OF FLOWS	France	Signature d'un accord de gestion concertée des flux migratoires et de développement solidaire (encouragement de la migration circulaire)	Ministère de l'Intérieur (FR)	2008	Ongoing
39	HORIZONTAL ACTIVITIES	MONITOR/ MANAGEMENT OF FLOWS	Luxembourg	Signature d'un accord entre le Luxembourg et Cabo Verde Relatif à la Gestion Concertée du Flux Migratoire et au Développement Solidaire	Ministère des Affaires étrangères (LU)	2015	Completed
40	HORIZONTAL ACTIVITIES	MONITOR/ MANAGEMENT OF FLOWS	Espagne	Renforcement de la Société Nationale de la Croix Rouge au Cap-Vert. / Strengthening the National Society of the Red Cross in Cape Verde	Croix Rouge	2007	Completed
41	HORIZONTAL ACTIVITIES	MIGRATION STRATEGY		MIEUX Action: Développement des politiques nationales de migration intégrale du CV en vue de réduire les migrations irrégulières et de maximiser les avantages pour la migration	ICMPD	2010	Completed

Source: Scoreboard MP Cape Verde, last updated February 2017.

ANNEX 6: LIST OF EU FUNDED PROJECTS AREA OF MIGRATION

LIST OF EU FUNDED PROJECTS IN THE AREA OF MIGRATION IN CAPE VERDE PERIOD 2008 - 2016

Year	Project N	Status	Project Title	Implementing authority	EU Responsible	Region	Beneficiary	EU Contribution
2008	165055	Closed	Promoting the implementation of the UN Protocols on Trafficking in Persons and Migrant Smuggling supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime.	UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME	Centrally Managed	All Countries	Global Legislators, parliamentarians, criminal justice practitioners and NGOs	2,699,998.00
2008	165063	Closed	Management of members states experts for short-term technical assistance, facilitating technical cooperation with third countries for preventing and managing illegal immigration	THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT	Centrally Managed	All Countries	Global: state authorities with responsibilities in the area of migration. Representatives will mainly come from the following ministries: Ministry of Interior, National agencies for migration and asylum issues, authorities responsible for border management (border guards, border police, customs), Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard to visa management, Ministries in charge of links with the diaspora and	2,708,164.35
2008	152794	Closed	SEAHORSE Cooperation Centres	REINO DE ESPANA	Centrally Managed	All Countries	MOROCCO, MAURITANIA, SENEGAL, CAPE VERDE, GAMBIA, GUINEA BISSAU target groups: Law Enforcement Authorities of the countries involved in the project	1,929,218.88
2008	165065	Closed	Strengthening the Cape Verde capacity to manage labour and return migration within the framework of the mobility partnership with the EU	REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA	Centrally Managed	All Countries	Cape Verde, Portugal and Spain Professionals working with migrants and in the training and employment sectors, potential migrants, return migrants; Cape Verdean migrants residing in Portugal and Spain , Cape Verdean students, Diaspora associations and Cape Verdean entrepreneurs	895,999.00
2008	153946	Closed	Contribution to the production of a new passport for Cape Verde	REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA	Centrally Managed	All Countries	Cape Verde and Portugal. Directorate for Aliens and Borders of Cape Verde	482,254.00
2009	226918	Closed	External Thematic Expertise on Migration II	THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT	Centrally Managed	All Countries		300,000.00
2009	153157	Closed	The Africa Remittances Institute project	INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT	DELEG OUA	Pan-African region	Ethiopia and Africa Union (AU) Member States with particular emphasis on: Nigeria, Senegal, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Ghana , Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, Uganda, DRC, Rwanda, South Africa, Mauritius, Kenya, Comoros, Guinea target groups: MS of the AU, local authorities and policy makers, Ministries of Finance, central banks and financial and non-financial institutions,	1,676,271.00
2009	228441	Closed	Support for the Africa-EU partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment	THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT	Centrally Managed	Africa	All African Countries	3,110,000.00
2010	229741	Closed	Appui et conseil aux administrations publiques africaines responsables des initiatives sur la migration et le développement dans la route migratoire de l'Afrique de l'Ouest.	FUNDACION INTERNACIONAL Y PARA IBEROAMERICA DE ADMINISTRACION Y POLITICAS PUBLICAS	Centrally Managed	West Africa Region	Cape Verde, Morocco, Senegal and Ivory Coast	1,094,685.06
2011	258612	Closed	Strengthening of capacities of Cape Verde in migration management	REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA	DELEG CV	Cape Verde	Cape Verde and some activities in MS (Portugal, France, the Netherlands, Luxemburg)	1,825,600.20
2011	280403	Closed	Migration EU Expertise II (MIEUX II): Providing short-term capacity building to third countries in all areas of migration management	THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT	Centrally Managed	All Countries	Global: state authorities with responsibilities in the area of migration.	4,499,995.00
2012	309836	Closed	Support for the Africa-EU partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment - RIDER to contract DCI-	THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT	Centrally Managed	Africa	All African Countries	276,484.00
2012	307406	Ongoing	Supporting the third phase of the Rabat Process: the Dakar Strategy	THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT	Centrally Managed	Africa	North Africa - West Africa - Central Africa	2,000,000.00
2013	335058	Ongoing	Migration EU Expertise II (MIEUX II): Providing short-term capacity building to third countries in all areas of migration management - RIDER to contract DCI-MIGR/2011/280-403	THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT	Centrally Managed	All Countries	Global	1,500,000.00
2016	379723	Ongoing	BLUE SAHEL	REINO DE ESPANA	Managed	Africa	West Sahel region	2,000,000.00
2016	381152	Ongoing	Reinforcement of Integrated Migration Management (RIMM)	REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA	Centrally Managed	Africa	Cabo Verde, São Tomé e Príncipe and Guiné Bissau	872,000.00
2016	380657	Ongoing	Projet de renforcement de la mobilité professionnelle en Afrique de l' Ouest - Coopération triangulaire au bénéfice des services de l' emploi du Cap Vert, du Ghana, de la Mauritanie, du Sénégal et	POLE EMPLOI	Centrally Managed	Africa	Ghana	1,717,200.00

ANNEX 7: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

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ANNEX 10: CONSULTATION SYNOPSIS REPORT

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1 INTRODUCTION

The overall purpose of the Consultation carried out as part of the External Evaluation of the European Union's Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) was to ensure that all relevant stakeholders are given the opportunity to express their views on elements of this external evaluation, as well as to gather evidence which would be used to inform possible policy-making.

More specifically, stakeholders have been consulted on their involvement and expertise on PCD and/or invited to express their comments and additional information on the main preliminary findings related to the Evaluation Questions (EQs) regarding the criteria of Relevance, Coherence, Efficiency, Effectiveness, and EU Added-Value.

To that effect, the Consultation process involved i) a Targeted Consultation (including interviews with relevant stakeholders and three online surveys) and ii) an Open Public Consultation (OPC):

- Interviews were carried out with various staff at the Commission and EEAS services, the European Parliament, and external stakeholders (OECD, CSOs, ACP Secretariat, among others);
- Three targeted online surveys were conducted as follows:
 - One survey targeted at staff in Commission services and in the EEAS (“Commission and EEAS survey”);
 - One survey targeted at staff in EU Delegations (“EU Delegations survey”);
 - One survey targeted at relevant PCD focal points in the 28 EU Member States (“EU Member States survey”);
- The 12-week online OPC, was undertaken from February 20th to May 31st, 2018.

Tailored questionnaires were developed for each of the targeted online surveys and for the OPC and can be found in Appendix (see Appendices 1-4).

The present Consultation Synopsis Report consolidates the information gathered from the three targeted online surveys and the OPC and presents in the following sections the results and findings per evaluation criteria.

2 INFORMATION ABOUT RESPONDENTS

A total of 86 responses were received as part of the three targeted online surveys and the OPC, split as follows:

- Open Public Consultation: A total of 31 contributions were received as part of the OPC. Contributions were received from individuals both in the EU and outside the EU, as well as from specific organisations/stakeholders (e.g. civil society organisations (CSOs), public national authorities, etc.).
- Commission and EEAS survey: A total of 90 staff in Commission services and in the EEAS were invited to participate in the survey and a total of 24 responses were received. Respondents included staff from 13 different DGs, the Secretariat-General and the EEAS.
- EU Delegations survey: A total of 67 EU Delegations based in developing countries were invited to participate in the survey and a total of 21 responses were received.
- EU Member States survey: All 28 EU Member States were invited to participate in the survey and a total of 10 responses were received.

3 RELEVANCE

Relevance of the EU PCD approach

The Open Public Consultation included a specific question on the relevance of the EU PCD approach and as shown in Table 1 below, only a narrow majority of respondents considered that the way in which PCD has been implemented in the EU has been or is relevant.

Table 13: Overview of responses to question No. 1 on Relevance

Q: Do you consider that the way in which PCD has been implemented in the EU has been/is relevant?		
Open Public Consultation		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	41.4	12
No	37.9	11
Do not have an opinion	20.7	6
TOTAL	100.0	29

However, the analysis of specific comments provided by respondents in relation to this question shows that the respondents that answered negatively to the question did not so much question the relevance of the EU PCD approach but rather its effectiveness, or in many cases simply the effectiveness of development aid in general: indeed, when asked to explain why they considered that the way in which PCD has been implemented in the EU has not been/is not relevant, the vast majority of these respondents focused on either examples of EU policies which in their view were not sufficiently taking account of development objectives or of likely impacts in developing countries (for example, in the area of trade policy some respondents argued that not sufficient consideration was given to development concerns or environmental aspects in the negotiation of trade agreements) or on what they perceived as failings of development aid (e.g. lack of impact on the ground, mismatch between the needs of developing countries and the actions funded by development aid, overlaps/duplication of efforts due to the multitude of actors, etc.).

With respect to respondents that considered that the way in which PCD has been implemented in the EU has been/is relevant, several of them described PCD as one of the pillars of EU action towards developing countries and in this respect recalled that it is enshrined in Article 208 of the EU Treaty. Furthermore, respondents mentioned several factors that highlight the relevance of the EU PCD approach: one respondent made the point that the EU as a major donor, important trade partner, major consumer of commodities from third countries and home to many multinational companies, has a particular responsibility to consider the indirect or unforeseen consequences of its many policies; another respondent noted that the EU acts on behalf of Member States (i.e. has exclusive or shared competence) in policy areas of key importance to developing countries (e.g. as trade, agriculture, fisheries and intellectual property protection), and therefore there is a need for PCD at the EU level. In this context, one respondent argued that for the most part, the way in which PCD has been implemented in the EU is relevant because any progress on development in one partner country may quickly and easily be reversed by ill thought out policies and actions emanating from elsewhere. Finally, one respondent made the point that by minimizing harmful impacts of policies in areas other than aid to developing countries and maximizing the positive effects, PCD by the EU not only benefits developing countries but also increases the effectiveness of EU development cooperation.

Examples of the relevance of the EU PCD approach in specific policy areas were also provided by respondents. For example, one respondent noted that PCD is highly relevant in the area of

migration, as it is well-established that development influences migration (to, from and outside Europe), and migration in turn influences sustainable development: as such, development cooperation policies and migration policies in both the internal and external dimensions need to be coherent to ensure that they are mutually supportive, and do not have conflicting outcomes. In this regard, the respondent also noted that PCD is referenced in the legislative basis of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and Internal Security Fund (ISF). At the same time, it can be noted that the respondent had a mixed view as to the way PCD has been implemented in the EU in the area of migration: the respondent stated that in practice there is little evidence of real coherence as regards migration policy; on the contrary, there is evidence that internal priorities in home affairs of EU Member States increasingly influence goals in development cooperation (the respondent also noted that there is little evidence that PCD is implemented in practice in the work of the AMIF and ISF).

Indeed, even among respondents that considered the EU PCD approach as relevant, some mixed views were expressed as to the way it is implemented. Some respondents argued for example that the way in which the principle of PCD has been implemented is relevant, but “unfortunately sometimes in a negative sense”: according to them, the increasing focus of various EU policies on its perceived self-interests (e.g. keeping migrants out of Europe or promoting the interests of European enterprises abroad) does not contribute to the reduction and/or eradication of poverty in developing countries, nor to the reduction of inequalities. In this context, these respondents argued that the EU should take its PCD commitment seriously into account, including when it is difficult, and trade-offs cannot be avoided: in their view, the bare minimum is that such trade-offs need to be made explicit; the ideal target is that the EU contributes positively to sustainable development in developing countries through its actions in other policy domains, like trade, migration, energy and tax.

Respondents also discussed the extent of the PCD commitment and the level of priority given to it by the various stakeholders. One respondent noted that although PCD is mentioned in the TFEU and the EU states that it is committed to ensure PCD, development is not the exclusive aim of the EU and therefore the implementation of PCD as a principle to promote often takes a backseat. Furthermore, another respondent noted that the concept of PCD and the obligation in the Treaty is not taken up in a uniform way by all EU Member States: some recognise it as very important element of relationship with partner countries (and this is reflected in the high level institutional arrangements for assessment, implementation, review and evaluation), while others barely acknowledge the requirement for PCD and its potential. Finally, one respondent mentioned that the fact that the PCD unit within the European Commission is in DG DEVCO speaks for itself: according to the respondent, this unit should exist and be as strong in all other DGs of the European Commission where PCD should be strongly sensitised.

The relevance of the EU PCD approach in the context of the post-2015 framework was also addressed by respondents. Respondents mentioned that PCD by the EU is vital for the success of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), most notably in developing countries, as one respondent argued, since PCD plays a role in addressing specific obstacles, for instance in the area of trade and finance, which prevent developing countries from generating funding and achieving the SDGs. Respondents considered that the SDGs provide a comprehensive, overarching framework for achieving policy coherence on sustainable development both within EU Member States and partner countries, and several respondents specifically welcomed the move from PCD to PCSD (Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development), in the sense that they see the need for the EU to identify possibilities to contribute via other policies (trade, migration, energy, etc.) to sustainable development in general, and in developing countries more specifically (in the view of these respondents, the focus on mitigating adverse impacts is

too narrow). However, respondents noted that in their understanding, during the period covered by the evaluation the EU had not yet started to operationalise the concept of PCSD.

Finally, it can be noted that several respondents made the point that for the EU PCD approach to remain relevant in the future, its implementation and specifically its mechanisms will need to be improved. In this regard, one respondent commented that the institutional mechanisms put in place are relevant, and make sense theoretically, but it is in practice that the mechanisms do not work most efficiently. At the same time, as another respondent noted, the existing mechanisms can only be effective when guided by a clear and concrete level of ambition of the EU in relation to specific policy dossiers and supported by political will-

Need for purpose built PCD mechanisms at the EU level

Survey results suggest mixed views from stakeholders as to whether the EU’s approach to PCD needs PCD-specific mechanisms to be implemented. As shown in Table 2 below, the responses to the question “*To what extent does the EU’s approach to PCD need PCD specific-mechanisms to be implemented?*” were generally split between “partially” and “substantially”, with respondents to the Commission and EEAS survey tending towards “partially”.

Table 14: Overview of responses to question No. 2 on Relevance

Q: Some mechanisms used to implement the EU’s approach to PCD (i.e. Impact Assessments, Inter-Service Consultation) are not specific to PCD but are general instruments used as part of the normal policymaking process by the Commission. Other mechanisms are specific to PCD (i.e. Biennial Reports, PCD Work Programme, PCD Training, Consultation under article 12 of Cotonou Agreement). To what extent does the EU’s approach to PCD need PCD specific-mechanisms to be implemented?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	8.3	2
Partially	41.7	10
Substantially	20.8	5
Fully	12.5	3
Do not have an opinion	16.7	4
TOTAL	100.0	24
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	10.0	1
Partially	40.0	4
Substantially	40.0	4
Fully	10.0	1
Do not have an opinion	0.0	0
TOTAL	100.0	10

Several stakeholders made the point that:

- On the one hand, PCD-specific mechanisms are relevant to raise awareness on PCD, focus and communicate about PCD research, and would be needed for data collection (e.g. development of specific indicators/scoring mechanism for coherence with a quality and common (agreed) methodology);
- On the other hand, in operational terms, the existing non-PCD specific mechanisms such as the Impact Assessments (IAs) and Inter-Service Consultation (ISCs) may be sufficient for inter-service or for coordination purposes and PCD considerations could well be mainstreamed across the general Commission instruments (the ideal situation being, as one stakeholder from the Commission noted, for development policy concerns to be fully

factored in to EU policy frameworks in various areas, as has happened to a large extent in the area of migration).

Ultimately, as one respondent to the EU Member States survey noted, the extent to which the EU's approach to PCD needs PCD specific-mechanisms is dependent on the way the non-PCD-specific instruments are being used: if IAs or ISCs have a strong PCD-component already, the need for PCD-specific mechanisms becomes less high.

In this context, some stakeholders pointed out that the key challenge is at a level above mechanisms. As one respondent to the EU Member States survey noted, mechanisms are necessary but not sufficient for the EU to promote PCD: these mechanisms will be effective when guided by a clear and concrete level of ambition of the EU in relation to specific policy dossiers. In this respect, one stakeholder from the Commission argued that there is a strong need for a – if not EU-wide, at least Commission-wide – common PCD agenda (i.e. work programme or strategy) that defines actions, objectives, time lines and indicators, since uncoordinated and piecemeal approaches lack strategic vision and make progress monitoring and reporting very difficult. Furthermore, another stakeholder pointed out the need to have a specific Inter-Service Group (ISG) on PCD (the formal ISG on PCD, which was created in 2006, is indeed no longer active: the coordination between PCD Focal Points within the Commission currently occurs on an informal capacity).

When asked for the most relevant PCD-specific mechanisms or best practices to implement the EU's approach to PCD, a variety of views were expressed but the most frequent answers were:

- PCD training and awareness raising activities: stakeholders argued that since PCD is about mainstreaming, the key aspect is to raise awareness and enhance understanding of and expertise on PCD and PCD-specific themes, in particular with respect to experts outside the field of development cooperation);
- The PCD Biennial Report, which according to stakeholders is relevant in terms of looking back and regularly reporting on progress.

It can be noted that several stakeholders also mentioned the PCD Work Programme, although this mechanism was essentially a one-off activity (it has only been used once, for the period 2010-2013): nevertheless, some stakeholders highlighted this mechanism as relevant in terms of looking forward, to communicate a plan of action, with targets and indicators, which works towards the PCD goals. Finally, some EU Member States also highlighted the relevance of the Informal Member States PCD Network arguing that Member States “need reporting /meetings/trainings to have the possibility to exchange points of views, to learn from other Member States (best practices), to know about the new PCD approach and how to implement the recommendations”.

Adaptation of organisational structures and/or the functioning of PCD mechanisms during the period 2009-2016

Survey results suggest that stakeholders are not fully convinced that organisational structures and/or the functioning of PCD mechanisms have adapted well to new needs and/or demands of the various stakeholders during the evaluation period. As shown in Table 2 below, the majority of stakeholders that responded to the question “*To what extent have organisational structures and/or the functioning of PCD mechanisms been adapted to new needs and/or demands of various stakeholders (during the period 2009-2016?)*” answered “partially”.

At the same time, it can be noted that the question proved difficult to answer for many stakeholders: a high number of respondents indicated that they do not have an opinion on the subject (more than 60% of respondents to the Commission and EEAS Survey and 3 out of 10 respondents to the EU Member States Survey).

Table 15: Overview of responses to question No. 2 on Relevance

Q: To what extent have organisational structures and/or the functioning of PCD mechanisms been adapted to new needs and/or demands of various stakeholders (i.e. CSOs, EU Member States, developing countries) during the period 2009-2016?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	4.2	1
Partially	25.0	6
Substantially	8.3	2
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	62.5	15
TOTAL	100.0	24
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	60.0	6
Substantially	10.0	1
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	30.0	3
TOTAL	100.0	10

When asked to list what in their view were the most relevant changes over the 2009-2016 period, stakeholders offered a wide variety of responses, mentioning, *inter alia*: the revision of IA guidelines in 2009 and 2015 and the development and introduction in 2015 of a specific tool to guide the assessment of policy initiatives' impacts on developing countries (even though one stakeholder noted that in practice the assessment of impacts on developing countries remain few in number); the development of PCD training tools and adaptation of the training to EU Delegations (development of an e-learning module in 2016); or the introduction in 2014 of regular reporting on PCD by EU Delegations (through the inclusion of two specific questions on PCD in the External Assistance Management Report).

However, some negative changes occurring during the period were also mentioned by stakeholders, such as the fact that the PCD Biennial Report was downgraded from a Commission Communication to a Staff Working Document and has been put on hold due to the changing context introduced by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Agenda and the new European Consensus on Development (for this reason, no PCD Biennial Report was published since 2015).

The Open Public Consultation also included specific questions on whether the way in which PCD has been implemented in the EU as responded well to: (i) the evolving (past and current) needs of developing countries; (ii) institutional changes at the Commission level and the European External Action Service; and (iii) EU's development objectives.

As shown in Table 4 below, the majority of OPC respondents considered that the EU PCD approach and its mechanisms has not responded well to the evolving needs of developing countries.

Table 16: Overview of responses to question No. 3 on Relevance

Q: Has [the way in which PCD has been implemented in the EU] responded well to the evolving (past and current) needs of developing countries?		
Open Public Consultation		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	17.2	5
No	72.4	21
Do not have an opinion	10.3	3
TOTAL	100.0	29

When asked to explain why they doubted that the EU’s PCD approach has responded well to the evolving needs of developing countries, a variety of factors were mentioned by respondents.

Several respondents indicated for example that they fail to see how the principle of PCD has been taken into account when the EU Delegations drafted the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) for the period 2014-2020: as noted by the respondents, the NIPs formulate the EU’s priorities for development cooperation with specific partner countries but do not make explicit how the EU via its trade policy, migration policy, human rights diplomacy, etc. contributes to sustainable development of these partner countries. One respondent noted that although the country strategy papers have included in the past sections on PCD, the role of the EU Delegations in discussing PCD with governments and stakeholders is not explicit: therefore, it is difficult to assess how current procedures of consultation in country are responding directly to the needs of developing countries.

In this regard, respondents noted that with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty EU Delegations gained the status of diplomatic missions, now representing the EU officially in partner countries: their role has been expanded from development cooperation and economic and trade cooperation to include duties such as conducting political dialogue and making diplomatic representations on behalf of the EU; furthermore, they play a key role in designing, programming and implementing EU development cooperation programmes, and also take a leading role by coordinating on the spot with Member States on the implementation of all EU assistance, both multilateral and bilateral, to boost synergy and increase the visibility of the EU. According to respondents, this made it even more important for civil society partners in the Global South to be consulted directly about non-development policies affecting them.

Some respondents argued that at partner country level, EU Delegations have scarcely made any visible effort to make sure that different EU interventions (trade, development, human rights, diplomacy, etc.) coherently contribute to local sustainable development. Although the last report from the European Commission about PCD (2015) mentions capacity building activities for EU Delegations’ staff and talks about ‘initiating steps for a regular PCD reporting mechanism for EU Delegations’, the respondents noted that they have not been able to retrieve any public information to check whether these intentions have materialised and what the concrete benefits have been for partner countries.

Some respondents argued that the current approach is definitely not participatory and leaves little room to affected communities and CSOs from the Global South to share their views about the possible and already tangible impact of EU policies on their livelihoods and rights. One respondent noted that the existing Cotonou Agreement provides a formal mechanism for ACP governments to raise issues of concern, for example, where they believe that EU policies and regulations are having a negative impact: according to the respondent, a similar mechanism should be incorporated into any new agreement(s) post Cotonou and similarly, other

stakeholders in partner countries who have concerns to raise, should be provided with a direct channel to EU and encouraged to participate in EU consultations.

Respondents also discussed whether the PCD challenge areas have adapted well to the evolving needs of developing countries. One respondent argued that when the original twelve PCD priority areas were reduced to five clusters in 2009, it immediately sent signals that some sectors were less important, for example, environment, fisheries, or decent work. Other respondents considered that the 5 PCD challenge areas that were defined in 2009 continue to be important areas of attention and are still relevant for developing countries but argued that it would be worthwhile to look at PCD priority areas again in light of the 2030 Agenda and of SDGs, to see whether these accents are still fit for purpose or if the priority areas need to be adapted. Furthermore, one respondent noted that the graduation of some developing countries to middle income status may possibly create new needs for PCD.

Finally, some respondents argued that there is a need to incorporate an inequality lens in PCD, and to pay equal attention to all dimensions of sustainable development, as per Agenda 2030, as in their view that is far from being the case now.

Respondents also provided comments on the extent to which the EU PCD approach responded to the evolving needs of developing countries in specific sectors/areas:

- Environment, climate change and biodiversity: One respondent argued that despite the efforts, there is still the need to better align PCD with the recent and urgent needs of developing countries, in particular on biodiversity issues (climate change, deforestation, biodiversity loss, wildlife crime): the respondent welcomed the initiatives taken by DG DEVCO on the strategic approach to biodiversity conservation in Asia and Africa (larger than tigers and elephants), but considered that EU development cooperation should look more in the achieving the SDGs in order to align cooperation priorities with environmental ones. Another respondent noted that in an increasingly globalized economy, there are growing interactions between EU policies and environmental and social problems experienced in partner countries, with increasing deforestation, water scarcity, biodiversity loss and climate change impacts around the world: given the high dependence of many communities in developing countries on healthy ecosystems to meet needs related to food security, energy, water, income generation and health, the respondent made the point that it is important for EU development cooperation to respond to these challenges. According to the respondent, there are currently wide disconnects between many EU external environmental policy objectives and the negative impacts in partner countries of EU consumption and economic activities: in their view, more work is needed to align EU environmental and development policies and achieve coherence between these two policy areas, as aimed for in the SDGs.
- Migration: Some respondents argued that the priorities on migration for developing countries should stem directly from their needs, rather than being driven by EU interests. In that sense, one respondent that Mobility Partnerships (MPs) and Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMP) are useful for PCD due to the consultative process they employ and because the documents are available to the public: according to the respondent, MPs and CAMP encompass in a single framework all areas of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMP), including migration and development, and they can evolve over time to adapt to the evolving priorities of partners (e.g. by prompting partner country authorities to articulate their position on different migration-related issues, MPs can promote coordination not only between the EU and its partner countries, but also among the different institutions involved in the field of migration in partner countries themselves). However, the respondent argued that there are challenges in maintaining political attention

and momentum for ensuring MPs remain living and guiding documents of EU relations with partner countries and the implementation of MPs in practice shows a clear imbalance across the thematic pillars of the GAMM with limited commitments and follow-up actions with regard to legal migration, human rights and refugee protection. Finally, the respondent noted that the more recent and higher visibility Partnership Frameworks concluded with five African countries are in contrast explicit in using an incentive-based approach to stemming irregular migration (including use of development and neighbourhood policy tools): in the view of the respondent, since the agreed texts are not made public they lack the transparency of MPs and CAMMs to review how PCD was implemented and furthermore, the expected use of development cooperation funds as incentives of the Partnership Frameworks represents a contradiction with the principles of aid effectiveness to which the EU has also committed.

- Trade:** One respondent argued that the first need of ACP countries is to secure their preferential access to the European market, which is often their only exportation market for many agricultural goods: in several cases, this preferential access is the only way to trade their products and provides farmers and their families with jobs and decent revenues (which is also instrumental in limiting rural exodus towards ACP cities and potentially towards Europe). According to the respondent, this preferential access is jeopardized not only by the trade agreements that the EU already concluded with Ecuador and Peru or Nicaragua and Guatemala, but also by the agreements it is currently negotiating with Mexico and Mercosur countries (in this regard, the respondent specifically noted that although the Commission may argue that the provisional agreement reached with Mexico states that the tariff will be set at a level that will not affect ACP banana producers, this tariff will nonetheless be hard to compete with). Based on this, the respondent considered that the PCD approach has not responded well to the needs of developing countries because it has always prioritized trade with third parties over ensuring the development of some of the least developed countries in the world.

As shown in Table 5 below, opinions were relatively split on the subject, but a majority of the respondents that expressed an opinion on the subject considered that the way in which PCD has been implemented in the EU has not responded well to institutional changes at the Commission level and the EEAS.

Table 17: Overview of responses to question No. 4 on Relevance

Q: Has [the way in which PCD has been implemented in the EU] responded well to institutional changes at the Commission level and the European External Action Service?		
Open Public Consultation		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	24.1	7
No	37.9	11
Do not have an opinion	37.9	11
TOTAL	100.0	29

Some respondents argued that the institutional changes have brought a solid coherence between various EU policies (such as development, external action, trade, migration and agriculture, etc.) but have not led to increased policy coherence for development in the sense of development objectives being taken more into account in non-development policies, as enshrined in Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty. Instead, it appears to these respondents that development cooperation policies and programmes need to increasingly take into account the EU's interests and objectives in other (non-development) areas of work, often to the detriment of its own (sustainable) development objectives.

In relation to the above, some respondents commented that the EU's Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy even seems to subordinate development objectives and noted that it makes no reference whatsoever to PCD. According to these respondents, what EU leaders perceive as the interests of Europe (i.e. build a fortress Europe and consolidate the power of large European transnational corporations) have been increasingly prevailing in all the EU's policies; in the development sphere, this means in the view of respondents that development aid is used to back up the EU's economic diplomacy, as best exemplified with the EU's External Investment Plan. In light of the above, the respondents stressed that it is important that the EU's efforts, through development and non-development policies, are made coherent with sustainable development principles and human rights.

The creation of EEAS and the changing role of EU Delegations was also the subject of comments from respondents. One respondent argued that it has had a negative effect in terms of PCD because EU Delegations now accomplish both political and development mandates and are too constrained by political and diplomatic considerations of bilateral relations to follow efficient development policies. Another respondent argued that the principle and operationalisation of PCD within the EEAS remains weak as illustrated by the regrettable lack of attention paid to PCD in the EU's Global Strategy.

It can also be noted that one respondent made the point that responsibility for PCD has remained within DG DEVCO whereas one might argue that PCD is a Commission wide responsibility and should sit with a Vice-President or President, because it is non-development policies and actions that are most likely to have negative or unforeseen consequences for developing countries.

However, some positive views were also expressed by respondents with respect to institutional changes and how the EU PCD approach responded to them or may respond to them in the future. One respondent argued for example that the establishment of the EEAS in 2011 and the adoption of the EU Global Strategy in June 2016 have widened the opportunities to follow and implement a genuinely comprehensive approach: according to the respondent, in a context in which all elements of EU external policy have been brought together, it is more likely that questions of policy coherence will surface. Another respondent noted that the set up of project teams at Commissioner-level and of an Inter-Service Steering Group for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, as well as the fact that according to DG DEVCO PCSD is a standing item on their agendas, is a first and important step. At the same time, the respondent pointed out that it remains unclear how within the Commission the various threads fit together to achieve an overall approach (e.g. responsibilities of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans, High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini, Commissioner Neven Mimica). According to the respondent, in this area as well the key factor is political will and whether the topic (PCD/PCSD) is driven forward effectively and ambitiously by those at the top of the Commission.

Finally, one respondent made the point that in the area of migration and taking into account institutional changes, it is important to enhance institutional collaboration and coordination within and between the key entities responsible for migration and development, as well as for PCD, including DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, DG HOME, and EEAS. The respondent noted that the GAMM and the Migration Policy Dialogues with developing third countries are led by DG HOME but funded by DGs DEVCO and NEAR: as a result, in their view development considerations are less articulated, and can present a barrier to PCD. According to the respondent, the link with development cooperation action should be enhanced through re-

thinking these institutional arrangements and migration policy dialogue should be fully integrated, also institutionally, within development cooperation in the field of migration, in particular in countries with enhanced cooperation frameworks. The respondent noted that in general the number of EU staff working on the theme of migration has substantially increased in a rapidly evolving policy context and substantially increased funding in partner countries from both internal policy and external action instruments: in their view, this is likely to pose challenges in terms of staff capacity and knowledge of PCD and requires further investment in staff training, tools and planning.

As shown in Table 6 below, a majority of OPC respondents considered that the way in which PCD has been implemented in the EU has not responded well to EU's development objectives.

Table 18: Overview of responses to question No. 5 on Relevance

Q: Has [the way in which PCD has been implemented in the EU] responded well to EU's development objectives?		
Open Public Consultation		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	27.6	8
No	44.8	13
Do not have an opinion	27.6	8
TOTAL	100.0	29

At the same time, it can be noted that the analysis of specific comments provided by respondents in relation to this question suggests that a significant number of respondents might have answered negatively to the question not so much because they considered that the EU PCD approach has not responded well to EU's development objectives but rather because they considered that EU's development policy is not achieving its objectives, since their comments appear to focus on the impact of development aid and were not referring to PCD.

With respect to the respondents that answered negatively and were clearly referring to the EU PCD approach or PCD issues, most explained their position by highlighting that in practice only a limited number of EU policies (or policy proposals) take into account EU's development objectives and/or the likely impacts of the policy in developing countries.

Several CSOs that contributed to the OPC (including CONCORD Europe and members of CONCORD Europe) cited in this regard a report by CONCORD Europe (CONCORD Europe (2017) "Seeing the bigger picture"), which showed that only in 4 out of 17 cases of new proposals with a likely impact on developing countries, the aspect of PCD was taken into account during the impact assessment phase. The respondents noted that there were a few positive exceptions, such as the Proposal for a Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment, for which the interests of developing countries were clearly taken into account when weighing the different policy options and influenced the policy option which was finally retained. However, in other cases, while the impacts in developing countries have been looked at from a development perspective, the option most favourable to those countries is not the one that has been retained by the European Commission, such as in the proposal for a Country-By-Country Reporting Directive. Furthermore, in other cases, while respondents noted with satisfaction that the EU's human rights obligations have sometimes played a positive role (such as in the case of the conflict minerals regulation), PCD has not been an argument for or against different policy options. For example, with respect to the conflict minerals regulation the European Commission outlined six policy options, but opted for a non-binding approach in its legislative proposal. The Impact

Assessment Unit of the European Parliament noted that “*a certain bias is shown throughout the IA towards the preferred option [consisting of a voluntary self – certification scheme for EU Importers]. (...) The three main objectives of the proposal directly affect third countries (...) Nevertheless, the IA does not provide a separate part on third countries in the analysis, and there is no explicit treatment of any development aspects.*”⁴⁵³ Finally, the CONCORD Europe showed that some new proposals with a likely impact on developing countries did not even go through the impact assessment process at all, such as the Partnership Framework on Migration. Based on the above, the various CSOs concluded that there are many improvements to be made to the scope and process of impact assessments.

Other respondents made similar points, by highlighting the mixed record of the EU PCD approach in terms of EU policies effectively taking account of development objectives. One respondent noted for example that certain initiatives that have been taken by the EU are a positive response to incoherence, e.g.:

- The introduction of an EU Timber Regulation to correspond to development objectives in source countries concerning forest law enforcement, governance and trade and to close the potential flaw of EU still importing illegal timber while supporting developing countries to fight illegal logging.
- The introduction of the IUU regulation, which potentially addresses loss of livelihoods and revenue in coastal and fishing communities in developing countries as well as depletion of fish stocks, illegal trade and corruption (although, as pointed out by the respondent it does not include issues of human rights and slave labour, so strictly speaking is not a comprehensive PCD measure, and studies are showing that IUU import regulations are currently being undermined by use of the weakest EU port of entry).

In contrast however, the respondent argued that global deforestation resulting from EU consumption has not been adequately addressed. In this context, the respondent recalled that: the EU contributes deforestation by importing products like palm oil, beef and leather, soy and cocoa from deforested and converted areas in developing countries and emerging economies; halting deforestation by 2020 is one of the SDGs that the EU committed to; and it is also critical to reach the Paris Agreement’s objective of limiting global temperature increase to 2C while aiming for 1.5C. To further highlight the importance of this issue in the context of PCD, the respondent noted that: currently emissions from deforestation and forest degradation account for 11% of the global total; the associated environmental, economic and social impacts are significant (the livelihoods of more than 1.6 billion people are estimated to be dependent on forest resources, and forests are not only an essential source of timber, food and fibres, but they are also home to 80% of the world’s terrestrial biodiversity, are a major provider of various ecosystem services, and play a significant role in the global carbon cycle); deforestation accounts annually for more greenhouse emissions than the total EU economy.

In the area of migration, one respondent noted that according to an assessment undertaken by IOM in 2017, while migration is included in main development policies, far fewer migration and asylum policies integrate development aspects, despite commitments to PCD. The respondent noted that the European development policy framework (most recently the 2017 European Consensus on Development) acknowledges that migration is part of inclusive and sustainable growth for human development, and also states that EU development policy “*contributes, inter alia, to supporting democracy, the rule of law and human rights, preserving peace and preventing conflict...*” However, according to the respondent, political developments have led to greater focus on addressing the root causes of irregular migration through

⁴⁵³ [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2014/528797/EPRS_BRI\(2014\)528797_REV1_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2014/528797/EPRS_BRI(2014)528797_REV1_EN.pdf)

development cooperation, including the use of aid conditionality dependent on partner countries cooperating on readmission and return, and a focus on preventing migration: in the view of the respondent, this is not consistent with development objectives, and has led to a situation where PCD has not been able to “protect” the development agenda against evolving pressure resulting from migration challenges. Finally, the respondent noted that the absence of PCD from discourses around irregular migration and development cooperation has been acknowledged by the European Parliament (PE 614.577), civil society and the UN, which raised this in its position paper on the Consensus on Development.

On the other hand, some respondents considered that the way in which PCD has been implemented responded well to EU’s development objectives and highlighted in this regard the fact that the PCD concept has been well aligned with the development objectives of the European Development Consensus (2006) and that the new EU Consensus on Development (2017) directly links the EU’s development objectives to the SDGs and emphasizes the importance of PCD contributing to PCSD: in that sense, by definition, the EU PCD approach is well aligned with EU’s development objectives.

Furthermore, one respondent pointed out that the EU Consensus on Development stresses that the EU and its Member States encourage other countries to assess the impact of their policies on the achievement of the SDGs, including in developing countries, and that the EU development policy provides support to partner countries in their own efforts to create a conducive framework for PCSD. As noted by the respondent, the Consensus also lists examples of areas where PCD efforts should be reinforced – e.g. trade, finance, environment and climate change, food security, migration and security – and states that particular attention should be paid to the fight against illicit financial flows and tax evasion, as well as to the promotion of trade and responsible investment; however, how these areas are to be made more coherent in order to promote sustainable development is not specified.

As one respondent pointed out, the issue now is how to move towards Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD), taking also into account the implementation of SDGs at the EU level. The respondent argued that the EU should maintain PCD efforts to take account of developing countries’ (in particular least developed countries’) interests, and that PCSD could therefore build upon PCD’s lessons learned, good practices and mechanisms in place. In this context, the respondent noted that it supports ECDPM’s position, as defined in the document ECDPM (2017) “*Discussion paper 210 - Policy coherence and the 2030 Agenda: Building on the PCD experience*”.

4 COHERENCE

EU's approach to PCD as a priority within wider EU policy

Survey results suggest that the EU's approach to PCD has not been much reflected as a priority within the wider EU policy-making of Commission services and the EEAS.

As shown in Table 7 below, the majority of respondents to the Commission and EEAS Survey consider that, within their own DG/service, PCD has only been reflected partially as a priority, or not reflected as a priority at all.

Table 19: Overview of responses to question No. 1 on Coherence

Q: To what extent has the EU's approach to PCD been reflected as a priority within the wider EU policy making of your DG/service during the period 2009-2016?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	8.3	2
Partially	50.0	12
Substantially	12.5	3
Fully	8.3	2
Do not have an opinion	20.8	5
TOTAL	100.0	24

The analysis of individual responses suggests however that the level of priority given to PCD might vary greatly depending on the DG/service: while in some DGs the PCD approach appears to have been reflected, at least to some extent, as a priority (e.g. DG DEVCO and DG TRADE, although it can be noted that opinions were split among respondents from DG DEVCO as to whether this level of priority has been substantial or not), the situation appears to be very different in other DGs/services, reflecting mainly the fact that they are not involved in EU policy making (e.g. Eurostat) or that their scope of action has limited or no external dimension and therefore have few dossiers/policies to which PCD would apply (e.g. DG TAXUD, DG JUST, DG FISMA, DG ENER).

The feedback from stakeholders also suggested that one factor explaining why the PCD approach has not been a priority in certain DGs/services has been the lack of awareness on PCD: one stakeholder mentioned for example that awareness on PCD within the EEAS is still limited to development practitioners i.e. to the teams that work on development cooperation; other teams do not know what PCD is, which suggests that in practice the mainstreaming of PCD in all EU policies has some way to go.

Finally, in terms of evolution during the 2009-2016 period, some stakeholders argued that the level of importance or priority of PCD has decreased during this period, citing as reasons various factors such as the lack of political support and commitment (including at the level of DG DEVCO), the lack of interest in the topic, as well as the lack of engagement on PCD issues.

Coherence of the EU PCD approach with wider EU policy and evolving international obligations of the EU

As shown in Table 8 below, opinions were split among OPC respondents as to whether the EU’s PCD approach has been coherent with wider EU policy and evolving international obligations of the EU, with a narrow majority of respondent answering negatively.

Table 20: Overview of responses to question No. 2 on Coherence

Q: In your opinion, is the way in which PCD has been implemented in the EU coherent with wider EU policy and evolving international obligations of the EU?		
Open Public Consultation		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	39.3	11
No	46.4	13
Do not have an opinion	14.3	4
TOTAL	100.0	28

Several respondents considered that the EU PCD approach is in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted globally in 2015 (to which the EU and its Member States committed), in line with the EU and Member States’ obligations in the field of Human Rights (as confirmed in Article 21 of the Treaty) and fits well with the Better Regulation aim of increased coherence across different policy domains. In addition, one respondent noted that the EU aims to fulfil the interests of its Member States, its international obligations, while at the same time taking into account the interests of developing countries: according to this respondent, coherence between actions in these areas in the end is furthered by the fact that many of today’s challenges are shared challenges, e.g. conflict and instability/insecurity threatening welfare and wellbeing abroad, most notably in developing countries, while at the same time having an impact in the EU (for instance migration).

At the same time, many respondents highlighted examples, which in their view show a lack of coherence between one the one hand the EU PCD approach and the way in which it has been implemented and on the other hand EU wider policy or evolving international obligations of the EU.

For instance, some respondents noted that the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS) adopted in 2016 outlines a number of priorities for the Union and mentions only once in passing the commitment to policy coherence for development: this contrasts with dozens of mentions of migration, terrorism or growth (all more self-centred policy priorities) and might suggest that the EU’s PCD efforts, while consistent with the letter of the EUGS, are not strongly aligned with its order of priorities.

Furthermore, several respondents questioned whether the way in which PCD has been implemented in the EU remains coherent in the framework of the 2030 Agenda and SDGs. In particular, some respondents noted that although the formulation of PCD as a key contribution to broader PCSD in the New Consensus on Development makes the work on PCD consistent with the 2030 Agenda, the five PCD challenges have not been updated since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda. In this context, respondents argued that it could be worth reflecting on whether they still represent the five issues on which policy coherence is of utmost importance (in this regard, respondents noted that for instance multiple stakeholders have raised the importance of policy coherence in the domains which influence the affordability of medicines in developing countries, such as intellectual property rights and research). On the other hand,

respondents noted that the inclusion of climate change within these five priorities revealed that the more encompassing sustainable development ambition which materialised with the 2030 Agenda has been present in the EU's PCD early on, which makes the EU's PCD work consistent with the EU's commitment as a party to the United Nations Framework Conference on Climate Change.

With respect to the current five PCD challenge areas, respondents also highlighted that the challenge on 'Trade and Finance' contrasts with the other four, in that it does not define the contours of a fairly palpable PCD challenge: according to respondents, 'Trade and finance' encompasses several areas that are crucial for PCD (e.g. curbing illicit financial flows to ensure maximum domestic resources mobilisation for development; or avoiding trade agreements which compromise the industrialisation of developing countries), but because this challenge is formulated in vague terms, it is not possible to assess whether what is aimed at here is consistent with the EU's goals and commitments.

In general, several respondents called for an EU-wide debate on PCD in the framework of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and its SDGs. One respondent noted that SDGs apply to both developed and developing countries and therefore should be comprehensively integrated into the EU's decision-making process at both internal and external levels; furthermore, the PCD should be included as a core issue in the upcoming EU policy debates on the new Global Strategy and the MFF. Another respondent mentioned that considering the new documents make indirectly (EUGS) or directly (Consensus) statements on PCD/PCSD, it would be worth reflecting on the potential for a new Communication setting out the EU's ambition or to dedicate a substantial chapter on that in a new EU Strategy on Sustainable Development. The respondent noted that the last dedicated Communication on PCD was published in September 2009: given that PCD remains a key component of the EU's competence for development policy as enshrined in TFEU Art. 208 and given the target 17.14 of the Agenda 2030, the respondent recommended further engagement laying out the EU's medium- to long-term ambition based on the general statement made in the new EU Consensus on Development and the Council Conclusions "A sustainable European future" of 20 June 2017.

It can also be noted that respondents mentioned that they see examples of PCD in practice whereby the objective of PCD is reversed i.e. instead of ensuring that EU policies do not run counter to EU development policies, EU policies, strategies and actions are adopted which serve EU political self-interest first at the expense of development. In relation to this, some respondents stressed that the principle of PCD does not mean that development cooperation objectives should be aligned with wider EU policy, but the reverse: wider EU policy should be aligned with development cooperation objectives.

Respondents also mentioned examples of incoherence that they had identified in specific sectors/ areas (although most of these examples in fact highlight a lack of effectiveness of the PCD approach rather than a lack of coherence of the EU PCD approach with wider EU policy and EU international obligations):

- **Biodiversity:** The EU has committed under the SDGs to halt the loss of biodiversity and prevent the extinction of species by 2020 (target 15.5) and under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity to address biodiversity loss, including by substantially increasing financial resources (Aichi target 20). One respondent argued that in spite excellent progress made through DG DEVCO's B4Life flagship programme, clearly greater attention and finance needs to be given to this issue within future EU development aid programmes to achieve these international commitments.

- **Tropical deforestation:** The EU has signed up to international commitments signalling its intention to contribute to halting deforestation, such as the New York Declaration on Forests with the goal of ending natural forest loss by 2030, and the SDG target of halting deforestation by 2020 (target 15.2). One respondent noted that despite these international commitments, the EU lacks a strategy for tackling tropical deforestation, which is currently dealt with in a fragmented manner across a range of Directorate-Generals. The respondent also made the point that in terms of EU development policy, funding has mainly focused on implementing FLEGT (to tackle illegal timber logging) and REDD+ but not to addressing the impacts of EU consumption of and trade in agricultural commodities and tropical deforestation. According to the respondent, in particular virtually no attention has been given to protecting the world's remaining intact forests which play a disproportionately high role in storing carbon and protecting biodiversity, but which are being deforested at twice the global deforestation rate.
- **Climate change:** One respondent noted that EU and EU Member States continue to provide subsidies for fossil fuels and put public investment in carbon intensive projects while at the same time, through development cooperation, the EU is providing funding for climate mitigation, resilience, adaptation and for disaster risk reduction.
- **Migration:** Respondents noted that in this regard the key evolving international development obligation is the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs (in particular the SDG 10.7 target, which aims to 'facilitate safe, regular and responsible migration'). One respondent noted that: (i) the Agenda requires stakeholders to move to a whole-of-government approach to achieve policy coherence on migration governance that enhances development impacts; (ii) the migration-SDG linkages reach beyond implementing migration policies, and entail integrating migration across governance sectors; (iii) ultimately, policy coherence is crucial to achieving the SDGs as well as to building effective migration governance, therefore migration needs to be included in SDG implementation. In order to be in-line with these international obligations, the respondent argued that the EU will need to intensify PCD on migration both horizontally (between migration policy and development policy, as well as across different development sectors) and vertically (across government levels to ensure that local and regional authorities are empowered by national governments in their capacity as migration first responders and service providers and can own and implement strategies to carry forward the 2030 Agenda). Another respondent noted that although migration is seen as a positive contribution to development in the UN SDGs, it is in their view where the PCD objective is reversed, as the EU is increasingly looking to stop migration "through addressing root causes" as in the External Investment Fund and through the implementation of its emergency and crisis policies, is in danger of undermining human rights.
- **Trade:** One respondent noted that a question often raised is not so much whether PCD is consistent with trade agreements such as TTIP and CETA, as well as with Economic Partnership Agreements with developing countries, but rather the other way: are these agreements consistent with the commitment to PCD? Or rather: given the interests at stake in an international trade agreement negotiation, is it even possible for the outcomes to be aligned with PCD? Based on this, the respondent concluded that in a nutshell the political economy of policy-making is often more favourable to other priorities than PCD, with resulting negative implications for the consistency of policy formulation as well as for the effectiveness of implementation.

Finally, several respondents noted that some international obligations of the EU stem from its agreements with third states and in this regard mentioned the specific case of the EU's Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) with ACP countries, which in its article 12, recognises PCD as a relevant topic for dialogue with partners. Respondents noted that this article provides ACP

countries with a right to be informed about PCD-relevant pieces of legislation adopted in the EU; to submit propositions for amendments; and to be informed of the reasons if their amendments are rejected. According to respondents, the mechanism has been used at least once but is not taken up systematically: in their view, one way to make the EU's PCD efforts more consistent with the EU's commitments expressed in the CPA could be to work on raising developing countries' awareness of PCD relevant items and of their right to engage with the policy making process to promote their perspectives, and by asking them directly in the framework of annual dialogues if there are any PCD issues faced.

5 EFFICIENCY (CAPACITY, RESOURCES, BEST PRACTICES)

Level of human resources (staffing and expertise) available to implement the EU's approach to PCD

Survey results suggest that most stakeholders consider the level of human resources (staffing and expertise) available sufficient to implement the EU's PCD commitment (see Table 9 below). At the same time, it can be noted that a high number of respondents indicated that they do not have an opinion on the subject (almost half the respondents to the Commission and EEAS survey and 7 respondents out of 10 for the EU Member States survey).

Table 21: Overview of responses to question No. 1 on Efficiency (Capacity, Resources, Best practices)

Q: Is the actual level of human resources (staffing and expertise) available to implement the EU's PCD commitment within the Commission services and EEAS sufficient?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Not sufficient	10.0	2
Barely sufficient	10.0	2
Sufficient	35.0	7
Do not have an opinion	45.0	9
TOTAL	100.0	20
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Not sufficient	0.0	0
Barely sufficient	20.0	2
Sufficient	10.0	1
Do not have an opinion	70.0	7
TOTAL	100.0	10

The analysis of individual responses and of specific comments provided by respondents confirms that the feedback from stakeholders on the available level of human resources (staffing and expertise) is rather mixed, as different views were expressed by stakeholders:

- Some stakeholders considered that both staffing and expertise were insufficient, with one noting that it was often caused by the lack of awareness on PCD's importance and EU commitments to PCD. In this regard, one respondent also argued that one factor is certainly the different role of DG DEVCO (mainly policy and programme implementation) compared to the former DG DEV (mainly policy definition), which makes it more difficult to act powerfully on an issue like PCD which is by its very nature eminently political.
- Some stakeholders considered that the level of resources is currently sufficient to manage PCD mechanisms, with the caveat that the required level of resources ultimately depended on EU's strategies and political priorities in this regard – i.e. if the Commission was more ambitious as regards the implementation of PCD, more human resources would be needed (one of these respondents noted that only three colleagues within DG DEVCO are tasked to deal with PCD, hence “their role is rather “monitoring”, reporting, information sharing, etc. than influencing policies”).
- Finally, several stakeholders argued that it was not a question of staffing (or of expertise among staff working on PCD directly), but rather of insufficient leverage of the available staff and expertise. Some respondents made the point that the central challenge was raising awareness beyond development practitioners (i.e. improving understanding of PCD beyond DG DEVCO) or, to go even further, increasing expertise among staff not directly working on PCD within the Commission services and EEAS across the board. In this regard, it was

also mentioned by one respondent that the lack of an enabling and supporting environment for PCD within DG DEVCO and EEAS made the PCD portfolio difficult to promote.

Redundancies/synergies between organisational structures

Survey results suggest that most stakeholders consider that there are no redundancies between organisational structures of various Commission services with respect to the implementation of the EU’s PCD commitment (see Table 10 below). At the same time, it can be noted that a sizable share of respondents indicated that they do not have an opinion on the subject (more than half of respondents).

Respondents did not comment much on this subject, often simply noting that if there were redundancies they were not aware of them. One respondent that answered negatively to the question “*Are there redundancies between organisational structures of various Commission services with respect to the implementation of the EU’s PCD commitment?*” noted that the implementation of the PCD commitments is the role of both DG DEVCO and other DGs: DG DEVCO should assist in identifying the development impacts of the policies of internal policy DGs, whilst the latter should be in the lead in addressing these impacts. On the other hand, among respondents that responded positively to the question, one pointed out that there are redundancies between EEAS and DG DEVCO because there are no clear roles or mandates for PCD in these institutions; in addition, this respondent highlighted that the role of the Secretariat-General, which interferes on PCD issues, is also unclear.

Table 22: Overview of responses to question No. 2 on Efficiency (Capacity, Resources, Best practices)

Q: Are there redundancies between organisational structures of various Commission services with respect to the implementation of the EU’s PCD commitment?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	10.0	2
No	45.0	9
Do not have an opinion	45.0	9
TOTAL	100.0	20
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	0.0	0
No	40.0	4
Do not have an opinion	60.0	6
TOTAL	100.0	10
EU Delegations Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	20.0	4
No	25.0	5
Do not have an opinion	55.0	11
TOTAL	100.0	20

Survey results suggest that vast majority of stakeholders consider that there are synergies between organisational structures of various Commission services with respect to the implementation of the EU’s PCD commitment (see Table 11 below). However, as with the previous question, a high number of respondents indicated that they do not have an opinion on

the subject (more than two thirds of the respondents to the Commission and EEAS survey and more than half of the respondents of the EU Member States and EU Delegations surveys).

When asked to list the most important synergies, respondents provided several examples:

- The general coordination between DG DEVCO and EEAS;
- The coordination between line DGs and individual units within DG DEVCO (e.g. the coordination between DG TRADE and DG DEVCO Units C4 and A1; the coordination between DG ENER and DG DEVCO Unit C6 for all DG ENER’s activities vis a vis developing countries; the existence of food cooperation between DEVCO and HOME on migration, which is increasingly supported/coordinated by SG, etc.);
- The coordination between staff under DG DEVCO budget lines in EU Delegations and staff of other DGs, e.g. in the field of fisheries (for example, in relation to fisheries sustainable fisheries partnerships agreements, coordination between fisheries attaché representing DG MARE and its colleagues in charge of development cooperation) or trade (coordination between trade officers in EU Delegations and desk officers in DG TRADE, for example in relation to Economic Partnership Agreements: one respondent to the EU Delegations survey highlighted this synergy by noting that for DG Trade, it is important to have a direct access to the government of the partner country as to discuss the relevant trade issues; while for the EU Delegation, it is important to have access to technical knowledge regarding trade-related issues available in DG TRADE).

Overall, the feedback from stakeholders suggests that the stronger synergies were found in the area of trade and development.

Table 23: Overview of responses to question No. 3 on Efficiency (Capacity, Resources, Best practices)

Q: Are there synergies between organisational structures of various Commission services with respect to the implementation of the EU's PCD commitment?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	30.0	6
No	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	70.0	14
TOTAL	100.0	20
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	40.0	4
No	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	60.0	6
TOTAL	100.0	10
EU Delegations Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	31.6	6
No	15.8	3
Do not have an opinion	52.6	10
TOTAL	100.0	19

Standardisation of PCD-related processes

As shown in Table 12 below, a majority of respondents indicated that their DG/service has not implemented/standardised PCD-related processes within its organizational structure or its operational procedures.

Table 24: Overview of responses to question No. 4 on Efficiency (Capacity, Resources, Best practices)

Q: Has your DG/Service implemented/standardized PCD-related processes within its organizational structure or its operational procedures?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	31.6	6
No	47.4	9
Do not have an opinion	21.0	4
TOTAL	100.0	19

The number of respondents that answered positively can be considered low given that several DG DEVCO staff are among respondents, but it can be noted that positive responses included one from a respondent in DG TRADE, which indicated that PCD is a clear part of a job description and responsibility for an identified unit within DG TRADE.

Knowledge/awareness of the modus operandi of PCD mechanisms

As shown in Table 13 below, a majority of respondents to the Commission and EEAS survey considered the level of knowledge/awareness of the modus operandi of PCD mechanisms as “sufficient”, but there was still a sizable share of respondents that did not share this view.

Table 25: Overview of responses to question No. 5 on Efficiency (Capacity, Resources, Best practices)

Q: Is the level of knowledge/awareness of the modus operandi of PCD mechanisms in your DG/service and staff, and by the EEAS sufficient?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Not sufficient	21.1	4
Barely sufficient	15.8	3
Sufficient	52.6	10
Do not have an opinion	10.5	2
TOTAL	100.0	19
EU Delegations Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Not sufficient	33.3	7
Barely sufficient	38.1	8
Sufficient	28.6	6
Do not have an opinion	0.0	0
TOTAL	100.0	21

The mixed feedback appears to reflect the lack of a common view on what should be the optimal level of knowledge/awareness within EU institutions. For example, while one respondent considered that the level of knowledge/awareness was not sufficient because most colleagues believe PCD is exclusive to the EU actions in the international domain, another one argued that there might not be a need for all services to know specifically about the modus operandi of PCD

mechanisms, if those mechanisms are embedded and systematised in the broader Commission processes. Furthermore, one respondent mentioned that in the area of migration, knowledge on the modus operandi of PCD mechanisms was limited but the migration & development agenda of the Global Approach to Migration & Mobility (GAMM) was better known: according to this stakeholder, since most work on PCD on migration is conducted through this framework, the lack of knowledge on PCD-specific mechanisms is not necessarily a problem.

With respect to the EU Delegations survey, it can be noted that a majority of respondents considered the level of knowledge/awareness of the modus operandi of PCD mechanisms as “barely sufficient” or “insufficient”: several respondents highlighted a general lack of awareness at Delegation level about PCD and the way it is implemented, and therefore called for more awareness raising and training on the subject.

Cooperation and coordination between EU institutions and with non-EU institutions

The results of the Commission and EEAS survey and the EU Member States survey show that most stakeholders consider that EU PCD mechanisms contributes, at least to some extent, to enhance coordination (i) between EU Member States, EP, Council, and EEAS, (ii) between the EU and other EU stakeholders (CSOs, European Economic and Social Committee), and (iii) between the EU and developing countries. As shown in Table 14 below a variety of views was expressed by respondents and the most frequent answer for all sub-questions was “partially”. It can also be noted that the sub-question for which the most “none” answers were recorded was the one on whether the EU PCD mechanisms enhance cooperation and coordination between the EU and developing countries.

When asked to identify good practices showing how PCD mechanisms have PCD mechanisms have enhanced cooperation and coordination between the aforementioned stakeholders, several respondents mentioned the regular meetings of PCD focal points of EU Member States with DG DEVCO and EEAS. One respondent noted that PCD is relatively high on the agenda of the European Parliament Rapporteur, which also ensured the role of PCD in the new European Consensus on Development, while another argued that the implementation of the 2030 Agenda holds great potential for an increased focus on PCD across sectors.

Respondents also identified areas for improvement. One respondent highlighted that the EU PCD approach should involve in a more extensive way beneficiary countries and EU Delegations, while another argued that perhaps more can be done to mobilise Member States to take concerted action in PCD areas, e.g. by using EU focal points meetings not only for reporting and sharing information but also to tackle a concrete PCD issue. On a general level, several respondents pointed out the need to further raise awareness on PCD (and specifically increase knowledge about PCD outside the development policy community), as this is the first step to enhance effective cooperation and coordination.

Finally, one respondent highlighted that developing countries still do not possess any PCD mechanisms of their own, so the existing PCD mechanisms serve to point at the EU policies’ “incoherence” without addressing often more serious incoherence at national level in the developing countries.

Table 26: Overview of responses to question No. 6 on Efficiency (Capacity, Resources, Best practices)

Q: To what extent do (EU) PCD mechanisms enhance effective cooperation and coordination between:		
1. EU Member States, EP, Council, and EEAS?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	5.6	1
Partially	38.9	7
Substantially	16.7	3
Fully	5.6	1
Do not have an opinion	33.3	6
TOTAL	100.0	18
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	50.0	5
Substantially	40.0	4
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	10.0	1
TOTAL	100.0	10
2. The EU and other EU stakeholders (CSOs, European Economic and Social Committee)?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	38.9	7
Substantially	16.7	3
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	44.4	8
TOTAL	100.0	18
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	50.0	5
Substantially	0.0	0
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	50.0	5
TOTAL	100.0	10
3. The EU and developing countries?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	16.7	3
Partially	27.8	5
Substantially	16.7	3
Fully	5.6	1
Do not have an opinion	33.3	6
TOTAL	100.0	18
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	40.0	4
Substantially	30.0	3
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	30.0	3
TOTAL	100.0	10

With respect to the EU Delegations survey, the results suggest that most stakeholders in EU Delegations consider that the PCD commitment contributes to enhance coordination between EU Member States and EEAS as well as between the EU and developing countries, but only to some extent. As shown in Table 15 below, the most frequent answer to the questions “*To what extent does the PCD commitment (enhance effective cooperation and coordination between EU Member States and EEAS?)*” and “*To what extent does the PCD commitment (enhance effective cooperation and coordination between the EU and developing countries?)*” was “partially”.

At the same time, it can be noted that when asked to provide examples of the enhanced coordination and cooperation, respondents mainly came up with examples where the link to the PCD commitment is not clear. Nevertheless, a few relevant examples were mentioned, often in the area of trade and development or climate change. The EU Delegation to Mozambique mentioned for example that (i) trade and development policies are strongly linked in Mozambique and that the recently signed EPA and the consecutive EPA Implementation Plan are broadly discussed with EU Member States, EEAS and the Government of Mozambique; (ii) the Delegation, together with Member States, is actively engaged in dialogue on climate change, both in the framework of COP 22 and in the implementation of targeted projects and programmes. Furthermore, the EU Delegation to Nicaragua and Central America mentioned for example that “trade is an area where PCD is relatively well accounted for, due to the Association Agreement between the EU and Central America, which provides for a dialogue framework between the EU, its member States and Central America”. The Delegation noted however that other policies likely to affect developing countries are less discussed, one exception being perhaps the financial transparency initiatives that have gained momentum in Panama.

Table 27: Overview of responses to question No. 7 on Efficiency (Capacity, Resources, Best practices)

Q: To what extent does the PCD commitment (i.e. taking into account the objectives of development cooperation in policies which are likely to affect developing countries, as per Art. 208 of the TFEU) enhance effective cooperation and coordination between:		
1. EU Member States and EEAS?		
EU Delegations Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	15.0	3
Partially	35.0	7
Substantially	25.0	5
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	25.0	5
TOTAL	100.0	20
2. The EU and developing countries?		
EU Delegations Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	5.0	1
Partially	55.0	11
Substantially	30.0	6
Fully	5.0	1
Do not have an opinion	5.0	1
TOTAL	100.0	20

6 EFFICIENCY / EFFECTIVENESS (PCD MECHANISMS)

PCD Biennial Report

Survey results suggest that stakeholders generally consider that the PCD Biennial Report is, at least to some extent, a suitable tool for monitoring PCD progress. As shown in Table 16 below, responses to the question “*To what extent is the EU PCD Biennial Report suitable for the purpose of monitoring PCD progress*” were generally split between “partially” or “substantially”.

Stakeholders however appeared to be slightly less convinced of the effectiveness of the EU PCD Biennial Report in terms of influencing policy-making and changing behaviour and practice, as the most frequent answer of respondents to the questions “*To what extent is the EU PCD Biennial Report effective in influencing policy-making in order to take account of development objectives in new policies and initiatives?*” and “*To what extent is the EU PCD Biennial Report effective in changing behaviour and practice within Commission services regarding the EU's approach to PCD?*” was “partially”.

Table 28: Overview of responses to question No. 1 on Efficiency/Effectiveness (PCD mechanisms)

Q: To what extent is the EU PCD Biennial Report:		
1. Suitable for the purpose of monitoring PCD progress?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	5.6	1
Partially	27.8	5
Substantially	27.8	5
Fully	16.7	3
Do not have an opinion	22.2	4
TOTAL	100.0	18
2. Effective in influencing policy-making in order to take account of development objectives in new policies and initiatives?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	5.6	1
Partially	44.4	8
Substantially	22.2	4
Fully	5.6	1
Do not have an opinion	22.2	4
TOTAL	100.0	18
3. Effective in changing behaviour and practice within Commission services regarding the EU's approach to PCD?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	11.1	2
Partially	55.6	10
Substantially	22.2	4
Fully	5.6	1
Do not have an opinion	5.6	1
TOTAL	100.0	18

Respondents highlighted several positive aspects of the PCD Biennial Report, such as:

- The report is a source of information for public and policymakers on interactions between different EU policies and provides useful evidence to adapt/improve future EU action.
- The drafting process was described by one respondent as a support to reinforcing organisational and procedural changes both in the EU and in EU Member States. Another stakeholder commented that the preparation of the PCD report is a good opportunity to not only take stock of achievements but identify weaknesses/difficulties encountered so far and possible ways to remedy these: the preparation of the report is therefore an exercise which can encourage different stakeholders working on PCD in each of the priority areas to enhance coordination.
- The report is the basis for promoting dialogue and engagement with stakeholders and with European Parliament on thematic PCD issues. One respondent argued that through its collaborative approach in the preparation and decision-making, the EU PCD report helps very much raising awareness of PCD issues in other Commission services and EU Member States administrations at least every two years; its publication triggers political debates on PCD in Council and Parliament as well as with civil society. Indeed, as pointed out by another stakeholder, the European Parliament and NGOs have used the PCD report as a tool for dialogue with the Commission services and as reference for further debate.
- Specifically, the report was described by a respondent as a way to promote engagement and ownership (and progress) by Member States on PCD by means of comparison with others that are more advanced: the respondent argued that the report raises awareness among Member States and sector ministries in Member States about PCD commitments and issues and can be considered to serve as capacity-building through a training-by-doing process.

At the same time, respondents also highlighted several limitations of the tool:

- One respondent noted that the EU PCD Biennial Report is useful to communicate but might be less effective in influencing operations/policies on the ground. In relation to this, another respondent highlighted that follow-up to the report in the area of migration was limited, as it did not receive much attention beyond development policymaking circles.
- One respondent mentioned that the preparation of the report can have some effect on the people that are actually involved with its preparation, but this is usually very limited number of people and often the same people over several reporting cycles, therefore the spread of the impact is very small.
- As one respondent noted, the Biennial Report is mainly considered as additional workload by line DGs (i.e. a constrain). Another respondent mentioned that “it is quite often just one report among many others to which we have to contribute”.

For the PCD Biennial Report to be more effective in the future, respondents came up with the following recommendations:

- The report could change from being a mostly descriptive exercise to becoming a more analytical tool. However, as noted by the respondent this would presuppose the existence of a PCD strategy or action plan against which progress could be measured/tracked.
- The report could be prepared by external independent experts.
- The report could be used for outreach in a larger extent for raising awareness and to initiate debate.
- Finally, one respondent noted that future reports should consider a move to Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD), which would reflect the reality of policy making in line DGs.

EU Delegations Reporting

Survey results suggest that stakeholders agree that reporting by EU Delegations is suitable, at least to some extent for the purpose of monitoring progress. As shown in Table 17 and Table 18 below, most respondents answered the question “*To what extent is reporting by EU Delegations on PCD issues (including EAMR) suitable for the purpose of monitoring PCD progress*” with either “partially” or substantially”; no respondent selected “none as an answer.

The results of the EU Delegations survey suggest however that stakeholders are slightly less convinced of the effectiveness of the EU Delegations reporting in terms of influencing policy-making and changing behaviour and practice. As shown in Table 18, the most frequent answer of respondents to the sub-questions on whether the reporting by EU Delegations is “*effective in influencing policy-making in order to take account of development objectives in new policies and initiatives*” and “*effective in changing behaviour and practice within Commission services regarding the EU's approach to PCD*” was “partially”.

Table 29: Overview of responses to question No. 2 on Efficiency/Effectiveness (PCD mechanisms)

Q: To what extent is reporting by EU Delegations on PCD issues (including EAMR) suitable for the purpose of monitoring PCD progress?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	31.6	6
Substantially	31.6	6
Fully	0	0
Do not have an opinion	36.8	7
TOTAL	100.0	19

Table 30: Overview of responses to question No. 3 on Efficiency/Effectiveness (PCD mechanisms)

Q: To what extent is reporting by EU Delegations (including EAMR) relevant to raise policy coherence issues in general and PCD issues in particular?		
1. Suitable for the purpose of monitoring PCD progress:		
EU Delegations Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	50.0	10
Substantially	30.0	6
Fully	10.0	2
Do not have an opinion	10.0	2
TOTAL	100.0	20
2. Effective in influencing EU's policy-making in order to take account of development objectives in new policies and initiatives:		
EU Delegations Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	5.0	1
Partially	55.0	11
Substantially	5.0	1
Fully	5.0	1
Do not have an opinion	30.0	6
TOTAL	100.0	20

3. *Effective in changing behaviour and practice within Commission services regarding the EU's approach to PCD:*

EU Delegations Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	10.0	2
Partially	55.0	11
Substantially	5.0	1
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	30.0	6
TOTAL	100.0	20

The analysis of individual responses showed in more detail that opinions appear to be split as to whether EU Delegations reporting, in particular through the External Assistance Management Report (EAMR), has been effective as a PCD mechanism.

Several stakeholders consider that the EAMR remains a very relevant tool and the right framework for EU Delegations to report on PCD, and highlighted the positive aspects of EU Delegations reporting in general:

- One respondent mentioned that the feedback of EU Delegations helps the Commission to have an overall assessment of the impact of EU policies in developing countries and provides good and less good examples of specific policies e.g. trade, fisheries and helps to identify some trends.
- One respondent pointed out that EU Delegations are better suited to understand and to report the real issues “on the ground”, not limited to one sector or narrowed down and reflected out of the context. EU Delegations can potentially also have an overview of the MS actions with relevance for PCD.

At the same time, many other stakeholders pointed out the EAMR’s limitations as a PCD mechanism, such as:

- The EAMR is seen as an administrative process to complete and the wider policy implications are often not considered. As noted by one respondent, the main focus of the EAMR is on the implementation of development cooperation programmes and not broader political considerations: it is therefore not clear whether it is the most suitable tool to get information on impacts of EU policies in partner countries.
- The high number of questions in the EAMR (most of them on Key Performance Indicators related to the implementation of development aid) makes it difficult for EU Delegations to report on every single one in detail: as a result, the two PCD-related questions may be lost and not given sufficient consideration;
- Some respondents mentioned that the reports coming from EAMR are not easily usable at this stage, as in many cases the reports do not respond to PCD and show a lack of understanding and awareness of PCD issues from EU Delegations staff. In this regard, one respondent argued that there has to be a higher level of commitment from Heads of Delegation to PCD while another argued that there is a need to identify key indicators or issues to be collected by EU Delegations to serve the PCD monitoring. At the same time, one EU Delegation respondent made the point that being able to spot and analyse the impacts of EU policies is complex and that EU Delegations might lack the specialist expertise to do so.
- Respondents from the EU Delegations survey also noted that there was so far no significant feedback regarding the PCD part of the EAMR as to know whether it had any impact. In particular, one respondent argued that it was unfortunate that feedback by headquarters on reporting is summarised to cover all Delegations and not done Delegation by Delegation.

On a more general level, respondents in EU Delegations noted that interaction with DGs driving EU policies is not regular and its frequency varies depending on the DG. In this regard, one respondent mentioned that there could be a scope for increasing inter-service dialogue to address country-specific PCD issues, at the request of a Delegation.

PCD training activities

Survey results suggest that most stakeholders generally agree that PCD training activities are suitable for the purpose of increasing PCD awareness, but opinions appear to be relatively split as to whether PCD training activities are effective in influencing EU's policy making and in changing behaviour and practice (see Table 19 below).

It can however be noted that a high share of respondents stated that they do not have an opinion on these subjects, in particular when it comes to respondents to the EU Delegations survey.

Table 31: Overview of responses to question No. 4 on Efficiency/Effectiveness (PCD mechanisms)

Q: To what extent are (the EU's) PCD Training Activities:		
1. Suitable for the purpose of increasing PCD awareness?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	16.7	3
Substantially	27.8	5
Fully	22.2	4
Do not have an opinion	33.3	6
TOTAL	100.0	18
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	10.0	1
Substantially	40.0	4
Fully	10.0	1
Do not have an opinion	40.0	4
TOTAL	100.0	10
EU Delegations Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	5.0	1
Partially	5.0	1
Substantially	15.0	3
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	75.0	15
TOTAL	100.0	20

2. Effective in influencing EU's policy-making in order to take account of development objectives in new policies and initiatives?

Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	5.6	1
Partially	38.9	7
Substantially	16.7	3
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	38.9	7
TOTAL	100.0	18
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	10.0	1
Partially	20.0	2
Substantially	10.0	1
Fully	10.0	1
Do not have an opinion	50.0	5
TOTAL	100.0	10
EU Delegations Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	15.0	3
Substantially	10.0	2
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	75.0	15
TOTAL	100.0	20

3. Effective in changing behaviour and practice within Commission services regarding the EU's approach to PCD?

Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	11.1	2
Partially	33.3	6
Substantially	33.3	6
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	22.2	4
TOTAL	100.0	18
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	10.0	1
Substantially	0.0	0
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	90.0	9
TOTAL	100.0	10
EU Delegations Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	15.0	3
Substantially	5.0	1
Fully	5.0	1
Do not have an opinion	75.0	15
TOTAL	100.0	20

The individual responses of stakeholders showed in general a positive appreciation of PCD training activities (including the e-learning tool), but at the same time highlighted that many stakeholders (in particular in EU Delegations) were not aware of the availability such training.

Although as noted by one respondent both the training in Brussels delivered by DG DEVCO and the new PCD e-learning course have been made use of by a number of colleagues outside DG DEVCO, and therefore can be said to have contributed in raising awareness and enhancing knowledge of PCD outside DG DEVCO, several stakeholders made the point that staff outside DG DEVCO should be more involved in PCD trainings, in particular colleagues in other line DGs in charge of drafting EU legislative proposals.

The lack of coverage of PCD training activities at the level of EU Delegations was also the subject of many comments. One respondent to the EU Member States survey mentioned that PCD training should be mandatory not only for the Heads of Cooperation but also for the Heads of Delegations. One respondent to the EU Delegations survey argued that PCD training should be mandatory for people departing to a Delegation at least to give some minimum standards, while noting that without continued support from headquarters (given the changing environment) it might not have a lasting effect. Finally, another respondent from an EU Delegation mentioned that it might be useful for colleagues active in a given sector to be informed on a regular basis of developments in the corresponding EU policy and examples of analyses of impact in terms of development, noting that Capacity4Dev could be a suitable instrument for this.

With respect to the e-learning course, stakeholders familiar with the tool appear to show a positive appreciation, with several respondents describing it as very useful. However, as one stakeholder noted it is not well known yet. Furthermore, one respondent argued that the e-learning course is “a good first start for newcomers into PCD, but it is not enough” and suggested that DEVCO and EEAS senior managers have to invest some time into developing a more effective outreach strategy.

On a general level, some respondents argued that to be more effective in influencing policy-making, PCD training would need to be much more hands-on and operational. In this regard, one stakeholder mentioned that the next step to further improve PCD training could be targeted trainings, e.g. on specific policies most relevant for PCD.

Impact Assessments

Survey results suggest that stakeholders consider the Impact Assessment (IA) instrument as a suitable PCD mechanism but are slightly less convinced of its effectiveness in terms of influencing policy-making and changing behaviour and practice. As shown in Table 20 below, the most frequent answer of respondents to the question “*To what extent are Impact Assessments suitable for the purpose of adequately taking into account development objectives in non-development EU policies?*” was “substantially”, while the most frequent answer of respondents to the question “*To what extent are Impact Assessments effective in changing behaviour and practice within Commission services regarding the EU's approach to PCD?*” was “partially”.

Table 32: Overview of responses to question No. 5 on Efficiency/Effectiveness (PCD mechanisms)

Q: To what extent are Impact Assessments:		
1. Suitable for the purpose of adequately taking into account development objectives in non-development EU policies?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	22.2	4
Substantially	44.4	8
Fully	22.2	4
Do not have an opinion	11.1	2
TOTAL	100.0	18
2. Effective in changing behaviour and practice within Commission services regarding the EU's approach to PCD?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	5.6	1
Partially	55.6	10
Substantially	22.2	4
Fully	5.6	1
Do not have an opinion	11.1	2
TOTAL	100.0	18

Respondents did not comment much on the Impact Assessment mechanism, but noted that IAs are a particularly useful tool for DEVCO to provide input to the policy-making in other DGs and highlighted the potential positive role played by the IA Board (now Regulatory Scrutiny Board): all IA reports need to be approved by the IA Board and therefore as long as the IA Board insists that potential impacts on developing countries are assessed, this holds. At the same time, they also mentioned the specific constraints linked to this mechanism, e.g. the fact that DG DEVCO is rarely involved in IAs (or does not have “the capacity to follow”) or the fact that DG DEVCO is “only allowed to intervene rather late in the process”.

Inter-Service Consultation

As shown in Table 21 below, survey results suggest that stakeholders consider that Inter-Service Consultation (ISC) is, at least to some extent, a suitable tool for the purpose of adequately taking into account development objectives in non-development EU policies. However, stakeholders appear to be slightly less convinced of its effectiveness in terms of influencing policy-making and changing behaviour and practice.

Stakeholders appeared to consider that ISCs are generally a useful opportunity for DG DEVCO to defend PCD aspects but at the same time some noted that the ISC often comes too late in the policy formulation process while others pointed out that ultimately the final drafts of the documents are agreed at Cabinet level depending on political priorities, thereby limiting to some extent the effectiveness of ISCs as a PCD mechanism.

Table 33: Overview of responses to question No. 6 on Efficiency/Effectiveness (PCD mechanisms)

Q: To what extent is Inter-Service Consultation:		
<i>1. Suitable for the purpose of adequately taking into account development objectives in non-development EU policies?</i>		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	33.3	6
Substantially	38.9	7
Fully	22.2	4
Do not have an opinion	5.6	1
TOTAL	100.0	18
<i>2. Effective in changing behaviour and practice within Commission services regarding the EU's approach to PCD?</i>		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	5.6	1
Partially	66.7	12
Substantially	16.7	3
Fully	5.6	1
Do not have an opinion	5.6	1
TOTAL	100.0	18

Commission Work Programme Screenings

As shown in Table 22 below, survey results suggest that there is a variety of views as to whether Commission Work Programme Screenings are a suitable and effective PCD mechanism, but it appears that most stakeholders consider its suitability and effectiveness as limited: no respondent selected “fully” as an answer to any of the two sub-questions, while a sizable share of respondents selected “none” as an answer.

Table 34: Overview of responses to question No. 7 on Efficiency/Effectiveness (PCD mechanisms)

Q: To what extent are Commission Work Programme Screenings:		
<i>1. Suitable for the purpose of adequately taking into account development objectives in non-development EU policies?</i>		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	16.7	3
Partially	33.3	6
Substantially	22.2	4
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	27.8	5
TOTAL	100.0	18

2. Effective in changing behaviour and practice within Commission services regarding the EU's approach to PCD?

Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	27.8	5
Partially	27.8	5
Substantially	11.1	2
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	33.3	6
TOTAL	100.0	18

Respondents did not comment much on this specific mechanism as part of the survey, but the few comments that were provided appear to confirm that opinions are split on the suitability and effectiveness of Commission Work Programme Screenings as a PCD mechanism: while one stakeholder mentioned that the screening of the Commission Work Programme was an important mechanism to identify priorities for PCD, another stakeholder described the mechanism as “just a formality on an ex-post basis”.

PCD EU Member States Informal Expert group

As shown in Table 23 below, survey results suggest that most EU Member States consider the EU Member States Informal Expert group as partially suitable to monitor PCD progress and as partially effective in influencing EU’s policy-making and changing behaviour and practice regarding the EU PCD approach.

Table 35: Overview of responses to question No. 8 on Efficiency/Effectiveness (PCD mechanisms)

Q: To what extent is the PCD EU Member States Informal Expert group:		
1. Suitable for the purpose of monitoring PCD progress?		
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	60.0	6
Substantially	30.0	3
Fully	10.0	1
Do not have an opinion	0.0	0
TOTAL	100.0	10
2. Effective in influencing EU’s policy-making in order to take account of development objectives in new policies and initiatives?		
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	10.0	1
Partially	70.0	7
Substantially	10.0	1
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	10.0	1
TOTAL	100.0	10

3. Effective in changing behaviour and practice within Commission services regarding the EU's approach to PCD?

EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	10.0	1
Partially	30.0	3
Substantially	10.0	1
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	50.0	5
TOTAL	100.0	18

The analysis of individual responses highlighted in more detail the variety of views among stakeholders. While some Member States highlighted that it was an effective mechanism to report on progress and share best practices, some others precisely regretted that due to a number of factors (e.g. the varying level of representation from Member States or the fact that many have a horizontal PCD function as opposed to dealing with other ministries on specific policy dossiers) the network mainly has an information sharing role and has limited to no effect on the promotion of PCD by itself. In this regard, one Member State suggested that the EUMS expert group should be formalized, so that its conclusions can weigh more in the EU decision process and within Member States and reach other decision levels.

Dialogues with developing country partners

Results of the Commission and EEAS survey and of the EU Member States survey suggest that most stakeholders consider that PCD issues have not much been included in dialogues with developing country partners. As shown in Table 24 below, the majority of stakeholders that responded to the question “*To your knowledge, to what extent have PCD issues been included in dialogues with developing country partners*” answered “partially”.

Table 36: Overview of responses to question No. 9 on Efficiency/Effectiveness (PCD mechanisms)

Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	11.8	2
Partially	41.2	7
Substantially	17.6	3
Fully	5.9	1
Do not have an opinion	23.5	4
TOTAL	100.0	17

EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	10.0	1
Partially	40.0	4
Substantially	0.0	0
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	50.0	5
TOTAL	100.0	10

Most stakeholders appear to acknowledge that PCD issues have been discussed, at least to some extent, with developing country partners. One stakeholder mentioned that reporting from EU Delegations shows an increased number of dialogues where PCD issues have been raised, although there is still room for improvement. There are specific areas, for which the dialogue on PCD issues appears to be more frequent or extensive than in others: one stakeholder cited the example of migration, where during the evaluation period an increasing focus was placed on engaging partner countries on the development impacts of migration through bilateral and regional migration dialogues. Since the start of the migration crisis, dialogue on migration issues with African countries has been reinforced (e.g. Valletta process): according to this stakeholder, development aspects of migration are raised in these processes by partner countries, and the EU fully recognises its joint interest in engaging with partners on this PCD perspective.

On the other hand, several stakeholders noted that the number of consultations demanded by ACP States under Article 12 of the Cotonou Agreement is clearly disappointing: one stakeholder mentioned that the Article has in fact only been used once in a formal sense and that was more for a general exchange without significantly affecting decisions. According to one stakeholder in the Commission, the under-utilisation of this potential tool is mainly due to the lack of awareness on PCD by partner countries.

Furthermore, although relevant issues of policy coherence may be raised as part of policy dialogue with developing countries, it appears that these issues are not explicitly discussed in reference to the PCD concept and EU's commitment to PCD – this means that, as pointed out by one stakeholder, these issues have not been considered under the PCD lens as understood by DG DEVCO.

The EU Delegations survey also included specific questions on the suitability and effectiveness of consultations with developing country partners. As shown in Table 25 below, survey results suggest that if stakeholders in EU Delegations appear to consider that consultations with developing country partners are suitable for the purpose of increasing knowledge on the EU's PCD commitments ("substantially" is the most frequent answer to the first question, and no respondent selected "none"), they are however slightly less convinced that these consultations can be effective in (i) influencing EU's policy-making in order to take account of development objectives in new policies and initiatives or (ii) changing behaviour and practice within Commission services regarding the EU's approach to PCD, especially regarding the latter.

Table 37: Overview of responses to question No. 10 on Efficiency/Effectiveness (PCD mechanisms)

Q: To what extent are consultations with developing country partners (i.e. consultation under article 12 of Cotonou Agreement 2010 second revision; political dialogues with partner countries; structured dialogues with partner countries):

1. Suitable for the purpose of increasing knowledge of the EU's PCD commitment?

EU Delegations Survey

Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	35.0	7
Substantially	40.0	8
Fully	15.0	3
Do not have an opinion	10.0	2
TOTAL	100.0	20

2. Effective in influencing EU's policy-making in order to take account of development objectives in new policies and initiatives?

EU Delegations Survey

Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	5.0	1
Partially	45.0	9
Substantially	45.0	9
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	5.0	1
TOTAL	100.0	20

3. Effective in changing behaviour and practice within Commission services regarding the EU's approach to PCD?

EU Delegations Survey

Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	20.0	4
Partially	40.0	8
Substantially	10.0	2
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	30.0	6
TOTAL	100.0	20

Respondents noted however that PCD as such is rarely a topic in the consultations: while it is true that consultations may be used to increase knowledge on PCD, it has not been an objective so far. Furthermore, respondents mentioned that EU Delegations indeed hold a dialogue with developing country partners on policy areas with a significant PCD content (e.g. trade, climate change) but it is unclear how this impacts on the way the EU approaches PCD.

One respondent argued that political dialogue with partner countries should be more structured and focused on PCD issues, stating that “awareness within counterpart institutions and civil society organisations from partner countries should be better promoted, in order to increase the effectiveness of dialogue and produce clear road map on practical initiatives aimed at boosting PCD, if required”. Another respondent argued that regular feedback from consultations with partner countries is relevant to Commission services in Brussels and should consistently be taken into account when planning, designing and deciding on particular measures for a respective country or for an EU approach to partner countries worldwide, so that realities on the ground are better taken into consideration.

Overall efficiency and effectiveness of PCD tools and mechanisms

The Open Public Consultation included a specific question on the overall perception of the efficiency and effectiveness of PCD mechanisms. As shown in Table 26 below, a majority of the respondents that expressed an opinion on the subject considered that the use of PCD tools and mechanisms has not been effective and efficient in influencing EU policies likely to affect developing countries so that they take account of development objectives.

It can however be noted that the analysis of detailed comments provided by respondents suggests that the question proved difficult to answer by “yes” or “no” for most respondents due to, *inter alia*, a lack of information on the existing PCD tools and mechanisms, the fact that the efficiency or effectiveness may vary greatly depending on the PCD mechanism, and in general the methodological challenge of assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of such mechanisms.

Table 38: Overview of responses to question No. 11 on Efficiency/Effectiveness (PCD mechanisms)

Open Public Consultation		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	27.6	8
No	48.3	14
Do not have an opinion	24.1	7
TOTAL	100.0	29

Indeed, a group of respondents (EU Member States who appear to have prepared and coordinated, in part, their response based on exchanges within the PCD Community of Practice and in collaboration with the think-tank ECDPM) pointed out that on a methodological level, assessing the degree of success of the EU’s efforts in promoting PCD would require measuring coherence, which is impossible. In this context, the group of respondents highlighted the following:

- Policy making processes are complex, and it is never possible to identify all factors which influence outcomes;
- From an observer’s point of view, it is impossible to know for certain the level of efforts put in specific tools and priorities for PCD; the level of resistance from other constituencies; and the possible other sources which could drive the policy making to be more in line with PCD (political parties, civil society organisations, etc.) so there is no way to quantitatively assess efficiency and effectiveness even roughly and in terms of trends.
- When some progress is noticeable in some areas, one can assume that it relates to the PCD work somehow, but the driver of change can have come from elsewhere and it is not possible to draw conclusions regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of EU PCD efforts.

Based on the above caveats and in their view the resulting impossibility to answer the question, this group of respondents argued that it is nevertheless possible to comment on two potential proxy indicators for PCD performance: the alignment of the EU’s efforts with identified good practices in the area of PCD; broader trends whereby policy outputs and outcomes are in line or contradicting these efforts.

Following from this, the main points made by this group of respondents were the following:

- Policy coherence system:

- The PCD tools of the EU match many of the criteria for PCD emphasised by the OECD's 'Eight Building Blocks' and ECDPM's 'Policy coherence systems' analyses. To name just a few elements: the commitment to PCD is established at the highest level (treaty); a coordinating 'champion' is appointed (DEVCO Unit A1) and periodical reviewing is in place (among other things the public consultation to which respondents contributed). In theory then, a policy coherence system is in place and poised to deliver on pursuing the principle of PCD.
- According to the policy coherence system analysis, though, the locus of authority (responsibility assigned) matters for the effectiveness of the 'champions' and 'watchdogs'. The fact that the dedicated PCD team coordinating internal work across services (thematic units, other DGs, EEAS and EU Delegations) and with other institutions (Council and European Parliament) resides with DG DEVCO could be interpreted as a limitation to the efforts in pursuing PCD, since the organogram places them under an administration with a de facto narrower mandate than their own.
- The NGO network CONCORD released in Autumn 2017 a report on the EU's impact assessments. The report stresses that less than a quarter of policies likely to be relevant to developing countries were accompanied by sufficient impact assessments. The report also stressed the potential role as a PCD champion which could be played by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, which responds to impact assessments – a role yet unfulfilled, since 56 of its responses included only one explicit mention of PCD.
- Policy outcomes:
 - The narrative on negative effects of non-aid policies that undermine development is increasingly accepted outside the aid sector (the 2030 Agenda illustrates this). For example, the fact that the amount of tax revenues lost due to illicit financial flows is often greater than the total amount of aid is receiving wider acknowledgement. While there is no single causal relationship between this narrative and national strategies or international agreements for curbing illicit financial flows, every achievement in this area can be understood as an illustration of progress on the PCD front.
 - To take another specific example close to the concern for PCD in the EU, various assessments of EU policies in fields such as agriculture, fisheries, energy and trade have documented attempts to get these policies to integrate the concern for food security in developing countries. These efforts have produced some results. For instance, the EU's Economic Partnership Agreements have come to include food security safeguard clauses, hence introducing a development concern within trade instruments. In a few cases such as this one, the concern for PCD seems to have progressed. This is no evidence of efficiency or effectiveness in PCD promotion per se but it can shed a light on it.

Furthermore, two respondents pointed out that the results of PCD efforts seem to be highly variable from one instrument to the other, citing a 2017 research paper (Stross, Simon (2017) "*Royal roads and dead ends. How institutional procedures influence the coherence of European Union policy formulation*"), which assessed PCD promotion in EU institutions in the areas of fisheries, environment and security policies and found that coherence promotion is highly dependent on the policy instrument at stake and on the institution that carried the initial policy proposition. According to the respondents, this suggests that the political economy of different sectors is more or less favourable to PCD in the first place.

Respondents generally acknowledged that the EU has gradually strengthened its work on procedures, instruments and mechanisms to promote and enhance PCD and recommended that the EU continues this work. At the same time, there were also some critical views: for example, one respondent argued that all existing instruments belong to the soft law category, which

means that the EU has no mechanism to “sanction” the Commission in the cases where it does not consider development objectives when it drafts and adopts policies that are likely to affect developing countries.

Finally, one respondent mentioned that PCD tools and mechanisms are not easily available for the public. For instance, the respondent noted that no framework of indicators, baselines and targets is available on DG DEVCO’s website. In that sense, it is difficult according to the respondent to understand to which extent tools and mechanisms have been effective and efficient in influencing EU policies affecting developing countries.

In addition to the general comments above, respondents also provided specific comments on individual mechanisms: these are summarised below and largely echo the feedback from the respondents to the targeted surveys, which were presented in the previous sections.

■ PCD Biennial Report:

- Several respondents expressed appreciation for the Biennial Report as a PCD tool. One specific respondent mentioned that they considered the PCD Biennial Report to be a very strong instrument to follow up on progress at EU level on PCD and assess the effectiveness and efficiency of EU policies in specific areas. However, respondents noted that this way of reporting was discontinued in 2015 and in this regard one respondent expressed hope that anytime soon the Commission will renew its PC(S)D reporting, whether in separate format, or as part of the intended annual SDG reporting cycle.
- Some respondents also recommended to change the format from showcasing to real progress reporting, based on clear targets, actions plans and timelines. According to these respondents, the report could also include a thorough evaluation of the functioning of PC(S)D institutional architecture and processes within EU institutions. In this regard, respondents mentioned that possible inspiring examples could be the Dutch PCD Action Plan and the annual progress report to the Dutch House of Representatives, or the EU first progress report on the gender action plan, which according to respondents identified in a honest way both achievements and gaps and is useful to identify next steps going forward.

■ PCD training, EU Delegations’ reporting, Dialogues with developing country partners:

- One respondent argued that training and exchanges/dialogues on PCD has proven useful to engage EU Delegations and embassies/developing country governments in the monitoring of potential problems and solutions to coherence issues. The respondent noted however that the latest biennial report suggests that this requires further attention.
- One respondent mentioned that another EU tool which has not yet been used to promote and share good practice on PCD is Capacity4Development: as noted by the respondent, the website lists several horizontal topics and discussion groups but does not cover PCD.
- Some respondents argued that the Commission and the EEAS staff in EU delegations worldwide should reach out more proactively to local groups of people whose rights are affected by EU policies, in order to engage in a dialogue with them, and that this should be closely monitored. In this context, according to the respondents the PCD training for EU staff should give guidance on how to reach out to local stakeholders and how to deal with reports about serious human rights impacts by EU policies (in this regard, respondents noted that the EU country roadmaps for engaging with civil society, the Human Rights Country Strategies and the Gender Action Plan also provide useful tools to build on).
- Some respondents argued that there should be more transparency about the feedback all EU Delegation staff send to Brussels in their various reports, and about the analysis that

is done at headquarters level, and how this feedback is taken forward: this feedback should also be discussed in more depth at the annual meetings of EU heads of delegation and of heads of cooperation.

■ Impact Assessments (IAs) and Inter-Service Consultation (ISC):

- Respondents mentioned as positive developments (i) the introduction in the IA guidelines of a requirement to consider the potential impacts of a proposed policy of regulation on developing countries, which according to one respondent was as an important recognition of the PCD obligation; and (ii) the development of a specific tool to guide the assessment of potential impacts on developing countries (Tool #34 of the Better Regulation Toolbox), which one respondent described as a priori a very strong instrument for ex-ante policy coherence for development.
 - One respondent also highlighted the role of the ISC mechanism, which in their view makes it more likely that different perspectives (including those related to the interests of developing countries) are taken into account.
 - However, all respondents that addressed the IA mechanism in their comments stressed that past studies have shown that in practice only a limited number of IAs for policies likely to have impacts on developing countries effectively assessed or even considered impacts on developing countries, which led to some missed opportunities from a PCD perspective; and that even in cases when IAs of policy proposals pointed to potential negative impacts on developing countries, none of these policy proposals were radically revised on the basis of the findings (in this regard, most respondents referenced past studies undertaken by CONCORD on IAs carried out by the Commission, which as mentioned earlier showed that only a limited number of policies likely to be relevant to developing countries were accompanied by sufficient impact assessments).
 - In light of the above, respondents considered that the IA instrument is still insufficiently contributing to the goal of policy coherence for development in policy outcomes and should be improved as a PCD mechanism. In this regard, one respondent recommended to increase capacity for this type of work, to improve dialogue with, for example, NGOs and civil society in the consultation process and improve communication and transparency around decision-making processes at the Commission. Another respondent noted that the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) could in theory ask for the IA to be revised if they judge that the impacts on developing countries have not been properly acknowledged or evaluated. However, the respondent expressed doubt as to whether the RSB currently has enough time or capacity to look at all the criteria for IAs: the respondent commented that in their understanding the RSB members do not have time to read the inputs from stakeholders to impact assessments but just want to be satisfied that stakeholders have had a chance to contribute and provide opinions.
 - Finally, some respondents argued that, apart from DG DEVCO, there is no systematic PCD capacity available in other DGs (i.e. staff with expertise and a solid background in environmental protection and social issues/human rights, able to capture those too often neglected dimensions of sustainable development). The respondents argued that safeguarding PCD seems to be seen in the Commission as the main responsibility of DG DEVCO, which means in practice that, unless DG DEVCO takes a proactive role in IAs and ISCs, other (lead) DGs will not automatically include the PCD perspective in their proposals. However, according to these respondents the nature of the PCD concept, and even more the PCSD concept, is that every DG, especially when it has the lead on a certain policy proposal, should by definition take the impact on sustainable development and on developing countries into account. The respondents therefore recommended to structurally build and/or enhance the PCSD capacity in the other DGs.
- Commission Work Programme: One respondent highlighted that the regular screening of EU initiatives for PCD relevance that was in the past sent to PCD focal points has been

helpful in bringing PCD issues to the attention of policy makers. Based on this, the respondent hoped that this mechanism will be continued in the future.

- Informal EU Member States network: One respondent – which is a member of the network – mentioned that they highly valued the Community of Practice of likeminded countries/frontrunners on PCD (with EU and OECD as observers and facilitated by ECDPM) as a forum for exchange and learning on specific PCD themes and overarching approaches to monitor progress.

7 ADDED VALUE

Added value of the EU PCD approach for EU Member States

As shown in Table 27 below, the results of targeted surveys suggest that most respondents to the Commission and the EEAS appear to have some doubts as to whether PCD objectives could be fully achieved by Member States in the absence of the EU’s approach to PCD (with the majority of respondents answering the question “*To what extent could PCD objectives be achieved by Member States without the EU’s approach to PCD?*” with “partially”) while respondents to the EU Member States appear to be more optimistic in this regard (with most respondents answering with “substantially”).

Table 39: Overview of responses to Question No. 1 on Added Value

Q: To what extent could PCD objectives (“i.e. taking account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that are likely to affect developing countries, Art 208 (TFEU)”) be achieved by Member States without the EU’s approach to PCD?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	5.6	1
Partially	61.1	11
Substantially	16.7	3
Fully	5.6	1
Do not have an opinion	11.1	2
TOTAL	100.0	18
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	10.0	1
Partially	20.0	2
Substantially	60.0	6
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	10.0	1
TOTAL	100.0	10

Several stakeholders pointed out that PCD is not only on the agenda of EU Member States because of EU commitments but also because of discussions at the international level, in particular OECD where EU Member States are members but not the EU.

One respondent to the EU Member States survey stated for example that the EU is one of many agents working together with its members towards a higher level of PCD and highlighted that the OECD has its own standards and guidelines regarding PCD, to which they pay close attention as well. In this regard, respondents to the EU Member States survey also mentioned the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (with regard to PCD, the principles ownership, alignment and harmonisation are especially important), as well as the role played by think tanks and civil society organisations that are involved in discussions on PCD issues. At the same time, as pointed out by one respondent from the Commission the PCD commitment at EU level based on Article 208 of the TFEU is by far the strongest, and practice shows that EU Member States look very much to the EU and the Commission when it comes to guidance on and implementation of PCD commitments.

In this context, the added value of the EU PCD approach for Member States is reflected relatively clearly in the responses from the EU Member States survey. One respondent stated for example that in the absence of the EU PCD approach, the basis of their PCD policies would

simply be gone, while another stressed that EU approach to PCD is essential for the achievement of PCD objectives and that their country refers to EU’s work in this area in their bilateral and multilateral relations. It appears that according to stakeholders the main benefit of the EU PCD approach is to provide a “common base” for PCD but respondents highlighted as well that the EU also plays an important role in sharing experiences and best practices, in advocating for the importance of the topic, and in monitoring national PCD efforts – herby reinforcing PCD at all levels.

Stakeholders noted that many policy areas remain in the exclusive competence of Member States and therefore Member States could in principle achieve the PCD objectives without EU’s involvement in all policies which are of their own competence; however, this would largely depend on the political will and commitment to PCD at the national level and as some stakeholders noted, the pressure for PCD is not equal in all Member States. With respect to policy areas for which the EU has exclusive competence or shared competence, it would clearly be difficult for Member States to achieve PCD objectives in absence of the PCD EU approach and as one stakeholder noted, this precisely include policies that have a high impact on development (e.g. trade, agriculture, security, migration).

On a more general level, several stakeholders pointed out that it is politically very important that the EU promotes PCD, because if the EU as a big player in development cooperation does not pursue policy coherence for development, then what individual Member States try to achieve in this area will have little effect. One respondent argued that the EU’s input is needed to ensure coordination and coherence and that from the outset they could not envision PCD without a role for the EU institutions, as effective multilateralism and thus PCD only works if all parties (i.e. both the EU and its Member States) are involved.

The Open Public Consultation also included a specific question on the added value of the EU PCD approach and as shown in Table 28 below, a majority of respondents considered that honouring the commitment to promote PCD by the EU has created additional value, beyond what could be achieved by the EU Member States acting independently.

Table 40: Overview of responses to Question No. 2 on Added Value

Q: Do you consider that honouring the commitment to promote PCD by the EU has created additional value, beyond what could be achieved by the EU Member States acting independently?		
Open Public Consultation		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	70.4	19
No	25.9	7
Do not have an opinion	3.7	1
TOTAL	100.0	27

When asked to explain why they considered that the EU PCD approach has created additional value, most respondents to the OPC highlighted the following aspects:

- The EU is a major player in terms of development finance and policies and has convening power that Member States on their own are unlikely to achieve.
- Furthermore, in several policy areas that are of key importance to developing countries the EU has shared (environment, agriculture, parts of fisheries policy) or exclusive (e.g. trade policy, parts of the fisheries policy) competence. In those areas, respondents stressed that it is crucial for the EU to provide a combined approach in order to achieve policy coherence as the EU PCD approach cannot be replaced by the PCD of Member States. As summarised by one respondent, in policy areas where it has exclusive competence, the EU has a

particular responsibility when it comes to promoting PCD, and in policy areas where it has shared competence the EU can provide a crucial added value, which could not be achieved by Member States acting independently.

In this regard, respondents were generally positive about the role played by the EU PCD approach. One respondent noted that the EU has been working on PCD thematic areas where it can truly make a difference and its leading role in development finance and international policy has set an example for EU Member States to follow suit and set their own PCD priorities where they can make a difference. Another respondent mentioned that the importance given to PCD by the EU since 2005 and the enshrining of PCD as a legal obligation in the Treaty has been instrumental in raising the awareness and understanding of the topic across all EU Member States and probably beyond (as mentioned by the respondent, some Member States had already recognised the importance and value of PCD, but for others it was fairly unknown). To illustrate this, the respondent mentioned as an example the biennial report, which in their view has elevated the topic and served as an awareness raising tool amongst Member States' development ministries and agencies and has also fostered more analysis and reflection on the impacts of national or EU policies on development objectives and how these can be mitigated or turned into positive outcomes.

Against this background, several respondents made the point that the EU should act (or continue to act) as a role model / pioneer for many Member States where the implementation of PCD is still weak, while noting that this should not lead to Member States shifting responsibility to the EU.

Additionally, some respondents noted that the most effective way of honouring the EU's commitment to PCD would be more tangible outcomes for developing countries: in this regard, respondents recommended the European Commission to develop concrete, time-bound action plans with well-formulated outcomes for the five PCD priority areas.

Finally, it can be noted that one respondent provided specific comments on the added value of the EU PCD approach in the area of migration, referring to an assessment carried out by IOM in 2017 on the status of migration mainstreaming in EU and Member States' development cooperation policies, the main findings of which were the following: (i) migration is framed differently in policy frameworks, with varying emphasis on development aspects; (ii) migration is included in development policies but development is rarely included in migration policies; (iii) ad-hoc migration mainstreaming is preferred to more systematic approaches. According to the respondent, all of these are areas through which the EU could greatly add value through providing quality assurance and technical tools for promoting and supporting PCD on migration: in their view, it is therefore critical that the EU continues to prioritise PCD on migration, rather than expecting Member States to act independently.

Influence of the EU PCD approach on EU and EU Member States' cooperation with the international community on development issues

Survey results suggest that stakeholders agree that the EU PCD approach has enabled, at least to some extent, the EU and its Member States to foster cooperation with the international community on development issues.

As shown in Table 29 below, most respondents to the Commission and EEAS survey answered the question *"To what extent has the EU's approach to PCD enabled the EU and EU Member*

States to create links, avoid fragmentation and foster cooperation with the international community (i.e. UN, OECD) on development issues?” with “substantially”, while most respondents to the EU Member States survey answered with “partially”. It can be noted that under both surveys, no respondent selected “none” or “fully” as answer.

Table 41: Overview of responses to Question No. 3 on Added Value

Q: To what extent has the EU’s approach to PCD enabled the EU and EU Member States to create links, avoid fragmentation and foster cooperation with the international community (i.e. UN, OECD) on development issues?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	11.1	2
Substantially	38.9	7
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	50.0	9
TOTAL	100.0	18
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	50.0	5
Substantially	30.0	3
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	20.0	2
TOTAL	100.0	10

Most stakeholders appear to consider that the EU PCD approach has allowed promoting PCD (and the positions of the EU and its Member States in this regard) in internal fora, citing as an example the inclusion of PCSD in the SDG agenda. One stakeholder noted that the EU is internationally seen as the forerunner as regards PCD, which gives it a strong backing and credibility on development issues, both within the UN and the OECD.

At the same time, one respondent to the EU Member States survey noted that while the OECD has embraced relatively early the concept of PCSD, the Commission services have yet to take a stance on how to properly implement it: according to this stakeholder, a balancing act between PCD and PCSD has been found as a result in most recent documents on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

On a general level, stakeholders appeared to agree that there is a good cooperation between the various international organisations and the EU on PCD and coherence, but one stakeholder mentioned that PCD, and coherence in general, could become a more prominent aspect of cooperation with the international community on development issues.

Influence of the EU PCD approach on EU Member States’ own PCD commitment

Survey results suggest that stakeholders consider that the EU PCD approach contributed to reinforcing EU Member States’ own PCD commitment, although opinions vary with respect to the extent of this contribution.

As shown in Table 30 below, most respondents answered the question “*To what extent does the EU’s approach to PCD contribute to reinforcing EU Member States’ own PCD commitment?*”

with either “partially” or “substantially”. It can be noted that no respondent selected “none” as answer.

Table 42: Overview of responses to Question No. 4 on Added Value

Q: To what extent does the EU’s approach to PCD contribute to reinforcing EU Member States’ own PCD commitment?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	22.2	4
Substantially	27.8	5
Fully	5.6	1
Do not have an opinion	44.4	8
TOTAL	100.0	18
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	40.0	4
Substantially	30.0	3
Fully	20.0	2
Do not have an opinion	10.0	1
TOTAL	100.0	10

When asked to provide examples of how the EU PCD approach contributed to reinforcing EU Member States’ own PCD commitment, respondents reiterated some of the elements mentioned above:

- Some Member States mentioned that they used the EU PCD approach as a basis for their own policy;
- Some noted that the EU’s role and guidance was very useful to keep the issue well alive within Member States;
- Some highlighted the positive contribution of specific mechanisms: respondents for example mentioned that the meetings of the Informal Member States PCD Network allow for regular assessment of where they stand in national terms on promoting PCD, while the PCD biennial reports provide accountability and good visibility (and even sound competition) for and between Member States.

At the same time, one Member State argued that even though the PCD approach does contribute to reinforcing Member States’ own PCD commitment, it should do so even more, e.g. by promoting PCD training among Member States experts.

With respect to respondents to the Commission and EEAS survey, several stakeholders made the point that the EU PCD approach and the work done by the Commission serves as peer pressure for the Member States. One stakeholder argued for example that EU Member States’ contributions to the PCD biennial report and the publication of these reports create a strong peer pressure to strengthen national PCD measures and noted that it can be seen over the years in the PCD biennial reports that more and more EU Member States increase their ambition to strengthen national PCD processes. In any case, if the EU PCD approach certainly contributed to strengthening at least some of the EU Member States’ own commitment to PCD, as one other stakeholder commented it was ultimately the political commitment at the level of Member States that made it possible.

Influence of the EU PCD approach on EU Member States' priorities and commitments regarding poverty reduction in developing countries

Survey results suggest that most stakeholders consider that the influence of the EU PCD approach on EU Member States' priorities and commitments regarding poverty reduction in developing countries has been limited.

As shown in Table 24 below, the most frequent answer of respondents to the question *“To what extent does the EU’s approach to PCD reinforce EU Member States’ priorities and commitments regarding poverty reduction in developing countries?”* was “partially”. None of the respondents selected “fully” as an answer.

Table 43: Overview of responses to Question No. 5 on Added Value

Q: To what extent does the EU’s approach to PCD reinforce EU Member States’ priorities and commitments regarding poverty reduction in developing countries?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	5.6	1
Partially	22.2	4
Substantially	16.7	3
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	55.6	10
TOTAL	100.0	18
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	20.0	2
Partially	40.0	4
Substantially	30.0	3
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	10.0	1
TOTAL	100.0	10
EU Delegations Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	15.0	3
Partially	50.0	10
Substantially	20.0	4
Fully	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	15.0	3
TOTAL	100.0	20

The analysis of individual responses however further underlines the doubts expressed by stakeholders as to whether the EU PCD approach has influenced EU Member States' priorities and commitments to poverty reduction.

Several stakeholders explicitly stated that they are not convinced that there is any influence of the EU PCD approach on EU Member States' priorities and commitments regarding poverty reduction in developing countries and that such priorities and commitments would probably be the same in the absence of the EU PCD approach. As several respondents to the EU Member States survey noted, their commitments to poverty reduction derive from internal policy decisions or more specifically from their development cooperation policy, therefore the link to the EU PCD approach is not evident. Furthermore, as one stakeholder pointed out PCD is in practice strongly implemented in Member States where there is already an important commitment to poverty reduction: in other words, those Member States that have probably been

the most influenced by the EU PCD approach already had strong commitments to poverty reduction. Finally, when asked for examples of the influence of the EU PCD approach on Member States' priorities and commitments to poverty reduction, respondents in many cases mentioned aspects that appear to be related to the coordination between EU and EU Member States to ensure the complementarity of their development cooperation policies, with no clear link being established with the EU PCD approach.

At the same time, even if evidence of the influence of the EU PCD approach on EU Member States' commitments to poverty reduction appears difficult to identify, some stakeholders still considered that the EU PCD approach could potentially have a positive influence in this regard, albeit perhaps indirectly. For example, even Member States that appeared to consider that the EU PCD approach had not influenced their own commitment to poverty reduction mentioned that it might nevertheless influence other Member States to work in the same direction, and that PCD leverage at national level still creates an important awareness instrument for development issues in other national policy areas. As noted by stakeholders, the PCD commitment is a reminder for Member States when deciding on other non-development policies and taking into account the impact of non-development policies on poverty in developing countries can have a bigger impact than only providing aid.

8 IMPACT

Outcomes and impacts in developing countries of policies that have incorporated a PCD approach during the policy formulation process

The Open Public Consultation included a specific question on the outcomes and impacts in developing countries of four EU policies that were considered to have incorporated a PCD approach during the policy formulation process and for this reason had been selected as case studies to evaluate the EU’s PCD at the impact level.

As shown in Table 32 below, a majority of respondents to the OPC indicated that they were aware of positive or negative effects that the four specific EU policies may have had on developing countries and took the opportunity to comment on the various effects that they had identified.

Table 44: Overview of responses to the Question on Impact

Q: Are you aware of any positive/ negative effects the 4 EU policies listed below may have had on developing countries around the world?		
The EU policies/ initiatives concerned by this question are the following:		
a) Global Approach to Migration and Mobility;		
b) EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking;		
c) Common Fisheries Policy (reform of 2013);		
d) Generalised Scheme of Preferences.		
Open Public Consultation		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Yes	67.9	19
No	32.1	9
Do not have an opinion	0.0	0
TOTAL	100.0	28

The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) – and in general the topic of migration – was the policy on which respondents commented the most. While some respondents mentioned that the GAMM contributed to reinforcing the importance of the nexus between migration and development and expanding the focus of the European migration policy (which until then was focused on security) and that GAMM’s related actions certainly had a positive impact on developing countries, there were also critical views. One CSO that contributed to the OPC mentioned for example the specific case of the Mobility Partnership (MP) between the EU and Cape Verde and argued that the projects under this MP showed a strong focus on strengthening border control and migration management with a remarkably low representation of development goals. In this context, the respondent also cited a previous study by the Foundation Max van der Stoel⁴⁵⁴, which concluded that the EU-Cape Verde MP mainly functioned as a European instrument to fight irregular migration towards EU territory instead of an instrument utilising migration for Cape Verde’s development.

⁴⁵⁴ Van Stokkum, Linde-Kee (2015) “More Mobility for Development! Policy Coherence for Development in practice: making the EU Mobility Partnership a tool for development in Cape Verde”, Foundation Max van der Stoel, June 2015.

Respondents also noted that since the adoption of the European Agenda on Migration, the GAMM has somewhat moved into the background. In this regard, one respondent noted that while the EU references the GAMM when discussing PCD, the European Agenda on Migration has not achieved the same balance with partner countries interests and lacks substantive commitments to PCD. In addition, the respondent argued that a particular challenge is the implementation of the new Partnership Frameworks with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, where it is of critical importance for the EU to ensure that development aid continues to be delivered in line with aid effectiveness principles to which the EU has committed.

Several respondents expressed concerns in relation to aid conditionality and the perceived use of development funds to achieve the EU's political goal of migration control. For example, one respondent made the point that aid delivery must not be made contingent on returns and readmission, nor prioritized based mainly on the EU's internal policy interests without the ownership and engagement of partner countries, because such aid conditionality could risk the achievement of the SDGs and the commitment taken to 'leave no one behind'. Another respondent commented that it had witnessed in the last 2 years a 'PCD in reverse' i.e. development cooperation being increasingly securitised to serve an internal EU migration control agenda: in the view of this respondent, the PCD principle should be re-established by removing conditionality on managing migration and in this context the 2030 Agenda provides an opportunity to focus on protecting migrants' and refugees' human rights and taking their development potential into consideration. The respondent also argued that the Partnership Framework should be revised to reflect this and should contribute as much as possible to sustainable development and human rights in these countries through support for addressing intra-African migration and strengthening cross-continental migration and regional economic development.

Finally, one respondent highlighted that in operational terms incoherence can arise when DG HOME and DGs DEVCO/NEAR (as well as EU Member States) implement projects on migration in the same developing countries, which is increasingly the case (particularly in the fields of return, reintegration, information campaigns, counter trafficking, and smuggling). According to the respondent, the diversity of actors working on the same theme leads to overlaps and incoherence and places pressure on the government of such developing countries to deal with EU-funded projects with differing objectives and methodologies targeting similar themes.

The EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking (EUAP) was perceived positively by respondents, who described it for example as "a comprehensive and coherent approach to tackling the problem" and "a great example of how Member States and EU institutions should work together to achieve coherence in the EU and with non-EU countries". As one respondent noted, it is difficult to provide a causal link between the EUAP and actual results on the ground, especially as implementation is still in progress, but respondents considered that there are indications of positive impacts, especially in terms of increased political interest from partner countries (which include many developing countries) to tackle the problem, and enhanced efforts in several range and importing countries to combat wildlife trafficking. In this regard, several respondents highlighted the various proposals and recommendations that were submitted or co-sponsored by the EU (in line with the EUAP) and subsequently adopted at the 17th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 2016, which according to respondents brought a strong message to the international community and will have significant positive impacts on many developing countries.

Furthermore, respondents noted that the EUAP also encourages the funding by DG DEVCO of programmes aimed at combating poaching and illegal wildlife trade on the ground (e.g. in partner countries, most of which are developing countries): as one respondent argued, these programmes “should make a substantial difference, not just in terms of saving threatened wildlife but also by benefiting communities in terms of increasing stability and economic opportunities and improving governance, and reducing the threats to their security from wildlife traffickers”. Finally, one CSO that contributed to the OPC recommended that the policy coherence approach set by the EUAP should be built on by further integrating environmental crime within EU development and security programmes and by promoting this issue at the 18th meeting of the CITES CoP in 2019.

Most respondents considered that the latest reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) signalled progress in terms of PCD and highlighted the various provisions stemming from the CFP, in particular in relation to Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs), that can have positive effects in developing countries. At the same time, respondents noted that SFPAs can also have potential negative consequences, such as the risk of overfishing: as established in the basic CFP regulation the fishing opportunities negotiated under SFPAs should allow EU vessels to fish only the surplus resources of partner countries; however, as pointed out by one respondent the concept of surplus is difficult to apply in practice due to a lack of reliable information on fish stocks and the fishing effort of domestic fishing fleets, or of other foreign fleets which have also been granted access by the partner countries. Furthermore, one respondent argued that there has been little evidence of direct local job creation or increased local economic activities resulting from access agreements and that the lack of transparency has also been an issue, even more so in the case of joint ventures. Regarding the latter, the same respondent acknowledged that the new legal framework adopted in June 2017 for EU fishing fleets outside EU waters greatly improves the transparency requirements, including for private arrangements by EU flagged vessels, and requires, *inter alia*, the same stringent fisheries management standards for all EU vessels operating outside EU waters: according to the respondent, the implementation of these measures should improve policy coherence for sustainable development.

It can also be noted that one specific respondent argued that the CFP reform insufficiently took into account the impact on fishing in non-EU waters during the policy formulation process. Citing a research paper by ECDPM, the respondent pointed out that the final report of the impact assessment largely restricted the analysis of the CFP’s external dimension to SFPAs and Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and excluded from the analysis the majority of EU vessels that fish outside EU waters under private agreements or joint ventures. The respondent argued that the Commission should take this dimension into account when evaluating the current CFP, as a single, unified EU Fisheries Policy should not make a distinction between the EU’s territorial waters and fishing activities of EU fleets outside those waters, in terms of standards: the internal and the external dimensions of the CFP should have equal ambition in terms of contributing to sustainable development.

The Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) was addressed by a limited number of respondents and all the respondents that addressed this specific policy referred to the ongoing mid-term evaluation of the EU’s GSP. In this context, one respondent pointed out that the final interim report of this mid-term evaluation as well as the latest GSP progress report (covering the period 2016-2017) offered indications of both positive effects (e.g. positive economic impact of the scheme, increase of exports for many beneficiary countries under the arrangement; relative increase in share of exports under EBA (targeting LDCs) in GSP over

time; implementation projects that are carried out are in line with the updated EU Aid for Trade Strategy) and possible negative effects (e.g. the preference utilization rate of exports under GSP is low for some beneficiaries – however, there are various possible reasons for this, some of which are not negative; the impact of export diversification under GSP is unclear (neutral effect)).

It can also be noted that one respondent mentioned the specific case of Cambodia, where land dispossessions originating from sugar cane plantations are particularly an issue and CSOs have called upon the EU to uphold its commitment to a comprehensive, independent remediation framework regarding these dispossessions – in view of human rights violations resulting from the impacts of the EBA trade preferences: although the Commission has been responsive to these calls for action to the extent that they supported an independent audit to assess complaints about land disputes in the sugar sector, the respondent noted that the EU has not triggered the activation of the human rights clause in the EBA trade preferences nor launched a formal investigation into human rights violations in Cambodia.

Finally, in terms of recommendations for the future, one respondent argued that the EU should use the GSP reform to optimise the system and make it more sustainable: specifically, it should be examined how an additional granting of preferences for sustainably produced products could be introduced in the system.

9 SUSTAINABILITY

Political will and continuous learning to ensure sustainability of PCD at EU policy-making level

Survey results suggest that opinions are split as to whether political will and continuous learning are adequate to ensure sustainability of PCD at EU policy making level, with the majority of stakeholders considering that it was not fully adequate. As shown in Table 33 below, the majority of stakeholders that responded to the question “*To what extent is there adequate political will and continuous learning to ensure sustainability of the EU's approach to PCD at EU's policy-making level?*” answered “not adequate” or “nearly adequate”.

Table 45: Overview of responses to Question No. 1 on Sustainability

Q: To what extent is there adequate political will and continuous learning to ensure sustainability of the EU's approach to PCD at EU's policy-making level?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Not adequate	29.4	5
Nearly adequate	23.5	4
Adequate	23.5	4
Highly adequate	5.9	1
Do not have an opinion	17.7	3
TOTAL	100.0	17
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
Not adequate	11.1	1
Nearly adequate	22.2	2
Adequate	0.0	0
Highly adequate	0.0	0
Do not have an opinion	66.7	6
TOTAL	100.0	9

Respondents to the Commission and EEAS Survey mentioned several factors explaining why in their view the political will was less than adequate to ensure PCD's sustainability:

- Uneven distribution of political will in the EU (across thematic areas) and among Member States: one stakeholder argued that there is for example more understanding and goodwill in “complementary” thematic areas such as agriculture, fisheries, health and food safety, environment and climate change, and less in thematic areas with a “competitive approach” such as energy, industry or trade. Another stakeholder also mentioned that there is good follow-up in DG DEVCO structures, but more could be done to ensure proper discussion of PCD reports in other Council/EP formations, which should be encouraged to share ownership of the PCD agenda with DG DEVCO.
- Change in priorities at the EU level: one stakeholder argued that due to other political pressures in Europe, PCD – and development cooperation overall – has fallen through the cracks and that there is currently not a sufficiently strong commitment to poverty eradication, citing as an example “the rather weak approach to the 2030 Agenda implementation within the EU institutions, particularly in the Commission”.
- Lack of clarity with regards to the PCD commitment: one stakeholder highlighted that there is a lack of clarity on what Art. 208 of the TFEU means for the Commission and for Member States, and as a result no clear mandate has been given.

With respect to the EU Member States survey, as shown in Table 25 above most respondents stated that they do not have an opinion on the subject, noting *inter alia* that it is difficult for them to assess the level of political engagement at EU level. Nevertheless, some respondents indicated that in their view PCD (and now PCSD – Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development – in the context of the SDGs agenda) is not a top priority for the Commission leadership and there is definitely a need to increase political will and continuous learning at the policy-making level across silos. Respondents highlighted that political will and leadership are crucial for the implementation of a PCD approach, so raising awareness for development at the higher political level should be a priority: in relation to this, one stakeholder argued that the SDGs have created an additional demand for PCD, to which the EU must respond.

PCD mechanisms embedded in the policy formulation process

Survey results suggest that although there is a variety of views on the subject, most stakeholders consider that PCD mechanisms have only partially become a permanent part of a policy formulation process that takes account of the EU’s approach to PCD at EU level (see Table 34 below).

Table 46: Overview of responses to Question No. 3 on Sustainability

Q: To what extent have PCD mechanisms (i.e. Commission Work Programme Screening) and Commission instruments (i.e. Impact Assessments, Inter-Service Consultation) become a permanent part of a policy formulation process that takes account of the EU's approach to PCD at EU level?		
Commission and EEAS Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	53.0	9
Substantially	17.6	3
Fully	17.6	3
Do not have an opinion	11.8	2
TOTAL	100.0	17
EU Member States Survey		
Answer choices	Responses (%)	Responses (No.)
None	0.0	0
Partially	33.3	3
Substantially	11.1	1
Fully	11.1	1
Do not have an opinion	44.4	4
TOTAL	100.0	9

Most stakeholders appear to acknowledge that the impact assessment (IA) mechanism is the key tool for achieving PCD, with one stakeholder describing it as “the only potentially effective instrument in policy formulation” among those explicitly mentioned in the question. In addition, one stakeholder commented that the introduction of the Better Regulation Guidelines and Toolbox in 2015 represented an improvement for PCD due to the introduction of a specific tool on the assessment of impacts in developing countries.

However, several stakeholders noted that in practice the number of IAs where the impacts on developing countries are assessed remains small. In light of this challenge, one stakeholder suggested that more awareness-raising and coordination on common objectives is needed for future improvement. At the same time, another stakeholder pointed out that in many cases, such as for example the CAP reform, the challenge is not so much the awareness or understanding

of the PCD principle, but rather the practical implementations and the frequent lack of time, resources and expertise in the IA process to do a full PCD analysis of the proposed policy/legislation.

A few stakeholders also highlighted the Inter-Service Consultation (ISC) as a mechanism that – like the IA instrument – is embedded in the EU policy formulation process and can contribute positively to the sustainability of PCD, with one stakeholder noting for example that through the ISC process policy makers and officials become more aware of the complexities of DGs’ areas of competence.

Other existing PCD mechanisms were not discussed much by survey respondents in the context of this question on the sustainability of PCD, but one respondent to the EU Member States survey commented that from their perspective it is not clear how the Commission Work Programme Screening and the answers to the PCD questions in the External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) feed into the policy formulation process, nor are the results shared on a regular basis with EU Member States to join forces.

On a more general level, one stakeholder pointed out that in terms of sustainability it would be key for mechanisms to evolve in line with the new framework of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD).

10 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OR RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE EU PCD APPROACH

The questionnaire of the Open Public Consultation included a final open question inviting respondents to provide any additional views they might have on the way with which PCD has been implemented.

CONCORD (the European confederation of Relief and Development NGOs) and its members used this opportunity to express the following views on selected EU policies that have an influence on developing countries:

- Successive Common Agricultural Policy reforms have reduced trade distortion for farmers in developing countries. However, in CONCORD's analysis (bit.ly/2uJO8L2) EU farmers receive direct payments that make them more competitive on the global market. First pillar payments contribute to generate surplus food commodities for cheap exports based on cheap imported inputs. Farmers in the Global South do not receive such support. The combination of CAP subsidies with EU trade defence instruments and market access to third countries under FTAs creates unfair competition for smallholders in developing countries. Since 2009, the value of EU agro-food exports has increased rapidly, hindering the development of the agri-food sector in Sub-Saharan African countries, whose net export surpluses have significantly declined. The EC's ongoing emphasis on export-led agricultural growth makes this increasingly problematic. A telling case is the export of subsidised dairy products towards developing countries. This puts at risk local investments in smallholder dairy supply chains, as in West Africa. The EPAs imply in certain cases an immediate reduction of import duties on some dairy products from the EU – e.g. the interim EPAs require the suppression of duties on milk powder from 5% to zero from 2018 in Ivory Coast & from 2021 in Ghana. This will make it even more difficult for these countries to protect their milk producers & develop their domestic dairy sector.
- The 2015 Trade for All strategy focuses strongly on Global Value Chains (GVCs). CONCORD members analysed (bit.ly/29yZOMo) the impact of the GVC policy on human rights (decent work, child labour, women's rights), environment (deforestation) & food security. The impact is considerable and often negative. The report recommends to 1) monitor any tensions between GVC policies and the right to food, to ensure sustainable & inclusive local food security and food systems are protected & promoted 2) develop sound criteria for upholding sustainability and human rights in GVC initiatives in line with the right to food, water & land, such as those laid out in OECD Guidelines & the VGGTs 3) adopt a mandatory human rights due diligence regulatory framework, backed with adequate monitoring & enforcement mechanisms 4) take further steps, together with MS, to implement the promising Amsterdam Declarations (2015) on eliminating deforestation from GVCs & on making palm oil sustainable.
- EU consumption and global deforestation: Agricultural expansion for the production of commodities such as soy, beef, palm oil, coffee and cocoa drives almost 80% of all deforestation (FAO 2016). The associated environmental, social & economic impacts are significant. Deforestation may undermine food security, land rights, indigenous rights & livelihoods and contributes to climate change and biodiversity loss. An EC study (2013) states EU MS imported & consumed as much as 10% of the global consumption of products associated with deforestation in the countries of origin. A 2018 EC feasibility study lays out options to step up the EU's contribution to halt deforestation. Quite a few companies have taken voluntary steps to curb forest destruction through their supply chains but so far there has been no commitment from the EU to complement these voluntary measures, incl. through regulatory measures, addressing over-consumption in the EU & supporting

producer countries. Halting deforestation by 2020 is an SDG target & critical to reach the Paris Agreement objectives.

- Through their taxation policies the EU and its Member States have a significant impact on domestic revenue mobilisation efforts of developing countries. Double taxation treaties (DTTs) between Member States and developing countries directly define what developing countries can tax. ActionAid research ('Mistreated', 2016) shows that EU Member States have a high number of very restrictive treaties which severely limit developing countries' taxing rights. While some Member States have undertaken analysis of development impact of their DTTs & undertaken action, a lot remains to be done. The EU proposal on corporate transparency (COM/2016/0198) which could have introduced a country-by-country tax reporting obligation on large companies came short of including elements of significance for developing countries, despite the Impact Assessment recognising the importance of this directive for their DRM efforts. Some of the other key EU tax policy processes, like the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) & ATAD2 failed to even consider their potential impact on developing countries, not to mention taking it into account in actual legislation. The Impact Assessment for the CCCTB proposal (SWD(2016)341) fails to mention developing countries even once throughout its 158 pages. While the EC is aware of the importance of the EU for developing countries' DRM, application of the PC(S)D principle in the EU and Member States' tax policies remains extremely limited & should be improved.

EU Member States that contributed to the OPC also used the opportunity to provide concluding remarks and recommendations for the future. One EU Member State respondent in particular stressed that: (i) PCD remains extremely relevant for development cooperation but is also extremely difficult to implement: policy coherence in external relations (trade, agriculture, politics, etc.) is already a major challenge for the EU; policy coherence for development is a much bigger challenge; (ii) PCD is a highly political issue and its implementation depends on the political will at highest level: commitment on technical level and structures/procedures can help if there is a political will, but it cannot replace political will; (iii) The PCD agenda has become more sophisticated and is often conceived as highly theoretical and complicated with little practical relevance; (iv) there are some encouraging developments at EU level (procedures in place are working: every policy with external components has to be submitted to all related DGs, including to DG DEVCO, before the college approves a new policy), but in order to be able to assess policy proposals specifically, respective capacities are needed, but are not always available. In view of this, the EU Member State respondent recommended stressing the strategic importance of PCD while being realistic on what we can achieve, creating awareness about PCD as a cross cutting issue, and focusing on the practical level and political support.

Looking ahead, another EU Member State respondent identified the following elements as being crucial for pursuing PCD:

- To formulate a strategy on PCD on a number of priority areas with, for each area, goals aligned with the SDGs, actions being taken to achieve these goals, and progress being monitored and reported on by means of indicators;
- To encourage and use academic research on policy coherence;
- To promote effective dialogue with governments in partner countries to identify important incoherencies and to achieve synergy in resolving them;
- To create opportunities for dialogue with NGOs and political space for civil society organizations in developing countries to give their views on coherence issues.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: COMMISSION AND EEAS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE



Appendix 1 -
Commission and EEAS

APPENDIX 2: EU DELEGATIONS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE



Appendix 2 - EU
Delegations Survey Q

APPENDIX 3: EU MEMBER STATES SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE



Appendix 3 - EU
Member States Surve

APPENDIX 4: OPEN PUBLIC CONSULTATION QUESTIONNAIRE



Appendix 4 - OPC
Questionnaire.pdf

ANNEX 11: LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Persons Interviewed during the Inception Phase

Date	DG/Service	Person interviewed	Unit	PCD Role
28/09/2016	DEVCO	Nicoletta Merlo, Deputy Head of Unit (at the time of the interview) Aurelie Vernin, Team Leader Norbert Probst, Policy officer Amalia Garcia-Thärn, Seconded National Expert	Unit A1	PCD Team
13/10/2016	AGRI	David Pinheiro de Melo Francis Fay, Head of Unit Christina Miranda, deputy Head of Unit Javier Sirvent, International Relations Officer	Unit A3	ISG member Focal Point
13/10/2016	TRADE	Mark Henderson, Policy Officer	Unit D1	ISG member & Focal Point
14/10/2016	HOME	Jan Saver, International Relations Officer	Unit A3	ISG member & Focal Point
17/10/2016	RTD	Nienke Buisman, Policy Officer	Unit C3	ISG member & Focal Point
18/10/2016	MARE	Kristofer Du Rietz, Adviser International Affairs	Directorate B	ISG member & Focal Point
18/10/2016	CNECT	Daniel Spoiala, International Relations Officer	Unit D3	
18/10/2016	SANTE	Stéphane André, Policy Officer Jean-Baptiste Le Bras, Policy Officer	Unit D3 Unit B2	ISG member
18/10/2016	CLIMA	Martin Kaspar, Policy Officer	Unit A2	ISG member
18/10/2016	ENV	Véronique Hyeulle, Senior Expert	Unit F2	ISG member & Focal Point
19/10/2016	NEAR	Odoardo Como, Head of Sector Evaluation Helena Laakso, Evaluation Officer	Unit A3	ISG member
20/10/2016	ECFIN	Beatriz Pérez de la Fuente, Policy Officer Willem Kooi, Economic Data Analyst	Unit D3 Unit D1	ISG member
20/10/2016	EAC	Deirdre Lennan, Policy Officer	Unit B4	ISG member
20/10/2016	MOVE	Stefano Paci, International Relations Officer	Unit E1	ISG member & Focal Point
20/10/2016	SECGEN	Charlotte Rive Luiza Bara, Policy Officer Tuula Turunen, Policy Officer	Unit C4 Unit E3 Unit E3	ISG member Focal Point
21/10/2016	JRC	Melis Sandrine Alguadis, Policy Analyst	Unit A2	ISG member
21/10/2016	JUST	Martijn Quinn, Deputy Head of Unit	Unit o2	ISG member & Focal Point
21/10/2016	SJ	Sandra Bartelt, Member of Legal Service CFSP and External Relations Team		ISG member
24/10/2016	FISMA	Arnaud Rohmer, International Relations Officer	Unit o1	ISG member
24/10/2016	TAXUD	Juan José García Sánchez, Head of Sector	Unit B4	ISG member
25/10/2016	GROWTH	Philippe de Taxis du Poët, Policy Officer Simone Ravanelli, Assistant Policy Officer	Unit A4	ISG member
25/10/2016	ENER	Marco Berti Palazzi, International Relations Officer Pavlina Nikolova, International Relations Officer Ruta Baltause, Policy Officer	Unit A3 Unit A3	ISG member Focal Point
26/10/2016	DEVCO - Trade	Bertrand Jolas, Policy Officer	Unit C1 Unit C4	Focal Point
26/10/2016	DEVCO - Food Security / Agricultural Policy	Camilla La Peccerella, Policy Officer	Unit C1	
26/10/2016	DEVCO - Trade	Chloe Allio, Policy Officer	Unit C4	
27/10/2016	DEVCO - Fisheries	Isabelle Viallon, Policy Officer	Unit C1	
27/10/2016	ENV	Veronique Hyeulle, Senior Expert Patrick Wegerdt, Senior Expert	Unit F2	ISG member & Focal Point
27/10/2016	DEVCO - Trade	Philippe Jacques, Policy Officer	Unit C4	
09/11/2016	DEVCO - Migration	Camilla Hagström, Head of Section	Unit B3	
09/11/2016	DEVCO - Health	Kevin McCarthy, Policy Officer	Unit B4	
09/11/2016	ECHO	Emil Andersen, Deputy Head of Unit Dominique Albert, Deputy Head of Unit	Unit C1 Unit B1	

Date	DG/Service	Person interviewed	Unit	PCD Role
09/11/2016	DEVCO - Trade	Roger Bellers, Policy Officer	Unit C1	
22/11/2016	DEVCO	Mariusz Tamborski, Policy Officer	Unit C4	
		Aurelie Vernin, Team Leader	Unit A1	PCD Team
		Norbert Probst, Policy officer	Unit A1	
		Amalia Garcia-Thörn, Seconded National Expert	Unit A1	
		Catherine Pravin, Deputy Head of Unit	Unit A1	
25/11/2016	DEVCO	Zdenka Dobiasova, Programme Manager	Unit 04	Evaluation Manager
06/12/2016	DEVCO – Water, Infrastructure and Cities	Paola Ciccarelli, Head of Unit	Unit D4	Former PCD officer
			Unit C5	

Persons Interviewed during the desk and field phases

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Name	Position	Purpose	Date
Gael de Rotalier	Policy Officer DG ENVIRONMENT Team Leader Wildlife Trade- Unit for Multilateral Environmental Cooperation	EUAP Wildlife Trafficking	16 June
Gaspar Frontini	Head of Unit DG DEVCO Unit A1 – Policy and Coherence	Horizontal PCD issues	19 June
Marie-Aurélie VERNIN	Team leader PCD Team Unit A1 – Policy and Coherence DG DEVCO	Horizontal PCD issues	19 June
Amalia Garcia-Tharn	Seconded National expert PCD Team Unit A1 – Policy and Coherence DG DEVCO	Horizontal PCD issues	19 June & 20 June
Norbert Probst	Policy Officer PCD Team Unit A1 – Policy and Coherence DG DEVCO	Horizontal PCD issues	19 June & 28 June
Carsten Sorensen	Deputy Head of Unit General coordination and inter-institutional relations DG DEVCO	Horizontal PCD issues	19 June
Philippe Mayaux	Head of sector Biodiversity and Ecosystem services Unit Environment, Ecosystems, Biodiversity and Wildlife DEVCO.C2	EUAP Wildlife Trafficking	23 June
Daniel Spoiala	Seconded national expert Policy Outreach and International Affairs Dir D — Policy Strategy and Outreach DG CONNECT	Digital Single Market Strategy Horizontal PCD Issues	27 June
Neda Angelova	Policy officer – Digital policy DG CONNECT	Digital Single Market Strategy	27 June
Oluf Nielsen	International Relations Officer DG CONNECT	Digital Single Market Strategy	27 June
Tomas Baert	Head of Unit DG TRADE Unit G1 Trade Strategy	Trade for All Communication	28 June
Luca De Carli	Deputy Head of Unit DG TRADE Unit G1 Trade Strategy	Trade for All Communication	28 June
Jean-Philippe Rabine	Policy Officer Accounting and financial reporting Unit FISMA/B3	Country by Country Reporting	28 June
Julie Timon	Policy Officer European Commission DG TRADE G3 - Market Access, Industry, Energy & Raw Materials	Responsible sourcing of mineral originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas	28 June
Mark Henderson	Policy Officer - Trade and Development DG TRADE, former PCD Focal Point Unit D1. Trade and Sustainable Development, Generalised System of Preferences	Horizontal PCD issues	28 June
Dániel Krámer	Policy Officer DG TRADE Unit D1. Trade and Sustainable Development, Generalised System of Preferences	General System of Preferences	29 June
Bertrand Jolas	Policy Officer - Trade and Regional Integration Services, Rules of Origin, Fair Trade, Green Economy DG DEVCO Dir C — Planet and Prosperity 4. Private Sector, Trade	Trade for All Communication	30 June
Mariusz Tamborski	Policy Officer - Public Private Partnership, Investment, Blending and Private Sector, Raw materials (non-energy/non-agricultural) DG DEVCO Dir C — Planet and Prosperity 4. Private Sector, Trade	Responsible sourcing of mineral originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas	30 June
Sergio Piazzardi	Policy Officer DG DEVCO Dir C — Planet and Prosperity 4. Private Sector, Trade	Responsible sourcing of mineral originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas	30 June

Name	Position	Purpose	Date
Antonino de Lorenzo	PCD Focal Point Unit A3 - International coordination DG HOME	Horizontal PCD issues	30 June
Silja Kasmann	Unit A3 - International coordination DG HOME	Global Approach Migration and Mobility	30 June
Maria Madrid-Pina	International Relations Officer Unit A3 - International coordination DG HOME	Global Approach Migration and Mobility	30 June
Lieven Brouwers	Policy officer Unit Legal migration and integration DG HOME	Review EU Blue Card Directive	30 June
Philippe JACQUES	Policy Officer - Trade Policy and Regulation, Quality Infrastructure, SPS and TBT, Regional Integration, Trade facilitation DG DEVCO Dir C — Planet and Prosperity 4. Private Sector, Trade	General System of Preferences	03 July
Michal Spiechowicz	Policy officer – Raw Materials Unit Resource Efficiency and Raw Materials - C2 DG GROW	Raw Materials Initiative Horizontal PCD Issues	5 July
Camilla Hagström	Head of Sector Unit B3 Migration DG DEVCO	Global Approach Migration and Mobility/Review EU Blue Card Directive Horizontal PCD Issues	5 July
Eva Corral	Seconded national expert GLOBAL 5 - Development Cooperation Coordination European External Action Service	Horizontal PCD Issues	7 July
Isabelle Viallon	Fisheries, aquaculture DG DEVCO Dir C — Planet and Prosperity 1. Rural Development, Food Security, Nutrition	Common Fisheries Policy / Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing Regulation	13 July
Leonard Mizzi	Head of Unit DG DEVCO Dir C — Planet and Prosperity 1. Rural	Common Agricultural Policy	13 July
Leslie Pierrard	DG DEVCO B1 / Governance, Democracy, Gender and Human rights European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights	General System of Preferences	14 July
Joost Paardekooper	Deputy Head of Unit Dir C — Fisheries Policy Atlantic, North Sea, Baltic and Outermost Regions 1. Fisheries Management Atlantic, North Sea and Baltic Sea DG MARE	Common Fisheries Policy	14 July
Dorian Filote	International Relations Officer Unit A1: Global issues and relations with ACP DG Agriculture and Rural Development	Common Agricultural Policy	14 July
Willi Schulz-Greve	Head of Unit Unit A1: Global issues and relations with ACP DG Agriculture and Rural Development	Common Agricultural Policy	14 July
Paolo Ciccarelli	Head of Unit Unit C5 Water, Infrastructure and Cities DG DEVCO	Digital Single Market Strategy Horizontal PCD Issues	19 July
Claudia Boldrini	Head of Sector Energy Unit C6 Sustainable Energy and Climate Change DG DEVCO	Policy Framework Energy and Climate Change	19 July
Etienne Coyette	Head of Sector Climate Change Unit C6 Sustainable Energy and Climate Change DG DEVCO	Policy Framework Energy and Climate Change	19 July
Markus Sperl	Coordinator for Inter-institutional Relations Secretariat General Unit F2 – European Council, Coreper I & II	Horizontal PCD Issues Migration	28 July
Zdenka Dobiasova	Former Policy Officer PCD Team - DG DEVCO	Horizontal PCD issues	25 October
Gustavo Martin Prada	Former Director for International Cooperation and Development Issues DG DEVCO	Horizontal PCD Issues	14 February 2018
Filiberto Ceriani-Sebregondi	Head of Division GLOBAL 5 - Development Cooperation Coordination European External Action Service	Horizontal PCD Issues	30 May 2018

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Name	Position	Purpose	Date
Cristian Dan Preda	MEP PCD Standing Rapporteur	Horizontal PCD issues	27 July (written questionnaire)

OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

Name	Position	Purpose	Date
Lonne Poissonnier	Policy and Advocacy Coordinator CONCORD Europe	Horizontal PCD issues	10 July
Evert-Jan Brouwer	Political Adviser Woord en Daad Foundation – EUCORD Co-chair SDG CONCORD Europe	Horizontal PCD issues	10 July
Blandine Bouniol	Former Policy and Advocacy Coordinator CONCORD Deputy Director for Advocacy HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL	Horizontal PCD issues	18 October
Sally Nicholson	Head Development Policy and Finance European Policy Office WWF		30 October
Nuno Vaz	Institute for Cooperation and Language - CAMOES Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs PCD Focal Point EU Member State Portugal	Horizontal PCD issues	14 November
Werner Thut	Senior Policy Advisor Policy Coherence for Development Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation SDC PCD Focal Point Switzerland	Horizontal PCD issues	14 November
Martine Rutten	Senior Policy Advisor Office for International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs PCD Focal Point EU Member State Netherlands	Horizontal PCD issues	15 November
James Mackie	Head of Learning and Quality Support European Centre for Development Policy Management – ECDPM	Horizontal PCD issues	23 November
Viwanou Gnassounou	Assistant Secretary-General, Department of Sustainable Economic Development & Trade ACP SECRETARIAT	Horizontal PCD issues	24 November
Ebba Dohlman	OECD – Senior Advisor on PCSD, former Senior Advisor on PCD and former Head of the PCD Unit OECD	Horizontal PCD issues	13 December
Jennifer Hollings	EU/Regional Programme Development Officer, International Organisation of Migration – IOM, Regional Office for the EEA, EU and NATO	Horizontal PCD issues	21 February 2018

ANNEX 12: NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

1. INTRODUCTION

The evaluation as per the ToR has been organised in 3 phases and the methodology followed according to these phases has been explained in detail in the Inception and Desk reports. Here we present a summary.

The three levels of the evaluation:

Level 1 – Implementation and functioning of PCD tools and mechanisms: A mapping of policies or other initiatives and a description of the work done on PCD-related issues was carried out during the Inception stage. During the Inception stage, a number of activities and policies/initiatives were selected for further analysis under Level 2.

Level 2 – Evaluation of the outputs of PCD process on selected EU initiatives: During the Desk Phase, an in-depth analysis of the outputs produced by PCD tools and mechanisms in the selected initiatives was carried out to establish how influential the implementation of PCD mechanisms has been on the decision-making process for the selected initiatives. The selected activities presented in Table 1 were also analysed in depth in conjunction with the selected policies/initiatives. A more limited number of case studies (sub-areas and countries) was also identified among the 13⁴⁵⁵ selected policies/initiatives for the evaluation of the outcomes and impact carried out during the Field Phase under Level 3.

Level 3 – Evaluation of the outcomes and impact levels based on agreed field case studies: Under the evaluation's field phase and based on the methodology approved by the ISG for the assessment of impact, the Evaluation Team carried out further desk research and conducted field visits in order to assess the outcomes (and, if possible, impacts) for the 4 selected case studies.

The evaluation questions have been designed to respond to the three levels of analysis.

2. DESK PHASE (LEVEL 1 AND LEVEL 2)

2.1. Inventory of PCD activities and PCD relevant policies

This work was initiated during the first stage of the Inception stage and completed with the presentation of the Inception report. The report was discussed and validated by the ISG on the evaluation which also validated the selection of activities and the selection of policies to be further reviewed in the next stage of the Desk phase.

An inventory of activities was conducted based on desk reviews and preliminary interviews. The inventory was later used to refine the IL and select 8 activities to be further assessed during the Desk phase.

⁴⁵⁵ While the Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Regulation (IUU) had originally be included in the selected initiatives/ policies in the Inception Report, it was later decided during the Desk Phase to remove this policy from the desk analysis for a number of reasons: (i) the formulation process of the IUU Regulation started before the evaluation period; (ii) the selected policies already included a policy in the same sector (Common Fisheries Policy); and (iii) a preliminary analysis of the IUU Regulation did not suggest any significant findings that would add value to the analysis of PCD mechanisms.

A mapping of policies/initiatives was undertaken based on results of the Screening exercise of the CWP undertaken yearly by DG DEVCO and which identifies policies as PCD relevant. These results were also considered with policies included in the PCD Biennial Reports and which are considered also as PCD relevant. As a result, the evaluation team produced a mapping of about 400 policies. This mapping was later used to establish a selection of 13 policies to be further analysed during the second stage of the Desk phase.

The rationale for the selection of activities and relevant policies is presented below.

Table 1: Criteria for the selection of activities and instruments

▪ Internal or external interaction
▪ Systematic occurrence of the activity.
▪ Strong envisaged causal relation to output
▪ Use of the activity during the evaluation period (2009-2016)
▪ Resources consumption
▪ Influence of the activity in another activity for PCD processes
▪ Coverage of the 4 clusters of activities (PCD mechanisms) identified in the IL

Table 2: Criteria for the selection of policies and initiatives

Individual policies/initiatives – Justification
▪ Non-development policies.
▪ Relevance to the 5 PCD Challenge Areas.
▪ Evolution on the policy/initiative.
▪ Geographical scope of the policies and initiatives.
▪ Framework policy or part of overarching policy/initiative.
▪ Type of EU competence.
▪ Included in PCD WP, screening of CWP, or Biennial Reports.
▪ Policies launched by the European Commission exclusively
▪ No interventions funded by ECHO or EIB

2.2. Assessment of selected PCD activities and selected policies

The assessment of PCD activities was based on documentary evidence (internal documents, official documents, studies) and stakeholders interviews. A report for each activity was produced and was the basis for the preliminary findings presented in the Desk report. The assessment of the selected policies involved thematic experts and was based on policy review, including ISC records when available, and all official and public documents available on EURLEX for each of the policies analysed, as well as interviews with stakeholders at Commission services including DG DEVCO, which were involved at some stage of the policy preparation phase. As a result of the assessment a policy report was produced for each case and was the basis for the consolidated findings report of the analysis undertaken.

2.3. Analysis of Impact Assessments

The evaluation team has carried out its own assessment of Commission IAs, using as a sample the policies identified in the “Mapping of PCD policies and initiatives” included in Annex 3 of the Inception Report (i.e., all the policies that have been identified as being PCD-relevant by

PCD awareness-raising mechanisms during the evaluation period⁴⁵⁶). Based on this methodology, 54 PCD-relevant IAs were identified,⁴⁵⁷ including 41 IAs that had been carried out in 2009-2016.⁴⁵⁸ The detailed assessment of all IAs on policies identified in the Mapping can be found in the main draft Final Report and Annexes.

- Our analysis is restricted to a smaller sample of 41 policies specifically identified as having potential effects on developing countries through PCD awareness-raising mechanisms (including the PCD CWP screening and the PCD Work Programme).
- The exact criterion we used to determine if an IA “took account of impacts in developing countries”⁴⁵⁹ is less stringent than the criteria used by Global Focus⁴⁶⁰: as part of this exercise, we only assessed whether the IAs explicitly identified potential impacts on developing countries, regardless of the extent to which these impacts are discussed or assessed or whether all possible impacts have been identified. There is indeed a high degree of heterogeneity in the level of the detail with which impacts on developing countries are addressed. The quality and extent were only analysed in detail for those policies that had been selected for further analysis under Level 2 of this evaluation.

The results on the assessment of activities, policies, and Impact Assessments were presented as preliminary findings in the Desk Report. They have been included in the Draft Final Report and are the basis for the answers to evaluation questions together with stakeholders’ views.

2.4. Targeted consultations

The evaluation team conducted as part of the Consultation Strategy developed and presented in the approved version of the Inception Report, a round of interviews in Brussels with Commission services, the EEAS, and institutional and civil society stakeholders. Also, three Targeted on-line surveys for Commission services and the EEAS, for EU Member States, and for EUD Delegations were conducted. The questionnaires were validated and approved by DG DEVCO and the results of the surveys are presented in the Consultation Report and included in the findings of the draft Final Report.

3. FIELD PHASE (LEVEL 3)

3.1. Assessment of PCD impact

Based on the assessment of the 13 selected policies presented in the Desk Report, the evaluation team further established a selection of 4 policies to be considered for the case studies to be conducted during the Field phase. Throughout the evaluation process the team pointed out to the challenges to be faced for the assessment of the contribution of selected non-development policies incorporating a PCD approach in relation to the outcomes and impact in third countries.

⁴⁵⁶ As specified in the Inception Report, the “Mapping of PCD policies and initiatives” gathers all the policies and initiatives mentioned in PCD CWP screening documents, in the Biennial Reports, or in the PCD work programme.

⁴⁵⁷ The number of IAs is much lower than the number of policies/initiatives identified in the mapping, because the mapping also included a high number of non-legislative initiatives or implementing acts that did not require an IA. Also, for some policies that consisted of a package of legislative proposals (e.g., the Digital Single Market Strategy package), we considered the various IA reports produced for each individual proposal as one single IA.

⁴⁵⁸ For some policies mentioned in the mapping, the corresponding IAs were actually finalised between 2005 and 2008 (such as for some policies that were mentioned *a posteriori* in PCD Biennial Reports published during the evaluation period).

⁴⁵⁹ I.e., “Explicit reference in IAs of policies’ likely impacts in developing countries”.

⁴⁶⁰ Since 2009, the CSO Global Focus (formerly CONCORD Denmark) has carried out a yearly screening of the Commission’s IAs to analyse whether these sufficiently assess potential impacts on developing countries. From 2009 to 2015, Global Focus has analysed 530 IAs.

As the refining of the methodology to be followed during the Field phase depended on the specific case studies, once the selection had been validated by the ISG, the evaluation team proposed the Detailed Field Methodology which was later approved by the ISG prior to the field visits. The methodology followed for each case is here attached in annex I to this Note on Methodology. For each of the case studies addressing EQ7 on Impact the evaluation team conducted field missions with the assistance of local experts on the topic for each country visited. During the 8 field visits for the case studies the evaluation team met with a range of stakeholders and collected evidence, which together with the desk review conducted have been the basis for the 8 Country Notes included as annexes in the draft Final Report.

Below the rationale for the selection of the case studies based on three prior considerations:

I. Prior considerations

i) Lack of clear definition of PCD. One of the key findings of the Desk Phase is that there is no clear and unanimous understanding regarding the EU's approach to PCD – the principle⁴⁶¹ contained in the TFEU article 208(1) – within DG DEVCO and across DGs. The EU's approach to PCD has many potential meanings:

- a. Under a strict definition of PCD (and the evaluation team's initial understanding of PCD built on internal DG DEVCO documents and the ToR), PCD could be defined as the development compatibility/friendliness of non-development EU policies, *for which EU PCD mechanisms have ensured the adaptation of these policies in order to incorporate development cooperation objectives*. Under this definition, the main PCD output (in the context of this Evaluation and according to the IL diagram included in the Inception Report) would translate in practice as “development provisions reflected in non-development policies *as a result of the application of EU PCD mechanisms*”. Therefore, this strict definition relates to the policy-making process and the application of EU PCD mechanisms during policy formulation.
- b. Under a broader definition of PCD, the PCD “principle” could be defined as the coherence of EU policies with development cooperation objectives, regardless of whether EU PCD mechanisms have played a key role during policy formulation. Under this definition, any EU non-development policy that contains development considerations or development cooperation objectives could be considered the main PCD output regardless of whether EU PCD mechanisms have played a role during the policy formulation process (i.e., if an EU policy contains development-specific clauses/considerations due to, for instance, an international commitment of the EU, such as WTO, EITI, etc.). Under this definition, even an EU policy that is development-friendly as an unintended effect of policy-making could be considered a PCD output. Therefore, under this broader definition, the main PCD output is not necessarily linked to the application of EU PCD mechanisms.

In face of this reported lack of clear and unanimous understanding of the EU's approach to PCD, the identification of concrete *PCD Outputs* during the Desk Phase analysis at level 2 of the IL (with respect to the selected 13 policies) becomes rather challenging in the context of the evaluation. Given that under the broader definition of PCD, any non-development EU policy, including a development consideration (or being development-friendly) – regardless of the influence of EU PCD mechanisms – could be considered a PCD Output, the challenge resides in the fact that the ToR establishes that in order to continue with the analysis at level 3 of the IL there should be a direct link between selected policies and the use of EU PCD mechanisms.

⁴⁶¹ The Treaty states that “the Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.”

ii) Limited application of EU PCD-specific mechanisms/limited availability of EU PCD outputs under the strict definition of PCD. In Section 5.2 (1), the ToR specify that “A more limited number of case studies (sub-areas and countries) will then be proposed by the consultant among the initiatives / policies that have been influenced positively by the use of PCD mechanisms for evaluation of the outcome and impact.

Criteria to be applied by the consultant to propose the case studies should at least include: initiatives / policies with proven causality link between applied mechanisms and policy formulation; (...) availability of concrete PCD outputs to be able to explore further causality links to outcome and impact (see below). The final case studies will be agreed by the ISG; they will include at least four (4) policies / initiatives and a total of 8 field visits, half of them in sub-Saharan countries.”

As requested in the ToR (Section 5.2), the Evaluation Team is currently undertaking at level 2 the “*Evaluation of the outputs of PCD process on selected EU initiatives. This will consist of an in-depth analysis of the outputs produced by **PCD tools and mechanisms** in the selected initiatives: how far the implementation of PCD mechanisms has been influential all along the decision-making process.*”

- a. To date, the review of the effectiveness of PCD mechanisms with respect to the 13 selected policies shows the following:
- b. PCD-specific mechanisms, such as the Biennial Report and the CWP Screening, do not play a central role in the policy formulation process; while PCD non-specific mechanisms, such as the IA and ISC, play a more significant role in the policy formulation process.
- c. The development considerations contained in the selected policies (i.e., the “outputs of the PCD process”) are often the result of EU international commitments and/or of the policy approach of the own lead DG; and, therefore, cannot be linked to PCD mechanisms. From this angle, the inclusion of development considerations in EU policies seems, in one case, rather driven by the external coherence of EU policies (coherence with international agreements or commitments) than internal coherence. In other cases, the inclusion of development considerations in EU policies can be seen as the result of the own approach of the lead DG to the particular policy with no involvement or specific contribution of DG DEVCO. Finally, “development-friendliness” of EU policies can sometimes be an unintended consequence of policy-making.

As pointed out above, evidence to date indicates that “PCD work” at the formulation stage of the policy does not necessarily stem from PCD mechanisms. There is also a lack of a “clear” and “explicit” link with the PCD work or process followed in the design of the policy and the foreseen *implementation* activities regarding developing countries:

- a. The “development” activities (foreseen during implementation of the policy) in developing countries do not necessarily come/stem directly as a result of the policy, as these could already be taking place in a broader context of programmatic actions.
- b. The “actions” with respect to developing countries are not contained in detail in the policy, but rather are expressed as a general commitment.
- c. Evidence suggests that DG DEVCO is the service responsible for the execution of “development” actions or the “development component at the local level” during implementation of the policy.

iii) The Evaluation Team considered that the selection criteria for the analysis of impact outlined in the ToR based on the “availability of concrete PCD outputs to be able to explore

further causality links to outcome and impact” should be interpreted according to the broader definition of PCD outlined above. Hence, in order to carry out the assessment at the impact level, it proposed to:

- Consider that development considerations / development friendliness / development cooperation objectives / development-related clauses contained in a policy constitute a distinctive element of the main PCD output as set in the IL of the EU’s approach to PCD regardless of an explicit link with PCD mechanisms (this would be in line with the broader definition of PCD above);
- Consider general “development” impacts of the policy/policy areas⁴⁶², regardless of whether PCD mechanisms were the driving force in ensuring the inclusion of development consideration in the policy;
- Include the potential impact of development activities foreseen at the implementation level of the policy regardless of the explicit direct link with the selected policy, as these activities stem from general “development related” commitments and not so much from specific and explicit commitments or detailed implementation measures stated in the policy; and
- Further explore “missed opportunities,” including unintended positive effects of the policy where no explicit PCD mechanisms have influenced, but where the policy still has some effect regarding development objectives. According to the ToR, case studies for the field phase should include policies with proven causality of use of PCD mechanisms in the policy design (“policies influenced positively by the use of PCD mechanisms”). If we only consider for the case studies those policies for which there is evident/explicit use of PCD mechanisms, the identification of missed opportunities is limited to the analysis of the IA and the objectives of the policy, leaving out the possibility of highlighting unintended positive effects at the impact level of those policies that “failed” to be influenced by PCD mechanisms, but still “delivered” a development-friendly/compatible approach.

II. Selection of case studies for field phase

In order to select the policies/case studies to be considered at the impact level, we applied an exclusion and selection criteria as presented in Table 8 below:

- First, we removed from the sample of 13 policies those that do not include development considerations or make reference to development cooperation objectives: the Digital Single Market Strategy and the fourth AML Package.
- Second, we excluded **non-legislative** proposals that do not include clear implementation measures: the 2030 framework for climate and energy policies, and the Trade for All Communication.
- Third, we excluded policies for which implementation activities have not yet taken place given the policy’s recent or pending adoption: this includes the Regulation on responsible sourcing of minerals and the review of the EU Blue Card Directive.

This exclusion exercise rules out 6 policies out of the 13 selected policies. Furthermore, of the 7 remaining policies, 2 of them – CBCR and RMI – can be grouped together, as they are closely linked and address issues of governance in the extractive industry. We were therefore left with 6 policies/potential case studies for which we propose impact assessment focus areas in the last column of Table 3.

⁴⁶² Based on and acknowledged in any previous related study/evaluation/academic paper regarding the selected policy.

Table 3: Exclusion and selection criteria

PCD-related policy/initiative	No dev.	Exclusion Criteria		Comments
		Non-legislative	Limited impleme to date	
Digital Single Market Strategy	XX			n/a: lack of development considerations in the policy
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter the Financing of Terrorism	XX			n/a: lack of development considerations in the policy
Policy framework for climate and ene period 2020-2030		XX		n/a: non-legislative proposals without clear implementat measures
Trade for All Communication		XX		n/a: non-legislative proposal without clear implementation meas
Responsible sourcing of mini originating in conflict affected and hi risk areas			XX	n/a: policy (associated Regulation) recently adopted
Review of the EU Blue Card Directive			XX	n/a: policy's adoption still pending
Raw Materials Initiative		Communication w clear implementati measures		The RMI has been the subject of a vast number of impact studies is inter-linked with 2 other policies analysed at Level 2: CBCR the Communication and Regulation on Responsible sourcing mineral originating in conflict affected and high-risk areas.
Common Agricultural Policy (C/ (reform 2013)		Regulation		Over its successive reforms, the CAP has become less tr distortive and it is commonly assumed that developing count have positively benefited from the decrease in trade distortion seems relevant to review evidence of the impact of the CAP ref on developing countries.
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (ref 2013)		Regulation		The CFP provides a framework for the signing of Fisher Partnership Agreement (SFPAs) with developing countries. assessment of the impact of a selected SFPA makes a tangible relevant case study.
Generalised Scheme of Preferen (GSP)		Regulation		The GSP is an interesting case study as some implementat activities/DG DEVCO programmes can directly be traced back to regulation. We thus propose to focus on the outcomes of th programmes.
Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR)		Directive		The CBCR clause in the Directive on Financial Reporting has b in effect since 2013. It is proposed to study the impact of the CB on the mining sector of countries of the African Great Lakes regi
EU Action Plan against Wild Trafficking		Communication wi clear implementati measures		The EUAP against Wildlife Trafficking includes meas addressing root causes of the problem, which refer to provid alternative livelihoods to local communities. Despite being in its 1 year of implementation, some actions have taken place or are par ongoing activities with developing countries.
Global Approach to Migration Mobility		Communication wi clear implementati measures		Mobility Partnerships (MPs) constitute the principle bilate frameworks for facilitating policy dialogue and operatic cooperation with partner countries in the EU Neighbourhood area is proposed to study two selected MPs with third countries.

As defined in the Inception Report the impact evaluation criterion focused on the outcomes and impacts in developing countries resulting from the changes in EU's policies and actions brought about by incorporating a PCD approach. The complexity involved in isolating the expected effects of an EU non-development policy incorporating a PCD approach (at the level of outcomes and impact) represents the main challenge of the evaluation. Therefore, the impact for the selected policies was based on a combination of a meta-evaluation of existing impact studies of the selected policy with a focus on impact on developing countries and a qualitative assessment based on field visits and stakeholder interviews.

3.2. Open public consultation (OPC)

The strategy of the OPC was presented within the Consultation Strategy and later revised during the Desk phase. As part of the OPC strategy a questionnaire and a background document were prepared. DG DEVCO has conducted the OPC together with SG and the results will be consolidated by the evaluation team.

3.3. Consolidation of findings

The synthesis of the findings resulting from the Desk phase and the Field phase have led to the answers of the EQs. As a last step, conclusions and recommendations have been formulated. This work is presented in the draft Final Report. It will be discussed in the ISG meeting and comments will be incorporated into the Final Report.

ANNEX 1: METHODOLOGY FOR CASE STUDIES – EQ7

In this section, we provide the methodology for addressing the four JCs and indicators corresponding to the four policy case studies being undertaken to address EQ7.

JC 7.1: The Common Fisheries Policy (2013 reform) has had positive development outcomes and impacts in selected countries

Overview and general logic. The external dimension of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) provides a framework for the activities of EU vessels fishing outside EU waters. This includes bilateral fisheries agreements, which define the rights of access of the EU fleet to fish resources in third country waters: they can be reciprocal agreements based on an exchange of fishing possibilities, or can involve a financial compensation paid to the third country in return for access to its fish resources, as is the case for bilateral fisheries agreements with developing countries in Africa and Oceania.

Criticised for the ‘fish, pay and go’ attitude, in particular in relation to developing countries, these bilateral agreements have been reshaped into Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) by the 2002 CFP reform, to include a development dimension, e.g. through clauses related to monitoring, local processing and employment of local crew. Further revision of the agreements was introduced by the 2013 CFP reform, which renamed them Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs) and brought several principles into law: the agreements should be of mutual benefit to the EU and to the third country concerned; the standards for EU vessels fishing in EU waters should also apply to fishing outside EU waters; the agreements can target only surplus of the allowable catch. SFPAs are a tool for improving fisheries governance in the EEZ of coastal state partner countries; they aim to ensure the sustainable exploitation of resources, whilst at the same time supporting the partner countries’ capacity to develop their fishing sector.

In order to assess whether the 2013 CFP reform has had positive development outcomes and impacts, the case studies will therefore specifically look at the development impacts of SFPAs, by focusing on two specific SFPAs that were concluded following the reform: one mixed-species agreement (Mauritania, which is the largest SFPA in terms of financial contribution) and one tuna agreement (Senegal).

Table 47: Summary of key features of current SFPAs with Mauritania and Senegal

Country	Expiry date of the current protocol	Nature of the FPA	Contribution from the EU budget per year (EUR)	Earmarked for sustainable fisheries policy per year (EUR)
Mauritania	15 November 2019	Multi-Species Agreement (<i>shrimp, demersal fish, tuna and small pelagic fish</i>)	61.625.000	4.125.000
Senegal	19 November 2019	Tuna Fishery Agreement, with a limited demersal component (<i>hake</i>)	1,808,000 to 1,668,000	750,000

Indicators for addressing the JC, and methodology for each indicator. In order to assess the economic, social and environmental impacts of the SFPAs on the selected countries, the case studies will focus on three main indicators: (1) Extent of SFPAs’ contribution to the local economy in the selected countries; (2) Extent of SFPAs’ contribution to employment in the

selected countries; and (3) State of fish stocks covered by the SFPAs and presence of positive/negative externalities of SFPAs on food security in the selected countries.

1 7.1.1 Extent of SFPAs' contribution to the local economy in Mauritania and Senegal

In all SFPAs, the EU pays the partner country a financial contribution composed of two distinct parts:

1. Compensation for the access rights provided to EU vessels to exploit the fishing opportunities defined in the Protocol; and
2. Sectoral support for the partner country, with the aim of promoting the implementation of a sustainable fisheries policy in the partner country.

The compensation for the access rights contributes to the local economy by providing revenues for the national budget. This compensation is substantial for Mauritania (57.5 million EUR/year in the current protocol, down from 67 million EUR/year under the previous protocol) but more limited for Senegal (0.92-1.06 million EUR/year).

Sectoral support is considered an important tool for achieving the objectives of improving partner countries' fisheries governance and fostering the economic development of their fisheries sector. According to SFPAs' provisions, the Joint Committees shall establish a multiannual sectoral programme in the form of a matrix in line with the partner countries' needs and priorities for the fisheries sector. Actions financed under the sectoral support may include for example: monitoring, control and surveillance activities; scientific research on fish stocks; support to laboratories/food safety (exports); support to shipyards; infrastructure linked to fisheries activities/ sector (e.g. support to develop industries ashore involved in the processing of marine products); or support to (local) artisanal fishing.

In a recent report⁴⁶³, the European Court of Auditors argued that the Commission's control of sectoral support actions has been limited and the actions actually implemented by the partner countries were in some cases different from those agreed. In the new Protocol with Mauritania, specific provisions relating to the implementation and monitoring of the sectoral support have been introduced⁴⁶⁴: the Protocol states *inter alia* that financial support cannot be used to cover the operating expenses of the beneficiaries, that technical support is to be administered by an implementation unit subject to an annual external audit, that for each project included in the programming a series of indicators showing the impact on the fisheries sector shall be defined, and that monthly meetings shall be organised to monitor implementation.

Finally, most SFPAs contain provisions on the promotion of cooperation among economic operators but the level of implementation of these clauses appears to differ widely depending on the countries. With respect to the selected countries, the relevant provisions encourage in broad terms the economic integration of European operators in the local fishing sector: the Senegal Protocol encourages *inter alia* the creation of joint ventures and "the exchange of information on fishing techniques and gear, preservation methods and the industrial processing of fisheries products" (Article 10) and imposes landing of part of the catches in Dakar in order to foster local socio-economic activity (see below), while the Mauritania Protocol *inter alia* encourages relations between enterprises in the "technical, economic and commercial spheres"

⁴⁶³ European Court of Auditors (2015) "Are the Fisheries Partnership Agreements well managed by the Commission?", Special Report.

⁴⁶⁴ The proposed set up is the first of its kind: the current Protocol with Senegal, which was concluded earlier, does not include similar provisions.

and lists possible areas of cooperation e.g. development of industry related to fishing, vocational training, sale of fishery products, aquaculture (Article 7).

The case studies will aim to assess the SFPAs' contribution to the local economy, with a specific focus on the impact of the SFPAs' sectoral support components and considering, when available, the specific indicators of projects included in the programming.

17.1.2 Extent of SFPAs' contribution to employment in Mauritania and Senegal

SFPAs are expected to contribute to job creation in partner countries in two main ways:

- (v) Direct employment on board EU vessels engaged in fishing under SFPAs and their management; and
- (vi) Employment in downstream processing of fishery products generated.

EU vessels frequently operate by choice with crew from SFPAs partner countries or other third countries within the region of operation. Furthermore, the granting of fishing authorisations in most SFPAs carries a condition that the vessel operators recruit a minimum number of crew per vessel (or a percentage) of nationals of the partner country⁴⁶⁵. In the case of the SFPAs with Mauritania and Senegal, the following provisions are included in the ongoing Protocols:

- **Mauritania:** The Protocol states that the minimum number of Mauritanian fishermen to be taken on board EU vessels shall be: 1 per vessel for tuna seiners, 3 per vessel for pole and line tuna vessels, 60% of the crew for shrimp vessels and demersal species (rounded downwards, officers not being included), 60% of staff involved in production duties (factory, packaging and freezing) for all pelagic trawlers.
- **Senegal:** The Protocol states that for EU fishing vessels operating under the Protocol (tuna seiners, pole-and-line vessels, and deep-sea demersal trawlers), at least 20% of the seamen signed on during the fishing season in the Senegalese fishing zone shall be from Senegal or possibly from an ACP country and that "vessel owners shall endeavour to sign on Senegalese seamen" (Senegalese crew are generally appreciated and hence embarked in large numbers on many fleets).

Employment in downstream processing is expected to be generated mainly in tuna processing. The EU vessels operating under SFPAs in the Atlantic Ocean tuna fisheries exclusively supply cannery operations and only about 20% of Atlantic catches enter EU processing establishments: the balance is processed in the region, in processing establishments based in Ghana (2 canneries), Ivory Coast (3 canneries) and Senegal (1 cannery⁴⁶⁶). Landing or transshipping of tunas at an operational base in third countries is a common practice, driven by the strategies of tuna business operators to undertake as much processing as possible in lower cost locations. Furthermore, while tuna fishing opportunities under the SFPAs are generally not linked to any specific landing obligation in the partner countries, one exception is the products of the pole and line vessels fishing under the SFPAs with Senegal: the SFPAs' protocol specifies that these vessels shall land their catches in the Port of Dakar.

With respect to non-tuna fishing products, the Mauritania SFPAs entails a landing obligation for demersal fishing vessels and for the non-freezer pelagic fleet and these landings provide inputs to local processing establishments (it can be noted however that under the terms of the

⁴⁶⁵ For tuna vessels – which may not visit the third country concerned – the requirement can be widened to nationals of ACP countries.

⁴⁶⁶ The processing establishment in Senegal is supplied by both the Senegalese fleet and EU pole and line vessels operating in the region to produce frozen whole tuna, loins and canned products.

Protocol, the ship owners shall decide on the destination of their vessels' production: it may be processed, stored under customs control, sold in Mauritania or exported). The SFPAs with Senegal does not entail any landing obligation for hake (the only non-tuna species covered by the SFPAs).

The case studies will aim to estimate the number of jobs created in Mauritania and Senegal that can be linked to SFPAs, based on the two categories defined above (in this context, it can be noted that a recent study commissioned by the European Parliament assessed the impact of SFPAs on employment in both the EU and third countries: a summary of the findings is included in Annex 1). At the same time, the case studies will also consider changes in the countries' overall employment in the fisheries sector (including small-scale artisanal fishing) to assess the existence of possible positive or negative externalities of SFPAs on overall fisheries employment in the two selected countries.

17.1.3 State of fish stocks covered by the SFPAs and presence of positive/negative externalities of SFPAs on food security in Mauritania and Senegal

One of the main objectives of SFPAs is to ensure sustainable exploitation of marine resources and the key sustainability principle of SFPAs is that the fishing opportunities negotiated in the protocols should only allow EU vessels to fish surplus resources⁴⁶⁷.

In this context, the evaluation will seek to collect updated information on the state of fish stocks in Mauritania and Senegal, relying on the work carried out by the Joint Scientific Committees linked to the two SFPAs, which compile and analyse data on the fishing effort and on catches and are to produce annual stock assessment reports. It can be noted however that past studies have highlighted that the surplus concept has proven very difficult to implement in practice, due precisely to a lack of reliable information on fish stocks (also because scientific coordination is lacking for straddling small pelagic stocks present in Moroccan, Mauritanian and Senegalese waters) and on the fishing effort of domestic fish fleets, or other foreign fleets which have also been granted access by the partner countries⁴⁶⁸. Furthermore, in the context of SFPAs the very notion of surplus in the partner country's waters is in fact questionable if applied to highly migratory or straddling stocks that cover different EEZs.

Sustainable fishing is also closely linked to food security. While SFPAs aim to contribute positively to food security, critics have argued that they may have a negative impact when resources targeted under the access agreements are key to food security, i.e. small pelagic stocks such as the round sardinella caught off the coast of Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal (species that are essential for the Senegalese artisanal fishery and local food consumption, namely all small pelagic species, have been excluded from the scope of the SFPAs with Senegal, but the SFPAs with Mauritania allows EU vessels to catch this resource). In this context, the case studies will also seek to assess the existence of possible externalities of SFPAs on food security in the two selected countries.

⁴⁶⁷ Article 31 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013.

⁴⁶⁸ See for example European Court of Auditors (2015).

JC 7.2: The Generalized Scheme of Preferences Regulation contributes to poverty eradication by expanding exports from the selected countries to the EU

Overview and general logic. The overall logic of the EU GSP (as for GSPs of other countries) is that by providing preferential access to markets for exports from developing countries these exports will expand and, to the extent that these exports will not merely be diverted from other export markets but also lead to an increase in total output, creating additional employment (which will, in turn, contribute to reduced poverty and sustainable development)⁴⁶⁹. In the longer term and as a knock-on effect, expanded production will foster investment, as well as have positive spillovers to non-exporting sectors, with positive long-term effects on economic growth and social development.

To test the validity of this argument and provide a response to the JC, in principle each step of the causal chain would have to be scrutinized. However, given the resource and time constraints for the case study, we accept, in principle, the link from increased employment to poverty reduction, and focus on the review of to what extent the GSP Regulation has led to increased exports and employment. At the same time, we also consider the implications of increased exports on environmental, social and human rights issues.

Indicators for addressing the JC, and methodology for each indicator. As mentioned, a core condition for the GSP to have a developmental impact is that it actually leads to increased exports from the benefitting countries. In addition, these increased exports must then also lead to increased employment and/or incomes in order to have more than a remote trickle-down impact on poverty alleviation. Finally, the increased exports should not have unintended effects (but might well do) which nullify or at least significantly reduce the intended developmental impact.

In response to this, the evaluation focuses on three indicators: (1) the extent to which the GSP impacts on exports from eligible countries; (2) the extent to which increased exports lead to increased employment and/or incomes; and (3) the presence of positive or negative externalities generated.

17.2.1 Changes in exports of selected countries caused by the GSP

In principle, the methodology for assessing this indicator will be based on an analysis of the selected country's:

- Exports to the EU;
- Exports to the world (in order to check for diversion effects); and
- Changes in exports over time.

Exports of each of the two countries will be assessed at various levels of sector/product disaggregation (HS 2- to 6-digit levels). For each of the two countries, the analysis will consist of a cross-sector comparison – answering the question whether exports in sectors/products covered by GSP perform better than non-covered sectors/products – as well as changes over time, in particular where sectors graduated from or de-graduated to the GSP (as happened, for example, to footwear and leather goods from Vietnam in 2009 and 2014).

⁴⁶⁹ Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, OJ L 303/1 of 31.10.2012, Preamble recital (7).

The assessment of this first indicator will start with desk research, primarily descriptive statistical analysis, prior to the field visits. Data sources will be the COMEXT website for exports to the EU and COMTRADE for exports to the world.

The findings of this research will determine to a large extent the issues to be discussed with stakeholders in the two countries visited (see section **Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.**). Some follow-up questions will also be addressed during the interviews, e.g. on reasons for low or high preference utilization (such as other existing – primarily technical – barriers for exporting to the EU, RoO substantive and administrative/procedural requirements, low preference margins, limited awareness about the GSP, etc.).

Based on desk research, a limited cross-country analysis of performance under GSPs will also be undertaken; this is likely to be based on secondary data only, notably the currently ongoing GSP mid-term evaluation, and previous studies of the GSP, including the Commission’s own impact assessments.

I 7.2.2 Changes in employment and incomes at sector level

For selected sectors in each of the two countries the effect of changes in exports on output and, following from that, employment and incomes will be analysed. The sectors to be covered here will follow from the analysis under I 7.2.1; the focus will be on sectors where the GSP has had the largest effects on exports. As disaggregated statistics on employment and incomes at sector levels are typically not available in the literature or databases for developing countries, the analysis for this indicator will largely have to be determined through interviews with sector representatives during the field visit; the preliminary analysis already undertaken has yielded initial findings which have been taken into consideration for the selection of interview partners in the two countries; see section 5 below.

I 7.2.3 Presence of positive / negative externalities linked to GSP-induced exports

Examples of such externalities are:

- Environmental impact (for example, has growth in environmentally damaging or friendly sectors been encouraged, have environmentally friendly manufacturing practices been promoted?);
- Social impact (for example, have social standards been established, have increased exports led to better working conditions or, to the contrary, been based on exploitation or violation of social standards; have exports in sectors with low standards been benefitted more than in others?);
- Regional impact (have exports induced by GSP affected specific concentrated areas, leading to widening disparities across regions?).

The methodology for assessing this indicator will essentially be qualitative, based on stakeholder consultations during the field visit, and complementary literature review.

Justification of country selection: As only two countries can be visited and covered by the case studies, a careful choice of countries is important in order to avoid – to the extent possible given this sample size – selection bias, and at the same time ensure that countries which offer some lessons are chosen. Therefore, the following selection criteria have been applied:

- High value of exports under GSP: high absolute export values under the GSP are a condition, *ceteris paribus*, to yield developmental impacts in the country concerned;
- High share of GSP eligible exports: a high share of eligible GSP exports allows, *ceteris paribus*, to identify developmental impacts of the GSP in the country concerned;
- High share of GSP preference utilisation: in order for the GSP to have any impact in a developing country, it must be utilised by exporters.⁴⁷⁰

These selection criteria are complemented by a number of exclusion and inclusion criteria:

- Exclude countries covered by cases studies in the ongoing GSP evaluation as well as those covered in the Joint Staff Working Document accompanying the Commission's 2016 report on the GSP, which covered all GSP+ countries.⁴⁷¹ This avoids overlap and ensures value for money;
- Exclude countries which offer limited lessons for others, e.g. because of a very particular economic structure, size, etc.
- Include countries at different developmental stages, i.e. covered by different GSP arrangements (notably, EBA and Standard GSP which offer the largest variance), which at least theoretically permits drawing lessons about how different GSP arrangements affect developing countries;
- Include countries from different geographical areas, while considering the importance of Africa.

Applying these criteria, Vietnam and Mozambique have been selected. More details on the selection procedure are presented in annex.

JC 7.3: The EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking is likely to contribute to development objectives by engaging in and benefiting local communities from wildlife conservation in selected countries

Overview and general logic. The EUAP against Wildlife Trafficking (the Plan) aims at increasing the effectiveness of EU policy and actions against the illegal trade of wildlife through a strategic framework for the period 2016-2020 and through coordinated efforts and cooperation between Commission services, EEAS, EU Member States, but also Europol, Eurojust and other stakeholders including developing countries. This integrated approach incorporates as a new element the objective to prevent wildlife trafficking by addressing the root causes in source countries (i.e. developing countries), as well as enforcing existing rules and combating wildlife crime in the EU and strengthening the global partnership against wildlife crime internationally. With respect to developing countries, the EUAP includes specific objectives and actions aimed to *inter alia*: involve local communities in source countries of wildlife trafficking, providing them with alternative livelihoods and alternative sources of income; other actions linked to the strengthening of enforcement / governance in developing countries; and finally, some actions aimed at improving coordination / cooperation between the EU and developing countries.

⁴⁷⁰ Note, however, that reasons for low preference utilisation will be investigated, primarily through document review coupled with interviews in the selected countries.

⁴⁷¹ *Joint Staff Working Document "The EU Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance ('GSP+') covering the period 2014–2015."* Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Report on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences during the period 2014–2015 (COM(2016) 29 final), SWD(2016) 8 final, 28 January 2016.

Structure of the Plan. The structure of the Plan is presented in Figure 2 below. The Plan has 3 main priorities:

1. Priority 1 – Preventing wildlife trafficking and addressing its root causes
2. Priority 2 – Making implementation and enforcement of existing rules and the fight against organised wildlife crime more effective
3. Priority 3 – Strengthening the global partnership of source, consumer and transit countries against wildlife trafficking.

Each priority is further broken down into 4 Objectives (for a total of 12 objectives) and each objective is further broken down into concrete actions. The Plan contains a total of 32 actions which are further broken down into expected results (an action can have several expected results).

Assessment of the PCD approach of the Plan. The following considerations should be taken into account with respect to the PCD approach of the Plan:

- Since developing countries are the main source markets for wildlife trafficking, any of the 12 objectives and virtually all of its 32 corresponding actions could (and should) have an indirect impact in developing countries, hopefully in the form of “reduced poaching” or “preserved wildlife/biodiversity”. For instance, a decrease in demand for wildlife products in Europe through an awareness-raising/demand reduction campaign in EU Member States – resulting from Action 1 - should lead to reduced poaching in developing countries in the future, provided that the demand for such products in the rest of the world and locally doesn’t increase by the same amount).
- However, many actions – such as Action 1 on awareness-raising/demand reduction campaigns in the EU – are not implemented at the level of developing countries but rather at the level of the EU. Hence, the direct impact of these actions (implemented mainly within the EU) on developing countries will be difficult to verify/assess in developing countries. We consider such actions (those implemented in the EU) for the purpose of this specific assessment to be “*non PCD-relevant*”.
- Other actions directly target developing countries with clear implementation measures at the level of developing countries. For these actions, it is more likely that direct impact can be observed/assessed in the field. Therefore, for the purpose of the present assessment we consider that these actions with clear implementation measures in developing countries constitute the “PCD” outputs of the Plan and we identify them as “*PCD-relevant*”.

In order to isolate the “PCD outputs” of the Plan, we have classified all 32 actions of the Plan either as “PCD-relevant” (in green color) or “non PCD-relevant” (in red color) and presented in the results in Figure 1 and Annex 1 below. The rationale and justification for the categorization of each action is presented in the right-hand column of the table in Annex 1. Overall, we find that the Plan includes:

- 22 non PCD-relevant actions;
- 10 PCD-relevant actions.

Reconstructed Intervention logic of the PCD approach of the Plan. The intervention logic (IL) of the PCD approach of the Plan is presented below, where we only include the 10 PCD-relevant actions. As shown in Figure 1, the various PCD-relevant actions implemented will lead to the following PCD outcomes:

- The first proposed outcome is “Livelihood of adjacent communities preserved or improved” and is the result of two PCD-relevant actions: (i) the strengthening of

engagement of rural communities in the management and conservation of wildlife (Action 4) and; (ii) the support of the development of sustainable livelihoods for communities living in and adjacent to wildlife habitats (Action 5). The assessment of this outcome will be done as part of Indicator 7.3.1 (focusing on Livelihood) as detailed below;

- The second proposed outcome is “Corruption reduced” and is the result of Action 8 on support initiatives to fight the corruption associated with wildlife trafficking at the national, regional and international levels. The third proposed outcome is “Capacity of enforcement and judiciary improved” which should result from such actions as Action 24 (Step up cooperation on enforcement between the Member States and EU enforcement actors and key non-EU countries and other regional Wildlife Enforcement Networks, relevant global networks), and Action 25 (Support capacity building for law enforcement in key source and market countries, including enforcement within protected sites). Outcome 2 and 3 will be assessed under Indicator 7.3.2 (covering the broad term of Rule of Law) as explained below;
- The fourth proposed outcome is “Developing countries are supported through effective programmes” and stems from Action 26 (Ensure that wildlife trafficking is considered for EU funding under relevant programmes in the areas of natural resources management, environment, organised crime, security and governance, organised crime, security and governance) and Action 27 (Increase effectiveness of funding support against wildlife trafficking). The fifth proposed outcome is “Improved coordination with relevant source, transit and market countries” linked to Action 28 (Step up dialogue with key source, transit and market countries, including dialogue with local communities, civil society and the private sector) and Action 30 (Strengthen cooperation against wildlife trafficking with relevant regional organisations, such as the African Union, SADC, the East African Community, ASEAN, and in relevant multilateral fora, such as ASEM). Both outcomes which are linked to cooperation will be assessed under indicator 7.3.3.

It is expected that the 5 outcomes will contribute to reduced trafficking of wildlife and the preservation of biodiversity in developing countries (Indicator 7.3.4).

Overall approach and scope of the assessment of the development outcomes and impact.

As per the objective of the evaluation which is to assess the likely impact of the “PCD outputs” of the EU selected policies, the focus of the field mission will be placed, with respect to the Plan, on assessing the achievement of the 5 proposed PCD outcomes (grouped into 3 broad indicators I.7.3.1 to 7.3.3) in the selected developing countries. The assessment of the overall likely PCD impact of the Plan will be largely based on the perception of stakeholders including those contacted during field interviews (see Indicator 7.3.4 below).

Indicators:

I 7.3.1: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on the Livelihood of local communities

According to the plan, the expected results of actions linked to this indicator are:

- The need for proper engagement of rural communities in the design and implementation of measures against wildlife trafficking is made a priority in relevant EU and Member States policies and funding (linked to Action 4)
- Support to sustainable economic activities benefiting rural communities living in and adjacent to wildlife habitats is prioritised in EU and Member States' policies on funding support for rural areas in source countries (linked to Action 5)

Hence the objective of the field visits will be to assess to what extent these results have been achieved or are likely to be achieved at the level of the selected countries by inter alia looking at the following sources:

- Number of ongoing or foreseen projects targeting local communities that can be linked to the Plan
- Likely effectiveness of these projects based inter alia on the review of the impact of similar projects in the past, stakeholders' opinion, etc.

I 7.3.2: Likely impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on corruption and the capacity of enforcement and judiciary in developing countries

According to the Plan, the expected results of actions linked to this indicator are:

- Wildlife trafficking included in EU policy and tools against corruption (notably as part of **dialogues with key third countries receiving budgetary support**); Issue addressed in **bilateral meetings with key partner** countries and in relevant multilateral fora, including G7, G20, UN Convention against Corruption (linked to Action 8);
- Continued funding support provided for ICCWC activities, including evaluations of enforcement systems based on the ICCWC wildlife and forest crime Toolkit; Results of ICCWC Toolkit recommendations taken into account in targeted support to third countries (linked to Action 25)

Hence the objective of the field visits will be to assess to what extent the associated outcomes have been achieved (corruption reduced, capacity of enforcement and judiciary improved as shown in the IL in Figure 1) or are likely to be achieved at the level of the selected countries by inter alia looking at the following sources:

- Evidence of dialogue with selected country;
- Evidence of bilateral meetings;
- Evidence of meetings with regional taskforces;
- Evidence of continued support for ICCWC activities and impact on these activities in third countries.

I 7.3.3: Likely impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on cooperation between the EU and developing countries (both in terms of support programmes, and improved coordination to address wildlife trafficking)

According to the plan, the expected results of actions linked to this indicator are:

- "Strategic Approach for Wildlife Conservation in Africa" serves as a basis for programming relevant development support; Further regional or thematic strategic approaches are developed; Development cooperation funding streams, including the European Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, and other financial instruments such as the Partnership Instrument, are mobilised against wildlife trafficking, within the agreed financial envelopes of the contributing programs, and other possible funding sources are explored (linked to Action 26);
- Regular meetings held in key countries to coordinate donor activities; Beneficiary countries asked to report on how the measures against wildlife trafficking funded by the EU have been effective in addressing the problem (using indicators such as the number of seizures and successful prosecutions) (linked to Action 27).

- Priority countries identified; Specific dialogue and technical cooperation structures established; Topic systematically included in the agenda of political and sectorial dialogues and of high-level meetings with key non-EU countries or regions ((linked to Action 28).
- Network of focal points in delegations and embassies in relevant countries set up, making use, where appropriate, of existing structures such as the Green Diplomacy Network (linked to Action 30).

Hence the objective of the field visits will be to assess to what extent the outcomes (as explained in the reconstructed intervention logic of the PCD approach of the Plan) have been achieved or are likely to be achieved at the level of the selected countries by *inter alia* looking at the following sources:

- Review of quality of programming and likely impact of the programmes
- Review of quality of coordination, structure dialogue, focal points, etc. and likely impact of these mechanisms

I 7.3.4: Likelihood of impact of EUAP against wildlife trafficking on the reduction of Illicit Trade between the selected country and the EU

The impact indicator will serve to contextualize the action plan at the level of the selected country and gather evidence on the perceived relevance / likelihood of impact of the overall Plan from the point of view of local stakeholders. This indicator will be assessed via *inter alia*:

- Figures on seizures, poaching, and illicit trade estimates (Sources: World WISE database, MIKE, UNODC reports, others);
- Exports of wildlife to EU, export quotas and CITES listed exports of wildlife (source Trade statistics of wildlife trade, WTO, UNODC reports, CITES reports others);
- Stakeholders views.

Implications for country selection: Given the proposed methodology, it would seem important to select countries for the field visits that have or will benefit from EU assistance in the field of wildlife preservation and trafficking. Indeed, since most PCD outputs and outcomes of the Plan will be implemented through structured dialogue and/or EU programmes or projects, most lessons will be learned in countries that have benefited in the past from such projects and activities.

JC: 7.4: The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) contributes to poverty reduction by facilitating the legal migration of third country residents towards the EU and promoting social and economic development in selected countries

The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) aims to establish an overarching framework of the EU External Migration Policy and defines how the EU conducts its policy dialogues and cooperation with non-EU countries, based on four equally important objectives:

- better organising legal migration, and fostering well-managed mobility;
- preventing and combatting irregular migration, and eradicating trafficking in human beings;
- promoting international protection, and enhancing the external dimension of asylum; and
- maximising the development impact of migration and mobility.

The respect of human rights is a cross-cutting priority for this policy framework, a dimension that is of relevance to the four pillars of the GAMM.⁴⁷²

The policy objectives of the GAMM are based on the premise that good governance of migration **and mobility** of third countries nationals can create value on a daily basis for the development of millions of people, increase the EU's competitiveness and enrich European societies. Good governance of migration and mobility thus also has a developmental potential and can bring benefits to partner countries: increasing migrant households well-being thanks to opportunities abroad such as acquiring new skills and work experience; fostering more foreign direct investment through diaspora communities; enhancing transfer of remittances, know-how and innovations; countering brain drain and promoting brain circulation.⁴⁷³

Therefore, the general framework of the GAMM considers as one of its priorities to maximise the development impact of migration and mobility. As one of the tools to implement the GAMM, Mobility Partnerships (MP) with selected countries constitute a specific framework for cooperation with the EU in the areas of legal migration, development, border control, and international protection.⁴⁷⁴ The aim of the MPs has been to make the most of the opportunities and benefits that migrants, country of origin and receiving country can derive from the management of migration flows and at the same time promoting positive outcomes for the development of the country of origin.

The proposed methodology for the analysis of the impact of the GAMM in the countries chosen as case studies, Armenia and Cape Verde, takes the MP with each country as the point of reference to assess the contribution of this EU migration policy to development in partner countries. Cape Verde is the only African country to have signed a MP (as this are mainly focused on EU Neighbourhood countries), has a diaspora that exceeds the size of its resident population and has relied over the years on migration as a development resource.⁴⁷⁵ Armenia, a partner country in the Eastern Partnership, has also a big diaspora and almost 30% of the population lives below the national poverty line.⁴⁷⁶ Both countries also receive influx of migrants from other countries and are considered within the migratory routes towards the EU. MPs are based on reciprocity and establish specific commitments for each partner country, but mainly evolve around four areas: a) mobility, legal migration and integration, b) migration and development (diaspora, mitigate brain drain, support voluntary return and re-integration) c) border management (readmission agreements), and d) asylum and international protection (legislation, support measures). For the country case studies, we shall look at the contribution of the GAMM to the economic and social development of each country in terms of the framework provided by each MP. The review of relevant literature suggests that despite the aim of MPs to promote migration and mobility, some of the measures aimed at regulating legal migration could limit the potential improvement of migration opportunities.⁴⁷⁷ Therefore the

⁴⁷² COM(2011) 743 final, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.

⁴⁷³ (COM(2011) 743 final, p.6

⁴⁷⁴ The Common Agenda on Mobility and Migration (CAMM) constitute a second and alternative framework for partner countries and for the EU and its Member States, when both sides want to establish an advanced level of cooperation, but one or the other is not ready to enter into the full set of obligations and commitments. (COM(2011) 743 final, p.11.

⁴⁷⁵ Resende-Santos, J. (2016), Cape Verde: Rethinking Diaspora in Development Policy. *Int Migr*, 54: 82–97. doi:10.1111/imig.12212.

⁴⁷⁶ <https://www.adb.org/countries/armenia/poverty> ; Black, Richard, et al. (2007) Understanding Migration as a Driver of Poverty Reduction in Europe and Central Asia, Working Paper C9, Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty.

⁴⁷⁷ Brandao, F. and Zoomers, (2012) Europe's mobility partnerships with migrant-sending countries in the global south: A view from Cape Verde, in *European Migration and Asylum Policies: Coherence or Contradiction? An interdisciplinary evaluation of the EU programmes of Tampere (1999), The Hague (2004), Stockholm (2009)*, Publisher: Éditions Bruylant,

indicators cover not only the potential benefits of economic and social remittances, but also consider measures in place such as readmission agreements and visa facilitation agreements. As this constitutes a short case study the contribution of the GAMM will be analysed in terms of outcomes due to migration flows to the EU in terms of economic and social remittances, and potential unintended effects due to border management. Effects of specific migration legal regimes⁴⁷⁸ will not be analysed in detail but when available, information that distinguishes between high skilled migration and unskilled migration will be considered.

Indicators:

1.7.4.1 Extent of contribution of financial remittances

Financial remittances have a potential to contribute to alleviate inequality and poverty in developing countries, and also raise the living standards of recipient households as they can be used to provide for services such as education and health. This indicator will consider sources on:

- Flows of remittances from EU – share of country’s GDP (source WB, national statistics);
- Share of households receiving financial remittances (through official channels);
- Value of remittances per capita;
- Existence of mechanism for low cost transfer of remittances;
- Diaspora investments – share of total FDI.

1.7.4.2. Extent of contribution of social remittances

The transfer of knowledge and skills has been regarded as social remittances with which migrants also contribute to their countries’ development. The notion also implies that the circulation of ideas, skills, and social capital contribute to local development processes.⁴⁷⁹ This indicator will consider the following elements, based on the MPs for Armenia and Cape Verde, and the available sources:

- Existence of skills matching schemes and mechanisms prior to departure according to the country of destination;
- Existence of skills matching schemes and mechanisms for returnee migrants according to the local labour market;
- Existence of mechanisms to promote the participation of highly qualified migrants to provide training, transfer competencies upon return in national institutions;
- Engagement of diaspora in skills and knowledge transfers schemes, engagement of diaspora associations assisting local communities and creating business opportunities within the partner country (Sources: literature review, interviews).

Editors: C. Gortázar, M.-C. Parra, B. Segaeert & C. Timmerman (Eds, pp.287-295); A. Pina-Delgado, J. (2013), The Current Scheme to Manage Migration between Europe and Cape Verde: Promoter of Development or Tool for Border Closure?. *Popul. Space Place*, 19: 404–414. doi:10.1002/psp.1781; Van Stokkum, L. (2015), More mobility for development: Policy Coherence for Development in practice: making the EU Mobility Partnership a tool for development in Cape Verde, FMS, Netherlands.

⁴⁷⁸ Long-term residents, family reunification, students, researchers and highly qualified people: EU Blue Card Directive; Directives on seasonal workers and on intra-corporate transferees; Single Permit Directive; Directive on researchers and students.

⁴⁷⁹ Lacroix, Th., Levitt, P. and Vari-Lavoise, I. (2016), Social remittances and the changing transnational political landscape, *Comparative Migration Studies*, 4:16. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-016-0032-0>

1.7.4.3 Extent of improvement of social and economic conditions upon return

The reintegration of migrants who decide to return to their countries of origin can have an effect on the development of their countries when the opportunities to reintegrate to the labour market and the incentives to return exist. This indicator will consider:

- Economic and living conditions of returnee migrants, portability of social security rights. (Sources: existing studies on returnee households);
- Measures to support returnee migrants, skills matching schemes and support for entrepreneurship (existence of measures, programmes and number of migrants attended), number of matching skills services and migrants attended (Source: literature review, interviews).

1.7.4.4 Unintended effects of border management measures and unintended effects of other measures facilitating migration

This indicator will consider:

- Readmission agreements and number of readmitted migrants per year, existence of measures to support returned irregular migrants;
- Visa facilitation schemes and beneficiaries per year and type;
- Recruitment in vulnerable sectors, existence of framework for ethical recruitment and promotion of training in national institutions.
- Border infrastructure and measures (EU IBM standards);
- Changes in local legislative framework on migration and mobility (including asylum legislation);
- Asylum infrastructure.