



Joint strategic country evaluation of the development cooperation of Denmark, Sweden and the European Union with Bangladesh 2007-2013

**Final Report
Volume II – Annexes**

March 2016

*Contract N° EVA 2011/Lot 4
Specific Contract N° 2014/350917/1*

Development
and Cooperation
EuropeAid

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Contract No EVA 2011/Lot 4
N° 2014/350917/1

**This evaluation was commissioned by the Evaluation Unit
of the Directorate General for International Cooperation and
Development (European Commission)**

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*The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view
which are not necessarily shared by Denmark, EU and Sweden
or by the authorities of the concerned country.*

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Annex 1 : Terms of Reference

**Joint Country Evaluation of the development cooperation
of Denmark, Sweden and the European Union
with Bangladesh**

Terms of Reference

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1 EVALUATION MANDATE

The Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the European Consensus encourage donors to jointly evaluate development assistance, involving the partner country.

The European Union and its Member States promote the use of joint evaluations, in line with the policy on joint programming and the principles of aid effectiveness.

The evaluation of the European Union's co-operation with **Bangladesh** is part of the **2014** evaluation programme as approved by the Commissioners for Development, and agreed by the Commissioners for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood, Humanitarian Aid and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The joint evaluation will assess the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of joint efforts as well as the consolidated impact for the country development in relation to the policy priorities in the Agenda for Change.

Furthermore, the joint evaluation can feed into the EU+ joint programming process that started in 2013 with some joint analysis and could possibly evolve into a joint response to the 7th Five Year Plan (FYP) of the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) for the period mid-2015 to mid-2019 (under elaboration). It will also be timely to inform respective bilateral programming exercises of Member States and for the envisaged revision of the EU Multiannual Indicative Programme foreseen in 2015 to align the GoB FYP.

Denmark, Sweden and the European Union hereafter called **Evaluation Partners (EPs)**, decided to conduct jointly an evaluation of their development cooperation with Bangladesh.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 PARTNER COUNTRY BACKGROUND

While Bangladesh economic growth is averaging 6% per annum over the past 10 years and is not depending anymore on Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), development cooperation, which represented 1.69% of the GNI in 2012, has provided a steady financial and technical support to investment. Project aid represents 37.3% of 2014 Annual Development Programme with disbursement of the EU+ Group (EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland) reaching some €500 million every year.

GoB is strongly committed to accelerate inclusive growth and reduce poverty with the aspiration of accessing middle income country (MIC) status by 2021. In 2013, GNI per capita reached \$900 (Atlas method) and if growth continues at the rate of a minimum of 5.4% annually, Bangladesh could attain MIC status in 2021. In the 2014 Human Development Index, Bangladesh improved its ranking with 142th position (out of 186 countries). The country is ranked 111th (out of 148 countries) in the 2013 Gender Inequality Index. Bangladesh has managed to meet several MDG targets like reducing the poverty gap ratio, attaining gender parity at primary and secondary education, and significantly lowering the infant and maternal mortality rate. Nevertheless, while poverty has reduced, about 30% of the population (around 50 million people) of Bangladesh remain under poverty line including 17.6% (around 26 million people) in extreme poverty. Structural causes of chronic poverty are not properly addressed by most poverty reduction programmes, and the risk of falling under extreme poverty due to recurrent natural disasters and shocks is acute. Furthermore, Bangladesh is suffering from the Government's difficulties to translate strategies and policies into programmes and to allocate/absorb necessary resources for their implementation. Although the Bangladeshi people have proved to be extremely resilient, the combination of all these challenges is negatively affecting the most vulnerable.

2.2 DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

In 2013, the European Union (EU) has maintained its position as the biggest global Overseas Development Aid (ODA) donor accounting again for over half of the total ODA to developing countries as reported by OECD/DAC (€56.5 billion out of €101.5 billion). Net ODA receipts in Bangladesh reached USD 2,152 million in 2012 (compared to USD 1,490 million in 2011) equalling to 1.69% of the Gross National Income (GNI).

The EU (including Member States) is a long-lasting trade partners for Bangladesh and its first export market but has also been a reliable development partner. Development assistance to Bangladesh has been strategically designed in line with the European Consensus on Development, the internationally agreed MDGs and the Agenda for Change.

2.3 DENMARK/DANIDA

Denmark celebrated the four decades long partnership with Bangladesh in 2012. The overall objectives of Denmark's cooperation with Bangladesh for the period under evaluation have been to:

- Contribute to poverty reduction, growth and sustainable development, in particular through priority programmes within human rights and good governance; agriculture; water supply and sanitation and business partnerships.
- Contribute to the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law and good governance and thus political stability, through strengthening key democratic institutions in the field of public administration and civil society.
- Collaborate on global issues like climate change
- Promote commercial cooperation between Denmark and Bangladesh

The Bangladesh Country Programme for 2016-2021 is in the design phase. In line with the Strategy for Denmark's Development Assistance and the Denmark - Bangladesh Country Policy Paper and in line with the priorities of the Government of Bangladesh as described in the Bangladesh Perspective Plan (2010-2021) and the Sixth Fiver Year Plan (2011-2015) the Bangladesh Country Programme will cover the following Thematic Programmes: 1) Agriculture and Food Security, 2) Green Growth/Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation and 3) Human Rights and Good Governance.

2.4 EUROPEAN UNION (EU)

Cooperation Agreement on partnership and development signed in 2001, which among other things aims at (i) supporting the sustainable and social development of Bangladesh and particularly of the poorest sections of its population, with special emphasis on women, (ii) securing the conditions for developing trade and assisting Bangladesh in diversifying its production potential as well as (iii) pursuing equilibrium between policies for sustainable economic growth, social development and protection of the natural environment.

The geographical bilateral development cooperation was governed by the Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 (€403 million) which was grounded on the GoB Poverty Reduction strategy paper and concentrated on three focal sectors (Human and social development, good governance and human rights and economic and trade development), and two non-focal sectors environment/disaster preparedness and food security/nutrition. A 2009 mid-term review (MTR) re-oriented slightly the Multiannual Indicative Plan focus. The MTR has identified a number of issues and lessons learnt, such as the need for a more pro-poor approach in view of increased food and fuel price volatility; the need for reinforced efforts on primary education-related MDGs, and the growing need to take into account the commitments entered into by EU and Member States in the field of aid effectiveness. Modifications proposed included to step up support to Primary Education (formal and non-formal) instead of shifting support to Secondary Education; add an action in the field of social statistics with a view to supporting the 2011 Census; greater emphasis on pro-poor actions in all possible sectors, in particular Private Sector Development; (greater emphasis on reform issues in the health sector; and further support to statistics for development policy-making.

For the period 2014-2020, the EU identified priorities from the national development strategies and policies (Bangladesh Perspective Plan 2010-2021, Outline Perspective Plan of Bangladesh, so-called Vision 2021, and the Sixth Five Year Plan 2011-2015) and relevant sector ones. EU will continue promoting a more equitable growth and improved democratic governance with the aim of eradicating extreme poverty and increasing resilience, in line with the Agenda for Change. The Multiannual Indicative Plan (MIP) 2014-2020 (€690 million) proposes to focus on three sectors: i) Strengthening Democratic Governance, ii) Food and Nutrition security, iii) Education and Skills Development.

From 2016, EU aid will synchronise with Bangladesh 7th Five Year Plan 2016-2020 and align with the EU+ joint programming process together with interested EU+ Member States.

Across sectors, EU development programme integrates gender equality, human and labour rights, as well as priorities such as environment and climate change adaptation, which in Bangladesh remain a priority for EU attention.

2.5 SWEDEN/SIDA

The overall objective of Sweden's development co-operation with Bangladesh for the period 2008-2014 was that the right to education, health and a clean and healthy environment is fulfilled for women, men, girls and boys living in poverty. This will in turn contribute to the achievement of the goal of all Swedish development co-operation – to create the conditions for poor women and men to improve their lives – as well as the goal of Sweden's Policy for Global Development – to contribute to equitable and sustainable global development. Along with the development goals of Bangladesh (as expressed in the 6th Five Year Plan), two perspectives form the basis of the co-operation: poor people's perspectives on poverty and a rights perspective. The objectives of the Swedish Co-operation Strategy were i) increased access to and improved quality of primary education for children living in poverty, with a particular focus on girls; ii) improved access to efficient and non-discriminatory quality health care for people living in poverty, with a particular focus on maternal health care; iii) strengthened rights for women, and improved democratic governance through greater opportunities for women and men living in poverty to assess and demand quality and non-discriminatory social services; and iv) improved urban environment for the benefit of people living in poverty. The yearly country allocation for Bangladesh during the strategy period (2008-2014) has been 240 MSEK.

The Swedish Government has in August 2014 adopted a new Results Strategy for the Development Co-operation with Bangladesh for 2014-2020. The new strategy covers four areas: i) enhanced democracy and gender equality, improved respect for human rights, and freedom from oppression; ii) improved opportunities for people in poverty to contribute to, and benefit from, economic growth and to attain quality education; iii) an improved environment, reduced climate change and an enhanced resilience to environment and climate related risks and natural disasters; and iv) improved health, with a particular focus on children, women and sexual and reproductive health.

The yearly country allocation will remain approximately 240 MSEK (Million Swedish Krona) and Sweden will continue to work with partners within government and the civil society, as well as the private sector.

3 EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND MAIN USERS

The main objectives of the evaluation are to provide the relevant external co-operation services of the European Union, the interested Member States, the partner government and the wider public with:

- **an overall independent assessment of the co-operation strategy and delivery of the Evaluation Partners in Bangladesh.**
- key lessons to be learnt and strategic, operational and forward looking recommendations in order to improve the current and future strategies, programmes and actions of the Evaluation Partners, **including EU+ joint programming.**

The main users will be the Evaluation partners¹ the EU+ Group, the Government of Bangladesh, and the development partners. The evaluation will also be of interest to the wider international development community.

4 EVALUATION SCOPE AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS

4.1 EVALUATION SCOPE

The evaluation will review the **cooperation** of the Evaluation Partners for the **period 2007-2013 (2014 where appropriate) in Bangladesh.**

The evaluation should assess focal sectors and other important areas of Evaluation Partners co-operation with the country:

- Human and Social Development (Education and Health)
- Governance and Human Rights
- Economic and Trade Development with a particular emphasis on pro-poor Private Sector Development
- Food Security and Nutrition
- Gender equality and women empowerment, particular focus will be given to the **integration of gender equality** in the Evaluation Partners' strategies and programmes in all sectors².
- Environment and Disaster Management, Climate Change Adaptation as cross-cutting issue

The actual coverage of the different sectors will be defined in the Inception Phase

The evaluation will draw on pertinent major Evaluation Partners' (EPs) policy documents, and those specifically relating to Bangladesh.

The evaluation will cover :

- All of Commission's co-operation with Bangladesh and EEAS co-operation in so far as it relates to development,
- Spending and non-spending activities completed, in progress and being planned in the evaluation period. Political and policy dialogue must be covered,
- All particular thematic or issue focus as set out in section 4,
- All Evaluation Partners financial instruments and channels relevant to the country during the evaluation period, notably the **instruments of Budget Support and Sector-Wide Programme.**

Particular attention will be given to relevance and impact of *EPs strategies to government policies and poverty reduction strategies.*

The evaluation should also assess whether the EPs *are harmonised and coordinated and working in complement* with each other to improve impact and effectiveness.

European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and European Investment Bank (EIB) interventions are not part of this evaluation but coherence and complementarity with these organisations' strategies will be examined.

¹ For the EU: EU Commissioner(s), EU Management, thematic units, the European Union Delegation in Bangladesh

² The gender commitments of EU development policy are spelled out in the **EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (2010-2015)**, which aims to reinforce EU coordination on gender equality policies in development cooperation and improve the work on this matter. SEC (2010) 265 final: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/SEC_2010_265_gender_action_plan_EN.pdf.

ANNEX 5 contains issues to be included in the evaluation questions to be prepared by the evaluation team.

5 METHODOLOGY, TOOLS AND MAIN DELIVERABLES

The methodology to be used is based on the OECD/DAC Evaluation criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, impact and the 3Cs: complementarity of the European Union's interventions (EC+MS), coordination with other donors; and coherence between the Evaluation Partners (EP) interventions in the field of development cooperation and other EP policies that are likely to affect Bangladesh.

The evaluation should adhere to the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.

The overall guidance to be used is available on the web page of the DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit under the following address: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-approach-and-methodology_en

For the Sector budget support in primary education consultants will be guided by the Methodology for the evaluation of budget support operations as elaborated by the OECD/DAC Network on Development Evaluation in cooperation with the DEVCO evaluation unit.

6. EVALUATION APPROACH AND MAIN DELIVERABLES

The basic approach to the assignment consists of three *main phases + the dissemination*, which encompasses several stages. *Deliverables* in the form of reports³ and slide presentations should be submitted at the end of the corresponding stages.

³ For each Report a draft version is to be presented. For all reports, the contractor may either accept or reject through a *response sheet* the comments provided by the Evaluation manager. In case of rejection, the contractor must justify (in writing) the reasons for rejection. When the comment is accepted, a reference to the text in the report (where the relevant change has been made) has to be included in the response sheet.

The table below summaries these phases:

| <i>Evaluation phases:</i> | <i>Stages:</i> | <i>Deliverables⁴:</i> |
|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| 1. <u>Desk phase</u> | <u>Inception stage:</u> Structuring of the evaluation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ <i>Slide presentation</i> ➤ <i>Workshop in Dhaka</i> ➤ <i>Inception report</i> |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data collection • Analysis | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ <i>Desk Note</i> |
| 2. <u>Field phase</u> (Bangladesh) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data collection • Verification of the hypotheses | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ <i>Slide presentation (Preliminary findings)</i> |
| 3. <u>Synthesis phase</u> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis • Judgements • Seminar in Dhaka | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ <i>Draft final report</i> ➤ <i>Slide presentation + minutes of the country seminar</i> ➤ <i>Final report</i> |
| 4. <u>Dissemination phase</u> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seminar in Brussels | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ <i>Slide Presentation</i> |

All reports will be written in *English*. The reports must be written in Arial or Times New Roman minimum 11 and 12 respectively, single spacing. Inception and Desk reports will be delivered only electronically. The Draft Final report and the Final report will also be delivered in hard copies. The Executive summaries in English as well as the cover page photo (free of any copyright, free of charge) will be delivered separately in electronic form. The electronic versions of all documents need to be delivered in both editable and not editable format.

The contractor shall prepare draft minutes of the meetings. Once approved, these minutes shall be distributed by the Evaluation manager to the participants.

⁴ The contractors must provide, whenever requested and in any case at the end of the evaluation, the list of all document reviewed, data collected and databases built.

Desk Phase

Inception Stage

The process will start with an *initial 1day meeting* of the evaluation team leader + key experts in Brussels with the Management Group (Video Conference) to discuss and clarify objectives and requirements stated in the ToRs and technical offer of the team of experts. The team leader should participate to this meeting from Brussels (is advisable as well the participation of key experts).

The inception phase will include a **preliminary visit** of the evaluation team leader (and key experts) in Bangladesh of at least 1 week. This visit has different objectives: a) to give the Evaluation a good authorizing environment in the country since over the course of the year consultants will be asking and reviewing documents, making inquiries, etc...; b) to secure a "blessing" from senior officials from national Authorities and heads of agencies/NGOs in the country.

During this mission a $\frac{1}{2}$ day **inception workshop** will be held in Dhaka at which the team leader (plus key experts), the members of the Management Group, the Reference Group and relevant stakeholders shall participate (staff members of the responsible government line-ministries, interested members of the development partner Community, CSOs, private sector representatives). At that time we expect the team have elaborated the **first draft of the Intervention Logic and the Evaluation Questions** (*Slide Presentation*) to be tested with the stakeholders in Dhaka. A tentative date is planned for **the 8th December 2014**.

The workshop logistics (room rental, catering etc.) costs are **not** to be included in the offer.

Taking into account the outcome of the inception meeting and the preliminary mission, the contractor must deliver an **Inception Report** which should contain the following elements:

- the national background/context (political, economic, social, etc.) and the cooperation context between the Evaluation Partners and Bangladesh;
- the intervention logics (both faithful and reconstructed) of the EPs cooperation;
- an inventory of spending and non-spending activities carried out by the EPs during the period to be finalised in the desk report;
- the evaluation questions; a limited number of appropriate judgment criteria per evaluation question. Quantitative and/or qualitative indicators related to each judgment criterion if possible will be included otherwise presented in the desk report;
- a proposal outlining suitable methods of collection and analysis of data and information, indicating any limitations;
- a detailed work plan for the next phases.

The Desk Note

Upon approval of the Inception report, the contractor will carry out the last stage of the desk phase and will prepare and present a **Desk Note**, which should not include the *preliminary findings* but the following elements:

- the agreed evaluation questions with judgement criteria and their corresponding quantitative and qualitative indicators;
- the hypotheses and assumptions to be tested in the field phase;
- progress in the gathering of data. The complementary data required for analysis and for data collection during the field mission must be identified;

- the comprehensive list of EPs activities finalised and a list of activities examined during the desk phase, bearing in mind that activities analysed in the desk phase must be representative;
- methodological design, including the evaluation design, data collection tools to be applied in the field phase, and appropriate methods to analyse the information, indicating any limitations;
- a work plan for the field phase: a list with brief descriptions of activities for in-depth analysis in the field, the use of quantitative tools is advisable.

The contractor will present (slides presentation) and discuss the Desk report with the Management group in a meeting in Brussels in Video Conference with Dhaka.

Field phase

The fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out in the Desk report. The work plan and schedule of the mission will be agreed in advance (in principle at least three weeks before the mission starts). If it appears necessary to substantially deviate from the agreed fieldwork approach and/or schedule, (duration, number of experts, category etc.), the contractor must ask for the approval of the Evaluation manager before any changes can be applied. The related eligible costs will be revised accordingly. At the conclusion of the field mission the contractor will present the **preliminary findings** of the evaluation:

- (1) to the EU Delegation and the Reference Group (RG) during a de-briefing meeting and
- (2) to the Management Group (MG) in Brussels in VC with Dhaka with the support of *a slide* presentation during a half-day meeting.

Synthesis phase

The contractor will submit *the Draft final report* in conformity with the structure set out in annex 2.

The *Draft final report* will be discussed with the MG in Videoconference and transmitted to the RG. Following the meeting with the MG, the consolidated comments will be sent by the Evaluation Manager and the contractor will make appropriate modifications to the Draft final report taking into consideration comments received during de-briefing meetings with the Reference group. On the basis of comments expressed by the MG and RG members, the evaluation team has to amend and revise the draft report. While potential quality issues, factual errors or methodological problems should be corrected, comments linked to diverging judgements may be either accepted or rejected. In the latter instance, the evaluation team should explain the reasons in writing.

The in-country seminar

The approved Draft final report will be presented at a seminar in **Dhaka** using a slide presentation. The purpose of the seminar is to present the results, the conclusions and the preliminary recommendations of the evaluation to the national authorities, the EU Delegation and EU Member States and to all the main stakeholders (representatives of civil society organisations, other donors etc.) and obtain their reactions.

For the seminar, 80 hard copies of the main report (see annex 2 of the ToR) have to be produced and delivered (in principle) to the EU Delegation (the exact number of reports, addressee and delivery date will be specified by the Evaluation manager). Before printing, a proof copy shall be sent to and approved by the Evaluation manager.

The contractor shall submit the minutes of the seminar. These minutes, once approved by the Evaluation manager, will be included as an annex of the Final report.

The seminar logistics (room rental, catering etc.) costs are not to be included in the offer. The cost related to the presence of the experts is to be covered by the offer.

The contractor will prepare the **Final report** taking into account the comments expressed during the seminar. The Final report must be approved by the Evaluation manager before it is printed. The executive summary will not exceed 5 pages and included into the Final main report.

The offer will be based on *80 hard copies of the Final main report (without annexes) and 2 copies with annexes*. The Evaluation manager will indicate in due time how many copies exactly are to be sent to the DEVCO Evaluation Unit and how many to be delivered at the place of the dissemination seminar. Before printing, a proof copy shall be sent to and approved by the Evaluation manager. A non-editable version on CD-ROM support shall be added to each printed Final main report.

The Evaluation Unit will make a formal judgement on the quality of the evaluation in the "Quality Assessment Grid" (see annex 3) to be sent to the contractor before publication on Internet.

Dissemination phase

The approved final report will be presented to a wider range of stakeholders during a ½ day meeting organised in Brussels. The evaluation team will prepare a slide presentation.

The purpose of the seminar is to present the results, the conclusions and the recommendations of the evaluation to all the main stakeholders (EU Member States, partner countries' representatives, civil society organisations, European institutions and other donors, etc.). The slide presentation and minutes of the meeting are considered as a product of the evaluation.

For the seminar, 80 hard copies of the report (see Annex 2 of the ToRs) have to be produced and delivered to the place of the seminar in Brussels. Before printing, a proof copy shall be sent to and approved by the Evaluation manager. Once approved, minutes and the updated slide presentation will be published on Internet along with the evaluation report.

The seminar logistics (room rental, catering etc.) costs are not to be included in the offer. The cost related to the presence of the experts (travel cost, per diem etc.) is to be covered by the offer.

Other seminars and/or dissemination activities may be requested. In case of financial implications on the total contractual amount, such request (requests) will be formalised via a rider.

7. MANAGEMENT AND STEERING OF THE EVALUATION

The **Evaluation manager** (EM) at the DEVCO Evaluation Unit is responsible for the procurement and contracting of the team and for the administrative management of the assignment. The EM will provide a pivotal role in facilitating the quality assurance process and ensure that evaluation is undertaken in accordance to the ToRs. He/she will be responsible of the organisation and serve as principal liaisons with the Management and Country Reference Group members.

The evaluation will be closely followed by a **Management Group** composed as follows:

- For the EU: Evaluation Unit
- For Denmark: Royal Danish Embassy/DANIDA,
- For Sweden, The Swedish Embassy in Dhaka,
- The EU Delegation in Dhaka as observer

The Management Group is responsible for the (timely) realisation and quality control of the evaluation. This includes:

- To facilitate contacts between the evaluation team, Reference Group, the Government and relevant stakeholders.
- To ensure that the evaluation team has access to and has consulted all relevant information sources and documents.
- To ensure that the evaluation will be carried out according to the ToR.
- To validate the Evaluation Questions.
- To oversee the work of the consultants including comment and approval of reports; comments by individual group members are compiled into a single document by the evaluation manager and subsequently transmitted to the evaluation team.

The overall approach of the Management Group will be to work in a transparent manner based on regular consultations with the Country Reference Group (see below).

The *Country Reference Group (MG)* will be established to:

- serve as a resource and provide advice and feedback to the Management Group and evaluation team including on the draft reports produced during the evaluation process.
- ensure the evaluation team has access to and consults all information sources and documentation on activities undertaken.

It will be composed of:

- For EU, the EU Delegation in Dhaka
- For the Government of Bangladesh, the European Relations Division (ERD)
- For development partners, representatives to be identified
- For the civil society, representatives to be identified.
- For the private sector, representative to be identified.

8. THE EVALUATION TEAM

The evaluation team as such is expected to possess expertise in:

- **Evaluation methods and techniques in general** and, if possible, of evaluation in the field of external relations and development cooperation. It is highly desirable that at least the Team leader is fully familiar with the Commission's methodological approach (cf. EuropeAid Evaluation Unit's website: previous relevant expertise in Bangladesh will be an advantage;
- the following fields:
- Social sectors: **Education, Health**
- **Governance and Human Rights,**
- **Economic and Trade Development** (included Private Sector Development)
- **Food and Nutrition Security**
- **Gender equality, women empowerment and gender mainstreaming**
- **Environment and Disaster Management, Climate Change Adaptation** as cross-cutting issue
- Aid modalities and particularly **Budget support**, included **OECD/DAC methodology to evaluate Budget Support** operations
- **working knowledge of English**

Following experience is an advantage:

- Local language(s)

The key skills are indicated **in bold**. In their absence, the 80 points threshold may not be reached.

It is expected that the Team leader will be an expert of category Senior.

The team composition should be justified and the team coordination and members' complementarity should be clearly described. A breakdown of working days per expert must be provided.

The team members must be independent from the programmes/projects/policies evaluated. Should a conflict of interest be identified in the course of the evaluation, it should be immediately reported to the Evaluation manager for further analysis and appropriate measures.

The team will have excellent writing and editing skills. The Contractor remains fully responsible for the quality of the report. Any report which does not meet the required quality will be rejected.

During the offers evaluation process the contracting authority reserves the right to interview by phone one or several members of the evaluation teams proposed.

The Framework Contractor must make available an appropriate logistical support for the experts, including their travel and accommodation arrangements for each assignment, the secretarial support, appropriate **software** and communication means. The experts will be equipped with the standard equipment, such as an individual laptop, computer, mobile phones, etc. No additional cost for these items may be included in the offer.

9. THE TECHNICAL OFFER

The financial offer will be itemised to allow the verification of the fees compliance with the Framework contract terms as well as, for items under h to k of the contractual price breakdown model, whether the prices quoted correspond to the market prices. In particular, the local travel costs will be detailed and if necessary, justified in an Explanatory note. The per diems will be based on the UN per diem http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/procedures/implementation/per_diems/index_en.htm which are the maxima not to be exceeded.

The total length of sections 2, 3 and 4 of the technical offer (Framework contract, Annexe 1, section 10.3. b) may not exceed 20 pages, a CV may not exceed 5 pages. References and data relevant to the assignment must be highlighted in bold (font minimum Times New Roman 12 or Arial, 11)

The methodology submitted shall not contain terms such as "if time allows", "if the budget allows", "if the data are available" etc. Should it appear that an activity foreseen in the methodology is impossible or inappropriate to be carried out due to force majeure or other reasons in the interest of the assignment, the change to the methodology as well as its financial impact must be agreed by the Evaluation manager.

The offer is expected to demonstrate the team's understanding of the ToR in their own words. Should the offer contain quotations, these sections must be clearly identified and sources indicated.

10. TIMING

The project implementation is due to start in November 2014. The expected duration is of 11 months. As part of the technical offer, the framework contractor must fill-in the timetable in the Annex 4. However, this table shall not start by a precise date but by "day/week 1".

11. TECHNICAL OFFERS EVALUATION CRITERIA

The offers must contain as minimum all items referred to in the Annex 1, art. 10.3.b. of the Framework contract.

The offers evaluation criteria and their respective weights are:

| | Maximum |
|---|----------------|
| Total score for Organisation and methodology | |
| Understanding of ToR | 5 |
| Organization of tasks including timing | 10 |
| Evaluation approach, working method, analysis | 20 |
| Quality control mechanism | 5 |
| Sub Total | 40 |
| Experts/ Expertise | |
| Team leader | 20 |
| Other experts | 30 |
| Expert for quality control | 10 |
| Sub Total | 60 |
| Overall total score | 100 |

ANNEXES

ANNEX I: INDICATIVE DOCUMENTATION TO BE CONSULTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

Indicative only:

Denmark

- Review Aide Memoire Agriculture Sector Support Programme Phase II, Mid-Term Review Report, March 2009
- Review Aide Memoire Joint Review of the Danish Support to Water and Sanitation Sector 2012-2015, March 2013
- Review Aide Memoire Human Rights and Good Governance Programme, Phase III, April, 2014

European Commission

- 2001 Cooperation Agreement between EC and GoB
- European Country Strategy Paper for Bangladesh Multi annual Indicative Programmes (MIP) 2007-2013
- 2009 MIP Mid term Review
- Exiting relevant programme evaluation report (list to be provided later)
-

Sweden

- Strategy for Development Co-operation with Bangladesh, 2008-2014.
- The Swedish Government's Gender Policy.
- The Evaluation of the Bangladesh Reality Check
- Exiting relevant programme evaluation report (list to be provided later)
- The Results Strategy for Development Co-operation with Bangladesh 2014-2020 – as soon as decided and available

Government of Bangladesh

- GoB 6th Five Year Plan and Development Result Framework
- Relevant sectoral policy

Aid effectiveness

- Joint Cooperation Strategy 2010-2015
- Local Consultative group relevant documents (review etc...)
- EU+ Joint programming relevant documents
- The Busan Commitments on Managing Diversity and reducing fragmentation – stock take and emerging issues – February 2014

ANNEX 2: OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL REPORT

The overall layout of the **Final report** is:

- Executive summary (1);
- Context of the evaluation and methodology;
- Evaluation questions and their answers (findings);
- Conclusions (2); and
- Recommendations (3).

Length: the final main report may not exceed 70 pages excluding annexes. Each annex must be referenced in the main text. Additional information regarding the context, the activities and the comprehensive aspects of the methodology, including the analysis, must be put in the annexes.

(1) Executive summary

The executive summary of the evaluation report may not exceed 5 pages (3.000 words). It should be structured as follows:

- a) 1 paragraph explaining the objectives and the challenges of the evaluation;
- b) 1 paragraph explaining the context in which the evaluation takes place;
- c) 1 paragraph referring to the methodology followed, spelling out the main tools used (data on the number of projects visited, number of interviews completed, number of questionnaires sent, number of focus groups conducted, etc.);
- d) The general conclusions related to sectorial and transversal issues on one hand, and the overarching conclusion(s) (for example on poverty reduction) on the other hand;
- e) A limited number of main conclusions should be listed and classified in order of importance; and
- f) A limited number of main recommendations should be listed according to their importance and priority. The recommendations have to be linked to the main conclusions.

The chapters on conclusions and recommendations should be drafted taking the following issues into consideration:

(2) Conclusions

- The conclusions have to be assembled by homogeneous "clusters" (groups). It is not required to set out the conclusions according to the evaluation criteria.
- The general conclusions related to sectorial and transversal issues and the overarching conclusion(s) (for example on poverty reduction).
- Specific conclusions on each financial instrument indicated in the ToR section "3.1.1. Legal scope". These conclusions will focus on effectiveness, efficiency, added value, complementarity and synergies with other financial instruments.
- The chapter on conclusions must enable to identify lessons learnt, both positive and negative.

(3) Recommendations

- Recommendations should be substantiated by the conclusions.
- Recommendations have to be grouped in clusters (groups) and presented in order of importance and priority within these clusters.
- Recommendations have to be realistic and operational.
- The possible conditions of implementation (who? when? how?) have to be specified and key steps/action points should be detailed when possible.

Annexes (non exhaustive)

- National background;
- Methodological approach;
- Information matrix;
- Monograph, case studies;
- List of documents consulted;
- List of institutions and persons met;
- People interviewed;
- Results of the focus group, expert panel etc.;
- Slide presentations in the country/regional seminar and the seminar minutes;
- All data bases constructed for the purpose of the evaluation.

EDITING

The Final report must:

- be consistent, concise and clear;
 - be well balanced between argumentation, tables and graphs;
 - be free of linguistic errors;
 - include a table of contents indicating the page number of all the chapters listed therein, a list of annexes (whose page numbering shall continue from that in the report) and a complete list in alphabetical order of any abbreviations in the text;
 - contain an Executive summary (or summaries in several linguistic versions when required).
 - be typed in single spacing and printed double sided, in A4 format.
- The presentation must be well spaced (the use of graphs, tables and small paragraphs is strongly recommended). The graphs must be clear (shades of grey produce better contrasts on a black and white printout).
 - Reports must be glued or stapled; plastic spirals are not acceptable.
 - The contractor is responsible for the quality of translations and their conformity with the original text.

ANNEX 3 :QUALITY ASSESSMENT GRID

| Concerning these criteria, the evaluation report is: | Unacceptable | Poor | Good | Very good | Excellent |
|---|---------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------|------------------|
| 1. Meeting needs: Does the evaluation adequately address the information needs of the commissioning body and fit the terms of reference? | | | | | |
| 2. Relevant scope: Is the rationale of the policy examined and its set of outputs, results and outcomes/impacts examined fully, including both intended and unexpected policy interactions and consequences? | | | | | |
| 3. Defensible design: Is the evaluation design appropriate and adequate to ensure that the full set of findings, along with methodological limitations, is made accessible for answering the main evaluation questions? | | | | | |
| 4. Reliable data: To what extent are the primary and secondary data selected adequate? Are they sufficiently reliable for their intended use? | | | | | |
| 5. Sound data analysis: Is quantitative information appropriately and systematically analysed according to the state of the art so that evaluation questions are answered in a valid way? | | | | | |
| 6. Credible findings: Do findings follow logically from, and are they justified by, the data analysis and interpretations based on carefully described assumptions and rationale? | | | | | |
| 7. Validity of the conclusions: Does the report provide clear conclusions? Are conclusions based on credible results? | | | | | |
| 8. Usefulness of the recommendations: Are recommendations fair, unbiased by personnel or shareholders' views, and sufficiently detailed to be operationally applicable? | | | | | |
| 9. Clearly reported: Does the report clearly describe the policy being evaluated, including its context and purpose, together with the procedures and findings of the evaluation, so that information provided can easily be understood? | | | | | |
| Taking into account the contextual constraints on the evaluation, the overall quality rating of the report is considered. | | | | | |

ANNEX 4: TIMING

To be filled by the contractors and submitted as part of the methodology

| <i>Evaluation Phases and Stages</i> | <i>Notes and Reports</i> | <i>Dates</i> | <i>Meetings/Communications</i> |
|-------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|--|
| Desk phase | | | |
| Inception stage | | <i>November 2014</i> | Briefing session in Brussels VC (Video Conference) Dhaka MG Meeting |
| | Workshop (MG, RG + key stakeholders) <i>Slide presentation</i> | <i>08 December</i> | Inception mission of the evaluators to the field (TL + Key experts – 1 week) |
| | Draft Inception report (<i>Slide presentation</i>) | | MG meeting Brussels VC Dhaka |
| | Final Inception report | <i>January</i> | |
| Desk study | Desk note | <i>February</i> | MG Meeting Brussels VC Dhaka |
| | No final Desk required comments taken into consideration in the Draft final Report | | |
| Field phase | | | |
| | Mission of the TL and all experts in Bangladesh (3 weeks) | <i>March/April</i> | De-briefing meeting with the Delegation + RG |
| | Slide Presentation | | MG Meeting Brussels; VC Dhaka |
| Synthesis phase | | | |
| | 1 st Draft final report | <i>May 2015</i> | MG Meeting VC Dhaka |
| | 2 nd Draft final report Presentation + Minutes | <i>June/July 2015</i> | Seminar in Dhaka |
| | Final report + other deliverables | <i>July</i> <i>September</i> | Seminar in Brussels |

MG: Management Group ; RG: Reference Group

ANNEX 5 : ISSUES TO BE STUDIED

- 1) How appropriate are the Evaluation Partners' strategy as regards the objective of reducing poverty? Were the strategies aligned to GoB's national policies? Were there sufficiently concentrated and ranked?
- 2) To what extent have the Evaluation Partners' interventions in the different sectors contributed to policy dialogue focused on meeting the needs of the poorest and marginalised population groups?
- 3) Are the results and impacts satisfactory in relation to the goal of poverty reduction?
- 4) To what extent has Evaluation Partner aid in the selected sectors contributed towards improving the lives of the poorest?
- 5) To what extent has gender equality been integrated? How? And with what results?
- 6) Is budget support an adequate financing modality in Bangladesh? Is there a common understanding of Public Finance Management challenges and actions to be undertaken.
To what extent have the interventions in the different sectors contributed towards fair access to basic services of a high quality? To what extent have the modalities of implementation of the strategy and choice of partnership made it possible to meet the needs of the poorest regions as a priority? In particular what are the outcomes of technical cooperation programmes?
- 7) Do the involvement of EU and Member States in national aid coordination mechanism (Joint Cooperation Strategy and Local Consultative Group) as well on the specific EU+ coordination and its contribution to complementarity reduce fragmentation and improving coherence of policy dialogue?.
- 8) Policy coherence: to what extent has the design of the respective strategies taken into account potential interactions and conflicts with other policies ie trade and political issues?

Annex 2: National context and Evaluation Partners' engagement in Bangladesh

This annex presents in detail both the national background and the EPs' strategic and financial engagement in Bangladesh.

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1. National context

Bangladesh has approximately 159 million inhabitants on a landmass of 147,570 square kilometres, making it the most densely populated non-city country in the world. It is a low-income country, with a per capita income of US\$ 1010 (Atlas method) in 2013 and 24% of its population is estimated to be living in poverty (2014). Historically, geography has been a main determinant of the country's development, with 80% of its land being floodplains created by more than 300 rivers and channels, including three major rivers: the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and the Meghna. Bangladesh forms only a small part of a large regional hydrologic system—less than 10 % of the river basin falls within the national territory. Its southern part is nestled in the Bay of Bengal with a 710 km long coastal belt that is home to nearly 35 million people.

Bangladesh's geographical position and very high population density make it highly vulnerable to natural disasters including floods, droughts, and cyclones. While Bangladesh has substantially improved its capacity to manage such natural disasters (and hence reduce the associated human and economic costs), global climate change has increased these vulnerabilities manifold and threatens to undermine the gains made in disaster risk reduction.

1.1. Political context

After independence in 1971, Bangladesh endured close to two decades of poverty, famine, political turmoil and military coups. The restoration of democracy in 1991 has been followed by *relative* calm and economic progress. Constitutionally, direct elections in which all citizens, aged 18 or over, can vote are held every five years for the unicameral parliament known as the Jatiyo Sangshad. Currently it has 350 members (including 50 reserved seats for women) elected from single-member, first past the post constituencies. However, politics remain highly confrontational especially between the two female headed major parties; the ruling Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Dynastic and personal elements exacerbate the tensions between the two main parties.

In the evaluation period Bangladesh has seen one caretaker government (2006-2008) and one election (2008) resulting in Awami League winning. The 2008 elections (supported *inter alia* by EU) were generally perceived as a success. First, for Bangladesh's political institutions because it demonstrated that they could oversee a peaceful transition of power from one government to another without the violence that had accompanied such changes in the past. Second, for the Bangladesh political elite, who witnessed a return to traditional party politics, and for ordinary citizens, many of whom voted for the first time in their lives – the turnout was over 86% – indeed, more women than men actually voted in this election. Third, for the robustness of the election system itself in that some known corrupt individuals were either not re-elected or saw their previous majority slashed. And finally, for the international community who had invested so much in supporting a free and fair electoral process. However the first past the post system also meant that the BNP-led opposition with 33% of the vote only had 10% of the seats in parliament, whereas the Awami League led coalition with 49% of the vote had 88% of the seats. Combined with

antagonistic relations between the main parties, the political contest is often seen as a ‘winner takes all’ process.

Since the 2008 elections, central level politics have arguably become even more antagonistic with frequent jailing of opposition politicians¹ and breakdown of consensus on core democratic processes. The opposition has increasingly resorted to parliamentary boycotts, political demonstrations, *hartals* (labour strikes), and transport blockades. These activities have often succeeded in disrupting economic activities and immobilizing the government. Consequently 2013 was marked by more than 85 nationwide general strikes and blockades, with the opposition calling for constitutional amendments and the instalment of a caretaker government. However the demands from the opposition were not heeded by government, resulting in the former boycotting the January 2014 elections which were unsurprisingly won by the ruling Awami League coalition, with its candidates declared victors in 127 of the 154 uncontested seats by default. 21 people died in election related violence on the voting day alone, with over 100 polling centres set on fire. EU did not send monitors as ‘Bangladesh’s main political parties were unable to create an atmosphere for transparent, inclusive and credible elections, despite many efforts, including under UN auspices.’² Institutional oversight is weak in Bangladesh. Competition between political parties has hindered development of strong mechanisms for domestic accountability, with a state driven by party interests, in which the ruling party tends to use state institutions for its own interests rather than developing institutions with appropriate checks and balances. Public institutions have very few formal oversight mechanisms that the opposition can use to hold the government accountable. Parliament and the judiciary do not provide significant oversight of executive power. Nongovernmental organizations, professional associations, and the media provide alternative checks and oversight on Parliament and the executive, but many are allied with partisan interests.


At local level the constitution of Bangladesh provides in principle for a highly decentralized public sector - with a local governance unit in every administrative unit of the Republic that is entrusted to elected councils. In reality, however, Bangladesh is widely considered to be one of the most centralized countries in the world with only around 16.2% of total public expenditures being spend at local level.³ The country’s 64 districts (Zillas) are divided into Upazilas, which are further divided into Unions. Districts, Upazilas and Unions are considered as administrative units, composed of elected persons. Due to rapid growth of towns and cities, in sub-urban areas the Union Parishad is frequently replaced by the Municipal Corporations (Pourashava) and City Corporations.

¹ E.g. the leader of the country’s main Islamic party, Jamaat-e-Islami has now been sentenced to death twice (sic), first by a criminal court and secondly, by Bangladesh self-styled International Crimes Tribunal.

² EU High Representative, Ms Ashton, 20 December 2013.

³ This includes the estimated amount of devolved local government expenditures in Bangladesh (2.6% points), plus the deconcentrated expenditures (7.1 % points), while other (direct or delegated) centralized expenditures in support of the local public sector account for another 6.4 % points. See Jamie Boex : ‘Providing basic public services at the door step of the people? Estimating the size of the local public sector in Bangladesh’ Urban Institute, 2012.

Figure 1 - Local authorities expenditure as % of total public spending, Bangladesh in an international perspective



Source: Local Public Sector Initiative, 2012

As can be seen from the figure above there are 10 City Corporations, 310 Pourashavas (Municipalities), 64 Zila Parishads (Districts), 481 Upazila Parishads (sub-districts) and 4498 Union Parishads (rural local governments). Additionally, there are 3 Hill District Councils. These local government institutions are served by nearly 77,000 elected representatives and 75,000 government officials. Since inception, these local government institutions were given responsibilities for the maintenance of law and order, infrastructure development, promotion of health, education, and some other basic social services.

Democratically elected local government bodies termed parishads, meaning "councils", exist at both the Upazila and union levels throughout rural Bangladesh, while the urban centres are covered by various categories of Pourashava (municipalities), and city corporations.


There are Zilla Parishads (at the district level), which are run by an appointed administrator drawn from among the members of the ruling party. The local government system is overseen at the central government level by the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives (MoLGRDC). There is no specific sector policy on local government nor on decentralization. However, the constitutional provisions, sector policies and especially the most recent Five Year Plan recognise the importance of a local government system and its role in development management and service delivery in Bangladesh, and the system is backed up by a recently refined comprehensive legal framework for Union and Upazila Parishads. In both of these institutions, women are guaranteed a minimum number of seats. Many of the same governance weaknesses found at central government level are also present locally, in particular the limited transparency and accountability, which has been pointed out as a key concern⁴. EU and Denmark have funded a joint project supporting local governance and decentralisation, in partnership with UNDP.

⁴ See e.g. Barkat *et. al.*: 'Policy Brief on Local Governance and Decentralization in Bangladesh', Human Development Research Centre, May 2013

1.2 Economic and social context

With the political and security stabilisation (relative to the previous years) in the early 1990s economic growth picked up and has been positive ever since, with an accelerating trend over time as can be seen from Figure 2 below. While not comparable to the East-Asian ‘tiger economies’ growth rates when they were at a similar developmental level, Bangladesh’s achievements are nevertheless substantial and extremely robust to the numerous external and internal shocks such as natural disasters, global financial crises and political turmoil. The most recent estimate by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics puts GDP growth for FY 2014 at 6.1%, 10 basis points higher than the preceding year. The Bangladesh economy has seen substantial structural change with a declining share of agricultural GDP over the last four decades, dropping from about half of total GDP during the 1970s to about 15.8 per cent in 2014. Despite this decline, the sector still provides employment to about half of the country’s labour force. Moreover, agricultural production provides critical linkages for development to the rest of the economy. The performance of agriculture thus has an important bearing on employment generation, food security and poverty alleviation in the country. In other words, while the declining share of agriculture in national income is a natural process, the development priorities still need to recognise the primacy of agricultural growth in providing food and income security to households in Bangladesh. Generally, Bangladesh has, over the evaluation period progressed towards a more food secure, better-nourished and healthier country. However, challenges still remain for many people in terms of diversification of food production, access to food in adequate quantity and quality, and nutrition outcomes, especially for mother and children.⁵

Figure 2 - Bangladesh GDP Growth Rate



Source: World Bank: WDI and Country Update, 2014

For most of the period the garments industry and remittances were the two key *growth drivers*; combined, they accounted for two-thirds of export earnings and allowed Bangladesh to run a surplus on the current account. The growth of the garment industry, set to

⁵ See e.g. the Ministry of Food: ‘Monitoring Report: National Food Policy Plan of Action and Country Investment Plan, 2014’

become the most important manufacturing sector in Bangladesh, has also catalysed significant social changes. Women with access to such factory jobs have declining fertility and later marriage. Exposure to the garment sector reduces the incidence of early marriage and childbirth by 28 % and 29 % respectively. The results can be explained by parents' propensity to keep younger girls in school to have a better chance of getting at high paid garment sector work later.⁶

Remittances contribute significantly to inclusive income growth both directly by augmenting the income of the receiving families and indirectly by contributing to local level development. This in turn also accelerates poverty reduction: studies have shown that poverty incidence among households receiving remittances from abroad was only 17 % compared to 42 % among the population at large.⁷

Growth drivers have become more diverse with the combination of falling fertility and increased labour demand from factories pushing up agricultural wages and productivity. A recent ODI study estimates that agricultural wages in Bangladesh rose a staggering 45% for men and 48% for women between 2005 and 2010, clearly also driving rural poverty reduction.⁸

In aggregate poverty has declined from 57% at the beginning of the 1990s to 49% by 2000, 40% by 2005 and 31% by 2010, the latest year for which survey-based evidence is available. However, based on extrapolations, the World Bank estimated that poverty has declined further to 24% in 2014 (World Bank, October 2014). Inequality has also fallen, albeit more modestly, with the gini coefficient dropping from 33.5 in 2000 to 32.1 in 2010.⁹

Bangladesh has made significant progress in the increase of equitable access to *education*, reduction of dropouts, improvement in completion of the cycle, but quality issues still remain. Bangladesh has already achieved gender parity in primary and secondary enrolment. As a result of massive expansion of supply, targeted stipends to bring the poorest and girls into schools and continued investments in education, Bangladesh achieved almost universal access in primary education with the net enrolment rate (NER) at 97% in 2014 as can also be seen from the figure below.¹⁰

⁶ Heath and Mobarak: 'Manufacturing Growth and the Lives of Bangladeshi Women', NBER Working Paper 20383.


⁷ Siddiqui & Mahmud: 'Migration Impacts on Poverty and Local Level Development' August 2014 and World Bank 2011.

⁸ ODI: *Rural Wages in Asia* London, October 2014.

⁹ World Bank *WDI*, 2014. For comparison, Denmark's recent gini coefficient was 24.0 whereas the corresponding figures for Germany and USA were 30.6 and 48.0 respectively.

¹⁰ Planning Commission: '*Bangladesh MDG Progress Report*' August 2014

Figure 3 - Net enrolment rates at primary level for girls and boys



Sources: BANBES, MOE & APSC, DPE

However, the poor quality of education is undermining progress in the survival rate to grade 5, which in turn poses a challenge in achieving MDG 2. The trend growth rate for primary cycle survival at present is considerably below the warranted rate for achieving the 100 % target. In this context, high repetition and dropout rates pose serious challenges for accelerating progress in survival to the last grade. On average, 8.6 years of pupil inputs are required to produce a 5 years primary school graduate. Concerted demand side efforts have been made to improve especially girls’ secondary education through a stipend programme using especially private channels.


The challenges nevertheless remain and are primarily structural and operational which call for more than incremental reform. For example:

- Per student per year public expenditure around \$50 (best estimate) does not provide a threshold of minimum necessary investment to achieve the quality and equity objectives in primary education and break away from a “low-cost-low-yield” pattern.
- To have a manageable class size (around 30 students per teacher) and internationally accepted learning time norm (about a thousand hours in a year), at least 50% more teachers are needed in the system and their skills and performance need to be improved (which is related to the resource issue noted above.)
- Curriculum, textbooks, learning materials, student assessment and pedagogic practices are not fully aligned to learners achieving specified competencies.
- A highly centralized system and culture of governance and management needs to give way to more responsibility and authority with accountability and stakeholder involvement at school and local level.

EU and Sweden have supported the education sector throughout the evaluation period.

In the *health* sector Bangladesh has made impressive gains in the related MDGs, increasing the odds of surviving through childhood and pregnancy and controlling the burden of communicable disease. The health sector (government, private sector and NGO providers) has continually incorporated proven cost-effective interventions, which have enhanced the impact of health services. The development of a highly pluralistic health system environment characterized by the participation of a multiplicity of different stakeholders and agents and by ad hoc, diffused forms of management, has contributed to these outcomes by creating conditions for rapid change. As can be seen from figure 4, under five mortality rates have been reduced by 2/3 in two decades, including substantial improvements during the evaluation period.

Figure 4 - Under 5 Mortality Rates (per 1,000)



Source: SVRS, BBS various years


The main cause of death among 1 to 5 five years old children is no longer disease-related, but drowning (see GoB: MDG Progress Report, 2014). Similar to the under-five mortality rate, substantial reduction has been documented in the infant mortality rate which dropped from 87 per 1,000 live births in 1993-94 to 43 in 2011. EU and Sweden have supported the health sector throughout the evaluation period. Moreover, improved nutritional status has also reduced child stunting and underweight, which in turn substantially impact under-5 mortality rates.

However in both the health and education sector the quality and consistency of the delivery of public services is often compromised due to both low levels of funding (e.g. Bangladesh invests only 2.5% of GDP in education) and governance fragility that often undermines the accountability nexus between the clients (e.g. pupils and patients), providers (e.g. schools and clinics) and financers (e.g. local and central governments).

1.3 Governance context and the development paradox

Bangladesh is in some ways a development paradox. As demonstrated above it has achieved impressive progress on key social indicators of importance to its development partners in areas such as general education -and girls' education in particular- and health indicators. Consequently, Bangladesh has already met several MDG targets. Moreover, Bangladesh has seen robust growth over the last two decades, accelerating to an annual average just above 6% throughout the evaluation period, despite the adverse external shocks such as the end of the favourable trading regime under the multifibre agreement (MFA) and the global financial crisis.

Figure 5 - Governance indicators in Bangladesh



These achievements are even more impressive given the poor quality of governance that characterises not only Bangladesh's public sector institutions but also much of the private sector, where corporate governance is weak, as illustrated by the Rana Plaze factory collapse. Moreover, Bangladesh has consistently featured among the poorest performers in international indexes, such as the corruption perception index and other more specific indicators have shown virtually no progress (see figure 5). Some argue that Bangladesh thus defies conventional wisdom that

good governance of key institutions is a core ingredient of promoting inclusive growth and it also calls into question the validity of previous warnings that failure to address governance quality would undermine the development gains.¹¹ This was already stated more than a decade ago in e.g. the previous EU evaluation of its Bangladesh country strategy (2003) as well as in one of DfID's first 'Drivers of pro-poor growth' studies on Bangladesh (2002). Bangladesh is thus arguably a case of a growth governance conundrum.¹² On the other hand, it should also be noted that poverty reduction, especially in rural areas, is to a certain extent driven by remittances, which are invested in income generating activities. Moreover, with better governance Bangladesh might arguably have attained much higher growth rates, not least if complemented with infrastructural improvements (power, roads and ports).

Despite the antagonistic political context, there has been a consensus around some core institutional principles such as the maintenance of macroeconomic discipline, as evident

¹¹ See e.g. Asadullah, Savoia, and Mahmud: 'Paths to Development: Is there a Bangladesh Surprise?' in *World Development*, Vol 62, 2014

¹² See e.g. Mahmud, Ahmed & Mahajan: 'Economic Reforms, Growth and Governance: The Political Economy Aspects of Bangladesh's Development Surprise' World Bank 2010.

from low inflation rates, fiscal deficits and external indebtedness. Moreover, the state has significantly improved its capacity to manage natural disasters, thus reducing considerably their macroeconomic impact.

Recognizing its limitations in meeting the strong demand for services, successive governments have created space and forged partnerships with NGOs and the private sector to deliver services. Similar consensus has been achieved on the role of women, where consistent efforts have been made to unleash the development potential of half the population, with successive governments having supported family planning, girls' participation in schooling and female entry into the labour force. All three EPs have focused on governance in the evaluation period, often in the form of strengthening demand and reducing alleged information asymmetries between government and the wider population.

1.4 National development strategies

In the public sphere, the National Planning Commission is mandated to establish a long-term perspective for development planning; to determine the goals, strategies, targets and priorities of development plans and annual development programmes; and to formulate policy for the achievement of planned goals and targets. Often this has taken the form of Five Year Plans, starting in 1973 with the first plan. Currently the Sixth Five Year Plan for FY 2011 to 2015 is providing the policy and strategy framework.

However, at the start of the evaluation period Bangladesh had a poverty reduction strategy paper entitled '*Unlocking the Potential National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction*' which de facto covered the period 2005 to 2010, as the caretaker government from 2006 to 2009 effectively continued working under the strategy. This strategy had eight key focus areas: employment, nutrition, maternal health, sanitation and safe water, quality education (primary, secondary and vocational), criminal justice, local governance and monitoring. It set out eight specific avenues – four strategic blocks and four supporting strategies - through which the goal of accelerated poverty reduction would be pursued:

- Supportive macroeconomics to ensure rapid growth, with a focus on stable macroeconomic balances, improved regulatory environment, higher private investment, increased inflow of FDI, effective trade and competition policies, and a poor- and gender-sensitive budgetary process
- Choice of critical sectors to maximise pro-poor benefits from the growth process, with special emphasis on the rural, agricultural, informal and SME sectors, and with improved connectivity through rural electrification, roads and telecommunications
- Safety net measures to protect the poor, especially women, against anticipated and unanticipated income/consumption shocks, through targeted efforts
- Human development of the poor, to raise capacity through education, health, sanitation, safe water, nutrition and social interventions
- Participation and empowerment of the poor, especially women, and other disadvantaged and marginalised groups such as disabled, ethnic minorities, ecologically vulnerable, etc.
- Promoting good governance through improving implementation capacity, promoting

local governance, tackling corruption, enhancing access to justice for the poor, and improving sectoral governance

- Improving service-delivery in the areas of basic needs
- Caring for the environment and its sustainability.

The strategy also noted that there were three critical follow-up issues which would determine the success of the strategy: implementation and coalition-building, costing and resource mobilisation for target attainment, benchmarking and monitoring of progress. All three EPs have used this strategy to guide their cooperation efforts in the first part of the evaluation period.

With a new AL government taking office in 2009, its main election manifesto was quickly adopted to become the *Vision 2021* (the year chosen to coincide with Bangladesh's golden jubilee as an independent nation). It envisions a Bangladesh which, by 2020/2021, will be a middle-income country where poverty will be drastically reduced, where Bangladeshi citizens will be able to meet every basic need and where development will be on fast track, with ever-increasing rates of inclusive growth. Politically the vision is to base Bangladesh on democratic principles with emphasis on human rights, freedom of expression, rule of law, equality of citizens irrespective of race, religion and creed, and equality of opportunities. The Bangladesh economy should be managed within the framework of a market economy with appropriate government interventions to correct market distortions, to ensure equality of opportunities, and to ensure equity and social justice for all.

Currently the **Sixth Five Year Plan**, covering the FY 2011 to 2015, is the implementation vehicle of the Vision 2021. The fundamental objective of the plan is to develop strategies, policies and institutions that allow Bangladesh to accelerate growth and reduce poverty. Key is the creation of productive employment opportunities by implementing both demand side measures (e.g. stimulating economic growth) and supply side ones (e.g. growth in the labour force and improved quality). A key challenge is to reduce the share of workers (est. at 80%) engaged in low-income, low productivity jobs in the informal sectors and shift them toward higher productive and higher income jobs, primarily in the formal sector.

A key pillar in improving the long-term quality of the labour force is to provide quality *education* to more pupils and for a longer duration. Thus the plan aims to: extend universal primary education to grade 8; eliminate illiteracy; remove the education gap between the poor and rich, create a new generation equipped with technical skills and scientific knowledge; better remunerations for teachers; and overall, improve the quality and equity in education. To do so, the plan will focus on reversing the low completion rates as well as improving educational governance (e.g. merit based recruitment and career development). Improving *health* outcomes is also viewed as a priority in the five-year plan, as it is both a cause and effect of poverty, illiteracy and ignorance. However, it is also recognised that the health sector programme (HNPS) has underperformed in key areas such as implementation, insufficient inter-ministerial coordination, centralised and prolonged procurement processes. This underperformance is one of the causes of remaining wide gender disparities in core indicators such as in morbidity and chronic health problems. Better management of health services, including better health governance, is key to

improve these indicators. Specific attention is also given to the *environment, climate change and disaster management* with a view to promote sustainable development. The plan states that the adverse interactions of environmental degradation and climate change could have severe consequences for the Bangladeshis' welfare, especially for the poorer segment that may not have adequate access to coping mechanisms. Reducing environment degradation is a key objective of the plan as is climate change mitigation and adaptation. Focus will be on implementing the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. The plan also emphasises the need to carry forward the National Disaster Management Plan using a 'all hazards, all risks and all sectors' approach.

The plan also makes a frank admission that effective implementation is crucially dependant on improved *governance*, including accelerated fight against corruption, better M&E and fundamental institutional reforms. These reforms will seek to promote robust accountability mechanisms, both through checks and balances within the government and feedback mechanisms for society at large as accountability spurs better performance and counters corruption and inefficiency. However, it is also recognised that improving governance is a long-term process that will require persistency.

Finally, the current *social safety net* programmes reflect the GoB's response to support the poor and the vulnerable population manage those risks. Household Income and Expenditure Surveys show that the coverage of these programmes for the poor and vulnerable households has increased over the evaluation period and they have helped lower poverty. But data also suggest that a large proportion of the poor and vulnerable households do not have any access to these programmes. The average benefit of safety net programmes has been low and in many cases falling in real terms. There is considerable leakage of allocated funds (related to governance challenges) and a significant percentage of household beneficiaries are non-poor.¹³ Consequently, the impact on poverty reduction from the amount of money spent in these programmes is less than is possible with a better designed social protection system.

In recognition of these concerns, the Government of Bangladesh has issued the National Social Protection Strategy that seeks to streamline and strengthen the existing safety net programmes with a view to achieving better results from money spent, and to broaden the scope of social protection from the more narrow safety net concept to include employment policies and social insurance to address the emerging needs of a middle income Bangladesh in 2021 and ahead.

¹³ See GoB : 'National Social Protection Strategy, 2014'

2. Evaluation partners' engagement in Bangladesh

2.1 Denmark

2.1.1 Intervention logic

Strategy rationale and assumptions

Bangladesh has been one of the main recipients of Danish development assistance since the country gained independence in 1971. For more than four decades poverty reduction has been the overriding priority of this assistance.¹⁴ The key strategic document of relevance to this evaluation is the 'Bangladesh – Denmark Partnership - Strategy for Development Cooperation 2005 to 2009', and most recently the 'Denmark – Bangladesh Policy Paper 2013-2017'. In the interim Denmark partly relied on the Joint Cooperation Strategy (2010) concerning cooperating modalities and but it did not provide *strategic* directions for Danida, whereas the concretisation of the 2013-2017 Policy Paper is currently (early 2015) ongoing. Hence, for this evaluation the strategy framework of Denmark will be based mainly on the 2005-2009 strategy, combined with attempts to reconstruct a strategy in the 2010-2013 period from the actual interventions and their objectives.

The overall objective of the strategy was 'Poverty reduction through promotion of pro-poor economic growth and strengthened democratic development, including improvement in governance, respect for human rights, rights of minorities, and improved gender equality'. Further, the strategy also committed Denmark to align with Bangladesh's PRSP and the relevant policies and strategies at sector level.

A particular focus of Denmark has been the emphasis on accelerating inclusive rural growth, as poverty was both deeper and more widespread here. Female headed and poorer households were particularly targeted, as were ethnic minorities, not least in CHT. A key strategic tenant was to provide both on-and off-farm employment opportunities as well as improve water and sanitation in rural areas, which in turn could improve health outcomes, productivity and rural incomes.

The strategy also noted that the poor quality of governance and limited national ownership had compromised the ability to channel funding through the Bangladeshi administration. Consequently, Denmark increased its focus of the programme on good governance, in particular corruption. Danish assistance would therefore seek to promote good governance and an effective and fair justice system through support to key institutions.

The 2005 strategy and the subsequent engagements also demonstrate an attempted shift away from discrete projects towards sector programmes that would take a more

¹⁴ In the most recent Country Policy Paper of 2013, Denmark's poverty objective is complemented by the twin objectives of promoting commercial cooperation and collaborating on tackling global issues (e.g. terrorism and climate change)

comprehensive approach, addressing more systemic issues by encompassing an entire sector and not only project specific issues. This resulted in larger agriculture and WatSan sector programmes.

Assumptions

The strategy was also based on a number of assumptions, particularly related to the implementation of a number of reforms and measures on behalf of GoB. This included:

- That GoB would implement reforms to improve governance and achieve higher and sustained economic growth, endeavouring to create the foundation for successful implementation of the poverty reduction strategy
- Related to this, the strategy also assumed that for pro-poor reform momentum to accelerate, a consensus between the government and the opposition would have to be rebuilt. This assumption obviously demanded outreach and reconciliation between the two major political parties
- That GoB would accelerate measures to curb corruption and misuse of funds, including strengthening the external oversight and ensuring the functioning of an independent Anti-Corruption Commission
- That GoB would ensure the functioning of an independent, operational National Human Rights Commission
- That GoB would separate judiciary from executive control by implementing the Supreme Court order of 1999 as an element in establishing proper rule of law
- That GoB would continue and strengthen commitment to addressing Bangladesh's development needs by assuming a leading role in coordination of external assistance and hereby anchoring ownership locally
- That GoB would allocate adequate counterpart funding and personnel for implementation of the country programme and actively work to ensure sustainable implementation through existing institutional infrastructure, as per agreements
- Speed up the implementation of the 1997 Chittagong Hills Tracts Peace Accord

On the Danish side, the number of assumptions were fewer, but it was nevertheless considered an important assumption that Denmark increasingly aligned and gradually channelled funds through government systems in order to improve national ownership. It was also assumed that Denmark would increase aid transparency and coordinate with relevant donors.

At the time of drafting the strategy there were also a number of more *implicit* assumptions made, upon which the below ToC is made. At the input level, it was assumed that the need to support further key economic, political and social sector reforms necessitated policy dialogued. This perceived need was mostly articulated in the governance and human rights area. Further, given the limited financial resources available to implement the key policies and strategies, financial assistance was also deemed necessary. Here the assumption that Denmark would eventually channel financial support through government systems, as fiduciary risks receded, proved wrong. A final category of inputs was technical assistance, based on the assumption that Bangladesh still had deficiencies in its human capital, which necessity external TA, but that such needs were diminishing as Bangladeshi competencies

grew. Danish financed TA would instead concentrate on e.g. monitoring of financial flows. Preliminary indications are that this assumption proved valid.

In terms of translating inputs into outcomes and impacts, key assumptions in the agricultural space centred around the need to 1) improve rural infrastructure which was deemed a critical barrier to trade and loss reduction and 2) the need to improve extension and general quality of inputs to the sector (e.g. seeds) that could improve productivity. Combined this would lead to higher productivity and higher rural incomes, benefitting especially women. In the governance and human rights the main assumption seemed to be that a combination of support to core government institutions (such anti-corruption commission and electoral support) and strengthening the demand side (e.g. though support to NGOs) would improve governance and respect for human rights (including gender equality). These assumptions will be further tested in the desk and field phases.

Areas of intervention

There have been three key areas of intervention in the evaluation period: 1) Agriculture, 2) water & sanitation and 3) human rights/governance. In addition, a business-to-business programme has also been implemented during the entire evaluation period, linking Danish companies to Bangladeshi counterparts.

The *agricultural sector programme* had the overall objective of contributing to poverty reduction through i) higher production diversification opportunities at household and village level, ii) awareness raising on natural high nutrient rich food and its production, and iii) increased participation of women and other disadvantaged groups in sectoral activities. This has been of particular importance due to the 'feminisation' of the labour force in rural areas. In addition, there was strong focus on marketing of agricultural products and market access. The concrete support targeted improved technical extension services for producers, with increased involvement of NGOs, community based organisations (CBOs) and the private sector.

This was aligned with support to the Government services, which concentrated on regulatory activities, research, and extension advice. The programme also supported the establishment of sustainable income-generating enterprises, on and off-farm, with a particular focus on increasing the participation of the poor and women.

Denmark also supported applied research on new agricultural technologies emphasising diversified crop production integrated with animal and aquatic production, in order to improve the livelihood of marginal farmers.

As a sub-sector within the agricultural programme, a rural road component aimed to develop a rural road network that could create a significant contribution to economic development in the programme area, by generating new employment possibilities for marginalized women especially, improved marketing conditions, improved investment opportunities and more effective agricultural and trading activities in previously isolated and economically inactive local areas.

The agricultural sector programme was implemented in the poorer areas in the coastal belt (Greater Noakhali and Greater Barisal), but some components (integrated pest management and soil fertility) were national programmes and were implemented in most rural districts. The agricultural sector programmes continued beyond the evaluation period.

The *water and sanitation programme* also had the overall objective of contributing to poverty reduction but through improved standard of public health and an improved sustainable environment. Specifically, Danish assistance to the sector focussed on:

- Improved access to hygiene promotion and safe sanitation and water supply services for the poor, in particular in un-served and underserved areas in the coastal belt, Chittagong Hills and selected districts in the north-western part of the country.
- Policy support, institutional development and capacity building with regard to water and sanitation services and integrated water resources management.
- Support to decentralisation and community participation with regard to water and sanitation services.
- Support to private sector and NGO involvement, networking and capacity building.
- Strengthening hygiene promotion and community-led total sanitation initiatives with emphasis on establishing relevant linkages to the health, information and education sectors.

The implementation of activities was realised through existing structures and local government institutions, supported by NGOs and private sector operators. Denmark is still active in the WatSan sector.

Human rights and governance has also been a priority sector (or theme) throughout the evaluation period. The overall objective of Denmark's support to the sector has been to strengthen the rule of law, improve governance and democratisation, and promote access to justice for the poor. The strategic focus has been on:

- Promotion and securing the rights and access to justice of women, children and indigenous peoples.
- Support to key institutions for the promotion of good governance, decentralisation and anti-corruption.
- Promotion of human rights through instruments such as information, education and communication.

In more concrete terms, the associated sector programme has supported access to justice of women and children, aiming to: secure the rights of the indigenous peoples and their organisations, support human rights, education, decentralisation and capacity development of local government bodies, key institutions responsible for the accountability, public finance. Capacity development was also provided for the parliament and the judiciary in addition to support to the electoral processes. Other areas have been support to institutions such as the Ombudsman, the Human Rights Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission. The programme is still ongoing, but has been adjusted in several respects.

In addition, Denmark has also been active in supporting business to business partnerships between Danish and Bangladeshi companies throughout the evaluation period, although


the forging of new partnerships is currently suspended as the legal basis of the programme has been questioned.

While the 2005 strategy did not put emphasis on climate change, the latter has assumed increasing importance during the evaluation period. Thus in 2008 Denmark provided assistance to the formulation and revision process of the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. In following years, Denmark increased its activities within climate change including support to the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund; a fund that was also supported by the EU and Sweden. Related, improved disaster management has also assumed increased importance over the evaluation period.

Theory of change diagram

Below is an attempt to illustrate the theory of change behind Denmark's strategy and interventions during the evaluation period.


Figure 6 - Theory of Change diagram – Denmark



2.1.2 Inventory of activities - Denmark

The team has been able to get the inventory of Danish activities for the period 2007-2013. The allocations over that period amounted 254 M€, while the disbursements amounted 173 M€¹⁵. The figure below, based on OpenAid, provides the disbursements per year

Figure 7 - Total Disbursements of Denmark, €M




Disbursements do vary quite substantially, partly due to large-scale infrastructure in WatSan where large one-off payments tend to produce spikes in e.g. 2010. Average has been around 40 M€ per year over the period.

As stated above the three core sector programmes have dominated disbursements, which is also illustrated in the chart below.

¹⁵ “Quantitative overview regarding development engagements”, January 2015.

Figure 8 - Danida Sectors, 2007-2013




2.2 European Union

EU-Bangladesh relations date back to 1973 and have evolved over the years with increasing amounts of development assistance but also by deepening economic relations even further. The comprehensive co-operation agreement signed in 2001 considerably broadened the scope for co-operation, in extending it to trade and economic development, human rights, good governance and the environment. Trade has grown substantially since then, with the EU being the main trading partner for Bangladesh.

Figure 9 - EU-Bangladesh trade

Total goods: EU Trade flows and balance, annual data 2004 - 2013 Source Eurostat Comext
Statistical regime 4



Exports from Bangladesh to EU are dominated by clothing (90%) whereas EU exports to Bangladesh are dominated by machinery and transport equipment. Bangladesh has benefitted from the Everything But Arms (EBA) trade arrangement under the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) granting preferential access to imports from Bangladesh. Partly as a result, the EU runs a substantial -and growing- trade deficit with Bangladesh, Bangladeshi exports to the EU having more than doubled during the evaluation period.

2.2.1 Intervention logic

Strategy rationale and assumptions

Trade and economic development has also played a substantial role in the EU's strategy for 2007-2013, as it was one of three key strategic areas (focal areas), the two others being human & social development, and good governance.

The overall objective of the strategy was to reduce poverty through rapid economic growth, greater inclusion of the poor and increased employment generation, within a framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights. The strategy was partly based on the GoB's own development strategy, the PRSP, and also on a strong commitment to assist Bangladesh in meeting the MDGs. The strategy was also informed by the European Consensus on development priorities of 2006, which has a strong emphasis on governance, human rights and economic development. Finally, the choice of focal areas was also based on an analysis of where the EU could add most value, given its past experiences, core competencies and mandate. The overall objective was reconfirmed in the 2011 mid-term review (MTR) of the strategy, but with the suggestion that a more pro-poor approach should be adopted, especially in the economic and trade development area.

In addition to the three focal areas, the strategy also identified two non-focal sectors, *food security and environment/disaster management*, as areas that would complement the focal areas. The strategy was implemented in two phases, the first being 2007-2010, and then adjusting the multi-annual indicative programme for 2011-2013 based on the MRT.

Assumptions

The EU also had some key explicit assumptions upon which successful implementation of the strategy rested. Overall, both the EU and the GoB (in its PRSP) concurred that good governance was the underlying foundation without which development would fail to materialise. The EU further specified that assumption in stating that free and fair elections were crucial to all of its programming and that the antagonistic nature of politics would be abated with the Parliament playing a constructive role in promoting accountability. A key economic assumption at that time was that Bangladesh could overcome the phasing out of WTO textile quotas that many had deemed crucial in establishing the garment industry (an assumption that proved right, as the garment industry grew strongly thereafter). The key environmental assumptions were related to the ability to provide adequate clean water and to climate change. It was assumed that Bangladesh would be able to maintain reasonable water quality and that the health gains would not be undermined. Moreover it was also assumed that improved disaster management and climate change adaptation would be

needed to counter the increased extreme weather incidence and their impacts. Finally, the strategy also assumed that GoB's low absorptive capacity would necessitate more joint-donor projects, which reduce the transaction costs.

The more implicit and underlying assumptions regarding the needs and their translation into inputs mirror the ones of Denmark (see above), with the crucial added input of trade policy and (preferential) trading schemes. Here the assumption was that by combining trade policy with trade related assistance (TRA), competitiveness, trade and growth would be boosted, which in turn would translate into job creation and higher incomes. Clearly, trade has increased, incomes have been rising and jobs in the tradable sector have also been created, but the contribution of EU trade policy and TRA is being evidenced.

There are also several similarities in the focus on governance and human rights where there has been focus on stimulating both the demand and supply sides through e.g. non-state actors in areas such as transparency and accountability and through support to the government in e.g. strengthening PFM through the SPEMP programme. In the social sectors, a key assumption concerning aid modalities would appear to have been that increased harmonisation and alignment would improve the availability of inputs at service delivery level with higher efficiency and more supportive of national strategies. This remains a key assumption also after the CSP mid-term review in 2010. In the private sector development and trade assistance, EU assumptions also centred around the need for stronger multi-donor joint approaches, especially in relation to trade and investment issues, somewhat less so in domestic private sector development. The EU also built on the assumption (formulated in a trade needs assessment) that the regulatory environment constitutes a key barrier to trade; this in turn informed the substantial focus on TRA. The mid-term review did not fundamentally challenge these assumptions but noted that trade and regulatory reforms encountered strong resistance, contributing to slower than expected progress. Instead, the review recommended more focus on explicit pro-poor private sector development projects, presumably based on the assumption that traction would be better and resistance from vested interests less.

Areas of intervention

In the **trade and economic development** area, the EU aimed to deliver on its commitment to integrate Bangladesh into the world trading system. This was also a global objective of the EU as formulated in the 2002 Trade and Development Communication on assisting developing countries benefitting from trade. Under this strategy Bangladesh became one of the main beneficiaries of the EU's trade related assistance. A three-pronged approach was adopted focusing on:

- Addressing the regulatory environment and removing barriers to trade
- Increasing the competitiveness of the business sector, particularly SMEs, to facilitate export diversification and simultaneously ensuring corporate social responsibility, decent work and environmental sustainability
- Increasing the productivity of the workforce (mainly through technical and vocational training, improved working conditions and full respect for core labour rights).

The 2010 mid-term review of the strategy noted slower than expected progress in the trade related programmes and further argued for more emphasis on pro-poor private sector

development that was more clearly benefitting the poor. Thus, the EU complemented its strategy by assisting and promoting entrepreneurship at grassroots level particularly in rural areas.

In the **Human and Social Development** areas, the primary justification for support was that investment would be critical to both meeting the PRSP and the MDG targets, and that the EC had a proven track record in the health and education sector programmes (HPNSP and PEDP).

- In the *education* sector, the objective was to assist Bangladesh in having an integrated education system that was inclusive and quality oriented. The EC supported three sub-sectors in education (formal primary education, non-formal education, and secondary education) in combination with sector dialogue with the government and other development partners. Educational efficiency was also a key priority. As regards the aid modalities, the EU committed itself to promote joint programming and financing among donors and for the government to develop a comprehensive education sector approach encompassing at least primary and secondary education. The 2010 mid-term review of the strategy largely confirmed the validity of this strategy but called for more focus on quality issues, as well as mainstreaming of climate adaptation, through ensuring measures that enable the delivery of education following damage to infrastructure or reduced availability of staff. Whereas the CSP stated that the MIP 2007-2010 would start focus on secondary education, analysis and consultation during the MTR have made it clear that the secondary education subsector was not ready to absorb donor resources. The primary education sector programme is still ongoing in 2015 and the EU is likely to stay engaged for the foreseeable future.
- In the *health* sector, the EU's strategy aimed to improve the health status of the population – particularly the poor, women and children in both urban and rural areas. The primary channel for this support would be the government's health sector programme (HNPSP) through contributions to a World Bank administered pool-fund.¹⁶ EU also stated that it would be funding projects on issues where innovative strategies needed to be developed, outside of the HPNSP. Overall there were three specific objectives that the EU aimed to achieve 1) Strengthening the Public Health Sector Management and Stewardship Capacity, 2) Health Sector diversification, through development of new delivery channels for publicly and non-publicly financed services and, 3) Stimulating demand for essential services. The 2010 mid-term strategy review argued that performance had been only moderately satisfactory partly due to dramatic under-spending, low cost-effectiveness, and weak ownership by the government. EU has subsequently reduced its bilateral country specific engagement in the health sector, although it will still benefit through thematic and other initiatives.

In the last focal area, **governance and human rights**, the overall objective was to: "contribute to the reduction of poverty, the strengthening of democratic values and the reinforcement of a more equitable society". This would be achieved through a broad approach based on two specific objectives - to increase the effectiveness of public

¹⁶ In addition the EU funded a FAO Food Programme from 2009-2012 that was also part of the health sector programme.

institutions and to improve security and access to justice for the poor. The strategic ambition was to have larger projects and programmes within the area that could catalyse more systemic impact in general public sector reforms, PFM, decentralisation and support to core human rights institutions. Thematically the strategy was to have a two-pronged approach, one focussing on governance effectiveness, that would support more effective service delivery of the government and a second focussing on human rights that would improve access to fair justice especially for the poor minorities and women.

Specific interventions in the *good governance* area focussed on public financial management through the Strengthening of Public Expenditure Management Programme (SPEMP) for aligning public expenditure with national priorities through a medium term budgetary framework (MTBF), as the link between policies and allocation of budget resources has been weak, and there was substantial segregation of investment and recurrent expenditure planning. Denmark has also supported the SPEMP. The EU has also supported local governance, including Local Governance and Decentralisation Programme for Union Parishad and Upazilla Parishads, and the Access to Land and Property Rights Project. These are seen as crucial for improving service delivery, making growth sustainable and reducing poverty. The MTR noted overall good progress, but that government-led programmes had mixed results, due to serious ownership and capacity issues in some line ministries. The MTR also suggested to link especially local governance interventions with EU actions in environment, disaster management and food security.

Since 2007, Bangladesh has been greatly affected by *food insecurity* stemming in part from volatility of prices, which has prompted the EU to support this non-focal sector. Government of Bangladesh has thus reemphasise again the need to reach self-sufficiency in national food production. In 2006, the Government of Bangladesh ratified a new National Food Policy (NFP) – an action supported by EU funding - which was followed by the approval of the corresponding Plan of Action in August 2008. Support to the policy level included the USAID/EU funded and FAO supported National Food Policy Capacity Strengthening Programme (2006-2014). EU has aimed at boosting productive capacities of agricultural workers and small farmers and at mitigating and reversing situations of food insecurity of the most vulnerable poor households. Substantial funding from e.g. the Food Facility, makes this the largest non-focal sector. The MTR confirmed the relevance of EU engagement in the sector (also against the backdrop of the food price volatility in in 2008-2009).

Despite being a non-focal sector, disaster management, environment and climate change grew in importance for the EU during the evaluation period, with the MTR focusing on enhancing risk awareness and appreciation of the inter-linkages between climate change and other areas of sustainable development. As a consequence, the EU will seek to mainstream climate change and environmental concerns into all relevant interventions.


Cross cutting issues included democracy, good governance, human rights, indigenous peoples' rights, gender, children's' rights, environmental sustainability, and global warming. Gender mainstreaming was a key cross-cutting issue for the EU, not only as a reflection of the MDGs and international agreements that placed gender equality at the heart of poverty reduction, but also due to the inequalities that pervaded Bangladesh society and prevented women and girls from attaining their rights and access to education, health, participation in

politics, and opportunities in employment. More emphasis has been placed on gender issues with the EU Council 2010 adoption of the ‘Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development EU Plan of Action 2010-2015’, which is an operational Gender Action Plan for the EEAS, the European Commission and EU Member States (MS). One of its requirements is to have annual assessments on progress made in the Action Plan implementation and to prepare country strategies and/or national programmes designed on the basis of a proper gender analysis. In Bangladesh, a gender profile was produced in 2014, also serving as an input to the EU+ planning and programming cycle for 2014-2020.

Theory of change diagram

Below is the theory of change that is intended as a graphic illustration of the logical reasoning and assumptions behind EU's development cooperation.


Figure 10 - Theory of Change diagram – EU



2.2.2 Inventory of activities - EU

As is shown in Figure 11 below, the EU committed a **total of 631 M€** in Bangladesh over the evaluation period 2007-2014¹⁷.

Figure 11 - EU commitments to Bangladesh, per year, 2007-2014, €M¹⁸




The Third Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP 3) represented 40% of the peak year 2011. The list of all EU interventions is presented in Annexe 2.

The interventions cover a wide range of thematic areas (see Figure 12 below). They include the 3 focal sectors of the CSP 2007-2013, i.e., Human and social development (incl. education); good governance and human rights; and economic and trade development. They also include its 2 non-focal sectors, i.e. environment/disaster preparedness and food security/nutrition.

¹⁷ The inventory was made from the EuropeAid database CRIS (Common RELEX Information System), and its Data warehouse (DWH). CRIS/DWH extractions were made in January 2015. According to the terms of reference, interventions funded by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Commission Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO) are outside the scope of this evaluation and are therefore not included in the inventory.

¹⁸ EU commitments refer to committed amounts for DCI-Asia decisions relating directly to Bangladesh during the years 2007-2014, and contracted amounts during the years 2007-2014 for interventions funded on other financial instruments and thematic programmes (which decisions are at regional or global level and are sometimes before the evaluation period). They include: Food Facility (DCI-FOOD); thematic programme “Non-state actors and local authorities in development” (DCI-NSA); Instrument for Stability (IfS); Environment and natural resources sustainable management (DCI-ENV); European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR); Human and Social Development (DCI-HUM); Education (DCI-EDUC); Gender (DCI-GENRE).

Figure 12 - EU commitments to Bangladesh, per sector, 2007-2014



In terms of funding sources, **various financial instruments and a wide range of thematic programmes** were used. The main source was clearly the bilateral geographic instrument DCI-Asia with 66%, and various DCI thematic (30%), in the field of food security, environment, non-state actors, etc., as shown in the table below.

Table 1 - EU commitments to Bangladesh, per financial instruments and thematic programmes, 2007-2014¹⁹

| EU Financial Instrument | Commitments, €M | % |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| DCI-Asia | 416 | 66% |
| DCI-FOOD (+ FOOD) | 136 | 22% |
| DCI-NSA (+ ONG-PVD) | 32 | 5% |
| IFS-RRM | 18 | 3% |
| DCI-ENV (+ ENV) | 9 | 1% |
| EIDHR (+DDH) | 7 | 1% |
| DCI-HUM (+ SANTE) | 6 | 1% |
| DCI-EDUC | 3 | 1% |
| DCI-GENRE (+ GENDER) | 3 | 0% |
| Others | 2 | 0% |
| Total | 631 | 100% |

Source: ADE analysis based on EuropeAid databases (CRIS and Data Warehouse)

¹⁹ Financing instrument for development cooperation (DCI); Food Facility (DCI-FOOD); thematic programme “Non-state actors and local authorities in development” (DCI-NSA); Instrument for Stability (IFS); Environment and natural resources sustainable management (DCI-ENV); European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR); Human and Social Development (DCI-HUM); Education (DCI-EDUC); Gender (DCI-GENRE).

Considering the disbursements made over the period 2007-2014, the total amounted 650 M€, detailed per year in the table below.

Table 2 - EU disbursements to Bangladesh, per year

| Year | Disbursement in EUR |
|--------------|---------------------|
| 2007 | 57.664.942 |
| 2008 | 109.653.199 |
| 2009 | 74.584.839 |
| 2010 | 110.401.525 |
| 2011 | 96.318.349 |
| 2012 | 77.229.681 |
| 2013 | 66.952.481 |
| 2014 | 57.594.784 |
| Total | 650.399.800 |

Source: ADE analysis based on CRIS and Data Warehouse (February 2015)

Lastly, in terms of **aid modalities**. Over the evaluation period, the EU has mainly used action grants (36 % of contracted amounts) and joint management with multi-donors (33% of the contracted amounts). Budget support represented 8% of contracted amounts over the evaluation period, including the budget support to Third Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP 3) Government of Bangladesh (51 M€).

Under the current portfolio (DCI bilateral, regional and thematic), 34% is implemented through direct management (284 M€) and 65% with indirect management (529 M€), including 11% partially decentralised with government (90 M€), and 52% indirect management with International Organisations (426M€)²⁰.

A substantial part of EU funding has been channelled through the United Nations. Indeed, almost 30 such contracts during the years 2007-2014 have been identified, for more than 200M€. Ten contracts have a value higher than 10 M€.

²⁰ Data from the EUD.

Table 3 - EU contracts in Bangladesh with UN contractors, ten highest contracted amounts, 2007-2014²¹

| Contract title | Contractor | Contracted amount (M€) | Contracting Year |
|---|--------------------|------------------------|------------------|
| Supporting Local Development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts | UNDP | 24 | 2011 |
| Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts | UNDP | 16 | 2007 |
| Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs (PERP) | UNDP | 15 | 2007 |
| Local Governance and Decentralization Programme for Union Parishads and Upazila Parishads | UNDP | 14 | 2012 |
| Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) 2010-2014 | UNDP | 13 | 2009 |
| Better Work and Standards Programme (BEST): Quality, Fishery and Textile | UNIDO | 12 | 2010 |
| Food Security for the Ultra-Poor (FSUP) | WFP | 12 | 2008 |
| Accelerating Progress towards Maternal and Neonatal Mortality and Morbidity Reduction | UN Population Fund | 10 | 2008 |
| Support to the Justice System - Activating Village Courts | UNDP | 10 | 2007 |
| Strengthening Election Management in Bangladesh (SEMB) | UNDP | 10 | 2012 |

Source: ADE analysis based on EuropeAid database (Data Warehouse)

Finally, EU has also been active in policy dialogue with limited or no financial disbursement involved, including the local consultative group, as well as in the negotiation of the Joint Cooperation Strategy 2010-2015.

²¹ Financing instrument for development cooperation (DCI); Food Facility (DCI-FOOD); thematic programme “Non-state actors and local authorities in development” (DCI-NSA); Instrument for Stability (IfS); Environment and natural resources sustainable management (DCI-ENV); European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR); Human and Social Development (DCI-HUM); Education (DCI-EDUC); Gender (DCI-GENRE).

2.3 Sweden

2.3.1 Intervention logic

Strategy rationale and assumptions

Sweden has provided development assistance to Bangladesh since the country became independent in 1971. Sweden's engagement with Bangladesh during the evaluation period is detailed in the first place in the Swedish Cooperation strategy for development cooperation covering the period 2008-2012, and extended until 2014.

The cooperation strategy is firmly inscribed within:

- Sweden's international development cooperation policy, which aims "to create the conditions for poor women and men to improve their lives";
- Sweden's policy for global development, which aims "to contribute to equitable and sustainable global development"; and
- The priorities laid down in the Bangladeshi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.

The cooperation strategy also rests on the following guiding principles and considerations:

- Applying poor people's perspectives on development and the rights perspective is at the core of the Swedish development cooperation. Four principles serve as guidelines: participation, non-discrimination, transparency, and accountability.
- It is of utmost importance for Sweden to encourage Bangladesh to take concrete measures to improve governance and reduce corruption.
- Budget support to Bangladesh cannot be considered as long as the implementation of a programme for reforming the administration has not shown results in terms of reduced risk of corruption.

Finally, the cooperation strategy is based on the following directions:

- Sweden aims to concentrate its efforts, around the following lines: (i) the high degree of sectoral concentration on health and primary education continues to be relevant; (ii) concessionary credit-financed investments will be provided to only one general area (the urban environment); (iii) particular attention should be put on climate change efforts; and (iv) phasing out of the support to private sector development and review of the portfolio to civil society organisations so as to align it more closely with the 2008-2012 strategy's new focus.
- Swedish cooperation in other important policy areas (trade, labour law, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), environment and climate, research and information technology, and migration) aims at achieving synergy effects for development cooperation.
- Sweden will ensure good coordination with both bilateral and multilateral donors while implementing development cooperation.

The Climate Change Initiative (CCI) taken by the Swedish Government in December 2008 for the period 2009-2011 has complemented the strategy. It aims "to support long-term projects and programmes for adaptation to climate changes in the poorest countries". The

initiative foresaw up to 50 MSEK (€4.7 mill.) for 2009 and 2010 respectively, and 40 MSEK (€3,8 mill.) for 2011. An amendment increased the total allocation to 180 MSEK (€17 mill) and extended the implementation period to 2009-2012.

Assumptions

The strategy intervention is based on a number of underlying assumptions, which have not been made systematically explicit.

On overall Sweden's engagements:

- Swedish cooperation has a potential to bring about change for people living in poverty: it can act as a catalyst for change and reform due its comparative advantages as a small donor (capacity for flexibility and willingness to take risks and supporting new ideas).
- Sector support should give Sweden a point of departure for a dialogue on how the principles of non-discrimination, participation, openness and accountability can be applied.

On support to the education and health sectors:

- Including the most vulnerable poor people, particularly women and children both in rural areas and in the cities, in the support to education and health sectors is key for enabling poor people to improve their lives.
- Focusing on results-based management, public finance management and decentralization is key to contribute to a more efficient functioning of the health and education sectors.

Areas of intervention

Primary health care and education have been the core areas of the Swedish development assistance. Other Swedish strategic areas of intervention mostly focused on women's rights, climate change and urban environment.

More in detail, the support focused on:

- **Health:** Sweden has delivered support to (i) the two health sector programmes (HNPS (2003-2011) and HPNSDP (2011-2016)) for overall improvement of health, population and nutrition sub-sectors, (ii) urban primary health care and (iii) sexual and reproductive health and rights through a consortium of NGOs.
- **Education:** support has been provided to the formal Primary Education Development Programmes (PEDP 2&3), and in the non-formal sector to the Basic Education for Hard to Reach Urban Working Children (BEHTRUWC) and the Centre for Mass Education in Science (CMES).
- **Human rights and Democratic governance:** support consisted in a combination of dialogue and direct support to organisations and institutions, with a particular focus on strengthening women's rights. Support has been provided to a selection of human rights organisations, with whom Sida has a long partnership experience and who work to enhance awareness of human rights, participation, capacity building of community-based organisations, and monitoring. The aim is to contribute to the strengthening of the civil society to act as watch dogs. The focus has been in particular on violence against women and promotion of access to justice. Through continuous dialogue with government and civil society organisations, Sweden also aimed to push for further

developments in these areas (e.g. discrimination and violence against women and girls which is high on the government's agenda). The 2010 MTR notes: "a clearer focus in the strategy on targeting specific areas of concern in the area of human rights and democracy would be welcome"²². On the democracy side, political dialogue has been used to help with the preparations for the parliamentary election 29 December 2009, the installation of the new government, and the follow up on democratic reforms initiated by the interim government (e.g. key governance institutions such National Human Rights Commission, Election Commission and the Anti-corruption commission). Support has also been provided to the Bangladesh Reality Check Approach, a five-year study initiated in 2007 on education and health services providing people-centred information.


- **Climate change:** measures to adapt to the effects of climate change, and in particular to disaster management (through the Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) Phase 1 (2004-2009) and 2 (2010-2014)); and planned contribution to the Bangladesh Climate Change Multi Donor Trust Fund (BCC MDTF) for 2010-2012 within the framework of the Swedish Climate Change Initiative.
- **Urban environment:** support has been provided via concessionary credits (in the form of grants combined with loans). Two projects were started in 2012 in the area of water and sanitation.

Theory of change diagram

Below is the team's attempt to illustrate the theory of change and assumptions behind Sweden's development cooperation.

²² Swedish Embassy, *Draft Sector Paper: Mid term review 2010 of the Cooperation strategy*, 2010

Figure 13 - Theory of Change diagram – Sweden



2.3.2 Inventory of activities - Sweden

The table below presents inventory information for Sweden based on data received to date by the evaluation team, and on OpenAid. It shows that SIDA’s development aid to Bangladesh amounted to a yearly level of roughly 25-30 M€. This level was relatively stable over those years.


Table 4 - SIDA development aid to Bangladesh, per year²³

| Year | Outcome in SEK | Outcome in EUR |
|--------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| 2007 | 231.005.321 | 25.046.786 |
| 2008 | 215.227.363 | 22.636.084 |
| 2009 | 278.732.903 | 26.211.926 |
| 2010 | 258.133.757 | 26.878.780 |
| 2011 | 217.279.098 | 24.069.201 |
| 2012 | 239.992.887 | 27.557.663 |
| 2013 | 251.650.600 | 29.146.277 |
| 2014 | 267.227.363 | 29.410.230 |
| Total | 1.959.671.675 | 210.956.947 |

Source: ADE analysis based on OpenAid (for 2007) and SIDA data (for 2008-2014)

The following table shows the distribution by sector, on the basis of the data set provided by SIDA (2008-2014). As per Sweden’s strategic orientations, health and education have been the core areas of its development assistance.

²³ The figures from SIDA data (i.e. except data of 2007) reflect the yearly “outcome” amounts for SIDA’s projects for each of the years indicated. They don’t include outcomes for coming years of on-going interventions. They cover, however, ‘outcomes’ of interventions which have started before the evaluation period. All types of SIDA external aid have been considered, except for loans and humanitarian assistance. Data for 2007 is based on OpenAid, which is a slightly different accounting methodology.


Figure 14 - SIDA development aid to Bangladesh, per sector 2008-2014²⁴

2.4 Consolidated view for the three partners

Below is an attempt to produce a diagram depicting the joint efforts by Denmark, Sweden and EU. This is obviously an artefact as there has been no specific strategy by the three EPs. However all three are part of the EU+ group which also includes France, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland. They aim to improve aid effectiveness through a more focused and collaborative approach to the programming of EU development assistance. Nevertheless there are many complementarities and joint objectives in the support by the EPs. Consequently, the theory of change presented below is an attempt to combine the various interventions, outputs and objectives into one illustration.

²⁴ Ibid.

Figure 15 - Consolidated theory of Change diagram



It is challenging and also slightly speculative to develop *assumptions* at this aggregated and highly reconstructed level, but clearly there are similarities between the three EPs. First of all there is the obvious assumption that finance, technical assistance (though diminishingly so) and policy dialogue are key inputs needed to address the development challenges in Bangladesh. Also, all three EPs seem to make the assumption that ‘conventional’ demand and supply routes of promoting good governance would work in Bangladesh. As both Sweden and the EU have supported the same two core social sector programmes, they probably share similar assumptions regarding the effects of pooling assistance and promoting harmonisation. However, it would seem that there are currently somewhat divergent patterns regarding the willingness of e.g. using budget support as a way of aligning further, with both Sweden and Denmark having revised their ambitions. There may be to a certain extent a symptom ‘harmonisation’ – fatigue by which development partners are beginning to question the benefits of numerous meetings and negotiations in this context vis-à-vis the cost and effects of these efforts. Thus, the assumptions around the alignment and harmonisation issues will also be tested in the next phases.

2.4.1 Global view of the areas of intervention

Below is a table highlighting and summarising the core intervention areas of each EP.

Table 5 - Evaluation Partners areas of intervention during the evaluation period

| Focus areas | EU | DANIDA | SIDA |
|--|--|--|---|
| Human and social development | <i>Priority sector</i> Focus on primary education and health | <i>Priority sector</i> Focus on water and sanitation sector, both from an infrastructure and health perspective | <i>Priority sector</i> Focus on primary education and primary healthcare (through a human rights based approach) |
| Governance and human rights | <i>Priority sector</i> Focus on the effectiveness of public institutions, and on improving security and access to justice | <i>Priority sector</i> Focus on public sector management and human rights | <i>Priority sector</i> Support to human rights, with a focus on strengthening women's rights Support to electoral processes |
| Economic and trade development (focus on pro-poor Private Sector Development) | <i>Priority sector</i> Regulatory environment and removing barriers to trade Increasing competitiveness of SMEs to facilitate export diversification Increase the productivity of the workforce | <i>Priority sector</i> Commercial cooperation between Danish and Bangladeshi companies | Concessional and environmental loans |
| Food security and nutrition | <i>Non focal sector</i> Focus on safety nets for the hard core poor | <i>Priority sector</i> Support to agricultural production, agro-processing and agro-business development | |
| Gender equality and women empowerment | <i>Cross-cutting</i> | <i>Cross-cutting</i> | <i>Cross-cutting</i> |
| Climate change and disaster management | <i>Non focal sector</i> Focus on early warning, community awareness and preparedness | <i>Cross-cutting</i> | <i>Non-focal sector</i> |

Source: ADE


Annex 3: Methodology of the evaluation and evaluation questions

The methodology for this joint evaluation of the EPs’ cooperation with Bangladesh followed EuropeAid’s methodological guidelines for geographic evaluations, which is itself based on the OECD/DAC approach, and took account of ADE good practices developed for country-level evaluations.

1. Evaluation process

The evaluation followed a process in three phases as described in the Terms of Reference (Annex 1) and as per the figure below presenting the evaluation process, with the main activities, deliverables, Management Group (EU) meetings in Brussels, and field debriefings in Dhaka (BG).

Figure 1 - Evaluation process



2. Methodological approach

The team applied a theory-based non-experimental design for this country-level evaluation¹, using the reconstructed theories of change as the basis for assessing the contribution of EPs' development cooperation strategies to GoB government policies and poverty reduction strategies.

This evaluation followed a rigorous approach so as to guarantee the credibility of the analysis. The team started the evaluation in preparing the evaluation framework, before delineating methods and tools for data collection and analysis.

2.1 Preparing the evaluation framework

The team has applied the following successive three steps:

- Reconstruct intervention logics

The team analysed in detail the rationale, assumptions and theories of change of the EU, DK and SE strategies with Bangladesh for the period 2007-2013 (see Annex 2). The consolidated theory of change diagram constituted the framework for the formulation of the evaluation questions (EQs).

- Set-up inventories

On the basis of the data extracted in CRIS for the EU as well as of the databases provided by Denmark and Sweden, the team treated the data so as to build a comprehensive quantitative overview of the funding for each EP. It provided for each EP an overview of overall funding per year and a financial breakdown per sector as well as a breakdown per financial instrument and aid modality used for the EU. It also compiled a detailed list of all interventions financed by each EP during the evaluation period (see Annex 2).

- Define and structure Evaluation Questions

In order to provide focus to the evaluation, nine Evaluation Questions (EQs) have been formulated during the structuring stage of the evaluation. They have been detailed with their corresponding Judgement Criteria (JC) and Indicators (I) in an evaluation matrix (see below). The EQs are summarised in the table below and their location in the consolidated theory of change diagram is proposed in the diagram below.

¹ Theory-based evaluation is an approach in which attention is paid to *theories* of policy makers, programme managers or other stakeholders, i.e., collections of assumptions, and hypotheses - empirically testable - that are logically linked together.

Table 1 - Evaluation questions

| | |
|--|--|
| EQ1 Strategies | To what extent were EPs' strategies, including choice of sectors, relevant for sustainable poverty reduction? |
| EQ2 3Cs | To what extent have EPs' strategies been coherent, coordinated with and complementary to each other and other development partners' strategies? |
| EQ3 EPs' support to primary education (Step 1) | To what extent and under which circumstances have interventions by development partners (notably EPs) contributed to aid effectiveness and to enhancing the policies, spending actions and service delivery of the Government of Bangladesh in the field of formal and non-formal primary education? |
| EQ4 Results in primary education (Step 2) | Has access to better quality primary education for all Bangladeshi boys and girls improved? What have been the main determining factors of observed evolutions? |
| EQ5 Inclusive private sector development | To what extent have EPs' interventions contributed to enhancing private sector development, including in rural areas, hereby promoting increased employment and inclusive growth? |
| EQ6 Human rights and democratic governance | To what extent have EPs' interventions contributed to fostering respect for human rights and democratic governance? |
| EQ7 Climate change and disaster management | To what extent have EPs assisted Bangladesh in adapting to climate change and improving disaster management? |
| EQ8 Gender equality | To what extent have EPs contributed to improving gender equality and the empowerment of women? |
| EQ9 Aid modalities and types of partnerships | To what extent have the EPs' different aid modalities and their capacities facilitated the reaching of intended objectives? |

Figure 2 - Location of evaluation questions in the consolidated theory of change




Table 2 - Evaluation matrix

| | |
|---|---|
| EQ 1 Strategies | To what extent were EPs' strategies, including choice of sectors, relevant for sustainable poverty reduction? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |
| Under-standing and coverage of the question | <p>This question evaluates if the strategies deployed by the EPs were relevant to achieve the desired outcome and if they aligned to the relevant domestic initiatives.</p> <p>Alignment to especially GoB's policies and systems has been seen as instrumental in achieving sustainable poverty reduction, partly due to the need to strengthen established structures and not create parallel ones, partly due to the need to lower transaction costs. Alignment to government policies is key; alignment can also evolve around supporting non-state actors' (e.g. civil society and business associations) own policies and initiatives. The alignment ambition is obviously also based on the assumption that the policies, systems and procedures to which the EPs align, are <i>de facto</i> conducive to achieving sustainable poverty reduction. This will also be investigated, mainly through the evidence gathered for the analysis of interventions in the other EQs.</p> <p>This question analyses how the EPs translated their strategic objective into the main concrete interventions (e.g. education, governance, climate change and agriculture). Further, it assesses if there has been a 'strategic thread' whereby the individual interventions were convincingly and analytically linked to the overall strategic objective. Consequently, the theories of changes developed, and their underlying assumptions have been analysed and tested for validity at the time of formulation and also the degree to which their proved right (to the degree feasible).</p> |
| Link with evaluation criteria and theory of change | <p>Link with evaluation criteria: the EQ addresses relevance.</p> <p>Link with key issues: the EQ also addresses complementarity with other development partners.</p> <p>Link with theory of change: this EQ is cross-cutting but primarily related to how EPs conceptualised the needs of the country and, on that basis, translated the needs into specific inputs and interventions. It is thus located around the inputs section but it will test the totality of the relevance of transmission chain from inputs till impacts. The assumption of alignment being conducive to poverty reduction will be tested, as will some of the sector specific assumptions regarding the social sector interventions (e.g. necessity of improved governance and additional finance).</p> |
| Proposed Judgment criteria and indicators | |
| JC 1.1 | <i>EPs' strategies clearly aimed at poverty reduction with a credible 'theory of change' using relevant interventions in the main areas of support</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Design of main interventions demonstrates strong poverty reduction focus and robust analysis of causal mechanisms to achieve this ▪ Monitoring systems of interventions and sectors of support include indicators tracking poverty reducing objectives ▪ Assumptions regarding the need for closer strategic and intervention level alignment proved relevant and monitored ▪ Assumptions regarding the necessity of improved governance (also at sector level) proved relevant and monitored |

| | |
|---------------|--|
| <i>JC 1.2</i> | <i>EPs' strategies were aligned with relevant GoB's national policies for poverty reduction and other domestic initiatives</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Design of main interventions sharing aligning at objective level that of the domestic counterparts ▪ Beneficiary organisations (e.g. ministries, NGOs, private sector organisations) stating that their policies, priorities and conditions were driving design and implementation. ▪ Share of assistance channelled through domestic funding systems. |

| | |
|---|---|
| EQ2 3Cs | To what extent have EPs' strategies been coherent, coordinated with and complementary to each other and other development partners' strategies? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |
| Under-standing and coverage of the question | <p>This question aims to assess the degree of coordination and complementarity reached between EP and with other DPs. It will also examine policy coherence, both between EP and within the EU as an entity (with a specific focus on EU trade and development policies).</p> <p>It examines:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The effects of the efforts devoted by each EP to ensure effective coordination and complementarity with each other and other DPs, and hence to reduce aid fragmentation; ▪ The degree of policy coherence between EPs, and in particular the extent to which they represented a coherent response to key developmental and political challenges; and ▪ The degree of EU policy coherence between EU non-development policies (including trade) and EU development cooperation policy in Bangladesh. |
| Link with evaluation criteria and intervention logic | <p>Link with evaluation criteria: coherence.</p> <p>Link with key issues: coordination, complementarity and coherence: the 3Cs</p> <p>Link with ToC: the question spans the entire consolidated theory of change, in looking at the degree of coordination and complementarity of EPs strategies and interventions between each other and with other DPs and at the degree of policy coherence between EPs and within the EU as an entity.</p> |
| Proposed Judgment criteria and indicators | |
| <i>JC 2.1</i> | <i>EPs devoted sufficient efforts to ensure effective coordination and complementarity with each other and other DPs</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Choice of focal areas of each EP according to its comparative advantages ▪ Degree of information sharing between EPs ▪ EPs allowing for a leading role of the GoB in coordination of external assistance (incl. division of labour) ▪ Effective involvement of each EP in national aid coordination mechanisms ▪ GoB-DP joint monitoring of objectives according to a common framework ▪ Degree of articulation of EPs interventions with each other and with other DPs |
| <i>JC 2.2</i> | <i>EPs were able to present a coherent response to key developmental and political challenges</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Degree of common interplay between the strategy responses of each EP (e.g. development policy objectives pursued and retained focal areas) to respond to key Bangladeshi development and political challenges ▪ EPs spoke with one voice to respond to key Bangladeshi development and political |

| | |
|---------------|---|
| | <p>challenges</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effects of the work of the EU+ group launched in 2013 |
| <i>JC 2.3</i> | <i>EU ensured coherence between its global policies (incl. trade) and its development policy in Bangladesh</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Explicit reference in EU development cooperation strategy-level and programming documents to potential interactions and conflicts with other EU policies (e.g. trade, migration and political issues) ▪ Degree of interplay between EU trade and migration policies related interventions and EU development policy related ones |

| | |
|--|---|
| EQ 3 | To what extent and under which circumstances have interventions by development partners (notably EPs) contributed to aid effectiveness and to enhancing the policies, spending actions and service delivery of the Government of Bangladesh in the field of formal and non-formal primary education? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |
| Under-standing and coverage of the question | <p>This question examines both the direct and induced outputs of donor interventions in education during the period under review. Sector budget support - and to a lesser extent, basket funds - are expected to increase the share of external finance managed through government systems as well as the predictability of foreign assistance. They are aimed at improving aid effectiveness, i.e. more coordinated, more harmonized, more aligned aid and with lower transactions costs. They are also supposed to increase the fiscal space for the concerned sector. Most indicators identified under are not donor-specific and therefore the suggested analysis will take into account all donor interventions. But it is expected that qualitative interviews with donors, GoB officials and CSOs representatives will allow to identify some distinctive intervention features of EPs but also other major donors (ADB, WB). Consequently, the analysis (and thus by implication the conduct of interviews) will be organised in two parts: general questions on donors interventions and identification of specificities.</p> <p>This question first aims at delineating further the inputs (funds, policy dialogue and institutional strengthening) provided by the donors. In doing so, the team will also provide an assessment of the ‘appropriateness’ of the EU budget support package in context of the primary education sector in Bangladesh. This question then assesses the extent to which the three core pillars of donors’ interventions supporting PEDP 2 and PEDP 3 – funding, policy dialogue and institutional development – have achieved these intended objectives.</p> <p>However, the aid effectiveness agenda cannot be considered as an end in itself: it is supposed to serve the enhancement of education strategies, policies and governance as well as budget programming and execution geared towards a better coverage and quality of education services. This is also in line with the focus areas of PEDP 2 and 3: Planning and Management, Decentralization, Resource Allocation, Monitoring. The question will therefore also assess the extent to which donor interventions have contributed to these expected improvements.</p> <p>The focus of donors’ interventions has been primary education, understood broadly as encompassing pre-primary education and non-formal education. These domains are indeed covered by PEDP 2 and 3. Primary education is therefore and logically the focus of this evaluation. Yet, a primary objective of a Swap (<i>sector-wide</i> approach) is to provide a holistic view of a sector, here education. The question will therefore assess the extent to which donor</p> |

| | |
|---|---|
| | <p>interventions favoured an understanding of primary education in its interdependence with other sub-sectors (such as secondary education or vocational training/’skills sub-sector’), especially in the context of a planned extension of primary education from grade 1-5 to grade 1-8. Besides, some DPs’ complementary interventions were intended to compensate for the lack of government services in specific areas/sub-sectors (specifically in non-formal education); in this context, the analysis assesses the extent to which donor interventions helped the government to address these limitations in a sustainable manner.</p> <p>Both Swedish and EU supports to PEDP 2 and 3 were pooled with the assistance of other donors: the analysis, whilst taking account of all donor interventions under the TF/Swap, attempted to isolate the effects of EU/SE support on identified improvements by analysing their characteristics, conditions for disbursement, specific associated TA and complementary interventions (for instance the EU’s Chittagong Hill Tracts project). However, attribution remained difficult in the SWAp context.</p> |
| Link with evaluation criteria and intervention logic | <p>Link with evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency</p> <p>Link with key issues: complementarity</p> <p>Link with ToC:</p> <p>In Sweden’s theory of change, enhancing national ownership and donor coordination, increasing stakeholder participation in the education sector programmes and improving governance constitute critical underlying processes to increase access to and improve quality of primary education especially for children living in poverty.</p> <p>Similarly, in the EU theory of change, increased alignment and harmonisation that promote aid efficiency and effectiveness as well as improved governance are key to achieve an integrated education system that is inclusive and quality-oriented.</p> |
| Proposed Judgment criteria and indicators | |
| JC 3.1 | <i>Development partners’ interventions in education contributed to greater aid effectiveness in primary education (more predictable, coordinated, harmonised and aligned aid and lower transactions costs)</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Disbursements according to plans included in financing agreements and consistent with government’s budget cycle ▪ Disbursements mechanisms (conditions, indicators etc.) better harmonised and more consistent with the government’s strategies and policies ▪ Existence of effective joint institutions for policy dialogue and performance monitoring ▪ Degree of involvement of all stakeholders (government in its various components, donors, CSOs) ▪ Extent of use of government systems (incl. procurement) ▪ Government-driven and coordinated mechanisms to identify and manage TA |
| JC 3.2 | <i>Development partners’ interventions in education contributed to an increased fiscal space for primary education</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution of budgetary allocations to education and primary education ▪ Evolution of actual expenditures in education and primary education ▪ Influence of TF/Swap on the observed changes and EU/Sweden specific role |
| JC 3.3 | <i>Development partners’ interventions in primary education were conducive to improvements in the design, execution and monitoring of education policies and budgets as well as in the governance of the sector</i> |

| | |
|---------------|--|
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A costed sector strategy and consistent sub-sector programmes have been developed under the government’s leadership and with wide stakeholders’ participation ▪ Improved institutional framework (improved intra-sector coordination, decentralisation and school management autonomy) ▪ Gender-sensitive policy design and budget programming ▪ Improved PFM in primary education including government systems to monitor education expenditures up to school level ▪ Strengthened education management information system to monitor and report on inputs (teachers, physical infrastructures...) and outcomes ▪ Quality-oriented education policies (teachers’ training, curriculum, pedagogical methods etc.) ▪ CSOs’ capacities to monitor education policies, budget and the quality and accessibility of public services strengthened i.e. CSOs’ watchdog and accountability capacities enhanced. ▪ Influence of TF/Swap on the observed changes and EU/Sweden specific role |
| JC 3.4 | <i>Development partners’ interventions in primary education contributed to an increased availability of quality and gender sensitive primary education services across the country</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Number of primary schools (government / private) ▪ Number of schools with pre-primary education (government/private) ▪ Increased coverage of non-formal education programmes ▪ Teacher Student Ratio (government / private) and teachers’ absenteeism ▪ % of trained teachers in school (government/private; male/female) ▪ Percentage of schools with separate functioning toilets for girls ▪ Number of schools providing school feeding programmes ▪ Coverage of the stipends programmes (boys/girls) ▪ Textbook available and timely distributed ▪ Number of junior secondary schools ▪ % of trained teachers in junior secondary schools ▪ Territorial disparities for the above-mentioned indicators (evolution in the gap between the best and worst performing upazilas or specific historically disadvantaged areas) |

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| EQ 4 | Has access to better quality primary education for all Bangladeshi boys and girls improved? What have been the main determining factors of observed evolutions? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |
| Under-standing and coverage of the question | This questions aims to assess the main primary education dynamics in terms of access, quality and equity (gender, wealth, territorial) over the evaluation period. It also intends to identify critical factors that have shaped these performances. It will link these achievements with particular policies implemented by the government, and supported by donors. It will also attempt to cast light both on demand-side and external factors. It should be noted that quality education remains an elusive concept from an analytical perspective. The present analysis will draw on both examination rates and annual learning assessments, despite their limitations, to document issues of quality. |
| Link with evaluation criteria and intervention logic | <p>Link with evaluation criteria: effectiveness and sustainability</p> <p>Link with ToC: one key expected outcome of the EU support is to improve the population’s educational status particularly for the poor and girls/women; for Sweden, fulfilling the right to education for women, men, girls and boys living in poverty constitute a core component of the expected intermediate impact of its intervention.</p> |

| Proposed Judgment criteria and indicators | |
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| JC 4.1 | <i>The participation to primary education, formal and informal, for boys and girls and across the country has increased</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Net enrolment rate in primary education ▪ Number of children enrolled in formal government pre-primary education programmes ▪ Number of primary age children enrolled in NFE programmes ▪ Number of children from non-formal education institutions taking Grade V examination ▪ % of primary school age children with disabilities in formal and non-formal programmes ▪ Gross enrolment rate in junior secondary education (grade-6-8) ▪ Regional disparities for the above-mentioned indicators (evolution in the gap between the best and worst performing upazilas) ▪ Socio-economic disparities for the above-mentioned indicators (Gap between the most advantaged and most disadvantaged upazilas) ▪ Gender disparities for (some of) the above-mentioned indicators (Gap between boys and girls) |
| JC 4.2 | <i>The retention within primary education increased and learning outcomes improved for all children across the country</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Drop-out rate, boys/girls, national/ divisions (or district) ▪ Completion rate, boys/girls, national/ divisions (or district) ▪ Level of achievement in Grade V (a. Bangla; b. Mathematics): mean score (boys and girls); disparities between divisions (or district) (Trends in learning outcomes from annual National Assessments) ▪ Pass rate from NFE schools in Grade V terminal examination (total/girls) ▪ Regional disparities for the above-mentioned indicators (gap between the best and worst performing upazilas) ▪ Socio-economic disparities for the above-mentioned indicators (gap between the most advantaged and most disadvantaged upazilas) |
| JC 4.3 | <i>The results achieved were determined by factors related to policies implemented by the Government of Bangladesh and/or by other external factors</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quantitative analysis of the relationship between overall <i>access, retention and learning outcomes</i> performance indicators (as presented above) and variables influenced by government's policies implemented during the evaluation period (infrastructures, textbooks, trained teachers, stipends or school feeding programmes, presence of female teachers etc.), students' characteristics (gender, wealth, parents' level of education etc.) and upazila-wide socio-economic and cultural characteristics. ▪ Quantitative analysis of the relationship between equity-sensitive <i>access, retention and learning outcomes</i> performance indicators (regional, socio-economic and gender disparity indicators as presented above) and variables influenced by government's policies implemented during the evaluation period (infrastructures, textbooks, trained teachers, stipends or school feeding programmes, presence of female teachers etc.), students' characteristics (gender, wealth, parents' level of education etc.) and upazila-wide socio-economic and cultural characteristics. ▪ Qualitative analysis of the relation between education performances and factors that cannot be quantified (pedagogical methodologies, school governance, teachers-students interactions, gender-sensitive policies, etc.) |

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| EQ5 Inclusive Private Sector Development | To what extent have EPs' interventions contributed to enhancing private sector development, including in rural areas, hereby promoting increased employment and inclusive growth? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |
| Under-standing and coverage of the question | This question aims to assess the degree to which direct interventions aimed at private sector development have been relevant and effective for inclusive growth and ultimately poverty reduction. As EU's trade-related interventions in Bangladesh were evaluated under the global aid for trade evaluation (2013), the main focus here will be on the other private sector development initiatives, in particular those focusing on rural and deprived areas. The question will clearly cover the Danish support to agriculture (and aquaculture) as well as EU's non-trade activities. |
| Link with evaluation criteria and theory of change | Link with evaluation criteria: primarily focussed on effectiveness, subsidiary focus on efficiency, impact and sustainability. Link with theory of change: the question is clearly located in the cluster around the target areas of food security, agriculture, trade and private sector development, with the expected outputs of improved private sector competitiveness as well as higher agricultural productivity and incomes. This in turn is assumed to lead to increased incomes and decent employment for the poor, all of which contributing to accelerated pro-poor economic growth. |
| Proposed Judgment criteria and indicators | |
| JC 5.1 | <i>EPs have addressed the key binding constraints to inclusive private sector growth at enterprise/farm level</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Productivity increases among enterprises / farms benefitting from EPs' support or services ▪ Increased number of enterprises/farmers benefitting from advisory/extension services under EP supported programmes ▪ Inclusiveness in terms of how to reach the poor is explicitly operationalised in design documentation ▪ Employment and incomes of the poor increased in EP supported programmes |
| JC 5.2 | <i>EPs assisted in improving the supportive, regulatory and legal framework for inclusive private sector growth especially in rural areas</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EPs support assisted in lowering barriers to entry for pro-poor private sector development ▪ EPs assisted in developing sustainable capacity in supportive organisations (e.g. extension and business advisory services) of importance to rural poor ▪ EPs assisted in improving the regulatory framework for pro-poor PSD ▪ Core indicators in supported areas improving (from e.g. Doing Business, Enterprise Surveys, TI). ▪ Interviews with enterprises/farmers on the experienced changes in the framework conditions |
| JC 5.3 | <i>EPs promoted the creation of decent work opportunities</i> |

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| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Occupational health and safety is part of the private sector support in the design, implementation and M&E. ▪ EPs work to address specific gender concerns in the their private sector support programmes ▪ Corporate social responsibility promoted |
| EQ 6 Human rights and democratic governance | To what extent have EPs' interventions contributed to fostering respect for human rights and democratic governance? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |
| Under-standing and coverage of the question | <p>This question aims to assess the effectiveness of EP support in the field of human rights and democratic governance. It will examine the extent to which the support of all three evaluation partners has contributed to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Empower and enable CSO to defend human rights; ▪ Enable the Government to better discharge its obligations as duty bearer with regard to human rights and social justice; ▪ Reduce violence and discrimination against vulnerable and exposed groups, including minorities, women and children, particularly when living in poverty; and ▪ Strengthen the Government's ability to conduct free and fair elections. |
| Link with evaluation criteria and ToC | <p>Link with evaluation criterion: mostly effectiveness since it assesses the effects of the support of all three EP in the area of human rights and democratic governance.</p> <p>Link with ToC: This question focuses at the results level of the consolidated ToC. It addresses one of the major expected results of the strategy supported by all three partners, e.g. improved human rights and democracy.</p> |
| Proposed Judgment criteria and indicators | |
| <i>JC 6.1</i> | <i>EPs' support has contributed to empowering and enabling civil society organisations to defend human rights</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Geographical coverage of CSO having benefited from EP support (e.g. CSO active at both national and sub-national levels) ▪ Beneficiary CSO report having benefited from effective capacity-building measures that empowered them to defend human rights more effectively ▪ Evolution in the number of rights holders (particularly those belonging to vulnerable or exposed groups) reached during the evaluation period; ▪ Evolution in the field presence in zones affected by human rights violations during the evaluation period; ▪ Evolution in the number of direct contacts with duty bearers during the evaluation period. |
| <i>JC 6.2</i> | <i>EPs' support has contributed to enable the Government to better discharge its obligations as duty bearer with regard to human rights and social justice</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Geographical levels (e.g. both national and sub-national levels) targeted by EP support ▪ Extent of use within the EU-GOB dialogue of the findings of multilateral human rights resources (including the UPR process and UN special procedures) ▪ Evolution in the acceptance of international human rights commitments by the GOB ▪ Parliamentary activity on implementation of human international human rights |

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| | <p>obligations in the reference period</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution of the capacity of the National Human Rights Commission to perform its functions and missions/activities carried out (e.g. campaigns, trainings, etc.) ▪ Evolution of the capacity of the judicial system (resources, equipment and number of trained judges, reduction of backlogs, human rights education) to perform its functions ▪ Evolution of the number of members of vulnerable and exposed groups having access to the judicial system |
| JC 6.3 | <i>EPs' support has contributed to reduce violence and discrimination against vulnerable or exposed groups, including minorities, women and children, particularly those living in poverty</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution of laws and policies in place to address the needs of vulnerable or exposed groups ▪ Evolution of the number of women and children being subject to violence (e.g. prevalence of acid attacks, rape, etc.) and discrimination ▪ Evolution in human rights violations suffered by members of ethnic and religious minority groups, indigenous (tribal) peoples, socially marginalised groups (dalits); ▪ Perceptions of representatives of minorities, women and children on the effectiveness of the EP contribution to the reduction of violence and discrimination, and of EP willingness to engage in dialogue and action on human rights needs and challenges experienced by these groups |
| JC 6.4 | <i>EPs' support has strengthened the country's ability to conduct free and fair elections</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution of the capacity of the Government to manage elections (in particular 2008 and 2014 elections) ▪ Evolution of the capacity of the Bangladesh Election Commission to perform its functions ▪ Appraisal made by national and international observers of the election processes |

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| EQ 7 Climate change and disaster management | To what extent have EPs assisted Bangladesh in adapting to climate change and improving disaster management? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |
| Under-standing and coverage of the question | <p>This question intends to evaluate whether the strategies and interventions of the EPs in support to disaster preparedness and climate change adaptation have been successful in achieving their intended outcomes, or are likely to achieve them.</p> <p>It will assess the extent to which:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EPs' support to awareness and preparedness has influenced the country's relevant policy processes and responses and CSO advocacy in ensuring the consideration of natural disasters and climate change adaptation challenges in such policies. ▪ EPs have integrated climate change and disaster management concerns into sector programmes (not directly targeting disaster preparedness or climate change adaptation related issues), thus contributing to reducing losses caused by climate change and disasters. Specifically, interventions under this JC aim to mainstream disaster preparedness and/or climate change adaptation into education, trade, governance and health. <p>Policy dialogue is at the core of the three EPs' strategies. Bilateral policy dialogue at country level, deepened cooperation within multilateral fora and organizations as well as the influence of the EU's Green Diplomacy Network, are key elements in pursuing national and international advocacy on climate change as a global issue. This is covered in JC 1.3.</p> <p>Finally, national capacity strengthening in relation to disaster preparedness and climate change adaptation are at the core of JC 1.4</p> |
| Link with evaluation criteria and intervention logic | <p>Link with evaluation criteria: This EQ is primarily dealing with effectiveness and (avoided) impact. It will also cover aspects of efficiency and complementarity.</p> <p>Link with ToC:</p> <p>In the EPs ToC, although with different weights, ensuring disaster preparedness and/or climate change mainstreaming into sector programmes to ensure a decrease in environmental and socioeconomic damages, mainly in relation to vulnerable groups, is foreseen. In the EU's and Sweden's strategies, enhancing national capacities and awareness are important underlying conditions to achieve this goal. Finally, policy dialogue, and to a lesser extent donor coordination, are key features in all three ToCs. Indeed, increasing policy dialogue to deepen EPs and Bangladesh effective dialogue on climate change related issues at country and multilateral level appear as a crucial instrument. Crucial, not only to ensure that the inter-linkages of climate change related issues with sustainable development and poverty reduction are considered at national level, but also to increase EU's international advocacy on global issues.</p> |

| Proposed Judgment criteria and indicators | |
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| <i>JC 7.1</i> | <i>EP's support has contributed to ensuring that CC and disaster concerns are addressed in policies and interventions across sectors</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of awareness by key stakeholders (including target groups, national/regional/local authorities, economic actors and other Non State Actors) ▪ Evidence that the EPs interventions have triggered processes whereby the socio-economic importance and development perspective of climate change is better understood and reflected in policies ▪ Measures taken by EP funded interventions to strengthen the mainstreaming of CC adaptation and disaster risk reduction into national and sub-national development and sector planning and implementation ▪ Evidence that EP strategies and interventions for the agriculture, governance and education sectors address CC and disaster concerns |
| <i>JC 7.3</i> | <i>Policy dialogue enabled EPs to engage in climate change in a relevant manner and enhance achievement of the EU's environmental and climate change policy</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Existence of a structured and ongoing policy dialogue at country level in this area ▪ Extent to which the dialogue with the EPs contributes to defining a locally owned Climate Change policy, with clear priorities as well as linkages to sustainable development (mainly in relation to vulnerable groups conditions) and poverty reduction ▪ Perception of key stakeholders on political dialogue (incl. Green Diplomacy Network) usefulness and on its translation into EPs strategic programming |
| <i>JC 7.4</i> | <i>EPs' support has enhanced the country's preparedness to natural disasters and adaptation to climate change</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strengthened normative and operational work (follow-up and monitoring of, and reporting on, information and data) on climate change related challenges, in line with the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) and with the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. ▪ Evidence of new technologies (digital elevation data, weather prediction systems, etc.) and generation of accurate flood risk maps, accurate medium and short-term information, etc. ▪ Evidence of dissemination of warnings addressed to vulnerable groups ▪ Evidence of use of disaster risk and vulnerability indicators in national strategies ▪ Reduced magnitude of loss and damage (GDP, productive assets, social indicators, loss of lives, infrastructure damage, etc.) from natural disasters |

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| EQ 8 Gender equality | To what extent have EPs contributed to improving gender equality and the empowerment of women? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |
| Under-standing and coverage of the question | <p>EP programming will be reviewed in terms of its coherence with GoB priorities. GoB is signatory to several international conventions (with some reservations), including CEDAW, CRC and ICPD, which provide a framework for its work on gender equality and the empowerment of women. It has also committed to meeting the MDGs, several of which relate to gender equality. These international commitments were and are encapsulated in the government led PRSP and five year plans, in which the government has attached top priority to women's advancement and gender equality on human rights grounds. The 2005 PRSP for example includes eight priority areas, three of which include a particular focus on gender: nutrition, quality improvement in education and maternal health. The PRSPs also included a focus on increased participation, social inclusion, empowerment and good governance, including women's human rights. The government has also recently introduced a Women's Development Policy.</p> <p>The evaluation approach also needs to be framed by the development context and national progress made in promoting gender equality, to determine which elements of progress are the direct and indirect results of EP programming. It also needs to determine whether EPs have allocated funds appropriately for promoting gender equality, and whether programming on gender has been carried out in a coherent and coordinated manner with other development partners.</p> <p>Given persistent inequalities the evaluation will assess the extent to which the focus of programming has been on gender equality as opposed to women as a vulnerable group, that is how far have the systemic causes of gender inequality been addressed through policy dialogue, capacity development of and support to partners, and direct programming.</p> |
| Link with evaluation criteria and intervention logic | <p>Link with Evaluation criteria: effectiveness and impact</p> <p>Link with Theory of Change:</p> <p>For the EU, gender is included at the results level, as follows: "improved health and educational status particularly for the poor, girls/women". In the case of Sweden, gender is included in three of the four main programmatic outputs: rights, maternal health and education. For Denmark, gender is mainly included under the general umbrella of women's rights.</p> |
| Proposed Judgment criteria and indicators | |
| JC 8.1 | <i>Gender issues have been effectively mainstreamed in relevant EP programmes and projects</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strength of gender analysis in programme and project planning documents ▪ Appropriate gender-sensitive results statements and indicators in planning documents ▪ Degree to which the programme/project cycle has included effective gender-sensitive implementation and its monitoring ▪ Extent to which EPs have focused on recent gender-related priorities including women's rights, gender based violence and LGBT discrimination ▪ Extent to which EPs have implemented their internal agency gender equality policies, including internal capacity development |

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| JC 8.2 | <i>EPs' gender programming has effectively supported Government of Bangladesh and other partner capacity</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Degree to which EPs have been responsive to the commitments and national strategies of the GoB ▪ Effectiveness of support to implementation the national Women's Development Policy ▪ Degree to which the capacity of the women's machinery and NGOs have been strengthened by the EPs' support ▪ Degree to which gender has been mainstreamed in relevant policies and programmes of key government ministries other than the women's machinery ▪ Extent to which EPs have worked in a coordinated fashion to promote a common understanding of gender equality and the empowerment of women |
| JC 8.3 | <i>EPs have addressed systemic causes of gender inequality</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Degree to which EPs have supported implementation of CEDAW and other relevant international conventions ▪ Effectiveness of policy dialogue on gender equality between EPs and the Government of Bangladesh ▪ Degree to which EPs analysis highlights the systemic causes of gender inequality ▪ Degree to which analysis is translated into programming addressing the systemic causes of gender inequality ▪ Selection of thematic programming areas likely to support gender equality |
| JC 8.4 | <i>Gender equality has increased as a direct or indirect result of EPs' programming</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Change in incidence of primary and secondary enrolment, by sex ▪ Ratio of literate women to men, 20 to 24 years old ▪ Change in incidence of gender based violence ▪ Change in incidence of maternal mortality ▪ Change in incidence of under-5 mortality rates, by sex ▪ Change in incidence of child marriage, by sex ▪ Change in incidence of human trafficking, by sex ▪ Changes in women's access to land, property and credit increased |

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| EQ9 Aid modalities and capacities | To what extent have the EPs' different aid modalities and their capacities facilitated the reaching of intended objectives? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |
| Under-standing and coverage of the question | This questions aims to assess the rationale and implications of the EPs choices regarding aid modalities and the degree to which capacities were appropriate to manage the aid. It will thus try to get complementary insight into the selection and process guiding modality choice, and the subsequent implementation. Further, it will seek to demonstrate the degree to which this made a contribution to policy related objectives, and aid efficiency and effectiveness. This question will thus compare the modalities, the depth of policy dialogue generated, the transactions cost inherent and the achievement of more efficient and effective aid, potentially drawing informative lessons on the merits and demerits of the various modalities and implications in terms of capacity to manage these. It also aims to provide insights into the adequacy of the capacities in terms of managing the portfolio and having the capacity to respond to a changing context, which in turn is also linked to the instruments that the EPs have available for responding flexibly. |
| Link with evaluation criteria and theory of change | Link with evaluation criteria: efficiency and effectiveness. Link with theory of change: the question is not located in any particular area in the theory of change figures, as it is cross-cutting. However it will deal with some of the underlying assumptions concerning e.g. the assumptions on ownership and transaction cost of budget support. |
| Proposed Judgment criteria and indicators | |
| JC 9.1 | <i>Aid modality choices have been explicitly based on an analysis of their expected sustained impact on poverty reduction</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Selection of aid modalities explicitly discussed and analysed in the formulation and negotiation of EPs' support, in relation to likely poverty impact ▪ The aid modality selection processes were based on partners needs |
| JC 9.2 | <i>The choice and mix of aid modalities have allowed for engagements between EPs and the diverse stakeholders including NSAs</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Policy dialogue with GoB features in Swap/budget support design and implementation. ▪ Aid modality (and their engagement implications) to non-state actors considered in design documentation ▪ Implication for quality of partnerships considered when choosing aid modality ▪ Opinion of other development partners on the choice of aid modalities to engage partners ▪ EPs have reduced their support fragmentation as a result of using more efficient and/or harmonised delivery channels |
| JC 9.3 | <i>The capacity of both EPs and GoB have been sufficient to manage the aid modalities and interventions, including in terms of responsiveness to a changing context</i> |
| Indicators | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Adequate capacity levels (including resources in the field and support from HQ) and ability to manage aid modalities ▪ Adequate capacity absorption of GoB institutions ▪ Existence and use of instruments/procedures/risk mitigation strategies to monitor the political, economic and social context, at strategic and operational level ▪ Indications that changes in the context and risks –including risks affecting coherence– have been regularly re-assessed and that the EPs support strategies have been adapted as result of these re-assessments |

2.2 Approach for data collection and analysis

This evaluation has been built around two major analytical frameworks: (i) analysis of overall issues (e.g. relevance of the strategies) and (ii) in depth analysis of cooperation in selected sectors. For each one of the theme and sector covered, the team carried out an extensive data collection work that is presented in Annex 5.

2.2.1 Analysis of overall issues

Overall issues concern the relevance of the strategies (EQ1), the 3Cs (EQ2), and the aid modalities and management capacity (EQ9). For all these three major issues, the team used a combination of evaluation techniques focusing both at general-level and project/programme level to substantiate the indicators proposed for each JC.

These tools will mainly included documentary analysis, face-to-face interviews, field observation for the projects that will be visited during the field phase, as further specified in the below table.

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| Strategies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In-depth study of strategy and project level documents, interviews and site visits to assess: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The causalities between the specific interventions and the strategic objectives of the EPs ○ The degree of alignment to GoB policies |
| 3Cs | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In-depth study of documents (EPs strategy documents and documents on aid effectiveness and the aid architecture in Bangladesh) and interviews to assess the degree of coherence, coordination and complementarity between the EPs strategies ▪ Interviews to assess the effectiveness of the LCG Working Groups on aid effectiveness, education, PSD and trade, gender, climate change and environment, and governance ▪ Interviews and site visits to check whether EPs interventions showed complementarities between each other and with other DPs |
| Aid modalities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mapping of the aid modalities used for the interventions selected for in-depth review ▪ In-depth study of strategy and project-level documents and interviews to assess: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The analytical process behind the choices made in terms of aid modalities ○ Whether the mix of aid modalities was conducive to greater coordination ○ Whether the aid modalities retained were commensurate with the EPs capacities |

2.2.2 In depth study of main areas of cooperation

Beyond analyses on overall issues, the evaluation considered five main areas of ‘action’ analysis that have been a priority area of focus throughout the evaluation period for all three partners:

- Primary education;
- Private sector development, especially in rural areas;
- Human rights and democratic governance;
- Climate change and disaster management; and
- Gender equality.

This approach presented some degree of representativeness of the EPs’ cooperation strategies whether they are looked at from the angles of the scope of the intervention, spending amounts, or different aid modalities and management types.

The assessment mostly focused on the effectiveness of EPs’ support in each one of these areas. It concerns in particular EQ3, EQ5, EQ6, EQ7 and EQ8.

The team reviewed, for each sector, the evolution of the national background (e.g. national policies and institutional framework). It then examined the objectives pursued by the EPs’ strategies and got a grip of the portfolio actually implemented for each EP. Based on documentary review and interviews, the team further analysed the outputs and results achieved by the portfolios of interventions and attempted to link them, through the theories of change, to key outcomes and impacts at sector level. This assessment was conducted on the basis of a review at both sector level as a whole and at project/programme level.

Concerning the in-depth studies, the team conducted a detailed assessment of a few EPs’ interventions for each one of the five cooperation areas (see table below). This included an extensive documentary analysis on the basis of available project documentation (in particular identification studies, financing agreements, and monitoring and evaluation reports), which is detailed in Annex 6. It has been complemented by face-to-face interviews held during the field phase and on site observations. This assessment also provided information at programme/project level on overall issues (see section above).

Table 3 - Selected interventions for in-depth study

| Sectors of intervention | EP |
|--|-------------|
| Primary education | |
| Third Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP 3) (2012-2017) | EU & SE |
| PEDP 3 Result-based management technical assistance support (2008-2014) | SE |
| Support to the Hard to Reach through Basic Education (SHARE) (2010-2017) | EU |
| Private sector development | |
| Agricultural Sector Programme Support, Phase II (ASPS II) (2006-2013) | DK |
| Better Work and Standards Programme (BEST) (2009-2015) | EU |
| Integrated Support to Poverty and Inequality Reduction through Enterprise Development (INSPIRED) (2012-2018) | EU |
| Human rights and democratic governance | |
| Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs (PERP) (2007-2010) | EU, DK & SE |
| National Human Rights Commission Capacity Development Project (2009-2015) | DK & SE |
| Supporting Local Development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (2011-2013) | EU |
| Conflict Prevention, Recovery and Peace-building in Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh (2014-2015) | DK & SE |
| Climate change and disaster management | |
| Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF) (2012-2016) | EU, DK & SE |
| Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP Phase II) (2010-2014) | EU & SE |
| Sundarban Environmental And Livelihoods Security (SEALS) (2010-2014) | EU |
| Gender equality and empowerment of women | |
| Agriculture Sector Programme Support Phase II (ASPS II) - Regional Fisheries and Livestock Development Component (RFLDC) (2006-2011) | DK |
| Agriculture Sector Programme Support Phase II (ASPS II): Agricultural Extension Component (2006-2011) | DK |
| Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence against Women Phase-III (One-Stop-Crisis centre) (2011-2016) | DK |
| Food and Livelihood Security programme for the Ultra-poor women, Small and Marginal farmers (2012-2014) | EU |
| Strengthening Activism Towards Human Rights Culture in Bangladesh (2012-2016) | SE |

During the main field mission held in April 2015, the team conducted various site visits to observe the direct outputs of some of the selected interventions and to conduct interviews and focus groups with key stakeholders, including final beneficiaries (see table below).

Table 4 – Key stakeholders met during site visits

| Sector | Location visited | Stakeholders met |
|--|--|---|
| Primary education | Tongi | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Government primary school: headteacher and teachers ▪ Share non-formal education centre: teacher, parents and school children |
| Private sector development | Noakhali | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ District & Upzilla Livestock Officer ▪ Agriculture Extension Officer ▪ Farmers Filed Schools participants ▪ Rural infrastructure engineers ▪ LCS members ▪ Danida Climate Change Adaptation Project Advisors ▪ Danida Integrated Farm Management coordinators ▪ Farmers' organisations |
| | Savar | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Senior staff at Fish Inspection and Quality Control, Department of Fisheries |
| Human rights and democratic governance | Savar | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Survivors from Rana Plaza |
| | Dhaka | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Meeting with local committee slum dwellers ▪ Focus group with women slum dwellers |
| Climate change and disaster management | Sunderbans West | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Staff of Concern Worldwide (SEALS) ▪ Staff of NGO Shushilan (SEALS) ▪ Staff of NGO Jagrata Juba Shangha (Paribartan project) |
| | Sunderbans East Bagerhat (Upazila: Morolgong) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Baraikhali Savings Group ▪ Project Staff, CBAS-SRF Project, World Vision, ▪ Union and Ward Disaster Management Committee ▪ SEALS Beneficiaries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Dropout children who completed non formal primary education ○ Small business owner (stationary shop) ○ Ward Disaster Management Committee |
| | Kulhna | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Forest department ▪ NGO staff |
| | Cox's Bazar | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Forest department ▪ Young Power in Social Action (YPSA) staff |
| Gender equality | Mymensingh | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ School children involved in theatre performance on human rights ▪ School children watching theatre performance ▪ School teachers ▪ Villagers involved in street theatre |
| | Dhaka Medical College (One Stop Crisis Centre) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Focus group with three doctors, two police officers, two lawyers, one counselor, four nurses |

2.2.3 Overall methodological approach for primary education

Given its specificity and complexity, the analytical framework for the analysis of donor support in the field of primary education (including basket fund and SBS) is presented separately.

The evaluation of donor support to primary education has been based on the OECD-DAC 3-step methodological approach to evaluate budget support operations. However, it has been adjusted to take account of the specificities of the Bangladeshi context: evaluation of the support from two donors, to one single sub-sector (primary education), through basket fund and sector budget support, with various forms of budget support (targeted for Sweden – the ‘treasury model’ – and untargeted for the EU). The use of the methodological approach remains relevant insofar as all donors involved in PEDP 2 Trust Fund and in PEDP 3 Swap have been committed to aid effectiveness principles (coordination, harmonization, alignment and result-based management) with a view to improve education policies, management and budget allocation to achieve better education outcomes.

2.2.3.1 Adapted OECD-DAC methodological approach:


Step 1 of the methodological approach – covered by the Evaluation Question 3 – is based on an inventory of inputs to primary education (funding, policy dialogue mechanisms, capacity building and complementary interventions) and assessed both the relationship between external support and the national budget and policy processes (direct outputs) and the contribution of external assistance to the improvement in public policies, public spending, public service delivery, and public institutions (induced outputs). Within this step, the analysis also addressed the contribution of donor interventions to improvements in the availability of primary education services, across the territory. Because of the minor financial weight of EU/Sweden support in total support to primary education over the period and the fact that the EU SBS is very recent, the results of applying Step 1 of the adapted OECD/DAC methodological approach have foremost reflected the outputs of the PEDP 2 TF, the PEDP 3 Swap and other supports to the sector. However, the analysis attempted to isolate the effects of EU/SW support on identified improvements by examining their characteristics, conditions for disbursement, specific associated TA and complementary interventions.

Step 2 of the methodological approach – covered by Evaluation Question 4 – analysed primary education performances in terms of access, retention (drop-out and completion rate) and equity (gender and territorial) over the evaluation period. It documented relations between these sector outcomes and main public policy interventions, notably promoted by donors, as well as other external factors. The analysis has been based on a methodology that mixed quantitative (historical statistical analysis and econometrics) and qualitative approaches. While the statistical analysis was limited to the district level, the econometrics provided insights into upazilas-level dynamics. As primary education was the focus, basic trends at junior secondary level were also analysed to document the interdependence between progress at primary level and current challenges at junior secondary level. Given the time lapse for education policies to achieve impacts (for instance increased literacy rate, better productive labour force, greater political participation or diminished social prevalence of patriarchal norms), the analysis was limited to the outcome level.

Step 3: In this step, results of Step 1 and Step 2 were linked. Attribution analysis was conducted, focusing on aspects for which a reasonable linkage was expected of DPs' inputs, direct and induced outputs, with overall outcomes. On the basis of the findings of EQ3 and EQ4, the team constructed a conversation model (see figure 3) showing the contribution of donor support to education throughout the chain of effects, from direct and indirect outputs, until results. The relative degree of influence of donor support at each level of the chain has been illustrated through arrows showing different levels of effects: essential effect; important effect ; moderate effect ; absent or weak effect.

The figure below illustrates schematically our adapted OECD-DAC approach.

Figure 3 - Methodological approach to evaluate donor support to primary education



2.2.3.2 Econometric analysis of the Education Sector in Bangladesh

Objective of the econometric analysis:

The aim of the econometric analysis of the Education Sector in Bangladesh was to increase our understanding of the underlying mechanisms that determine the performance of education services in Bangladesh. To be more specific the initial aim was twofold:

- To investigate the extent to which education performance levels are influenced by volume and quality of education inputs (while controlling for other factors that are not directly influenced by the degree of education input volume and quality), on the one hand;

- And, on the other hand, explore whether volume and quality of education inputs contribute to reduce (or not) the degree of education performance discrepancies between target groups (girls vs. boys; socio-economically advantaged children vs. socio-economically disadvantaged children; children living in urban environments vs. children living in rural areas; disabled children vs. non-disabled children).

Initial research design:

While the debate about the quantitative assessment of education performance is still ongoing, we initially decided to focus in this analysis on three types of education performance metrics: (i) participation, (ii) retention and (iii) learning outcomes. To study the determinants of (i) participation, (ii) retention and (iii) learning outcomes, and more specifically the role played by education service inputs, our research design builds on the following theoretical causal relations that underpin education production functions:

Access / retention = f (supply components {infrastructures incl. latrines, safe water, electricity; social support incl. stipends or school feeding programmes; school transport; availability of (female) teachers; teaching quality; ... }, demand elements {distance school-home ; student's characteristics such as gender or rank in the household; opportunity costs ; poverty level ; cultural factors})

Learning outcomes = f (school characteristics {availability of textbooks; availability of teachers ; teachers' level of qualification and motivation ; actual learning time; school management mode; teaching methods including individual support}, family characteristics {socio-cultural capital; writing culture; early cognitive development; interest in school activities etc.})

The initial research design supposed the merger of data sets in five steps (outlined in detail in the Desk Note), especially with the view to account for socio-economic characteristics of upazilas and students. More precisely, it was expected that these five phases would have generated the required empirical data material to econometrically investigate in a detailed quantitative analysis the following two main issues:

- The impact of education service inputs (and of the way they are allocated) on education performance levels in Bangladesh: the suggested econometric research design aimed to provide a detailed analysis at the upazila-level of the determinants of education performance levels (measured in terms of (i) participation, (ii) retention and (iii) learning outcomes) in Bangladesh in 2013. The aim was to provide an in-depth investigation of the relationship between education performance levels and the characteristics in terms of volume and quality of the allocation of education services across a widely diverging sample of upazilas. To do so, we intended to control both for upazila-wide socio-economic, regional and cultural specificities and for student-specific characteristics
- The impact education service inputs (and of the way they are allocated) on the degree of education performance discrepancies across target groups: the suggested econometric research design aimed to explore, at the upazila and district levels, the main determinants of the discrepancies observed in the performance of education services across upazilas (between boys and girls) as well as across districts (between the

best and the worst performing upazilas of the district, between the most socio-economically advantaged and the most socio-economically disadvantaged upazilas...

Data collection challenges:

As it was stressed in the inception and desk reports, the actual feasibility of the econometric analysis, as it was initially envisaged, depended on the availability of specific sets of data:

- Annual primary schools census, school level data for 2013
- Annual secondary schools census, school level data for 2013
- National Student Assessment, school level data for 2013
- Learning Assessment of Secondary Institutions (SEQAEF), school level data for 2013
- MICS (Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey), upazila level data for 2013

Several initiatives were taken by the team to collect the data throughout the evaluation process. During the preliminary mission in December 2014, the education team met with the M&E Division under DPE/MoPME, the BANBEIS (MoE) and the BBS to explain the evaluation exercise and its data requirements. The formal procedures to access the data were clarified with the respective departments: a formal letter to the DG of the DPE/MOPME for primary school census and national student assessment data; an email to the BBS and BANBEIS, which would provide details on the data requirements. Between the two missions, letters and emails were sent to the two institutions, which remained without answer. Prior to the second mission held in April 2015, formal emails were sent by the Team Leader of the evaluation to the three institutions to further explain the data required to conduct the evaluation and request access to the data. The team discussed the difficulties in accessing the data with the EUD, which facilitated a meeting with the Director of the M&E Division (DPE/MoPME). During this meeting, the team was informed that the data of the National Students Assessment were actually owned by the World Bank and the University of Melbourne. The World Bank, however, did not agree to share the data with the team on the ground that any evaluation of PEDP 3 should have been jointly decided at the level of the PEDP 3 consortium². Given these fruitless efforts, at the end of this mission, the EUD sent new letters to the three institutions. The senior national education expert met in May with the M&E and Management Information divisions within the DPE and the BBS to try to retrieve the data, in vain. Only BANBEIS replied but sent national data, while school-level data were needed. In June, the education team contacted UNICEF, which has supported the BBS to conduct the 2013 MICS. This request was also unsuccessful. Eventually, on 20 June 2015, only upazila-level primary school census data, which had been collected during the inception mission, were available to the team. This led the team to revise the econometric approach (see below). However, the team, with the help of the EUD, was still pursuing efforts to collect the data in June. In case the team gets access to the data (at the latest on 16 July), the team proposes to incorporate the results of the econometric analysis in the Revised Draft Final report so as to be in line with the initially envisaged econometric approach.

² The latter had been formally informed about the evaluation by the EUD

Revised econometric approach:

Given that the analysis performed has been based on the 2013 Census data on Primary Education in Bangladesh provided by the MoMPE and with a view to complement the existing econometric analysis conducted by the World Bank, efforts have been focused on the disparities observed in the education sector. Indeed, the WB study analysed the relation between learning assessments and inputs, through a national perspective. But factors behind disparities between upazilas in terms of internal efficiency and gender performance were not investigated.

Unfortunately, as already discussed, the socio-economic characteristics of upazilas could not be factored in so far. It should be noted that the non-integration of these characteristics limits the analysis carried out since it prevents the team from factoring into the influence of poverty, which is recognized by the literature as being important. The team expects to factor into the analysis the socio-economic dimensions in the revised draft final report when the MICS data will be made available (at the latest on 16 July 2015).

The objective of the analysis is to disentangle the underlying forces that help understanding the rationales behind observed disparities.

The results of the econometric analysis are presented under Annex 5 as a separate Appendix to the section dealing with primary education.

2.2.4 Challenges and limitations

This evaluation team faced a number of challenges and limitations. The methodological approach followed throughout the evaluation process aimed to mitigate as much as possible these challenges.

This evaluation was joint (DK, EU, SE) but it actually covered three relatively independent strategies. The approach adopted did not attempt to conduct three distinct evaluations of the strategies adopted by each EP. Instead, the team built a common evaluation framework for all three EPs and aimed to highlight both common lines and major discrepancies between the EPs' strategies.

This strategy-level evaluation covered a particularly wide scope. It encompassed the strategies and operations of three donors, which went across different sectors, periods and geographical areas and involved a range of partners. The evaluation had to go beyond the mere summation of evaluations of multiple operations. The team designed a specific structured methodological approach based primarily on a common set of EQs, JCs and indicators for the three EPs. These EQs covered both overall transversal issues (such as the relevance of the EPs' support) and five key sectors supported by the three EPs.

This evaluation has also included an in-depth assessment of DPs' support to primary education (including basket fund and SBS), which has been guided by the OECD/DAC methodology for the evaluation of budget support operations. The adapted OECD/DAC approach and the challenges encountered have been detailed above (section 2.2.3.2).

Limitations of the analysis were closely related to the quantity and quality of information that was available to the evaluation team.

- This relates in particular to the process of accessing primary sources, as well as the availability, heterogeneity and quality of secondary data. For instance, the evidence in the form of documents from Sweden was often incomplete due to inadequate filing system. Fortunately many of the interventions were joint with other development partners from which such documentation could be obtained.
- A main challenge encountered in information collection was related to a lack of information on results and impacts.³ This was attributable to a widespread absence of systematic monitoring and, eventually, to a limited availability of assessments and evaluations that sufficiently reflected on outcomes and impacts. The evaluation team aimed to mitigate this by diversifying the sources of information and subsequent triangulation.
- In constructing the inventory and typology of the interventions supported by each one of the EP, the team faced key challenges that are common to all mapping exercises for this type of evaluations. They relate to the information source on which they are based. The inventory for the EU has been based on an extraction of the CRIS database. The inventories for Denmark and Sweden have been based on the databases communicated by these two EPs upon request of the evaluation team. The information provided included the disbursed amounts per intervention as well as a sector classification, but it did not systematically detail the committed amounts nor the aid modalities used.

High staff turnover among EPs (and indeed most DPs) limited the institutional memory on which the team could rely on. This was further aggravated by higher staff turn over in most government counterpart institutions (albeit with some interesting exceptions such as the BSTI). Thus many interviews focussed on more recent events and programmes often not covering the early years of the evaluation. This has been particularly challenging for evidencing most verbal engagement, e.g. policy dialogue, as there was in such cases a lack of both personal and written evidence. Finally limited availability of especially senior staff (due to leave of absence, other priorities, holidays, business travel etc.) also reduced the team's access to institutional memory and more strategy level dialogue. The team triangulated, as much as possible, data originating from several sources so as to mitigate this bias.

The evaluation looked at specific achievements at country level, as well as progress made and constraints encountered through specific case studies. At country level, it was difficult to isolate the impact of the EPs' support in a multi-stakeholder and complex environment. None of the identifiable dynamics and effects at country level was solely dependent on the EP's contributions, but were the results of an interplay of various stakeholders and contextual factors. In order to better assess a possible EPs' contribution to progress related to various indicators, the team completed quantitative data with qualitative assessments from different actors, and then cross-checked information so as to more clearly delineate the role played by the EP.

³ Notable exception is the Danida Farmer field school evaluation and the Danida evaluation of the Business to business programme.

Annex 4: List of Evaluation Partners Interventions

This annex presents the lists of the three Evaluation Partners' development aid interventions in Bangladesh during the evaluation period:

- **EU :**
 - List of decisions specific to Bangladesh made by EuropeAid in 2007-2014 under the financial instrument DCI-Asia, with indication of committed amounts in Euro
 - List of contracts specific to Bangladesh made by EuropeAid in 2007-2014 under global/regional financial instruments and programmes (DCI-FOOD, EIDHR, IFS-RRM, etc.), with indication of contracted amounts in Euro
- **Sweden :**
 - List of contributions specific to Bangladesh made by SIDA, for which SIDA had 'outcomes' in 2008-2014, with indication of 'outcome' amounts in Swedish krona and Euro.¹
- **Denmark :**
 - List of contributions specific to Bangladesh made by Denmark in 2007-2013, with indication of 'outcome' amounts in Danish krona and Euro.

¹ This list presents inventory information for Sweden based on data received to date by the evaluation team. It relates to the years 2008 to 2014 (data not received yet for 2007). These figures reflect the yearly "outcome" amounts for SIDA's projects for each of the years indicated. They don't include outcomes for coming years of on-going interventions. They cover, however, 'outcomes' of interventions which have started before the evaluation period. All types of SIDA external aid have been considered, except for loans and humanitarian assistance.

List of EU interventions funded under DCI-ASIA

| Domain | Decision year | Title | Allocated | Contracted | Paid | Sector ADE |
|----------|---------------|--|------------|------------|------------|--|
| DCI-ASIE | 2011 | Third Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP III) | 54.000.000 | 53.800.000 | 11.096.605 | Education |
| DCI-ASIE | 2010 | SHARE: Support to the Hard to Reach through Basic Education | 49.301.093 | 49.301.093 | 21.515.233 | Education |
| DCI-ASIE | 2012 | Poverty Reduction Through Inclusive and Sustainable Markets (PRISM) | 30.000.000 | - | - | Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) development |
| DCI-ASIE | 2014 | Activating Village Courts in Bangladesh | 25.000.000 | - | - | PFM, decentralisation and anti-corruption |
| DCI-ASIE | 2009 | Food and Livelihood Security (FLS) Project | 24.000.000 | 23.116.479 | 19.526.542 | Food security |
| DCI-ASIE | 2011 | Supporting Local Development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts | 24.000.000 | 24.000.000 | 21.781.451 | Conflict prevention and resolution, and peace-building |
| DCI-ASIE | 2011 | Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF) | 20.000.000 | 20.000.000 | 10.000.000 | Environment and Climate |
| DCI-ASIE | 2012 | Food Security 2012 Bangladesh - Ujjibito | 20.000.000 | 20.000.000 | 10.967.060 | Food security |
| DCI-ASIE | 2013 | EU Support to health and nutrition to the Poor in Urban Bangladesh | 20.000.000 | - | - | Basic health care |
| DCI-ASIE | 2009 | INSPIRED-Integrated Support to Poverty and Inequality Reduction through Ente | 19.000.000 | 14.954.965 | 9.349.106 | Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) development |
| DCI-ASIE | 2007 | Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs (PERP) | 15.000.000 | 15.000.000 | 14.686.152 | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| DCI-ASIE | 2008 | Better Work and Standards Programme | 15.000.000 | 14.713.518 | 13.255.991 | Trade policy and administrative management |
| DCI-ASIE | 2011 | Union Parishad and Upazila Support Programme | 14.000.000 | 14.000.000 | 6.013.011 | PFM, decentralisation and anti-corruption |
| DCI-ASIE | 2009 | Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) 2010-2014 | 13.000.000 | 13.000.000 | 11.230.918 | Disaster prevention and preparedness |
| DCI-ASIE | 2007 | Support to the Justice System - Activating Village Courts | 10.000.000 | 10.000.000 | - | PFM, decentralisation and anti-corruption |
| DCI-ASIE | 2008 | Strengthening Access to Land and Property Rights for All Sections of the Commu | 10.000.000 | 9.059.979 | 4.822.330 | PFM, decentralisation and anti-corruption |
| DCI-ASIE | 2009 | Sundarbans Environmental And Livelihoods Security (SEALS) | 10.000.000 | 8.838.371 | 7.935.925 | Food security |
| DCI-ASIE | 2011 | Strengthening Election Management in Bangladesh (SEMB) | 10.000.000 | 10.000.000 | 6.989.380 | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| DCI-ASIE | 2008 | Trade Policy Support Programme | 6.000.000 | 4.889.069 | 3.364.171 | Trade policy and administrative management |
| DCI-ASIE | 2011 | Dummy contract for Support to the 2011 Bangladesh Population and Housing Ce | 6.000.000 | - | 3.802.411 | Other |
| DCI-ASIE | 2007 | Local Governance Support project - learning and innovation component (LGSP-LI | 4.999.750 | 5.000.000 | 4.999.750 | PFM, decentralisation and anti-corruption |
| DCI-ASIE | 2010 | Support to Population and Housing Census 2011 | 4.400.000 | - | 4.180.000 | Other |
| DCI-ASIE | 2007 | Resolution of the protracted refugee situation for the Muslim refugees of Myanr | 3.970.136 | 3.970.136 | 3.970.136 | Material relief assistance and services |
| DCI-ASIE | 2011 | Protection, essential services and durable solutions for refugees in Bangladesh | 3.000.000 | 3.000.000 | 3.000.000 | Multi-sector aid |
| DCI-ASIE | 2009 | Programme in support of long-term solutions to the protracted refugees situatio | 2.498.216 | 2.498.216 | 2.498.216 | Material relief assistance and services |
| DCI-ASIE | 2013 | Protection, essential services and durable solutions for refugees in Bangladesh; f | 1.500.000 | - | 1.200.000 | Multi-sector aid |
| DCI-ASIE | 2010 | Accelerated progress towards achievement of Millennium Development Goals w | 1.225.592 | 4.000.000 | 1.225.592 | Multi-sector aid |

List of EU interventions funded under other financial instruments and programmes

| Title | Contractor | Contract Year | Type Of Aid | Contracted Amount (EUR) | Paid Amount (EUR) | Instrument compiled | Sector ADE |
|---|--|---------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|--|
| Vulnerable Group Development for Ultra-Poor (VGDUP)-PTF Operating costs GONOPROJATONTRI BANGLADESH (Bangladesh) | GONOPROJATONTRI BANGLADESH | 2007 | Project-type interventions | 18.550.000,00 | 18.109.595,77 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| School Feeding Component of FS 2006 GONOPROJATONTRI BANGLADESH (Bangladesh) | GONOPROJATONTRI BANGLADESH | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 13.650.000,00 | 12.120.630,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Programme of Support for the rehabilitation of livelihoods devastated by cyclone SIDR in Bangladesh C(2008) 2548 BRAC SOCIETY (Bangladesh) | BRAC SOCIETY | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 12.666.579,96 | 12.666.579,96 | IFS-RRM | Conflict prevention and resolution, and peace-building |
| Food Security for the Ultra-Poor (FSUP) WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (Italy) | WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 11.600.000,00 | 10.916.082,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Food Security for the Ultra-Poor in the Haor Region (FSUP-H) CARE INTERNATIONAL UK LBG (United Kingdom) | CARE INTERNATIONAL UK LBG | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 9.592.800,00 | 8.424.000,37 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Gaibandha food security project for ultra poor women STICHTING INTERKERKELIJKE ORGANISATIE VOOR ONTWIKKELINGSSAMENWERKING, ICCO (Netherlands (The)) | STICHTING INTERKERKELIJKE ORGANISATIE VOOR ONTWIKKELINGSSAMENWERKING, ICCO | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 8.937.572,87 | 8.259.272,53 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF) THE WORLD BANK GROUP (United States) | THE WORLD BANK GROUP | 2010 | Basket funds/pooled funding | 8.500.000,00 | 4.250.000,00 | DCI-ENV / ENV | Environment and Climate |
| Soil Fertility Component - PTF - Food Security 2006 GONOPROJATONTRI BANGLADESH (Bangladesh) | GONOPROJATONTRI BANGLADESH | 2009 | Other technical assistance | 8.177.500,00 | 6.429.617,19 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Food Facility, EC-UNDP IV, Bangladesh UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (United States) | UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 7.498.910,00 | 7.498.910,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Crew Wage for Rural Employment Opportunities for Public Assets UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (United States) | UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME | 2008 | Developmental food aid | 7.271.176,32 | 7.271.176,32 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| National Food Security Nutritional Surveillance Project BRAC UNIVERSITY (Bangladesh) | BRAC UNIVERSITY | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 5.220.838,00 | 3.757.513,93 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Crop Intensification for Achieving Food Self-Sufficiency in the Coastal Regions of Bangladesh BRAC SOCIETY (Bangladesh) | BRAC SOCIETY | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 5.000.000,00 | 5.000.000,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Restoring socio-economic stability and strengthening community resilience in areas affected by cyclone AILA BRAC SOCIETY (Bangladesh) | BRAC SOCIETY | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 4.987.051,02 | 4.987.051,02 | IFS-RRM | Conflict prevention and resolution, and peace-building |
| Sustainable Technology Transfer to Enhance Productivity for Ultra Poor STEP UP NETZ PARTNERSCHAFT FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND GERECHTIGKEIT EV (Germany) | NETZ PARTNERSCHAFT FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND GERECHTIGKEIT EV | 2011 | Project-type interventions | 3.996.000,00 | 3.431.848,30 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Enhancing Governance and Capacity of Service Providers and Civil Society in Water Supply and Sanitation Sectors NGO FORUM FOR DRINKING WATER SUPPLY & SANITATION ASSOCIATION (Bangladesh) | NGO FORUM FOR DRINKING WATER SUPPLY & SANITATION ASSOCIATION | 2012 | Project-type interventions | 3.850.000,00 | 1.779.828,83 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| National Food Policy Capacity Strengthening Programme - Phase II THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (Italy) | THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS | 2008 | Other technical assistance | 3.850.000,00 | 3.765.407,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Preventing and addressing undernutrition in young children and women and its underlying causes. WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (Italy) | WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 3.600.000,00 | 2.494.669,83 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |

| Title | Contractor | Contract Year | Type Of Aid | Contracted Amount (EU) | Paid Amount (EUR) | Instrument compiled | Sector ADE |
|---|---|---------------|----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|---|
| Food Security Block Grants UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (United States) | UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME | 2007 | Developmental food aid | 3.350.836,26 | 3.350.836,26 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Ujjibito (RERMP 2) Start up Programme Estimate (Supplies) GONOPROJATONTRI BANGLADESH (Bangladesh) | GONOPROJATONTRI BANGLADESH | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 3.251.948,00 | 302.719,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Health Education and Livelihood support Programme for the Ultra Poor households (HELP - Ultra Poor) ISLAMIC RELIEF WORLDWIDE (United Kingdom) | ISLAMIC RELIEF WORLDWIDE | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 3.130.215,00 | 2.993.871,29 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Reduction of food insecurity for poor and extreme poor households CONCERN UNIVERSAL LBG (United Kingdom) | CONCERN UNIVERSAL LBG | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 3.061.230,47 | 3.061.230,47 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Cross-border transfer of agricultural technologies, institutional and market development CONCERN UNIVERSAL LBG (United Kingdom) | CONCERN UNIVERSAL LBG | 2011 | Project-type interventions | 2.803.269,11 | 2.608.094,70 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Making Agriculture and Market Systems work for Landless, Marginal and Smallholder Farmers in Bangladesh. PRACTICAL ACTION LBG (United Kingdom) | PRACTICAL ACTION LBG | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 2.384.571,18 | 2.384.571,18 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| ONGIKAR - Facilitating implementation of National Education Policy (NEP) and Skills Development Policy (SDP) GONO SHAKKHARATA OBHIJAN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION (Bangladesh) | GONO SHAKKHARATA OBHIJAN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 2.350.000,00 | 500.367,00 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Education |
| Strengthening Poorest and Vulnerable Households Capability to Improve Food Security in Northwest Bangladesh CARE OSTERREICH VEREIN FUR ENTWICKLUNGSSZUSAMMENARBEIT UND HUMANITARE HILFE (Austria) | CARE OSTERREICH VEREIN FUR ENTWICKLUNGSSZUSAMMENARBEIT UND HUMANITARE HILFE | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 2.133.149,25 | 2.133.149,25 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Initiative to Enhance Monga Coping Capacity OXFAM GB LBG (United Kingdom) | OXFAM GB LBG | 2009 | Investment project aid | 1.971.953,95 | 1.971.953,95 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Strengthening Agricultural Capacities of Ultra-Poor in Bangladesh NETZ PARTNERSCHAFT FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND GERECHTIGKEIT EV (Germany) | NETZ PARTNERSCHAFT FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND GERECHTIGKEIT EV | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 1.897.543,97 | 1.897.543,97 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Technical and Vocational Education and Training for Young People in the Informal Economy in Bangladesh THE SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND LBG (United Kingdom) | THE SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND LBG | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 1.692.568,00 | 1.523.311,00 | DCI-EDUC | Education |
| Strengthening womens collectives in Bangladesh, India and Nepal ACTIONAID LBG (United Kingdom) | ACTIONAID LBG | 2012 | Project-type interventions | 1.500.000,00 | 897.360,00 | DCI-GENRE / GENDER | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Strengthening Capacity and Networking of NSAs and LAs on Disability (SCANED) CENTRE FOR DISABILITY IN DEVELOPMENT VOLUNTARY SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATION (Bangladesh) | CENTRE FOR DISABILITY IN DEVELOPMENT VOLUNTARY SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATION | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 1.500.000,00 | 380.346,00 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Empowering the Poor Through Federations FOLKEKIRKENS NODHJALP FOND (Denmark) | FOLKEKIRKENS NODHJALP FOND | 2007 | Project-type interventions | 1.497.436,00 | 1.497.436,00 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Multi-sector aid |
| Inclusive Protection and Empowerment Project for Children with Disabilities (IPEP) RED BARNET FORENING (Denmark) | RED BARNET FORENING | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 1.492.000,00 | 367.996,80 | DCI-HUM | Multi-sector aid |
| Community actions for child protection from violence FAMILY PLANNING ASSOCIATION OF BANGLADESH VOLUNTARY SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATION (Bangladesh) | FAMILY PLANNING ASSOCIATION OF BANGLADESH VOLUNTARY SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATION | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 1.483.444,95 | 480.793,55 | DCI-HUM | Multi-sector aid |

| Title | Contractor | Contract Year | Type Of Aid | Contracted Amount (EU) | Paid Amount (EUR) | Instrument compiled | Sector ADE |
|--|---|---------------|----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---|
| Skills for Unemployed and Underemployed Labour (SkillFUL): Promoting sustainable training in the informal economy for poverty reduction.SUISSECONTACT,SCHWEIZERISCHE STIFTUNG FUR TECHNISCHE ENTWICKLUNGSSZUSAMMENARBEIT (Switzerland) | SUISSECONTACT,SC HWEIZERISCHE STIFTUNG FUR TECHNISCHE ENTWICKLUNGSSZUSAMMENARBEIT | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 1.466.345,00 | 1.319.711,00 | DCI-EDUC | Education |
| Technical Assistance Support to Food Security for Ultra-Poor (FSUP)AGRICONSULTING SPA - SOCIETA' PER LA CONSULENZA E LO SVILUPPO DELLE ATTIVITA' AGRICOLE ED AMBIENTALI (Italy) | AGRICONSULTING SPA -SOCIETA' PER LA CONSULENZA E LO SVILUPPO DELLE ATTIVITA' AGRICOLE ED AMBIENTALI | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 1.374.422,12 | 1.374.422,12 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| SANJOG II: Building linkages and local capacities on Poverty reduction, Education, Empowerment and Rehabilitation of children vulnerable to, or survivors of, Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation in Bangladesh ACTING FOR LIFE, LA VIE, PAS LA SURVIE ASSOCIATION (France) | ACTING FOR LIFE, LA VIE, PAS LA SURVIE ASSOCIATION | 2007 | Project-type interventions | 1.097.328,27 | 1.097.328,27 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Other |
| Improving Child Protection and Rehabilitation of Children from Sexual Abuse and Exploitation in BangladeshRED BARNET FORENING (Denmark) | RED BARNET FORENING | 2011 | Project-type interventions | 1.094.915,00 | 985.423,50 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Technical Assistance Support to Vulnerable Group Development for Ultra-Poor in Bangladesh GFA CONSULTING GROUP GMBH (Germany) | GFA CONSULTING GROUP GMBH | 2007 | Project-type interventions | 1.033.858,28 | 1.033.858,28 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Affordable and sustainable health care for vulnerable peopleSTICHTING REFORMATORISCHE HULPAKTIEWOORD EN DAAD (Netherlands (The)) | STICHTING REFORMATORISCHE HULPAKTIEWOORD EN DAAD | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 1.000.000,00 | 900.000,00 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Basic health care |
| Upazila Model of School Improvement ProgrammePLAN INTERNATIONAL (UK) LBG (United Kingdom) | PLAN INTERNATIONAL (UK) LBG | 2011 | Project-type interventions | 1.000.000,00 | 900.000,00 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Education |
| Strengthening Community Based Organisations for pro-poor democratic governanceFOLKEKIRKENS NODHJAELP FOND (Denmark) | FOLKEKIRKENS NODHJAELP FOND | 2012 | Project-type interventions | 1.000.000,00 | 440.186,00 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Rural Urban Child Migration ProjectRED BARNET FORENING (Denmark) | RED BARNET FORENING | 2011 | Project-type interventions | 998.996,00 | 748.932,61 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Alleviating poverty through disaster risk reduction in North West BangladeshFOLKEKIRKENS NODHJAELP FOND (Denmark) | FOLKEKIRKENS NODHJAELP FOND | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 998.860,45 | 998.860,45 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation |
| Partnerships to combat child labour through corporate social responsibility CSR in BangladeshRED BARNET FORENING (Denmark) | RED BARNET FORENING | 2011 | Project-type interventions | 997.467,00 | 893.634,94 | DCI-HUM | Multi-sector aid |
| Improved access to and utilisation of affordable, quality sexual reproductive health (SRH) services and information among marginalised and low income women, men and young people in the underserved areas in BangladeshMARIE STOPES BANGLADESH LBG (Bangladesh) | MARIE STOPES BANGLADESH LBG | 2012 | Project-type interventions | 989.917,00 | 435.683,00 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Basic health care |
| SEEMA-Solidarity and Empowerment through Education, Motivation and AwarenessCARE OSTERREICH VEREIN FUR ENTWICKLUNGSSZUSAMMENARBEIT UND HUMANITARE HILFE (Austria) | CARE OSTERREICH VEREIN FUR ENTWICKLUNGSSZUSAMMENARBEIT UND HUMANITARE HILFE | 2011 | Project-type interventions | 941.850,00 | 815.816,75 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |

| Title | Contractor | Contract Year | Type Of Aid | Contracted Amount (EUR) | Paid Amount (EUR) | Instrument compiled | Sector ADE |
|--|--|---------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---|
| Community Managed Water Supply and Sanitation Programme for the Rural Poor of Chittagong Hill Tracts NGO FORUM FOR DRINKING WATER SUPPLY & SANITATION ASSOCIATION (Bangladesh) | NGO FORUM FOR DRINKING WATER SUPPLY & SANITATION ASSOCIATION | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 918.216,00 | 918.216,00 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Other |
| Strengthening NSAs to claim rights and services for extreme marginalized and socially excluded communities of BangladeshOXFAM GB LBG (United Kingdom) | OXFAM GB LBG | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 860.430,00 | 860.430,00 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Social and Economic Security for Traditional Resource Users of the SundarbanRELIEF INTERNATIONAL-UK LBG (United Kingdom) | RELIEF INTERNATIONAL-UK LBG | 2011 | Project-type interventions | 844.626,00 | 760.163,00 | DCI-HUM | Multi-sector aid |
| Employment of LAs and NSAs in Responding to Economic Development Opportunities and Climate Change and Disaster VulnerabilitiesCARE OSTERREICH VEREIN FUR ENTWICKLUNGSSUSAMMENARBEIT UND HUMANITARE HILFE (Austria) | CARE OSTERREICH VEREIN FUR ENTWICKLUNGSSUSAMMENARBEIT UND HUMANITARE HILFE | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 839.060,78 | 839.060,78 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Strengthening Non-State Actors (NSA) and Local Bodies (LBs) to reduce children poverty and promote rights of vulnerable children (VC)THE SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND LBG (United Kingdom) | THE SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND LBG | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 808.146,67 | 784.676,07 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Early Childhood Care and Development in Disaster Prone AreasPLAN INTERNATIONAL (UK) LBG (United Kingdom) | PLAN INTERNATIONAL (UK) LBG | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 807.321,73 | 807.321,73 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Other |
| Promoting rights through community action: improved access to inclusive education for children with disabilitiesLEONARD CHESHIRE DISABILITY LBG (United Kingdom) | LEONARD CHESHIRE DISABILITY LBG | 2011 | Project-type interventions | 785.133,00 | 706.620,00 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Education |
| Effective Participation for Transparent and Accountable Local GovernanceDIAKONIA I (Sweden) | DIAKONIA I | 2012 | Project-type interventions | 750.000,00 | 351.169,00 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Quality Primary Education for Children from Extreme Poor Households on Remote River Islands in North-West Bangladesh NETZ PARTNERSCHAFT FUR ENTWICKLUNGUND GERECHTIGKEIT EV (Germany) | NETZ PARTNERSCHAFT FUR ENTWICKLUNGUND GERECHTIGKEIT EV | 2007 | Project-type interventions | 749.970,00 | 708.106,93 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Education |
| Promoting safe migration and local development in eight districts in BangladeshFOLKEKIRKENS NODHJAELP FOND (Denmark) | FOLKEKIRKENS NODHJAELP FOND | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 747.680,58 | 747.680,58 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Other |
| Development of a comprehensive national network for Provision of Assistive Technology: PROVAT ASSOCIATION FEDERATION HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL (France) | ASSOCIATION FEDERATION HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL | 2007 | Project-type interventions | 737.306,84 | 737.306,84 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Ensuring Water & Sanitation Facilities towards Disaster Risk ReductionCONCERN UNIVERSAL LBG (United Kingdom) | CONCERN UNIVERSAL LBG | 2011 | Project-type interventions | 731.236,90 | 656.931,18 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation |
| Developing a safety net for urban marginalized and disadvantaged childrenFONDAZIONE TERRE DES HOMMES ITALIAONLUS (Italy) | FONDAZIONE TERRE DES HOMMES ITALIAONLUS | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 719.700,00 | 675.157,53 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Other |
| Promoting the rights of older people and influencing policy through cultural campaigning and media workHELPPAGE INTERNATIONAL LBG (United Kingdom) | HELPPAGE INTERNATIONAL LBG | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 688.857,00 | 192.371,00 | DCI-HUM | Multi-sector aid |
| Integrated Community Based Arsenic Mitigation ProjectKATHOLISCHE ZENTRALSTELLE FUERENTWICKLUNGSHILFE E.V. (Germany) | KATHOLISCHE ZENTRALSTELLE FUERENTWICKLUNG SHILFE E.V. | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 665.950,00 | 616.811,35 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Other |
| Nutritional Surveillance Component - PTF - Food Security 2006GONOPROJATONTRI BANGLADESH (Bangladesh) | GONOPROJATONTRI BANGLADESH | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 650.000,00 | 585.169,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |

| Title | Contractor | Contract Year | Type Of Aid | Contracted Amount (EUR) | Paid Amount (EUR) | Instrument compiled | Sector ADE |
|---|---|---------------|---|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--|
| Promoting safe migration and local development in four districts in Bangladesh, through awareness raising, skills development and Institutional capacity building.FONDAZIONE TERRE DES HOMMES ITALIAONLUS (Italy) | FONDAZIONE TERRE DES HOMMES ITALIAONLUS | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 644.953,00 | 644.953,00 | DCI-MIGR | Other |
| Economic Empowerment for Poor and Vulnerable Women in BangladeshBRAC SOCIETY (Bangladesh) | BRAC SOCIETY | 2012 | Project-type interventions | 634.037,00 | 164.687,00 | DCI-GENRE / GENDER | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Building Pro-Poor, Inclusive and Gender Sensitive Local Governance in Rajshahi and Chapainowabganj districts of BangladeshCARE INTERNATIONAL UK LBG (United Kingdom) | CARE INTERNATIONAL UK LBG | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 623.304,28 | 623.304,28 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| 'Inclusive': Barrier Free Inclusive Society for Persons with DisabilitiesTHE ROYAL COMMONWEALTH SOCIETY FORTHE BLIND ROYAL CHARTER (United Kingdom) | THE ROYAL COMMONWEALTH SOCIETY FORTHE BLIND ROYAL CHARTER | 2012 | Project-type interventions | 601.698,64 | 445.274,02 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Promotion of Local Culture in the Sundarban Impact Zone in Bangladesh through Cultural Ecotourism and EntrepreneurshipRELIEF INTERNATIONAL-UK LBG (United Kingdom) | RELIEF INTERNATIONAL-UK LBG | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 599.477,00 | 356.885,60 | DCI-HUM | Multi-sector aid |
| Strengthening the role of Non State Actors on Climate Change policy formulation in South Asia and enhancing their capacities to influence global climate change negotiationsOXFAM GB LBG (United Kingdom) | OXFAM GB LBG | 2011 | Project-type interventions | 523.414,40 | 523.414,40 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Multi-sector aid |
| Pioneering, Connecting & Empowering Voices for ChangeSTICHTING FREE PRESS UNLIMITED (Netherlands (The)) | STICHTING FREE PRESS UNLIMITED | 2012 | Project-type interventions | 503.317,00 | 374.534,31 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Quality control of fortified biscuits for school feeding project.INCATEMA CONSULTING SL (Spain) | INCATEMA CONSULTING SL | 2010 | Other technical assistance | 499.780,00 | 446.944,83 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Promoting Older People's Participation in Development in Rural Bangladesh HELPAGE INTERNATIONAL LBG (United Kingdom) | HELPAGE INTERNATIONAL LBG | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 498.089,00 | 498.089,00 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Capacity Building of Indigenous Human Rights DefendersINDIGENOUS PEOPLES DEVELOPMENT SERVICES (Bangladesh) | INDIGENOUS PEOPLES DEVELOPMENT SERVICES | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 497.216,18 | 163.320,22 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Adolescents as Agents of Change: Transforming gender relations through an adolescent development projectNARI MAITREE ASSOCIATION (Bangladesh) | NARI MAITREE ASSOCIATION | 2007 | Project-type interventions | 445.419,60 | 445.419,60 | DCI-GENRE / GENDER | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Joint Country Evaluation of development cooperation of Denmark, Sweden and the European Union with BangladeshAIDE A LA DECISION ECONOMIQUE SA (Belgium) | AIDE A LA DECISION ECONOMIQUE SA | 2014 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 441.836,00 | 0.00 | EVA | Other |
| Strengthening Indigenous Peoples Initiatives for Good Governance in BangladeshINDIGENOUS PEOPLES DEVELOPMENT SERVICES (Bangladesh) | INDIGENOUS PEOPLES DEVELOPMENT SERVICES | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 439.411,50 | 439.411,50 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Improved food and livelihood security in Bagerhat District, Bangladesh in the context of increased disaster risk and climate changeCATHOLIC AGENCY FOR OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT TRUST (United Kingdom) | CATHOLIC AGENCY FOR OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT TRUST | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 388.821,36 | 388.821,36 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Food Security |
| Conflict Prevention through deradicalization of YouthBANGLADESH ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE SOCIETY (Bangladesh) | BANGLADESH ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE SOCIETY | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 335.135,00 | 93.251,00 | IFS-RRM | Conflict prevention and resolution, and peace-building |

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|--|---|---------------|--|------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---|
| Improving Maternal and Newborn Health through Public-Private PartnershipKINDERNOTHILFE EV (Germany) | KINDERNOTHILFE EV | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 325.392,00 | 221.976,76 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Basic health care |
| Strengthening Citizen Participation in Improving Local GovernanceCHRISTIAN AID LBG (United Kingdom) | CHRISTIAN AID LBG | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 318.743,00 | 286.868,00 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Member's contribution to the administrative budget of the IJSG for the year 2012/2013INTERNATIONAL JUTE STUDY GROUP (Bangladesh) | INTERNATIONAL JUTE STUDY GROUP | 2012 | Core contributions to multilateral institutions | 309.577,10 | 309.577,10 | COMORG | Trade policy and administrative management |
| Making it work: Access to justice for persons with disabilities in BangladeshASSOCIATION FEDERATION HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL (France) | ASSOCIATION FEDERATION HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL | 2012 | Project-type interventions | 300.000,00 | 270.000,00 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Strengthening the voice of human rights defenders to protect right and entitlements of ethnic minoritiesOXFAM GB LBG (United Kingdom) | OXFAM GB LBG | 2012 | Project-type interventions | 300.000,00 | 270.000,00 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Oikko (unity) - United for translating rights into action NOWCARE OSTERREICH VEREIN FUR ENTWICKLUNGSSZUSAMMENARBEIT UND HUMANITARE HILFE (Austria) | CARE OSTERREICH VEREIN FUR ENTWICKLUNGSSZUSAMMENARBEIT UND HUMANITARE HILFE | 2014 | Core support to NGOs, other private bodies, PPPs and research institutes | 300.000,00 | 0,00 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Promoting Social and Political Rights of Persons with Disabilities through implementation of CRPD in BangladeshACTION ON DISABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT LBG (United Kingdom) | ACTION ON DISABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT LBG | 2012 | Project-type interventions | 299.999,86 | 269.999,86 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Promoting enhanced participation and empowerment of Dalit communities in Bangladesh with an evidence base for realization of Dalit Human Rights and EntitlementsCHRISTIAN AID LBG (United Kingdom) | CHRISTIAN AID LBG | 2014 | Project-type interventions | 292.822,63 | 0,00 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Advancing indigenous peoples' rights through promoting the implementation of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) recommendations in BangladeshINTERNATIONAL WORK GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS FORENING (Denmark) | INTERNATIONAL WORK GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS FORENING | 2014 | Project-type interventions | 286.114,00 | 0,00 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Combating Violence Against Women in Bangladesh through Community Participation, Education and Media AccessRELIEF INTERNATIONAL-UK LBG (United Kingdom) | RELIEF INTERNATIONAL-UK LBG | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 285.191,05 | 285.191,05 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Promotion of Human Rights for Preventing Violence and Discrimination against Women and Girls (PPVD)DHAKA AHSANIA MISSION (Bangladesh) | DHAKA AHSANIA MISSION | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 285.000,00 | 285.000,00 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Securing Women Communitys Basic Rights through Gender Mainstreaming in Local GovernanceWOMEN JOB CREATION CENTRE ASSOCIATION (Bangladesh) | WOMEN JOB CREATION CENTRE ASSOCIATION | 2011 | Project-type interventions | 283.637,53 | 283.637,53 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Member's Contribution to the administrative Budget of the International Jute Study Group for the Year 2011/2012 INTERNATIONAL JUTE STUDY GROUP (Bangladesh) | INTERNATIONAL JUTE STUDY GROUP | 2011 | Core contributions to multilateral institutions | 272.835,62 | 272.835,62 | COMORG | Trade policy and administrative management |
| Transparency for Human Rights in Bangladesh (THR)RELIEF INTERNATIONAL-UK LBG (United Kingdom) | RELIEF INTERNATIONAL-UK LBG | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 254.804,88 | 254.804,88 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |

| Title | Contractor | Contract Year | Type Of Aid | Contracted Amount (EU) | Paid Amount (EUR) | Instrument compiled | Sector ADE |
|--|--|---------------|----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---|
| Promotion and Protection of the Human Rights of Dalits (PPHRD) PARITTRAN ASSOCIATION (Bangladesh) | PARITTRAN ASSOCIATION | 2011 | Project-type interventions | 252.000,00 | 178.922,14 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Promoting Rights and Accessibility to the Ultra Poor in Char lands areas through Democratic Local Governance (PRADG) MANAB MUKTI SANGSTHA VOLUNTARY SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATION (Bangladesh) | MANAB MUKTI SANGSTHA VOLUNTARY SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATION | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 240.000,00 | 194.274,40 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Mapping and capacity building of tea plantation workers and little known ethnic communities of Bangladesh SOCIETY FOR ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (Bangladesh) | SOCIETY FOR ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 239.999,47 | 175.127,27 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Peoples Action for Democratic Governance (PADG) DEMOCRACYWATCH VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION (Bangladesh) | DEMOCRACYWATCH VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 237.974,91 | 214.177,00 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Institutionalising Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) for enhanced access to justice of the vulnerable communities SHUSHILAN ASSOCIATION (Bangladesh) | SHUSHILAN ASSOCIATION | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 218.235,20 | 218.235,20 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Coordinated Effort to Access to Justice for Vulnerable Groups ASSOCIATION FOR INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT-COMILLA (Bangladesh) | ASSOCIATION FOR INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT-COMILLA | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 216.540,56 | 216.540,56 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Institutionalised of the Rights of Women Workers of Rural Informal Labour Sector ASSOCIATION ACTION IN DEVELOPMENT AID (Bangladesh) | ASSOCIATION ACTION IN DEVELOPMENT AID | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 213.633,57 | 213.633,57 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Preventing Violence Against Women Through Empowerment DHAKA AHSANIA MISSION (Bangladesh) | DHAKA AHSANIA MISSION | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 190.000,00 | 190.000,00 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Education on the Convention against Torture and OPCAT Awareness Programme in Bangladesh ODHIKAR ASSOCIATION (Bangladesh) | ODHIKAR ASSOCIATION | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 186.874,61 | 168.187,15 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| European Union - Bangladesh Civil Society Seminar on Human Rights and Decent Work ITALTREND C&T SPA (Italy) | ITALTREND C&T SPA | 2011 | Project-type interventions | 119.996,00 | 119.996,00 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Mid Term Evaluation of the Rural Employment Opportunities for Public Assets LANDELL MILLS LIMITED (United Kingdom) | LANDELL MILLS LIMITED | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 115.100,76 | 115.100,76 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Food Security Programme 2009 Formulation Mission CARDNO EMERGING MARKETS (UK) LTD (United Kingdom) | CARDNO EMERGING MARKETS (UK) LTD | 2008 | Investment project aid | 112.281,07 | 112.281,07 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Creation of Sustained Institutional Capacity of Religio-ethnic Minority Communities in Southwest part of Bangladesh through a Participatory Process of Building organisation/platform to defend and Promote Human rights of these Communities UTTARAN ASSOCIATION (Bangladesh) | UTTARAN ASSOCIATION | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 111.610,04 | 111.610,04 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Ex-post evaluation of Food Security for Vulnerable Group Development (FSVGD) Project COWI BELGIUM SPRL (Belgium) | COWI BELGIUM SPRL | 2007 | | 109.558,24 | 109.558,24 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Ex-post evaluation of Rural Maintenance Programme Phase III Stage III HTSPE LIMITED (United Kingdom) | HTSPE LIMITED | 2007 | | 107.716,55 | 107.716,55 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |

| Title | Contractor | Contract Year | Type Of Aid | Contracted Amount (EUR) | Paid Amount (EUR) | Instrument compiled | Sector ADE |
|--|---|---------------|---|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--|
| Support to the Soil Fertility Component (FS 2006) Project Task Force for the management of call for proposalsCARDNO EMERGING MARKETS (UK) LTD (United Kingdom) | CARDNO EMERGING MARKETS (UK) LTD | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 107.530,77 | 107.530,77 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Ex-Post Evaluation of Vulnerable Group Development for Ultra-Poor (VGDUP) programmeAGRER SA (Belgium) | AGRER SA | 2012 | Project-type interventions | 103.412,77 | 103.412,77 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Mid-Term Review of the Food Security Programme 2006 in BangladeshLANDELL MILLS LIMITED (United Kingdom) | LANDELL MILLS LIMITED | 2012 | Other technical assistance | 99.453,00 | 99.453,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Ex-post evaluation of Rural Employment Opportunities for Public AssetsAGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA (Belgium) | AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA | 2012 | Project-type interventions | 98.789,74 | 98.789,74 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Comparative assessment of EC Food Security interventions in Bangladesh IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA (Belgium) | IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA | 2009 | Other | 98.068,84 | 98.068,84 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Bridging media and ethnicityMANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE LBG (Bangladesh) | MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE LBG | 2007 | Project-type interventions | 95.696,09 | 95.696,09 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Makingsure Aid for the Needy to Uphold and Sustain Human Rights (MANUSH) BIVA ASSOCIATION (Bangladesh) | BIVA ASSOCIATION | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 92.952,00 | 92.952,00 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| A financial and system audit concerning Food Security Programme 2006 in Bangladesh, Components 1, 2 and 4MOORE STEPHENS LLP (United Kingdom) | MOORE STEPHENS LLP | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 91.670,02 | 91.670,02 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Short Term Technical Assistance during the Inception Phase of Vulnerable Group Development for Ultra-Poor (VGDUP)TRANSTEC SA (Belgium) | TRANSTEC SA | 2007 | Project-type interventions | 89.801,14 | 89.801,14 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Promotion of Human Rights of indigineous woman and youth in BangladeshINDIGENOUS PEOPLES DEVELOPMENT SERVICES (Bangladesh) | INDIGENOUS PEOPLES DEVELOPMENT SERVICES | 2007 | Project-type interventions | 82.319,51 | 82.319,51 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Combating causes and effects of acid violenceACID SURVIVORS FOUNDATION VOLUNTARY SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATION (Bangladesh) | ACID SURVIVORS FOUNDATION VOLUNTARY SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATION | 2007 | Project-type interventions | 76.670,36 | 76.670,36 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Fostering Human Rights of the Landless and minorities getting access to land through Civic participation and pro-poor gender sensitive governance in Hatiya Upazila under NoakhaliDWIP UNNAYAN SONGSTHA (Bangladesh) | DWIP UNNAYAN SONGSTHA | 2007 | Project-type interventions | 76.646,09 | 76.646,09 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Mid Term Evaluation of the Vulnerable Group Development for Ultra Poor (VGDUP) ProgrammeAGRER SA (Belgium) | AGRER SA | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 75.025,03 | 75.025,03 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Treatment and Rehabilitation of Adibashi (Tribes) Victims of Torture and Organised Violence in BangladeshBANGLADESH REHABILITATION CENTRE FOR TRAUMA VICTIMS ASSOCIATION (Bangladesh) | BANGLADESH REHABILITATION CENTRE FOR TRAUMA VICTIMS ASSOCIATION | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 66.497,52 | 66.497,52 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Evaluation of EIDHR CBSS BDSACO SASPJ (Belgium) | SACO SASPJ | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 65.035,00 | 19.510,50 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Food Security Programme 2009 Identification MissionTRANSTEC SA (Belgium) | TRANSTEC SA | 2008 | Other | 59.522,08 | 59.522,08 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Audit Contract: Audit of IFS - BRAC: Post SIDR Livelihood RehabilitationMOORE STEPHENS LLP (United Kingdom) | MOORE STEPHENS LLP | 2010 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 54.111,34 | 54.111,34 | IFS-RRM | Conflict prevention and resolution, and peace-building |
| Mid-Term Review of National Food Policy Capacity Strengthening Programme (NFPCSP)SCANAGRI DENMARK AS (Denmark) | SCANAGRI DENMARK AS | 2007 | | 51.839,99 | 51.839,99 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Mid Term Review of FOSHOLITALTREND SPA (Italy) | ITALTREND SPA | 2007 | | 49.106,68 | 49.106,68 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |

| Title | Contractor | Contract Year | Type Of Aid | Contracted Amount (EUR) | Paid Amount (EUR) | Instrument compiled | Sector ADE |
|---|--|---------------|---|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---|
| Financial & System Audit for the Vulnerable Group Development for Ultra Poor Programme MAZARS SA (France) | MAZARS SA | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 48.263,00 | 48.263,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Mid-Term Review of the National Food Policy Capacity Strengthening Programme (NFPCSP) Phase II HTSPE LIMITED (United Kingdom) | HTSPE LIMITED | 2012 | Other technical assistance | 40.934,00 | 40.934,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| ELE - Exploratory Mission regarding EU Election Observation Mission to Bangladesh ITALTREND SPA (Italy) | ITALTREND SPA | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 40.813,47 | 40.813,47 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Assessment of applications received under the Call for Proposals EIDHR-CBSS 2010 ITALTREND SPA (Italy) | ITALTREND SPA | 2010 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 35.252,45 | 35.252,45 | EIDHR / DDH | Other |
| Audit of Food Security Programme 2006 in Bangladesh, Components 4: Soil Fertility MOORE STEPHENS LLP (United Kingdom) | MOORE STEPHENS LLP | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 35.160,00 | 17.580,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Assessment of Applications for Call for proposals for EIDHR Micro Projects'2006 ITALTREND SPA (Italy) | ITALTREND SPA | 2007 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 33.762,82 | 33.762,82 | EIDHR / DDH | Other |
| Rural Employment Opportunities for Public Assets (REOPA) Financial & Systems Audit MAZARS SA (France) | MAZARS SA | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 31.812,00 | 31.812,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Audit for the project titled "Poverty Eradication Through Establishing Food Security for the Rural L Hard-Core Poor of Bangladesh ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJSREVISOREN CVBA (Belgium) | ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJSREVISOREN CVBA | 2007 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 29.224,00 | 29.224,00 | ADM-MULTI | Other |
| Assessment of proposals for EIDHR Country Based Support Scheme ITALTREND SPA (Italy) | ITALTREND SPA | 2008 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 27.777,83 | 27.777,83 | EIDHR / DDH | Other |
| Promoting Rights of the Disadvantaged by Preventing Violence Against Women (PROTIRODH) STICHTING CARE NED | STICHTING CARE NED | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 800.000,00 | 800.000,00 | EIDHR | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| ELE - Exploratory Mission regarding EU Election Observation Mission to Bangladesh TRANSTEC | TRANSTEC SA | 2006 | Other technical assistance | 52.797,99 | 52.797,99 | EIDHR | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Human rights promotion through the strengthening of Fair Trade in the Bangladesh traditional handicraft sector FONDAZIONE TERRE D | FONDAZIONE TERRE D | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 75.810,58 | 75.810,58 | EIDHR | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Media Access and Education for Human Rights : Bangladesh RELIEF INTERNATIONAL-UK LBG | RELIEF INTERNATIONAL-UK LBG | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 74.111,82 | 74.111,82 | EIDHR | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Equity in the News: Promoting Human Rights Media in Bangladesh BANGLADESH CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS | BANGLADESH CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 95.833,24 | 95.833,24 | EIDHR | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Action to Safeguard Human Rights of the Indigent DHAKA AHSANIA MISSION (Bangladesh) | DHAKA AHSANIA MISSION | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 63.956,38 | 63.956,38 | EIDHR | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| A Community Level Advocacy Efforts for the Women Workers of the In-formal Labour Sector in Rural Bangladesh ASSOCIATION ACTION | ASSOCIATION ACTION | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 87.258,00 | 87.258,00 | EIDHR | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Promotion of Human Rights of Indigenous People in Bangladesh INDIGENOUS PEOPLES DEVELOPMENT | INDIGENOUS PEOPLES DEVELOPMENT | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 83.933,52 | 83.933,52 | EIDHR | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Audit for Block Grant, CRIS Contract No. ONG-PVD/2005/112108 ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJSREVISOREN CVBA (Belgium) | ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJSREVISOREN CVBA | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 26.706,56 | 26.706,56 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Education |
| Audit of Creating Opportunities for Sustainable Economic Uplift in Remote Rural Areas of Bangladesh with High Concentrations of Extreme Hard Core and Hard Core Poor Families MAZARS SA (France) | MAZARS SA | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 25.315,00 | 25.315,00 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Food Security |
| Assessment of Concept Notes and Full Applications under NSA/LA CIP 2008 HTSPE LIMITED (United Kingdom) | HTSPE LIMITED | 2009 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 25.000,00 | 25.000,00 | ADM-MULTI | Other |
| ELE - EU EOM to Bangladesh 2007 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (Switzerland) | INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 2.935.363,00 | 2.935.363,00 | EIDHR | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| ELE - Chef Observer for EU EOM Bangladesh - Parliamentary Elections January 2007 VON DER WENGE GRAF | VON DER WENGE GRAF | 2006 | Other technical assistance | 3.172,37 | 3.172,37 | EIDHR | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Evaluation of Proposals for the Food Security Programme 2007 - Food Security for Ultra-Poor (Call for Proposal EuropeAid 126636/L/ACT/BD) AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA (Belgium) | AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA | 2008 | Other | 24.697,67 | 24.697,67 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Assessment of Concept Notes from the EIDHR CBSS Bangladesh BUSINESS AND STRATEGIES IN EUROPE (Belgium) | BUSINESS AND STRATEGIES IN EUROPE | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 23.376,63 | 23.376,63 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Rural Employment Opportunities for Public Assets (REOPA) Financial and Systems Audit MAZARS SA (France) | MAZARS SA | 2010 | Other technical assistance | 22.947,00 | 22.947,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |

| Title | Contractor | Contract Year | Type Of Aid | Contracted Amount (EU) | Paid Amount (EUR) | Instrument compiled | Sector ADE |
|--|--|---------------|---|------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---|
| Audit for the Project titled "Developing a conducive environment for urban disadvantaged children in Dhaka city" MAZARS SA (France) | MAZARS SA | 2007 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 22.742,00 | 22.742,00 | ADM-MULTI | Other |
| Monga Mitigation Project: TOR for Request for services for Assessors AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA (Belgium) | AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA | 2009 | Developmental food aid | 22.447,72 | 22.447,72 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Documentary/audio-visual for the Bangladesh Food Security Investment Forum, 26-27 May 2010, Dhaka INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE NON PROFIT CORP (United States) | INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE NON PROFIT CORP | 2010 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 20.000,00 | 20.000,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Dummy contract 2009/229296 created to replace the audit contract 2008/163956 MOORE STEPHENS LLP (United Kingdom) | MOORE STEPHENS LLP | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 19.940,01 | 19.940,01 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Basic health care |
| Food Security for Vulnerable Group Development Women and their Dependents (FSVGD) Cash Component Audit MAZARS SA (France) | MAZARS SA | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 19.339,00 | 19.339,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Financial & System Audit Final for the VGDUP programme ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA (Belgium) | ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA | 2012 | Project-type interventions | 18.903,71 | 18.903,71 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Partnership for Food Security Project (FOSHOL CARE) - Financial Audit MAZARS SA (France) | MAZARS SA | 2008 | Other | 18.248,06 | 18.248,06 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Vulnerable Group Development for Ultra-Poor (VGDUP) Financial & System Audit MAZARS SA (France) | MAZARS SA | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 17.460,00 | 17.460,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Dummy Contract created to replace the contract no. 20008/164383 to Pay the amount outstanding under the contract MOORE STEPHENS LLP (United Kingdom) | MOORE STEPHENS LLP | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 17.024,02 | 17.024,02 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Education |
| Audit for Asserting the human rights of brothel children and their women in prostitution (WIP) mothers project MAZARS SA (France) | MAZARS SA | 2007 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 17.024,00 | 17.024,00 | EIDHR / DDH | Other |
| Audit for Integrated development programme to improve the lives of disabled people in Bangladesh MOORE STEPHENS LLP (United Kingdom) | MOORE STEPHENS LLP | 2006 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 23.471,76 | 23.471,76 | DCI-ENV | Environment and Climate |
| Audit for Urban Community Health Project MOORE STEPHENS LLP (United Kingdom) | MOORE STEPHENS LLP | 2006 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 10.059,50 | 10.059,50 | DCI-ENV | Environment and Climate |
| Inclusion in the team of Mr Kazi Alam MOORE STEPHENS LLP (United Kingdom) | MOORE STEPHENS LLP | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 16.905,00 | 8.452,50 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Capacity Strengthening Component of Rural Employment Opportunities for Public Assets (REOPA) UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME | UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 18.667.409,26 | 18.667.409,26 | DCI-FOOD | Food Security |
| Assessment of proposals for Call for Proposals Food Security 2003 in Bangladesh AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA (Belgium) | AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 21.988,22 | 21.988,22 | DCI-FOOD | Food Security |
| Audit for FSVGD Cash component contracts 80512-97753-80081 MOORE STEPHENS LLP (United Kingdom) | MOORE STEPHENS LLP | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 36.295,89 | 36.295,89 | DCI-FOOD | Food Security |
| Audit for RMP III MOORE STEPHENS LLP (United Kingdom) | MOORE STEPHENS LLP | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 57.031,50 | 57.031,50 | DCI-FOOD | Food Security |
| Fisheries and Aquaculture Enterprise Development for the Adivasi (Tribal) Communities in the North West Frontier Province INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DIETETIC RESEARCH AND PROMOTION | INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DIETETIC RESEARCH AND PROMOTION | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 1.015.484,00 | 1.015.484,00 | DCI-FOOD | Food Security |
| Income Food Security for Ultra-Poor (IFSUP) NETZ PARTNERSCHAFT FÜR ENTWICKLUNG UND COOPERATION | NETZ PARTNERSCHAFT FÜR ENTWICKLUNG UND COOPERATION | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 1.049.272,21 | 1.049.272,21 | DCI-FOOD | Food Security |
| Micro-finance Support Intervention for Food Security for Vulnerable Group Development (FSVGD) PALLI KARMA SAHAYA | PALLI KARMA SAHAYA | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 3.371.902,40 | 3.371.902,40 | DCI-FOOD | Food Security |
| Rural Employment Opportunities for Public Assets (REOPA) GONOPROJATONTRI BANGLADESH GONOPROJATONTRI BANGLADESH | GONOPROJATONTRI BANGLADESH | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 481.998,00 | 481.998,00 | DCI-FOOD | Food Security |
| Assesment of NSA CIP full proposals 132-199 HTSPE LIMITED (United Kingdom) | HTSPE LIMITED | 2012 | Other technical assistance | 13.678,57 | 13.678,57 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Evaluation of Proposals for the Food Security Programme 2006 in Bangladesh - Nutritional Surveillance Component (Call for Proposal EuropeAid 125836/L/ACT/BD) AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA (Belgium) | AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA | 2007 | Project-type interventions | 12.769,51 | 12.769,51 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Technical support to the Project Task Force and Implementing Partners (IPs) on soil fertility and fertilizer management. HAQUE (Bangladesh) | HAQUE | 2010 | Other technical assistance | 10.000,00 | 10.000,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| End line survey/evaluation of the Soil Fertility Component Project HOQUE (Bangladesh) | HOQUE | 2014 | Project-type interventions | 10.000,00 | 2.000,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Dummy contract created to replace the contract No. ENV/ 2006/128233 to pay the final invoice pending under the contract MOORE STEPHENS LLP (United Kingdom) | MOORE STEPHENS LLP | 2008 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 9.602,49 | 9.602,49 | DCI-ENV / ENV | Environment and Climate |

| Title | Contractor | Contract Year | Type Of Aid | Contracted Amount (EU) | Paid Amount (EUR) | Instrument compiled | Sector ADE |
|---|---|---------------|---|------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---|
| Expenditure verification of Programme estimate for period 1.10.2013 to 30.6.2015 of Ujjibito RERMP-2K.M. ALAM & CO CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS PARTNERSHIP (Bangladesh) | K.M. ALAM & CO CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS PARTNERSHIP | 2014 | Project-type interventions | 8.875,00 | 3.550,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| ELE - Chief Observer for the EU Election Observation Mission for elections in Bangladesh on 18 December 2008VON DER WENGE GRAF LAMBSORFF () | VON DER WENGE GRAF LAMBSORFF | 2008 | Project-type interventions | 7.754,68 | 7.754,68 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Financial Audit for the project "Capacity Building for Tuberculosis Control and Leprosy Elimination Bangladesh"MOORE STEPHENS LLP (United Kingdom) | MOORE STEPHENS LLP | 2008 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 5.808,20 | 5.808,20 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Other |
| The people schools' programme (Gonopatschala)MOORE STEPHENS LLP (United Kingdom) | MOORE STEPHENS LLP | 2008 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 5.808,20 | 5.808,20 | DCI-NSA / ONG-PVD | Other |
| Expenditure verification of the last two terms of the Soil Fertility Component Jul 2013 - Jun 2014NURUL FARUK HASAN & CO (Bangladesh) | NURUL FARUK HASAN & CO | 2014 | Project-type interventions | 5.219,00 | 0,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Food Security 2006 Programme, Soil Fertility Component, Monitoring and Evaluation FrameworkALAM KHAN (Bangladesh) | ALAM KHAN | 2010 | Other technical assistance | 5.000,00 | 5.000,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Monitoring of soil fertility related activitiesHAQUE (Bangladesh) | HAQUE | 2012 | Other technical assistance | 5.000,00 | 5.000,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Monitoring of soil fertility related activitiesHAQUE (Bangladesh) | HAQUE | 2013 | Project-type interventions | 5.000,00 | 5.000,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| M&E of Activities of Implementing Partners under FSP 2006 Soil Fertility ComponentQUAYYUM (Bangladesh) | QUAYYUM | 2013 | Other technical assistance | 5.000,00 | 5.000,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| National Baseline Study for the Soil Fertility ComponentHOQUE (Bangladesh) | HOQUE | 2010 | Project-type interventions | 4.900,00 | 4.900,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Assessor, Soil Fertility Call for ProposalsANWARUL QUADER SHAIKH (Bangladesh) | ANWARUL QUADER SHAIKH | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 4.875,00 | 4.875,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Expenditure verification of the School Feeding Component Jul 2011 to Jun 2013NURUL FARUK HASAN & CO (Bangladesh) | NURUL FARUK HASAN & CO | 2014 | Project-type interventions | 4.550,00 | 1.820,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Assessor TL, Soil Fertility Call for ProposalsGUL HOSSAIN (Bangladesh) | GUL HOSSAIN | 2009 | Project-type interventions | 3.825,00 | 3.825,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Expenditure verification of the Nutrition Surveillance Component Jul 2011 to Dec 2013K.M. ALAM & CO CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS PARTNERSHIP (Bangladesh) | K.M. ALAM & CO CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS PARTNERSHIP | 2014 | Project-type interventions | 3.785,00 | 0,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |
| Organization of EU Human Rights JamboreeMANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE LBG (Bangladesh) | MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE LBG | 2008 | Administrative costs not included elsewhere | 2.998,00 | 2.998,00 | EIDHR / DDH | Other |
| Audit of OPCAT ProjectHODA VASI CHOWDHURY & CO PARTNERSHIP (Bangladesh) | HODA VASI CHOWDHURY & CO PARTNERSHIP | 2014 | Project-type interventions | 2.800,00 | 0,00 | EIDHR / DDH | Human rights, justice and democratic governance |
| Making Markets Work for Small-Holder Farmers and Rural Producers (Bangladesh)PRACTICAL ACTION LE | PRACTICAL ACTION LE | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 619.030,67 | 619.030,67 | DCI-NSA | Trade policy and |
| Disabled Peoples Rights and Inclusion Strengthening DPOs and Beyond, BangladeshACTION ON DISABILITY | ACTION ON DISABILITY | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 667.918,00 | 667.918,00 | DCI-NSA | Human rights, justice and |
| Sustainable Livelihoods for Poor Producers in Mymensingh and Netrokona, Bangladesh (SLIPP)THE TRAUDCRAFT EXC | THE TRAUDCRAFT EXC | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 442.871,40 | 442.871,40 | DCI-NSA | Multi-sector aid |
| Proximity services for a full participation of people with disabilities in all spheres of life - BangladeshASSOCIATION FEDER/ | ASSOCIATION FEDER/ | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 726.887,27 | 726.887,27 | DCI-NSA | Human rights, justice and |
| Haor Initiatives for Sustainable Alternative Livelihoods (HISAL) - BANGLADESHCONCERN WORLDWID | CONCERN WORLDWID | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 749.995,83 | 749.995,83 | DCI-NSA | Multi-sector aid |
| Integrated Community-Based Arsenic Mitigation Programme in 100 unions BangladeshKATHOLISCHE ZENTR/ | KATHOLISCHE ZENTR/ | 2006 | Other technical assistanc | 704.351,69 | 704.351,69 | DCI-NSA | Other |
| Integrated Community Development Project in favour of outcaste and indigenous minority populaASSOCIATION SECOU/ | ASSOCIATION SECOU/ | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 512.833,26 | 512.833,26 | DCI-NSA | Human rights, justice and |
| Creating Opportunities for Sustainable Economic Uplift in Remote Rural Areas of Bangladesh with VIA DON BOSCO ASBL | VIA DON BOSCO ASBL | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 379.903,88 | 379.903,88 | DCI-NSA | Food Security |
| M&E of Activities of Implementing Partners under FSP 2006 Soil Fertility ComponentISMAIL HOSSAIN (Bangladesh) | ISMAIL HOSSAIN | 2013 | Other technical assistance | 0,00 | 0,00 | DCI-FOOD / FOOD | Food Security |

| Title | Contractor | Contract Year | Type Of Aid | Contracted Amount (EUR) | Paid Amount (EUR) | Instrument compiled | Sector ADE |
|---|--------------------|---------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Audit of Post Flood Micro Credit Rehab. RDRSMOORE STEPHENS LLP (United Kingdom) | MOORE STEPHENS LLP | 2006 | | 37.008,53 | 37.008,53 | REH | Reconstruction and rehabilitation |
| Adolescents' and Women's Reproductive and Sexual Health Initiative (ARSHI) CARE INTERNATIONAL | CARE INTERNATIONAL | 2006 | Project-type interventions | 1.835.750,00 | 1.835.750,00 | SANTE | Basic health care |

List of SIDA interventions

| Contribution ID and title | OUTCOME in SEK | OUTCOME in EUR | Sector |
|---|----------------|----------------|-------------------|
| 51060001 HPNSDP Health Population Nutrition Sector Dev Prog | 160.440.441 | 18.502.601 | Health |
| 42000084 HNPSP | 120.000.000 | 12.596.027 | Basic health care |
| 42000181 Third Primary Education Dev. Prog (PEDP 3) | 105.922.449 | 12.219.303 | Education |
| 42000084 HNPSP | 120.450.666 | 11.327.130 | Health |
| 51060017 Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund | 90.000.000 | 9.437.942 | Environment |
| 51060001 HPNSDP Health Population Nutrition Sector Dev Prog | 80.000.000 | 8.862.040 | Health |
| 51060001 HPNSDP Health Population Nutrition Sector Dev Prog | 80.091.355 | 8.814.611 | Health |
| 51060002 Urban Primary Health Care Service Delivery Project | 55.000.000 | 6.345.288 | Health |
| 42000181 Third Primary Education Dev. Prog (PEDP 3) | 53.400.000 | 5.915.412 | Education |
| 42000181 Third Primary Education Dev. Prog (PEDP 3) | 43.320.000 | 4.767.667 | Education |
| 42000096 Second Erimary Education Dev. Programme (PEDP-II) | 45.341.689 | 4.721.309 | Education |

| Contribution ID and title | OUTCOME in SEK | OUTCOME in EUR | Sector |
|---|----------------|----------------|--|
| 51060020 CDMP2, Disaster Man UNDP | 50.000.000 | 4.701.979 | Humanitarian aid |
| 51060017 Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund | 40.000.000 | 4.593.080 | Environment |
| 42000095 BEHTRUWC - Second Phase | 40.000.000 | 4.258.168 | Education |
| 42000096 PEDP II | 36.131.313 | 3.792.592 | Primary education |
| 42000095 BEHTRUWC - Second Phase | 36.096.950 | 3.788.985 | Basic life skills for youth and adults |
| 42000084 HNPSP | 35.781.125 | 3.727.508 | Health |
| 51060002 Urban Primary Health Care Service Delivery Project | 30.000.000 | 3.301.709 | Health |
| 42000095 BEHTRUWC - Second Phase | 31.300.000 | 2.943.439 | Education |
| 42000096 PEDP II | 28.718.322 | 2.700.659 | Education |
| 51060006 Continuation SRHR Project | 20.700.000 | 2.383.773 | Health |
| 51060029 ICDDR B Core support | 20.000.000 | 2.306.474 | Health |
| 51060006 Continuation SRHR Project | 20.700.000 | 2.201.308 | Health |

| Contribution ID and title | OUTCOME in SEK | OUTCOME in EUR | Sector |
|--|----------------|----------------|-------------------------------|
| 51060019 City Regions Development Project-co financing ADB | 20.000.000 | 2.201.139 | Sustainable infrastr. & serv. |
| 82030018 ICDDR,B 2010-2011 Coresupp | 20.225.953 | 2.172.556 | Research |
| 51060044 RHSTEP cont SRHR | 18.000.000 | 1.981.025 | Health |
| 51060023 Urban environment WaterAid | 15.500.000 | 1.788.759 | Sustainable infrastr. & serv. |
| 51060022 Centre for Mass Education in Science 2011-2015 | 14.000.000 | 1.621.486 | Education |
| 51060019 City Regions Development Project-co financing ADB | 10.000.000 | 1.158.204 | Sustainable infrastr. & serv. |
| 51060029 ICDDR,B 2012-2015 Core support | 10.000.000 | 1.100.570 | Research |
| 75000512 ICDDR,B 2008-2009 | 10.000.000 | 1.049.669 | Medical research |
| 51060023 Urban environment WaterAid | 9.000.000 | 990.513 | Sustainable infrastr. & serv. |
| 51060004 TIB Driving Change | 8.163.114 | 941.356 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 75000512 ICDDR,B 2008-2009 | 10.000.000 | 940.396 | Research |
| 51060004 TIB Driving Change | 8.415.559 | 902.218 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |

| Contribution ID and title | OUTCOME in SEK | OUTCOME in EUR | Sector |
|--|----------------|----------------|--|
| 51060018 WSP Bd -Urban W&S | 7.000.000 | 807.763 | Sustainable infrastr. & serv. |
| 42000178 CMES, 2007-2010 Phase | 7.421.483 | 779.010 | Basic life skills for youth and adults |
| 54030167 RFSU south 2011-2012 | 6.333.086 | 701.551 | Health |
| 51060009 Strategic Fund | 6.420.534 | 687.874 | Other |
| 54100020 ICDDRDB 2012-2015 | 6.000.000 | 660.342 | Research |
| 51060022 Centre for Mass Education in Science 2011-2015 | 5.800.000 | 638.330 | Education |
| 54050154 Dairy hubs & skills dev in Bangladesh(PRAN-Tetra) | 5.800.000 | 638.330 | Agriculture & forestry |
| 42000168 Second UPHCP | 6.000.000 | 629.801 | Basic health care |
| 42000178 CMES, 2007-2010 Phase | 6.272.532 | 589.866 | Education |
| 54030004 Forum Syd Frame 2009 | 6.223.542 | 585.259 | Health |
| 42000177 Support to SRHR NGOs | 5.617.566 | 584.942 | Health |
| 51060026 Steps: WR Strengthening Movement 2010 - 2014 | 5.400.000 | 580.238 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |

| Contribution ID and title | OUTCOME in SEK | OUTCOME in EUR | Sector |
|---|----------------|----------------|----------------------------|
| 51060042 PEDP 3 RBM-TA Sida-ADB Administration Agreement | 5.000.000 | 579.102 | Education |
| 54030013 Sw Church frame 2010-2012 incl EU | 5.136.382 | 568.985 | Health |
| 54050247 B4D ISC Sustainability managers | 5.000.000 | 550.285 | Education |
| 54000156 Save the Children Framework Agreement South 2013- 2015 | 4.849.211 | 533.689 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 42000168 Second UPHCP | 5.000.000 | 520.637 | Health |
| 51060032 Strengthening Civic Engagement in BGD Elections | 4.300.000 | 498.028 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 42000168 Second UPHCP | 5.000.000 | 470.198 | Health |
| 42000177 Support to SRHR NGOs | 5.000.000 | 470.198 | Health |
| 51060004 TIB Driving Change | 5.000.000 | 470.198 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060033 Strengthening Activism (Ain o Salish Kendra) | 4.000.000 | 463.282 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 54030013 Sw Church frame 2010-2012 | 4.359.303 | 453.923 | Health |
| 54030012 Swedish Church frame 2009 | 4.796.796 | 451.089 | Health |

| Contribution ID and title | OUTCOME in SEK | OUTCOME in EUR | Sector |
|--|----------------|----------------|----------------------------|
| 51060015 Natl. Human Rights Commission Capacity Dev Project | 4.000.000 | 429.806 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 42000178 Center for Mass Edu in Science 2007-2010 | 4.039.599 | 423.039 | Education |
| 54030052 RFSU framesupport 2010 | 3.835.587 | 398.026 | Health |
| 54030006 Forum Syd Frame 2010-2012 incl EU | 3.592.291 | 397.938 | Health |
| 54030091 Frame support SCS 10-11 incl EU | 3.495.530 | 387.219 | Health |
| 54030008 Rädda Barnen 09-11 frame | 3.956.065 | 372.027 | Education |
| 51060011 BNWLA Making Difference | 3.464.637 | 369.772 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 54050153 Centre of Excellence for the RMG industry in Bangladesh (H&M-ILO) | 3.000.000 | 347.461 | Education |
| 74003839 Framesupport Diakonia | 3.622.800 | 340.687 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060021 Reality Check Phase IV | 3.136.501 | 339.065 | Research |
| 54110005 B4D-SIWI Chemical Management India 2013-14 | 2.870.000 | 332.405 | Market development |
| 51060034 Protection of Women's Rights in BGD (BNWLA) | 3.000.000 | 330.171 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |

| Contribution ID and title | OUTCOME in SEK | OUTCOME in EUR | Sector |
|---|----------------|----------------|----------------------------|
| 54030013 Sw Church frame 2010-2012 incl EU | 2.707.378 | 313.570 | Health |
| 51060026 Steps: WR Strengthening Movement 2010 - 2014 | 2.700.000 | 310.033 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060025 TIB - BIBEC | 2.800.000 | 308.159 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 54030114 Diakonia frame 2012-2014, incl EU own contribution | 2.630.648 | 304.683 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 54030114 Diakonia frame 2012-2014, incl EU own contribution | 2.678.935 | 294.835 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060012 ASK Promoting Gen Equity | 2.730.000 | 289.254 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 54030113 Diakonia frame 2011 | 2.565.920 | 284.241 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 54030091 Frame support SCS 09-11 | 2.694.010 | 280.520 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 52170008 UN Women, Prevention of VAW | 2.500.000 | 275.142 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 42000096 Second Primary Education Dev. Programme (PEDP II) | 2.417.740 | 267.826 | Education |
| 54030267 SMR South 2013-2015+east 2014-2015 | 2.273.431 | 250.207 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060032 Strengthening Civic Engagement in BGD Elections | 2.200.000 | 242.125 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |

| Contribution ID and title | OUTCOME in SEK | OUTCOME in EUR | Sector |
|---|----------------|----------------|-------------------------------|
| 51060015 Natl. Human Rights Commission Capacity Dev Project | 2.000.000 | 229.654 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060033 ASK Strengthening Activism Towards HR Culture | 2.000.000 | 229.654 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 54030533 Plan Sweden EU-Bangladesh 2014-2018 | 2.074.390 | 228.301 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060023 Urban environment WaterAid | 2.000.000 | 221.551 | Sustainable infrastr. & serv. |
| 51060036 NHRC Capacity Development Project Continuation | 2.000.000 | 220.114 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060033 Strengthening Activism (Ain o Salish Kendra) | 2.000.000 | 220.114 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 52170005 CHT Conflict Prevention, Recovery & Peacebuilding | 1.993.200 | 219.366 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060012 ASK Promoting Gen Equity | 2.014.303 | 189.424 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 54030010 SMCs frame 2009-2011 | 1.963.000 | 184.600 | Health |
| 51060021 Reality Check Phase IV | 1.481.913 | 170.473 | Research |
| 51060013 Steps Inception Phase | 1.755.217 | 165.060 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 54030064 Diakonia framesup. 2010 | 1.546.750 | 161.059 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |

| Contribution ID and title | OUTCOME in SEK | OUTCOME in EUR | Sector |
|--|----------------|----------------|-------------------------------|
| 54030006 Forum Syd Frame 2010-2012 | 1.411.091 | 146.933 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060038 Midwives in Bangladesh | 1.129.332 | 130.800 | Health |
| 51060051 Audit icddr,b 2013 | 1.010.107 | 116.991 | Research |
| 51060009 Strategic Fund | 1.226.268 | 115.318 | Other |
| 74003115 PMU frame 2007-2009 | 1.192.653 | 112.157 | Health |
| 51060018 WSP Bd -Urban W&S | 1.000.000 | 110.057 | Sustainable infrastr. & serv. |
| 54050153 Centre of Excellence for the RMG industry in Bangladesh (H&M-ILO) | 1.000.000 | 110.057 | Education |
| 54030153 Plan Sweden Framework Agreement South 2011-2013 | 934.994 | 108.291 | Health |
| 51060011 BNWLA Making Difference | 1.031.131 | 96.967 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 54000156 Save the Children Framework Agreement South 2013- 2015 | 781.197 | 85.976 | Health |
| 54030075 PMU dev coop 2010 | 790.434 | 82.306 | Health |
| 54030079 SMR South 2010-2011 | 752.236 | 81.119 | Health |

| Contribution ID and title | OUTCOME in SEK | OUTCOME in EUR | Sector |
|---|----------------|----------------|-------------------------------|
| 54050154 Dairy hubs & skills dev in Bangladesh(PRAN-Tetra) | 700.000 | 81.074 | Agriculture & forestry |
| 51060042 PEDP 3 RBM-TA Sida-ADB Administration Agreement | 710.000 | 78.140 | Education |
| 54030155 PMU south 2011-2012 | 641.600 | 71.074 | Health |
| 42000095 BEHTRUWC - Second Phase | 555.327 | 61.118 | Education |
| 54000153 SSNC 2013-2015 | 461.792 | 50.823 | Environment |
| 54030086 SSNC South 2010-2011 | 432.797 | 47.943 | Agriculture & forestry |
| 42000134 Center for Policy Dialog | 470.556 | 44.251 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 42000166 BWHC | 467.766 | 43.989 | Health |
| 51060045 Study on Gender & Elections | 354.393 | 39.003 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060043 Evaluation of Bangladesh Reality Check | 268.391 | 31.085 | Research |
| 51060008 Persommel & Cons Fund | 238.504 | 27.490 | Other |
| 51060039 Follow-up of City Region Development Project, CRDP | 233.481 | 27.042 | Sustainable infrastr. & serv. |

| Contribution ID and title | OUTCOME in SEK | OUTCOME in EUR | Sector |
|---|----------------|----------------|-------------------------------|
| 51060026 Steps Towards Development 2010 - 2014 | 221.386 | 25.641 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060035 Strategic Fund for 2012 | 182.364 | 20.940 | Other |
| 54030024 LO-TCO Frame 2009 | 219.007 | 20.595 | Health |
| 51060009 Strategic Fund | 176.139 | 20.226 | Other |
| 52170002 U4 Workshop - Strengthening integrity and transparency in the education and health sectors of Bangladesh | 168.511 | 18.546 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060049 Stakeholder Analysis Resilience Strategic Fund | 154.721 | 17.920 | Environment |
| 51060039 Follow-up of City Region Development Project, CRDP | 161.775 | 17.804 | Sustainable infrastr. & serv. |
| 52170000 Asian Women University/ICPD + 20 | 130.000 | 14.307 | Health |
| 51060008 Persommel & Cons Fund | 133.609 | 14.191 | Other |
| 54120069 EOM Bangladesh 2013 | 111.227 | 12.882 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060054 Performance of Seven Women in BGD | 108.232 | 11.912 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 52170006 Personnel & Consultancy Fund 2014-2017 | 99.156 | 10.913 | Other |

| Contribution ID and title | OUTCOME in SEK | OUTCOME in EUR | Sector |
|---|----------------|----------------|----------------------------|
| 54030001 SSNC 2009-2011 | 106.500 | 10.015 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 42000145 SAMATA (Gr. Faridpur) | 103.582 | 9.741 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 54000156 Save the Children Framework Agreement South 2013- 2015 | 86.800 | 9.553 | Education |
| 52170007 Engaging Wahab BEHTRUWC | 84.619 | 9.313 | Education |
| 54000156 Save the Children Framework Agreement South 2013- 2015 | 69.440 | 7.642 | Conflict, peace & security |
| 54030091 Save the Children Framework Agreement South 2010- 2011,incl. EU until 2015 | 55.647 | 6.445 | Health |
| 51060053 Engaging Wahab & Co to review RHSTEP and BAPSA | 54.500 | 5.998 | Health |
| 51060011 BNWLA Making Difference | 41.317 | 4.744 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 42000168 Second UPHCP | 38.400 | 4.409 | Health |
| 51060050 Actor Mapping - Political & Social Accountability | 31.363 | 3.632 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 51060008 Persommel & Cons Fund | 32.344 | 3.560 | Other |
| 54030006 Forum Syd Frame 2010-2012 incl EU | 28.003 | 3.243 | Health |

| Contribution ID and title | OUTCOME in SEK | OUTCOME in EUR | Sector |
|---|----------------|----------------|-------------------------------|
| 54030006 Forum Syd Frame 2010-2012 incl EU | 27.753 | 3.054 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 54030013 Sw Church frame 2010-2012 incl EU | 22.891 | 2.519 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 54030114 Diakonia frame 2012-2014, incl EU own contribution | 21.595 | 2.377 | Conflict, peace & security |
| 51060041 Consulting Service of CRDP 2013 | 12.240 | 1.418 | Sustainable infrastr. & serv. |
| 54030114 Diakonia frame 2012-2014, incl EU own contribution | 8.098 | 891 | Other |
| 54030393 Swedish Church Frame Extension year 2013 | -1.098 | 121 | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 54030289 SSNC South 2012 | 9.305 | 1.078 | Agriculture & forestry |
| 54030091 Save the Children Framework Agreement South 2010- 2011,incl. EU until 2015 | -11.273 | 1.241 | Education |
| 74003112 LO/TCO South 2007-08 | 32.533 | 3.059 | Health |
| 74300080 Rädta Barnen 2008 Frame | 37.931 | 3.567 | Health |
| 74003291 Sw Church Frame ag 2008 | 40.840 | 3.841 | Health |
| 54030261 Swedish Mission Council 2012 South | 35.754 | 4.141 | Health |

| Contribution ID and title | OUTCOME in SEK | OUTCOME in EUR | Sector |
|---|----------------|----------------|-------------------------------|
| 42000182 UNICEF Cyclone Assistance | 79.590 - | 8.288 - | Education |
| 54030091 Save the Children Framework Agreement South 2010- 2011,incl. EU until 2015 | -79.211 | 8.718 - | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 42000178 Center for Mass Edu in Science 2007-2010 | 83.489 - | 9.587 - | Education |
| 74002897 Forum Syd 06-08 SouthSEKA | 106.992 - | 10.061 - | Health |
| 74003290 SMC frame agreement 2008 | 162.877 - | 15.317 - | Health |
| 54030004 Forum Syd Frame 2009 | 319.081 - | 33.225 - | Health |
| 51060012 ASK Promoting Gen Equity | 308.094 - | 35.684 - | Democracy, HR & gender eq. |
| 42000084 HNPS | 2.903.430 - | 336.276 - | Health |
| 42000001 EFDRP Flood Rehab. ADB | 11.776.632 - | 1.107.470 - | Sustainable infrastr. & serv. |

List of DANIDA interventions

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|-------------|
| Agricultural Extension Component | 106.275.925 | 14.265.732 | Agriculture |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 30.842.921 | 4.139.355 | Agriculture |
| Agriculture and Food Security Project in Chittagong Hill Tracts | 14.000.000 | 1.877.028 | Agriculture |
| Integrated Farm Management Component | 13.309.300 | 1.784.423 | Agriculture |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 11.014.037 | 1.478.101 | Agriculture |
| Support to PC, MOA and MOFL | 10.530.709 | 1.412.706 | Agriculture |
| Agro Business Development Component | 10.000.000 | 1.340.734 | Agriculture |
| Studies, Review and Formulation | 6.653.725 | 893.063 | Agriculture |
| B2B Project: M.R. Rice Mill Ltd and Nakskov Mill A/S | 2.991.597 | 401.755 | Agriculture |
| Balanceret og miljørigtig anvendelse af kunstgødning | 2.537.293 | 340.480 | Agriculture |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 1.938.455 | 259.986 | Agriculture |
| JPO ASPS phase 2 | 658.875 | 88.371 | Agriculture |
| International advisers | 418.780 | 56.147 | Agriculture |
| Støtte til Institut for Udvikling af Landbrugsjordens Ressourcer (SRDI) | 126.510 | 16.976 | Agriculture |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| Strengthening Plant Protection Services (SPPS) | 87.406 | 11.721 | Agriculture |
| Smallholder Livestock Development Component in Five Southern Districts | 29.770 | 3.992 | Agriculture |
| Integrated Soil Fertility and Fertiliser Management | 17.813 | 2.389 | Agriculture |
| Støtte til frøpatologisk laboratorium, Bangladesh Agricultural University | 12.605 | 1.691 | Agriculture |
| Policy and Planning Support Unit, Ministry of Agriculture | 10.603 | 1.422 | Agriculture |
| Policy and Planning Support Unit, Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock | 7.634 | 1.024 | Agriculture |
| Rehabilitation of storage facilities for grain | 7.480 | 1.003 | Agriculture |
| Local Initiative for Farmers Training (LIFT) | 961.515 | 128.934 | Agriculture |
| Almen uddannelse, Bejoypur | 1.938.000 | 117.016 | Basic education |
| Almen og faglig uddannelse | 552.608 | 74.186 | Basic education |
| Ameliorate the Socio-Economic Status of the Blind People in Patuakhali and Neighbouring Districts | 121.614 | 16.313 | Basic education |
| Braille transcription and talking book library services for the blind students in Bangladesh | -16 | -2 | Basic education |
| Support to Maternal and Child Care Services | 1.300.000 | 174.785 | Basic health |
| Support to the Continuation and further Development of Activities of the Centre for the Rehabilitation of the Paralysed | 639.572 | 85.759 | Basic health |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|--|
| Community based rehabilitation of people with disabilities | 187.357 | 25.132 | Basic health |
| Improving the Health Care status of underprivileged families in three local clinics | 74.800 | 10.034 | Basic health |
| Bangladesh Academy for Security Training | 2.500.000 | 335.103 | Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 1.994.695 | 267.782 | Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security |
| Towards Developing a Better Counter Terrorism Regime in Bangladesh | 1.472.086 | 197.753 | Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 883.086 | 118.398 | Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security |
| Towards Developing a Better Counter Terrorism Regime in Bangladesh - Phase II | 599.983 | 80.442 | Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security |
| Support to the Regional Workshop for Police Officers and Prosecutors in South Asia on Effectively Countering Terrorism | 117.807 | 15.827 | Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security |
| NAST (National Academy for Security Training/Government of Bangladesh | 47.084 | 6.311 | Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security |
| Assistance to local communities on climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, Bangladesh. | 4.666.873 | 626.620 | Disaster prevention and preparedness |
| Support to National Flood Forecasting and Warning Services in Bangladesh | 4.000.000 | 537.083 | Disaster prevention and preparedness |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 3.000.000 | 402.564 | Disaster prevention and preparedness |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 1.342.126 | 180.510 | Disaster prevention and preparedness |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <i>Not specified</i> | 1.000.000 | 134.219 | Disaster prevention and preparedness |
| B2B: Union Mercatile Ltd og Staerk Reklamebureau | 337.918 | 45.295 | Education, level unspecified |
| Support to Madinatul Ulum Girl's Madrasa Students | 71.038 | 9.530 | Education, level unspecified |
| Support to Scholarship and Motivation for Meritorius Students | 70.000 | 9.393 | Education, level unspecified |
| Support for Saint Mathew's School, Birganj, Dinajpur | 69.980 | 9.384 | Education, level unspecified |
| Support to Students' Technological Requirements | 67.950 | 9.116 | Education, level unspecified |
| Support for Social Motivation Services | 62.060 | 8.328 | Education, level unspecified |
| "Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building of the Department of Development Studies" | - 136.968 | - 18.367 | Education, level unspecified |
| Contribution to GFDRR to Bangladesh victims for Sidr Tyfon floodings | 10.000.000 | 1.341.904 | Emergency response |
| Emergency relief for the victims of the cyclone in Bangladesh 2007. Danish Red Cross | 2.500.000 | 335.237 | Emergency response |
| Emergency relief for the victims of the cyclone in Bangladesh 2007. Save the Children | 2.500.000 | 335.237 | Emergency response |
| Support to flood victims | 1.000.110 | 134.110 | Emergency response |
| Humanitarian Assistance to Cyclone Aila Affected Children in the Coastal Areas of Bangladesh | 299.880 | 40.292 | Emergency response |
| Support to ICDDR,B's 2007 flood related healthcare and humanitarian services | 300.000 | 40.228 | Emergency response |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| Humanitarian Aid for Cyclone Mahasen Victims- support to ActionAid | 299.999 | 40.222 | Emergency response |
| Relief Programme for Affected Families of Sajek-Gangaram Arson Incident | 74.163 | 9.952 | Emergency response |
| Minor Climate Interventions, 2010 | 307.621 | 41.246 | Energy generation and supply |
| Joydevpur-Kabirpur-Tangail Transmission Project | - | - | Energy generation and supply |
| | 1.241.866 | 166.612 | Energy generation and supply |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 153.958.055 | 20.667.557 | Fishing |
| Impact Evaluation of Aquaculture Interventions in Bangladesh | 1.449.731 | 194.513 | Fishing |
| Impact Evaluation of Aquaculture Interventions in Bangladesh | 300.000 | 40.257 | Fishing |
| Greater Noakhali Aquaculture Extension Component | 12.596 | 1.316 | Fishing |
| Patuakhali and Barguna Aquaculture Extension Component | - | - | Fishing |
| | 440.878 | 60.090 | Fishing |
| Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF) | 10.000.000 | 1.340.959 | General environmental protection |
| Climate Change Adaptation Pilot Project | 4.946.164 | 663.149 | General environmental protection |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 3.000.000 | 402.876 | General environmental protection |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 1.556.576 | 208.968 | General environmental protection |
| Support to Government of Bangladesh on Climate Change Negotiation | 999.998 | 134.057 | General environmental protection |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Rapid Mass Awareness on Climate Change through an extended series of TV Programmes | 500.000 | 67.144 | General environmental protection |
| Minor climate interventions, Bangladesh 2009 | 420.173 | 56.437 | General environmental protection |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 407.510 | 54.668 | General environmental protection |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 299.918 | 40.234 | General environmental protection |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 280.439 | 37.765 | General environmental protection |
| Protecting Environmental Justice | 235.399 | 31.607 | General environmental protection |
| Minor climate interventions, Bangladesh 2008 | 154.360 | 20.740 | General environmental protection |
| Transparence and Accountability | 65.084.563 | 8.743.566 | Government and civil society, general |
| Promotion of Human Rights | 63.961.260 | 8.590.474 | Government and civil society, general |
| Public Sector Management | 53.686.997 | 7.200.466 | Government and civil society, general |
| Access to Justice | 49.369.426 | 6.630.205 | Government and civil society, general |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 33.055.295 | 4.435.291 | Government and civil society, general |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 19.000.000 | 2.547.395 | Government and civil society, general |
| Community Development Centre, CODEC | 15.000.000 | 2.012.956 | Government and civil society, general |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 11.870.000 | 1.591.451 | Government and civil society, general |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| PSU expenditure | 10.035.627 | 1.347.179 | Government and civil society, general |
| Community Based Rehabilitation in North West Bangladesh | 9.828.100 | 1.319.023 | Government and civil society, general |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 6.559.712 | 879.761 | Government and civil society, general |
| Advisers for the H.R. Phase | 6.061.885 | 813.822 | Government and civil society, general |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 6.020.024 | 806.980 | Government and civil society, general |
| Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs | 4.999.972 | 670.471 | Government and civil society, general |
| Leadership Development Programme | 5.000.000 | 670.270 | Government and civil society, general |
| Building Capacities on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Issues In Bangladesh : Rights and Good Practices | 3.430.000 | 460.139 | Government and civil society, general |
| National Election Programme for the 2008 Bangladesh Parliamentary and Upazila Elections | 3.178.807 | 426.426 | Government and civil society, general |
| Support to Indigenous Peoples in Plain Land | 3.039.652 | 407.938 | Government and civil society, general |
| Strengthening Civic Engagement in Election & Political Processes for Enhanced Transparency and Democratic Accountability -Main Phase | 2.929.500 | 392.768 | Government and civil society, general |
| Support to Capacity Building of the Judicial Administration Training Institute (JATI) 49973 | 2.638.982 | 354.040 | Government and civil society, general |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 2.517.916 | 337.979 | Government and civil society, general |
| Support to the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs on Gender and Communication Strategy Campaign Phase II | 2.243.699 | 301.229 | Government and civil society, general |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <i>Not specified</i> | 2.185.541 | 293.023 | Government and civil society, general |
| Strengthening Capacity for Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh | 2.000.000 | 268.504 | Government and civil society, general |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 2.000.000 | 268.147 | Government and civil society, general |
| Support to the 10th Bangladesh Parliamentary Election | 2.000.000 | 268.147 | Government and civil society, general |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 872.491 | 260.108 | Government and civil society, general |
| Human Rights | 1.738.893 | 233.098 | Government and civil society, general |
| Support to the Asia Foundation on Pre Election Preparation | 1.550.000 | 207.814 | Government and civil society, general |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 1.502.021 | 201.381 | Government and civil society, general |
| Champion Integrity Today | 1.499.277 | 200.988 | Government and civil society, general |
| Bitmap II | 1.486.166 | 199.507 | Government and civil society, general |
| Promoting Democratic and Decentralised Governance (PDDG) | 1.441.203 | 193.522 | Government and civil society, general |
| Women in need- Combating Trafficking and Violence Against Women Using Mobile Hotlink | 1.398.693 | 187.801 | Government and civil society, general |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 1.320.412 | 177.094 | Government and civil society, general |
| Transparency in the Private and Public Sector | 1.257.414 | 168.613 | Government and civil society, general |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Enforcement of local institutional laws focusing public awareness through sustainable good governance approach (ELFOS). | 927.176 | 124.501 | Government and civil society, general |
| An Analysis of Bangladesh's Macroeconomic Performance | 915.511 | 122.902 | Government and civil society, general |
| Braille Transcription and Talking Book Library Services for the Visually Impaired or Blind Students in Bangladesh | 840.744 | 112.806 | Government and civil society, general |
| Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence Against Women | 773.985 | 103.787 | Government and civil society, general |
| Migrant Remittances - Strategy Development | 584.218 | 78.344 | Government and civil society, general |
| Establishing Human Rights and Good Governance through Institution Building for Prevention of Torture and Organised Violence in Bangladesh | 547.481 | 73.416 | Government and civil society, general |
| Gender and Governance Sensitisation Programme for Youths | 494.937 | 66.445 | Government and civil society, general |
| Life Skill Development and Empowerment of Adolescent Girls | 467.382 | 62.748 | Government and civil society, general |
| Enforcement of Local institutional laws Focusing public awareness through Sustainable good governance approach (ELFOS) Phase II | 399.640 | 53.581 | Government and civil society, general |
| Programme for Building Teenager as Good Citizen Phase II | 397.701 | 53.435 | Government and civil society, general |
| Advocacy for Grassroots through Community Participation | 381.099 | 51.099 | Government and civil society, general |
| Capacity Building of Anti-Corruption Commission | 372.175 | 49.879 | Government and civil society, general |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Development Interventions for Chittagong Hill Tracts and its Inhabitants | 356.897 | 47.858 | Government and civil society, general |
| Protection and Promotion of Indigenous People's Rights through Awareness and Capacity Building in Bandarban Hill District | 320.040 | 42.915 | Government and civil society, general |
| Programme for Building Teenager as Good Citizen | 292.630 | 39.240 | Government and civil society, general |
| Rehabilitation Programme for the Disabled people | 255.674 | 34.309 | Government and civil society, general |
| Preparation Phase for the Project Culture for Empowerment of People | 213.903 | 28.682 | Government and civil society, general |
| Support to the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs on Gender and Communication Campaign | 208.350 | 27.939 | Government and civil society, general |
| School of Performing Arts for Community Empowerment | 140.934 | 18.902 | Government and civil society, general |
| Support to General Coordination of International Observers for 2007 Parliamentary Election | 128.695 | 17.257 | Government and civil society, general |
| Leadership Development involving Trade Unions and Labour Leaders in Reform Agenda | 107.918 | 14.482 | Government and civil society, general |
| Other Costs (review etc.) | 107.069 | 14.356 | Government and civil society, general |
| "Life and Culture of the Mro People in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Visual Advocacy" | 76.206 | 10.219 | Government and civil society, general |
| International Day of World's Indigenous Peoples 2012 | 75.177 | 10.077 | Government and civil society, general |
| Support to United Network on Women and Election 2008 | 72.529 | 9.733 | Government and civil society, general |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Observance of the International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples 2010 | 72.524 | 9.731 | Government and civil society, general |
| Support to International Indigenous Peoples' Day 2013 | 70.500 | 9.452 | Government and civil society, general |
| Observance of the International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples 2011 | 66.850 | 8.988 | Government and civil society, general |
| Observance of the International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples 2009 | 64.257 | 8.634 | Government and civil society, general |
| Vegetable Gardening and Horticulture Development Programme | 57.993 | 7.776 | Government and civil society, general |
| Cultural Strategy for Bangladesh: Support to Preparation Phase | 52.993 | 7.106 | Government and civil society, general |
| International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples | 47.810 | 6.411 | Government and civil society, general |
| Observance of the International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples 2008 | 42.850 | 5.750 | Government and civil society, general |
| Documentary Film - Female Garment Workers | 12.724 | 1.706 | Government and civil society, general |
| Observance of the International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples | - 1.195 | - 160 | Government and civil society, general |
| Seminar on Indigenous Peoples of Bangladesh and Eastern India | - 1.696 | - 227 | Government and civil society, general |
| Come on Bangladesh Just Do It | - 2.765 | - 371 | Government and civil society, general |
| Technical Assistance Support to Bangladesh Bank | - 3.635 | - 487 | Government and civil society, general |
| Support to Good Governance, World Bank | - 4.436 | - 596 | Government and civil society, general |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <i>Not specified</i> | - 5.666.182 | - 763.350 | Government and civil society, general |
| <i>Not specified</i> | - 5.988.265 | - 809.396 | Government and civil society, general |
| <i>Not specified</i> | - 8.083.946 | - 1.088.747 | Government and civil society, general |
| Support to '11th Annual Scientific Conference (ASCON)' | 119.999 | 16.091 | Health, general |
| PS Project - Joint Venture for local production of Safety Syringes | 4.246.924 | 570.089 | Industry |
| PS Project - JV between Clothing Partners International and Consumer Products Limited for establishing an all-over printing facility for knitwear | 3.724.804 | 499.856 | Industry |
| B2B Project: Techno Vista Limited and Bording Data A/S | 3.717.204 | 498.922 | Industry |
| B2B Project: STAERK Reklamebureau A/S, Denmark and Visual Soft Ltd, Bangladesh | 3.582.133 | 480.665 | Industry |
| PS Project: Thin Plate Steel Components | 3.352.449 | 449.692 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 3.268.875 | 438.771 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 3.065.858 | 411.367 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 2.964.472 | 398.093 | Industry |
| PS Project: 3rd Party Enviroment friendly Dyeing Services | 2.765.388 | 370.839 | Industry |
| PSD Project: Offshore Graphic Service Centre | 2.717.930 | 364.682 | Industry |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|----------|
| B2B: Bestec Corporation, Dhaka and Brahe & Partnere Arkitektfirma A/S, Denmark | 2.678.033 | 359.391 | Industry |
| PSD Project between Scankort A/S and Decode Ltd. concerning Offshore Digital Mapping Services | 2.672.972 | 358.448 | Industry |
| PS Project - Joint Venture for export of Play Items for Kindergartens and Schools made from PVC free raw material | 2.633.269 | 353.258 | Industry |
| PS-project: Luka Collection ApS and ZMM Fashion Ltd. regarding establishment of a JV for production of t-shirts, polo shirts and other kinds of knitwear. | 2.610.967 | 350.328 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 2.589.933 | 347.534 | Industry |
| PS Project - JV for production and export of high value elastic knitwear garments | 2.433.838 | 326.537 | Industry |
| PS Project - Joint Venture with technology transfer for local production and export of diabetic food products | 2.406.345 | 322.752 | Industry |
| PS Project - Joint Venture with technical assistance for establishing an Offshore Software Development Center | 2.238.160 | 300.138 | Industry |
| PSD Project between Adcomm Ltd. and AdPeople A/S concerning a back-office for advertising services | 2.046.423 | 274.571 | Industry |
| PS-Project: Offshore Software Development Center | 1.952.240 | 261.865 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 1.941.868 | 260.724 | Industry |
| B2B: Fisher's Shipyard Ltd and AS Scan | 1.780.591 | 238.714 | Industry |
| PS Project: Fibre Optic Cable Components | 1.736.071 | 232.889 | Industry |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|----------|
| PS Project: Offshore Geographical Information Systems (GIS) Processing | 1.614.126 | 216.446 | Industry |
| B2B-Technovista Limited and Bording Data A/S | 1.226.576 | 164.682 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 1.162.741 | 156.011 | Industry |
| B2B-Visual Soft Ltd and Staerk Reklamebureau A/S -3D | 1.117.022 | 149.895 | Industry |
| PS: Feasibilitystudier | 1.106.488 | 148.444 | Industry |
| Support to Small Crafts Producers Development Main Phase | 1.011.659 | 135.825 | Industry |
| B2B Pilot: NordPro Aps and TradeExcel Graphics Limited | 999.925 | 134.298 | Industry |
| B2B: M.R. Rice Mill Ltd and Nakskov Mill Foods A/S | 1.000.000 | 134.184 | Industry |
| B2B: Global Business Solution A/S and Spinnovation Limited | 974.472 | 130.765 | Industry |
| B2B Pilot: Primex Corporation Limited and Koelemadsen A/S | 964.413 | 129.510 | Industry |
| B2B: Leadsoft Bangladesh Ltd and Capavo A/S | 944.515 | 126.905 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 944.894 | 126.745 | Industry |
| B2B Pilot: Smoke Solution and Hatil Complex Ltd | 933.080 | 125.173 | Industry |
| Advisory Unit PS | 927.833 | 124.418 | Industry |
| B2B: Southtech Ltd and Comentor A/S | 894.382 | 120.017 | Industry |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|----------|
| B2B pilot: ICT Alliance and Admiral IT | 886.322 | 118.901 | Industry |
| PS Project - Technical and marketing cooperation between Engilsviken A/S and Noakhali Gold for processing of prawns | 874.663 | 117.288 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 853.173 | 114.649 | Industry |
| B2B Pilot: Peninsula Fishing and Seamaster ApS | 849.890 | 114.173 | Industry |
| B2B Pilot: Vantage Engineering and Construction Ltd. and Energi Danmark A/S | 838.898 | 112.546 | Industry |
| B2B Contact Phase | 836.708 | 112.252 | Industry |
| B2B: Sea Resources Ltd and Cosmos Trawl A/S | 792.966 | 106.533 | Industry |
| DBP - Mads Staunskjær ApS and ScanMap | 745.775 | 99.982 | Industry |
| Eurotex Apparel aps and Jaya Knitting Limited | 740.414 | 99.270 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 739.796 | 99.187 | Industry |
| Truemax ApS and American International University Bangladesh | 726.518 | 97.394 | Industry |
| B2B Pilot: Zonning Multimedia og Future Leaders Ltd | 707.420 | 95.113 | Industry |
| B2B: Interspeed Advertising Ltd. and Grace Tours ApS | 682.497 | 91.631 | Industry |
| PS Project - Technical cooperation for local production of equipment for processing fish and shrimp | 636.249 | 85.285 | Industry |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|----------|
| Offshore Software Development Center | 616.070 | 82.612 | Industry |
| B2B Pilot: Periscope and Contest A/S | 556.806 | 74.812 | Industry |
| DBP Consultancy and Marketing | 544.589 | 73.007 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 523.948 | 70.366 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 522.824 | 70.153 | Industry |
| Viking Rubber A/S and MbM Garments Limited | 522.869 | 70.103 | Industry |
| B2B Pilot: Marine Electronic Service and K.M. Marine El A/S | 521.029 | 69.882 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 506.698 | 67.918 | Industry |
| B2B Pilot: MultiSafh Bags Ltd and Cold Legeredskaber A/S | 495.777 | 66.536 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 477.663 | 64.200 | Industry |
| B2B: Western Marine Shipyard Ltd And PlantWare A/S and Stella Shipping A/S | 474.566 | 63.763 | Industry |
| DBP Study Visits | 444.975 | 59.655 | Industry |
| PSD Project: Advanced training for outsourced 3D Rendering of Architectural Drawings | 435.085 | 58.351 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 364.443 | 48.921 | Industry |
| PPP: REPL Limited and DanChurchAid, KomTek Miljo A/S | 350.000 | 46.914 | Industry |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|----------|
| PSD: Share of Embassy's shared expenses | 337.000 | 45.190 | Industry |
| B2B Pilot: Ahmed Amin Group and Envotherm A/S | 296.337 | 39.843 | Industry |
| PS Project: C. Jahn and Sonia Ltd. for design center for the apparel industry | 266.486 | 35.734 | Industry |
| B2B: Fashion Tex International Ltd and X Company | 252.303 | 33.847 | Industry |
| Alkalaer | 245.975 | 32.971 | Industry |
| DBP Kølemadsen A/S and Virgo Pharmaceuticals Limited | 241.340 | 32.357 | Industry |
| B2B Pilot: Shimizu Specialized Pvt Limited og Nyhavn Vod-og Trawlbinderi ApS | 214.253 | 28.806 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 212.653 | 28.591 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 208.563 | 28.017 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 205.135 | 27.562 | Industry |
| Preparatory Phase for Support to Small Craft producers Development Project | 159.060 | 21.371 | Industry |
| PSD Start-up Facility: BBT Benny larsen ApS. og FONS Bangladesh Ltd. | 146.445 | 19.652 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 135.300 | 18.151 | Industry |
| B2B: Western Marine Limited and Stella Shipping P/S | 130.951 | 17.567 | Industry |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|----------|
| <i>Not specified</i> | 81.547 | 10.947 | Industry |
| B2B Pilot: Graphic Associates Ltd. and Epoka Medic Mission A/S | 54.121 | 7.263 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 52.854 | 7.106 | Industry |
| Umbilical Cord Cutting and Clamping Device | 27.000 | 3.621 | Industry |
| PS: Study visits to Bangladesh | 25.000 | 3.352 | Industry |
| B2B Consultancy and Marketing | 4.575 | 614 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 3.596 | 482 | Industry |
| Cross Cutting Activities 2006- Migrant Workers Remittances | 448 | 60 | Industry |
| Save the Children Denmark & The Danish Federation of SME's - development of tools for combating of child labour in the textile industry in Bangladesh | - 19.357 | - 2.597 | Industry |
| PSD: Vocational Training Institute | - 82.167 | - 11.010 | Industry |
| PSD Project: Marticco ApS and Techno Vista Ltd. for development of portalchain solutions | - 91.351 | - 12.248 | Industry |
| PSD Project between OW Maskinservice A/S and MegaCorp Ltd. concerning spareparts for pharmaceutical machinery | - 102.127 | - 13.691 | Industry |
| <i>Not specified</i> | - 146.445 | - 19.652 | Industry |
| PSD:Ice Cream Production and Product Development | - 384.190 | - 51.510 | Industry |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|--|
| PSD Project: Environmentally friendly printing for Knitwear | 485.380 | 65.072 | Industry |
| PS Project - Joint Venture between Ole Steen Knudsen A/S and Ananda Builders Limited for establishing a Ship Design Centre | 893.553 | 119.977 | Industry |
| Integrated Community Health and Development Project (CHDP) | 4.346.453 | 583.423 | Other multisector |
| Støtte til selvhjælpsgrupper | 4.142.707 | 556.036 | Other multisector |
| Multi-Donor Fund - UNDP | 1.844.785 | 247.521 | Other multisector |
| Culture for Empowerment of People | 3.604.039 | 483.865 | Other social infrastructure and services |
| Underprivileged Childrens Education Programme (UCEP) | 3.051.242 | 409.131 | Other social infrastructure and services |
| Child-led Organisation and Advocacy on Child Labour, Bangladesh | 2.904.790 | 389.887 | Other social infrastructure and services |
| PPP: UCEP Bangladesh and Save the Children Denmark | 1.796.964 | 241.284 | Other social infrastructure and services |
| Support to the 4th International Children's Film Festival Bangladesh 2011 | 28.575 | 3.842 | Other social infrastructure and services |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 13.855 | 1.856 | Other social infrastructure and services |
| Rehabilitation of Households affected by River Erosion in Ramgati, Laxmipur District | 709 | -95 | Other social infrastructure and services |
| Rehabilitation of people with disability through community involvement | 3.984 | 534 | Other social infrastructure and services |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|--|
| Humanitarian Assistance to the Cyclone Victims in the Coastal Areas of Bangladesh | 242.670 | 32.541 | Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation |
| Support to PRODIPAN on Rehabilitation | 66.933 | 8.975 | Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation |
| Rural Roads and Market Access Component | 170.628.309 | 22.898.226 | Transport and storage |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 166.428.427 | 22.308.380 | Transport and storage |
| Upgrading of Zia International Airport | 4.321.071 | 579.724 | Transport and storage |
| Infrastructure development in Patuakhali and Barguna districts | 2.756.274 | 370.333 | Transport and storage |
| Minor Roads in Lakshmipur and Feni Districts | 1.249.706 | 167.910 | Transport and storage |
| Road Safety Awareness Campaign in Bangladesh with a special focus on the Patuakhali - Kuakata Road | 449.413 | 60.264 | Transport and storage |
| Advisers to the transport programme | 395.978 | 53.121 | Transport and storage |
| Project Steering Unit Admin Costs | 93.432 | 12.529 | Transport and storage |
| District Maintenance Systems | 52.825 | 7.098 | Transport and storage |
| Unallocated funds | 4.399.243 | 589.822 | Unspecified |
| Support to Bishhwo Shahitto Kendro on Creating Responsive Young Leadership | 4.244.722 | 569.902 | Unspecified |
| Support to Promotion of Community Voices through Community Radio | 949.616 | 127.287 | Unspecified |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|
| Steering Unit Dhaka | 198.393 | 26.604 | Unspecified |
| Logistic Support to ERD | 431 | 58 | Unspecified |
| Awareness raising on prevention of HIV/AIDS among the transport sector workers and Danida's minor roads programme | - 372 | -50 | Unspecified |
| Saidabad Water Project, Phase II | 302.999.821 | 40.670.822 | Water supply and sanitation |
| Water Supply and Sanitation Component | 196.678.647 | 26.408.000 | Water supply and sanitation |
| HYSAWA Fund Component | 65.206.732 | 8.741.828 | Water supply and sanitation |
| Sector Capacity Building Component | 40.907.921 | 5.491.923 | Water supply and sanitation |
| Sector Policy Support Component | 20.336.768 | 2.731.134 | Water supply and sanitation |
| Advisers to Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Programme | 13.829.458 | 1.856.247 | Water supply and sanitation |
| Hygiene Promotion, Sanitation and Water Supply Project in Chittagong Hill Tracts | 9.621.276 | 1.292.209 | Water supply and sanitation |
| Programme Mangement and Administration | 6.883.865 | 924.727 | Water supply and sanitation |
| Sector Policy Support Component | 5.961.034 | 799.121 | Water supply and sanitation |
| <i>Not specified</i> | 4.664.750 | 625.303 | Water supply and sanitation |
| Vandforsynings- og sanitetsprojekt i bysamfund i 5 kystdistrikter | 3.252.090 | 436.399 | Water supply and sanitation |
| Support for Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre | 1.650.100 | 221.321 | Water supply and sanitation |

| Project/Programme title | Disbursement in DKK | Disbursement in EUR | Sector |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|
| Danida Adviser - Support to Water Supply and Sanitation Sector | 1.154.603 | 154.782 | Water supply and sanitation |
| Programme Management and Review | 275.415 | 36.921 | Water supply and sanitation |
| Bridging Phase of the HYSAWA Fund Project | 24.035 | 3.224 | Water supply and sanitation |
| NGO Forum for Water and Sanitation | 8.482 | 1.137 | Water supply and sanitation |
| International Training Network Centre | 41.710 | 5.593 | Water supply and sanitation |
| Support to NGO's management of activities for hygiene, water supply and sanitation in CHT, Bangladesh | 97.198 | 13.036 | Water supply and sanitation |

Annex 5 - Detailed facts and findings for each evaluation question

This annex completes the answers to each evaluation question (EQ) presented in the Main Report. It provides background elements on each EQ as well as the detailed evidence - structured per Judgment Criteria - upon which the findings of the EQ are based.

The structure of this annex follows the one of the main report. It presents detailed facts and findings for each theme or sector covered in-depth as follows:

- Relevance of the cooperation strategies
- Coordination, complementarity and coherence (3Cs)
- Aid modalities
- Primary education
- Private sector development
- Human rights and democratic governance
- Climate change and disaster management
- Gender equality and the empowerment of women

For each one of the sectors covered in-depth, this annex also provides detailed conclusions and recommendations at sector level.

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1. Detailed facts and findings on the relevance of EPs strategies

1.1 Brief overview of EPs strategies

All three evaluation partners had poverty reduction as the main objective of their development cooperation. As corollary, most of the specific interventions have also aimed to contribute to poverty reduction but addressing different challenges deemed critical for pursuing that objective.

The EU stated, in its 2007-2013 CSP, that it would seek to contribute to reducing poverty strategically through support to rapid economic growth, greater inclusion of the poor and increased employment generation, within a framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights. Operationally, it would align with the (then) PRSP and focus most of the funding on three sectors i.e. social development, good governance and economic & trade development, based on the assumption that this would increase alignment and also utilise its core competencies and consequently increase relevance.

Denmark in its 2005-2009 strategy also stated its strategic objective as: “poverty reduction through promotion of pro-poor economic growth and strengthened democratic development, including improvement in governance, respect for human rights, rights of minorities, and improved gender equality”. Denmark also committed itself to alignment to the PRSP and to financial alignment by gradually channelling funds through government systems as PFM capacity improved. Clearly, the latter commitment rested on the assumption that PFM would improve. The key sectors were agriculture, WatSan and good governance, with this choice partly being based on Denmark’s previous experiences and its division of labour vis-à-vis other donors.

Sweden’s objective (2008-2012 Strategy) was that the right to education, health, and a clean and healthy environment be fulfilled for women, men, girls and boys living in poverty. Sweden also aimed to align closely with government strategies, not least in education and health, but also noted that its strategy should have flexibility and a willingness to take risks, for supporting new ideas and innovations alongside the sector programmes and taking care of areas that would otherwise be forgotten. The poverty reduction objective has thus been firmly established as the overall objective for all three EPs strategies and alignment has also played a crucial part in how the EPs strategically would achieve this. This objective and the substantial emphasis (at that time at least) on alignment to achieve that end, has thus been a key strategic tenant.

1.2 Brief overview of national strategies and policies

A Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) entitled “Unlocking the Potential: National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction (NSAPR I)” was prepared in 2005. The NSAPR I was put into implementation during FY2005-FY07 and subsequently it was extended up to June 2008. The second NSAPR (FY2009-FY11) was prepared by the caretaker government, but revised in 2009 after the elected government came into office. However, after the revised NSAPR II, the GoB reverted to naming its main planning document as the 6th Five Year Plan and although there was still strong poverty focus it was only one objective among several. Most ‘direct’ poverty reduction efforts are now articulated in the National Social Protection Strategy (2014). The current 6th Five Year Plan still conceptualises economic growth as a core engine in reducing poverty, complemented by investments in social protection, health and education.

The **Sixth Five Year Plan** is also the implementation vehicle of the Vision 2021. The fundamental objective of the plan is to develop strategies, policies and institutions that allow Bangladesh to accelerate growth and reduce poverty. Key is the creation of productive employment opportunities by implementing both demand side measures (e.g. stimulating economic growth) and supply side ones (e.g. growth in the labour force and improved quality). A key challenge is to reduce the share of workers (est. at 80%) engaged in low-income, low productivity jobs in the informal sectors and shift them toward higher productive and higher income jobs, primarily in the formal sector.

A key pillar in improving the long-term quality of the labour force is to provide quality *education* to more pupils and for a longer duration. Thus the plan aims to: extend universal primary education to grade 8; eliminate illiteracy; remove the education gap between the poor and rich, create a new generation equipped with technical skills and scientific knowledge; better remunerations for teachers; and overall, improve the quality and equity in education. To do so, the plan will focus on reversing the low completion rates as well as improving educational governance (e.g. merit based recruitment and career development). Improving *health* outcomes is also viewed as a priority in the five-year plan, as it is both a cause and effect of poverty, illiteracy and ignorance. However, it is also recognised that the health sector programme (HNPS) has underperformed in key areas such as implementation, insufficient inter-ministerial coordination, centralised and prolonged procurement processes. This underperformance is one of the causes of remaining wide gender disparities in core indicators such as in morbidity and chronic health problems. Better management of health services, including better health governance, is key to improve these indicators. Specific attention is also given to the *environment, climate change and disaster management* with a view to promote sustainable development. The plan states that the adverse interactions of environmental degradation and climate change could have severe consequences for the Bangladeshis’ welfare, especially for the poorer segment that may not have adequate access to coping mechanisms. Reducing environment degradation is a key objective of the plan as is climate change mitigation and adaptation. Focus will be on implementing the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. The plan also emphasises the need to carry forward the National Disaster Management Plan using a ‘all hazards, all risks and all sectors’ approach.

The plan also makes a frank admission that effective implementation is crucially dependant on improved *governance*, including accelerated fight against corruption, better M&E and fundamental institutional reforms. These reforms will seek to promote robust accountability mechanisms, both through checks and balances within the government and feedback mechanisms for society at large as accountability spurs better performance and counters corruption and inefficiency. However, it is also recognised that improving governance is a long-term process that will require persistency.

1.3 EPs portfolio of projects

All projects and programmes were conceived as contributing to the EPs' overall objective of poverty reduction, but some had a more direct-targeted approach (such as support to the hard-core poor, contracting poor rural women for road construction etc.). Other interventions, especially within PSD, rural development and trade had a stronger focus on creating a more enabling environment that was deemed necessary for promoting inclusive growth, such as the BEST project which aimed at improving the private sector's ability to comply with international standards, enabling companies to export more easily. Only the Danish business to business programme had a twin objective of poverty reduction support while simultaneously promoting Danish companies to expand in Bangladesh. A recent evaluation concluded that the programme failed to effectively and efficiently deliver on either objective, both in Bangladesh and elsewhere.¹

The main empirical basis for the portfolio analysis is the case studies which have been conducted within the chosen sectors i.e. education, climate change, gender, private sector development, human rights & democratisation. A number of the interventions were joint (e.g. PEDP in education, Bangladesh Climate Resilience Fund, Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photograph and the National Human Rights Commission Capacity Development Project). Here attempts have been made to identify the particular focus and priorities of the individual EP as well as identify possible differences in emphasis in the policy dialogue.

1.4 Facts and findings per Judgement Criteria

JC1.1 Extent to which EP strategies aimed at poverty reduction with a credible 'theory of change' using relevant interventions in the main areas of support

| JC1.1: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|---|------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ At strategy level all EPs had poverty reduction as core focus, which was also reflected in their concrete engagements | Strategies, both global, national and sector wise as well as project and programme documents. | Strong |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EPs' strategies have been based on a combination of both perceived | Interviews. Programme and project documents, | More than satisfactory |

¹ Danida: Evaluation of Danida Business-to-Business Programme 2006-2011, November 2014

| JC1.1: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|--|-------------------------------|
| comparative advantages, division of labour and pragmatism based on past interventions. | including design, reviews, monitoring and evaluation. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> However, most regulatory and policy level engagements often had only weak analysis (ToC) of the causal linkages to poverty reduction. | Interviews. Programme and project documents, including design, reviews, monitoring and evaluation. | Strong |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unsurprisingly, monitoring of poverty impacts has also been weak where the initial ToC analysis was weak | Interviews. Programme and project documents, including design, reviews, monitoring and evaluation. | Strong |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assumptions regarding governance improvements and capacity often proved overly optimistic. Sustained, long-term trial-and-error approaches did produce encouraging results both regarding capacity development and wider outcomes | Interviews. Programme and project documents, including design, reviews, monitoring and evaluation. | More than satisfactory |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased HQ pressure to leverage development objectives for domestic gains has had limited practical implications yet. | Strategy and portfolio analyses, interviews, evaluations. | Indicative but not conclusive |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|---|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Design of main interventions demonstrates strong poverty reduction focus and robust analysis of causal mechanisms to achieve this | Data fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring systems of interventions and sectors of support include indicators tracking poverty reducing objectives | Data fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assumptions regarding the need for closer strategic and intervention level alignment proved relevant and monitored | Data partly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assumptions regarding the necessity of improved governance (also at sector level) proved relevant and monitored | Data partly available |

General level findings

The 3 EPs have had poverty reduction as the overall objective of their respective strategy, with Sweden putting emphasis on a right-based approach to especially education and health. They all conceptualised poverty as multidimensional : they consequently argued that a multidimensional approach was warranted to address poverty. The concept of theory of change was only introduced in the latter part of the evaluation period and has not been consistently used by the EPs. However, the key issue the evaluation has focused on relates to the degree to which there has been strong and coherent analysis and links between the development engagement designs and the poverty reduction ambitions. The evaluation has thus not retroactively imposed present day standards on interventions design but rather sought to determine the analytical rigour and credibility vis-à-vis poverty reduction

strategies. The case studies below are examples that provide most insights into the strategic choices of the EPs.

For the **EU** the key areas that could assist strategically in reducing poverty were within the human and social development sector, good governance, and economic and trade development. These priorities are also fully consistent with the 'European Consensus' on development priorities which pointed to governance, human rights and economic development as key concerns of EU Development policy. The three focal areas were, moreover, those in which over the years the EU had developed expertise and understanding and was therefore deemed best placed to provide added value through its programmes. This strategy focus was complemented by two non-focal sectors, food security where the EU intended to contribute to basic safety nets for the most vulnerable, and environment/disaster preparedness through small scale interventions to improve capacity to prepare for environmental risks. In the economic and private sector development areas, the CSP mid-term review argued for less trade policy level focus and more on direct pro-poor private sector development, which was subsequently reflected in the design of e.g. INSPIRED.

The CSP mid-term review did undertake some level of strategic monitoring of the assumptions regarding the need to align, arguing that government weaknesses continued to constitute impediments. Similar sentiments were expressed by Sweden and Denmark.²

As is also substantive in the detailed sector and project level analysis, the portfolio chosen by the EU was relevant to the overall objective of poverty reduction. However the country strategy was only partly driving the choice of sectors and portfolio composition. Also driving this was the past experiences (e.g. previous engagements) and the related comparative advantage. Increasingly the division of labour also influenced the choice of portfolio and catalysed a critical review of how best EU could contribute.³

The **Danish** 2005-2009 strategy focused on support to pro-poor economic growth and improved governance, human rights and democratisation. Hence, the strategy argued that poverty could be reduced through support to acceleration of pro-poor economic growth in particular in rural areas where most of the population lived (and lives) and where poverty was (and is) most widespread. Support would be given for the development of agriculture and non-farm economic activities. Emphasis would be given to poorer households and female-headed households and for indigenous peoples in CHT. Support for the acceleration of economic growth would also be given through support for the development of the rural private sector to expand employment opportunities also in non-agricultural sectors. Governance issues would be addressed systematically in the cooperation through policy dialogue, direct interventions and as a cross-cutting issue to be pursued in all other interventions. Focus would be on promoting accountability, transparency and the rule of law at all levels of society and in particular those institutions (government and non-

² See Sida: Mid Term Review of Cooperation – Overview of Achievements & Challenges in the Country Context from an Aid Effectiveness Perspective, 2010 and Danida: 'Bangladesh Country Programme Review', 2007

³ See EU: Mid-term review 2010 and EARM 2012

government) which Denmark cooperated with in the implementation of Danish assistance. This was based on the assumption that good governance was critical to effective poverty reduction. Similarly, democratisation and respect for human rights was also deemed critical, with the transmission mechanism being that increased participation and voice of the poor would catalyse more inclusive and pro-poor policies.

The concrete sectors of engagement, WatSan, agriculture and HR&D proved relevant to poverty reduction, even though the HR&D struggled to deliver improvements in the overall framework (see sector analysis for HR&D). However, millions of poor peoples lives have been improved, although there have been issues of sustainability of the delivery systems.⁴ Only the 'non-focal' business-to-business programme had limited relevance for poverty reduction, with all project bar one have been rated as having no or only marginal contribution to poverty reduction.⁵

Against this background, it is noteworthy that the 2013 strategy marks a rather radical shift with poverty reduction being only one among other objectives, as Denmark wants what it calls a 'more balanced relationship, with Denmark also pursuing its own interests by developing commercial ties with Bangladesh.'⁶ Similar developments have been seen in the Netherlands and, outside the EU, in Canada and Australia.

The **Swedish** strategy for poverty reduction utilised both the right's perspective and the poor people's perspective⁷, with four principles serving as guidelines: participation, non-discrimination, transparency, and accountability. This was especially the case within health and education, which constituted the core of Sweden's support. Sweden also viewed improved governance as key in improving inclusiveness and pro-poor policies, by holding the government to account. The strategy for better transparency and accountability rested on support to civil society organisations to strengthen women's rights, and contributions to strengthen the capacity of these organisations for critical, independent review of government institutions and policies. In the two social sectors, Sweden's strategy was to use the sector programme approach as the main platform, due to the transaction costs benefits and potential to improve national wide delivery. However, Sweden would complement these efforts with specific interventions in e.g. results based management aimed at reducing corruption. Finally, the Swedish strategy also made climate change a central theme due to its impact on especially the poor. The Swedish strategy was also supposed to benefit from both upward and downward monitoring, through e.g. annual Reality Checks where Sweden set out to listening to poor people's realities about primary healthcare and primary education by embedding a team at village levels.⁸

⁴ See the sector analysis on PSD and HR&D.

⁵ Danida. Evaluation of Business to Business programme, 2005-2011, Bangladesh Country Report,

⁶ Danida: Denmark – Bangladesh Policy Paper 2013.

⁷ This also resulted in the five so called reality checks, where Swedish consultants embedded themselves with poor Bangladeshi facilities to report on how the strategies materialised at the ultimate beneficiary level, with a specific focus on health and education service delivery.

⁸ This was done from 2008 to 2012.

Findings from bilateral development engagements

EU

Support to the Hard to Reach through Basic Education (SHARE): This project is *design-wise* robustly focused on poverty reduction and the most vulnerable children. The major thrust of the SHARE programme was to provide quality primary education for the hardest to reach children, with the help of NGOs. Additionally, the programme was designed to make a contribution to adult education, with a focus on literacy, numeracy and family life skills.⁹ It also embraced pre-primary education, which was (and is) widely recognised as a necessary tool to prepare children of poor and illiterate parents for primary school; and educational support to low-performing disadvantaged students at government schools. The focus seemed relevant and it thus has a credible theory of change, but using an NGO and with apparently limited cost-recovery, its sustainability may be compromised.¹⁰

Monitoring of poverty impact was supposed to take place both by communities themselves as well as through the implementing institution, the latter supposed to consistently use results-based monitoring formats. This monitoring was supposed to feed into the ‘knowledge management component’. However, the component faced implementation challenges, the causes of which have been mainly rooted in choices made in the design phase.¹¹ Because of distrust with the government body in charge of non-formal education (the BNFE) – shared by most donors – the EU decided to by-pass the government, which was insufficiently involved in the design. The choice was also made of a ‘floating TA’, without any institutional anchorage. The government nourished resentment about being side-lined. This had important effects on the implementation of this component, which was supposed to ensure the coordination between the three provision projects and promote the dissemination of non-formal education best practices including with the government.

The *assumptions* also proved to be difficult to fulfil, as the lack of coordination and wider trust (probably the main assumption) between GoB and the project undermined both sustainability and effectiveness. Thus the SHARE project did not pursue closer alignment with national strategies but remained a project, with limited learning emanating to the public sector.

Better Work and Standards Programme (BEST): This was an example of a more indirect strategy to poverty reductions where economic growth from integration into the world economy is the primary transmission channel. The more precise *design strategy* was to improve competitiveness and facilitate export growth and diversification through increased productivity and compliance of the production base with international norms and practices. There was very limited monitoring of poverty impact and how the transmission mechanism in reality would play out, but the link between better compliance, standards and economic

⁹ See EU, *SHARE Action Fiche*

¹⁰ MN 211, 212, 218, and 221

¹¹ EU, *ROM SHARE reports*; MN 221

growth seems to be reasonably established. However, there was substantial uncertainty if compliance objectives have been reached which in turn would also undermine the somewhat weak transmission mechanism to poverty reduction. Thus it is stated: 'What is clear is that while some good progress has been made in regard to some aspects of various components the results for the three major components, with the possible exception of BWIG, have not met expectations and are not sustainable in the longer term. This is particularly the case when one considers that the BEST Programme is a successor programme to the BQSP which covered, over a period of four years (2006-2010), almost identical subjects to those of BEST with apparently little to show for it.' (see BEST: Mid-term Review 2013). However, subsequent to the MTR substantial more progress was made, as accreditation to standard adherence improved significantly.

Again the main issue here being that very limited was done in terms of *monitoring* poverty impact, not least in the shrimp sector, where the EU, though its support to the sectors' ability to comply with EU standards, facilitated an expansion of this rather capital intensive sector, often at the expense of more labour intensive rice farms. While this could be overall positive (as part of a structural transformation of the rural economy to higher productivity activities) very little is known about the actual poverty and wider socio-economic impact, both in the short and medium term.

The *assumptions* underpinning the BEST on alignment to national policies and also on governance proved both relevant and also mostly fulfilled. BEST worked diligently to protect the key institutions from being overly politicized (which tend to reduce capacity as promotion are often not merit based and staff churn high), a key governance assumption. It also worked hard to gain cross-ministerial commitment to the project and widespread acceptance of the necessary reforms and capacities needed. Outside industry pressure also assisted in fulfilling these crucial assumptions.

Integrated Support to Poverty and Inequality Reduction through Enterprise Development (INSPIRED): This project can be partly seen as a response to the criticism that the trade focused development engagement were not sufficiently/ directly poverty focused and hinged on assumptions regarding policy reforms that were challenging to implement. Thus the overall objective was to reduce poverty in Bangladesh by supporting the development of SMEs in the country, while the project purpose was to enhance competitiveness and sustainable pro-poor growth of SMEs in selected sub-sectors of the economy of Bangladesh. More concretely, the project supported the development of an SME policy (in Ministry of Industries), a grant scheme of business intermediary organisations and access to finance for SMEs (primarily through training).

However, there has to be limited focus on the 'missing middle': how the activities (e.g. grants, training of banks and SME policy) will de facto generate employment for the poor. Thus the *design* had weaknesses in terms of establishing a credible theory of change of how the activities would reduce inequality and poverty. Other design weakness were related to ambiguous assignment of roles and responsibilities which undermined ownership and effectiveness.

The design weakness in terms of establishing a credible link between activities and reaching the poverty related objectives have translated into poor *monitoring* of poverty outcomes (cf. progress reports).

Regarding the *assumptions*, the INSPIRED clearly was too ambitious in assuming that the project would pave the way for sector budget support to the SME sector, indeed the ownership and relevance to the national policy has been mostly low (apart from the component on access to finance) diminishing strategic alignment. Also on governance, the assumption that BIOs would be exclusively focussed on serving the clients proved problematic as numerous corruption cases have demonstrated. Here there was perhaps a naïve view of the institutional set-up in Bangladesh, not aided by the large grants available.¹²

Denmark

ASPS II: The poverty focus is quite explicit and directly targeted to the poor in the *design*. The development objective of the programme was to “Improved living conditions of poor marginal and small farmer households through enhanced, integrated and sustainable agricultural productivity” and there was a clear and well-articulated focus on marginal and small-scale farmers, as well as on poor rural women. The design had a credible link between the objectives, outputs and activities including how this would contribute to poverty reduction. While there was strategic clarity, there have been concerns about the sustainability and ownership of the project, which in turn also may undermine the viability of the poverty impacts. Thus the 2010 review stated:

‘Building public sector institutional ownership has proven difficult, especially at the central level. Changes in bureaucratic structures and procedures and advancement on decentralisation, that would be necessary elements for effective and sustained development efforts, are not necessarily considered desirable at levels of society where political and economic interests are closely interrelated. Consequently, with ownership on part of the public sector to a great extent depending on the interest taken by individuals at the management level, which is often hampered by frequent transfers, it has been important to maintain separate management structures with professionals contracted directly by the components. There are no indications that this situation would change in the foreseeable future.’ (p. 40)

The institutional sustainability, especially at central level has been weak, but may be compensated by strong capacities of more or less autonomous FFS whereas the rural roads seems to be one-off interventions that temporarily reduce poverty for some, while for others the savings made could become a stepping stone (see project completion report, 2013). Moreover, with increasing focus on demonstrating results (such as length of road constructed) there is clearly the risk that such short-termism focus may increase.¹³ Consequently, there may be a dilemma in delivering immediate tangible poverty reduction with limited institutional sustainability, whereas working at central level is challenging and the transmission mechanisms to poverty reduction weaker. However, central level policy,

¹² See e.g. MN 026 and the Action Fiche for Inspired.

¹³ See MN 006 and 008

the regulatory/legal framework and the enforcement hereof are clearly also important but far more difficult.

Sweden:

Results based management (RBM) TA for PEDP III: This was a more technocratic indirect project, with the objective of strengthening RBM, evidence based planning and information management in the Department for Primary Education (DPE). However, it would also have some bearing on PEDP 3's ability to monitoring poverty reduction. Thus the Final Report stated that it had supported the education household survey to become 'a key instrument in monitoring PEDP 3 poverty impact. The TA assisted with planning and preparation of the EHS, including (i) drafting survey questionnaire; (ii) review Memorandum of Understanding between DPE and Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS); (iii) review of preliminary findings; and (iv) facilitated six meetings between DPE and BBS.' (Pinz, November 2014).

Findings from joint programmes and cross-cutting engagements:

Primary education:

PEDP 2 and 3 (EU & SIDA): the programme *design* documentation *clearly links* the support with poverty reduction activities with strong focus on enhancing the education of poor boys and girls. There is strong correlation at the individual level between the length and quality of education and key poverty indicators such as income, health and nutrition. While access has been the focus of PEDP 2, the way inputs are being transformed in classrooms to achieve better learning outcomes has constituted the core focus of PEDP 3.

Monitoring in PEDP has been primarily through annual sector performance (ASR) which reported on key educational indicators cover issues related to schooling infrastructure (quantity and quality), teaching force, enrolment, retention and gender and territorial disparities (DPE, *ASPR*, 2008-2014). Sweden's results based management TA provided support to the strengthening of the monitoring framework, including the annual primary schools census and the ASPRs, but the substantial international TA emphasis limited local ownership and sustainability. In 2011 and 2013, national students assessment have been conducted and provided information about the level of students' learning achievements, beyond the mere examination pass rates. Poverty reduction progress in terms of educational achievements has been sufficiently monitored. However, challenges remain in terms of guarantying the quality and reliability of data, the integration of educational data collection systems and the use of data to inform policy-making.

The *assumptions* informing the formulation of PEDP 3 were threefold: the viability of the treasury model for effective programme financial management; sufficient organisational capacity to implement a complex and large scale programme and a high growth and macro-economic stability assumptions to ensure increased financing to the sector (EU, *PEDP 3 Action Fiche*). The first assumption was realistic – the system has been viable – but it has been in practice a complex system, very demanding for both donors and governments (MN 205, 206, 208; *EU BS ROM Report 2013*). The capacity requirements were certainly underestimated in the design phase. The high growth and macro-economic stability allowed increased financing to the sector in absolute terms but the national allocations to

the sector remained unchanged and below international benchmarks and regional figures (DPE, *ASPR 2014*; author's calculations based on MoF budget data). Thus the assumption regarding the need and benefits of closer alignment have been mostly valid, although the assumption that EU's focus on SBS would catalyse improvements in broader PFM reforms proved to be more difficult to attain.

Climate change adaptation (CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR)

All three EPs have been active with rather closely aligned objectives and also through joint programmes. DRR and CCA by nature has a strong poverty relevance, as disasters can destroy peoples livelihoods assets (and kill them) and climate change can a) enhance the risk of disasters and b) threaten the future productivity and incomes, e.g. from agriculture. It is well known that the poor and vulnerable are also those most vulnerable to, and most affected by, disaster. The *EPs' design* reflected these insights and their interventions in all had a robust focus on reducing vulnerability, which in turn also promoted poverty reduction.

For example, many of these interventions were designed to promote alternative livelihoods, improve smallholder agriculture, and income generation to reduce vulnerability, e.g. the NGOs work under SEALS (EU), BCCRF (all EPs) support for community-based reforestation, and Climate Field Schools under CDMP (EU SE). Moreover, BCCRF was clearly focused on the poorest. As stated in the TAP: 'Climate change resilience fund: Climate change is likely to impact most severely on the poorest and most vulnerable in society. Hence, activities will focus on the needs of this group for food security, safe housing, livelihood, employment and access to basic services, including health.' (Source: BCCRF - TAP) Further, the BCCRF would also be researching the linkages between climate change, poverty, vulnerability and health.

More direct targeting of the poor has been seen in the SEALS and BCCRF where women and vulnerable groups were the main beneficiaries, e.g. by having specific selection criteria giving preference to female headed households, landless, and ethnic minorities.

In general, there was inconsistent *monitoring* of the poverty outcomes of the CCA and DRR interventions. The actual monitoring that eventually took place also reveal shortcoming. Thus the effectiveness of targeting of women and vulnerable groups under CDMP was less clear, only 30.7% of the respondents to the LDRRF impact survey found that the schemes had improved the safety of women and children.¹⁴ In other instances there was hardly any monitoring beyond inputs, activities and outputs. Thus BCCRF produced no evidence that the WB was monitoring progress against the logframe. The fact that the programme was not underpinned by a theory of change meant that the robustness of the BCCRF indicators could be questioned.¹⁵ Similarly in the case of the SEALS programme, where outcome and impact monitoring was required to investigate how far the strategy supported the

¹⁴ *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, p. 13

¹⁴ Niaz Ahmed Khan, Kazi Maruful Islam, Shamim Hayder Talukder, Shuchita Sharmin, Main Wara Gowhar, Nazme Sabina, Eminence, *Impact Assessment of Comprehensive Disaster Management Program I and II*, 2013, pg xv

¹⁵ See DfID: Annual Review of the Climate Change Programme, 2014, p. 16

objectives of SEALS, and whether interventions based on donations contributed to structural change of the resource management and utilisation system.¹⁶

Among the key *assumptions* for the flagship BCCRF project was that there would be increased strategic alignment with GoB with the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) to increasingly act as coordinator of the fund, in the process also developing its capacity. However this did not materialise as DPs generally did not have sufficient confidence in MoEF, nor assisted in developing the appropriate capacity. In addition, the fact that the mandate of MoEF was limited in terms of power to effectively coordinate other sector ministry also undermined both the assumption and DPs confidence. Thus limited strategic alignment emerged.

In both EU's SEAL and Danida's Climate Change Adaptation initiatives within rural infrastructure, there has been an assumption that GoB would maintain climate resilient infrastructure and, crucially, allocate appropriate budgets for this. However, this has generally not materialised, also undermining strategic alignment and sustainability.

Human rights and democratic governance

Many of the human rights interventions had a clear *design* focus on poverty aiming at protecting the poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups and provide them better access to e.g. judicial system enabling them to claim their rights (village courts and support to the NHRC), whereas broader development interventions aimed at e.g. consolidating the peace process in CHT and had a clear design with focus on poverty reduction. The causal pathways to achieve more inclusive human rights enforcement were relatively well articulated, but less in terms of actual assisting the vulnerable, not least outside the main urban centres.

As regards *monitoring* of the poverty reduction implications, the focus has generally been on monitoring the broader human rights situation and limited attention has been paid to on the ground situation outside the major urban centres, partly due to resource constraints, partly due to the partnering NGOs urban focus and, arguably, bias. Moreover, there has been very limited direct monitoring by EPs of the portfolio due to limited human resources allocated, thus relying mostly on second hand reports from e.g. UNDP and the main NGOs.¹⁷ Thus there has not been a robust monitoring of poverty outcomes, and that has also been the case for NHRC, which has been criticised for having weak monitoring capacity.¹⁸

A key assumption in supporting the electoral commission has been the abstinence of GoB to politically interfere in the commission's recruitment, promotion and prioritisation. Increasingly, this absolute core governance assumption has been undermined leading to increasing frustrations and reduction in support.

¹⁶ See EU: SEALS Mid-term Review, 2013.

¹⁷ See Sector Analysis for Human Rights and Democratic Governance.

¹⁸ UNDP: Mid-term Review of the NHRC capacity development project, October 2013.

Gender

In interventions specifically focused on gender, all EPs have aimed to reduce gender gaps, with particular emphasis on women's rights. Moreover, all EPs have also committed to mainstream gender in their programming. The commitment to mainstream gender concerns into the *design* of all programmes has clearly been relevant from a poverty reduction perspective as there are numerous gender specific challenges that restrain especially women from escaping poverty. However, this mainstreaming did not systematically take place in project designs with e.g. limited attention paid to gender analysis and consequently neglected formulation of gender-sensitive results statements and corresponding indicators.¹⁹ Also the design often focused on women rather than gender equality, which undermined efforts to change attitudes and cooperation of men that is crucial for promoting systemic changes, also in relation to poverty reduction. Moreover, men and boys also suffer from gender specific challenges, with most 'hard to reach' out of school children being boys. This was arguably also a design flaw that made gender interventions less anchored in a robust analysis of the causal mechanisms of exclusion.

Unsurprisingly, the limited inclusion of results statements and indicators has also reduced understanding of any changes in gender dynamics, including in relation to poverty reduction. Programming tended to focus on income generation and livelihoods for women rather than gender equality. Given the feminization of poverty in Bangladesh, EPs programming to support women's livelihoods has led to a reduction in poverty, and given that female headed households are often the poorest households and some EPs projects targeted these households, EPs have been successful in some cases in supporting poverty reduction for those most difficult to reach. However, the focus on livelihoods alone, without an equivalent focus on supporting women's rights, may not have led to sustainable and systemic poverty reduction in the broader sense in EP projects. That is, unless the social norms underpinning gender inequality have been challenged through EP programming then even if women's poverty levels improve somewhat they were still subject to violence, lack of mobility and decision making, and men still controlled additional income received in some areas under EP programming.

Consequently, several programmes have been unable to *monitor* changes in the systemic causes of gender equality, nor the role of men in promoting gender equality. At the aggregate level, monitoring has also been ineffective. All EPs gender policies included commitments to monitor GEEW related financial allocations against the OECD-DAC gender marker. All three EPs have done so but not used the tool as intended (i.e. for sharpening the analysis) but rather as a formalistic 'box-ticking' requirement, with imprecise inputting of data.

¹⁹ 80% of the 25 project documents evaluated did not include an adequate gender analysis that would have allowed for meaningful results indicators. See Sector Analysis of Gender.

A common *assumption* in most EPs interventions was that government would maintain its strategic commitment to promote gender equality, to which EPs could then align. In the education and, partly, agricultural sectors this assumption has proven relevant and monitored. Here the government has maintained a strong focus on e.g. promoting girls' enrolment (also through stipends) and that extension services would deliver gender sensitive packages. However, the assumption that the government would increase investment (both in terms of capital and human resources) in specific gender equality and empowerment of women, proved more challenging. In general, the main ministry (Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, MoWCA) has been weak and poorly resourced, with significant 'policy evaporation' i.e. being unable to translate many of its policies into practice. On the other hand, Danida, in its supported Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence against Women through MoWCA, has, through 15 years long support, eventually managed to convince GoB to increase funding to allow crucial elements of the programme (e.g. the one stop crises centres) to be largely financed by domestic resources.

Assumptions regarding good governance have also become important over the evaluation period. Many of the NGOs working on both human rights and gender equality promotion issues are partly funded by external development partners, and the government has increasingly focused on controlling and potentially reducing such support, e.g. through the Foreign Donation Act. Here the assumptions regarding the maintenance of an open and widening political space have proven more uncertain, but it should be noted that NGOs focusing exclusively on non-contentious gender issues still operate comparatively freely.

JC1.2 Degree of alignment of EP strategies with relevant GoB's national policies for poverty reduction and other domestic initiatives

| JC1.2: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|--|--|-------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> At overall objective level there has been high degree of alignment with both GoB policies as well as the private sector and CSOs | Project documents, national policies/strategies, interviews. | Strong |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> GoB alignment incentives have varied and the lack of strong leadership has stymied progress | Sector analysis, interviews, and internal EP docs. | More than satisfactory |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EPs alignment efforts have peaked, and subsequently become more competitive and fragmented. | Interviews, strategies, LCG docs. | More than satisfactory |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased focus on delivering tangible results may compromise strategic vision and undermine systemic improvements | Project documentation, reviews, evaluation, interviews and sector analysis | Indicative but not conclusive |

Please qualify the quality of evidence: strong; more than satisfactory; indicative but not conclusive; weak

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|--|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Design of main interventions sharing aligning at objective level that of the domestic counterparts | Data fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Beneficiary organisations (e.g. ministries, NGOs, private sector organisations) stating that their policies, priorities and conditions were driving design and implementation. | Data partly available |

General level

All three EPs have made alignment a core feature in their original strategies (DK from 2005, EU 2007 and SE 2008). However, there has been some divergence among the EPs during implementation.

DK stated in 2005 that its development assistance would both at objective and financial channelling level be aligned to GoB. All three core sectors project documents took their cue from corresponding sector policies and shaped the development objectives around those.²⁰ The 2013 strategy is arguably still broadly aligned with that of GoB regarding poverty reduction and governance (democratic and technocratic), which were also key objectives in 2005. However, the new strategy also have as an overall objective that of fostering commercial cooperation between Denmark and Bangladesh, which mostly has translated into assisting Danish companies in increasing exports and/or outsourcing to Bangladesh. It is not evident that this added objective is aligned to that of GoB nor the private sector for that matter.²¹ There has been (and is) also increased use of results-focused contracts between the embassies and HQs which may have lead to less aligned and less strategic development assistance. This focus has intensified the need to produce quantifiable results and tend to distort preferences towards short-term investments in outputs which can be measured instead of an investment which may have more significant, longer-term but less quantifiable benefits. The road sector is a case point with increased emphasis on kilometres constructed and less on improving Bangladesh's ability to priorities, manage and maintain its critical rural infrastructure.²²

EU: The 2007-2013 CSP was strongly grounded in the GoB's own development strategy and in the two key social sectors, health and education, the EU aligned to GoB's programmes, using SWAP like approaches. The 2007-20013 CPS generally had robust faith in alignment to GoB policies and sector plans. The EU has also aimed for wider alignment of other development partners, arguing that it would support 'joint actions to assure that the currently substantial 'off budget' aid flows (e.g. Global Health Initiatives and major bilateral donors), are fully aligned with consistent sector policies and the poverty reduction strategy, and effectively complement the funding through Government channels as provided by the EC and EU Member States. (EARM, 2008)'.

²⁰ See e.g. Danida. ASAP II project document, 2006 and Project Document Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence against Women Phase-III : July 2011 – June 2016

²¹ See Danida: Evaluation of the Business to Business programme, 2014

²² MN 006.

Moreover, over time the EU also began to have concerns about the PRSP's appropriateness as the strategy to align to stating that it 'has a number of weak points which hinder alignment, like the lack of priority, weakness of indicators, lack of coherence with ongoing sector processes' (EARM 2009). But the EU has generally been committed to align as much as feasible, and has also been aiming to align its next MIP cycle to the 7th five-year plan.²³

Finally the future strategic decision, mainly designed in HQ, which puts significant emphasis on using member states as implementing partners, can potentially limit the alignment with GoB objectives as well as those of non-state actors. The EU has, during the evaluation period, developed solid partnerships with especially UN specialised agencies as well as relevant government ministries. Re-orienting assistance to 'domestic' EU MS agencies (e.g. GIZ; DfID and AfD) is not respecting the GoB's stated preference to continue their cooperation with many of the existing partners.²⁴

SE: Sweden arguably had a unfavourable view of the GoB's overall strategy (the then PRSP) as being able to guide alignment efforts aimed at poverty reduction. Thus the Swedish strategy stated: 'The [PRSP's] lack of detailed action plans, medium to long financing plans and expenditure frameworks will, however, make it difficult to follow up the ambitious goals. Goals that are directly related to the effects of climate change are not included in the present document.' Moreover, the mid-term review reiterated the view that the PRSP's goals were 'unrealistic, as there is a budget deficit. Links between the PRSP and sectoral priorities are sometimes weak, which may lead to delays in achievements. Furthermore, the GoB has no overall plan or strategy on managing foreign assistance, the link to capacity development is weak, and there is an overall institutional weakness in coordinating external assistance. Fragmentation of aid and projectification is common, which puts further strain on GoBs capacity to coordinate ODA.'²⁵ Moreover, the mid-term review also had scepticism about the incentives and willingness of both DPs and GoB to pursue an alignment agenda, noting that while individual donors claimed that the number of their PIUs had fallen, the overall had gone up. Finally, the review also noted that Sweden was a relatively small DP in Bangladesh and in that context it could consider other aid modalities outside the SWAPs in health and education, instead focussing on piloting and innovation. As stated by the Swedish embassy team. 'The Team recommends that we pursue looking into more innovative supports that could have a catalytic effect, but are not necessarily in line with the Paris agenda.' The 2014-2018 is largely devoid of alignment analysis and direction but reiterated Sweden's ambition 'to develop and apply innovative forms of cooperation and financing, including results-based aid.'²⁶ Finally, and similarly to Denmark, Sida is also under pressure to deliver tangible results to a domestic Swedish constituency, not least in the health sector, which can produce impressive figures relatively quickly. Thus there are pressures for e.g. financing NGOs or private contractors

²³ See e.g. EARM 2012.

²⁴ See e.g. EU: Draft Implementation Plan 2015-2020 and MN 005

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Government of Sweden: 'Results strategy for Bangladesh 2014–2020' 2014

to deliver health services (e.g. vaccines) directly to beneficiaries, instead of work on improving the domestic system's ability to manage and improve the overall health system.²⁷

Findings from bilateral development engagements

EU

BEST: BEST had economic growth and poverty reduction as overall objective through increased competitiveness and facilitate export growth and diversification, which was in *close alignment* to GoB policy more narrowly defined within the component areas of 1) Quality Infrastructure; 2) Fisheries Quality; and 3) Better Works in Textile and Garments. Only the Better Works in Textile component had a more explicit pro-poor focus on helping e.g. female workers asserting their rights and developing their negotiation skills. However, this is not a key strategy of GoB nor other domestic organisation, but rather a stand-alone intervention (which does not necessarily reduce its relevance).

Also most of the key *beneficiary organisations* involved in BEST (Bangladesh Accreditation Board, Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution, Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Inspection & Quality Control, Bangladesh Frozen Foods Exporters Association, Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association, University of Fashion and Technology, Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association and Bangladesh Textiles Mills Association) stated that their policies and priorities had been driving design and implementation, which the BEST project has been acting as a facilitator, broker, knowledge bank, financer and convener, providing critical inputs into the process, that allowed for (eventual) progress.²⁸

INSPIRED: The *project objectives were aligned to the GoB's policies* (at the time of commencement) and were: Overall objective: reduced poverty in Bangladesh by supporting the development of SMEs in the country. The project objective was: enhanced competitiveness and sustainable pro-poor growth of SMEs in Bangladesh. The latter was to be achieved through three separate project components, namely: 1. Supporting the national strategic and regulatory environment for SMEs, 2. Enhancing SME competitiveness and 3. Improving SME access to finance. These components were achieved by activities targeting appropriate entities in government and in the commercial world. However, a key challenge was that the project struggled to get traction on improving the national strategic and regulatory environment (component 1) as the lead Ministry of Industries at one point was reducing its cooperation with what it perceived was inappropriate EU financed TA. Only recently with new staff on both EU and GoB, traction has picked up again. In this component EU has been more supporting strategy formulation rather than aligning to it and there has been concerns that policy formulation is overly EU consultancy driven, not appropriately contextualised and aligned to the Bangladeshi SME policy.²⁹ In the component 2, focus has been on a grant scheme that will assist in job generation benefiting the poor, which is clearly aligned to GoB policies. Again

²⁷

²⁸ See MNs 105 to 112

²⁹ E.g. The SME strategy is based on best practices as formulated in EU's Support to Small Business Act, which was not considered the most relevant reference. See MN 027 and 026.

actual implementation has been done by the project with limited support from GoB and limited implementation alignment has taken place. Only on component 3 has alignment progress at both objective and implementation level taken place, with robust involvement of e.g. Bangladesh Bank (the central bank) and associated bank training academies.³⁰

Unsurprisingly, those domestic *beneficiary institutions* to which the project was most closely aligned, not least implementation wise, were also those stating that their policies, priorities and conditions had been driving both design and implementation. Thus Ministry of Industries expressed serious concerns about the degree to which both components 1 and 2 had been designed and, even more forcefully, how they had been implemented, arguing that they had been flawed right from design, to implementation, with EU consultants of varying quality driving the process with insufficient contextual and domestic anchoring.³¹ In component 3 the view had become more sanguine, with growing involvement of the core institutions in the implementation, thus facilitating operational alignment of activities, which in turn also promoted both ownership and sustainability.³²

Denmark

ASPS II was *clearly aligned* to the government's agricultural policy at objective level and had a strong poverty focus. The development objective was to 'improve living conditions of poor marginal and small farmer households through enhanced, integrated and sustainable agricultural productivity'. This was fully aligned to the (then) New Agriculture Extension Policy (NAEP) as well as the Plan of Action for the National Agricultural Policy and the National Plan of Action for Nutrition. However, at central level, efforts to promote alignment and policy reform gained limited traction and were eventually reduced in scope.

At local level there was generally reasonable alignment, but the project modality was dominant with Danish financed TA driving most of the process. This has in some cases reduced sustainability of e.g. the support to farmers CBOs which was phased out with the closure of the project (MN 006). The results on the ground seem to have delivered substantial poverty reduction in line with GoB policy³³. Thus the rural roads component completion report argued that 'the extensive use of LCS groups by the RRMAC has had a direct impact on poverty in the component districts by providing employment on rural infrastructure schemes and by providing training in income generating activities, literacy and human rights. [...] Indications from the impact studies, component statistics, field observations and anecdotal evidence are that the activities of the Component have contributed to improved living conditions of poor rural households and to poverty reduction and empowerment of poor rural women.' Similarly in the agricultural extension component (AEC) stated in its completion report that 'The FFS approach, as practiced in *ASPS II* in Bangladesh, appears to be a cost-effective mechanism for lifting poor rural households, including land-less and often excluded and marginalized population groups, out of poverty, hunger and malnutrition. In addition to the direct effects, the level of spill-

³⁰ See MN 104.

³¹ MN 027.

³² See project, fiche, sector analysis and MN 028 and 104.

³³ See e.g. Danida: Evaluation of the Farmer Field Schools, 2012.

over effects has shown to be of large magnitude'. In a sense the FFS influenced policy in terms of the concept and curriculum being mainstreamed within DAE and thus had some bottom-up policy influence.

Most *beneficiary organisations* interviewed expressed that the ASPSP did reflect their priorities and policies.³⁴ However, there were exceptions with the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock increasingly viewing the ASPSP II focus on reforming especially the veterinary vaccine supply as undue interference, leading to eventually terminating support, as Danida was unwilling to align to a policy that was perceived as detrimental to promoting a sustainable and private sector led sector. In the Ministry of Agricultural and more specifically in the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE) there has been a gradual increase in implementation alignment and allowing it to drive the implementation, with ASPSP II staff increasingly becoming involved in piloting and facilitation, rather than implementation.

Findings from joint programmes and crosscutting engagements

Primary education

PEDP 3 (EU & SE): There has been an unquestionable evolution towards increased *alignment* in the primary education sub-sector. This applies both to the objective level as well as implementation channels. PEDP 3 mid-term review expresses stakeholders' consensus that PEDP represents a major step forward in terms of use of government systems, strengthening government's ownership and systems' accountability, and donor harmonization (MoPME/DPs, JARM May2014 Record of Discussions, p.6)³⁵. Under PEDP 3, donors' disbursement mechanisms are largely aligned with the government's programme document. However, even though DPs channel their funds using the treasury system, several exception to the GoB Procurement Guidelines (2008) have been decided upon to ensure their consistency with World Bank's and ADB's procurement rules. The 'Treasury model' could be appropriately characterised as a targeted or earmarked budget support with stringent fiduciary safe-guards³⁶ (EU, *ROM BS Report 2013*, p.5). The choice of this 'hybrid system' (MN 200) was based on several arguments. Even though the overall PFM environment was assessed as challenging, financial management in education was considered relatively strong. Besides, DPs felt that, throughout the implementation of PEDP 2, the government demonstrated a growing leadership and ownership. Finally, there was a recognition of the high transaction costs associated with a Trust Fund leading to the more aligned treasure model. This middle-ground system also met the preferences of other main participating donors, SE included.

The main *beneficiary organisations*, the Directorate of Primary Education and its parent Ministry of Primary and Mass Education have clearly been driving the design of the education polices (MN 220). However, during implementation DPs' concerns over the financial management system and procurement issues tended to crowd out discussions on more substantial education policy reforms, that were central to the ministry. Thus the discourse and focus of PEDP has become less aligned than desired by government.

³⁴ See MN 014, 116 to 119

³⁵ PEDP 3 would be at the 'forefront of global best practice' (MoPME/DPs, *JARM May 2014 Record of Discussions*, p.6).

³⁶ For details on fiduciary safeguards see JC3.3.

Climate change and disaster risk reduction:

Bangladesh Climate Change and Resilience Fund (BCCRF, supported by EU, SE and DK, managed by the WB). At policy level the government's Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) from September 2009 was viewed as an ideal opportunity for development partners to *align* their actions in the area of climate change and pool their funds into the BCCRF (see e.g. EU's Action Fiche). Hence at sector policy level there was also alignment. However in terms of alignment with government systems there was the intention to eventually make it a fully government managed fund, but due to fiduciary concerns BCCRF was setup as donor-funded trust. Moreover, a separate secretariat was established for BCCRF with its own consultancy staff, although government did provide office space at the BCCTF Secretariat. Moreover, a separate set of proposal preparation and approval procedures were established, instead of following GoB's Development Project Proforma (DPP) procedures, although in practice the proposals ended up having to follow both the BCCRF and DPP procedures (as well as World Bank procedures). With different funding, management structures, staff, and approval processes there were no synergies with GoB own BCCTF, although the two mechanisms were set up to implement the same strategy. Hence, BCCRF made only a marginal contribution to development GoB management and implementation capacity and implementation due in part to limited alignment. The combination of this parallel structure and the fact that only one of the sub-projects was implemented directly by Government resulted in a limited direct involvement and ownership of GoB.³⁷ Most the *beneficiary organisations* interviewed were of the opinion that the BCCRF did not substantially align to GoB and was driven by the World Bank's project priorities.

In the *CDMP II* project there was arguably somewhat more aligned at objective level with GoB also being driven a subnational part of implementation and also managing a substantial part of the funding, at times to the concerns of the donors.³⁸ Here there was generally more buy-in from the beneficiary organisation. Similarly with the *SEALS* project where both objectives and implementation was, partly at least, aligned to GoB priorities and systems, with EU also trusted the forestry department to manage part of the funding.

However, all interventions in the sector were using various project modalities (e.g. EU's WBs trust fund and UN's NEX) and there were no serious attempts to develop the capacity of GoB to manage climate and disaster funding, which in turn may have put Bangladesh in a disadvantaged position for obtaining finance from the Green Climate Fund.

Gender

EPs strategies were referring to the need for *alignment* with the gender elements of the government's main policies and strategies including the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers' and the 6th National Development Plan from the period.³⁹ EPs were also responsive to the government's strategic commitment to promote gender equality and empowerment of

³⁷ MN 304, MN 305, MN 309

³⁸ MN 304, 306, 309, 310, 317

³⁹ Sida *Strategy for Development Cooperation with Bangladesh (2008-2012)*, 2008; Danida *Strategy for Development Cooperation 2005-2009*, 2005; EU *Bangladesh-European Community Country Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013*, nd.

women and reduce violence against women. This has resulted in programming directly tied to government priorities, for example in education and food security. However, due to capacity weaknesses and budget constraints of the key Ministry of Women & Children's Affairs, implementation tended to be the key bottleneck, not alignment at objective level. In the case of support to CSOs, EPs were generally also aligning to their specific objectives (i.e. they did not attempt to impose their agenda) and especially long-term, core support has been instrumental in ensuring their activities.

All beneficiary organisations (including MoWCA and CSOs) have generally appreciated the support and argued that it had assisted in supporting the implementation of their priorities, with a high degree of ownership in the process.⁴⁰ In particular Denmark was singled out as being key in assisting MoWCA by providing long-term support, that eventually proved effective and gradually has become sustainable.

Human rights and democratisation

There are some similarities in this space, where EPs in general have been *aligned to the objectives* of the CSOs supported. Moreover harmonisation has also been improved in cases where DPs consortiums have been formed (e.g. Transparency International Bangladesh). However EPs have also at times made CSOs aligned to the requirements of the specific instruments of the EPs, but generally this did not compromise the objective level alignment. In the case of support to GoB organisations, such as the Electoral Commission and the National Human Rights Commission, there was arguably agreement at the top objective level (e.g. the Election Commission is supposedly the 'Guardian of Free and Fair Elections'), but in terms of implementation EPs have been cautious to be seen as being too aligned with the Commission, mainly as it was feared that close alignment could be construed as adding legitimacy to often compromised electoral processes. Partnering with UNDP may have led to closer than desired alignment than EPs would otherwise have wished. This was less the case for support to the National Human Rights Commission, where implementation alignment could be agreed concerning non-contentious issues such as violence against women, children's rights, most economic and social rights, whereas thorny questions (such as disproportionate use of force, custodial torture, disappearances, political/extrajudicial killings, death penalty, free and fair elections, repressive measures against the opposition, corruption), was challenging to address with GoB.

Again most beneficiary CSOs stated that they retained strong ownership and were setting the priorities both during design and implementation, although at times had to adjust reporting to EPs demands (e.g. Sweden pushing for results-based reporting). In the case of the Electoral Commission it has become clear that EPs have somewhat different priorities which undermine their ability to align and even support.


⁴⁰ MN 502, 507, 508 and and 519.

2. Detailed facts and findings on coherence, coordination and complementarity (3Cs)

2.1 Overall context

Over the period, many DPs have been active in Bangladesh, with four largest – the ADB, DFID, Japan and the World Bank (IDA)- representing more than 60% of total programmable aid disbursements (which amounted to 16,082M USD in 2012 USD constant prices over the period 2007-2013⁴¹. Support from the EU (excluding member states) totaled 4% (568M USD) of all donor aid, which is equivalent to one third of the UK support to Bangladesh over the same period. Support from Denmark totaled 2,2% and support from Sweden totaled 1,4% of all donor aid. Table 1 below gives the full details.

Figure 1 - Programmable aid disbursement to Bangladesh 2007-2013, in 2012 USD constant prices



⁴¹ Source: OECD data.

Table 1 - Country Programmable Aid received by Bangladesh, 2007-2013, in M US\$ (2012)

| Donor | EU Member State | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2007-2013 | % |
|--|-----------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|--------|
| United Kingdom | x | 154,79 | 228,92 | 269,55 | 239,83 | 366,46 | 304,96 | 414,6 | 1979,11 | 12,31% |
| Netherlands | x | 90,33 | 76,57 | 67,09 | 74,45 | 72,82 | 63,81 | 64,95 | 510,02 | 3,17% |
| Germany | x | 29,64 | 49,73 | 55,25 | 51,73 | 57,4 | 64,57 | 82,86 | 391,18 | 2,43% |
| Denmark | x | 43,2 | 43,05 | 45,74 | 81,45 | 53,2 | 60,29 | 31,93 | 358,86 | 2,23% |
| Sweden | x | 6,32 | 32,03 | 46,67 | 37,43 | 30,59 | 36,86 | 37,61 | 227,51 | 1,41% |
| Spain | x | 10,95 | 3,61 | 5,13 | 5,54 | 3,76 | 0,57 | 0,57 | 30,13 | 0,19% |
| Italy | x | 0 | 4,75 | 6,88 | 5,39 | 1,85 | 0,69 | 2,1 | 21,66 | 0,13% |
| France | x | 0,89 | 0,7 | 0,72 | 0,98 | 0,9 | 0,93 | 6,37 | 11,49 | 0,07% |
| Ireland | x | 0,32 | 0 | 0,06 | 0,3 | 0 | 0,01 | 0 | 0,69 | 0,00% |
| Finland | x | 1,22 | 1,24 | 1,09 | 1,06 | 0,78 | 0,77 | 0,8 | 6,96 | 0,04% |
| Luxembourg | x | 0,13 | 0,32 | 0,15 | 0,76 | 1,17 | 0,93 | 1,66 | 5,12 | 0,03% |
| Austria | x | 0,1 | 0,13 | 0,12 | 0,1 | 0,14 | 0,08 | 0,01 | 0,68 | 0,00% |
| Belgium | x | 0,09 | 0,25 | 0 | 0,07 | 0,09 | 0,02 | 0,02 | 0,54 | 0,00% |
| Greece | x | 0,08 | 0,24 | 0,11 | 0,07 | 0,11 | 0,1 | 0,07 | 0,78 | 0,00% |
| Poland | x | 0,29 | 0,06 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,03 | 0,01 | 0,01 | 0,5 | 0,00% |
| Czech Republic | x | 0,11 | 0,01 | 0,08 | | 0 | 0,01 | 0 | 0,21 | 0,00% |
| Cyprus | x | 0,2 | 0,03 | 0,08 | | | | | 0,31 | 0,00% |
| Slovak Republic | x | 0,09 | | 0,05 | | | | | 0,14 | 0,00% |
| Hungary | x | | 0,03 | | | | 0,01 | 0,01 | 0,05 | 0,00% |
| Estonia | x | 0,04 | | | | | | | 0,04 | 0,00% |
| Romania | x | | | | | 0,01 | | | 0,01 | 0,00% |
| Japan | | 84,67 | 156,32 | 109,17 | 129,75 | 182,88 | 444,01 | 523,82 | 1630,62 | 10,14% |
| United States | | 46,2 | 51,02 | 62,2 | 68,61 | 75,82 | 141,72 | 157,34 | 602,91 | 3,75% |
| Australia | | 23,92 | 22,44 | 42,87 | 46,54 | 67,84 | 103,16 | 89,96 | 396,73 | 2,47% |
| Canada | | 56,75 | 81,75 | 56,37 | 56,98 | 58,03 | 26,57 | 70,22 | 406,67 | 2,53% |
| Korea | | 9,05 | 10,31 | 17,62 | 59,19 | 81,04 | 48,45 | 46,17 | 271,83 | 1,69% |
| Switzerland | | 22,71 | 18,1 | 22,17 | 20,86 | 23,65 | 25,2 | 29,07 | 161,76 | 1,01% |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | | 29,38 | 26,18 | 21,19 | 12,74 | 11,83 | 5,35 | 6,78 | 113,45 | 0,71% |
| Norway | | 30,82 | 29,4 | 23,27 | 4,86 | 6,33 | 4,99 | 7,22 | 106,89 | 0,66% |
| United Arab Emirates | | 1,4 | 9,96 | 0,45 | 0,12 | 0,05 | 0,01 | 0,05 | 12,04 | 0,07% |
| Turkey | | 1,05 | 1,36 | 1,01 | 0,62 | 1,43 | 1,62 | 2,64 | 9,73 | 0,06% |
| New Zealand | | 0,3 | 0,1 | 0,11 | 0,13 | 1,18 | 0,54 | 0,4 | 2,76 | 0,02% |
| Thailand | | 0,07 | 0,29 | 0,42 | 0,23 | 0,22 | 0,11 | 0,32 | 1,66 | 0,01% |
| Russia | | | | | | | 0,14 | | 0,14 | 0,00% |
| IDA | | 656,62 | 835,94 | 344,48 | 366 | 338,71 | 674,91 | 637,11 | 3853,77 | 23,96% |
| AsDB Special Funds | | 385,12 | 497,11 | 371,81 | 297,09 | 279,07 | 356,81 | 348,49 | 2535,5 | 15,77% |
| EU Institutions | | 77,48 | 92,89 | 56,22 | 123,18 | 75,87 | 70,87 | 71,69 | 568,2 | 3,53% |
| IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) | | | | | | | 140,03 | 416,5 | 556,53 | 3,46% |
| GAVI | | 9 | 28,19 | 28,09 | 54,01 | 31,1 | 26,39 | 96,86 | 273,64 | 1,70% |
| Global Fund | | 26,66 | 34,4 | 25,21 | 43,7 | 33,01 | 28,77 | 72,04 | 263,79 | 1,64% |
| Other multilateral donors and private donors | | 79,04 | 63,54 | 118,5 | 132,87 | 151,3 | 114,96 | 107,94 | 768,15 | 4,78% |
| Total EU Member States | | 338,79 | 441,67 | 498,82 | 499,21 | 589,31 | 534,62 | 643,57 | 3 545,99 | 22,05% |
| Total EU Member States (EU Institutions) | | 416,27 | 534,56 | 555,04 | 622,39 | 665,18 | 605,49 | 715,26 | 4 114,19 | 25,58% |
| Total all donors | | 1 879,03 | 2 400,97 | 1 799,98 | 1 916,69 | 2 008,67 | 2 749,23 | 3 328,19 | 16 082,76 | 100% |

Source: ADE analysis based on OECD-DAC (February 2015)

Aid flows are expected to grow over the next five to ten years. Besides the traditional multi and bilateral development partners, there are also new large emerging development partners such as China and India, which are providing assistance mainly in the form of credit lines and infrastructure loans. Bangladesh is however not an aid dependent country in terms of financing with total aid flows accounting for 1,3% of GDP on average over the period (see table below).

Table 2 - Aid flows to Bangladesh

| | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | Average |
|----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
| Official aid flows (in % of GDP) | 0,7 | 0,5 | 0,6 | 0,8 | 1,3 | 2,3 | 3,1 | 1,33 |
| - Of which grants | 0,4 | 0,4 | 0,3 | 0,6 | 0,3 | 0,6 | 0,6 | 0,46 |
| - Of which concessional loans | 0,3 | 0,2 | 0,3 | 0,2 | 1,1 | 1,7 | 2,4 | 0,89 |

Note: Aid flows defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief

Source: IMF Article IV 2010, 2011 and 2013

ADB, DFID, Japan and the World Bank engaged in 2005 in intensive preparations and consultations that led to a joint framework designed to facilitate closer harmonisation and programme coherence: the Joint Strategic Framework. While formally a partnership between four participants, others were drawn in at sector level or became engaged as co-financiers. Characterized as a turning point for aid alignment and harmonization in Bangladesh, the JSF approach was not institutionalised. In particular, there were no clearly identified next steps and no shared monitoring framework. On the basis of the JSF experience, a number of DPs have sought to formalize a common approach and framework jointly with GoB, which resulted in the signature by the GoB and fifteen donors in August 2008 of a Statement of Intent to develop a Joint Cooperation Strategy (JCS) in support of the national poverty strategy. In June 2010, the GoB and eighteen development partners signed a JCS (2010-2015), which laid the ground for accelerated implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action in the country. It foresaw regular collective dialogue through: (i) the Bangladesh Development Forum coordinated by the WB to review progress achieved and outline major priorities and reform, and (ii) the establishment of a GoB-DP Local Consultative Group (LCG) providing a forum for on-going dialogue between GoB and DPs on the country's challenges and strategies (LCG plenary) and regular dialogue at sector and thematic level (LCG working groups). In addition to collective dialogue, the JCS Action Plan -setting actions and milestones- was key for implementing the JCS.

All three EPs committed in their strategy documents to ensure improved coordination with both bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as to bring about a more far-reaching division of labour between various donors, based on comparative advantages and on the possibility of donors complementing each another as set out in the Paris Declaration. At EU level, the 2007 EU Code of Conduct on Division of labour in Development Policy established requirements on EU Member States to have division of labour and reduce sector spread. This guided the work of EU MS towards closer EU coordination. In 2013, the EU+ joint programming process started to have a coordinated response to the 7th Five Year Plan (FYP) starting in 2016.

Beyond coordination and complementarity, Sweden and Denmark committed to ensure coherence of their respective policy priorities with those of the EU. The EU also established a policy framework so as to ensure overall EU policy coherence. In its 2005 Communication on Policy Coherence for Development, the European Commission has defined coherence commitments in the overall framework of the EU and identified several priority areas with high potential of attaining synergies with development policy objectives,

amongst which trade, environment and migration. Moreover, the 2005 ‘European Consensus’ on EU Development Policy provides a common vision that guides the action of the EU, both at its Member States and Community levels, in development cooperation.

2.2 Facts and findings per Judgement Criteria

JC2.1 Effects of the efforts devoted by each EP to ensure effective coordination and complementarity with each other and other DPs

| JC2.1: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|---|------------------------|
| Early period characterised by the fragmentation of donor support | PRSP GoB and WB documents on aid effectiveness EPs strategy documents | Strong |
| Intensification of the work to strengthen aid effectiveness, which culminated in the signature in 2010 of the JCS and in the set-up of the LCG mechanisms | LCG documents and website JCS-related documents EPs strategy documents EU EAMR Interviews | Strong |
| Declining importance of the harmonization agenda afterwards | Interviews | More than satisfactory |
| Limited interest of GoB in coordinating donors | EPs strategy documents EU EAMR Interviews | Strong |
| EPs worked closely with the UN and the WB | EPs strategy documents EU EAMR EPs project level documents Interviews | Strong |
| Adherence to division of labour principles has been inconsistent | EPs strategy documents EU EAMR Interviews | Strong |

Please qualify the quality of evidence: strong; more than satisfactory; indicative but not conclusive; weak

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|--|----------------------------------|
| ▪ Choice of focal areas of each EP according to its comparative advantages | data fully available |
| ▪ Degree of information sharing between EPs | data fully available |
| ▪ EPs allowing for a leading role of the GoB in coordination of external assistance (incl. division of labour) | data partly available |
| ▪ Effective involvement of each EP in national aid coordination mechanisms | data fully available |
| ▪ GoB-DP joint monitoring of objectives according to a common framework | data fully available |
| ▪ Degree of articulation of EPs interventions with each other and with other DPs | data partly available |

1. Choice of focal areas of each EP according to comparative advantages

A. General level review:

The EU chose its focal areas according to expertise & willingness to concentrate resources:

- The Country Strategy for 2007-2013 focuses on three key strategic areas, notably the human and social development sector, good governance, and economic and trade development. They are reflected in the PRSP and are those in which over the years the EC has developed solid expertise and understanding and is therefore best placed to provide added value through its programmes. In addition, there are two non focal sectors, food security and environment/disaster preparedness through small scale interventions to improve capacity to prepare for environmental risks.
- “Interventions will have to build even more strictly than before on the EU’s comparative advantage, particular expertise, or otherwise well-established track record if they are to make a meaningful contribution to the Joint Cooperation Strategy process in Bangladesh, with which this MIP is to be fully aligned. The issue of Division of Labour, which may make it advisable for a partner to take a back seat in certain ‘overpopulated’ sectors in order to concentrate expertise and financial resources in others, makes further flexibility a necessity.”

Source: EU CSP 2007-2013 & CSP MIP 2011-2013, p.15

Sweden committed to select its focal areas according to comparative advantages, sector concentration and donor concentration:

- “Strategic choices have been made based on poverty analyses, experience from previous cooperation, the profiles and commitments of other donors, Sweden’s development assistance policy priorities and Sweden’s comparative advantages.”
- Improved urban environment: “There are considerable needs in this area which have received relatively little attention by other donors”
- Support to the development of the business sector: “In line with the ambition to

increase both sector concentration and donor concentration in Bangladesh, this support should be phased out by Sweden. Several other donors are active in this area.”

Source: Sweden Development Strategy 2008-2012

Danish choices of focal areas have been made according to past experience:

- “Choice of priority sectors based on objective and chosen strategies, experience from past assistance, specific needs and the overall donor situation. Three priority sectors/areas: (i) agriculture (including rural roads); (ii) water supply and sanitation; (iii) human rights and good governance.”

Source: Denmark Strategy 2005-2009, p.26

B. Sector level review:

Primary education:

The contributions of the EU and SE in the policy dialogue have been valued and the expertise of their education programme officers widely recognised. Even though SE has decided to phase out of education, both agencies benefit from a comparative advantage in education based on their long-term engagement in the sector. In the context of a SBS to education, the EU parallel involvement in PFM issues provides the EU with additional source of comparative advantage.

PSD:

The Mid-Term Review CSP 2011-2013 notes that the “EU has a clear comparative advantage in trade and private sector development in Bangladesh where it is in the lead on trade-related technical assistance. As the destination of approximately 50% of Bangladesh’s exports, the EU has a clear role to play in this field now and in the future.” Interviews held in the field confirmed that the EU has had a clear advantage in trade and that the expertise provided has been broadly lauded for being relevant and leading. The EU had less added value in the SME strategy components of BEST, where the expertise was generally characterized as low quality, although with some exceptions (e.g. the access to financial services component).

The ASPS II Aide mémoire (2009) notes that “Danida has thorough experience in Bangladesh from supporting field implementation of larger programmes which have benefited the rural poor. Field implementation support - as compared to central level institutional support activities - is an area where Danida both has thorough experience and a comparative advantage, as compared to other development partners.” Indeed, DK support spanned several decades and there was thus some institutional memory among local staff at embassy and in GoB, although staff rotation has reduced this. Expertise to central level government reforms was not demanded and hence not recognized. Other expertise has been recognized as useful.

CC:

Comparative advantage was reported mainly in terms of financing and staffing : Dfid being the strong one, EU in the middle, then Sida, lastly Danida. Danida does however, have a distinct advantage when it comes to engaging the agricultural sector in

mainstreaming, due to experience with this and a long-standing involvement in the agriculture sector.

HR & D:

The EU notes, in its Mid-Term Review of the CSP (2011) that “Proper attention should be paid to the appropriate division of labour among donors according to their comparative advantage. Given its longstanding political and financial support to the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord and its implementation, and its comparative experience on Indigenous Peoples, the EU is uniquely placed to continue this support.”

The full integration of HR&D in development cooperation is perceived by the EPs themselves, and by some of their partners, as a comparative advantage of EP interventions as compared to other development partners.

Gender:

Danida and Sida have led on GEEW for many years, at least two decades. So they have been more effective on GEEW in Bangladesh, e.g. Danida’s project documents were considerably better than the EU’s. Little Sida documentation was available; therefore it wasn’t possible to carry out a thorough assessment of their portfolio, but respondents noted the strength of their programming on GEEW.

2. Degree of coordination between EPs and with other DPs

A. Overall

The early period was characterized by the fragmentation of donor support “In many sectors, programme activities are not well coordinated and there are a wide variety of funding mechanisms with many donors operating separately. This fragmentation leads to overlap, duplication and high transaction costs for both GoB and DPs.” Source: GoB, *Bangladesh Joint Cooperation Strategy*, page 3

Denmark notes the incipient sector coordination in the beginning of the evaluation period:

- “A Harmonisation Action Plan (HAP) was developed in 2006 after joint consultations between the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) and development partners. The plan is based on the principles of the Paris Declaration and embedded in the PRSP. Many of the targets set out in the HAP are only advancing slowly or not at all. The intention to promote programme-based approaches and sector coordination is still incipient, as is the intention to strengthen GoB and development partners’ coordination of PRSP implementation and monitoring. As regards improvement of PFM and procurement processes, various initiatives are underway and might provide a solid basis for improving alignment.

Source: Denmark Bangladesh Country programme review, 2007, p.8

All EPs noted, in their strategy documents, their willingness to strengthen donor coordination:

Denmark:

- “Given that government led donor coordination is particularly weak, opportunities to strengthen donor harmonisation of programming will be continuously explored to ensure maximum efficiency and impact.” Source: Denmark Strategy 2005-2009

EU:

- “The EC’s strategy has been designed and will be implemented in cooperation with the other main donors and in broad conformity with the Bangladesh Harmonization Action Plan which the Government and Donors are developing in the context of the PRSP.”
- Four largest donors have particularly shaped the donor landscape in Bangladesh: the Asian Development Bank, UK DFID, Japan and WB. Based on a common assessment, these four donors issued their Country Assistance Strategies in April/May 2006, based on 24 joint strategy outcomes, some of which correspond to the EC’s development priorities.
- “With the exception of Japan, which has to date had a strong focus on infrastructure development and thus allowed for little common scope, the EC has collaborated with all of these donors.”

Sources: EU CSP 2007-2013, p.8, 13-14

B. Sector level

Primary education:

The EU and SE contributions to PEDP 3 have been coordinated within the broader PEDP 3 coordination framework. The degree of coordination between PEDP 3 consortium partners has increased in comparison with PEDP 2 but there is room for improvement: “To reduce the number of DPs’ concerns would be better” (MN 202). In the case of the EU, the expected synergy between the support to PEDP 3 and its SHARE programme in non-formal education did not materialize. Besides, there has been no coordination between the EU’s support in non-formal education and other EU MS’s (including SE) interventions in this sub-sector. SE’s RBM TA was very well articulated to PEDP 2 and PEDP 3 interventions and, over time, was adjusted to respond to the changing aid modalities. The TA achieved a high degree of complementarity with SE’s support to PEDP 3 and more broadly with all DPs’ contributions: it served the objectives of the broader programme.

PSD:

The EU CSP 2007-2013 reflects a very close partnership in the previous period between the EC and DFID (joint design of the first trade sector programme (Private Sector Development Support Programme, PSDSP)). The action fiche of INSPIRED (EU) notes that “the programme will seek to work in different sectors and/or at different nodes of the value chains, in order to avoid duplication and where possible ensure complementarities with the work of SEDF and other SME initiatives, in particular through the selection of projects under the grant scheme”. Similarly, the action fiche of BEST (EU) notes that the programme “complements the rest of the EC TRTA portfolio which supports the development of a comprehensive trade policy, an improved investment climate and stronger SMEs as they serve to enhance the policy framework in which the programme should operate.” Throughout the period, there has been limited coordination, but arguably

also limited duplication.

Concerning ASPS II (DK), the project proposal notes (p.11): “coordination of development assistance rarely goes beyond information sharing. Initiatives of any importance to harmonise procedures of different donors and between donors and government are normally not on the agenda.”

CC:

EPs have not sufficiently exploited synergies between CDMP and PECM and sector support on mainstreaming. E.g CDMP did mainstreaming in education sector, which is a sector Sida supported. And both CDMP and Danida were engaged in mainstreaming in the agriculture sector. EPs could take advantage of the mainstreaming capacity/expertise of CDMP/PECM and they in turn could have used EP sector support as vessels for reaching the ground. EPs were not even aware that their HQs funded PECM. See I-714.

“A Value for Money Report for CDMP II, pg 15: Partnerships. CDMP II has had close working relationships with their donors and the government counterparts, as evidenced by project reviews and stakeholder feedback. In terms of collaborating more with other projects carrying out similar work, more could be done. This has been a common observation for the other UNDP projects as part of this review. There is room for more effective collaboration, and projects should explore more avenues of such collaboration. For example: on the cyclone shelters issue, CDMP II can engage better with BCCRF, UPPR, or international NGOs working in the similar field. Examples of such collaboration (and their costs and results) can be tracked and reported. Taking advantage of synergies will advance the value created by each project, and contribute to stronger VfM narratives. Many development partners are interested in this aspect of VfM, for example DFID have changed their Annual Review template recently, which features a specific question on the performance of partnerships of the project under review.”

HR &D:

The EU recognized in the 2007-2013 CSP that “according to the strategies of SIDA and DANIDA, which are at an earlier stage of preparation, there is scope to develop complementary programmes in the area of Governance and Human Rights.” “UNDP was a privileged partner for the implementation of programmes in the area of Governance and Human Rights”.

At the level of specific development interventions, co-ordination has been ad hoc, or not taking place. At the end of the period, the EU’s withdrawal from a specifically tailored approach to the CHT area coincided with DK and SE continued support for the current UNDP CHT intervention.

As to the other interventions examined in depth: SE and DK supported the National Human Rights Commission, while the EU did not; the EU supported the Electoral Commission project, while SE and DK did not; and all 3 contributed to the old PERP project. EPs collaborated with other DPs on other interventions. Civil society organisations have indicated a clear preference for the formation of donor consortia of development partners that provide them with core support. An example of such a consortium is the development partners supporting Transparency International Bangladesh. The formation of such consortia appears to be ad hoc, rather than systematic.

For PERP, the project final report (p.29) notes “the strong partnership between BEC and UNDP was crucial to the timely and effective implementation of the project. Under UNDP administration, international donors collaborated and coordinated closely throughout this project. The management embodied the spirit of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.”

3. Drafting of the JCS and restructuring of the LCG mechanisms to make aid more effective:

“The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) and fifteen donors signed a Statement of Intent to Develop a Joint Cooperation Strategy (JCS) in support of the national poverty strategy (Revised NSAPR II) in August 2008. The overall goal of a JCS is to make aid in Bangladesh more effective by creating common platforms for national and sector dialogues and a national owned change process for improving delivery of aid. Specifically it aims at:

- Reducing aid fragmentation and high transaction costs for all partners due to weak lead and coordination, including streamlining project approval processes;
- Improving national capacity for ownership of cooperation activities through improved human resource management;
- Strengthening donor alignment to national systems, which are felt by many partners to be lacking the necessary solidity to move towards more aid-effective modalities, such as budget support;
- Improving accountability for development results and enhancing predictability of aid flows;
- Agreeing on a common framework for expected development outcomes at national and sector levels for the coming years.”

Source : GoB, NSAPR II, 2009

EPs acknowledged this step forward towards increased coordination and harmonization:

- EU: “The Government has always been pro-active in leading and implementing the aid effectiveness agenda. A Joint Cooperation Strategy (JCS) was signed in 2010 by the Government and 18 development partners to implement the aid effectiveness principles. The Action Plan 2012-2014 identified specific milestones and action points to measure strengthening of Government aid management, enhancement of the use of country systems, rationalisation of sector support, improvement of results monitoring and institutionalisation of regular collective dialogue. Development policy dialogue between the Government and its partners takes place under the Local Consultative Group (LCG) and related thematic working groups. Alignment of donor-funded development interventions with country policies is relatively advanced, with a number of sector programmes and/or sector-wide trust funds in place (education, health, disaster risk reduction, climate change, public finance management reform) to support implementation of Government policies.”

Source: EU, Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2020

- SE: “The JCS is expected to achieve better harmonised and streamlined programmes supporting Bangladesh’s development plans and strategies by providing a common platform for inclusive partnership between all development actors, including civil society. The JCS will institutionalise a mechanism by which GoB and its DPs hold each other accountable for making

concrete and measurable progress towards greater AE, which in turn is expected have a greater impact on development results.”

Source: Sweden, Mid-term review of cooperation – 2010, p.4-5

EUAMR evidence efforts deployed for increased coordination and harmonization with the restructuring of the LCG and the drafting of the JCS:

- “Government and donors have intensified their work on strengthening aid effectiveness and better aligning aid delivery modalities with the Paris principles. The Delegation has been closely involved in the processes for restructuring the Local Consultative Group (the main donor coordination institution), in drafting of the Joint Cooperation Strategy, and accelerating implementation of division of labour among EU parties in the challenging context of the broader harmonisation efforts, where other important donor partners continue to view division of labour with a certain sense of contempt and distrust.
- “EU partners have started their work on a Division of Labour, although in 2009, due to the intense general aid management reform, the efforts mostly focussed on pushing for harmonisation and DoL in the context of the JCS with other donors.”

Source: EAMR 2009

- The EUD “increased the Delegation's profile in donor harmonisation by taking on leading roles in several important LCG working groups (Private Sector Development/ Trade related Technical Assistance (PSD/TRTA) and Health) and by being elected to the LCG Executive Committee. It actively collaborated in the reforms to improve aid effectiveness in Bangladesh; highlights of the year being the Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) in February and high level signature of Joint Cooperation Strategy in June. The Delegation was leading strategic discussion among EU and likeminded partners as well as with government and the LCG donors on how better division of labour and rationalisation of aid can be promoted.”
- “Through the implementation of the Action Plan attached to the Joint Cooperation Strategy (JCS), signed in June 2010, work is ongoing with all donors and government to come to more rational aid delivery and to achieve better development results in Bangladesh.”
- “The two milestone events (Bangladesh Development Forum in February and the signature of the Joint Cooperation Strategy in June 2010) gave great visibility to the improved coordination between government and DPs.

Source: EAMR 2010

4. Effectiveness of the LCG Working Groups

A. Overall

“The Government of Bangladesh (GOB) and development partners meet regularly to discuss development issues in Bangladesh through the Local Consultative Group (LCG) mechanisms. The basis for the discussions is the national strategy for poverty reduction and other sectoral strategies and policies. The LCG structure includes an annual high level Bangladesh Development Forum, GoB-DP LCG Plenary meetings plus around 20 LCG Working Groups in various sectors and priority areas. (..) GoB and partner have agreed to change the previous JCS Working Group into a new LCG Aid Effectiveness Working

Group (LCG AE WG) to support the implementation of the JCS Action Plan and other related aid effectiveness tasks. The main thrust of the JCS is to implement the Paris and Accra commitments in country over the coming years.”

Source: <http://www.lcgbangladesh.org/aewg.php?q=1&s=24>

In the early period, Denmark notes that division of DP in LCG was not conducive to donor harmonization:

- “Although all development partners participate together in the LCG partnership framework, the division of the development partners in these groupings does not facilitate donor harmonisation, and efforts should be made to integrate the different groups around a joint country strategy as the existing among the four ends in 2008.”

Source: Denmark Bangladesh Country programme review, 2007, p.8

EUAMR:

- “EUD actively collaborated in the reforms to improve aid effectiveness in Bangladesh, inter alia by participating in the joint development partner response to the 6th Five Year Plan (SFYP) in April and during the elaboration of a Development Results Framework that is now an integral part of the Government's 6th 5-year plan. EUD actively participated and played a leading role in donor coordination in Bangladesh: Delegation staff were Co- and Deputy Co-Chair respectively in the Local Consultative Group (LCG) Working Groups on Private Sector Development & Trade and Health, from June onwards LCG Co-Chair PFM Reforms under LCG Governance, member in the Steering Committee for CHTDF and voting member of the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund Governing Board.

Source: EAMR 2011

- Local Consultative Group (LCG): “The EU Delegation and MS are active at all level of LCG and discuss and prepare Plenary meetings and ExComm meetings. At working group (WG) level, the EU Delegation is chairing the Education WG and the Private sector development WG, UK is chairing the Aid Effectiveness WG, the Environment & Climate Change WG, and the Health Population and Nutrition, Netherlands is chairing the Water Resource Management WG. The Joint Cooperation Strategy Action Plan 2012-2014 was extensively discussed with EU MS. EU delegation proposed to champion harmonisation outcome 'Sector support rationalised' and to coordinate with Germany the milestone on 'Comprehensive, sector-wide capacity development strategy developed in at least 2 sectors' (Education for EU and Climate Change for Germany)”.

Source: EAMR 2012

Interviews held in Dhaka with a range of key representatives from the EU, DK, SE, NL, DFID, WB, UNDP, JICA, GIZ show that significant efforts have been invested in the early period to ensure donor coordination, which culminated in the signature in 2010 of the JCS and in the set-up of the LCG mechanisms. The importance of the harmonization agenda has since been declining.

- Context of non-aid dependant country where aid effectiveness has not been an agenda that drove GoB (cf. donor policy interference in GoB policy-making has not been welcome). Overall GoB has not pushed efforts in prioritizing national needs and in asking for donor assistance.
- JCS: peak of efforts in terms of alignment to national strategies and coordination. LCG mechanisms set-up: it constitute a forum for sharing view sand analysis and to move

the agenda in a more coordinated way (=value added in terms of information sharing for donors and for GoB) ; important to mobilise donors' funds after the 10th Parliamentary elections ; not functioning perfectly ; very uneven, with unequal commitment of the GoB according to the WG, and varied over time ; non-traditional donors have not taken part (issue for the future – need to broaden the LCG) ; joint results framework has been set-up but it was not tied to aid (and therefore not taken seriously by the GoB), and it has not been updated over the period. GoB has not taken a leading role in coordinating donors.

- Since the signature of the JCS, there has been progressively less commitments to joined approaches, and competition between DPs progressively shaped the donor landscape.

Sources: MN 005, 006, 007, 008, 010, 011, 012, 013, 019, 101.

On the GoB-DP joint monitoring framework:

The GoB notes in 2010 a “lack of common development results framework, with specific, measurable indicators, used by GoB and DPs.” Source: GoB, *Bangladesh Joint Cooperation Strategy*, page 3

The World Bank launched the process of development of a development results framework in 2010 (EU EAMR 2010).

Sweden notes in 2010 that the results framework is too complex to monitor progress:

- The PRSP has a results framework, which is too ambitious and contains too many indicators. Accordingly, there is not a sophisticated enough system in place to monitor progress against results. A 2006 review of the framework by the World Bank's aid effectiveness unit rated it as D (on a scale A-E). In the 2008 Paris survey it has progressed to C, but it is unlikely that the target of B will be achieved in the near future. Work is about to commence on a joint DP GoB development results framework, which together with a re-structured Local Consultative Group (LCG) structure will be a useful tool to monitor progress against objectives of the PRSP.”

Source: Sweden, Mid-term review of cooperation – 2010, p.4-5

B. At sector level

P. Education:

The Education Local Consultative Group has not been functional. It has met very irregularly. It has been chaired by the MoPME in contrast to the original idea of a co-chairing by the two ministries in charge of education. When it has met, PEDP 3 issues dominated discussions. It has therefore not played any sector coordination role in a sector characterized by a high degree of fragmentation (MN 205). It could have been the appropriate body to promote intra-sectoral coordination and to structure a higher-level policy dialogue, including with the Ministry of Finance and civil society.

The PEDP 3 policy dialogue structures and performance monitoring mechanisms took over. The performance monitoring framework has primarily been based on 9 Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs) selected from the 27 Key Performance Indicators (KPI) included in the PEDP3 document. During the design phase, the decision was taken to opt for output indicators rather than outcome indicators, mainly under the influence of the World Bank and CIDA, which considered that the country was not ready for a fully-

fledged outcome-based approach (MN 205). Sector performances have been jointly assessed twice a year, through a Joint Consultation Meeting held in November, and a Joint Annual Review Mission in May.

PEDP 3 donors select a chair for a one year mandate, supported by a deputy-chair, meant to become the next chair. In September 2014, Ausaid took over the chairmanship from the World Bank, and has been seconded by DFID. DPs' main interlocutors have been the Director General of the DPE (MoPME) for policy matters and the DPE programme division. During the third week of JARM, DPs meet with other government bodies such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education or the ministry in charge of public administration (MN 210).

PEDP 3 joint working groups (quality; disparity; administration, monitoring and evaluation; and finance and procurement) serve as on-going coordination mechanism on major management and implementation decisions. They are co-chaired by a government official and a DP representative. There has been limited involvement of other implementing agencies (NAPE, LGED and NCTB). DPs organise a form of division of labour and do not participate to all working groups. They are however all members of the Finance and Procurement working group. But the World Bank and ADB have set up a restricted group within the broader group, "which conducts the work that would have been done by a project management unit" (MN 210). The EU chaired the ELCG in 2013 but during that time the government only organized three meetings (MN 205). The EU has recently (end of 2014) started to co-chair the PEDP 3 disparity working group.

The LCG has been so far dysfunctional. The PEDP 3 policy dialogue structure has marked a step forward in terms of harmonization and coordination. The sharing of information among DPs has improved in comparison with PEDP 2. DPs take joint decisions about the fulfilment of DLIs. However, there is room to improve DPs' coordination: "DPs have different concerns" (MN 202). Besides, discussions within working groups and JARM have been overly driven by DPs' concerns over the treasury model and procurement issues that have crowded out more substantial discussions over policy reforms (MN 205, 206, 202, 204 and 207). "All conditionalities consumed dialogue" (MN 202).

PSD:

LCG has not been an issue for the interventions nor coordinated anything substantial. Coordination has taken place at intervention level, but then again only to a limited extent. The only partial exception is the sustainability compact where the Head of the LCG's PSD sub-group is part of the 3+5 Group, comprising of three Secretaries (Labour, Commerce and Foreign Affairs) and five Ambassadors (EU, US, Canada, the Netherlands as the chair of the PSD LCG subgroup). This group is charged with monitoring the Compact. However the LCG as such played a limited role. The INSPIRED ProDoc mentioned that the LCG had been consulted to ensure that project 'would be complementary with (or at least non-duplicative of) current and planned initiatives in SME development in Bangladesh.'⁴²

⁴² EU: INSPIRED Action Fiche, 2009

CC:

The LCG enabled information sharing only.

HR&D:

The LCG and particularly its Governance Working Group and related Task Teams (Justice and Human Rights, core labour standards, Public Administration Reform, Political Governance, PFM, Local Governance, Anti-Corruption, Land) have been the main coordination mechanisms between the Government and DPs. “These groups face challenges to meet regularly and go beyond exchange of information, therefore limiting the scope for meaningful policy dialogue. EU Member States coordinate actions and policy priorities in regular fora. In addition, numerous ad-hoc meetings and exchanges take place among relevant DPs and other partners (CSOs, think-tanks) on all issues covered by this MIP.”

Source: EU, Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2020

The political dialogue with the GoB takes place elsewhere: through contacts directly with the cabinet, and the parliament, which were more effective on confrontational issues. These contacts were often undertaken separately by each of the EPs, rather than jointly.

With regard to NGOs, an important development was the recent inclusion (June 2014) of NGOs in the Local Consultative group meetings. This was an EU initiative, and NGO participation was coordinated by Transparency International Bangladesh. “Upon EU's initiative, in March 2014 the GWG agreed to include CSO representatives as members of the GWC. CSOs were consulted in a meeting organised by the EU and other GWG DPs and asked to elect civil society representatives to the group. CSOs representatives first participated to the GWG meeting in July 2014, making valuable contributions on policy issues such as the Information, Communications and Technology Act (ICT Act) and the National Integrity Strategy (NIS). CSOs were also represented at the December GWG meeting where it was agreed to reflect their participation in the GWG ToRs and to involve them in the thematic task Teams. Procedural issues were also discussed so as to ensure better transparency and accountability of the system vis-a-vis the broader civil society. CSO participation at the GWG is considered an important step towards strengthening CSOs role in policy dialogue with GoB and DPs.”

Source: EAMR 2014

Gender:

The LCG Working Group on Women and Gender Equality enabled information sharing only. It was not viewed as effective, and government stopped attending because it was not seen as a decision making forum. The EU GAP committed the EU to strengthening its lead role in promoting GEEW, including through appointing a lead donor – a role taken on by Sida. Overall, the EU was not perceived as leading on GEEW, neither through the Local Consultative Group Working Group on Women's Advancement in Gender (LCGWAGE) nor in other fora.

5. Collaboration with UN and the WB:

- “Interaction with the WB, the second largest donor with a total commitment level of US\$ 2 billion has occurred across most fields, notably through the WB’s coordination of the donor consortium in support to the first Health Sector Programme HPSP and, in 2005-6 as lead donor in support of decentralisation, through the Local Governance Support Programme. The issuing of the WB’s new CAS in 2006 with a strong emphasis on governance underpinning development provides a good basis for further close collaboration under the 2007-13 CSP.”

Sources: EU CSP 2007-2013 p. 36-37

- “Twice yearly coordination and portfolio (9 joint programmes) review meetings between the Delegation and UNDP, provide an additional mechanism to discuss project issues and establish a more policy oriented dialogue. (..) In the economic and trade sector, cooperation worked well with UNIDO. UNIDO regularly discussed different project-related issues with the Delegation. However, it appeared that at times overly centralized management structure of UNIDO became a hindering factor for the smooth implementation of activities.”

Source: EU EAMR 2011

- “Regular consultations with UN agencies and WB took place to discuss common approaches, and harmonise development objectives as well as sector priorities. There is a smooth and effective collaboration between EU and UN at the LCG DP Plenary and working group levels. Strategic dialogue with most IOs on global themes and national development policies is continuous. Policy support is often covered within EU funded programmes where IO experts’ team actively participate in the dialogue, therefore indirectly representing EU’s views in the discussions. Dialogue is also enhanced during the design of specific interventions (gaining value when it includes other DPs in particular Member States).”

Source: EU EAMR 2014

6. Degree of leadership of GoB in coordinating external assistance:

Denmark documents the that the GoB has not taken the lead in coordinating donors.

- “The Government of Bangladesh has so far not assumed a leading role in coordination of the external assistance. Coordination of external funding mainly takes place through the Local Consultative Group (LCG) coordinated by the World Bank, with participation of both bilateral and multilateral donors. Representatives of the Government participate on an ad-hoc basis in thematic discussions. The national cooperating partners are in many cases not sufficiently equipped to prepare, negotiate and implement projects. As a result of this, there are still certain areas of support in which interventions are relatively donor-driven and where the point of departure is donor development priorities. However, there is a growing understanding within the Government of the need to enhance the national institutional capacity with the aim of taking a lead in coordination of external assistance, and thereby strengthening the sense of national ownership and responsibility. The publication of the PRSP, which has been well received by multilateral agencies and bilateral donors, has provided a new framework for collaboration.”

Source: Denmark Strategy 2005-2009

- “The conditions for taking the aid effectiveness agenda forward in Bangladesh are difficult: although in principle committed to the agenda, the Government does not in practice take the lead in donor coordination and harmonisation, and the development partners themselves are configured in two groupings, one comprising the four biggest and the other the rest. An organisational framework for the aid partnership around the poverty reduction strategy (PRS) is not yet fully in place.
 - Both harmonisation and in particular alignment is hampered by the character and quality of the public sector, which is highly centralised, very bureaucratic, and focused on compliance with rules and on resources spent rather than on results to be achieved. Many civil servants are insufficiently qualified, and they are lowly paid. Human resource management in the civil service is poor, and civil service reform has never materialised. In spite of certain results of public financial management (PFM) reform, the quality of PFM is generally poor, with a low level of accountability. Corruption is widespread. Bangladesh however now has a legal framework for procurement that lives up to international standards.”
- Source: Denmark, Country programme review, 2007, p.5

7. Division of labour:

All three EPs note in their strategy documents that division of labour among the development partners has progressed slowly due to weak national leadership and reluctance among some DPs to take the concept of division of labour forward.

The EU notes in 2008 that “work on Division of Labour, to which EC and EU MSS have committed themselves by signing up to the EU Code of Conduct for Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy will now need to be intensified in order to produce tangible results. EU partners have begun to informally explore possibilities for better DoL in the health and education sectors.” (Source: EAMR 2008). In addition, Bangladesh is one of the pilot countries for EU fast-tracking of Division of Labour (DoL) (Source: Mid-Term Review CSP 2011-2013)

Sweden notes in 2010 limited progress on division of labour and no leading role of GoB in coordinating external assistance:

- “Progress on Division of labour (DoL) has been limited and there is a clear lack of interest among the larger DPs (both multi- and bilateral). There is a lack of incentives among the GoB to lead a DoL process, which seems to be crucial for the process to commence. The EU+ group has initiated some internal work but progress has so far been limited. However, the EU delegation and the Netherlands have a clear mandate to lead the process, and there are strong incentives from some HQs for results.
- “A reason for the lack of interest from GoB could be the low aid dependency. Total ODA is only 2% of GDP, and even though the share is approximately 10% of the GoB budget the lack of interest is striking.”

Source: Sweden, Mid-term review of cooperation – 2010, p.4-5

Denmark notes in 2013: “division of labour among the development partners is progressing slowly due to weak national leadership and reluctance among some

development partners to take the concept of division of labour forward.”

Source: Denmark Strategy 2013-2017, p.8-10

Interview findings show that division of labour has globally not well advanced, with no overall strong willingness to move this agenda forward:

- Accra/Busan requirements to reduce aid fragmentation and the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour (2007), which recommend to focus on 3 sectors maximum, has had limited effects on division of labour so far:
 - DFID: not interested by division of labour if this implies that they will have to focus on max 3 sectors.
 - EU: reduction of the focal sectors down to 3 sectors with the CSP 2007-2013 but focal sectors remained very wide (hereby encompassing several sectors such “good governance and human rights” including both PFM issues and human rights, and “human and social development” including both health and education) and the EU remained de facto active in a wide range of sectors with its thematic budget lines
- No clear/agreed view between partners on each DP comparative advantage. Still, in the area of trade and democratic governance, DPs recognised that the EU had an added value, with the EU pushing and taking a harder line than the bilaterals.
- Donors are in favour of division of labour as long as it does not conflict with their national interests

Sources: MN 005, 006, 007, 008, 010, 011, 012, 013, 019, 101.

JC2.2 Degree of coherence of the response provided by EPs to key developmental and political challenges

| JC2.2: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|--|------------------------|
| Close match between EPs strategies to respond to key Bangladeshi challenges | EPs strategy level documents Interviews | More than satisfactory |
| EU partners took common views and positions on political and development issues | EPs strategy level documents EU EAMR Interviews | More than satisfactory |
| EU joint programming efforts (since 2013) strengthened the frame for EU coordination and led to a stronger EU position within the donor community | EU documents on Joint Programming EPs strategy level documents EU EAMR Interviews | Strong |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|--|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Degree of common interplay between the strategy responses of each EP (e.g. development policy objectives pursued and retained focal areas) to respond to key Bangladeshi | data fully available |

| | |
|---|----------------------|
| development and political challenges | |
| ▪ EPs spoke with one voice to respond to key Bangladeshi development and political challenges | data fully available |
| ▪ Effects of the work of the EU+ group launched in 2013 | data fully available |

1. Involvement of EP per area over the period:

Human and social development (DK,EU&SE)

- Primary education (EU&SE)
- Health (EU&SE)
- Water and Sanitation (DK)

Governance and Human rights (DK,EU&S)

- HR CSOs and institutions (All)
- PFM (EU&DK)
- Political process (EU&SE)

Trade and private sector development (EU)

Food security (EU) and Agriculture (DK)

Environment, climate change and disaster management (All)

Source: Reconstructed intervention logic for the three EPs (ADE, Inception report of the CLE Bangladesh)

This shows that all three partners active in HR CSOs and institutions and environment & climate change. EU and Sweden both active in several sectors: primary education, health & political processes.

Table 3 - Focal areas and objectives pursued by each EP

| | EU | Denmark | Sweden |
|--|---|--|---|
| Focal areas | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Human and social development sector - Good governance and human rights - Economic and trade development | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Agriculture (including rural roads); - Water supply and sanitation; - Human rights and good governance - Climate change | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Primary education - Health care - Women's rights and democratic governance - Urban environment - Others (e.g. climate change) |
| Overall development policy objectives | Poverty reduction through rapid economic growth, greater inclusion of the poor and increased employment generation, within a | Poverty reduction through promotion of pro-poor economic growth and strengthened democratic development, including improvement in governance, respect for human rights, | Right to education, health, and a clean and healthy environment is fulfilled for women, men, girls and boys living in poverty |

| | | | |
|----------------------------|---|---|----|
| | framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights | rights of minorities, and improved gender equality | |
| Geographic coverage | NA | Nation-wide and focus on selected districts in the coastal belt of southern Bangladesh (especially Lakshmipur, Feni, Noakhali, Patuakhali and Barguna) and in the CHT depending on developments | NA |

Sources: EU CSP 2007-2013, Denmark Strategy 2005-2009, Swedish Development Strategy 2008-2012

The EU committed itself to mainstream into all priority areas gender, rural development, food security, environment and good governance.

Source: EU CSP 2007-2013, p.2

Swedish and Danish strategies both have a strong focus on human rights, poor people and on women/girls.

2. Extent to which EPs aimed at having / have had a coordinated approach to respond to Bangladeshi development challenges

DK specifically committed to have a coordinated EU response.

- “The EC strategy must be seen as part of a broad donor landscape where donors will contribute with diverse expertise and resources to a balanced aid package to Bangladesh.” Source: CSP 2007-2013
- DK notes “The EU is an important partner for Denmark in Bangladesh, and the Danish policy priorities and instruments are closely coordinated with those of the EU. Denmark will continue to actively engage in the process of formulating the EU’s policies towards Bangladesh, which takes place in a close interplay between the EU delegation and EU missions in Dhaka, EU capitals and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in Brussels. Whenever possible, Denmark will work for a coordinated EU position in order to maximise the influence and the outcome of the EU’s efforts in Bangladesh. A fully fledged EU delegation has resulted in closer coordination among EU missions and made the EU more visible in Bangladesh.” Source: Denmark Strategy 2013-2017, p.9
- “The focus of the Commission closely matches that of Sweden and there is scope to increase the dialogue and coordination of development assistance in the fields of primary education and human rights.” Source: Swedish Development Strategy 2008-2012, p.6-14-15:

Primary education:

There has been no specific coordination between the EU and SE, within the broader PEDP 3 coordination mechanisms. There has been no effort to build up alliances between the EPs, and more broadly between EU MS, to promote common positions within the PEDP 3 policy dialogue that has been overly determined by the two development banks (MN 206).

PSD:

DK mentioned in its ProDoc that it would support donor harmonization at a national level and at regional level, but in reality there was limited coordination, nor any overlap. EU had the intention that the INSPIRED project would provide the 'basis for providing direct budgetary support in the future' to the SME sector.⁴³ This has clearly not materialized so far and it is extremely unlikely to be achieved by the project.

CC:

Through BCCRF and CDMP, EU and SE aimed at a coordinated approach. Danida was not that active in the sector. BCCRF MTR found: *"major donors were all aware of each other's' activities and where overlaps in project documents may be perceived GOB and the DPs were ready to focus efforts through the team judged to have comparative advantage in the specific area."*

Gender

EPs have not aimed at having a coordinated approach. The EU Delegation has not shown any leadership in that respect.

3. Extent to which EPs spoke with one voice:

A. Overall:

- Regular formal dialogue took place within the framework of the monthly EU+ Development Counsellor meetings, which issued several joint responses at Ambassador level on development related issues:

- "In 2009 the Delegation has reinforced its leading role among the EU development counsellors group, which was enlarged in 2009 with like-minded countries Switzerland and Norway. Almost always initiated and coordinated by the Delegation in the development counsellors group, the EU+ group has issued several joint responses at Ambassador level on development related issues, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy, changes to the Procurement Act, and the Bangladesh Development Forum, and taken joint positions on aid effectiveness related matters vis-à-vis GoB and other DPs." (..) "In order to play a visible and leading role in this process in view of EC and EU commitments to the implementation of the Paris/Accra agendas, the Delegation decided in 2009 to allocate more substantial resources to this exercise. One contract agent has been employed since August 2009 to support the OS in coordination and issues related to aid effectiveness."
- Source: EAMR 2009
- "The Delegation's Head of Cooperation was elected by the EU-Norway-Switzerland constituency to represent them in the ExComm (the 7 member management committee representing the Local Consultative Group donors in relations with Government) as of July 2010. In December the Delegation submitted a first draft for a Concept Note on Division of Labour in Bangladesh to government.
- Source: EAMR 2010

⁴³ Ibid.

- “Time was spent to foster EU coordination regularly, tangible outputs being a number of joint HOMs reports, management and secretariat for EU+ Development Group. In 2011 drafting of a Blue Book on EU (COM + MS) relation with Bangladesh began.”
 - Source: EAMR 2011
 - “Consultations on Foreign Donations Act (FDA): between July and December 2014, several meetings were held with representatives of a coalition of 15 CSOs that is actively advocating for the revision of the draft FDA. Coordination involved the DPs at the level of EU+ group, Governance WG/FDA Task Force and LCG DP plenary. The EUD played a leading role in promoting a coordinated DP/CSO position and in carrying out a broad advocacy campaign on Cabinet Division, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Standing Committee. Through separate but synergic advocacy actions, DPs and CSOs have managed to engage high levels of government in some systematic dialogue on the Foreign Donations Act (FDA), strengthening their own voice as stakeholders and paving the way for further engagement on this matter in the next future. It is too early to appreciate impact of such advocacy actions on the finalisation of the FDA by the authorities.”
- Source: EAMR 2014

B. Sector level:

Primary education:

Both the EU and Sweden have had complementary contributions to the policy dialogue; they have developed a form of division of labour when they participate to PEDP 3 working groups (MN 205, 206 and 220). Their contribution has been valued by other partners. However, EPs’ voices within the policy dialogue need to be assessed in a context where, under PEDP 3, ‘donors speak on voice, but it’s mainly the banks’ voice’ (MN 206). The two banks ‘run the show’ (MN 219) and there is room for more diversity among donors to forge coordinated positions that do not only reflect the two banks’ prevailing approach.

PSD:

In general not much, with the partial exception of the sustainability compact which all EPs support. However, EU has been driving the process with DK being mostly engaged in bilateral activities, there has been limited scope for harmonizing viewpoints.

CC:

EPs have spoken with one voice. They’ve been completely harmonised in relation to CDMP, BCCRF – using each other as representatives, due to capacity constraints. They also shared the same views and backed up each other. DfID, EU and Sida were very active in dialogue, Danida less so (it gave little money to BCCRF and Embassy staff was constrained) but has fully supported the positions of the other EPs and DfID. See I-721.

In HR&D:

The EPs spoke with one voice, e.g. there is no evidence of dissent among the EPs on public statements made by one of them in the HR&D sector. Public statements are very often joint statements. There is also no evidence of substantive disagreements on approaches to the GoB in the HR&D sector.

Gender:

EPs have not spoken with one voice.

4. Degree of coherence reached through EU joint programming

A. Overall:

“Since 2006, the EU and its member states have repeatedly expressed commitment to move forward on joint programming as also reflected in the new EU development policy: *Agenda for Change*. In the council conclusions for the Busan High Level Forum in November 2011, the EU agreed on the scope and principles of EU Joint Programming. The agreed principles greatly reflect Danish and other like-minded donors’ priorities: Joint programming should be led by local coordination mechanisms and promote the alignment to national systems and procedures, it should be kept simple and pragmatic, and it should include all relevant donors’ position on joint programming. In response to the Busan council conclusions, a joint programming assessment was launched in January 2012 by the European Commission/European External Action Services.”

Source: Project description: The Danish Approach to EU Joint Programming. Nov 2012

In February 2013, the European development partners present in Bangladesh – namely the Delegation of the European Union, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland – agreed to engage (on a voluntary basis) in preparing a joint programming to “make better use of the EU+ cumulative analytic, representative and programming resources therefore raising visibility and coherence of the EU+ and its core values and at the same time improving EU+ leverage and impact.” As a prerequisite, it was agreed in an EU+ roadmap to undertake joint diagnostic analyses so as “to have a shared understanding of the political, economic and social processes which drive or block changes in Bangladesh, plus of the dynamics of change in Bangladesh (interests and incentives)”. Joint studies were launched in 2013 and provided analysis for a scenario planning and risk assessment (Country Gender Profile, Political Economy Analysis, Country Environmental Profile and Civil Society Mapping). On the basis of these analyses, the EU+ group agreed on *a shared vision of development challenges, opportunities and priorities in Bangladesh* for their future cooperation with the country, as a first step towards joint programming, in line with the Busan commitment of reducing aid fragmentation. Shared Vision (endorsed by HoMs in May 2014 and communicated to the Economic Relations Division) is focused on poverty reduction and the respect of human rights. Its priorities encompass a wide range of areas: economic development, democratic governance, gender equality, environmental sustainability, resilience to natural disasters and climate change.

In April 2014, EU+ Development Counsellors decided to focus on quality dialogue at sector level and coordinated common views and positions in preparation of the 7th FYP discussions. Sectors were selected according to EU+ group involvement in LCG, human resource capacity and scope for enhanced dialogue in the framework of 7FYP. EU facilitators were identified to coordinate EU common positions and messages (Denmark for agriculture, EU for Human Rights, civil society, nutrition, environment and climate change, resilience, France/UK for urban development, Germany for energy, Netherlands for water, UK for PFM and poverty, Sweden for gender, Switzerland for skills

development). HoMs endorsed sectors' priorities and messages in December 2014. On this basis an Interim Joint Programming document was drafted.

Sources: EU+ Roadmap for developing a joint analysis and response, 2013, EU, Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2014-2020 ; Bangladesh EU+, Joint Programming, Interim document, 2014, EU+, Shared Vision, 2014 ; EAMR 2013 ; EAMR 2014.

- “Joint programming has been extensively discussed. A joint assessment made by EU Heads of Cooperation and Heads of Mission was shared with HQ in February 2012. Following the note sent by EEAS/DEVCO in September 2012 on the subject, it was re-discussed with EU Heads of Cooperation. Joint programming challenges are related to (i) difficulties for most EU Member States to align to GoB cycles and between EU donors due to changing political priorities and schedules, (ii) differences in the substance and methods used by different MS for carrying out country analyses, (iii) different instructions sent from capitals to their in-country representatives. However, while no formal harmonisation of programming processes is in place, alignment to GoB strategic plans has been done by all MS and an informal Division of Labour does exist. Furthermore, EU Member States (MS) all signed up to the Joint Cooperation Strategy. This already ensures a good level of coherence, coordination and complementarity among EU donors. The EU delegation is proposing to move towards joint programming in a gradual way and envisage alignment from 2015 onwards, if feasible, based on substance rather than harmonisation of cycles. This would allow the EU to align with the 7th GoB Five year Plan, including MS that would be willing to share a joint analysis and response. Meanwhile, further discussions will be held with MS on their analysis of the main issues faced by Bangladesh with a view to identifying our differences and harmonising our approaches.”
Source: EAMR 2012
- “Based on the PEA's preliminary findings, the EU+ Development Counsellors held a scenario planning workshop. The objective of the workshop was to reach a common understanding of the development related implications of an improving or deteriorating political, social and economic environment for development cooperation programming in Bangladesh. The main conclusions highlighted the need to develop new dialogue and partnership opportunities through alliances or platforms with emerging partners like youth, private sector including SMEs, new generation of civil servants and civil society leaders, including religious ones. Furthermore, it was decided to build on existing and/or develop new initiatives for more resilient programmes/aid modalities combining different types of actors and interventions like the Ready Made Garment example where development aid can be mutually supportive with trade/labour policy reforms/diplomacy, and complement private sector development.”
Source: EAMR 2013
- “The Country Environmental Profile was finalised and findings used to prepare a Joint Strategy on Environment and Climate Change. Common messages and priorities for key sectors were endorsed by HoMs and will be used for the 7th Five Year Plan (7FYP) discussions. EUD chaired the monthly EU+ Development Counsellors meetings.”
Source: EAMR 2014

Interviews held in Dhaka with a range of key representatives from the EU, DK, SE, NL, DFID, WB, UNDP, JICA, GIZ show that at EU joint programming efforts, which started in 2013, gave a frame for coordination and offered the EU a stronger position within the donor community.

- EU MS and EUD embarked in joint programming in 2013: realisation of a mapping exercise (who's doing what?) and elaboration of common messages for the different sectors on a high/general level. This gives EU MS a framework for coordination.
- There has been a common EU line on political issues (e.g. elections)
- EU joint programming feeds into the LCG mechanisms. Efforts from EU MS to speak with once voice: EU positions were agreed within the framework of the monthly EU Development Counsellor meeting. This enabled the EU to give a coherent response in the LCG DP meeting. This gave to all EU MS a stronger view/position within the donor community. There is a recognition that working as a EU grouping makes sense when EU MS have positions to take vis-à-vis other important donors (e.g. WB) (MN 009).
- Caveat on DFID. DFID has been a major player in Bangladesh. DFID was not systematically harmonized/aligned, in terms of positions, with EU positions. In several instances, DFID decided to speak on its own and in some instances it communicated the EU line on behalf of EU MS (instead of letting the EUD do so).

Sources: MN 005, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 011, 012, 013, 019, 101.

B. Sector level:

Primary education:

DPs' interventions in education have, so far, suffered from a silo vision of education, which has neglected critical issues related to intra-sector inter-dependences. The EU joint programming exercise in education does not seem to acknowledge the importance of viewing any division of labour as firmly anchored to a sector-wide understanding of education. EU MS may run the risk of consolidating the prevailing sector fragmentation further.

PSD:

Limited relevance and does not seem to have driven much. However EU is exiting the trade sector partly as a consequence of DoL. DK does not seem to have invested any substantial resources in the process, but rather taken a token approach of passive participation.

CC:

Some [DPs] see the LCGs playing a coordinating role⁴⁴, other do not see the LCGs playing such a role⁴⁵, and interestingly some find the DPs are very well coordinated (MN 318), while others have the opposite opinion, and find both policy dialogue and donor actions on climate change scattered, e.g. due to limited leadership provided by GoB⁴⁶.

⁴⁴ MN 304, MN 305

⁴⁵ MN 302, MN 318

⁴⁶ MN 303, MN 305, MN 310

The EPs supported the same sector/programmes – they were well coordinated in relation to BCCRF and CDMP, selecting DfID and also EU as lead. Danida selected Sida and later the Swiss to represent DK in BCCRF. (See I-721). No issues of non-coherence between the three EPs were found.

HR & D:

No evidence collected during the visit on this issue. The EU’s current role of “designated coordinator” on both “human rights” and “civil society organisations” within the framework of EU+ joint programming offers a good opportunity for ensuring coherence particularly on confrontational HR&D issues.

Gender:

There was very limited leadership shown by the EU Delegation and no real discussion of division of labour. GAP reporting could have been one way to foster this discussion but it was ineffective.

JC2.3 Degree of coherence between EU global policies (incl. trade) and EU development policy in Bangladesh

| JC2.3: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|--|------------------------|
| The EU has monitored the potential implications of EU global policies on its development assistance to Bangladesh | EU strategy level documents Interviews | Strong |
| Overall, EU trade/human rights policies and EU development policies showed strong coherence in Bangladesh | EU strategy level documents EU project level documents (BEST programme) Interviews | More than satisfactory |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|---|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Explicit reference in EU development cooperation strategy-level and programming documents to potential interactions and conflicts with other EU policies (e.g. trade, migration and political issues) | Data fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Degree of interplay between EU trade and migration policies related interventions and EU development policy related ones | Data partly available |

The EU CSP refers to the 2005 EU Communication on policy coherence for development: “the Commission has identified the following priority areas with high potential of attaining synergies with development policy objectives: trade; environment; security; agriculture and fisheries; social dimension of globalisation, employment and decent work; migration; research and innovation; information society; transport and energy. (..) The Communication further calls on non-development policies to respect development policy objectives and on development cooperation to also contribute, where possible, to reaching the objectives of other EU policies.” It also refers to the 2005 European Consensus on

Development, “which provides, for the first time, a common vision that guides the action of the EU, both at its Member States and Community levels, in development cooperation”.
Source: EU CSP 2007-2013

Annex 5 of the CSP Mid Term Review presents an assessment of policy coherence for development. It stresses: “some of the twelve policy areas included in the GAERC Conclusions, such as trade, environment and climate change, have a considerable impact on EU-Bangladesh relations. The interaction of the different EU policies is closely followed by Member States represented in Dhaka and the EU Delegation meet regularly in different formations (development counsellors, trade counsellors, human rights task force, climate change task force –recently created) to monitor ongoing developments in Bangladesh and their impact on EU policy-making.”

Trade:

“The EU is Bangladesh’s main trade partner. Bangladesh’s total exports to the EU amounted to some € 6 billion (0.4% of total EU imports) in 2008. Bangladesh benefits from the most preferential trade arrangement granted unilaterally by the EU to 50 LDCs (the Everything but Arms scheme - EBA), which is an integral part of the EU’s Generalised System of Tariff Preferences (GSP). Under the EBA, Bangladesh enjoys duty and quota-free access to the EU market for all their products except arms and armaments. Bangladesh exports to the EU are concentrated in a few sectors: textiles and textile articles (86 %) and live agricultural products (3.9 %).

The EBA scheme has substantially contributed to the increase of exports from Bangladesh. In 2007, Bangladesh ranked 4th amongst the users of the EU’s GSP (6.2% of the total EU preferential imports). Preferential imports from Bangladesh have risen from about € 2,048 million in 2003 to € 3,559 million in 2007. The global utilisation rate in the same period has varied from 58 % to 71 %.

The EU’s trade assistance programme, which aims to support the integration of Bangladesh in the world’s trading system, is the EU’s largest of its kind. The programme’s specific objective is to increase trade and economic growth in Bangladesh through an improved trade regulatory framework (including inter alia trade policy making, quality standards and intellectual property rights), an increased SME competitiveness and export diversification.”

Migration:

“Increasingly, migration is recognised as a livelihood option and a major development issue. Remittances sent by migrants through official channels reached a record high level of USD 8 billion in 2008. The Bangladeshi migrant population amounts to 5 million people in over 100 countries. Most migration flows from Bangladesh are to Gulf countries and South East Asian emerging economies (i.e. Malaysia, Singapore) for short-term employment. Migration from Bangladesh to European countries is mostly limited to a relatively small number of skilled and semi-skilled workers.

Bangladesh has benefitted from thematic programmes in the area of migration. These programmes have aimed at the protection of migrants’ rights, in particular from trafficking and exploitation, fostering the links between migration and development, and promoting well managed labour migration.”

Source: Annex 5 of the CSP Mid Term Review

“Trade policy dialogue: the EU Delegation organised a dialogue with stakeholders on trade and development issues with the partnership of the Centre for Policy Dialogue in April. In October, the EU Delegation actively contributed to the policy discussion held in Geneva under WTO Trade Policy Review (TPR) for Bangladesh. The discussion with the stakeholders in April and TPR meeting provided opportunities to communicate EU's perspectives on the overall trade and industrial policy of Bangladesh.”

Source: EAMR 2012

Interviews held in Dhaka with key representatives from the EU, NL and the WB indicate that EU trade/human rights and development policies globally showed a strong coherence.

On trade:

- The Sustainability Compact (signed by the GoB, the EU and ILO) illustrates strong coherence between EU Trade/Development policies. The EU used its leverage: it succeeded to obtain GoB commitments to upgrade the working conditions for the textile industry. The major drivers for the improvements on labour standards lied in the market access and in the advisory services/projects funded by donors. However some stakeholders pointed out that the EU could have leveraged its substantial trade with Bangladesh into more binding commitments on behalf of GoB on e.g. workers' safety and rights in the wake of Rana Plaza. Hence, the sustainability compact was seen as “a good step forward but not sufficiently binding, and efforts may fizzle out over time”.
- Regular exchanges between the EUD trade section and EU staff dealing with trade assistance programmes ensured full consistency of the portfolio
- Caveat on BEST programme: limited analytical efforts have been devoted at design stage to environmental and socio-economic impacts (e.g. income distributional changes due to increased trade) in the support to the shrimp industry.

On human rights:

- There has been a close link between the EU political actions and the EU development aid. All Heads of Mission agreed on a Human Rights (HR) Country Strategy for Bangladesh (2011). This gave a mandatory obligation for EU MS to work together (note: this obligation does not exist in other areas). As a result, the EU aid portfolio has been fully aligned to the HR Country Strategy. However, stakeholders pointed out that this “strategy is very wide, lacks prioritisation and is more a shopping list”.

Sources: MN 005, 010, 021, 023, 102, 103

3. Detailed facts and findings on aid modalities

3.1 Overall context

The choice of modalities used by the EPs has received increasing attention during the evaluation period. The three high-level forums, in Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011) have been especially instrumental in entrenching the principle of using country systems as the first option for aid programmes in support of activities managed by the public sector.

The three EPs have been strong backers of all three statements and this has had ramifications in the way development cooperation support has been granted. A key part of operationalising the commitments made in Paris, Accra and Busan has been to focus on the aid modalities by which EPs support its partner. In particular, EPs have aimed to harmonise and align their assistance as much as possible with domestic procedures and systems. This is also reflected in the key aid strategies of EPs and in their operational guidelines on technical cooperation (e.g. the EU's Backbone Strategy and Danida's Aid Management Guidelines). In Bangladesh, aid modalities have varied from discreet projects to pool funding programmes and sector-wide approaches (SWAPs), and the EU has also provided budget support to the primary education sub-sector.

The choice of aid modalities allows for different interactions between EPs and their Bangladeshi partners. Thus, one of the supposed benefits of sector budget support to GoB is that it can create an entry point into policy dialogue and reduce transaction cost. For stakeholders outside the government such as CSOs, private sector representatives, trade associations and labour unions, other modalities may be more appropriate.

To a certain extent, the choice of aid modalities may also be influenced by the quality and quantity of the capacities available inside the EPs: e.g. managing numerous smaller size projects may require different (and probably more) capacity than focusing on larger scale budget-support types of interventions. With substantial decentralisation/deconcentration of responsibilities to Dhaka-based representations, the capacity of the EPs has also become a central issue on its own. Not least in a challenging Bangladeshi context with often abrupt changes and unforeseen obstacles due to e.g. the political instability or fiduciary challenges. It is thus important that the capacities are sufficient to support the choice of aid modalities both qualitatively (e.g. engaging in policy dialogue and project management) as well as quantitatively (e.g. that there is sufficient staff to managed the portfolio).

3.2 Aid modalities used by EPs

European Union:

Over the evaluation period, the EU has mainly used action grants (36 % of contracted amounts) and joint management with IOs (33% of the contracted amounts). Budget support represented 8% of contracted amounts: it relates to the budget support to Third

Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP 3) Government of Bangladesh (€85m with top-up).⁴⁷

Throughout the period, the EU extensively used indirect management⁴⁸, where the EU entrusts budget implementation to the partner country/IOs/ EU MS/other bodies. It has significantly used joint management with IOs (see table below).

Table 1 - Management modes used by the EU⁴⁹

| EU portfolio | 2009 | 2010 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|------|----------------|----------------|
| Direct management | N/A | N/A | 28% | 45% (€229m) | 34% (€284m) |
| Indirect management | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 65% (€529m) |
| - partially decentralised with GoB | N/A | N/A | N/A | 12% (€60m) | 11% (€90m) |
| - with IOs | €39m (46,40% of total funds) | €83.8m (68.9% of total funds) | 39% | 42% (€216m) | 52% (€426m) |

Source: EU, EAMR for the period 2007-2014

Concerning channelling through IOs, the EU has used the United Nations substantially. Almost 30 such contracts during the years 2007-2014 have been identified, for more than 200M€, with ten contracts having a value higher than 10M€.

The EU faced difficulty to increase the use indirect management with the GoB. “Capacity, fiduciary and other constraints make that the centralised management mode continues to be indispensable in the cooperation in several sectors for a considerable time to come” (EAMR 20011). The EUD could not “increase the degree of decentralisation despite Busan commitments due to difficulties experienced in the programmes, but also considering the low level of accountability of the new Government” (EAMR 2013). “Programme implementation under indirect management with the government is still cumbersome despite EUD accompanying measures to assist the government in performing. In 2014, the delegation had to face 2 sensitive cases of mismanagement and misuse of funds in programmes estimates. For MIP 2014-2020, there is limited scope for a substantial increase of indirect management with the government. Operational and financial monitoring by delegation should be enhanced. At the same time, programmes should give stronger focus on capacity building of the government including through TA component” (EAMR 2014).

Overall, the degree of decentralisation in Bangladesh remained minimal throughout the period: in most of the decentralised programmes, the EU Delegation endorsed the contracts and managed the funds, and the actions were implemented by technical assistance, international organisations or NGOs.

Denmark:

⁴⁷ Source: ADE, Inception report of the Joint Country Evaluation, Bangladesh, on the basis of data from the EUD.

⁴⁸ Note: before 2014, indirect management was referred to as decentralised management

⁴⁹ Information is not consistently available throughout the period.

Over the period, three core sector programmes (agriculture, water and sanitation, and human rights and good governance) have dominated Danish disbursements in the country. Decentralised management with TA ensuring safeguards has been the preferred aid modality.

Sweden:

Health and education have been the core areas of the Swedish development assistance. Over the period, a Swedish representative noted that around 70% of the Swedish portfolio has been channeled through IOs (UN, WB and ADB). Sweden relied on the government and on NGOs for most of the remainder. In addition, a Swedish representative noted that “the portfolio has been overall unbalanced regarding aid modalities used and very stable over time” (MN 008).

Overall view for selected interventions:

For selected interventions (see table below), EPs used a mix of aid modalities: project approach through the GoB or directly through NGOs ; channelling through IOs (through the UNDP for the support to Human rights and democratic governance and through the WB for the support to Climate change) ; Treasury model (SE) and SBS (EU) for the support to primary education.

Table 2 - Aid modalities used for selected interventions

| EP | Project title | Aid modality | Implementing partner |
|--|--|--|---|
| Human rights and democratic governance | | | |
| DK & SE | Conflict Prevention, Recovery and Peace-building in Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh | Channelling through UNDP (BCPR Trust Fund) | Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility (CHTDF) UNDP |
| EU | Supporting Local Development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts | Channelling through UNDP | |
| DK, SE | NHRC | Channelling through UNDP | NHRC |
| EU, DK, SE | Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs (PERP) | Channelling through UNDP ⁵⁰ | Bangladesh Election Commission |
| Climate change and disaster management | | | |
| DK | BCCRF | Multi-Donor Trust Fund ⁵¹ | World Bank |
| EU | BCCRF | Sector Policy Support Programme Pool fund – Joint management with the World Bank | |
| PSD | | | |
| DK | ASPS II | Project approach | Management units hosted by M. of Agriculture, M. of Fisheries and Livestock, and M. of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives |

⁵⁰ Nine international DPs (Denmark, EU, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and UNDP) contributed

⁵¹ Four main DPs (UK, Denmark, Sweden & EU + Switzerland) contributed to this Trust Fund

| | | | |
|----|---|--|--|
| EU | INSPIRED | Project approach – Partly decentralised management (with ex ante approval by the EC) | Ministry of Industries and Bank of Bangladesh |
| EU | BEST | Project approach - centralised (indirect) and joint management. Joint management mode with UNIDO and Delegation agreement between the EC and GTZ | Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI, under MoI); Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock; and Ministries of Textiles, Jute and Commerce |
| | Gender | | |
| DK | Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence against Women (Phase III) - OCC | Project approach | Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, Project Implementation Unit |
| DK | Farmers Field Schools | Project approach | Ministry of Agriculture |
| SE | Strengthening Movement to Advance Women's Rights | Project approach | ASK (NGO) |
| EU | Food and Livelihood Security programme for the Ultra-poor women, Small and Marginal farmers | Project approach – Partially decentralised management | Ministry of Women and Children Affairs & Resource Integration Centre (RIC) |
| | Primary education | | |
| EU | PEDP3 | Sector Budget Support | Directorate of Primary Education (MoPME) |
| SE | PEDP3 | Treasury model | |
| EU | SHARE | Project approach - direct centralised management mode Grants (Budget line call for proposals) and services (TA) | NGOs (Save the Children UK ; CARITAS Bangladesh and Dhaka Ahsania Mission) |
| SE | PEDP 3 Result-based management technical assistance support | Project approach: Sweden's direct management (phases 1 & 2); ADB-administered TA grant (phase 3) | Directorate of Primary Education (MoPME) |

3.3 Facts and findings per Judgement Criteria

JC9.1 Extent to which aid modality choices and channels used have been explicitly based on an analysis of their expected sustained impact on poverty reduction

| JC9.1: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|--|---|------------------------|
| Aid modalities have generally not been the subject of an overall analysis as regards their potential impact on poverty reduction | EPs strategy documents Project level documents (identification and formulation phases) | More than satisfactory |
| Choices of aid modalities driven by a context characterized by high fiduciary risks and capacity constraints. EPs adopted significant control measures in all aid modalities and had a high share channelled through IOs. Alignment to country systems remained limited. | Interviews Project level documents (identification and formulation phases) | More than satisfactory |

| | | |
|---|--|------------------------|
| Choice of aid modalities mostly driven by EPs, with varying levels of consultation with the partners depending on the projects | Project level documents (identification and formulation phases) Interviews | More than satisfactory |
| EPs devoted efforts to adapt the choice of their aid modalities to the national context. In HR&D, PSD and non-formal education, preference given to projects since the move towards a SWAP was premature. | Project level documents (identification and formulation phases) | More than satisfactory |
| EPs often decided to channel their funds through the UN, in recognition of its mandate, experience, expertise, logistical capacity and reach. | Project level documents (identification and formulation phases) Interviews | Strong |
| Move towards BS (EU) underpinned by analyses and proved appropriate in the context and given the alternatives | Project level documents (identification and formulation phases ; monitoring reports) Interviews | Strong |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|---|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Selection of channels and aid modalities explicitly discussed and analysed in the formulation and negotiation of EPs' support, in relation to likely poverty impact | <i>Data partly available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The aid modality selection processes were based on partners needs | <i>Data partly available</i> |

A. Overall approach:

Aid modalities as such are not the subject of an overall analysis as regards their potential impact on poverty reduction within the EPs strategy documents. They are determined at identification and formulation phases at project level.

Interviews held during the field mission with a range of stakeholders showed that EPs choices of aid modalities have been driven by a context characterized by high fiduciary risks and capacity constraints. Indeed, Bangladesh has been characterized by a high level of corruption throughout the period. It has been difficult for the EPs to find good implementing partners. Development Project Proforma (DPP) or a Technical Assistance Project Proforma (TPP) project-type of approach has been the preferred aid modality on GoB side ("projectised" mentality). Within this context:

(i) EPs adopted significant control measures in all aid modalities (projects, SWAPs) and decided to have significantly used channelling through UN/WB/ADB, with IOs acting as a safeguard:

- EU: interviewees stress that centralised management and joint management represented 80% of the portfolio over the period 2012-2014. Around 1/3 of the

portfolio has been channelled through the UN. The degree of decentralisation remained minimal, with the EUD endorsing the contracts and managing the funds for decentralised programmes.

- SE: interviewees stress that around 70% of the funds have been channelled through the IOs over the period, with the IO acting as safeguard. SE did not have the resources to be in direct interaction with the GoB and did not sufficiently trust the GoB to go directly through it.
- DK: interviewees stress that DK preferred modality has been decentralised financial management with TA to ensure safeguard. In alignment with Danida 2005-2009 strategy, DK has gradually reduced Danish funded parallel structures and increasingly relied on domestic structures at local level.

(ii) All EPs have engaged in direct partnership with local government institutions, civil society and NGOs. For instance, the EU has engaged with CSOs through thematic and geographic programmes. EU grants contracts with CSOs represented around 30% of cooperation programme in 2014.

As a result, alignment with country systems and procedures remained limited, with most EPs programmes (apart from PEDP3 SBS) being project-based and not using country systems.

Sources: MN 005, 006, 007, 008, 013

This is confirmed by the documentary review, which highlights that the traditional system of external assistance management in Bangladesh has relied on parallel systems of planning, accounting and auditing for donor funds, separate from the national budget. Each project has its own project document – a DPP or a TPP – in accordance with GoB procedures for implementation of the Annual Development Plan. The approval of TPPs by the government has been low (commonly more than one year after the signature of FA). All project funds (except Treasury Model and SBS funds) have flown from the EPs to designated accounts and not through the Treasury. The main reasons are “lack of transparency and accountability. Bangladesh has the worst Corruption Index score of South Asia excluding Afghanistan” (EU EAMR 2013). All funds - both EPs and GoB contributions – have however been included in the GoB Annual Development Plans and thus considered “on budget” or captured in the national accounts.

Throughout the period, EPs (and more generally DPs) devoted efforts to streamline the DPP/TPP process, including through discussion in the framework of the LCG. At the end of the period, draft Guidelines for Simplification of Preparation, Processing, Approval and Revision Procedure of the Development Projects were prepared by the Planning Division and commented by DPs (EU EAMR 2013).

B. Project level review:

1. Degree of consultation with partners on the selection of aid modalities:

The choice of aid modalities has been driven by EPs, with varying levels of consultation with the partners depending on the projects.

Primary education:

The PEDP 3 formulation and the modality of the treasury model were subject to an 18-month design process, which was very participatory (MN 219, 220, 205; EU, QSG minutes). However, this modality was complex and new in the education sector and in Bangladesh. Within this general framework, the EU's choice of sector budget support was also discussed with the government during the design phase. The EU services were very much involved in the design and two missions from the headquarters came to Bangladesh. However, due to the high staff turn-over within the civil service, the officials who took part to the design phase and understood the logic of the SBS are no longer in charge (MN 205). Besides, the fact that the EU SBS and the treasury model, which were introduced at the same time but were not completely aligned, created confusion among government's counterpart (MN 202, 204; EU, ROM BS report 2013).

PSD:

Stakeholders met did not evidence that the design phase of PSD programmes had involved substantial consultation. The design of the projects has mainly been driven by EU/DK consultants in the case of ASPSII and INSPIRED. For BEST, whilst GoB has been more engaged, the design has been informed by UNIDO, which had significant technical expertise as well as being driving the implementation of the predecessor programme.

HR & D:

As far as the financially more substantial development interventions are concerned, the main EPs modalities have been: (i) core support to HR&D advocacy NGO's and (ii) funding of UNDP projects supporting governmental guardian institutions. The interventions offered support to multi-annual plans developed by either the NGO or UNDP, and run over a number of years.

Discussions took place during the design stage – but these discussions were, to a significant degree, based on trust in the implementing partner. With regard to NGOs, the EPs did not intervene in the priority-setting of the organization (apart from the emphasis on vulnerable or exposed groups); discussions were more about how the NGO planning process and the EP funding cycle could be made to coincide. Even the National Human Rights Commission and the Election Commission were ready to adjust their own planning cycle to EP funding cycles.

2. Appropriateness of aid modalities to national context and partners' needs:

The documentary review of DK and EU projects⁵² show that they tried to adapt the choice of their aid modalities to the national context, in particular the degree of development of

⁵² SIDA project documentation was too limited to conduct a similar review

the national policy framework and the level of the national capacities. In several cases, this led the EPs to adopt a project approach instead of a SWAP, but often with a view to pave the way for an eventual SWAP (case of ASPs II for DANIDA; cases of INSPIRED and partly SHARE for the EU).

Primary education:

SHARE project (EU)

Choice of aid modality on the basis of an assessment of the national policy framework & governance and ownership issues. Whilst a SWAP was envisaged, a project approach has been decided in the end.

“While the European Commission has declared a preference to align with country systems, the institutional assessment of Bureau of Non-formal Education (BNFE), conducted during the formulation that it is not advisable to channel funds through BNFE for the following reasons:

- BNFE receives little support from the government in terms of allocated resources. It is an essentially donor-financed institution that stands isolated from the aforesaid Directorate of Primary Education, which in turn is responsible for the implementation of the sub-sector programme PEDP II
- As regards BNFE’s institutional capacity, a number of past and ongoing technical assistance and capacity building projects have not yielded the expected results and received low marks in terms of impact and sustainability”

“To conclude: A policy preference expressed at identification stage was to move closer to a sector-wide approach, or an implementation driven by government. However during the formulation stage consultants have stressed that there are clearly unacceptable risks involved at this present time, especially in relation to the non-formal sector. Issues to do with governance, accountability, ownership, staffing and lack of an overarching policy framework, embracing formal and non-formal education, and the current uncertainty of the future structure of the government system in relation to non-formal education mean that there is not yet a solid foundation on which to build”.

Source: EU, SHARE Action Fiche

Aid modality chosen in light of its likely impact on Bangladesh’s education targets:

“As part of the EC project identification mission referred to before, seven options were explored and then prioritized. (...) Wishing to make a significant and timely contribution to the achievement of Bangladesh’s education targets, it is therefore the best option to follow a project approach using NGOs to support the government in its challenging endeavours. (...) The proposed programme offers the following advantages over other interventions:

- it represents the most efficient way to reach key target groups effectively in the short term;
- it promotes learning in a way that can inform future policy and practice;
- it encourages closer collaboration between NGOs and government as well as among NGOs;
- it includes a strong capacity-building element which is likely to lead to a feeling of ownership at government;

- it has the potential to interest other development partners in aid harmonisation; and
- it has the potential eventually to evolve and be subsumed within a sector-wide approach.”

Source: Identification fiche

PEDP 3 - Component 1 (BS) (EU)

The design process, the planning of delivery of expected outputs and the choice of verification protocols did not sufficiently take the government’s limited capacity into account (EU, *ROM BS report 2013*).

EU move towards SBS (see also sector analysis on primary education):

The EU decision to move towards SBS has been the subject of specific analyses during the formulation stage of PEDP3. The assessment concluded that SBS could hold a specific advantage over the results-based financing (RBF) pooled funding approach, in spite of the country high-risk fiduciary environment.

Financing options for the SPSP are discussed in the Identification fiche. Two options were envisaged:

- Results-based financing (RBF)-based pooled funding arrangement: where the EU contributes to a pooled fund arrangement and funds disbursed according to agreed budget lines and eligible expenditure.
- Policy-based SBS: where the EU directly disburses into the recipient government treasury, based on agreed harmonized arrangements with other DPs. This would include a common results framework to be used for setting disbursement triggers; as far as possible common disbursement schedules ; and joint monitoring arrangements.

Potential strengths & weaknesses of each option are reviewed in the IF (p.10-11).

The fiche then presents the EUD’s assessment: “SBS may help engender wider ownership in the GoB due to its funding not being linked to any specific activities” ; “Policy-based financing may enable a better balance in sector focus between quality concerns and governance reforms”, and concludes “SBS could hold a comparative advantage”.

The fiche recognizes that SBS entails a high political risk, Bangladesh remaining a high-risk fiduciary environment. It also notes that “MS support for SBS can not be taken for granted, which could undermine harmonization among the DP, and is likely to lead to a situation where the EU becomes the first and only grant donor that considers Bangladesh eligible for SBS”.

Source: Identification fiche for PEDP3

This move proved appropriate in the context (see sector analysis on primary education). The PEDP3 multi-donor programme has been implemented through a Swap approach, based on the so-called ‘Treasury model’, which is actually a targeted BS with stringent fiduciary safeguards. DPs have provided pooled funding into a Consolidated Fund within the GoB Treasury System. DPs disbursements have been based on 9 DLIs and made against a specific list of eligible expenditures. “Given the prevailing context (lack of PFM progress, widespread corruption in the country), targeted BS is considered to have been the most appropriate choice of aid modality”. (EU, *ROM BS Report*, p.5).

Sweden and Denmark both decided not to offer budget support due to the prevalence of high fiduciary risks. This reflects the consensus among EU MS (at the level of Heads of Mission), which was not in favour of budget support. “Fiduciary risks remain a key constraint to working through government systems in Bangladesh and the main reason why practically all development partners remain reluctant to even contemplate general budget support. Sector budget support is only being attempted in very few sectors, first and foremost in the health sector where the process is still in its early stages. However, introducing budget support in Bangladesh remains a long-term goal, requiring both political will and sustained efforts to carry through public-sector reforms related to improving performance, oversight and transparency in the public sector. To this end, Denmark will continue to make it a key priority to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to budget support in Bangladesh, incl. through its support to the Strengthening Public Expenditure Management Programme (SPEMP).”

Source: Denmark Country Strategy 2013-2017, p.10

PSD (including agriculture)

ASPS II Project (DK): there has been a willingness to adapt the aid modalities to the level of development of the policy framework and the level of the national capacities. Hence, instead of a SWAP, the provision of specific international TA (as a supplement to the human resources of GOB), with a decrease over the programme period, has been selected. Detailed quotes:

“Danish assistance to Bangladesh has a long term aim of providing support through a SWAP. At present there are several factors that limit the possibility of providing Danish assistance through SWAP. The policy framework for the agricultural sector is not fully developed. There are therefore several on-going policy processes aiming at strengthening the overall policy framework for the agricultural sector. ASPS I attempted to embark on a SWAP approach, this failed because of the Agricultural sector ministerial set up, and SWAP is not readily accepted by GOB. In this context ASPS II will pursue a strategy that seeks to promote an integrated agriculture farming system approach firmly anchored at local levels.

(...)

Financial management also needs to be further strengthened in order for Danida to fully embark on SWAP. Danida stresses the importance of providing support to local decision making in agricultural development. Through support to the agricultural sector, Danida will provide support to decentralisation and to local government including support to UP. At present the local government structures are weak and there are no strong budgeting and accounting mechanism at this level.

(...)

The general strategy is to provide specified international TA during specific periods, with a decrease over the programme period, and to have provision for extra inputs that may be identified during implementation. International TA are regarded as a supplement to the human resources of GOB. Selection and definition/revision of their responsibilities will be a joint exercise. National TA will supplement the international TA where appropriate, and replace them if necessary when the international TA input is completed. The participating

institutions will be encouraged to appoint their own National TA on the GOB contract basis as to replace the Danida-financed staff later in the programme period.”

Source: project proposal p.17

INSPIRED project (EU): the aid modality choice has taken into account local capacity constraints: a project approach has been preferred to a SWAP after careful analysis, as illustrated thereafter. An evaluation “considered the opportunities for a Sector Wide Approach to SME Development in Bangladesh in order to achieve greater alignment with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action and the aid commitments of the 2002 Barcelona European Council. An analysis of the internationally accepted criteria for a successful sector-wide programme indicates that such an approach, although desirable for a strategic and integrated support to poverty reduction through SME development, is still premature in Bangladesh due to the need for relevant institutional strengthening, capacity building and strategic planning. Therefore, the report recommended supporting the GoB in developing the required fundamentals for such an approach to be implemented in future, which is going to be addressed under Comp 1 of INSPIRED.” Source: EU, Action Fiche for INSPIRED

CC and DM: (see also sector analysis on climate change):

BCCRF: choice of aid modality has not been explicitly justified in the Action Fiche. Modalities for BCCRF were not appropriate, as it was a completely parallel project setup that did not develop management capacity in permanent institutions that could promote sustainability.

CDMP: Interviews show that modalities were not appropriate.

SEALS: Interviews show that modalities were appropriate.

HR & D:

Mix of aid modalities generally appropriate but with several caveats:

- Difficulty for EPs to fully integrate HR in development interventions mediated through UNDP because UNDP has not adopted a human rights approach.
- EU instruments have not been responsive enough to adapt to a changing context
- Several NGOs decided not to go for EIDHR funding due to the cumbersomeness of the procedures. Local civil society organizations generally perceive the EU as being interested in ‘big projects’, and that administrative burdens are heavier than in their cooperation with DK and SE.

Sources: Project documentation and MN021

3. EPs often decided to channel their funds through the UNDP, in recognition of its mandate, experience, expertise, logistical capacity and reach. This was particularly the case for support to HR & D.

“Conflict Prevention, Recovery and Peace-building in Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh” project (DK)

Decision to work with an implementing partner who has the necessary experiences, expertise, and logistics.

“The Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility (CHTDF) is a UNDP managed vehicle for Development Partners to promote peace consolidation, human security, democracy,

and social cohesion among fragmented communities of CHT. CHTDF is well positioned to implement the proposed interventions based on its long presence in the CHT. Since 2003, the CHTDF in partnership with the GoB has engaged with all stakeholders to promote sustainable development and peace for all people guided by the CHT Peace Accord. Moreover, it is working in all 25 upazilas (sub-districts) of the 3 Hill Districts of CHT. Hence, CHTDF has the necessary experiences, expertise, logistics, networks, and human resources to achieve the outputs described below to maximize impacts.

Source: Project proposal

NHRC project (DK):

Project formulation based on a domestic needs assessment.

“This project has been developed following a needs assessment of the National Human Rights Commission undertaken in early 2009. This confirmed that the NHRC would require a 5 year programme of capacity building to establish it as an effective, efficient and credible organisation capable of ensuring promotion and protection of human rights in Bangladesh, particularly of the most vulnerable groups. The project focuses on capacity development of personnel, but also addresses a number of structural and infrastructural issues, as identified by the needs assessment.”

Source: Project proposal

Choice of implementing partner according to its experience: “UNDP has a history of advocating establishment of a human rights commission in Bangladesh over many years. UNDP is a trusted partner of the GoB especially in the area of justice, human rights and human security. Furthermore, UNDP is currently supporting the immediate needs of the NHRC from its existing access to justice project in partnership with the MoL. Thus UNDP has built a strong working relationship with the new NHRC. (...) Given the scale of the envisaged project, UNDP will work in partnership with other international donor partners. This would involve donor contributions to the cost-sharing basket.”

Source: Project proposal

PERP (DK): Choice of implementing partner with a long experience.

“UNDP has been providing support to the Bangladesh Election Commission since 1997, and recently signed a new work plan entitled ‘Support to the Electoral Process’ (SEP) Project. This project provides support for ongoing policy and advisory services, capacity building and knowledge sharing and is implemented by the Election Commission. The project document for the PERP project was prepared with technical assistance from the SEP project.”

Source: Project proposal

PEDP3 (EU) Component 2 of the project: choice to go through a contribution agreement with UNICEF on the basis of UNICEF mandate and expertise in the sector. “Component 2: *Technical Cooperation*: Joint management through the signature of a contribution agreement with UNICEF. In order to streamline technical cooperation / technical assistance provision under PEDP III, the EU will sign a contribution arrangement with UNICEF. UNICEF has been identified as a partner for technical cooperation because of its organisational mandate and extensive experience in providing capacity development for the sector. UNICEF is also knowledgeable about and has built good working relationships

with local education authorities through piloting of the school improvement grants during PEDP II, hence can facilitate the next phase of education decentralisation.” Source: EU, Action fiche PEDP3

BEST (EU): Choice of UNIDO on the basis of its long experience in industrial development. A Standard Contribution Agreement under FAFA has been signed in joint management mode with the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) for Result 1 of the programme. “The mode of delivery has been proposed following the evaluation of the BQSP due to its efficiency and cost effectiveness. Further to that UNIDO has been selected because of its long experience in industrial development and in setting up quality infrastructures.” German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) for Result 2. “GTZ has been selected to implement component 3 (Result 2), because of its extensive experience in working with the relevant stakeholders in Bangladesh. Germany is a main contributor in Bangladesh in this sector. UNIDO and GTZ have worked together throughout the implementation of the current BQSP and have as such proved their ability to complement each-other.” Source: EU, Action fiche BEST

JC9.2 Extent to which choice and mix of aid modalities have allowed for engagements between EPs and the diverse stakeholders including NSAs

| JC9.2: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|--|---------------------|
| Partly in response to the context (fiduciary risks and capacity constraints), EPs engaged with a wide range of stakeholders through a mix of aid modalities | EPs strategy documents EU EAMR Project-level documentation (monitoring and evaluation reports) Interviews | Strong |
| Progressive move towards joined approaches, which enhanced harmonization between DPs, with a caveat for EU SBS | EPs strategy documents IEG evaluation of the JSF Project-level documentation (monitoring and evaluation reports) Interviews | Strong |
| Alignment to country systems has remained limited, with fiduciary risks being a main inhibitor | EPs strategy documents EU EAMR Project-level documentation (monitoring and evaluation reports) Interviews | Strong |
| Channelling through IOs enabled EPs to be present in and to provide adequate support to key sectors. It limited the fragmentation of DPs support but has also been a source of tension between DPs. | EPs strategy documents EU EAMR Project-level documentation (monitoring and evaluation reports) Interviews | Strong |

| | | |
|---|--|--------|
| Limited depth of EPs policy dialogue with GoB throughout the period | EPs strategy documents EU EAMR Project-level documentation (monitoring and evaluation reports) Interviews | Strong |
|---|--|--------|

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|--|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy dialogue with GoB features in Swap/budget support design and implementation. | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aid modality (and their engagement implications) to non-state actors considered in design documentation | <i>Data partly available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implication for quality of partnerships considered when choosing aid modality | <i>Data partly available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Opinion of other development partners on the choice of aid modalities to engage partners | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EPs have reduced their support fragmentation as a result of using more efficient and/or harmonised delivery channels | <i>Data fully available</i> |

1. Engagement with a wide range of stakeholders

A. Overall approach

In a context of capacity constraints and governance-related problems, EPs engaged with a wide range of stakeholders through a mix of aid modalities: pooled funding mechanisms including sector programmes; direct partnership with local government institutions, civil society and NGOs ; policy and political dialogue.

Denmark aimed to use different instruments and to work at different levels with a range of stakeholders, with policy dialogue and diplomacy being key features of the approach.

In the early period, whilst central Government remained the key partner for development cooperation, problems related to governance and corruption resulted in a large number of activities taking place in direct partnership with local government institutions, civil society and NGOs. Denmark envisaged, in its 2005-2009 strategy document: (i) to examine “the feasibility of pooling resources or entering into “basket-funding” with other donors, facilitating joint donor appraisal, supervision and monitoring, joint studies, technical assistance and consultancies etc.” ; (ii) to devote “efforts will be made to build and support decentralisation to local government structures within the different programmes” (support the restructuring of roles and responsibilities between local and central authorities and to strengthen linkages between the two levels) ; (iii) to continue “direct support to civil society based organisations and explore possibilities of involvement in new areas within the sector programmes”; (iv) to continue “technical assistance, although possibly at a lower level than before. It is anticipated that the growing number of Bangladeshi professionals who are highly qualified in technical and socio-economic fields will provide an increasing source of local advisory services in the future. In the long-term, it is anticipated that Danida advisers

will concentrate on providing advisory services for sector planning, monitoring at the central level and overseeing the flow of funds.”

In its 2013-2017 strategy, Denmark recognizes “it is necessary to use different instruments and to work at different levels with a wide range of stakeholders”, and underlines the importance of political dialogue and diplomacy. “Denmark will employ rights-based approaches in its development assistance to Bangladesh to ensure a systematic inclusion and empowerment of the most vulnerable groups in society.”

Source: Denmark Country Strategy 2013-2017.

In its 2008-2012 strategy, Sweden envisaged to use a mix of instruments and modalities to implement its strategy: “policy dialogue; programmes and other interventions, with special emphasis on the sector programmes for health and education; and support to local civil society organisations and other channels providing a voice for poor people”.

Sweden also recognized the necessity to have systems in place to reduce the risk of corruption. “The widespread corruption puts demands on increased and stronger focus on openness, access and opportunities for people to demand accountability. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank, which administer donor funds in the sector programmes, have established financial systems aimed at reducing the risk of corruption. At the national level, the government has begun to implement a broad programme for reforming the administration, which includes better procurement legislation and new financial routines. This is being done with full donor support and is expected to produce results in the long term. Before the results of these measures can be documented, budget support to Bangladesh cannot be considered.”

Source: Sweden development strategy 2008-2012

In its CSP 2007-2013, the EU highlights, for the governance area, the need for a flexible approach balancing between sector type programmes and specific projects.

- “The difficulties faced in the sector programmes combined with the low absorption capacity and the parliamentary elections in 2006/2007 engender a need for caution. For this reason, a high degree of flexibility is built into the implementation of the CSP and NIPs, especially as regards the governance priority by balancing between sector type programmes and specific projects to assure a continued flow of funds aid.”

Source: EU CSP 2007-2013

In the EU MIP 2011-2013, the EU highlights that “pooled funding mechanisms, joined policy dialogue with the Government and alignment with government systems will be sought wherever possible and appropriate, the latter through (partially) decentralised management arrangements or even Sector Budget Support if the conditions for it are met.”

In the EAMR 2014, it recognizes that “corruption in Bangladesh still represents an obstacle for the smooth implementation of programmes in all sectors and for all implementation modalities, in particular for indirect management with the government and budget support. Fiduciary risk of channelling aid through the GoB’s systems is still judged to be substantial. (...) Programme implementation under indirect management with the GoB continued to be cumbersome due to ineffective coordination and communication, absence of collaboration, inadequate capacity of national project directors, delayed implementation, difficulties to

comply with rules and procedures e.g. for Call for Proposals (CfP) process, poor compliance for contracting.”

It also notes that “the Commission’s approach to the implementation of food security support, which is delivered in Bangladesh through a wide range of partners (Government of Bangladesh, international organisations, international and local NGOs) has resulted in high impact on the target groups.”

Source: EU MIP 2011-2013, p.12-20

EU collaboration with NSA:

As of 2008, the EU notes its willingness to expand collaboration with NSA, and to strengthen the “efficiency of the collaboration between state and non-state actors”, non-state actors playing “an increasingly important role, gradually more in concert with government authorities” (EAMR 2008, p.5). It acknowledges that the “independence of action assumed by the new EIDHR instrument is not realistic in Bangladesh, as organisations can not operate and activities cannot be financed by donors without the prior approval by the NGO Affairs Bureau of the Government of Bangladesh which has demonstrated to be rather reluctant in allowing permission to projects working on issues considered by the GoB as 'sensitive' like death penalty, torture etc.” (EAMR 2011). In the EU MIP 2011-2013 (p.12-20) the EU notes that “Non-State Actors (NSAs) will continue to be directly supported under the EU’s dedicated thematic budget lines. Moreover, NSAs will also continue to play an essential role in the implementation of the current MIP, most notably in interventions at grassroots level.” Over the period 2012-2014, the number and total amount of grant contracts with NGOs (both through thematic and geographic programmes) increased, from 97 grant contracts for a total amount of EUR 165 million in 2012 to 136 grant contracts with CSOs (mainly NGOs) for a total amount of EUR 201 million in 2014 i.e 34.72% of the total cooperation programme. (Source: EU EAM 2012, 2013 and 2014). In 2014, the EU notes that “CSOs remain important partners for implementation of the EU programmes in all sectors either directly or in association with other institutions. It is the view of local civil society that the EU should increase support to CSOs as actors of governance and policy dialogue and to establish a more structured dialogue mechanism with CSOs. The 2014 EU+ Civil Society Mapping Study made recommendations for action in this direction, in the framework of the MIP” (EAMR 2014).

B. Project level review:

Primary education:

PEDP 3 design phase was very participatory and NGOs took an active part to the process (MN 219, 220, 205; EU, *QSG minutes*). However, the implementation – policy dialogue and capacity development interventions – mostly targeted the ‘implementer’, the Directorate of Primary Education, within the MoPME, and to a lesser degree other implementation agencies (NAPE, LEGED and NCTB). There has been insufficient regular dialogue with the ministerial level (MoPME), the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education, outside formal meetings during the JARMS and the mid-term review (MN 205, 206, 210). In that context, the specific features of the EU SBS – specific reporting on the macro and PFM eligibility criteria ; tying of the PFM conditionality to the performance of SPEMP –

did not promote the intended engagement with the MoF. The HQ unilateral decision to suspend disbursement on PFM grounds (2014) undermined efforts aimed at building a good country-level understanding of the SBS instrument (“the EU is the most conservative, rigid partner”, MN 204).

After the design phase, the involvement of NGOs in the policy dialogue has been minimal, despite the consistent push from donors. Only at the very end of the period, the government agreed upon the participation of NGOs to PEDP 3 working groups, though the umbrella organisation CAMPE (MN 207, 210, 206). Donors have not attempted to coordinate nor harmonise their support to education advocacy NGOs, such as CAMPE (MN 206, 207, 219) and have seemingly paid little attention to teachers’ unions, as key sector stakeholders.

PSD:

DK argued that its project approach has allowed for on the ground delivery of and engaged with localized farmers organisations. This provided a powerful example for GoB to learn and adopt. EU has engaged with UNIDO and GIZ both of which had good expertise within e.g. standards and social compliance respectively, which in turn allowed for credible engagement with GoB’s ministries, the private sector and labour unions. A consultancy framework contract would probably not have delivered the same expertise, nor have the same reputational risk profile, as the INSPIRED project testifies.

Climate Change:

- BCCRF: WB lead, MoEF engaged (but not sufficiently so), funded IDA projects, FD project, NGO projects. Indeed, Ministries of Finance and Planning should probably have had stronger roles in BCCRF and CDMP delivery – to convene/coordinate sectors, ensure more strategic implementation and to build the capacity to handle new climate financing.
- CDMP: UNDP and MoDMR lead, engaged a broad range of stakeholders: central government ministries and agencies, local government, education institutions, and NGOs (but as contractors). But the modalities did not fully ensure transformative change in GoB and local level participation as intended. Most notably CDMP did not did not promote a participatory, comprehensive “all hazards” approach at the local level (see I-731), but tangible outputs and results were delivered.
- SEALS: FD was lead, but also direct EU agreements with NGOs.

HR&D:

In the HR&D sector all development interventions are based on engagement with the variety of partners: GoB (guardian institutions), NGOs and international organizations – given the use of intermediaries.

2. Progressive move towards joined approaches, which enhanced harmonization between DPs, with a caveat for EU SBS.

A. Overall approach

The EPs committed to move towards SWAPs in various sectors. In practice, this move towards SWAPs has only been possible in education and health.

Denmark had the ambition to use SWAp as a way to enhance harmonisation:

- “It was agreed that harmonisation at the level of the programmes can best be promoted through a selective approach, choosing one relatively narrow sub-sector in the agriculture and the water and sanitation programme, respectively, and seek collaboration with other development partners to advance towards sector-wide approach (SWAp)-like harmonisation in these areas.”

Source: Denmark Bangladesh Country programme review 2007, p.5-16

The EU committed, in its strategy documents, to engage into joined-up approaches, and in particular programmes in support of sector policies in the focal areas. It pursued the ultimate goal of a SWAP in the governance and trade areas.

- “With regard to implementing modalities, the EC will actively pursue joined-up approaches with other donors, including sector or sector type programmes. A mechanism for jointly agreed benchmarks will be encouraged in sector type or other larger programmes with a view to reward the expeditious delivery of agreed reforms. (..) Budget support is not regarded as appropriate in the first stage of implementation, but might be considered in the second MIP.”
- Governance area: “Until now most donors have supported small programmes in this area, resulting in dispersed actions rather than broader programmes with systemic impact. The approach of the CSP is to support the GoB’s reforms plans in a more comprehensive manner through integrated reform programmes. Based on the GoB’s reform plans stated in the PRSP, support may include the overhaul of the public administration and sector management, including support for public financial management reform and for improved service delivery, the reform of the judiciary the police and the prison service, the creation of governance institutions (Human Rights Commission, Ombudsman), and continued support for the decentralisation process to enhance more effective local governance. Should the opportunity arise, we will support sector type programmes in justice and law and order and/or in local governance/decentralization, on the basis of jointly agreed benchmarks.
- Economy & Trade: “EC has been one of the largest donors in Bangladesh in this sector. (..) Tackling trade and investment issues requires a comprehensive multi-donor approach with the ultimate goal of a sector-wide approach steered by the Government in full cooperation with the private sector. It is therefore proposed to address a number of related challenges through joint donor approaches, specifically improving the investment climate, strengthening of the legal and institutional trade-related framework, WTO-capacity building, vocational education and supporting export diversification. At the same time, our country strategy will ensure complementarities through parallel interventions in the governance and education areas to make pro-poor growth possible through faster trade integration.”

Source: EU CSP 2007-2013 – p.13-14-20-32

It is explicitly recognized in several key documents (JCS, EPs strategy documents, IEG evaluation) that sector-wide programmes in the education and health sectors have contributed to improve coordination, harmonization and alignment.

- “The sector programmes have greatly enhanced donor co-ordination and the cohesiveness of donor interventions.” (..) “The nature of the sector wide programmes has led to a fundamental change in relations with the international donor community,

generating the need for close co-ordination and alignment of approaches to implement multi donor funded programmes. World Bank and the Asian Development Bank became privileged partners, given their co-ordinating role in the health and primary education sector programmes.

Sources: EU CSP 2007-2013

- “There has been some progress in harmonization with the use of sector-wide programmes in education and health. However, the proportion of aid using programme-based approaches (PBAs) decreased due to a reduction in budget support and other forms of PBAs.”

Source: GoB, Bangladesh Joint Cooperation Strategy, page 3

- “The case for a programme approach was particularly compelling in Bangladesh given the large number of donors in the health and education sectors. In fact, globally Bangladesh has among the largest number of development partners in the health and education sectors. On average, over the past decade there have been about fifteen donors involved in the health and education sectors, heightening the need for donor coordination and alignment of donor priorities and systems with that of the GoB. While the programme approach in the two sectors has had some success at improving ownership, harmonisation, and alignment, there has been less success with the other tenet of the Paris Declaration — managing for development results and mutual accountability. The idea of a programme approach was initiated by the development partners although the approach was in response to issues that were felt by the relevant ministries and donors alike. These were usually expressed as: concerns about policy coherence across projects within the sector, high transaction costs to GoB (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW), Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MoPME), Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning) and donors associated with the myriad of projects, and the opportunity costs to GoB of administering and managing projects. These issues were particularly acute in Bangladesh health and education sectors because of the larger numbers of development partners in these sectors in particular.”
- “The PEDP was initially conceived as a conventional investment project, and during preparation the development partners recommended a programme approach. GoB did not agree (because the programme approach was perceived as a loss of power) and the operation was implemented as a multi-donor funded project. Some principles of a sector programme were adopted, for example, multiple donors supporting a comprehensive expenditure programme based explicitly on government policy and objectives for the subsector. The PEDP laid the ground for the sector programme that followed. The permission of the Prime Minister was sought before the GoB agreed to the programme approach under PEDP-II. PEDP-II was financed by 12 development partners, with the ADB being the lead agency. Total financing for the PEDP-II was \$1.8 billion over 6 years, with the GoB providing two thirds of project costs, and the development partners financing the remaining third. Pooled funding procured goods, services, and civil works followed GoB procurement rules, and accounted for about 85 percent of the procurement under the PEDP-II. For procurement based on ICB, the non-pooled account was used following the procurement rules of the ABD or World Bank, depending on the source of the funding.”
- “At the start of the implementation of the sector programmes in both sectors GoB ownership and leadership was relatively weak. Ownership and leadership has evolved in

the education sector, as demonstrated by the leadership by MoPME and DPE in the 2008 Joint Annual Review — informed by a strong evidence-base and active participation by DPE staff. However, the increasingly experienced leadership is continuously threatened by the frequency of position changes and transfers, a feature of the Bangladeshi civil service that is unlikely to change for the time being.”

- “One of the main benefits from the sector-wide programmes has been improvements in coherence in the support provided by development partners to GoB. Each of the sector programmes was preceded by joint donor and government consultative and planning processes to arrive at a common set of priorities and implementing arrangements for the sector. While these were not without shortcomings, there is less duplication, greater complementarity, and a steady increase in use of government systems. It appears that even parallel donors (who are not formally part of the sector programme) have found ways to complement what the pooled and non-pooled donors financed through the sector programme.”

Source: IEG – Evaluation JSF 2010, p.62-63-64-66

IEG recognizes the advantages of pooled funding whilst acknowledging that parallel funding also allowed for flexibility:

- “Should all donors be urged more to join pools, or should one be indifferent as long as the pools have a minimum size? A key advantage of pooled funding is that it uses, strengthens and reinforces government systems e.g. procurement, disbursement, financial management systems, recurrent budgets for operations and maintenance. For this reason the majority of the financing should be pooled. However, the Bangladesh experience has also demonstrated that the availability of non-pooled and parallel funding has allowed for flexibility and responsiveness while still remaining within the overall framework on the sector programme’s agreed priorities, so parallel funding is unlikely to go away. But these mechanisms should involve a minority share of total donor assistance to a sector, and all efforts should be made to reduce their distortions (i.e. they should be consistent with the overall priorities of the sector programme), and the additional transaction costs they pose to government (numbers of missions and reporting requirements).”

Source: IEG – Eval JSF 2010, p.67

3. Alignment has remained limited, with fiduciary risks being a main inhibitor.

Denmark notes that alignment to country systems remained limited. “Overseas development assistance (ODA) to Bangladesh is dominated by projects. These are to a great extent managed through parallel project implementation units (PIUs) or through non-governmental organisations (NGOs). SWAps have only been developed within health and primary education. Only one of the bilateral development partners provides sector budget support, and none general budget support. Harmonisation among development partners is the least developed among the programme countries supported by Denmark. Considering that the national framework conditions for alignment in Bangladesh are difficult, the weak harmonisation among donors makes alignment even more difficult. Development partners have little shared approach on aligning with national systems and even within individual development partners’ own programmes, practices differ substantially regarding alignment with national systems, procedures and policies. Joint missions are rare and so is joint

analytic work, common arrangements and procedures.” (..) “For day-to-day management, DK relied on Programme Implementation Units (PIUs) or the like, which were most of the time attached to GoB units headed by Project Director (PDs) or Deputy PDs. Whilst anchored to GoB institutions, “varying proportions, but usually the majority, of the staff is paid on the programme budgets and report to the Danida advisers as much as to the PDs. In addition, the programme-paid staff receives remuneration packages which are much better than GoB staffs. The functions of the PIUs for their programmes and (sub)-components are however more important than the character of the PIUs in terms of the Paris definition. There is more or less agreement among all involved that the work foreseen in the programme documentation would not be done, or only very slowly and haphazardly, if the PIUs were not there to plan, organise, and administer it. On the other hand, there is also little doubt that the existence of the PIUs, regardless of their mix of departmental and programme staff, distance the projects from their host departments and very much reduce the sense of ownership of these to the development activities. What further reduces the ownership and leadership of the partner department is the fact that the PDs are often not available for more than a fraction of their working time. This is especially the case where the Head of the partner department is PD and it causes the PIU and thereby the component to be led in practice by the Danida adviser.”

Source: Denmark Bangladesh Country programme review 2007, p.8-16-26

DK committed to ‘channelling of funds through government systems as financial management capacity improves’. However, this did not materialise to any significant extent. Thus while the DK 2013 policy paper reiterates is long-term objective of aligning to GoB financial systems, a certain degree of scepticisms is also now noticed: “Denmark will continue to promote aid effectiveness among Government, development partners and NGOs. In line with international aid effectiveness declarations and the 2010 Joint Cooperation Strategy, Denmark will continue efforts to align its development assistance with national systems and to harmonise it with the assistance provided by other development partners. While there has been moderate progress in aligning official development assistance flows to national development priorities, alignment with country systems and procedures remains limited. Fiduciary risks remain a key constraint to working through government systems in Bangladesh and the main reason why practically all development partners remain reluctant to even contemplate general budget support.”

Source: Denmark Country Strategy 2013-2017, p.10

The EU notes in 2014 that “most of EU-Bangladesh programmes are still project based and do not use country systems apart from the PEDP3 sector budget support.” “In most sectors of intervention, national sector policy are not sufficient mature for receiving sector budget support. High level of corruption and government procurement system not responding to international standards impede broader use of country systems.” (EU EAMR p.38)

The Swedish MTR (2010) also notes that “use of donor systems remain the main aid modality” in spite of “a slight increase in use of country systems thanks to the World Bank and ADB providing some budget support (mainly as credits & loans)”.

Widespread corruption is also cited as a deterrent for aligning to country systems on

financial management of the Swedish assistance. However, the strategy had the hope that the situation would improve and thus stated: ‘At the national level, the government has begun to implement a broad programme for reforming the administration, which includes better procurement legislation and new financial routines. This is being done with full donor support and is expected to produce results in the long term. Before the results of these measures can be documented, budget support to Bangladesh cannot be considered.’ (p. 18) This long-term ambition was somewhat reduced in the mid-term review in 2010 where it was argued that after some improvement during the care-taker government (primo 2007 - primo 2009, i.e. when the Swedish strategy was drafted) where corruption was reduced and PFM improved, but these gains were largely eroded by the subsequent government, contributing to the consensus among bilateral DPs that General Budget Support (GBS) was not yet feasible. Again the mid-term review pinned its hope on yet another round of future reforms. ‘There is however a massive PFM reform programme underway, which hopefully can improve the current situation’⁵³

B. Project level review:

Primary education:

There has been an unquestionable evolution towards increased *alignment* in the primary education sub-sector. PEDP 3 mid-term review expresses stakeholders’ consensus that PEDP represents a major step forward in terms of use of government systems, strengthening government’s ownership and systems’ accountability, and donor harmonization (MoPME/DPs, JARM May2014 Record of Discussions, p.6)⁵⁴.

In terms of alignment, under PEDP 3, donors’ disbursement mechanisms have been largely aligned with the government’s programme document. However, even though DPs channeled their funds using the treasury system, several exceptions to the GoB Procurement Guidelines (2008) have been decided upon to ensure their consistency with World Bank’s and ADB’s procurement rules. The ‘Treasury model’ could be appropriately characterised as a targeted or earmarked budget support with stringent fiduciary safeguards⁵⁵ (EU, *ROM BS Report 2013*, p.5).

In terms of harmonization, disbursement mechanisms under the treasury model – the joint list of DLIs and the joint agreement about their fulfilment - have represented a step forward in terms of harmonisation. Specifically, the two development banks (WB and ADB) have achieved important efforts of harmonisation of their procurement regimes: i.e. a standard bidding document, a similar procedure in case of flawed procurement and a mutual recognition of their list of black-listed companies (MN 220). This has represented a progress in comparison with PEDP 2 when tensions between the two development banks constituted a source of disruption of the programme implementation (MN 220, MN 210). However, due to the complexity of PEDP 3, the history of ADB’s leadership under PEDP 2 and human resource constraints, most other donors overly relied on the two

⁵³ Embassy of Sweden: ‘Mid Term Review of Cooperation – Overview of Achievements & Challenges in the Country Context from an Aid Effectiveness Perspective’ 2010.

⁵⁴ PEDP 3 would be at the ‘forefront of global best practice’ (MoPME/DPs, *JARM May 2014 Record of Discussions*, p.6).

⁵⁵ For details on fiduciary safeguards see JC3.3.

development banks: the harmonisation has been primarily shaped by the two banks' prevailing approach (MN 206, MN 208). In that broad context, the EU SBS and its specific disbursement modalities (specific reporting on macroeconomic and PFM eligibility criteria, two EU outcome indicators, and a payment request to be submitted to the MoF, not the MoPME, unlike other donors) have been considered by the government - MoF and MoPME - additional burdens and a breach into donors' commitment to harmonisation (MN 202 and 204; EU, *ROM BS report 2013*). There has been only little effort to harmonise support to NGOs involved in education, as non-formal education providers or as advocacy bodies (MN 219, 206, 207).

PSD:

BEST: There was virtually no alignment concerning the *use of domestic funding systems*, with a classical project approach (through a contribution agreement with UNIDO and GIZ). This was partly due to the highly technical nature of the project which included the sourcing of specialised expertise within e.g. quality infrastructure and international standards, which was deemed (by both EU and GoB) most optimally delivered through a project approach.

INSPIRED: Non of the assistance was *channelled through a domestic funding institution*, but as mentioned above, component 3 managed to relaying on the appropriate organisations to implement activities, in contrast to the other two components. The INSPIRED project had as an ambition that it would pave the way for more aligned and harmonised approaches to SME support from donors, allowing for using sector budget support. However, there are no indications that this has been promoted and will be a likely outcome.

There is no evidence of the aid modalities leading to a more harmonized approach, despite this being a stated intention. However, GoB's line ministries preferred projects.

Climate Change:

Aid modalities used (joint funding) led to increased harmonization/coherence between DPs (e.g. speaking with one voice). There were very good relations among DPs/EPs funding BCCRF and CDMP. But BCCRF was not well aligned to GoB systems (see sector analysis on climate change JC7.3).

Gender:

None of the EPs *channelled their assistance* to GoB institutions through its funding mechanisms; all was projectized due to fiduciary and broader confidence concerns. There has been no change in that position over the evaluation period. Support to CSOs has at times more aligned to their funding systems, due to easier oversight, smaller budget sizes and higher degree of transparency. Thus many CSOs have been able to develop their internal capacity and pursue their own defined goals due to the fact that EPs (DK and SE in particular) have provided core funding.

HR & D:

Concerning the channel through which EPs delivered the assistance all was in the form of project aid, either bilaterally, through UNDP or through thematic lines. However, some CSOs have received core long-term funding that is arguably reticent of a kind of 'NGO

budget support' which has proven valuable and ensured the survival of several of the organisations, but obviously with serious sustainability concerns.

4. Channelling through IOs enabled EPs to be present in and to provide appropriate support to key sectors. It limited the fragmentation of DPs support but has also been a source of tension between DPs.

EPs have been channeling a substantial share of their assistance through IOs (UN/WB/ADB) in a context of prioritisation of action and harmonization of aid (Paris/Accra/Busan), as well as staff constraints.

This aid modality offered benefits to EPs: it enabled EPs:

- To be present in several key sectors (e.g. HR&D), which has been key in a context of scarce human resources
- To draw on an implementing partner who has the necessary mandate, experience, expertise and logistical capacity (e.g. comparative advantage of WB in PFM / mandate of UN in CHT).
- To draw on a partner who has pooled resources, and hence limited DPs fragmentation.

However, there were divergence of views/tensions between EU/WB/UN on trust fund governance, contractor v.s. development partner relationship incl. on information provision, government ownership (e.g. management from Washington), and positions on political issues (e.g. elections).

Sources: MN 005, 007, 008, 013, 021.

The successive EU EAMR also evidence that channelling has been a source of tension:

- “EUD confronted with sometimes deep-seated differences of view between EC on the one hand and especially the WB (including IFC) on the other hand on issues of trust fund governance, government ownership, the importance of proper consultation when identifying and formulating programmes, the importance of managing programs locally rather than from Washington, etc.” This was the case of BCCRF and SPEMP (WB), CHTDF (UNDP) (tendency to prioritize short-term outputs rather than results), Activating village courts (UNDP). (EU, EAMR 2009).
- HNSP Trust Fund : “mixed experience: WB is administrator of the TF, which results in close alliance between WB and MoH&FW. This facilitates problem solving and seems to assure swift disbursement. However, the importance of keeping financial flows smooth has on occasion put attention for the reform agenda of the sector programme under pressure.” (EU, EAMR 2011)
- “UN/WB-managed Trust Funds/pool funds: while improvement has been noted during 2012, it remains a challenge to influence and monitor the management of the programmes due to irregular dialogue at management committee level and unsatisfactory reporting, particularly on the financial side. Recommendations from external monitoring/review missions and joint pressure from donors have led to some noticeable progress.” (EU, EAMR 2012, p.7). “There is a need to adapt the General Conditions derived from our Framework Agreements with the UN and the WB. (EU, EAMR 2013)

- “With UN organisations, timeliness of reporting, efficient and effective monitoring, and adequate EU visibility still need further improvement.
 - UNDP managed CDMP: implementation rate is slow. Deficiencies in some of the field works have been identified (poor design, bad quality of materials) and monitoring is inadequate. The EU Delegation is concerned with this situation and is looking at pragmatic solutions, together with other involved donors and UNDP, to rectify this situation
 - Economic and trade sector: good degree of cooperation has continued between EU Delegation and UNIDO
 - Governance sector, the contracting process with UNDP was lengthy (interference from UNDP's liaison office in Brussels, delays in final clearance), however, since the implementation started, cooperation with UNDP has become more businesslike
 - Cooperation with FAO and WFP is good. However, budget of the Actions and related financial reports are usually compiled by HQ and does not provide the necessary details to allow adequate monitoring A problem identified with some UN agencies (in particular UNDP), is the reluctance to share information and assessments concerning procedural and contractual issues (e.g. UN's National Implementation Modality -NEX, Harmonised Approach to Cash Transfers) when entrusting major tasks of implementation, evaluation or audit to national institutions”. (EU, EAMR 2012)
- “SPEMP and BCCRF: “While WB now has mobilised the technical and human resources to implement such programmes, its centralised/regionalised management is a major constraint. In many cases, task team leaders and project managers are not based in Dhaka, which is delaying implementation and decision making processes. Some managerial deficiencies are gradually being addressed, mainly poor communication with donors. Finally EU visibility is not ensured as required.” (EU, EAMR 2012)
- “Regular consultations with UN agencies took place to discuss common approaches and harmonise our development objectives. There is a smooth and effective collaboration between EU and UN at the LCG DP Plenary and working groups levels. Overall, technical cooperation is good and programme management has improved. However, within the framework of FAFA, reporting remains minimal and the EUD has limited access to internal and external control reports on activities operated by UN. Even on specific and motivated requests, UN agencies are reluctant to submit any additional information (ie audit reports, follow up of irregularity cases, sub-contractors and partners including national authorities)”. (EU, EAMR 2013)
- Cooperation with World Bank and IFIs: “The EU contributes to World Bank managed Trust Fund for PFMIP/SPEMP, BCCRF and to IFC managed TF for the Bangladesh Investment Climate Fund (BICF). WB's centralised/regionalised management continues to be a major constraint. In many cases, task team leaders and project managers are not based in Dhaka or take long to recruit/replace, which delays implementation and decision making processes. Some managerial deficiencies are gradually being addressed and solved. However, EU visibility is not yet ensured as required. Effectiveness of implementation appears better ensured by IFC: the BICF programme is properly managed in close cooperation with others donors namely DFID”. (EU EAMR 2013)

- “Indirect management with International Organisations: Overall, our cooperation is positive as UN/WB have technical comparative advantage and added value in specific sectors and in some cases, are the only authorised recognised authorities by the government (UN for the Rohingyas, CHT). Some have global mandate on thematic/cross-cutting initiatives. They have acquired over the years appropriate human resources, expertise, management capacity, and have well-established relations with the GoB. However, shortcomings appear in the financial and technical reporting (delays, no transparency) and visibility of EU is diluted. The delegation commits to pay extra attention to the respect of the visibility requirements while reporting conditions should be strengthened within the framework agreement EU/UN and EU/WB (FAFA/PAGODA)”. (EU, EAMR 2014, p.18).

5. The depth of EPs policy dialogue with GoB has remained limited.

EPs strategy documents all note the intention to intensify policy dialogue with GoB and other relevant stakeholders.

e.g. “Denmark will intensify the policy dialogue with the Government, the opposition and all with a focus on how to accelerate the process of change. This implies continued active participation in the Bangladesh Development Forum coordinated by the World Bank and maintaining an active role in the LCG, as well as in all the relevant LCG Sub-Groups and Working Group meetings”

Source: Denmark Strategy 2005-2009

Interviews conducted in the field show that the depth of EPs policy dialogue with GoB has remained limited.

- Overall, there has been a lack of appetite of GoB for policy dialogue. GoB is in the driving seat of its policies, and development cooperation is sometimes more a “burden” to them. But it’s also an opportunity for them to be in touch with the international community (credibility on the international scene)
- Policy dialogue has been mostly led by DFID, WB, ADB and UNDP, which are well staffed and have the technical expertise
- SE intended objectives in terms of policy dialogue have not been reached
- The EU notes in 2011 that the quality of the sector policy dialogue under the primary education sub-SWAp, where ADB is the main Government partner for day-to-day implementation, can be further improved (EU EAMR 2011). Interviews show that within the framework of PEDP3, policy dialogue has been limited at the level of the implementer only (but not with MoPE and with MoF). The EU SBS has not fostered policy dialogue with the GoB: there has been an annual dialogue on sector performance within the framework of PEDP3; the 2 EU indicators (results-based) have not allowed a deepening of the policy dialogue.

Sources: MN 005, 006, 007, 008, 013, 021.

Concerning policy dialogue on PFM, the EU reports on the difficulties to move forward the PFM reform process during the period. In 2015, the GoB committed to conduct a PEFA assessment and to update a PFM reform strategy.

- “EUD ensures continued dialogue through the PFM task force of the LCG Governance WG and PFMIP/SPEMP. At the LCG, DPs identified 8 "Policy Priority

Areas" with specific milestones for 2012 and 2013 for the dialogue on PFM reform which the Government Co-Chair (i.e. the Finance Division) also endorsed. In spite of continuous pressure by the PFM task force, the Government did not approve the new Audit Act to reinforce the independence and strength of the Comptroller and Auditor General." (EU EAMR 2013: p.10-11-12)

- "Together with DFID, EU coordinates common positions among EU Member States under the framework of the EU + joint programming process (cf EU HoMs report on PFM, December 2014). Policy dialogue with the GoB is also ensured through programmes such as PFMIP/SPEMP and PEDP3 at sector level. Overall, there have been improvements in PFM but fiduciary risk of channelling aid through the GoB's systems is still judged to be substantial. Improving PFM is prominent on GoB and DPs' agenda. The EU is also engaged in bilateral dialogue with the Government on PFM reforms. In 2014, EU emphasised the wider benefits of better PFM to improve the government accountability and good economic governance, as well as to reduce fiduciary risk for donors when using country systems. Also as a result of this bilateral policy dialogue, the GoB committed to conclude a PEFA assessment by June 2015 and to update a PFM reform strategy by December 2015 (through SPEMP). The EU is monitoring closely the milestones to assess the feasibility of channelling aid through budget support. DPs are advocating for a comprehensive assessment on PFM to be included in the 7th Five year Plan 2015-2020". (EU EAMR 2014 p.8, 11)

JC9.3 Extent to which the capacities of both EPs and GoB have been sufficient to manage the aid modalities and interventions, including in terms of responsiveness to a changing context

| JC9.3: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|--|---|------------------------|
| For the EU: no shortage of human resources and overall adequate skills mix in the early period. Pressure on human resources as of 2013, which is further aggravated by increased commitment and disbursement pressure. | EU EAMR Interviews | More than satisfactory |
| Limited internal capacity at sector level at EPs' representations has been one driver in using IOs. | Interviews | More than satisfactory |
| Significant tensions between EU HQ/EUD on programming and choices of aid modalities, especially since 2011. | Interviews | More than satisfactory |
| The low absorption capacity of GoB institutions throughout the period has been a major cause of delay in implementing almost all programmes | EPs strategy documents Project level documents Interviews | More than satisfactory |
| Risks (e.g. political, capacity, fiduciary, continued GoB commitment) were often well identified during the formulation stage, but sometimes underestimated (e.g. capacities of the partners overestimated in education and climate change). Mitigation measures were not sufficiently thought through and insufficient. | EPs strategy documents Project level documents Interviews | More than satisfactory |

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| Lack of flexibility of EU procedures. DK procedures more flexible. | | |
|--|--|--|

Please qualify the quality of evidence: strong; more than satisfactory; indicative but not conclusive; weak

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|---|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Adequate capacity levels (including resources in the field and support from HQ) and ability to manage aid modalities | <i>data partly available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Adequate capacity absorption of GoB institutions | <i>data fully available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Existence and use of instruments/procedures/risk mitigation strategies to monitor the political, economic and social context, at strategic and operational level | <i>data fully available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Indications that changes in the context and risks –including risks affecting coherence- have been regularly re-assessed and that the EPs support strategies have been adapted as result of these re-assessments | <i>data fully available</i> |

1. EPs capacities and ability to manage aid modalities

A. Overall

In the early period, EU EAMR report an adequate skills mix and do not report significant challenges as regards human resources. In 2010, “the intensive preparation of new actions in the area of education and health in 2010 in combination with the Delegation's already very large portfolios in these sectors highlighted the fact that human resources in the Health and Education team (Operations 3) are probably overstretched and in need of reinforcement.” (EAMR 2010). “There seems to be a mostly, although not fully, adequate skills mix, both in terms of sectoral expertise and in terms of aid modalities. The evolving nature of our portfolio and rotation of key staff means however that continuing investments need to be made in this respect. Particular needs are in training in budget support, public finance management, the use of programme estimates etc.” (EAMR 2011). “The skills' mix in the delegation will have to be adapted to the sectors chosen in the context of new programming, and to the overall amount of funds available. Given the likelihood that the amount of budget aid will increase, additional training in this area will be required.” (EAMR 2012)

The EU reports pressure on what had become scarce human resources as of 2013, which was further aggravated by increased commitment and disbursement pressure. Indeed, staff from the OPS section went down towards the end of the evaluation period. Besides, EU annual allocations have significantly increased since 2011: €51 M/year for the MIP 2007-2010 ; €66 M/year for the MIP 2011-2013 ; and €98.5M/year for the MIP 2014-2020 (or €690M for the full period 2014-2020). The EU highlighted the “importance of concentrating actions on a manageable number of interventions” (CSP MIP 2011-2013, p.15).

- “Regarding the absorption capacity of the delegation, the pressure on scarce human resources is gradually increasing due to difficulties related to recruitment and vacancies, requiring redistribution of tasks. The 2014 increased annual allocation will further aggravate the situation. (..)The delegation would welcome indications from DEVCO on how to adapt restricted human resources to the increased funding allocation and requirements of MIP 2014-2020. There is a risk that identification, formulation and monitoring of programmes will lose in quality without stronger support from HQ or additional human resources at the delegation. (..) The skills mix of staff is currently adequate”. (EAMR 2013)
- “In 2014, the HR have been put under increased stress due to a combination of factors that included: i) additional workload generated by transfer of activities from 2013 to 2014 due to the critical political situation, ii) finalisation of the MIP 2014-2020, iii) unexpected early departure of the Head of Cooperation (post vacant for 6 months), iv) vacant contract agent posts that have not been filled requiring redistribution of files among task managers, v) vacancy of local agent support staff (secretaries mainly), vi) 2014 staff turnover and foreseeable 2015 turnover (AC mobility and officials rotation). The reduction of human resources under Optimus coupled with the increase of workload due to higher financial allocation of the MIP 2014-2020 (+ 70%) present a considerable risk for the management of the Delegation activities, in particular in the development cooperation domain. The delegation is already in difficulties (2 task managers are not being replaced, one of them on sensitive issues – village court, decentralisation, elections...) to ensure continuity and adequate quality of implementation and monitoring of development assistance and to maintain close collaboration and coordination with GoB, civil society, various partners, private sector and other actors. The ease workload by increasing size of contracts will be limited as present contract size is already largely average across all Delegations. (...) The suppression of staff posts will reduce the technical expertise of the delegation and put at risk the quality of OPS work (policy dialogue, design of programmes and adequate monitoring). (...) Blending of grants of major infrastructure programmes with AFD and EIB required HR outside sectors of concentration”. (EAMR 2014)
- Rotation issues occurred throughout the period (sources: EAMR 2011, 2012 and 2014):
 - 2011: Finance & Contracts (F&C) had permanent problems with the position of one CFIV (Audit Task Manager) since 2008. Due to medical circumstances the absences of the holder of this post has caused major problems in the correct execution of all audit tasks in the delegation. In addition, no successor was recruited for the Head of Operations Section 1 complicated work in the second half of 2011. Average vacancy rate was 4%.
 - 2012: The EU Delegation had difficulties in filling posts on rotation and recruiting CAs. On the basis of 30 posts allocated to Contract Agents (CAs) and Local Agents (LA)s in the F&C & Administration and Operation sections, 4 posts were effectively vacant. Of these, two CA posts were not available to the Delegation during the entire year due to parental and medical leave. One LA post and one CA post were vacant due to departure and promotion. Average vacancy rate for officials was 15%
 - 2014: some posts were not filled during the year: Head of Cooperation (6 months), 2 contract agents (OPS, F&C) and secretaries.

Interviews held in the field show that managing EUD's portfolio has been challenged by cuts in staff and tensions with HQ at the end of the evaluation period.

- EUD: pressure on scarce human resources at the end of the evaluation period
- This is confirmed by several stakeholders, who perceived the EUD as being understaffed “analytically” vis-à-vis its mandate. The scarcity of human resources has undermined EU's standing and ability to engaged pro-actively within the donor community
- Significant tensions between HQ/EUD on programming and choices of aid modalities, especially since 2011, with the EUD/HQ having different perceptions and the EUD having “little to say” in a HQ-led decision process. This led to sudden changes in the orientations negotiated by the EUD with the partners (programmes not approved in QSG without discussion with EUD)

They also show that the lack of internal capacity at the EPs' representation has been a driver in using UN organisations.

Source: MN 006, 008, 013, 016, 020

B. Project level review:

Primary education:

Both the EU and SE faced human resources constraints, which limited the potential influence they may have played in the sector. SE benefitted from the long-time engagement in the sector of a highly experienced and highly praised education officer who played a pioneering role in promoting RBM in education. In the EU, there has been a close collaboration between programme officers in charge of education and PFM, which constitutes a critical factor of success in the context of a SBS programme (and needs to be further strengthened). Building a policy dialogue at a higher political level would require a consistent and continuous involvement of the EUD senior management (head of section and head of cooperation), which has not been the case throughout the evaluation period (MN 220).

PSD:

For DK, it would seem that there has been adequate capacity, also by using directly Danida contracted TA which also augmented the capacity of DK (i.e. a kind of outsourcing). The response from BEST and INSPRIED project staff is that EU has provided support and oversight that has been useful and appropriate. However GoB views the EU as too lenient in its management of INSPRIED TA and also in the design of a flawed project concept (the latter sentiment widely shared).

Climate Change:

Limited capacity of all three EPs to engage in the sector (one staff person covering DM and CC as well as other sectors), so the three EPs latched on to DfID, World Bank, UNDP, which largely made it more manageable – except that issues with BCCRF set-up and the agreement with WB created major problems.

HR & D:

EPs local capacities in the HR&D sector at the local level have been limited. DK and SE have a one staff focal point on HR&gender. The limited capacity left little other choice than to work through intermediaries when it comes to the implementation of development interventions.

2. Capacity absorption of GoB institutions and national bodies

A. Overall

Throughout the period, the low absorption capacity of GoB institutions has been a major cause of delay in implementing almost all programmes. Absorption capacity issues have been linked to weak institutional capacity, aid governance problems and a lack of political will for reforms.

- “A fundamental lesson to be drawn from the 2002-2006 strategy is the low absorption capacity of GoB institutions, as a result of which disbursement levels have been rather low. The problem is common to all donors, as illustrated in Annex 5. It results from a number of factors, including weak institutional capacity, aid governance problems and a lack of political will for reforms. The latter was particularly true for the first health sector programme (HPSP), for which the EC was forced to decommit half of its €66 million contribution, when, following the 2001 elections, the in-coming government back-tracked on reforms previously agreed. Similarly, the implementation of the first sub-sector programme in primary education (PEDPII) has been hampered by limited Government ownership. The lesson to be drawn for the future strategy is to ensure involvement of the Government at the early stage of programme design so as to ensure high degree of ownership. This is all the more likely as the interventions proposed in the CSP 2007-2010 echo the GoB’s own reform plans set out in the PRSP”. (Source: EU, CSP 2007-2013, p.13)
- Absorptive capacity: Absorptive capacity has in the past been a major cause of delay in implementing almost all programmes and has held up a significant pipeline of projects for different donors. The frequent transfer of government officials over the lifecycle of a project results in repeated agreements with different officials on the planning of programmes. The slow internal approval process and coordination mechanisms strictly limits the number of bilateral inputs to absolutely strategic projects and strongly argues the case that other assistance should be channelled through major joint-donor approaches. As this experience is common to all development partners, the willingness to join hands is widespread.” (EU CSP 2007-2013, p.13)
- In 2013, “Corruption represents an obstacle for the smooth implementation of our programmes in all sectors. An amendment passed in October reduces the independence of the Anti-Corruption Commission, which already does not have the adequate means to operate. The Public Accounts Committee and Comptroller and Auditor General remain ineffective. The Audit Act was not passed in 2013. The implementation of National Integrity Strategy (NIS) is not adequate despite DP support.” (EU EAMR 2013)
- At the end of the evaluation period, the EU stresses the weaknesses of government absorption and institutional capacity: “Poor project execution prompting the government to cut foreign aid spending by nearly 9% in the development budget for

current fiscal year (Source: Financial Express 20 Jan 2015) coupled with the PFM deficiencies raise a risk of non-absorption of the increased 2014-2020 MIP financial allocation. Some programmes implemented by the government (Land Access, TPSP, INSPIRED) also face risks of not achieving expected results due to Ministry's staff weak capacity and high turnover". (EU EAMR 2014, p.13)

- Denmark further notes in its strategy the need "to support national capacity building to enhance sustainability, facilitate management of aid flows and strengthen implementation capacity at all levels of administration in order to enable the national structures to administer development assistance in an accountable and transparent way." (Source: Denmark Strategy 2005-2009, p.25)

B. Project level review:

Primary education:

PEDP3: capacity risk has been identified in the Action Fiche: "Another major risk is related to capacity of the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education/Directorate of Primary Education to plan, manage, implement and monitor a massive sector reform programme. This capacity risks are mitigated by careful sequencing of implementation steps and processes in the programme design to enabling policies into the results." However, the design of PEDP 3 insufficiently took into account the government's limited capacities and the adjustments required by the introduction of a new mode of intervention and partnership. The government partner also suffered from a high turnover of its staff, which has undermined the capacity development efforts.

PSD:

DK has viewed GoB financial management capacity as inadequate and too corrupt for alignment to national budget and transfer systems. SPEMP failure has not contributed to any changes herein. DK overestimated GoB's capacity/willingness to engage in policy level dialogue. At lower level there have also been lack of capacity to take on e.g. road maintenance and use of road software. LCS have also not developed capacity to act as businesses. In FFS capacity has been developed gradually as GoB/MoA has become convinced of the benefits and allocated more resources. EU's partners have slowly developed capacity within the BEST activities, whereas there has been limited progress in the SME strategy area. Financial sector has seen more progress in developing capacity to serve the SME sector (component 3 of INSPIRED). Still in RMG sector, there was a lack of capacity/willingness to implement necessary regulations to enforce amended labour act undermines progress.

Climate Change:

BCCRF overestimated MoEF and GoB capacity, so too little time, too little TA and too optimistic design. See I-731.

HR&D:

HR&D advocacy NGOs have been entirely dependent on EPs funding. The capacity of guardian institutions has been affected by government interference, that hampered their independence, and the effectiveness of their contribution to HR&D.

3. Instruments/procedures/risk mitigation strategies to monitor the political, economic and social context

A. Overall

The EU identified political risks (elections) and envisaged a programme with broad approach to mitigate them. "The underlying assumption behind all our programming is that the 2007 elections will be free and fair and that Bangladesh will continue to function as a democratic state. Within this scenario the main risks foreseen are that the incoming government does not maintain the commitments to improved governance set out in the PRSP and that relations between donors and government in key areas remain strained or deteriorate. A further risk is that the deeply partisan nature of politics in Bangladesh will persist following the next election to the degree that Parliament does not fulfil its role effectively and reforms are not legitimised by proper debate and consultation. Our strategy for mitigating these risks is to assure that our programme is sufficiently broad and flexible to accommodate a variety of approaches, to focus on the demand side of justice and good governance, and to ensure that we work collaboratively with other main donors to support the GoB in taking forward key reforms." Source: EU CSP 2007-2013, p.23

The MTR further stresses that "major weaknesses in the public sector's human resources management are affecting the country's performance not only in general, but also in development cooperation. The incessant and excessive rotation of government officials, due to systemic factors but also for political reasons, undermines all efforts to build

institutional memory and capacity, and stands in the way of more effective ownership of development activities by Government services.

Source: EU MTR EU CSP p.9

Further to the need, clearly identified in the course of the MTR, for more flexibility in the implementation of EU-Bangladesh cooperation and for resources to improve the Government's capacity to manage aid and improve aid effectiveness, the MIP envisaged to finance a Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF) (appr. €2 million) to accompany ongoing EU interventions (monitoring, evaluation, studies and seminars not covered by other means), prepare future ones and contribute jointly with other development partners and the Government of Bangladesh to ad hoc needs for studies, seminars and training in the context of joint cooperation interventions (including in the context of overarching issues such as the Joint Cooperation Strategy or civil service reform). It will allow the EU, by means of well targeted, small-scale interventions, to build further on achievements of past or ongoing assistance. It will also provide resources to help the EU and the Government prepare the next Country Strategy Paper. The TCF will likewise provide the much needed resources for continuous consultation by the GoB and the EU with Bangladesh's very extensive civil society on all issues of interest to EU-Bangladesh cooperation.

Source: EU MTR EU CSP p.18

Due to the specific situation of Bangladesh with heavier administrative procedures (TPP/DPP process and NGO Affairs Bureau approval) and the huge number of beneficiaries targeted by EU interventions, average length of programme implementation period (5 years) requires spreading payments beyond the usual 3 years (some major grants timeframe are 8 years while some international organization contribution agreements - UN, WB Trustfund - can last 10 years) (Source: EU EAMR 2013).

Denmark identified political risks as major risks and dialogue as mitigation.

- “Major risks for Denmark's development engagement in Bangladesh stem from the potential lack of political commitment to combat corruption, ensure rule of law and respect for human rights, and address inequality. Key tools are also regular policy dialogue with Government and close donor coordination.” “A key response to political risks will be regular policy dialogue with the Government – in close coordination with likeminded donors – and support to watchdog organisations.”

Source: Denmark Bangladesh Country Programme 2016 – 2021, Concept Note, 2014, p.10

Sweden has not made an explicit assessment of risks in its 2008-2012 strategy. The 2010 MTR of the cooperation strategy reports that “fiduciary risks still remain substantial or high” and that “GBS should not be considered, as an aid modality”.

B. Project level review:

The review of selected Danish interventions and EU interventions for PSD and primary education show that risks (e.g. political risks, capacity risks, fiduciary risks, GoB continued commitment) have often been identified during the formulation stage. Mitigation measures have generally not been made explicit.

Primary education:

During PEDP 3 design phase, the fiduciary risks associated with the treasury model were subject to a thorough analysis and extensive fiduciary-risk safeguards were put in place to mitigate them. *“Financial management risk:* The main challenge of the PEDP III is to ensure financial probity and minimise improper use of funds from the sector budget. To mitigate this risk, the government’s public financial management (PFM) system has been assessed extensively over the course of preparation for PEDP III. These reviews focused both on the national PFM system as well as sector-level capacity to manage and account for public funds. Based on the identified weaknesses, a sector PFM action plan has been developed that will provide assurance as to how programme funds will be managed and accounted for. Additional safeguards for partners implementing the treasury model include procurement exceptions and conducting of joint annual fiduciary assessments. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank will provide additional fiduciary oversights by closely monitoring the spending levels on the programme expenditure framework and budgets heads”. (Source: Action fiches). While general fiduciary risks remained a source of concern, the sector safeguards may be considered sufficient to pursue the treasury model for a second phase. However, the PEDP 3 procurement regime turned to be very complex in practice and source of major implementation delays. There is certainly scope to maintain the same degree of risk mitigation, while simplifying the procurement regime.

Fragmentation of the education sector and primary education sub-sector was identified as a major challenge and therefore risk in the design phase (EU *PEDP 3 Action Fiche*; EU, *BS ROM Report 2013*; WB, *Public Expenditure Review 2010*). More specifically, the need to integrate the numerous parallel projects (inc. EU supported ones) was also identified as a critical challenge. However, DPs (inc. the EU and SE) paid too little attention to this fragmentation challenge and worked within its parameters rather than attempting to develop a strategy to address it.

According to EU, *ROM BS Report 2013* (p.5): ‘the risk assessment should have been more profound in particular with ... sector finance and PEDP 3’s budget structure’. Even though the mid-term review provided analyses on these issues (WB, *MTR Economic Analysis, 2013*; WB, *MTR Financial Analysis, 2013*), these aspects have not been given a prominent place in the regular policy dialogue.

PSD:

DK identified a number of relevant risks/assumptions including :

- That the political and economic environment would be conducive to the process of enabling the private sector to gradually take over direct service delivery to farmers.
- This did not happen in the fisheries and livestock sector, which was a main driver of eventually phasing out support to MoFL.
- That public partner institutions (MOA/DAE; MOFL/DLS/DOF, and LGED) will adhere to national and sector policies as well as governance and accountability principles;
- There seems to have been limited improvements in governance and accountability.
- That the group-based Field School approach will be accepted as a major public extension delivery mechanism in cooperation with NGOs, CBOs and private commercial stakeholders in the sector;

→ Eventually the FFS became accepted but it demanded strong and persistent engagement.

- That LCS groups are accepted as sub-contractors for rural roads and markets;
- LCS did not become accepted as stand alone businesses, only with Danida funding.
- That existing training institutions will have the capacity to develop and implement planned training programmes;
- Only partially, but increasingly so.
- That mandates of DLS and DOF as public entities will be clarified on the basis of emerging sub-sector policies. In this context, that decisions will be taken to transfer the responsibility for direct veterinary practice as well as vaccine production and distribution to the private sector while, on the other hand reinforcing the regulatory capacity of DLS and DOF.
- This did not happen and was a main reason for not continuing support to DLS/DoF.

BEST (EU):

Identification of risks and assumptions presented in the Action Fiche.

- The most important being the continued commitment of the GoB to ensuring BSTI and BAB are autonomous
 - This has largely been the case and resulted in regional accreditation of BAB. EU through BEST has worked hard to convenience of the importance of this commitment and largely been successful.
- Participation of the two large interest organizations BKMEA and BGMEA (Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers Association), whereby both organizations have voiced concerns vis-à-vis strengthening the voice of workers
 - The implementer, GIZ had substantial experience in managing labour relations and succeeded in ensuring participation in the project.
- Continued commitment of the GoB to increase the number of inspectors
 - This has been an issue, but improved after Rana plaza.

INSPIRED (EU)

Identification of risks and assumptions presented in the Action Fiche.

Risks:

- GoB integrates the national strategy and action plan for SME development into the national budget and implements it.
 - Strategy still at draft stage, limited ownership so far.
- No change in Government policy that the SMEC/SMEF are the lead organisations in the sector
 - No changes, but both organisations have weak capacity.
- Business intermediary organisations continue to provide services for their members after the expiry of the project.
 - Unknown as projects are only to start
- Regulators utilise their new knowledge and skills to reform the regulatory environment
 - Seems to hold
- Continued interest of banks in SME financing
 - This has been the case.

Climate Change:

BCCRF (EU): Risks are succinctly presented in the Action Fiche.

HR & D:

EPs have been aware of risks but mitigation activities remained limited, e.g. as to NGOs : they have not been encouraged to explore other fundraising activities ; as to guardian institutions : the support was not conditional on the fulfillment of performance standards.

CHT (EU): the project proposal includes a risk analysis table identifying risks, evaluating their consequences, likelihood and level, and identifying mitigation measures. (Source: project proposal)

PERP (EU): “Specific objectives with enough flexibility to easily and effectively respond to unforeseen challenges and windows of opportunities.” “Flexibility in implementation and budgeting allowing for effective and timely response to unforeseen challenges and windows of opportunity.” (Source: project final report)

Gender:

OCC: The project proposal details potential risks and notes that a mitigation strategy should be developed during the formulation stage.

4. Responsiveness of EPs to changes in the context**A. Overall**

The political situation in 2013 led implementing partners to introduce contingency planning. “Political and security situation in 2013 had negative consequences on programme implementation and monitoring. In 2013, 172 days of hartal/blockade were held with a peak in November/December, resulting in loss of lives, violence, assets and infrastructure destruction and vandalism. Projects incurred delays in implementation, partners could not access target beneficiaries and had to adopt contingency plans to adapt to the situation.” (...) “Implementing partners have introduced contingency planning to adapt to the situation and limit the impact on the most vulnerable population. No suspension of contract was requested by partners, however if the situation continues in 2014, suspension might be considered.” “In addition, the political environment in 2013 slowed down most of the programmes, requiring extensions in many cases”. (EU, EAMR 2013)

B. Project level review:Primary education:

The EU support to non-formal education (SHARE) has played a critical gap-filling role to contribute to the enrolment of children from hard-to-reach areas and from poor socio-economic background. However, the potential benefit of the aid modality mix has not been fully exploited: the synergy with PEDP3 did not materialise. Only at the end of the evaluation period, the EUD has realised the potential benefit of a better coordination between both interventions. In the case of SE, the mix “RBM TA and support to PEDP

3” was effective and characterised by an important degree of flexibility, since the TA objectives were adjusted to the shifting modes of intervention from PEDP 2 to PEDP 3.

PSD:

DK has been somewhat more flexible than EU, having direct control over recruitment and management of TA, whereas EU has been relying on either consultancy company or international organizations. BEST has been able to respond to opportunities, less so INSPIRED.

Climate Change:

The modalities for BCCRF and partly for CDMP were not sufficiently responding to the actual challenges, needs and opportunities (to build climate finance readiness, to introduce at the local level a comprehensive DRR approach). (see I-731).

HR & D:

In HR&D, EPs interventions aimed at building the capacity of government institutions and civil society organizations. Political interference by the Government in the EPs partnerships with both categories of actors hindered flexible responses to changes in the country context. As a consequence, flexible responses to change rather came from political interventions, such as public statements. A good working relationship between the development people and the political advisors at the delegation/embassy level has been crucial to respond to an evolving situation.

EU interviewees noted a degree of inflexibility in aid modalities when rapid responses were needed in the HR&D field. Even though the Instrument for Stability offered the possibility to react more quickly, interviewees felt that the instrument was not responsive enough to address a quick changing environment.

4. Detailed facts and findings on primary education

4.1 Overall context of sector

Over the past twenty years, Bangladesh's education system has expanded considerably, at all levels, both in terms of enrolment and number of institutions. From the early 1990s to 2013, the country achieved significant progress in expanding the provision of primary education. In addition, in 2012, about 50 percent of preschool children were receiving some form of pre-primary education. Primary and lower secondary education completion have also systematically increased over time. The country achieved gender parity at both primary and secondary levels, ahead of the MDG target set for 2015. However, challenges have remained high especially to improve the retention within the system, to improve learning outcomes and to achieve an equitable access to primary education for all children including those in hard to reach areas and urban slums, the extreme poor and children with special educational needs.

4.1.1 National strategies and policies

The government of Bangladesh adopted in 2010 the *National Education Policy* (NEP) that defined strategic orientations for the sector including, at primary level, (i) the establishment of an integrated school system from pre-school to higher secondary levels, encompassing all public, NGO and private providers; (ii) the improvement of quality; (iii) the decentralisation of primary education; and (iv) the development of partnerships with NGOs and the private sector. The NEP specifically foresaw the extension of universal primary education to grade 8. The sector policy framework is complemented by the *National Skill Development Policy*, adopted in 2011, the *Comprehensive Early Childhood Development Policy* (2013) and the *Non Formal Education Act* (2014). Over the evaluation period, at primary level, the Primary Education Development Program 2 (PEDP2, 2004-2011) and the Primary Education Development Program 3 (PEDP3, 2011-16) constituted the government's key operational documents to achieve its ambitions in primary education. The PEDP3, under implementation since 2011 through a Sub-Sector Wide Approach, is stated to be aligned with the NEP but does not yet foresee the implementation of the envisaged extension of the primary cycle to grade 8.

4.1.2 Institutional context

Whilst the government is the main provider of primary education,⁵⁶ preschool including early childhood development services, non-formal, secondary and tertiary education are mainly supplied by private institutions. The primary education sub-sector (grade 1 to 5) is highly diversified: the government runs around half of all primary schools, catering for

⁵⁶ The official school age is 6-10 years old at primary level, 11-15 at secondary level.

about three quarters of enrolled children; Registered Non-Government Primary Schools (RNGPS), nationalised in 2013 and now known as Newly Nationalised Primary School (NNPS), enrol about 20% of children, whilst the remaining students attend *madrassas*, NGO-run non-formal centres and private for-profit schools. At secondary level, about 98% of the institutions are private, but they are mostly supported through public subsidies. Non-formal education is provided by more than 700 NGOs. The technical and vocational education and training (TVET) sub-sector, even though small, has been growing, with a major expansion of private institutions in the last two decades.

There are two ministries in charge of education: (i) the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MoPME), which covers primary education, non-formal basic education and literacy, and (ii) the Ministry of Education (MoE) which oversees secondary, higher and vocational education, but also *madrassas*, including those delivering primary education. There is limited coordination between the two ministries. Within MoPME, the Directorate for Primary Education (DPE) oversees the primary education sub-sector and the Bureau of Non-Formal Education (BNFE) is responsible for the implementation of non-formal education. Other government agencies are also involved in the process of delivery, including the National Academy for Primary Education (NAPE) in the area of teacher training and the National Curriculum and Textbook Board (under the Ministry of Education), which is responsible for developing curriculum and for textbooks printing and distribution. The Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) oversees works on school infrastructure.

4.2 Strategies of relevant EPs in the sector

European Union

Since the early 2000s, the EU has been continuously involved in Bangladesh's education sector. Its sustained engagement under the CSP 2007-2013, under the first priority area 'Human and Social Development', was justified by both the critical role played by education in meeting the PRSP and MDGs targets and by the EU's proven track-record in the sector. The EU's intervention in education aimed to support Bangladesh to work towards a more integrated education system that is inclusive and quality-oriented and to develop a sector-wide approach in education. According to the strategy, the EU's involvement in education was to cover three sub-sectors: primary, secondary and non-formal education. Following the mid-term review, it was decided, in 2010, to continue and step up the support to formal and non-formal primary education instead of shifting support to secondary education: this sub-sector was assessed as not mature enough to absorb donor resources on a scale comparable to the primary education sector. The strategy also insisted on the critical role played by quality vocational training and improved school-to-work transitions as necessary conditions for sustainable poverty reduction. The MIP 2014-2020 identifies 'Education and skills development' as one of its three focal sectors and foresees interventions in 1) primary education, with a focus on quality, 2) secondary education and 3) a continued support targeting 'hard-to-reach' children and urban slums. Under the next MIP, the EU will also continue to support the implementation of the 2011 *National Skills Development Policy* with an emphasis on improving quality and relevance of education, vocational training and skills development.

Sweden

The Swedish support to education in Bangladesh aimed to increase access to and to improve the quality of formal and non-formal primary education for children living in poverty with a particular focus on girls. It has been anchored within the broader cooperation strategy based on two axes – human rights and poverty reduction – translated into four principles (participation, accountability, non-discrimination and transparency). These principles influenced the Swedish strategic priorities in education with particular attention paid for instance to the education rights of disabled children and more generally to inclusive education, corporal punishment and reproductive rights. The Swedish cooperation also incorporated TVET interventions but under a private sector component. It also put an emphasis on the role of civil society organisations as watch dogs in the education sector to strengthen the accountability of the government to the society.

4.3 EPs portfolio of projects

European Union

The EU supported the government's *second Primary Education Development Programme* (PEDP 2, 2003-2011, €105m) through a joint financing agreement with the Asian Development Bank. PEDP 2 was a multi-donor programme covering the formal primary education subsector. It aimed to improve the quality of primary education and to strengthen sub-sector planning and management and focused on infrastructure development and teachers' recruitment.

The EU supports the government's *third Primary Education Development Programme* (PEDP 3, 2012-2017, €85m) implemented through a sub-Sector Wide Approach encompassing most interventions that support pre-primary and formal primary education. The EU programme has two main components: a budget support and a technical cooperation through an agreement with UNICEF.

The *Support to the Hard to Reach through Basic Education* (SHARE 2010-2017; €52m) aims to provide non-formal education to hard-to-reach children in slums and rural areas. It is implemented through four NGO-led initiatives: Shikhon II coordinated and monitored by Save the Children UK and implemented by three local NGOs; ALOGHAR (Lighthouse) is implemented by CARITAS Bangladesh in partnership with the association Secours Catholique CARITAS, France; UNIQUE II implemented by Dhaka Ahsania Mission and SUSTAIN implemented by Save the Children and 5 partner NGOs. A technical assistance component is dedicated to knowledge management, capacity building and coordination.

This two pillar strategy – support to PEDP 3 and SHARE – was meant to enable the EU to engage with the government and other partners at policy level on sector reform through the PEDP 3 policy dialogue mechanism, while still being able to provide direct assistance to the poorest and most needy segment of the population.

The *Upazila Model of School Improvement Programme* (2011-2014; €1.4m; budget line: NSA and local authorities) was implemented by Plan International UK, and aimed to implement a sustainable and replicable School Improvement Program (SIP) model in 142 primary

schools. It worked jointly with the local authorities, school management committees and CBOs to improve quality of teaching and learning, school management and joint planning and monitoring of school activities.

Ongikar (2013-2017; €2.6m) was implemented by Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE), an umbrella organisation of education NGOs, intended to conduct policy advocacy, awareness raising and capacity development of different stakeholders and actors, from grassroots to national levels.

Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Reform in Bangladesh (2007-2017; €13.5m) is implemented through a convention with the International Labour Organisation and supports the development of a market-oriented and flexible TVET system, which responds to the demand for competitive skills of the modern sector as well as to the needs of youth and under-privileged groups.

The *Erasmus Mundus* programme, aimed at enhancing the capacity of universities in third countries through the transfer of know-how and good practices from EU university partners.

The *Public Financial Management Improvement Program* (PFMIP 2009-2013; €15m) is the EU contribution to a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), administered by the World Bank, for the implementation of the “Strengthening Public Expenditure Management Program” (SPEMP). SPEMP was built around three key priority areas: (i) budget preparation and execution, (ii) internal and external auditing, and (iii) legislative and public oversight.

Sweden

SIDA supported the government’s second *Primary Education Development Programme* (PEDP 2, 2004-2011; SEK 255m) through a joint financing agreement with the Asian Development Bank (see above, under EU projects).

Third Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP 3; SEK 310m) supports the government’s PEDP3 implemented through a sub-Sector Wide Approach (see above under EU projects).

Result-based management technical assistance (RBM 2013- 2014; SEK 2.9m) aimed to support the Directorate of Primary Education in implementing PEDP3 focusing on the institutionalisation of the results-based management approach.

The *Basic Education for Hard to Reach Urban Working Children* (BEHTRUWC 2005–2013; SEK 182m) is a government project for 166 150 urban working children contributing to the gradual elimination of child labour. It is funded by the Government, UNICEF, Sweden and Canada.

The *Center for Mass Education in Science* (CMES; SEK 18m), co-funded with Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), has supported non-formal education. It aimed to

improve technical skills based curriculum, to provide support to employment/self-employment initiatives, gender and poverty monitoring, and community social enterprises.

The *Driving Change Project* (2009-2013; SEK 25m) is implemented by Transparency International Bangladesh that intended to create, through Committees of Concerned Citizens (CCCs) a conducive environment for participation in anti-corruption activities. It also aimed at expanding and sustaining the demand for accountability, transparency and efficient governance with particular relevance to the health and education sectors.

The *Bangladesh Reality Check* (2007-2011), which started in 2007, funded a longitudinal five-year study on how poor people perceive the health and education services. The objective was to make the poor people's voices heard, to detect up-coming trends, and to influence policymakers in the social sectors.

4.4 Facts and findings per Judgement Criteria for EQ3 and EQ4

EQ3: EPs support to primary education (Step 1)

JC3.1 Effects of DPs interventions in education on aid effectiveness in primary education (more predictable, coordinated, harmonised, aligned aid and lower transactions costs)

| JC3.1: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|---|---------------------|
| From PEDP1 to PEDP3, progress towards greater harmonisation, coordination and alignment | EPs strategy-level documents PEDP 2 and 3 documentation (formulation, disbursement, monitoring and completion reports) Interviews | Strong |
| PDP3 is a hybrid programme, anchored to a project approach. Key Swap features were not integrated (comprehensive view of sector finance, sector interlinkages, long term development of systems and trust in the government to deliver) | PEDP 3 documentation (formulation, disbursement, and monitoring reports) Interviews | Strong |
| The policy dialogue moved away from discussions on inputs but donors' disbursement imperatives and excessive focus on procurement prevented a more substantive dialogue on policy issues | PEDP 2 and 3 documentation (formulation, disbursement, monitoring and completion reports) Interviews | Strong |
| Donors' almost exclusive interlocutor has been the DPE. There has been hardly any direct dialogue with the MoF, the ministerial level (MoPME) or the MoE except through formal occasions such as joint annual review or mid- | Programme implementation documents Interviews | Strong |

| | | |
|---|--|--------|
| term review | | |
| Genuine efforts to improve the management of TA but it remained donor-driven and geared towards compliance rather than transfer of know-how | Programme implementation documents Interviews | Strong |
| BS was a relevant choice for the EU but its outcome indicators did not make any significant difference in the policy dialogue held; the suspension of disbursements in 2014 did not provide the EU with any leverage on PFM issues and undermined its credibility | Programme implementation documents Interviews | Strong |
| Dialogue led by the two development banks (IFIs) that made genuine efforts of harmonisation between them. Other donors (incl. EU and SE) overly relied on them. | Programme implementation documents Interviews | Strong |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|---|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Disbursements mechanisms (conditions, indicators etc.) better harmonised and more consistent with the government's strategies and policies | Data fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Disbursements according to plans included in financing agreements and consistent with government's budget cycle | Data partly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Existence of effective joint institutions for policy dialogue and performance monitoring, reduced numbers of parallel missions and meetings | Data fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Degree of involvement of all stakeholders (government in its various components, donors, CSOs) | Data fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Extent of use of government systems (incl. procurement) | Data fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Government-driven and coordinated mechanisms to identify and manage TA | Data fully available |

Disbursements mechanisms (conditions, indicators etc.) better harmonised and more consistent with the government's strategies and policies

From PEDP 1 (1997-2003) to PEDP 3 (2012-16), aid to primary education has become increasingly coordinated and harmonised as well as aligned with government's procedures and systems. Every new programme built on the lessons drawn from the previous one and was designed to mitigate the negative effects of the insufficient harmonization, coordination and alignment of aid practices that characterised its predecessor. From PEDP 1 to PEDP 3, the change in aid modalities (projects, basket funds and treasury model) has been a challenge for government officials. However, the PEDP 3 mid-term review reflects a consensus between stakeholders that PEDP 3 represents a step forward in terms of use

of government systems, strengthening government's ownership and systems' accountability, and donor harmonization (MoPME/DPs, *JARM May 2014 Record of Discussions*, p.6).

Prior to PEDP 2 (i.e. before 2004), there were at least 32 primary education projects under implementation (WB, *PEDP 2 Implementation report*, p.1). PEDP 2 was intended to mitigate the negative effects of a fragmented aid to the sector: eleven donors, including the EU and Sweden, contributed to a single programme, a Trust Fund (or basket fund), led by ADB. But funds were still channelled and managed through a managing and financing structure that was parallel to government systems. The common financial management mechanisms were also overly complicated and had perverse effects on the timely implementation of activities (DPE, *PEDP 3 Programme Document*, p. 4). PEDP 2 created very high transaction costs and did not encourage any focus on reforms (MN 200, representative of aid agency). Besides, coordination among donors was undermined by the tension between the ADB and the World Bank (MN 220, representative of aid agency).

The on-going PEDP 3 has been designed to overcome the difficulties faced by PEDP2. It is also a multi-donor programme (Asian Development Bank, Australia, Canada, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Nations Children's Fund, United Kingdom and the World Bank) but it is implemented through a Swap approach and based on the so-called 'Treasury model': donor funds are directly channeled to a Consolidated Account at the Treasury. Its working modalities are detailed in a Joint Financing Agreement signed by all participatory agencies, including Sweden and the EU. It represents an 'entirely new modality for aid delivery in Bangladesh' (EU, *ROM BS report 2013*, p.4).

Under PEDP 3, donors' disbursement mechanisms are largely aligned with the government's programme document. DPs disbursements are in part based on evidence of PEDP 3 expenditures through financial statement produced by the Integrated Budgeting and Accountancy System (IBAS) of the MoF. DPs disbursements are also based on 9 Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs) selected from the 29 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) included in the PEDP 3 document. These DLIs are the result of a compromise between the government and donors. They can be grouped in three categories: (i) improving quality of the learning, (ii) increasing participation and reducing social disparities, and (iii) improving program planning and management. For each DLI, a list of expected outputs/key actions to undergo has been identified for each implementing year. Each DLI is considered separately and disbursement is contingent upon meeting all the outputs for that indicator for a particular year. All DLIs are weighted equally. The 9 DLIs and the associated matrix of outputs are common to all participating donors, including the EU and Sweden. However, some DPs disbursement mechanisms combined variable and fixed tranches (including the EU, Sweden and ADB), while others only base their disbursement on variable tranches (including the WB and DFID).

Despite this alignment with government's policies and system, the 'treasury model' keeps many features of a project approach. Even though the term of 'budget support' is commonly used in Bangladesh to characterize this scheme, it differs from an EU-type sector budget support (SBS) in various ways. First, DPs disbursements are made against a specific list of eligible expenditures. In practice, out of GoB budget expenditures, this list

only excludes pensions, advances and discrete projects but the programme remains underpinned by an earmarking logic. Besides, even though DPs channel their funds through the treasury, several exceptions to the GoB Procurement Guidelines (2008) have been decided upon to ensure compliance with World Bank and ADB procurement rules. The ‘Treasury model’ could be appropriately characterised as a targeted or earmarked budget support with stringent fiduciary safeguards⁵⁷ (EU, *ROM BS Report 2013*, p.5). Moreover, if DPs have spoken to the government with “one voice”, the latter has overly been determined by the two leading agencies, ADB and the World Bank, which tend to “run the show” (MN 206). These two agencies have made robust efforts in harmonizing their procedures: i.e. the mutual recognition of their list of black-listed companies, the development of a standard bidding document and a common procedure in case of flawed procurement (MN 220). As a result, tensions that existed during PEDP 2 due to ADB’s leading role have been lessened. However, during the first three years of implementation, other participating donors mainly relied on the two development banks. The complexity of the programme, the legacy of PEDP 2 when donors delegated their decision-making power to ADB and human resource constraints prevented them from formulating alternative views or raising issues.

The choice of this ‘hybrid system’ (MN 200) was based on several arguments. Even though the overall PFM environment was assessed as challenging, financial management in education was considered relatively strong. Besides, donors felt that, throughout the implementation of PEDP 2, the government demonstrated a growing leadership and ownership. Finally, there was a recognition of the high transaction costs associated with a Trust Fund. However, the two main leading agencies – the World Bank and ADB - have specific guidelines and restrictions on the amount they can spend through budget support (or ‘programme lending’). Besides, despite the robustness of sector PFM, they were not ready to entirely rely on government procurement procedures. This middle-ground position also met the preferences of other main participating donors, such as DFID that has adopted, since 2010, a more cautious approach to budget support or JICA which has only recently become a budget support provider. Given the context, the treasury model or earmarked budget support may be considered as the appropriate aid modality (EU, *ROM BS Report*, p.5). However, many of the challenges faced by the implementation of PEDP 3, have been rooted in its hybrid nature.

EU and Sweden specificities:

The EU support to PEDP 3, while anchored to the SWAP, slightly differs from the general scheme. As a genuine sub-sector budget support, its funds are not tied to a list of eligible expenditures. Besides, the EU added to the joint list of DLIs two specific outcome-level indicators (to be used as of 2013-14): ‘completion rate at primary level for boys and girls’ and a ‘upazila level composite performance indicator’. Further, the EU financing agreement includes the two general eligibility conditions related to sound macroeconomics and public finance management that need to be documented by the MoF, which has been responsible of submitting payment requests; for other participating DPs, payment requests have to be submitted by the MoPME.

⁵⁷ For details on fiduciary safeguards see JC3.3.

The two EU-only outcome indicators reflect a divergence, among PEDP 3 donors, about the meaning of result-based management, which is a structuring feature of the programme. Whilst the EU strategy is to promote a focus on outcomes, the World Bank and the ADB apply a traditional approach linking disbursements to reforms and outputs. This major divergence was pointed out by the EU HQ services during the formulation phase of the programme (EU, *QSG minutes*). The dominant output-based orientation was actually the result of intense negotiations during the formulation phase between the EU and other main donors (specifically World Bank/CIDA and the EU) (interview with EU Delegation, MN 205).

In practice, the two general eligibility criteria have also been problematic, for several reasons. First of all, the government (MoPME and MoF) consider them as being additional requirements or an ‘extra burden’ (MN 202, MN 208, MN 209). This perception has been related to the need to prepare an additional report, specific to the EU, and to be submitted by the MoF. While the EU programme – as a fully-fledged budget support – is in principle more aligned with the government’s system than the treasury model used by other donors, the Bangladeshi partners view it as a breach to donors’ commitment to harmonization and coordination.

Second, the PFM ‘conditionality’ has been tied to the performance of a specific multi-donor and World Bank-led project (SPEMP)⁵⁸ rather than to general progress in the government’s PFM reforms. The underperformance of the SPEMP - largely rooted in project design and management issues as well as lack of ownership - has partly fed the EU decision to suspend its disbursement in 2013; other partners that financed both PEDP 3 and SPEMP, including EU MS, did not follow suit, even though most shared the EU concerns over fiduciary risks. The relevance of the framing of the EU PFM conditionality as tied to a donor project is doubtful.⁵⁹ Moreover, the decision to suspend the disbursement was taken in a context where the partner country and other DPs were in a learning phase as regards the EU SBS mechanisms. When taking the suspension decision, the EU headquarters paid insufficient attention to the risk of undermining efforts aimed at building a good country-level understanding of the SBS instrument, especially since this requires a relatively long learning period. Obviously, this context was not conducive to learning and acceptance of the EU SBS instrument by the stakeholders (MoPME, MoF and other donors). This also reflects the limits of coordination/harmonization among EU member states: the suspension decision (2014) was taken unilaterally by the EU headquarters, against the Delegation’s recommendation and without consultation with other EU member states. In addition this decision did not provide the EU with a greater leverage to promote PFM reforms and undermined its credibility towards the government (MoPME and the MoF). Most officials interviewed had a negative perception of the EU, as an agency, labelled as ‘the most rigid, the most conservative partner’ (MN 204). In a context where the PEDP 3 has mainly been a DPE-implemented project, the EU suspension has been perceived as an irrational decision, including by other prominent donors (MN 220). The EU ‘makes PEDP 3 suffer’ (MN 222), whilst SPEMP has been out

⁵⁸ ‘General Conditions for fixed tranche release require evidence of satisfactory progress in implementing the Strengthening Public Expenditure Management Programme (SPEMP)’.

⁵⁹ This issue was actually raised during the formulation phase at the EU QSG.

of control of the DPE officials. Besides, sector fiduciary risk safeguards have been in place. The EU BS logic – which assumes a governmental collegiality or interdependence through the budget under the responsibility of the MoF – has had, so far, no resonance in the Bangladeshi aid context.

In general, the various actors (MoF, MoPME and other DPs) have faced challenges in understanding the logic of the instrument and its implications, especially in contrast with the ‘treasury model’. During the formulation phase, the EU delegation, together with HQ staff, devoted efforts to explain the BS instrument to government partners (MoF and MoPME). However, the high degree of staff turnover within the administration implied that the people who were sensitized were no longer in post when the implementation started.

Disbursements according to plans included in financing agreements and consistent with government’s budget cycle:

Ideally, donors’ disbursements should occur during the 3rd quarter of the calendar year, at the beginning of the fiscal year, to ensure the predictability of DPs flows of funds to the Consolidated Fund. The EU Financing Agreement evokes annual disbursements, scheduled after the May JARM. However, the JFA foresees bi-annual disbursements, in July and January, following bi-annual review arrangements.

The various JARM and JCM aide memoires show that the timing of DPs’ disbursements has varied quite substantially between DPs and that they mostly happened in the first quarter of the calendar year, corresponding to the third quarter of Bangladesh’s fiscal year. Moreover, in many cases, funds disbursed were below the planned amount. In FY 11-12, DPs provided US\$153M to the Consolidated Fund, i.e. 71% of their commitment for year 1. By March 2013, the EU should have disbursed three tranches worth €13.5M, but had only disbursed the first €4.5M Fixed Tranche (EU, *ROM BS Support Report 2013*, p.7).

**Table 1 - DPs’ planned vs actual cumulative disbursements as of 30/06/2014
(in thousand Taka)**

| Development Partner | Planned | Disbursed | Percent |
|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|
| World Bank | 17 023 600 | 14 670 079 | 86,2 |
| ADB | 18 571 200 | 14 757 451 | 79,5 |
| DFID | 7 970 140 | 7 739 539 | 97,1 |
| EU | 2 499 374 | 1 101 777 | 44,1 |
| CIDA | 2 476 160 | 915 273 | 37,0 |
| SIDA | 2 089 260 | 1 844 981 | 88,3 |
| UNICEF | 23 214 | 16 040 | 69,1 |
| JICA | 1 392 840 | 909 769 | 65,3 |
| AusAid | 1 624 980 | 1 938 567 | 119,3 |
| Total | 53 670 768 | 43 893 475 | 81,8 |

Source: the author based on DPE, *PEDP 3 Main Document, Annex F* for planned disbursement; DPE, *Unaudited Interim Financial Report 4th quarter 2014* for actual disbursements. Exchange rate (30/09/2014): 1USD= 77,38 Taka.

A main reason for these delays lies in the process to reach an agreement on the fulfilment of DLIs, which is considered lengthy, tedious and putting excessive demands on the government officials: ‘GoB institutions are burdened with onerous requirements set forth in DLIs protocols, such as time-consuming and resource-intensive evidence collection’ (ibid).

EPs’ specificities:

For the EU PEDP 3 programme the timely submission of payment requests has been a challenge (EU, *Disbursement Report 3*, p.3). This has been mainly due to the novelty of budget support in Bangladesh. In contrast with other DPs, this delay has been worsened by the fact that, whilst the MoPME sends its payment requests directly to PEDP 3 DPs, the EU requires the payment request to be submitted by the MoF through the ERD (EU, *ROM BS Report 2013*, p.5).

Existence of effective joint institutions for policy dialogue and performance monitoring that have led to lower transaction costs

Under PEDP 2, besides the common financial management arrangements, a number of other good aid practices were adopted, such as joint reporting systems, joint missions, and annual sector performance review procedures (EU, *PEDP 3 Disbursement Report 2012*). PEDP 3 has contributed to reinforce the mechanisms for joint policy dialogue and performance monitoring and to decrease the number of parallel missions.

Within the broader framework of the Local Consultative Group (LCG), the LCG Education Working Group (ELCG) is the DP-government body for policy dialogue and coordination body in the education sector. It has approximately 30 members. The ELCG, chaired by the MoPME, has set up several sub-groups including a Skills Development Working Group, a non-formal education sub-group and the PEDP 3 Consortium that gathers the DPs supporting the PEDP 3. The PEDP 3 Consortium has itself set up four working groups (Administration & Monitoring, Disparity, Quality, and Procurement & Finance). Sector PFM issues are mainly discussed at the Procurement & Finance Working Group (PFWG), co-chaired by the World Bank and ADB. In theory, these working groups are supposed to engage into meaningful discussions about policy reform proposals and more technical issues.

The key instrument for sector coordination is the Joint Financing Agreement (JFA), signed by the Government and DPs, including the EU and Sweden. The arrangements set out in the document include (i) common system and procedures for information sharing, decision making, monitoring and reporting; (ii) joint government and development partners consultation procedures and annual joint review processes; (iii) common instrument and model for flow of funds and disbursement arrangements for development partners via the treasury model. The JFA also specifies Program Expenditure Framework and Budget Heads and disbursement conditions based on achievement of the agreed DLIs.

Sector performance is jointly assessed twice a year, through a Joint Consultation Meeting held in November, and a Joint Annual Review (JARM) in May. Means of verification include an Annual Sector Performance Report (ASPR), which is edited every year by the

Directorate of Primary Education (DPE) of MoPME. The ASPR reports the status of 14 key performance indicators of primary school level quality indicators (PSLQI) and of selected programme-level output indicators as per the monitoring and evaluation matrix of PEDP 3. It also includes the budget execution report, the disbursement linked indicators (DLIs) overview, and the annual strategy based on lessons learned. These performance reviews are supplemented by quarterly and annual fiduciary reviews: the former verify Interim Unaudited Financial Reports (IFR) by extracting financial information from relevant institutions and visiting sample field offices; the latter examine financial management and procurement in PEDP 3 focusing on payment processing, payroll, personnel and procurement⁶⁰. In total, each year, the government has to provide DPs with 16 reports (DPE, *PEDP 3 Programme Document*, p. 19)⁶¹.

From PEDP 2 to PEDP 3, the nature of the policy dialogue has changed, with a greater focus on policy reforms away from discussions around inputs. However, the current set-up for policy dialogue and performance monitoring has some detrimental effects. The dominant output-focused approach has had two negative effects on the nature of the dialogue between the government and donors. First, the dialogue has mainly focused on the 9 DLIs and neglected other key performance indicators, which are not addressed in the working groups (EU, *Aide memoire disbursement report 2012*; EU, *ROM BS Report 2013*; MN 200, 205 and 219). Besides, the sector review joint missions and discussions held within working groups have rather been geared towards a control of compliance than towards strategic discussions around key education reforms. Despite the stated objective of conducting a policy dialogue on reforms, interactions between DPs and government officials have been very much dominated by DPs tendency to micro-management (MN 205, 219, 220, aid agencies representative; EU *ROM BS Report 2013*, p.7). This goes against one key ambition of a Swap, which is to promote a 'process-oriented approach through learning by doing' (OECD, *Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery Vol.2*, p.36).

Even though PEDP 3 appears far less donor-driven than PEDP 2, the dialogue has remained overly shaped by donors' internal imperative to 'move money' (MN 200, aid agency representative). In this context, the EU outcome indicators did not achieve their intended objective, i.e. to shift the discussion away from outputs towards a more outcome-oriented approach. They were forgotten in the dialogue, the EU Delegation being the only stakeholder concerned by their monitoring (MN 205, 219, aid agencies representatives).

Moreover, the working groups under the PEDP 3 consortium have become a bureaucracy in the name of harmonisation and coordination. This form of dialogue – the working groups, the performance review missions and consultation meetings – has not been associated with low transaction costs for the government. For instance, in 2013, the JARM was held between the 19th of May and the 11th of June, implying that senior officials in the

⁶⁰ PFM issues are dealt with under JC 3.3.

⁶¹ Quarterly financial reports, annual fiduciary review reports, annual audit report, approved budget, procurement plan, PFM progress report, annual Compliance with Environmental Safeguard Report, annual Compliance with Social Safeguards report, annual report on Compliance with Inclusive Education and Gender Action Plans, semi-annual and annual reports on Progress and achievement of DLIs, annual sector performance report, the school census report, annual sub-component progress report, the Annual Operational Plan and provisional budget for the following year, an annual report on information for policy dialogue.

MoPME and MoF have been monopolised by donors' demands during three weeks. If one factors in the preparatory time and the other reviews in the year (the annual JCM, the fiduciary reviews, etc.), this scheme excessively crowds out the government's 'policy space'. According to *EU, ROM BS Report 2013* (p.7), 'key stakeholders clearly suffer from a lack of capacity to provide DLI related evidence ... and seriously resent having to spend time on purely administrative/clerical work'.⁶²

The choice of verification protocols for some DLIs has insufficiently taken into account their practical implications for the administration: for instance, the proof of transparency in the recruitment of teachers that involved one million candidates, for 15,000 posts or the verification of SLIP transfers to schools (school level improvement plan) based on bank statements. This tedious process to collect evidence on DLIs fulfilment has rather resulted in a confrontational than a collaborative relationship between the government and DPs and fuelled a lack of trust that hampers a constructive dialogue and undermines government's ownership (*EU, ROM BS report 2013*, p.7-8).

However, since the beginning of the programme, donors have shown a certain degree of flexibility and managed to adjust the protocols of DLIs verification to take account of government's implementing challenges. The structure of the working groups has also been modified to improve the quality of discussions. Finally, DPs' micromanagement has also enabled them to develop their knowledge about government constraints and systems, which constitutes a condition for meaningful policy dialogue. Yet, DPs could arguably strike a better balance between their disbursement imperatives and the longer-term objective of a Swap: to 'broaden partner countries' ownership of decisions about sectoral policy, strategy and spending' and to encourage 'long-term capacity/system development in sector' (*OECD, Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery Vol.2*, p.36).

Finally, the PEDP 3 consortium's working groups overrode the ELGC itself as the main locus for dialogue. In practice, the ELGC has met very infrequently and the dialogue has been monopolised by PEDP 3. The ELGC was initially supposed to have a full sector wide coverage, including other sub-sectors that are under the responsibility of the MoE. The ELGC, initially meant to be co-chaired by the two ministries, has been headed by the MoPME. When the ELGC convened, only MoE junior officials participated to the meetings, which were in any case focused on PEDP 3 issues. PEDP 3 donors, under the IFIs' leadership, have contributed to undermining the ELGC, which could have been the appropriate body to address issues related to inter-linkages between education sub-sectors. This is all the more problematic that the extension of primary education to grade 6-8 or the development of vocational training constitute important strategic orientations for the country and require strategic planning across sub-sectors.

EPs' specific role in policy dialogue

The EU's influence in policy dialogue has necessarily been shaped by its relatively minor financial contribution compared to the other PEDP 3 partners. In addition, in accordance with the aid effectiveness principles and contrary to the World Bank or the ADB, the EU has not had any regular interactions with the government outside the main joint review

⁶² See also MN 202, government officials: 'Conditionalities consume the dialogue, we have less time for substantive issues'.

missions/consultation meetings. This lack of direct access to the government prevented the EU from making use of the full-intended benefits of the instrument. In addition, it did not offer the EU the necessary space to have a specific dialogue on the instrument, its logic and specific disbursement mechanisms. This certainly contributed to the insufficient internalization of the instrument within the government.

The EU has tried to influence the policy dialogue despite its relatively minor financial contribution, for instance as the chair of the ELCG in 2014. However, during the time the EU was chairing, this body only met three times, which limited the EU's possibility to shape discussions. Other DPs valued both the Swedish and EU contributions to the policy dialogue. The EU as a whole (EU, DFID, Sweden) is the second largest DP to PEDP 3 in financial terms, after the ADB and almost at parity with the World Bank. However, to date, there has been limited joint effort between EU member states to shape common positions. As a result, the coordinated approach and disbursement imperatives of the two development banks have dominated the dialogue (MN 205).

Degree of involvement of all stakeholders (government in its various components, donors, CSOs)

The formulation of PEDP 3 included a wide participatory process in which all stakeholders were actively involved, including CSOs (EU, *PEDP 3 QSG minutes*; MN 207, CSO representative). The implementation process has changed the degree of inclusiveness. DPs' quasi-exclusive counterpart has been the DPE (MoPME) and limited discussion has occurred at ministerial level, outside formal meetings during JARMS and the mid-term review. Apart from the lack of involvement of other sub-sectors throughout the period, already mentioned, there has been minimum involvement of other implementing agencies (LGED, the National Academy for Primary Education; and the National Curriculum and Textbook Board) and other departments in the MoPME. Moreover, in practice, PEDP 3 has not encouraged a more inclusive dialogue with e.g. the Ministry of Finance (MN 205, 206).

The collaboration with the civil society, which characterized the PEDP 3 design phase, was not sustained during implementation. As argued by an aid agency official, 'the idea of a joint responsibility was lost' (MN 200). Some CSOs are members of the ELGC, but, as noted above, this body is largely dysfunctional. CSOs are invited to the meetings of the joint annual review missions but their inputs are not, in general, taken into account. Besides, because CSOs are not involved in the preparatory process of the initiatives discussed at the JARM, their ability to challenge presentations in JARM meetings is limited. CSOs considered their invitation as an instrument of mere legitimization (MN 207, CSOs' representative). In the context of the negotiation of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), the government has recently agreed to integrate CSOs, through the umbrella organization CAMPE (Campaign for Popular Education), in PEDP 3 working groups. Finally, the place of teachers' unions in the policy dialogue remains unclear.

DPs' role

Development partners, including the EU and Sweden, have consistently pushed for a better inclusion of CSOs within the policy dialogue structure. However, their efforts have been hampered by the traditional distrust between the government and CSOs. Besides,

donors have not developed a coordinated approach to their support to advocacy CSOs. For instance, both DFID and the EU have supported CAMPE but there has been no discussion between the two agencies about a joint strategic approach or the possibility of a joint steering committee. Besides, DPs have not engaged with teachers' unions, considered as highly politicized.

Government-driven and coordinated mechanisms to identify and manage TA

PEDP 3 has been designed with a view to overcome the problems faced under PEDP2, when 'TA was sometimes underutilized, unfocused, or ineffective' (DPE, *PEDP3 Programme Document*, p.5). TA was also overly donor-driven. 'There is consensus among all stakeholders that the design and coordination of the consultants was not very effective and the performance only partly satisfactory' (ADB, *PEDP 2 Completion Report*, p.60). Prior to the start of PEDP 3, the Directorate of Primary Education undertook a systematic assessment of TC/TA needs. Based on this survey, a rolling plan was drafted and then updated on a regular basis, as part of the joint annual review missions. In practice there have been three broad pools of TA: AusAid and the EU through UNICEF; ADB and some others; and technical cooperation procured directly by the government. In addition, JICA and DFID directly funded parallel TA arrangements.

Despite a decrease in parallel funding in comparison with past situation, the management of TA has remained problematic. The provision of TA has still been very much donor-driven and the interventions rather geared towards compliance of DLIs than transfer of know-how. As noted by an aid programme officer, 'most requirements are achieved by consultants' (MN 205) and most reports also produced by them. For instance, the national student learning assessment that falls under the responsibility of the M&E Division within DPE (MoPME) is largely produced by experts based in Australia and Washington, without any involvement of staff from the M&E division, except for data collection. From the first learning assessment exercise in 2006 until 2015, there has been no capacity transferred to the Division (MN 203 and 209). As another example, DFID has provided TA to support the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) to prepare the PEDP 3 audit report: its role is not only to build the capacity of CAG but also, explicitly, to 'assess the level of compliance with PEDP3 requirements' (EU, *PFM report*, p.10).

TA is overly shaped by a 'gap-filling' approach, on a short-term basis, rather than a long-term capacity development orientation. Some features of the Bangladeshi administration, which is characterised by a high degree of staff turn-over, have contributed to the lack of sustainable transfer of know from TA. However, the output-oriented nature of PEDP 3 and the prevailing project management approach have played a critical role in preventing TA from playing a genuine institutional building role. 'TA remains patchy and is only provided as a last resort ahead of deadlines' (EU, *ROM BS Report 2013*, p. 8). The sustainability of capacity building initiatives, which already caused serious difficulties under PEDP 2 (EU, *ROM Report PEDP2*, 2010, p.4) has remained a major concern under PEDP 3. As already noted, donors could strike a better balance between their disbursement imperatives and the long-term capacity building objectives that may be better achieved through 'learning by doing' and 'trials and errors' processes.

EPs' specific role

The EU played a key role in encouraging a rationalization of TA both under PEDP 2 and PEDP 3. Under PEDP 2, the EU delegation changed its initial approach to an ad-hoc needs-based facility, enabling the government to request TA when needed. The EU delegation has been heavily engaged in supporting the government in identifying the required TA (formulating TORs) (EU, *ROM Report PEDP 2*, 2010, p.3). Under PEDP 3, it encouraged the alignment with the DPE TA/TC rolling plan. The EU has chosen UNICEF as its implementing partner of its TA to contribute to the decrease of TA schemes (UNICEF also implemented AusAid's TA component). This choice was also determined by the procedures available to the EU to mobilise TA. This choice was initially not supported by the government (MoF/ERD, *Minutes of the tripartite meeting on the Action Fiche PEDP3*, Nov. 2011). Besides, the arrangement with UNICEF raised practical challenges: the organization conducts parallel discussions with the government without acknowledging its EU/AusAid co-funding (MN 205).

Sweden's Result-Based Management technical assistance, in 2013 and 2014, was very effective. Good quality TA were mobilized and provided critical support to the Directorate of Primary Education in improving key planning and monitoring tools: the Annual Operational Plan (AOP), the Annual Sector Performance Report and the Annual Primary Schools Census. Efforts were also made to institutionalize RBM at local level, through training sessions with local officials (ADB/SIDA/DPE, *TA 8085-BAN: Support for the Third Primary Education Development Project. Results-Based Management Technical Assistance. Final Report*, 2014). However, consistent with the prevailing approach under PEDP 3, capacity development for planning and monitoring was not envisaged at ministerial level and overly focused on the Directorate of Primary Education, which goes against the objectives of a Swap. The AOP only covers DPE's activities. Initially, annual sector performance reports only focused on PEDP activities, which represent only a subset of the DPE activities. With time, the scope of the report has slightly been expanded to cover discrete projects, which fall outside PEDP 3, and the document provides some budget information for the whole MoPME. However, the technical assistance did not promote a broader coverage of the annual primary schools census to include, for instance, non-formal learning centres.

JC3.2 Effects of DPs' interventions in education on fiscal space for primary education


| JC3.2: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|--|---|------------------------|
| Financial resources allocated to primary education raised significantly, especially for the development part | Author's calculation based on MoF data (provided by the EUD) | More than satisfactory |
| GDP share for public education and primary education expenditures among the lowest in the world | World Development indicators World Bank Public Expenditure Review 2010 | More than satisfactory |
| DPs support supplemented the government effort, on a relatively small, but non-negligible, scale | Annual sector performance report 2014 | Indicative |

| | | |
|---|--|------------|
| DPs showed little interest in sector finance and in the implications of the lack of predictability of their disbursements | EU PEDP 3 Action Fiche and QSG Minutes PEDP 3 documentation (formulation, disbursement, and monitoring reports) Interviews | Strong |
| PEDP 3 low execution rate (in comparison with initial funding plan) but MoPME good execution rate (based on revised budget) | Annual sector performance reports WB MTR Economic Analysis | Indicative |
| Complex procurement regime (ADB, WB, national system) challenging for government officials and caused implementation delays | Interviews PEDP 3 documentation (formulation, disbursement, and monitoring reports) | Strong |
| EU attempted to promote a focus on sector finance and outcomes through DLI inc. their specific outcome indicators but this was not successful | Interviews PEDP 3 documentation (formulation, disbursement, and monitoring reports) | Strong |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|--|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evolution of budgetary allocations to education and primary education | <i>Data partly available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evolution of actual expenditures in education and primary education | <i>Data partly available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Influence of TF/Swap on the observed changes and EU/Sweden specific role | <i>Data partly available</i> |

Due to steady economic growth over the evaluation period, the volume of public spending on education increased steadily, in nominal terms. In particular, the budget of the MoPME more than doubled, in nominal terms, between FY 2007-08 and FY 2013-14 (see figure below). The growth in the development part was even more pronounced: over 180% in the same period. The development part does not only cover infrastructure investments but also non-salary recurrent spending such as stipends and provision of textbooks. While the growth in recurrent expenditures was steady over the evaluation period, the increase in development expenditure accelerated after FY 2011-12, which corresponds to the PEDP 3 implementation. Between FY 2008-09 and FY 2013-14, the spending unit also doubled in nominal terms, to reach about 8,000 Taka per student (80€).⁶³

⁶³ Calculated based on 2008 and 2013 enrolment (GPS and RNGPS) and budget allocation for FY 2008-09 (revised budget) and FY2013-14 (budget).

Figure 1 - Evolution of MoPME Budget

Source: Author's own calculations, based on 'budget briefs', MoF web site, various years. Note: revised budget except for FY 2013-14 (for that year, voted budget).

Nevertheless, the budget effort toward the MoPME declined from 6.1% in FY 2008-09 to 4.8% in FY2011-12. Despite a rise in the next two fiscal years, its FY 2013-14 level (5.4% of the budget) was still below its 2008-09 level.⁶⁴ More generally, Bangladesh spending on education remained below international norms. Between FY 2008-09 and FY 2013-14, the education share of total government expenditure always remained below 15%, and its GDP share below 2 percent - well below the EFA benchmark of 20% and 6% respectively and low by international/regional comparison.⁶⁵ The GDP share for public education and primary education expenditures remains among the lowest in the world. Besides, the budget has been subject to increasing pressure mainly due to the nationalisation of registered non-government schools, which required absorbing about 114,000 additional teachers on the civil service pay roll from FY13/14. Finally, the unit cost of construction increased due to inflation and the change of the design (WB, *MTR Economic Analysis*, p.3).

Table 2 - Education Budget Overview

| | 2007-08 | 2008-09 | 2009-10 | 2010-11 | 2011-12 | 2012-13 | 2013-14 |
|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Education budget as % of GDP | | 2.09 | 2.04 | 2.30 | 2.20 | 2.06 | 2.11 |
| Education budget as % of gov budget | 13,3 | 13,1 | 14,3 | 14 | 11,4 | 11,1 | 11,3 |
| MoPME Budget as % of Education Sector | 46,1 | 45,4 | 43,3 | 44 | 42,1 | 45 | 47,5 |
| MoPME non-dev exp as % of gov non-dev | 5,8 | 5,1 | 5,1 | 5,9 | 5,2 | 5,0 | 4,9 |

⁶⁴ Author's own calculations, based on 'budget briefs', MoF web site, various years.

⁶⁵ According to UNESCO, *Global Education Index 2012*, public expenditures as % of GDP was 3.7% in India, 3.8% in Nepal and 2.9% in Pakistan.

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| MoPME dev exp as % of gov non-dev | 8,1 | 8,7 | 9,5 | 8,2 | 5,8 | 7,3 | 7,8 |
| Allocation MoPME (Crore Taka) | 5273 | 5578 | 6842 | 7993 | 7727 | 9453 | 11930 |

Source: Author's own calculations, based on "Budget briefs", MoF web site, various years; DPE, *ASPR 2014*, p. 83 and DPE, *ASPR 2013*, p. 110. Note: revised budget for all years except FY 2013-14 (budget). Education budget made of MoPME and MoE (education division) budgets.

PEDP 3 is financed by the Government and nine DPs for a total cost of USD 8.4 billion for both the revenue (USD 4.18 billion) and development budgets (USD 3.34 billion) (DPE, *PEDP3 Document Programme*, p. iv). The indicative total contribution of the DPs is USD 1,055.5 million or 12% of PEDP 3 budget and 37% of its development budget.

Table 3 - Indicative schedule of Development Partners disbursements (in USD million)

| Development Partner | 2011/12 | 2012/13 | 2013/14 | 2014/15 | 2015/16 | Total | Percent |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|---------|
| ADB | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 0 | 320 | 30.3 |
| World Bank | 60 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 0 | 300 | 28.4 |
| DFID | 32 | 33 | 38 | 41 | 46 | 190 | 18.0 |
| EU | 6.2 | 12.4 | 13.7 | 15.1 | 22.6 | 70 | 6.6 |
| CIDA | 0 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 65 | 6.2 |
| Sida | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 45 | 4.3 |
| AusAid | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 35 | 3.3 |
| Jica | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 30 | 2.8 |
| Unicef | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Total | 200.3 | 243.5 | 249.8 | 254.2 | 107.7 | 1,055.5 | 100.0 |
| <i>DLI (variable)</i> | <i>151</i> | <i>180</i> | <i>185.5</i> | <i>188.5</i> | <i>73.5</i> | <i>778.5</i> | |
| <i>Fixed tranches</i> | <i>58.1</i> | <i>66.1</i> | <i>66.1</i> | <i>66.1</i> | <i>26.6</i> | <i>283</i> | |

Source: adapted from DPE, *PEDP3 Programme Document, Appendix F*. The EU amount was revised to €85.5M.

PEDP 3 also triggered a shift in the composition of MoPME budget, with a greater weight to development expenditures: non-development expenditures decreased from 61% of the budget in 2011-12 to 55% in 2012-13 (DPE, *ASPER 2013*, p.111).

The development budget also encompasses a list of 'discrete projects' (16 in 2013/14). Their share in MoPME development budget decreased from 69% in 2011 to 50% in 2012 due to the expansion of PEDP3 activities. Yet, their total budget in 2013/04 was equivalent to the PEDP3 budget (DPE, *ASPR 2014*, p.87). The most important project in terms of finance is the 'Primary education stipend program'. Another discrete project intends to construct 1,500 schools in underserved areas. These initiatives, consistent with PEDP 3 objectives, were left out of the bigger programme (PEDP 3). They are financed both by the government and foreign agencies, with the share of the latter on the increase (from 13% of the total budget of discrete projects in FY2011-12 to 27% in FY 2013-14). These foreign agencies include donors involved in PEDP 3: it is the case of the EU supported school feeding programme. The integration of the Stipend programme under PEDP 3 was discussed during the mid-term review but was further postponed until robust and systematic evidence is available about the achievements of the programme.

In terms of execution, since 2010/11, MoPME has achieved positive results with an execution rate consistently above 90%. Spending on development budget was more uneven, although the execution rate improved in 2012/13 in comparison with 2011/12. In 2011/12, PEDP3 had a very slow start, due to the late approval of the Annual Operational Plan (AOP), in October 2012, four months into the financial year. In 2012/13, the AOP planning process was much improved, resulting in an overall improvement in the execution of the development budget (DPE, *ASPR 2013*, p.112).

Table 4 - MoPME Budget Execution Rates for 2010/11, 2011/12 and 2012/13 (%)

| | 2010/11 | | 2011/12 | | 2012/13 | | 2013/14 (up to March '14) | |
|---|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|--------------------|
| | Actual/ Original | Actual/ Revised | Actual / Original | Actual/ Revised | Actual / Original | Actual/ Revised | Actual / Original | Actual/ Revised |
| Development budget <i>PEDP (2 & 3)</i> | 76% 80% | 87% 94% | 69% 91% | 98% 88% | 86% 77% | 96% 96% | 69% | 73% |
| Non-development budget | 105% | 103% | 106% | 109% | 104% | 102% | | |
| Total MoPME Budget | 93% | 97% | 91% | 106% | 96% | 99% | | |

Source: DPE, *ASPR 2014*, p.85 and DPE, *ASPR 2013*, p.112. NB: official information does not indicate if the execution rate is calculated at commitment or payment level.

However, the MTR underlines the slow disbursement of the development budget part of PEDP 3, especially for key quality and disparity related reforms. Only about 35% of funds planned to be disbursed by year 3 (FY 13/14) were spent. The development budget implementation period had to be expanded by one year (WB, *MTR Economic Analysis*, p.3).

Role of DPs and EPs

DPs supplemented the government's financial effort on a relatively small but non-trivial scale. However, the design of PEDP 3 did not pay enough attention to sector finance as a whole, focusing on the PEDP 3 budget, which is only a component of MoPME budget⁶⁶. The World Bank conducted a public expenditure review in education in 2010, which covered the entire sector, with a focus on primary and junior secondary education (World Bank, *Bangladesh Public Expenditure and Institutional Review. Volume II: Sector analysis*, 2010). However, its main recommendations – 'improve coordination between the two ministries of education', 'gradually increase the overall funding level in education' and 'strengthen budget management systems to improve policy planning, reduce fragmentation and ensure continuous monitoring of sector budget performance' - did not inform the PEDP 3 design and implementation.

These recommendations were in line with the traditional objectives of a Swap (see OECD, *Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery Vol.2*) but not with the project approach that informed the design of PEDP 3. One PEDP 3 DLI was intended to ensure a sufficient fiscal space for the programme and more broadly for primary education: "subsector financing adequate to implement the government's PEDP 3 and cannot be less than 1.03% of GDP in every period". In practice, as long as the government would allocate to the programme (a sub-set of MoPME budget) more than was disbursed by DPs, the DLI was considered met.

⁶⁶ According to EU, *ROM BS Report 2013*: 'the risk assessment should have been more profound in particular with ... sector finance and PEDP3's budget structure' (p.5).

Given that donors only contributed to 12% of PEDP 3 budget, this condition was easily ticked off and did not lead to in-depth financial analyses. There has been very little study of budget trends for the sector or of criteria for allocations of funds to lower levels (DEO, UEO and schools). The financial implications of major political decisions (nationalisation of RNGPS, increase in teachers' salaries, construction of pre-primary classroom in primary schools and the extension of primary education to grade 8) have not been sufficiently integrated in the policy dialogue, beyond discussions during the Mid-Term Review. Moreover, the implications of the lack of predictability of DPs disbursements (timing and amounts) have been insufficiently taken into consideration by donors.

The second part of the "finance DLI" ("1.03% of the GDP") was actually pushed by the EU during the design phase, against other donors' will. This reflected the EU's concern over sector finance, a core feature of its BS instrument. However, this indicator did not play its intended role – to encourage a better understanding/monitoring of sector finance to inform the policy dialogue. It suffered from a rigid approach of DPs' assessment of DLI compliance: when the actual allocation reached only 1.00% of the GDP, in a context of economic slowdown, DPs assessed the DLI as unmet. In a context where the lead donors (World Bank and ADB) showed little interest in sector finance, the EU, as a relatively small player, was not in a position to push for a greater focus on sector finance.

The key constraints in execution of the PEDP 3 budget have been related to the special provisions for procurement included in the JFA associated with limited initial capacity in complying with these procurement requirements (MTR, Financial Analysis, p.6). However, the technical assistance and training provided helped in strengthening MoPME/DPEs (and LGED) capacity in preparing annual procurement plans and managing procurement in compliance with the international best practice principles as reflected in the JFA. Yet, the multiple procurement authorities (MoPME, ADB and World Bank) have remained, after four years of implementation, a major challenge for DPE officials and a continuous cause of delay in implementation. Limits on the availability of advances constituted another constraint to implement some activities (for instance, training and travel). The treasury model allowed to identify the problem and, after DPs and DPE jointly raised the issue, this has been addressed to some extent by the MoF, which granted higher than regular thresholds for advances for some expenditure categories of PEDP 3. Enhancement in e-Procurement, that should cover 100% of civil works contracts by 2016, may have also helped in improving the execution rate (JARM May 2014 record of discussion, p.7). The implementation of PEDP 3 infrastructure component was also suspended due to DPs' disagreement with the government's list for school infrastructure investments. DPs' decision was guided by their concerns to set up a mechanism to circumvent favoritism in the choice of school locations and to guaranty need-based investment with the view to contribute to reduce disparities in access to schools. This delay in implementation will have an impact on the total cost, since the unit cost of classrooms has significantly increased since the beginning of the programme.

JC3.3 Effects of DPs' interventions in primary education on improvements in the design, execution and monitoring of education policies and budgets as well as in the governance of the sector

| JC3.3: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|--|--|---------------------|
| A national education strategy and a sub-sector operational plan were developed through broad consultation. However, PEDP 3 is out of sync with the national strategy, i.e. it does not integrate the expansion of primary education to grade 8; neglects unified system and decentralisation priorities; and financial plan inconsistent with even NEP financial framework. | EPs strategy-level documents PEDP 2 and 3 documentation (formulation, disbursement, monitoring and completion reports) Interviews | Strong |
| Fragmentation initially identified as a critical challenge of the sector. Some progress with integration of pre-primary education and the nationalisation of RNGS. No significant effort of DPs to address the fragmentation issue. | EPs strategy-level documents PEDP 2 and 3 documentation (formulation, disbursement, monitoring and completion reports) Interviews | Strong |
| DPs have not promoted aid effectiveness in their support to NGO-run non-formal education. Funding provision without working towards strengthening government institutional, policy and financial capacities to sustain this provision undermines the potential long term impact on poverty reduction | Share programme document (formulation, ROM reports) Interviews | Strong |
| Decentralisation, which is at the core of PEDP 3, has in practice narrowed focus on SLIP transfers to schools. No broad discussion on decentralisation, financial framework for schools and lower government levels and school autonomy. | EPs strategy-level documents PEDP 2 and 3 documentation (formulation, disbursement, monitoring and completion reports) | Strong |
| Achievement of gender parity in enrolment as a tremendous accomplishment over the last two decades. Gender sensitive design of PEDP 3 but in practice societal gender attitudes were still an obstacle to girl child's safety and security in and out of school, participation in vocational-technical education and life prospects in general. Gender attracted little interest in the policy dialogue because it is seen as focused on girls' enrolment. | EPs strategy-level documents PEDP 2 and 3 documentation (formulation, disbursement, monitoring and completion reports) | Strong |
| PEDP 3 and treasury model drove improvements in sector PFM. Despite acknowledged fiduciary risks, existing safeguards considered robust by the concerned IFIs. PFM capacities building focused on the DPE & LGED, not the ministry. The budgeting function has been neglected. | EPs strategy-level documents PEDP 2 and 3 documentation (formulation, disbursement, monitoring and completion reports) | Strong |

| | | |
|--|--|--------|
| | World Bank, <i>Project Paper for additional credit to PEDP3</i> Interviews | |
| In face of SPEMP stalemate, DPs have tended to revert to ad-hoc, PEDP3/DPE-specific PFM systems (accountancy software). This means the setting up of parallel implementation arrangements in opposition to the stated Swap approach | Interviews World Bank, <i>Project Paper for additional credit to PEDP3</i> | Strong |
| Planning, monitoring and reporting capacities relatively strengthened with the improvements of tools (AOP, ASPR, APSC, NSA, infrastructure 'live data base'). Data management and use still problematic with key data sets unavailable for analysis and answering RBM questions. Focus on the DPE and actual internalisation of RBM questionable: heavy involvement of TAs. NSA data kept and processed in Australia and Washington with little transfer of know-how | EPs strategy-level documents PEDP 2 and 3 documentation (formulation, disbursement, monitoring and completion reports) Interviews SIDA's TA RBM programme documents | Strong |
| Quality a genuine focus of PEDP3. DLIs played an important leverage role in achieving key quality-focused reforms: curriculum revision, diploma in education, distribution of textbooks, discussion on career path, NSAs. But not yet results on the ground. | EPs strategy-level documents PEDP 2 and 3 documentation (formulation, disbursement, monitoring and completion reports) Interviews | Strong |
| While involved in the PEDP 3 design, CSOs did not play any role during the implementation. Lack of donors' coordination and strategic thinking in their support to advocacy CSOs. DPs have not engaged with teachers' unions. | Interviews EPs strategy-level documents PEDP 2 and 3 documentation (formulation, disbursement, monitoring and completion reports) | Strong |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|---|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A costed sector strategy and consistent sub-sector programmes have been developed under the government's leadership and with wide stakeholders' participation | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Improved institutional framework (improved intra-sector coordination, decentralisation and school management autonomy) | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Gender-sensitive policy design and budget programming | <i>Data partly available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Improved PFM in primary education including government systems to monitor education expenditures up to school level | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strengthened education management information system to monitor and report on inputs (teachers, physical | <i>Data fully available</i> |

| | |
|---|--|
| infrastructures...) and outcomes | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quality-oriented education policies (teachers' training, curriculum, pedagogical methods etc.) | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CSOs' capacities to monitor education policies, budget and the quality and accessibility of public services strengthened i.e. CSOs' watchdog and accountability capacities enhanced | <i>Data partly available (data missing on Sweden's "Driving change" project)</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Influence of TF/Swap on the observed changes and EU/Sweden specific role | <i>Data fully available</i> |

Strategic framework and sub-sector programmes:

The *National Education Policy*, adopted in 2010, sets out the strategic orientations for the whole education sector. A *National Skill Development Policy* was adopted in 2011, to address the issues related to technical and vocational education and training in the country. The *Non-Formal Education Law*, enacted in 2014, aims to strengthen the legal framework for promoting non-formal and continuing education. They have been developed in isolation to each other and their consistency between each other is questionable.

At primary level, PEDP 3 (2012-2016) operationalises the NEP objectives for formal and non-formal primary education; it covers grades 1 through 5 and one year of pre-primary education. PEDP 3 formulation process gave rise to an intense appraisal and consultative donor-led exercise that lasted two and a half years (EU, *ROM BS Report 2013*, p.5; MN 220). However, PEDP3, in spite of rhetoric, did not systematically take NEP as the guide for programme design. PEDP 3 did not integrate a major recommendation of the NEP, i.e. that of the extension of primary education up to grade 8. As such, PEDP 3 is 'out of synch with NEP' (EU, *PEDP3 ROM BS Report 2013*, p. 5). As noticed in the QSG 2 for PEDP 3, 'it remains unclear to what extent the leading document in the country is the national strategy (NEP) or a multi-donor support programme (PDEP 3)' (EU, *Minutes of the QSG II PEDP 3*, p. x). From a financial point of view, the PEDP 3 financial planning scenario has also been inconsistent with that of the *National Education Policy* that aims to raise government education spending to a minimum level of 4.5% of GDP by 2018 (whereas PEDP 3 budget plan is still based on the status quo of 2.3% of GDP over 2012-2017) (EU, *PEDP3 Action Fiche 1*, p.4).⁶⁷ At the same time, there also has been a lack of comprehensive and systematic effort on the part of the government to embark on an NEP implementation effort.

Improved institutional framework

Sector coordination

Fragmentation was identified as a key challenge of the sector, during the formulation of PEDP 3 (EU, *PEDP 3 Action Fiche*). This fragmentation characterises both the institutional set up – mainly with two ministries (MoPME and MoE) but also implementing agencies -

⁶⁷ 'The financial scenario attached to the National Education Policy (NEP) is irrelevant, and in any case disconnected from the overall Medium-Term Budgetary Framework' (EU, *PEDP3 QSG2 Minutes*)

and the provision mechanism with several types of providers (public, private, madrasa), both for formal and non-formal education. The fragmentation of the strategic framework, mentioned above, has been directly rooted into this institutional fragmentation. However, in comparison to PEDP 2, PEDP 3 (which now covers pre-primary in addition to primary education) represents a progress towards more integration. The government's decision to nationalise registered non-governmental schools in 2013 also represents a positive step forward. These schools, which were less endowed than GPS, also recorded lower learning achievements than GPS. However, the financial implications of the nationalisation and of additional pre-primary classrooms have not been fully thought through. Besides, PEDP 3 was supposed to integrate non-formal education, under the responsibility of the Bureau of Non Formal Education (BNFE), within the "second chance and alternative education" component. It is estimated that the non-formal primary education sector may enrol about 1.8 million children and available evidence suggests better or comparable performance of NFPE students compared to formal primary schools. It is a complex sector, with about 700 providers, using competing delivery models (Ahmed, 2015). However, the government's ambivalence towards NGO-run NFE programmes and the BNFE's lack of capacities have so far prevented the government from exerting an oversight of NFE that recognises its role in achieving UPE and its sustainability. Moreover, the lack of reliable data hampers a full understanding of the NFE sector. The recent decision (2014), following the MTR in 2014, to shift the responsibility of NFPE from the BNFE to the DPE and the creation of a dedicated new division, if designed appropriately, may create the condition for an improved integration of non-formal education. However, the decision contradicts the recently adopted Non-formal Education Act 2014 which vests all non-formal education oversight to a Non-formal Education Board. The issue of integration of madrassas would also require inter-ministerial coordination (madrassas fall under the responsibility of MoE), which is traditionally challenging within the Bangladeshi administration.

DPs' role:

An important feature of the education aid landscape is that it mirrors the domestic institutional fragmentation of the sector between various ministries. This institutional fragmentation was mentioned as a main challenge in the EU's PEDP 3 Financing Agreement/Action Fiche, which however did not indicate how the sub-sector budget support may contribute to address this challenge or what initiatives DPs could take to mitigate the detrimental effects of this institutional fragmentation. This was also raised as a critical issue by the World Bank's 2010 *Public Expenditure Review*. Besides, the fact that under PEDP 3 DPs continued to finance discrete projects under MoPME's development budget contributes to the fragmentation. The need to integrate all the numerous projects, which was noted as a critical challenge during PEDP 3 formulation (EU, *ROM BS Report 2013*, p.5), remains relevant at the end of the evaluation period.

To all the intent and claims about DPs' commitment to a Swap, they have not utilised one main feature of a Swap: that of having a holistic view of a sector, composed of all its sub-sectors. To date, donors have seemingly paid little attention to critical challenges related to education sub-sector interdependence – at strategic and budgetary levels. Several donors envisaged for the future to shift from primary to secondary education, including the ADB and the EU (EU, *MIP 2014-2020*, p.8). This should address funding challenges of

secondary education, which is highly underfunded; yet the enduring sub-sector approach will not respond to sector-wide issues.

NGOs involved in the delivery of non-formal education have been, for the last twenty years, 100% donor-funded. Besides, in most cases, communities themselves have contributed to the construction of the centres or classrooms (MN 211, 212, 218). Aid agencies have never initiated any coordination mechanisms or joint strategic reflection about their support in the field. There has been no attempt to promote aid effectiveness in non-formal education or to develop a harmonised approach within EU member states: the EU supports the SHARE project (implemented by directly funding NGOs, without government involvement), Sweden the BETHRUWC project (implemented with the BNFE) while DFID, which funds BRAC (an important NFE provider), withdrew from the BETHRUWC. Donors have certainly contributed to the consolidation of the fragmentation in the sector and did not use PEDP 3 structures and systems as platforms to encourage a better integration of non-formal education.

As already noted, Sweden's RBM TA who worked towards the improvement of the national education census did not encourage the integration of NFE learning centres in the census. The Second Chance Education programme, as a PEDP 3 non-DLI component, also suffered from a policy dialogue focused on DLI activities (MN 205, 219, aid agencies representatives). The critical issue of the sustainability of donor-funded NGO-based primary education delivery for the most vulnerable children has not been paid any attention from donors. Once a project ends, communities, by definition the poorest, are supposed to run the schools by themselves, a non-sustainable and inequitable solution. This question should be tackled within a broader discussion about the fiscal space for primary education and the degree of equity of the current funding mechanisms. DPs' lack of strategic thinking and broad understanding of sector finance has undermined the potential long-term impact on poverty reduction of their support to NGOs.

The EU's SHARE programme was intended to contribute to a better coordination between formal and non-formal education under the government's leadership. However, the design of the project insufficiently involved the government – the Action Fiche actually reflects a high level of defiance vis-à-vis the government (EU, *SHARE Action Fiche*). This lack of involvement was motivated, on the EU side, by the lack of trust in the BNFE, shared by most donors. However, this tense relationship undermined the scope for synergies between the two EU funding mechanisms, PEDP 3 and SHARE. Besides, due to its poor performance until 2014 (MN 211, 212, 218, 221), SHARE knowledge management component, which was meant to strengthen the collaboration, did not contribute to the reductions of the initial tensions: the TA did not manage to build a relationship with government officials; the national conference organised by the project was not attended by any government official (EU, *ROM SHARE reports*; MN 221). Since 2014, however, a new team leader took a more strategic approach and commissioned an analytic paper on the role of NFPE in achieving universal primary education and its sustainability. In addition, the EUD, especially as chair of the PEDP 3 “disparity working group” is in 2015 committed to push for a dialogue on non-formal education. A data base of all NFE learning centres has also been developed by the Share project, in coordination with the BNFE, and the data base should be downloaded on the project web site before the end of

2015 (MN 221). If it will fill an important knowledge gap, it remains anchored in a project, ad-hoc approach, not geared towards a long term strengthening of government/national systems. The project still suffers from the inopportune initial choice of implementation modality – a “floating TA”, without any institutional anchorage, which remains problematic to develop relationship with the government. However, the very recent period has seen the late recognition of the need for a better coordination between support for the delivery of non-formal education and policy dialogue under PEDP 3.

Decentralisation and School management autonomy

To deepen the decentralisation of primary education was part of PEDP 2 Output 1 ‘Quality Improvement through Organizational Development and Capacity Building’ and is one strategic orientation of the NEP as well as an expected outcome of PEDP 3 (‘Sub-district (upazila) and school level management functions decentralised’). The ‘School Learning Improvement Plans’ (SLIPs) aim to address school and community-wide matters linked with learning outcomes and primary completion. They are intended to empower head teachers and School Management Committees to adopt a bottom-up planning process. Upazila Primary Education Plans (UPEPs) aim to help reduce disparities between areas within upazilas and promote quality primary education for all children.

Under PEDP 2, decentralisation and devolution of decision-making authority to districts made slow progress. A draft devolution plan was prepared and partially approved. Selective administrative and financial responsibilities were devolved to upazilas, such as flexible school timing, teacher transfers, and local procurement of teaching and learning materials (ADB, *PEDP II Completion Report*, p.4). Under PEDP 2, SLIPs were supported by the provision of school-level improvement planning grants and this has been continued and scaled up under PEDP 3. According to the programme target, 80% of government primary schools (including newly nationalised) are to receive SLIP grants. In 2013, nearly two-thirds of schools (62%) received SLIP grants, up from 27% the previous year due to disbursement difficulties. The SLIP coverage however, has not increased compared to the PEDP 3 baseline of 64% of schools receiving funds (DPE, *ASPR 2014*, p.82). SLIP grants have enabled schools to plan and implement limited improvements in their physical environment, contributing to creating a more welcoming learning space for children (UNICEF, *Qualitative evaluation of SLIPs*, 2010). However, this initiative did not support a broader education decentralisation/deconcentration agenda aimed at devolving management functions, including those which impact directly on teaching and learning. The grant per school is in any case very low (about US\$300 a year) and the schools’ funding system remains highly centralised with limited spending decisions devolved to them (Claussen, *PEDP3 MTR Financial Analysis*, p.10). Relationships of authority, financial responsibility and accountability between levels of government and between government and schools or communities remain unclear. Finally, local budget entities, the Upazila Education Offices and District Primary Education Offices, are not yet computerized and linked to IBAS: the monitoring of budget execution remains a challenge.

DPs' role:

DPs have played a critical role in supporting the SLIP initiative. Under PEDP 2, a TA was dedicated to support the implementation of the UPEP/SLIPs schemes. However the technical support mainly consisted of the design to elaborate procedures and approval requirements for the measly SLIP. It was not geared toward the encouragement of greater local responsibility and initiatives. Under PEDP 3, decentralisation has been covered by one DLI. The government's readiness to decentralise social service delivery has remained uncertain. This lack of interest certainly explains the limited progress in setting up a genuine regulatory framework to allow the devolution of competences and funding in primary education.

Two aspects of DPs interventions also influenced the current status. Due to the nature of the policy dialogue, excessively focused on the fulfilment of DLIs (see above), the discussion about decentralisation was narrowly focused on the question of disbursement of SLIP grants to schools. This also illustrates the crowding out effect of DLIs on other important KPIs included in PEDP 3: indeed, to monitor the improvement of decentralisation, the document foresees two KPIs (KPI 10 'Number and types of functions delegated to districts, upazilas and schools'; and KPI 11: 'Expenditure of block grants (conditional and unconditional) for upazilas and schools). The policy dialogue on DLIs fulfilment did not encourage a systematic collection and analysis of data on school level resource and hampered discussions on the broader financial framework for schools and lower government levels towards the development of a more efficient and effective school grant system (Claussen, *MTR Financial Analysis*, p. 10).

The coordination between PEDP 3 and DPs programmes aimed at supporting decentralisation seems almost non-existent, even at the level of programming documents (EU, *PEDP3 Action Fiche* and EU, *Local Governance and Decentralization Programme Action Fiche*). EU programming documents also display a lack of information as regards the organisational structure of the education system below ministerial level as well as a confusion between 'decentralisation' and 'deconcentration' (as noted by PEDP-3 QSG, Minutes p.3). Even though this confusion may reflect the lack of clarity on the ground, this should have been made explicit in the FA/AF and put in contrast with standard modes of administrative organisation. There has been no coordination between the Local Consultative Working Group dealing with education vis-à-vis the group dealing with local governance.

Gender sensitive policy

Achievement of gender parity in enrolment has been a tremendous accomplishment over the last two decades. Under PEDP 2, gender and inclusive education were treated in a holistic manner, to remove barriers children may face for access and participation. According to this approach, gender should not be treated as a separate issue. An Inclusive Education Framework was produced considering for key areas - gender, tribal children, special needs, and vulnerability – with four separate actions plans. TA was provided between 2007 and 2009 to support its implementation. Training modules and materials addressing inclusive education and gender aspects were developed. A gender strategy guided action in curriculum and textbook review, classroom practices and teacher recruitment. New employment opportunities were created for 45,000 teachers, of which

60% were women. Besides, a total of 5,000 toilets were constructed in 2,500 schools to provide separate facilities for girls and boys (ADB, *PEDP 2 Completion report*, p.49).

The design of PEDP 3 has also been gender-sensitive with key monitoring indicators disaggregated along gender lines (see *PEDP 3 Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix*). An important policy decision was the upgrading of the minimum qualification for teachers' recruitment for women to higher secondary level (HSL), which aligned requirement for both men and women (DPE/DPs, *JARM May 2014 Minutes*, p.2). Despite the achievements, the qualitative aspects of inclusion remained challenging: patriarchal and misogynist attitudes remain barriers to safety and security of girls on way to school; law enforcement action and community mobilisation in favour of girls have been less than vigorous. Early marriage remains an important factor of girls' drop out. The JFA foresees the elaboration and regular review of a gender/inclusive education plan: the drafting of the plan was delayed and the document only finalised in 2015.

DP's role

Gender and inclusive education do not get political attention. The lack of interest is partly due to the good results achieved by the country in terms of girls' enrolment in the context of a widespread narrow view of gender issues as focused on girls.

Improved PFM systems

Bangladesh's Public Finance Management (PFM) system has undergone a number of reform initiatives over the past two decades with DPs substantial involvement. PFM reform has been supported within the framework of the Strengthening Public Expenditure Management Program 2010-2014 (SPEMP) financed through a Multi Donor Trust Fund managed by the WB and funded by DFID, EU, Netherlands, DANIDA and CIDA. SPEMP has three main components, i) Deepening MTBF (Medium Term Budgetary Framework) and Financial Accountability; ii) Strengthening the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General Office (C&AG) and iii) Strengthening Parliament Oversight. Main noticeable achievements have been progress in macroeconomic modelling, the introduction of the MTBF (which presents the budget for the first fiscal year and estimates of future year's budget requirements) and its rolling out in line ministries but the MTBF reform has not yet been embraced and the GoB still used the traditional dual budget process over the period, the introduction of the Integrated Budgeting and Accounting System (IBAS) (which remained however incomplete and did not yet concern lower administrative levels), improvements in external audit and legislative oversight (EU, *PFM Annual Report 2013*, p. 5; EU, *PFMIP Monitoring report 2012*; MN 018, MN 023).

Given DPs choice to channel their funds to PEDP 3 through the country's financial systems, PFM aspects have been at the core of the programme. The last PEFA exercise in March 2011 (report published in 2012) included a specific analysis of MoPME. An education sector PFM roadmap/action plan, annexed to the JFA, has been implemented to strengthen the Ministry's fiscal planning and management. It sets out 19 separate actions to address financial management and procurement weaknesses, including those identified by the PEFA, and covers the following aspects: budgeting, flow of funds, accounting, internal controls and internal audit, financial reporting, audit and accountability; and procurement (EU, *disbursement report 3*, p.8). Additional safeguards have been put in place to assess the

capacity and weaknesses of the systems. The fiduciary oversights arrangement include: quarterly and annual fiduciary reviews, review of and no objection on the procurement plan, prior review of International Competitive Bidding for goods and works and all consultancies, review and follow-up on the Interim Unaudited Financial Report (IFR), Annual audit Report and quarterly reporting on procurement risk mitigation plan and procurement performance reporting.

Several sector-specific PFM improvements have been achieved through PEDP 3. The programme has used IBAS to produce financial reports, the quality of which has gradually improved over the years (WB, “*Project paper on a proposed additional credit to PEDP 3 – Annex 5*”, 2014, p.52). The programme has been a pioneer of PFM reforms by integrating both revenue and development budgets, and making use of the new accounting functionalities provided by iBAS. Audit at MoPME has been strengthened in coordination with SPEMP. For the first time, the audit of a Government department has covered both revenue and development expenditure (EU, Annual PFM Report 2013, p. 21). The timing of MoF budget releases to the DPE and field officers has also improved significantly, from November to August (WB, “*Project paper on a proposed additional credit to PEDP 3 – Annex 5*”, 2014, p.52).

The treasury model has allowed to identify problems (for instance, the cash constraints for advances) and to improve the systems: for instance, there has been a better follow up on SLIPs disbursements based on government systems; a ‘live data base’ is being set up in 2015 to prioritise infrastructure investments based on actual needs. It has encouraged a nascent dialogue between MoPME, MoF and the CAG (MN 205, 220 aid agencies representatives). According to the JARM of May 2014, ‘improved financial management is one of PEDP 3 significant success stories’ (DPE/DPs, JARM May 14 Minutes, p.5).

DPs’ role

DPs played an instrumental role in putting PFM issues at the forefront of the programme. However, the PFM and fiduciary arrangements under PEDP 3 have rather been geared towards DPs’ internal needs to mitigate fiduciary risks than inspired by a holistic strategy to improve the expenditure cycle in the MoPME. The introduction of the financial management model has been such a preoccupation for the donors and has demanded so much time and effort from the government counterparts, that it had the effect of sidelining the substantive policy, strategy and operational concerns of primary education development in the country. In DPs’ approach, the budget has rather been considered as a pure technical conduit to channel funds than a government’s strategic financial tool to implement its public policies. PEDP 3 did not give the MoPME the opportunity to strengthen its negotiating power with the MoF and improve the budget design function. Besides, as in the case of planning and monitoring functions, PFM capacity building have rather been mainly on the DPE (and, to a less extent, on the other PEDP3 implementing agencies) than on the ministry itself. Finally, in the context of limited progress in MoF-led PFM reforms, PEDP 3 donors (under the World Bank and ADB leadership) tended to regress to ad-hoc, parallel PFM systems: i.e. a computerized accounting system was started to be piloted in 2014 in DPE to monitor expenditures of the DDOs and ensure regular reconciliation (WB, 2014, p.58).

Result-based management and performance management information system

Under PEDP 2, the DPE/MoPME adopted a result-based management approach for its planning and reporting activities. Several tools were introduced such as AOP, ASPR and, for local level management, UPEP and SLIP, (see above) (ADB, *PEDP2 Completion Report*).

In comparison with PEDP 2, PEDP 3 has put an increased emphasis on how inputs are used at school level to improve learning outcomes (DPE, *PED3 Programme Document*, p. 14) and reinforced the result-based management approach. The programme document defines 'results areas' and KPIs to monitor implementation progress, within which donors have selected their disbursement triggers (DLIs, see above). The format of the annual sector performance reports has evolved to take account of PEDP 3 needs and the report documents progress against KPI. Its coverage has been broadened beyond PEDP 3 to encompass data on discrete projects.

As regards primary education statistics, the process of conducting and validating the Annual Primary School Census (APSC) significantly improved, with extended coverage across schools and a reduced production time from 18 to 12 months (DPs, *April 2014 JCM minutes*, p.2). Yet, as already mentioned, the coverage of data remained incomplete (non-formal education delivered by NGOs, for example, is not integrated). Besides, there was no system of sample-based quality check, hence, scepticism about the accuracy and completeness of the census persists.

In addition to the ASPR and the APSC, additional monitoring tools have been developed that reflect efforts to improve data collection and analysis. These include the national student assessments (NSA), the Education Household Survey, the live database for infrastructure, the gender-disaggregated database and the integrated pre-primary education data. However, the system, methods and quality control have to be improved further. For example, accurate data on net enrolment rate in pre-primary education was not available, though this relates to an important operational objective.

The NSA tests grade 3 and grade 5 students in Bangla and mathematics. There were four rounds of NSA carried out in 2006, 2008, 2011 and 2013. The results from the first two rounds (2006 and 2008) of surveys under PEDP 2 were incompatible because of an insufficient standardisation of tests items. Within PEDP 3, the DPE developed standardized test items in collaboration with NCTB under the guidance of ACER supported by WB from 2011 and onward. However, the technical capacity to carry on this work with further adaptation and drawing policy and operational implications for quality improvement, has not improved much.

DPs' role

DPs played an instrumental role to promote RBM within MoPME and to develop/strengthen the various monitoring tools. RBM was supported by a SIDA-funded TA support. Under PEDP 3, the ASPR was a key instrument to assess the degree of performance achieved. Besides, one DLI covered the strengthening of the annual census. However, as already pointed out, one needs to question the degree of internalisation of the RBM approach given the high involvement of TA in producing the reports and analysing

data. Moreover, the fact that NSA exercises did not encompass any capacity development of the DPE M&E division, including the capacity to stock the cleaned raw data that are kept by the World Bank, greatly questioned the actual scope of the achievements that NSA may represent.

Quality-oriented education policies (teachers' training, curriculum, pedagogical methods etc.)

While PEDP 2 focused, in practice, on infrastructure, PEDP 3 put a strong emphasis on quality. Important progress has been achieved including curriculum and examination reform with the incremental introduction of competencies in the grade 5 exam, merit-based teacher recruitment; the raise in the minimum qualification for recruitment of female teachers to Higher Secondary Certificate level and the development, piloting and expanded coverage of a Diploma in Primary Education (dip-in-ed). Under PEDP 2, the Government re-introduced pre-primary classes after a piloting exercise in the early 1990s.

Under PEDP 3, the pre-primary education curriculum, teacher's guide and manuals were finalised and formally adopted (MTR, *JARM May 2014*, p.3, 6-7). Every government primary school (GPS) has received Tk.5,000 for procurement and preparation of supplementary teaching learning materials for the pre-primary level (DPE, *ASPR 2014*, p.x). The timing of the distribution of textbooks has substantially improved: they are now available in classrooms during the first month of the academic year. Yet, establishing the quality, relevance and practical value of teacher's guide and manuals through trial and development with involvement of classroom teachers has been neglected. Evidence of actual availability and use of these in classroom is lacking. Moreover, the effective implementation of dip-in-ed new curriculum appears questionable in a context where major changes in capacity and practices in Primary Training Institutes have not occurred. Besides, Each Child Learns (ECL) labelled a "flagship" pilot for transforming classroom practices has been struggling due to insufficient support and commitment from the central level. Finally, only limited attention was paid to teachers' supervision by local level administrators, with the view to provide professional support and to tackle unprofessional behaviour such as absenteeism and private tutoring.

DPs' role

The identification of DLIs put a strong emphasis on quality-related reforms. The 9 DLIs were chosen because they were considered catalytic components that would directly impact quality. These DLIs have indeed played an effective leverage role on the above-mentioned advancement. Specifically, the policy dialogue put an emphasis on the role of teachers as drivers of the improvement in learning achievements, through a multifaceted understanding of the teaching profession that encompasses their recruitment, initial training and motivation. Despite the failed attempt to create a 'primary education cadre' within the civil service, DPs have continued to promote the setting up of a formal 'career path' that could be conducive to teachers' long-term professional motivation and reward of performance. However, despite this focus on the teaching profession, DPs tended to neglect the issue of teachers' supervision. This aspect is also related to the lack of interest for budget allocation to lower administrative levels, with Upazila education offices being the body in charge of this supervision.

The treasury model has also suffered from a usual feature of Swap/SBS approach: the disconnect between central level dynamics and systems and local realities (ODI, *Sector Budget Support in Practice. Synthesis Report*, 2010).⁶⁸ The focus on DLIs compliance has prevented a discussion about the obstacles that may hamper the actual transformation of quality-oriented reforms into effective changes in the classrooms. Besides, due to its novelty, the financial management model has become donors' primary preoccupation and has been very demanding for the government counterparts. This has had the effect of crowding out, to a certain degree, a substantive dialogue on policy, strategy and operational concerns of primary education development.

CSOs' capacities as watchdogs

CSOs have been involved on a wide scale in the provision of formal and non-formal education. However, their advocacy role, their participation within the policy dialogue structure and their actual influence over policy making have remained limited. CAMPE, the umbrella of NGOs involved in education, has conducted annually, between 2000 and 2014, data-based Education Watch (EW) surveys. EW picks a particular theme for each survey: learning achievement outcome has been the theme in four of the reports since 2000, hence enabling the establishment of a long-term trend in learning achievement by using the same tests. These reports contributed to a more general trend, at international and national level, towards a greater emphasis on learning outcomes.

DPs' role

See JC3.1

JC3.4 Effects of DPs' interventions in primary education on availability of quality and gender sensitive primary education services across the country

| JC3.4: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|---------------------|--|
| The availability of education services (infrastructures and trained teachers) marginally improved over the evaluation period with additional primary and pre-primary classrooms, the recruitment of teachers and the timely distribution of textbooks | APSC 2008 - 2013 | Strong (but issue of quality of census data) |
| Students' learning conditions only marginally improved: high students/teacher ratio, infrastructure quality problematic, proportion of trained teachers stable | APSC 2008 - 2013 | Strong (but issue of quality of census data) |
| Major supply challenges: donors' lack of interest for the fiscal space question problematic | Interviews | Strong |

⁶⁸ With sector budget supports (earmarked or not), "the dialogue is often dominated by upstream policy issues and public financial management issues as a result of donor fiduciary concerns" (ODI, 2010, p.17).

| | | |
|---|--|--------|
| Suspension of PEDP 3 infrastructure component to reach agreement on allocation criteria questionable | Interviews and PEDP 3 implementation documents | Strong |
| DPs' financial support contributed to the increase in the availability of classrooms in the country | PEDP 3 implementation documents | Strong |
| DPs played an influential role in the growth of pre-primary facilities and timely distribution of textbooks through policy dialogue | Interviews and PEDP 3 implementation documents | Strong |
| DP's RBM approach did not translate into better quality of infrastructure | PEDP 3 implementation documents | Strong |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|--|---|
| ▪ Number of primary schools (government / private) | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| ▪ Number of schools with pre-primary education (government/private) | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| ▪ Increased coverage of non-formal education programmes | <i>Scant information on trends in the number of non-formal programmes</i> |
| ▪ Teacher Student Ratio (government / private) and teachers' absenteeism | <i>No data on teachers' absenteeism collected on a regular basis</i> |
| ▪ % of trained teachers in school (government/private; male/female) | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| ▪ Percentage of schools with separate functioning toilets for girls | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| ▪ Number of schools providing school feeding programmes | <i>Data not available</i> |
| ▪ Coverage of the stipends programmes (boys/girls) | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| ▪ Textbook available and timely distributed | <i>Data on textbook availability not collected on a regular basis</i> |
| ▪ Number of junior secondary schools | <i>Data available for grade 6-10 secondary schools</i> |
| ▪ % of trained teachers in junior secondary schools | <i>Data on teachers only</i> |
| ▪ Territorial disparities for the above-mentioned indicators (evolution in the gap between the best and worst) | <i>District or sub-district (Upazila)-based data not</i> |

| | |
|---|---|
| performing upazilas or specific historically disadvantaged areas) | <i>provided in soft-copy, which prevented an in-depth analysis of the disparities</i> |
|---|---|

Between 2008 and 2014, the number of primary schools in the country increased by 30%, from about 82,000 to about 108,000. The growth was not driven by government primary schools, the number of which only slightly increased (37,672 in 2008, 38,000 in 2014). However, under PEDP 2, about 41,000 new classrooms were constructed in government primary schools; under PEDP 3, as of April 2014, 8,900 additional classrooms had been built. Besides, under a government ‘discrete project’, 667 new schools were constructed as of April 2014⁶⁹ (DPE, *APSC 2011*; DPE, *ASPR 2014*).

Despite this effort, in 2013, only 23% of primary schools met the student per classroom standard ratio of 40. Only 43% of primary classrooms were considered in ‘good conditions’ and 64% had separate functioning toilets for girls. Primary School Quality Level (PSQL) indicators have been introduced under PEDP 2 to track minimum standards in primary schools. In 2010, only 17% of schools (GPS and NNPS) met three out of four key PSQL indicators. The share meeting these indicators increased to 24% in 2011, but remained constant over 2012-2013. Specifically, there was very modest improvement on PSQLs related to school infrastructure and water/sanitation.

In 2013, the vast majority of GPS (80%) were run through a double-shift system, which implied far fewer contact hours than the standard defined. 95% of the government primary schools and 88% of the newly nationalised primary schools now offer pre-primary education (PPE). Yet these figures hide a less positive situation in terms of class size, availability of a dedicated and properly equipped space and a dedicated and properly trained teacher for PPE. While the number of stipend recipients remained relatively steady between 2006 and 2009 around 4.7 million children, the figure rose steeply to 7.6 million in 2011, reflecting a clear government priority to boost the social demand for education.

Despite the recruitment of some 45,000 additional GPS teachers between 2004 and 2011, which represented an increase of about 15% in the teaching force, there was still an acute shortage of primary teachers. Between 2008 and 2013, the student-teacher ratio in GPS and RNGPS remained almost stable, decreasing slightly from 50 to 49. In 2013, only 53% of primary schools met the standard student-teacher ratio of 46 (a high level already). Due to a lack of pre-primary teachers, some teaching assistants (as well as community volunteers) taught pre-primary classes. The government has created 37,672 additional posts of assistant teachers (one for each GPS) for pre-primary classes, and the recruitment of 15,000 assistant teachers is under process (DPE, *ASPR 2014*, p.44). Statistics were inconsistent about whether the new recruitment over 7 years represented a net addition to teaching force after annual attrition.

The proportion of teachers (in GPS and RNGPS) who meet the minimum qualification - being trained to at least C-in-Ed level - has maintained at around 80% since 2008. The nationalization of RNGPS has however increased the number of under-qualified teachers,

⁶⁹ These were apparently not entirely accounted for in the 2014 ASPC.

especially female assistant teachers. In 2013, only 78% of female teachers in newly nationalized primary schools have the minimum qualification compared to 89% of their female counterparts in GPS.

Every student should have access to free (used or new) textbooks for each subject. In 2010, only one-third of the schools received their textbook within the first month of the school year. In 2013, 99% of schools received textbooks within the first month of the school year. Information is however lacking on the actual use of these textbooks in classrooms and at home.

Between 2009 and 2013, the number of secondary schools increased only marginally by 3%, from 19,080 to 19,600. Similarly, the number of teachers only grew slightly by 7%.

DPs' role

Through their financial support within PEDP 2 and 3, DPs contributed to the improvement of the availability of primary classrooms. Through their policy dialogue that gave a prominent place to pre-primary education and textbook provision, they also made a difference in the provision of education services. However, the country has continued to face major supply challenges, both in terms of infrastructures and qualified teachers. Schooling conditions for children have only slightly improved and were not conducive to good learning achievements. In that context, DPs' lack of interest for sector finances and the issue of fiscal space was all the more problematic. Moreover, PEDP 2 and 3 complex procurement regimes and the lengthy negotiations over criteria to ensure need-based infrastructure investments had a direct impact on the slow progress in the availability of new classrooms. The restricted improvement in the quality of schooling infrastructure also questions the relevance of DPs' RBM approach and of its related TA. The monitoring of the Primary School Quality Level (PSQL) indicators – a key innovation introduced under PEDP 2 to track minimum standards in primary schools – did not steer any major quality transformation.

EQ4 : Results observed in primary education (Step 2)

JC4.1 Evolution of participation in primary education, formal and informal, for boys and girls and across the country⁷⁰

| JC4.1: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|---------------------|--|
| Total enrolment in formal primary education sharply increased between 2008 and 2013 | APSC 2008 and 2013 | Strong (but issue of quality of census data) |
| The Net Enrolment Ratio steadily increased from 87.2% in 2005 to 97.3% in 2013 | APSC 2008 and 2013 | Strong (but issue of quality of census data) |
| Girls enjoy a better access to school than boys | APSC 2008 and 2013 | Strong (but issue of quality of census data) |
| The number of out-of-school children remains high (16% of the 6-14 age group) with geographical disparities between and within divisions. | APSC 2008 and 2013 | Strong (but issue of quality of census data) |
| Secondary education GER remained stable between 2009-2013 (53-54%) | BANBEIS web site | Strong (but issue of quality of census data) |


| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|---|--|
| ▪ Net enrolment rate in primary education | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| ▪ Number of children enrolled in formal government pre-primary education programmes | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| ▪ Number of primary age children enrolled in NFE programmes | <i>Scant information, only estimation</i> |
| ▪ Number of children from non-formal education institutions taking Grade V examination | <i>Data not available</i> |
| ▪ % of primary school age children with disabilities in formal and non-formal programmes | <i>Number not percentage available</i> |
| ▪ Gross enrolment rate in junior secondary education (grade-6-8) | <i>GER available for the entire cycle (grade 6-10)</i> |
| ▪ Regional disparities for the above-mentioned indicators (evolution in the gap between the best and worst performing upazilas) | <i>District-based data not provided in soft-copy, which prevented an in-depth analysis</i> |

⁷⁰ In the following paragraphs, data is based on APSC 2008, 2009, 2013 and 2014, except when it is explicitly mentioned.

| | |
|---|-----------------------------|
| | <i>of the disparities</i> |
| ▪ Socio-economic disparities for the above-mentioned indicators | <i>Data not available</i> |
| ▪ Gender disparities for (some of) the above-mentioned indicators | <i>Data fully available</i> |

Total enrolment in formal primary education of children aged 6–10 sharply increased between 2010 and 2012, before stabilising in 2013 at around 17.5 million children.

Figure 2 - enrolment in primary 2005-2013 (in millions)



Source: DPE, ASPR 2014, p.38

The Gross Enrolment Rate (GER)⁷¹ significantly increased from 93.7% in 2005 to 107.7% in 2010. It slightly declined in 2011 to reach 101.5% before recording a steady growth up to 108.6% in 2013. The Net Enrolment Rate (NER)⁷² steadily increased from 87.2% in 2005 to 97.3% in 2013. These positive achievements in terms of access to primary education were not mirrored at secondary level: between 2009 and 2013, the secondary education GER (entire cycle, grade 6 to 10) remained stable (53-54%). Moreover, these official enrolment figures should be treated with caution as they are difficult to reconcile with other statistics: the existence of about 5.5 million out-of-school children between 6 and 14, a drop-out rate of about 20% and about 1.8 million children enrolled in non-formal learning centres, not all counted in primary education statistics.

Girls have enjoyed a better access to primary education than boys: in 2013, the NER for boys was 96.2% and 98.4% for girls. However, in the more remote rural areas girls still have had significant problems in continuing their enrolment in primary schools and in attending school regularly (DPE, *PDEP 3 Programme Document*). The number of children with disabilities enrolled at primary level slightly increased from 77.000 in 2008 to 83.000 in 2013. The gender disparity in favour of girls is even more pronounced at secondary level:

⁷¹ The GER is the number of children, regardless of age, enrolled in grades 1–5 relative to the total population of children aged 6–10 years (official primary school age of Bangladesh).

⁷² The NER is the number of children of the official primary school age (6–10 years) enrolled in grades 1–5 relative to the total population of children aged 6–10 years.

in 2013, the secondary education GER (entire cycle, grade 6 to 10) was 58% for girls, 50% for boys.

Enrolment remained uneven across geographical areas, without any reduction in disparity across districts. Between 2009 and 2014, the NER standard deviation remained steady around 4.5.⁷³ In some districts the primary NER even decreased between 2009 and 2014 (i.e. Cox's Bazar, Sunamgonj or Sylhet).

The total number of out-of-school children aged 6 to 14 is estimated around 5.5 million, representing 16 % of the total population in that same age group. The majority of out-of-school children aged 6 to 14 either never enrolled in school or did not complete grade 1. Across the seven divisions, the proportion of out-of-school children varies from 19.7% in Khulna to 26.6% in Sylhet. The disparity at lower geographical units is even more marked: the average rate of school exclusion for the 10 lowest participation districts is 28.2% compared with 17.5% for the 10 highest participation districts. A slightly higher proportion of primary-aged boys (24%) are excluded from school compared with girls (22%) (DPE, ASPR 2014, p.42). Due to a lack of educational services, the education participation in urban slums is low.

Total enrolment in pre-primary shot up by 73% from 2010 to 2011. By 2013, there were 1.83 million pre-primary children in GPS/RNGPS, more than the double of the enrolment of PEDP 3 baseline year in 2010. The 'percentage of Grade-1 students in primary schools who have attended pre-primary education' increased from 38% in 2011 to 67% in 2013 (GPS 68% and RNGPS 64%).

JC4.2 Evolution of retention within primary education increased and learning outcomes improved for all children across the country⁷⁴

| JC4.2: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Significant progress achieved in terms of retention within primary schools: important decrease in drop-out rate and major increase in completion rate | APSC 2008 and 2013 | Strong |
| Girls' dropout rate declined faster than boys' one, resulting in a widening of the gender gap | APSC 2008 and 2013 | Strong |
| The dropout rate remained high and characterised by substantial regional and social disparities | APSC 2008 and 2013 | Strong |
| No significant change in overall student achievement between 2011 and 2013 | NSA 2011 and 2013, ASPR 2014 | Strong |

⁷³ The author's calculations are based on APSC 2009 and 2014 (draft).

⁷⁴ In the following paragraphs, data based on APSC 2008, 2009, 2013 and 2014, except when it is explicitly mentioned.

| | | |
|---|------------------------------|------------|
| assessments | | |
| Progress in narrowing the gap between high and low performing upazilas (upazila composite performance index) has been slow | ASPR 2014 | Strong |
| Learning achievement differed for income quintiles, disadvantaged geographical areas, socio-cultural attributes (language, ethnicity etc.) and personal characteristics (special needs) | EW reports, MICS, NSA, PECE | Indicative |
| The retention within the system also improved at secondary level, however only for girls and the dropout rate remained extremely high (44%) | BANBEIS census 2009 and 2014 | Strong |
| At secondary level, though girls enjoyed a better access than boys, they suffered from a lower retention in the system (higher dropout rate and lower completion rate) | BANBEIS census 2009 and 2014 | Strong |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Drop-out rate, boys/girls, national/ divisions (or district) | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completion rate, boys/girls, national/ divisions (or district) | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Level of achievement in Grade V (a. Bangla; b. Mathematics): mean score (boys and girls); disparities between divisions (or district) (Trends in learning outcomes from annual National Assessments) | <i>Data fully available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pass rate from NFE schools in Grade V terminal examination (total/girls) | <i>Data not available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional disparities for the above-mentioned indicators (gap between the best and worst performing upazilas) | <i>Use of the Upazila composite index (KPI 9) and APSC-district data. Data partially available</i> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Socio-economic disparities for the above-mentioned indicators (gap between the most advantaged and most disadvantaged upazilas) | <i>Data hardly available</i> <i>EW reports provide some relevant data</i> |

Dropout and repetition are key internal efficiency indicators that show how the system converts inputs (budgets) into results (students who completed primary education). The cycle dropout rate (calculated in using the reconstructed cohort model) fell markedly from 50% in 2008 to 21.4% in 2013. Dropout in grade 4 remained the highest amongst the 5 grades, but decreased from 10% in 2012 to 7.8% in 2013. Grade 5 dropout rate has

reduced drastically from 11.1% in 2011 to 1.9% in 2012 and 2.3% in 2013. Equally significant, grade 1 dropout reduced sharply from 6.3% in 2012 to 1.5% in 2013. The dropout rate, around 20%, however, remained very high, and therefore a major concern. Besides, the gap between districts only slightly narrowed down between 2009 and 2014 (standard deviation from 7.6 to 6.9) and substantial geographical disparity persisted. In 2014, three districts still recorded a drop-out rate close to 40% (Gaibandha, Kishorganj and Netrokona). The poorest children (the bottom 20%) were 12% more likely to be out of school, compared to the richest 20% (HIES 2010, cited in DPE, *ASPR 2014*, p.56). The completion rate displayed a steady growth from about 50% in 2006 to 60% in 2010 and 78.6% in 2013.

At primary level, girls' dropout rate declined faster than boys' resulting in widening of the gender gap. In 2010, the gap between boys and girls was only 1 percentage point in favour of girls. By 2013, girl's dropout rate was 7 percentage points lower than boys. Yet, at secondary level, if girls enjoyed a better access than boys, they suffered from a lower retention in the system: in 2013 their drop-out rate was 50% against 42% for boys and their completion rate was 50% against 58% for boys. These figures show that greater challenges in terms of girls' education are situated at secondary level. However, as shown by the econometric analysis, in 2013, Upazilas characterised by significantly higher average dropout rates and lower average completion rates were also characterised by large discrepancies between girls' and boys' performances at the grade 5 examination, in favour of boys.

The 2011 National Student Assessment established a baseline of performance of Grade 3 and Grade 5 students on a set of curriculum learning outcomes in Bangla and Mathematics. The 2013 NSA shows that, for the Bangla test, 75% of grade 3 students were working at grade 3 level or above compare to 68% in 2011. This reflects improvement in learning achievements. However, only 25% of grade 5 learners achieved learning outcomes at their grade level, as in 2011. Besides, the average scale score for Bangla increased moderately in grade 3 (from 100.2 in 2011 to 104.2 in 2013) but slightly declined in grade 5 from 116.2 in 2011 to 115.2 in 2013. In mathematics, the average scale scores for grade 3 slightly increased from 100.8 in 2011 to 103.7 in 2013 and the average scale scores for grade 5 decreased from 118.6 in 2011 to 115.8 in 2013. Changes at both levels are small and are likely to have little practical significance. Besides, 43% of grade 3 learners and 75% of grade 5 learners are far behind their expected grade level learning outcomes performance. This does not reflect a significant change in overall student achievement between 2011 and 2013 (DPE, *ASPR 2014*, 27-33).

Gender differences in Bangla scores have been small and not statistically significant. The NSA also finds that the students in Government Primary Schools (GPS) outperform their peers in Registered Non-Government Primary Schools (RNGPS) by a substantial margin and there is, in both types of schools, a large variance in competencies among students of the same grade, across geographical divisions. The achievement level of urban students was moderately better than that of rural students. National assessments of student learning outcomes conducted by CAMPE conclude that student achievement in primary schools was notably worse in isolated areas as well as in high-poverty districts (DPE, *PEDP3 Programme Document*).

In order to monitor progress in narrowing geographical disparities, an *Upazila* composite performance index (KPI 9) has been constructed on the basis of three performance indicators:

- *Gender participation indicator*: Absolute difference between (i) the ratio of girls in the total number of children enrolled in the *Upazila* and (ii) the average ratio of girls in the population.
- *Effectiveness/Efficiency indicator*: Survival rate to grade 5.
- *Learning outcomes indicator*: The percentage of children who passed the grade 5 Primary Education Completion Examination (PECE) among those that was eligible to sit for the examination. In other words, this combines the participation and the pass rate.

Compared to the baseline in 2010, both top and bottom 10% of *Upazilas* improve by 0.1 on the index, but the gap remains the same at 1.2: progress in narrowing the gap between high and low performing *Upazilas* has been slow.

JC4.3 Explanatory factors to observed evolutions

| JC4.3: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|---|---|
| The increase in infrastructure and programmes to reduce schooling cost influenced growth in enrolment and retention | Interviews, international comparison and literature | Indicative |
| Narrow fiscal space for education contribute to persisting high number of out-of-school children and drop-out-rate | Interviews, international comparison and literature | Indicative |
| NGO-run non-formal education play a critical gap-filling role | Interviews, field visit | Strong |
| Children's poverty is strongly related to access, retention and learning achievements | WB education sector review | Indicative (no access to data and seemingly no external quality check on the study) |
| Teacher's formal educational certification (ASCC) positively associated with learning achievements | WB education sector review, econometric analysis | Indicative (no access to raw data and seemingly no external quality check on the study) |
| Greater disparity in learning achievements among than within schools | WB education sector review | Indicative (no access to raw data and seemingly no external quality check on the study) |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|--|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quantitative analysis of the relationship between overall <i>access</i>, <i>retention</i> and <i>learning outcomes</i> performance indicators (as presented above) and variables influenced by | Data hardly available for a |

| | |
|--|--|
| government's policies implemented during the evaluation period (infrastructures, textbooks, trained teachers, stipends or school feeding programmes, presence of female teachers etc.), students' characteristics (gender, wealth, parents' level of education etc.) and upazila-wide socio-economic and cultural characteristics | first-hand analysis. Current analysis conducted with second-hand sources (mainly ASPR). |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quantitative analysis of the relationship between equity-sensitive <i>access</i>, <i>retention</i> and <i>learning outcomes</i> performance indicators (regional, socio-economic and gender disparity indicators as presented above) and variables influenced by government's policies implemented during the evaluation period (infrastructures, textbooks, trained teachers, stipends or school feeding programmes, presence of female teachers etc.), students' characteristics (gender, wealth, parents' level of education etc.) and upazila-wide socio-economic and cultural characteristics | Data hardly available for a first-hand analysis. Current analysis conducted with second-hand sources (mainly ASPR). |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Qualitative analysis of the relation between education performances and factors that cannot be quantified (pedagogical methodologies, school governance, teachers-students interactions, gender-sensitive policies, etc.) | Data partly available |

The greater availability of classrooms in the country, achieved thanks to government budgetary efforts supplemented by DPs' support under PEDP 2 and 3, had a direct impact on positive enrolment dynamics. The econometric analysis showed that the best performing upazilas in terms of completion rates were the ones that benefitted from significantly better infrastructures, had more schools working in single shifts and a slightly higher percentage of teachers with a C-degree. Programmes to reduce the cost of schooling - such as stipend, school feeding and free textbooks - have certainly driven the growth in enrolment and positively influenced the attendance, drop-out and completion rates trends. Stipend recipients, who are obliged to be present at school to receive the stipends, record a higher attendance rate (89% for boys and 91% for girls) than non-recipients (65% and 69% respectively) (World Bank, *Education Sector Review Report*, 2014). However, one may question the relevance of the stipend programme in 2015. Direct quality enhancing inputs, such as learning materials, school meal, teacher support and supervision and greater individual attention to children falling behind in class may be better incentives for students to come and stay in school. Eliminating out-of-pocket expenses for parents, such as exam fees and private tutoring needs would also be of help. The increase in the completion rate has certainly been influenced by the introduction of the Primary Education Completion Exam, as more pupils outside of GPS/NNPS sat for the exam. The introduction of pre-primary classes in primary schools certainly drove the enrolment increase at that level.

The World Bank's 2013 *education sector review report* conducted a detailed analysis of the NSA 2011 data to identify key factors driving students' learning outcomes. According to the study, wider gaps in achievements rather existed between schools than within schools. Also, poverty is correlated with low student performance. Students from poor households performed about three-fourths of a year behind their wealthier counterparts in Bangla and half a school year behind in mathematics. Parental education (especially the mother's) also

influenced student learning. Test scores were generally higher for children who have books and read at home.

There is little correlation between years of teaching experience and student learning outcomes. With regard to teacher's formal educational certification, the students of teachers who possess only a Secondary School Certificate underperformed. However, there appears to be no consistent differences in student performance among teachers with qualifications beyond a High Secondary Certificate. As regards teacher training, there is a positive correlation found only in subject-based training. "Time on Task" affects students' achievements. There is also a strong correlation between the number of days of student absence and their poor performance at the test (World Bank, Education sector review report, 2013).

The economic analysis conducted for this evaluation confirmed the weak relation between in-service training and performances of the system in terms of retention. It also corroborates the finding on the influence of teachers' initial training above secondary school certificate. It also showed that the lack of educational services influenced girls' performances: in the upazilas characterised by a higher percentage of schools with high pupil/classroom and pupil/teacher ratios, girls underperformed, in comparison with boys, at the grade 5 examination.

In addition to the factors identified by the World Bank study and the present econometric analysis, there are factors that are less amenable to quantification that do affect learning achievements: they revolve around classroom/school interactions. Prevailing teaching practices have remained characterised by rote learning and excessively oriented to high stake examination. Teaching conditions (overcrowded classrooms) and inadequate professional support prevented the actual adoption of children-centred pedagogical methodology by teachers. Providing greater individual attention to children falling behind was not yet a key feature of teaching practice. Supervision of schools remained limited, especially in remote areas, mostly due to overburdened assistant upazila education officers. Besides, supervision, when it occurred, was insufficiently geared towards the provision of professional guidance to improve teaching-learning processes in classrooms (CAMPE, 2011). NFE programmes have demonstrated the impact of a close, regular and supportive monitoring of teachers. NFE teachers generally received a low salary: this led to a high level of attrition of teachers. However, the close supervision they benefited from, focused on professional guidance, has contributed to high examination pass rate (MN 211, 212 and 218). Teachers' absenteeism and lack of punctuality, which are often signs of low job satisfaction and low morale, also influenced the number of contact hours, in a country where the official number of schooling days per year is relatively low (CAMPE, 2011). Private tuitions by GPS teachers, which were officially forbidden, have informally become almost mandatory for students to achieve good grades.

4.5 Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions: crossing the results of Steps 1 & 2 (Step 3)

In contrast to PEDP 2, PEDP 3 and the treasury model have represented progress in terms of coordination, harmonisation and alignment on government's systems. However, PEDP 3 has remained a hybrid system, anchored to a project approach and overly determined by donors' disbursement imperatives. In that context, the main objectives of a Swap could not be entirely fulfilled, especially concerning having a comprehensive sector-wide focus, an understanding of sector finance and long-term system development through learning by doing. Moreover, at the time of this evaluation, there were no signs that these objectives were informing donors' medium to long-term strategic vision for the sector. The scope for aid effectiveness improvement remained significant.

DPs contributed to the country's achievements in terms of access and retention. Their financial support complemented the government effort to expand the supply of classrooms and therefore promote access and retention. Their support to NGO-provided non-formal education played a critical gap-filling role to encourage poor children's enrolment. They have been instrumental in promoting key quality-oriented reforms, including the introduction of the Diploma in Education and the timely delivery of textbooks, which may eventually positively influence learning outcomes.


However, DPs' mode of intervention has not been entirely conducive to promoting positive dynamics in the sector. The complexity of the procurement regime they decided upon contributed to the slow delivery of new infrastructures and their RBM approach did not manage to drive better quality infrastructure. Throughout the period, DPs funded non-formal education provision without working towards strengthening government institutional, policy and financial capacities to sustain this provision. This undermines the potential long-term impact on poverty reduction.

The treasury model has suffered from a usual feature of the Swap approach - a focus on central level processes and systems and a relative neglect of local level dynamics - which have not been conducive to an actual translation of quality-oriented reforms into effective changes in classrooms. DPs struck an inadequate balance between disbursement imperatives, transparency requirements and long-term system development/government ownership. This has undermined capacity development and crowded out substantial discussion about structural issues, including obstacles that may hamper the actual transformation of quality-oriented reforms into effective changes in the classrooms. While the teaching profession has been DPs' key focus to improve quality, DPs have paid limited attention to the issue of teachers' supervision to encourage better quality teaching and professional behaviours in schools. DPs have also insufficiently drawn lessons from NFE good teaching practices (i.e. close supervision of teachers, a higher number of contact hours or multi-grade system) with the view to inform the policy dialogue on formal primary education. The focus on the teaching profession has not been accompanied with any engagement with teachers' unions, which, despite their politicisation, represent critical stakeholders to achieve actual transformation of teaching practices. Whilst the strong correlation between children's poverty and learning achievements has been demonstrated, DPs have paid insufficient attention to the stipend programme and its cost-benefits. While

the relation between learning achievements and book reading has been pointed out, DPs' interventions have been narrowly focused on textbook delivery. Generally, donors' lack of interest for sector finance and their silo vision of the education sector were not conducive to a holistic comprehension of Bangladesh's education sector with the view to tackle its structural challenges. Finally the prevailing conceptualisation, among DPs and government officials, of gender issues focused on girls' enrolment and a neglect of secondary education where girls' education challenges are the most acute - has not contributed to giving gender issues a prominent place in strategic discussions.

A simplified diagrammatic overview of our Step Three analysis is presented in the below figure.

Figure3 - Overview of the treasury model impacts and transmission mechanisms in Bangladesh



Recommendations

Generally, in order to achieve the whole potentiality of a Swap, donors should strike a better balance between the requirements for transparency and accountability, disbursement imperatives and the objective of long-term system development. The prevailing and somewhat paternalistic ‘hand-holding approach’⁷⁵ should gradually be replaced with a more trust-based relationship, given that ‘learning by doing’ and ‘errors and trials’ processes constitute effective capacity and ownership building mechanisms. Similarly, donors should refrain from developing ad-hoc, parallel PFM systems at DPE level that is geared towards the exclusive management of PEDP 3.

If the treasury model is maintained in the next phase of PEDP, the EU should continue with sector budget support. This instrument constitutes the best (and only) option to allow the EU to play a role in the policy dialogue. Even though the fiduciary risk remains a concern, the existing sector safeguards can be considered sufficient. However, given its relative small financial weight, the EU should also promote the creation of alliances with other EU member states or like-minded donors in order to counter-balance the current hegemonic power of the two banks. This will be all the more important that ADB has decided to phase out of primary education, hereby leaving the World Bank without counter-weight.

The policy dialogue should evolve away from a quasi-exclusive focus on the implementer (DPE) towards an engagement with the ministerial level including MoPME, MoF and MoE. An important agenda for this engagement should be to encourage the government to take a longer-term view of education system development with a focus on the key NEP objectives and priorities. It will be important to increase focus on structural changes in the system such as meaningful decentralisation and teachers’ supervision; ensuring education resources to achieve quality with equity objectives, thinking innovatively about numbers, performance and remuneration of teachers; moving towards learning assessment approaches that encourage competency-based learning and steer students, teachers and schools away from rote memorisation. The design of “PEDP 4” should involve these actors from the very initial stage, engaging them on the structural concerns. Specifically, donors should encourage a collaborative approach between the two ministries in charge of education to organise the planned expansion of primary education to grade 8.

To conduct a meaningful policy dialogue is time-consuming. The EU should pay greater attention to the human resources implications of the treasury model/budget support.

DPs should pay greater attention to intra-sector interdependence, especially between primary and junior secondary education, and to sector fragmentation. The intent here is not to recommend donor-led institutional reshuffle, which would merge ministries. DPs are indeed required to work within the existing administrative structure. The intent is rather to encourage the adoption of a genuine Swap that would pay attention to relationship between sub-sectors and design instruments to respond to its challenges – for instance through policy dialogue (a sector wide membership) and budget analyses (public

⁷⁵ The term is used by the World Bank to describe its approach of PEDP3 management.

expenditure review). DPs should ensure that a division of labour between DPs or EU MS would not lead to the consolidation of the existing silo vision of the education sector.

DPs should develop their knowledge about sector finance and budgeting mechanisms beyond PEDP 3 boundaries and fiduciary risks concerns. This should include a better understanding of the mechanisms of allocation of funds to lower levels (DEO, UEO and schools). This could necessitate a follow-up study to the World Bank's 2010 public expenditure review and to carry out regular 'rapid budget analyses' in the context of JARMS. One could also suggest that the Procurement and Financial Working Group broaden the scope of its agenda to cover these issues.

World Bank's main recommendations in its 2010 PER remain entirely relevant: 'improve coordination between the two ministries of education', 'gradually increase the overall funding level in education' and 'strengthen budget management systems to improve policy planning, reduce fragmentation and ensure continuous monitoring of sector budget performance'.

Regarding technical assistance, donors and the government should reflect on the possibility to support the establishment of long-term partnership between the government and Bangladeshi institutions able to provide capacity building support. The idea would be to encourage institution-based capacity development interventions rather than the current individual-based model that is undermined by the high staff turnover.

Specifically, the next NSA exercise should ensure a genuine transfer of know-how to officials in the MoPME (DPE/M&E and MID divisions), involving key professionals throughout the entire process, from the design of enumeration instruments to data analysis. Donors should support the government to develop its technical capacity to stock the cleaned raw data.

DPs should pay greater attention to the issue of teachers' supervision to encourage better quality teaching and professional behaviours in schools. This also calls for a better understanding of human and financial resources allocated to lower administration levels.

Learning achievements have been shown to be related to schools' characteristics: this calls for a more systematic focus on local level dynamics and school governance within a broad understanding of decentralisation/deconcentration that goes beyond the narrow emphasis on the disbursement of SLIPs grant to schools.

DPs should shift from a narrow focus on textbook delivery to a broader comprehension of the role of a thriving reading culture in promoting better learning achievements.

Given the relation between children's poverty and both access and learning achievements, measures that reduce schooling cost remain essential. In light of this, DPs should encourage an in-depth reflection about the stipend programme, its current mode of administration and its value for money, as opposed to other possible actions such as the elimination of out-of-pocket expenses for parents (exam fees and private tutoring) and

direct quality-enhancing interventions (supervision of teachers or pedagogy that focuses on low achievers etc.).

DPs should encourage a process of cross-fertilisation between formal and non-formal education. This should include the dissemination into formal education of the good practices experimented by non-formal education programmes (modes of teacher supervision, multi-grade system or focus on children falling behind in class, etc.).

DPs should promote aid effectiveness in their support to NGOs, be they education providers or advocacy institutions. In all cases, there is a great need for coordination and joint strategic thinking. For instance, donors that support CAMPE may think of promoting a joint steering committee and a joint assessment of its capacities to contribute to the policy dialogue. Donors could also usefully look at the initiative led by Save the Children to support a parliamentary education caucus. Donors that support non-formal education providers should reflect on the conditions to ensure the long-term sustainability of NGO-run education provision, a reflection that needs to be situated within a broader discussion about the fiscal space for (primary) education. DPs should develop relations with teachers' union as key stakeholder in the transformation of teaching practices.

Appendix 1 – Results of the econometric analysis

The methodological design of the econometric analysis is presented in Annex 3. This Appendix presents the results of the analysis.

As detailed in Annex 3, the objective of the analysis is to disentangle the underlying forces that help understanding the rationales behind observed disparities.

Table 1 hereunder describes the impact of a series of educational input variables on the performance indicator “dropout ratio” across the 506 upazilas. Displayed results have been estimated based on the following cross-sectional regression:

$$\text{DropoutRatio}_{i,2013} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{PupilTeacherRatio}_{i,2013} + \beta_2 \text{AddInputVar}_{i,2013} + \epsilon_{i,2013}$$

where $\text{AddInputVar}_{i,2013}$ is consecutively $\text{PupilClassroomRatio}_{i,2013}$; $\% \text{GoodCondClassrooms}_{i,2013}$; $\% \text{TeachersWithCDegree}_{i,2013}$; $\text{SubjectTrainingPerPupil}_{i,2013}$ and $\% \text{PupilsEnrolledinNonGPS/RNGPS}_{i,2013}$.

Table 1: Impact of Educational Input Factors on the Performance of Primary Education in Bangladesh in 2013 (performance measured by the dropout ratios observed across the 506 investigated upazilas)

| | Coeff | t-stat | Coeff | t-stat | Coeff | t-stat | Coeff | t-stat | Coeff | t-stat | Coeff | t-stat |
|----------------------------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|
| Constant | 0.1064 | 5.73 | 0.1086 | 5.34 | 0.1374 | 3.84 | 0.0704 | 0.78 | 0.0982 | 1.34 | 0.1061 | 5.56 |
| Pupil teacher ratio | -0.0006 | -1.7 | -0.0006 | -1.6 | -0.0006 | -1.8 | -0.0006 | -1.6 | -0.0006 | -0.8 | -0.0006 | -1.6 |
| Pupil classroom ratio | | | -0.0001 | -0.3 | | | | | | | | |
| % good cond classrooms | | | | | -0.0381 | -1.0 | | | | | | |
| % teachers with C-degree | | | | | | | 0.0376 | 0.41 | | | | |
| subject-training per pupil | | | | | | | | | 0.379 | 0.11 | | |
| % pupils in non GPS/RNGPS | | | | | | | | | | | -0.0015 | -0.2 |
| R ² adjusted | 0.041 | | 0.022 | | 0.023 | | 0.021 | | 0.021 | | 0.015 | |

While the impact of pupil/teacher ratios on observed dropout rates was expected to be positive, in the present sample the relationship is negative: in upazilas where the pupil/teacher ratio is higher the dropout rate is lower. Other educational input variables

seem to have no statistically significant influence on the level of dropout ratios across the country.

The lack of statistically significant links between educational input variables and output variables in the sample⁷⁶ may be due to the fact that dynamics determining the level of performance in education vary substantially across different subsamples in Bangladesh. To solve this problem we decide to concentrate on *disparities* - disparities observed among the Bangladesh education sector. We present here the in-depth analysis of educational disparities defined according to:

- Completion rates
- Gender disparities in terms of pass rates
- Pupil/teacher ratio

The objective is to get a better understanding of the driving forces of education performance indicators *in contrasted upazila-populations*. To do so we presents in the following sections the main characteristics and the main performance drivers across a set of extreme deciles – the 50 upazilas that do best (uppest decile) / worst (lowest decile) in terms of a sequence of predefined performance and context indicators. Analyzing these extreme sets of upazilas will enable us to increase our understanding of the underlying features that characterize the education sector in Bangladesh.

Upazilas ranked according to overall completion rates achieved

Table 2a presents the summary statistics of the education sector observed in upazilas that are included in the worst against the summary statistics of the educational landscape observed in upazilas that are included in the best performing deciles – performance defined in Table 2a as the *degree of completion achieved*. Column 1 and 2 describe the average features of the educational sector in the 50 worst performing upazilas in terms of completion rate (completion rate < 50,50%) whereas column 3 and 4 describe the average features of the educational sector in the 50 best performing upazilas in terms of completion rate (completion rate > 88,30%). Column 5 offers the significance level of the statistical t-test verifying the equality between the average values in both subsamples. *, ** and *** suggest that equality of average values are rejected at the 10, 5 and 1% significance level.

Findings can be summarized as follows:

- The districts for which the largest number of upazilas are characterized with the worst performance in terms of completion rates are: Kishoreganj (7), Cox's Bazar (6), Bhola (6), Netrokona (6) and Gaibandha (5).
- The districts for which the largest number of upazilas are characterized with the best performance in terms of completion rates are: Chittagong (10)⁷⁷ and Naoyaon (4).

⁷⁶ It should be stressed that similar regression have been performed between a wider set of educational output (pass rates, coefficient of efficiency, etc) and input (% teachers who received a subject-training, infrastructural variables, etc) variables. Empirical findings are overall coherent and seem to reveal – overall - that empirically documented links between input and output variables are very weak.

⁷⁷ Please note that this very ranking of the Chittagong district is as well confirmed at the Grade 5-Level Competencies as measured by the NSA study. (Bangladesh Education Sector Review (2013) World Bank)

Table 2a: Summary statistics describing the worst and best performing deciles defined based on the degree of completion achieved

| | Lowest Decile | | Highest Decile | | Signif test |
|---------------------------------|---------------|----------|----------------|----------|-------------|
| | Mean | Std.Dev. | Mean | Std.Dev. | |
| Pupil-Classroom Ratio | 77.4277 | 19.3104 | 63.3419 | 23.9140 | *** |
| % schools low PCR | 0.0766 | 0.1305 | 0.2214 | 0.1508 | *** |
| Pupil-Teacher Ratio | 42.3836 | 9.6257 | 50.2640 | 12.4824 | *** |
| % schools low PTR | 0.2387 | 0.2183 | 0.5206 | 0.2321 | *** |
| % classrooms in bad conditions | 0.2607 | 0.1328 | 0.2108 | 0.1188 | * |
| % Pacca classrooms | 0.9219 | 0.1679 | 0.9758 | 0.0235 | ** |
| % large classrooms | 0.0954 | 0.0446 | 0.0922 | 0.0375 | |
| % schools girl toilets | 0.5750 | 0.1736 | 0.6797 | 0.1634 | *** |
| % schools no toilet | 0.2224 | 0.1257 | 0.1213 | 0.0739 | *** |
| % schools safe water | 0.6226 | 0.1888 | 0.7258 | 0.1749 | *** |
| % schools wk tubewell | 0.4710 | 0.2254 | 0.5706 | 0.2478 | ** |
| % schools waterpoint | 0.7496 | 0.1909 | 0.8204 | 0.1753 | * |
| % schools SMC | 0.2126 | 0.1561 | 0.2278 | 0.1726 | |
| % schools PPE | 0.9106 | 0.1682 | 0.9671 | 0.0759 | ** |
| % schools SUP | 0.6637 | 0.3177 | 0.5361 | 0.3330 | * |
| % schools single shift | 0.1132 | 0.0793 | 0.1830 | 0.1163 | *** |
| % schools with textbooks in feb | 0.9743 | 0.1406 | 0.9941 | 0.0004 | |
| % headteachers with C deg | 0.9487 | 0.1405 | 0.9785 | 0.0253 | |
| % teachers with C deg | 0.8691 | 0.1355 | 0.9061 | 0.0508 | * |
| Subject training per pupil | 0.0142 | 0.0054 | 0.0123 | 0.0027 | ** |
| Sub-cluster tr per pupil | 0.0150 | 0.0045 | 0.0128 | 0.0028 | *** |
| Superv tr per pupil | 0.0036 | 0.0015 | 0.0032 | 0.0009 | * |
| Dropout rate | 0.5526 | 0.0938 | 0.0746 | 0.0312 | *** |
| Years input | 9.8595 | 1.3244 | 5.7350 | 0.3179 | *** |
| Efficiency coefficient | 52.7020 | 7.4233 | 87.0233 | 5.0981 | *** |
| Completion rate | 0.4274 | 0.0790 | 0.9254 | 0.0312 | *** |
| % pupils not in GPS or RNGPS | 0.5182 | 0.8120 | 0.4972 | 0.4811 | |
| Overall pass rate | 0.9644 | 0.0238 | 0.9777 | 0.0202 | *** |
| Overall gender pass rate diff | -0.0053 | 0.0136 | 0.0009 | 0.0101 | ** |
| GPS pass rate | 0.9778 | 0.0234 | 0.9909 | 0.0124 | *** |
| GPS gender pass rate diff | -0.0011 | 0.0106 | 0.0016 | 0.0081 | |
| RNGPS pass rate | 0.9622 | 0.0354 | 0.9790 | 0.0281 | ** |
| RNGPS gender pass rate diff | -0.0126 | 0.0271 | 0.0006 | 0.0155 | *** |
| DPE pass rate | 0.9149 | 0.0577 | 0.9069 | 0.0725 | |
| DPE gender pass rate diff | -0.0142 | 0.0547 | -0.0179 | 0.0831 | |
| BRAC pass rate | 0.9975 | 0.0090 | 0.9989 | 0.0034 | |
| BRAC gender pass rate diff | 0.0029 | 0.0096 | 0.0006 | 0.0031 | |
| Madrasah pass rate | 0.9257 | 0.1451 | 0.9393 | 0.1434 | |
| Madrasah gender pass rate diff | 0.0071 | 0.0018 | -0.0024 | 0.0015 | *** |

GPS: Government primary school; RNGPS: Registered non-government primary school; DPE: Other DPE and DSHE schools; BRAC: Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee Schools; SUP: Percentage of School receive SLIP grants; SMC: School management committees; Superv tr per pupil: Supervision training per pupil.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ The coefficient of (internal) efficiency is usually defined as the ideal (optimal) number of pupil-years required (i.e. in the absence of repetition and dropout) to produce a number of graduates from a given school-cohort for a cycle or level of education expressed as a percentage

- Bad and good performances go along. The upazilas for which we observe the best/worst (10%) performances in terms of completion rate achieved display as well significantly higher/lower average values in terms efficiency and lower/higher values in terms of dropout rates and input years.
- The best performing upazilas in terms of completion rates are also the ones that benefit from significantly better infrastructures, on average. This evidence is furthermore strengthened by the fact that we observe among the best performing upazilas that lower pupil/classroom ratios significantly reduce the amount of input years and significantly increase the efficiency observed in the upazilas (Table 2B, lower part, column 3 and 4).
- The best performing upazilas – in terms of completion rates achieved - have benefitted on average from a significantly lower number of (teacher) trainings per pupil compared to the worst performing upazilas. There is moreover no significant difference between both deciles in terms of percentage of head teachers with C-degree except a somewhat higher percentage of teachers with C-degree in the best-performing - completion rates - upazilas.
- The best performing upazilas – in terms of achieved completion rates – have on average more schools working in single shift.
- The worst performing upazilas – in terms of achieved completion rates – have on average more schools/pupils receiving SUP grants.
- School management committees are not significantly different across worst vs. best performing upazilas – in terms of achieved completion rates.⁷⁹
- (Table 2b) Within each of the extreme deciles there seems to be no significant impact of pupil / teacher ratios on efficiency, dropout ratios and/or input years.
- (Table 2b) The lower the pupil /teacher ratios seem only to have a significant positive impact on efficiency and negative impact on input years in the best performing decile. In the worst performing decile the pupil classroom ratios have no impact on any of our performance indicators.

Table 2b: Sensitivity of educational performance indicators to pupil/teacher and pupil/classroom ratios in the worst/best performing deciles defined based on the completion rates achieved

of the actual number of pupil-years spent to produce the same number of graduates. The “year-input per graduate” is usually defined as the estimated average number of pupil-years spent by pupils (or students) from a given cohort who graduate from a given cycle or level of education, taking into account the pupil-years wasted due to dropout and repetition

⁷⁹ These results confirm the rather weak impact of School Management Committees in Bangladesh (Bangladesh Education Sector Review (2013) World Bank).

| Sensitivity to pupil teacher ratios | Lowest Decile | | Highest Decile | |
|---|---------------|--------|----------------|--------|
| | Coeff | t-stat | Coeff | t-stat |
| Sensitivity of dropout ratios to pupil teacher ratios | 0.0002 | -0.31 | -0.0006 | -1.74 |
| Sensitivity of "input years" to pupil teacher ratios | -0.0119 | -0.59 | 0.0003 | 0.06 |
| Sensitivity of "efficiency coefficient" to pupil teacher ratios | -0.1518 | -1.37 | -0.0093 | -0.15 |
| Sensitivity to pupil classroom ratios | Lowest Decile | | Highest Decile | |
| | Coeff | t-stat | Coeff | t-stat |
| Sensitivity of dropout ratios to pupil classroom ratios | -0.0001 | -0.31 | 0.0001 | 0.67 |
| Sensitivity of "input years" to pupil classroom ratios | 0.0047 | 0.47 | 0.0036 | 1.96 |
| Sensitivity of "efficiency coefficient" to pupil classroom ratios | -0.0144 | -0.26 | -0.0465 | -1.97 |

Upazilas ranked according to performance (pass rate) disparity between boys and girls in their terminal examination^{80,81}

Table 3a presents the summary statistics of the educational landscape observed in upazilas that are included in the worst against the summary statistics of the education sector observed in upazilas that are included in the best performing deciles – performance defined in Table 3a as the *degree of performance (pass rate) disparity between boys and girls in their terminal examination*. Column 1 and 2 describe the average features of the educational sector in the 50 worst performing upazilas in terms of gender disparities (girls' vs boys' pass rate differential < -1% - revealing that the percentage of boys passing successfully the PECE examination is 1% higher or more compared to the one of girls) whereas column 3 and 4 describe the average features of the educational sector in the 50 best performing upazilas in terms of gender disparities (girls' vs. boys' pass rate differential > 0.8% - revealing that the percentage of boys passing successfully the PECE examination is 0.8 % higher or more compared to the one of girls).

- The districts for which the largest number of upazilas are characterized with the most (10%) negative differential between girls and boys terminal examination performance (pass rates) are: Cox's Bazar (4), Gaibandha (4), Jamalpur (3), Netrokona (3), Manikganj (3), Shariatpur (3) and Sylhet (3).

⁸⁰ Please recall that Bangladesh is placed third out of 178 countries in terms of improvements in education, health, and inequality over the last 20 years in the 2011 UN Human Development Report (UNDP, 2011). This high ranking is mainly driven by the fact that the country particularly stands out in terms of progress in female secondary schooling, fertility decline and two health indicators—infant mortality and child immunization. (Asadullah, M.N, Savoia A., Mahmud, W. (2014) Paths to Development: Is there a Bangladesh Surprise? World Development, Volume 62: 138-154.)

⁸¹ Please note that strong international investment support are still devoted to achieving gender parity in terms of educational performance.

Table 3a: Summary statistics describing the worst and best performing deciles defined based on the degree of performance (pass rates) differential between girls and boys⁸²

| | Lowest Decile | | Highest Decile | | Signif test |
|---------------------------------|---------------|----------|----------------|----------|-------------|
| | Mean | Std.Dev. | Mean | Std.Dev. | |
| Pupil-Classroom Ratio | 72.3453 | 18.4019 | 63.6387 | 20.4535 | ** |
| % schools low PCR | 0.1171 | 0.1541 | 0.2260 | 0.2158 | *** |
| Pupil-Teacher Ratio | 45.5943 | 9.8608 | 46.7899 | 14.5414 | |
| % schools low PTR | 0.2817 | 0.2344 | 0.4783 | 0.2651 | *** |
| % classrooms in bad conditions | 0.2388 | 0.0846 | 0.2447 | 0.1025 | |
| % Pacca classrooms | 0.9355 | 0.1019 | 0.9291 | 0.1126 | |
| % large classrooms | 0.0908 | 0.0334 | 0.0843 | 0.0349 | |
| % schools girl toilets | 0.6300 | 0.1643 | 0.6152 | 0.1681 | |
| % schools no toilet | 0.1775 | 0.1084 | 0.1978 | 0.1101 | |
| % schools safe water | 0.7010 | 0.1492 | 0.6442 | 0.1974 | * |
| % schools wk tubewell | 0.5714 | 0.2088 | 0.4875 | 0.2411 | * |
| % schools waterpoint | 0.8117 | 0.1718 | 0.7413 | 0.1959 | * |
| % schools SMC | 0.2456 | 0.1535 | 0.2434 | 0.1507 | |
| % schools PPE | 0.9225 | 0.1126 | 0.9458 | 0.0999 | |
| % schools SUP | 0.6573 | 0.2858 | 0.6034 | 0.2993 | |
| % schools single shift | 0.1332 | 0.0849 | 0.1369 | 0.1037 | |
| % schools with textbooks in feb | 0.9942 | 0.0000 | 0.9942 | 0.0000 | |
| % headteachers with C deg | 0.9709 | 0.0233 | 0.9687 | 0.0557 | |
| % teachers with C deg | 0.8859 | 0.0579 | 0.8917 | 0.0573 | |
| Subject training per pupil | 0.0129 | 0.0043 | 0.0138 | 0.0051 | |
| Sub-cluster tr per pupil | 0.0139 | 0.0038 | 0.0143 | 0.0042 | |
| Superv tr per pupil | 0.0034 | 0.0013 | 0.0037 | 0.0018 | |
| Dropout rate | 0.4008 | 0.1623 | 0.3018 | 0.1508 | *** |
| Years input | 8.1683 | 1.8699 | 7.3057 | 1.4818 | ** |
| Efficiency coefficient | 64.8793 | 13.8271 | 71.3892 | 14.6393 | ** |
| Completion rate | 0.5992 | 0.1623 | 0.6982 | 0.1508 | *** |
| % pupils not in GPS or RNGPS | 0.4322 | 0.4695 | 0.4174 | 0.4754 | |
| Overall pass rate | 0.9500 | 0.0211 | 0.9618 | 0.0228 | ** |
| GPS pass rate | 0.9687 | 0.0251 | 0.9792 | 0.0227 | ** |
| GPS gender pass rate diff | -0.0101 | 0.0092 | 0.0094 | 0.0113 | *** |
| RNGPS pass rate | 0.9388 | 0.0425 | 0.9588 | 0.0395 | ** |
| RNGPS gender pass rate diff | -0.0287 | 0.0298 | 0.0123 | 0.0246 | *** |
| DPE pass rate | 0.8961 | 0.0868 | 0.9238 | 0.0744 | * |
| DPE gender pass rate diff | -0.0293 | 0.0653 | 0.0081 | 0.0471 | *** |
| BRAC pass rate | 0.9939 | 0.0128 | 0.9980 | 0.0058 | ** |
| BRAC gender pass rate diff | 0.0002 | 0.0114 | -0.0010 | 0.0093 | |
| Madrasah pass rate | 0.8997 | 0.1462 | 0.8589 | 0.2632 | |
| Madrasah gender pass rate diff | 0.0004 | 1.3451 | -0.0016 | 0.9299 | ** |

GPS: Government primary school; RNGPS: Registered non-government primary school; DPE: Other DPE and DSHE schools; BRAC: Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee Schools; SUP: Percentage of School receive SLIP grants; SMC: School management committees; Superv tr per pupil: Supervision training per pupil.

⁸² A positive gender differential indicates higher pass rates for girls and a negative gender gap indicates higher pass rates for boys.

- The districts for which the largest number of upazilas are characterized with the most (10%) positive differential between girls and boys terminal examination performance (pass rates) are: Sylhet (4), Netrokona (3), Comilla (3), Rangamati (3) and Sunamyanj (3).
- Poor performance goes along. Upazilas characterized by large discrepancies between girls' and boys' performances at the terminal examination are as well characterized by significantly higher average dropout rates and input years and significantly lower average efficiency and completion rates.
- The quality of the infrastructure does not play a role in the reduction of gender performance disparities: upazilas characterized by higher disparity levels seem to have on average better infrastructures.
- The number of teachers and more specifically the pupil/teacher ratio does not affect the degree of gender performance disparities: the pupil/ teacher ratio is on average the same in the best vs. worst performing gender disparity upazilas.
- However in the worst performing upazilas – in terms of gender performance differential – we observe a significantly lower percentage of schools with low pupil classroom ratios and/or low pupil teacher ratios. This reveals that in these worst performing upazilas – in terms of gender performance disparity – there are significantly less “*excellence schools*” characterized by so-defined “*optimal*” educational parameters (schools where pupil teacher ratio < 46 and where pupil classroom ratio < 40).
- (Table 3b) The sensitivity of dropout rates, input years and efficiency coefficient to pupil/teacher ratios in the best performing decile – in terms of observed gender performance disparities – are counter-intuitive: as a matter of fact the lower the pupil/ teacher ratios the lower the efficiency and the higher the dropout / rate and input years. The pupil/teacher ratio has on the other hand no impact on performance (dropout, efficiency and input years) in the worst performing decile.
- (Table 3b) The sensitivity of dropout rates, input years and efficiency coefficient to pupil classroom ratios in the two extreme deciles – in terms of observed gender performance disparities – are as expected: the lower the pupil classroom ratios (which mean less crowded classrooms) the higher the efficiency and the lower the dropout ratios and input years indicators.

Table 3b: Sensitivity of educational performance indicators to pupil/teacher and pupil/classroom ratios in the worst/best performing deciles defined based on the degree of performance (pass rates) differential between girls and boys

| Sensitivity to pupil teacher ratios | Lowest Decile | | Highest Decile | |
|---|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| | Coeff | <i>t-stat</i> | Coeff | <i>t-stat</i> |
| Sensitivity of dropout ratios to pupil teacher ratios | -0.0011 | -0.48 | -0.0023 | -1.93 |
| Sensitivity of "input years" to pupil teacher ratios | -0.0368 | -1.37 | -0.0233 | -1.71 |
| Sensitivity of "efficiency coefficient" to pupil teacher ratios | 0.2459 | 1.23 | 0.2844 | 2.04 |
| Sensitivity to pupil classroom ratios | Lowest Decile | | Highest Decile | |
| | Coeff | <i>t-stat</i> | Coeff | <i>t-stat</i> |
| Sensitivity of dropout ratios to pupil classroom ratios | 0.0021 | 2.23 | 0.0023 | 1.62 |
| Sensitivity of "input years" to pupil classroom ratios | 0.0399 | 2.96 | 0.0214 | 2.18 |
| Sensitivity of "efficiency coefficient" to pupil classroom ratios | -0.3374 | -3.48 | -0.1927 | -1.97 |

Upazilas ranked according to the pupil teacher ratio

Table 4a presents the summary statistics of the educational landscape observed in upazilas that are included in the worst performing deciles against the summary statistics of the educational landscape observed in upazilas that are included in the best performing deciles – performance defined in Table 4a as the degree of human input invested: the inverse of the pupil teacher ratio.. Column 1 and 2 describe the average features of the educational sector in the 50 worst performing upazilas in terms of human resources invested (pupil/teacher ratio > >65) whereas column 3 and 4 describe the average features of the educational sector in the 50 best performing upazilas in terms of human resources invested (pupil teacher ratio < 34).

Table 4a: Summary statistics describing the worst and best performing deciles defined based on the degree of human resources invested (inverse of pupil/ teacher ratio)

| | Lowest Decile | | Highest Decile | | Signif test |
|---------------------------------|---------------|----------|----------------|----------|-------------|
| | Mean | Std.Dev. | Mean | Std.Dev. | |
| Pupil-Classroom Ratio | 66.9108 | 21.0527 | 72.4448 | 17.5143 | * |
| % schools low PCR | 0.1681 | 0.1608 | 0.1049 | 0.1003 | *** |
| Pupil-Teacher Ratio | 75.2010 | 8.1645 | 28.7017 | 4.1830 | *** |
| % schools low PTR | 0.4219 | 0.2481 | 0.3035 | 0.1901 | *** |
| % classrooms in bad conditions | 0.2466 | 0.1458 | 0.2192 | 0.0705 | |
| % Pacca classrooms | 0.9340 | 0.1468 | 0.9724 | 0.0249 | * |
| % large classrooms | 0.0993 | 0.0400 | 0.0931 | 0.0399 | |
| % schools girl toilets | 0.6135 | 0.1981 | 0.6151 | 0.1720 | |
| % schools no toilet | 0.1788 | 0.1503 | 0.1842 | 0.1284 | |
| % schools safe water | 0.6919 | 0.2089 | 0.7280 | 0.1804 | |
| % schools wk tubewell | 0.5467 | 0.2401 | 0.6214 | 0.1924 | |
| % schools waterpoint | 0.8053 | 0.1774 | 0.8390 | 0.0996 | |
| % schools SMC | 0.2499 | 0.1304 | 0.2448 | 0.1646 | |
| % schools PPE | 0.9466 | 0.1505 | 0.9260 | 0.1025 | |
| % schools SUP | 0.5930 | 0.3068 | 0.6608 | 0.2940 | |
| % schools single shift | 0.1572 | 0.0969 | 0.1042 | 0.0817 | *** |
| % schools with textbooks in feb | 0.9743 | 0.1406 | 0.9942 | 0.0003 | |
| % headteachers with C deg | 0.9398 | 0.1419 | 0.9738 | 0.0302 | * |
| % teachers with C deg | 0.8632 | 0.1403 | 0.8916 | 0.0587 | |
| Subject training per pupil | 0.0080 | 0.0018 | 0.0211 | 0.0037 | *** |
| Sub-cluster tr per pupil | 0.0085 | 0.0012 | 0.0210 | 0.0035 | *** |
| Superv tr per pupil | 0.0018 | 0.0006 | 0.0057 | 0.0015 | *** |
| Dropout rate | 0.2252 | 0.1165 | 0.3449 | 0.1582 | *** |
| Years input | 6.5495 | 0.9940 | 7.6974 | 1.7445 | *** |
| Efficiency coefficient | 80.0734 | 19.5215 | 67.2632 | 13.6163 | *** |
| Completion rate | 0.7548 | 0.1561 | 0.6551 | 0.1582 | *** |
| % pupils not in GPS or RNGPS | 0.5296 | 0.6886 | 0.3176 | 0.2108 | *** |
| Overall pass rate | 0.9794 | 0.0141 | 0.9685 | 0.0237 | *** |
| Overall gender pass rate diff | 0.0021 | 0.0108 | 0.0001 | 0.0103 | |
| GPS pass rate | 0.9918 | 0.0113 | 0.9792 | 0.0213 | *** |
| GPS gender pass rate diff | 0.0009 | 0.0107 | 0.0006 | 0.0094 | |
| RNGPS pass rate | 0.9849 | 0.0190 | 0.9570 | 0.0414 | *** |
| RNGPS gender pass rate diff | -0.0001 | 0.0129 | -0.0088 | 0.0230 | *** |
| DPE pass rate | 0.9196 | 0.0814 | 0.9360 | 0.0629 | |
| DPE gender pass rate diff | -0.0173 | 0.0938 | 0.0071 | 0.0837 | |
| BRAC pass rate | 0.9991 | 0.0032 | 0.9977 | 0.0077 | |
| BRAC gender pass rate diff | 0.0005 | 0.0037 | 0.0012 | 0.0080 | |
| Madrasah pass rate | 0.9393 | 0.1434 | 0.9393 | 0.1434 | |
| Madrasah gender pass rate diff | -0.2389 | 1.5004 | -0.2389 | 1.5004 | |

GPS: Government primary school; RNGPS: Registered non-government primary school; DPE: Other DPE and DSHE schools; BRAC: Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee Schools; SUP: Percentage of School receive SLIP grants; SMC: School management committees; Superv tr per pupil: Supervision training per pupil.

We observe:

- The upazilas where the highest amount of human resources is invested with respect to the number of pupils are the upazilas where we observe a significantly lower volume of classroom infrastructures with respect to the number of pupils when compared to the upazilas where the PTR ratio > 65 . It should be stressed however that a higher percentage of PACCA classrooms are observed in these low PTR ratio upazilas. To sum up: the upazilas where the highest amount of human resources is invested with respect to the number of pupils have less classrooms but the classrooms they have are on average better equipped.
- The upazilas where the highest amount of human resources is invested with respect to the number of pupils are performing significantly worse compared to the upazilas where the lowest amount of human resources is invested: Low PTR ratio upazilas display significantly higher dropout rates, significantly longer input years, significantly lower efficiency coefficients and significantly lower terminal examination pass rates (especially in the GPS and RNGPS sector).⁸³
- In these upazilas where the highest amount of human resources is invested with respect to the number of pupils we observe a higher percentage of pupils enrolled in the GPS and RNGPS educational sector compared to the upazilas where the lowest amount of human resources is invested.
- In these low PTR upazilas we observe a significantly lower percentage of schools working in single shift compared to the upazilas where the lowest amount of human resources is invested with respect to the total number of pupils.
- In these upazilas where the highest amount of human resources is invested with respect to the number of pupils, the percentage of trained headteachers is significantly higher and the number of teacher trainings invested per pupil is significantly larger compared to the upazilas where PTR ratios are above 65.
- There is no difference in gender disparity between upazilas belonging to the highest vs. lowest decile in terms of pupil teacher ratio.


⁸³ Please note that the factor correlation analysis performed in the Bangladesh Education Sector Review (2013, World Bank) does not investigate the relationship between pupil/teacher ratios and educational performance but exclusively between teacher-training-related factors and educational performance.

5. Detailed facts and findings on private sector development including rural development

5.1 Overall context of sector

Both the private sector in general and the rural sub-sector have seen strong growth over the evaluation period. The private sector has been driving the comparatively high economic growth rates averaging 6% in the period. In terms of exports, the ready made garment (RMG) industry dominates, accounting in 2013 for around 75% of exports and providing employment to more than 4 million workers, the majority of which are women.⁸⁴

Figure 2: Composition of the economy of Bangladesh



Since its start in the early 1980s the textile sector has –on average– grown at an impressive 17% annually, to become the largest industrial sector also in terms of employment and turnover. The economy has become more diversified over time with substantial growth in sectors such as IT, pharmaceuticals, ship-breaking & -building, banking (including of course micro-finance) and seafood products. Based on such robust and diversified growth, Bangladesh has been included in the so-called ‘next 11’ group of countries having a high potential of becoming, along with the India and China, among the world's largest economies in the 21st century.⁸⁵


However, there are still many obstacles to fully harnessing the potential of the private sector in Bangladesh. The infrastructure is inadequate, both in terms of roads, ports and

⁸⁴ Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA). 2013. "Ready-made Garment Yearbook."

⁸⁵ Goldman Sachs: [N-11 Equity Portfolio](#), February 2013


electricity, whereas governance weaknesses also undermine attempts to enforce contracts, getting permits/licences and starting a business. Access to credit is also a major impediment for especially micro and small enterprises, as is property registration. Not surprisingly Bangladesh scores very low on the Doing Business ranking, coming in at number 173 out of 189 countries (2015), with limited progress in the last years. This is obviously also a deterrent for both foreign and domestic investors.

Figure 3: Rural and Urban wages (ODI, 2014)



While agriculture’s share of the GDP has declined to around 15% today, it still provides employment to close to half of the labour force either directly (on-farm) or indirectly (e.g. agro-processing), but indications are that its share will fall further as the sectors growth rate is falling behind the rest of the economy’s trend line (see figure 1). However, as stated in the section 2.2 on the economic and social context, the rural wages have generally increased as labour demand from industry, combined with agricultural productivity increases, have allowed for upward pressures. Thus, the rural-urban wage gap has closed considerably during the last decade, as can be seen from figure 2, also a key driver in reducing urban – rural disparities contributing to poverty reduction.

Trade has grown substantially since then, with the EU being the main trading partner for Bangladesh.

Figure 3 - EU-Bangladesh trade**Total goods: EU Trade flows and balance, annual data 2004 - 2013**Source Eurostat Comext
Statistical regime 4

Exports from Bangladesh to EU are dominated by clothing (90%) whereas EU exports to Bangladesh are dominated by machinery and transport equipment. Bangladesh has benefitted from the Everything But Arms (EBA) trade arrangement under the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) granting preferential access to imports from Bangladesh. Partly as a result, the EU runs a substantial -and growing- trade deficit with Bangladesh, Bangladeshi exports to the EU having more than doubled during the evaluation period.

5.1.1 National strategies and policies

Despite a legacy of political discord, Bangladesh's successive governments have maintained an economic policy consensus committed to private sector development and to private sector-led growth. The national strategy for accelerated poverty reduction (NSAPR, 2005 and revised in 2009) emphasized that progress toward poverty reduction would require (i) an open and competitive environment that is conducive to private investment, with a particular emphasis on exports and rural development; (ii) raising poor people's capability to participate more fully in growth through access to higher-quality education, health care, safe water, and nutrition; and (iii) that the government improve its administrative and management capacity, promote local governance, tackle corruption, enhance justice for the poor, and improve security and public order to protect private property rights.

Development priorities included (i) accelerated growth in rural areas and the development of agriculture and off-farm economic activities; (ii) developing manufacturing SMEs; (iii) rural electrification, roads, water supply and sanitation, and supportive infrastructure including measures to reduce natural and human-induced shocks; and (iv) ICT. The 2009 revision generally confirmed these priorities but added further emphasis on infrastructure.

Also relevant for the evaluation period is the Sixth Five-Year Plan, 2011–2015 that included a growth strategy to boost the rate of private investment and foster structural change. More opportunities should be created in manufacturing and services to facilitate the transfer of many workers engaged in less-productive employment in agriculture and informal services to higher-income jobs. This economic rebalancing would be accompanied by strategies to enhance the income-earning opportunities of workers remaining in agriculture by raising crop productivity and diversification. The plan anticipated a more balanced rate of growth of urban centres (outside Dhaka) across the entire country through institutional reform and the establishment of locally elected and accountable city governments.

At SME level, the 2005 Policy Strategies recognized SME as indispensable actors for growth and poverty reduction and pledged further support in areas such as ICT use, access to financial services and innovation. The SME Strategy is currently being revised, with the assistance of EU's INSPIRED programme.

For rural and agricultural development (which is of specific interest to this evaluation), the above-mentioned national strategy for accelerated poverty reduction also provided policy direction for the rural sector. The emphasis was on agriculture and rural development as key sectors for poverty reduction and pro-poor economic growth. This was to mitigate the serious constraint that food insecurity among the large poor population in rural areas poses to development efforts. The subsequent 6th five year plan from 2011 to 2015 focused on accelerating agricultural commercialisation, diversification and agro-processing, while also complementing the emphasis on food security with food safety issues. Beside extension and SME support, GoB also committed to improving rural infrastructure that can facilitate commercialisation and diversification, primarily at the national road network level.

5.1.2 Institutional context

The *Ministry of Industries* (MoI) is primarily responsible for developing new policies and strategies for promotion, expansion and sustainable development of the industrial sector, including SME promotion. In terms of the ministry's contribution to the Vision 2021, it aims to make industrialisation a key driver in achieving middle-income status. EU has supported MoI through e.g. the BEST and INSPIRED programme.

The *Ministry of Commerce* (previously part of MoI) is responsible for overall trade and commerce related activities including internal commerce. It is also focused on delivering on the Vision 2021 ambition to become a middle-income country through the promotion of diversified, export-led industrialization as major engine for increased and sustained economic growth. It is also working to strengthen production networks of existing and new export products, thereby improving Bangladesh's position in global value chains. The ministry has received support from the EU through e.g. the trade policy support programme (TPSP) and also the BEST programme.

The *Ministry of Agriculture* (MoA) is responsible for policy formulation, planning, monitoring and administration. It also deals with pesticide policy and certification including introduction of new fertilizer and monitoring fertilizer market. In terms of outreach, the

most important activity of MoA is the department of agricultural extension which aims at creating an enabling environment growth in food production and commercial crops and to enhance farmers' income and growth of agro-based industry through proper utilization of existing resource base, organizing farmers and developing market linkages of agricultural produce. Denmark has supported MoA through e.g. the ASPS II (especially through the agricultural extension component, AEC) , continuing in 2013 with the Agricultural Growth and Employment Programme (AGEP) and its integrated farm management component (IFCM).

The *Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock* (MoFL) has as its mandate to: preserve fisheries resources, fulfil the requirement of animal protein through proper management and planned development, increase socio-economic conditions of fishermen, create employment opportunities for rural unemployed and landless people, expand foreign exchange earnings by exporting fish and fishery products and to innovate new technologies through research for fisheries development and preservation. Both Denmark and EU have supported MoFL in the evaluation phase through e.g. the ASPSII (with the Regional Fisheries and Livestock Component) and the BEST.

Finally, the *Ministry of Textiles and Jute* (MoTJ) is focussing on enabling the sector to 1) utilize the full potential through penetrating local and international markets to meet the growing demand for high-quality fibre and yarn production and 2) increase the productivity of jute and textile sector, through technology development, information and communication technology. EU has support MoTJ through the BEST programme with a focus on upgrading productivity, quality and competitiveness of the sector (especially textiles).

5.2 Strategies of relevant EPs in the sector

EU's strategy on trade in the evaluation period was first formulated in the Communication from 2002: *Trade and development: Assisting developing countries to benefit from trade* which was the first attempt to explicitly formulate a way the EU could fulfil its global commitments in support of the efforts of developing countries to better reap the benefits of trade and investment. This was subsequently backed up by substantial funding for trade related assistance (TRA), which Bangladesh also benefitted from. It was succeeded in 2012 by the Communication: *Trade, development and growth: Tailoring trade and investment for those countries most in need* which argued for a reorientation of TRA to those countries failing to integrate into the world economy (e.g. fragile and landlocked states). In terms of private sector development a key reference document is the: *Trade and Private Sector Policy and Development Support* from 2010 which commits the EU to promote inclusive and sustainable growth through a stronger business environment, a competitive local private sector and integration into the world economy as enabling vectors. In Bangladesh the key focus of the 2007-2013 CSP was to assist in improving the trade regulatory framework and increase SME competitiveness and export diversification. Initial focus was on the policy framework for trade and private sector development, but the mid-term review argued for complementing these interventions with a more direct pro-poor PSD focus.

Denmark's overall strategy for private sector development is entitled *Strategic Framework for the priority area Growth and Employment*, which states its commitment to continue support to the agricultural sector but takes a more comprehensive approach to the overall value chain, by e.g. linking farmers with markets and service providers (both public and private). In Bangladesh, the Danish 2005-2009 strategy emphasized that support would be given for the development of agriculture and non-farm economic activities. Particular attention would be given to poorer and female-headed households in areas where poverty was most persistent. Support for the acceleration of economic growth would also be given through support for the development of the private sector to expand employment opportunities also in non-agricultural areas. The strategy also stated that it would support the construction of rural roads using labour-intensive production methods closely linking it to the agricultural sector programme. Rural infrastructure development was thus supposed to provide opportunities for marketing agricultural products, and as the implementation of the support was foreseen in the same districts, the transport support was planned to be integrated in the Agricultural Sector Programme II. The new strategy covering 2013-2017 continues support to agriculture and also rural infrastructure, the latter being renamed Climate Resilient Rural Infrastructure.

5.3 EPs portfolio of projects

The EU is unsurprisingly having the largest portfolio which has included:

- Poverty Reduction Through Inclusive and Sustainable Markets (PRISM), which was approved in 2012 with a budget of €30m. The objective is to enhance the competitiveness of cottage and small enterprises in order to provide increased job opportunities in the targeted areas and sectors
- Integrated Support to Poverty and Inequality Reduction through Enterprise Development (INSPIRED) was approved in 2009 with a EU budget of €19m aiming at poverty reduction by supporting the development of SMEs in the country.
- Bangladesh Investment Climate Fund (BICF), with information about the details lacking.
- Bangladesh Quality Support Programme (BQSP), was approved in 2004 with a budget of €10m aimed at supporting the development of quality standards and quality management in Bangladesh in order to meet international standards. It was in many ways a predecessor of the next programme:
- Better Work and Standards Programme (BEST) was approved in 2008 with a budget of €15m, aiming at improving competitiveness and encourage export growth and diversification through increased productivity, and compliance with international standards. It is the successor to the BQSP.
- Trade Policy Support Programme (TSPS) was approved in 2008 with a budget of €6m. It aims at the development of an integrated national trade policy that will facilitate the identification of essential trade capacity building needs.
- Bangladesh Intellectual Property Rights Project, had a budget of €1.2 but otherwise few details.

Denmark has had a smaller portfolio, cantered primarily around the agriculture sector and the components herein. This sector has been supported for several decades. The portfolio relevant for this evaluation is hence limited to the following:

- Agriculture Sector Policy Support II (ASPSII), stated in 2006 and ended in 2013. It had a budget of DKK 530m (app. €71m) and had 3 major components (resembling projects) including agricultural extension, support to fisheries and livestock development and rural roads. Comparatively minor support has been granted to central ministries.
- The agricultural growth and employment programme (AGEP) started in 2013, with a budget of DKK 330m (app €44m). Its two core objectives are to increase and diversify agricultural production of female and male marginal and small farm households through Integrated Farm Management (IFM) Farmer Field Schools (FFS) and (ii) Strengthening of the competitiveness of the agricultural and agro-business sectors. It can be considered a continuation of the ASPSII but with added focus on agri-business development (e.g. processing).
- In addition Danida has also supported a business-to-business (B2B) programme that started in 2006 and ended in 2011. In that period, it funded 18 pilots that did not go into a project phase under B2B, and 17 full projects most of which (also went through a pilot phase. DKK 79 million were approved for the different phases, of which DKK 52 million has been disbursed as at March 2014. The main reason for the low disbursement rate is the relatively high failure rate among approved collaborations. The programmes contributions to poverty reduction through employment generation and growth were negligible ⁸⁶

5.4 Facts and findings per Judgement Criteria

JC5.1 EPs have addressed the key binding constraints to inclusive private sector growth at enterprise/farm level

| JC5.1: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|--|------------------------|
| Danida has worked closed to farmers and local business with robust results | FFS evaluation, field visits, reviews and interviews | Strong |
| EU has improved export opportunities significantly but the inclusiveness aspects may have been compromised in the process | Mid-term evaluation, ROM reports, progress reports, interviews, field visits and | More than satisfactory |
| EU work at SME strategy level has produced inconsistent and mostly disappointing results | ROM reports, interviews, progress reports. | More than satisfactory |
| Both bottom up and top down interventions required patience, quality support and building alliances of promoters | All of above and own analysis | More than satisfactory |

⁸⁶ See Danida: Evaluation of Danida Business-to-Business Programme 2006-2011 Bangladesh Country Report' September 2014. The evaluation was highly critical of the development outcomes, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the B2B programme, which was subsequently suspended.

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Productivity increases among enterprises / farms benefitting from EPs' support or services | Data partly available for DK, but otherwise hard to attribute to EPs support, which is hardly available for EU |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increased number of enterprises/farmers benefitting from advisory/extension services under EP supported programmes | Again relatively strong evidence from DK (fully available), but quite obvious given its direct service delivery focus. EU is hardly available. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inclusiveness in terms of how to reach the poor is explicitly operationalised in design documentation | Data partly available for DK, but hardly available for EU |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Employment and incomes of the poor increased in EP supported programmes | Data partly available for DK interventions, data hardly available for EU |

Indicator 5.1.1. Productivity increases among enterprises / farms benefitting from EPs' support or services

This indicator is arguably best documented in the Danish support to farmers' field schools where an impact evaluation was conducted in 2011. Here it is stated that for crop farmers 87% of the trained farmers had increased their crop (rice) yield, and that incomes were also improving compared to a control group of non-beneficiaries. The FFS also assisted in production diversification which is likely to have improved productivity. The productivity increases have been achieved relatively effectively and cost-effectively and will, be themselves by sustainable, as farmers will continue to utilise the higher productive methods. The key issue is of course the sustainability of FFS and the associated farmers clubs, union farmers' associations and CBOs created around the FFS. In general if an organisation/association was created primarily to tap into project benefits, their life-spanned then tended to follow that of the project, e.g. having limited sustainability. As stated in the project completion report 'Many farmers associations became inactive even before the end of the project. The process of forming farmers' associations should be reviewed and any plans for formation of new associations should include capacity building towards sustainable organisations.'⁸⁷ On the other hand the FFS is being increasingly funded by GoB; an achievement that has taken more than a decade to achieve and possibly one of the main bottom up policy achievements of Danida.

The Danish support to rural roads is also likely to have improved productivity, by e.g. reducing losses and facilitate timely delivery of inputs with lower transaction costs. No efforts have been made to quantify such productivity improvements for the specific Danida interventions, but with significant reductions in transport and improved

⁸⁷ Danida: Implementing Partners Final Report: Agriculture Extension Component (AEC) 2013. This was further corroborated by interviews see e.g. MN 006 and 117

accessibility, productivity should, *ceteris paribus*, have gone up. However, there are concerns about the sustainability of the rural infrastructure as the government focus is on the national network, whereas a substantial Danida emphasis has been on the feeder roads, where maintenance is more sporadic. As stated by Danida: ‘Sustainability aspects have to some extent been side lined by a need to concentrate on physical progress. A substantial number of TA staff has to a large extent carried out supervision and contract management tasks in particular in relation to LCS schemes, which the GoB (through LGED) did initially not have the organizational capacity to carry out and still needs to develop’.⁸⁸

The livestock and fisheries component also reports high production increases but does not mention productivity per se. But indications are that productivity has also increased, with the FFS approach also being used in livestock and fisheries. Also in the fishery sector seed quality has been improved as has the feed, rising productivity.⁸⁹ On the other hand sustainability is probably lower here than in the other two components, with the Ministry and its departments and field offices have weak outreach and limited willingness to constructively engaging in taking over project activities at the time of closure.⁹⁰ More fundamentally there has been an increasing disagreement between Danida and the Ministry about the appropriate role and responsibility of the ministry in terms of extension and provision of inputs, which ultimately resulted in Denmark terminating support, focusing solely on MoA instead.


EU’s projects have been more at policy level making quantifiable productivity estimates harder to make. The *BEST* project does try to improve productivity through e.g. linking Bangladeshi trade associations with EU research and design institutions, but there is no hard evidence produced yet. In general, the RMG industry has managed to increase production (see figure 1), probably through a combination of plain increases in the factors of production (e.g. more capital and workers) as well as productivity increases as the sophistication of production increases. Component 3 b on social compliance of the project has made concerted efforts to train mid-level managers for improving the productivity in the RMG and so far the tentative findings are positive with e.g. workers absenteeism rate decreasing in the supported factories on an average 4.60%. Migration rate has decreased in the factories on an average 4.24%. Grievances of workers has decreased in the factories on an average 65%. Efficiency bonus has increased in the factories on an average 5.25%.⁹¹ A total of 663 factories have seen supported to improve various aspects of compliance.

⁸⁸ See e.g. Danida: ‘Implementing Partner’s Final Report: Rural Roads and Market Infrastructure’.

⁸⁹ Danida: ‘Implementing Partner’s Final Report – RFLDC’ 2013

⁹⁰ Ibid. In addition misuse of funding also undermined trust between the partners and

⁹¹ GIZ: ‘Final Report: Promotion of Labour Standards in the RMG Sector, BEST’ June 2014.

Figure 4 - Exports of RMG in USD billions.

Source: *Textile Today*, 2014

Component 3A on Better Work in Textiles and Garments has as its objective to strengthen overall competitiveness in the textile and RMG sector, where quality and productivity improvements have been core ingredients. In this context the project has supported:

- National Performance Clusters for quality and productivity improvement; national institutes were assisted in building their capacity
- Alliance between national institutes and international institutes for mutual cooperation, knowledge sharing and academic exchange
- Development Plan for Textile Training for the textiles and garments industry

It is not possible to quantify nor attribute the productivity increases that have been the result of this support. However, all interviewed stakeholders, including industry associations, textile/RMG companies and trainers, all agreed that these initiatives have contributed to increased efficiency, productivity and ultimately profitability. A key driver has been the concert focus on improving added-value from both packing to being able to enter into higher price points in the fashion industry.⁹²

The INSPIRED project also aims to increase competitiveness, but again partly indirectly (access to finance) and partly through a grant scheme for business intermediary organisations / associations. But it is still too early to gauge quantitative impact. However, the access to financial services component is likely to improve accessibility of credits which will translate into increased investment of the SME, which in turn is likely to result in improved productivity. The support to business intermediary organisations may also benefit some enterprises in increasing productivity. But given its delayed and subsequently rushed launch and the many quality challenges, the impact is likely to be less than originally planned.

⁹² See e.g. MN 105, 106, 107, 108, 109 and 110.

Indicator 5.1.2. Increased number of enterprises/farmers benefitting from advisory/extension services under EPs supported programmes

Again the **Danish** agricultural support has arguably been ‘closest’ to the ground thus making attribution easier. Thus FFS evaluation states that since 2006, around three million poor people (representing more than 500,000 households) in rural Bangladesh have benefitted directly from new knowledge and techniques related to agricultural production and nutrition provided through FFS in ASPS II. To this should be added what seems to be quite large (but not quantifiable) spill-over effects from FFS farmers to non-FFS farmers. The sustainability of the core FFS concept is, as noted above, improving with stronger GoB buy-in, where the associated (but less critical) aspects of farmers organisations is arguably less sustainable, especially if created by Danida and not through a bottom-up voluntary fashion.

In the rural road component, poor rural women have benefitted from employment with a total of 3.10 million labour-days and the share of roads being maintained (in the project period) has increased from 43% to 75%, also benefitting an unknown number of local farmers and enterprises. However, there are concerns about the OHS status of the women engaged in the LCSs and the sustainability of the roads beyond project period is mixed.⁹³

The outreach of **EU’s support** to INSPIRED and BEST is harder to estimate due to its primary focus being at central level and less so at service delivery level. However, the grant schemes of INSPIRED could have some potential. For example, as an immediate impact just one of the anticipated 16 to 18 grant scheme projects could employ between 20,000 and 70,000 people according to the ROM report of September 2013. However, given the difficulties it will most likely not achieve this. Progress reports fail to demonstrate such outreach. But if e.g. better access to financial services for SMEs materialise (which indications point to), then the number of beneficiaries could be substantial. Again it is not possible to quantify the number, but especially the access to finance component could have strong impact.

Similarly for the BEST programme where better quality infrastructure, a more competitive RMG sector, and improved fisheries standards should also benefit a large number of enterprises and employees. The BEST project managed to ensure the lifting of the mandatory testing requirement on shrimp exports to the EU, easing trade and benefitting both the enterprises and the up to 3.5 million people working the shrimp industry or dependent on the incomes thereof. However, there has been relatively limited engagement on environmental and socio-economic aspects of shrimp farming, which was somewhat outside the scope of the project by design.

Indicator 5.1.3: Inclusiveness in terms of how to reach the poor is explicitly operationalised in design documentation:

The choice of engaging in agriculture by **Denmark** was partly linked to the possibility to target the poorest, whom were (and to a lesser extent still are) disproportionately based in

⁹³ See e.g. Danida: ‘Implementing Partner’s Final Report: Rural Roads and Market Infrastructure’ 2013 as well as MN 117 and 119.

rural areas. Also there was explicit focus on smallholders, marginal farmers and landless (the latter in case of fisheries and livestock). In addition, the rural roads component was explicitly targeting ultra-poor women in local contracting societies. The ASPS II also addressed poverty aspects related to food security and nutrition. The programme design focused on the importance of food availability, food access and appropriate food use based knowledge of basic nutrition and care. In this respect, the programme considered women's involvement as crucial since they provide the link between agricultural production, food security and nutrition. In line with this, the programme was designed to link its efforts in terms of agricultural diversification to nutrition (See ASPS ProDoc 2006). Operationally the design ensured that most of the interventions were primarily attractive for poorer and middle-income farmers who were willing to participate in e.g. road construction of FFS, which were less attractive and relevant for richer and larger farmers. Indeed all available documentation also point out that the interventions did indeed reach the poor and marginalised.

Again, with the EU being more focused on framework conditions and not actual service delivery at the front line, it is more difficult to assess its poverty focus. The design of BEST was at objective level linking integration into the world market with poverty reduction. However, there was limited causal analysis of how the specific outputs of the component would contribute hereto and if there were potential trade-offs between various options. E.g. the facilitation of increased shrimp production often results in substituting labour intensive rice farming with capital intensive fish-farming, which could have serious implication for poor rice farmers/workers.⁹⁴

Only the third component addressed workers' rights and OHS substantially, this component being primarily implemented by GIZ. Labour law information was provided in the fisheries component. The INSPIRED project is perhaps slightly more directly poverty focused with its emphasis on SMEs but there was limited analyses or theory of change of how the specific component will benefit the poorest. There could arguably be better analysis of how e.g. training of banks would benefit poverty reduction (see e.g. INSPIRED, Action Fiche, 2008 and; INSPIRED: *TA to support the Bangladeshi Bank Training Institutions – 4th and 5th Interim Report, 2014*).

Indicator 5.1.4: Employment and incomes of the poor increased in EP supported programmes

It would be very challenging to produce a credible and fully quantifiable indicator of EU's BEST and INSPIRED programmes. The links between the activities, outputs, outcomes and their impact on employment and income of the poorest is simply too precarious to attempt quantifying. However, this does not necessarily reduce their relevant and potential impact in terms of increased job opportunities and incomes for the poor.

The work on the RMG sector has demonstrated a robust ability to improve the living standards of the workers, albeit not without set-backs and challenges in terms of workers' environment and rights. BEST has thus supported 1500 manufactures by providing

⁹⁴ See e.g. Hossain, Uddin & Fakhruddin: 'Impacts of shrimp farming on the coastal environment of Bangladesh and approach for management' in *Reviews in Environmental Science* ' Vol 12, no.3, 2013. On the other hand there are many non-rice employment opportunities in Bangladesh which may compensate for the loss of rice-based livelihoods. The point here being that BEST failed to analyse and monitor likely consequences of its support concerning those aspects.

training on factory compliance with 663 factories improving their grade (GIZ: Final Report: Promotion of Labour Standards in the RMG Sector, 2015). In 2013 a total of 580 workers, supervisors, factory managers and labour leaders received training on labour law compliance and 12 out of fourteen benefitting factories had appointed a social compliance officer (progress report 1st half 2013). This should provide better working condition also for the poor.

However, the primarily objective of BEST has been to increase competitiveness with the implicit assumption that this would eventually trickle down to the poor in the form of increased incomes and employment. Limited efforts have been made to verify this. As mentioned above the support to the fishery sector may have displaced poor rice farmers, thus having a potential regressive effect.

In the case of the INSPIRED project work on the SME strategy, even if it is eventually passed, is unlikely to produce direct employment nor income for the poor, given the poor quality so far and the non-existent ownership from government. In addition the Strategy is also based on 'the European Union's "best practices" in supporting entrepreneurship and SME development, as identified in the Small Business Action (SBA) Europe'.⁹⁵ However, both the evaluation team as well as several interlocutors have serious concerns about the appropriateness of using EU best practices (such as the SBA) which have been developed in a radically different context.⁹⁶ It is challenging not to be cynical about this component of INSPIRED which has consistently under-performed. The support to business intermediately organisations (BIOs) may prove to raise the income of some poor and create jobs as well, but so far it is unknown if and to what degree that will materialise. Given the challenges in terms of delays, fraud and poor quality of preparation, the impact is likely to be reduced. The access to finance for financial services component may have better prospects of offering more jobs and incomes for the poor, but again, investments in productivity enhancing technology may reduce demand for manual labour while probably increasing incomes for remaining workers.⁹⁷

The **Danish** supported ASPSII has engaged directly with the rural poor and hence in a better position to produce evidence of relevance to the indicator. Income in FFS households on average has risen from BDT 52,000 before FFS (2007) to BDT 72,000 after FFS participation (2010), the increase within control village households within the same period was only from BDT 47,000 to BDT 57,000 (FFS evaluation, 2011). The income increase within FFS households is most significant for the households with the lowest income levels indicating a strong pro-poor orientation. Self-employment at household level has also increased in FFS area. The FFS also created local jobs as facilitators, but numerically that was not significant, and sustainability has been mixed although improving with MoA increasingly taking on facilitators to expand the FFS concept.

⁹⁵ INSPIRED: National SME Development Strategy, March 2015, Draft 2

⁹⁶ See e.g. MNs: 027, 104 and 113.

⁹⁷ This is clearly a structural change that is necessary to raise productivity and ultimately incomes in the long run. However, structural change does have short-term consequences, especially for workers with poor skills and mobility.

The rural road component obviously provided both employment and incomes for the ultra-poor women who benefitted from 3.1 million labour days of work. However, the work was by design temporary but with the ambition that the local contracting societies could be catalyst for closer integration into the local economy. This did not fully materialise as commercial contractors remained uninterested in direct un-subsidised businesses with the LCSs, but the LCSs encouraged saving schemes with allowed the women seed capital for e.g. establishing other income generating activities (see Project Completion Report – Rural Roads, 2013).

JC5.2 EPs assisted in improving the supportive, regulatory and legal framework for inclusive private sector growth especially in rural areas

| JC 5.2: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|--|--|---|
| EU has had most directly and consistent focus on this area | Project design, ROM, interviews and evaluations | Strong |
| Denmark largely abandoned central level engagement, focussing on a bottom-up demonstration approach. | Interviews, reviews, ProDocs and evaluations | Strong |
| EU has improved shrimp trading framework significantly, but less so elsewhere | Interviews, progress reports, ROM and evaluations. | Strong |
| Other indicators for framework conditions have not improved substantially | DB & TI indexes, ROM, evaluations and interviews | Strong on indexes, but indicative on EPs contribution |
| EU has used trade as a lever for improving the working conditions in the RMG sector | Interviews, Sustainability Compact. | More than satisfactory |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EPs support assisted in lowering barriers to entry for pro-poor private sector development | BEST has some good evidence on this, as does Danida ASPSII. Less on EU's INSPIRED. Hence Data partly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EPs assisted in developing sustainable capacity in supportive organisations (e.g. extension and business advisory services) of importance to rural poor | For BEST and ASPS data is close to fully available, but only partly for INSPIRED |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EPs assisted in improving the regulatory framework for pro-poor PSD | For BEST data is close to fully available, where as for ASPSII it is partly available, and for INSPIRED hardly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Core indicators in supported areas improving (from e.g. Doing Business, Enterprise Surveys, TI). | Data fully available, but limited data on attribution |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with enterprises/farmers on the experienced changes in the framework conditions | Data partly available, with esp INSPIRED having incomplete data. |

Indicator 5.2.1. EPs support assisted in lowering barriers to entry for pro-poor private sector development

In terms of concrete interventions **EU** has been most active in this space aiming to create an enabling environment including lowering entry to the private sector. Especially the **INSPIRED** programme focuses on SMEs and *if* an improved strategic and regulatory framework is produced, passed by relevant authorities and implemented, *then* it will probably assist entry for new companies. However, there have been serious and widespread concerns about the quality of support to the process offered by EU to the Bangladeshi counterparts, and this has arguably also compromised the quality of the deliverables, including the draft strategy. Given the disappointment and consequent lack of ownership of the strategy process, it is doubtful that GoB commits to its passing and implementation. As concerns the support to BIOs this may prove more successful, but the outcomes are still to materialise, with the process so far having been marred by delays, misuse of funding and lack of engagement from relevant ministries, diminishing expectations for successful implementation.

The access to finance is clearly relevant in this context as this is a critical constraint for both micro and small enterprises. Indications are that banks have improved their capacity to serve SME sector, which will ease their entry and eventual expansion. Overall credit to SMEs has increased 17% y-o-y from 2013 to 2014, but the attribution of the project is arguably minimal and certainly not quantifiable.⁹⁸ Nevertheless and in contrast to the other component of the project, there is strong ownership and commitment to take the activities forward post project.⁹⁹

The **BEST** project and its focus on standards has less direct focus on pro-poor development and the accreditation and certification will, in the short-term, mostly benefit larger more established companies, although many of these do employ poor people. These companies will find it easier to export, expand and trade, which should provide more employment opportunities. However, only component 3b had a direct pro-poor focus on the RMG sector's workers and their rights and conditions. Again the work in the shrimp sector may have accelerated a process of substituting (poor) labour with capital which narrowly viewed has probably not contributed to pro-poor private sector development, but rather to a structural transformation of agriculture (including aquaculture) with higher productivity, capital requirements and less use of manual labour.

A key ambition in **Denmark's** support to the agricultural sector has been to promote employment generation, e.g. through higher incomes and productivity from agriculture. The means have primarily been extension services, promotion of higher productive livestock and fisheries technologies and the construction of rural roads. Limited support has been granted to central level regulatory institutions (e.g. MoA and MoFL) with correspondingly limited outcomes in terms of policy and regulatory improvements.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand the robust improvements in farmers income as a consequence of the extension and FFS has allowed for both agricultural product diversification, as well as

⁹⁸ Bank of Bangladesh: *Economic Indicators*, March 2015

⁹⁹ MN: 028 and 115

¹⁰⁰ See e.g. Danida: Joint Technical Review ASPSII, 2010. This support was subsequently terminated.

diversification into other and new business, although no quantifiable evidence is available on the latter.

The rural roads had as an ambition that the LCS could become viable operators in the commercial market and thus also create new enterprises. However, this was an overly optimistic assumption given the low qualifications of the poor rural women who made up the LCS. Nevertheless the saving schemes that was associated with some of the LCS, did allow the individual (or smaller groups) of women to establish other income generating activities, but again this has not been quantified. Moreover many LCS women have also benefitted from the FFS training that has clearly assisted equipping them in starting or improving agricultural based jobs and incomes therefrom.

Indicator 5.2.2 EPs assisted in developing sustainable capacity in supportive organisations (e.g. extension and business advisory services) of importance to rural poor

Both the EU and Denmark have supported business-enabling organisations that are relevant to the rural poor. Most directly has been the Danish support to agricultural extension in agriculture, fisheries and livestock development, mostly used the FFS approach. Within GoB and DAE in particular the approach is widely recognised and adopted in a number of DAE programs, including the Integrated Pest Management Program (See PCR: AEC, 2013). Thus the component has assisted in developing sustainable capacity. However, a key ingredient of the programme, that of the farmer trainers, has experienced sustainability challenges with high turnover of staff and difficulties in retaining female trainers (ibid.). Moreover, the support to the central level of MoA and MoFL had limited impact in promoting institutional change and development capacity, but at local level there was more willingness to embrace the new methods and engaging in capacity development that could be used immediately and produced tangible results.

In the rural road component, indications are that the LCS are not robust organisations with the required capacity to become competitive commercial players, but they have catalysed smaller activities that help reduce poverty. As for the support to road maintenance in, Danida provided support for the Road Maintenance Software supposed to make better prioritisation of maintenance work, but local road engineers have failed to provide relevant inputs and the funding mechanism (the Road Maintenance Fund) also failed to be established, reducing overall effectiveness.¹⁰¹

EU's support to INSPIRED is also directly targeted at business intermediate organisations (BIOs) with a substantial grant programme, that after initial delays was under way in April 2015. However, there is limited information available on the characteristics of the grants and consequently also no information on the likely effects. It should be noted that this will likely benefit both rural and non-rural poor, as the programme is nationwide. In addition some of the BIOs are EU based. The access to finance component of INSPIRED is likely

¹⁰¹ See Implementing Partner's Final Report: 'Rural Roads and Market Access' 2013 as well as interviews with local engineers (MN 117).

to make the financial sector (a key supporting institution) more responsive to and relevant for SMEs, and given the commitment and ownership by domestic stakeholders, it would seem that this is the most successful component of INSPIRED.

Indicator 5.2.3: EPs assisted in improving the regulatory framework for pro-poor PSD

The EU is most active in the regulatory space with both BEST and INSPIRED having a strong focus on various policy, strategy and regulatory aspects. BEST is clearly also focusing on better enforcement of regulation, through e.g. better quality infrastructure, but also includes work on standards in the RMG and fisheries sectors. The mid-term evaluation of BEST (2013) was rather harsh in its critique on progress in regulatory reforms arguing that ‘the various components the results for the three major components, with the possible exception of BWTG, have not met expectations and are not sustainable in the longer term. This is particularly the case when one considers that the BEST Programme is a successor programme to the BQSP which covered, over a period of four years (2006-2010), almost identical subjects to those of BEST with apparently little to show for it.’ However, more progress has been achieved since this evaluation, as the various stakeholders realised the necessity of finalising the activities before the end of the project and also because of increasing industry pressure. Consequently accreditation has been achieved for some support institutions and fish and shrimp testing services were also fully available in April 2015. While reforms of key institutions such as the Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI) have progressed slowly (BEST Progress Report 2H 2014), the progress report nevertheless claim that the program has made significant contribution to economic growth and poverty reduction by supporting Bangladesh to take advantage of global market opportunities during its intervention period in the field of national quality infrastructure, textiles/garments and fisheries sectors. However, there is limited evidence available to the team to fully substantiate this claim, as the causalities and attributional channels are too weakly associated with BEST activities.

The INSPIRED programme also aims to develop sectoral and inter-ministerial national strategy and action plan for SME development which addresses all aspects of SME support including improving the business environment (strategic and legal-regulatory framework) that is in line with accepted international best practice. However, the project has suffered from severe delays due to inappropriate EU TA (according to ROM, 2013 as well as EUD and MoI) as well as interface challenges with MoI, the host ministry. More progress is indicated in the recent progress reports (4th and 5th from 2013 and 2014) but with limited tangible outcomes yet (e.g. no new strategy and action plan approved, nor a timeline provided). The more successful INSPIRED component on access to finance has limited ambition on changing the regulatory framework, although part of the outcomes is also to improve awareness of Bangladeshi financial sector policy makers and regulators of the special needs of SME financing. This may influence the regulatory framework, although hasn't so far.

Denmark has had fewer and increasingly diminishing regulatory reform ambitions in its development engagements in the agricultural space. Support to central level failed to get tracking on supporting policy and regulatory reforms. However, a noticeable achievement

has been in the seed sector. Here Danida assisted the Seed Wing of MOA prepared seed rules, seed acts and nursery guidelines which have created an enabling regulatory environment for seed industry development. Also with Danida support, the Seed Wing has conducted molecular characterization of 565 crop varieties (310 rice varieties and 225 other crops) which helps to develop the regulatory underpinning for the Plant Variety and Farmer's Right Protection act to protect ownership of crop varieties of Bangladesh.

Moreover, the FFS concept piloted by Danida has changed the curriculum of the national FFSs and that can be seen as a small but important bottom-up change, that will probably increase productivity of small-scale farmers and hence constitute a pro-poor change.

Indicator 5.2.4: Core indicators in supported areas improving (from e.g. Doing Business, Enterprise Surveys, TI)

In general the business environment is challenging in Bangladesh and overall indicators such as those in Doing Business have shown limited progress as detailed in table x below:

Table 1 - Selected Doing Business Indicators: Distance From Frontier

| Year | Overall | Starting business | Dealing with Construction Permits | Getting Electricity | Registering Property | Getting Credit | Paying taxes | Int'l trading |
|------|---------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------|--------------|---------------|
| 2007 | .. | 70.91 | 59.07 | .. | 23.99 | 43.75 | 67.2 | 46.67 |
| 2008 | .. | 65.63 | 60.18 | .. | 24.24 | 43.75 | 66.35 | 56.55 |
| 2009 | .. | 69.94 | 58.1 | .. | 24.21 | 43.75 | 71.85 | 56.29 |
| 2010 | 47.43 | 75.33 | 58.98 | 28.38 | 24.46 | 43.75 | 71.84 | 59.09 |
| 2011 | 49.25 | 79.05 | 59.8 | 31.3 | 32.46 | 43.75 | 71.84 | 59.08 |
| 2012 | 48 | 79.27 | 60.24 | 17.81 | 32.58 | 43.75 | 71.84 | 59.26 |
| 2013 | 47.47 | 79.25 | 60.65 | 11.96 | 32.21 | 43.75 | 72.39 | 59.51 |
| 2014 | 46.38 | 80.52 | 61.5 | 15.39 | 31.15 | 30 | 73.98 | 60.15 |
| 2015 | 46.84 | 81.36 | 61.9 | 17.32 | 31.34 | 30 | 73.98 | 61.36 |

Source: World Bank: *Doing Business* various years


This measure shows the distance of each economy to the “frontier,” which represents the best performance observed on each of the indicators across all economies in the Doing Business sample. The best performance has a score of 100. Thus the electricity score of 17 in DB 2015 means Bangladesh was 83 percentage points away from the frontier constructed from the best performances across all economies and across time. Starting a business had improved which could indicate lower barriers to entry, but the overall DTF has barely changed hovering around 47%. Bangladesh is placed as number 173 out of 189 economies in the 2015 ranking.¹⁰² In the area of substantial EU support (trade related

¹⁰² However, the accuracy of the Doing Business index in gauging the real experienced business environment has been questioned and hence should be treated rather as indicative. See e.g. Hallward-Driemeier, M. and L. Pritchett, Lant (2011) "How business is done and the 'doing business' indicators: the investment climate when firms have climate control," *Policy Research Working Paper Series* 5563, The World Bank. Bangladesh' ranking at the start of the evaluation period (2007) was 88 out of 175 countries.

assistance) some improvements have been made. Here EU has made it easier to trade within the shrimp sector, the second largest export of Bangladesh, which is a significant achievement and possibly the single largest contribution of the EPs in terms of improving the doing business index. It is unlikely that any other intervention of the EPs have contributed to improving the index. However, the EU has arguably also assisted Bangladesh in avoiding a further deterioration in its international trading position, by not imposing sanctions on its RMG exports in the wake of the Rana Plaza tragedy.¹⁰⁵ instead using the opportunity to agree with both GoB and RMG industry to a ‘Sustainability Compact’ to promote better labour rights and more responsible supply chain management in garment manufacturing. Thus EU has used its leverage as the main importer of RMG to both continue an open trade regime but also to press for improved working conditions.

Another set of indicators is the Enterprise Surveys of the World Bank, which interviews the firms on their experienced challenges. Such surveys were done in 2007 and 2013 thus covering the evaluation period. The results are presented in the Figure below:

Figure 5 - Percentage of firms claiming biggest obstacle in the business environment:



Source World Bank: *Enterprise Survey*, 2007 and 2014

As can be seen the political instability was the top most cited obstacle in 2013, whereas access to finance seems to have improved (though still being a significant obstacle) as has access to electricity. The EU has worked to promote political stability (see EQ6), but clearly this is an area where outside (incl. EU) influence is limited and mainly driven by domestic concerns and dynamics. Corruption also has increased in importance and more detailed analysis reveals that whereas in 2007 around 1/3 claimed that a bribe was

¹⁰⁵ Following the Rana Plaza tragedy, the US administration moved to unilaterally impose trade sanctions by removing the country’s privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).

necessary to get a government contract, that number had increased to ½ in 2013. A staggering 77% of the interviewed enterprises stated that a ‘gift’ was needed to obtain an import licences, against ‘only’ 51% in 2007. Again it would seem that the various attempts by EPs to reduce corruption (e.g. SPEMP, support to anti-corruption commission and TIB) have made limited progress, at least for businesses, probably underlining the fact that outside pressure has limited leverage.

It is thus not surprising that Bangladesh had the dubious distinction of being at the bottom of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) during 2001-5. The ranking has improved since, though it remains among countries considered to be the worst affected by corruption. Bangladesh's position worsened in 2014 from 2013 – it scored 25 out of 100, two points lower, resulting in a slide of nine steps in the global ranking from 136 in 2014 to 145 in 2013. Bangladesh is the second worst performer in Asia, only better than Afghanistan. Corruption also constitutes sources of insecurity as evidenced in the case of the Rana Plaza collapse. As stated by TIB: “The building was constructed in an illegally occupied piece of land, violating laws, regulations and codes thanks to a collusion of corrupt officials with business facilitated by the powerful in both sides of the political spectrum”¹⁰⁴. Corruption has also become a key factor of fatal violence and clashes between factions and sub-factions of the politically powerful to capture public contracts. Political affiliation is thus the most viable credential for securing permits to set up business enterprises in such sectors as banking, insurance and media houses.¹⁰⁵

EPs, through the Sustainability Compact and other initiatives mentioned above, have attempted to address some of the issues of e.g. factory inspects, workers rights and wider governance issues. The sustainability compact, with the implicit threat of sanctions, has been able to catalyse some improvements in specific areas, whereas wider governance challenges remained highly problematic and not fundamentally changeable by the EPs (nor the wider donor community).¹⁰⁶

Consequently it is challenging to attribute such indicators to the interventions of EPs and or DPs as changes are due to a host of factors of which donor programme may only play a minor role.

Indicator 5.2.5: Interviews with enterprises/farmers on the experienced changes in the framework conditions

The EU supported-BEST programme probably had the most positive end-beneficiaries, in the form of shrimp exporting companies that were unanimously praising the easing of exports to the EU, which had helped facilitate an expansion of production and also increased the profitability. Automatisation of certification was also lauded for brining down both processing time and reducing human faults (and probably also corruption).¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ From The Daily Star, March 2015

¹⁰⁵ See Iftek Haruzzaman: *Corruption and political instability: A threat to security*, Transparency International Bangladesh, 2015

¹⁰⁶ See e.g. Progress Report, April 2015.

¹⁰⁷ See MN 106

The INSPIRED programme has so far not engaged directly with enterprises, only intermediaries. In the access to finance component the banks participating in the training have reported high satisfaction with the relevance, quality and expected impact on their work¹⁰⁸ However, the BIO in component 2 are still to be fully implemented and its challenging to estimate their likely impact at enterprise level.

Denmark has engaged comparatively less in the framework conditions, but FFS participants were generally positive on the skills and management techniques that they learnt, which would be disseminated throughout the country with a revised curriculum. None of the farmers interviewed knew about the revised seed policy, which should also change the framework conditions.

JC5.3 EPs promoted the creation of decent work opportunities

| JC 5.3: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|--|---|-------------------------------|
| EU has had the most explicit focus, with some progress in RMG sector | Project design, ROM, interviews and evaluations | More than satisfactory |
| The Sustainability Compact has also promoted better CSR and workers' right, aiding e.g. BEST | Sustainability Compact, interviews | Indicative but not conclusive |
| Managing multiple objectives (e.g. increasing trade and promoting OHS) can be challenging | Project design, ROM, interviews and evaluations | More than satisfactory |
| Denmark has played insufficient attention CSR/OHS in its work on rural roads | Reviews, evaluations, field observations and interviews | Indicative but not conclusive |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Occupational health and safety is part of the private sector support in the design, implementation and M&E. | Strong in some components (BEST 3b and ASPS II Rural Road) less so elsewhere. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EPs work to address specific gender concerns in the their private sector support programmes | Almost fully available in ASPSII, partly so in BEST and INSPIRED |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Corporate social responsibility promoted | Almost fully available for BEST component 3b. Data partly available for other interventions. |

Indicator 5.3.1. Occupational health and safety is part of the private sector support in the design, implementation and M&E

OHS does not appear as an important priority in Danish engagement in the agricultural sector, perhaps a reflection of the individual/family nature of farming, in which organised labour is rare. However, in the case of poor women in the LCSs more focus on OHS could

¹⁰⁸ See INSPIRED: 'Training impact evaluation report: Financial Statements & Ratio Analysis' By Hossain, April, 2014

and should have been included. Thus, the evaluation team did notice that the women engaged in the rural road construction are subject to rather harsh working conditions, having to carry heavy baskets of soil and clay for prolonged periods of time (see picture 1).

Picture 1: Poor women in Danida uniforms, organised in a LCS and working on rural road construction in Noakhali.



Moreover the LCS women are also required to sleep on-site in tents to prevent theft of construction materials, equipment and tools, which raises many personal security concerns.¹⁰⁹ Clearly the women recruited are often desperately poor and the project does offer an income and social benefits of group work with associated status improvement, but the non-monetary working conditions offered are by the evaluation team considered borderline exploitative. It is noteworthy that the LCS concept was criticised already in 2008 as being exploitative, at which time the project inserted specific project contract clauses in tender documents for LCS contracts that were geared to prevent worker exploitation.¹¹⁰ However, there was (and is) a need to revisit this issue again.

In the **BEST** programme there is emphasis on OHS with factory managers and supervisors being given training on OHS in the fisheries sector. However, this was only a minor part of BEST, the majority being focus on increasing compliance to standards that would allow trade to flourish. This has been done most successfully in the shrimp sector.

¹⁰⁹ See MN 117

¹¹⁰ See Implementation Partner's Final Report: 'Rural Roads and Market Access Component' 2013. P. 12

However, there is little evidence that de facto OHS practices in that sector has changed substantially, with substantial health risks associated with prolonged work in saline water and also reports on violation of workers' rights.¹¹¹

The third component (b) supports the implementation and enforcement of the labour law and improved compliance with international labour and social standards. There is thus strong emphasis and work has been done with company managers to address the issue. In the INSPIRED project component 2 grant scheme makes specific mention of supporting business support services to SMEs adopting innovative business models addressing social and/or environmental objectives. The outcome of this is still to be documented.

Indicator 5.3.2: EPs work to address specific gender concerns in the their private sector support programmes

Gender sensitivity has generally been well integrated in **Danish** ASPSII component activities at community level. FFSs had required female participation and poor women were active in a range of income generating activities promoted by CBOs and farmers clubs, especially homestead gardening, livestock rearing and pond fish cultivation. In some villages female members of community organisations also organised non-farm activities such as sari-manufacturing and mat-making. However, women were underrepresented among TA staff and in the leadership of farmers' clubs and local government support units, according to the joint technical review of 2010.

More gender sensitivity could have been invested in the rural roads component with gender specific OHS issues were not fully considered (see above), also in view of the serious risk of sexual and violent abuse associated with sleeping in tents at project sites. Danida has not had strict enough monitoring, especially since gender specific exploitation has previously been raised as a concern. On the other hand the component has also provided work, incomes, basic literacy/numeracy to the marginalised women, which has improved the living conditions. However, the scheme was not and is still not sustainable.

EU's INSPIRED programme has supported gender mainstreaming in the National Strategy for SME Development and the capacity development of the SME Foundation's existing gender development department, which seeks to encourage women entrepreneurs and acts horizontally across the SMEF to ensure that the needs of women entrepreneurs are addressed in all SMEF interventions.

However, progress reports show limited reference to gender issue for component 1 : it is specified that an engagement with a Women's Chamber of Commerce took place. Given the highly challenging implementation process until now, the project has invested most its resources in getting the basic processes and partnership in place with only limited focus on gender issues so far.

¹¹¹ See E.g. Environmental Justice Network: *Impossible Cheap: Abuse and injustice in Bangladesh's shrimp industry* January 2014 and Loni Hensler: *A sustainable future for shrimp production in Bangladesh?* April 2013

In component 3 (access to finance) there is more reporting with e.g. a seminar on credit access for women entrepreneurs (with more than 600 attending). In addition three training events have been held:

- Credit access for women entrepreneurs training programme – BBTA & BIBM
- Banker's training in how SMEs should interact with banks during the loan application phase – BBTA & BIBM (sub-activity 105.4.27);
- “Women Entrepreneurship – train the training (TTT) Programme”, in collaboration with women entrepreneur organizations delivered in Dhaka, Chittagong and Sylhet;
- “Women Entrepreneurship – Making Women Bankable through training in business and financial management – TTT programme.

While there is no evidence of the outcome of this training in terms of actual additional number of female entrepreneurs that get access to financial services, the component has at least managed to deliver on the numerical ambitions of the design documentation which was many concerned with the training.

The **BEST** project also had strong design focus on gender issues aiming to e.g. advance female workers in the RMG industry to higher position in management. However, the mid-term evaluation focus on the establishment of “Women’s Cafes” where the garment and textile workers can play games (Ludo), drink tea and get legal advice, for instance about labour disputes and workers’ rights. These, according to the mid-term evaluation, have high impact in terms of teaching the female workers about their rights and responsibilities but questionable sustainability.

The work in the shrimp sector has not considered gender issues in any substantial manner, as the focus has been on compliance with standards. However, there are many gender issues in the sector with women having health and reproductive health issues when working for prolonged time in saline water, as mainly women do in the sector. In addition there are widespread reports of women being paid lower salaries for similar work to men, as well as facing increased threats of abuse.¹¹²

Indicator 5.3.3 Corporate social responsibility promoted

There is no explicit reference to corporate social responsibility (CSR) in **Danida** support to ASPSII even though it is arguably an issue in the LCS, where there are serious concerns about the working conditions of the women. FFS is mainly focused on individual farmers with limited CSR relevance.

The **EU** supported BEST programme has more explicit focus on the worker’s rights, not least in component 3 on better work in textile which has training companies on workers’ rights and environmental aspects of production. Also in the fisheries component, factory managers and supervisors have been given training on OHS as well as monitoring of labour compliance initiatives and meeting with compliance officers from 27 factories. However, impact of especially the fisheries sector is still not fully evidenced, whereas there

¹¹² See Swedish Society for Nature Conservation: *Murky waters The environmental and social impacts of shrimp farming in Bangladesh*, July 2013

is some evidence of the GIZ work in the RMG sector.¹¹³ This work has also been aided by the EU's lead role in the Sustainability Compact, which has both put pressure on, as well as supported, the industry in better compliance and respect for workers' right, in the process also improving CSR.

Finally the sustainability compact has also focused on and improved the CSR in the RMG sector, with a focus on workers' rights, factory safety, fire safety and structural integrity and enforcement of the amended labour law. According to progress reports the private sector has mobilised a strong response and the government has also step up efforts in critical areas such as inspections, but more progress is still need in terms of e.g. union rights.¹¹⁴ Despite the unfinished agenda of improving CSR in the RMG sector, it is beyond doubt that the EU in partnership with GoB, ILO, the private sector and others have made a significant, but still incomplete, contribution to improving CSR.

5.5 Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions:

Denmark and EU have adopted rather different strategies with different entry points: one more at the micro level, the other primarily at policy/regulatory level. Both have faced challenges in navigating the Bangladeshi context and both have achieved success and failures, but with differences in the ability and flexibility to respond. In general engaging with a view to improve the policy and regulatory frameworks for private sector development has required persistence, acceptance of set-backs and the formation of pro-reform alliances involving domestic actors that could drive the process forward. Danida has for more than a decade supplied international TA at the central government level to drive such reforms but with relatively few results, stemming mainly from the fact that there was no demand for the TA and also limited enthusiasm for initiating reforms that could alter power relations, especially within the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock. Danida was arguably slow in fully accepting these facts, partly because it was pursuing a Danida conceived 'sector approach' which, at the time of design, should include central level policy support. However, once the limited results and futility of continuing support was realized, Danida acted swiftly to terminate this support, instead investing even more resources in delivering at especially farm level. Nevertheless, working at lower level did produce valuable insights and as evidence of substantial impact emerged, GoB also adjusted the framework conditions to mainstream innovations in e.g. extension, albeit mostly incrementally.

EU has been more consistently focused on improving the framework condition for private sector development, at times aiming for transformative impact. Most success has been the trade related area where the EU has made a substantial contribution in improving Bangladeshi standards and compliance to international norms and certification schemes. This has, and will increasingly continue to, improve businesses' ability to penetrate new and higher added-value markets. However, the achievement of this outcome has taken a decade

¹¹³ GIZ: Final Report: Promotion of Labour Standards in the RMG Sector' July 2014

¹¹⁴ EU/ILO: Staying Engaged: A Sustainability Compact for RMG, Progress Report, July 2014 and EU: Bangladesh Sustainability Compact, Technical Status Report, April 2015

of engagement with not only the relevant (and numerous!) government ministries and agencies, but also by engaged the private sector which had a clear, if also collective, interest in driving through the reforms needed and developing the required technical capacities. EU and its competent TA team (sources from UNIDO through a contribution agreement) have judiciously sequenced its interventions according to demand and absorptive capacity, as well as strengthening alliances with the private sector. Combined with persistence and learning from past challenges, this has produced robust and largely sustainable outcomes. However, while successfully forming and catalyzing alliances with the private sector, EU should arguably also have focused more on the socio-economic and environmental impacts, which were not primary concerns of the private sector. In the area of improving the framework conditions for SMEs, EU has, so far, had significantly less success as the was limited demand for the both the reforms themselves and the TA. Moreover flawed design and low quality TA further aggravated the situation and EU's procedures (under the framework contract) have clearly not been conducive to consistently identify quality TA.¹¹⁵

A common characteristic of successful implementation has been that contextualized, demanded, realistic and at times piecemeal approaches offer better entry points for catalyzing sustainable and domestically owned change processes. Both Denmark and the EU have attempted more blue-print approaches that were based on so called 'best practices' with quite ambitious objectives. This gained limited traction in the Bangladeshi context and both Danida's subsequent bottom up focus in agriculture and the EU's persistent and at times slowly progressing work on trade standards eventually managed to produce impressive results. Key has been a concept of working with the grain, e.g. sizing opportunities when they emerged, building on what was already there (also in terms of demand and ownership) and forging alliances with reformers and committed implementers that could drive the process forward. Again these processes have been far from linear and often not taken a pre-defined direction as stated in e.g. log-frames of ToCs. Especially Denmark has had the flexibility to adjust and sizing opportunities as and when they emerged. This has helped millions of farmers and rural micro-businesses to improve their incomes and incrementally also improved the extension system. The EU has also started out with relatively minor incremental interventions, but keeping the more transformative vision as a long term objective. This has eventually paid off, but only through a reiterative process and long-term focus, starting with solving local, manageable problems that have been debated, defined and refined by local people in ongoing processes. This has legitimised at all levels (political, managerial and social) the interventions, building ownership and momentum throughout the process to be 'domestically owned' in reality (not just on paper). Especially the BEST project has engaged through local conveners who mobilised all those with a stake in progress (in both formal and informal coalitions and teams) to tackle common problems and introduce relevant change. This is in stark contrast to more typical projects that have attempted to impose e.g. EU best practices, standards and strategies through supply driven TA of varying quality.

Compared to Denmark, the EU has been seen by GoB as a larger, more legitimate and relevant partner in trade related policy dialogue and has worked at central policy level,

¹¹⁵ However, the more technocratic component on access to financial services for SMEs has been the exception with both strong demand for specialised TA and correspondingly reasonable quality TA provision by the EU.

dialoguing with relevant stakeholders both inside and outside government. Clearly the EU had the ambition, technical expertise (though partly sources from UNIDO), legitimacy and clout to engage in such policy dialogue. This is also seen in the Sustainability Compact where the EU's trade importance has also been used for leveraging more inclusive and safer private sector development. Denmark has arguably directly engaged a larger number of poor and assisted in lifting their incomes, while simultaneously reducing its ambitions in terms of central level policy engagement, instead effectively relying on the power of demonstration and subsequent persuasion.

Recommendations:

Both Denmark and the EU have made significant contributions to accelerate private sector development and also to make it more inclusive, the latter most notably in the case of Denmark. Below are some key recommendations for further improving the inclusiveness aspect.

- Adjust the level of ambitions to be commensurate with capacities and timeframes
Promoting more transformative policy and regulatory reforms not only requires the mutual commitment but may also require longer timeframes than the typical project duration allows for. If engaging at policy level, there is a clear need to have the capacity to meaningfully and qualitatively contribute with expertise and useful advice, focusing on issues that are of relevance and priority to the partners. Also there should be acceptance of set-backs and adjustments to changing priorities as new openings occur, something that Danida has allowed for in adjusting to a more bottom up approach. Especially in a highly dynamic context of rapid private sector development and a volatile political situation EPs should display more flexibility and agility than traditional log-frames and pre-determined milestones may allow for. As the experience of EU in the standard setting demonstrated, progress is seldom linear nor entirely predictable, but persistent work on available openings and quick-wins helped catalyse what eventually became more transformative impacts.
- Seek alliances with the private sector, but analyse their incentives for inclusive growth
There is higher chance of success if powerful interest back the reforms / changes promoted. This has clearly been seen in both the BEST, but also in component 3 of the INSPIRED programme where private banks have engaged. However, the private sector obviously has its own incentives and these should be factored into the design and implementation phases, to avoid compromising e.g. workers' rights/safety and also to ensure inclusive growth. BEST did this well in the work in the textile and RMG support but arguably less so in fisheries.
- EU: Stay engaged in the trade sector, but broaden impact analysis beyond the narrow scope trade
The EU has a special obligation to help countries benefit from global trade, as it is itself the world's largest trading block and a setter of many standards that impacts on Bangladesh's ability to trade. This was also the position of most DPs and GoB. However, more efforts should be made to make trade more coherent with its social and environmental objectives on e.g. impact on the poorest, working conditions and the

environment. The current intention of the EU to address trade through its regional programme, will not be sufficient to address the specific challenges facing Bangladesh.

- While there are many benefits to working directly with private sector at local level, more efforts should be made to ensure sustainability and decent work.

EU has increased its focus on decent work, not only in the BEST project but also in the context of the sustainability compact and its associated requirements for OHS and wider labour rights. However, Denmark has arguably not fully incorporated such protective measures sufficiently into its engagement with women groups in its rural roads / climate change adaptation work where the contractors are arguably subjecting the women to harsh working conditions and unsafe accommodation. Moreover sustainability of the infrastructure is a key concern with limited integration into the national framework for infrastructure. The focus on tangible results (which in the case of Denmark is augmented by a contract between the Embassy and HQ stipulating targets) may further increase incentives for results on the ground with limited systemic integration and sustainability.

6. Detailed facts and findings on human rights and democratic governance

6.1 National Context

During the evaluation period, the two major political parties - the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) - were caught in a deadlock on the representation of the society as either primarily Islamist or pluralist, and on safeguarding the non-partisan character of the electoral system.

When Bangladesh gained independence in 1972, secularism was, at the AL's initiative, enshrined as a fundamental principle in the Constitution. In 1979, under the reign of General Ziaur Rahman (the husband of the current BNP opposition leader), the principle of secularism was deleted from the Constitution, and a principle of absolute trust and faith in the almighty Allah was introduced. In 1988, Islam was declared the State religion. Upon acceding to power in December 2008, the current AL government, through the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment (2011) restored secularism as one of the fundamental principles of State policy; removed the principle of absolute trust in Allah - but retained Islam as the state religion¹¹⁶. Article 23, committing the State to move towards protecting the culture of 'tribes, minor races, ethnic sects and communities' was another addition.

The Fifteenth Amendment also abolished the concept of a non-party caretaker government responsible for organizing the elections. This concept had been introduced in 1996 to ensure that elections would be organized in a non-partisan way. The caretaker government, consisting of the Chief Justice and a team of advisors appointed by the Chief Justice and the President, were jointly tasked with organizing elections within 90 days from taking office.

A number of elections took place under the system, but in January 2007, the military intervened in response to sporadic countrywide violence, and put in place its own caretaker government that continued until the elections held in December 2008. At the elections, the AL led alliance won a two-thirds majority. The Awami League used its majority to abolish the system of the caretaker government in June 2011, to the alarm of the opposition.

With the caretaker government system gone, the Election Commission (see Articles 118 and following of the Constitution) became the key institution responsible for the organization of elections. Serious concerns arose, however, about appointments made and the actual conduct of the Election Commission that was perceived as partisan. These concerns were a factor in the decision of the opposition to boycott the 2014 elections that

¹¹⁶ Article 2A "The state religion of the Republic is Islam, but the State shall ensure equal status and equal right in the practice of the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and other religions"

inevitably returned the Awami League to power. Since June 2011, the opposition has challenged the legitimacy of the electoral system and of the government that the system has produced. This has led to an increase in the number of strikes and in political violence resulting. The political climate remains volatile.

As to corruption, the World Bank aggregate Indicator on control of corruption for the 1996-2013 period showed some improvement in Bangladesh' global ranking.¹¹⁷ Popular perception nevertheless was that overall corruption had increased in Bangladesh during 2011-2012. According to the most recent Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer survey (2012), an overwhelming majority of the respondents (93%) identified the political parties and police as the most corrupt institutions in Bangladesh followed by the judiciary (89%), parliament (88%) and the government administration (84%).

Human rights are included in the Constitution as fundamental rights (civil and political rights, in Part 2) and as fundamental principles of state policy (economic, social and cultural rights in Part 3). Bangladesh is party to the core international human rights conventions. During the evaluation period Bangladesh ratified important international treaties including the UN Convention Against Corruption (ratified 2007), the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and the Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (all ratified in 2010).

In some areas progress has been made as various domestic laws were adopted that brought national law closer to international human rights standards (e.g. the post- Rana Plaza amended Labor Act incorporating a number of ILO standards, or the Child Rights Act incorporating the definition of a child included in the Convention on the Rights of the Child), and/or address issues of concern to the international community (the adoption of legislation criminalizing domestic violence).

Table 1 - Legal opportunities and risks

| Opportunities for improved human rights protection and democratic governance | Risks for human rights protection and democratic governance |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Right to Information Act (2009) - Act establishing the National Human Rights Commission (2009) - Amendment to Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act (2010) - Small Ethnic Groups Cultural Institutions Act (2010) - Labour Act (July 2013) - Child Rights Act (2013) - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act (2013) - Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act (2013) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Act, 2006 (amended in 2009 and 2013) - The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) (2009-scope broadened 2012) - Foreign Donations Act (bill pending) |

¹¹⁷ <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports>

However, in other areas, domestic legislation remained problematic. This was sometimes due to old legislation, such as the Code of Criminal Procedure (1898) that enables the police to arrest anyone “who has been concerned in any cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so concerned” [section 54(1), see also section 144(1)]. New legislation also granted wide discretion to the government to limit civil and political rights. One example was the ICT Act that criminalizes the publication of information on websites that i.e. “causes to deteriorate or creates possibility to deteriorate law and order, prejudice the image of the State” (Art 57). During the evaluation period, penalties for such an offence were increased to minimum of seven years’ imprisonment and a maximum of 14 years. In 2010, the domestic International Crimes Tribunal was created to prosecute Bangladeshis which had committed war crimes in collusion with the Pakistani military during the struggle for national liberation. Access to observe the trials was strictly regulated; death sentences have been rendered, and two executions have taken place, including the execution of Mohammad Kamaruzzaman, an Islamist opposition leader in April 2015.

In other legislative areas, such as the prevention of child marriage, the government appeared to waiver in its original commitment to bring legislation in line with international expectations. But apart from the legislation itself, it was the way the legislation was implemented (or not - when democratic and human rights guarantees are at stake) that has raised concern within civil society and among external actors. Interventions by the Rapid Action Battalion, the elite anti-terrorism unit of the police, for example, appear to escape human rights scrutiny. More generally, international and domestic human rights organizations reported an increase in human rights violations due to the political controversy on the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

An issue of relevance both from a governance and a human rights angle is the relationship between the government and domestic civil society. The space for political dialogue between the government and civil society has tended to shrink in since the 2011 period. At the heart of the debate is the application and possible amendment of the Foreign Donations act, regulating the receipt by NGOs of foreign funds. In Bangladesh, human rights advocacy NGOs, while tolerated by the government, are fully dependent on external funding. On 1 December 2014 the Cabinet (i.e. the chief executive body) approved the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Bill granting the NGO Affairs Bureau in the prime minister’s office approval authority over foreign-funded projects on a case-by case basis. It will have the authority to “inspect, monitor and assess the activities” of groups and individuals and to close groups and cancel their registration if it sees fit. The Bill is yet to be approved by Parliament, and has been strongly contested both by civil society organizations and development partners. But even under current less invasive legislation, human rights advocacy NGOs and development partners reported increasing delays in the approval process of foreign funds.

The Odhikar case

Odhikar, a human rights advocacy NGO, published a report on killings by security forces in June 2013. The killings – that were also reported upon by international human rights NGOs - took place in response to a demonstration in Dhaka on May 5-6, 2013, by the Islamist Hefazat-e-Islami movement.

The secretary and director of Odhikar were charged under section 57 of the ICT Act for publishing the report. At the time of writing, both were free on bail, with the case still pending.

The EU funded a two-year Odhikar project on ‘Education on the Convention against Torture and OPCAT Awareness Programme in Bangladesh’ in 2010. The first year of the project was only cleared by the NGO Affairs Bureau in January 2012, 13 months after of its submission. 50% of the funds for the second year were cleared in March 2013, but after the Odhikar report mentioned above was published in June 2013, the remainder of the funds, as well as all other foreign funding has been blocked. It is currently uncertain how long the organisation will be able to continue.

When the secretary of Odhikar was arrested in August 2013, the EU Delegation and EU Heads of Mission issued a public statement declaring that “We consider that a vibrant civil society and the work of human rights defenders have important roles to play in the strengthening of human rights in this country. We have conveyed our detailed concerns about the detention of Mr Adilur Rahman Khan to the relevant authorities in Bangladesh. It is essential that no harm comes to him. We urge the authorities to observe due process at all stages of the proceedings against him, and in particular ensure full respect for his human rights”.

The Chairperson of the National Human Rights Commission expressed his concern to the media about the arrest, but the NHRC did not issue a written statement.

6.2 EPs strategies on human rights and democratic governance and related development interventions

There is a significant coherence in the priority given by the three EPs to human rights and democratization in:

- HQ strategy documents;
- Bangladesh country policies;
- Development interventions in Bangladesh.

Development interventions in the sector appropriately aimed at strengthening the capacity of both the duty bearer (the Government of Bangladesh) and rights holders with a view to contributing to domestic policies that are ideally produced through a democratic process and that result in effective human rights protection. Several interviewees (from the EPs field offices, other development partners, recipient organizations) stressed that the right-based approach was seen as an added value of the EPs development interventions as compared to other development partners (such as the World Bank).

EU strategy

Some of the main global instruments committing the EU to ‘keeping human rights at the heart of its external action’¹¹⁸ include:

¹¹⁸ Preparations for Action Plan (2015-2019), Joint Communication EC/High Representative JOIN (2015) 16 final (28.4.2015)

- Art 21, Treaty of European Union, reaffirming the EU's determination to promote human rights and democracy through all its external actions;
- Joint Communication EC/High Representative COM 2011 886 final (12.12.2011) on Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – Towards a more Effective Approach envisaging country-based human rights approaches seeking to match objectives with realities on the ground; systematic consultations with international and local human rights NGOs [on this issue see also Communication EC on: The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations, COM(2012) 492 final (12.9.2012)]; democracy support creating synergies between electoral assistance, political society and other critical components of state building; and reaffirming the long-standing commitment to mainstream human rights and democratic development across development cooperation through country human rights strategies and a human rights based approach;
- EU Council Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (25 June 2012), stating that in the area of development cooperation, “a human rights based approach will be used to ensure that the EU strengthens its efforts to assist partner countries in implementing their human rights obligations”. EU human rights policies will be carefully designed for the circumstances of each country; instruments used will include constructive engagement, political dialogue, projects, sanctions and condemnation.
- The EU Action Plan human rights priorities are listed as the death penalty, torture, human rights defenders, children's rights (incl. child labour), women and gender-based violence, IHL, LGBT, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, business and human rights, administration of justice, ensuring accountability for violations, minority and indigenous peoples; disability.
- Regulation (EU) 233/2014 Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation 2014-2020 (11 March 2014) reiterating that development cooperation shall contribute to consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and the relevant principles of international law [art. 2(b,ii)]; committing to a differentiated approach among partner countries [art. 3(2)]; including non-discrimination, minorities, persons with disabilities, rights of vulnerable groups, of women, the rule of law and the promotion of political dialogue as cross-cutting issues that are to be mainstreamed [art. 3(3)] and committing to promote “a rights-based approach encompassing all human rights (...) in order to integrate HR principles in the implementation of the Regulation, to assist partner countries in implementing their international HR obligations and to support the rights holders with a focus on poor and vulnerable groups in claiming their rights” [art. 3(8b)].
- EU Council conclusions on a rights-based approach to development cooperation, encompassing all human rights¹¹⁹ reaffirming earlier documents, and welcoming the development by the European Commission of a Toolbox for a rights approach to development (see below), while also recognising the key role of EU Delegations, which requires adequate training of staff on the rights-based approach.

¹¹⁹ From May 2014, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142682.pdf

Human rights and democratic governance take an equally prominent place in documents specifically dealing with EU-Bangladesh cooperation:

- The Cooperation Agreement EC-Bangladesh (27 April 2001) holds in its Article 1 (“Basis”) that respect for human rights and democratic principles as laid down in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights underpin the domestic and international policies of the Parties, and constitute an essential element of the Agreement;
- In the Bangladesh-European Country Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013 ‘Good governance and human rights’ is a focal area. DCI 2007-2013: Governance and Human Rights as a focal sector. Two specific objectives are identified: to increase the effectiveness of public institutions and to improve access to justice for the poor. In the area of human rights, particular attention will be given to women and children’s rights and to the rights of all minority groups in the country (at. p.18); the human rights and democratisation interventions in the Chittagong Hill Tracts will amount to ‘a comprehensive approach to the region’ (ibid.). In the area of governance effectiveness, one of the indicators is to enhance ‘the Election Commission’s ability to play full role in ensuring free and fair elections’ (ibid.).
- In the Development Cooperation Instrument MIP 2014-2020 (30 March 2014): ‘Strengthening Democratic Governance’ is a priority focus sector. A rights based approach is to be adopted in all focus areas, but no information is offered on how this is to be done.

The strategic prioritization of human rights and democratic governance in EU-Bangladesh cooperation is reflected in the substantial variety of EU development interventions in this area. During the evaluation period major interventions in the sector targeted support to village courts, to establish an electoral roll with photographs, to strengthen election management in Bangladesh, and to support local development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (also in the context of post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the thematic programme on civil society and local authorities offered opportunities to develop a portfolio of a wide array of other human rights and democratic governance (HR&D) interventions, mostly focusing on the rights of vulnerable and exposed groups. In addition, the Sustainability Compact was an immediate and unique response to the Rana Plaza tragedy, linking trade and human rights concerns.

EU Development Interventions in the Human Rights and Democratic Governance sector

The interventions addressed the variety of human rights and governance concerns in Bangladesh: women’s rights, disability, water and sanitation, sexual exploitation children; rural-urban child migration, transparent and accountable pro-poor local governance, human rights awareness, human rights defenders, indigenous peoples’ rights, the rights of *dalits*, access to Justice for Vulnerable Groups, media and ethnicity, etc. They did so through support of international and domestic civil society organisations.

Denmark and Sweden strategies

There was coherence between the HR&D approaches of the EU, Denmark and Sweden. Human rights and democratic governance are similarly prioritised in Denmark and Sweden development cooperation both in strategic documents and at the operational level, even if

the language used to describe the relationship differs somewhat. Denmark formally adopted a human rights based approach to development, and was one of the Member States pushing the EU in the same direction (leading to references to a ‘rights based approach’ in recent EU documents described above). Sweden perceives human rights as an objective of development cooperation. Much is made of the impact of these terminological variations in academic writing, and they matter to some extent: DK for instance developed a global ‘Tool for Human Rights Based Approach and Gender Equality Screening’¹²⁰ intended as an incentive for systematic screening of country programming on the application of the human rights based approach and mainstreaming of gender equality. The 2012 EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on HR&D tasked the European Commission with “developing a toolbox for working towards a rights based approach to development” to be used both by HQ and in the field¹²¹. A similar instrument is absent from the Swedish approach.

Nevertheless, DK and SE Bangladesh cooperation strategy documents give equal and similar attention to HR&D issues.

The 2005-2009 Bangladesh-DK partnership strategy for development cooperation¹²² contained a chapter on HR&D focusing on the strengthening of the rule of law, improving governance and democratisation, and promoting access to justice for the poor. The strategic focus was on the promotion and securing the rights and access to justice of women, children and indigenous peoples; support to key institutions for the promotion of good governance, decentralisation and anti-corruption; promotion of human rights through instruments such as information, education and communication. The strategy document also included a section on the Chittagong Hill Tracts, focussing on the strengthening of CHT institutions and the right to health. In DANIDA’s Denmark-Bangladesh Country Policy Paper 2013-2017, one of the four overall objectives is to promote democracy, HR, rule of law and good governance – through strengthening key democratic institutions in the field of public administration and civil society. Rights-based approaches in development assistance will be employed to ensure a systematic inclusion and empowerment of HR of the most vulnerable groups in society including through political dialogue and the strengthening of watchdog institutions.

Sweden’s priorities in human rights and democratic governance have not changed during the evaluation period. In the area of human rights, Sweden supported some of the leading NGOs in the field (BNWLA, ASK) on a long-term basis. The country also supported the National Human Rights Commission through UNDP’s capacity development project. In democratic governance, Sweden focused on support to Transparency International, including the establishment of local committees of concerned citizens¹²³. One of the four

¹²⁰ See: <http://amg.um.dk/en/~media/amg/Documents/Technical%20Guidelines/Guidelines%20for%20programmes%20and%20projects/Country%20programmes/HRBA%20word.pdf>

¹²¹ See: http://www.eidhr.eu/files/dmfile/SWD_2014_152_F1_STAFF_WORKING_PAPER_EN_V5_P1_768467.pdf

¹²² Bangladesh-Denmark Partnership 2005-2009, 39-42

¹²³ See <http://www.swedenabroad.com/en-GB/Embassies/Dhaka/Development-Cooperation/Development-Cooperation-with-Bangladesh/>

SIDA sub-objectives in its Results Strategy for Bangladesh 2014-2020 is to strengthen “democracy and gender equality, greater respect for human rights and freedom from oppression” (sub-objective 1). This includes supporting:

- Enhanced capacity to practice democratic governance, with a focus on transparency and combating corruption.
- Enhanced capacity of public institutions to combat violence against Women;
- Enhanced capacity of civil society to work towards greater accountability and contribute to knowledge about democracy, gender equality (including violence against women), and human rights.

The strategy will strive to contribute to improved access to sexual and reproductive health rights – which Sweden will be able to do as it is “seen as a reliable partner and is in a good position to work in difficult and controversial areas”. According to the Strategy document, enhanced democracy, gender equality and respect for human rights should be mainstreamed in all result areas.

6.3. Portfolio of EP development interventions

EU development interventions aimed to address the variety of human rights and governance concerns in Bangladesh (see box above). They did so through support of international and domestic civil society organisations.

The portfolio of DK and SE development interventions reflected a similar mix of capacity-building interventions aiming both at (semi-)governmental institutions and civil society organizations, with SE most clearly indicating¹²⁴ an intention to offer stronger direct support to the government in the future, particularly on women’s rights (i.e. the Ministry of Women and Children). Both embassies employed one gender and human rights focal point. Due to recent cuts in embassy staff, they both faced similar problems in managing the portfolio: working through implementing agencies was thus a necessity (and not only a choice). The implementing agencies were inter-governmental (UNDP) or non-governmental.

Differently from the EU, both DK and SE remained committed to a specific HR&D regional approach to the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

¹²⁴ MN409.

6.4 Facts and findings per Judgement Criteria

JC6.1 Contribution of EP support to empowering and enabling civil society organisations to defend human rights

All HR&D Advocacy NGO interviewees (ASK, BLAST, TIB, ODHIKAR)¹²⁵ confirmed that the organisations have been fully dependent on foreign funding for their core operations, including from the EPs. The organisations would not be able to operate without EPs (and other development partners') support, so continued funding is crucial for their survival, and thus for the independent monitoring of human rights and democratisation issues in Bangladesh, as well as for a civil society-government dialogue on these issues to take place. Some ideas for income-generating activities were being considered recently, but not much was implemented so far, nor have the EPs put much emphasis on the need to strive towards more financial independence which might not be easy in any case.

Full dependence on external funding had some drawbacks: the government occasionally described NGOs as 'foreign agents'; public opinion could be critical of NGOs because of their 'lifestyle'; on the other hand, dependent was a 'fact of life'. As discussed above, in the recent period the government has increasingly used the legal framework on foreign donations to delay (and in the Odhikar case: block) foreign funding of NGOs.

The interviewees welcomed their relationship of trust with the EPs. The EPs generally adopted an appropriate hands off approach that respects the NGO's autonomy. They did not intervene in the strategic choices made by the NGOs; funding was granted for a whole programming cycle; only in the pre-funding phase intensive negotiations sometimes took place that mostly dealt with aligning the NGOs' planning with the specific EP instrument through which support was given. NGOs expressed a preference for interacting with a consortium of donors providing core support to the organisation – e.g. development actors have organised in an ad hoc consortium for their cooperation with Transparency International Bangladesh, but not with BLAST, for reasons that appear to be co-incidental. NGOs welcomed more regular exchanges with development actors that provide them with structural support.

Apart from the core funding offered to a number of HR&D NGOs, EPs also provided some project-specific funding, the EU's bi-annual call under the EIDHR instrument is the most notable example. Although EIDHR is project-based, larger projects may still amount to a significant proportion of an NGO's annual budget. The EIDHR is an important support modality because it allows flexibility in responding to changing human rights challenges as identified from below by civil society. Not all local civil society organisations were able to formulate EIDHR project proposals though; the process was deemed burdensome (particularly for smaller projects that are more suited to local civil society) - as one interviewee put it, "not all brave people are necessarily good accountants" - and as a

¹²⁵ MN403, MN405, MN406, MN412.

result a significant amount of the funding went to foreign and international NGOs (who might then cooperate with community organisations).

NGO interviewees confirmed that EPs attach importance to the geographical reach of the NGO activities across the country. None of the main HR&D advocacy organisations have a presence in all districts, although they all aspire to monitor the situation in all Bangladesh, and to strengthen their activities at the local level. NGOs have different ways of organizing locally: TIB has established 45 citizens' volunteer groups (Committees of Concerned Citizens) in 45 districts; Odhikar has no field offices, but has trained 500 peoples as human rights defenders that are spread over the country. An alternative and possibly more promising approach to setting up decentralized units is for the HR&D advocacy organisations to invest in vertical networking with local community organisations. This is the approach taken by ASK and BLAST, although both organizations recognize that much more could still be done. In conclusion, the field presence and coverage of the HR&D advocacy NGOs have increased over the evaluation period, but full country coverage has not been achieved.

The relationship between the government and HR&D advocacy organizations has been strained particularly in the post-2011 period. NGOs were able to input to some extent on legislative activities – sometimes in concert with development partners. The intensity of exchanges with the government has varied, depending on each specific NGO. None of the NGO interviewees (MN 403, 405, 406, 412, 413) however, indicated an increase in their contacts with the government during the evaluation period. As the 2014 *Civil Society Mapping* study notes there was 'a shrinking space for engaging in policy dialogue and governance and a risk of politicisation and political instrumentalisation of civil society organisations' (p.8). Elsewhere, the study notes that: 'maintaining a comfortable relationship with public authorities is perceived as having an increased importance in recent years' (p.32).

NGOs that did not share the Awami League's commitment to secularism as a fundamental constitutional principle came under significant stress. On the other hand, HR&D advocacy organizations of any colour needed to tread lightly when addressing human rights issues that directly confronted the government such as violations by law enforcement personnel, custodial torture, politically motivated killings and disappearances, certain instances of corruption etc. In the current political climate, interviewees confirmed, 'coalitions between NGOs have to be formed if we want to address sensitive issues'.¹²⁶ Instances of such horizontal coalition-building have occurred, but are not always straightforward as many of the HR&D advocacy NGOs are built around strong personalities.

On less confrontational issues (i.e. HR&D issues that the government is willing to address), cooperation between the government and NGOs was possible. Such multi-stakeholder cooperation tended to have a positive HR&D impact. Some interesting examples of GoB-NGO cooperation include the cooperation between the National Human Rights Commission and civil society organisations on a variety of areas and activities, the

¹²⁶ MN403, MN405, MN406, MN412.

cooperation between the Anti-Corruption Commission and TIB and the involvement of NGOs in the operation of victim support centres (e.g. in the Chittagong Hill Tracts).

In sum, vertical networking between advocacy NGOs and local community organisations; the building of horizontal coalitions on sensitive issues; and multi-stakeholder cooperation in sub-sectors where this is politically feasible are all important in taking HR&D issues forward.

During interviews, both EPs and NGOs confirmed that mutual consultations occurred from time to time¹²⁷, primarily at the initiative of the EPs. An important development was the recent inclusion (June 2014) of NGOs in the Local Consultative group meetings. This was an EU initiative, and NGO participation was coordinated by TIB.¹²⁸

| JC6.1: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|--|---|------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EPs appropriately provided core funding for HR&D advocacy NGOs | Interviews, Annual reports and websites HR&D NGOs | Strong |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HR&D advocacy NGOs are urban based with a varying degree of representation at the district level. EPs prioritised NGO coverage and activities in all districts but this objective has not been fully achieved. Vertical networking with community organisations offers a viable alternative to establishing local presences. | Interviews, Annual reports and websites HR&D NGOs, MtR “Civil Society Mapping and Recommendations for EU+ Future Engagement with Civil Society. Bangladesh” Constantini/Uddin, <i>EU Civil Society Mapping Final Report</i> (18 March 2014) | Strong |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Through EIDHR, EU offered some support to bottom-up, small scale initiatives by a wider group of civil society organizations engaged in HR&D activities. | Lists of EIDHR projects, interviews | Strong |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EPs support has not resulted in an improvement in the CSO-GoB dialogue on confrontational HR&D issues. EPs modestly encouraged horizontal networking on confrontational issues EPs have supported some GoB-NGO cooperation on non-confrontational issues. | Interviews, Focus group slum dwellers Dhaka, Annual Report National Human Rights Commission (2013) | Strong |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EPs occasionally involved NGOs in the preparation of their own HR&D activities (such as approaches of the Government of Bangladesh). | Interviews, minutes Local Consultative Group meetings | More than satisfactory |

¹²⁷ MN401, MN403, MN405, MN406, MN408, MN 410, MN412.

¹²⁸ MN412

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|---|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Beneficiary CSO report having benefited from effective capacity-building measures that empowered them to defend human rights more effectively | Partly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Geographical coverage of CSO having benefited from EP support (e.g. CSO active at both national and sub-national levels) | Fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution in the field presence in zones affected by human rights violations during the evaluation period | Partly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution in the number of rights holders (particularly those belonging to vulnerable or exposed groups) reached during the evaluation period | Partly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution in the number of direct contacts with duty bearers during the evaluation period. | Partly available |

JC6.2 Contribution of EPs support to enabling the government to better discharge its obligations as duty bearer with regard to human rights and social justice

Capacity-building

Given the mixed record of the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) on human rights and democratization, EPs focused their capacity-building support initiatives mainly on (semi-) governmental bodies that were somewhat removed from the central executive. These included guardian institutions such as the National Human Rights Commission and the Election Commission; the judiciary; and the Chittagong Hill Tracts institutions that were created as part of the CHT process (see under JC 6.3).

Differently from the NGOs discussed above, the guardian institutions have not been fully dependent on EPs (or other development partners) funding. On the contrary, according to international standards, adequate funding for these institutions should be provided by the state through a procedure that guarantees their independence from the government in power – and, arguably for that matter, from any other actor. During interviews, officials at both the NHRC and EU nevertheless insisted that EPs financial and technical support to their institutions has been important and should continue, because the government was providing insufficient funds to cover the organizations' needs and/or because the staff lacked professional expertise. At the NHRC, the additional argument put forward was that EPs support was crucial to enable the NHRC to take action on confrontational human rights issues.

NHRC

DK and SE supported the National Human Rights Commission through a UNDP capacity development project that has been largely successful in achieving its defined aims (equipping the NHRC with modern administrative systems, developing the capacity to monitor and investigate (less successful), carrying out human rights education, capacity to

engage in legal analysis and policy advice). Nevertheless, the NHRC both in terms of its independence and functioning does not fully meet the international standard for national human rights institutions. The International Coordinating Committee for National Human Rights Institutions (ICC) granted the NHRC Bangladesh B-status “as being not fully in compliance with the Paris Principles” in May 2011. The ICC expressed concerns about government influence in the selection procedure, independence of staff and inadequacy of resources. According to an NHRC source (MN402), the NHRC proposed an amendment to the NHRC Act to the government in September 2014 in order to bring the legislation in line with the Paris Principles, to no avail so far. Recently the government did give clearance to hire 20 additional staff (of which ten professional staff), which should allow the NHRC to open four regional offices, and thus ensure more adequate country-wide coverage.

The UNDP NHRC capacity-building project is at its end. Among interviewees opinions on the NHRC and the continuation of donor support varied considerably. Most interviewees recognized that the NHRC could potentially be a key organization for human rights protection, and that it had done some good work. On the other hand, the NHRC was not sufficiently independent from the government, and this had resulted in selectivity in investigating and addressing violations. The EPs were a step removed from the NHRC because UNDP acts as an implementing agency. The EPs lacked the capacity to directly manage a NHRC capacity development project UNDP, however, defined its role as a provider of technical assistance, and thus preferred to avoid ‘difficult’ issues such as the thoroughness and selectivity of NHRC investigations, or its effectiveness in providing remedies to victims.

GoB International Obligations

GoB has cooperated well with UN human rights mechanisms. During the evaluation period, a number of international human rights treaties were ratified (although Bangladesh has not recognized the competence of any individual complaints procedure), and the independent experts on extreme poverty and on water and situation visited the country (in 2009, see A/HRC/15/55), as well as the special rapporteur on violence against women (in 2013, see A/HRC/26/38/Add.2). At the 2013 UPR process,¹²⁹ the large majority of recommendations were welcomed by the government – except for recommendations on ratifying ILO Convention No.169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, on abolishing the death penalty and on decriminalizing homosexuality (see A/HRC/24/12/Add.1, at 3, 5, and 6). The Government of Bangladesh has cooperated well with UN human rights mechanisms. At the 2013 UPR Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process, the large vast majority of recommendations were welcomed by the gGovernment – except for recommendations on ratifying ILO Convention No.169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, on abolishing the death penalty and on decriminalizing homosexuality (see A/HRC/24/12/Add.1, at 3, 5, and 6). The EPs enabled the NHRC, through their support, to submit an alternative report to the UPR, to organize a mock UPR session, and to prepare shadow reports on the prohibition of torture and the right to food). SE encouraged an NGO shadow report to CEDAW. The EPs used the UPR outcome and art.1 EC-Bangladesh Cooperation Agreement in the political dialogue with the government

¹²⁹ The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a mechanism of the UN Human Rights Council.

Parliamentary activity

As reported above, a number of positive developments occurred in the area of domestic legislation. Again, EPs intervened indirectly through supporting the work on legislative reform of the NHRC (e.g. on the Child Rights' Act or the Rights of Persons with Disabilities' Act) and of NGOs (e.g. ASK's role in advocating for legislation and procedures with regard to domestic violence against women) or directly by approaching parliament (e.g. on the amendment to the domestic violence act), relevant ministries (e.g. on the revision of the child marriage act) or the Cabinet (e.g. on the revision of the foreign donations legislation).

Judiciary

EP development interventions with regard to the formal judiciary were piece-meal, mostly in response to proposals (e.g. under the EIDHR) from international and local NGOs. It is in the nature a process based on an open call that the result is somewhat unpredictable. NGO and EP interviewees and reports agreed that the judiciary as a whole continued to suffer from political and executive interference, corruption, low capacity and quality, and lack of oversight¹³⁰. In a press statement released in April 2015, the Chief Justice declared that the 'backlog of cases in the judiciary had increased because of the shortage of judges as well as the absence of lawyers during the trial proceedings'. EP interventions did not attempt to contribute to a major overhaul of the judiciary, and none occurred.

Nevertheless, EPs supported HR&D NGOs were able to achieve some success in enforcing rights through litigation, both in individual and public interest cases. According to an NGO interviewee (MN 403), "some independent judges remained, and it was possible to win cases for very vulnerable people if the cost for the government was not very high: why would anyone object that relief is given to a disabled person?" Litigation also offered interesting opportunities for vertical cooperation among NGOs: HR&D advocacy NGOs assisted community organizations representing disadvantaged groups in taking cases to court with the help of friendly law firms (e.g. in successfully protecting slum dwellers against forced evictions in the absence of an alternative solution offered by the government).

The major EU intervention in the sector of the judiciary was the Village Courts project. The village courts were created in a 1976 Ordinance as a local dispute settlement mechanism to deal with petty issues; the intention was to create low-threshold largely informal arbitration panels that were easily accessible to poor and vulnerable people. The village courts remained defunct for a long time, until they were activated first by NGOs, and subsequently discovered by UNDP as a potentially interesting tool to achieve local justice. The EU decided to provide substantial funding to the UNDP/Ministry of Local Government "Activating Village Courts" project in 2010 (see <http://www.villagecourts.org/>); the second phase of implementation will start in January 2016 with an increased EU commitment of funds. An independent study confirmed that village courts "may act as a useful bridge between Bangladesh informal and formal justice

¹³⁰ E.g. see International Crisis Group, *Mapping Bangladesh's Political Crisis*, February 2015, pp. 14-16

institutions in an attempt to provide justice to the rural communities”.¹³¹ As to community perceptions of the village courts a 2014 BRAC study found that:

“The satisfaction level of the resolution reached in a village court, according to the community members where VC has been initiated, is quite mixed. Responses with „satisfied“ and „dissatisfied“ both stand at about 16%. A gender bias is evident as women are found to be less satisfied than men. The predominant reason for the satisfaction of the VC is that the resolution process is fair with percentage of the responses standing at 53.6%. This is followed by trials not consuming time and being cost effective. The main reasons behind dissatisfaction of respondents are that trial is not fair and that trial is biased. Survey results have shown that more female respondents find the dispute resolution process and the trial to be biased when compared to male”. (Brac Institute of Governance and Development, Baseline Perception Study of Access to Justice for the Marginalized and Excluded through Community Legal Services Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) Community Legal Services Project (September 2014),19).

According to the same study, satisfaction rates for formal courts were significantly lower. There is little doubt that the formal justice system remained largely inaccessible for vulnerable and exposed groups. Several interviewees (MN 403, 412,413) quoted a figure of 2% of vulnerable and exposed people facing injustice that had their case heard in court.

| JC6.2: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|--|--|---------------------|
| <p><i>Capacity-building Efforts</i></p> <p>EPs appropriately focused on indirect (through UNDP) support to guardian institutions at some distance from the executive, such as the National Human Rights Commission and the Election Commission. The geographical scope of such institutions is national, although representation at the district or local level could be improved.</p> | <p>Project-level documentation, interviews, Annual Report National Human Rights Commission, UNDP MTR NHRC (2013)</p> | <p>Strong</p> |
| <p><i>National Human Rights Commission</i></p> <p>Support to the National Human Rights Commission has resulted in a broader range of activities taken up, but the NHRC does not yet operate in compliance with the Paris Principles</p> | <p>Interviews, Annual Report NHRC, UNDP MTR NHRC (2013), ASK NHRC Assessment ‘Bangladesh: Institutional Commitment Needed’ (2013-2014), Paris Principles (United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/48/134 (4 March 1993), intervention documents</p> | <p>Strong</p> |
| <p><i>GoB International Obligations</i></p> <p>EPs have contributed to the broad acceptance by the</p> | <p>UN documents, interviews, Annual report NHRC</p> | <p>Strong</p> |

¹³¹ Bashir Ahmed, Mohammad Tarikul Islam, The Role of Union Parishad in Rural Dispute Resolution in Bangladesh: an Evaluation in the Light of People’s Perception, Studies on Asia, Series IV, Volume 3, No. 1, March 2013, 188-210

| | | |
|---|---|-------------------------------|
| <p>GoB of international human rights instruments and of cooperation with UN human rights bodies</p> <p>EPs make use of multilateral human rights resources in the dialogue with the GoB contributing to a decent GoB record on cooperation with international HR bodies and acceptance of international HR commitments.</p> | | |
| <p><i>Parliamentary Activity</i></p> <p>EPs have achieved some success in promoting parliamentary activity on implementation of human international human rights obligations in the reference period, but also adoption of new laws that threaten HR&D.</p> <p>Implementation problems remain serious. Existing laws (new and old) were increasingly used to curb opposition; there was a shrinking space for political dialogue.</p> | <p>Parliamentary documents, interviews</p> | <p>Strong</p> |
| <p><i>Judiciary and vulnerable and exposed groups</i></p> <p>EPs' piecemeal interventions in the formal judicial sector (e.g. EU under EIDHR – this is on the basis of a call, so resulting activities always unpredictable);</p> <p>Some success stories in bottom-up public interest litigation cases and non-confrontational individual cases by supported CSOs - but judiciary remained subject to political interference;</p> <p>Village courts project (substantial EU funding) aimed at providing access for vulnerable and exposed.</p> <p>Overall access to justice for vulnerable or exposed remained very low (2% of those facing injustice have their case heard in court).</p> | <p>Interviews, EP portfolio, relevant intervention documents, newspaper articles, various studies¹³²</p> | <p>More than satisfactory</p> |

¹³² Bashir Ahmed, Mohammad Tarikul Islam, *The Role of Union Parishad in Rural Dispute Resolution in Bangladesh: an Evaluation in the Light of People's Perception*, Studies on Asia, Series IV, Volume 3, No. 1, March 2013,188-210); Brac Institute of Governance and Development, Baseline Perception Study of Access to Justice for the Marginalized and Excluded through Community Legal Services ; Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) Community Legal Services Project (September 2014) ; Moran e.a., Perceptions, attitudes and understanding. A Baseline survey on Human Rights in Bangladesh (2011) – study commissioned by NHRC

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|--|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Geographical levels (e.g. both national and sub-national levels) targeted by EP support | Data partly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Extent of use within the EU-GOB dialogue of the findings of multilateral human rights resources (including the UPR process and UN special procedures) | Data partly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution in the acceptance of international human rights commitments by the GOB | Data fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Parliamentary activity on implementation of human international human rights obligations in the reference period | Data fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution of the capacity of the National Human Rights Commission to perform its functions and missions/activities carried out (e.g. campaigns, trainings, etc.) | Data fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution of the capacity of the judicial system (resources, equipment and number of trained judges, reduction of backlogs, human rights education) to perform its functions | Data partly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution of the number of members of vulnerable and exposed groups having access to the judicial system | Data partly/hardly available |

JC6.3 Contribution of EP support to reducing violence and discrimination against vulnerable or exposed groups, including minorities, women and children, particularly those living in poverty

Chittagong Hill Tracts

The institutions in the Chittagong Hill Tracts Area remained in a transitional stage over the evaluation period, due to the delayed implementation of the Peace Accord. As the governance structure for the region was not only incomplete, but also subject to contestation by the former parties to the conflict, the HR&D challenges were quite different from the remainder of the country. In this region, UNDP's role was that of an international presence meant to build confidence between the parties formally engaged in armed conflict. This role was quite different from the role it played in development interventions elsewhere in Bangladesh. A further complicating factor was that the government promoted a change in the population structure, through support of the inflow of Bengali settlers into areas once dominated by tribal peoples. The government did acknowledge the "special" situation in CHT and established a designated ministry (Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs) to coordinate administrative and development activities in CHT districts.

Seventeen years after the signing, the Peace Accord has not been fully implemented, and the area remained under a transitional regime: the institutional set-up jointly agreed between the government and the armed opposition groups has not been completed. This state of affairs haunts and hinders reconciliation, and leaves the path to renewed conflict open. Given the unstable environment, the vulnerability of the CHT population to human rights violations and undemocratic governance remained high; a recent study finds that

indigenous women and girls are ‘extremely vulnerable’, and identifies impunity as the single most important contributing factor to their safety and security¹³³ [Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, Marginalization and Impunity. Violence against women and girls in the CHT (May 2014)]. It is well recognized in the literature that a transitional (justice) context, such as the Chittagong Hill Tracts context, requires a specific approach from development partners. Typically, the role of the international community is to act as a potential source of information, expertise and training on reconciliation; and to insist on accountability for serious HR violations, unacceptability of certain crimes, and on establishing truth¹³⁴).

The continued violence, even after the Peace Accord, including land grabbing, extortions, and communal violence in the CHT have resulted in deep mistrust between Bengali and ethnic communities as well as fractions among indigenous peoples. In addition, some anti-peace accord segments of the CHT are active with fast spreading of negative propaganda to create distortion and fear. All three IP political parties have reportedly raised their ‘armed groups’ to protect their existence.

From 2011 to 2014, the EU offered substantial support to a UNDP *Supporting Local Development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts* project. According to the 2014 Evaluation (Final Report March 2014 Evaluation (IBF International Consulting in collaboration with ADE)) the results achieved by the project were mixed: there had been improvements with regard to the capacities of the CHT specific institutions resulting in an improved service delivery, but community capacity-building efforts in assisting them to securing more sustainable livelihoods had not proven successful. The report also found that to a certain degree the international presence of CHTDF had a stabilizing and protecting effect on the local level, at least in the road accessible areas because potential perpetrators of human rights violations felt observed. With regard to minority rights and indigenous issues several effective activities were conducted which were instrumental in strengthening the cultural identity and the capacities of the indigenous population to solve the outstanding conflict issues in a constructive way through such events as cultural festivals, studies and publications of ethnic history and traditions”.

The 2014 evaluation recommended that a “component on rule of law including a transitional justice mechanism (...) be added to complement the existing Peace Accord advocacy”. A 2012 ROM evaluation concurred that the duration of “this large scale and ambitious intervention was too short with a view to the long-term nature of the peace-building process”. The EU delegation in Dhaka favored the idea of a second phase for the project with a stronger emphasis on HR&D, but failed to convince HQ.

In the meantime DK and SE funded another currently on-going UNDP CHT project Conflict Prevention, Recovery and Peace-building in Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh (2014-2015) that aimed. at contributing to an improvement of the law and order situation in the country.

¹³³ Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, Marginalization and Impunity. Violence against women and girls in the CHT (May 2014)

¹³⁴ (IDEA, Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. A Handbook, Stockholm, 2003, 45-46

The HR&D situation in CHT nevertheless remained volatile. Clearly, EPs supported UNDP projects have so far not impacted significantly on the HR&D situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Vulnerable or Exposed Groups in general

As already noted, the EPs impacted both directly and indirectly (through capacity-building support measures) on domestic legislation efforts aimed at strengthening the position of vulnerable and exposed groups.

Nevertheless, there is little indication that vulnerable or exposed groups became less vulnerable to human rights violations during the evaluation period. Annual reports of international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch do not reflect such an improvement, nor did any of the interviewees indicate a positive trend.

Domestic Violence and Child Marriage

Notwithstanding the passing in 2010 of the Domestic Violence Act – supported and welcomed by the EPs – a recent nation-wide study conducted by the government found that 87% of Bangladeshi married women are abused by their husbands. Of the 12,600 women surveyed, 65% stated that they were physically tortured by their husband and 36% were victims of sexual violence.

On a related issue of similar important concern to the EPs, notwithstanding the legislation banning child marriage, one in every three girls marries before age 15; 64% marries before 18. See: “Sexual Harassment: change of mind-set essential”, The Independent, 27 April 2015. According to a 2014 UNICEF report, Bangladesh ranked second globally among the countries with the highest prevalence of child marriage in the global index in child marriage and first in Asia (UNICEF, Ending child marriage, Progress and prospects (2014) available as http://data.unicef.org/corecode/uploads/document6/uploaded_pdfs/corecode/Child-Marriage-Brochure-HR_164.pdf]

One difficulty faced by EP delegations is that they lack the capacity to reach out directly to vulnerable and exposed groups. Activities take place through implementing agencies (international organizations, NGOs). Effectiveness is dependent on the performance of these agencies. There is little time to go in to the field, and when it happens, it is usually at the invitation of the implementing agencies, that also have an interest of their own. The visibility of the EPs’ role in HR&D issues among vulnerable and exposed people has been very low, and as there was no direct relationship between the EPs and vulnerable and exposed rights holders, the EPs had no other option than to rely on the assessment of implementing agencies as to what the priority human rights concerns of the vulnerable and exposed are.

Focus group with Women Slum Dwellers Kallyanpor Poora Bosti slum (Dhaka)

During the evaluation team field mission, a focus group (MN 414) was held with nine to twelve women walking in and out at Kallyanpor Bosti Slum. The meeting provided some anecdotal information on their human rights awareness and priorities.

All were familiar with the term human rights (its equivalent in Bangla *Manob odbikar*). When asked what the term meant, they answered: “Where I work, my boss should give me proper payment”, “Women’s rights are human rights”, “Child education is a human right”, “Early marriage is a human rights issue”, and “A husband beating a wife is a HR issue”. The examples given coincided with what they identified as their main problems, and thus their priority human rights concerns, in addition to “the right to live in the slum”.

They also said: “Many foreign people come here, and still we have no change”.

Human rights awareness among vulnerable or exposed people remains problematic, and thus constitutes a proper area for EP development interventions. According to one NGO interviewee (MN 403), there were differences among vulnerable or exposed groups: “disability were much less assertive in human rights than indigenous groups”. An October 2011 baseline survey on human rights (awareness) in Bangladesh generally found that half of the respondents had not heard the term ‘human rights’ at all. Those who had knew it from television, neighbors, public discussions and school. More than 60% of respondents believed that violence against wives was acceptable for ‘disobedience’ and ‘bad behavior’ or when her conduct affected the reputation of the family (Moran e.a., Perceptions, attitudes and understanding. A Baseline survey on Human Rights in Bangladesh (2011) – study commissioned by NHRC).

| JC6.3: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|--|-------------------------------|
| <p><i>Vulnerable and exposed groups: Chittagong Hill Tracts</i> Some HR&D components in supported UNDP projects (particularly in ongoing DK/SE project) but no attempt at a dedicated program to cover HR&D problems in Hill Tracts (which would certainly respond to HR&D concerns). UNDP did not practice a human rights based approach to development, but focused on non-confrontational technical assistance; in the absence of any other watchdog, its presence in the area nevertheless had a positive impact HR&D impact. Non-implementation Peace Agreement remained stumbling block. EPs engagement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts has been substantial, but the HR&D situation remains highly volatile. EPs disagree on how best to engage with HR&D issues in CHT in the future.</p> | <p>On-site visit Interviews, NHRC Annual Report, EPs' portfolio of development interventions, relevant intervention documents including monitoring and evaluation reports (see project fiche), various studies¹³⁵</p> | <p>More than satisfactory</p> |
| <p>EPs delegations lack the capacity to reach out directly to vulnerable or exposed groups, and remained dependent on implementing agencies</p> | <p>Interviews</p> | <p>Strong</p> |
| <p>EPs have supported legislative developments addressing the needs of vulnerable or exposed groups.</p> | <p>Interviews, legislative developments</p> | <p>Strong</p> |
| <p>The impact of EPs interventions on the scale of human rights violations of vulnerable and exposed groups remained limited.</p> | <p>NGO annual reports, interviews, newspaper articles, Moran e.a., <i>Perceptions, attitudes and understanding. A Baseline survey on Human Rights in Bangladesh (2011)</i> – study commissioned by NHRC</p> | <p>More than satisfactory</p> |
| <p>EPs visibility among rights holders is low.</p> | <p>Interviews, Focus groups (Slum dwellers and Rana Plaza survivors)</p> | <p>Indicative</p> |

¹³⁵ Abdullah Al Faruque, *Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord: Challenges and Human Rights Issues* (October, 2014) - study commissioned by NHRC ; Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, *Marginalisation and Impunity. Violence against women and girls in the CHT* (May 2014)

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|---|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution of laws and policies in place to address the needs of vulnerable or exposed groups | Data fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution of the number of women and children being subject to violence (e.g. prevalence of acid attacks, rape, etc.) and discrimination | Data partly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution in human rights violations suffered by members of ethnic and religious minority groups, indigenous (tribal) peoples, socially marginalised groups (dalits) | Data partly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Perceptions of representatives of minorities, women and children on the effectiveness of the EP contribution to the reduction of violence and discrimination, and of EP willingness to engage in dialogue and action on human rights needs and challenges experienced by these groups | Data partly available |

JC6.4 Contribution of EP support to strengthening the country's ability to conduct free and fair elections

During focus groups with slum dwellers and garment workers, it was stated that “our only relation with the government is when we vote”. Their ID card was important because it recognized their existence. Candidates employed people as ‘campaign laborers’ during election periods to ensure their loyalty. Poor people has some political leverage during election periods but not afterwards.

While EP development interventions focusing on technical assistance to the Election Commission were useful as such, they proved insufficient to impact in a sustainable way on the country's ability to conduct free and fair elections.

As indicated above, international and domestic election observers evaluated the 2008 and 2014 general elections differently. The 2008 elections were deemed to be relatively free and fair, and showed that that electoral institutions and standardized electoral processes could govern a peaceful transition of power in Bangladesh. In the pre-election period to the 2014 elections, negotiations between AL and BNP leadership however failed to produce an agreement to hold inclusive and participatory elections. The US headquartered National Democratic Institute assessed the 2014 elections as follows:

With the credibility of the elections in question, the United States declared on Dec. 22 that it would not deploy international observers for the elections and international observer missions from the European Union, the International Republican Institute and the Commonwealth cancelled their international monitoring activities. Rising tensions between the ruling AL government and the BNP-led opposition, and the resulting deterioration in the security situation, also proved to be a complicating factor for Bangladeshi citizen election monitoring organizations. Due to the constricted political space, many of these groups were hesitant to comment openly on the electoral environment, fearing reprisals. Voter turnout on Election Day was low by Bangladeshi standards, and many of Bangladesh's citizens have lost confidence in the ability of country's political process to deliver credible, participatory and democratic elections.

High Representative Catherine Ashton issued a declaration on behalf of the European Union on 9 January 2014 strongly condemning the acts of violence and regretting that the people of Bangladesh were not given an opportunity to express fully their democratic choice (see EUD Bangladesh website). At the time of the evaluation team's field mission in April 2015, city council elections took place in Dhaka and Chittagong on 28 April 2015. Halfway through Election Day, the BNP withdrew its candidates, in response to reports on irregularities at the polling stations by observers and the media. AL candidates were victorious in all instances. According to the Chief Election Commissioner, the elections had been largely peaceful and the candidates should accept the results [*The Independent* (29 April 2015)]. The EU issued a public statement that there had been credible reports of vote-rigging, intimidation and violence, and called for a thorough investigation (see EUD Bangladesh website). On 18 May 2015, TIB published its assessment that "the recent elections to the three city corporations under Dhaka and Chittagong cannot be called free and fair".

In this context, EP development interventions in support of the Election Commission inevitably only have had a limited impact on achieving sustainable democracy in Bangladesh, raising the issue of whether continued EP support gives legitimacy to a flawed political process.

The 2007-2010 Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs (PERP) UNDP project, funded by all three EPs achieved its objectives of creating a credible electoral roll, and as a spin-off, a national identity card for all. This was a huge substantial operation that was brought to a successful end. Clearly, the establishment of a credible election roll fulfilled a pre-condition for the holding of any election, but did not guarantee that future elections would be free and fair. Utilizing remaining government funds, the government and the Election Commission extended the project to mid-2012. Updates to the voter list were undertaken in 2012 and 2014; ideally this should be done every year

The Strengthening Election Management in Bangladesh (SEMB) project was the EU-funded on-going five-year PERP follow-up program of capacity development-building support to the Election Commission (started April 2011). The project equally also received support from DFID and USAID, and was once more administered implemented by UNDP. Again some results were achieved in building technical capacity, but the Electoral Commission's (mis-)handling of the 2014 elections, understandably caused the EU to reduce its support to the project. In April 2015, views differed on whether EU support to the Electoral Commission should be extended in the current political context. Both UNDP and Electoral Commission staff argued that support should continue as the aim of the UNDP project was to strengthen the technical capacity of the Election Commission, and there was a further need to so. EC and UNDP could not change the political landscape, and it was unrealistic for development partners to expect the project to create an enabling environment that would allow the Election Commission to function independently and transparently.

According to Article 118(4) of the Constitution, the Election Commission shall "be independent in the exercise of its functions and subject only to this Constitution and any other law". Members are appointed by the President, however the government also controls the appointment of secretariat staff, and the EC's financial resources.

Investigations into irregularities have not been vigorous, and both civil society and the general public perceive of the Election Commission as partisan and subject to government interference. Public confidence in the institution, particularly among supporters of the opposition, remains low.

During interviews, Election Commission staff (MN407) strikingly expressed the opinion that there was no need for any legislative reform of the Election Commission as ‘the EC was totally independent constitutionally’. This statement contrasts with the view taken at the National Human Rights Commission that the NHRC Act needs to be amended to ensure the institution’s full independence (MN402).

The Election Commission was, as of April 2015, both unable and unwilling to act as the guarantor of free and fair elections.

| JC6.4: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|--|------------------------|
| <p><i>Election Commission</i> The PERP (electoral roll with photographs) project was very successful as a pre-condition for proper elections. The electoral roll was subsequently updated by GoB. But Election Commission remained unable to guarantee free and fair elections.</p> | Interviews, Intervention documents including evaluations (see intervention fiche), IDEA, <i>International Electoral Standards. Guidelines for reviewing the Legal Framework of Elections</i> (2002), European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), <i>Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters</i> (2002) | Strong |
| EPs have not made a significant contribution to the holding of free and fair elections. | Interviews, International Crisis Group, <i>Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis</i> (February 2015), Wen-Chen Chang ea. <i>Constitutionalism in Asia</i> (2014). | Strong |
| The political participation of vulnerable and exposed groups remained limited. | Interviews, focus groups | More than satisfactory |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|---|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution of the capacity of the Government to manage elections (in particular 2008 and 2014 elections) | Fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evolution of the capacity of the Bangladesh Election Commission to perform its functions | Fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Appraisal made by national and international observers of the election processes | Fully available |

6.5 Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions

All 3 EPs gave priority to HR & D in their country strategies in a consistent manner. This led to development interventions aimed at strengthening the capacity of both the duty

bearer (the GoB) and rights holders (via NGOs) with a view to contributing to domestic policies that are produced through a democratic process and that result in effective human rights protection.

The government's HR&D performance during the evaluation period was, however, mixed and this impacted on the EP's capacity-building development efforts. It remained appropriate to partner with GoB institutions that could potentially play a positive role in the human rights and democratization sector, but the risk was that EP support would - and/or would be seen as- adding legitimacy to a fundamentally flawed system. In addition, EPs were developing the capacity of rights holders by strengthening domestic human rights organizations - that were more or less responsive to the needs of the vulnerable and exposed, who are the EP's stated main target group among the rights holders.

The EPs perceived administrative bodies such as the NHRC and the Election Commission and of the judiciary as potential guardians of the executive (and thus as partners for the HR&D agenda). They encouraged HR&D advocacy NGOs to gradually extend their reach to exposed and vulnerable groups. Difficulties arose.

The supported administrative bodies and the judiciary were systematically subjected to political influence (interviewees described these institutions as "weak, not fully transparent, not independent"). HR&D advocacy NGOs also suffered from undue government interference, while at the same time remaining fully dependent on external funding; some were aligned with either government or opposition; and mixed signals were received about their responsiveness to human rights threats experienced by the most vulnerable and exposed.

As a result of these political constraints (rather than by design), EPs HR&D development interventions have primarily dealt with HR&D issues that are non-confrontational vis-à-vis the GoB. Non-confrontational HR&D issues were issues on which the GoB was willing to move (or contemplated moving) into the direction of what is required by international standards, and on which it was ready to cooperate with local and external actors. Such issues included technical capacity development of HR&D guardian institutions, violence against women, children's rights, and most economic and social rights. To be clear, non-confrontational HR&D development interventions were still relevant to vulnerable or exposed groups, and also controversial within the society at large (domestic violence and women's rights in general, child marriage etc.).

The implication of the (imposed) bias on HR&D development interventions is that the full range of (confrontational) human rights and democratization issues (e.g. disproportionate use of force, custodial torture, disappearances, political killings, death penalty, free and fair elections, repressive measures against the opposition, corruption) needed to be addressed through political actions. An EU human rights country strategy for Bangladesh was developed in 2011, but this was a confidential document described by one interviewee as being not sufficiently prioritised ("shopping list"). There certainly has been an increase in the number of public statements on HR&D in the post-2001 period, as evidenced by the table below.

There have been impediments to achieving full complementarity between development and political interventions in the HR&D sector. Within the EU delegation responsibilities for development and political interventions are attributed to different persons. Although a coherent HR&D country strategy requires integration of the development and political interventions, there is a tendency for staff to respect (or demand respect of) each other competencies.

Table 2 - EU Public Statements on HR&D issues in Bangladesh (2011-2015)

| | 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | Total |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Elections | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | 3 |
| Labour Rights in garment industry | 1 | 4 | 4 | 2 | | 11 |
| Capital punishment | 1 | 2 | 1 | | 1 | 5 |
| Political violence | 3 | | 2 | | | 5 |
| Visit delegation European Parliament on HR&D | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| Human Rights Defender | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| Indigenous Peoples | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| Publicising supported HR&D development interventions | 1 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 5 |
| total | 8 | 10 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 32 |

Source: based on data from EUD Bangladesh Website 2015 (includes data until 8 May 2015)

The impact of EU public statements on HR&D positions of the government has been mixed. According to some interviewees, the current government was politically much more oriented towards Russia and India than towards Europe.

However, there was a sector where the EU unquestionably enjoyed political leverage: the ready-made garment industry. More than half of Bangladesh's total exports have been directed towards the EU, and 90% of the exports to the EU were in clothing. The man-made disaster at Rana Plaza in 2013 resulted in a quite unique follow-up process of use and interplay of development and political interventions, and of linking EU trade and human rights policies in Bangladesh. This process included numerous high-level public statements, not only by the High Representative, but also by successive EU Trade Commissioners stressing the importance of labor rights. It led to the adoption of a *sui generis* multi-stakeholder instrument (the "Sustainability Compact for Continuous Improvements in Labour Rights and Factory Safety in the Ready-Made Garment and Knitwear Industry in Bangladesh") bringing together the EU, the government of Bangladesh, the US and the ILO with the stated common goal of improving working conditions and the respect of labor rights in Bangladesh. Bangladesh labor legislation was quickly reformed to improve its conformity with ILO Conventions. Promises at the level of EU development interventions were made e.g. through the inclusion of an objective on "increasing access to an equitable labor market" in the EU Development Cooperation Instrument MIP 2014-2020 (30 March 2014) and through increased attention to promoting labor rights and security in DK development activities, including by offering assistance to Danish companies in securing compliance and higher standards of Bangladeshi partner companies.

Recommendations

1. Ensure adequate capacity of EPs in-country staff to engage in evidence-based assessments of the local HR&D situation, and in particular of its impact on vulnerable or exposed groups;
2. Prioritize human rights awareness of vulnerable or exposed groups;
3. Encourage alliance-building between the government and civil society organizations on improved human rights protection for vulnerable or exposed groups;
4. Maintain core support for HR&D advocacy NGOs;
5. Maintain support to Government of Bangladesh institutions removed from the central executive power that may act as HR&D guardians, but include performance indicators with regard to their independence and the relevance of their activities to vulnerable or exposed groups;
6. Address confrontational HR&D issues through political interventions;
7. Evaluate the Sustainability Compact model developed in the wake of the Rana Plaza building collapse.
8. Invest in a distinct EPs HR&D approach for the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

EU strategic documents explicitly envisage the development of country-based human rights approaches seeking to match objectives with realities on the ground. Such policies should be “carefully designed for the circumstances of each country”. While remaining firmly based on international obligations, differentiation at country level should allow the EPs to effectively address the needs of the rights holders that are most under threat by adverse trends in HR&D, i.e. the vulnerable or exposed.

Prioritizing the vulnerable or exposed in HR&D interventions at the country level inevitably requires that development partners give significant weight to evidence-based assessments made within the country, and in particular to assessments produced by their own in-country presence, i.e. delegation and embassy staff. In-country staff should have the capacity to monitor and assess the HR&D situation, and enabled to guide the direction of the HR&D country strategy.

- (1) *Ensure adequate capacity in-country to engage in evidence-based assessments of the local HR&D situation, and in particular of its impact on vulnerable or exposed groups.*

Although there is an EP (HQ) strategic commitment to produce differentiated HR&D country strategies that are informed by local country offices, little space is created for local HR&D responsible to learn from vulnerable or exposed groups about these groups’ priority HR&D concerns.

In-country staff should be mandated (e.g. in their job profiles) to meaningfully engage directly and independently with vulnerable and exposed groups (i.e. prioritised rights holders). Direct contacts are a prerequisite for ensuring that the EPs HR&D country policy is properly differentiated i.e. accurately reflects the concerns of vulnerable or exposed groups, and that the EPs interventions are locally legitimate, i.e. enjoy the support of the rights holders.

EPs local presences should engage in an evidence-based HR&D assessment, and this HR&D assessment should guide the direction of the EP’s HR&D country policy.

(2) *Prioritize human rights awareness of vulnerable or exposed groups.*

Sustainable human protection is ultimately dependent on the capacity of rights holders to enforce their rights in situations where these rights are under threat. Human rights claiming requires human rights awareness, which currently remains low in Bangladesh.

EPs should continue to contribute to human rights awareness both indirectly and directly:

- by investing sufficiently in human rights awareness activities by public authorities and civil society organizations focused on those most in need of protection;
- but also directly, through their political interventions, and by maintaining visibility for HR&D themes through media work (television is a major source of information on human HR&D issues in Bangladesh).

(3) *Encourage alliance-building between the government and civil society organizations on improved human rights protection for vulnerable or exposed groups.*

Human rights and democratisation claims are successful when the government accommodates them. Creating an atmosphere where government and civil society are willing to cooperate on HR&D issues matters.

EPs should identify and support opportunities for cooperation between government and civil society organisations on HR&D issues. Such opportunities currently exist on HR&D themes which the government perceives of as non-confrontational. Again, the nature of the supported activities may vary widely: from ensuring that service delivery is appropriate for vulnerable or exposed groups and that the service provider is accountable to facilitating GoB-CSO cooperation on legislative reform.

(4) *Maintain core support for HR&D advocacy NGOs.*

There is little prospect that the dependency of HR&D advocacy NGOs on external funding will diminish significantly over the next few years. EPs development interventions aimed at empowering and enabling civil society organisations to defend human rights and reclaim democracy will remain key.

EPs should :

- Form donor consortia to interact regularly with HR&D advocacy NGOs that receive core funding for their operations.
- Encourage structural alliances between HR&D advocacy NGOs and local rights-based service providing CSOs and community organisations with a view to increasing the relevance of the NGO's advocacy efforts to vulnerable and exposed groups.
- Support horizontal alliances between HR&D advocacy NGOs on activities addressing confrontational HR&D issues; mutual support between NGOs should include joint trial observations of cases brought by any of the HR&D advocacy NGO's, particularly on confrontational issues;

- (5) *Maintain support to GoB institutions removed from the central executive power that may act as HR&D guardians, but include performance indicators with regard to their independence and the relevance of their activities to vulnerable or exposed groups.*

Guardian institutions potentially play an important role in ensuring that the government fulfils its international human rights obligations and ensures inclusive political participation. EPs should support such institutions, but given the current political context, continued support should be made conditional on improved performance with regard to the independence of these institutions from the executive, and the relevance of their activities to vulnerable or exposed groups. EPs should insist on the inclusion of clear performance indicators on these two issues when providing support through intermediary agents.

With regard to specific institutions:

- EPs should insist on full compliance by the National Human Rights Commission with the Paris Principles within a reasonable time.
- As an alternative to the inclusion of performance indicators, EPs may consider to suspend assistance to the Election Commission until the appointment process has been revised and a credible framework for monitoring elections and investigating election irregularities is established.
- The establishment of a development partners' consortium devising an overall strategy for support to the judiciary (including both formal and informal institutions) is advisable.

- (6) *Address confrontational HR&D issues through political interventions.*

For the reasons explained above, addressing all HR&D issues (including some issues that are prioritized in the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy) in Bangladesh through development interventions is difficult. Full coverage of HR&D concerns therefore requires complementing development interventions with political interventions.

It is recommended that EPs:

- Systematically address confrontational HR&D issues in the political dialogue with the government, and in public statements;
- Systematically consult HR&D advocacy NGOs that receive core support on addressing confrontational HR&D issues. EU's role of "designated coordinator" on both human rights and civil society organisations within the framework of EU+ joint programming offers an opportunity in this regard; to monitor the situation of human rights defenders and support and protect human rights defenders in need in line with the EU Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights.

(7) *Evaluate the Sustainability Compact model developed in the wake of the Rana Plaza building collapse.*

The Sustainability Compact adopted in response to the extraordinary 2013 Rana Plaza disaster represents a departure from other EP development and political interventions on HR&D issues, in terms of: the nature of the instrument (an agreement directly concluded with the government and with ILO); the interaction between high-level political interventions and development interventions; the linking of human rights, governance and trade concerns; and the inclusion of very specific follow-up mechanisms.

The effectiveness of the Sustainability Compact model in bringing HR&D change deserves to be evaluated, with a view to considering the possibility of using a similar model within Bangladesh (e.g. outside the garment industry; as an instrument of human rights mainstreaming) or in the cooperation with other countries.

(8) *Invest in a distinct EP HR&D Approach for the Chittagong Hill Tracts.*

Given the EP's prioritisation of the rights vulnerable or exposed groups, a sustained investment in human rights and democratisation efforts in the CHT area is highly relevant.

The CHT HR&D approach will however need to respond to the specific characteristics of the CHT situation. A distinct HR&D approach to the CHT situation is necessary, because the post-conflict institutional set-up remains incomplete and is deeply contested. The central government and the tribal population remain at odds on what constitutes a legitimate system of governance. The HR&D in the region have put UNDP's preferred non-political technical assistance approach under great stress.

EPs should ensure that UNDP adopts a robust HR&D transitional justice approach in its on-going and future efforts. There may be opportunities for a collaborative effort through engaging all stakeholders, including government authorities, law enforcement agencies, civil society, media and communities at large.

7. Detailed facts and findings on climate change and disaster management

7.1 Overall context of sector

Bangladesh is extremely vulnerable to natural disasters including floods, droughts and cyclones. Over 219 natural disasters took place in 1980-2008, causing over US\$16 billion in total damage, and an estimated 10 million Bangladeshis are affected annually by natural disasters¹³⁶. There are multiple causes for this vulnerability, the main ones including:

- Its monsoon climate and geographical position at the bottom of the Bay of Bengal;
- A predominantly flat topography in the low-lying Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna delta;
- A very high and growing population density; and
- A mainly rural population, which depends on agriculture and natural resources for their livelihoods.


Bangladesh has substantially improved its capacity to manage such natural disasters and reduced the associated loss of lives and human and economic costs. Major improvements in early warning systems and the establishment of cyclone shelters have in particular contributed to these improvements. GoB has a long history of experience with disaster management (DM). In recent years, Bangladesh has adopted a more holistic approach to DM and risk reduction, an “*all hazards, all risks and all sectors*” approach. UNDP views Bangladesh as “*a global leader in its institutional framework for disaster risk reduction and sustainable development, with a number of core government policies and programmes incorporating risk reduction from their earliest stages*”¹³⁷. GoB spends 6% to 7% of its annual combined development and non-development budgets on climate sensitive activities. This is equivalent to 1.1% of the GDP and corresponds to about US\$1 billion annually (source: BCCRF Mid Term Review, 2014).

However, significant institutional constraints are affecting the sector’s performance, including: insufficient coordination among key stakeholders at all levels, financial constraints, capacity constraints and insufficient awareness, and corruption. Moreover, global climate change threatens to undermine the gains made in disaster risk reduction. The impacts of climate change are already felt, with an increased frequency and magnitude of extreme climatic events and changes in the rainfall patterns. The predicted sea level rise will further exacerbate the risk of floods, saltwater intrusion, pollution of water sources, and

¹³⁶ Bangladesh Awami League, *Disaster Management – Institution, Policies and Legal Framework*, 2014, para. 2, <https://www.albd.org/index.php/en/resources/special-reports/1387-disaster-management-institution-policies-and-legal-framework>, 17 July 2014

¹³⁷ Bangladesh Awami League, *Disaster Management – Institution, Policies And Legal Framework*, 2014, para. 34, <https://www.albd.org/index.php/en/resources/special-reports/1387-disaster-management-institution-policies-and-legal-framework>, 17 July 2014

loss of productive land. These trends and issues are predicted to increase significantly in the coming decades.



Source: Dwijen Mallick, Ashrafal Amin and Atiq Rahman Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS), *Case Study on Climate Compatible Development (CCD) in Agriculture for Food Security in Bangladesh*, 2012

7.1.1 National strategies and policies

Overall, the policy environment has been supportive of climate change adaptation (CCA) and DM and has during the period under evaluation undergone transformation with an increasing emphasis on proactive risk reduction and action across sectors. The table below provides a brief overview of the key policies, with the most important at top.

Table 1 - Main CC and disaster policies

| Policy | CC/disaster contents |
|--|---|
| CC policies: | |
| Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP – 2008, revised in 2009) | Calls for climate related activities under six pillars, with the purpose of developing Bangladesh’s capacity to adapt to the impacts of climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions |
| National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA – 2005, updated in 2009) | Identifies priority programmes to enhance the adaptive capacity of Bangladesh |
| Climate Change Trust Fund Policy (2010) | Guides the priorities and establish the overall modalities for BCCTF (Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund) |
| Climate Change Trust Fund Act (2010) | |
| Disaster policies: | |
| Draft Disaster Management Policy (2008) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The DM Vision of GoB to reduce the risk of people ▪ Promotes a paradigm shift from response to risk reduction |
| 2010-2015 National Plan for Disaster Management | Aims at reducing the risk and vulnerability to disaster and to put in place an effective emergency response system. Sets out 3 strategies: integrated DM-DRR, community involvement, non-structural mitigation mechanisms Replaces 2008-2015 National Plan for Disaster Management (2008) |
| Standing Orders on Disaster (SOD – 2010) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Specify DM duties and responsibilities at all levels and guides GoB and civil society. ▪ Require that all ministries/depts./ agencies mainstream DRR into their plans |
| Disaster Management Act (DMA) (2012) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Places obligations and responsibilities on ministries and committees ▪ Ensures transparency and accountability in the DM system. ▪ Sets up the Department for Disaster Management (DDM) |
| Cyclone Shelter Construction, Maintenance and Management Policy (2011) | Aims at ensuring proper use of the multi-purpose cyclone shelters |
| Development and sector policies: | |
| Vision 2021 (2010) | Long-term development vision for Bangladesh vis-à-vis poverty eradication. Political manifesto of the Bangladesh Awami League during 2008 elections. 2021 marks the 5 th anniversary of Bangladesh’s independence with economic and political freedom. |
| Sixth Five Year Plan 2012-2016 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Considers CC and DM with a view to promote sustainable development. ▪ Climate change mitigation and adaptation are key objectives, focusing on implementing BCCSAP ▪ Emphasises the need to carry forward the National Disaster Management Plan using an ‘all hazards, all risks and all sectors’ approach. |

| | |
|---|---|
| 2011-2015 PRSP | Promotes comprehensive DM and risk reduction |
| National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction II – NSAPR II 2009-2011 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Recognises recurrent natural disasters as a major vulnerability. ▪ Strategic block IV includes DM and social safety nets. ▪ Supporting strategy 4 is <i>caring for environment and tackling climate change.</i> |
| Perspective Plan | Plan for achieving Vision 2021 goals. |
| National Sustainable Development Strategy (2013) | <p>Strategy to ensure that development processes are carried out in a more sustainable manner in order to address the alarming environmental challenges</p> <p>The concept of sustainable development appeared in the UNCED under Agenda 21</p> |
| Agricultural Master Plan | Aims at developing agriculture in coastal zones to provide the poor with sustainable food security, better livelihood and reduced poverty |
| Planning Commission’s compliance procedures (Development Project Proforma) | Project development procedures, formats, and requirements to be followed by development planners |

7.1.2 Institutional context

The institutional landscape in Bangladesh related to climate change and DM is complex with numerous actors reflecting the country’s geographic location, the significant influence of weather related disasters, and the high level of vulnerability to climate change. The government’s institutional set up was revised during the period under evaluation and DM has been given increased prominence, e.g. with the upgrading of the Bureau of Disaster Management and Relief to the Disaster Management and Relief Division (DMRD) in 2009 and later to the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR)¹³⁸. The table below provides an overview of the key institutions and stakeholders/actors engaged in climate change and DM in Bangladesh.


¹³⁸ Bangladesh Awami League: “Disaster Management – Institution, Policies And Legal Framework”, 2014, para. 26, <https://www.albd.org/index.php/en/resources/special-reports/1387-disaster-management-institution-policies-and-legal-framework>, 17 July 2014

Table 2 - Main CC and disaster institutions

| Institution | CC/disaster mandate/role |
|--|---|
| Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF), incl: | Coordinating Ministry for CC |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ BCCRF Secretariat, Climate Change Unit | <p>Intended to assume coordinating role for BCCRF</p> <p>The BCCRF Secretariat has been disbanded</p> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Department of Environment (DoE) | Aims at controlling environmental problem by implementing projects, laws and proper education. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bangladesh Forest Department (BFD) | <p>Responsible for the management and protection of coastal forests and mangroves</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinating Dept for SEALS • Implementing Climate-Resilient Participatory Afforestation and Reforestation Project (BCCRF funded) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF) | <p>Finances climate change projects.</p> <p>Worth 385M\$ (GoB's own funds)</p> |
| Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR), incl.: | Coordinating Ministry for DM and DRR |
| | Previously the Bureau of Disaster Management and Relief (pre-2009), then the Disaster Management and Relief Division (DMRD) under the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MoFDM) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Department of Disaster Management (DDM) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DDM has the mandate to implement the objectives of DMA 2012 ▪ Coordinating dept for DM and DRR, set up in 2012 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Previously the Directorate of Relief and Rehabilitation (DoRR) and Disaster Management Bureau (DMB) ▪ Coordinating dept for CDMP ▪ Implements modern Food Storage Project, implementation progress (BCCRF) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cyclone Preparedness Programme (CPP) | Community preparedness programmes to mitigate the effects of cyclones in the cyclone prone areas. |
| Ministry of Agriculture, incl.: | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Department of Agriculture Extension (DAE) | <p>Responsible for advising farmers on CCA and DRR in farming practises and crop selection</p> <p>Implements Supporting Agriculture Adaptation to Climate Change project (BCCRF)</p> |
| Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development & Cooperations, incl.: | Oversees local governments |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) | Responsible for construction of disaster protection infrastructure (e.g. shelters, flood protection) and for climate proofing infrastructure |

| | |
|--|--|
| National Disaster Management Council (NDMC) | Formulated and reviews DM policies and issues directives Headed by Prime Minister |
| National Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction (NPDRR) | Coordination platform on DRR comprising GoB departments, institutes, and research organisations NGOs Hosted at DMRD |
| District Disaster Management Committees | Coordinate DM activities at district level |
| Upazilla Disaster Management Committees | Coordinate DM activities at upazilla level |
| Union Disaster Management Committees | Coordinate and implement DM activities at union level |
| Pourashava (municipality) Disaster Management Committees | Coordinate and implement DM activities at municipality level |
| City Corporation Disaster Management Committees | Coordinate and implement DM activities at city level |
| Volunteers | Community volunteers engaging in emergency assistance |
| NGOs (national and international) | Provide humanitarian assistance and implement CC and DRR projects at the local levels Involved in community-level implementation of CDMP and SEALS |
| Private Sector | Contractors for the construction of infrastructure, incl shelters etc. |
| Infrastructure Development Company Limited (IDCOL) | Parastatal – responsible for energy infrastructure Implements Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Development Project II, (Solar Irrigation Project) (BCCRF) |
| Academia/universities | Conduct research Provide CC and DM/DRR related education and training |
| DPs: | |
| ▪ EU | Funds BCCRF, CDMP, SEALS |
| ▪ Sida | Funds BCCRF, CDMP |
| ▪ Danida | Funds BCCRF |
| ▪ WB | Administers BCCRD, SEALS |
| ▪ UNDP | Administers CDMP |
| ▪ DfID/British Embassy | ▪ Funds BCCRF, CDMP ▪ Chairs CC and environment LCG |
| ▪ UNCRO | Chairs DER LCG |
| ▪ SDC/Swiss Embassy | |
| ▪ Norad/Norwegian Embassy | |
| ▪ AusAID/Australian Embassy | |
| ▪ UNFPA | |
| ▪ UNICEF | |
| CC& Environment LCG | Dialogue/coordination platform for GoB and DPs on CC |
| DER LCG | Dialogue/coordination platform for GoB and DPs on DM |

Figure 1 - Institutional setup for disaster management



Source

Source: UNDP, *Impact Assessment of Comprehensive Disaster Management Program (CDMP)*, 2013

7.2 Strategies of relevant EPs in the sector

The EU had environment and disaster preparedness as a non-focal sector in its 2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper, which was intended to be supported through targeted support to natural disasters preparedness (with awareness, technology supply and capacity building elements). Moreover, the strategy called for mainstreaming of environment and CCA in sector programmes (education – using education to create awareness about CCA, trade, governance, and health), with a focus in the 2011 NIP on tools such as EIAs (environmental impact assessment) and SEA (strategic environmental assessment – for the food security and nutrition sector) to avoid unintended negative impacts. The main goal was to make the country less susceptible to the impacts of natural hazards and prevent disasters. The 2010 Mid-term review confirmed the adequateness of the response strategy for the environment and disaster preparedness sector (provided that other sources of EU funding, such as ECHO, DIPECHO, the Instrument for Stability, thematic initiatives (such as the Global Climate Change Alliance — GCCA were added) but added the policy dialogue on Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction in the framework of the Green Diplomacy Network/Initiative (established in 2003 by the EU and managed since 2012 by the EEAS).

In the MIP for 2014-2020, the focus has changed – the focus on environment, climate change and disaster is in the new MIP entirely on mainstreaming across sectors, especially in the food and nutrition security sector where one expected result is “*vulnerability to shocks*”

and stresses reduced including expected impacts from climate change”, but there is no longer a separate non-focal sector for climate change and DM.

Sweden’s strategy considers mainstreaming of CCA into sector programmes (primary education and health), as well as targeted support to adaptation, disaster preparedness support (mainly through CSOs’ awareness and preparedness in order to increase their advocacy role) and policy dialogue with the Government and CSOs. The main measures are the Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) Phase 1 (2004-2009) and 2 (2010-2014); and contribution to the Bangladesh Climate Change Multi Donor Trust Fund (BCC MDTF – now BCCRF) for 2010-2012 within the framework of the Swedish Climate Change Initiative. The Climate Change Initiative (CCI) taken by the Swedish government in December 2008 for the period 2009-2011 complements the strategy for Bangladesh. It aims to support long-term projects and programmes for adaptation to climate changes in the poorest countries.

The 2014-2020 results strategy has “*a better environment, limited climate impact and greater resilience to environmental impact, climate change and natural disasters*” as one of its four sub-objectives.

Denmark’s programming focused on climate change as a crosscutting issue and calls for climate change mainstreaming into sector programmes, mainly within the Agricultural Sector Programme. The 2005-2009 Strategy had a geographical focus on selected districts in the coastal belt of Southern Bangladesh – these districts are affected by floods and cyclones – but the strategy did not mention climate change explicitly. In 2008/9 a CCA screening and management planning has been carried out in for ASPSP (agriculture sector support) and WSSPSII (WASH sector support) to: a) develop a methodology and tools for climate change screenings of activities; b) demonstrate and test the proposed methodology on selected projects; and c) prepare climate management plans and draft proposals for pilot projects¹³⁹. More recently, dialogue and collaboration on global issues like climate change became one of Denmark’s four overall objectives in the country. The main objective according to the 2013-2017 Bangladesh Partnership Policy is to have a more internationally assertive Bangladesh (that) would enable increased cooperation on global issues including climate change, particularly in the United Nations and other multilateral fora. The policy calls for the development of a new green growth programme, expected to commence in 2016 and which will include climate change as a focal area. A new country programme for 2016-2021 is currently (as of May 2015) under development. Climate Resilience and Sustainable Energy is one of the three intended thematic programmes with three development engagements: a) Climate Resilient Rural Infrastructure Project (CRRIP), b) Strengthen Community Resilience to Climate and Environmental Change in Chittagong Hill Tracts, and c) Climate Resilience through Strengthened LGIs. Moreover, it is intended under the Governance and Rights thematic programme to support local level CCA and DM under the “*Sustainable Democratic Union Parishad Project*” development engagement. CCA will also be mainstreamed in the Inclusive Agricultural Growth thematic programme.

Within the framework of the **EU+ joint programming** (EU, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland), EU has been identified as coordinator for resilience priority sector, and co-coordinator (with Germany and France)

¹³⁹ Danida, *Joint Technical Review, Agricultural Sector Support, Phase II*, 2010, pg 10-11

for environment. The draft EU+ Joint Programming Interim document (2014) identifies that building resilience requires going beyond the traditional disaster risk reduction approach and that complementarities and synergies across relevant sectors (governance, social protection, livelihoods, education, CCA) must be sought out. The document refers to climate change in relation to a number of sectors (water, urban development, environment and resilience – and the energy sector focuses on renewable energy).

7.3 EPs portfolio of projects

The table below provides an overview of EP actions which either have climate change and/or DM as their primary objective or as a significant element. The three major programmes are BCCRF, CDMP and SEALS, which are all supported by the EU. Two of them are supported by Sida (BCCRF, CDMP), and Danida is supporting BCCRF. These two programmes are also supported by other donors, DfID being the largest. SEALS has solely been funded by the EU. In addition to the main actions, the EPs have been individually funding smaller projects, especially the EU, which has supported a range of projects, whereas Sida and Danida have only funded a few each. The UNDP-UNEP Poverty, Environment and Climate Mainstreaming (PECM) has been funded by all three EPs (although Danida support ended in 2012), but through funding provided for the global UNDP-UNEP Poverty-Environment Initiative (PEI) by their HQs; the Delegation and Embassies are not involved in PECM.

Table 3 - EPs' climate change and disaster actions

| Action | EU | Sida | Danida |
|---|----|------|--------|
| BCCRF (Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund) Disbursed budget: 29.5M€ - EU: 14.3M€/Sida 130MSEK (13.9M€)/Danida 10MDKK (1.3M€) | X | X | X |
| CDMP (Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme) Disbursed budget: 16.9M€ - EU: 11.5M€/Sida 50MSEK (5.4M€) | X | X | |
| SEALS (Sundarbans Environmental And Livelihoods Security) Disbursed budget: EU: 23M€ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sundarbans Development & Alternative Resources Integration (SUNDARI) (Concern Worldwide) • CBAS (World Vision) | X | | |
| Climate Change Adaptation Pilot Project (CCAPP) | | | X |
| UNICEF Post Cyclone Response/Cyclone Assistance | | X | |
| Stakeholder Analysis Resilience Strategic Fund | | X | |
| Improved food and livelihood security in Bagerhat District, Bangladesh in the context of increased disaster risk and climate change (Jagrata Juba Shangha/Catholic Agency for Overseas Development Trust) | X | | |
| Increasing Resilience and Reducing Risk of Coastal Communities to Climate Change and Natural Hazards in the Bay of Bengal (Paribartan) (Concern Worldwide) ¹⁴⁰ | X | | |
| Strengthening the role of Non State Actors on Climate Change | X | | |

¹⁴⁰ Implemented in Bangladesh and India

| | | | |
|---|---|---|------------------|
| policy formulation in South Asia and enhancing their capacities to influence global climate change negotiations (Oxfam GB) | | | |
| Comprehensive Option, Managing Measures and Actions against Natural Disaster (COMMAND) | X | | |
| Ensuring Water & Sanitation Facilities towards Disaster Risk Reduction (Concern) | X | | |
| Early Childhood Care and Development in Disaster Prone Areas | X | | |
| Programme of Support for the rehabilitation of livelihoods devastated by cyclone SIDR in Bangladesh | X | | |
| Support for the restoration of socio-economic stability and strengthening of community resilience in areas affected by cyclone AILA in Bangladesh | X | | |
| Initiative to Enhance Monga Coping Capacity (Oxfam GB) | X | | |
| Alleviating poverty through disaster risk reduction in North West Bangladesh (DanChurchAid) | X | | |
| Employment of LAs and NSAs in Responding to Economic Development Opportunities and Climate Change and Disaster Vulnerabilities (CARE Austria) | X | | |
| UNDP-UNEP Poverty-Environment Initiative (PEI): Poverty, Environment and Climate Mainstreaming (PECM) ¹⁴¹ | X | X | X ¹⁴² |
| Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Programme (CCAMP) ¹⁴³ | | | X |

In addition to the above, a number of other actions cover climate change and/or disaster preparedness as part of their activities (mainstreaming), among the most prominent examples are some of the programmes and projects under Danida's support for the agriculture sector (see JC 7.1, below for more details on the mainstreaming of climate change and disaster risk reduction).

7.4 Facts and findings per Judgement Criteria

JC7.1 Contribution of EP's support to ensuring that CC and disaster concerns are addressed in policies and interventions across sectors

| JC7.1: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|--|---------------------|
| EPs' support contributed to an understanding of preventive DRR and CCA as a crosscutting issue, mainly at national level, but also at community level and to some extent local GoB level – but still a tendency to focus on structural (as opposed to non-structural) measures. | Programme Reviews, ROM reports, interviews, field visits (on-site observations, focus group discussions, interviews) | Strong |

¹⁴¹ Support provided by EPs directly from HQ without Delegation/Embassy involvement

¹⁴² Danida support was discontinued after 2012

¹⁴³ Programme document from April 2014, so falls outside the period under evaluation

| | | |
|---|--|------------------------|
| EPs' support (esp. for CDMP) significantly influenced GoB's DRR/CCA policy framework and national development planning, and some sectors plans. There is now a conducive policy framework for CCA and DRR, including addressing non-structural issues. | Reviews, ROM reports, interviews | Strong |
| DRR and CCA policy implementation has remained a challenge due to capacity constraints and sectoral mandates of line ministries. MoEF and MoDMR did not have sufficient capacity and power to convene ministries across sectors. | Reviews, interviews with different stakeholders | More than satisfactory |
| EPs' country strategies view CCA and DRR as crosscutting issues to be mainstreamed in the support across sectors. But actual mainstreaming has mainly taken place in Danida's agriculture sector support and EU support for SEALS; mainstreaming was limited in other sectors. CDMP (and PECM) promoted mainstreaming in national systems. | EPs strategy documents, reviews, ROM reports, progress reports, design documents, interviews | Strong |
| More emphasis is given to mainstreaming by the EP's in their next programming (as of 2014). EU is moving away from specific support for CC and DRR and focuses on integration in other sectors. Danida has moved in the opposite direction, and CC is now a specific focal area. Sida focuses on mainstreaming in the health and education support. | EPs strategy documents, interviews with EPs | More than satisfactory |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of awareness by key stakeholders (including target groups, national/regional/local authorities, economic actors and other Non State Actors) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CC and DM/DRR programme documentation provide some evidence on awareness changes. Fields visits provide evidence for the visited locations. Interviews with EPs, GoB representatives in Dhaka, multilateral agencies and other resource persons uniformly confirm the impression of the evaluation team. <p>Data partly available</p> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence that the EPs interventions have triggered processes whereby the socio-economic importance and development perspective of climate change is better understood and reflected in policies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Available documentation does only to some extent capture information relevant to this indicator – with the exception of the CDMP MTR (policy influence not focus of BBRC and SEALS) Interviews with EPs and multilateral agencies has provided further information on the influence on policies <p>Data partly available</p> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measures taken by EP funded interventions to strengthen the mainstreaming of CC adaptation and | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Available documentation does only to a limited extent capture information relevant to this indicator, suggesting this was not the focus of |

| | |
|---|---|
| <p>disaster risk reduction into national and sub-national development and sector planning and implementation</p> | <p>most programmes – CDMP MTR DfID annual review and other CDMP reports are the main written sources of information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interviews with EPs, Government, UNDP project staff and beneficiaries, and UNDP consultants provided information on the state of mainstreaming in the national system and the role of different donors and programmes <p>Data fully available</p> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence that EP strategies and interventions for the Private sector development (agriculture), governance and education sectors address CC and disaster concerns | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EP strategies on mainstreaming clear, but the evidence on the implementation in practice is more scattered (indicating limited mainstreaming). Some review and progress reports from non CC&DM sector, especially for Danida’s agriculture sector actions provide information on mainstreaming. ▪ Interviews with EPs, multilateral agencies and project implementers provided information. <p>Data partly available</p> |

I-711) Evidence of awareness by key stakeholders, including target groups, national/regional/local authorities, economic actors and other non-state actors

Bangladesh has made significant progress in terms of reducing the casualties from natural disasters. However, climate change poses an emerging challenge, since it is leading to increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, which coupled with population growth and increasing pressure on land and water resources will lead to increased vulnerability for many communities, unless adaptation and risk reduction measures are put in place. Moreover, there has been, and continues to be, a tendency among stakeholders to focus on a) disaster response rather than preventive measures/disaster risk reduction (DRR), and b) structural measures (infrastructure, such as embankments and shelters) rather than non-structural measures (such as changing agricultural practices)¹⁴⁴. Addressing these remaining gaps requires that the awareness of the value of preventive and non-structural measure are widely understood at the local level, and that other sectors integrate CCA and disaster resilience concern in their planning and implementation. Numerous stakeholders as well as the MTR of CDMP report that while there in the central government generally has a good understanding of DRR, the awareness at the local level (upazillas, unions and communities) is more uneven and often low; the field visit gave the evaluation team the same impression of a mixed level of awareness, depending on location.

144 Sources:

- European Union, Monitoring Report. *MR-139241.01. Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) 2010-2014*, 31/03/2011, pg 3
- Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etü, *Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review*, 2012, pg 7

The CDMP Mid-term Review found that CDMP had increased awareness, with CDMP directing its efforts (i.e. training/capacity building, networking activities, knowledge products, policy advocacy) towards changing people's mindset from a response to a relief focus with comprehensive approach to reduce disaster risk and build resilience. At the national level a shift has taken place with the establishment of the Disaster Management and Relief Division (DMRD), revision of the Standing Orders on Disaster (SOD), and the development of the National Plan for Disaster Management 2010-2015, in which CDMP played a key role. At the local level (districts, upazillas and unions), the DRR awareness is now higher, but implementation is still response-oriented and adoption of DDR and CCA principles remains limited¹⁴⁵, and at this level even CDMP interventions had a tendency of investing in infrastructure rather than non-structural DRR, e.g. LDRRF funds were generally not invested in non-structural DRR¹⁴⁶, although CDMP supported the Department of Agricultural Extension in developing and implementing climate field schools for farmers and in training extension officers on climate change and DRR¹⁴⁷. Nonetheless, the DfID 2014 Annual Review found that the vast majority of Union Disaster Management Committees in CDMP areas identified mitigation activities as a priority to address disaster risk, and while almost 50% emphasised structural protection, almost 40% gave importance to awareness raising, which is evidence that CDMP contributed to raising local level awareness¹⁴⁸. However, the MTR found that "CDMP's intent of creating a paradigm shift from disaster response to risk reduction has been more effective at national level than at local level where government apparatus still remain entrenched in a relief-mindset"¹⁴⁹.

Another important result of CDMP leading to increased awareness, is the substantial influence on the education system from primary to tertiary level. As a result, DRR and CCA has been mainstreamed into the training and education curricula of 43 education institutions (primary, secondary and tertiary); 5 tertiary education institutions have commenced on DM education programmes, 2 universities offer undergraduate course in DM and there is a 2-year Masters degree course for working professionals. Moreover, 18 universities have DM modules in their Master's programmes. The Ministry of Education incorporated DM and climate change issues in 39 textbooks at primary level. A compulsory DRR/DM module is now included in GoB civil service training for all civil servants.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ Sources: Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review, 2012, pg 34 ; MN 306, MN 316

¹⁴⁶ MN 309, MN 317

¹⁴⁷ MN 315

¹⁴⁸ Department for International Development, Annual review, Jolobayoo o Jibon (Climate Change Programme, Bangladesh), 2014, pg 7

¹⁴⁹ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review, 2012, pg 7

¹⁵⁰ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review, 2012, pg 23

The SEALS MTR found that the NGOs supported by SEALS had significantly enhanced disaster awareness at the local and community levels¹⁵¹. One of the SEALS strategies was to establish Ward Disaster Management Committees (WDMC), whereas the lowest level of Disaster Management Committees elsewhere in Bangladesh is Union Disaster Management Committees (UDMC); the rationale being that the communities in the Sundarbans Impact Zone are particularly vulnerable to cyclones and that WDMCs could help raising local awareness and contribute to disaster response actions. However, SEALS did not engage at the ward level in all the unions covered, but instead worked with UDMCs, e.g. by conducting orientation meetings with UDMCs; this approach seems reasonable and cost-conscious since the WDMC chairpersons are also UDMC members and WDMCs follow the guidance given by UDMCs. One UDMC reported that SEALS had inspired them to invest a small amount of the Union's own budget in disaster preparedness, which they did not do before¹⁵². However, the field visit revealed that the awareness had not been raised uniformly by SEALS; the awareness of community members was much higher in the locations visited in Sundarbans West than in Sundarbans East. This difference seems at least in part to be explained by the fact that the districts in Sundarbans West were more vulnerable and had been impacted far more severely by cyclone Aila than those in Sundarbans East; indeed, WDMC members met in Sundarbans East indicated that disaster was not a priority issue in their ward¹⁵³.

Similar to SEALS, the BCCRF funded Climate Resilient Participatory Afforestation and Reforestation Project reports that it made most of the inhabitants of Piniyerkul (Cox's Bazar) aware of the role of forest conservation in CCA¹⁵⁴. However, communities in the Cox's Bazar area visited by this evaluation team did not demonstrate a good understanding of climate change and adaptation¹⁵⁵, so the project has not consistently been implemented in a manner that created awareness about the impacts of climate change and CCA options.

As part of the mainstreaming of climate change in Danida's support for the agricultural sector, climate change awareness modules were tested under the farmer field schools¹⁵⁶.

To summarise, awareness has been quite high at the national level about disaster and climate change resilience as a crosscutting issue, which needs to be addressed with structural and non-structural preventive actions, rather than only response. EPs' support through CDMP has played an instrumental role in these. EPs' support through CDMP, SEALS and a lesser extent BCCRF has also enhanced the local level awareness of this in specific areas, but the local level awareness remains more uneven. CDMP support has also ensured that DRR is included in education at all levels, which will greatly contribute to

¹⁵¹ Floris Deodatus, Gautam Shuvra Biswas, M.A. Sekendar, Sundarbans Environmental And Livelihoods Security (SEALS) Project DCI-ASIE/2009/20133, Mid-Term Review, 2013, pg 34

¹⁵² MN 311

¹⁵³ MN 312

¹⁵⁴ Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF), Ministry of Environment and Forests, *Annual Report 2013*, 2013, pg 58-59

¹⁵⁵ MN 313

¹⁵⁶ Danida, Joint Technical Review, Agricultural Sector Support, Phase II, 2010, pg 11

maintaining and increasing the awareness in the future, thereby also ensuring the sustainability of the results achieved.

I-712) Evidence that the EPs interventions have triggered processes whereby the socio-economic importance and development perspective of climate change is better understood and reflected in policies

Overall, the stakeholders consulted¹⁵⁷ and several sources agreed that Bangladesh's policy framework for climate change and DRR is conducive. It is also acknowledged that CDMP has made an important contribution to this; as stated in the 2013 ROM report: *DRR/CCA is mainstreamed in key policies and in Planning Commission project compliance procedures*¹⁵⁸. Indeed, CDMP delivered several policy results promoting DRR: a) Revised Standing Orders on Disaster (SOD) which now give strong emphasis to DRR; b) National Plan for Disaster Management (2010-2015), outlining planned activities of DMRD (MoDRM); c) draft Disaster Management Policy, Disaster Management Act endorsed and its technical guidelines verified; d) Cyclone shelter guidelines developed; e) assistance to DMRD to compile a draft SAARC Plan of Action for Disaster Management (2011-2015).¹⁵⁹

None of the BCCRF funded projects engaged in policy formulation. BCCRF was established to support the implementation of the BCCSAP (Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan) but BCCRF did provide a platform for EPs to discuss and influence climate financing related policy issues (see JC72). Moreover, BCCRF funded studies generated policy-relevant information (see JC73). SEALS did not engage in policy processes.

EU also funded an action to support civil society advocacy on climate change, namely the: *Strengthening the role of Non State Actors on Climate Change policy formulation in South Asia and enhancing their capacities to influence global climate change negotiations* (Oxfam GB, 0.53 mill €), but the extent to which this enabled NGOs to influence policies is not known by the evaluation team. Moreover, the EU funded Improving Democracy through Parliamentary Development (IPD) Project prepared policy research briefs on the effectiveness of cyclone shelter to inform Parliamentary Committees, but the extent to which this lead to any policy results is not known by the evaluation team.¹⁶⁰

To summarise, EP's support through CDMP has been instrumental in ensuring that a conducive policy framework is in place for DRR and CCA, but the influence on policies in relation to DRR has been more comprehensive than in relation to CCA, although the two topics are closely related.

¹⁵⁷ MN 301, MN 302, MN 304, MN 306, MN 309, MN 310, MN 317

¹⁵⁸ European Union, Monitoring Report. MR-139241.01. Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) 2010-2014, 31/03/2013, pg 2

¹⁵⁹ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review, 2012, pg 21

¹⁶⁰ Professor Robert Nakamura, Carl DeFaria, *Final Evaluation, Improving Democracy through Parliamentary Development (IPD) Project*, 2014, pg 58

I-713) Measures taken by EP funded interventions to strengthen the mainstreaming of CC adaptation and disaster risk reduction into national and sub-national development and sector planning and implementation

CDMP was the only climate change and DM specific action under the EP's country programmes, which aimed at influencing government planning processes across sectors. The evaluation team did not identify any EP sector support, which aimed at including climate change or DRR in the respective sector planning processes. Like CDMP, the PECM project (funded by EU and Sida, and previously also Danida) also aimed at influencing policy and planning processes in relation to climate change; but PECM was part of the global UNDP-UNEP Poverty-Environment Initiative and thus not part of the EP's country strategies for Bangladesh (although CDMP helped with its establishment)¹⁶¹. PECM works with the Ministry of Planning, which among other things helped with appraising projects with a DRR lens and prepared guidelines for the Development Project Proforma procedures, which will be enacted in the near future¹⁶².

DRR and CCA was incorporated in a number of key plans and procedures, such as: the 6th Five Year Plan, the Perspective Plan, the National Sustainable Development Strategy, the Agricultural Master Plan, and also the Planning Commission's Development Project Proforma procedures¹⁶³. Four ministries have Disaster Risk Reduction Action Plan, including the Ministry of Women's Affairs¹⁶⁴. As described under I-712 and I-713 above, CDMP played an instrumental role in this mainstreaming of DRR and CCA in the plans and procedures.

However, while stakeholders broadly agree that policies and plans generally have been conducive for the integration of climate change and DRR across sectors; the main challenge has been to ensure their implementation. Capacity constraints (especially at the local level) remain a limiting factor, but another challenge has been sectoral mandates as well as resource allocations, which have not been conducive for engaging in crosscutting approaches (especially at the central level). MoDMR has the responsibility for coordinating DRR, but due to capacity constraints and as a new ministry it has been difficult for it to convene other ministries.¹⁶⁵ Similarly, it has been difficult for MoEF to convene other, more powerful, ministries¹⁶⁶.

CDMP has addressed the capacity constraint issues by providing capacity development support for line ministries, for example, staff from the Ministry of Women's Affairs were

¹⁶¹ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review, 2012, pg 22

¹⁶² MN 302

¹⁶³ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review, 2012, pg 21 and 35

¹⁶⁴ Sources: A Value for Money Report for CDMP II, 2015, pg 8 ; Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review, 2012, pg 21 and 35

¹⁶⁵ MN 302, MN 304, MN 306, MN 317

¹⁶⁶ MN 305

trained on DRR and CCA¹⁶⁷. Moreover, extension officers from the Department of Agricultural Extension were trained on disaster and climate risk management in agriculture under the DCRMAS (disaster and climate risk management in agriculture) project funded by CDMP¹⁶⁸. By 2013, 61 government officials from different ministries and agencies were better prepared for planning and implementation of climate change initiatives¹⁶⁹. At the local level, SEALS contributed by training local government staff on climate change and DRR in its target upazillas/unions.

CDMP stakeholders also report that the programme was successful in changing the mindsets of civil servants, so a number of (but not all) ministries and departments are now committed to addressing DRR (such as the Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Agriculture and its Department of Agricultural Extension, the Ministry of Women's Affairs, Ministry of Education, Department of Fisheries, Department of Livestock, the General of Health Services, the Geological Survey, the Meteorological Department), although they still need to enhance their capacity to build DRR into their programmes. Indeed, the Ministry of Planning/Planning Commission now reported to play a central role in the promotion of DRR¹⁷⁰. Moreover, the Ministry of Agriculture has now committed its own resources for the implementation of climate field schools, a concept developed with CDMP financing¹⁷¹.

To summarise, CDMP and PECM were the only EP funded actions, which influenced government planning processes in relation to DRR and CCA; this was not done through the EPs' support for various focal sectors. While CDMP support contributed to the conducive policy framework in place for mainstreaming, implementation remains a challenge, due to capacity constraints as well as issues related to sector mandates and funding allocations. CDMP addressed the capacity issue by providing capacity development for a range of government ministries and agencies, and SEALS contributed with capacity development for local government and stakeholders. CDMP successfully ensured that a number of ministries and departments became committed to mainstreaming DRR. It was beyond the reach of CDMP to address the issues related to sector mandates.

I-714 Evidence that EP strategies and interventions for the agriculture, governance and education sectors address CC and disaster concerns

As described in section 2 above, all three EPs' strategies for 2007-2013 considered climate change mainstreaming into interventions across sectors a priority. This intention was also reflected in the design/programme documents for a number of actions in the PSD/agriculture, governance and education sectors. Moreover, available progress reports and reviews/evaluations do sometimes, but not always, provide reference to the integration of climate change and DRR concerns, leaving an impression that while climate change and

¹⁶⁷ Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Annual Progress Report 2012*, 2012, pg 41-42

¹⁶⁸ MN 316

¹⁶⁹ Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, *Annual Progress Report 2013, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014)*, 2013, pg 29

¹⁷⁰ MN 306, MN 304

¹⁷¹ MN 317

DRR was indeed considered in a number of actions (mainly in the agriculture sector), mainstreaming was not always done in a consistent manner or as envisaged in the programme design; this impression was confirmed by stakeholders interviewed¹⁷². Concrete examples are provided in the following.

PSD/agriculture sector: Damage caused by cyclone Sidr, meant that the targets for Danida's agriculture sector support (ASPS II) were revised with the introduction of rehabilitation work, which in turn demonstrates the relevance of mainstreaming DRR into actions in the sector¹⁷³. The CCA screening and management planning was carried out in 2008/9 for all three ASPSII components led to the following recommendations: a) implement pilot projects to mainstream climate change into policies and plans and, b) link climate change research and the farmer field schools (FFS) and field/ponds trials. In response, climate change adaptation training and field trials were piloted in the FFSs and adaptive research on saline and drought tolerant crop varieties was carried out¹⁷⁴. Indeed, FFS was a main area where climate change and resilience was mainstreamed in ASPS II, with adaptive research trials as well as climate change and DRR to some extent being included in the FFS training curriculum, although the 2011 evaluation of the FFS approach recommended further strengthening the inclusion of climate change in FFS¹⁷⁵. More recently, the Integrated Farm Management Component (IFMC) climate change and DRR were covered with a session on risk and DM during fish cultivation¹⁷⁶ and with a 2-3 hour session on climate change under the module on farmer organization and social issues¹⁷⁷. The general view by IFMC stakeholders¹⁷⁸ and shared by the 2010 joint technical review¹⁷⁹ and the 2013 Agricultural Growth and Employment Programme (AGEP) inception review¹⁸⁰ was that CCA was implicitly addressed under the FFS approach, since it built farmers' resilience and capacity to adjust their farming system, although climate change and DM was only covered explicitly to a certain extent in the FFS curriculum. In fact, the coverage of crosscutting issues such as climate change had been reduced since the curriculum had been overly bulky and thus difficult for farmers to absorb, and it was now attempted to integrate these issues more in the main elements of the training¹⁸¹. Nonetheless, the 2013 AGEP inception review recommended that more attention be paid to include climate resilience in the FFS curriculum¹⁸².

¹⁷² MN 304, MN 309, MN 006

¹⁷³ Danida, *Joint Technical Review, Agricultural Sector Support, Phase II*, 2010, pg 32

¹⁷⁴ Danida, *Joint Technical Review, Agricultural Sector Support, Phase II*, 2010, pg 10-11

¹⁷⁵ Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, *Evaluation of the Farmer Field School approach in the ASPS II*, 2011, pg 16-17 and pg 36

¹⁷⁶ Department of Agricultural Extension, *Annual Progress Report, July 2013-June 2014, Integrated Farm Management Component (IFMC), Agricultural Growth and Employment Programme*, 2014, pg 38

¹⁷⁷ MN 315

¹⁷⁸ MN 314, MN 315, MN 318

¹⁷⁹ Danida, *Joint Technical Review, Agricultural Sector Support, Phase II*, 2010, pg 30

¹⁸⁰ Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, *Inception Review of the Agricultural Growth and Employment Programme, 2013 – 2018, (AGEP), Review Aide Memoire*, 2015, pg 4

¹⁸¹ MN 314

¹⁸² Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, *Inception Review of the Agricultural Growth and Employment Programme, 2013 – 2018, (AGEP), Review Aide Memoire*, 2015, pg 4

Under the CCAPP project, which was part of the support for the agriculture sector, Danida piloted various climate change adaptation actions, such as climate resilient rural infrastructure: e.g. rural roads which were raised to avoid submerging by floods and cyclone and thereby affecting e.g. access to cyclone shelters; and improved drainage to reduce the risk of waterlogging of fields; it also provided training to raise awareness and Union Parishad capacity to maintain climate proofed infrastructure. Community awareness and income generating activity training on CCA for the local poor and women, was also implemented¹⁸³. CCAPP will be continued and upscaled under CCAMP, which in addition will also engage in mitigation (renewable energy/biogas, and energy efficiency of industries¹⁸⁴. There have been concerns about the sustainability and working conditions for the poor women, all of which are addressed in EQ5.

The evaluation team did not find evidence that disaster risk and vulnerability issues had been addressed in relation to the EU support for the fisheries sector/shrimp production under the BEST programme, although aquaculture can be vulnerable to disasters (e.g. cyclones) and that saltwater shrimp production in certain areas (e.g. the Sundarbans Impact Zone) has increased the vulnerability of communities due to an increased risk of salt intrusion in freshwater resources¹⁸⁵.

However, a clear distinction between whether a) climate change and DRR was tackled as specific actions or b) CC and DRR was mainstreamed into other sector interventions is not easy to make. At the community-level climate and disaster resilience is intimately intertwined with livelihoods strategies, farming systems and the use of natural resources and other rural development aspects – and as such CCA and disaster resilience often to a large extent boils down to sound natural resource management, good farming practices and alternative income generation. A good example of this is the SEALS programme, which was labelled as natural resource management/environmental protection but which promoted a comprehensive livelihoods package to a) reduce pressure on the Sundarbans mangrove forest, b) reduce vulnerability/enhance resilience and c) increase incomes and reduce poverty. Another example is CCAPP, piloted under Danida's agriculture sector, but with a strong focus on climate change.

Governance sector: Available documentation indicates that climate change and DM was not mainstreamed in most actions in the governance sector. Nonetheless, a few examples of mainstreaming or intentions to mainstream were found:

- EU's and Danida's support for the UNDP implemented Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility (CSDDF) had climate change and DM as components of the support¹⁸⁶, but EU did not provide funding for the DM component. Under Danida's

¹⁸³ MN 318; Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies, *Evaluation of Climate Change Adaptation Pilot Project (CCAPP) Interventions: Noakhali, Lakshimpur, Patuakhali, & Barguna Districts*, 2014

¹⁸⁴ MN 318; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassy of Denmark Bangladesh, *Thematic Programme Document for Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Program (CCAMP) in Bangladesh*, 2014

¹⁸⁵ MN 311, MN 315, see also project fiche on BEST and the Sector analysis for EQ 5

¹⁸⁶ MN 302

support, women groups were mobilised to build climate resilient and DRR infrastructure (e.g. rural roads).

- The EU, Sida and Danida funded and UNDP implemented PERP project put in place a comprehensive disaster recovery system and management procedures to avoid the risks of losing the database and voter list to disaster¹⁸⁷.
- Danida and Sida funded and UNDP implemented Bangladesh National Human Rights Commission Capacity Development Project carried out a training workshop in climate change and DM in 2012 as part of the Universal Periodic Review process¹⁸⁸.
- The EU and Danida funded Decentralization Programme for Union Parishads and Upazila Parishads included activities on strengthening Standing Committees for Effective Governance, which also covered Social Welfare and Disaster Management Committees. However, the MTE (2014 pp. 67-68) found that the issues on environment and climate change have not yet been addressed under the two programmes¹⁸⁹. The MTE did not present any findings relating to the support to DM¹⁹⁰.

Education Sector: There is very little evidence of mainstreaming taking place in the education sector. The assessment of the budget support for the education sector showed that the design was climate sensitive; the 2011 Action Fiche for the EU funded Primary Education Development Programme III stated that *PEDP III will give special attention to education response to potential impact of climate change and other natural disasters*¹⁹¹. However, the evaluation team did not find any documentation on the extent to which this was reflected in the implementation, neither did interviews with sector stakeholders reflect that such mainstreaming had taken place, and the mainstreaming appears to have been limited. Under the Upazila Model of School Improvement Program of Khansama, Plan Bangladesh the NGO BRIF provided a broad range of trainings, including DRR, for para-teachers/SIP volunteers¹⁹².

According to the 2010 National Education Strategy, “Social environment and climate change” is a mandatory subject at primary level¹⁹³. The PEDP 3 result matrix includes a sub-component entitled: “Education in emergencies”, with two indicators, “number of

¹⁸⁷ UNDP, *Final Project Narrative Report 31 December 2010, Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs*, BGD/07/002, 2010, pg. 17-18, pg 31

¹⁸⁸ UNDP, *Bangladesh National Human Rights Commission Capacity Development Project, Progress Report*, 2013, pg. 17-18, pg 53

¹⁸⁹ Jens Peter Christensen, Salahuddin Aminuzzaman, Salma Akhter, Jesper Steffensen, Taiabur Rahman, K M Mahiuddin, Ekram Hossain, M. Firoz-Ul.Hassan, *Local Governance and Decentralization Programme for Union Parishad and Upazila Parishad, Union Parishad Governance Project (UPGP) & Upazila Governance Project (UZGP), Midterm Evaluation*, 2014, pg 67-68

¹⁹⁰ Jens Peter Christensen, Salahuddin Aminuzzaman, Salma Akhter, Jesper Steffensen, Taiabur Rahman, K M Mahiuddin, Ekram Hossain, M. Firoz-Ul.Hassan, *Local Governance and Decentralization Programme for Union Parishad and Upazila Parishad, Union Parishad Governance Project (UPGP) & Upazila Governance Project (UZGP), Midterm Evaluation*, 2014, pg 325

¹⁹¹ EU, *Action fiche no 1 for Bangladesh, Primary Education Development Programme III (PEDP III)*, DCI-ASIE/2011/022-542, 2011, pg 12

¹⁹² Kazi Saleh Ahmed, Goutam Roy, Romij Ahmed, Nazrul Islam Khan, Foundation for Research on Educational Planning and Development, *A Mid-term Evaluation of Upazila Model of School Improvement Program of Khansama Plan, Bangladesh*, 2013, pg 44

¹⁹³ DPE, *PEDP 3 Main Document and Annexes*, pg 66

upazilas from flood/cyclone prone areas whose stakeholders training in education in emergencies” and “percentage of schools closed due to an emergency that have been accommodated in temporary schools”. The document foresaw various activities such as the development of upazila plans for education in emergencies in disaster prone areas, the inclusion of modules on education in emergencies in training programmes for educators and administrators and block allocations for managing education in emergencies channelled through Upazila Primary Education Plans (UPEPs)¹⁹⁴. However, given that this sub-component was not selected as a Disbursement Linked Indicator, it was not subject to a close monitoring. The annual sector performance reports do not document any progress on this area and its related indicators.

Health sector: The evaluation team only came across one example of climate change and DRR considerations in health sector actions, the EU funded Early Childhood Care and Development in Disaster-Prone Areas, implemented by Plan Bangladesh. In the case of the EC support to health and nutrition of the poor in urban Bangladesh, the relevance of climate change for the health sector was not considered in the design, as can be seen from the following statement from the action fiche: *Climate change is not likely to affect project activities, except for the possible effects of floods and cyclones which may occur during the implementation period and would delay project activities and divert municipal resources from urban primary health care to relief and rehabilitation.* However, the evaluation team finds this statement insufficient and inaccurate, as climate change can affect health with increased spread of e.g. water-borne or mosquito transferred diseases. It can also affect nutrition and food security as it impacts on agricultural production¹⁹⁵.

New country programming: While mainstreaming in some sectors was limited in 2007-2013, EU and Sida have put significant emphasis on mainstreaming in their new country programming and Sida reports that good progress has been made on this, particularly in the health sector, where there are plans to support CCA, taking departure in a BCCRF study¹⁹⁶. EU will discontinue to have climate change and disaster as a separate non-focal sector, and instead address this through mainstreaming into its focal sectors, e.g. as a component under the support for the nutrition sector¹⁹⁷. Interestingly, Danida has moved in the opposite direction: in 2007-2013, climate change was addressed mainly under the support for the agriculture sector, but in the new programme climate change has become a specific focal sector, but this partly by relabelling previous interventions as being climate change programmes (e.g. rural roads was part of ASPs II but is now a separate climate change programme).

It should be noted that the EPs supported two UNDP initiatives (CDMP and PECM), which specifically focused on mainstreaming of DRR and CCA into GoB policy and planning processes across sectors. So far, there appears to have been no deliberate attempts to use these programmes to reinforce mainstreaming in EP support for other sectors,

¹⁹⁴ PEDP 3 Joint Financing Agreement, pg 19

¹⁹⁵ EU, *EC support to health and nutrition of the poor in urban Bangladesh*, CRIS number: DCI-ASIE/2013/022-536, Draft Action Fiche, 2013, pg 9

¹⁹⁶ MN 304

¹⁹⁷ MN 309

although there appears to be good scope for collaboration and synergies in this regard – CDMP could have provided methodologies and expertise of benefit to the EP sector support programmes, and the EP programmes could in return have provided entry points for CDMP to enhance its collaboration with sector ministries and agencies. For example, CDMP has ensured that DRR has been integrated into the education sector curricula and teaching, which could have been of benefit to Sida’s support for this sector – and both Danida’s agriculture programme and CDMP have engaged with the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE). In the case of the latter, there were some synergies, with CDMP introducing the Climate Field Schools (CFS), which provided approaches for DRR and CCA integration in the Farmer Field Schools promoted by Danida’s IFMC programme.

To summarise, CCA and DRR was to a certain extent mainstreamed into Danida’s support for the agriculture sector. Mainstreaming in EPs’ support for other sectors was limited, although a strategic objective of all three EPs. However, in the programming for the next programme phase the EPs are putting more emphasis on ensuring that mainstreaming takes place in programme implementation. EPs’ support for CDMP and PECM specifically focused on mainstreaming into GoB’s processes, but no attempts were made to explore potential collaboration and synergies between these and EP’s sector support programmes – an opportunity was lost in this regard.

JC7.2 Extent to which policy dialogue enabled EPs to engage in climate change in a relevant manner and enhance achievement of the EU’s environmental and climate change policy

| JC7.2: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|--|--|------------------------|
| The LCGs have not been forums where policy/strategic issues are discussed; they are rather formal structures, where information has been shared. They tend to be driven by donors more than by GoB. GoB had limited interest in dialogue detached from concrete engagements. | Interviews with different stakeholders, screening of LCG minutes | More than satisfactory |
| GoB-EP policy dialogue and DP coordination mainly took place in connection with programmes (BCCRF and CDMP). GoB has generally been open to policy dialogue with DPs, but it takes “bringing something to the table” to be able to engage in a substantial dialogue, and EPs relevantly used their programmes for this purpose. | Interviews with different stakeholders, own analysis | More than satisfactory |
| EPs’ influence on policies was achieved mainly through implementation of programme activities, which supported GoB in policy processes, rather than through dialogue. CDMP (and PECM) had activities assisting GoB with the development of policies/plans to promote DRR and CCA. Programmes also influenced policies and strategies through demonstrating viable approaches and options on the ground, such as Climate Field Schools. CDMP had a substantial influence on policies/plans (see JC 71). | Reviews, ROM reports, EAMR reports, interviews | Strong |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Existence of a structured and ongoing policy dialogue at country level in this area | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LCG minutes and documents demonstrate that there is a structure ▪ Interviews with DPs/EPs is the main source of information on policy dialogue. <p>Data fully available</p> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Extent to which the dialogue with the EPs contributes to defining a locally owned Climate Change policy, with clear priorities as well as linkages to sustainable development (mainly in relation to vulnerable groups conditions) and poverty reduction | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EAMR reports provide limited information on tangible results of policy dialogue ▪ Interviews with DPs/EPs is the main source of information on policy dialogue. <p>Data partly available</p> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Perception of key stakeholders on political dialogue (incl. Green Diplomacy Network) usefulness and on its translation into EPs strategic programming | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ This is not reflected in documents. ▪ Interviews with DPs/EPs is the sole source of information on views on/perceptions of policy dialogue. ▪ Limited information was obtained on the influence of policy dialogue on programming <p>Data partly available</p> |

I-721) Existence of a structured and ongoing policy dialogue at country level in this area

The formal mechanisms for DP-GoB dialogue in the sector have been the LCGs on a) Climate Change and Environment chaired by MoEF and Dfid, and b) DER (disaster and emergency response) chaired by MoDMR and UNRCO (UN Resident Coordinator's Office). The LCGs generally met on a quarterly basis¹⁹⁸.

There was a general agreement that the LCGs have not provided a platform for real policy dialogue¹⁹⁹ and that they were mainly donor driven²⁰⁰. However, EPs/DPs met expressed different views on the LCG meetings: some found them useful and dynamic, others found that they were not motivating, too formal or the dialogue weak; some found the LCGs covered both operational and strategic issues, such as discussions related to the preparation of the 7th 5-year plan, others that they mainly discuss programme issues, are too formal and not operational. Some see the LCGs playing a coordinating role, other do not see the LCGs playing such a role.²⁰¹ And interestingly, some found the DPs very well coordinated, while others had the opposite opinion and found both policy dialogue and donor actions on climate change scattered, e.g. due to limited leadership provided by GoB²⁰².

¹⁹⁸ MN 304, MN 310

¹⁹⁹ MN 309, MN 310, MN 318

²⁰⁰ MN 305, MN 309

²⁰¹ MN 302, MN 304, MN 305, MN 309, MN 310, MN 318

²⁰² MN 303, MN 305, MN 310, MN 318

At the same time, EPs/DPs generally found that GoB was willing to discuss policy with DPs and open to ideas²⁰³, but that the LCG was not the place where such discussions took place. One government representative expressed that the most valuable dialogue forum has been (and continue to be) when people come to the ministry and discuss; this really adds value to their process²⁰⁴.

Rather, policy dialogue took place in connection with programmes²⁰⁵, EPs especially found that BCCRF provided a useful EP-GoB dialogue platform as well as for DP coordination; this forum was less formal and thus left room for a more open discussion²⁰⁶; and CDMP also provided a good platform for donor coordination, e.g. when CDMP II was being programmed, discussion were held with GoB on ideas for a new national plan for DM²⁰⁷. One EP expressed that the main window of opportunity to engage in a dialogue is during the design of programme support, when the support focus, approach and modalities are discussed: *“without programming there is no dialogue”*²⁰⁸.

The ability of all three EPs to engage in policy dialogue was affected by capacity constraints; the staff responsible for climate change and DM was also responsible for a range of other themes and thus had limited time to attend in LCGs and discussions²⁰⁹. Therefore, they rely on other EPs/DPs for the dialogue; for example Danida mandated Sida and the Swiss Embassy to represent them in BCCRF discussions²¹⁰ and the dialogue with GoB on BCCRF was led by DfID in cooperation with EU²¹¹. In relation to CDMP, the dialogue was led by EU and DfID on behalf of the donor group²¹².

To summarise, EPs used programmes as an entry point for policy dialogue on CCA and DRR, for which the LCGs had only provided limited scope. However, staff capacity constraints limited the extent to which EPs could engage in dialogue, to overcome this challenge, the EPs would mandate other DPs to represent them.

I-722) Extent to which the dialogue with the EPs contributes to defining a locally owned Climate Change policy, with clear priorities as well as linkages to sustainable development (mainly in relation to vulnerable groups' conditions) and poverty reduction

²⁰³ MN 304, MN 309

²⁰⁴ MN 316

²⁰⁵ MN 309, MN 318

²⁰⁶ MN 304, MN 309, MN 310

²⁰⁷ MN 304, MN 309

²⁰⁸ MN 318

²⁰⁹ MN 304, MN 309, MN 318

²¹⁰ MN 310, MN 318

²¹¹ MN 309, MN 310

²¹² MN 309

The policy framework for climate change and DM has been widely seen by stakeholders as being conducive and comprehensive. In relation to DM, the policies promote a crosscutting and proactive/preventive approach to DM: they promote DRR. The main climate change policy, the BCCSAP (2009) defines priorities and builds on 6 pillars, which link to sustainable development: 1) food security, social protection and health; 2) comprehensive DM; 3) infrastructure; 4) research and knowledge management; 5) mitigation and low carbon development; 6) capacity building and institutional strengthening. 4-10 programmes are defined within each of these pillars. The 2009 NAPA (National Adaptation Plan of Action) identifies eight short-term and eight medium-term priority projects. See chapter 1.1 for an overview of the policies. However, while the policy framework has been conducive, their implementation remains a challenge, especially at the local level, as described earlier.

Support from EPs has contributed significantly to the policy framework (especially in relation to DRR and disaster mainstreaming), but more through programmatic support from CDMP for policy development than through dialogue. As described under JC71, CDMP had a significant influence on policies and plans. As one EP expressed, programme activities can also influence policy, e.g. by demonstrating new approaches, which are sometimes subsequently lifted into policies and plans for upscaling²¹³. Moreover, policy programmes such as CDMP and PECM/PEI have an element of policy dialogue in their activities, so the distinction between policy dialogue and programmes has not always been entirely clear.

Nonetheless, EPs pointed out one specific result of the dialogue with GoB, which took place in the BCCRF context, although BCCRF was established for the implementation of the BCCSAP rather to influence policy. BCCRF enabled a dialogue on climate financing in the light of the new global climate financing mechanisms, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Each developing country needs to establish a National Designated Authority (NDA) with the role of a) lead a country-driven approach to identify the strategy for addressing climate change with GCF funding, b) nominating implementing entities for accreditation to access GCF funds, and c) providing strategic oversight of GCF funded activities²¹⁴. Initially, GoB planned to appoint MoEF as the NDA. But, the EPs advocated for appointing the Economic Relations Division (ERD) of the Ministry of Finance as NDA, since the NDA would have a fiduciary and financial oversight role, and ERD has this expertise, whereas MoEF's expertise has been (and is) more related to technical matters and thus more relevant for a role as implementing entity. This dialogue was successful, and GoB finally appointed ERD as the NDA; ERD will create a separate unit for this role. 14 national agencies are now in the process of being accredited as national implementation agencies, including MoEF.²¹⁵

To summarise, GoB has put in place a conducive policy framework for CCA and DRR, and EP's contributed significantly to this through CDMP's programme activities. However,

²¹³ MN 318

²¹⁴ <http://news.gcfund.org/>

²¹⁵ MN 309

the tangible contribution from policy dialogue was more limited, the only clear example being the influence on the selection of the nationally designated authority for the Green Climate Fund.

I-723) Perception of key stakeholders on political dialogue (incl. Green Diplomacy Network) usefulness and on its translation into EPs' strategic programming

As described above (I-721), the donors have different views on the role of the LCGs, but there is general agreement that actual policy dialogue has been limited and mainly took place in relation to programmes, and especially programme formulation. EPs agree that GoB has been open to having a dialogue on policy with DPs, and GoB has appeared as appreciating discussions with donors. The dialogue on country programming appears to have worked well in general and EP's country strategies are well aligned with the needs for support in relation to climate change and DM, and there is no doubt that GoB and stakeholders were involved and consulted in relation to programme formulation. However, the extent to which political dialogue influenced the strategic programming of the EPs is less clear, although BCCRF was specifically conceived to support the implementation of the BCCSAP in response to a request from GoB. But as described above, one EP expressed that programme preparation provided the best opportunity to engage in policy dialogue and influence policies, as part of the negotiations on the focus and modalities of future support²¹⁶. When considering the above-described influence programmes and in particular CDMP had on policy, it appears that programmes influenced policy dialogue rather than vice-versa.

The EU Green Diplomacy Network (GDN) has recently started activities in Bangladesh as part of the preparations for the UNFCCC COP 21 in Paris, where it is the hope of the EU and several countries that a binding agreement is reached on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. EU's and Bangladesh's positions are very aligned in this regard. The EUD is currently (as of May 2015) working together with Sweden, UK, France and Germany on the preparations for COP 21. Demarches from Brussels are followed up on and activities include dialogue with GoB to share and discuss positions for COP 21, and awareness raising/visibility activities, such as events. Hence, GDN and the related dialogue focuses on global policy processes/governance rather than national processes in Bangladesh.²¹⁷

To summarise, the extent to which policy dialogue influenced strategic programming is not clear, but BCCRF was established in response to GoB's request for support for BCCSAP implementation. Overall, EPs' programmes influenced policy dialogue rather than vice-versa. GDN focused on global processes and did not influence EPs' programming.

²¹⁶ MN 318

²¹⁷ MN 309

JC7.3 Effects of EPs' support on the enhancement of the country's preparedness to natural disasters and adaptation to climate change

| JC7.3: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|---|------------------------|
| EP support significantly contributed to reducing vulnerability, especially in relation to floods and cyclones, due to different actions: a) improved flood warning, b) improved disaster response capacity, c) enhanced access to shelter and increased coverage of flood protection infrastructure, d) enhanced community and household awareness of DRR options, and e) more resilient livelihoods practices (e.g. agriculture). | Reviews, progress reports, interviews, field visits (on-site observations, focus group discussions, interviews) | More than satisfactory |
| CDMP contributed to improving the institutional setup (e.g. establishment of MoDMR) and facilitated the engagement of a range of GoB entities. | Reviews, progress reports, interviews | More than satisfactory |
| EP support enhanced the institutional capacity and human resource base in Bangladesh to engage in DRR and CCA, especially at national level (CDMP), but also (more unevenly) at local level (CDMP, SEALS and to some extent BCCRF). | Reviews, progress reports, interviews, field visits (on-site observations, focus group discussions, interviews) | More than satisfactory |
| EP support did contribute to the promotion of improved new and innovative approaches to address DRR and CCA (e.g. flood warning, Climate Field Schools), but not to the extent expected. LDRRF actions were scattered and did not promote a comprehensive "all hazards" approach. BCCRF to a large extent invested in infrastructure. | Reviews, progress reports, interviews, field visits (on-site observations, focus group discussions, interviews) | Strong |
| There was a tendency at the local level to focus on structural rather than non-structural interventions, and sometimes actions were mainly upscaling what partners were already doing; and while actions were relevant, the CCA/DRR angle was not always clearly framed. | Reviews, progress reports, interviews, field visits (on-site observations, focus group discussions, interviews) | Strong |
| Due to shortcomings in the design and modalities, CDMP and BCCRF were not as transformative as intended and some opportunities were lost: BCCRF was parallel to GoB systems and overestimated GoB capacity, so had limited GoB ownership and did not develop GoB capacity. CDMP actions were scattered and with insufficient local involvement, since LDRRF covered too many districts and due to a centralised approach to procurement and design. | Reviews, progress reports, ROM reports, EAMR reports, interviews | Strong |
| Sustainability is a significant concern. Timeframes were generally too short compared to stakeholder capacity and ambitions. Stakeholders display a project dependency with unclear exit strategies; this has at | Reviews, progress reports, ROM reports, EAMR reports, interviews, field visits (on-site | Strong |

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| least to some extent been linked with GoBs practice of carrying out all work through projects. CDMP did not ensure commitment from communities for contributions for maintenance. | observations, focus group discussions, interviews), own analysis | |
|---|--|--|

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strengthened normative and operational work (follow-up and monitoring of, and reporting on, information and data) on climate change related challenges, in line with the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) and with the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Most available reports and documentation focus on outputs and provide limited results-oriented information. ▪ CDMP MTR provides results-oriented information. ▪ BCCRF projects are still young, latest developments are not fully captured in available documents and it is still too early to fully assess results. ▪ Interviews have provided additional and updated information <p>Data fully available</p> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of new technologies (digital elevation data, weather prediction systems, etc.) and generation of accurate flood risk maps, accurate medium and short-term information, etc. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MTRs for CDMP and SEALS provide information. ▪ Studies and knowledge produces from BCCRF re available. ▪ Interviews have provided some additional information for this indicator <p>Data fully available</p> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of dissemination of warnings addressed to vulnerable groups | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MTR for CDMP provides some information regarding this. ▪ This was not the focus of BCCRF. ▪ Interviews provided additional information re. CDMP. ▪ Field visits provided additional information re SEALS. <p>Data fully available</p> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of use of disaster risk and vulnerability indicators in national strategies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Many but not all strategic docs are available ▪ Only CDMP had some activities with some relevance for this indicator. ▪ Strategy and sector monitoring reports not available. <p>Data partly available</p> |

| | |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reduced magnitude of loss and damage (GDP, productive assets, social indicators, loss of lives, infrastructure damage, etc.) from natural disasters | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MoDMR was unable to provide quantitative data. ▪ CDMP website provides some data. ▪ MTRs and progress reports provide some data for CDMP and SEALS. ▪ The CDMP impact study provides some evidence. ▪ Too early to assess for BCCRF, and only construction of cyclone shelters address this indicator ▪ Site visits provided qualitative and location-specific evidence <p>Data partly available</p> |
|---|---|

I-731) Strengthened normative and operational work (follow-up and monitoring of, and reporting on, information and data) on climate change related challenges, in line with the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) and with the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP)

BCCRF was established specifically to support the implementation of BCCSAP implementation, and its modalities required that all sub-projects addressed at least one of the six BCCSAP pillars²¹⁸. However, the support for creating a BCCRF Secretariat was the only action under BCCRF specifically aiming at developing MoEF capacity related to implementing BCCSAP, and this did not perform as expected (the BCCRF Secretariat is not functional anymore and the staff trained have left and capacity of MoEF was not enhanced). The other sub-projects under BCCRF did generally not focus strongly on building the national/GoB capacity and systems to promote CCA and implement BCCSAP and the NAPA. Three projects focused on infrastructure as part of IDA projects (cyclone shelters, solar irrigation, food storage), one focused on reforestation and basically assisted the Forest Department in expanding its reforestation activities (e.g. with community involvement) as well as reducing community dependency on forest resources, and one project focused on community adaptation implemented by NGOs. In the case of the reforestation project, the community groups visited by the evaluation team did not demonstrate a good understanding of climate change and adaptation²¹⁹.

Stakeholders generally agree that BCCRF had some design flaws. The funded sub-projects are generally performing well and delivering their individual intended outputs, for a large part due to the fact that three of the six projects were integrated with IDA projects and thus benefiting from their structures and WB systems. However, BCCRF did not have the

²¹⁸ *Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund Mid Term Review*, Final Report, 2014, pg 4

²¹⁹ MN 313

transformative role it was intended to have, in terms of a) enhancing GoB's capacity to implement the BCCSAP and b) allow for the implementation of innovative approaches to CCA. The DfID Annual Review (2014) gave BCCRF performance rating B (moderately not meeting expectations)²²⁰. The issues related to the design were:

- *Overestimating the capacity of GoB:* It was the intention that different Government departments would submit project proposals, which would be selected for BCCRF funding based on specific quality and relevance criteria, including alignment with BCCSAP. However, the design did not include a process for supporting the identification and formulation of proposals, so while several proposals were received, most of them did not meet the quality and relevance criteria. The BCCRF Secretariat set up at MoEF was supposed to play a role in the proposal screening, but never became fully functional. Due to this issue, it was difficult to identify projects to support and it was instead decided to use BCCRF funds for sub-projects implemented under the World Bank's IDA projects. Only one of the sub-projects were government prepared and led (the *Afforestation and Reforestation for Climate Change Risk Reduction in Coastal and Hilly Areas of Bangladesh* project).²²¹
- *Insufficient time frame:* Initial four-year time frame was insufficient to a) build GoB capacity, b) formulate and select proposals, and c) implement sub-projects. The programme was extended for two years, till end 2016. Sub-project implementation did in general not start until late 2013, e.g. due to the challenges related with getting quality project proposals.²²² Stakeholders in the reforestation project express concerns about the limited timeframe available for implementation and ability to achieve sustainability within the period available; but part of the problem also appears to be a dependency on projects (whether GoB or donor funded) and lack of a clear exit strategy.²²³
- *Setup and modalities were parallel to GoB systems and procedures:* BCCRF was setup as donor-funded trust for the BCCSAP implementation due to fiduciary concerns related to GoB's BCCTF Trust Fund. Moreover, a separate Secretariat was established for BCCRF with its own staff (GoB chose to recruit consultants instead of appointing government staff as originally intended), although the government did provide office space at the BCCTF Secretariat. Moreover, a separate set of proposal preparation and approval procedures were established, instead of following GoB's Development Project Proforma (DPP) procedures, although in practice the proposals ended up having to follow both the BCCRF and DPP procedures (as well as World Bank procedures). With different funding, management structures, staff, and approval processes there were no synergies with BCCTF, although the two mechanisms were set up to implement the same strategy. Hence, BCCRF had little contribution to building GoB capacity and implementation. The combination of this parallel structure and the fact that only one of the sub-projects was implemented directly by government resulted in a limited direct involvement and ownership of GoB.²²⁴

²²⁰ Sources: MN 304, MN 305, MN 309, MN 310, MN 318, as well as DfID, *Annual review, Jolobayoo o Jibon (Climate Change Programme, Bangladesh)*, 2014, pg 17

²²¹ MN 304, MN 305

²²² MN 305, MN 309, MN 318

²²³ MN 303, MN 313

²²⁴ MN 304, MN 305, MN 309

- *Lack of funding for TA and capacity building, and of a clear definition of TA roles and responsibilities:* The World Bank was selected as fund administrator, but did not cofund BCCRF itself. Moreover, there was not a clear/common understanding between the World Bank and the donors on the provision of TA and capacity building for GoB, Moreover, the management fee for the World Bank was too low to fully cover the provision of TA. The lack of a common understanding led to tensions.²²⁵

Due to the above shortcomings, the donors and the World Bank agreed not to continue BCCRF after the closing of the first phase, whereas a more long-term mechanism had been the original intention with BCCRF. It was also decided in 2013 not to fund any further sub-projects, so the actual spending will be much lower than commitments made by the donors. One EP pointed to two other design errors of BCCRF: a) the World Bank should not have been engaged only as a fund administrator but rather as an equal partner by contributing World Bank funding for the BCCRF trust fund, and b) the Economic Relations Division (ERD) of the Ministry of Finance should have been the home of the secretariat for BCCRF rather than MoEF, due to its fund management expertise and ability to convene sector ministries.²²⁶ This has also informed the decision to promote ERD in the context of the GCF (see I-722 above).

CDMP was more focused on the preparation and implementation of disaster policies, although it did have a component on community level CCA. Indeed, interventions have mainly focused on sudden onset disasters (cyclones, floods, earthquakes) rather than on slow onset disasters (drought, future climate change) and the share of funding spent on climate change was a small proportion, e.g. under LDRRF USD 2 million USD out of a USD 30 million budget was spent on adaptation²²⁷. Hence, its capacity development focus was more on DRR than CCA. In relation to DRR, CDMP made important contributions to enhancing national capacity, through a) knowledge generation and introducing new technologies and approaches (see I-722 below), b) providing equipment, and c) capacity building at various levels and in different sectors; results include:

- *A strengthened institutional framework:* CDMP played a role in advocating for the establishment of the Disaster Management and Relief Division (DMRD)²²⁸ (and subsequently the MoDMR²²⁹). CDMP also funded the expansion of GoB's Cyclone Preparedness Programme (CPP) to five cyclone affected upazillas²³⁰.
- *Enhanced DRR capacity of ministerial staff and improved understanding of their roles in DRR:* CDMP provided training for staff from different ministries, incl. staff from the

²²⁵ MN 304, MN 305, MN 309, MN 318

²²⁶ MN 318

²²⁷ *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015 pg 9

²²⁸ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Eti, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review*, 2012, pg. 34

²²⁹ European Union, *Monitoring Report. MR-139241.01. Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) 2010-2014*, 2013, pg 2

²³⁰ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Eti, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review*, 2012, pg. 31

Ministry of Women's Affairs on DRR and CCA²³¹. Staff from the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE) has been trained on DRR and CCA, and the candidate training for extension officers now covers these topics²³², with support from CDMP 3900 farmers were trained in climate field schools, and climate change and DM is now included in the farmer field schools approach used by DAE (see JC 71)²³³. CDMP reports that a number of ministries and agencies as a result of CDMP have a better understanding of their sectoral responsibilities before, during and after disaster than there was before. This pertains especially to: the Ministry of Agriculture and the Department of Agricultural Extension, the Department of Fisheries, the Department of Livestock, the Meteorological Department, the Geological Survey, the General of Health Services, and the Ministry of Education²³⁴.

- *Enhanced capacity of the urban volunteers system*: CDMP has trained a significant number of urban disaster volunteers; GoB's target is to have a network of 62,000 urban volunteers (MTR pg 29); and CDMP has trained 23,357 of these²³⁵. Two concreted examples are reported on urban volunteers implementing the skills imparted and equipment provided by CDMP: volunteers helped in a landslide in Chittagong (2012) and in the Rana Plaza building collapse urban volunteers contributed to the rescuing of 2,500 lives²³⁶.
- Master course for working professionals, compulsory disaster module *Enhanced access to DRR education, and thereby the future pool of experts* for all civil servants in GoB civil service training, and DM modules included in master programmes of 18 universities (see JC 71).

Overall, the 2013 Mid-term Review of CDMP finds that CDMP has contributed to creating a national pool of professionals inside and outside government²³⁷. In addition to the above, CDMP also engaged in enhancing the capacity of local governments (districts, upazilas, unions), e.g. through its climate risk assessment (CRA) approach.

However, while DRR and CCA awareness increased among union officials (see JC71) and district administrations are now more inclined to engage in DRR, the absorption and adoption of DRR and CCA principles remain limited. Indeed the Mid-term Review found that CDMP's approach to local government capacity building was of limited effectiveness and needed reorientation²³⁸. This view is shared by a number of interviewees²³⁹, and also

²³¹ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review*, 2012, pg. 35

²³² MN 315

²³³ MN 315, *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 8

²³⁴ MN 317

²³⁵ Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, *Annual Progress Report 2013, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014)*, 2013, pg 27

²³⁶ Sources: Department for International Development, *Annual review, Jolobayoo o Jibon (Climate Change Programme, Bangladesh)*, 2014, pg 9. *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 7

²³⁷ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review*, 2012, pg. 23

²³⁸ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review*, 2012, pg 6 and pg 8

reflects the evaluation team's impression from the field visit. The shortcomings related to the implementation of DRR at the local level (e.g. of LDDRF activities) were related to the following:

- *CDMP/LDDRF modalities did not ensure a focused and comprehensive approach to DM:* Several stakeholders point out that funded actions were scattered thematically and geographically; and that a comprehensive “all hazards” approach, which addressed structural issues in fewer selected locations would have led to more comprehensive results and demonstrated the value of a comprehensive approach.²⁴⁰
- *Centralised design and procurement and insufficient local involvement and planning for sustainability:* While projects were selected on the basis of local CRAs, the CRA process was fast-tracked due to time constraints and did thus not comprise a fully consultative process as intended. Moreover, the projects selected were mainly infrastructural, and the detailed design (e.g. of cyclone proof houses) and the procurement were handled in Dhaka with limited involvement of local government and communities. Communities were engaged as paid labour, but were not requested to contribute (neither in cash nor in kind) and no agreements were made with communities regarding their responsibility for simple maintenance, even if it is often unlikely that local governments have the resources to maintain the infrastructure built.²⁴¹

SEALS, like CDMP, had a stronger focus on DRR than climate change adaption, albeit in the context of a broader approach to livelihoods, agriculture and natural resources, but did address adaptation capacity at the local government and community level through its NGO projects. Climate risk and vulnerability assessments, and action plans to reduce vulnerability and disaster impacts were developed at upazila, union and village levels, and a series of capacity development and awareness raising activities were implemented, e.g. on: the roles and responsibilities of the Union Disaster Management Committees (UDMC), household level disaster preparedness, and understanding early warning signals. Plans for volunteers rescuing vulnerable community members (e.g. elderly, children and disabled persons) were disseminated, volunteers were provided with equipment, and village mock drills were carried out²⁴². A UDMC visited during the field visit indicated that the SEALS support had inspired them to engage in DRR activities such as strengthening embankments and making people aware of the meaning of warning signals²⁴³. The field visit gave the impression that the capacity created was more significant in Sundarbans West than in Sundarbans East,

²³⁹ MN 306, MN 309, MN 310, MN 317

²⁴⁰ Sources: Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review*, 2012, pg. 41 and MN 304, MN 306, MN 317, MN 318

²⁴¹ Sources:

- *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 9
- MN 309, MN 317, MN 318, MN 311, MN 313

²⁴² Concern Worldwide, *Sundari Project information, SUNDARI – To promote alternative livelihood options for Sundarbans' resource harvesters to reduce human pressure on Sundarbans that contribute to maintain /or improving Sundarbans biodiversity*, January 2012-April 2015, pg 4

²⁴³ MN 311

perhaps not so much due to differences in the approaches of the implementing NGOs, but rather due to different levels of vulnerability to cyclones, where the areas visited in Sundarbans West had been far more severely affected by cyclone Aila – indeed the Ward DMC interviewed in Sundarbans East indicated that “disaster was not the main concern in their area”²⁴⁴.

Like for BCCRF, SEALS stakeholders express a concern about achieving sustainability within the timeframe available, especially for the community groups established and the need for a follow-up project; and also here there seems to be a lack of a clear exit strategy²⁴⁵.

To summarise, BCCRF was established specifically to support the implementation of BCCSAP implementation, but did not contribute to this to the extent anticipated, due to design shortcomings (parallel setup to GoB’s systems and structure) and unrealistic expectations related to GoB capacity. The other EP actions were not aimed at implemented BCCRF and the NAPA; CDMP mainly focused on the implementation of disaster policies rather than climate policies, but did contribute significantly to strengthening the institutional framework and national capacity. However, CDMP too was affected by design shortcomings, and did not sufficiently promote a comprehensive DRR approach and enhance government capacity at the local level. SEALS also focused more on DRR than climate change, and successfully built local level capacity in particularly vulnerable areas to engage in preventive DRR. However, the sustainability of community-level actions has not been fully ensured.

I-732) Evidence of new technologies (digital elevation data, weather prediction systems, etc.) and generation of accurate flood risk maps, accurate medium and short-term information, etc.

Under BCCRF, the World Bank commissioned analytical studies in relation to: climate change and health, water logging and flood and risk mitigation in urban areas, environmental studies for the constructions of the Urir Char-Noahkali Cross-Dam project, upscaling of innovation in disaster risk management, and spatial and temporal downscaling of climate data. A number of these studies are currently ongoing (as of May 2015). The World Bank reports that there has been a high demand for these high-quality studies. For examples the study on urban flooding is now in the process of being put into a book for publishing, due to a high demand from stakeholders. Moreover, the modelling study for spatial and temporal downscaling of climate data will provide previously unavailable information on climate change at the local level, which will be used to inform project designs of different agencies, and it has been quoted in the 5th IPCC Assessment Report.²⁴⁶ Sida reports that the BCCRF Study on climate change, diseases and the implications for the health sector has informed the ongoing (as of May 2015) work on mainstreaming climate change in their future support for the health sector, such as developing adaptation plans for the sector.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁴ MN 311, MN 312

²⁴⁵ MN 307

²⁴⁶ MN 305

²⁴⁷ MN 304

One EP finds that the BCCRF sub-projects were generally not innovative or introducing new approaches but funded traditional actions, such as building cyclone shelters and grain silos, or reforestation²⁴⁸. The field visit and stakeholder interviews confirmed this opinion in relation to reforestation, where BCCRF mainly funded an upscaling of the Forest Department's existing reforestation activities²⁴⁹. BCCRF could have been used to test and promote innovative solutions in relation to the IDA projects they cofunded, but the evaluation team did not come across any concrete examples of this taking place. Nonetheless, the Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Development II project promoted innovative renewable mini-grid energy solutions, such as replacement of diesel pumps with solar pumps and biogas plants for cooking²⁵⁰. Moreover, one EP finds that some of the projects funded under the NGO window were innovative, but the evaluation team did not have access to documentation on these projects²⁵¹.

Several knowledge products have been developed under CDMP and CDMP studies and DM plans for upazillas and unions as well as knowledge products from other sources are made available through the online e-library (more than 300 products available) on the CDMP website²⁵². Hazard maps for districts and unions were developed²⁵³. The DfID annual review (2014) as well as the CDMP value for money study (2015) found that CDMP has generated good knowledge and evidence on DM and risk reduction and CCA, and a number of knowledge products are of excellent quality, but the dissemination to stakeholders could still improve²⁵⁴.

Seismic risk assessments were carried out in three cities (VfM study p. 7); these have reportedly informed the preparation of a new World Bank urban earthquake resilience programme²⁵⁵. The national technical capacity to assess seismic vulnerabilities and carry out seismic zonation for urban planning was enhanced²⁵⁶.

The computing capacity at Bangladesh Meteorology Department (BMD) was enhanced, and satellite data can now be accessed and analysed in 10 minutes, before this took 2 hours²⁵⁷. Moreover, as described under I-733 below, CDMP has significantly improved the warning system, e.g. by introducing new innovative approaches.

²⁴⁸ MN 318

²⁴⁹ MN 303, MN 308, MN 313

²⁵⁰ World Bank, Report No: ISR15093, *Implementation Status & Results, Bangladesh, Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Development II (RERED II) Project (P131263)*, 2014, pg 2

²⁵¹ MN 304

²⁵² Sources: MN 317, <http://www.cdmp.org.bd>, *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 7

²⁵³ *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 7

²⁵⁴ Sources: Department for International Development, *Annual review, Jobobayoo o Jibon (Climate Change Programme, Bangladesh)*, 2014, pg 12; *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015 pg 7

²⁵⁵ MN 317

²⁵⁶ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review*, 2012, pg. 6-7, pg 28, pg 51

²⁵⁷ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review*, 2012, pg. 31

Innovative approaches and new technologies for DRR at the local level were tested and demonstrated, including:

- 46 units of semi-detached cyclone resilient houses constructed for 92 families in 2013²⁵⁸.
- Ten Resilient Agricultural Model Villages (RAMV) were established²⁵⁹.
- Field pilots on CCA in crop production (adaptive crop varieties)²⁶⁰.
- Ten model fire stations are being constructed CDMP²⁶¹.

SEALS implemented and promoted the upscaling of pilots on integrated farming systems to improve livelihoods, including enhancing resilience by introducing resilient varieties and raised dykes²⁶².

To summarise, EPs' support generated a substantial amount of new knowledge and information, through studies and assessments on emerging issues, and high quality knowledge products were produced. Moreover, technical capacity was enhanced, e.g. with the introduction of improved remote-sensing based early warnings. Field pilots of CCA and DRR options were also carried out. However, activities implemented on the ground were not always innovative, but often focused on traditional actions all-ready well-known in Bangladesh such as storm shelters and other infrastructure or up-scaling existing activities of the implementing agency, such as reforestation by the Forest Department.

I-733) Evidence of dissemination of warnings addressed to vulnerable groups

CDMP has significantly strengthened the early warning capacity in Bangladesh in relation to flood and cyclone warning:

- The Bangladesh Meteorological Department staff was trained on data processing to produce more location-specific forecasts²⁶³.
- The capacity of the Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre was increased to from three to five days, giving people more time to take preventive measures²⁶⁴.
- An Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system with phone accessible early warning forecasts was established at the Disaster Management Information Centre. 190,000

²⁵⁸ Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, *Annual Progress Report 2013, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014)*, 2013, pg 17

²⁵⁹ Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, *Annual Progress Report 2013, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014)*, 2013, pg 28

²⁶⁰ Sources: MN 301, Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review*, 2012, pg. 35

²⁶¹ *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 8

²⁶² MN 311

²⁶³ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review*, 2012, pg. 35

²⁶⁴ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review*, 2012, pg. 31

IVR hits covering 2013 and 2014 were reported, the cost per beneficiary accessing IVR is estimated at USD 5.20²⁶⁵.

- Situation reports on hazards/disasters are made available on the CDMP website²⁶⁶.

These improvements have led to a significantly enhanced access to early warnings:

- 2 million people are getting flash flood early warning up to 48 hrs in advance²⁶⁷.
- Around 88 million people in four river basins now have two more days warning to take measures to protect life, livelihoods and assets, due to extended flood lead time²⁶⁸.
- The holders of more than 110 mill SIM-cards have access early warning dissemination from IVR²⁶⁹, corresponding to an estimated 36-75 million beneficiaries²⁷⁰.

While SEALS has not engaged directly in improving the warning system, it has through awareness raising and training enhanced the understanding of SEALS project beneficiaries of the government warning signals and how to respond to them²⁷¹.

To summarise, CDMP significantly improved the access to early warning for a large proportion of Bangladesh's population, and SEALS enhanced the understanding at the local level of warning signals.

I-734) Evidence of use of disaster risk and vulnerability indicators in national strategies

The main national development strategies and plans contain disaster related indicators. The 6th Five-Year Plan has a couple of indicators under environmental sustainability related to cyclone shelter and communities habitats and assets²⁷². The 2005-2008 National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction has a section on Comprehensive Disaster Management towards Poverty Reduction and Growth with a series of indicators²⁷³. The National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction II FY-2009-11 has disaster indicators in relation to the sections on Water Resources, Employment Generation and Labour Welfare, and Environment and Tackling Climate Change for Sustainable Development²⁷⁴. The

²⁶⁵ *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 12

²⁶⁶ <http://www.cdmp.org.bd/modules.php?name=Situation>

²⁶⁷ Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, *Annual Progress Report 2013, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014)*, 2013, pg 27

²⁶⁸ Sources: Department for International Development, *Annual review, Jolobayoo o Jibon (Climate Change Programme, Bangladesh)*, 2014, pg 8 ; *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 4 ; Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, *Annual Progress Report 2013, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014)*, 2013, pg 27

²⁶⁹ Department for International Development, *Annual review, Jolobayoo o Jibon (Climate Change Programme, Bangladesh)*, 2014, pg 8

²⁷⁰ *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 12-13

²⁷¹ MN 311, MN 312

²⁷² *The 6th Five-Year Plan*, 2011, pg 245

²⁷³ *2005-2008 National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction*, annex 3, section 7, pg 220

²⁷⁴ *National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction II, FY 2009 – 11*, pg 239, pg 243, pg 247

National Sustainable Development Strategy has indicators or CRAs and Risk Reduction Action Plans and cyclone shelters²⁷⁵.

However, the main climate change and DM plans and policies do not have any indicators:

- The National Disaster Management Policy has no indicators²⁷⁶
- The Rational Plan for Disaster Management 2008-2015 contains an intention of carrying out M&E and establishing indicators, but has no defined indicators.
- The BCCSAP has no indicators. The 2008 version stated indicators would be developed, but such reference was taken out in the 2009 version²⁷⁷
- The National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) has no indicators²⁷⁸

A couple of interviewees pointed out that there is no monitoring and review of the implementation of BCCSAP, and that sectors do not use disaster data in their planning processes.²⁷⁹ The Value for Money Study found that there appeared to be an insufficient monitoring capacity in MoDRM, where the main interest has been to monitor the number of infrastructure units built; this also affected the monitoring of CDMP²⁸⁰. No evidence was found of CDMP having engaged in enhancing the monitoring capacity of MoDRM and the use of disaster monitoring data in GoB planning processes. Results-oriented monitoring and review could have helped ensuring informed decision-making, which in turn could have contributed to ensuring that BCCSAP was implemented in a manner that delivered cost-effective resilience through a comprehensive DRR approach.

To summarise, while the main national development strategies contain disaster related indicators, the main DM plans and policies do not contain indicators. Disaster data are not used in sector planning. EP supported programmes did not engage in promoting the use of disaster indicators; in this regard a potential tool for promoting preventive DRR actions was lost.

I-735) Reduced magnitude of loss and damage (GDP, productive assets, social indicators, loss of lives, infrastructure damage, etc.) from natural disasters

It is not possible to directly measure and attribute a reduced magnitude of loss and damage to the EP programmes. However, the available documentation does provide evidence that the programmes supported have reduced vulnerability of programme beneficiaries.

CDMP: The 88 million people who are benefitting from the increased 5-day early flood warnings can now save an estimated 70% of their movable resources/capital goods, if they get five days advance warning for flood events, compared to an estimated 50% of their

²⁷⁵ *National Sustainable Development Strategy*, 2013, pg 142

²⁷⁶ Disaster Management Bureau, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, *National Disaster Management Policy*, draft, 2008

²⁷⁷ Sources: Ministry of Environment and Forests, *Bangladesh Climate Strategy and Action Plan 2008*, 2008 ; Ministry of Environment and Forests, *Bangladesh Climate Strategy and Action Plan 2009*, 2009

²⁷⁸ Ministry of Environment and Forests, *National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA)*, updated version, 2009

²⁷⁹ MN 306, MN 310

²⁸⁰ *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 15

assets with previous 3-days notice²⁸¹. The CDMP Value for Money Study estimates that for every USD1 invested in flood early warning, one can expect up to USD 260 return and that the net value of benefits from CDMP in this regard has been estimated at USD 336-495 million²⁸². Similarly, the increased flash flood warning time for 2 million people means that farmers can save up to 70 % of their crops in the fields²⁸³. Moreover, the vulnerability to cyclones of an estimated 3 million beneficiaries has been reduced after CDMP enabled the expansion of the Cyclone Preparedness Programme²⁸⁴.

In spite of the challenges scattered implementation of LDRRF and lack of a comprehensive approach an estimated 3 million beneficiaries are now less vulnerable due to LDRRF investments. The Value for Money Study has on this basis calculated the costs per LDRRF beneficiary at USD 7.60, which was found better than for comparable schemes elsewhere²⁸⁵. The 2013 Impact Study carried out a survey among LDRRF beneficiaries; 59% reported that LDRRF schemes had reduced the disaster risk, 25.6% saw a partial reduction in risk and only 15.4% saw no contribution²⁸⁶. Moreover, CDMP reports that in 2013, its support for livelihoods (e.g. adaptive cropping, irrigation facilities, skills training, cash for work) reduced the vulnerability of 1.1 million people²⁸⁷.

The BCCRF funded Emergency Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project (ECCRP) constructed and rehabilitated cyclone shelters and coastal embankments, and cyclone affected agricultural livelihoods were recovered: 230,000 households engaged in crop production; 38,000 in livestock production and 37,000 in fisheries benefitted²⁸⁸. 41 NGO sub-projects under the Community Climate Change Project engaged in drought, salinity and flood prone areas, and a number are reportedly showing results in addressing climate risk beyond traditional livelihoods projects, but the nature of the results and their impact on people's vulnerability is not known to the evaluation team²⁸⁹. The Modern Food Storage Facilities Project is anticipated to lead to an increase in the grain reserves available to households to meet their post-disaster needs²⁹⁰.

²⁸¹ Sources: *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 4 and Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, *Annual Progress Report 2013, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014)*, 2013, pg 7

²⁸² *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 5-6

²⁸³ Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, *Annual Progress Report 2013, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014)*, 2013, pg 27

²⁸⁴ *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 4

²⁸⁵ *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 11

²⁸⁶ Niaz Ahmed Khan, Kazi Maruful Islam, Shamim Hayder Talukder, Shuchita Sharmin, Main Wara Gowhar, Nazme Sabina, Eminence, *Impact Assessment of Comprehensive Disaster Management Program I and II*, 2013, pg xv

²⁸⁷ Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, *Annual Progress Report 2013, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014)*, 2013, pg 15

²⁸⁸ World Bank, *Implementation Status & Results, Bangladesh, Bangladesh Modern Food Storage Facilities Project*, 2014, pg 9

²⁸⁹ World Bank, *Implementation Status & Results, Community Climate Change Project (P125447)*, 2015, PG 2

²⁹⁰ World Bank, Report No: ISR16596, *Implementation Status & Results, Bangladesh, Bangladesh Modern Food Storage Facilities Project (P120583)*, 2014

Case: Cyclone Mahasen (2013)

A tangible example of how improved disaster preparedness reduced losses from cyclones is the tropical storm Mahasen in 2013, where 1.1 million people were evacuated to shelters within 24 hours, and as a result only 17 lives were lost. CDMP contributed to this by a) contributing to a revision of the Standing Orders on Disasters (SOD) leading to better coordinated responses, expansion of the Cyclone Preparedness Programme, and construction/rehabilitation of shelters and access roads.²⁹¹ Moreover, shelters constructed by the BCCRF funded ECCRP project were occupied by 40,219 people and 4,307 livestock.²⁹²

SEALS reached 45,000 direct beneficiaries in the Sundarbans Impact Zone²⁹³. Their resilience was enhanced through alternative livelihoods options, and the contribution to better protection of the Sundarbans mangrove forest will help maintaining its role as a barrier protecting against floods, cyclones and sea level rise in the future. The NGO activities have helped enhancing the disaster preparedness of beneficiaries through a range of activities, such as training on DRR and preventive measures and preparation of action plans, raised plinths for houses, rainwater harvesting and storage for emergencies, keeping grab-bags with emergency supplies, enhanced understanding of how to react during emergencies. However, the disaster preparedness did not appear to be uniform among all beneficiary communities²⁹⁴. Earthworks protecting villages and crops were carried also out²⁹⁵.

Targeting: *SEALS* and BCCRF appeared to have been good at targeting women and vulnerable groups, e.g. by having specific selection criteria giving preference to female headed households, landless, and ethnic minorities²⁹⁶. The targeting of women and vulnerable groups under CDMP was less effective and the mid-term review found that gender was not taken into account in beneficiary selection and the beneficiaries were mostly men²⁹⁷. Only 30.7% of the respondents to the LDRRF impact survey found that the schemes had improved the safety of women and children²⁹⁸.

²⁹¹ Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, *Annual Progress Report 2013, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014)*, 2013, pg 21

²⁹² (Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF), Ministry of Environment and Forests, *Annual Report 2013*, 2013, pg 22

²⁹³ Floris Deodatus, Gautam Shuvra Biswas, M.A. Sekendar, *Sundarbans Environmental And Livelihoods Security (SEALS) Project DCI-ASIE/2009/20133, Mid-Term Review*, 2013, pg 14

²⁹⁴ MN 311, MN 312

²⁹⁵ Concern Worldwide, *Sundari Project information, SUNDARI – To promote alternative livelihood options for Sundarbans' resource harvesters to reduce human pressure on Sundarbans that contribute to maintain / or improving Sundarbans biodiversity, January 2012-April 2015*, 2015, pg 4

²⁹⁶ MN 303, MN 311, MN 312, MN 313

²⁹⁷ Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, *Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review*, 2012, pg 21 and 35; *A Value for Money Report for CDMP II*, 2015, pg 13; MN 506

²⁹⁸ Niaz Ahmed Khan, Kazi Maruful Islam, Shamim Hayder Talukder, Shuchita Sharmin, Main Wara Gowhar, Nazme Sabina, Eminence, *Impact Assessment of Comprehensive Disaster Management Program I and II*, 2013, pg xv

To summarise, EPs' support improved the access to early flood warning for 88 million people and thereby reduced their risk of losing lives and livelihoods assets. Moreover, three million people are as a result of EPs' support less vulnerable to cyclones, and another three million had their vulnerability reduced due to LDRRF. Livelihoods activities and community/household level DRR support has reduced the vulnerability of approximately 1.5 million people (CDMP reached 1.1 million people, SEALS reached 45,000 beneficiaries, and BCCRF reached around 300,000 households). It is thus reasonable to conclude that EP support will significantly reduce future losses and damage from especially from floods, but also from cyclones and to a lesser extent from other types of natural disasters.

7.5 Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions

Both GoB and EPs have aspirations to strengthen the integration of CCA and preventive DRR as crosscutting concept, acknowledging the multisectoral responses and that both structural and non-structural measures are needed to significantly reduce the vulnerability of Bangladeshis to disasters and to the long-term effects of climate change – seeing that these are development issues, which can significantly impact on the country's economic development. The policy framework for such an integrated approach is in place in Bangladesh, and the awareness has increased. EPs have made important contributions to this, especially through CDMP (BCCRF did not focus on policy processes); the contribution to policy has mainly come from programmatic actions, and to some extent also from dialogue related to BCCRF and CDMP, rather than from policy dialogue in the formal LCGs.

Moreover, EPs have contributed to enhancing the knowledge base, e.g. through studies carried out under BCCRF and CDMP, which can help both GoP and DPs to make informed decisions and programming, e.g. when the BCCRF study on climate change and health informs Sida's ongoing programming (as of May 2015) for the health sector. The national capacity has also been enhanced through CDMP's training for a range of stakeholders, technical and methodological support and piloting of new approaches, technical equipment for forecasts and warnings, and work on the inclusion of DRR in all levels of education, which also contributes the future capacity/resource base. The enhanced institutional and human capacity at the national level have led to very tangible results, a particularly important example is the improved flood warning system, which has reduced the vulnerability for millions of Bangladeshis.

Nonetheless, there are still constraints, which hamper the implementation of the DRR policy aspirations. For example, sectoral mandates are not always conducive for crosscutting and integrated approaches. Moreover, there are still capacity constraints, especially at the local levels, where there is still a tendency to focus on response rather than prevention and on infrastructure construction rather than non-structural DRR actions, despite the fact the infrastructure is more expensive to construct and especially maintain. Capacity has also been enhanced at the local level with EPs' support, albeit more unevenly so. EPs programmes have attempted to address the capacity issues at the local levels, but have at the same time been influenced by these constraints, e.g. with BCCRF and LDRRF

mainly focusing on investment in infrastructure such as shelters and embankments. Moreover, in some cases the funded actions are basically an upscaling of existing work, such as reforestation by the Forest Department – and while these actions generally appear relevant for enhancing resilience, they are not always implemented with a clear CAA or DRR lens or building community awareness about these concepts, which could enhance their capacity to identify changes in the risk context and further adapt in the future as climate change become more severe and the associated risk of disasters increase. A common criticism of CDMP has been that the LDRRF was implemented in a scattered manner and did not demonstrate the value of a comprehensive “all hazards” DRR approach. Nonetheless, innovative approaches to community and household level DRR and CCA have been promoted, e.g. in relation to farming. Moreover, local level Disaster Management Committees have been strengthened in project areas and communities have been made aware of measures to reduce vulnerability and how to react before and during a disaster.

However, sustainability has been and continue to be a major concern; stakeholders and beneficiaries widely perceive the timeframe of especially BCCRF and SEALS insufficient to consolidate the results achieved – and considering the level of ambition and the national and local capacities, this concern generally appears valid. However, an equally important issue related to sustainability is that stakeholders generally have a project dependency, consistently arguing that “a new project is needed” (whether funded by GoB or DPs) and there has been a general absence of a concrete exit strategies.

The above constraints in relation to implementation of BCCRF and CDMP are to a large extent related to weaknesses in their design and modalities. BCCRF’s implementation setup was parallel to GoB systems, which gave limited scope for GoB ownership and capacity development – and no scope for synergies and reinforcing BCCTF; GoB’s own mechanism for implementing the BCCSAP. BCCRF could have been an important tool in making Bangladesh ready for funding from the new global Green Climate (GCF) fund, but did not really contribute to this, since it did not develop GoB capacity or put in place/reinforce GoB structures to handle such funding. CDMP did not have the modalities in place to ensure a sufficiently sharp geographic focus and a strategic implementation (and demonstration of the value) of a comprehensive and integrated DRR approach. Moreover, both programmes had a limited involvement of the Ministries of Finance and Planning; a stronger involvement of these could for CDMP have further enhanced the ability to engage with sector ministries, and for BCCRF enhanced the possibility to build a robust national capacity to manage BCCRF and later GCF funds.

While EP strategies prioritised the mainstreaming of CCA and DRR across their support to other sectors, this only happened to some extent, and mainly in relation to agriculture. Overall, the support for CDMP (and PECM) made more significant contributions to mainstreaming, than EP sector support – but there were no deliberate attempts to use the expertise of these programmes to support/enhance the mainstreaming in EP’s sector support, so an opportunity was missed in this regard. There could be scope for the new programming phase to link CDMP/PECM and sector support for the benefit of both GoB systems as well as for achieving the EP’s policy aspirations regarding mainstreaming (and promoting a green economy).

Recommendations:

Mainstreaming of CCA and DRR in the support for different sectors has been a priority for the three EPs. With the exception of the support for the agricultural sector, the previous experience with such mainstreaming in the EP's bilateral sector support for Bangladesh was limited. However, the EPs supported CDMP and PECM, which for a number of years have engaged in mainstreaming, and have developed approaches, experiences and partnerships, which could benefit the future mainstreaming into the EPs' bilateral sector support programmes. Sector support programmes can on the other hand enhance the scope and impact of CDMP and PECM by providing a vehicle for further upscaling the DRR and CCA agenda.

Recommendation 1: Tap into the expertise and experience of EP funded mainstreaming initiatives (CDMP, PECM) for inputs to mainstreaming in EP programming, implementation and policy dialogue in other sectors. This can for example be done through joint activities to build mainstreaming capacity with central and local government in the sectors supported and demonstrating mainstreaming options, where CDMP and PECM provide technical inputs on mainstreaming to the implementing partners of sector support.

The timeframe for BCCRF was insufficient to deliver the intended results, not least seen in the light of the novel nature of the programme, the intend to achieve transformative change, and the capacity gaps within GOB. Neither BCCRF nor SEALS had enough time to ensure sustained change, especially at the local government and community levels. Continuity and longer-term engagement is needed to achieve sustainable and transformative results, especially when promoting approaches to new concepts.

Recommendation 2: Take into consideration in the planning of future support that developing the capacity and systems to ensure resilience and reducing vulnerability takes time

MoEF never assumed the leading role anticipated for BCCRF, and it will be the Ministry of Finance that has the role as Nationally Designated Authority for GCF. While MoDMR did assume a leading role for LDRRF, it did not perform as expected in terms of funding innovation and demonstrating a comprehensive DRR approach, where all hazards are addressed through a combination of both structural and non-structural interventions. Moreover, the fund managing capacity and expertise at the Ministry of Finance is significantly stronger than at MoEF and MODMR, who it turn both have the technical capacity and mandates vis-à-vis CCA and DRR, respectively. The ministries of finance and planning also have stronger authority vis-à-vis coordinating sector ministries and could therefore play a central role (with technical inputs from MoEF and MoDMR) in promoting mainstreaming and enhancing its inclusion in district level planning, budgeting, and implementation. Future support should take advantage of, and reinforce, the strengths and mandates of the different ministries.

Recommendation 3: For future support for CC & DRR mainstreaming use the Ministry of Finance or Planning as entry points, while ensuring that MoEF and/or MoDMR play a technical role to ensure quality. Possible options would be:

- Use the Ministry of Finance as lead agency for project selection and fund management, but ensure that MoEF and/or MoDMR play a technical role, e.g. in project screening,

development of thematic focus and technical tools. This could include supporting ERD in building strong mechanisms and modalities for handling climate and DRR finance in order to build Bangladesh's GCF readiness.

- Support MoEF and MoDMR in strengthening their regulatory role and capacity.

Considering that the World Bank has a significant CC portfolio in Bangladesh, it is noticeable that its role in BCCRF was as a fund administrator and that World Bank funds were not contributing to BCCRF. Moreover, the funding set aside for technical advisory and backstopping were insufficient and there was not a clear mutual understanding and on the role of the World Bank in terms of this. Hence, the modalities for engagement in BCCRF were not attractive for the World Bank. The ownership would probably have been stronger and the relationship between the World Bank and EPs more balanced, if the World Bank had been a donor and equal partner in BCCRF.

Recommendation 4: In future collaboration with the World Bank on climate change and DRR, do not use the World Bank merely as a fund administrator, but include World Bank as a donor/equal partner.

CDMP achieved significant results in terms of influencing policy and building national capacity. However, there are certain aspects of DM, where challenges remain and where CDMP did not fully achieve the anticipated results. There was some inertia in terms of allocating LDRRF and BCCRF funding for activity types, which were already well-known to GoB and thus funding was to a certain extent used for upscaling what GoB was already doing (e.g. constructing infrastructure, such as shelters and embankments), rather than introducing new approaches and innovation. Moreover, the approach applied for LDRRF was centralised, and thus not fully engaging local stakeholders and ensuring their ownership; and it is at the local level that the capacity constraints are most pronounced and the understanding of DRR most limited. Hence, some of the key gaps vis-à-vis enhancing resilience were not fully addressed.

Recommendation 5: Ensure that future programme support and policy dialogue related to DM and CC have a strong focus on the main constraints, especially at the local level:

- Comprehensive DRR approaches
- Preventive measures
- Non-structural DRR
- Defining and measuring outcome/impact targets and indicators
- Local government involvement, ownership and capacity
- Community awareness and ingraining knowledge
- Community participation, contributions and written agreement of their duty to undertake simple maintenance

8. Detailed facts and findings on gender equality and the empowerment of women

8.1 Overall context of sector

Bangladesh has seen many positive developments on gender equality and the empowerment of women (GEEW) over the last decade, including developments related to female education and health, and in some ways Bangladesh is an example for other low income countries to follow concerning investments in GEEW.²⁹⁹ Many problems remain however, in particular related to women's decision-making, dowry, mobility, and violence against women, which continues to be endemic.³⁰⁰

Education

Bangladesh has closed the gender gap for enrolment in primary and secondary school, with girls now outnumbering boys. Yet on tests of knowledge and skills, girls still do worse than boys. They also suffer higher dropout rates and lower completion rates in secondary education, partly due to child marriage and adolescent motherhood.³⁰¹ Results from a 2007 World Bank study showed that increase in female education has also promoted more liberal attitudes towards women and girls, and predicts that as female education expands, so will the demand for it. Researchers' data from studying the Female Secondary School Stipend Project in Bangladesh suggests that the program has been successful in increasing enrolment of girls in secondary school.³⁰²

Political empowerment

Bangladesh has elected female heads of government, and the current cabinet has several women heading ministries. The share of women in Parliament rose beyond the required 15% quota in 2008 through party nominations.³⁰³ In the 2008 election 19 of the 64 successful women were directly elected by voters, without assistance from party quotas.³⁰⁴ Currently, 19.7 per cent of parliamentary seats are held by women³⁰⁵ Women's participation in local decision-making has also improved because of the 24% quota set for women in

²⁹⁹ World Bank, *From Whispers to Voices, Gender and Social Transformation in Bangladesh*, 2008.

³⁰⁰ Human Rights Council, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, addendum on Bangladesh*, 2014.

³⁰¹ EU, *Bangladesh Europe 2012* (p. 58).

³⁰² World Bank, *Education for all in Bangladesh : Where does Bangladesh Stand in Terms of Achieving the EFA Goals by 2015?*, 2007 ; Schurmann, A. *Review of the Bangladesh Female Secondary School Stipend Project Using a Social Exclusion Framework. Journal of Health, Population and Nutrition*, 27 (4), 2009.

³⁰³ EU, *EU Bangladesh Europe 2012* (p. 58).

³⁰⁴ UNDP, *Asia-Pacific Human Development Report* ,2010 (p.95)

³⁰⁵ UNDP, *Bangladesh Human Development Report*, 2014 (p.4)

local government institutions, but women occupy few senior decision-making positions.³⁰⁶ People in Bangladesh report a higher rate of satisfaction with the decisions made by local women representatives in terms of the distribution of public resources and allocation of projects.³⁰⁷

Health

Access to primary health care, including antenatal and postnatal care, has been expanded. Inequality in infant mortality has been reversed, with infant mortality now lower for girls than for boys. The contraceptive prevalence rate rose from less than 10 per cent in 1975 to 56 per cent in 2009. The country nearly halved its fertility rates from 1990 to 2009, and has rapidly improved overall child mortality rates.³⁰⁸ However only 15 per cent of women give birth in medical institutions. Life expectancy at birth is 71.5 for women and 69.9 for men.³⁰⁹

Key development statistics on gender equality and the empowerment of women

The two Millennium development goals related to gender equality have been achieved according to UNDP.³¹⁰

- #3 Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women

Gender parity in primary and secondary education has been achieved at a national level/girls now outnumber boys.

There has been steady improvement in the social and political empowerment of women, and sharp increase in the number of women in seats in parliament.

- #5 Improve Maternal Health

The average rate of decline in maternal mortality has been 3.3% per year since the base year (1990), and the average rate to achieve the MDG was 3%.

According to the Bangladesh Maternal Mortality Survey, maternal mortality declined from 322 per 100,000 live births in 2001 to 194 in 2010, a 40% decline in 9 years.³¹¹

Table 1 provides further details on key statistics.

³⁰⁶ EU, *EU Bangladesh Report 2012* (p. 58)

³⁰⁷ UNDP, *Asia-Pacific Human Development Report*, 2010 (p.104)

³⁰⁸ EU, *EU Bangladesh Report 2012* (p. 20)

³⁰⁹ UNDP, *Human Development Report Bangladesh 2014* (p.4)

³¹⁰ <http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/mdgoverview/overview/mdg5/>

³¹¹ <http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/mdgoverview/overview/mdg3/>

Table 1: Key statistics related to gender equality and the empowerment of women

| Indicators | Year | Source of data |
|--|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Change in incidence of primary and secondary enrolment, by sex ratio of girls to boys in primary & secondary education | 2005 (earliest available): 106 2007: 107 2011 (latest available): 110 | World Bank World Development Indicators Database |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ratio of literate women to men, 20 to 24 years old ratio of literate women to men, 15-24 years old | 2001: 90 2012: 105 | World Bank World Development Indicators Database |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Change in incidence of maternal mortality Number of maternal deaths | 2000: 12,000 2007: 8,800 2014: 5,200 | World Bank World Development Indicators Database |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Change in incidence of under-5 mortality rates, by sex per 1000 | 2000: Male 91, Female 85 2010: Male 52, Female 46 2013: Male 44, Female 38 | World Bank World Development Indicators Database |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Change in incidence of child marriage, by sex | 2013: 38% of women married before age 15, 74% married after age 15 but before age 18f | UNICEF, Ending Child Marriage: Progress and prospects, 2013 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Change in incidence of human trafficking, by sex | 2005-2007: 450 persons accused of human trafficking, 100-150 arrests, 30-50 convictions 2012: applications for repatriation received, 330 women, 190 boys, 232 girls | UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, 2009 Combatting Human Trafficking, Bangladesh Country Report 2012, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh |

8.1.1 National strategies and policies

The Bangladesh state guarantees the rights of the women in Articles 27, 28, 29 and 65 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. In particular, Article 28(4) paves

the way for enactment of legislation to facilitate women's development. Apart from constitutional obligations, Bangladesh is a signatory of almost all the international agreements related to GEEW, including the main Convention, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Driven by the constitutional obligations and commitment to international agreements, the Government has accorded special emphasis to programmes to promote women's development in the 6th Five year Plan and National Women's Policy, 2011. The National Women's Policy set 22 targets, and the activities of the Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs (MoWCA) are closely associated with the realization of these goals.³¹²

MoWCA has formulated a number of policies to attempt to ensure overall development for women and children, including the National Women Development Policy 2011; the National Children Policy 2011; the Domestic Violence Protection and Preservation Rules 2013; and the Early Childhood Care and Development Policy 2013. The National Women Development Policy provides guidelines on prevention of child marriage, removal of discrimination against disabled girls and their protection, provision for secured and standard recreational, cultural and sports facility for the girl child, and removal of mental and physical abuse of women, rape, dowry, family abuse and acid throwing. In addition, the National Child Policy 2011 accords special priority to the girl child. It emphasizes counseling of the adolescent girl, provision of sanitation facilities for girls in educational institutions and the workplace, and special security arrangements for girls during disasters.

In 2013, MoWCA drafted the National Action Plan to implement the National Women Development Policy. To implement the action plan, concerned ministries have been requested to assess the financial needs attached to each of the items to be implemented by them.

The 6th Five Year Plan for 2011-2015 entitled 'Accelerating Growth and Reducing Poverty' advocates an increased awareness of the need to integrate gender concerns into sector activities to achieve efficiency in poverty reduction and sustainable development. The plan recognizes that women constitute a large proportion of the poorest people in rural areas, and that an emphasis on poverty reduction should specifically target poor women and female-headed households.

8.1.2 Institutional context

MoWCA works through three arms: Department of Women's Affairs at District and Union levels through the Women's Affairs Officer, Jatio Mohila Sangstha (with 64 District Branch Offices and 50 Upazila Offices running GEEW programming) and the Bangladesh Shishu Academy (national academy for children in Bangladesh). There are also Union Parishad Standing Committees and district legal aid committees. MoWCA works through a set of Gender Focal Points (GFPs) in all other ministries, who are responsible for gender mainstreaming within their own ministry.

There are a large number of NGOs which are involved in GEEW programming and have

³¹² http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/budget/14_15/gender_budget/en/04_30_MoWCA_English.pdf

GEEW unit, such as BRAC and Asha, as well as NGOs that focus on GEEW such as Nijera Kori, or on women's rights such as Ain o Salsh Kendra (ASK) and Manusher Jono. Naripokho is one of the larger membership-based, women's activist organizations working for the advancement of women's right and entitlements. There is also a coalition of NGOs which produces the shadow CEDAW report.³¹³

There is also a coordinating body on GEEW for development partners and the government under the Local Consultative Group on Women and Gender Equality (LCGWAGE), chaired by UN Women, the aim of which it to promote coordinated aid delivery and strengthened gender mainstreaming.

8.2 Strategies of relevant EPs in the sector

The EU's *Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development for 2010-2015* (GAP) is a key framework for all EPs and sets out an ambitious agenda for promoting gender equality through a three pronged approach – political and policy dialogue on gender equality; gender mainstreaming, and specific actions to reduce gender equality. The Plan of Action includes nine indicators, six of which are a specific focus for this evaluation, as follows:

- Strengthen the lead role of the EU in promoting gender equality in development.
- Place gender equality issues systematically on the agenda of dialogue with partner countries.
- Ensure that gender is mainstreamed in EU funded projects and that general budget support and sector support programmes (SWAPs) use gender disaggregated indicators and include at least one gender equality performance indicator where relevant.
- Prioritise in-country non-state actors' participation, capacity building and advocacy on gender equality and the empowerment of women.
- Strengthen EU support to partner countries in their efforts to achieve MDGs 3 and 5.
- Strengthen EU support to partner countries in combating gender-based violence and all forms of discriminations against women and girls.

The EU's *Country Strategy Paper* for the period 2007-2013 also notes that gender is a cross cutting issue for the EC to both place gender equality at the heart of poverty alleviation and because of the inequalities that keep women and girls from attaining their rights.

Sweden's development cooperation prioritizes the right to education, health, and a clean and healthy environment for women, men, girls and boys living in poverty, and emphasizes as well women's rights.³¹⁴

³¹³ Citizens Initiative on CEDAW-Bangladesh, *Alternative Report to the UN-CEDAW Committee*, 2010.

³¹⁴ Sida, *Strategy for development cooperation with Bangladesh January 2008-December 2012*, 2008.

The Danish's government commitments note it will give high priority to reducing gender gaps and mainstreaming gender equality concerns in all sector programmes and projects. Separate programme activities on women's rights, including violence and trafficking in women were to be carried out, with gender also mainstreamed in agriculture and water sector programming.³¹⁵ There is thus a strong women's rights component in all EP strategies.

8.3 EPs portfolio of projects

All EPs committed to mainstream gender so in effect the portfolio should include all projects. To determine the EPs' focus in more detail a review was carried from the total list of EPs projects to determine which focused mainly on GEEW, and which included GEEW, based on the description provided on the EPs websites, where for some projects project descriptions were included but for others only the project names. This is set out in Table 2.

Table 2 - Projects that focus on GEEW and include GEEW in their description

| Projects targeted to gender - Sida | | |
|--|---|-------------------------------|
| Name and description | Sector | Date and amount (US\$) |
| The action related to assistance to the health sector, HPNSDP 2011-2016, the training of midwives for MDG 5 & 4 | Health | 2013-2014 173,391 |
| Basic School System and Adolescent Girls Programme: A Second Chance Education with Livelihood Skills and Gender Empowerment | Education | 2013-2014 2,149,481 |
| The over-all goal of the project Extension of Realization of Human Rights and Democratization is to establish rule of law through enhancing and protecting women's and children's rights. Its purpose has focused on improving the rights of women and children and their access to justice. | Governance, democracy, human rights and gender equality | 2003-2008 715,218 |
| Projects that include reference to GEEW - Sida | | |
| Name and description | Sector | Date and amount (US\$) |
| Bangladesh Health Nutrition And Population Sector Programme (HNPSP): Focus on vulnerable groups, especially the poor, women, children and the elderly. Aims to improve the health conditions of these and to strengthen the health system. | Health | 2005-2010 68,065,837 |
| H & M, Page and the ILO intends to put up a Center of Excellence for vocational training in the textile and clothing industry in Bangladesh. | Education | 2013-2017 460,603 |
| The organization Institute for Sustainable Communities will | Education | 2012-2017 |

³¹⁵ Danida, *Bangladesh-Denmark Partnership, Strategy for Development Cooperation 2005-2009*, 2005.

| | | |
|---|---|-------------------------|
| establish a training program for supervisors in the textile industry in environmental, health and safety issues. | | 1,034, 142 |
| Cyclone Assistance, the project will aim to rehabilitate 20,000 children (50% girls) under the Child Protection component and another 700,000 primary and pre-primary school age children in the worst affected districts where schooling has been disrupted. | Education | 2007-2009 3, 596,004 |
| ASK - rule of law based on principles of democracy, human rights, justice and gender equality. Its objectives are to increase access to justice, ensure accountability, and eliminate all forms of discrimination. | Governance, democracy, human rights and gender equality | 2003-2008 672, 223 |
| Support to Reproductive Health Care (further description not provided) | Health | 2007-2010 4,926, 268 |

| Projects targeted to gender - EU | | |
|--|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Name and description | Sector | Date and amount (Euro) |
| To enhance the capacity of communities to reduce VAW at the grassroots levels, to engage the local leaderships, civil society, educators, youth and media and strengthen their capacity as active advocates to raise awareness and eliminate VAW | Human rights | 2011-2013 239, 605 |
| The overall objective is to prevent all forms of violence and discrimination against vulnerable groups, particularly women and girls by promoting human rights in specific areas of Bangladesh | Human rights | 2011-2013 285,000 |
| Contribute to Secure Rights of the Vulnerable Community through Promotion of Democratic Governance in Bangladesh. In particular, strengthen grassroots institutions with special focus on outcaste/minority women groups | Human rights | 2011-2013 290,882 |
| The action aims to reduce mortality among the most marginalized mothers and newborns in Atpara upazila by building sustainable public-private partnerships, thus contributing to the achievement and sustaining of MDGs 3,4 & 5 | Health education | 2010-2013 325,392 |
| Sustained food security and improved livelihood through empowerment of Ultra Poor (Women) in Gaibandha District | Food aid/food security | 2009-2013 9,176, 969 |
| To improve food security of rural ultra poor (female-headed) households to overcome chronic poverty and contribute in achieving the 1st Millennium Development Goal (MDG | Food aid/food security | 2009-2012 3,130, 215 |
| Implementation of safety net type initiatives, exclusively targeting ultra poor women, using successfully tested innovative approaches | Not specified | Date not provided 36,500,000 |
| Food Security for the Ultra Poor: The project purpose is to improve the food security and nutritional well-being of | Food aid/food security | 2009-2013 |

| | | |
|--|--|------------|
| 30,000 ultra poor women and their dependants in disaster prone areas (asset transfer, increase capacity to manage income generating activities). | | 11,600,000 |
|--|--|------------|

| Projects that include reference to gender - EU | | |
|---|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Name and description | Sector | Date and amount (Euro) |
| Support to the justice system: Activating Village Courts: The objective specific to this project is to empower and enable the poor, women and vulnerable groups to access a fair and effective justice system at the local level by activating village courts so that disputes may be resolved in an expeditious, transparent and affordable manner. | Legal and judicial development | 2007-2013 10 million |
| Affordable and sustainable health care for vulnerable people: It aims to ensure affordable and sustainable health care for vulnerable people, as reflected by reduced child mortality (MDG 4), improved maternal health (MDG 5) and spread of HIV/AIDS and incidence of malaria and other diseases halted (MDG 6) | Basic health care | 2010-2013 1 million |
| Households Enhanced Access to Local Treatment and Health Services: To build an enabling environment to increase the access of the vulnerable and marginalised groups, in particular, women and children to the community based quality public health services by strengthening community capacity and rural health service providers | Basic health care | 2011-2014 148,000 |
| National Food Security Nutritional Surveillance Project: to strengthen and institutionalize the nutritional surveillance system in Bangladesh, which can monitor the nutrition and health status of women and child. | Food aid/food security | 2008-2013 5, 220, 838 |
| Preventing and addressing undernutrition in your children and women and its underlying causes: The specific objective is to improve the food security and nutritional well-being of ultra poor households in disaster prone areas through supplementary feeding, distribution of micro-nutrient powder, home garden promotion and nutrition education | Food aid/food security | 2011-2014 3,600,000 |
| Rural Employment Opportunities for Public Assets: REOPA focuses on: i) increase income of destitute women and landless poor by providing employment; ii) improving rural public assets; iii) strengthening local government institutions. | Food aid/food security | 2005-2012 840,000 |
| Vulnerable Group Development for the Ultra-Poor: reduce deep poverty and food insecurity in BGD by enhancing the capacity of the ultra poor, particularly women-headed households. | Not specified | 20 million |

| Projects targeted to gender – Danida | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Name and description | Sector | Date and amount (kr) |
| Support for the Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs to campaign for gender equality and communication. Phase II | Good governance and civil society | 2010-2011 2.24 million |
| Program for increased awareness of gender equality and good governance among selected groups of young people | Good governance and civil society | 2009-2011 0.54 million |
| Support to the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs to 'Gender and Communication Campaign' | Good governance and civil society | 2007-2008 0.21 million |
| Combating trafficking and violence against women | Good governance and civil society | 2009-2011 1.47 million |
| Prevention of violence against women and support for battered women | Good governance and civil society | 2000-2007 25.31 million |
| Support for United Nations work with women and elections 2008 | Good governance and civil society | 2008-2009 0.07 million |

| Projects that include reference to gender - Danida | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Name and description | Sector | Date and amount (kr) |
| Human rights and good governance in Bangladesh, Phase II | Good governance and civil society | 2005-2010 220 million |
| Human rights and good governance in Bangladesh, Phase III | Good governance and civil society | 2011-2016 190 million |
| Support for self-help groups | Good governance and civil society | 1996-2011 3.75 million |
| Support for village development through the Bangladeshi NGO CODEC | Not specified | 1985-2007 129 million |
| Strengthening underprivileged children's rights (UCEP) | Good governance and civil society | 1997-2007 64.2 million |
| Health and development | Health | 1999-2011 18.6 million |

Table 2 demonstrates that:

- Targeted projects to GEEW allocated relatively small amounts to GEEW.
- The EU’s portfolio has been mainly focused on livelihoods and health, while Danida has had more of a focus on women’s and girls’ rights, while Sweden falls between the other two EPs.
- EU did not use the gender marker accurately, as it has no projects rated as “significant” in its OECD-DAC reporting (see Figure 1), whereas a number of projects fall into this category based on project documentation.
- Although the EU’s portfolio has been much larger overall in terms of funding, it has a roughly similar number of projects on its website that include reference to gender as Danida and Sida.

The portfolio reviewed in depth involved 25 project planning documents for all of the projects selected for in-depth analysis for this evaluation, as these project documents were readily available, and 13 evaluation reports of those projects which were also readily available. This includes mainly EU and Danida project documents, as Sida provided only few project documents. In addition ti involved in depth analysis of four projects:

- Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence against Women (MSPVAW), supported by Danida and implemented by MoWCA.
- The EU supported Food and Livelihood Security Project (FLS), implemented by the Department of Women Affairs and NGO implementing partners.
- The Danida supported Agriculture Sector Programme Support Agricultural Extension Component, and implemented through the Ministry of Agricultural, Department of Extension.
- ASK programme, supported by Sida and Danida, and implemented by ASK and partner NGOs.

8.4 Facts and findings per Judgement Criteria

JC8.1 Degree of mainstreaming of gender issues in relevant EP programmes and projects

| JC8.1: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|--|---------------------|
| All EPs committed to mainstreaming gender in their programming through country level strategies. The strategies have not translated into systematic gender mainstreaming in project planning. | Review of EPs strategies and 25 project planning documents and 13 evaluations, and documents for four projects reviewed in-depth; interviews | Strong |
| There has been a lack of gender-sensitive results statements and corresponding indicators, demonstrating that attention to GEEW has been ad hoc, and GEEW | Review of EPs strategies and 25 project planning documents and 13 evaluations, and documents for four projects reviewed in-depth; | Strong |

| | | |
|---|--|------------------------|
| has often been an add-on rather than being integrated into project planning. | interviews | |
| EPs strategies have focused on women's rights but this was not systematically translated into programming | Review of EPs strategies and 25 project planning documents and 13 evaluations, and documents for four projects reviewed in-depth | More than satisfactory |
| EPs have not invested in internal staff capacity on GEEW, or made effective use of the OECD-DAC gender marker system. Overall mainstreaming was not adequate. | Interviews, review of GAP reporting | Strong |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strength of gender analysis in programme and project planning documents | Data fully available for the EU, partly available for Danida, and hardly available for Sida |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Appropriate gender-sensitive results statements and indicators in planning documents | Data fully available for the EU, partly available for Danida, and hardly available for Sida |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Degree to which the programme/project cycle has included effective gender-sensitive implementation and its monitoring | Data fully available for the EU, partly available for Danida, and hardly available for Sida |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Extent to which EPs have focused on recent gender-related priorities including women's rights, gender based violence and LGBT discrimination | Data fully available for all EPs through strategies, fully available for the EU, partly available for Danida through project level documentation, and hardly available for Sida as no project documentation provided |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Extent to which EPs have implemented their internal agency gender equality policies, including internal capacity development | Data partly available All EPs internal policies were available and it was possible to meet GFPs in Dhaka, however despite requests it wasn't possible to meet Heads of Mission |

The overall objective of **Sweden's** development cooperation with Bangladesh during the period under evaluation was that the right to education, health, and a clean and healthy environment is fulfilled for women, men, girls and boys living in poverty. Of its four main strategic axes, three explicitly addressed gender equality:

- Increased access to and improved quality of primary education for children living in poverty, with a particular focus on girls.
- Improved access to efficient and non-discriminatory health care for people living in poverty, with a particular focus on maternal health care.
- Strengthened rights for women and improved democratic governance through greater opportunities for women and men living in poverty to assess and demand

quality and non-discriminatory public service delivery.

The strategy also emphasized that implementation would be proactive in listening to men's and women's experiences concerning public services.³¹⁶

The **Danish** government commitments as encapsulated in its strategy documents also noted that development assistance would give high priority to reducing gender gaps and mainstreaming gender equality concerns in all sector programmes and projects. Separate programme activities on women's rights, including violence and trafficking in women were to be carried out, with gender also mainstreamed in agriculture and water sector programming. Denmark's strategy put particular emphasis on contributing to eliminating gender-based discrimination and violence, including support to government to mobilise the state machinery to deal more effectively with violence against women.³¹⁷

The EU's country strategy document notes that its programming would include support to promoting human rights, with particular regard to women and children's rights, and in supporting the government's reform of the health sector, with the EU's overall objective being to improve the health status of the population – particularly the poor, women and children in both urban and rural areas. Gender was to be mainstreamed throughout other programming, as appropriate.³¹⁸

Hence, all three EPs strategies have had a focus on women's rights, particularly in the case of Sida which was the most explicit of the three policies as far as taking a rights based approach is concerned.³¹⁹

The strategies have not translated into systematic gender mainstreaming in project planning, although Danida projects demonstrated a higher level of mainstreaming than those of the EU.³²⁰ A review of 25 project proposals, fiches and logframes, and 13 external evaluation reports outside of the four projects reviewed in more detail, found:

- Eighty per cent of project documents do not include an adequate gender analysis in the context section.
- A lack of gender-sensitive results statement and corresponding indicators, showing that attention to GEEW has been ad hoc and GEEW was often an add-on rather than being integrated into project planning.
- GEEW was reflected more strongly in the education, agriculture and food security sectors than in climate change, good governance and the private sector.
- The emphasis on women's rights incorporated in EPs strategies was not reflected in 80 per cent of project documents.
- No project documents, including those with a specific rights focus, include LGBT issues.

³¹⁶ Sida *Strategy for Development Cooperation with Bangladesh (2008-2012)*, 2008.

³¹⁷ Danida *Strategy for Development Cooperation 2005-2009*, 2005.

³¹⁸ EU *Bangladesh-European Community Country Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013*, nd.

³¹⁹ MN503, 504, 506, 516.

³²⁰ Only a limited number of Sida project documents were available for review.

- Almost all project documents represent women as a vulnerable group and/or victims, rather than as development participants.
- Forty six per cent of evaluations reviewed include little or no information on gender, and it can be assumed by implication that the projects evaluated had a limited impact on GEEW.

There were however good planning practice examples identified, as set out in Box 1.

Box 1: Good practice in project planning

The Danida supported Agricultural Growth and Employment Programme 2013-2018 project document included a Gender Equality Rolling Plan which follows the project cycle and demonstrates how gender will be mainstreamed at each stage of the cycle, including relevant indicators, and also links the Gender Equality Rolling Plan to the objectives of the project as a whole.

UNDP, with financial support from the EPs, commissioned an extensive gender assessment to support their programming in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, based on document review and a 548 household survey, detailing access to: economic opportunities; control over income; education; rights related to families; household assets and properties and health facilities.³²¹

EPs' gender policies³²² included commitments to develop staff capacities on GEEW, particularly those of Gender Focal Points (GFP), and to track GEEW related financial allocations against the OECD-DAC gender marker.³²³ In the EU a GEEW training was held in 2014 with patchy attendance of some 15 out of 70 staff, the first training since 2006. In Sida the last formal GEEW training was in 2008, although global gender network meetings were held regularly for knowledge exchange. Danida provided regular GEEW training for sector-level staff. Sida had a full time GFP in place for a two-year period, while in the EU and Danida GFPs took on this role in addition to other full time responsibilities and spent less than 10 per cent of their time on GFP work. The current EU GFP is about to step down, and there have been no volunteers for a replacement so an administrative staff member has been appointed as GFP, signifying the low status of the GFP role as well as the implications of recent staff cuts.³²⁴

Aggregate reporting against the OECD-DAC gender marker for the period under review is set out in Figure 1 provides indicative data on the emphasis placed on GEEW by the EPs.³²⁵ The gender marker includes a four point rating:

- “principal” (2) - gender equality was an explicit objective of the activity;

³²¹ MIDAS, *Final Report on Gender Assessment of Chittagong Hill Tracts*, 2013.

³²² 2010-2015, 2010; Sida, *Promoting Gender Equality in Development Cooperation, 2005-2010*, 2005; Sida, *On Equal Footing, Policy for Gender Equality and the Rights and Role of Women in Sweden's International Development Cooperation 2010-2015*, 2010; Danida, *Gender Equality in Danish Development Cooperation, Strategy*, 2004.

³²³ <http://www.oecd.org/investment/stats/37461060.pdf>

³²⁴ MN503, 504, 511, 516, 518.

³²⁵ <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=GENDER>; OECD-DAC, *Aid in Support of Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: Statistical Overview*, 2012.

- “significant” (1) - gender equality was an important, but secondary, objective of the activity;
- “non-targeted” (0) - an activity is not found to target gender equality and;
- n/s, or not screened – these rating are included as the y axis for Figure 1.

Figure 1: % of EPs activities as rated by OECD-DAC gender marker ratings, 2008-2013 (by rating 0-2)




Figure 1 is based on total allocations by the EU of US\$ 737 million, Sida of US\$252 million, and Danida of US\$272 million, and provides evidence of more effective gender mainstreaming in Sida, with substantial gaps in EU project planning, and Danida performing between the other two EPs concerning principal and significant allocations to GEEW. All EPs reported against the OECD-DAC gender marker, but the exercise to date has been more of a formal requirement than analytical exercise. Data from the gender marker did not appear to be used internally by the EPs for strategic planning. Some respondents including GFPs were unclear about the purpose of the gender marker, and therefore did not prioritize using it or promoting it within their EP.³²⁶

The conclusions above concerning mainstreaming in the project cycle, internal capacity development and use of the OECD-DAC gender marker are in line with the findings of the global EU GEEW evaluation.³²⁷ This report found:

There is a mismatch between the EU’s strong policy commitments on GEWE and the organisational capacity to deliver on them. There is no evidence of any capacity assessment to determine the internal capacities needed to deliver the GEWE policies, or of a strategy to build essential capacities. What exists is a piecemeal approach to the delivery of policy commitments.

EU’s financial commitments to GEWE have increased in the period 2007–13 but human resource capacity to manage this increasing volume of work has not. Management have assumed that staff will be able to identify and address gender

³²⁶ MN503, 504, 511, 516, 518.

³²⁷ EC, *Evaluation of EU support to Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Partner Countries. Final Report*, 2015, p. vii.

issues in this work, with support from GFPs. However, staff do not see gender as their responsibility and so do not give it the required attention in their work. Furthermore most GFPs have neither the time nor the adequate technical expertise with regards to gender mainstreaming.

JC8.2 Effects of EPs gender programming on Government of Bangladesh and other partner capacity

| JC8.2: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|--|---|------------------------|
| EPs were responsive to the government's commitments and national strategies, e.g. all EPs' strategy documents refer to the need for alignment with gender elements of the government strategies. | Documentary review of EPs' and GoB's strategies, interviews | Strong |
| EPs have not been major contributors to implementation of government GEEW policy, including the national Women Development Policy. | Interviews, documentary review of EPs strategies and projects | More than satisfactory |
| EPs were successful in supporting the capacity of CSOs on GEEW, as well as the capacity of some beneficiaries. | Interviews, documentary review of evaluations and project documents | More than satisfactory |
| The EU Delegation was not perceived as leading on GEEW, neither through the Local Consultative Group nor in other fora. There appeared to be no significant GEEW issues on which the EU had taken the lead during the evaluation period. | Interviews | More than satisfactory |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|--|----------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Degree to which EPs have been responsive to the commitments and national strategies of the GoB | Data fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effectiveness of support to implementation the national Women's Development Policy | Data partly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Degree to which the capacity of the women's machinery and NGOs have been strengthened by the EPs' support | Data fully available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Degree to which gender has been mainstreamed in relevant policies and programmes of key government ministries other than the women's machinery | Data partly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Extent to which EPs have worked in a coordinated fashion to promote a common understanding of gender equality and the empowerment of women | Data partly available |

EPs were responsive to the government's commitments and national strategies, e.g. all EPs strategy documents refer to the need for alignment with the gender elements of the

government's main policies and strategies including the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers from the period.³²⁸ EPs were also responsive to the government's strategic commitment to promote GEEW and reduce violence against women (VAW). This has resulted in programming directly tied to government priorities, for example in education and food security. The determining issue, however, was not fundamentally about coherence with national strategies. Rather it was about whether the government had the political will and capacity to adequately promote GEEW, and the focus that the EPs were willing to put on GEEW if the government did not prioritize GEEW itself.³²⁹

The EU GAP committed the EU to strengthening its lead role in promoting GEEW, including through appointing a lead donor – a role taken on by Sida. Overall, the EU Delegation was not perceived as leading on GEEW, neither through the Local Consultative Group Working Group on Women's Advancement in Gender (LCGWAGE) nor in other fora. There were no significant GEEW issues on which the EU Delegation had taken the lead during the evaluation period. This was due partly to lack of senior manager leadership, and partly to lack of capacity, i.e. a part time GFP with many other responsibilities. Comparison was made between the EU and DFID; DFID had apparently been vocal in opposition to planned legislation to reduce the age of marriage for girls to 16 from 18, which would exacerbate some of the causes of gender inequality, and is contrary to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, of which Bangladesh is signatory, and public comments by the Prime Minister.³³⁰ This has been (and is) particularly pertinent as prevention of child marriage was one part of the 2014 Bangladesh and EU Joint Programming interim document.³³¹

Because the EU did not play a coordinating and convening role, and was seen to downplay GEEW itself, reporting on the Gender Action Plan (GAP) was subsequently inadequate, with only the EU, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark reporting on a limited number of GAP indicators. EU Member States did not consider GAP reporting a useful process, with the exception of one Member State which noted that the GAP had been useful for networking purposes. There is also no evidence that GAP reporting has been used in any way to determine EPs strategies and priorities.³³²

EPs have been successful in supporting the capacity of counterparts on GEEW through individual projects. Sida and Danida funding to ASK, a prominent Bangladeshi human rights NGO, has facilitated staff training, networking, and maintenance of a human rights database. This has been long term support to an NGO that is fully dependent on donors for support.

This necessarily raises the issues of sustainability. NGOs which focus on human rights and

³²⁸ Sida *Strategy for Development Cooperation with Bangladesh (2008-2012)*, 2008; Danida *Strategy for Development Cooperation 2005-2009*, 2005; EU *Bangladesh-European Community Country Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013*, nd.

³²⁹ MN 502, 506

³³⁰ MN517

³³¹ Bangladesh-EU + Joint Programming, Interim Document 10 December 2014, Draft.

³³² MN 504, 506, 511, 513, 516, 518

are not membership based³³³ do not have a clear path to financial sustainability. Danida has supported MoWCA over 15 years, with an additional five years of funding planned, in establishing and running innovative One Stop Crisis Centres (OCC) which provide support to victims of violence. Such long-term support is exemplary; it has allowed MoWCA to develop the OCCs into a national institution which has become largely self-supporting. Since 2000 Danida funding has dropped from some 85 per cent to some 15 per cent of the OCC budget, with the government now providing 80 per cent of the OCC budget; this includes the OCC location, and staff some of whom are permanent and some of whom such as the police officers are seconded from other ministries.³³⁴

Danida has also provided effective capacity development to the Department of Agriculture Extension (DAE) under the Agriculture Sector Programme Support project, including developing capacity at the local level of farmers, Farmer Trainers, Farmer Clubs, Union Farmer Associations and local level DAE staff. Having a senior international technical advisor located in DAE is likely to support ongoing capacity development. However an external evaluation found that: “current levels of AEC [Agriculture Extension Component] activities could not be sustained within the present DAE set-up should Danida funding cease to exist.”³³⁵ For the EU supported Food and Livelihood Security project beneficiary capacity has been noticeably developed, but the capacity of the Department of Women Affairs and project implementing partners had not been significantly developed.³³⁶

Gender mainstreaming throughout the government has not been a focus for EPs, as this has been viewed as the responsibility of MoWCA. MoWCA has been working through GFPs in ministries, but the GFPs were not in decision-making positions, and have been unlikely to promote mainstreaming effectively. There has been no road map for mainstreaming across the government, although it was not possible within the scope of the evaluation to determine fully the effectiveness of government GFPs.³³⁷ Among Bangladesh ministries MoWCA has been considered to have a relatively low level of capacity; a respondent referred to it as a ministry to which staff are posted as a “punishment”.³³⁸ As noted, at the strategic level providing support to MoWCA has been viewed as problematic by some donors, because it is perceived that the government itself is not prioritizing GEEW, and donors want to support areas that the government is prioritizing.³³⁹

³³³ As for example the main human rights network, Manusher Jono is.

³³⁴ MN 502

³³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, *Evaluation of the Farmer Field School Approach in the Agriculture Sector Programme Support Phase 11, Bangladesh*, 2011

³³⁶ EU, *Technical Assistance to the Department of Women Affairs for the Food and Livelihood Security project, Special Study, Final Report*, 2014.

³³⁷ EU, *Gender Country Profile, Final Report*, 2014, contains a detailed analysis of MoWCA; Citizens Initiative on CEDAW-Bangladesh, *Alternative Report to the UN-CEDAW Committee*, 2010.

³³⁸ MN517

³³⁹ MN 517

JC8.3 Extent to which EPs' support addressed systemic causes of gender inequality

| JC8.3: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|--|---|-------------------------------|
| All of the key policies related to GEEW suffered from policy evaporation, and at the strategic level EPs have not been major contributors to ensuring the implementation of GEEW policy | National GEEW policies and action plans, interviews | More than satisfactory |
| Both policy and political dialogue concerning GEEW and women's rights have not been strong enough. | Interviews | Indicative but not conclusive |
| All EPs' country level strategies have included a women's rights focus, but do not explicitly discuss the systemic causes of gender equality in any depth, in particular political and economic structures and gender norms and relations. Subsequently EPs programming tended to focus on income generation and livelihoods for women rather than gender equality, with limited attention to either changing the systemic causes of gender equality, or the role of men in promoting gender equality. | EP country level strategies and project documents, interviews | More than satisfactory |
| EPs reporting against the OECD-DAC gender marker does not allow for clear conclusions as to whether EPs are selecting thematic programming likely to support GEEW | OECD-DAC gender marker reports, interviews | Strong |

| Indicators | State of play of data collection |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Degree to which EPs have supported implementation of CEDAW and other relevant international conventions | Data partly available |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness of policy dialogue on gender equality between EPs and the Government of Bangladesh | Data hardly available; requests for interviews with Heads of Missions were referred to GFPs, who could only partly speak to questions of policy and political dialogue |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Degree to which EPs analysis highlighted the systemic causes of gender inequality | Data fully available through EP strategic planning and project documents |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Degree to which analysis was translated into programming addressing the systemic causes of gender inequality | Data partly available; only a select number of EP projects could be reviewed. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Selection of thematic programming areas likely to support gender equality | Data hardly available – OECD-DAC data was not reliable enough to draw |

| |
|---------------------------|
| conclusions in this area. |
|---------------------------|

Systemic causes of gender inequality in Bangladesh include: political and economic structures that promote men's interests and needs; patriarchal norms that support male dominance, seclusion and child marriage; women's lack of access to resources; dowry; endemic violence against women; lack of enforcement of legislation; and lack of capacity to address GEEW.³⁴⁰ All EPs' country level strategies included a women's rights focus, but did not explicitly discuss the systemic causes of gender equality in any depth, in particular political and economic structures and gender norms and relations.³⁴¹ For example Sida's *Strategy for Development Cooperation 2008-2012* (p.11) includes only two sentences in terms of analysis of systemic inequality: "The situation of women and children remains a matter of concern. Women continue to be the victims of discrimination and violence." Subsequently in their strategy documents EPs tended to focus on women rather than gender equality, with limited attention to either challenging the systemic causes of gender equality, or the role of men in promoting gender equality. "Rights" was equated with access, e.g. the right to access health or education, rather than attempting to change the structures that caused lack of access in the first place. Consequently EPs' programming for women had a focus on income generation and sustainable livelihood programming, except in the case of Danida whose programming appears to have had more of a focus on the systemic causes of gender inequality. The systemic causes of gender inequality are covered in detail in the EU 2014 *Gender Country Profile*, which considers gender inequality through the life cycle and analyses patriarchal norms which govern Bangladesh society, however the main recommendation of this report is on creation of a knowledge hub on GEEW, which will have little immediate impact on causes of gender equality, especially in a context of scarce resources within the EUD (MN 030).

EPs have not provided support for implementation of the national Women's Development Policy. The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women notes: "the estimated expenditure from 2013 to 2014 on a national action plan for the implementation of the policy is zero, and no portion of the Ministry's budget was spent on the policy in its 2011–2012 and 2012–2013 periods."³⁴² As noted in the last section, supporting gender mainstreaming throughout the government does not appear to be a priority for the EPs. All of the key policies related to GEEW suffered from policy evaporation, and at the strategic level EPs have not been major contributors to implementation of GEEW policy. One respondent noted that the donors including the EPs have tended to try and take responsibility for development of GEEW policies. However they noted that civil society has been a more substantial player in this area than the donors (although many civil society organisations are supported by the donors), and that policies would have been drafted anyway without donors' input.³⁴³

³⁴⁰ World Bank, *Whispers to Voices, Gender and Social Transformation in Bangladesh*, 2008.

³⁴¹ Sida *Strategy for Development Cooperation with Bangladesh (2008-2012)*, 2008; Danida *Strategy for Development Cooperation 2005-2009*, 2005; EU *Bangladesh-European Community Country Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013*, nd.

³⁴² Human Rights Council, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, addendum on Bangladesh*, 2014.

³⁴³ EU, *Gender Country Profile, Final Report*, 2014; Citizens Initiative on CEDAW-Bangladesh, *Alternative Report to the UN-CEDAW Committee*, 2010; MN506, 508, 517

One prong of the EU GAP is policy dialogue, with three corresponding GAP indicators: update Heads of Mission on gender issues; encourage the establishment of a gender coordination mechanism; and ensure that strategic planning documents are gender mainstreamed. Requests for interviews with Heads of Mission were referred to GFPs, so it was not possible to determine progress against the first indicator. As noted, a gender coordination mechanism exists but the EU does not play a lead role in it; and while strategic planning documents are gender mainstreamed this has not translated into systematic mainstreaming in programming.

The GAP also refers to the need for political dialogue: “In the framework of political dialogue, the EU should discuss with partner countries or regional organisations how they are implementing international legal obligations on women's rights and should discuss possible ways and means to support efforts in this regard.” There was no evidence that the EPs have prioritized political dialogue in relation to GEEW, as opposed to human rights more generally; however as it was not possible to discuss this area with Heads of Missions this can only be a tentative finding, based on interviews with GFPs, other Member States and experts.³⁴⁴ A recent case is the government’s plans to reduce the age of marriage from 18 to 16 for females, noted above. EPs have taken specific and noteworthy initiatives, for example Heads of Mission participating in the #HeforShe campaign which aims to involve men in promoting GEEW, participating in events for International Women’s Day, and mentioning gender issues in speeches, such as those related to the Rana Plaza collapse. However these initiatives have mainly ad hoc, and the EPs have apparently not been involved in any coordinated political dialogue with the government, neither under EU leadership nor otherwise. Sida has supported policy dialogue indirectly through its partnership with ASK, one of a number of organizations that produced the CEDAW shadow report, however this cannot be counted as systematic political dialogue.³⁴⁵

JC8.4 Contribution of EPs’ support on gender equality

| JC8.4: Summary Response | Information sources | Quality of evidence |
|---|--|-------------------------------|
| A number of EPs projects contributed to promoting GEEW, but overall EPs’ support to GEEW was not systematic. | Project evaluations, interviews | More than satisfactory |
| The four projects selected for more in-depth review illustrate both the positive results achieved by the EPs in relation to livelihoods, and the issues they faced in promoting GEEW and addressing systemic causes of gender inequality. | Project site visits, project evaluations, interviews | More than satisfactory |
| At the strategic level inadequate attention was placed on prevention in EPs’ programming on violence against women. | Project site visits, interviews | Indicative but not conclusive |

³⁴⁴ MN506, 508, 515, 517

³⁴⁵ Citizens Initiative on CEDAW-Bangladesh, *Alternative Report to the UN-CEDAW Committee*, 2010.

The indicators included in the evaluation Inception Report were at the macro-level, e.g. change in incidence of primary and secondary enrolment, by sex. Given the scale of EPs funding it was not possible to make a direct connection between their interventions and these macro-level data, so the table on state of play of data collection was not completed in this case.

A number of individual EPs projects contributed to promoting GEEW, but overall EPs support to GEEW has not been systematic or consistent and in some cases may not be sustainable. Findings from seven evaluation reports demonstrate that:

- In the EU supported Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme gender was not taken into account during beneficiary selection, beneficiaries were mostly men, reinforcing gender norms.³⁴⁶ On the contrary, in the Danida supported Climate Change Adaptation Project a gender inclusive approach was adopted in planning and implementation, which created employment for poorest women, and emphasized women's income generation leading to improvements in women's status, dignity and economic condition.³⁴⁷ However as noted in the private sector analysis of this evaluation, the project may not have fully incorporated protective measures sufficiently into its engagement with women groups in its rural roads/climate change adaptation work where the contractors are arguably subjecting the women to harsh working conditions and unsafe accommodation. Sustainability of the infrastructure developed is also a key concern with limited integration into the national infrastructure framework.³⁴⁸
- EU support to livelihoods has been effective through the Rural Employment Opportunities for Public Assets (REOPA) project has provided a sustained response, which has leveraged destitute women out of the cycle of extreme poverty. The project provided employment to destitute women on road maintenance, with savings invested in income generating activities (IGA).³⁴⁹
- To boost the participation of women in the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector, the EU supported TVET reform project developed a policy 'Promoting Gender Equality in the TVET Sector in Bangladesh'. This had the active involvement of all stakeholder partners and was guided by a Gender Working Group with 15 representatives from Government, ministries and departments and 3 civil society organizations. The next stage of this process is outlined as to ensure that the implementation of the policy guides future TVET and Skills Project. Several institutions are encouraging females to participate in non-traditional courses, and providing washrooms and safe accommodation for women.³⁵⁰
- Some EU supported projects will likely result in longer term changes in gender norms and relations, but results were mixed. The REOPA project and the EU supported Local Governance Support project led to increased mobility, participation in decision-

³⁴⁶ UNDP, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme 2010-2-14, Mid Term-Review*, 2012,

³⁴⁷ Danida, *Evaluation of Climate Change Adaptation Pilot Project (CCAPP)*, 2014.

³⁴⁸ Implementation Partner's Final Report: 'Rural Roads and Market Access Component' 2013, p. 12.

³⁴⁹ EU, *Rural Employment Opportunities for Public Assets (REOPA), Ex-Post Evaluation*, 2013, MN 505.

³⁵⁰ ILO, *Technical and vocational Education and Training (TVET), Final Independent Evaluation*, 2014.

making, and control over resources for women. The REOPA evaluation notes: “Non tangible benefits such as women's empowerment with improved social inclusion in the community, decision making ability, mobility, access to services, and gender equity and human rights are found considerably positive. Women hesitated to engage themselves in work outside the household, which was like taboo in some areas. The project actions are breaking the chain of such social taboo and employability of them increased among REOPA crew.”³⁵¹ The Local Government Support project similarly found changes in gender relations as a result of the project: “the public attitude towards women in the local governing process is changing, with a large number of people supporting the approach. A survey shows that in the LGSP-LIC areas some 46% of respondents indicated that they believed that women can participate effectively in planning and supervisory work, while just 24.6% of the respondents believed the same in non-LGSP-LIC areas.” For the project on the Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility (CHTDF) it was found that: “The CHTDF has contributed to the improvement of the position of women in the CHT through inclusive programmes and in the formation of the PNDGs [women’s groups]. The rights and positions of women in leadership have improved to some extent. However, participation in decision making by women is still very limited and in some villages, women are not allowed to make decisions even in their own organizations and projects.”³⁵²

The four projects selected for more in-depth review are illustrative of both the positive results achieved by the EPs in relation to livelihoods, and the issues they faced in promoting GEEW and addressing the systemic causes of gender inequality. Two of these projects – the Danida supported Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence against Women (MSPVAW), and Sida support to ASK - were specifically targeted at women’s empowerment, the EU GAP third prong. The MSPVAW was perceived as an innovative project as under its main component, the OCCs, the project brings together ten ministries which provide coordinated services to clients. Eight OCCs were in place at District level, staffed by doctors, nurses, lawyers, counselors and police officers, who provided a comprehensive service to clients, and also included shelters. The project introduced 40 new OCC cells at District and 20 at Upazila levels, staffed by a Medical and Programme Officer. The OCC model is an effective one for those accessing services, and clients expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the services provided. However, coverage is extremely limited in relation to the extent of the problem; 19, 286 clients were covered by all OCCs between August 2001 and April 2014, whereas millions of women are victims of violence.³⁵³ The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women also expressed concern about the overall quality of services provided in the OCC shelters, and limited freedom of movement of clients.³⁵⁴ Recourse through legal means may be limited to about

³⁵¹ UNDP op cit., p. 40. Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operatives, *Local Governance Support Project – Learning and Innovation Component*, 2011.

³⁵² EU, *Evaluation of Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facilities, Final Report*, 2014, p. 42.

³⁵³ IMED op cit; the 2013 Annual Progress Report notes 2619 clients received at all OCCs for 2013; MN 514.

³⁵⁴ Human Rights Council, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, addendum on Bangladesh*, 2014.

20 per cent of cases, partly because legal remedies are lengthy and costly, and there appears to be limited conviction of perpetrators of violence.³⁵⁵ The project does include a prevention component, which makes up some four per cent of the project budget, as opposed to 79 per cent for the OCCs; at the strategic level greater focus could be placed on prevention in EP programming on violence against women, as the OCCs will never cover more than a small fraction of those subject to violence.³⁵⁶

The EU supported Food and Livelihood Security Project (FLS), implemented by the Department of Women Affairs, aimed to improve food security of rural ultra-poor households in the North-western Districts of Bangladesh. The project planned to support livelihoods of 80,000 ultra-poor women, female-headed households and people with disabilities, through cash transfers to buy productive assets and training on IGAs. During implementation issues related to beneficiary selection were apparently avoided by cross-checking beneficiary lists, avoiding diversion of resources. A major constraint was theft of some Euro 365,000 of project resources by one of the implementing NGOs, which resulted in a court case at the Anti-Corruption Commission, and as yet no recovery of funds. Overall the project resulted in an increase in food production, purchasing power and social inclusion. Beneficiaries were organised into groups which met twice a month, where as well as discussing income generation activities they discussed social issues such as child marriage and trafficking, although these meetings do not appear to have significantly increased knowledge of women's rights.³⁵⁷

The Danida supported Agricultural Extension Component of the Agriculture Sector Programme Support planned to address the need for more effective extension services in the crops sub-sector, to improve productivity and for improved market opportunities, working mainly through Farmer Field Schools (FFS). The project had a major positive effect on increased knowledge on agricultural production and nutrition for three million poor people, and significantly raised income of participating households, and the impact of FFS on household nutrition and food security is statistically highly significant, most notably among lowest income households, however project reporting on nutrition and food security is not sex-disaggregated so gender differentials are not reported on. Results related to GEEW were mixed. The FFS intended addressing socio-cultural issues such as dowry and women's rights, but these issues were not discussed with men, and there was limited increased awareness among women; there was also no evidence of increased mobility or access to markets and the public sphere in general. Women had more decision-making power within households, particularly around less important decisions, but women who took loans as part of the project tended to hand the funds to their husbands who decided how they should be spent.³⁵⁸ These findings and those related to the FLS illustrate the

³⁵⁵ Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division, (IMED) Ministry of Planning, Government of Bangladesh, *Impact Evaluation Study of Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence Against Women (2nd Phase)*, 2014; MoWCA, *Annual Progress Report 2013*; <http://www.dhakatribune.com/law-amp-rights/2013/jun/19/one-stop-crisis-centre-limited-medicare-only>

³⁵⁶ IMED op cit. ; MN502, 506.

³⁵⁷ EU, *Technical Assistance to the Department of Women Affairs for the Food and Livelihood Security project, Special Study, Final Report*, 2014; MN 501, 503.

³⁵⁸ Danida, *Evaluation of the Farmer Field School Approach in the Agriculture Sector Programme Support Phase II, Bangladesh*, 2014 ; MN 511, 512.

constraints to a livelihood approach in addressing the systemic causes of gender inequality. While these projects provided livelihood support they addressed only to a certain extent gender norms and relations, as they primarily take a needs based as opposed to a rights based approach.

The ASK's programme, supported by Sida and Danida, included in its 2012-2016 logical framework a number of objectives related to women's rights:

- At least two rights based laws drafted and proposed
- 850,000 people made aware of their human rights, including women's rights
- 3,200 human rights actors capacitated, including related to GEEW and rights
- 55,000 rights violations addressed through legal services
- at least 1,000 recorded incidents of violence against women addressed, and
- 52 school theatre groups active promoting human and women's rights

ASK's is the only programme in the portfolio that takes an explicit rights based approach. ASK's entire budget comes from donors, which raises questions about longer-term sustainability.

The project was very successful in promoting women's rights, leading to an increase in women's knowledge of their rights and participation as actors in their communities. Women's groups were established in 40 unions in 10 districts, which monitored the services of the Union Parishad, tried to prevent child marriage, were active in preventing violence against women, and in some cases participated in the *salish* (village court). Forty-eight community based organisations were established to prevent human and women's rights violations. Community based Human Rights Defenders (HRD) were found to be highly effective in supporting rights holders locally, although most HRDs were male. The project also advocated for implementation of the various national legislations on women's rights related to e.g. protecting women against domestic violence and protecting the rights of children.

Issues raised were that it is common for lawyers to consider domestic violence against women as dowry cases, as the latter are easier to manage in court, a finding common with the OCC, and which downplays the role of domestic violence. Street theatre also represented women in line with the patriarchal norms, as victims or passive. Nevertheless the project contributed very positively to changing gender norms and relations and upholding women's rights.³⁵⁹

Overall therefore EPs found it easier to promote livelihoods than change the structures that cause gender inequality. It should be noted that changing social norms is a longer-term process dependent on context and somewhat outside the control of individual projects.

³⁵⁹ Ain o Salish Kendra, *Mid-term Review Report: "Strengthening Activism Towards Human Rights Culture in Bangladesh"*, 2014; mn 504, 507, 515, 519.

8.5 Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions

Overall EPs have not pursued gender mainstreaming systematically. The EPs country strategies include adequate reflection of gender equality and women's empowerment (GEEW) (excepting the systemic causes of gender inequality), but this has not translated into systematic mainstreaming in project plans and evaluations. EPs have not invested in internal staff capacity on GEEW, or made effective use of the OECD-DAC gender marker system.

There was no evidence to suggest that there were any significant GEEW issues on which the EU had taken the lead, partly due to a lack of senior manager leadership and capacity. EPs were successful in supporting the capacity of counterparts on GEEW at local level, with a number of good practice examples, but gender mainstreaming throughout the government was not a major focus for EPs.

EPs strategies focus on women rather than gender equality, with limited attention to either changing the systemic causes of gender equality, or the role of men in promoting gender equality. EPs have not been major contributors to the implementation of GEEW policy, and there is no evidence to suggest that they have prioritized political dialogue or been involved in coordinated political dialogue in relation to GEEW, neither under EU leadership nor otherwise.

A number of individual EPs projects contributed to promoting GEEW, but overall EPs' support has not been systematic, and in some cases raised issues as regards sustainability. Positive results were achieved for women's livelihoods, partly through selection of good implementing partners, but there were limited results in addressing systemic causes of gender inequality.

Recommendations (all to begin in first quarter 2016)

- EPs should jointly implement a fully funded two-year action plan strengthening internal gender mainstreaming.

This recommendation is important given the weaknesses in internal capacity identified in the evaluation in relation to policy and political dialogue and gender mainstreaming in project development. This should include regular capacity development of all relevant staff in gender analysis, gender sensitive strategic planning, and use of the OECD-DAC gender marker. After this action plan is implemented the EPs should move on to support directly the capacity of the government in gender mainstreaming.

- The EU Delegation and Member States should implement the recommendations of the 2014 *Gender Country Profile* concerning the need to set up a knowledge hub.

The 2014 *Gender Country Profile* identified lack of knowledge sharing related to gender analysis as a key constraint to effective work on GEEW. The knowledge hub should be funded on an ongoing basis by the EU Delegation and Member States, and follow the guidelines for development set out in the *Gender Country Profile*.

- EP project documents should systematically include GEEW issues.
A number of EP project documents were either gender-blind, did not pay adequate attention to GEEW, had limited focus on changing the systemic causes of gender inequality, or represented women as victims or vulnerable rather than active participants in development. During project development EP project proposals should be screened more carefully on an ongoing basis by project review bodies to ensure adequate attention to GEEW.

- In its monitoring and evaluations, EPs should assess more fully GEEW issues and in particular qualitative changes in gender relations.
A number of EP monitoring reports and evaluations did not pay adequate attention to issues of gender inequality, including the qualitative changes in gender norms and relations which are so important to ensuring women's rights. EP staff responsible for monitoring and evaluation should ensure that M&E processes fully capture GEEW issues on an ongoing basis, commissioning special studies on GEEW if needed.

- Support to programming working against Violence against Women should increase attention to prevention.
A significant percentage of budgets on work on violence against women is allocated to post violence service delivery rather than prevention. Through its support to the MSPVAW, Danida should encourage MoWCA to allocate a greater percentage of the programme budget on prevention.

- Targeted actions should focus in more depth on working with men as well as women.
A major gap in EP programming was a lack of focus the role that men can play in changing gender relations; EP programming often equated GEEW with women. Targeted programming for men could for example include educational programs for men on stopping violence against women.

Annex 6 – Project fiches

This annex provides, for the interventions selected for in-depth review, the evidence collected at outputs and results level on the basis of existing project documentation. It proposes one fiche per intervention, which details the programme logic, the results chain from activities until results, and the lessons learnt. Each fiche also includes a brief observation from the evaluation team on the basis of the site visits and interviews conducted in the field in April 2015.

The table below lists, for each sector, the selected interventions for in-depth review.

| Sectors of intervention | EP |
|--|-------------|
| Primary education | |
| Third Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP 3) (2012-2017) | EU & SE |
| PEDP 3 Result-based management technical assistance support (2008-2014) | SE |
| Support to the Hard to Reach through Basic Education (SHARE) (2010-2017) | EU |
| Private sector development | |
| Agricultural Sector Programme Support, Phase II (ASPS II) (2006-2013) | DK |
| Better Work and Standards Programme (BEST) (2009-2015) | EU |
| Integrated Support to Poverty and Inequality Reduction through Enterprise Development (INSPIRED) (2012-2018) | EU |
| Human rights and democratic governance | |
| Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs (PERP) (2007-2010) | EU, DK & SE |
| National Human Rights Commission Capacity Development Project (2009-2015) | DK & SE |
| Supporting Local Development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (2011-2013) | EU |
| Conflict Prevention, Recovery and Peace-building in Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh (2014-2015) | DK & SE |
| Climate change and disaster management | |
| Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF) (2012-2016) | EU, DK & SE |
| Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP Phase II) (2010-2014) | EU & SE |
| Sundarban Environmental And Livelihoods Security (SEALS) (2010-2014) | EU |
| Gender equality and empowerment of women | |
| Agriculture Sector Programme Support Phase II (ASPS II) - Regional Fisheries and Livestock Development Component (RFLDC) (2006-2011) | DK |
| Agriculture Sector Programme Support Phase II (ASPS II): Agricultural Extension Component (2006-2011) | DK |
| Multi-Sectoral Programme on Violence against Women Phase-III (One-Stop-Crisis centre) (2011-2016) | DK |
| Food and Livelihood Security programme for the Ultra-poor women, Small and Marginal farmers (2012-2014) | EU |
| Strengthening Activism Towards Human Rights Culture in Bangladesh (2012-2016) | SE |

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1. Primary Education Development Programme 3 (PEDP 3)

Title: PEDP 3**EPs:** EU and Sweden**Aid modality:****EU:** Sector Budget Support (SBS)/ Co-financing technical cooperation pool fund managed by UNICEF (TC)/Directly centralised (DC)**Sweden:** MSEK 310 (Treasury model)**Budget (EU):**

- Planned:
 - 1st FA signed: M€ 54 (SBS: M€51; TC: M€2.8; DC: M€0.2)
 - 2nd FA (re-submission): M€ 74 (SBS: M€70.38; TC: M€3; DC: M€0.62)
 - Rider (top-up): M€89 (SBS: M€85; procurement: M€3.5)
- Disbursed: M€10.5

FT 1: €M4 (Dec. 2012); FT2 & VT 1: M€6.5 (Sept.2013); FT3&VT2: suspended

Beneficiary: MoPME, the Directorate of Primary Education (DPE), the Ministry of Finance (MoF), local government education authorities at district and sub-district levels, pre-primary, primary and non-formal education schools (public, private and non-government organisations), school management committees, school teachers and head teachers and parents and children.**Implementation dates:**

FA signature: 29/01/2012

Start-date actual: 29/01/2012

End-date planned: 29/01/2017

Program logic:**▪ Logical framework:**

The EU and Sweden support the government's *third Primary Education Development Programme* (PEDP3) implemented through a sub-Sector Wide Approach encompassing most interventions that support pre-primary and formal primary education. The EU budget support modality slightly diverges from other donors' approach based on the treasury model, an earmarked budget support coupled with fiduciary risk safeguards. In comparison with PEDP 2, PEDP 3 increased the focus on how inputs are used at the school level to improve learning outcomes in the classroom and raise primary school completion rates.

▪ Assumptions:

- Viability of the treasury model for effective programme financial management; and
- Sufficient organisational capacity to implement a complex and large scale programme
- High growth and macro-economic stability assumptions to ensure increased financing to the sector

| Results chain <i>(as indicated in project documentation)</i> | Expectations and achievements <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> | Alternative contributing factors <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> |
|--|---|---|
| Output 1 (Result area 1: Improved student learning outcomes) | Intended output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Prottekæei shikhe</i> or teachers accountable for each child's learning; ▪ School and classroom based assessment ▪ Curriculum and textbooks strengthened ▪ Timely production and distribution of textbooks ▪ ICT introduced in education ▪ Teacher education and development, including introduction of a new Diploma in Education (Dip-in-Ed) and implementation of a comprehensive continuous teacher education program of in-service training and support networks Achieved output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 99% of schools received textbooks within the first month of academic month ▪ Dip-in-Ed set up ▪ Each child learn facing stalemate, lack of ownership at local level (school, U/DEO) | |
| Output 2 (Result area 2.1: Universal access and participation) | Intended output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Alternative and second chance education (NFE), including equivalency framework for non-formal education ▪ Free pre-primary education in government primary schools ▪ Mainstreaming inclusive education, including gender affirmative actions ▪ Continuous education provision in emergencies ▪ Communications and social mobilisation Achieved output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 95% of GPS with pre-primary classroom but question about quality/suitability of the facilities ▪ Second chance education and gender/inclusive education facing stalemates | NGO-run non-formal education provision Low administrative capacities within the government to coordinate NFE sub-sector Government's own budget |
| Output 3 | Intended output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Targeted stipends for poor students ▪ School health and expanding school feeding programmes provided | Government's own resources |

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| (Result area 2.2: Regional, gender and other forms of disparities minimised) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Child friendly school physical environment created ▪ Overcrowded classrooms and access disparities through needs based infrastructure reduced <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The number of stipend recipients remained relatively steady between 2006 and 2009 around 4.7 million children, the figure rose steeply to 7.6 million in 2011. ▪ Unmet target in terms of quality physical infrastructures ▪ Classrooms still overcrowded and disparities only slightly reduced | The stipend programme was implemented outside PEDP 3 |
| <p>Output 4 (Result area 3.1: Education decentralisation and school governance enhanced)</p> | <p>Intended output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Field-level offices strengthened ▪ School management and governance decentralized ▪ School level leadership and development ▪ Organisational review and strengthening, including creation of new posts, filling of vacancies and career paths <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SMC and UPEP Guidelines approved and distributed to schools. SLIP funds disbursed to schools. | Lack of political will to promote decentralisation and limited resources to lower administration levels |
| <p>Output 5 (Result area 3.5: Sector budget effectiveness enhanced)</p> | <p>Intended output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Grade V terminal exam strengthened ▪ Teacher recruitment, promotion and deployment ▪ Annual school census strengthened ▪ National students assessment improved <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Grade V examination implemented as of 2012 and increased number of competence-based items ▪ Teacher and head teacher recruitment process followed merit-based procedures and career path proposal submitted by DPE to MOPA. ▪ New diploma in PE piloted in 7 PTIs | Support from Sweden's RBM TA to improve the annual census |

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Annual census expansion plan for more coverage of schools and revised questionnaire. Separation of IT and EMIS functions and recruitment of 2 statisticians | |
| Output 6 <i>(Result area 4: Programme Planning and Management)</i> | <p>Intended output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Programme management and governance strengthened ▪ Programme financial management strengthened ▪ Appropriate predictable sector financing ensured; ▪ Sector monitoring functions and results based management strengthened ▪ Needs-based human resource development and training ▪ Public-private partnerships formalised <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Timely production of ASPR ▪ Timely production of interim un-audited IFR ▪ Implementation of the PFM action plan ▪ PPP not formalised | Support from Sweden's RBM TA to improve monitoring functions |
| Intermediate outcome 1 | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All children acquired grade-wise and subject-wise expected learning outcomes or competencies in the classroom <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Examination revised to get competence-based ▪ Learning assessment conducted in 2011 and 2013 | |
| Intermediate outcome 2 | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Participation of all children in pre- and primary education in all types of schools (formal, non-formal, and madrasah) <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NER increased from 87.2% in 2005 to 97.3% in 2013 ▪ The number of out-of-school children remains high ▪ Scant information about NFE enrolment | |
| Intermediate outcome 3 | Intended outcome | |

| | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Regional and other disparities reduced in terms of participation, completion and learning outcomes <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Slow narrowing down of geographical disparities for the three dimensions | |
| Intermediate outcome 4 | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sub-district (upazila) and school level management functions decentralised <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SLIPs transferred to 64% of schools ▪ Little progress in decentralisation of management function | |
| Intermediate outcome 5 | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effectiveness of budget allocation and utilisation increased <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No attention to budget allocation, good budget execution rate but low programme execution rate | |
| Intermediate outcome 6 | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Improved sector and programme planning and results based management <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ RBM tools available | |

Lessons learnt (as indicated in e.g. project reviews and evaluations):

From PEDP II:

- Overambitious and rigid programme design led to late start-up
- The sector-wide approach has i) created high level of government ownership and leadership and ii) enhanced programme sustainability compared to standalone projects
- Government organisation strengthened through use of existing structure and systems, which enabled greater focus on governance and systemic issues
- Delays in implementation due to difficult coordination with other ministries (MoF, Public Service Commission, Ministry of Establishment...).
- Pooled funding arrangements complex and not necessarily reducing fiduciary risk

From on-going PEDP III:

- Difficult dialogue on PFM with the GoB due to limited ownership of PFM reforms
- Difficult to ensure proper understanding of EU specific requirements
- Under-utilisation of technical assistance (despite the common TA framework)

Observations from the evaluation team:

In contrast to PEDP2, PEDP 3 and the treasury model have represented progress in terms of coordination, harmonisation and alignment on government's systems. PEDP 3 led to the strengthening of sector-level PFM and of the monitoring functions. DPs also contributed to the country's achievements in terms of access and retention and were instrumental in achieving critical quality-oriented reforms that may eventually positively influence learning outcomes.

However, PEDP 3 remains a hybrid system, anchored to a project approach and overly determined by donors' disbursement imperatives. The scope for aid effectiveness improvement remains significant. Enrolment and retention significantly improved but learning conditions and learning achievements only marginally changed, whereas geographical gap only slightly narrowed. While DPs paid a great attention to the teaching profession, less interest was paid to the professional support to teachers and to the lower levels of administration and school dynamics. The treasury model has suffered from a usual feature of Swap approach - a focus on central level processes and systems and a relative neglect of local level dynamics that partly contributes to a slow translation of quality-oriented reforms into effective changes in classrooms

Within this broad framework, the EU choice for budget support was relevant but the potential of the instrument could not be realised. EPs' interventions were complementary and their contributions to the policy dialogue valued. However, there has been insufficient efforts to build common positions among EU member states.

The Treasury model revealed a very complex mode of intervention that

- Viability of the treasury model for effective programme financial management; and
- Sufficient organisational capacity to implement a complex and large scale programme

The high growth and macro-economic stability allowed increased financing to the sector in absolute terms but the national effort to the sector remained unchanged and below international benchmarks and regional figures.

The Treasury model has been in practice a complex system that had been very demanding for both donors and governments and required a long learning period. The planning of expected outputs insufficiently took into account the limited capacity of the government: this led donors to overtake the management of results rather than trusting the government to deliver.

Information source:

Interviews (MN 200 to 210, 214, 216, 219, 220 and 22); PEDP 2 programme documents and completion reports; PEDP 3 programme documents; PEDP 3 implementation documents incl. JARM aide-memoires, ASPR and APSC; EU *Rom Report*.

2. Long term results management technical assistance project – PEDP 3

Title: Long term results management technical assistance project – PEDP 2&3

EP: Sweden

Aid modality: Phase 1 (May 2008 – April 2009), phase 2 (Jan. 2010 – Oct. 2011), 1 year extension (2012): Sweden’s direct management; phase 3: ADB-administered TA grant

Budget:

- Planned: SEK 2,971,760
- Disbursed: SEK 2,818,254

Beneficiary: Directorate of Primary Education (MoPME)

Implementation dates: 2008 - 2014

Program logic:

Logical framework: The main objective of the project was to strengthen and sustain result-based management, evidence-based and information management at the Directorate of Primary Education (DPE) in the context of PEDP 2 (2004-2011) and subsequently PEDP 3 (2011-2017). Technical assistants provided support to develop and strengthen various planning and monitoring tools (AOP, ASPR and the APSC). They also worked towards the internalisation of the RBM approach both at central and local levels.

▪ **Assumptions:**

Clear results have been defined which are relevant for the sector and can be measured and clear reporting formats are available in time. The organisation aligns responsibilities with results and the management culture is result-oriented. The processes for monitoring and budgeting enable the organisation to convert inputs into the desired results; there is a well-defined planning and budgeting processes.

| Results chain <i>(as indicated in project documentation)</i> | Expectations and achievements <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> | Alternative contributing factors <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> |
|--|---|--|
| Output 1: improved reporting on results of PEDP2 (Phases 1 and 2) | Intended output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Improved reporting on results of PEDP 2 Achieved output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Regular production of annual sector performance reports ▪ School census validation survey ▪ Creation of a upazila education performance profile ▪ Capacity building in DPE M&E division and MIS cell | Fragmentation of school data collection systems |
| Output 2: evidence-based planning and central and RBM internalisation at central and local levels (Extension, phase 2) | Intended output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ An improved ASPR ▪ Evidence-based annual operational plan developed for 2012/13 ▪ A training plan on result-based management for district and upazilas developed ▪ Plan to consolidate the annual census to integrate all providers developed ▪ Reporting instruments developed Achieved output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Draft ASPR 2012 provided to participant in advance to May 2012 JARM ▪ UEPP 2012 finalised in Sept.2012 and distributed to all UEO and DEO ▪ The ASC revised to take account of PEDP3 requirements ▪ A revised data cleaning manual | High level of staff turnover Entrenched traditional incremental approach to planning and budgeting Limited political support to deconcentration/decentralisation |
| Output 3 | Intended output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reporting on results of PEDP 3 implementation improved | |

| | | |
|---|---|--|
| <p>(phase 3): PEDP 3 evidence-based planning and reporting</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The use of information for evidence-based planning improved; ▪ RBM approach institutionalised <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ APSC 2012 and 2013 finalised and availability of a data cleaning manual data analysis tools prepared, such as APSC data dictionary and distributed Upazila ▪ ASPR format revised and report finalised; ▪ revised PEDP3 M&E framework formulated ▪ a web-based AOP software set-up, ▪ national and ▪ divisional ASPR dissemination workshops organised ▪ ASPR 2014 At-A-Glance for local level prepared ▪ distribution, including local education authority and schools; ▪ selection and mobilization of 14 new RBM trainers; ▪ 11 RBM district level training workshops conducted ; and (v) training of 150 trainers for Upazila ▪ draft proposal on RBM Institutionalization | |
|---|---|--|

Lessons learnt (as indicated in e.g. project reviews and evaluations):

- The Information Management Division (IMD) has difficulty to meet its target of producing the report by the end of academic year.
- There is a need to review and re-design the APSC report format.
- There is a need for more systematic mean of collecting information, especially on discreet projects and NFE activities
- The reliability of APSC/ASPR analysis has been hindered by the lack of credible population data the information remains underutilized

Need for better cooperation with other agencies responsible for collecting primary education data, especially with BANBEIS

Observations from the evaluation team:

The TA played a critical role in developing the planning and monitoring functions at the DPE level. The AOP and ASPR have been integrated in the routine work of the DPE. Under PEDP 2, they effectively prepared the ground for an actual result-focus orientation under PEDP 3. The quality of the experts who were mobilised has been widely recognised. There had been a good complementarity between the basket fund/Treasury model and this TA intervention.

Nevertheless, the process of transfer of know-how to DPE staff has been undermined by the high turnover of staff within the administration, the lack of specialists (statisticians) appointed in the M&E Division but also donors' disbursement imperatives that encourage a gap-filling approach over long-term system development. The limited progress on the Upazila Education Development Plans also demonstrates the challenge faced by the TA to promote the internalisation of RBM at district and upazilas, which is in part explained by the lack of political will to support the process of decentralisation/deconcentration. The difficulty faced by the M&E and MI divisions to provide education census data for the evaluation-related econometric analysis reflects the limits of the progress achieved in terms of data management and use at the DPE. The limited improvement in the quality of infrastructure also testifies of the limits of the RBM approach since the regular monitoring of PSQI indicators did not translate into policy or resource allocation changes. Finally, little effort has been deployed to strengthen the planning and reporting capacity of the ministry as a whole and to strengthen the collaboration between MoPME and MoE, which is a direct reflect of PEDP 2 and 3 focus on the DPE,.

Information sources:

Interviews (MN 205, 206, 210, 216, 219 and 220)

TA RBM programme documents: ADB / SIDA / Directorate of Primary Education, *TA 8085-BAN: Support for the Third Primary Education Development Project Results-Based Management Technical Assistance – Final report*, 2014 and *Quarterly Reports* Sept.2013 – Sept. 2014; Oxford Policy Management, *Long Term Result Based Management Technical Assistance Project, Extension phase, Final Report*, 2012

3. SHARE: Support to the Hard to Reach through Basic Education

Title: SHARE: Support to the Hard to Reach through Basic Education

EP: EU

Aid modality: Project approach/direct centralised management

Budget:

- Planned: M€ 52 (+€2.55 NGO co-funding)
Call for proposal: M€48.5; TA: M€3; Audit/M&E: M€0.5
- Disbursed: M€ 20,3
Budget reallocation: CFP: M€47.6; TA: M€3; Audit/M&E: M€1.4

Beneficiary: 400,000 hardest to reach children

Implementation dates:

EC decision date: 26/07/2010

End date planned: 28/02/2017

Program logic:

▪ **Logical framework:**

The programme aimed to provide quality primary education to the hardest to reach children, with the support of NGOs and to contribute, in a smaller scale, to adult education, with a focus on literacy, numeracy and family life skills. Even though the programme was not directly implemented with the government body in charge of NFE (BNFE), the programme also intended to strengthen the partnership between the government and the NGOs in the education sector. SHARE has two components. The first component has mainly focused on the provision of basic education for out-of-school children from the hardest to reach segments of society through four NGOs-led initiatives. The second component addresses the need for knowledge management, capacity building and coordination among the NGO-run projects and with the government and other providers of formal and non-formal primary education.

▪ **Assumptions:**

- Government and NGOs are ready and willing to heed
- The political situation continues to allow for NGO-supported alternative schooling approaches
- Sufficient and suitable (groups of) NGOs respond to the call for proposals to deliver alternative schooling programmes.
- The government will be interested in cooperating with, and participating in, capacity building, lessons learning, and other progress review activities.
- The government is receptive to innovative linkages with the NGO activities and approaches included in the project

| Results chain <i>(as indicated in project documentation)</i> | Expectations and achievements <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> | Alternative contributing factors <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> |
|---|--|--|
| Output 1 (Component 1) | <p>Intended output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provision of primary education and other education services ▪ Project management and coordination among the NGOs involved in individual projects. <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 8.364 schools established, 308.285 students enrolled ▪ Little coordination established | Communities were in charge of the construction of the learning centres. |
| Output 2 (Component 1) | <p>Intended output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establishment of school management Committees ▪ Training and ongoing support to empower communities to supervise schools, teachers and students. <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Dec. 2013, 7.488 SMC established (out of 9.554 target) ▪ 2557 PPE teachers/tutors recruited & trained ▪ 4.605 NFPE teachers/tutors recruited & trained ▪ 373.435 parenting education provided | |
| Output 3 (Component 2) | <p>Intended output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Development of an agreed set of data for all projects, ▪ Organisation of exchanges of experience and expertise among NGOs involved ▪ Establishment of an Advisory Board for SHARE ▪ Drafting of annual SHARE reports, Development and maintenance of a website, ▪ Sharing of materials developed by SHARE | <p>In the initial phase little relationship with the government</p> <p>Under-achievement of the TA</p> <p>Lack of capacity at the BNFE</p> |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provision of technical assistance ▪ Action research <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A database on NFE learning centres developed with the BNFE. ▪ A national conference organised in 2013 gathering NFE stakeholders ▪ Web site developed and functional ▪ Annual reports drafted ▪ One cross field visit organised and two share seminars organised in Nov.2012 | Lack of coordination between donors supporting NGOs-run NFE |
| Output 4 (Component 2) | <p>Intended output Specific training to NGOs on results-based management</p> <p>Achieved output: No progress achieved</p> | In the initial phase little relationship with the government Under-achievement of the TA |
| Intermediate outcome 1 Literacy, numeracy, key livelihood and life skills acquired by boys and girls who have dropped out of, or never enrolled in, primary schools, as well as by other community members lacking basic educational competencies | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A minimum of 80 % of enrolled boys and girls succeed in government recognised grade 5 examinations by the end of their education cycle ▪ Similar enrolment levels for girls and boys, with gender differentials maintained within the range of ± 5 % across all project years. ▪ Living habits and livelihood components (e.g. sanitation, hygiene, and family life education) included within the broader curriculum of all project interventions, at the latest by the end of year 2 <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ High pass rates of NFE-enrolled children (sup. to 90%). ▪ Girls' enrolment slightly higher | |
| Intermediate outcome 2 Community capacity to influence school | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All project schools implement school-level improvement plans no later than at the end of year 2. | |

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| management and accountability enhanced | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All project schools with active community action groups/school committees no later than at the end of year 2. ▪ Community members active in monitoring the performance of students ▪ Teachers in all schools, commencing no later than at the end of year 2. <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ See above, output 1 on establishment of SMC. The other indicators were included in the Action Fiche but were not reported on | |
| <p>Intermediate outcome 3 Lessons learned, best practices and materials shared and disseminated, and used in the NGO community and, if desired, responsible government agencies to inform policy and practice</p> | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Information sharing interactive website fully operational no later than at the end of Year 1. ▪ Lessons/experience sharing events for all implementing institutions at least twice yearly, commencing by the end of year 1. ▪ Minimum 50,000 visits on knowledge management website highlighting best practices and resources, during programme lifetime. <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A web site and a FB page are functional ▪ A national conference organised in Jan. 2013 | |
| <p>Intermediate outcome 4 Results-based management institutionalised at NGOs and, if desired, at relevant government institutions</p> | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increased consistent use of information for evidence-based planning by implementing institutions and, possibly, government partners ▪ Increased consistent use of results-based monitoring formats by implementing institutions ▪ Frequent collection, use, reporting and targeted dissemination of monitoring data <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No progress | <p>Under-performance of the 'knowledge component', lack of government's involvement in the design phase, lack of capacities at the BNFE, competition between DPE and BNFE as the government body in charge of NFE</p> |

| | | |
|--------------------|--|--|
| End outcome | Intended outcome Enhanced life prospects (earnings, social mobility, etc) for target beneficiaries Greater capacity to play a full role in society, exercise democratic rights, and contribute to national development. Achieved outcome <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ These potential long term impacts have not been monitored | |
|--------------------|--|--|

Lessons learnt (as indicated in e.g. project reviews and evaluations):

- Based on international studies commissioned in the identification phase, successful programmes consolidate and took to new levels the achievements of earlier projects and initiatives: SHARE programme is strongly based on the previous EU NFPE programme
- Key ingredients of success: exchange among NGOs and with the government and the wider community and the quality of teachers
- The government face difficulties in cooperating with NGOs in the education sector; past technical assistance to the Bureau of NFE did not bear fruit and the government does not provide enough resource (personnel and budget) to this institution.

Observations from the evaluation team:

The provision component, through NGOs (Caritas, Save the children, Dhaka Ahsania Mission) was successful in promoting enrolment of children from poor background and hard-to-reach areas. The NGOs developed innovative models (multigrade system, higher number of contact hours and close supervision of teachers), which proved successful in terms of examination pass rate. However, their model has also been based on teachers' low salary, which turned to be a critical challenge for all projects: they faced a high level of teachers' attrition. The sustainability of the learning centres at the end of the projects is also doubtful and the solution promoted within the programme – to ask very poor communities to take over the running of schools – is questionable and proved in the past, in most cases, unsuccessful. For instance, out of our 2.300 centres under UNIQUE I, only 450 are continuing today, on the basis of parents' contributions. Quality is not good especially due to the lack of teachers' supervision.

Besides, the 'knowledge management component' faced implementation challenges, the causes of which have been mainly rooted in choices made in the design phase. Because of distrust with the government's body in charge of non-formal education (the BNFE) – shared by most donors – the EU decided to by-pass the government, which was insufficiently involved in the design. The choice was also made of a 'floating TA', without any institutional anchorage. The government nourished resentment about being side-lined. This had important effects on the implementation of this component, which was supposed to ensure the coordination between the three provision projects and promote the dissemination of NFE best practices including with the government. The initial technical assistant did not manage to build any relation with government officials, who did not participate to the national conference organised by the project in 2013. Only in the beginning of 2014, with the arrival of a new technical assistant, progress could be achieved no financing agreement was signed. As a result, there were four discrete projects implemented without any relation with each other. This also undermined the possibility of synergy between the EU's intervention in formal education (PEDP 3) and in non-formal education (Share), which was one strategic stated objective.

Finally, coordination with other DPs' (including Sweden) that have supported other NGO-led non-formal education provision did not occur.

Information sources:


Interviews (MN 206, 211, 212, 213, 215, 218 and 221); EU, *ROM reports* nr 1625334, 1625943, 1626032 and 1626048); Action fiche and financing agreement

4. Agricultural Sector Programme Support, Phase II (ASPS II)

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| <p>Title: Agricultural Sector Programme Support, Phase II EP: Danida Aid modality: Project, but with initial SPS/SWAp ambitions Budget:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Planned: 531m DKK (according to data from EoD, 2015) ▪ Disbursed: 492m DKK <p>Beneficiary: 1) Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) esp extension), 2) Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock /MoFL) and 3) Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives (esp. for rural roads) Implementation dates: Start 2006 end 2011, but extended to mid-2013</p> | |
| <p>Program logic:</p> <p>Logical framework: The overall objective of the ASPSII was to ‘improve the living conditions of poor marginal and small farmer households through enhanced, integrated and sustainable agricultural productivity’ The development objective was to increase ‘marginal and small-scale farmers’ production and incomes so that they will have moved out of poverty and improved their nutritional status. Farmers will be able to express their interest and demands and receive agricultural support from the private sector and a responsive local government system that was able to deliver decentralised services. The rural economy stakeholders would include productive farmers, and private enterprises in food, aquaculture and livestock production and processing. Village and rural roads would be maintained to a standard that meets the transport needs for the timely supply of inputs and for access to farmers and their markets. This was distilled into three components as illustrated below:</p> | |
| Components | Immediate Objectives |
| <p>Agricultural Extension Implemented by the Department of Agriculture Extension (DAE), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). Using especially the farmers’ field school (FFS) concept</p> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improved, demand driven, integrated, and decentralised extension systems developed to support poor marginal and small farmer households. 2. Enhanced capacity of associated agricultural agencies of MOA. |
| <p>Regional Fisheries and Livestock Development Implemented by the Department of Fisheries (DOF) and the Department of Livestock Services (DLS), Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock (MOFL).</p> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improved and sustainable productivity of, and returns from, fisheries and livestock systems of resource poor households |

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| <p>Rural Roads and Market Access Implemented by the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED), Ministry of Local Government Rural Development and Cooperatives (MLGRDC).</p> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improved efficiency and sustainability of the rural roads and market infrastructure. 2. Improved efficiency of LGED's maintenance management. |
| <p>▪ Assumptions: <i>Major assumptions were explicitly formulated at the impact level, and included:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ That public expenditure for agriculture and rural development, including rural roads, would increase on an annual basis, ▪ That subsidies to agricultural inputs would continue, ▪ That sector policies, strategies and plans, which were then in the process of being approved, would be implemented; implying that public extension services would gradually withdraw from direct extension delivery and focus on supervision and regulatory measures. ▪ That the political and economic environment would be conducive to the process of enabling the private sector to gradually take over direct service delivery to farmers, ▪ That environmental analyses were included in sectoral, fiscal and trade policies as well as in the design and implementation of projects and programmes, and that removal of subsidies would first be directed at environmentally damaging practices. ▪ That future governments would continue to support and further develop the increased role of local governments in development activities. <p><i>At the outcome level major assumptions included:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ That public partner institutions (MOA/extension; MOFL, and LGED) would adhere to national and sector policies as well as governance and accountability principles; ▪ That the group-based Field School approach would be accepted as a major public extension delivery mechanism in cooperation with NGOs, CBOs and private commercial stakeholders in the sector; ▪ That LCS groups were accepted as sub-contractors for rural roads and markets; ▪ That existing training institutions would have the capacity to develop and implement planned training programmes; ▪ That mandates of DLS and DOF as public entities would be clarified on the basis of emerging sub-sector policies. In this context, that decisions would be taken to transfer the responsibility for direct veterinary practice as well as vaccine production and distribution to the private sector while, on the other hand reinforcing the regulatory capacity of DLS and DOF. <p>Further the ProDoc of 2006 also indicated that there were risks involved in assuming that the changing role of especially extension service would encounter resistance from vested interests in the public sector. Moreover fiduciary risk in the context of financial harmonisation and alignment were also mentioned.</p> | |

BANGLADESH - ASPS2 COMPONENTS



| Results chain (as indicated in project documentation) | Expectations and achievements (as indicated in project documentation) | Alternative contributing factors | Observations from the evaluation team |
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| <p>Output 1 Agricultural Extension</p> | <p>Intended output</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. FFS with the Integrated Crop Management approach established and developed in app. 200 Upazilas. 2. FFS developed into clubs, CBOs, and farmer associations, and provided support. 3. Significantly increased number of Farmer Trainers developed through strengthened training programme 4. An increased emphasis on linkages between agricultural production, food use and nutrition. 5. Increased use of mass media and ICT for extension messages and market information 6. Appropriate technologies for small and marginal farmers developed and adopted using the FFSs. 7. Improved capacity in agricultural agencies of MOA in its redefined role. <p>Achieved output (from project completion reports 2013)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The project implemented 12000 FFS events during which 297 825 male and 297 | <p>Evaluation of FFS (2011) corroborates the findings from the PCR and finds that app. 3 million (1/2 m HH) have benefitted directly with new knowledge and techniques. On 4. the FFS evaluation claims better results than the PCR in terms of nutrition and food security</p> <p>On 7. both the technical review of ASPSII (2010) and FFS evaluation questioned the sustainability of capacity development at central MoA level. It was thus stated that ‘efforts to establish sector programme support to a large extent have been wasted in Bangladesh. During ASPS I, and initially during ASPS II, institutional support units were meant to build capacity and promote change. However, these units largely failed to produce lasting results and have consequently been closed or are in the process of being so.’ (ASPSII review, 2010, p. 40)</p> | <p>Clearly the outreach has been impressive and outputs have generally been achieved, expect for central level capacity development interventions.</p> <p>A considerable number of FFS facilitators have been trained and they in-turn have training over 1:2 million households. Also many farm clubs / CBOs have been created, and many demonstration of e.g. need seeds have been made.</p> <p>However the 2010 review mention the trade-off between fiduciary risk of channelling funding to GoB systems. Most of the results were hence delivered as through projectized vehicles, potentially undermining institutional sustainability.</p> <p>However most of the activities and outputs have been delivered as planned with reasonable efficiency.</p> |

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| | <p>825 female farmers trained on Integrated Crop Management (ICM)</p> <p>2. The 12,000 events evolved into the formation of 8,000 farmers clubs to take the FFS concept forward.</p> <p>3. 297,825 male and 297,825 female farmers trained on ICM</p> <p>4. 1563 trainers trained in linkages between agriculture, food and nutrition. However limited improvements for FFS HH vs. non-beneficiaries</p> <p>5. 129 TV and radio programmes supported as well as given access to agricultural experts via the internet</p> <p>6. 3511 demonstrations of new technologies were offer as well as 2836 research trials by club members</p> <p>7. Significant number of trainings, scholarships and study tours.</p> | | |
| <p>Output 2 Regional Fisheries And Livestock Development</p> | <p>Intended output</p> <p>1: Effective support to resource-poor households through decentralised, integrated and demand-driven fisheries and livestock extension provision</p> <p>2: Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and farmers' associations formed and enabled to successfully articulate their demands to local private and public service providers.</p> | | <p>The project approach has delivered impressive outputs and secured tremendous outreach. However, engagement with the MoFL was arguably problematic as the policy pursued by the ministry in terms of controlling veterinary medicine and vaccines were running counter to the objectives Danida sought (e.g private sector strengthening), as the ministry</p> |

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| | <p>3: Linkages with the private sector improved to enable farmers to access quality inputs and markets.</p> <p>4: Local government institutions in component areas enabled to address the expressed demands of the local community in relation to the areas of fisheries and livestock development.</p> <p>5: The capacity of the DOF and DLS to deliver public goods (supporting legislative and regulatory framework, quality control of inputs and products, disease control, relevant research, monitoring) enhanced</p> <p>Achieved output (mainly based on MoFL's PCR of 2013)</p> <p>1: 457,000 HH have benefitted from extension/FFS services with around 41% continuing the techniques learnt. 55% of beneficiaries are women.</p> <p>2: Around 317 CBOs are active at completion (2013) against a target of 450. Also focus on human rights issues</p> <p>3: 24 hatcheries supported (mainly sea food) and over 100 CBO supported to procure inputs.</p> <p>4: 1886, mainly members from 275 UPs, have received support in the form of</p> | <p>In general the component on fisheries and livestock largely achieved or even exceeded the targets for outputs, as already noted in the 2010 technical review report.</p> <p>1. 2010 review and 2011 FFS evaluation praised the FFS and the wider extension work for its outreach.</p> <p>2. 2010 review notice the CBOs dependence on donor support</p> <p>3. Too production oriented, limited marketing support</p> <p>4. Limited integration between agricultural extension on the one hand and fisheries & livestock</p> | <p>had several conflict of interests in the area. This catalysed the decision to eventually stop support to the ministry.</p> <p>Thus on 5) support to DOF and DLS the project did not fundamentally change the perverse incentive system that caused the ministry to maintain status quo (MN 006).</p> |
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| | <p>training. Focus on technical issues and block grant management.</p> <p>5: Limited information available, but substantial focus on IT hardware procurement. Two central level project support units were closed down, but research was carried out.</p> | | |
| <p>Output 3 Rural roads & market access</p> | <p>Key Intended output</p> <p>A) Capacity of local level engineer offices' staff to plan and manage road networks through effective interfacing with local government improved</p> <p>B) Capacity of local contracting societies (LCS, groups of poor female road workers) to participate in rural roads and market access infrastructure and other IGA improved</p> <p>C) Union Roads and Upazila roads rehabilitated with >1 million LCS labour days</p> <p>D) Village A and B roads, rural markets and related market access infrastructures improved on demand responsive basis with >1.3 million LCS labour days</p> <p>E) Strategy developed to include Roads and Structures Database Management System(RSDMS) decision-making & GIS module, and Rural Roads and Structures</p> | <p>2010 review argued that A) and E) were doing progress the development of a computer based monitoring and planning system for road maintenance, utilising advanced software and GIS facilities already available at LGED headquarters.</p> <p>2010 review also argued that the project was on target to meet its quantitative as there was more GoB funding being available.</p> | <p>However, without funding local level engineers have failed to provide the basic information that is need for the database to be useful, which has undermined the usefulness of the database. And the absence of a road fund further limits the sustainability. This relates to A and E)</p> <p>B) Most LCS meet did not 'commercialise' but relied on Danida scheme for continued work. However, the income was reported as important in catalysing IGAs at a small scale. Nevertheless the rather harsh working conditions of the poor women in the LCSs combined with them being instructed to sleep in tents on-site to prevent theft of tools,</p> |

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| | <p>Maintenance Manual participatory guidelines: This also entailed increased capacity of LGED to maintain roads.</p> <p>Achieved output</p> <p>A) Substantial training both locally and internationally of 1185 government staff. Limited demand responsiveness (PCR, 2013)</p> <p>B) Substantial training but only partly achieved as commercial sector show limited interest</p> <p>C) Targets mostly achieved</p> <p>D) Targets mostly achieved</p> <p>E) Mixed results, efforts to create a road fund turned futile, but some activities positive such as community monitoring of road conditions (PCR 2013)</p> | | <p>does raise some OHS and workers rights issues.</p> <p>C &D) the key issues is of course the sustainability which is still dubious and varying, although GoB is increasing investments in the area, also with support from the World Bank. The sustainability is of course also linked to the limited use of the RSDMS.</p> |
| <p>Intermediate outcome 1 Improved, demand driven, integrated, and decentralised extension systems developed to support poor marginal and small farmer households & enhanced capacity of</p> | <p>Intended outcome</p> <p>a) 15% increase in incomes of benefiting farmers over non-benefitting</p> <p>b) Improve food security</p> <p>c) Improve nutritional status (13% reduction in underweight children)</p> <p>Achieved outcome</p> <p>a) The PCR claim 14% increase over non-benefitting farmers, but with highest impact in lower-income HHs.</p> | <p>Strong performance on output indicator and the immediate outcomes also corresponding strong output. However the less quantifiable ones of capacity development seems to have underperformed esp. at central level (see 2009 and 2010 reviews). The 2010 review thus stated that with sustainability 'on part of the public sector to a great extent depending on</p> | <p>The component seems to have benefitted the poorest the most; a reversal compared to many other interventions where elite capture is often dominant. Especially poor marginalised women have benefitted from both LCS and FFS. The national FFS curriculum has also been updated to reflect the important findings emerging from the field.</p> |

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| associated agricultural agencies of MOA | <p>b) Project farmers estimate that their probability of being hit by food shortage has decreased from 20% before FFS to 11% after FFS, compared to a slight decrease from 31% to 30% within non-project farmers</p> <p>c) Sharp reduction overall in under-nutrition, but only slight difference between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. However for severe underweight, beneficiaries outperformed non-beneficiaries, indicate a reach to the poorest.</p> | the interest taken by individuals at the management level, which is often hampered by frequent transfers, it has been important to maintain separate management structures with professionals contracted directly by the components (i.e. Danida)'. | <p>The degree to which this is an outcome of enhanced capacity of the MoA is however questionable. A substantial number of persons actually carrying out the activities were either directly paid by Danida through the parallel management structures described in the previous box. More than 300 were directly paid by Danida and allowances also play a role in attracting both staff and beneficiaries.</p> <p>Some local level MoA staff have clearly had capacity enhanced, but it is questionable if these would have the resources to continue the outreach. Besides the frequent staff transfers also undermined capacity development efforts.</p> <p>The capacity development efforts have gradually become 'privatised' with the increased farmer capacity being one element, and with commercial FFS being another. However there was limited evidence that commercial FFS were taking off in any substantial manner.</p> |
| Intermediate outcome 2 | Intended outcome | The 2009 'Impact evaluation of aquaculture interventions' reported | |

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| <p>Improved and sustainable productivity of, and returns from, fisheries and livestock systems of resource poor households</p> | <p>The component operates with two 'golden indicators' for achieving success</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 300,000 HH with access to improved extension services and 12,000 FFS 2. 500 Active CBOs offering farmer –to-farmer extension, input supply & marketing services <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 337,000 HH w. extension services and 14,5000 FFS 2. 537 CBOs and 12 district associations active. <p>In general the 2013 PCR and the 2011 argues that both incomes and nutritional status improve more among beneficiaries than the control group. However, the 2011 evaluation argued that nutritional improvements were marginal and statistical insignificant.</p> | <p>no significant improvements compared to control group, but argued that spill over effects likely contaminated results. However the later FFS evaluation (2011) also reported significant improvement for this component, but noted that the CBOs had sustainability challenges.</p> | <p>Similarly to the immediate outcome 1, there has been tangible improvement in productivity from fisheries and livestock systems of poor households, but the a key issue is the sustainably not only of the public institutions but also the CBOs and farmers' clubs (MN 006 & MN 014).</p> |
| <p>Intermediate outcome 3 Improved efficiency and sustainability of the rural roads and market infrastructure.</p> | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LGED capacity enhanced with 20% increase in road network maintained and 2.3 million LCSs labour days. LCS sustainable 10% increase in produce marketed. ▪ Efficiency of LGED maintenance mgmt. improved with a 5% decrease in unit costs and mgmt. systems developed and operational. | <p>A cyclone (SIDR) meant that additional funding was need with GoB provided. Only limited base line</p> | |

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| | <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The maintenance of the road network has been increased from 43% to 75% or 32% points against a target of 20% points in the four component districts. LCS women benefitted with a total of 3.10 million labour-days, but LCS commercial contractor development did not take place. Data as regards 'increase in marketed produce' is not available. ▪ The LGED maintenance mgmt. interventions have been found effective to reduce overall annual maintenance cost per km. | <p>and no control groups included undermines evaluability. (2010 Review)</p> | <p>The component is a continuation of a previous road project and has worked along the same concepts. It is still a challenged to improve both efficiency and sustainability and there are also concerns about the OHS of the women employed under the LCSs.</p> |
| End outcome | <p>Intended outcome</p> <p>1 Improve the living conditions of poor marginal and small farmer households through enhanced, integrated and sustainable agricultural productivity?</p> <p>2 marginal and small-scale farmers' production and incomes so that they will have moved out of poverty and improved their nutritional status (ProDoc, 2006)</p> <p><i>Achieved outcome 1:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increased product diversification with 70% of beneficiaries using at least two new technologies for crop production. (PCR, AEC, 2013) | <p>FFS evaluation (2011): In comparison with women from control villages, women from FFS households showed remarkably more awareness and knowledge of improved nutrition, including better nutrition for pregnant women and infants, improved cooking methods, and health among others. FFS evaluation also indicates a strong production diversification effect from FFS. The total number of agricultural products produced by FFS households is 3.7 compared to</p> | <p>It is quite noteworthy that the end outcome is not related to systemic changes or improvement in capacity to continue to deliver the services to the rural poor. Clearly the programme achieved most of the quantifiable targets, but also failed to influence central government policies in the way envisaged. Also the public institutions that were originally intended to take over responsibility have still only limited capacity to do so.</p> |

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 15% increase in crop yields compared to non-beneficiaries (target 10%) (PCR, 2013) <p><i>Achieved outcome 2:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Incomes increased by 30% among beneficiaries, only 15% in control group ▪ The project has significantly contributed to food security and raised the nutritional status (PCR, 2013) | <p>3.1 within control village households. Moreover, 87% of the trained farmers had increased their crop (rice) yield, but the FFS evaluation does not provide quantifications.</p> | <p>Clearly the knowledge instilled in the individual farmers is sustainable as such and there will also be spillovers to neighbours, as well as in the country-wide FFS system. But there is limited evidence that GoB, CBOs nor the private sector will continue the activities on the same scale.</p> |
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Information sources:

MN: 006, 014, 117, 118, 119, 314, 318, ProDocs, reviews, FFS Evaluation, end of project reports (x3)

Lessons learnt (as indicated in e.g. project reviews and evaluations):

There has been no aggregated lessons learnt from the overall ASPStII programme, only at component level:

Extension (Sources: PCR for component and 2011 FFS Evaluation)

Both direct and spill-over effects had substantial poverty reducing effects

Even hard-core poor can join and benefit from rural markets.

Gender roles can be challenged through female economic activities

Creation of change agents (farmer organisations) is difficult and require more than just training and seed money

Potential trade-off between cohesive/effective farmers organisations and inclusion of the ultra-poor; can lead to elite capture.

There is no single blue-print FFS approach: Has to be adapted

Aquaculture and livestock (sources: PCR for component, 2009 aquaculture evaluation and 2011 FFS evaluation)

FFS is appropriate for resource poor farmers incl. fish-farmers.

Local FFS facilitators should be chosen on technical not political merit

FFS curriculum needs adaptation to local ecology and markets

CBO can complement GoB extension services, but sustainability is challenging

CBO needs social cohesion, but challenging for poor/illiterate to manage a CBO.

CBO acting as service agents for input suppliers (taking commission) can increase sustainability prospects

Women's mobility is limiting CBO participation to day-time meetings in same village

Private agribusinesses have proven the value chain can be strengthened by inclusion of CBOs.

Local governments should extend investment beyond infrastructure to also include production sectors

DLS and DoF should re-orient their training curriculum toward being more relevant for the poor.

Adaptive research has suffered under institutional researcher not sufficiently practical oriented and overloaded with other academic burdens -> suboptimal and often late outputs

Projectised management setup (TA heavy PMU) makes subsequent alignment with GoB norms and standards challenging and cause friction.

Rural roads and market infrastructure (Sources PCR for component):

Temporary employment offers a route to income and integration into local economy of the poorest.

LCS while being competitive and providing quality may need more support to become capable contractors.

Difficult to coordinate a de facto rural road project under an agricultural sector umbrella.

Observations from the evaluation team:

Danida attempted to introduce a sector approach in its engagement with GoB, but clearly underestimated the unwillingness of the two key ministries (MoA and MoFL) to engage in meaningful policy level dialogue and change processes. To its credit Danida realised the extremely limited direct impact at central level and phase out such support, which was not demanded, but arguably accepted as part of the overall 'aid package' which clearly had elements that were demanded, not least at local level, as well as offering employment for hundreds of Bangladeshi staff.

Operationally, the decision to cancel central policy level support demonstrate significant flexibility that Danida has in adapting as it realised the futility of continuing this support. However, design-wise Danida knew of the limited interest in such support when drafting the programme, but nevertheless pressed for this, as that was seen in HQ as how one should ‘do’ sector programmes in Danida. Moreover, already at design stage Danida also was aware of the market interventions by MoFL in the veterinary medicine supply. As stated in a 2005 study ‘vaccine availability has been a significant problem as MoFL has not managed to provide adequate supply, whereas the private sector is restricted in providing vaccines partly because government vaccines are heavily subsidised. Livestock farmers, on the other hand, have experienced problems in achieving profitability when not supported by the projects, partly due to irregular vaccine supply from government services and the lack of competitive alternatives from the private sector.’ The study further added that: continued and unchanged support for MoFL, without reforming the incentive and governance framework, will probably continue to produce mixed outcomes.¹ However Danida nevertheless continued support to MoFL without any significant reforms to the incentive and governance frameworks.

The ASPS II thus gradually became focused at the local, implementation level, where substantial achievements have been made, in no small part due to Danida’s flexible and adaptable procedures that have allowed for quick and effective recruitment of key (mostly local) TA staff that has ensured fast roll out. Perhaps the most evident example of this is the rural roads and market access, where Danida has paid poor women for constructing infrastructure (primarily roads) with limited chances of sustainability in terms of both the infrastructure and the groups formed (the LCSs). However it does provide incomes, albeit with some concerns regarding OHS and their security.

There have nevertheless been some policy central level impacts of the ASPS II, with e.g. the seed policy being shaped with assistance from Danida, but perhaps more impacting, the practices introduced in FFSs. Here the staff of DEA has experienced new approach such as group work, involvement of beneficiaries and adaptation to local contexts, which previously had limited traction. Moreover the national FFS curriculum has been reformed following the ASPS II experiences as has the IPM policy. DEA is increasingly taking over FFS facilitators after Danida support has ceased, with Danida now focusing more on innovation / adaptation of the approach.

In conclusion it may be that for a relatively small partner such as Danida, policy and institutional change may be best promoted ‘bottom up’ and incremental though e.g. demonstration and working on real issues, rather than directly with policy makers and central institutions the latter having shown limited demand and interest in engaging with Danida.

¹ Network for Smallholder Poultry Development: *Study on Danida Support to the Smallholder Livestock Sector in Bangladesh*, March 2005

5. Better Work and Standards Programme, Project Fiche

Title: Better Work and Standards Programme (BEST)

EP: EU (w. UNIDO); GIZ (implementers) and Norway (co-funder)

Aid modality: Project approach, with both centralised, joint (UNIDO) and indirect management (GIZ)

Budget:

Planned: € 15 million

Disbursed: €12 million (December 2014)

Beneficiary: Component 1: Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI, under MoI), component 2: Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock and others and, component 3: Ministries of Textiles, Jute and Commerce.

Implementation dates: FA signed end-2009 to end-2014, extended to Mid-2015.

Program logic:

Logical framework:

The overall objective of BEST is to contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction by supporting Bangladesh to take advantage of global market opportunities and the Project Purpose is to improve competitiveness and facilitate export growth and diversification through increased productivity and the compliance of the production base with international norms and practices. Over 90% of the project financing comes from the EU. UNIDO, NORAD and GIZ are also contributors with the Government providing assistance in kind. BEST has 3 well defined components;

Component 1: Strengthen the overall national quality conformity assessment infrastructure and integrate it with the international quality infrastructure in order to increase consumer protection through improved product safety and quality features and improve competitiveness so to allow Bangladesh better exploit global market opportunities.

Component 2: Strengthen the national quality infrastructure for fish and fish products to meet safety and quality requirements in export markets, improve competitiveness and take advantage of global market opportunities particularly in EU markets

Component 3: Strengthen overall competitiveness in the textiles and RMG sector (sub-component 3a) and to improve the working conditions of the RMG sector leading to the expansion of the sector and creating better employment opportunities (subcomponent 3b, implemented by GIZ).


Responsibility for implementation is the EU delegation in Dhaka and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, UNIDO, who have signed a contribution agreement in joint management mode. UNIDO implementation will cover components 1, 2 and component 3a. GIZ through an agreement with the Delegation implemented component 3b regarding labour laws and social compliance in the RMG sector.

Assumptions:

The programme has a number of explicit assumptions in the logframe. At overall level this related to the commitment of the GoB to ensuring the autonomous status of key institutions.

The second risk related to the maintenance of political and economic stability, whereas the third concerned the maintenance of the sectors' competitiveness. Another key assumption asserted that the investment and security climate should not deteriorate. Finally, an assumption was also that the needed legislation would be passed.

At component level, assumptions also centered around the commitment from GoB and the private sector to support the institutions. Moreover the log frame also mentioned the risk of the private sector not seeing sufficient tangible benefits from the interventions (e.g. accreditation / certification) reducing the effectiveness. The textile and garment component further assumed that world demand would increase and access to the world market would continue to be accessible, while the Bangladeshi industry would remain competitive. Finally, there were concerns by the two main private sector bodies Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA) and Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers Association (BGMEA), that the strengthening the voice of workers would undermine competitiveness. An assumption was thus that labour relation would remain stable and positive.



Source: Textile Today, 2014

As can be seen from figure 1 above the RMG sector has managed to increase export substantially throughout the evaluation period even in the challenging period of the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, indicate that world markets remained open and that the industry remained competitive vis-à-vis e.g. China and India.

| Stated results chain | Stated expectations and achievements | Alternative contributing factors (From e.g. reviews and evaluations) | Observations from the evaluation team |
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| <p>Output 1</p> <p>Better quality infrastructure Incl. national quality conformity.</p> | <p>Key intended output</p> <p>1. • Certificates issued by Bangladesh Accreditation Board (BAB) accredited laboratories, inspections bodies and conformity assessment and certification bodies are accepted by overseas buyers</p> <p>2. • Credibility, reliability and range of BSTI services substantially improved (Log frame has a long-list of specific indicators)</p> <p>• 20 % increase in BSTI services to export sector that uses conformity assessment and certification services</p> <p>Key achieved output</p> <p>1. BAB has according to progress report from 2H 2014, accredited 19 labs, incl. 3 testing labs. This, according to staff, is accepted by overseas buyers, and BAB is already well-respected.</p> <p>2. No hard figures available but accelerating progress in reforms. New law on quality policy is formulated and is expected to be passed shortly. There is now widespread aware and acceptance of the required reforms of BSTI.</p> | <p>There has been a strong drive to obtain accreditation and certification. Especially in the latter part of the project implementation has accelerated (see mid-term evaluation). Also BEST has been able to operate with political shrewdness: 'UNIDO operates within difficult political and economic environments, which pose significant risks to project delivery. In the example of the BAB project, the team found that the ability of the recipient agency's management to resist political pressure allowed it to hire the most competent and motivated staff, which has ensured that the new agency is building a solid foundation' (NORAD: Review of Norad's support to UNIDO's Trade Capacity Building Programme 2005-2013' Oslo, January 2015)</p> | <p>The sustainability may be compromised if not accompanied by underpinning institutional and legal reforms, which has been gaining traction as both GoB and industry begins to realise the benefits of localised faster and cheaper certification/ accreditation, similarly to what has been seen in fisheries. No progress on consumer rights strengthening and this sub-component was dropped as GoB did not accept the need for independent NGO/watchdog involvement. Strong private sector engagement is likely to improve sustainability.</p> |
| <p>Output 2</p> <p>Better fishery quality</p> | <p>Key intended output</p> <p>a) Regulatory framework for controls in the supply chain (distributor, farm, hatchery, feedmill) harmonised, including veterinary medicinal products (VMP) and possible conflicts of interest prevented</p> | <p>Reasonable progress and high relevance as judged by the mid-term evaluation (2013). This is backed up by the progress reports and the Norad evaluation.</p> | <p>Significant results according to both the Ministry /DOF and the industry BFFEA. Effective support to competent authorities- inspection &</p> |

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| | <p>b) Official controls by competent authorities extended throughout the entire supply chain c) Increased validity and reliability of sampling and analysis for official controls d) Involvement of the private sector in analysis of official controls</p> <p>Key achieved output</p> <p>a) Most of the activities have been completed, with new/revised regulations, policies and manuals within feed, hatchery, aquaculture medicine and fishery waste management been developed and approved. Policy on National Residue Control Plan in fisheries developed by BEST and adopted in 2011. BEST has trained DoF officers in its implementation b) New protocol on control of fish and fishery products approved by Dept. of Fisheries and inspector staff trained in its use. c) Some progress in capacitating Khulna fish inspection and quality control (FIQC) but still not fully functions according but GoB willing to invest (MN 116). Laboratories are accredited for ISO 17025 by BAB</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Accreditation process is underway • Laboratories successfully passed in 10 proficient tests • Completed Validation of 27 methods, 17 using ELISA and 10 methods using AAS at each station • Pre-export testing service now available in a reasonable | <p>Training has been a key element of HRD</p> | <p>certification wings. Introduced risk based inspections that reduced export cost as well as inspection cost. Traceability has also improved including e-traceability along the value chain.</p> <p>Social compliance and socio-economic work has been more limited to ToT and manuals production. Limited evidence of substantial / transformative work in this space.</p> |
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| | <p>short time at regional FIQC Labs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Test results become more reliable, widely acceptable & faster <p>d) Training has been provided to field assistances / lead farmers in cooperation with Bangladesh Frozen Foods Exporters' Association (BFFEA).</p> | | |
| <p>Output 3 Better work in textiles and garments</p> | <p>Key intended output</p> <p>a) The social compliance status of about 2000 factories has been upgraded and at least moved to the next higher category.</p> <p>b) 20% of companies capable to deal directly with buyers and/or offer “fast response” services and/or create new products or own brands by Programme end</p> <p>c) 100 companies demonstrate significant increase in quality and productivity by programme end.</p> <p>Key achieved output</p> <p>A) 1500 manufactures (75% of the targeted 2000) have received training on factory compliance with 663 factories improving their grade (GIZ: Final Report: Promotion of Labour Standards in the RMG Sector, 2015). Social compliance seems to have played a minor part in the de facto implementation of the programme, which seems more focussed on competitiveness and add-value. Nevertheless the in 2013 a total of 580 workers, supervisors, factory managers and labour leaders received training on labour law</p> | <p>Based on presentation 20 April 2015:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Performance Clusters developed for quality and productivity improvement • National institutes were assisted in building their capacity • Created alliance between national institutes and international institutes for mutual cooperation, knowledge sharing and academic exchange • A long-term Support Plan for Textile Training” for the textiles and garments industry • Analysis and Planning assistance to MoTJ and MoC | <p>a) According to beneficiaries substantial improvements in social compliance. Must needed assistance rendered.</p> <p>b) Again robust appreciation by beneficiaries claiming to the improved response time and in-house innovation.</p> <p>c) No quantitative info.</p> |

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| | <p>compliance and 12 out of fourteen benefitting factories had appointed a social compliance officer (progress report 1H 2013).</p> <p>B) Focus seems to have been readjusted to foster design and educational/training partnerships between EU and Bangladeshi institutes. This however has progressed well.</p> <p>C) The project has formed national performance clusters of companies focussing on quality and productivity improvements through training. Experts from London College of Fashion, led the training.</p> | | |
| <p><i>Intermediate outcome 1</i> Strengthen the overall national quality conformity assessment infrastructure and integrate it with the international quality infrastructure in order to increase consumer protection through improved product safety and quality features and improve competitiveness so to allow Bangladesh better exploit global market opportunities</p> | <p>Intended outcome</p> <p>A) Bangladesh Accreditation Board (BAB) is a full member of the Asia-Pacific Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation and signatory to its Mutual Recognition Arrangement (APLAC-MRA).</p> <p>B) The institutional structure of Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI) is reformed and its operational capacity strengthened in line with international norms</p> <p>Achieved outcome</p> <p>A) BAB is a signatory to APLAC-MRA, considered a landmark achievement. 19 labs accredited (end 2014).</p> <p>B) Limited info in own reports with focus on activities done, less on outputs</p> | <p>A) Project have delivered, but probably also due to pressure from private sector and commitment from GoB</p> <p>B) Mid-term evaluation claims serious shortfalls in this area, with too much GoB focus on regulatory and enforcement aspects, to the detriment of facilitating trade, Moreover ineffective coordination between BSTI, other ministries and the private sector has hampered progress.</p> | <p>A. Pressure from private sector has catalysed stronger GoB commitment. BEST instrumental in leveraging this pressure, but will need to be kept.</p> <p>B) After mid-term evaluation substantial progress achieved with BSTI asserting its role as a reference body along international norms.</p> |
| <p><i>Intermediate outcome 2</i></p> | <p>Intended outcome</p> | | |

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| <p>Official controls improved and integrity of production management systems strengthened to meet international norms, so as to improve food safety conditions and maintain access to export markets for fishery products</p> | <p>Reduction in the positive results in samples to below 5% for both Bangladeshi (NRCP) and EU (RASFF) standards</p> <p>Achieved outcome No figures available in documentation, uncertain if this key outcome has been maintained.</p> | <p>Mid-term evaluation gives the second lowest scoring for impact (fair) and the worst for sustainability for this component, arguing that most activities will not be continued without external support</p> | <p>Successful audit of fisheries sector by Food & Veterinary Office of EU in 2011</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 20% mandatory testing requirement by EU has been lifted in 2011 due to improved food safety compliance of Bangladesh shrimp – Reduced NRCP/Pre-shipment non-compliances – Drastic reduction of Rapid Alerts (RASFF) – No Rapid Alerts (RASFF) in 2013-14 (64 in 2008-09) - Instrumental in the process of harmonizing various legislations- new market entry. |
| <p><i>Intermediate outcome 3</i> To enable the Textiles and Clothing sector to better compete in the post Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) context, through better performance and enhanced social compliance</p> | <p><i>Intended outcome</i> 1) The textiles and garment sector complies with minimum standards stipulated in the revised Bangladesh Labour Law 2006 and increased application of international labour and social standards in the RMG sector. 2) Clusters, partnerships and better planning in both public and private sector increase competitiveness</p> <p><i>Achieved outcome</i> 1) Again limited reflection in progress reports on impact, mostly listing activities and outputs. Mid-term evaluation is mostly positive on both impact and sustainability 2) Limited hard evidence, but mid-term evaluation claims a strengthened total value</p> | <p>Mid-term evaluation claims this component being the most impacting and most sustainable although designed slightly worse than the two other components (still, the rating was 'very good').</p> | <p>Industry leaders aware of the catastrophic business consequence of a 2nd Rana Plaza and hence interested in sustaining levels. Sustainability of knowledge and information sharing has been enabled through coaching selected leaders as peer educators for others, multiplying the awareness-raising in other workers and the community alike.</p> <p>2) Beneficiaries claimed significant benefits and the figures on exports support this as does the increased productivity.</p> |

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| | chain and better diversification are key outcomes that improve competitiveness. Impact is thus rated 'very good' (second highest rating) whereas sustainability is only 'good'. | | |
| <i>End outcome</i> To contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction by supporting Bangladesh to take advantage of global market opportunities | <p><i>Intended outcome</i></p> <p>A Poverty level fallen B GDP growth rate higher C Exports rate of growth higher D Diversification of exports improved</p> <p><i>Achieved outcome</i></p> <p>A+B The evaluation team do not consider the project having substantial effects on overall poverty levels nor GDP growth, but at best a marginal contribution. C In general garment exports have increased over the evaluation period, but attribution is not possible at this stage. D. Much of the partnership has evolved around better and faster designs, which could lead to more innovation. However, there are only few explicit reflections on this in the project documentation</p> | | There has been substantial progress since the mid-term evaluation and many of the outcomes have been partly or fully achieved as GoB and private sector have pressed for changes and effectively availed of the assistance offered through BEST. |

Information sources:

MN: 017. 026, 027. 105-112, reviews, ROMs, mid-term evaluation, NORAD final evaluation, GIZ end-of-project completion report.

6. Project Fiche: Integrated Support to Poverty and Inequality Reduction through Enterprise Development (INSPIRED)

Title: Integrated Support to Poverty and Inequality Reduction through Enterprise Development (INSPIRED)

EP: EU

Aid modality: Project approach

Budget:

- Planned: €19.0000€ from EU and
- Disbursed: €8.9m

Beneficiary: GoB/ERD: Bank of Bangladesh & Ministry of Industries

Implementation dates: Financing agreement signed in November 2010, TPP in June 2012. End scheduled to November 2018

Program logic:

▪ **Logical framework:**

This project's overall objective is "reduced poverty in Bangladesh by supporting the development of SMEs in the country". The project purpose is "enhanced competitiveness and sustainable pro-poor growth of SMEs in Bangladesh". The latter is to be achieved through three separate project components, namely: 1. Supporting the national strategic and regulatory environment for SMEs, 2. Enhancing SME competitiveness, and 3. Improving SME access to finance. Specifically, Component 1 activities target the SME Cell (SMEC) of the Ministry of Industries (MoI), and the SME Foundation (SMEF) which was set up with ADB support, for the implementation of the MoI SME policy. Component 2 activities target organisations supporting SMEs such as Chambers of Commerce and Business Intermediary Organisations (BIO). Component 3 activities work with the Bank of Bangladesh (the Bangladesh Central Bank), its training Academy (BBTA), and the Bangladesh Institute of Bank Management (BIBM) a non-profit organisation jointly owned by the Bank of Bangladesh and the country's commercial banks.

The project is managed by the Ministry of Industries' Small and Medium Sized Enterprise Cell, with a part-time Project Director appointed by the Ministry, and the various components are supported by three Technical Assistance organisations.

Each of the three components have their own objectives: 1: Improving the national strategy and enabling environment for small enterprises in preparation for a sector-wide approach to SME Development; 2: Enhancing SME Competitiveness through BIOs and; 3: Introducing sustainable improvements in SME access to appropriate and affordable finance. Component 3 is only loosely associated with the two other components, as it is primarily working with the Bank of Bangladesh Training Academy and the Bangladesh Institute of Bank Management (BIBM) under a different contract.

Assumptions:

At overall objective level the only assumption was that there would be continued political stability. The other assumptions follow the components:

1: National SME strategy: GoB integrates the national strategy and action plan for SME development into the national budget and implements it; No change in Government policy that the SMEC/SMEF are the lead organisations in the sector and; Cooperative involvement of key ministries especially the Ministry of Finance which will coordinate an effective inter-ministerial committee. The later has been problematic with MoI having limited commitment to the project (See ROM report September 2013 as well as interviews with MoI and INSPIRED staff).

2: Enhanced SME competitiveness through BIO: BIOs continue to provide services for their members after the expiry of the project and; sufficient relevant local business/sector associations apply for support under the grant scheme.

3: SME Access to finance: Continued interest of banks in providing services to SMEs. Regulations hindering SME access to finance are reformed in accordance with the project proposals. Adequate attendance at the training courses offered by BBTA/BIBM.

| Results chain <i>(as indicated in project documentation)</i> | Expectations and achievements <i>(as indicated in project documentation)</i> | Alternative contributing factors <i>(as indicated in e.g. reviews add evaluations)</i> | Observations from the evaluation team |
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| <p>Output 1 SME strategy</p> | <p>Intended output</p> <p>1) A multi-sectoral and inter-ministerial national strategy and action plan for SME development that address all aspects of SME support including improving the business environment (strategic and legal-regulatory framework) and provide donors with the basis for providing direct budgetary support in the future</p> <p>2) A strengthened national capacity to plan and implement integrated support to SME development.</p> <p>3) An established and effective SME stakeholder networking mechanism aimed at sharing good practices and disseminate/scale up innovative business models</p> <p>Achieved output</p> <p>1) A SME policy was developed in 2014 and efforts seem to be underway as regards SME Strategy with an expected ‘quantum leap’ in the form a of Strategic Advisory Committee’ being formed 5th Progress Report)</p> <p>2) Time has been lost, but now an organisational review has proposed an organisational development strategy for</p> | <p>ROM report (Sept. 2013) states slow progress due to inappropriate training and, above all, lack of ownership ad interest from MoI, which coupled with distrust between EU TA and MoI has poisoned the atmosphere.</p> | <p>Some progress seems to have taken place since ROM of 2013 with new EU TA having established working relations with MoI, which on its side has a new secretary. However, MoI is still questioning the overall rationale of the project, in particular the used of TA, which it considers excessive, supply driven, inappropriate and not relevant.</p> <p>Training to MoI and its SME Cell still considered inappropriate, whereas the SME foundation is more satisfied with e.g. training in cluster economics.</p> <p>Considerable repetition of activities between progress reports in component 1 and 2 is symptomatic of the slow progress of project staff, as well as the adverse climate slowing down progress.</p> |

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| | <p>SMEF. In addition a learning and development assessment (aka TNA) is being performed.</p> <p>3) SME Network: Most efforts appear to have been directed at web-page development. With limited additional info.</p> | | |
| <p>Output 2 SME competitiveness through BIOs and grants</p> | <p>Intended output</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. All grants for BIOs implemented 2. All grants for cluster development implemented <p>Achieved output</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Grant contracts signed in November 2013 at least for BIO 2. Cluster development grants have been reduced in scope. | <p>ROM of 2013 was very sceptical of the output being achievable, citing lack of ownership, poor interface with GoB and poor quality of TA.</p> | <p>Despite very slow initial progress the grant scheme is now on tract for BIOs but with a reduced number and reduce timeframe. Fraud and procedural disagreements have marred the process. Too few grants have been disbursed against target and project staff argues that grant size should have been smaller to reduce fraud incentives (MN 026).</p> |
| <p>Output 3 SME access to finance</p> | <p>Intended output</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Knowledge transfer to and capacity development of BBTA and BBTA 2. Improved awareness of relevant policy markers on SME financing needs <p>Achieved output</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. TNAs, HRD plans 2. No information | <p>ROM of 2013 stated that working relationships had improved, TA engaging at all levels with the BBTA and the BIBM. They were coaching relevant staff in line with accepted good practice. This helped ensure that the capacity building / training was appropriate and effective.</p> | <p>The arrival of a new TL in early 2013 instil some vigour and also engagement with beneficiaries that improved progress and took the project forward. (see also MN 104). Delays in signing the TAPP also caused implementation gaps.</p> |
| <p>Intermediate outcome 1 SME strategy</p> | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development and capacitate to implement Multi-sectoral and annual SME strategy & action plan <p>Achieved outcome</p> | . | <p>The project has seriously under-performed, partly due to poor design, but even more so due to poor TA provision from EU. An EU TA written draft has been produced, but with limited input from GoB / national consultants.</p> |

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SME policy in place, some acceleration now but various problem has delayed process. | | |
| Intermediate outcome 2 SME competitiveness through BIO and grants | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthened skills of BIO & associations in advocacy and service provision Increased competitiveness of SMEs in supported clusters <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Not much info on effects, more on inputs, activities and control measures. Perhaps judged premature to estimate effectiveness No evidence available | | <p>As stated above there have been many challenges and the BIO grants have only recently been awarded. Limited measurable outcomes, but likely to be below initial ambitions. ROM report states that the TA in this context has been appreciated by SMEC. Cluster training to SME foundations may improve its consultancy capacities to the detriment of other service providers (as pointed out by e.g. BFCCI)</p> |
| Intermediate outcome 3 SME access to finance improved | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Improved capacity of BoB to develop a regulatory framework supportive of SME access to finance. Improved capacity of financial institutions to develop and deliver financial products for SME <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Not much info on effects, more on inputs, activities and control measures. Perhaps judged premature to estimate effectiveness No evidence available | <p>ROM: Virtually no reflection on the likely effects and impacts, but may materialise within SME credit risk management, SME delinquency management and SME product development and marketing</p> | <p>The training, study tours and ToT has been offered and all partners are expressing satisfaction with it. Tracer studies and self evaluation also reveal high satisfaction with participants reporting high relevance, quality and with positive impact on working practices. ROM report states that the good progress and appreciate study tours to EU. Committed partners</p> <p>However there is now strengthened capacity of BBTA & BIBM to develop and deliver effective and self-sustaining training on SME banking, with the state of the art training equipment and conducive learning environment.</p> |

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| <p>End outcome Enhance competitiveness and sustainable pro-poor growth of SMEs</p> | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 5,785 jobs directly attributable to SME grant scheme 2. GoB adoption and financing of national SME strategy, creating basis for SME competitiveness <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No evidence of job creation and no plausible method to attribute directly. 2. Only some steps toward this | | <p>For component 3, Credit to SMEs increased 17% y-o-y from 2013 to 2014 (BB: Economic Indicators, March 2015). However attribution is not possible.</p> <p>ROM report is negative in its assessment, but subsequent staff changes may have altered the outlook.</p> <p>For component 1 the outlook is bleak with limited likely impact. For component 2 the it is premature, but there is very little evidence suggesting that the component will make a meaningful contribution to OO</p> |
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Lessons learnt:

The project was badly designed with unclear division of responsibilities, with especially the role of MoI being ambiguous and contradictory in the TAPs/ToRs leading to MoI being reluctant to cede authority that the thought was theirs. Also there was too much copy-past in the ToR across the components that was not appropriate and did not specific the real focus.

In policy related work and when working with key departments and cell within GoB, ownership and commitment is crucial, without which progress is difficult.

Observations from the evaluation team:

The INSPIRED project has faced many challenges, right from design to implementation and its closing down phase. At objective level the intention to accelerate poverty reduction through SME development seem relevant (as do most overall objectives in development projects) as SMEs provide jobs for 70-80% of the non-agricultural workforce and 25% of Bangladesh's gross domestic product last year, about 40% of gross manufacturing output, and around 25% of the total labour force in Bangladesh. They are also geographically widely distributed so they offer a good prospect for geographic diversification of the economy.² However it is not evident that support to SMEs is inherently more effective than support to micro or larger companies. The former are clearly also engaging many poor, not least in rural areas whereas the latter have also lifted a significant proportion of especially women out of poverty (c.f. the RMG sector, which is dominated by larger companies, typically having over 250 employees).³

Regardless of these principal issues, the project was also undermined by the poor inconsistent design that caused both delays and alienated the key ministry, as some of the authorities initially expected to be granted to MoI were eventually deemed to contravene EU procedures (PRAG). All this conspired to delay the project substantially. Thus implementation was from the start behind. The design and procedural challenges were further compounded by largely ineffective, inappropriate and underperforming TA, which characterised especially the earlier period of the project and was perhaps most gravely affecting components 1 and 2. While it may be inherently challenging to attract qualified TA to Bangladesh, the contractors also aggravated the problem by prioritising corporate profitability to the extent that it severely compromised project performance and further antagonised MoI. ROM reports question the viability of the component due to incompetent EU TA, lack of involvement of MoI in design and interface challenges between TA and MoI

The EU has consistently been monitoring the process, but should arguably have intervened both at the design stage (to eliminate inconsistencies in ProDocs) and in blocking the

² See e.g. Aminul Islam: Effect of Entrepreneur and Firm Characteristics on the Business Success of SMEs in Bangladesh' in *Journal of Business and Management* Vol. 6, no. 3, 2011.

³ Beck, Demircuc-Kunt & Levine in their seminal study find no correlation between SME growth and poverty reduction in the cross country analysis. See their 'SMEs, Growth and Poverty: Cross Country Evidence' in *Journal of Economic Growth*, Vol. 10, 2005.

posting of clearly unsuitable TA. Later, the EU has arguably also allowed TA to stay on for too long time and allowed the contractors to have too wide gaps in the TA provision. Recently there have been improvement, especially in component 3 which have somewhat clearly and technical focus, allowing for better delivery once correct TA had been identified.

All the above challenges have seriously compromised efficiency with time and resources (especially for TA, but also for GoB officials attending sub-standard trainings) being wasted. As the project has been TA heavy (€10m out of a total budget of €19m) and as the TA has been of decidedly mixed quality, both efficiency and effectiveness have suffered substantially. This has also undermined the likely impacts with the drafting and finalisation of the SME strategy in doubt whereas the grants for BIOs hold out more promise, their impact is still unknown. The main achievement of the project has been the training and study tours undertaken in component 3, which has been widely appreciated among both the training institutions as well as the bank staff receiving the training. SME lending has increased but that is arguably more attributed to general growth in the economy and less related to project training. Nevertheless it is likely that the project will make a small impact on banks willingness to and competences in offering financial services for SMEs.

It is unlikely that the current high level of training on SME finance can be maintained but both BBTA and BIBM are committed to continue the efforts albeit at a lower intensity level, reflecting their capacities and budgetary realities. For both component 1 and 2 the sustainability is more uncertain; in component 1 it is a question of whether there will be much to sustain, whereas the various BIOs have varying degrees of sustainability, making it difficult to generalise. However the short timeframe, poor preparations and low quality of the initial TA does not bode well.

Information sources:

MN: 023-028, 102, 104, 113, 114, 115, ROM report, action fiches, TAP, reviews and research

7. Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs

Title: Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs

EP: EU, DK, SE

Aid modality: UNDP coordinated project with joint management

Budget:

- EU 15.000.000 EUR
- DK 645.305 EUR
- SE 745.156 EUR

Beneficiary: Bangladesh Election Commission (and the people of Bangladesh)

Implementation dates: 3 July 2007 for 36 months; no-cost extension to 31 December 2010. As part of its sustainability strategy and utilizing remaining government funds, the Government of Bangladesh and the Election Commission extended the project for an additional 18 months to end in June 2012.

Program logic:

- Logical framework: The project aimed at the progressive fulfilment of the human rights of the country's population, in particular children, women and vulnerable groups with the foundation of strengthening democratic governance, as per UNDAF Outcome n°1. The specific objective was to establish technical conditions and infrastructure enabling the GoB to prepare a credible photo voter list that allows democratic elections to take place.
- Assumptions:
 - Stability of the political environment;
 - Dependence on logistical support by the Army does not harm the integrity of the project;
 - Muslim women can be sensitised to have their photograph taken;
 - The Electoral Commission is able to function independently;
 - The Management Capacity for the project will be sufficient.

| Results chain <i>(as indicated in project documentation)</i> | Expectations and achievements <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> | Alternative contributing factors <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> |
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| <p>Output 1 A credible photo voter list is completed</p> | <p>Develop software to support photo voter list data entry and storage</p> <p>Train field workers who will facilitate the creation of the photo voter list</p> <p>Support data collection and integration for the completion of the photo voter list</p> <p>Support printing and distribution of the photo voter list</p> <p>Support some of the key operating costs (for the core project team)</p> <p>Achieved output [Reviews of the project undertaken by the European Commission (EC), the Department for International Development (DFID) and UNDP concluded in general that the project was highly successful, having far greater impact than envisioned].</p> <p>In 2008, The PERP project registered more than 81 million voters in less than 11 months. A useful and innovative by-product of the voter registration process was the national ID card given to each registered voter.</p> | N/A |
| <p>Output 2 Central and countrywide technology infrastructure for updating the</p> | <p>Establish ICT infrastructure at data collection offices to build capacity to complete the photo voter list</p> <p>Achieved output:</p> | |

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| voter list established and maintained | In 2010 the project focused on maintaining the accuracy and integrity of the database prior to closure of the project. The project took a number of steps to upgrade and enhance the voter database. A comprehensive masterplan that outlined the necessary steps to enable BEC to maintain the voter list database and take forward the national ID card initiative, was developed. | |
| Output 3 Skills capacity developed in photo voter list and ICT at central and field levels | To maintain and further develop the capability of the system after the December 2008 Elections Achieved output: The PERP project, in 2009 and 2010, focused on enhancing the capacity of the BEC to upgrade and maintain the new photographic voter list. In 2009, the project supported the BEC to update the voter database independent of the Army, marking the successful transition of management from the Army to the BEC. The election commission, with support of the project, successfully updated the voter list registering an additional 4.7 million new voters. The updated voter list was successfully employed for subsequent elections at city, municipality and village levels. | |
| Intermediate outcomes | None were identified. | |
| End outcome | Intended outcome The production of a credible election roll with photographs. Achieved outcome: | |

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| | Achieved for the December 2008 elections. | |
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Lessons learnt (as indicated in e.g. project reviews and evaluations):

(From UNDP Bangladesh/ Election Commission, Final Project Narrative Report (31 December 2010))

- A robust, inclusive multi-stakeholder partnership was required;
- A strong leadership that can provide sustained efforts that affects change to the lowest level of the electoral administration.;
- Civil-military relationship is important in managing tasks requiring speed and accuracy with the enormous logistical support that the military can provide.;
- Specific objectives with enough flexibility to easily and effectively respond to unforeseen challenges and windows of opportunities;
- Good communication - both internal and external is essential for engaging partners and informing the general public about the process and rights related to voter registration.;
- Rigorous auditing checks at local levels that involve the community.
- Permanent staff to ensure sustainability of activities and institutionalization of knowledge and skills.;
- A combination of innovation and new technology with traditional and cultural grounded practices;
- Project design must ensure that ICT systems can develop in line with new technological solutions.;
- A well-defined role in a multiparty environment is a must to ensure proper commitment and communication.

Observations from the evaluation team:

Concerning the follow-up to the PERP project:

Updates of the electoral roll were undertaken in 2012 and 2014, but should ideally be undertaken annually.

In the context of the on-going support to capacity development of the Election Commission, the EU has insisted on an external audit of the voter card system. At the time of writing (April 2015), no agreement had been reached on this issue with the Election Commission.

Information sources:

MN 405, 407,408,409,410

Bangladesh Election Commission, UNDP, Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs, BGD/07/002, Final Project Narrative.

8. National Human Rights Commission Capacity Development Project

Title: Bangladesh National Human Rights Commission Capacity Development Project

EP: DK, SE

Aid modality: contribution to the UNDP project Bangladesh National Human Rights Commission Capacity Development Project (BNHRCCDP), with UNDP as implementing partner. Switzerland was also part of the development partner consortium.

Budget:

Planned:

- DANIDA: \$ 1,500,000

- Sweden: \$ 1,500,000

Beneficiary: National Human Rights Commission (and ultimately ‘the people of Bangladesh’)

Implementation dates: planned: 1 May 2010 – 30 April 2015; effective: July 2010-June 2015

Program logic:

Logical framework: The project purpose is: *“To improve the promotion and protection of human rights of all, particularly for disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, such as women, disabled, ethnic minorities and children through institutional capacity development of the National Human Rights Commission.”*

Assumptions

Sustainability of the project initiatives requires NHRC’s wide understanding and ownership at all levels. It also requires recognition at the broader community level and commitment by the Government of Bangladesh and other key stakeholders to the project and its aims.

Commitment by the Government necessarily includes a clear and unambiguous budgetary commitment to the long-term financing and budgetary requirement to ensure that effective project-supported achievements continue uninterrupted and are maintained once the project ceases.

| Results chain <i>(as indicated in project documentation)</i> | Expectations and achievements <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> | Alternative contributing factors <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> |
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| Output 1 Institutional Development | <p>Institutional development: “The NHRC is fully equipped and operational with modern administrative systems, rules and procedures”</p> <p>Achieved output:</p> <p>MTR: The core capacities of staff in relation to NHRC’s mandate have been enhanced: all of NHRC’s professional staff has been trained on the core human rights instruments and complaints handling. The five-year Strategic Plan of the NHRC (2010–2015) was finalized following an extensive and inclusive national consultation process. The NHRC is now acknowledged as the apex national institution on human rights in Bangladesh following its recognition by international and regional bodies. Regular capacity development efforts by the project have resulted in an increased capacity of the Commission staff to undertake the duties necessary for a Human Rights Commission to fulfil its mandate. Through an improved understanding of their role and duties, Commission staff is better able to efficiently and effectively operate and work to promote and protect human rights in Bangladesh.</p> | N/A |
| Output 2 Human rights monitoring and investigation | <p>“The NHRC has developed the capacity to efficiently and effectively monitor the human rights situation nationally and handle complaints, including information gathering and investigations, in a fair and independent manner that is responsive to the needs of the NHRC’s clients”.</p> <p>Achieved output (MTR): The Commission has designed, with project support, a number of tools to build its internal capacity to consistently and effectively process and investigate human rights complaints it receives. These tools include a</p> | |

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| | <p>standard operating procedure (SOP) manual for complaints handling, including rules and procedures for investigations, mediation and conciliation. Coupled with an online complaints management system, these tools have begun to assist the Commission to improve its proficiency in dealing with complaints, thereby enhancing its ability as an institution to meet its mandate. The capacity of the Commission to investigate human rights violations more effectively was enhanced. The NHRC has strengthened its collaboration with partner organizations by entering into an agreement with key non-governmental organization (NGO) partners to collaborate on monitoring the human rights situation and the referral of complaints.</p> | |
| <p>Output 3 Human rights awareness</p> | <p>“NHRC efficiently and effectively carried out human rights education and training to develop a human rights based culture in Bangladesh”.</p> <p>Achieved output (MTR):</p> <p>The education programme was one of the success stories of the BNHRC-CDP. The Commission has produced, with project support, a wide variety of informational materials to expand knowledge and understanding of human rights issues, and to enhance the profile and presence of the NHRC throughout the country. With essential support of the project, the NHRC has strengthened capacity to engage in community education through mass awareness-raising campaigns. In its role as the national focal point for human rights, the NHRC produced human rights documentation and material for its members and staff as well as for the public, including students, scholars and human rights workers. The NHRC built a rapport with senior media personalities and requested input on the preparation of a journalist’s training manual on human rights.</p> | |
| <p>Output 4</p> | <p>Intended output</p> | |

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| <p>Human rights research reporting and policy development</p> | <p>“The NHRC is capable of conducting a high quality, human rights-based analysis of legislative proposals, draft laws and existing legislation and administrative practices with regard to Bangladesh’s obligations under international conventions, and to provide high quality policy advice to the Government of Bangladesh on human rights issues”.</p> <p>Achieved output (MTR)</p> <p>With the project’s support, the Commission has strengthened its capabilities in the area of policy advice to the Government of Bangladesh in order to ensure that new laws and policies are consistent with international human rights standards. The activities of the NHRC relating to the UPR have been exemplary. It collaborates with the Government in the implementation of the recommendations made during the Human Rights Council in 2009 and 2013. The Commission drafted and submitted its Universal Periodic Report (UPR) stakeholder report to the HRC UPR working group in 2012. Several evidence-based analysis reports have been drafted with project support on Bangladesh’s legal instruments and their compliance with core human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). These analyses have strengthened the NHRC’s own knowledge and understanding of international human rights standards. In addition, the reports have enhanced the NHRC’s ability to influence policy-level change on certain human rights issues by improving the level of evidence-based discourse in public debates. The NHRC Child Rights Committee played a key role in advocating for child rights within the context of the drafting of the Children Act 2013. Within its mandate to review legislation to ensure</p> | |
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| | compliance with human rights standards, the NHRC has been providing recommendation to relevant Ministries related to different issues such as trafficking, disability and discrimination. | |
| Intermediate outcomes | None were identified. | |
| End outcome | <p>Intended outcome: “To improve the promotion and protection of human rights, particularly for disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, such as women, the disabled, ethnic minorities and children through institutional capacity development of the National Human Rights Commission”.</p> <p>Achieved outcome – the project is still in progress. MTR identified gaps in performance measurement system, particularly with regard to reporting on outcomes and impacts.</p> | |

Lessons learnt (as indicated in e.g. project reviews and evaluations):

According to the MTR:

- The main priority activities should be to improve investigation and monitoring capacity of the NHRC, failing which, the NHRC would not be able to meet the multiplied investigation needs that arise from the increased awareness of human rights;
- Changes need to be made in the decision-making process of the Commission, in the role of the Chairman as Chief Executive and in the new set-up/appointment of honorary members. The amendment of the NHRC Act is necessary for the sake of the independence of the Commission as well as its efficiency. The consequence of weak parent legislation may lead to the Commission's failure to fulfil its functions. High-level advocacy is required to establish a better understanding and political will to introduce amendments which are in line with international human rights law;
- The degree of ownership is low. BNHRC-CDP appears to be more visible in some cases than the NHRC. Donors and NGOs have expressed their view that it appears that the BNHRC-CDP is performing NHRC's work rather than of developing capacity (i.e. drafting annual reports, conducting research studies and human rights awareness-raising campaigns);
- The NHRC's strategic partnership with NGOs is limited to seven well-known ones. There are, however, many more NGOs who have experience, outreach as well as good connections with the Government and non-governmental sectors, which should be further capitalized on;
- Recruitment policy of the NHRC is not sustainable. The staff should have background on human rights, which is not the case at present, since most are seconded from different, unrelated Ministries;
- Regional representation of NHRC: Since most of the disempowerment is at the regional levels, providing access for them to the NHRC is crucial in achieving the goals of the Commission.

Observations from the evaluation team:

The Paris Principles (United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/48/134 (4 March 1993) set the international standard for national human rights institutions. The International Coordinating Committee for National Human Rights Institutions (ICC) granted the NHRC Bangladesh B-status "as being not fully in compliance with the Paris Principles" in May 2011. The ICC raised the following concerns which remain to be addressed (fully) today, both by the Government of Bangladesh, and through the interventions of development partners:

- The selection committee established by section 7 of the Act is primarily comprised of government appointees and the quorum requirements would appear to allow nominations solely by those members;
- The NHRCB has advised that the Secretary-General and two senior officers have been seconded from the Public Service. While (the Committee) understands that this is permissible pursuant to s. 23(4) of the Act, it notes that such an arrangement may, or may be seen to, compromise the independence of a national human rights institution;
- The (Committee) notes that to function effectively, a national human rights commission must be provided with an appropriate level of funding and staffing in order to allow it to fulfil its mandated activities. The NHRCB indicates in its application that its proposed staffing component is 87 though it is currently functioning with 22 staff.

- According to an NHRC source, the NHRC proposed an amendment to the NHRC Act to the GoB in September 2014 in order to bring the legislation in line with the Paris Principles – of which the NHRC also informed the ICC in March 2015 – so far without result. Recently the GoB gave clearance to hire 20 additional staff (of which ten professional staff), which should allow the NHRC to open four regional offices.

During interviews, stakeholders took the following positions:

- At the NHRC, the view was expressed that continued support from the development partners after the expiry of the current project was necessary. A meeting with ambassadors was planned for June 2015. There might be a transitional period, after which a further 5-year second phase support from DANIDA (to run concurrently with their planning cycle) was hoped for. It was argued that ‘donor funds were particularly needed for those issues on which we criticize the government, e.g. custodial deaths, enforced disappearances, violations of rights of religious minorities, Chittagong Hill Tracts;
- SE confirmed readiness ‘in principle’ to continue support, but also lack of capacity to directly fund the NHRC (rather than through UNDP). The NHRC did not act on all human rights violations, and sometimes this was taken up, also through the Ambassador. The reappointment of members in 2016 offered an opportunity to insist with the speaker of parliament that credible appointments were made; DK felt that supporting guardian institutions was very important – the NHRC was not independent but ‘you do not deal with a headache by cutting off the head’; EU deplored the absence of resources to really pursue individual cases.
- According to UNDP representatives, it was unlikely that the NHRC Act would be amended soon. The professional human rights expertise of NHRC staff needed to be strengthened further but ‘overall our project is achieving its results’. It was unrealistic to think that the GoB would fully fund the NHRC. The NHRC was a key institution that was internationally recognized, and deserved to be funded.
- Opinions on the NHRC and on continued donor support varied considerably among Human Rights Advocacy NGOs: ‘the government should provide sufficient funds; it should be our own organisation; donors should support but not influence’; ‘the NHRC is a mouthpiece of the government; a barking dog to which no attention is paid; donors should stop funding’; ‘the NHRC at least speaks from time to time, and has done some good work; it generally does reach out to civil society in its activities; it should develop a fully-fledged complaints procedure’; ‘the NHRC does not perform on major human rights issues; it only acts when it is pushed by civil society, and then balances that immediately by a subsequent pro-government position; UNDP never takes a stand’.

Information sources:

EU, Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the project, October 2013

MN 401, 402, 403, 405, 406,408,409, 410, 412

Annual Reports NHRC,

ASK NHRC Assessment ‘Bangladesh: Institutional Commitment Needed’ (2013-2014), Paris Principles (United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/48/134 (4 March 1993)

9. Supporting Local Development in CHT

Title: Supporting Local Development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts

EP: EU

Aid modality: Joint management through the signature of a Standard Contribution Agreement UNDP.

Budget:

- Planned total cost: EUR 27 339 409
- Contribution from EU: EUR 24 000 000 (disbursement)

Beneficiary: local official institutions and local communities

Implementation dates: For 48 months starting from 1 January 2011.

Program logic:

Logical framework: The main objective of the project was to contribute to an Enabling environment for local development, contributing to the achievement of local Millennium Development Goal targets in 25 Upazila in the CHT by end 2013'.

This was to be achieved by increasing the capacity of CHT government and community institutions to deliver services and manage development activities.

Assumptions:

- relative stability of the socio-political situation;
- continued relative tolerance between different groups in the region;
- commitment by the government to implement the Peace Accord;
- gradual reduction of the role of the military forces in the region;
- gradual clarification of the roles and responsibilities of local CHT institutions.

| Results chain <i>(as indicated in project documentation)</i> | Expectations and achievements <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> | Alternative contributing factors <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> |
|---|---|---|
| Output 1 Capacity of local government institutions is strengthened. | Intended output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Capacities of local government institutions to advocate on CHT issues strengthened, resulting in enhanced clarity and consensus on CHT issues - Capacity of local government institutions in the CHT strengthened, resulting in improved management system for decentralized service delivery - Participatory planning, budgeting, monitoring mechanisms among CHT Institutions and stakeholders enhanced to contribute towards achievement of the Millennium Development Goals Achieved output (based on Final Report March 2014 Evaluation (IBF International Consulting In collaboration with ADE)): <p>CHTDF had been effective in advocacy, raising the awareness of a wide range of organizations and government on key issues for implementation of the Peace Agreement. Institutional Capacity Building has been promoted with CHT institutions with the aim of ‘increasing capacity to deliver services and support community development. However, whilst the delivery of activities was in line with proposed plans, the overall effectiveness of capacity building was less so.’</p> | <p>Major parts of the Peace Accord (PA) were not implemented and this has impacted on the CHTDF programme negatively with regard to impact and sustainability.</p> <p>Although violent conflict was not in evidence most of the time, communal tensions especially over land, continued and land-grabbing increased, particularly with a cadastral survey mooted and the presence of settlers is changing demographic balance in the CHT. These factors meant that the original conflict over the regional autonomy of CHT as a tribal-inhabited region with special characteristics continued. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council (CHTRC) and the three Hill District Councils - were still operating without elections being held limiting the right of the Indigenous People to participate in self-governance.</p> |

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| <p>Output 2 Capacity of local communities is strengthened</p> | <p>Intended output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Communities are empowered to plan and implement small scale development projects - Communities have increased access to economic opportunities <p>Achieved output</p> <p>If community empowerment is understood as a limited increase in some household incomes and savings then some measures had been effective. However the fact that reportedly 37% of households were either excluded or dropped out of the Para Development Committees meant that equitable benefits and distribution had not been achieved and the programme had not been substantially effective. Community Empowerment necessarily embodied social and political assets as well as financial and in this respect the programme has not been effective at delivering empowerment to communities. Of the 3257 PDCs and the 1685 PNDGs started to potentially provide valuable community level institutional frame-works to be sustained and grow, it was estimated that approximately only 31% of PNCs and 60% of PNDGs were effectively functional.</p> <p>The training programmes under Economic Development that provided an opportunity for communities to introduce economic activities (such as beekeeping, mushroom growing and weaver – groups) had made a positive and effective contribution in some households and were effective. The lack of effective and adequate market research and/or inappropriate activities meant that many of the promoted projects were ineffective and failed.</p> <p>A comprehensive community empowering process had not resulted and there was no substantial increase in the ‘voice’ of people. Community empowerment has been largely confined to delivering limited economic improvements</p> | |
| <p>Intermediate outcomes</p> | <p>No specific intermediate outcomes were included.</p> | |

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| <p>End outcome</p> | <p>Intended outcome:</p> <p>At the end of the project implementation CHT institutions, both government and community-based, own a model of local governance based on mutual accountability, transparency and efficiency in decision making, in order to ensure improved access of the population to quality basic services, and to enhance economic growth.</p> <p>Achieved outcome</p> <p>According to the 2014 Evaluation, overall there was a slight improvement with regard to the capacities of the CHT specific institutions resulting in an improved service delivery. on the job' approach. However, there were still crucial constraints preventing the project capacity building efforts fulfilling its full potential such as coordination gaps between created CHT institutions and governmental line structures, staff shortage, lack of resources and pending of transferred responsibilities. It was clear that the percentage of PDCs that are successfully encompassing an 'empowering community institution' are less than one third of those started by CHTDF.</p> <p>Community Empowerment has generally been interpreted by CHTDF very narrowly and has not encompassed assets and capabilities to secure more sustainable livelihoods or indeed engender the basis of peace building.</p> <p>The capacity of the majority of communities remained low in spite of receiving services for 5 years. About half of the PDCs are not yet confident to manage their activities and organisation.</p> | |
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Lessons learnt (as indicated in e.g. project reviews and evaluations):

Seventeen years after the signing, the Peace Accord has not been fully implemented, and the area remained under a transitional regime: the institutional set-up jointly agreed between the government and the armed opposition groups has not been completed. This state of affairs haunts and hinders reconciliation, and leaves the path to renewed conflict open. Given the unstable environment, the vulnerability of the CHT population to human rights violations and undemocratic governance remained high; a recent Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission study finds that indigenous women and girls are 'extremely vulnerable', and identifies impunity as the single most important contributing factor to their safety and security. It is well recognized in the literature that a transitional (justice) context, such as the Chittagong Hill Tracts context, requires a specific approach from development partners

Observations from the evaluation team:

The human rights and governance team conducted a field visit in CHT area. Only the national team member could take part to it due to the government's embargo on foreigners visiting CHT districts. The national team member went for a two-day visit. However, she had to shorten her trip due to mayoral election in Chittagong and subsequent restriction on UNDP vehicles' mobility. During the visit in CHT, the evaluation team (ET) met relevant key stakeholders including district level government and law enforcement officials, poor ethnic and mainstream Bengali communities and UNCHTDF program officials.

The field visit confirmed the information received from secondary sources and national level interviews. Peace is still fragile in the CHT. Seventeen years after signing of the CHT Peace Accord in 1997, vital aspects of the Peace Accord remain unimplemented (e.g. land dispute resolutions between indigenous people and Bengali settlers, repatriation of Indian repatriated refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), de-militarization of CHT, transfer of 33 subjects from the Ministries to the each of the three Hill District Councils). Despite the government's efforts to mainstream development activities in CHT along with the rest of the country, the government has so far failed to bring the CHT region on a level playing field to be at par with other districts.

At present, the CHT districts have a different administrative set up than that of the rest of the country. For example, while the personnel matters (e.g. leave, permission for higher studies) of medical doctors in different parts of the country are solely handled by the Ministry of Health, in CHT, these are handled by three separate agencies (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs and Deputy commissioner's office at the district level belonging to Ministry of Public Administration). At the same time, the geographical terrain in CHT region is very different than that of the rest of the country making service delivery difficult. Simple access to services like health or education remains a struggle for many residents of remote unions. Given the complex administrative set up and geographical remoteness, it is difficult to mainstream development activities in this region following the same planning and implementation processes that are done for the other 61 districts of the country.

On the other hand, slow implementation of the Peace Accord is undermining the peace building process and affecting human security of CHT people. The continued violence even after the Peace Accord, including land grabbing, extortions, and communal violence in the CHT have resulted in deep mistrust between Bengali and ethnic communities as well as factions among indigenous peoples. In addition, some anti-peace accord segments

of the CHT are active with fast spreading of negative propaganda to create distortion and fear. All three IP political parties have reportedly raised their 'armed groups' to protect their existence. CHT may be gradually transforming from a 'Post-Conflict' to a 'Pre-Conflict' region. Thus, the confidence building initiatives of UNDP in the region is still very relevant.

Despite mainstreaming of women empowerment in all development interventions, violence against women such as rape and murder is increasing in CHT. GBV in CHT is often used as a tool to intimidate the people so that they abandon their land. The capacity to address the challenges is extremely low in all institutions. The case monitoring/ follow up is also very weak and in cases of Bengali/IP violence, particularly where IP women are the victims, there is a widespread perception that investigators do not respond impartially. The present Victim Support Center is not well equipped with essential support related to post violence (forensic, DNA test, safety and privacy, psychosocial counselling) to victims and technical assistance be provided for police management..

With regards to human rights, there is a lack of watchdog bodies or whistle blowers in the region to monitor gross human rights violations. UN agencies are considered to be the only human rights defenders in CHT. If UN or international communities are not present in the region then human rights situations will deteriorate. Army and civil administrations are considered to be biased to the Bengali communities. This has made indigenous people more vulnerable in the region.

Taken together three extreme vulnerabilities of the CHT region (geographical remoteness, communal tension and administrative bottlenecks in implementing the peace accord), it is important to formulate CHT-specific integrated development program instead of mainstreaming development funding through budgetary support or through specific service providing ministries (e.g. health, education). Even the government acknowledges the "special" situation in CHT and thus has established a designated ministry (Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs) to coordinate administrative and development activities in CHT districts.

An effective strategy in countering human insecurity and threat in CHT may be a "tailor-made CHT-specific collaborative approach" through engaging all stakeholders, including government authorities, law enforcement agencies, civil society, media and communities at large. Sustained international and donor support—political, technical, and financial—is critical to generating momentum for resolving the current impasse over CHT issue and vital to permit the CHTDF to have maximum impact.

For example, in absence of proper convictions in cases of communal violence, violence against women, and politically motivated violence, the perpetrators have a sense of impunity from such crimes. At the same time, people of the CHT are vulnerable because they cannot access the formal and informal justice system. Thus, CHT specific Village Court model should be developed and rolled out. Land management and land ownership issues are at the core of the complexities of CHT. This can be another area of intervention. Conflict management and transformation capacities at local level need to be developed to prevent violence. Support needs to be provided for the harmonization of the CHT governance framework and amendment of national and CHT specific laws and acts, revising and drafting rules of business and improving organograms of CHT institutions by engaging wide scope of national, regional and district actors.

Policy and advocacy support to MoCHTA, RC and HDCs to advocate on policy changes and improved models of service delivery in CHT may be another area of intervention.

Finally, efforts need to be taken to move towards more inclusive politics at regional and district level, including through the engagement of a wider group of actors in the dialogue on implementing the Peace Accord and governing CHT.

Information sources:

Final Report March 2014 Evaluation (IBF International Consulting
In collaboration with ADE)

Monitoring Report MR-145083.01 03/10/2012[

Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, Marginalization and Impunity. Violence against women and girls in the CHT (May 2014)

Site visit

MN401, MN404, MN409.

10. Conflict Prevention, Recovery and Peace-building in Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh

Title: Conflict Prevention, Recovery and Peace-building in Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh

EP: Sweden, Denmark

Aid modality: Support to UNDP project

Budget:

Planned and disbursed

- | | |
|-----------|-------------|
| ○ Sweden | USD 500,000 |
| ○ Denmark | USD 474,000 |

Beneficiary:

1. Peoples of CHT through the policy advocacy work and changed policy environment;
2. CHTIs (CHTRC, HDCs, IDP TF and traditional institutions) will should have increased capacity;
3. Peoples of 118 Unions by the improved law and order situation through the Community Policing activities;
4. CHT institutions, which should gain strengthened capacities for development policy formulation and project planning, community outreach and consultation, technical support service provision, and development resource management.

Implementation dates: 1/07/2014 - 30/09/2015

Program logic:

Logical framework: The main objective was to “facilitate confidence building to solve long standing problems to development and sustainability in the CHT”. The continued violence even after the Peace Accord, including land grabbing, extortions, and communal violence in the CHT have resulted in deep mistrust between Bengali and ethnic communities as well as fractions among indigenous peoples. Furthermore, with regard to the Peace Accord, the core elements of the Accord remained unimplemented to date. Therefore, without addressing these root causes, the peace consolidation in the CHT would continue to be fragile. The project aimed to address these critical root causes by building upon results yielded from the past interventions on these areas as well as maximizing synergies with existing projects implemented by the CHT Development Facility.

- **Assumptions:** The assumption was that the slow implementation of the Peace Accord which is contributing to an increase in communal violence can be countered through the proposed project. It is argued that CHT Development Facility (CHTDF) of UNDP Bangladesh is well positioned to implement the proposed interventions based on its long presence in the CHT.

| Results chain <i>(as indicated in project documentation)</i> | Expectations and achievements <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> | Alternative contributing factors <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> |
|--|--|--|
| Output 1 | Intended output: National Policy/Advocacy to support the Government of Bangladesh to implement the CHT Accord Achieved output The project is on-going ; no reviews, monitoring or evaluations available. | N/A |
| Output 2 | Intended output: Improved capacities of CHTIs to facilitate local confidence building and strengthen social cohesion in the CHT. Achieved output: The project is on-going ; no reviews, monitoring or evaluations available. | |
| Output 3 | Intended output: Improved mechanism to support the victims of communal violence and strengthen human security Achieved output: The project is on-going ; no reviews, monitoring or evaluations available. | |
| End outcome | Intended outcome: Government institutions at the national and subnational levels are able to more effectively carry out their mandates, including delivery of public services, in a more accountable, transparent, and inclusive manner Overall facilitate confidence building to solve long-standing problems to development and sustainability in the CHT Achieved end outcome: The project is on-going ; no reviews, monitoring or evaluations available. | |

Lessons learnt (as indicated in e.g. project reviews and evaluations):

The project builds on lessons learned from previously thematically related CHTDF interventions including CHT Local Development (EU), which according to the 2014 Evaluation, underestimated the importance of advocacy, failed to contribute significantly to capacity building, and could be improved through giving more attention to rule of law issues.

Observations from the evaluation team:

The human rights and governance team conducted a field visit in CHT area. Only the national team member could take part to it due to the government's embargo on foreigners visiting CHT districts. The national team member went for a two-day visit. However, she had to shorten her trip due to mayoral election in Chittagong and subsequent restriction on UNDP vehicles' mobility. During the visit in CHT, the evaluation team (ET) met relevant key stakeholders including district level government and law enforcement officials, poor ethnic and mainstream Bengali communities and UNCHTDF program officials.

The field investigation aimed to determine to what extent human rights were being mainstreamed in this on-going post-conflict intervention. It confirmed the information received from secondary sources and national level interviews. Peace is still fragile in the CHT. Seventeen years after signing of the CHT Peace Accord in 1997, vital aspects of the Peace Accord remain unimplemented (e.g. land dispute resolutions between indigenous people and Bengali settlers, repatriation of Indian repatriated refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), de-militarization of CHT, transfer of 33 subjects from the Ministries to the each of the three Hill District Councils). Despite the government's efforts to mainstream development activities in CHT along with the rest of the country, the government has so far failed to bring the CHT region on a level playing field to be at par with other districts.

At present, the CHT districts have a different administrative set up than that of the rest of the country. For example, while the personnel matters (e.g. leave, permission for higher studies) of medical doctors in different parts of the country are solely handled by the Ministry of Health, in CHT, these are handled by three separate agencies (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs and Deputy commissioner's office at the district level belonging to Ministry of Public Administration). At the same time, the geographical terrain in CHT region is very different than that of the rest of the country making service delivery difficult. Simple access to services like health or education remains a struggle for many residents of remote unions. Given the complex administrative set up and geographical remoteness, it is difficult to mainstream development activities in this region following the same planning and implementation processes that are done for the other 61 districts of the country.

On the other hand, slow implementation of the Peace Accord is undermining the peace building process and affecting human security of CHT people. The continued violence even after the Peace Accord, including land grabbing, extortions, and communal violence in the CHT have resulted in deep mistrust between Bengali and ethnic communities as well as fractions among indigenous peoples. In addition, some anti-peace accord segments of the CHT are active with fast spreading of negative propaganda to create distortion and fear. All three IP political parties have reportedly raised their 'armed groups' to protect their existence. CHT may be gradually transforming from a 'Post-Conflict' to a 'Pre-Conflict' region. Thus, the confidence building initiatives of UNDP in the region is still very relevant.

Despite mainstreaming of women empowerment in all development interventions, violence against women such as rape and murder is increasing in CHT. GBV in CHT is

often used as a tool to intimidate the people so that they abandon their land. The capacity to address the challenges is extremely low in all institutions. The case monitoring/ follow up is also very weak and in cases of Bengali/IP violence, particularly where IP women are the victims, there is a widespread perception that investigators do not respond impartially. The present Victim Support Center is not well equipped with essential support related to post violence (forensic, DNA test, safety and privacy, psychosocial counselling) to victims and technical assistance be provided for police management.

With regards to human rights, there is a lack of watchdog bodies or whistle blowers in the region to monitor gross human rights violations. UN agencies are considered to be the only human rights defenders in CHT. If UN or international communities are not present in the region then human rights situations will deteriorate. Army and civil administrations are considered to be biased to the Bengali communities. This has made indigenous people more vulnerable in the region.

Taking together three extreme vulnerabilities of the CHT region (geographical remoteness, communal tension and administrative bottlenecks in implementing the peace accord), it is important to formulate CHT-specific integrated development program instead of mainstreaming development funding through budgetary support or through specific service providing ministries (e.g. health, education). Even the government acknowledges the “special” situation in CHT and thus has established a designated ministry (Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs) to coordinate administrative and development activities in CHT districts.

An effective strategy in countering human insecurity and threat in CHT may be a “tailor-made CHT-specific collaborative approach” through engaging all stakeholders, including government authorities, law enforcement agencies, civil society, media and communities at large. Sustained international and donor support—political, technical, and financial—is critical to generating momentum for resolving the current impasse over CHT issue and vital to permit the CHTDF to have maximum impact.

For example, in absence of proper convictions in cases of communal violence, violence against women, and politically motivated violence, the perpetrators have a sense of impunity from such crimes. At the same time, people of the CHT are vulnerable because they cannot access the formal and informal justice system. Thus, CHT specific Village Court model should be developed and rolled out. Land management and land ownership issues are at the core of the complexities of CHT. This can be another area of intervention. Conflict management and transformation capacities at local level need to be developed to prevent violence. Support needs to be provided for the harmonization of the CHT governance framework and amendment of national and CHT specific laws and acts, revising and drafting rules of business and improving organograms of CHT institutions by engaging wide scope of national, regional and district actors.

Policy and advocacy support to MoCHTA, RC and HDCs to advocate on policy changes and improved models of service delivery in CHT may be another area of intervention. Finally, efforts need to be taken to move towards more inclusive politics at regional and district level, including through the engagement of a wider group of actors in the dialogue on implementing the Peace Accord and governing CHT.

Information sources:

Project Proposal United Nations Development Programme Country: Bangladesh Project Proposal

Site visit

MN401, MN404, MN409.

11. Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF)

Title: Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF)

EP: EU, Sida, Danida

Aid modality: Project – joint management with the World Bank

Budget:

- Planned: Total 81.5m€, increased to 112.3M€ (187M\$). EU 8.5M€ (from GCCA/ENRTP), increased to 28.5M€/Sida 50MSEK (4.8M€), increased to 130MSEK (10.2M€)/Danida 10MDKK (1.3M€)
Other donors: DfID 60MGBP (69.7M€)/Switzerland 3.4MCHF (2.6M€)
- Disbursed: EU: 14.3M€/Sida 130MSEK (13.9M€)/Danida 10MDKK (1.3M€)

Beneficiary: MOEF (Ministry of Environment and Forest), NGOs (The NGO funds managed by the Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF))

Implementation dates:

Starting date 09/02/1012 (planned starting date 01/01/2011), End date: 25/11/2015, extended to 31/12/2016

Program logic:

BCCRF was established with the purpose of supporting the implementation of the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP – 2008, revised in 2009). BCCRF was established as a EP financed fund which would be managed by the World Bank, but with a BCCRF Secretariat established at MoEF, which would assume responsibility for BCCRF gradually as its capacity was built. BCCRF would finance projects developed by GoB (90% of the funds) and NGOs (10% of the funds), which would be of direct relevance to at least one of BCCRF's pillars: 1) Food security, social protection and health; 2) comprehensive disaster management; 3) adaptation infrastructure; 4) research and knowledge management; 5) mitigation and low carbon development; and 6) capacity building and institutional strengthening.

Assumptions:

2013 results framework contains numerous outcome and output indicator assumptions, but most of them are directly controlled by the programme and thus not truly assumptions. More significant assumptions include:

- Qualified secretariat staff are hired to ensure follow up is done on decisions made in MC and GC meetings.
- Quality proposals follow prioritization criteria, sector guidelines and other criteria.
- The necessary level and quality of human resources and fiduciary due diligence can be defined as part of the capacity building needs.
- Assumption is that all proposals submitted should have a climate change added value.
- Qualified Secretariat staff is available to ensure follow up on technical issues pertaining to sectors.
- Sector ministries are making efforts to keep abreast of climate change solutions for their sector.

2009 AF:

- The newly elected Government that took office in January 2009 retains climate change as an important development issue, will maintain the BCCSAP and will support its implementation.
- GoB and the interested development partners will reach an agreement on the MDTF early 2010.

2011 AF:

- The elected Government retains climate change as an important development issue in the upcoming 6th Five Year Plan (2011-2016) and will support the implementation of the BCCSAP.

| Results chain <i>(as indicated in project documentation)</i> | Expectations and achievements <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> | Alternative contributing factors <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> |
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| Outcome 1.1 Demonstrated capacity of Secretariat to lead governing committees | <p>Intended output: Output 1.1 MC and GC meetings focus on decisions and follow up</p> <p>Achieved output: Meetings focused on decisions and follow-up but were lead by donors</p> | <p>Complementary actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF), GoB funded, MOEF managed ▪ Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), GoB, ADB, IFC, World Bank. World Bank managed ▪ CDMP ▪ DIPECHO ▪ Other EU ENRTP CC actions ▪ UNDP impl., GEF-funded project: community-based adaptation to climate change through coastal afforestation in Bangladesh ▪ Several actions funded by other donors and government |
| Outcome 1.2 Demonstrated capacity of Secretariat to manage and provide oversight on BCCRF activities | <p>Intended output:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Output 1.2.1 Sector guides and prioritization criteria made available to sector organizations ▪ Output 1.2.2 Human resources and fiduciary systems are in place and functional in Secretariat <p>Achieved output:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Guides and criteria were established, but not by Secretariat ▪ Human resources were in place in terms of consultants, but not anymore ▪ Fiduciary systems not established | |
| Outcome 1.3 Demonstrated capacity of Secretariat to measure and report on BCCRF results achieved. | <p>Intended output: Output 1.3.1 A program Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system in place to track BCCRF progress</p> <p>Achieved output: M&E carried out by WB, not by Secretariat.</p> | |
| Outcome 1.4 Demonstrated capacity of Secretariat to contribute to wider communication, coordination and | Intended output: | |

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| <p>knowledge sharing with multiple stakeholders, including donors and NGOs</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Output 1.4.1 Communication plan includes activities on communications outreach and dissemination of knowledge ▪ Output 1.4.2 LCG and other platforms are capitalized upon to enhance coordination and share lessons among the stakeholders <p>Achieved output:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Communication plan developed by WB, not Secretariat ▪ Seminar held by WB related to knowledge product on CC and health ▪ BCCRF in its own right a valuable platform for donor coordination and policy discussion with GoB | |
| <p>Outcome 2.1 BCCRF incentivizes investments that are innovative in a climate change program.</p> | <p>Intended output: Output 2.1 Innovative proposals submitted</p> <p>Achieved output:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 3 out of 6 projects prepared by WB (linked to IDA projects) ▪ Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Development II Project (RERED II) among other things promotes innovative renewable mini-grid energy solutions, such as replacement of diesel pumps with solar pumps and biogas plants for cooking. ▪ Afforestation and Reforestation for Climate Change Risk Reduction in Coastal and Hilly Areas of Bangladesh (CRPARP) relevant, but not innovative as it funds an upscaling of current FD and NGO activities | |
| <p>Outcome 2.2 Improved resilience to climate change effects in targeted population</p> | <p>Intended output:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Output 2.2.1 Households in climate vulnerable areas with increased access to food | |

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Output 2.2.2 Farmers adopting climate adaptive agriculture ▪ Output 2.2.3 Climate resilient infrastructure assets created ▪ Output 2.2.4 Farmers with access to clean energy services ▪ Output 2.2.5 Area covered under afforestation and reforestation program in climate vulnerable areas ▪ Output 2.2.6 More Community jobs in forestry sector in climate vulnerable areas ▪ Output 2.2.7 Community based sub-grants awarded ▪ Output 2.2.8 Community mechanisms established and functioning to respond effectively to specific climate risk <p>Achieved output:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Project implementation started in 2014 ▪ RERED II provided access to electricity from renewable to about 590,000 households by September 2014 Households were provided with efficient stoves and biogas, reducing reliance on fuelwood. ▪ The Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project constructed and rehabilitated cyclone shelters and coastal embankments. Cyclone affected agricultural livelihoods were recovered: Crops: 230,000 households (HH); livestock: 38,000 HH; fisheries: 37,000 HH | |
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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Community Climate Change Project (NGO window) activities target vulnerable households in salinity- fold- and drought-prone areas. ▪ CRPARP has engaged forest dependent households in participatory forest management, which is providing income opportunities while over time increasing the forest cover. | |
| <p>Outcome 3.1 Increased capacity of entity within and outside government to submit proposal for NIE accreditation</p> | <p>Intended output: Output 3.1 Proposals submitted from potential candidates in line with UNFCCC guidelines</p> <p>Achieved output:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Approved proposals in line with UNFCCC ▪ 3 out of 6 projects prepared by WB (linked to IDA projects) | |
| <p>Outcome 3.2 Increased knowledge and lessons learnt to inform climate change policy</p> | <p>Intended output: Output 3.2 Mechanisms for knowledge management and policy dialogue are in place</p> <p>Achieved output:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge has been generated through studies lead by WB. Studies have been published, and reportedly been widely in demand and referred to (MN 305). • The study <i>Urban Flooding of Greater Dhaka Area in a Changing Climate: Vulnerability, Adaptation and Potential Costs (Analytical Advisory Assistance)</i> included a comprehensive consultation process (http://www.bccrf-bd.org) | |

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| <p>Outcome 3.3 Bangladesh is considered an international model for implementing sound climate change adaptation solutions</p> | <p>Intended output: Output 3.3 Lessons offered through written or other means</p> <p>Achieved output: Too early to assess – projects have only been under implementation for less than 2 years. However, considering the problems with the design, BCCRF will not lead to this.</p> | |
| <p>Objective 1: GOB demonstrates capacity to lead and manage BCCRF through a functioning secretariat within MOEF</p> | <p>Intended outcome:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Outcome 1.1 Demonstrated capacity of Secretariat to lead governing committees ▪ Outcome 1.2 Demonstrated capacity of Secretariat to manage and provide oversight on BCCRF activities ▪ Outcome 1.3 Demonstrated capacity of Secretariat to measure and report on BCCRF results achieved. ▪ Outcome 1.4 Demonstrated capacity of Secretariat to contribute to wider communication, coordination and knowledge sharing with multiple stakeholders, including donors and NGOs <p>Achieved outcome: Secretariat was established but never became fully operational. Secretariat now disbanded. Was staff with consultants, not GoB staff. Consultants were trained and their capacity increased.</p> | |
| <p>Objective 2: BCCRF Investments contribute to climate resiliency of targeted vulnerable population</p> | <p>Intended outcome:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Outcome 2.1 BCCRF incentivizes investments that are innovative in a climate change program. ▪ Outcome 2.2 Improved resilience to climate change effects in targeted population <p>Achieved outcome:</p> | |

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 6 projects approved and under implementation, 3 are WB projects, 1 was BCCRF Secretariat support. Not all projects are innovative. ▪ Projects in early stage of implementation, but have improved resilience of direct beneficiaries See results under Outcome 2.2 above. ▪ Multipurpose Cyclone Shelter Construction Project: significantly reduced loss of lives from Mahasen cyclone (2013) due to increased number of shelters | |
| <p>Objective 3:</p> <p>GOB demonstrates strategic leadership on national climate change policy and global climate financing</p> | <p>Intended outcome:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Outcome 3.1 Increased capacity of entity within and outside government to submit proposal for NIE accreditation ▪ Outcome 3.2 Increased knowledge and lessons learnt to inform climate change policy ▪ Outcome 3.3 Bangladesh is considered an international model for implementing sound climate change adaptation solutions <p>Achieved outcome:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Government capacity to submit proposals not enhanced ▪ WB lead studies generated knowledge – unclear if they influenced policy ▪ BCCRF related donor-GoB dialogue lead to the selection of ERD as the Nationally Designated Authority for the Green Climate Fund | |
| <p>End outcome</p> <p><u>Vision</u></p> | <p>Intended outcome:</p> <p>By 2020 the BCCRF will be a government led, owned and managed collaborative and sustainable climate change financing mechanism, which is transparent and accountable,</p> | |

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| | <p>aimed at developing capacity and resilience of the country to meet the challenges of climate change</p> <p>Achieved outcome: Will not be achieved – BCCRF will close by end 2016</p> | |
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Lessons learnt (as indicated in e.g. project reviews and evaluations):

- Short time frames and attempts to fast-track disbursements can limit the ability to sufficiently address the long-term perspective of climate change.
- Increased disbursement speed and lowered transaction costs are insufficient arguments for attaching CC projects to other existing projects – on the other hand strategic synergies and clear linkages to the intended results and adding value are a strong justification for latching on to existing activities.

Observations from the evaluation team:

- The performance of the individual sub-projects funded by BCCRF are generally rated by WB implementation status and results reports as having a satisfactory or at least moderately satisfactory progress. Their risk rating is generally moderate, but for CRPARP the risk is assessed as being substantial. The DfID Annual Review (Mar 2014) rated the performance as “B – moderately not meeting expectations”. However, the DfID Annual Review found no evidence that the WB monitored the progress against the BCCRF log frame from 2013, and also found the robustness of the Log frame and indicators could be questioned, as they were not underpinned by a Theory of Change. The projects implemented were relevant for BCCSAP, but the field visit to sites CRPARP showed that some actions were not innovative but funding upscaling of current FD and NGO activities, and the activities did not always have a clearly framed CC&DM profile – indeed community beneficiaries met did not demonstrate a clear understanding of the linkage to climate change adaptation. MTR found that the 4-year time frame for the BCCRF was not appropriate to address the long-term process of CC. The IDA linked projects are likely to benefit from IDA’s sustainability measures, but the sustainability of the stand-alone projects is at risk, the CRPARP groups visited did not appear fully self-sustained yet, and no tangible sustainability measures appear in place – stakeholders express that there is a need for a follow-up project (MN 303).
- While the sub-projects reportedly have performed reasonably well as individual projects, they will not deliver the intended change and increased capacity of GoB to manage climate funds; objectives 1 and 3 will not be achieved. While the sub-projects do contribute to objective 2, outcome 2.1 (BCCRF incentivises innovation) will not be achieved. The programme design was inappropriate to ensure full government ownership and leadership – BCCRF was parallel to BCCTF even if they were intended to implement the same policy, and there were no linkages or synergies. GoB never assumed leadership and the BCCRF Secretariat at MoEF never became fully operational. The DfID Annual Review found that progress on capacity building in the BCCRF Secretariat had been very slow, which led to *inadequacies and delays in programme management, coordination between GOB ministries and agencies, and execution of project activities*. Moreover, the grant approval process was slow (MTR).
- WB had a fiduciary and TA responsibility, but not a programme management and coordination responsibility (DfID Annual Review), and with the limited GoB ownership there was not an appropriate programme management system in place (MN 305, MN 209).
- Due to the significant challenges with BCCRF, EPs and WB have decided not to continue supporting BCCRF after 2016, but GoB would have preferred it to continue.

- BCCRF did not implement actions to influence policy, but did provide a useful forum for EP-GoB policy dialogue on climate finance.
- 7 projects implemented by Bangladesh recipients (average size \$21m):
 1. Multipurpose Cyclone Shelter Construction Project (LGED: US\$25m – cofunding IDA ECRRP). Satisfactory progress. – WB project number: P111272
 2. Community Climate Change Project (NGO window) (PKSF: \$12.5m). Good progress. – WB project number: P125447
 3. Afforestation and Reforestation for Climate Change Risk Reduction in Coastal and Hilly Areas of Bangladesh (Bangladesh Forest Dept: US\$33.8m). Good progress. – WB project number: P127015
 4. Solar Irrigation Project (IDCOL: \$24.5m – cofunding with IDA RERED II and other sources). On schedule. – WB project number: P131263
 5. Modern Food Storage Project (MoFDM: \$25m – cofunding IDA Modern Food Storage Project). On schedule. – WB project number: P120583
 6. Secretariat for BCCRF (MOEF: \$0.2 m). Slow progress. – WB project number: P128445
 7. *Not approved (by end 2013) Agricultural Adaptation in Climatic Risk Prone Areas of Bangladesh (DAE: \$22.8m – additional funding for IDA support follow to NATP).* – WB project number: P147043
 8. *Not approved: Capacity Building Project – Secretariat Phase II (MOEF: \$5.5m)*
- 6 analytical studies/analytical and advisory activities (AAA) implemented by WB (average size US\$0.53m). WB reports that they have been in high demand and used and quoted, e.g. in the IPCC assessment report (MN 305), The study on health is informing ongoing Sida work on mainstreaming CC in their support for the health sector.
 1. Impacts of Climate Change on Climate Sensitive Diseases and Implications for the Health Sector – WB project number: P143457
 2. Water Logging of Urban Areas in a Changing Climate: Potential Damage and Adaptation – WB project number: P133511
 3. Detailed Design of Environmental Studies for Construction of Urir Char–Noakhali Cross Dam – WB project number: P144068
 4. Eco-Engineering, Climate Adaptation and Innovations in Urban Flood Risk Mitigation – WB project number: P148929
 5. Scaling up Innovation in Disaster Risk Management in Bangladesh – WB project number: P130724
 6. Making Climate Data Relevant to Decision Making in Bangladesh: Spatial and Temporal Downscaling – WB project number: P146094
 7. *Concept note stage by end 2013: A Proposal to Support Human and Financial Resilience to Natural Hazards*

Information sources:

- *Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund Mid Term Review, Final Report, 2014*
- European Union, *Monitoring Report, MR-145075.01, Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF), 2012*

- Department for International Development, *Annual review, Jolobayoo o Jibon (Climate Change Programme, Bangladesh)*, 2014
- BCCRF, *Results Framework 2012- 2017, Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund*, 2013
- BCCRF website: <http://www.bccrf-bd.org/>
- Stakeholder interviews

12. Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP)

Title: Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme, Phase II

EP: EU, Sida

Aid modality: Project – joint management/UNDP managed under their National Implementation Modality (government implements)

Budget:

- Planned: Total 38M€ (EU, DFID, UNDP), later budget increased to 52M€ (Sida, Norway, AusAID joined)
EU 13M€ (2010-2014). Sida 50MSEK (2009-13)
- Disbursed: EU 11.5M€/Sida 50MSEK (5.4M€)
By 30/6/2012 total spending was just 20%, the EUD is expecting an underspending of 50% by project end.

Beneficiary: Disaster Management Bureau (DMB)/Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MoFDM) now Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR)

Implementation dates: CDMP 1: 2004-2009, CDMP 2: 01/01/2010 – 31/12/2014

Program logic:

CDMP is comprehensive programme, which aims at addressing all aspects of disaster management, in order to transform disaster management in Bangladesh as per its overall objective: *National capacity of the disaster management system strengthened to reduce unacceptable risks and improve response and recovery activities by adopting a comprehensive risk management culture.* CDMP thus aims at ensuring that the disaster management paradigm in Bangladesh increasingly moves away from a primary focus on a) reactive response to disasters and b) structural measures (infrastructure, e.g. shelters) to a more holistic and preventive approach, which also seeks to reduce the risk and enhance the resilience towards disaster, including the application of non-structural measure. Hence, CDMP was designed to engage in a broad range of activities under its 6 outcome areas, including: promotion of the mainstreaming of disaster in national policies and plans across sectors, institutional reform, capacity development and awareness raising for a range of stakeholders at national and local levels in and outside government, piloting and implementation of structural and non-structural interventions to reduce vulnerability to disaster and adaptation to climate change at the local level in both rural and urban areas, strengthening of early warning systems, and strengthening of disaster response coordination.

▪ **Assumptions:**

2013 log frame: contains numerous output level assumptions, but also outcome level assumptions:

- An increasing number of DM professionals with enhanced competence get sufficient opportunity to contribute to the country's disaster preparedness
- CDMP manages to convincingly demonstrate LDRRF as a viable model for implementation of local risk reduction schemes
- Bangladesh recognizes the underserved needs of a rapidly growing urban population
- The systems and structures set in place by CDMP stand the test of major disasters

- Successive major natural disasters do not result in diverting resources committed for preparedness away from DRR to relief response
- Development programming of CDMP partners leads to a change of mindset in ministries, departments and agencies
- Ministries secure sufficient resources for continued DRR/CCA action post CDMP
- Continued strong political commitment for CCA
- Frequency and intensity of climate change hazards do not overwhelm what can be effectively managed

Original log frame:

- GoB will continue to give high priority to DRR.
- The funding gap will be filled by DFID or GFDRR before the signature of the Contribution Agreement between EC and UNDP.

| Results chain <i>(as indicated in project documentation)</i> | Expectations and achievements <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> | Alternative contributing factors <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> |
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| Numerous outputs intended and delivered, the below is not a comprehensive account | | |
| Output 1 Result 1 – professionalising disaster management system | Intended outputs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Output 1.1: Approved and implemented policy and legislative framework to guide disaster management reforms and programmes ▪ Output 1.2: MoDMR structure and skills improved to help the execution of revised Allocation of Business functions ▪ Output 1.3: Strengthened collaborative partnerships, information management and liaison capability ▪ Output 1.4: Decentralised capacity building and professional development structures established and providing quality support ▪ Output 1.5: Sustained MoDMR and sectoral ministries’ capability to effectively contribute to international and regional initiatives ▪ Output 1.6: ‘Knowledge Services Centre’ established and providing efficient quality KM service to disaster management Achieved outputs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Several policies and plans developed or influenced to include DRR (disaster risk reduction) and CCA (climate change adaptation), incl: 6th Five Year Plan, revised Standing Orders on Disaster, draft Disaster Management (DM) Policy, and under CDMP 1 the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP). ▪ Helped set up the Poverty, Environment and Climate Mainstreaming (PECM) project in the MoP (Ministry of Planning), now functioning without CDMP support and appraising projects with a DRR lens. ▪ TOR of Disaster Emergency Response (DER) revised and DER now sits with DMRD. | A conducive policy framework Complementary actions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECHO, DIPECHO • IFS projects • Other donors' food security and DRR interventions • Actions financed under the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Climate Change • Other CCA actions |

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DRR and CCA mainstreamed into training and education curricula of 43 institutions. 2 universities offer full-fledged undergraduate course in DM. 2-year Masters degree course for working professionals. 18 universities have DM modules in their Master's programmes. Ministry of Education incorporated DM and CC issues in 39 textbooks at primary level. 5 tertiary education institutions commenced DM education programmes. Compulsory DRR/DM module for all civil servants in GoB civil service training. 10 e-learning centres. CDMP 1 established Bangladesh Disaster Management Education, Research and Training Network, (BDMERTN). ▪ District administration more inclined to engage on DRR issues. Computers and IT hardware supplied to District Relief and Rehabilitation Officer (DRRO) and Project Implementation Officer (PIOs) in upazilas. | |
| <p>Output 2 <u>Result 2</u> – rural risk reduction</p> | <p>Intended output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Output 2.1: Institutional capacity of DDMC, UzDMC, and UDMC ▪ Output 2.2: Focused risk reduction and adaptation support provided to vulnerable communities through expansion and integration of CRA/RRAP within local level planning ▪ Output 2.3: Disaster risk reduction included in the microfinance sector to improve asset building and lower financial impacts of disasters at household level ▪ Output 2.4: Livelihood security and adaptation strategies for specific marginalised groups in 40 districts are in place ▪ Output 2.5: Community level risk reduction facilitated through an established LDRRF mechanism ▪ Output 2.6: Awareness and promotional materials to advocate the lessons learnt and best practices of rural risk reduction produced and disseminated <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 1200 Unions trained in CRA and FTRA. (2013) | |

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 746 household and community level small-scale risk reduction schemes implemented (54 pond sand filters, 103 deep tube wells, 13 rain water harvesting units, 527 hygienic toilets, 15 earth works, four brick works, 20 cyclone resilient houses, 4 solar panels). (2012) ▪ CRAs (climate risk assessment) carried out by CDMP 1. Fast Tracked CRA developed by CDMP2. ▪ Increased DRR and CCA awareness among union officials, village heads and communities. ▪ Hand pumps for drinking water, water points for piped water supply, rainwater harvesting tanks, and toilets provided. | |
| <p>Output 3 <u>Result 3</u> – urban risk reduction</p> | <p>Intended output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Output 3.1: Expansion of earthquake risk assessment and contingency planning and improved response in five new districts ▪ Output 3.2: Support to city corporations and municipalities to increase awareness & response for urban hazard risk across a range of key target audiences in selected cities ▪ Output 3.3: Community-based CRA/RRAP and mitigation works piloted in 45 densely populated wards ▪ Output 3.4: Ward level contingency planning institutionalised in Dhaka, Sylhet and Chittagong <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 46 units of semi-detached cyclone resilient houses constructed for 92 families in 2013. ▪ Seismic assessments in 3 cities (2012). Enhanced national technical capacity to in assess seismic vulnerabilities for urban planning. ▪ Core activities and methodologies that have potential to reduce risk to earthquake identified. ▪ 23,357 urban volunteers trained. | |

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Urban risk reduction agenda promoted at national level and now received greater policy attention. | |
| <p>Output 4 <u>Result 4</u> – response preparedness</p> | <p>Intended output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Output 4.1: Improved and more effective early warning, response and relief management in 40 high-risk districts ▪ Output 4.2: Effectiveness of community warning systems in high risk flood and cyclone districts improved and expanded ▪ Output 4.3: DMIC/DMIN fully operational and providing 24/7 information management and alerting capability ▪ Output 4.4: National damage, loss and needs assessment system established and functioning effectively <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Standing Orders on Disaster (SOD) revised to reflect DRR dimension. ▪ Airport authorities in Dhaka and Chittagong trained on DM. ▪ GoB's Cyclone Preparedness Programme (CPP) expanded to 5 new cyclone affected upazilas. ▪ Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre (FFWC) has the capacity to increase lead time from 3 to 5 days. Enhanced computing capacity at Bangladesh Meteorology Department (BMD) – satellite data can be access and analysed in 10 minutes. Disaster Management Information Centre (DMIC) has an Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system with phone accessible early warning forecasts, a cell broadcasting piloted, and databases on NGOs, shelters and LDRRF interventions (2012). In 110,000 inquiries addressed by IVR in 2013. ▪ 2,000 fishermen provided with lifejackets and solar lanterns in 2013. | |
| <p>Output 5 <u>Result 5</u> – mainstreaming and institutionalising DRR</p> | <p>Intended output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Output 5.1: Facilitating Mainstreaming DRR and CCA across sectors ▪ Output 5.2: Disaster Management issues are incorporated in the books of primary to higher secondary levels / NCTB ▪ Output 5.3: Strengthened BMD early warning capacity / BMD | |

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Output 5.4: Strengthened FFWC early warning capacity / FFWC ▪ Output 5.5a: Strengthened DAE capacity for adaptation of livelihoods to climate change ▪ Output 5.5b: Strengthened DoF DRR & CCA capacity ▪ Output 5.5c: Strengthened DLS DRR & CCA capacity ▪ Output 5.6: Mainstreaming climate risk management with technical support to MoEF/DoE ▪ Output 5.7: Ensuring mainstreaming DRR in the Health Sector ▪ Output 5.8: Enhanced skills and technical capability – FSCD ▪ Output 5.9: Enhanced skills and technical capability of GSB ▪ Output 5.10: Ensuring Mainstreaming DRR in the DPHE ▪ Output 5.11: Mainstreaming DRR in land use planning / MoL ▪ Output 5.12: Mainstreaming DRR in women and children affairs development initiatives / DWA <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PRSP included one separate policy on comprehensive disaster management. ▪ Disaster Management and Relief Division (DMRD) established, National Plan for Disaster Management 2010-2015 developed – CDMP played key role advocating for this. SOD revised. ▪ Ministry of Women’s Affairs has a risk reduction action plan and trained staff on DRR and CCA. Guidelines have also been initiated for fisheries, agriculture, livestock and environment sectors. (2012) ▪ Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) Department staff trained on data processing to produce more location-specific forecasts. Department of Agricultural Extension tested adaptive crop varieties. ▪ 10 Resilient Agricultural Model Villages (RAMV) established. | |
| <p>Output 6 <u>Result 6</u> – community climate change adaptation</p> | <p>Intended output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Output 6.1: Gaps bridged in community, institutions and climate science for improved and effective climate responsive CRA and RRAP initiatives | |

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Output 6.2: Contingency planning for vulnerable populations living in very high-risk areas ▪ Output 6.3: Disaster risk reduction with tools, techniques and methods developed on adaptation to climate change to enhance community resilience and policy advocacy <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Climate change studies carried out. ▪ CC principles integrated in CRA at grassroots level. ▪ Senior GoB officials trained on CCA ▪ Several field pilots on climate change adaptation in crop production, resilient habitat and solution to drinking water in the dry zones of Bangladesh. | |
| <p>Intermediate outcome 1 <u>Result 1</u> – professionalising disaster management system:</p> | <p>Intended outcome The development of strong, well-managed and professional institutions in Bangladesh which are able to implement a comprehensive range of risk reduction programmes and interventions at national level, as well as contributing to regional actions and international learning and best practice</p> <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CDMP has played an important role in the development of the current policy framework, which stakeholders and independent reviewers find conducive ▪ In 2013 a Ministry of Disaster and Relief was established in response to advocacy from CDMP and others. ▪ Increased capacity of MoDMR and its operational wings (e.g. DDM) ▪ CDMP has contributed to creating a strong pool of DM/DRR professionals | |
| <p>Intermediate outcome 2 <u>Result 2</u> – rural risk reduction</p> | <p>Intended outcome Reduced risk to rural populations through structural and non-structural interventions, empowerment of rural communities and improved awareness of, and planning for, natural hazard events, including the likely impacts of climate change</p> | |

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| | <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The vulnerability was reduced of 3M people in 2013 and of 2M people in 2012 due to LDRRF schemes. ▪ 1.1M+ people 1,100,000 people more resilient due to improved skills and livelihood status. ▪ 59% of beneficiaries reported that LDRRF schemes contribute to DRR in their locality; 25.6% of benefit saw a partial reduction in the disaster risk for their community. (Impact Assessment Report). 30.7% reported that the schemes had improved the safety of women and children. ▪ Several unintended benefits were delivered by LDRRF schemes (e.g. for health, transport/ communication, agriculture). ▪ Awareness has increased among communities and local institutions | |
| <p>Intermediate outcome 3 <u>Result 3</u> – urban risk reduction</p> | <p>Intended outcome Reduced risk to urban populations through structural and non-structural interventions, improved awareness of natural hazard events and the piloting of urban community risk reduction methodologies that target the extreme poor</p> <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Greater policy attention to urban risk management and clarified management and leadership roles in urban disasters. ▪ Enhanced technical capabilities in seismic-zonation (which is likely to influence future urban planning). ▪ 450 people of Gopalganj Municipality more resilient to urban disasters. ▪ Volunteers helped in a landslide in Chittagong (2012) and in the Rana Plaza building collapse using equipment provided by CDMP ((DfID Annual Review Mar 2014). | |
| <p>Intermediate outcome 4 <u>Result 4</u> – response preparedness:</p> | <p>Intended outcome</p> | |

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| | <p>Improved overall effectiveness and timeliness of disaster preparedness and response in Bangladesh by strengthening early warning systems, national management capacity and coordination facilities at all levels</p> <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strengthened early warning capacity. ▪ More than 110M sim cards (36-75M persons) gained access to early warning dissemination (DfID Annual Review 2014, CDMP Value for Money Study) ▪ Around 88 million people now have two more days warning to take measures to protect life, livelihoods and assets, due to extended flood lead time by the Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre from 3 days to 5 days (DfID Annual Review Mar 2014). ▪ 2M people are getting flash flood early warning – before most of the crops were lost, but now farmers can save up to 70% of their field crops. ▪ 88M people getting flood warnings 5 days in advance – and can save up to 70€ of their movable resources/capital goods) ▪ Safety of 2,000 fishermen in coastal fisher communities is now ensured when they are fishing. (2013) ▪ 12,000 vulnerable households better prepared for disasters. (2013) ▪ In preparedness for the Tropical Storm Mahasen, around 1.1 million people were evacuated to nearly 3,300 shelters within 24 hours. Only 17 people died. This demonstrates the positive impact of the SODs on disaster preparedness. (DfID Annual Review Mar 2014) | |
| <p>Intermediate outcome 5 <u>Result 5</u> – mainstreaming and institutionalising DRR</p> | <p>Intended outcome</p> <p>Improved disaster-proofing of development programming, and enhanced technical capacity to incentivise positive long-term changes in planning and investment decisions, in targeted ministries</p> <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 2,874 households in 10 Resilient Agricultural Model Villages are more secure from the adverse impact of disaster and climate change | |

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| <p>Intermediate outcome 6 <u>Result 6</u> – community climate change adaptation</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 2,845 people have access to safe drinking water <p>Intended outcome Community-level adaptation to disaster risks from a changing climate is effectively managed</p> <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CDMP has generated and validated CCA knowledge and practice. ▪ 61 government officials of different ministries and agencies are now better prepared for planning and implementation of climate change initiatives. (2013) | |
| <p>End outcome Overall Objective</p> | <p>Intended outcome National capacity of the disaster management system strengthened to reduce unacceptable risks and improve response and recovery activities by adopting a comprehensive risk management culture</p> <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CDMP has created a paradigm shift from disaster response to risk reduction, and several ministries have adopted DRR/CC, and education and training on DM is available. <i>“CDMP brought a set of new interpretations of old practices including the revision of Standard Orders on Disaster; introduced new evidence like Community Risk Analysis; facilitated the process of generating new ideas and technologies like the National Disaster Management Plan, and mainstreamed DM in other sectors”</i> A significant shift has been observed at the national and community level, but not at the sub-national level. Moreover, implementation capacity and coordination remain constraints. (Impact Assessment Report). ▪ GoB has now integrated in all its relevant policies and programmes – CDMP played a critical role in this ▪ CDMP has enhanced the capacity of CSOs and communities (Impact Assessment Report). ▪ CDMP has generated good knowledge and evidence on DM, DRR and CCA (Impact Assessment Report, DfID annual Review Mar 2014). | |

Table – Paradigm shift – changes towards risk reduction (source: Impact Assessment Report, 2014)

| | Policy | Values and perspectives | Practice |
|--------------|--------|-------------------------|----------|
| National | High | Moderate | Moderate |
| Sub-national | Low | Moderate | Low |
| Community | High | Moderate | High |

Lessons learnt (as indicated in e.g. project reviews and evaluations):

- From CDMP 1 (2004-9) (source Action Fiche): Knowledge management is a critical part of success; Move from a project approach to core business to ensure sustainability; Multi-donor frameworks can work; Community DRR can work; An information system is more than just a network of computers; Institutional reform and capacity building of MoFDM is a relatively slow process; Mainstreaming DRR out of the MoFDM (and into sectors) remains a key challenge; Partnership frameworks can help to accelerate policy development with action on the ground; The private sector is an important actor, but so far is not well understood.
- From 2013 ROM: Project complexity should be limited; for complex projects: EPs should get involved in project design; EPs should insist on a full log frame with a clear project purpose and verifiable indicators, also for the UN.
- From MTR: *“Implementing single standalone interventions without analysing their impact on the overall risk reduction within the village or taking into account linkages with other interventions limits the potential impact”*.

Observations from the evaluation team:

- Overall, CDMP delivered well on outputs, received the score “A – outputs met expectations” in DfID’s annual review (March 2014).
- Activities under Outcome 1 had remarkable success; CDMP has been very good at influencing the policy, planning and regulatory framework, education, awareness, and capacity at the national level. However, the DfID Annual Review found that it was unclear whether CDMP had ensured that ministries take Bangladesh’s risk profile into account when developing budgets and work plans. Stakeholder interviews indicate that CDMP has been able to significantly enhance the commitment to DRR in some ministries and agencies (e.g. Agriculture, Women’s Affairs, Meteorological Dept.), but not to the same extent in others.
- However, the engagement at the local level has been less effective. The MTR found that CDMP had been less successful in creating a paradigm shift from disaster response to risk reduction at local level where a relief-mindset is still dominant, and the MTR found that CDMP’s approach to capacity building and engagement with local authorities was of limited effectiveness, supply driven, ad-hoc in nature, and not conducive for building sustained local government capacity. A tendency to focus on structural rather than non-structural measures and response rather than prevention still appears to be the case in Bangladesh, albeit with differences between upazillas, unions and communities. Nonetheless, the DfID Annual Review found that the vast majority of Union Disaster Management Committees in CDMP areas identified mitigation activities as a priority to address disaster risk, and while almost 50% emphasised structural protection, almost 40% gave importance to awareness raising.

- The Local Disaster Risk Reduction Fund (LDRRF) is the main CDMP mechanism for rural risk reduction work. The achievements of the LDRRF have been limited according to the MTR and 2013 ROM, but the impact study had a more positive view on the results and found that LDRRF outcomes were of good quality (access road and an area for houses and assets raised above flooding level; WATSAN; livestock provision and training), and DMCs (Community Disaster Management Committees – responsible for preparedness, early warning, coping with disasters, recovery) functioned well. DMCs benefitting from LDRRF are far more active than those, which do not. However, common concern by a number of stakeholders as well as reviewers (2013 ROM, MTR, DfID 2014 Annual Review) are that LDRRF actions are a) scattered across a too large geographical area compared to the budget available and b) focused mainly on the construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure; thus not offering a comprehensive “all hazards” resilience-building package at the local level. Hence, although CDMP’s policy guidelines (2011) state that CDMP 2 would move away from stand-alone interventions and develop comprehensive approach to addressing risk reduction within a village, this was not implemented.
- The impression from the field visit is that the planning and procurement process for LDRRF activities was too centralised to fully ensure local ownership by local governments and communities. For example, community-members working on infrastructure construction provided paid labour – but there were no agreements/demands for local contributions (e.g. labour or local materials) or agreements on community responsibility for simple/basic maintenance.
- Elements of outcomes 2, 3, 4, and 5 are working very well, especially the flood and cyclone warning, and the dial-in weather service.
- Reaching vulnerable groups and women was sometimes a challenge with local elites capturing the benefits. A gender guidebook had been developed under CDMP I, but the new team for CDMP II was not made aware of it (MN 306).
- There are concerns about the sustainability of the results achieved. Policy and advocacy results are likely to be sustained, but the sustainability of risk reduction work at the local/community level is not ensured. (MTR). The DfID 2014 Annual Review Team found CDMP had weaknesses in relation to achieving lasting change.
- The programme design and management modalities were not sufficiently strong to ensure that CDMP was implemented in accordance with the intentions. 2013 ROM report and DfID 2014 Annual Review found problems in relation to the quality of design, the intervention logic/log frame was overly complex and without a clear theory of change, so CDMP was found as being i as a series of activities and not an integrated whole. Moreover, resources and staffing were found insufficient. The combination of this lack of strategic clarity and the management modalities and resources constraints appears to have been the main factors behind the inability of CDMP to promotion of a comprehensive DRR approach at the local level as intended. Moreover, the Implementation of CDMP II and continuity from CDMP I was negatively affected by a gap between the two phases and challenges related to filling the project manager position.
- UNDP is in the process of designing a new programme, which will build on elements of, and lessons from, CDMP, but there will not be a third Phase of CDMP (MN 302, MN 306). However, while Sida will continue to support DRR in Bangladesh, but the

form and the extent to which this support will be provided through UNDP has not yet been decided (MN 304). EU will now focus on mainstreaming CC in its other sectors, CDMP is not priority programme in new country programme but EU is considering to support some CDMP follow-up activities (MN 309).

Information sources:

- European Union, *Monitoring Report. MR-139241.01. Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) 2010-2014*, 2011
- European Union, *Monitoring Report. MR-139241.01. Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) 2010-2014*, 2013
- Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Khurshid Alam, Christine Apikul, Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, Caxton Etii, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Mid-Term Review*, 2012
- Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, *Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014), Annual Progress Report 2012*, 2012
- Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, *Annual Progress Report 2013, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2010-2014)*, 2013
- European Union, *Action Fiche n°4 for Bangladesh, Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme 2010-2014 (CDMP) DCI-ASIE/2009/205-925*, 2009
- Stakeholder interviews

13. Sundarban Environmental And Livelihoods Security (SEALS)

Title: Sundarban Environmental And Livelihoods Security (SEALS)

EP: EU

Aid modality: Project

Budget:

- Planned: 23M€ (€10M EU grant approved in 2009, NGOs provide €0.45€M for Result II)
- Disbursed:
Disbursement files (2012-2015): 2015: BDT 5M; 2014: BDT 8M; 2013: BDT 50M (0.49M€) + BDT 70M; 2012: BDT 40M + BDT 20M = BDT 193M (23M€)
Riders: Some rides appear to be missing, and they all use BDT not EUR
MTR: 30-40% of the annual budget for Result I (Forest Department) had been spent in the first three years (41% PE1, 32% PE2, 30% PE3). World Vision had spent 21% and Concern Worldwide 31% of their budgets by end May 2013; World Vision had received 53% of the total project budget from EU, Concern Worldwide only 15%.

The Forest Department (FD) and NGOs have different financial cycles.

Beneficiary: Communities in Sundarbans, Forest Department (FD) – Khulna, implementing NGOs: World Vision, Concern Worldwide, Jagrata Juba Shangha (JJS), Shushilan

Implementation dates: 10/11/2010 to 31/5/2015 in EU agreements with FD, World Vision, Concern Worldwide and Agriconsulting, but FD's Development Project Proforma (DPP) ends on 31/12/2014 (Source: 2013 MTR)

Program logic:

SEALS aims at improving the protection and sustainable management of the Sundarbans mangrove forest, while enhancing the livelihoods and reducing the vulnerability of the surrounding communities; with the purpose of **ensuring:** *Sustainable development of the Sundarbans Reserved Forest and the people who now depend on its resources.* It comprises two main components. The first component supports the Forest Department to improving the protection of the Sundarbans Reserve Forest (SRF); by providing improved infrastructure and equipment, training the staff, and introducing a management information system to enhance monitoring and patrolling. The second component is support for NGOs (World Vision and Concern Worldwide) to a) promote alternative livelihoods options to reduce forest dependency and improve livelihoods and incomes; b) reduce vulnerability to disaster by implementing DRR measures and raising awareness, and c) to promote approaches to sustainable resource extraction in SRF (community co-management, sustainable extraction techniques).

▪ **Assumptions:**

| | □□□□□□□□□□ in log frame | Status 2015 |
|----------------|---|-----------------------|
| Purpose | A stable political environment pertains | No disruptions caused |

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| | Political will to follow up project recommendations | No policy recommendations were made |
| | Another project takes on coastal fisheries | BMFCBP ongoing until 2017 |
| | IPAC proceeds on schedule | IPAC completed and followed by CREL |
| Result 1 | A comprehensive strategic management plan for SRF has been approved | IRMP (IPAC) has been approved |
| | The SRF resource inventory has been updated | Carbon inventory carried out under IPAC in 2010 and biodiversity inventory in sanctuaries by SEALS |
| | FD develops, through IPAC, standards and protocols for dealing and improving relations with local communities | Co-management rules have been prepared, but no access to 50% revenues |
| | FD willing to modernise protection strategy | Yes, MIST adopted in pilot areas and interest in further expansion |
| | GoB allocation to FD-SRF raised to a level adequate for maintenance | No increase of budget yet; current budget insufficient |
| | GoB agrees to hardship and hazards allowances for Sundarbans field staff | No such allowance for Sundarban staff (2013) |
| | GoB revenue budget allocation is adequate to maintain MIS/GIS | No increase of budget (2013) |
| | Result 2 | Effective and timely coordination with IPAC |
| Agreement achieved between various local government offices, communities and project | | CMCs and related groups and fora agreed with stakeholders |
| Other assumptions on sustainable resource extraction identified by MTR: | | |
| Improved control through enhanced management capacity | | Yes, at least in MIST pilot areas |
| Alternative livelihood reducing SRF resource use | | Reduced use by direct beneficiaries |
| The impact of awareness raising | | Enhanced DRR measures undertaken by vulnerable communities and UDMCs (not by all) |
| The regulatory interactions between organized resource users and CMCs | | Unknown |
| Source: 2013 MTR | | |

| Results chain <i>(as indicated in project documentation)</i> | Expectations and achievements <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> | Alternative contributing factors <i>(as indicated in project documentation, including reviews and evaluations)</i> |
|---|--|--|
| Output 1 Restored, modernised and cyclone-proof SRF protection in light of the new management plan (activity 1 for Result I) | Intended output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not further specified in available documents Achieved output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Trained most SRF staff ▪ Constructed/renovated infrastructure: buildings, pontoons, gangways, jetties ▪ Rehabilitated boats ▪ Improved water supplies: fresh water ponds, rainwater harvesting and filters ▪ Provided equipment for staff | Other projects implemented in Sundarbans on biodiversity, natural resource management, climate change adaptation, livelihoods: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sundarban Biodiversity Conservation Project, ADB/GEF ▪ Nishorgo Support Project, USAID ▪ Integrated Protected Area Co-Management project (IPAC), USAID ▪ Climate-Resilient Ecosystems and Livelihoods (CREL), USAID ▪ National Tiger Recovery Programme, GTI, Smithsonian Institute ▪ Sustainable Development and Biodiversity Conservation in the Coastal Forests of Bangladesh (SDBC), GIZ ▪ Strengthening Regional Cooperation for Wildlife Protection project, World Bank ▪ Bangladesh Tiger Action Plan (BTAP), FC Wildlife Trust of Bangladesh, Zoological Society of London and the University of Minnesota ▪ Mangroves for the Future (MFF) in Indian Sundarbans, MFF |
| Output 2 Sustainable Management Information System to guide SRF protection and management established (activity 2 for Result I) | Intended output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not further specified in available documents Achieved output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Management Information System (MIST) development in progress ▪ GIS based monitoring system ▪ Software for SMART patrolling, training and training manual ▪ 2 MIST pilots implemented | |
| Output 3 Improved sustainability of SRF resource extraction (activity 1 for Result II) | Intended output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Protection of SRF improved through strengthened grassroots institutions contributing to active SRF co-management committees. Achieved output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Co-management Committees (CMCs) established ▪ Awareness raised on sustainable resource extraction techniques | |
| Output 4 | Intended output | |

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| <p>Alternative livelihoods for SRF dependent households developed (activity 2 for Result II)</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Improved food security and reduced dependency of SRF resource harvesters through improved SRF product value chains and alternative livelihoods <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sustainable resource extraction and alternative livelihood options, e.g. Alternative Income Generating Activities (AIGA) promoted. 45,000 beneficiaries in the Sundarban Impact Zone (SIZ) reached through consultations, training, and community organisation activities ▪ 189 savings and loans groups for resource extractors established (4500 members) ▪ 1880 extractors trained on small business, crab fattening, fish culture, poultry and livestock rearing ▪ 1078 people short-term employed under Cash for Work ▪ 496 boys and girls received vocational training ▪ 1,845 Self-help Groups with 25,000 members established ▪ 31 CBOs formed | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP), EU, Sida, DFiD, Norad, AusAid, UNDP ▪ Post-cyclone SIDR Rehabilitation Projects ▪ Challenge Fund Shiree Programme, DFiD ▪ Bangladesh Marine Fisheries Capacity Building Project (BMFCBP), Fisheries Dept and Islamic Development Bank |
| <p>Output 5 Reduced risk of disasters for SIZ communities dependent on SRF (activity 3 for Result II)</p> | <p>Intended output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SIZ communities dependent on SRF resources are disaster resilient <p>Achieved output</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 145 community risk and vulnerability assessments carried out ▪ Ward Disaster Management Committees formed ▪ Adaptation and mitigations plans developed ▪ Afforestation programme: more than 18,000 saplings planted ▪ 333 fuel efficient stoves distributed ▪ 32 centres for non-formal education established targeting 1,000 boys and girls ▪ 465 volunteers of Cyclone Preparedness Programme (CCP) oriented on early warning (EW) systems and social mobilization ▪ 1625 households trained on DRR | |

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 14 mock drills conducted for school children ▪ School children given prizes for awareness raising ▪ Union disaster management committees (UDMC) trained on Standing Order on Disasters (SOD) roles and responsibilities ▪ 1 school ground raised to protect from flood ▪ 20 earthen road schemes (15.4 km) reconstructed and flood proofed ▪ 5 ponds to conserve freshwater ▪ Design of FD office building ground floors as cyclone and tidal surge shelters. 4 built, 4 under construction, 8 planned | |
| <p>Intermediate outcome 1 GoB capacity to manage the Sundarbans Reserved Forest restored and improved (Result I)</p> | <p>Intended outcome (<i>from indicators</i>)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>FD stations and camps on the periphery of SRF are strategically located, well equipped, have effective communications systems, are safe from natural hazard and have adequate trained staff by end-Y3</i> ▪ <i>Pilot of improved monitoring successful by end-Y3</i> ▪ <i>Interior of SRF is patrolled regularly and effectively by end-Y3</i> ▪ <i>FD staff follow standard protocols for patrolling and reporting by</i> ▪ <i>Improved linkage between SRF management and MIS by end-Y3</i> ▪ <i>Routine use (inputs, outputs) of FD's MIS by end-Y3</i> ▪ <i>Functional GIS with recent imagery by end-Y2</i> ▪ <i>FD monitoring of resource extraction</i> ▪ <i>Sustainable arrangement for MIS/GIS tech. staff by end-Y3</i> ▪ <i>Result and impact of SEALS training</i> <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Patrolling by FD staff in the SRF has increased due to an improved fleet and increased budget for fuel, but fuel budget likely to decrease post-project ▪ FD field staff motivated with regard to their job due to improved equipment, training and housing | |
| <p>Intermediate outcome 2</p> | <p>Intended outcome (<i>from indicators</i>)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SRF resources extracted sustainably | |

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| <p>Sustainable SRF resource extraction reduced dependence of surrounding communities on resources gathered from the Sundarbans and reduced exposure to natural disasters (Result II)</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Better organised SRF resources gathers and better prices obtained</i> ▪ <i>Increased value-addition on gathered SRF resources</i> ▪ NGOs: Increased productivity of SRF resources ▪ Reduced dependency on Sundarbans' natural resources/engagement in alternative livelihood options ▪ <i>Enhanced awareness on value of SRF resources and environmental services</i> ▪ <i>Increased school attendance</i> ▪ Reduced exposure and vulnerability to natural disasters ▪ <i>Increased access to FD cyclone-resistant infrastructure</i> ▪ <i>Increased access to cyclone shelters (75% of fringe communities)</i> ▪ NGOs: Reduced human pressure on the Sundarbans <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Populations in the SIZ aware of the importance of improved management of SRF to secure sustainable revenues and reduced disaster risk | |
| <p>End outcome Sundarbans Reserved Forest and the people who now depend on its resources are sustainably developed (Purpose)</p> | <p>Intended outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increased and increasing stable incomes/livelihood sources ▪ Sundarbans resources used sustainably ▪ Maintained or improved environmental integrity ▪ Reduced vulnerability of communities to extreme natural phenonema ▪ SUNDARI/Concern Worldwide: Contribution made to maintaining/improving Sundarbans' biodiversity <p>Achieved outcome</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Impossible to assess from the available documents | |

Lessons learnt (as indicated in e.g. project reviews and evaluations):

No lessons reflected in MTR and other available documents. There is no learning system to identify good practices and to adapt strategies. Lessons learned regarding feasible alternative livelihood options and disaster preparedness options at the local level as means to reduce vulnerability have been generated.

Observations from the evaluation team:

- SEALS was not a CC or DM/DRR project per se, but addressed climate change adaptation and disaster resilience as an integrated part (mainstreaming) of a more broad approach to promoting sustainable development, strengthening the protection of the Sunderbans improving rural livelihoods and reducing pressure on the Sunderbans forest resources.
- SEALS is field implementation, not a policy programme. But has collaborated with IPAC on mainstreaming of co-management for protected areas (MTR).
- SEALS enhanced DRR awareness and capacity, and promoted both structural and non-structural DRR measures. SEALS also enhanced the capacity local disaster risk committees. Hence, SEALS reduced vulnerability and contributed significantly at the local level to the implementation of national disaster policies, which call for a holistic and preventive approach to disaster management.
- FD highly appreciated the support provided by SEALS, which improved the patrolling system and capacity, improved the infrastructure and provided better equipment for the management of the Sunderbans Reserved Forest (MN 307). But some construction work was of poor quality due to lack of supervision (MTR).
- The NGOs have achieved tangible results in terms of providing alternative livelihoods, reducing forest dependency, and enhancing household incomes of direct beneficiaries. The vulnerability of direct beneficiaries to climate change impacts has been reduced through livelihoods diversification.
- Disaster resilience of direct beneficiaries has increased as a result of a range of actions, including: a) diversified livelihoods, b) awareness raising, c) training on disaster preparedness, d) improved protection of water sources. However, it is the impression from the field visit that the awareness and preparedness had not been increased uniformly in the benefitting unions and communities. The awareness and priority given to disaster risk reduction by local stakeholders appeared to a large extent to be determined by the severity of the experienced impacts of previous cyclones (notably Aila) – visited communities and unions that had been severely affected demonstrated a high level of awareness, commitment and tangible actions, whereas less affected communities only demonstrated limited awareness and gave more priority to income generation.
- Tender procedures were delayed due to some constraints; this led to low spending and slow progress under Result I. Budget info insufficient to assess spending for Result II, but seemingly low (e.g. for World Vision). (MTR)
- For Result II only progress monitoring is done, no progress was made in developing outcome/impact monitoring of SRF management (Result I) (MTR)
- Sustainability of the results achieved is a concern:
 - The availability of fuel to continue patrolling at the level done under SEALS is uncertain (SEALS had provided funding for fuel on a cost-sharing basis). GoB has agreed with EU to provide funding for fuel and to allocate some of the

revenue generated in Sunderbans (e.g. from tourism) for FD/Sunderbans management, but the extent to which GoB is able to honour this is currently not clear. Similarly the (financial) capacity to maintain of the infrastructure and equipment provided by SEALS is not clear. (MN 307, MN 309, MTR)

- The ability of the NGOs to ensure that the groups formed are viable in the future is also a concern; some of the groups visited appeared more solid than others – e.g. the savings groups established did not demonstrate a clear vision of the purpose of saving and the modalities for utilising the funds saved.
- Stakeholders in general express that “a new project is needed” and the “time is too short” to ensure sustainability. One NGO intends to continue supporting groups through other projects (MN 307). However, none of the implementing partners appears to implement tangible exit strategies.
- The EUD expresses that the new country strategy does not leave room for a continued support for the management of the Sunderbans by FD, but that support will still be provided for livelihoods in the area.

Information sources:

- Floris Deodatus, Gautam Shuvra Biswas, M.A. Sekendar, *Sundarbans Environmental And Livelihoods Security (SEALS) Project DCI-ASIE/2009/20133, Mid-Term Review*, 2013
- Disbursement files (2012-2015)
- Stakeholder interviews

Annex 7: List of persons met

| Name | Organization and Designation |
|-----------------------------|---|
| National authorities | |
| Md. Faruque | ADO, Munshugonj, Satkhira |
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Annex 9 – Minutes of the Discussion Seminar on the joint country evaluation of the development cooperation of Denmark Sweden and the European Union with Bangladesh during the period 2007-2013

Dhaka, 16 March 2016

Agenda

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| 8:45 – 9:15 | Arrival of participants and registration |
| 9:15 – 9:45 | Welcome address <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mr Mario Ronconi Head of Cooperation, European Union Delegation to Bangladesh • Mr Peter Bøgh Jensen Head of Cooperation, Danida • Mr. Abdul Mansur Md Faziullah Ministry of Finance, Economic Relations Division, Additional Secretary |
| 9:45 - 10:00 | Presentation of the Evaluation: purpose and process Ms Antonia Parera, Evaluation Manager, DG DEVCO 4 |
| 10:00 - 10:30 | Evaluation Findings and Conclusions Mr Peter Frøslev Christensen, Team Leader of the Evaluation and Ms Sonia Languille, Education Sector Lead |
| 10:30 - 11:15 | Questions and Comments |
| 11:15 - 12:00 | Evaluation Lessons Learnt and Recommendations Mr Peter Frøslev Christensen, Team Leader of the Evaluation and Ms Sonia Languille, Education Sector Lead |
| 12:00 - 12:30 | Questions and Comments |
| 12:30 - 13:00 | Concluding Remarks <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mr Mario Ronconi Head of Cooperation, European Union Delegation to Bangladesh |

1. Opening of the seminar

Mr Mario Ronconi, Head of Cooperation, European Union Delegation (EUD) to Bangladesh, opened the seminar and thanked all the participants for attending this event. He added a special word of thanks to the Additional Secretary, Mr Abdul Mansur Md Fazullah, from the Economic Relations Division (ERD) of the Ministry of Finance.

Mr Ronconi discussed the importance of regularly taking stock of evaluation works and having a strategic approach on the important aspects of the evaluation that can be implemented. He reminded the participants of the objectives of the evaluation. He invited the participants to freely comment on the presentation and on the draft report, to be finalised after incorporation of the comments received during this seminar.

Mr Ronconi also thanked other EU member states, Denmark and Sweden, for taking part to this joint evaluation exercise. He insisted on the importance of evaluations, even though they may constitute complex exercises. He noted that the evaluation partners tried to incorporate all relevant issues so as to get useful final results. He highlighted the need to focus on a limited number of areas for action instead of spreading efforts too thinly over too many sectors. This selection process is done at country and regional level in order to honour commitments made in regard of partnership, ownership and alignment.

Mr Peter Bogh Jensen, Head of Cooperation in DANIDA also welcomed all participants. He discussed how the evaluation had supported the design process of Danida's new Country Program for the next 5 years, which covers areas such as agriculture, governance and climate change and utilized evidence based policy as a core foundation. He talked about working with the government regarding many issues and put emphasis on the role of private resources to develop infrastructure and encourage investment. He also stressed the role of trade for development, which is a strategic axis of Bangladesh's Seventh Five year Plan. However, according to Mr Jensen, the Danish Embassy's new strategic orientation on trade and the private sector remains firmly tied to a continuing commitment to poverty eradication.

Mr. Abdul Mansur Md Faziullah, ERD Additional Secretary, thanked the EU, DANIDA and Sweden for their cooperation and appreciated this important initiative. He mentioned how the Developing Partners (DPs) always worked for the development of the country, especially in the economic sector. He emphasized that the country still needs support from the development partners in trade, education, poverty reduction and private sector development. He appreciated that facts and figures linked to the contribution of the development partners can be found in the report. He suggested that the evaluation team should reconcile its aid figures with those of the ERD's Foreign Aid Budget and Accounts. He emphasized the accountability of the Evaluation Partners to both the GoB and their domestic audiences. While Bangladesh has progressed towards the achievement of MDGs -and now SDGs-, to become a middle-income country, the country needs to do more. This evaluation will help orienting the Seven Five Year Plan in the right direction. However, he also pointed out that conclusions and recommendations should be better correlated. He also pointed out the importance of

channelling funds through country systems. Many requests have had been made to the EU and to other development partners in this respect.

2. Presentation of the Evaluation: purpose and process

Ms Antonia Parera, evaluation manager, DEVCO 04, gave a brief overview of the role and mandate of the Evaluation Unit and of the institutional framework of the European Commission. She stressed the importance of evaluation for accountability purposes as well as for learning (to see what is working and what is not). The results of evaluations are a key part of the aid effectiveness agenda. She underlined that evaluations are carried out by independent external evaluators and that member states are encouraged to engage in joint evaluations.

3. Presentation and discussion on the conclusions and recommendations

The Team Leader of the evaluation, Mr Peter Frøslev Christensen, presented the findings and conclusions of the report on the basis of a short PowerPoint presentation to leave ample time for questions and discussions. Ms Sonia Languille, Education Sector Lead, presented the education part of the presentation.

Ms Languille pointed out that the strategic link between primary and secondary education is not fully integrated. Under PEDP3 and the Treasury model policy dialogue has rather been focused on the implementer than on the ministry level. The confusion in the terminology related to budget support in the context of Bangladesh was pointed out. EU's budget support is different from the Treasury model. In this latter case, funds are directly channelled to the Treasury but their disbursement is still subject to fiduciary risk safeguard mechanisms and a specific list of eligible expenditures. Unlike the EU budget support model, the Treasury model can be considered an earmarked budget support. The ADB and the WB play a dominant role in the education sector and have a traditional project approach.

Following the presentation, four major issues were discussed on the basis of the participants' questions and comments.

▪ Involvement of IOs and NGOs

Representatives from the Government complimented on the report and indicated that this report could be used as a good reference report for future cooperation. They raised issues regarding the accountability and transparency of NGOs and international organisations (IOs). They mentioned that channelling funds through IOs and NGOs is undermining the capacity of the Government and may be subject to the same fiduciary risks as when funds are channelled through the GoB. They felt the report should more clearly mention the high administrative and consultative costs of channelling through IOs, the number of real demand-driven interventions implemented by NGOs, and the number of projects in line with the 7FYP and how they addressed government needs.

A representative from UCEP Bangladesh mentioned that there were limitations in country systems, which explain the role played by NGOs. Besides, NGOs can reach hard to reach areas, operate quickly and are more easily adaptable to change than the Government. It was also pointed out that the report did not sufficiently present some of the interesting progress made on health and other social sectors by Sweden and Denmark during the observed period.

▪ **Budget support/project support**

A UNDP participant noted the difficulty to see the link between budget support (which is a funding mechanism) and the development of tangible results. On governance, the most difficult part is to institutionalize the sector approach. The evaluators rightly pointed out the limitations. There have been notable improvements in recent years in aid effectiveness at the macro level in Bangladesh, most visibly in the mobilisation of external resources in support of the Millennium Development Goals, strengthening of country systems, budget support, sector-wide programmes and donor coordination. Yet UNDP argued that evidence-based knowledge in support of what works and what does not is still very weak. In order to make aid more effective, clear understanding of an evolving new architecture -responding to new challenges and new approaches- in the development ecosystem is essential. There are on-going challenges with the implementation of the current aid effectiveness agenda in this complex environment in the midst of the limited absorption capacities of government institutions. Hence, improving aid effectiveness is a joint responsibility of the GoB and its development partners. It is not just about managing funds but rather the implementation capacity of the government with its own funds and also the procurement.

The UNDP participant also stated that there are significant fiduciary risks. Capacity assessments hence need to be undertaken before moving to budget support. The DP-GoB agreements spell out the funding modality, although fund management is subject to compliance with governing rules and procedures of the government related to development projects. Depending on the clauses of the agreements signed between ERD and DPs, the latter also uses their own rules and regulations for making procurement and hiring consultants.

A representative from an NGO pointed out that the context had changed between 2013 and 2016. There are now substantial windows for private financing, and the SDGs explicitly aim to leverage such financing. But accountability mechanisms should also be mandatory for the private sector when financing public goods.

▪ **Education**

A participant from CAMPE compared PEDP 2 to PEDP 3 and mentioned that the latter was more effective in managing resources. There might be inherent challenges. He also mentioned the importance of including the measurement of the teacher pupil ratio. Besides, according to him, teachers' educational qualifications should be taken into account and non formal education should be brought under the roof of the government. He put an emphasis on policy dialogue and stressed that the insufficient number of government schools and the poor quality

of education delivered have also propelled the proliferation of private schools, which raises issues of inequality.

Mr. Abdul Mansur Md Faziullah argued that the evaluation was one-sided and that he would like to see a proper reflection on political stability and corruption. According to him, the field visit duration (3 weeks) was not enough to properly assess the implementation and/or the outcome of the projects. He also underlined that it was important to achieve a balanced view of the governance structure with clearly defined roles.

Bangladesh is a signatory of the 2005 Paris Declaration and is committed to implement the principles that were endorsed. Mr Ronconi underlined that the EU intends to use the country systems and work in a synchronized way with the government. This is fully compliant with the aid effectiveness ambition of the Paris Declaration.

▪ **Coordination issues**

A participant asked whether this evaluation report is linked to other evaluation reports and suggested other findings could also be linked. He stressed that cooperation among DPs is necessary, and that projects face huge challenges due to a lack of coordination. The fact that most DPs in Bangladesh spread their aid budget over a large number of sectors, resulting in considerable aid fragmentation, undermines the value and effectiveness of ODA in the country, as it increases the transaction costs as well as the coordination challenges.

A participant wondered how much confidence there is in taking the recommendations forward and asked about the status of the report. He added that the follow-up of the recommendations is perceived as time consuming and complex while it was recognized that more effort should be put into it. Besides, he mentioned that the lack of confidence in national systems poses a serious dilemma for both the GoB and DPs as that would limit the degree to which DPs could use (and hence strengthen) national systems and procedures.

4. Closing remarks

Mr Ronconi emphasized both the importance that for the EU Delegation to Bangladesh has the sector policy dialogue in some selected sectors and the need to improve country systems, with special focus on PFM and a social security strategy. He also noted the need for pragmatic coordination efforts and for building up a strong partnership.

Mr Peter Jensen from Danida noted that governance indicators have to improve if Bangladesh wants to be a middle-income country. He added that synergies go both ways in terms of cooperation. He also underlined that sometimes DPs may have to subsidise private companies to alleviate poverty.

Ms Antonia Parera noted that these comments would be considered case by case in the final version of the evaluation report.