



# Evaluation of EU Cooperation with Yemen 2002-12 Final Report Volume II – Annexes March 2015

*Evaluation carried out on behalf of  
the European Commission*



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## Evaluation of EU Cooperation with Yemen 2002-12

This evaluation was commissioned by the Evaluation Unit  
of the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid  
(European Commission)

Due to the prevailing security situation in 2014,  
this evaluation was undertaken without a field phase on the ground in Yemen

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***The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view,  
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## **Evaluation of EU Cooperation with Yemen**

### **Final Report Annexes, March 2015**

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# **Part 1: Annexes framing the evaluation**





## **ANNEX 1: EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE**



**EUROPEAN COMMISSION**  
Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation — EuropeAid  
Quality and Impact – Evaluation

**Evaluation of the European Union's  
cooperation  
with  
Yemen**

**Country Level Evaluation**

## 1. Mandate and Objectives

Systematic and timely evaluation of its programmes and activities is a priority<sup>1</sup> of the European Commission, including legislation and other non-spending activities.<sup>2</sup> Evaluation is key to account for the management of allocated funds, to inform decision making, and to contribute to improving development policy and practice. Of great importance is the focus on the **outcomes and impact** of European Union (EU) actions in the context of its evolving cooperation policy with an increasing emphasis on **result-oriented approaches**.<sup>3</sup>

The main objectives of the evaluation are:

- to provide the relevant external cooperation services of the European Union and the wider public with an **overall independent assessment** of the European Union's past and current cooperation and partnership relations with Yemen.
- to identify key lessons and to provide recommendations in order to improve the current and future strategies, programmes and actions of the European Union.

### 1.1 Evaluation users

The EU Delegation in Yemen will be developing its next long-term programming during the course of 2015, and will use the findings and recommendations of this evaluation to contribute to that process. Direct evaluation users also include EU management in Brussels, EU policy/thematic units, other EU Delegations working in fragile contexts, Yemeni authorities and Partners.

## 2. Background

### 2.1. Country context

The Republic of Yemen lies in the South-West of the Arabian Peninsula, with Saudi Arabia to the north, Red Sea to the west, the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea to the south and Oman to the east. It is the 50th largest country in the world in terms of its surface (527,968 km<sup>2</sup>) and has a sizeable coast line both to the Red Sea and to the Gulf of Aden/Arabian Sea (1,906km). It has a population of approximately 25 million, with 70% living in rural areas, and 50% are under 15 years old. A low income country and one of the poorest in the Arab world, with a GDP per capita of US\$ 2,306, Yemen ranks 154th out of 187 countries in the UN Human Development Index. It is unlikely to meet any of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.

Despite the high number of people living in rural areas and 50% of the population being active in agriculture and two thirds of the population dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, agriculture makes up only 11% of the GDP (Yemen imports 90% of its wheat and 100% of its rice, both main staples for the population, indeed it has been a food importer since the 1960s). In fact, 80% of Yemen's poor live in rural areas, mostly made up of scattered villages of less than 5,000 inhabitants, which exacerbates the problem of adequate service delivery (water use, sanitation, healthcare and education). Women are the most vulnerable in all groups.

Yemen's formal economy is mainly based on fossil fuels and some industry, but it faces depleting oil resources. An estimated 90% of its economy and employment are informal. An estimated 36% of Yemenis are unemployed, with a high rise in this figure during 2011, especially among young people, compounded by high levels of underemployment. Further structural problems are the highest population growth in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (3.1% a year, with a 5,2 total fertility rate per woman), diminishing water resources, food insecurity that reached close to 50% of the population in 2012 and high levels of malnutrition, widespread poverty, security concerns linked to terrorist threats and tribal tensions coupled with the highest per capita weapon possession in the world. It also has low education levels. While it was the first country in the region to grant women the right to vote, it ranks last on UNDP's gender inequality index. Widespread qat consumption and production – a mild narcotic

<sup>1</sup> EU Financial Regulation (art 27); Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006; Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006; Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006; Council Regulation (EC) No 215/2008.

<sup>2</sup> SEC(2007)213 'Responding to Strategic needs: Reinforcing the use of evaluation'.

<sup>3</sup> COM(2011) 637 final 'Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for change'.

that is chewed in sessions that last several hours – is estimated to compound the low levels of productivity and water depletion challenges.

While being the only formal democracy in the Gulf region, the Yemeni political landscape is greatly determined by entrenched elites, with important informal institutions that depend on political alliances, patronage, tribal networks and an important role for the security forces and some important business families. The Yemeni revolution which unfolded during 2011, challenged pre-existing power relationships and demanded a civil state based on rights, getting rid of corruption and the practice of nepotism. However, there is a long road ahead for reform in state institutions and decision making. Credible leadership for reform is still to emerge, although a core group of (young) technocrats and some of the (merchant) business community are at the forefront of reform-drivers among the elite. The donor community is united behind the new President and the government of national unity and strongly supports the transition process.

The 2011 unrest has added to the structural developmental challenges Yemen faces though its toll on the socio-economy on the country. The economy contracted by almost 11% during this period and a renewed food security crisis emerged. At the same time, this Arab-Spring-style revolution offered a window of opportunity to a government of national unity and a new President (Abd-Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi) to organise new elections and set the country on a firm path of development. Politically, implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement signed by ex-President Saleh and the opposition is well on track, with a National Dialogue expected to lead to the drafting and adoption of a new constitution in 2013. Presidential and/or parliamentary elections should then take place in accordance with a new electoral law in early 2014.

Given the manifold challenges that Yemen faces, and also this unique moment for undertaking reforms, donors around the world pledged over \$8 billion in a Donors' Conference and Friends of Yemen meeting in September 2012 to support Yemen's transition. The GCC countries provide the bulk of this aid, but are at the same time are the least transparent donors, with varying interests in Yemen. However, it is not clear through which channels this assistance will be disbursed, and so far the Yemeni authorities have shown limited leadership in tackling the economic and social issues.

The donor community in Yemen is relatively small, at least with regard to the presence of Western donors. Main EU donors are the European Commission, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, but several other European countries have just opened a presence after the 2011 events in Sana'a or have committed some level of aid, be it only humanitarian. The UN presence in Yemen has grown considerably in 2012, with the set-up of a Department of Political Affairs (DPA) office headed by the UN Secretary General's special advisor, Jamal Benomar, a UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and a small office of UN Women, among others. The UN still has to establish itself as a coordinating agency for the donor community on the ground. The World Bank is also present in-country. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is active, for example, providing \$100 m in concessional loans in 2012 to stabilise the macroeconomic situation. USAID re-opened its office in 2003 and is today one of the main donors, as are donors from the Gulf countries – be it state development agencies, such as the Saudi Fund, or overarching Gulf agencies and financial institutions, such as the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development or the Arab Monetary Fund.

## **2.2. Overview of European Union's cooperation with Yemen**

Cooperation between the EU and Yemen started in 1978. Relations were formalised in 1984 through a Development Cooperation Agreement between the EC and North Yemen, later extended to cover the entire country following unification in 1990. An expanded framework cooperation agreement on commercial, development and economic cooperation came into force in 1998,<sup>4</sup> providing the basis for long-term contractual commitment between the EU and Yemen.

Yemen also benefits from duty and quota free access to the EU market for all products originating in these countries, except arms.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> This is based on the 'ALA Regulation' Council Regulation (EEC) No 443/92 on financial and technical assistance to and economic co-operation with the developing countries in Asia and Latin America.

<sup>5</sup> 'The Everything But Arms' amendment to the EU Generalised Scheme of preferences (GSP) provided for in Council Regulation (EC) No 416/2001 of 28.02.2001.

In 2004, the EU placed its relations with Yemen in a broader perspective with the launch of the political dialogue and adoption of the **EU-Yemen Joint Declaration**. This seeks to pursue actions targeting stability, security and good governance and development in an integrated way. In the same year the European Council adopted the **Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and Middle East**. This seeks to engage with countries in the region to further political and economic reform process.

Within the framework of the ‘Agenda for Change’, the EU specifically supports countries in situations of fragility to establish functioning and accountable institutions which can deliver basic services and support poverty reduction by focusing on ‘state-building’. The EU uses the OECD definition which defines state-building as ‘an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state–society relations’. This is a broad concept which encompasses security sector reform and the rule of law as well as democratisation, civil society, human rights, public administration reform, public services delivery, and governance in its widest sense. The EU’s approach includes providing relief, crisis management, reconstruction assistance and long-term development cooperation, which are linked as part of an integrated approach built on the principle of sustainable development. The objectives of development, democracy, human rights, governance and security are intertwined.

As regards Yemen specifically, based on a request by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in 2009, the EU adopted an EU Comprehensive Approach. This incorporated several recommendations for the EU’s engagement, both short- and long-term, and political and economic. Most of these recommendations remain valid in the post-2011 context. They refer, among others, to the importance of reacting to the humanitarian needs of the population, the importance of continuous political and economic involvement with the Government, and encouraging them to prioritise and seriously advance on key reforms. The Comprehensive Approach also includes the need for enhanced coordination among donors on the ground and potentially for the EU to take on a lead coordinating role, and the need for improved dialogue with the GCC countries and particularly Yemen’s neighbours with the aim of getting them involved in Yemeni political processes. This latter point has of course been key during the GCC-brokered transition agreement signed in 2011, however advocating for continued, transparent engagement of GCC countries remains crucial. Finally, it is useful to note that the ‘Agenda for Change’ strongly emphasises that it is critical for societies to offer a future to young people, which is particularly relevant to the situation in Yemen.

The following EU Strategy Papers are relevant to the period of the evaluation (2002 – 2012) :

Yemen Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006  
Yemen Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013

They are sub-divided in National Indicative Programmes (NIP) for 1) 2002-2004 and 2005-2006 and 2) a NIP for 2007-2010 and a mid-term review and NIP for 2011-2013. The CSP 2007-2013 is currently being revised and extended for the period 2014-2015.

The **EU instruments deployed in Yemen during this period** are: The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) for bilateral geographic cooperation and thematic instruments, of which the most important is the Food Security Thematic Programme, Instrument for Stability (IfS) – both short-term and long-term – the Non-State Actors-Local Authorities thematic programme, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the ERASMUS programme and occasionally allocations from the migration thematic programme and the Investing in People thematic programme.

#### **EU Priorities 2002-2006**

- Food security in accordance with EC policies and the Yemeni food security strategy
- Poverty reduction in the framework of the Yemeni poverty reduction strategy
- Good Governance, democracy and respect for human rights
- Facilitation of business development and strengthening of economic institutions

**EU Priorities 2007-2013** built on the earlier strategy:

- To assist the Yemeni Government to promote good governance (and state-building) by supporting justice, rule of law, human rights, democratic institutions, civil society, civil administration and decentralisation
- To strengthen the Yemeni Government's capacities to fight poverty by fostering private sector development and improving the delivery of basic social services (with an emphasis on health and social protection)

In the framework of the 2011 mid-term review, food security received greater attention within the strategic objective of economic development and supporting livelihoods.

**EU funding allocation** during the period was as follows:

2002-2006 approx. €64m, ALA geographic budget line + thematic budget lines FOOD and DDH.

2007-2013 approx. €170m until 2012, with €45.7m to be allocated in 2013, DCI-geographic instrument + all other thematic instruments active on Yemen (see enumeration above)

### **3. Scope – Legal, Temporal and Thematic**

#### **3.1. Legal scope**

The overall EU engagement with Yemen should be taken into consideration including agreements, the cooperation framework and any other official commitments. This concerns the following instruments: the DCI, IfS, Non-State Actors and Local Authorities thematic programme, EIDHR, ERASMUS, and the migration and Investing in People thematic programmes.

Changes in the European Union's institutional set-up during the period, such as the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), should be taken into account.

#### **3.2. Temporal scope and evaluation criteria**

The evaluation will assess the EU cooperation strategy with Yemen and its implementation<sup>6</sup> during the period 2002–2012, using the 5 OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, namely: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. (See Annex 5 for distinctions in European Union understanding of terms.)

**In addition the evaluation will assess:**

- **consistency** between the intervention logic (programming) and implementation;
- **the value added**<sup>7</sup> of the European Union's interventions, both regarding choice of focus and instrument, and quality of implementation;
- the **3Cs: coordination, complementarity**, of the European Union's interventions with other donors' interventions (focusing on EU Member States); and **coherence**<sup>8</sup> between the European Union's interventions in the field of development cooperation and other European Union policies which are likely to affect Yemen.

#### **3.3. Thematic scope**

The evaluation should assess the focal sectors and other important areas of cooperation of the programme. These include state-building, resilience (particularly food security, private sector development and job creation), local government, civil society participation, and social welfare and health. However, the evaluation should pay special attention to the following: state-building, resilience, and EU responsiveness to changes on the ground. The evaluation users particularly seek to learn:

- what helps/hinders achieving sustainable impact on human development – with particular regard to resilience e.g. food security, social welfare, and job creation;

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<sup>6</sup> Implementation assessment will focus on the current programming cycle.

<sup>7</sup> See Annex 5 for definition.

<sup>8</sup> See Annex 5 for definition.

- what helps/hinders support for state-building processes in the context of Yemen’s fragile situation (note particularly the security-development nexus);
- what helps/hinders EU responsiveness to changes/shifts in the Yemen regime and policies, and whether more emphasis should be given to regional approaches to supporting Yemen (notably as concerns the role of regional actors and donors in this regard). Does EU cooperation address the relevant priorities, using the most appropriate instruments?

The evaluation should also consider whether cross-cutting<sup>9</sup> issues, particularly environment, civil society, and gender, were appropriately taken into account during programme planning and the extent to which they have been reflected in implementation.

Interventions funded by European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) are not part of the evaluation scope. However, coherence and complementarity between these (existing or potential) interventions and the strategy/ies evaluated, should be examined. In the case of Yemen, the potential for intervention by the European Investment Bank should be assessed.

#### 4. Process and Deliverables

The overall guidance for conducting the evaluation is available on the web page of DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/introduction/introduction\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/introduction/introduction_en.htm)  
The evaluation team may also wish to consult, ‘The DAC Guidelines on Evaluation in Conflict Situations – Guidance for peace and development actors working in settings of violent conflict, and state fragility, and, ‘The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’<sup>10</sup> – particularly the five peace-building and state-building goals.

The assignment will start with the Team Leader’s mission to Brussels for a briefing session.

Thereafter, the basic approach to the evaluation assignment consists of three **main phases** which cover several stages. **Deliverables** in the form of Reports<sup>11</sup> and slide presentations should be submitted at the end of each phase. The table below provides a summary.

Phases of the evaluation	Stages	Deliverables
<b>Desk Phase</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inception : Structuring the evaluation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Slide presentation</li> <li>• Inception Report</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data collection</li> <li>• Analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk Report</li> </ul>
<b>Field Phase (Country Mission)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data collection</li> <li>• Verification of hypotheses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Slide presentation</li> </ul>
<b>Synthesis Phase</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis</li> <li>• Judgements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Draft Final Report</li> <li>• Adapted Slide Presentation and Minutes of In-Country Seminar</li> <li>• Final Report</li> <li>• Quality control note</li> </ul>

All Reports will be submitted in English, in single spacing, Arial or Times New Roman minimum 11 and 12 respectively. Inception and Desk Reports will be delivered only electronically. The Draft Final and the Final Report will also be delivered in hard copies. The electronic versions of Reports should be delivered in both editable and non-editable format.

<sup>9</sup> Cross-cutting issues are those of the European Consensus on Development (Article 101): Human rights; Gender equality; Democracy; Good governance; Children’s rights; Indigenous people’s rights; Environment sustainability; Combating HIV/AIDS.

<sup>10</sup> New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, Busan 2011.

<sup>11</sup> For each Report a draft version is to be presented. For all Reports, the contractor may either accept or reject through a response sheet the comments provided by the Evaluation Manager. In case of rejection the contractor must justify, in writing, the reasons for rejection. When the comment is accepted, a reference to the text in the report where the relevant change has been made, must be included in the response sheet.

## 4.1. The Desk Phase

The Desk Phase comprises two components: the inception stage covering a presentation and the delivery of the Inception Report, and a second stage which ends with the production of the Desk Report.

### 4.1.1. Inception

The first task of the contractor is to produce a **slide presentation** that:

- identifies and prioritises EU cooperation objectives with Yemen as observed in relevant documents, and translates these specific objectives into intended results.
- reconstructs the intervention logic of the EU and presents it in narrative and logical diagram(s)
- defines the Evaluation Questions and judgement criteria<sup>12</sup>

The contractor will carry out a **preparatory visit to the field** to discuss main issues with the EU Delegation and key beneficiaries with prior, written approval of the Evaluation Manager. This visit will not exceed one week and will be quoted in the offer.<sup>13</sup>

An **Inception meeting will be held with the Reference Group in Brussels** to discuss the focus of the evaluation, and to validate:

- the intervention logic
- the evaluation questions and judgement criteria

### Inception Report

Taking into account the outcome of the inception meeting, the contractor should deliver an **Inception Report**, which should contain the following elements:

- an analysis of the national background/context (political, economic, social, etc.) and the cooperation context between the European Union and the partner country;
- a concise description of the European Union's development cooperation rationale with Yemen;
- the intervention logic (both 'faithful', and logically reconstructed) of the European Union's cooperation;
- the validated evaluation questions (Note : upon validation by the Evaluation Unit, the evaluation questions become contractually binding); a limited number of appropriate judgement criteria per evaluation question, and a limited number of quantitative and/or qualitative indicators related to each judgement criterion;
- a proposal outlining appropriate methods of collection and analysis of data and information, indicating any limitations
- a detailed work plan for the next phases.

If necessary, in light of planning undertaken, the Inception Report may suggest modifications to contractual provisions inter alia, the final composition of the evaluation team, and the final work plan and schedule.

### 4.1.2. Desk Report

Upon approval of the Inception Report, the contractor will proceed to the last stage of the Desk Phase, and will present a **Desk Report** which should include the following:

- the agreed evaluation questions with judgement criteria and their corresponding quantitative and qualitative indicators;
- initial analysis and first elements of response to each evaluation question and the assumptions to be tested in the field phase.
- progress made in gathering data. The complementary data required for analysis and for data collection during the field mission should be identified;

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<sup>12</sup> See Annexes 5 and 6 for further information on Evaluation criteria, and questions.

<sup>13</sup> The cost of the related inputs will only be eligible for payment if the mission was authorised by the contracting authority in advance, and undertaken as authorised, and indeed if it takes place. The eligible costs will be revised if the Mission is substantially modified (duration, number of experts etc.).

- a comprehensive list of EU activities and those examined during the Desk Phase, bearing in mind that activities analysed in the Desk Phase must be representative;<sup>14</sup>
- methodological design, including the evaluation tools to be applied in the field phase and appropriate methods to analyse the information, indicating any limitations;
- a work plan for the field phase: a list with brief descriptions of activities for in-depth analysis in the field. The Evaluators should explain their representativeness and the value added of the planned visits.

The contractor will present and discuss the Draft Desk Report with the Reference Group in a meeting in Brussels. The Desk Report will be finalised on the basis of comments received.

The country mission may not commence before the Evaluation Manager has approved the Desk Report.

## **4.2. Field Phase (country mission)**

The fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out in the Desk Report. The work plan and schedule of the mission will be agreed in advance with the EU Delegation in Yemen (in principle, at least three weeks before the mission starts). If in the course of the fieldwork it appears necessary to substantially deviate from the agreed approach and/or schedule, the contractor must ask the approval of the Evaluation Manager before any changes can be applied. At the conclusion of the field mission the contractor will present the preliminary findings of the evaluation:

- to the Delegation, during a debriefing meeting
- to the Reference Group in Brussels with the support of a **slide presentation**

## **4.3. Synthesis Phase**

### **4.3.1. The Draft Final Report**

The contractor will submit the Draft Final Report as per the structure set out in Annex 2, and will discuss it with the Reference Group in Brussels. The contractor will make appropriate amendments to the Draft Final Report based on consolidated comments from the Reference Group, sent by the Evaluation Manager.

### **4.3.2. The in-country seminar**

The approved Draft Final Report will be presented by the contractor in a seminar in Yemen using a slide presentation. The purpose of the seminar is to present the findings, conclusions and the preliminary recommendations of the evaluation to the National Authorities, the Delegation and all the main stakeholders (EU Member States, representatives of civil society organisations and other donors, etc.).

For the seminar, hard copies of the Draft Final Main Report in English (with annexes on electronic CD-ROM)<sup>15</sup> should be delivered to the EU Delegation in Yemen. The exact number of copies and delivery date will be specified at least three weeks before the seminar. For the purpose of the offer, 40 copies of the Main Report will be quoted (with executive summary in English and Arabic) but only the number requested will be eligible for payment. The electronic version of the entire Report (i.e. including the annexes) will be provided to the Evaluation Manager.

The contractor shall submit Minutes of the seminar. These Minutes, as well as updated slide presentation, will be included as an Annex to the Final Report. The seminar logistics (room rental, catering etc.) may be contracted later, as part or not of the specific contract for the present evaluation. No such logistics costs are to be included in the offer.

### **4.3.3. The Final Report**

The contractor will prepare the Final Report taking into account the comments expressed at the seminar, and any further comments from the Reference Group, the Delegation and/or the Evaluation Manager.

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<sup>14</sup> The representativeness must address the different dimensions (percentage of funds, sample size and choice – diversity, illustration of the chosen interventions ...).

<sup>15</sup> See Annex 2.



The Evaluation Unit will make a formal judgement on the quality of the evaluation in the Quality Assessment Grid<sup>16</sup> and submit to the contractor before publication. The Final Report must be approved by the Evaluation Unit prior to printing.

Hard copies in English of the **Final Main Report** (without annexes) as well as 5 copies of annexes should be submitted to the Evaluation Manager. The precise number will be determined nearer the time, but for the purposes of the offer, 40 copies of the Final Main Report (with Executive summary in English and Arabic) should be quoted, but only the number requested will be eligible for payment. An electronic support (CD-ROM) should be added to each printed Final Main Report (PDF format).

#### 4.3.4. The Quality Control Note

The contractor shall submit a **Quality Control Note** explaining how quality control was addressed during the evaluation and how the consortium has built on lessons learned from previous evaluations (Max 5 pages).

## 5. Responsibility for the Management of the Evaluation

The Evaluation Unit is responsible for the management and supervision of the evaluation. The Evaluation Manager will chair the process of the evaluation which will be closely followed by the Reference Group consisting of members of concerned services in the Commission and EEAS, as well as the EU Delegation in Yemen and the Embassy of Yemen in Belgium.

The principal tasks of the Reference Group are to:

- discuss draft reports
- ensure evaluation team has access to and consults all information sources and documentation on aspects of the programme
- discuss and comment on quality of work done by the evaluation team
- provide feedback on the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation

## 6. The Evaluation Team

The evaluation team should be drawn together such that it demonstrates expertise in the following:

- **Evaluation methods and techniques** and, particularly in the field of external relations and development cooperation. It is highly desirable that at least the team leader is fully familiar with the Commission's methodological approach (*cf. Evaluation Unit's website: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/introduction/introduction\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/introduction/introduction_en.htm)*).
- **Geographical experience : Yemen** (knowledge of Horn of Africa and/or the wider Gulf region will be an advantage)
- The following **technical areas** :
  - **Political economy and governance in context of fragile situations** (given the programme focus, expertise in the security-development nexus will be an advantage)
  - **Resilience** (given the programme focus, expertise in food security with an agronomy/environment perspective will be an advantage)
  - **Private sector development**
  - **Social service delivery** (given the programme focus, expertise in human development sector will be an advantage)
  - **Gender** (given the programme focus, expertise in human rights, and justice will be an advantage).

Expertise in social anthropology or sociology of Yemen will be a considerable advantage

Languages:

- **All team members should have good working knowledge of English**

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<sup>16</sup> See Annex 3.

- **At least one team member should be an Arabic speaker.** It would be an advantage if other team members also have a working knowledge of Arabic.

The key skills are indicated in bold.<sup>17</sup>

The team leader should be an experienced, senior expert with proven leadership skills and proven high standard of report writing and editing skills.

The team composition should be justified, and the team coordination should be clearly described.

Evaluators must be independent from the programmes/projects evaluated. Should a conflict of interest be identified in the course of the evaluation, it should immediately be reported to the Evaluation Manager, who will take appropriate measures.

The team will have excellent writing and editing skills. However, the contractor remains fully responsible for the quality of the Report. Any Report which does not meet the required standards will not be accepted.

The contracting authority reserves the right to conduct telephone interviews with shortlisted bids at no cost to the contractor. The team leader and one other senior expert will be required to participate. Any such interview will take place not later than 10 working days after the offers submission deadline. The contractor will indicate the telephone number to reach the team leader. Regarding the other expert, the contracting authority will inform the Framework contractor in due time about the name of the expert to be interviewed and the Framework contractor will be required to indicate the phone number to be used.

## **7. Timing**

The assignment is due to start in **mid-February 2013**. The duration is 12 months. In pursuit of a strong evaluation team, there will be **no penalty for a later start date up to April 30th 2013**.

Note: As part of the bid, the contractor is required to submit a time-table for the evaluation process as per the template in Annex 4

## **8. Offer for the Evaluation**

The offer will be itemised to ensure verification of fees compliance with the Framework contract terms. Items under h to k of the contract price breakdown model should demonstrate that the prices quoted correspond to market prices.

The total length of sections 2, 3 and 4 of the technical offer (Framework contract, Annex 1, 10.3.b) may not exceed 15 pages (font minimum Times New Roman 12 or Arial 11). CVs to be provided will be in addition to this.

### **Security Provisions**

Given the prevailing security conditions in Yemen, the contractor should take out an insurance policy to cover the risks of war, terrorism, insurrection, civil unrest and similar circumstances. The contractor is strongly advised to take appropriate measures to cover the costs of repatriation of its employees on security grounds. **Extraordinary costs due to higher security requirements while in Yemen are foreseen and are included in the Request. The security measures should be clearly described and costs introduced under incidental/reimbursable costs.**

## **9. Annexes<sup>18</sup>**

The contracting authority reserves the right to modify the annexes without prior notice.

<sup>17</sup> In the absence of those skills marked in bold, the 80 points threshold in a bid may not be reached.

<sup>18</sup> TOR annexes are not included in this volume. Please refer to the Europeaid Evaluation Unit for further information

## ANNEX 2: EVALUATION QUESTIONS WITH JUDGEMENT CRITERIA, INDICATORS AND METHODS

<b>EQ1: To what extent have the strategic choices made by the EU on the focus and composition of its cooperation with Yemen ensured its relevance to national priorities and needs?</b>	
<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	
<b>Relevance</b> , complementarity, <b>EU value added</b> , effectiveness	
<i>Scope of analysis and justification for its inclusion</i>	
This EQ aims to analyse the rationale underlying the strategic choices made by the EU on the nature and scale of its engagement in Yemen and the sectoral composition and focus of its development cooperation. The EQ takes into account the analytical basis for EU choices, including where possible why these decisions were made among wider options available at the time. It will also take into account the needs and problems of the population as expressed in successive government plans, highlighting where some major omissions were picked up in the EU strategy, and why. It will reveal the consultation process and alignment with government plans, and the promotion of ownership of the interventions. The principles of ownership and alignment in the Paris Declaration (2005) and partnership, mutual accountability Busan (2011) will be used as a guide. It will also, where possible, reveal the geographical distribution of the funds and the target beneficiaries in the population as a whole.	
<i>Judgement Criteria</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
1.1 EU strategic choices on the overall composition of its cooperation with Yemen were relevant to national priorities and needs.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that the nature and level of EU political engagement with Yemen was adequate to support EU cooperation objectives</li> <li>• Evidence that the observed scale and balance of investment and effort in political engagement and development cooperation was considered and delivered good effect</li> </ul>
1.2 EU strategic choices on focal sectors were based on sound analysis, were consistent with EU cooperation strategy and relevant to national priorities and needs.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that the selection of focal sectors was justified in relation to the EU's comparative advantages and added value and Yemen's national priorities and needs</li> <li>• Evidence that the CSPs and NIP/MIP were prepared in consultation with Government and other national and sub-national stakeholders</li> <li>• Evidence that focal sectors were selected on the basis of sound analysis and with the robust consideration of alternatives</li> </ul>
1.3 EU financing decisions on development cooperation programmes were consistent with EU cooperation strategy and relevant to national priorities and needs.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that the choice of programmes in each focal sector was relevant to achievement of the objectives of EU cooperation</li> <li>• Evidence that the choice of programmes was made with robust consideration of alternatives</li> <li>• Evidence that the results of EU development cooperation have reached its intended beneficiaries</li> <li>• Evidence that the results of EU development cooperation have addressed the policy objectives and priorities of the Government of Yemen</li> </ul>

<b>EQ2: To what extent has EU cooperation been designed and implemented in coherence with all relevant policies of the EU, EU Member States and other donors?</b>	
<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	
<b>Coherence</b> , complementarity, EU Value added	
<i>Scope of analysis and justification for its inclusion</i>	
This EQ aims to analyse how EU cooperation has related to the wider EU policy architecture and the strategies and programmes of EU Member States and other donors. The evaluation will examine how coherence was planned, how it was managed in practice and how ongoing coordination has been handled by the EU. The evaluation will seek to identify a limited set of cases of good or poor coherence and coordination, using these to draw lessons on how coherence and coordination could be better planned and managed. The evaluation will also explore why Yemen has been located where it has within the management architecture (including legal instruments) of EU cooperation and what implications this has had on the nature and scale of EU cooperation with Yemen. Finally this EQ will also briefly examine the potential for collaborative engagement with the European Investment Bank.	
<i>Judgement Criteria</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
2.1 EU cooperation addresses the objectives and requirements of relevant EU policies. <sup>19</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that EU cooperation objectives and actions have been consistent with the objectives and requirements of relevant EU policies</li> <li>• Evidence of why Yemen has been located where it has within the management architecture of EU cooperation and the implications that has had on the nature and scale of EU cooperation with Yemen (eg. Yemen falling outside assistance rendered to other Arab countries during the Arab Spring)</li> <li>• Evidence of the potential for collaborative engagement with the European Investment Bank in Yemen</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
2.2 EU cooperation is coherent with and complementary to the development strategies and programmes of Member States and other donors.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that EU decisions on strategy and programming have taken into account the strategies and programmes of EU Member States and other donors.</li> <li>• Evidence of the perceptions of Member States and other donors of the EU's added value and the extent to which EU cooperation reflects this.</li> <li>• Evidence of joint actions, added value or synergies achieved.</li> <li>• Evidence of contradictions or duplications.</li> </ul>
2.3 The EU coordinates its strategy and actions effectively with EU Member States and other donors.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence of EU participation in relevant donor and government coordination mechanisms.</li> <li>• Evidence that the EU has achieved an appropriate balance between national and regional dialogue.</li> <li>• Potential for collaborative intervention with the European Investment Bank (EIB) and relating coordination with other EU institutions.</li> </ul>

<sup>19</sup> Most notably, at the level of policy, the EU-Yemen Joint Declaration, the Agenda for Change, the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and Middle East, and the EU Comprehensive Approach. Then within specific thematic instruments, the Instrument for Stability, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Development Cooperation Instrument, the Food Security Thematic Programme, the Food Facility, the Non-State Actors Local Authorities Thematic Programme, the Migration and Asylum Thematic Programme and the Investing in People Thematic Programme.

<b>EQ3: To what extent has EU cooperation promoted and supported state-building processes in relation to international norms? What has helped or hindered effectiveness?</b>	
<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	
<b>Relevance</b> , Impact, <b>Effectiveness</b> , Sustainability, Coherence, EU Value Added	
<i>Scope of analysis and justification for its inclusion</i>	
<p>This EQ aims to analyse the extent to which the EU interventions and dialogue have promoted and supported state-building processes through the period of 2002-2012 and what successes have been achieved as a result of EU cooperation. In addition to regular state-building activities around governance, security and justice, democracy and human rights consideration will be given to the EU understanding of the security-development nexus and the Government of Yemen's understanding or interpretation of state-building and its role in the wider development of Yemen. The EQ will seek to determine the EU's contribution to observed changes as well as the added value and comparative advantage it brings state-building approaches. The link between development cooperation and political dialogue will be examined, and the extent to which one strengthens the other. The EQ will also examine how the EU has understood and applied global thinking and principles for engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states, and whether this has strengthened approaches to EU cooperation in Yemen.</p>	
<i>Judgement Criteria</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
<p>3.1 EU cooperation has been designed to contribute to state-building objectives, particularly with regard to governance, security and justice, democracy and human rights.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that state-building considerations were addressed in strategy and programming processes and documents for governance, security and justice, democracy and human rights interventions</li> <li>• Evidence that strategy and programme design has been undertaken with reference to international guidance on good practice for state-building, including the principles for good international engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states</li> <li>• Evidence that EU cooperation has been developed with a sound understanding of the security-development nexus in Yemen</li> <li>• Evidence that the relevance and feasibility of strategy and programme design has been informed by political economy analyses</li> <li>• Evidence that the Government of Yemen has shared the EU's understanding of the role and importance of state-building as a strategic objective</li> </ul>
<p>3.2 EU political dialogue and development cooperation in Yemen have been mutually reinforcing in pursuit of state-building objectives.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that EU services have planned EU political dialogue and development cooperation in Yemen to be mutually reinforcing in pursuit of state-building objectives</li> <li>• Evidence of good or poor practices in linkages (or lack thereof) between political dialogue and development cooperation</li> <li>• Evidence that demonstrates EU's evolving stance on the 'comprehensive approach' towards challenges in Yemen (and the region as a whole)</li> <li>• Evidence of increasing involvement of EU over the 11 year period in processes around political reform (e.g. the ongoing National Dialogue)</li> </ul>
<p>3.3 The results of EU cooperation have contributed to Yemen state-building objectives.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that EU support has improved or deepened state-society relations.</li> <li>• Evidence that EU cooperation has contributed to building public administration capacity to mobilise, allocate and manage public resources and that these benefits are sustainable.</li> <li>• Evidence the EU cooperation contributed to more effective, accountable and transparent public institutions.</li> <li>• Evidence that EU cooperation has contributed to more accountable and democratic practices and that these benefits are sustainable.</li> <li>• Evidence that EU interventions have contributed to changes in the enabling environment for political participation and to the ability of citizens to engage in political dialogue and exercise their human rights and that these benefits are sustainable. Unpack all the state-building principles in New Deal ie need to add justice, revenue collection, security....</li> </ul>

<b>EQ4: To what extent has EU cooperation contributed to greater resilience in Yemen? What has helped or hindered effectiveness?</b>	
<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	
<b>Effectiveness, Sustainability, Coherence, EU Value Added ,Impact</b>	
<i>Scope of analysis and justification for its inclusion</i>	
<p>This EQ aims to analyse the extent to which the EU interventions and dialogue have promoted and supported resilience through the period of 2002-2012 and what successes have been achieved as a result of EU cooperation, what has helped and what has hindered and why?. In addressing the question the evaluation will look both at the achievement of positive effects and impacts and the avoidance of negative effects and impacts. In May 2013 the EU Council defined resilience as ‘the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to prepare for, to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks without compromising long-term development prospects’. The evaluation will address this EQ using the Council definition or previously applied concepts that can be equated to this definition. The evaluation will determine the EU’s contribution to observed changes, including the added value that it brings through its own unique comparative advantages. The EQ includes coverage of the interface between development cooperation and humanitarian assistance (using the concept of Linking relief, rehabilitation and development – or LRRD) but will not address the composition or effectiveness of DG ECHO operations. Include Yemen’s understanding of resilience.</p>	
<i>Judgement Criteria</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
4.1 EU development cooperation (in particular, activities in support of food security, private sector development and job creation) has been designed to contribute to resilience objectives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that resilience has been addressed in strategy and programming processes and documents and how the concept of resilience has evolved during the period of the evaluation</li> <li>• Evidence that EU development cooperation (in particular, on food security, private sector development and job creation) were designed and managed in an integrated way to contribute to the evolving concept of resilience</li> </ul>
4.2 There has been a coordinated and consistent approach among EU services (DEVCO, ECHO, and EEAS) and Member States to understanding the root causes of fragility and vulnerability and enhancing resilience and impact.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that the planning and management of DEVCO and DG ECHO interventions was coordinated in line with the principles of Linking Relief and Rehabilitation to Development (LRRD)</li> <li>• Evidence that the EU has coordinated its resilience-enhancing interventions and dialogue with Member States</li> </ul>
4.3 EU development cooperation has strengthened the resilience of targeted beneficiary populations in Yemen and the capacities of intermediary organisations responsible for service delivery to vulnerable populations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that EU development cooperation (in particular, food security, private sector development and job creation interventions) has reached the most vulnerable, or not and why?</li> <li>• Evidence that EU development cooperation (in particular, food security, private sector development and job creation interventions) has contributed to increased capability of its recipients and beneficiaries to withstand, adapt to, or quickly recover from stresses and shocks without compromising their long-term development prospects, or not and why?.</li> <li>• Evidence that EU development cooperation has strengthened the capabilities of service delivery and intermediary organisations to provide sustained support to vulnerable populations.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>

<b>EQ5: In what ways has the EU engagement with regional actors and donors complemented and strengthened its cooperation in Yemen? Has appropriate emphasis been given to this engagement?</b>	
<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	
Relevance, Coherence, <b>Complementarity</b> , Effectiveness	
<i>Scope of analysis and justification for its inclusion</i>	
The evaluation will look at how the EU engaged with regional actors and donors (especially the GCC) to assess whether the balance of engagement and support at national and regional levels has been appropriate/maximised leverage for change. The evaluation will examine the extent to which Yemen has featured in EU dialogue with key Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Oman) and the extent to which this regional dimension has increased in importance over time/there is potential for doing more in this area. . (Broader issues of EU influence are dealt with separately in EQ8.)	
<i>Judgement Criteria</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
5.1 The EU has engaged effectively and appropriately with regional actors and donors to leverage development change within Yemen.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence of engagement with regional actors and donors, especially the GCC</li> <li>• Evidence that EU cooperation has been coherent with and complementary to the strategies and actions of relevant regional actors and donors</li> <li>• Indications that the objectives of EU cooperation at the national level could have benefited from greater engagement with regional actors</li> </ul>
5.2 EU engagement and cooperation with regional countries and organisations has given it greater leverage for initiating change in Yemen.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence of increased visibility, communication and influence of EU in regional fora that deal with Yemen</li> <li>• Evidence of coherence between EU regional engagement on Yemen and the EU's wider engagement with the GCC</li> <li>• Evidence of increasing inter-linkage between regional political dialogue and its impact on development cooperation in Yemen</li> <li>• Evidence that EU bilateral cooperation in other GCC countries has contributed (or has the potential to contribute) to the achievement of EU cooperation objectives in Yemen</li> </ul>
5.3 The extent to which EU dialogue with development partners and regional actors has deepened leverage on a central issue – state-building.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Examples where EU dialogue has strengthened coherence on leveraging change on state-building</li> <li>• Stakeholder perceptions of the EU contribution and added value to a leveraging change on state-building</li> </ul>

<b>EQ6: To what extent has EU cooperation taken cross-cutting issues into account and how has this contributed to results?</b>	
<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	
Impact, <b>Effectiveness</b> , Sustainability, Consistency	
<i>Scope of analysis and justification for its inclusion</i>	
This EQ will analyse the extent to which cross-cutting issues (CCIs) were addressed in the design and management of EU cooperation and the positive and negative effects and impacts that have occurred as a result of the EU's treatment (or lack thereof) of CCIs. The evaluation will consider how CCIs were treated in design and management processes, including monitoring and evaluation, and what positive and/or negative effects and impacts resulted from this treatment, and what factors helped and what factors hindered and why. The 2002-06 CSP does not explicitly address CCIs, while the 2007-13 CSP lists four – gender, civil society and environment and qat. These will be assessed in terms of whether they received adequate analysis and attention within EU interventions, and the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of those interventions. (Qat is included in analysis elsewhere).	
<i>Judgement Criteria</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
6.1 CCIs were taken into account in the analysis and design of EU cooperation in line with EU policy and guidance.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that EU staff had adequate access to guidance and support on whether and how to address CCIs</li> <li>• Evidence that CCIs were addressed adequately in the development of CSPs and NIP/MIPs</li> <li>• Evidence of CCI mainstreaming or specific actions in CSPs and NIP/MIPs</li> </ul>
6.2 CCIs were taken into account in political and policy dialogue in line with EU policy and guidance.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that CCIs were addressed adequately in analysis and preparations for political and policy dialogue</li> <li>• Evidence of CCI mainstreaming or specific actions in political and policy dialogue</li> </ul>
6.3 The effective treatment of cross-cutting issues has contributed positively to the results of EU cooperation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that treatment of gender as a cross-cutting issue in the design and delivery of EU development cooperation has enhanced the results achieved</li> <li>• Evidence that treatment of civil society as a cross-cutting issue in the design <u>and delivery</u> of EU development cooperation has enhanced the results achieved</li> <li>• Evidence that treatment of environment as a cross-cutting issue in the design <u>and delivery</u> of EU development cooperation has enhanced the results achieved</li> </ul>



<b>EQ7: In what ways and how effectively has EU cooperation been responsive to changes in the Yemen context? What has helped or hindered responsiveness?</b>	
<u>Evaluation criteria</u>	
Relevance, <b>Value added</b> , Consistency	
<u>Scope of analysis and justification for its inclusion</u>	
This EQ aims to analyse whether and how the EU's strategic choices were reviewed and adapted as conditions changed on the ground. In addressing this EQ the evaluation will look at the extent to which the EU engaged in analysis of context during strategy design (including scenario planning) and whether this analysis was updated with sufficient frequency and rigour to ensure EU responsiveness to changes in the Yemen context. The evaluation will explore examples of responsiveness and non-responsiveness – where changes in EU strategy or implementation did take place, <u>why</u> and to what effect; and where changes in the Yemen context should have elicited an EU response but did not.	
<u>Judgement Criteria</u>	<u>Indicators</u>
7.1 EU services drew effectively on context analysis and feedback mechanisms to design and adjust EU cooperation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that the EU sourced and accessed and analysed suitable information sources to ensure that CSPs and NIP/MIPs took adequate account of context</li> <li>• Evidence that the EU engaged appropriately in scenario and contingency planning and used relevant information sources and analysis to maintain the ongoing relevance and effectiveness of strategy and programmes</li> </ul>
7.2 Changes in EU cooperation strategy and its implementation were appropriate responses to changes in the Yemen context.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that changes in strategy or implementation (including differences between planned and realised strategy) responded appropriately to context analysis and scenario planning</li> <li>• Evidence of instances where EU cooperation should have responded to changes in the Yemen context but did not</li> <li>• Evidence that changes in strategy or implementation were effective</li> <li>• Evidence that changes in strategy or implementation were counter-productive or ineffective</li> </ul>

<b>EQ8: To what extent have the EU’s standing and achievements in Yemen been regarded as influential to the direction and pace of change in the country?</b>	
<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	
Impact, <b>Sustainability</b> , added value	
<i>Scope of analysis and justification for its inclusion</i>	
This EQ examines the extent to which the process and results of EU interventions and dialogue over the 11 year period has, in the opinion of key stakeholders, provided the EU with a standing that has enabled it to play an influential role in support of poverty reduction and reform in Yemen. Closely related especially to EQs 1 and 7, the focus here is on perceived impact and sustainability of the totality of EU political and developmental interventions and the comparative advantage that this might deliver to the EU as a potential key change agent.	
<i>Judgement Criteria</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
8.1 The EU has demonstrated leadership and/or a contribution in convening and coalition building with Government, Member States and other development partners around the need for change in Yemen.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government, Member States and other development partners’ understanding and acknowledgement of the EU’s leadership and convening role in Yemen</li> <li>• Examples of dialogue, agendas and coalitions in which there is plausible evidence of EU influence</li> </ul>
8.2 The EU is seen as more than a donor and as having been instrumental in shaping and supporting change processes in Yemen.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stakeholder perceptions on the nature of the EU’s standing and reputation in Yemen</li> <li>• Stakeholder understanding and acknowledgement of the EU’s change agent role in Yemen</li> <li>• Examples of significant influence and follow-through of EU dialogue acknowledged by stakeholders</li> </ul>
8.3 The process and results of EU cooperation have contributed to EU successes in influencing the direction and pace of change in Yemen.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Examples of EU cooperation successes and failures that have delivered instrumental and influential quick wins or lessons into change processes</li> </ul>

<b>EQ9: To what extent were the EU’s legal instruments, thematic instruments, aid modalities and management modalities applied in the most efficient and effective manner?</b>	
<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	
<b>Effectiveness, Efficiency</b>	
<i>Scope of analysis and justification for its inclusion</i>	
<p>This EQ aims to analyse whether EU cooperation was implemented using the most appropriate instruments, aid modalities and management modalities. While the geographic instrument to be applied (currently DCI) is of course a given, we will build on our analysis of why Yemen was positioned under this instrument rather than ENPI (as were other Arab and Maghreb countries) or its predecessor to examine the balance of financing and effort delivered through the geographic programme and thematic programmes and instruments. This will include examination of the analytical basis for their application and the extent to which synergies were pursued and achieved to deliver results in an effective and timely manner. Aid modalities (the project approach, sector approaches and budget support) as well as management modalities (centralised, decentralised and partially decentralised management arrangements) will both be explored in relation to the strategic and institutional basis for their application.</p>	
<i>Judgement Criteria</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
9.1 The manner in which EU instruments and modalities were applied in Yemen was appropriate to achieve EU cooperation objectives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence of allocations and spend per instrument</li> <li>• Evidence from key informants on the appropriateness of the scope of each instruments applied in Yemen with regard to the objectives of EU cooperation in Yemen</li> <li>• Evidence of the coherent application of instruments in each sector</li> </ul>
9.2 The mix of EU aid modalities applied in Yemen was appropriate to achieve EU cooperation objectives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that the mix of EU aid modalities applied in Yemen was appropriate to the capacities of beneficiary institutions and the political economy and conflict context of Yemen</li> <li>• Evidence of synergies between the different aid modalities (as opposed to the interventions financed through them)</li> </ul>
9.3 The mix of EU management modalities applied in Yemen has been appropriate to achieve EU cooperation objectives, including the building of national capacity.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that the mix of EU management modalities applied in Yemen was appropriate to the capacities of beneficiary institutions and the political economy and conflict context of Yemen</li> <li>• Evidence that the EU has applied a strategic approach to the management modalities that achieves an appropriate balance between effectiveness and capacity development</li> </ul>

<b>EQ10: To what extent has the EU resourced and deployed its services to deliver EU cooperation in an efficient manner?</b>	
<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	
Effectiveness, <b>Efficiency</b>	
<i>Scope of analysis and justification for its inclusion</i>	
<p>The EQ centres on how the EU has applied its staff and resources in the most efficient manner to deliver to EU cooperation objectives. The evaluation will analyse whether EU services (the EU-Yemen Desk and the EEAS, in Yemen and in Brussels) have been adequately staffed and resourced to design and deliver EU cooperation in a timely and effective manner, taking into account changes in context. We examine whether the move from Amman to Sana'a boosted the efficiency in managing the Yemen portfolio; and whether the EU could deliver its aid portfolio in the event of evacuation. The evaluators will also examine the extent to which EU administrative and financial procedures and processes have supported or hindered the EU's ability to fulfil objectives. Were financial allocations sufficient for purpose? This EQ also includes aspects of responsiveness, insofar as administrative efficiency has helped or hindered the EU's ability to respond appropriately and efficiently to changes in the Yemen context.</p>	
<i>Judgement Criteria</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
10.1 EU services in Brussels, Amman and Yemen have been adequately staffed, resourced and organised to design and manage EU cooperation efficiently and responsively.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence that the staffing and organisation of EU services in Brussels, Amman and Yemen has been appropriate to the workload requirements of EU cooperation</li> <li>• Evidence that the EU has adjusted the staffing and organisation of EU services appropriately in response to workload assessments</li> </ul>
10.2 EU administrative and financial procedures and processes have enabled EU services to design and manage EU cooperation efficiently and responsively.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence of the constraints placed on the EU by its administrative and financial procedures and processes and the extent to which these have supported or undermined its ability to be efficient and responsive</li> <li>• Evidence that administrative and financial procedures and processes have been adapted to improve efficiency</li> </ul>
10.3 EU services related to Yemen have been active in learning from its experience in Yemen, in communicating these lessons to wider relevant EU services and staff and in incorporating lessons into strategy and programme design and management.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence of monitoring, evaluation and lesson learning processes to strengthen the design and management of EU cooperation</li> <li>• Evidence that Delegation staff have drawn effectively on their own local knowledge to improve the effectiveness of EU engagement and cooperation</li> </ul>

## ANNEX 3: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

### 3.1 Methodology

We have applied a theory-based approach to the evaluation, using an intervention logic analysis to consolidate all elements of EU cooperation in a single framework that links rationale to strategy, programmes and results. Under each of the Evaluation Question (EQ) headings, we have presented evidence of the contributions that EU cooperation has made in Yemen and, where appropriate, what has helped or hindered the EU's contribution to results.

Notwithstanding the major constraint of limited availability of evaluative data about the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of EU cooperation, we have been able to triangulate a wide range of sources and derive a contribution story underpinned by a consistent set of challenges, drivers and constraints. These are reflected in our summary of findings and in the conclusions we draw.

The evaluation has comprised the following key steps, culminating in the acceptance of the Final Report in March 2015:

- Inception phase (May–August 2013)
- Desk-research phase (August–October 2013)
- Field work phase (June–July 2014)
- Preparation and finalisation of Final Report (July 2014–January 2015)

A preliminary visit to Sana'a was undertaken at the start of the evaluation. The planned field mission to Yemen did not take place due to the prevailing security situation in Yemen in 2014. Nevertheless, in June, July and August the team was able to conduct face-to-face and telephone interviews with a wide range of key informants including EU staff, senior Yemeni government officials, MS representatives, other international agencies, civil society and informed individuals.

### 3.2 Overall design approach

Our evaluation design had two main building blocks – an **analysis of strategy** (what was planned, what was realised) and an **analysis of programmes** (the specific contribution that EU interventions have made to results on the ground).

#### 3.2.1 Building block 1: Analysis of strategy

At the Inception stage we prepared a reconstructed Intervention Logic (IL, otherwise known as Theory of Change) for EU cooperation that identified: the context within which EU cooperation strategy was conceived; the rationale for EU engagement in Yemen; the strategic objectives that flowed from this rationale; the inputs and nature of support envisaged to achieve these objectives; the assumptions that underpinned the choice of inputs; and the intended activities and results of EU cooperation. Through examination of reports and interviews with Delegation staff and other stakeholders (MS, Government of Yemen, other donors), the team further examined how strategy had been developed and managed in practice.

To complement the IL a policy timeline was built (Annex 7) that juxtaposed major political and development events in Yemen with identified key points at which EU strategy changed (or should have changed but did not). Where possible the team sought evidence from the earlier years of EU support but recognised there would be a bias towards recent years both because of staffing and because of the significance of the 2011 crisis. Given the forward-looking nature of the evaluation and the relevance of looking at the EU strategy response to recent changes in context, this period of the evaluation was given particular emphasis.

**Table 1: Summary of methodology for strategy analysis**

<b>Steps</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Conduct individual and focus group interviews with Delegation staff.</li> <li>2. Conduct interviews with other stakeholders to triangulate their perceptions of EU contribution with those of EU staff.</li> <li>3. Document analysis to gather further evidence to support the storyline.</li> <li>4. Collate findings from programme analysis that can be mapped against expected results in the reconstructed IL analysis.</li> <li>5. Conduct validation meeting to review output from step 4; agree adjustments to reconstructed IL analysis that would result in a new diagram of strategy as realised.</li> </ol>
<b>Tools</b>	6. Semi-structured interviews; focus group discussions; document analysis.
<b>Analysis</b>	7. Triangulation of views between different stakeholder groups (EU, Government of Yemen, donors, others); synthesis of findings from different sources; validation of findings at field phase debriefing.

A separate step in the analysis of strategy was to examine where in the IL the EU made a difference, by comparing the intended and actual results of EU cooperation. This was approached in two ways: first, through the **analysis of programmes** that looked for evidence of the impact of EU-supported programmes and mapped this evidence against the IL analysis; second, through the **accumulation of opinion and evidence** offered by EU staff in Yemen (past and present), implementing partners, the wider donor community, Yemen Government and civil society, in order to locate in the IL analysis where they feel the EU has made its most significant contribution through development cooperation, political dialogue and humanitarian assistance. Thus through a process of triangulation of evidence the team was able to judge and create a visualisation of strategy ‘as realised’. Our analysis is presented across report findings and in Annex 9. An illustration of our approach to contribution analysis is presented in Table 2 overleaf, where we map evidence for EU support in the governance sector against the intervention logic and assumptions in our reconstructed strategic intervention logic analysis as presented in Annex 9.

The top two rows of Table 2 summarise strategy as planned. Two contribution stories are presented against strategy as planned, to illustrate how we assessed the provision of inputs, the design and delivery of activities, the achievement of results and how these contributed to strategic objectives:

- As the first two rows clearly indicate, strategy as planned was focused largely on working in partnership with a reform-minded government, to strengthen political inclusivity and government efficiency and transparency, thereby contributing to a more capable, accountable and responsive government.
- Contribution story 1 sets out our analysis of how strategy was implemented until 2009. Notwithstanding the lack of evaluative evidence of results, evidence clearly indicates an over-reliance on unrealistic assumptions about government intentions and capabilities, and a mismatch between the volume and organisation of financial and human resources in relation to strategic ambitions and to absorptive capacity in Yemen, leading to the delivery of limited results and a weak contribution to strategic objectives.
- Contribution story 2 sets out our analysis of how the reframing of strategy from 2009 led to increased standing and influence in support of the National Dialogue and the Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development (TPSD) and a more coherent approach to state-building. Again notwithstanding the lack of evaluative evidence of results, our analysis shows that the political gains delivered by a Sana’a based Delegation were not matched with an adequate speedy response from development cooperation, have been subsequently overtaken by events, and continue to be hampered by the EU’s lack of preparedness to deal with Yemen’s fragility.

**Table 2: Illustrative example of how we used contribution analysis to assess the EU contribution to results in the governance sector**

		Inputs	Activities	Expected results	Objectives
Strategy as planned	Intervention logic	<p>Political dialogue with Government of Yemen and regional actors (especially GCC)</p> <p>Policy dialogue through EU Delegation and regional initiatives</p> <p>Project aid</p> <p>Financial support (IfS)</p> <p>Training of security forces</p>	<p>Support to public administration reform</p> <p>Support to the judicial system</p> <p>Support to local governance and planning</p> <p>Support to police forces, customs and coast guards</p>	<p>More inclusive political process</p> <p>Greater transparency of Government institutions</p> <p>More capable, more efficient and less corrupt judiciary</p>	<p>Improved rule of law and protection of human rights</p> <p>Improved security situation</p> <p>Strengthened capacity and accountability of Government to its citizens</p> <p>Strengthened state–society relationship</p>
	Assumptions	<p>Government of Yemen is genuinely committed to reform the civil service and to establish a transparent, fair and accountable judiciary.</p> <p>Government of Yemen is genuinely committed to increasing transparency and accountability.</p>	<p>EU political dialogue is effective in influencing Government of Yemen policy and actions on governance reforms and in leveraging GCC advocacy for the same.</p> <p>Strengthening government relations with the EU could represent a window of opportunity to obtain the necessary support and foster the implementation of the reform programme.</p>	<p>Resourcing, organisation and location of EU services are adequately matched to the ambitions of EU cooperation strategy; regular evaluation leads to adjustment of strategy and programmes.</p>	
Contribution story 1 (pre-2009)		<p><i>EU seen historically as out of touch with key regional actors and with the political realities of Yemen.</i></p> <p><i>Persistent reliance on unrealistic assumptions about the capabilities and reform intentions of the Government of Yemen, based on a belief that political instability is a function of government ineffectiveness and lack of capacity.</i></p> <p><i>Lack of demonstrated understanding of the political settlement whereby instability may be a deliberate strategy among the regime’s informal elites to maintain international support and to stay in power.</i></p> <p><i>Inadequate attention paid to a strategic approach to national capacity development – in government, parastatals, NGOs or communities.</i></p>	<p><i>Predominant focus on government capacity building within government ministries and agencies.</i></p> <p><i>Pattern of support over time across governance, human rights and democracy, and security and justice, does not demonstrate a coherent and consistent approach to state-building.</i></p> <p><i>EU ambition delivered through project modality consistently exceeded absorptive capacity of Yemeni authorities.</i></p> <p><i>Scoping and calibration of EU cooperation not strategically managed; instruments used expediently rather than strategically; model for project design and management arrangements not fit for purpose.</i></p>	<p><i>Remote location of Delegation hampered engagement. Human resources inadequate to deliver EU’s strategic objectives in Yemen, especially prior to establishment of full Delegation in Sana’a.</i></p> <p><i>Support for administrative reform poorly designed and managed and quality of project outputs reviewed as very poor. No evaluative evidence of results.</i></p> <p><i>Support to democracy focused on elections, demonstrated continued reliance on unrealistic assumptions and ultimately overtaken by events in 2011 crisis.</i></p> <p><i>Support to CSOs grew significantly from 2007 onwards. CSOs continue to struggle to maintain independence and hold government to account.</i></p> <p><i>Persistently poor attention to monitoring and evaluation, therefore weak learning loops into strategy and programming. Programme evaluations scarce, so hard to judge how support has strengthened state–society relations.</i></p>	<p><i>EU cooperation prior to 2009 not framed by overarching state-building strategy; only in health sector are state-building approach and results visible.</i></p> <p><i>Persistent weaknesses in organisational coherence between DEVCO and EEAS and contested views on political economy analysis have constrained progress.</i></p>
Contribution story 2 (post-2009)		<p><i>Contextual understanding increased by MacDonald/Khalil study, which helped to reframe strategic thinking as reflected in the emergent strategy Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach in Yemen.</i></p> <p><i>Standing and political influence increased substantially during 2011 and 2012 when helping to secure GCC initiative.</i></p> <p><i>EU well placed to respond in 2011 but institutional readiness constrained by continued reliance on formal politics and formal institutions, time-consuming procedures and entrenched institutional behaviours.</i></p>	<p><i>Increasing EU influence and leverage. Yemeni officials see EU as being more neutral with comparative advantage on human rights. EU seen regionally as most trustworthy of G10 members.</i></p> <p><i>Shift to more politically-led strategic approach with a focus on supporting the National Dialogue and the TPSD.</i></p> <p><i>However, development cooperation unable to keep pace with political engagement; and emerging criticism of EU over-investment in GCC initiative, privileging short-term stability at expense of more radical change.</i></p>	<p><i>Establishment of full Delegation in Sana’a facilitated strengthened engagement. However, human resources remained inadequate to deliver EU’s strategic objectives in Yemen, including state-building.</i></p> <p><i>Efficiency and effectiveness undermined by complexities and inflexibilities of EU instruments and procedures, insufficient attention to the impact of Yemen’s fragility on staff and programmes; insufficient investment in evaluation, knowledge management and institutional memory; and absence of a strategic approach to capacity development and technical assistance.</i></p> <p><i>Persistently poor attention to monitoring and evaluation, therefore weak learning loops into strategy and programming. Programme evaluations scarce, so hard to judge how support has strengthened state–society relations.</i></p>	<p><i>EU cooperation from 2009 framed by a clearer overarching state-building strategy but with continued reliance on support to government.</i></p> <p><i>2009 emerging strategy (Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to Yemen) consistent with international norms and recognised vital relationship between political dialogue and development cooperation.</i></p> <p><i>Security situation has deteriorated significantly, triggering two successive evacuations of Delegation staff. EU not sufficiently staffed, resourced and organised to cope with Yemen’s fragility.</i></p> <p><i>Persistent weaknesses in organisational coherence between DEVCO and EEAS and contested views on political economy analysis continue to constrain progress.</i></p>

### 3.2.2 Building block 2: Programme analysis

During the Desk-research phase a thorough appraisal was made of all documentation provided on individual EU projects and programmes. Where previous evaluations have been undertaken, their findings are taken into account, as are reviews undertaken by implementing partners. The Desk Study itself mapped the extent of documentation available and the key findings from this exercise have been integrated into this Final Report.

During the field phase we also analysed in greater depth three **Case Studies** within the priority themes (state-building, resilience, responsiveness). For each case we examined the rationale for EU action, whether it be a programme (e.g. co-financing of the SFD) or an approach (e.g. political dialogue).

Each case study enabled us to explore more than one EQ. Where possible we used the case studies to drill down from strategy through design and management to results, looking for strategic or operational cross-linkages to other aspects of EU cooperation, before looking back up to assess the relationship between strategy as realised and strategy as planned.

**Table 3: Summary of case studies**

Case studies	Scope and purpose
1. Evolutions in the EU's approach to state-building.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To explore the role and importance of political dialogue as an effective tool for cooperation in general and to frame the EU's state-building efforts.</li> <li>• To explore the impact of the EU's investment in democracy, electoral assistance and human rights, including the 2006 EU Election Observation Mission (EOM).</li> <li>• To explore the extent to which increased EU support for CSOs from 2007 onwards has enhanced the endogenous process by which the state and society attempt to reconcile their expectations of one another, and contributed a more diverse political culture.</li> </ul>
2. EU contribution to resilience – the cases of the Social Welfare Fund (SWF) and the Social Fund for Development (SFD).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To explore the extent to which the SFD and SWF have been effective vehicles for building resilience at household and community level, demonstrating state responsiveness to pressing social and economic needs, and to determine the contribution and added value of the EU in this regard.</li> <li>• To explore the extent to which EU support to the SFD and SWF has formed part of a wider and integrated strategy addressing needs in Yemen.</li> <li>• To explore the extent to which support to these institutions was complementary/competing with those of other donors.</li> </ul>
3. EU Responsiveness and Private Sector Development in Yemen.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To explore the extent to which the EU's support to private sector development has been responsive to the changing political and development landscape in Yemen.</li> <li>• To explore how EU responsiveness has translated into actual funded activities within the country portfolio.</li> </ul>

### 3.3 Key risks and challenges

#### 3.3.1 Key constraints

The security constraints have obviously prevented access to many places and individuals and to further data that would have better informed the analysis presented here. Nevertheless, the team took advantage of the whole EU-Yemen Delegation being in Brussels, as well as having generous access to senior EU diplomats responsible for the regional as well as national programme and strategy. We were careful, however, to balance this with interviews with Yemen Government, Member States, other donors, civil



society and informed individuals able to give an historic and reflective view on EU influence and impact as a whole.

When exploring events and activities prior to 2008 we became aware of the high turnover and resulting loss in institutional memory not only of Yemen officials but also of international aid personnel. There was thus a greater reliance on written materials, though, as we see below, this was not without constraints.

### 3.3.2 Data collection

The process of data collection, collation and analysis has followed standard practice for the desk-based evaluation stage. We sought documentary data and information from a wide range of sources and in a wide range of formats, and where possible we have triangulated sources. Sources assessed include official documents produced by EU services and other government and donor agencies, internal EU correspondence, reports from partners/recipients of EU support, research studies, reports and practice papers prepared by consultancy firms and research organisations, academic papers, media reports and opinion pieces. We have not attempted to assess or categorise these evidence sources by their factual basis or the authoritativeness of the analysis and opinions they provide. But we have referenced all sources to allow readers to draw their own judgements as to the range and depth of our sources.

### 3.3.3 Data availability

During the Desk Phase, against each of the EQs we established preliminary findings, hypotheses to test at the field phase, and identified what further data and information we need. With regard to data availability challenges, we would like to highlight the following:

- **Limited EU information on results and impact** – During the period 2002-12, the EU financed 154 interventions through its NIP/MIPs and 140 interventions through thematic instruments and programmes. We have secured only two programme evaluations – of the Support for Administrative Reforms programme and the Evaluation Study of Health Development Councils, Yemen – and a handful of Results-Oriented Monitoring Reports. Where the EU has co-financed projects also supported by other donors, most notably some food security interventions with IFAD, the SWF and the SFD, evaluations and impact assessments commissioned by others are available and can be used to infer the effectiveness of EU support. However, in other areas there is a distinct lack of evaluative evidence of results and impact, even in areas of particular focus for the EU since 2002 such as much of the Food Security portfolio.
- **Missing documentation** – In developing the inventory we discovered that a number of documents could not be located. This was due in large part to the treble location of the Delegation and representative office over the period, in Brussels, Amman and Sana'a, and to filing inefficiencies. Thanks to the dedicated support of the Yemen Geographic Coordination team additional documents were retrieved and sent to us during the Desk Phase. However, many still remain missing. For example, there is a complete absence of any documentation relating to 17 Decisions, some of which relate to Decisions taken as recently as 2010.
- **CRIS document nomenclature and formats** – It has been challenging to work through the mass of Current Research Information System (CRIS) documentation in an efficient and effective manner. Documents are not systematically and intuitively named, making the database difficult to navigate; documents are often PDF versions of scanned photocopies, which are often not searchable electronically. There is a multiplicity of code numbers, a difference between titles of projects given by the EU and those of co-financers, and several cases where a multiplicity of completely different projects fall under the same Decision. It is therefore virtually impossible to search for document titles and contents by key words or phrases, with the risk that the directory of CRIS documents is underutilised for this and future evaluations.



## ANNEX 4: LIST OF PERSONS MET

The table below lists the people met during the course of this evaluation and who did not opt for anonymity. A confidential list of other interviewees was presented to the Evaluation Unit. In total, over 70 people were interviewed during the course of the evaluation, with key informants being interviewed more than once.

<b>Last name</b>	<b>First name</b>	<b>Position</b>
<i>EC and EEAS officials</i>		
ABOU AZZAM	Janine	Governance Adviser, Delegation
BARBE	Jean	Head of Section, Geographical Coordination, responsible for Yemen
BERGER	Christian	EEAS, Director, North Africa, Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq
BERNHARDT	Sarah	Health/nutrition Adviser, Delegation
BERTOUILLE	Thierry	Humanitarian assistance
BOIDIN	Jean-Claude	Head of Unit, Geographical Coordination Central Asia, Middle East/Gulf, Asia Regional Programmes
BOURTEMBOURG	Julien	Deputy Head of Political Section/Political Officer
BRINKMANN	Willem	Former EEAS Desk Officer for Yemen
CAMPO-PERFECTO	Maria	Assistant Policy Officer, Private Sector Development, Trade, Regional Integration
CAUWENBERGH	Johan	Head of Cooperation, Delegation
CERVONE	Michele	Former EU Ambassador to Yemen
CHITALIA	Salima	Civil society, local authorities Adviser, Delegation
CORNARO	Marcus	Deputy Director-General, DEVCO Geographic Coordination
DELPHIN	Henri	ECHO
De VANSSAY	Arnaud	Resilience, Food security
FIEDRICH	Marc	Foreign Policy Instrument Desk Officer
GIOE	Mauro	Economics Adviser, Delegation
GROSS	Philipp-Oliver	Former EEAS Desk Officer for Yemen
HALICIU	Mihaela	Fragile states, crisis management
HANSSON	Karolina	EIDHR Desk Officer
HORVERS	Mary	Former Governance Adviser, Delegation
JACQUES	Philippe	Former DEVCO Desk Officer for Yemen
LUDWICZAK	Cyril	EEAS Desk Officer for Yemen
MARIANI	Mario	Former Social Sectors Adviser, Delegation
MARTINS	Paulo	Former DEVCO Desk Officer
MEGANCK	Dirk	Director, Asia, Central Asia, Middle East/Gulf and Pacific
MINGARELLI	Hugues	Managing Director North Africa, Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq, EAS
MUSCHEIDT	Bettina	EU Ambassador to Yemen
NOYELLE	Claude	Social Welfare Adviser, Delegation
O'ROURKE	John	Head of Division, Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq, EEAS
PAVEL	Andreea	Former DEVCO Desk Officer
PEDERSEN	Jesper	Instrument for Stability Desk Officer
RAMAKERS	Micha	Former Head of Cooperation, Delegation

<b>Last name</b>	<b>First name</b>	<b>Position</b>
SATTIN	Eric	Thematic Adviser, Health
SCHIERHORST	Rainer	Former Head of Technical Assistance Office, Yemen
TAYLOR	Nicholas	Head of Sector, Employment, Social Inclusion, Migration
TIMMERMAN	Hilde	Head of Finance, Contracts and Audit, Delegation

*Officials from other agencies*

ALAMDY	Ali Abdullah	Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Yemen in Belgium
BACKHTEEVA	Regina	Communications Officer, WFP
BAHRAN	Fatia	IFAD Country Representative, Yemen
BAJWA	Mahboob	UNICEF Yemen
CAPPELAERE	Geert	UNICEF Yemen
ERDELMANN	Francesca	Senior Programme Officer, WFP
HONG	Mira	World Bank Yemen
HOPKINS	Jeremy	UNICEF Yemen
MAHY	Karen	DFID Governance Team Leader, Yemen
SCHARPFF	Hening	Deputy Country Director, WFP
TOTTMAN	Jonathan	DFID Rule of Law Advisor, Yemen

*Officials not interviewed but who commented on the draft final report*

AL-IRYANI	Lamis	Monitoring and Evaluation, Social Fund for Development
AL-WAREETH	Hanan M.	Third Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Yemen in Belgium
ANDERSON	Lisa	Country Director, Danish Refugee Council Yemen
BAUR	Dr. Henning	Director KfW Office Sana'a
CASTLE	Tanya	External Relations and Reporting Manager, Yamaan Foundation
SHAIBAN	Nabil A.	Senior Operations Officer, World Bank Yemen Country Office
WAHBA	Yasmine	Assistant Country Director- Programs, CARE International in Yemen

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## **Part 2: Annexes setting the scene**



## ANNEX 6: COUNTRY CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

### 6.1 Social and economic issues

The Republic of Yemen is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the Arab world.<sup>20</sup> Although classified by the World Bank as a lower middle income country,<sup>21</sup> Yemen ranks 160th out of 186 countries in the United Nations (UN) Human Development Index<sup>22</sup> and is currently facing a range of serious short- and long-term developmental challenges such as a high population growth rate, declining oil production and revenues, and a high degree of water scarcity. Yemen's population was estimated at 23,154,000 in 2010. Over 75% of the population is under the age of 25 and unofficial estimates place unemployment between 40 and 60%.<sup>23</sup> 73% of people live in rural areas in about 130,000 villages and localities making it difficult to provide basic services. Only 17% of these have access to safe drinking water.<sup>24</sup>

According to the World Food Programme 44.5% of Yemenis are food insecure, with children suffering one of the three highest stunting rates in the world. Both severe and moderate acute malnutrition rates are above global emergency norms.<sup>25</sup> Rising food prices place continued strain on the Yemeni Government to effect solutions for the vulnerable. Yemen ranks bottom of the UNDP's Gender Inequality Index.<sup>26</sup>

Although there has been a steady increase in GDP over the last decade, this has not contributed to a decline in poverty ratios. There has been little trickle down to the poor. For example, large-scale private fishing enterprises funded by foreign capital have experienced problems of hiring of non-Yemeni labourers, tax evasion, and low levels of contribution to government income. Many of these enterprises by-pass the rural areas where the majority of the population is located. Agricultural cooperatives, where they exist at all, perform poorly and much of the agriculture extension services can hardly support the salaries of its employees. Subsistence agriculture remains highly vulnerable to climate change, floods, and droughts.<sup>27</sup> The Government has attempted to create jobs and alleviate poverty through promoting Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) in the Government's Development Plan for Poverty Reduction, but with only limited success.<sup>28</sup> The sectors with potential for high economic performance and job creation include agriculture, fisheries, industry and tourism. Agriculture and fisheries (which account for 9.7% and 0.8% of GDP respectively) employ over 50% of the workforce.

In understanding the root and instrumental causes that have presented barriers to progress in Yemen, we can highlight five particular factors: weak governance; deprivation of basic services; centralisation of power in the central provinces and the isolation of peripheral governorates from the mainstream political process; weak rule of law; and corruption. These factors are exacerbated by an overall lack of all-inclusive participation in wider social, political and economic processes, particularly among women, youth and children.<sup>29</sup>

### 6.2 Political and security issues

Yemen has faced a series of political challenges, both before and since the 2011 citizen protests. Obstacles to reform have primarily been political. Yemen comprises the formal state and the informal state. The formal state is characterised by political pluralism, elections, a relatively free press and extensive civil society, all quite unique to the region. The informal state has depended on patronage and a network of alliances that link tribal sheikhs, government officials, business families and the armed forces. Patronage was, until recently, essentially a mechanism for short-term crisis resolution; but it has

<sup>20</sup> Lackner, Helen, 2014 'Why Yemen Matters', Saqi Books, London.

<sup>21</sup> [http://data.worldbank.org/country/yemen-republic#cp\\_wdi](http://data.worldbank.org/country/yemen-republic#cp_wdi), Accessed May 2013

<sup>22</sup> UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) – 2012 Rankings, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>, Accessed May 2013.

<sup>23</sup> Phillips, S., 'Yemen: Developmental Dysfunction and Division in a Crisis State', *Developmental Leadership Programme*, Research Paper 14, February 2011, p. 9. By mid-2011 MOPIC admitted 52% and WFP put the figure at 60%.

<sup>24</sup> United Nations Common Country Assessment, 2011.

<sup>25</sup> World Food Programme, *Comprehensive Food Security Survey: Republic of Yemen*, March 2012, Accessed June 2013.

<sup>26</sup> UNDP Gender Inequality Index (GII), <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/gii/>, Accessed May 2013

<sup>27</sup> Bennett et al, *Republic of Yemen: Country Programme Evaluation, IFAD*, (IFAD, December 2012).  
[http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public\\_html/eksyst/doc/country/pn/yemen/cpe-2012\\_full.pdf](http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/eksyst/doc/country/pn/yemen/cpe-2012_full.pdf)

<sup>28</sup> International Labour Organisation (ILO), 2008, *Decent Work Country Program, 2008-2010*.

<sup>29</sup> These factors were the contextual background to United Nations Common Country Assessment, Republic of Yemen, 2011.

been arguably the only effective political system in the country. With low tax revenues, a social contract between the Government and people in Yemen is slender; meanwhile oil revenues have provided ‘rent’ that allows entrenched elites to retain power.

Security forces and the civil service employ 1.2 million people, absorbing about 70% of the national budget. This, together with fuel subsidies, constrains economic growth/employment and severely curtails expenditure on basic services. State provision of services for its people has been poor.<sup>30</sup> Parallel project implementing institutions – notably the Social Fund for Development (SFD), but also a string of donor-sponsored Project Implementation Units – represent an attempt to increase access to basic services in the short term, but may risk undermining the capacity and legitimacy of state entities<sup>31</sup> in the longer term.

Serious threats to Yemen’s political and socio-economic stability lie in the continually precarious security situation, which has had a devastating impact on foreign investment, tourism and economic development. The conflict in the northern governorate of Saada has been played out in periodic wars since 2004 between government forces and Houthi rebels. This has led to the displacement of over 265,000 Yemenis. The dispute is further complicated by splits within the rebel groups and the involvement of regional actors.<sup>32</sup> Meanwhile, particularly since 2008, there has been a critical threat to political stability in the form of the ‘Southern Movement’. This has grown out of discontent with the northern-based regime, perceived as having secured its survival through exploitation of southern natural resources and the exclusion of southerners from governing institutions.<sup>33</sup> A counter-offensive by government troops in September 2010 displaced thousands in Shabwah Governorate.

The general climate of weakened security, growing social discontent with political institutions and rising youth unemployment in Yemen has provided a fertile breeding ground for recruitment by terrorist groups. In the face of diminishing influence in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan-Pakistan, Al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen merged with the Saudi branch of the terrorist group to form Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is consolidating its base in Yemen to launch attacks that threaten internal security, particularly through the local franchise Ansar Al-Shari’a, as well as regional and global security.

Fundamental reform is required to improve the socio-economic outlook of the country. The 2011 protests precipitated the end of President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rule after more than three decades in office and resulted in the signing of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement, which saw the transfer of power to his deputy, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. The agreement, bolstered by a UN-sponsored implementation document, outlines the three principal tasks of transition: (i) holding a National Dialogue, which was expected to lead to the drafting and adoption of a new constitution before elections in February 2014; (ii) addressing issues of transitional justice; and (iii) reforming the military-security apparatus while securing its extraction from the political realm.<sup>34</sup> A key challenge for President Hadi and the new transitional government is to bring about reform of the country’s governing institutions through combating entrenched corruption and nepotism while maintaining support among tribes and other networks of influence that are accustomed to working within a system of patronage.

### **Regional security and the Gulf Cooperation Council**

The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) is a regional organisation, with six members: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Set up in 1981, its objectives are to enhance coordination, integration and inter-connection among its members. Yemen’s historical relationships with GCC members, particularly Saudi Arabia, which hosts the GCC Secretariat, are complex and dynamic and have been particularly fraught with difficulties for a long time. Most notably, President Saleh’s support for Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War led to the expulsion of

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<sup>30</sup> Neil MacDonald and Rana Khalil (May 2009), Report of the assessment towards a ‘whole of EU’ approach to state building in Yemen: addressing fragility to prevent state failure.

<sup>31</sup> Bennett, J. et al (2010), *Evaluation of DFID Country Programmes: Yemen*, DFID, February 2010, <http://www.oecd.org/countries/yemen/45012078.pdf>

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>33</sup> Phillips, S., *Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis* (London, 2011), p. 26. The situation has changed since 2011, with several key cabinet politicians, including the Prime Minister, being from the South.

<sup>34</sup> International Crisis Group, ‘Yemen’s Military-Security Reform: Seeds of New Conflict?’ *Middle East Report No.139*, 4 April 2013, p. 1.

Yemeni migrant workers from Saudi Arabia and to long-standing and continuing objections to Yemen's desire for GCC membership. At present, Yemen has an observer status in several committees but there are no signs yet that full membership will be granted. Nonetheless Yemen has strong economic ties with GCC countries that play an influential role in the ebb and flow of Yemen's fortunes.

The EU established bilateral relations with the GCC countries through a 1988 Cooperation Agreement, intended to strengthen stability in a region of strategic importance; facilitate political and economic relations; broaden economic and technical cooperation; and broaden cooperation on energy, industry, trade and services, agriculture, fisheries, investment, science, technology and environment. The Agreement provides for annual joint councils/ministerial meetings (between the EU and the GCC foreign ministers), and for joint cooperation committees at senior officials' level.

With regard to security we can distinguish between 'soft' and 'hard' security threats. The former is in terms of resources: Yemen could become a burden for neighbouring GCC countries since it is rapidly running out of water and oil. With oil representing 75% of government income, Saudi Arabia in particular will be under increasing pressure to hold up the Yemen economy in the absence of alternative income sources. Meanwhile, two thirds of Yemen's population is under 25, and a lack of investment has led to very high levels of unemployment. The regional fear is that Yemen as a 'failed state' would have two possible outcomes: first, an unsustainable<sup>35</sup> outflow of Yemenis seeking work in neighbouring countries; second, an increase of terrorist activity breeding on discontent in Yemen and exacerbating regional insecurity and instability.

Regionally, there are several 'hard' security threats. The long-standing war in Sada'ar has sectarian implications; Yemen has a Sunni : Shi'ite Muslim ratio of about 2 to 1.<sup>36</sup> The present conflict is being fought between tribal rebels (historically associated with the Shia Zaidi sect and allegedly supported by elements in Shia Iran) and two governments (Yemen and the Sunni Muslim Saudi Arabia). While Iran's involvement remains a matter of speculation, Saudi Arabia's is much more real. Yemen allegedly received US\$10 million per month in 2007 from Saudi Arabia during the war, and the Saudis also intervened physically in November 2009 with extensive air and naval power.<sup>37</sup> Other regional concerns include the safeguard of trade routes from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea; although piracy has subsided, regional stability (notably in Somalia) is not yet assured. The presence of Al-Qaeda in the south of the country is a further cause of concern, not least because of the impact this has on foreign investment and tourism.

### 6.3 Overview of international donor landscape in Yemen

In its Third Socio-economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction 2006-10 (DPPR) and accompanying National Reform Agenda (NRA), the Government of Yemen set out its priorities for tackling four key developmental challenges: reducing oil dependency, reducing population growth, managing scarce water resources, and establishing an effective and efficient Government administration. This has since been followed by a series of further reform documents, including the Government's top ten reform priorities in 2009;<sup>38</sup> the Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development 2012-14, which outlines the urgent priorities of restoring political and security stability, meeting urgent humanitarian needs and achieving macroeconomic stability;<sup>39</sup> and the Fourth National Plan for Poverty Reduction 2011-15.

Until now implementation of reforms has been severely hampered by budget cuts, a lack of prioritisation and weak leadership and ownership. However, at a series of recent international donor conferences, including the 2012 Donor Conference Meeting, large sums of development aid were

<sup>35</sup> Foreign labourers in the 6 GCC countries already represent at least half of the total GCC population, and these countries could not absorb a huge increase in unskilled labour demands from migrating Yemenis.

<sup>36</sup> A politico-religious system known as Zaydism (originating from a Shia sect) dominated Yemen for centuries; Zaydi royalists lost the 1962-70 civil war.

<sup>37</sup> NATO Review (2010), 'Yemen's problems are the region's problems', [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2010/Yemen/Yemen\\_region\\_problems/EN/](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2010/Yemen/Yemen_region_problems/EN/)

<sup>38</sup> This never made it to the level of official endorsement and is completely forgotten today.

<sup>39</sup> Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, *Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development 2012-14*, [http://www.mpic-yemen.org/yemencd/images/stories/PDF/yemencg/TRANSITIONAL%20PROGRAM%20FOR%20STABILIZATION%20AND%20DEVELOPMENT%20\(TPSD\)%202012-2014.pdf](http://www.mpic-yemen.org/yemencd/images/stories/PDF/yemencg/TRANSITIONAL%20PROGRAM%20FOR%20STABILIZATION%20AND%20DEVELOPMENT%20(TPSD)%202012-2014.pdf)

pledged – \$7.9bn by the latter in 2012<sup>40</sup> – to support the transition process and encourage improved service delivery and economic management. The GCC plays a critical role in the Friends of Yemen process around coordination and consensus-building<sup>41</sup> and provides a substantial bulk of this assistance, although much can still be done to ensure that this support is coordinated with that of Western donors and aligned to Government priorities.

Yemen is a much under-aided country, with Western donor presence being relatively small. There are myriad reasons for this. Donors have for years been divided over the right approach to Yemen, citing insecurity in the country or the lack of a political settlement as obstacles to their further engagement. Genuine obstacles hamper the operations of donors and NGOs alike, among them corruption, limited channels for absorbing funds, growing insecurity, and serious human rights violations. Such challenges have already led a handful of donors, including the World Bank, to withhold support for the country. Although recent events have catalysed the involvement of a wider group of development partners, the main support over the last decade has been from the EU, UK, Germany, the Netherlands, World Bank, US and the UN. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has made contributions around four central themes of rule of law, economic management, social sector programming and aid effectiveness;<sup>42</sup> the World Bank, the Netherlands and Germany have all been fully engaged in the health and water sectors, although the Netherlands have only recently resumed funding in the aftermath of the Yemeni government crackdown on the 2011 protests.<sup>43</sup> USAID focuses on governance, economic growth and trade, food assistance, health and education.

The current set of priorities for the UN in Yemen, as outlined in the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), 2012-15 are: Inclusive and diversified economic growth; Sustainable and equitable access to quality basic social services to accelerate progress towards MDGs; Women and youth empowerment; and Good governance and social cohesion.<sup>44</sup> In addition to regular development programmes, the UN Humanitarian Appeal for 2013 amounted to \$702 million to assist some 7.7 million people, with the top priorities including food security and agriculture; nutrition; water and sanitation; and shelter.<sup>45</sup> The UN presence in Yemen has grown considerably since 2012 with the establishment of a Department of Political Affairs (DPA) office, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and a small office of UN Women.

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<sup>40</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/friends-of-yemen-2013>, Accessed June 2013.

<sup>41</sup> Hill, G. and Nonneman, G., 'Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy', *Chatham House Briefing Paper, Middle East and North Africa Programme, May 2011*, p. 13.

<sup>42</sup> Bennett, J. et al., *Evaluation of DFID Country Programmes: Yemen* (DFID, 2010).

<sup>43</sup> <http://www.minbuza.nl/en/news/2012/02/dutch-development-funding-to-support-transition-in-yemen.html>

<sup>44</sup> United Nations Development Assistance Framework, Republic of Yemen 2012-2015, Sana'a, January 2012.

<sup>45</sup> OCHA, Most critical activities, 2013 (OCHA Mid-Term Review, June 2013).

[https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/MYR\\_2013\\_Yemen\\_Most\\_critical\\_activities.pdf](https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/MYR_2013_Yemen_Most_critical_activities.pdf)

# YEMEN

## #YEMENCRISIS FACTS AND FIGURES

POPULATION

**23.8 MILLION**



POOREST COUNTRY IN MIDDLE EAST



PER CAPITA  
INCOME  
**\$1,270**



COMPARED TO OMAN \$19,450

**50%** LIVE BELOW  
THE POVERTY  
LINE



**14.7m**  
NEED HUMANITARIAN  
ASSISTANCE



**10 MILLION PEOPLE  
ARE FOOD INSECURE**



47%

UNDER FIVE  
ARE STUNTED



60%

CHRONICALLY  
MALNOURISHED



YEMEN IMPORTS **90%** OF ITS FOOD

YEMEN IS ONE OF THE MOST  
WATER-STRESSED  
COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD



**13 MILLION**  
LACK ACCESS TO GOOD  
SANITATION AND WATER



WATER SUPPLIES  
IN URBAN AREAS  
MAY ONLY LAST  
10-15 YEARS

The Humanitarian Practice Network at the Overseas Development Institute is an independent forum where field workers, managers and policymakers in the humanitarian sector share information, analysis and experience.

**HPN** Humanitarian  
Practice Network

Find out more at [www.odihpn.org/he61-yemen](http://www.odihpn.org/he61-yemen)

## 6.4 EU external relations and development cooperation

The period covered by this evaluation coincides with a period of significant change in the policy, institutional and organisational architecture of EU external relations and development cooperation as summarised opposite in Figure 1.

From the late 1990s, EU development policy was strongly influenced by the Union's attempt to define and establish itself as a strong global actor.

From the EC External Assistance reforms in 2000 until the operationalisation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2011, the EU's external services were split between the Council Secretariat and the European Commission. The Commission had separate Commissioners for Trade, Enlargement, External Relations, and Development, each supported by a Directorate-General (DG) of civil servants. DG External Relations (RELEX) maintained a network of 128 overseas EC

Delegations, responsible for aid implementation where appropriate. Development aid was split geographically between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group managed by DG Development, and Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, South Africa and the Neighbourhood countries, managed by DG RELEX. A separate aid implementation office, EuropeAid, was created in 2001 under the overall responsibility of the External Relations Commissioner. A separate administration for emergency aid, the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO), reported to the Development Commissioner.

The 2005 European Consensus on Development established a common framework for the provision of development assistance to developing countries provided by the European Union or by Member States. It emphasised the relationship between donor and recipient as one of partnership and equality, establishing 'that development is a central goal by itself; and that sustainable development includes good governance, human rights and political, economic, social and environmental aspects'. It also emphasised the concept of policy coherence for development (PCD), which later became an obligation in the Lisbon Treaty. This stipulates that all EU policies should be in support of developing countries' development needs, or at least should not contradict the aim of poverty eradication. The framing of EU cooperation as a whole therefore changed from this point. The European Consensus continues to be in force.

The Lisbon Treaty came into force on 1 December 2009, bringing far reaching consequences for the EU's external policies, in particular through the appointment of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) – also a Vice-President of the European Commission – and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS). EC Delegations became Delegations of the European Union with an increased political mandate to represent the interests of the Union, with

**Figure 1: The evolving framework of European development cooperation<sup>46</sup>**

Year	EU Milestone
1992	Maastricht Treaty: - Development - shared competence, poverty focus, policy coherence, coordination & complementarity between EC & Member States
2000	EC External Assistance Reforms: - EC Development Policy Statement - New implementing agency - EuropeAid - Deconcentration of project management to delegations - Regional & Country Strategy Papers - Inter-service Quality Support Group - Annual Report of EC development assistance
2000 - 2020	The EU-ACP Cotonou Partnership Agreement: - Integrated package – aid, trade & political dialogue - Political dialogue – Art. 8, violation of essential elements - Art. 96) - Conflict, peace & security – Africa Peace Facility - 10th European Development Fund – €22.7 bn - EU Water Facility, EU Energy Facility, EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, Natural Disaster Facility, Migration Facility - MDG Contracts - Good governance initiative - Economic Partnership Agreements
2005	Financing for development – EU aid targets: - 0.39% by 2006 - 0.56% by 2010 - 0.7% by 2015 - 50% of aid to Africa
2005	European Consensus on Development - European Community & Member States. EU external policies are ' <i>common</i> '. Recognition of ' <i>policy mix</i> '.
2005	OECD Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness + specific EU targets: - EU aid more predictable - EU aid better coordinated - EU aid aligned with partner countries' plans & systems - EU aid untied - EU technical assistance reformed
2005	EU Strategy for Africa – ' <i>whole of Europe for whole of Africa</i> '
2006 ...	EU Donor Atlas – annual
2007	EC external assistance budget instruments rationalized and simplified
2007	European Parliament Development Committee scrutiny of Country Strategy Papers under the Development Cooperation Instrument
2007	EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour & joint co-financing
2007	EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development (biennial)
2007	Joint EU-Africa Strategy

<sup>46</sup> *The Evolution of EU Development Cooperation: Taking the Change Agenda Forward*, Conference paper, Mikaela Gavass, ODI, 2009



development policy as the principal framework for the EU's cooperation with developing countries across its various elements of development, trade, humanitarian assistance, and fisheries. The 2013 Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises created yet more policy connections, between development and the Common Security and Defence Policy. Thus the breadth and interconnectedness of EU cooperation was significantly increased from 2009 onwards.

At the same time that the Lisbon Treaty came into operation in 2011, the EU adopted the Agenda for Change and new policy and rules for budget support. Both were designed to make development policy more strategic and more targeted. The Agenda for Change targets EU aid at the countries in greatest need, including fragile states, and emphasises the objectives of good governance and growth. Countries already experiencing sustained growth or with sufficient resources of their own were 'graduated' to different types of EU assistance. The Agenda also emphasises joint programming and a common results framework with EU MS, and innovative ways of financing development. The immediate effects on EU-Yemen cooperation were to increase the funding envelope, to reframe cooperation under the objectives of good governance and growth, and to encourage joint programming.

An early assessment by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)<sup>47</sup> of the effectiveness of organisational measures under the Lisbon Treaty highlights the following organisational challenges:

*The creation of DG DEVCO implies that after several years of separation, development policy making and implementation are again united in one DG, which could help ensure that implementation informs policy making. It also means that the split between different groups of developing countries (ACP versus the rest) across different directorates has come to an end, which could contribute to a more coherent approach across geographic areas. The EEAS is tasked with preparing aid allocation and programming decisions, which presents both opportunities (e.g. more holistic approaches) and risks (e.g. securitisation of aid). While the jury is still out as to the outcome, some major organisational challenges have become apparent. The litmus test for the focus of EU development cooperation (poverty or the pursuit of the EU's – economic, security and migration – interests as some fear?) will be the next programming cycle for the EU's financial instruments under the 2014 – 2020 budgetary framework.*

*First, the complexity of the programming cycle proves to be a major challenge. Particularly the fact that both the EEAS and DEVCO are leading on different steps of the aid programming cycle makes regular information exchange and good collaboration the more important and complicated. So far unclear reporting lines and divisions of tasks between the EEAS and DEVCO has created confusion within as well as beyond those bodies. EEAS and DEVCO staff regularly inform and consult each other, but duplication of efforts and protectionism rather than smooth EEAS – DEVCO collaboration is commonplace. There is a need to step up efforts for effective inter-institutional communication and agree on clear guidelines on workflows defined in an inter-institutional agreement.*

*Second, ensuring sufficient capacity to work effectively towards development objectives in the EEAS and DEVCO is a challenge. The EEAS has been equipped with a Development Cooperation Coordination Division and a cross-departmental Development Cooperation Task Force that are still to prove they can warrant mainstreaming of development concerns in the EEAS' work. To date, EU delegations are often understaffed to fulfil the role expected from them under the Lisbon Treaty. As for DEVCO, regardless of ambitions to become a centre of excellence on development policy, its new organisational structure may be counterproductive to these ambitions. DEVCO has undergone a substantial reallocation of staff, which has led to a significant loss of capacity in thematic directorates but has not necessarily resulted in an equally important strengthening of expertise at geographical level. The slimmed down thematic unit have limited capacity to provide sectoral quality support and operational guidance to geographic directorates and EU delegations, let alone to engage with other DGs on PCD issues as is expected of them. Overall, the establishment of the EEAS and DEVCO and subsequent new division of tasks have so far not shown convincing signs of steps towards more effective EU development cooperation.*

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<sup>47</sup> EU development cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty: People, institutions and global trends, ECDPM Discussion Paper 123, Jeske van Seters and Henrike Klavert, [www.ecdpm.org/dp123](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp123)



## ANNEX 7: TIMELINE OF RELEVANT EU POLICIES, STRATEGIES AND INSTRUMENTS TOGETHER WITH GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND EVENTS IN YEMEN

Timeline of relevant policies of the Government of Yemen and the European Union

Pre-2002	CSP 2002-06					CSP 2007-13					
	NIP 2002-04			NIP 2005-06		NIP 2007-10			MIP 2010-13		
	Technical Assistance Office		Resident Charge d'Affaires					Full Delegation			
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012

### Relevant Yemeni government policies

2000	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
2001	Yemen Second Five Year Plan (2001-2005)
2002	Yemen's Strategic Vision 2025
2003	Yemen PRSP (2003-2005)
2005	National Reform Agenda presented to donors
2006	Action Matrix for Comprehensive Good Governance Reforms
2006	Third PRSP (2006-10) - known as DPPR
2007	Public Investment Programme (2007-2010)
2008	Adoption of National Decentralisation Strategy
2009	Next generation of NRA presented to donors
2009	Launch of top-tem reform priorities
2011	Fourth DPPR (2011-2015)
2011	GCC agreement is signed (2011)
2012	The Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development is agreed

### Relevant EU policies and strategies for Yemen

1998	Cooperation Agreement between EU and Yemen
2001	Everything But Arms Regulation
2004	EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East
2004	Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue between the European Union and the Republic of Yemen
2006	European Consensus on Development
2006	Instrument for Stability
2006	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
2007	Signing of the Lisbon Treaty
2007	Development Cooperation Instrument supercedes previous geographic and thematic instruments under the ALA regulation
2007	EU commits to the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations
2007	Communication on EU response to fragile situations
2009	Lisbon Treaty comes into force
2011	EU adopts the Agenda for Change
2011	The EEAS is launched
2011	Joint Communication on the EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises

Timeline of key events in the Yemen political and conflict context

Pre-2002	CSP 2002-06						CSP 2007-13					
	NIP 2002-04			NIP 2005-06			NIP 2007-10			MIP 2010-13		
	Technical Assistance Office			Resident Charge d'Affaires						Full Delegation		
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	

**North and south unite**

1990 May - Unified Republic of Yemen proclaimed, with Saleh as president.

1991 - Yemen opposes US-led action against Iraq in Gulf War.

1993 April - Coalition government formed, made up of ruling parties of former north and south.

1994 - Armies of former north and south, which have failed to integrate, gather on former frontier as relations between southern and northern leaders deteriorate.

**Attempted split**

1994 May - Saleh declares state of emergency and dismisses Vice President al-Baid and other southern government members following political deadlock and sporadic fighting. Foreigners flee escalating fighting.

1994 May 21- Al-Baid declares independence of Democratic Republic of Yemen. Saleh rejects secession as illegal.

1994 July - Northern forces take control of Aden, secessionist leaders flee abroad and are sentenced to death in absentia.

**US vessel attack**

2000 October - US naval vessel USS Cole damaged in suicide attack in Aden which is subsequently blamed on al-Qaeda. Seventeen US personnel killed.

2000 October - Bomb explodes at British embassy. Four Yemenis who are jailed say they carried out attack in solidarity with Palestinians.

**Terror crackdown**

2001 November - President Saleh visits US, tells President Bush that Yemen is a partner in the fight against terrorism.

2002 February - Yemen expels more than 100 foreign Islamic scholars, including British and French nationals, in crackdown on terror and suspected al-Qaeda members.

2002 October - Supertanker Limburg badly damaged in attack, blamed on al-Qaeda, off Yemeni coast.

**Clashes in north**

2004 June-August - Government troops battle supporters of dissident cleric Hussein al-Houthi in the north; estimates of the dead range from 80 to more than 600.

2004 September - Government says its forces have killed dissident cleric Hussein al-Houthi, the leader of a revolt in the north.

2005 March-April - More than 200 people are killed in a resurgence of fighting between government forces and supporters of the slain rebel cleric Hussein al-Houthi.

2005 May - President Saleh says the leader of the rebellion in the north has agreed to renounce the campaign in return for a pardon. Minor clashes continue.

2005 July - Police and witnesses say at least 36 people are killed across the country in clashes between police and demonstrators protesting about a cut in fuel subsidies.

2006 March - More than 600 followers of slain Shia cleric Hussein al-Houthi who were captured following a rebellion he led in 2004 are released under an amnesty.

2006 September - President Saleh wins another term in elections.

2007 January-March - Scores are killed or wounded in clashes between security forces and al-Houthi rebels in the north.

2007 June - Rebel leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi accepts a ceasefire.

2007 July - Suicide bomber attacks a tourist convoy killing eight Spaniards and two Yemenis in the province of Marib.

2008 January - Renewed clashes between security forces and rebels loyal to Abdul-Malik al-Houthi.

2008 April - Clashes with troops as southern Yemenis protest against alleged northern bias in state job allocation.

2008 March-April - Series of bomb attacks on police, official, diplomatic, foreign business and tourism targets.

2008 September - Attack on US embassy in Yemeni capital Sana'a kills 18 people, including six assailants. Six suspects arrested.

Timeline of key events in the Yemen political and conflict context (cont.d)

Pre-2002	CSP 2002-06					CSP 2007-13						
	NIP 2002-04		NIP 2005-06			NIP 2007-10				MIP 2010-13		
	Technical Assistance Office		Resident Charge d'Affaires							Full Delegation		
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	

**Demands for reform**

Police fire warning shots at Common Forum opposition rally in Sanaa. Demonstrators demand electoral reform and  
 Government announces release of 176 al-Qaeda suspects on condition of good behaviour - **2009** February  
 The Yemeni army launches a fresh offensive against Shia rebels in the northern Saada province. Tens of thousands of people are displaced by the fighting - **2009** August  
 Clashes break out between the northern rebels and Saudi security forces along the two countries' common border. The rebels accuse Saudi Arabia of supporting the Yemeni government in attacks against them. The Saudi government denies this - **2009** October  
 Saudi Arabia says it has regained control of territory seized by Yemeni rebels in a cross-border incursion - **2009** November  
 Yemen-based branch of al-Qaeda claims it was behind failed attack on US airliner. The government calls on the West for more support to help it combat the al-Qaeda threat - **2009** December  
 President Saleh says government open to talks with Al-Qaeda militants, provided they renounce violence - **2010** January  
 Government signs ceasefire with northern rebels - **2010** February  
 Northern rebels release 178 captives after the government accuses the Shia Houthi group of failing to comply with the terms of the truce reached in February - **2010** March  
 Thousands flee government offensive against separatists in southern Shabwa province - **2010** September  
 Global terror alert after packages containing explosives originating in Yemen are intercepted on cargo planes bound for the US - **2010** October  
 Yemen says 3,000 soldiers killed in recent outbreak of fighting involving Houthi rebels - **2010** December  
 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits to express "urgent concern" at al-Qaeda activities in Yemen. Tunisian street protests encourage similar demonstrations in other countries, including Yemen. President Saleh pledges not to extend his presidency in 2013 or to hand over to his son - **2011** January  
 Pro-reform demonstrations continue. Police snipers open fire on pro-democracy camp in Sanaa, killing more than 50 people. Several ministers and other senior regime figures also defect to protesters. State of emergency is imposed - **2011** March  
 Unrest and violent government response continue. President Saleh vows to remain in office - **2011** April  
 Dozens die in clashes between troops and tribal fighters in Sanaa. Airport shuts and thousands flee the city - **2011** May  
 President Saleh is injured in a rocket attack and is flown to Saudi Arabia - **2011** June  
 President Saleh returns home. US-born al-Qaeda leader Anwar al-Awlaki is assassinated by US forces - **2011** September  
 Yemeni human rights activist Tawakul Karman wins Nobel Peace Prize, together with Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Leymah Gbowee of Liberia. UN Security Council passes resolution condemning violence, calls for transfer of power - **2011** October

**Unity government**

President Saleh agrees to hand over power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. Unity government including a prime minister from the opposition is formed - **2011** November  
 President Saleh leaves country. Parliament grants him full immunity in the face of objections from thousands of street protesters - **2012** January  
 Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi inaugurated as president after uncontested elections - **2012** February  
 International donors pledge more than \$4bn in aid to Yemen to help improve infrastructure and security. Aid agencies warn that Yemen is on the brink of food crisis. The government is thought to have asked for some \$10bn - **2012** May  
 Defence Minister Muhammad Nasir Ahmad survives car bomb attack in Sanaa that kills 11 people, a day after local al-Qaeda deputy head Said al-Shihri is reportedly dead in the south - **2012** September  
 A Saudi diplomat and his bodyguard are shot dead in Sanaa. Security officials say the assailants, who opened fire on the diplomat's convoy, were dressed in police uniforms - **2012** November

Timeline of key events in the Yemen political and conflict context (cont.d)

Pre-2002	CSP 2002-06					CSP 2007-13					
	NIP 2002-04		NIP 2005-06			NIP 2007-10			MIP 2010-13		
	Technical Assistance Office		Resident Charge d'Affaires				Full Delegation				
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012

**National dialogue**

Delayed national dialogue conference begins with aim of drafting new constitution - **2013** March  
 Ahmed Ali Saleh, son of ex-president Saleh, is removed as head of Republican Guard - **2013** April  
 US intensifies drone strikes against al-Qaeda - **2013** July  
 Several foreign embassies shut temporarily over fears of attacks by al-Qaeda - **2013** August  
 The shooting of a tribal leader at a military checkpoint in the eastern province of Hadramawt sparks mass protests in the provincial capital Mukalla - **2013** December  
 National Dialogue Conference winds up after ten months of deliberation, agreeing a document on which the new constitution will be based - **2014** January  
 Presidential panel gives approval for Yemen to become a federation of six regions as part of its political transition - **2014** February  
 EU Delegation Head of Security shot and killed in Sana'a - **2014** May  
 Tribesmen blow up the country's largest oil pipeline, disrupting supplies from the interior to a Red Sea export terminal - **2014** July  
 President Hadi sacks his cabinet and overturns a controversial fuel price rise following two weeks of anti-government protests in which Houthi rebels are heavily involved - **2014** August  
 Houthi rebels overrun the capital Sanaa, sign a power-sharing agreement with the government - **2014** September

## **Part 3: Annexes informing our findings**





## ANNEX 8: INVENTORY OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION, 2002-12

### 8.1 Introduction

This inventory contains the following sections:

1. Portfolio analysis
2. Inventory of financing decisions
3. Inventory of interventions financed through bilateral development cooperation
4. Inventory of interventions financed through thematic programmes
5. Inventory and summary analysis of DG ECHO Operations, 2002-2013


### 8.2 Portfolio analysis

#### 8.2.1 Analysis of global disbursements

Yemen received a total of US\$3,040m net disbursements of official development aid (ODA) from the donor community over the period 2005-2011, according to OECD-DAC aggregate geographical data. This represented just 1.5% of its GDP in 2011. Average ODA per capita was \$20 in the same year.

The Commission and 20 EU Member States accounted for 42% of ODA during the 2005-2011 period, with the Commission itself contributing 8% (including ECHO contributions). Germany has been the largest donor of Member States during this period (16%), followed by UK (9%) and Netherlands (7%). Outside of the EU, other significant donors have been multilateral organisations contributing 34% of the total for the period (over half of which coming from the World Bank), United Arab Emirates (10%), United States (7%) and the Arab Fund (5%). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has also provided very significant funds to the Government of Yemen, although these figures are not recorded on the OECD-DAC statistical database and are thus not included in the graph below. However, recent literature indicates that the Kingdom made a direct payment to the Yemeni Government of \$2.2bn in 2009, followed by a further payment of \$1-2bn in 2010 directly to the Yemeni Central Bank.<sup>48</sup>

Figure 2: Donor ODA to Yemen (US\$ millions), 2005-11



\* Excluding IMF concessions, total ODA for the period is \$3,305m.

Contributions from other donors, not shown above, total just under \$100m.

Source: ADE based on OECD-DAC statistical data (net disbursements in current prices, USD)


<sup>48</sup> Phillips, S. (2011) *Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis*, p. 82.

The above graph only gives a partial picture of aid to Yemen. In terms of sheer size, GCC aid commitments dwarf those of OECD-recorded donations. From 1990 to 2004, the Arab Fund, the Saudi Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, and the OPEC Fund provided over \$1 billion in aid to Yemen, compared to \$250 million by the EU over the same period.<sup>49</sup> Arab and Islamic NGOs provided \$51 million for the same period.<sup>50</sup> At the 2006 London donors’ conference co-convened by the GCC, Gulf donors pledged more than half of the total \$4.7 billion (\$2.5 billion) made by all international donors, with Saudi Arabia pledging about half of this, followed by UAE (\$650 million) and Qatar (\$500 million).<sup>51</sup>

Pledging figures are deceptive, though. Most of the London 2006 pledges were not disbursed, with Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) reporting that by early 2010 only 7% of pledges from GCC countries had been received.<sup>52</sup> Again though, this can be confusing because the MOPIC report only refers to funds channelled through MOPIC and other official Yemeni bodies, and not to the substantial funds channelled through informal bodies and/or as investments and loans. Nevertheless, this ‘additional’ assistance still does not significantly dent the deficit between pledges and disbursements.<sup>53</sup>

In part, the same story of unfulfilled pledges might have been true of the Riyadh Friends of Yemen conference in September 2012, where, for instance, Saudi Arabia pledged a further \$3.25 billion. However, this time the international community as a whole, including the Gulf States, have more readily fulfilled their pledges. One new component (though not the main driving force for increased commitments) is the signing in Riyadh of the Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF), between the Yemeni Government and the Friends of Yemen group. The MAF was created as a means of speeding up the Transition Program for Stabilization and Development, which ran from 2012 to 2014. It not only puts donors under strong pressure to deliver on pledges, but also commits the Yemeni Government to increasing transparency and easing of corruption, including the establishment of an anti-corruption court. In turn, the EU and GCC will also help Yemen create special economic zones and provide direct funding to Yemen’s social welfare fund.

**Figure 3: Donor ODA to Yemen (US\$ millions), 2005-11, per annum**



Source: ADE based on OECD-DAC statistical data (net disbursements in current prices, USD)

<sup>49</sup> Burke, E. (2013) EU-GCC Cooperation: Securing the Transition in Yemen, Gulf Research Center.

<sup>50</sup> MOPIC (2010), Progress on the Use of Pledged Resources: Status, Constraints Diversification of Aid Implementation Modalities and Solutions, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Sanaa.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Burke (2013), op. cit.

## 8.2.2 Analysis of EU disbursements 2002-12

Table 1 below sets out budgeted amounts for support to Yemen through the CSPs, ECHO and the thematic instruments that have country envelopes (IFS, NSA and EIDHR). Other thematic instruments, which are based on global calls for proposals, are not included here.

**Table 1: EU Support to Yemen 2002-12 (planned amounts)**


<b>Country Strategy Paper 2002-06</b>	<b>NIP 2002-04</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Food security</li> <li>• Poverty reduction</li> <li>• Good governance, democracy and respect for human rights</li> <li>• Facilitation of business development and strengthening of economic institutions</li> </ul> <b>TOTAL – €88-97m</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of economic institutions – €8-11m</li> <li>• Food security support – €33-35m</li> <li>• Poverty reduction – €16-20m</li> <li>• Strengthening of pluralism and civil society – €2-3m</li> </ul> <b>TOTAL – €61-70m</b>
	<b>NIP 2005-06</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poverty reduction and support to the Poverty Reduction Strategy – €25m <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Food security – €12m</li> <li>◦ Reproductive health and population support programme – €7.5m</li> <li>◦ Support to the sustainable development of fishery sector – €5.5m</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Strengthening pluralism and civil society – €2m</li> </ul> <b>TOTAL – €27m</b>
<b>Thematic Instruments 2002-06</b> <b>TOTAL – €17,677,872</b> <b>COMBINED TOTAL – €106-115m</b>	ECHO: €9,136,086 IFS: €0 NSA: €6,077,307 EIDHR: €2,464,479
<b>Country Strategy Paper 2007-13</b>	<b>MIP 2007-10</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Good governance (and state-building) by supporting justice, rule of law, human rights, democratic institutions, civil society, civil administration and decentralisation</li> <li>• Poverty reduction through private sector development, support for reproductive health policies and improved delivery of basic social services</li> <li>• Following the 2011 mid-term review, food security received greater attention</li> </ul> <b>TOTAL – €131m</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Good governance – €19.5m <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Support for the electoral framework, Parliament, political parties – €4.8m</li> <li>◦ Support for justice, the rule of law and human rights – €14.7m</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Poverty reduction – €40.5m <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Private sector development: agriculture and food processing – €15m</li> <li>◦ Private sector development: fisheries – €10.8m</li> <li>◦ Local community development – €7.2m</li> <li>◦ Population and reproductive health – €7.5m<sup>54</sup></li> </ul> </li> </ul> <b>TOTAL – €60m</b>
	<b>MIP 2011-13</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State-building and governance, with emphasis on effective decentralisation – €18m</li> <li>• Social sectors – €33m <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Public health – €26m</li> <li>◦ Social Welfare Fund – €7m</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Economic development / livelihoods – €20m</li> </ul> <b>TOTAL – €71m<sup>55</sup></b>
<b>Thematic Instruments 2007-12</b> <b>TOTAL – €97,454,248</b> <b>COMBINED TOTAL – €228m</b>  <b>TOTAL FOR 2002-2012 PERIOD:</b> <b>€334-343m</b>	ECHO: €80,590,000 IFS: €10,588,786 NSA: €4,476,144 EIDHR: €1,799,318

Figure 4 below illustrates the breakdown of EU disbursements by priority areas of cooperation as set out in the 2011-13 MIP. Over half of the total of €286,855,182 was spent on the broad area of economic development and livelihoods, encompassing private sector development, food security and development of economic institutions. One quarter was disbursed on social sectors, including health and social development.

<sup>54</sup> The allocation for population and reproductive health was eventually increased by €2m.

<sup>55</sup> In light of the Riyadh donor conference, programming for the 2011-13 period increased by €10m on the geographic DCI-MED budget line and by €2m on the food security budget line. The decision was taken in 2012 but funds were not committed until 2013 so these figures are not included here. However, the evaluation team will take this into consideration when assessing the responsiveness of EU development cooperation to such contextual changes.


**Figure 4: EU funding to Yemen by area of cooperation, 2002-12\***



\* Based on disbursement data for EU Decisions

Figure 5 below indicates the breakdown of EU disbursements by legal instrument. 59% of the total disbursements for 2002-12 were channelled through the bilateral MED and DCI-MED instruments; 29% was channelled through the FOOD and DCI-FOOD instruments; and 12% was channelled through the remaining thematic instruments.


**Figure 5: EU funding to Yemen by legal instrument, 2002-12\***



\* Based on disbursement data for EU Decisions

Figure 6 below presents a breakdown of EU disbursements by sub-sector, indicating the proportions within each that were allocated to civil society, international organisations, Yemeni authorities and private companies. The sub-sectors receiving most funding over the evaluation period are food and agriculture (just over one third of total disbursements), followed by social development, economic development and health. The lion’s share of disbursements to Yemeni authorities went to food and agriculture, health, and social development; allocations to international organisations covered the spectrum of sub-sectors but was proportionally 40% or higher in migration, security and justice, and human rights and democracy. Similarly, allocations to private companies covered a wide range of sub-sectors but was proportionally 70% or higher in fisheries, economic development, and governance. An important caveat to mention here is that the total disbursement figure obtained from the Current Research Information System (CRIS) for all Financing Decisions in Yemen during the evaluation period does not match that for all contracts. This is because financial data for the latter does not include amounts which have not yet been spent (‘reste à contracté’). For this reason, the total amounts for Figures 4 and 5 above, which are based on disbursements at the decision level, do not match those for figure 6 below, which is based on disbursements at the contract level.

**Figure 6: EU funding to Yemen by sub-sector (including proportional allocations to civil society, international organisations, Yemeni authorities and private companies), 2002-2012**



### 8.3 Inventory of Financing Decisions

The inventory below details Decisions across all budget lines, separated firstly by DCI-Geographic allocations, followed by thematic allocations.

Decision number	Instrument	Decision code	Project title	Sub-sector	Sector	Decision date	Start date	End date	Approved budget	Budget spent
7	MED	MED/1991/003-331 (CL)	Fourth Fisheries Development Project	Fisheries	Eco Dev	24/03/1992	13/04/1992	18/12/2003	€13,384,012	€13,384,012
23	MED	MED/1993/003-923 (CL)	Tihama V. Barquqa Irrig. System	Economic Development	Eco Dev	20/12/1993	20/02/2001	31/05/2005	€6,934,305	€6,934,305
30	MED	MED/1995/004-958 (CL)	Academic Staff Training and University of Sana'a Faculty of Engineering Development Project – DEGAGE LE 29/11/2001 -	Economic Development	Eco Dev	19/09/1995	26/09/1995	13/11/2003	€620,082	€620,082
8	MED	MED/1997/003-333 (CL)	Tourism Development Programme: 1997/98+1998/99	Economic Development	Eco Dev	27/11/1997	11/07/2001	02/08/2005	€274,196	€274,196
9	MED	MED/1997/003-334 (CL)	Socotra Archipelago: Establishment of Masterplan	Economic Development	Eco Dev	12/05/1998	28/06/2002	27/06/2003	€944,130	€884,805
14	MED	MED/1997/003-343 (CL)	Social Fund for Development (YEM/B7-3000/IB/97/0466)	Social Development	Soc Dev	25/11/1997	04/10/2000	10/02/2005	€15,000,000	€14,202,008
15	MED	MED/1997/003-379 (CL)	Development of Bank Sector Training in Yemen (YEM/B7-3000/IB/97/0714)	Economic Development	Eco Dev	01/09/1997	05/10/1998	11/11/2003	€718,320	€445,717
31	MED	MED/1997/004-997 (CL)	Strengthening Priority Areas of Vocational Training (YEM/B7-3000/IB/97/0468)	Economic Development	Eco Dev	16/11/1997	01/10/2000	31/12/2007	€7,000,000	€6,901,980
10	MED	MED/1998/003-335 (EC)	Support to the Health Sector Reform in the Republic of Yemen	Health	Soc Dev	02/12/1998	01/12/2000	30/06/2010	€6,700,000	€6,552,433
11	MED	MED/1999/003-336 (CL)	Civil Aviation Support – B7-3010/IB/99/088	Economic Development	Eco Dev	02/05/2001	22/02/2002	29/01/2010	€2,500,000	€2,425,511
12	MED	MED/1999/003-337 (EC)	Support for Administrative Reform (SAR)	Governance	Gov	26/09/2000	20/02/2002	30/04/2010	€6,000,000	€5,307,885
13	MED	MED/1999/003-338 (CL)	Support for the Free Zone Public Authority	Governance	Eco Dev	12/09/2000	14/09/2000	30/10/2007	€612,000	€605,514
17	MED	MED/1999/003-494 (CL)	EC Technical Advisory Office Operation (ECTAO)	Governance	Gov	03/07/1999	08/02/2000	27/04/2006	€1,229,015	€1,229,015
18	MED	MED/1999/003-608 (CL)	Delta Abyan Spate Irrigation	Economic Development	Eco Dev	28/03/2001	01/10/2001	03/06/2004	€1,600,000	€1,600,000
5	MED	MED/2000/003-329 (CL)	Support for Aden NWSA Restructuring – B7-3000/ER/00/001	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	01/07/1998	05/10/2002	31/12/2006	€6,000,000	€5,121,146
6	MED	MED/2000/003-330 (CL)	Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance	Fisheries	Eco Dev	27/11/2000	17/09/2002	28/02/2010	€3,000,000	€2,604,944
25	MED	MED/2000/004-019 (CL)	Mother and Child Health and Planned Parenthood Project (YEM/B7-3000/IB/95/0003) – DEGAGEMENT PARTIEL DE 49.999€ LE 16/11/2001 -	Health	Soc Dev	29/11/1995	19/06/1996	16/11/2004	€500,000	€450,000
28	MED	MED/2000/004-618 (CL)	Services-Pre Study Support to Yemen's WTO ACCESSION	Economic Development	Eco Dev	15/12/2000	21/03/2001	01/07/2004	€199,852	€196,127
16	MED	MED/2002/003-380 (CL)	Electoral Support Project for the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referenda in Yemen	Governance	Gov	29/11/2002	27/12/2002	27/09/2005	€432,250	€430,000
24	MED	MED/2002/004-007 (EC)	Support to Yemen's Accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)	Economic Development	Eco Dev	06/11/2002	03/07/2003	30/04/2011	€7,000,000	€6,223,430
29	MED	MED/2002/004-846 (CL)	Development or Economic institutions -Identification and formulation mission	Economic Development	Eco Dev	2002	22/04/2002	10/11/2003	€86,202	€71,142

Decision number	Instrument	Decision code	Project title	Sub-sector	Sector	Decision date	Start date	End date	Approved budget	Budget spent
35	MED	MED/2003/005-973 (EC)	Health Sector and Demography Support	Health	Soc Dev	21/11/2003	04/07/2005	still open	€8,000,000	€7,711,980
36	MED	MED/2004/006-222 (CL)	Support to the Third Phase of the Social Fund for Development – Yemen	Social Development	Soc Dev	29/07/2004	30/11/2004	31/12/2008	€8,000,000	€8,000,000
38	MED	MED/2005/017-262 (EC)	Supporting Government and NGO Partnerships for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights	Human Rights and Democracy	Gov	08/08/2005	31/12/2006	still open	€2,000,000	€1,768,993
39	MED	MED/2005/017-526 (EC)	Sustainable Development of the Fisheries Sector (Soc DevFS)	Fisheries	Eco Dev	08/08/2005	01/07/2008	12/10/2011	€5,500,000	€5,209,557
45	MED	MED/2006/018-518 (EC)	Yemen Reproductive Health & Population Programme	Health	Soc Dev	28/11/2006	01/06/2008	Still open	€10,500,000	€9,968,129
47	MED	MED/2007/019-211 (EC)	Support to the Electoral Processes & Parliament in Yemen	Governance	Gov	14/12/2007	07/07/2008	Still open	€4,800,000	€4,391,610
48	MED	MED/2007/019-212 (EC)	Support to Social Fund for Development	Social Development	Soc Dev	14/12/2007	06/07/2011	Still open	€11,200,000	€10,802,000
49	DCI-MED	DCI-MED/2008/019-572 (EC)	Support to Juvenile Justice, Rule of Law and Public Administration Modernisation in Yemen	Security and Justice	Gov	10/12/2008	05/12/2009	Still open	€9,500,000	€9,117,033
50	DCI-MED	DCI-MED/2008/019-573 (EC)	Reproductive Health and Population Programme Phase II 2010/2012	Health	Soc Dev	10/12/2008	22/04/2012	Still open	€9,500,000	€7,511,991
51	DCI-MED	DCI-MED/2008/020-279 (EC)	Global Allocation for IRAN-IRAQ-YEMEN	Multi	Multi	09/10/2008	25/08/2009	01/05/2010	€849,000	€783,135
53	DCI-MED	DCI-MED/2009/020-570 (EC)	Yemen Food Security Support Programme 2009	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	21/12/2009	11/05/2011	Still open	€17,000,000	€6,500,000
56	DCI-MED	DCI-MED/2010/022-235 (EC)	Enhancement of the Rule of Law, Human Rights and Gender Equality in the Republic of Yemen	Human Rights and Democracy	Gov	16/12/2010	05/10/2012	Still open	€7,200,000	€2,500,000
57	DCI-MED	DCI-MED/2010/022-236 (EC)	Yemen Fisheries Support Programme (YFSP)	Fisheries	Eco Dev	16/12/2010	02/07/2012	Still open	€10,800,000	€4,500,000
58	DCI-MED	DCI-MED/2010/022-546 (EC)	Global Allocation for DCI Middle East – Iran, Iraq and Yemen	Multi	Multi	13/10/2010	10/11/2010	Still open	€2,271,524	€1,751,524
60	DCI-MED	DCI-MED/2011/022-814 (EC)	Yemen Economic Support Programme (YESP)	Economic Development	Eco Dev	15/10/2010	Jul-11	Still open	€10,000,000	€9,722,879
61	DCI-MED	DCI-MED/2011/023-026 (EC)	Support to Yemen Health and Population Sector	Health	Soc Dev	20/12/2011	Feb-12	Still open	€10,000,000	€1,350,000
62	DCI-MED	DCI-MED/2012/023-673 (EG)	Democracy and State Building – Supporting Yemen's Transition	Governance	Gov	03/08/2012	Sep-12	Still open	€18,000,000	€-
65	DCI-MED	DCI-MED/2012/024-497 (PO)	Enhancing Resilience in Yemen: Strengthening Health Systems	Health	Soc Dev	28/11/2012	Sep-13	Still open	€20,000,000	€-

Decision number	Instrument	Decision code	Project title	Sub-sector	Sector	Decision date	Start date	End date	Approved budget	Budget spent
66	DCI-MED	DCI-MED/2012/024-504 (PO)	Enhancing Resilience in Yemen: Scaling Up Rural Growth	Economic Development	Eco Dev	28/11/2012	Sep-13	Still open	€10,000,000	€-
63	DCI-MED	DCI-MED/2013/023-817 (PO)	Enhancing Resilience in Yemen: Strengthening the Social Safety Net	Social Development	Soc Dev	Not dated	Jan-13	Still open	€10,000,000	€-
CDC	CDC	CDC/2003/005-002 (CL)	Capacity building network-strengthening civil society in Yemen	Governance	Gov	25/06/2003	20/12/2003	01/10/2006	€308,372	€308,372
46	DCI-FOOD	DCI-FOOD/2007/019-125 (EC)	Yemen – 2007 Food Security Programme	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	14/12/2007	09/03/2009	Still open	€4,500,000	€2,720,593
52	DCI-FOOD	DCI-FOOD/2008/020-458 (EC)	EC response to soaring food prices	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	10/12/2008	09/04/2009	Still open	€5,000,000	€4,999,905
DCI-FOOD	DCI-FOOD	DCI-FOOD/2009/021-494 (CL)	Set of measures for implementing the facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in developing countries	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev		03/12/2009	31/12/2011	€2,615,020	€2,615,020
54	DCI-FOOD	DCI-FOOD/2009/021-709 (EC)	Yemen Food Security Thematic Programme 2009	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	16/12/2009	16/12/2010	Still open	€7,000,000	€5,600,000
55	DCI-FOOD	DCI-FOOD/2009/021-710 (EC)	Yemen Food Security Information System 2009	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	16/12/2009	20/12/2010	Still open	€3,000,000	€-
67	DCI-FOOD	DCI-FOOD/2013/024-505 (PO)	Enhancing Resilience in Yemen: Strengthening Nutrition System	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	Not dated	Jul-13	Still open	€9,000,000	€-
DCI-MED	DCI-MED	DCI-MED/2012/023-587 (EC)	Global Allocation 2012– 2013 in favour of Iran, Iraq and Yemen	Multi	Multi	25/04/2010	13/06/2012	still open	€152,681	€121,444
DCI-MIGR	DCI-MIGR	DCI-MIGR/2008/020-206 (EC)	Creation of a national asylum system and enhancing protection and self-reliance of refugees in Yemen	Migration	Eco Dev	31/10/2008	18/12/2008	31/01/2012	€1,440,000	€1,295,999
NSA1	DCI-NSAPVD	DCI-NSAPVD/2008/019-404 (EC)	Global commitment for local calls for proposals Objective 1 – PVD Projects – Non-State Actors – AAP 2007	Multi	Multi	14/12/2007	22/12/2008	01/07/2011	€1,342,174	€1,268,225
NSA2	DCI-NSAPVD	DCI-NSAPVD/2008/020-081 (EC)	Global commitment for in-country calls for proposals - Objective 1- PVD projects – Non-State Actors – AAP 2008	Multi	Multi	12/08/2008	02/12/2009	still open	€823,500	€713,352
NSA3	DCI-NSAPVD	DCI-NSAPVD/2008/020-083 (CL)	Global commitment for in-country calls for proposals – Objective 1 – PVD projects – Local Authorities – AAP 2008	Multi	Multi	12/08/2008	12/08/2009	31/07/2011	€185,420	€178,331
NSA4	DCI-NSAPVD	DCI-NSAPVD/2009/021-105 (EC)	Global commitment for in-country and multi-country calls for proposals – Objective 1 – PVD projects – Non-State Actors – AAP 2009	Multi	Multi	08/06/2009	20/12/2009	still open	€1,651,000	€877,512
NSA5	DCI-NSAPVD	DCI-NSAPVD/2009/021-107 (EC)	Global commitment for in-country and multi-country calls for proposals – Objective 1 – PVD projects – Local Authorities – AAP 2009	Multi	Multi	08/06/2009	23/03/2010	31/12/2012	€259,577	€249,031



Decision number	Instrument	Decision code	Project title	Sub-sector	Sector	Decision date	Start date	End date	Approved budget	Budget spent
NSA6	DCI-NSAPVD	DCI-NSAPVD/2010/02-2-312 (EC)	NSA & LA Programme > Obj. 1 NSA (In-country + multi-country)	Social Development	Soc Dev	26/05/2010	17/01/2011	still open	€634,388	€570,950
NSA7	DCI-NSAPVD	DCI-NSAPVD/2012/02-2-941 (EC)	The thematic programme Non-State Actors (NSA): Objective Nr. 1 – In-country + multi-regional/country	Social Development	Soc Dev	12/05/2011	02/11/2012	still open	€1,016,367	€621,955
NSA8	DCI-NSAPVD	DCI-NSAPVD/2012/02-3-482 (EC)	Non-State Actors (NSA): Objective 1 – Actions in partner countries (in-country and multi-country interventions)	Social Development	Soc Dev	29/03/2012	02/11/2012	still open	€1,173,913	€576,219
33	DDH	DDH/2001/005-535 (CL)	Consolidation de l'Etat de Droit et des Institutions Démocratiques au Yemen par la Formation Déontologique des Forces de sécurité intérieure	Human Rights and Democracy	Gov	12/12/2001	14/12/2002	31/12/2005	€362,966	€362,966
DDH1	DDH	DDH/2006/018-012 (CL)	Administrative credits for EIDHR technical assistance 2006	Human Rights and Democracy	Gov	24/05/2006	29/05/2006	25/07/2007	€59,990	€56,012
43	DDH	DDH/2006/018-328 (CL)	EU EOM to Yemen 2006	Human Rights and Democracy	Gov	04/08/2006	11/08/2006	31/07/2007	€3,080,599	€2,475,423
EIDHR1	EIDHR	EIDHR/2008/019-719 (CL)	EIDHR 2008 AAP-Country Based Support Schemes (CBSS)	Human Rights and Democracy	Gov	25/04/2008	21/12/2008	31/10/2011	€900,000	€863,216
EIDHR2	EIDHR	EIDHR/2009/020-103 (CL)	ELE – Exploratory Missions for Election Observation	Human Rights and Democracy	Gov	26/06/2008	21/01/2009	15/03/2009	€61,920	€61,515
EIDHR3	EIDHR	EIDHR/2010/021-318 (EC)	EIDHR 2010 AAP-Country Based Support Schemes (CBSS)	Human Rights and Democracy	Gov	17/04/2009	10/02/2010	still open	€779,444	€727,629
EIDHR4	EIDHR	EIDHR/2011/022-196 (EC)	EIDHR 2011 AAP-Country Based Support Schemes (CBSS)	Human Rights and Democracy	Gov	18/03/2010	27/11/2011	still open	€550,711	€383,558
EIDHR5	EIDHR	EIDHR/2012/022-810 (EC)	EIDHR 2012 AAP-Country Based Support Schemes (CBSS)	Human Rights and Democracy	Gov	29/03/2011	13/01/2012	still open	€1,170,257	€766,623
4	FOOD	FOOD/1997/003-022 (CL)	Food Security 1997 Yemen	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	31/12/1997	28/02/2000	30/06/2006	€10,917,536	€10,917,536
3	FOOD	FOOD/1998/002-521 (CL)	Food Security 1998 Yemen	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	16/11/1998	31/12/1998	31/12/2005	€12,000,000	€11,386,402
2	FOOD	FOOD/2000/002-511 (CL)	Food Security 2000 Yemen	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	14/12/2000	01/06/2002	01/06/2007	€11,000,000	€10,978,561
1	FOOD	FOOD/2001/002-343 (CL)	Food Security 2001 Yemen	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	05/09/2001	01/06/2002	28/09/2007	€12,000,000	€11,975,462
FOOD1	FOOD	FOOD/2004/004-953 (CL)	Food Security – ONG Allocation Globale	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	02/05/2003	30/12/2004	31/12/2008	€1,868,601	€1,794,368
FOOD2	FOOD	FOOD/2004/006-190 (CL)	Assistance technique dans le cadre des programmes de sécurité alimentaire	Economic Development	Eco Dev	02/04/2004	27/09/2004	28/03/2007	€853,705	€853,705
37	FOOD	FOOD/2004/016-826 (EC)	2004 Food Security Programme in favour of Yemen	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	04/10/2004	30/12/2005	still open	€5,000,000	€4,588,757
40	FOOD	FOOD/2005/017-670 (EC)	2005 Food Security Programme in favour of Yemen	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	04/10/2004	17/10/2006	30/06/2012	€6,000,000	€5,911,302
42	FOOD	FOOD/2006/018-049 (EC)	2006 Food Security Grants to Non-Governmental Organisations in Yemen	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	14/03/2006	20/12/2007	25/12/2011	€2,850,000	€2,837,435
FOOD3	FOOD	FOOD/2006/018-115 (CL)	Yemen: Feasibility study: Setting-up of a Food Security Info. System	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	19/06/2006	28/12/2006	31/12/2007	€169,936	€101,962

Decision number	Instrument	Decision code	Project title	Sub-sector	Sector	Decision date	Start date	End date	Approved budget	Budget spent
44	FOOD	FOOD/2006/018-512 (EC)	Yemen Food Security Programme 2006	Food and Agriculture	Eco Dev	19/12/2006	22/06/2008	Still open	€6,000,000	€5,131,851
IFS-RRM1	IFS	IFS-RRM/2010/022-267 (CL)	IFS 2008/05-08/024 Yemen	Security and Justice	Gov	01/01/2010	25/01/2010	25/03/2010	€35,380	€35,380
59	IFS	IFS-RRM/2010/022-613 (EC)	Contributing to the restoring of a stable environment in Yemen in order to enable development and democratic consolidation to take place, by assisting its government and civil society in their efforts to redress the current security crisis	Governance	Gov	13/07/2010	15/04/2012	Still open	€15,000,000	€7,611,958
IFS-RRM2	IFS	IFS-RRM/2011/022-458 (EC)	Security Governance in Yemen – Conditions and framework for a multi-layered security network	Security and Justice	Gov	27/01/2010	27/12/2011	30/09/2014	€300,000	€113,532
IFS-RRM3	IFS	IFS-RRM/2012/023-116 (EC)	PAMF 5 – Fifth facility for urgent actions involving Policy Advice, Technical Assistance, Mediation, Reconciliation and other areas of assistance for the benefit of third countries affected by crisis situations’	Security and Justice	Eco Dev	24/03/2011	13/03/2012	still open	€642,848	€353,078
MAP	MAP	MAP/2007/017-969 (CL)	Annual Work Programme 2006 for budget line 19.02 04 – Call for proposals	Security and Justice	Gov	09/03/2006	19/09/2007	20/03/2010	€2,000,000	€1,870,342
MED1	MED	MED/2002/004-317 (CL)	Allocation Globale 2002	Multi	Multi	18/09/2001	02/10/2002	29/02/2004	€342,254	€326,895
MED2	MED	MED/2004/006-011 (CL)	Allocation Globale 2004 – Délégation Jordanie	Multi	Multi	25/06/2003	10/12/2004	31/03/2005	€58,746	€55,506
MED3	MED	MED/2005/017-088 (CL)	Allocation Globale MEDA 2005/2006	Multi	Multi	18/02/2005	23/11/2005	20/04/2006	€129,800	€118,417
MIGR	MIGR	MIGR/2007/018-381 (CL)	PAT 2006 Aeneas	Migration	Gov	13/09/2006	12/12/2007	30/06/2009	€1,104,902	€1,095,030
ONG1	ONG-PVD	ONG-PVD/2003/001-092 (CL)	pré-engagement P1 dont dépendront 190 contrats en faveur de pays en développement	Social Development	Multi	09/12/2002	20/02/2003	15/06/2006	€1,104,878	€1,104,878
ONG2	ONG-PVD	ONG-PVD/2004/004-562 (CL)	B76000 – PVD	Social Development	Multi	25/06/2003	24/05/2004	15/03/2008	€1,437,500	€1,403,897
ONG3	ONG-PVD	ONG-PVD/2007/018-227 (EC)	Pré-engagement dont dépendront les contrats PVD projets	Social Development	Multi	04/07/2006	17/10/2007	18/02/2012	€1,110,374	€1,040,373
21	REH	REH/1996/003-778 (CL)	Water Supply Systems in 3 Southern Governorates	Economic Development	Eco Dev	21/11/1996	12/12/1996	24/04/2004	€497,300	€448,580
19	REH	REH/1998/003-671 (CL)	Ibb/Lahaj Water Supply System	Economic Development	Eco Dev	25/06/2000	03/08/2000	02/08/2002	€1,600,000	€1,440,000
20	REH	REH/1998/003-677 (CL)	Lahaj Primary Health Care	Health	Soc Dev	15/03/1999	23/09/1999	15/03/2012	€787,179	€787,179
26	REH	REH/1998/004-078 (CL)	Lahaj Water Supply Schemes	Economic Development	Eco Dev	15/11/1998	17/12/1999	20/11/2003	€500,000	€499,804
27	REH	REH/1998/004-087 (CL)	Taiz/Lahej Health and Education	Health	Soc Dev	15/06/1999	15/09/1999	28/10/2003	€2,000,000	€2,000,000

Decision number	Instrument	Decision code	Project title	Sub-sector	Sector	Decision date	Start date	End date	Approved budget	Budget spent
22	REH	REH/2001/003-866 (CL)	Water Infrastructures and Access Roads Rehabilitation in Wadi Hadramaut	Economic Development	Eco Dev	14/11/2001	08/03/2002	27/01/2006	€1,719,392	€1,719,392
34	IIP	SANTE/1996/005-541 (CL)	B7-6310/96/0301 – National Mother and Child Health, Family Planning and Information, Education and Communication Programme	Health	Soc Dev	18/12/1996	27/07/1998	31/12/2002	€1,190,000	€1,062,000
32	IIP	SANTE/1997/004-999 (CL)	B7-6310/97/0139 – Technical Assistance to National MCH/FP/IEC Programme	Health	Soc Dev	19/05/2000	14/06/2000 04/03/2002	10/09/2003 02/10/2003	€877,966	€824,665

## 8.4 Inventory of interventions financed through bilateral development cooperation

The inventory below details all projects funded between 2002 and 2012 that relate to DCI-Geographic Decisions

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
MED	Fisheries	3331	1991	52765	Closed	Devis programme – 1999/2000 – Fourth fisheries development project.- Part payable localement	4TH FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT	03/11/1999	31/12/2000	€274,120.00	€274,120.00
MED	Fisheries	3331	1991	52763	Closed	EETS University of Wales, College of Cardiff	CARDIFF UNIVERSITY	08/04/1996		€128,580.13	€128,580.13
MED	Fisheries	3331	1991	52768	Closed	Dandar	DANDAR	12/06/1995	30/06/2003	€9,107,949.01	€9,107,949.01
MED	Fisheries	3331	1991	52759	Closed	Project Mid-term Review (IV Fisheries Devel.Proj.)	ENGVALL LARS O	30/08/1996		€20,477.04	€20,477.04
MED	Fisheries	3331	1991	52764	Closed	GISL International consultants	GISL	08/04/1996		€33,058.00	€33,058.00
MED	Fisheries	3331	1991	52769	Closed	GOPA-Consultants	GOPA-GESELLSCHAFT FUR ORGANISATIONPLANUNG UND AUSBILDUNG MBH	17/07/2000	30/09/2001	€168,043.60	€168,043.60
MED	Fisheries	3331	1991	52770	Closed	Immunotech supply contract	IMMUNOTECH	20/12/2001	31/03/2002	€10,784.55	€10,784.55
MED	Fisheries	3331	1991	52762	Closed	supply contract with labsystems ALA/91/22 fourth fisheries development programme	LABSYSTEMS CO LABSYSTEMS	04/11/2001		€17,150.40	€17,150.40
MED	Fisheries	3331	1991	52761	Closed	Services – T.A. Yemen-ALA91/22 4th Fisheries dev project	MACALISTER ELLIOTT & PARTNERS LIMITED	13/04/1992		€3,556,893.85	€3,556,893.85
MED	Fisheries	3331	1991	52760	Closed	Project Mid-term review -IV Fisheries Develp.Proj.	WATSON PATRICK	30/08/1996		€22,634.71	€22,634.71
MED	Fisheries	3331	1991	52766	Closed	YORK-Letter of contract 71- Supervision Services & Training	YORK AIRCONDITIONING & REFRIGERATION FZE	19/06/2000	20/08/2000	€21,046.75	€21,046.75
MED	Fisheries	3331	1991	52767	Closed	YORK-Letter of contract 69-Supply of spare	YORK AIRCONDITIONING & REFRIGERATION FZE	19/06/2000		€23,274.16	€23,274.16
MED	Economic Development	3923	1993	54517	Closed	Travaux – AL HASHEDI – Barquqa headworks and Canal network	AL-HASHEDI FOR TRADING & CONTRACTING	10/08/1999	31/12/2003	€5,789,215.84	€5,789,215.84
MED	Economic Development	3923	1993	54520	Closed	Travaux – AL-HASHEDI – Coût de suspension des travaux-Art. 40.2.b du contrat	AL-HASHEDI FOR TRADING & CONTRACTING	16/04/2002	31/12/2002	€161,331.14	€161,331.14
MED	Economic Development	3923	1993	54518	Closed	Services – DHV Technical Assistance	DHV AGRICULTURE & NATURAL RESOURCES BV	07/04/1999	31/12/2003	€976,411.43	€976,411.43
MED	Economic Development	3923	1993	54519	Closed	Services – Eric Tilman service contract	TILMAN ERIC	20/02/1998	20/05/1998	€7,347.00	€7,347.00
MED	Economic Development	4958	1995	64207	Closed	Services – UMIST VENTURES UVL.	UMIST VENTURES UVL	26/09/1995	30/09/1998	€620,081.83	€620,081.83
MED	Social Development	3343	1996	31233	Closed	Mid-term review of the Social Fund for Development Yemen	AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA	13/12/2002	30/06/2003	€92,840.95	€92,840.95
MED	Economic Development	3333	1997	52775	Closed	Services – Fima Studio	FIMA STUDIO S.R.L.	07/02/2000	31/12/2002	€179,676.47	€179,676.47
MED	Economic Development	3333	1997	27238	Closed	Revision mission Tourism Development Project	SOCIETA ITALIANA DI MONITORAGGIO SPA	26/06/2002		€24,120.00	€24,120.00
MED	Economic Development	3333	1997	52774	Closed	Services – Yemen Tourism Promotion Board	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	28/06/1998	28/06/2000	€70,400.00	€70,400.00

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
MED	Economic Development	3334	1997	52777	Closed	YEM 97/0787 – Socotra Archipelago – Provision of Technical Assistance	ATKINS CONSULTANTS LTD	08/09/1999	08/12/2000	€884,804.60	€884,804.60
MED	Social Development	3343	1997	52809	Closed	Local cost AWP year 2	AL MAMLAKA AL URDUNIYA AL HASHEMIYAH	01/04/2001	31/12/2004	€10,197,717.00	€10,197,717.00
MED	Social Development	3343	1997	52810	Closed	Work Plan and CE- 3rd year of Operation – April to December 2002	AL MAMLAKA AL URDUNIYA AL HASHEMIYAH	01/04/2002	31/12/2002	€1,056,510.78	€1,056,510.78
MED	Social Development	3343	1997	52808	Closed	Devis-programme – work programme and cost estimate year 1	AL MAMLAKA AL URDUNIYA AL HASHEMIYAH	01/01/2000	31/03/2001	€1,201,285.00	€1,201,285.00
MED	Social Development	3343	1997	52807	Closed	Services – BCEOM OEX – Assistance Technique – Social Fund for Development (YEM/B7-3000/IB/97/0466)	EGIS INTERNATIONAL SA	03/10/2000	03/01/2005	€1,123,512.35	€1,123,512.35
MED	Social Development	3343	1997	52811	Closed	Services – Contrat-Cadre/AS/I/B7-3000/Tebodin/97/091 – Social Fund for Development (YEM/B7-3000/IB/97/0466)	TEBODIN B.V.	30/05/1999		€52,588.89	€52,588.89
MED	Social Development	3343	1997	52806	Closed	Services – Short-term technical assistance support – Social Fund for Development (YEM/B7-3000/IB/97/0466)	VAN IMSCHOOT MARC	09/06/2000	31/12/2000	€24,632.00	€24,632.00
MED	Economic Development	3379	1997	52959	Closed	Services – PROMAN service contract	PROMAN SA	05/10/1998	05/10/2000	€445,717.47	€445,717.47
MED	Economic Development	4997	1997	65916	Closed	Services – GET – Strengthening Priority Areas of Vocational Training in Yemen	ICON-INSTITUT EDUCATION AND TRAINING GMBH	14/08/2000	31/12/2006	€2,397,122.00	€2,397,122.00
MED	Economic Development	4997	1997	65917	Closed	Devis programme – 4 months Interim work programme YEM/B7-3000/97/0468	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	30/10/2001	01/03/2002	€92,282.54	€92,282.54
MED	Economic Development	4997	1997	65918	Closed	Annual Work Plan 1 – 1/10/2002 to 30/09/2003	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	01/10/2002	30/09/2003	€437,200.00	€437,200.00
MED	Health	3335	1998	52778	Closed	Services – Technical Assistance/Support to HSR – EPOS	EPOS HEALTH MANAGEMENT GMBH	18/10/2000	01/12/2005	€1,926,888.06	€1,926,888.06
MED	Health	3335	1998	52779	Closed	Devis programme – Programme preparatory state	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	10/05/1999	31/12/2006	€535,233.60	€535,233.60
MED	Economic Development	3336	1999	4255	Closed	Revision mission Yemen Civil aviation support	ATOS BELGIUM NV	22/02/2002	22/04/2002	€50,292.05	€50,292.05
MED	Governance	3337	1999	4120	Closed	Support for Administrative Reforms	NEI B.V.	20/02/2002	31/12/2002	€28,721.60	€28,721.60
MED	Governance	3338	1999	3745	Closed	Support for the Free Zone Public Authority	HTSPE LTD	11/12/2001		€63,490.50	€63,490.50
MED	Governance	3494	1999	54005	Closed	Services – AGRER contrat cadre – COOP/EXT/1/98-Freund contrat CDN/A-N°0303-Année 2000	AGRER SA	08/02/2000	07/02/2001	€344,655.28	€344,655.28
MED	Governance	3494	1999	54006	Closed	Services – AGRER CN0409 – ECTAO YEMEN Rainer Schierhorst 2001-15/12/2002	AGRER SA	18/01/2001	15/12/2002	€580,086.91	€580,086.91
MED	Economic Development	3608	1999	54201	Closed	Delta Abyan Spate Irrigation	CARE DEUTSCHLAND-LUXEMBURG EV	03/04/2001	03/06/2004	€1,600,000.00	€1,600,000.00

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
MED	Food and Agriculture	3329	2000	52756	Closed	Services-Technical Assistance Support for Aden/EUROPAID/112835/D/2V/YE	EUROCONSULT MOTT MACDONALD BV	25/09/2002	31/12/2006	€2,089,961.40	€2,089,961.40
MED	Fisheries	3330	2000	52757	Closed	GOPA – FOURTH FISHERIES – AT MONITORING & SURVEILLANCE	GOPA-GESELLSCHAFT FUR ORGANISATIONPLANUNG UND AUSBILDUNG MBH	25/06/2002	31/12/2007	€1,415,508.33	€1,415,508.33
MED	Fisheries	3330	2000	52758	Closed	Project Account	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	17/04/2001	31/12/2005	€50,000.00	€50,000.00
MED	Health	4019	2000	55015	Closed	WHO-B7-3000/YEM/95-3	WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION	19/06/1996	19/12/1999	€450,000.00	€450,000.00
MED	Economic Development	4618	2000	29760	Closed	Reprise Access (MULLER-5--MED-RELEX/F/4)	INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IRELAND LTD	21/03/2001	31/08/2003	€196,127.24	€196,127.24
MED	Governance	3380	2002	52960	Closed	Service-UNDP	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME		19/12/2003	€432,250.00	€432,250.00
MED	Multi	4317	2002	56893	Closed	Demography and Health Sector Support – YEMEN	HEALTH RESEARCH FOR ACTION HERA CVBA	02/10/2002	31/12/2003	€119,974.00	€119,974.00
MED	Economic Development	4846	2002	9775	Closed	Identification for Development of economic institutions	HTSPE LTD	22/04/2002	31/05/2002	€71,141.67	€71,141.67
MED	Food and Agriculture	3329	2003	64800	Closed	Yemen Support for ADEN NWSA Restructuring-YEM/B7-3000/ER/00/0001	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	29/03/2003	31/12/2006	€1,549,366.00	€1,549,366.00
MED	Health	3335	2003	64872	Ongoing	YEM/B7-3000/IB/98/0710-WORK PLAN FOR THE PROGRAMME SUPPORT STAGE	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	01/03/2003	31/12/2008	€3,745,114.00	€3,278,079.00
MED	Economic Development	3336	2003	56965	Closed	Calibration flights and technical assistance for Yemen Civil Aviation Support	AFI FLIGHT INSPECTION GMBH	24/03/2003	24/03/2007	€737,363.64	€737,363.64
MED	Governance	3338	2003	68291	Closed	YEM/B7-3000/IB/1999/0254-Support to the Yemen Free Zone Public Authority	TDI GROUP LIMITED	17/01/2003	01/01/2005	€542,023.87	€542,023.87
MED	Economic Development	4007	2003	72986	Closed	Support of Yemen's Accession to WTO	DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FUR INTERNATIONALE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GIZ) GMBH	31/10/2003	30/11/2008	€5,530,133.67	€5,530,133.67
MED	Multi	4317	2003	69481	Closed	Identification and formulation mission- Programme to support Civil society in Yemen	EURONET CONSULTING GEIE	08/08/2003	29/02/2004	€127,011.27	€127,011.27
MED	Multi	4317	2003	65987	Closed	Demography and Health Sector Support – feasibility study	HEALTH RESEARCH FOR ACTION HERA CVBA	12/06/2003	09/08/2003	€79,910.00	€79,910.00
MED	Food and Agriculture	3329	2004	88826	Closed	Supply of Equipment, Tools, and Pipe Fittings (6 Lots)	COGEFO SRL	07/10/2004	08/02/2005	€180,102.40	€180,102.40
MED	Food and Agriculture	3329	2004	88906	Closed	Supply of Equipment, Tools and Pipe Fittings (6 Lots)	CORADE SPA	07/10/2004	08/02/2005	€134,465.10	€134,465.10
MED	Food and Agriculture	3329	2004	86752	Closed	Supply of water consumption meters – Lot 1	ELIN WASSERWERKSTECHNIK GMBH	08/09/2004	09/03/2005	€336,350.85	€336,350.85
MED	Food and Agriculture	3329	2004	88727	Closed	Supply of Equipment, Tools and Pipe Fittings (6 Lots)	FARMEX TECHNOLOGIES SARL	23/11/2004	24/03/2005	€369,413.00	€369,413.00

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
MED	Food and Agriculture	3329	2004	86629	Closed	Supply of water consumption meters -	PEARSON	21/07/2004	22/01/2005	€68,611.48	€68,611.48
MED	Food and Agriculture	3329	2004	89077	Closed	Supply of Pick-up Vehicles	PEARSON	07/10/2004	08/02/2005	€247,130.08	€247,130.08
MED	Food and Agriculture	3329	2004	88860	Closed	Supply of Equipment, Tools and Pipe Fittings (6 Lots)	YAHYAABU ALREJAL	10/02/2005	21/06/2005	€145,746.00	€145,746.00
MED	Fisheries	3330	2004	87024	Closed	1st Annual Work Plan	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	06/08/2004	30/06/2007	€530,374.00	€530,374.00
MED	Health	3335	2004	78793	Closed	Mid-term evaluation for the project support to health sector reform in Yemen	EUROPEAN CONSULTANTS ORGANISATION SPRL	11/03/2004	03/05/2004	€49,426.73	€49,426.73
MED	Governance	3337	2004	85756	Closed	Support for Administrative reform in Yemen	GOPA-GESELLSCHAFT FUR ORGANISATIONPLANUNG UND AUSBILDUNG MBH	26/07/2004	26/09/2009	€3,630,058.02	€3,630,058.02
MED	Social Development	3343	2004	85478	Closed	SUPPORT MISSION TO SFD FOR COMMUNICATION AND REPORTING GUIDELINES	AGENCE EUROPEENNE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA SANTE SCRL AEDES	15/08/2004	31/12/2004	€56,254.27	€56,254.27
MED	Social Development	3343	2004	84895	Closed	INTERNAL CAPACITY BUILDING MISSION FOR SOCIAL FUND FOR DEVELOPMENT	AGENCE EUROPEENNE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA SANTE SCRL AEDES	21/07/2004	10/02/2005	€149,806.47	€149,806.47
MED	Social Development	3343	2004	85672	Closed	SUPPORT TO SFD FOR IMPROVING THE MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEM	AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA	10/11/2004	30/11/2004	€47,115.44	€47,115.44
MED	Social Development	3343	2004	86500	Closed	Support mission for Designing low cost sewerage networks	ANTEA FRANCE SAS	03/11/2004	22/12/2004	€30,322.50	€30,322.50
MED	Social Development	3343	2004	86490	Closed	Support Mission to SFD for Training on Wastewater Treatment operations and maintenance	ANTEA FRANCE SAS	17/08/2004	25/09/2004	€27,676.81	€27,676.81
MED	Social Development	3343	2004	86377	Closed	Support Mission for Funds Management for SFD Yemen	EUROPEAN CONSULTANTS ORGANISATION SPRL	29/08/2004	26/11/2004	€44,964.48	€44,964.48
MED	Social Development	3343	2004	86455	Closed	Support Mission to SFD Yemen for designing the new operation manual	EUROPEAN CONSULTANTS ORGANISATION SPRL	23/08/2004	10/12/2004	€70,669.67	€70,669.67
MED	Social Development	3343	2004	86471	Closed	Support Mission for Low cost wastewater treatment System Specialist	FCG PLANEKO OY	09/08/2004	24/09/2004	€26,111.04	€26,111.04
MED	Economic Development	4997	2004	79486	Closed	CONSTRUCTION OF NAHOTI	UNITED FOR ENGINEERING PROJECTS & OILFIELDS SERVICES LIMITED LIABILITYCOMPANY	03/03/2004	31/12/2005	€1,688,391.75	€1,688,391.75
MED	Economic Development	4997	2004	79608	Closed	ANNUAL WORLPLAN 2004	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	03/03/2004	31/03/2005	€354,720.00	€354,720.00
MED	Fisheries	6011	2004	91761	Closed	Short-term TA for the Support to the sustainable development of the fisheries sector	HTSPE LTD	10/12/2004	31/03/2005	€55,505.75	€55,505.75
MED	Social Development	6222	2004	91315	Closed	Support to the third phase of the Social Fund for Development Yemen (Trust Fund TF053450)	THE WORLD BANK GROUP	30/11/2004	31/12/2008	€8,000,000.00	€8,000,000.00

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
MED	Economic Development	3336	2005	106032	Closed	Supply of Aviation Navigational Aid Equipment – Republic of Yemen	THALES AIR SYSTEMS & ELECTRON DEVICES GMBH	15/08/2005	16/08/2006	€1,518,693.00	€1,518,693.00
MED	Governance	3337	2005	108580	Closed	Mid-Term Evaluation of the project Support for Administrative Reform' Yemen	INTEGRATION INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS GMBH	01/02/2006	19/04/2006	€49,950.00	€49,950.00
MED	Governance	3337	2005	101265	Ongoing	Project Account	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	20/03/2005	31/12/2009	€50,000.00	€50,000.00
MED	Economic Development	4997	2005	102362	Closed	Supply contract Boss Pro Tech	BOSS PRO-TEC GMBH	03/05/2005	01/10/2005	€389,497.87	€389,497.87
MED	Economic Development	4997	2005	108262	Closed	SUPPLY OF HOTEL AND SCHOOL FURNITURE, COMPUTER AND TRAINING EQUIPMENT FOR THE NAHOTI/SANA'A /YEMEN	Q & T SRL	12/10/2005	13/04/2006	€879,421.32	€879,421.32
MED	Economic Development	4997	2005	105814	Closed	Annual Work Plan 2005	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	15/08/2005	31/12/2007	€663,344.79	€663,344.79
MED	Health	5973	2005	99733	Closed	Preparation phase for the HSDS Programme	AGENCE EUROPEENNE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA SANTE SCRL AEDES	18/04/2005	16/07/2005	€63,999.96	€63,999.96
MED	Health	5973	2005	101709	Closed	Technical Assistance for the Health Sector and Demography Support Programme	BMB MOTT MACDONALD BV	02/06/2005	15/10/2008	€1,598,823.01	€1,598,823.01
MED	Health	5973	2005	110492	Ongoing	WORK PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL POPULATION COUNCIL	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	10/11/2005	31/12/2009	€500,000.00	€470,781.00
MED	Health	5973	2005	98844	Ongoing	MAIN CONTRACT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HSDS PROGRAMME	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	23/02/2005	31/12/2009	€2,000,456.00	€1,988,500.00
MED	Health	5973	2005	106701	Ongoing	INCEPTION PERIOD WORK PLAN	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	02/08/2005	01/05/2006	€222,045.00	€222,045.00
MED	Health	17088	2005	109650	Closed	Feasibility survey of reproductive health and population programme	AGENCE EUROPEENNE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA SANTE SCRL AEDES	23/11/2005	20/04/2006	€118,416.70	€118,416.70
MED	Governance		2005	100896	Closed	Support to the Supreme Election Committee – Phase II	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	21/12/2005	21/07/2007	€436,525.00	€436,525.00
MED	Fisheries	3330	2006	125908	Closed	Supply of 4-wheel drive vehicles	ABDULKARIM HASSAN LUTFALLAH	05/11/2006	15/06/2007	€228,900.00	€228,900.00
MED	Fisheries	3330	2006	128465	Closed	Supply of Dedicated Communication Equipment (Lot 1&2)	ABDULKARIM HASSAN LUTFALLAH	04/12/2006	15/06/2007	€136,000.00	€136,000.00
MED	Fisheries	3330	2006	128330	Closed	Maritime Aerial Surveillance Mission Carrying out an investigative overt aircraft patrols of the fisheries waters of Yemen	C.A.E. AVIATION SARL	27/11/2006	28/01/2007	€170,000.00	€170,000.00
MED	Fisheries	3330	2006	116606	Closed	Marine charts showing Yemen coast and EEZ	UNITED KINGDOM HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE	26/04/2006	27/07/2006	€14,500.00	€14,500.00
MED	Economic Development	4007	2006	121813	Closed	Participation to the Export Seminar, Sana, 28 May 2006	LEE	30/05/2006	29/06/2006	€4,882.00	€4,882.00



Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
MED	Health	5973	2006	130021	Ongoing	Grant Contract for the Social Fund for Development	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	23/11/2006	31/12/2009	€2,861,500.00	€2,364,215.54
MED	Health	5973	2006	130089	Ongoing	Programme Management for the Implementation period	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	23/11/2006	31/12/2009	€312,150.00	€265,960.40
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2006	125414	Closed	Support to the identification and formulation phase of the Sharaka Yemen project	BUSINESS AND STRATEGIES IN EUROPE SA	11/10/2006	22/11/2006	€33,747.59	€33,747.59
MED	Health	3335	2007	142734	Closed	Identification of a Reproductive Health programme in Yemen	ECORYS NEDERLAND BV	27/08/2007	28/02/2008	€71,474.55	€71,474.55
MED	Health	5973	2007	140929	Closed	MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE HEALTH SECTOR AND DEMOGRAPHY SUPPORT PROGRAMME	AGENCE EUROPEENNE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA SANTE SCRL AEDES	18/07/2007	14/11/2007	€54,660.81	€54,660.81
MED	Fisheries	17526	2007	138052	Closed	Yemen: Sustainable Development of the Fisheries Sector: Work plan Preparation	CARDNO EMERGING MARKETS (UK) LTD	23/05/2007	31/12/2007	€172,155.00	€172,155.00
MED	Economic Development	3336	2008	154627	Closed	Additional calibration flight	AFI FLIGHT INSPECTION GMBH	28/04/2008	29/07/2008	€63,000.00	€63,000.00
MED	Economic Development	4007	2008	147253	Closed	MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE SUPPORT TO YEMEN'S WTO ACCESSION PROJECT	INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES OFBELGIUM SA	14/03/2008	31/05/2008	€73,708.10	€73,708.10
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	155207	Closed	Grassroots partnership on the protection empowerment, development and advocacy for marginalised communities (Akhdam) in Tihama Region	AL MUSTAKBAL SOCIAL ASSOCIATION	11/08/2008	10/05/2010	€79,047.00	€79,047.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	155200	Closed	Judicial and Cultural VAW Resisting integration within rural Yemen social System Projects	CIVIC DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES SUPPORT FOUNDATION ASSOCIATION	10/08/2008	01/06/2010	€88,782.00	€88,782.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	155174	Ongoing	Establishing Network to support and increase women ratios in the Parliament	CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS FOUNDATION	11/08/2008	01/09/2010	€150,000.00	€135,000.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	155153	Closed	Working together for children rights	FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY SCHOOL	11/08/2008	30/04/2010	€89,516.41	€89,516.41
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	156474	Closed	PCM training for Yemeni NGOs'	KING HUSSEIN BIN TALAL FOUNDATION	23/04/2008	24/05/2008	€9,000.00	€9,000.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	155170	Closed	Promotion of human rights and combating against all forms of violence towards women and children	MODERN YOUTH SOCIETY ASSOCIATION	11/08/2008	01/03/2010	€84,941.00	€84,941.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	155172	Closed	Women Training on leadership in political parties	POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT FORUM LTD	11/08/2008	01/06/2010	€61,022.89	€61,022.89
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	155210	Closed	Promotion of women and children's rights in Hajjah	SOUL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT	11/08/2008	01/11/2010	€127,000.00	€127,000.00

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	155221	Closed	Capacity building of rural women and fighting children labour	THE 27TH OF APRIL ORGANIZATION FOR DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION AND DEFENSE OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS LLC	11/08/2008	01/03/2010	€86,791.00	€86,791.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	155216	Ongoing	The national programme for supporting women political participation and reinforcing rights and freedom	WEFAQ FOR DEMOCRATIC REHABILITATION	11/08/2008	31/12/2009	€99,812.62	€79,850.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	155214	Closed	project on strengthening women rights in the rural districts of Dhamar Governorate	ZAHRA WOMEN S ASSOCIATION	11/08/2008	30/06/2010	€149,981.00	€149,981.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	161396	Closed	Provision of Computer training to selected Ministry of Human Rights staff	ABDULRAHMAN AHMED MOHAMMED AL SURMI	11/08/2008	30/06/2010	€9,915.00	€9,915.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	161404	Closed	Provision of Report Writing training in English language	AMERICA MIDEAST EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING SERVICES SVCS INC	11/08/2008	02/08/2010	€3,375.00	€3,375.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	161195	Closed	Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Human Rights of the Republic of Yemen	BERENSCHOT GROEP BV	11/08/2008	27/02/2010	€158,771.44	€158,771.44
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	148824	Closed	Logistic Support Sharaka Yemen	CORNILUS ADRIANUS DOULIDI	05/02/2008	05/03/2008	€4,417.83	€4,417.83
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	151098	Closed	Logistical Support to Sharaka Information Meeting with NGOs	CORNILUS ADRIANUS DOULIDI	26/02/2008	29/03/2008	€9,328.00	€9,328.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	161409	Closed	Business writing training in Arabic language	CORNILUS ADRIANUS DOULIDI	11/08/2008	12/02/2010	€9,000.00	€9,000.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	149151	Closed	'Preparation of a supply tender dossier for the Ministry of Human Rights in Yemen'	JCP SRL	19/02/2008	08/03/2008	€7,000.00	€7,000.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	161401	Closed	Provision of English language training	MAZEN SHAWQI MOHAMMED LUQMAN	11/08/2008	12/02/2010	€9,960.00	€9,960.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	161193	Closed	Support for the Establishment of a National Human Rights Institution in Yemen	TRANSTEC SA	11/08/2008	27/02/2010	€167,515.26	€167,515.26
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	161177	Closed	Supply of vehicles to Ministry of Human Rights	UNITED FOR ENGINEERING PROJECTS & OILFIELDS SERVICES LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY	02/08/2008	30/09/2009	€137,600.00	€137,600.00
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2008	161171	Closed	Supply of IT equipment for the Ministry of Human Rights	ZENITS TEKNOLOJI TAAHHUT LIMITED SIRKETI	10/08/2008	30/09/2009	€61,238.35	€61,238.35

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
MED	Fisheries	17526	2008	164081	Ongoing	Construction and Rehabilitation of landing and auction sites and related buildings at SHOQRA (Abyan Governorate)	ABDULBASET HASSAN	11/08/2008	12/08/2009	€297,200.00	€60,364.74
MED	Fisheries	17526	2008	164269	Closed	Supply of Laboratory Equipment and Chemical Reagents for the Ministry of Fisheries Wealth, Republic of Yemen – Lot 2 – Chemical Reagents	AL-FAIHA FOR LABORATORIES AND SCIENSCIENTIFIC SUPPLIES LLC	12/08/2008	25/08/2009	€38,283.00	€38,283.00
MED	Fisheries	17526	2008	163207	Closed	Technical Assistance in Project Management and Fisheries Information Systems	INTERNATIONAL INDEMAR FISHERIES SL	05/08/2008	31/12/2010	€1,918,224.49	€1,918,224.49
MED	Fisheries	17526	2008	162893	Closed	Technical Assistance in Fish Quality Control	LAMANS AE	05/08/2008	31/12/2010	€638,672.38	€638,672.38
MED	Fisheries	17526	2008	164090	Ongoing	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND SUPERVISION SERVICES FOR CONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION OF A: LANDING AND AUCTION SITES AND RELATED BUILDINGS AT SHOQRA (ABYAN GOVERNORATE), DOCK YARD (ADEN GOVERNORATE), SALIF (AL-HODEIDAH GOVERNORATE).	QASEM MOHAMED QAID ALMEHANI	11/08/2008	12/10/2011	€110,000.00	€88,337.50
MED	Fisheries	17526	2008	164266	Closed	SFDS – Supply of Laboratory Equipment for the Ministry of Fish Wealth, Republic of Yemen	SIMED INTERNATIONAL BV	11/08/2008	21/10/2009	€678,826.92	€678,826.92
MED	Fisheries	17526	2008	164078	Ongoing	CONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION OF LANDING AND AUCTION SITES AND RELATED BUILDINGS AT DOCK YARD (ADEN GOVERNORATE)	UNITED FOR ENGINEERING PROJECTS & OILFIELDS SERVICES LIMITED LIABILITYCOMPANY	11/08/2008	31/03/2011	€316,339.51	€286,430.12
MED	Fisheries	17526	2008	164082	Ongoing	CONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION OF LANDING AND AUCTION SITES AND RELATED BUILDINGS AT SALIF (AI-HODEIDAH GOVERNORATE)	UNITED FOR ENGINEERING PROJECTS & OILFIELDS SERVICES LIMITED LIABILITYCOMPANY	11/08/2008	12/08/2009	€198,435.00	€59,530.00
MED	Fisheries	17526	2008	147254	Closed	Preparation of tender dossiers for supplies, works and works supervision under Sustainable Development of Fisheries Sector in Yemen Project	VIDENCENTRET FOR LANDBRUG	19/03/2008	21/09/2008	€158,684.74	€158,684.74
MED	Fisheries	17526	2008	164265	Closed	Supply of IT hardware and software for implementation of the Fisheries Information System, Republic of YEMEN	ZENITS TEKNOLOJI TAAHHUT LIMITED SIRKETI	11/08/2008	12/08/2009	€582,735.51	€582,735.51
MED	Fisheries	17526	2008	146674	Ongoing	Advance payment request	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	03/02/2008	30/06/2010	€100,000.00	€100,000.00

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MED	Health	18518	2008	152280	Closed	Assistance to the Ministry of Health in the drafting of the Terms of Reference of the Technical Assistance to the Reproductive Health and Population Programme (RHPP)	ASSIA BRANDRUP-LUKANOW	08/04/2008	18/04/2008	€8,950.00	€8,950.00
MED	Health	18518	2008	149326	Closed	Preparation of the Work Plan for RHPP Programme	CONSEIL SANTE SA	05/05/2008	04/06/2008	€39,053.68	€39,053.68
MED	Health	18518	2008	169195	Ongoing	RHPP Preparation Phase Work Plan	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	30/09/2008	31/03/2009	€65,000.00	€52,000.00
MED	Governance	19211	2008	160082	Ongoing	EC-UNDP Joint Electoral Support Project	UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION	07/07/2008	07/06/2012	€2,198,828.33	€2,198,828.33
MED	Governance	19211	2008	168041	Closed	Needs Assessment and preparation of tender dossiers for support to Parliament in Republic of Yemen	SUDGEST AID AIUTARE LO SVILUPPO DIFFICILE SCRL	21/12/2008	10/03/2009	€104,910.21	€104,910.21
MED	Fisheries	3330	2009	224925	Closed	Evaluation of Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance MED /2000/003-330	TRANSTEC SA	28/12/2009	28/02/2010	€59,662.00	€59,662.00
MED	Health	3335	2009	228728	Closed	Payment by EC of Balance of decentralised contract 'Supply of Medical Equipment and furniture for district hospitals and health centres (Lots 1 & 2)' (EuropeAid/120548/D/S/YE)	SIMED INTERNATIONAL BV	30/12/2009	30/06/2010	€224,296.40	€224,296.40
MED	Economic Development	3336	2009	219541	Closed	Evaluation of EC support to Civil Aviation Authority in Republic of Yemen	PARSONS BRINCKERHOFF LTD	30/11/2009	29/01/2010	€56,161.95	€56,161.95
MED	Governance	3337	2009	212399	Ongoing	Supply of ICT Equipment for the Ministry of Civil Services and Insurances	COMPUTER ENGINEERING WORLD LLC	22/07/2009	30/04/2010	€1,549,155.58	€1,549,155.58
MED	Economic Development	4007	2009	205028	Closed	Support to Yemen's accession to the WTO	POHL CONSULTING & ASSOCIATES GMBH	06/07/2009	31/03/2011	€164,273.85	€164,273.85
MED	Economic Development	4007	2009	208018	Ongoing	Programme Estimate WTO-CCO	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	14/05/2009	30/04/2011	€410,000.00	€410,000.00
MED	Health	18518	2009	172377	Ongoing	Technical Assistance to the RHPP in the Republic of Yemen	BMB MOTT MACDONALD BV	09/03/2009	30/11/2012	€1,768,130.00	€1,430,430.97
MED	Health	18518	2009	206406	Ongoing	Inception Phase Work Plan	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	12/07/2009	12/12/2009	€136,996.00	€109,597.00
MED	Economic Development	4007	2010	244444	Closed	Support to Yemen's Accession to the World Trade Organization – TBT and SPS Expert	ACE INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS SL	20/10/2010	31/03/2011	€40,432.80	€40,432.80
MED	Health	5973	2010	253306	Closed	Audit of 2 FA: 'Support to Health Sector Reform Project' and 'Health Sector and Demography Support'	ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA	20/12/2010	12/01/2012	€5,952.80	€5,952.80
MED	Health	5973	2010	254619	Closed	Final evaluation of 2 Financing agreements in support of Yemeni health sector	IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA	30/12/2010	25/04/2011	€92,392.00	€92,392.00

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MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2010	241433	Closed	SHARAKA YEMEN Evaluation and Formulation of incoming 2010 Governance Support	IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA	07/06/2010	15/10/2010	€130,943.01	€130,943.01
MED	Human Rights and Democracy	17262	2010	246935	Closed	Fake contract for the late payment interest for contract 161171 (Supply of IT Equipment for the Ministry of Human Rights)	ZENITS TEKNOLOJI TAAHHUT LIMITED SIRKETI	04/08/2010	04/09/2010	€287.73	€287.73
MED	Health	18518	2010	258304	Ongoing	REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND POPULATION PROGRAMME	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	22/12/2010	21/03/2013	€365,000.00	€329,881.00
MED	Health	18518	2010	258869	Ongoing	Support to the CGHP (Comprehensive Governorate Health Plans) in Taiz, Lahj and Hodeidah	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	22/12/2010	22/12/2013	€2,785,000.00	€1,641,780.00
MED	Health	18518	2010	255806	Ongoing	Support activities of TAIZ Programme Governorate Health Plan (PGHP) developed within the context of the Reproductive Health and Population Programme (RHPP)	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	22/12/2010	22/12/2013	€1,800,000.00	€1,620,000.00
MED	Health	18518	2010	255807	Ongoing	Support activities of LAHJ Programme Governorate Health Plan (PGHP) developed within the context of the Reproductive Health and Population Programme (RHPP)	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	22/12/2010	22/12/2013	€1,050,000.00	€944,999.89
MED	Health	18518	2010	255808	Ongoing	Support activities of HODAIDAH Programme Governorate Health Plan (PGHP) developed within the context of the Reproductive Health and Population Programme (RHPP)	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	22/12/2010	22/12/2013	€1,950,000.00	€806,217.62
MED	Governance	19211	2010	237147	Ongoing	Technical Assistance and Capacity Building for the House of Representatives – Republic of Yemen	TRANSTEC SA	19/11/2010	31/12/2014	€1,086,700.00	€217,340.00
MED	Social Development	19212	2011	263283	Ongoing	1st programme estimate	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	06/07/2011	05/07/2013	€10,802,000.00	€10,802,000.00
MED	Health	18518	2013	317722	Decided	Evaluation of the EU support to Reproductive Health services in Taiz, Lahij, Al Hodeidah, and accompanying measures in view of its continuation.	IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA		07/01/2014	€132,983.00	€-
DCI-MED	Multi	20279	2009	224211	Closed	Assessment of the Fisheries Sector in Yemen	AGRER SA	11/12/2009	25/04/2010	€191,823.98	€191,823.98
DCI-MED	Multi	20279	2009	221859	Closed	Evaluation of outgoing and identification of incoming support to Public Administration Modernisation in Yemen	BUSINESS AND STRATEGIES IN EUROPE SA	27/10/2009	31/03/2010	€117,775.60	€117,775.60
DCI-MED	Multi	20279	2009	224064	Closed	Civil Society Mapping Study – Republic of Yemen	HTSPE LIMITED	15/12/2009	31/03/2010	€29,027.93	€29,027.93
DCI-MED	Multi	20279	2009	221070	Closed	Mapping Study on Technical Assistance in the Health Sector in Yemen	HTSPE LIMITED	10/12/2009	29/01/2010	€51,916.00	€51,916.00

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DCI-MED	Multi	20279	2009	224877	Closed	Scoping study for a Sector Wide Approach in Health	IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA	31/12/2009	01/05/2010	€76,784.00	€76,784.00
DCI-MED	Multi	20279	2009	224922	Closed	FORMULATION STUDY – FISHERIES SECTOR SUPPORT PROGRAMME YEMEN	TRANSTEC SA	28/12/2009	10/04/2010	€180,118.60	€180,118.60
DCI-MED	Security and Justice	19572	2009	216110	Ongoing	Strengthening the Juvenile Justice System in Yemen (2009-2011)	UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND	05/12/2009	31/07/2014	€3,900,000.00	€2,799,984.26
DCI-MED	Multi	22546	2010	254063	Closed	Evaluation Study – Health Development Councils (HDC) Yemen	IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA	10/11/2010	30/04/2011	€116,228.33	€116,228.33
DCI-MED	Security and Justice	19572	2010	237202	Ongoing	Support to the Yemeni Ministry of Interior through capacity building for police academies and police schools	CIVI POL CONSEIL, SOCIETE DE CONSEIL ET DE SERVICE DU MINISTERE DE L'INTERIEUR SA	20/07/2010	21/09/2014	€2,900,000.00	€723,934.68
DCI-MED	Security and Justice	19572	2010	252052	Ongoing	EU Support to Social Sector Capacity Building in the Republic of Yemen	ICON-INSTITUT PRIVATE SECTOR GMBH	06/12/2010	01/02/2014	€1,799,340.00	€1,032,144.50
DCI-MED	Food and Agriculture	20570	2011	256886	Ongoing	Increased participation in rural development and creation of sustainable economic opportunities for poor people	INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT	11/05/2011	10/05/2014	€6,500,000.00	€1,717,635.00
DCI-MED	Multi	22546	2011	278363	Closed	Yemen Social Welfare Fund Monitoring Mission	BUSINESS AND STRATEGIES IN EUROPE SA	31/12/2011	08/02/2012	€63,933.19	€63,933.19
DCI-MED	Multi	22546	2011	259100	Closed	Formulation of new EU Economic programme	ECORYS NEDERLAND BV	30/03/2011	29/07/2011	€148,558.00	€148,558.00
DCI-MED	Multi	22546	2011	279933	Closed	Formulation EU Governance Programme for the Republic of Yemen	HTSPE LIMITED	22/12/2011	15/05/2012	€186,895.70	€186,895.70
DCI-MED	Multi	22546	2011	280775	Ongoing	Economic and Social Impact of the Political Transition Conflict in Yemen – Scenarios for Reconstruction and Development	INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE NON PROFIT CORP	29/12/2011	29/09/2012	€165,775.00	€132,620.00
DCI-MED	Multi	22546	2011	278380	Ongoing	A financial audit of decentralised budget for the implementation of health services in Yemen	MOORE STEPHENS LLP	14/12/2011	30/06/2013	€130,312.50	€65,156.25
DCI-MED	Multi	22546	2011	258331	Closed	Governance in Yemen: training on PRAG and Programme Estimates	PARTICIP GMBH CONSULTANTS FUR ENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT	08/03/2011	06/09/2011	€11,394.60	€11,394.60
DCI-MED	Economic Development	22814	2012	301691	Ongoing	Feasibility Study for the Setting Up of a Credit Loan Guarantee Scheme (CLGS) for Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises in Yemen	ACE INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS SL	31/12/2012	14/02/2014	€263,370.00	€149,999.00
DCI-MED	Economic Development	22814	2012	309486	Ongoing	Formulation of National Export Strategy (NES)	AIDE A LA DECISION ECONOMIQUE SA	27/12/2012	03/08/2013	€169,310.00	€101,586.00
DCI-MED	Economic Development	22814	2012	308411	Ongoing	Trade Related Assistance to Yemen	ECORYS NEDERLAND BV	31/12/2012	29/02/2016	€980,200.00	€200,000.00
DCI-MED	Economic Development	22814	2012	295301	Closed	Recruitment of 1 external assessor for Call for Proposals 132890	LUSTRATI	13/08/2012	12/11/2012	€3,493.00	€3,493.00

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
DCI-MED	Economic Development	22814	2012	300917	Ongoing	Approach for Development finance ENhancement (ADEN)	MENNONITE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES OF CANADA NON-PROFIT CORPORATION	27/12/2012	30/01/2018	€8,300,000.00	€-
DCI-MED	Fisheries	22236	2012	293182	Ongoing	Fisheries Investment Project	INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURALDEVELOPMENT	02/07/2012	01/12/2015	€4,500,000.00	€928,000.00
DCI-MED	Health	19573	2012	284677	Ongoing	Emergency food security and nutrition support to targeted vulnerable populations in Yemen.	WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME	22/04/2012	21/12/2013	€2,000,000.00	€1,600,000.00
DCI-MED	Health	19573	2012	293485	Ongoing	Governance in the Health Sector in Yemen: support for the preparation of the Programme Governorate Health Plans (PGHP) in Hajja, Al-Mawheet and Al-Baida	CONSEIL SANTE SA	03/07/2012	01/07/2013	€109,685.00	€65,811.00
DCI-MED	Health	19573	2012	304579	Ongoing	Governance in health: support of human resources for health in Yemen	EPOS HEALTH MANAGEMENT GMBH	30/12/2012	29/08/2014	€912,072.00	€273,621.00
DCI-MED	Health	19573;23026	2012	306617	Ongoing	Governance in Health: technical cooperation for reproductive health services in Yemen	EPOS HEALTH MANAGEMENT GMBH	30/12/2012	29/09/2014	€1,349,235.00	€-
DCI-MED	Health	19573	2012	310429	Ongoing	Support activities of HAJJAH Programme Governorate Health Plan (PGHP) developed within the context of the Reproductive Health and Population Programme	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	30/12/2012	30/12/2014	€1,706,170.00	€685,608.00
DCI-MED	Health	19573	2012	310430	Ongoing	Support activities of AL MAHWIT Programme Governorate Health Plan (PGHP) developed within the context of the Reproductive Health and Population Programme	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	26/12/2012	26/12/2014	€960,733.00	€489,152.00
DCI-MED	Health	19573	2012	310431	Ongoing	Support activities of AL BAYDA' Programme Governorate Health Plan (PGHP) developed within the context of the Reproductive Health and Population Programme	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	30/12/2012	30/12/2014	€920,096.00	€473,298.40
DCI-MED	Human Rights and Democracy	22235	2012	299451	Ongoing	Promoting Equity and Legal Identity for Children in Yemen Through Improving Civil Registration (2012-2015)	UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND	05/10/2012	30/11/2015	€2,500,000.00	€759,931.92
DCI-MED	Multi	23587	2012	294861	Closed	Final Evaluation of FA in Support to Yemen's Accession to WTO (Decision 4007)	ECORYS NEDERLAND BV	05/07/2012	04/12/2012	€49,494.00	€49,494.00
DCI-MED	Security and Justice	19572	2012	294617	Ongoing	Provision of IT training to staff of Ministry of Interior	ABDULRAHMAN AHMED MOHAMMED AL SURMI	28/05/2012	30/05/2014	€8,850.00	€8,850.00
DCI-MED	Security and Justice	19572	2012	294623	Ongoing	Provision of IT training to staff of Ministry of Justice	ABDULRAHMAN AHMED MOHAMMED AL SURMI	28/05/2012	30/06/2013	€8,850.00	€8,850.00
DCI-MED	Security and Justice	19572	2012	293241	Ongoing	Supply of furniture for the Police Academy	ALI HUSSEN AL SURMI	28/05/2012	30/12/2013	€119,810.00	€71,886.00

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
DCI-MED	Security and Justice	19572	2012	294250	Ongoing	Provision of IT equipment to Police Academy	NATCO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LTD	28/05/2012	30/12/2013	€380,122.78	€228,073.67
DCI-MED	Multi	23587	2012	293176	Closed	Formulation Mission for the Programme in Support to the SWF Phase IV	BUSINESS AND STRATEGIES IN EUROPE SA	13/06/2012	01/08/2012	€108,056.00	€108,056.00
DCI-MED	Multi	23587	2012	292783	Ongoing	Governance in Yemen: training on PRAG and PROGRAMME ESTIMATES for institutional counterparts.	JCP SRL	18/10/2012	01/11/2013	€44,625.00	€13,387.50
DCI-MED	Fisheries	22236	2013	314452	Ongoing	Recruitment of consultant for drafting of procurement documents	SCOTT	12/05/2013	31/08/2013	€7,500.00	€-
DCI-MED	Multi	23587	2013	319684	Decided	Workshop for National Export Strategy	AIDE A LA DECISION ECONOMIQUE SA		19/07/2013	€19,872.00	€-
DCI-MED	Multi	23587	2013	318571	Ongoing	Formulation of an action in support for PFM reform in Yemen with a focus on fiscal decentralisation	IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA	06/06/2013	21/07/2013	€69,454.00	€20,836.20



## 8.5 Inventory of interventions financed through thematic programmes

The inventory below details all projects funded between 2002 and 2012 that relate to the Decisions for thematic instruments and programmes.

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
ADM-MULTI	Multi	19144	2007	141288	Closed	External Audit of YDF Grant Contract	MOORE STEPHENS LLP	11/09/2007	25/09/2007	€24,146.60	€24,146.60
CDC	Governance	5002	2003	52256	Closed	Capacity building network-strengthening civil society in Yemen	YEMENI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION	20/12/2003	01/10/2006	€308,372.00	€308,372.00
DCI-FOOD	Food and Agriculture	21709	2012	292194	Ongoing	Improved Management of under 5 Children and Women Malnutrition in Central Hodeidah Governorate.	PREMIERE URGENCE – AIDE MEDICALE INTERNATIONALE ASSOCIATION	28/06/2012	28/06/2014	€800,000.00	€333,063.84
DCI-FOOD	Food and Agriculture	21709	2010	255890	Ongoing	Preventing and mitigating malnutrition among children under five and pregnant and lactating mothers	UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND	16/12/2010	30/09/2014	€4,800,000.00	€2,869,735.00
DCI-FOOD	Food and Agriculture	19125	2009	217594	Closed	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND SUPERVISION SERVICES FOR CONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION OF A: LANDING AND AUCTION SITES AND RELATED BUILDINGS AT SHOQRA (ABYAN GOVERNORATE), DOCK YARD (ADEN GOVERNORATE), SALIF (AL-HODEIDAH GOVERNORATE). – RIDER 1	QASEM MOHAMED QAID ALMEHANI	05/09/2009	12/10/2011	€38,010.00	€38,010.00
DCI-FOOD	Food and Agriculture	19125	2010	232665	Ongoing	Social Welfare Fund support Programme – phase III 2nd Programme Estimate	SOCIAL WELFARE FUND	13/07/2010	31/12/2011	€642,742.00	€295,796.49
DCI-FOOD	Food and Agriculture	19125	2009	227537	Ongoing	1st Programme estimate	SOCIAL WELFARE FUND	31/08/2009	31/12/2009	€261,834.00	€209,467.20
DCI-FOOD	Food and Agriculture	19125	2009	200249	Closed	Formulation of EC Action Fiche for Yemen Food Security Support Programme under MIP 2007-2010	TRANSTEC SA	09/03/2009	14/07/2009	€102,787.86	€102,787.86
DCI-FOOD	Food and Agriculture	20458	2010	219011	Ongoing	Support to the purchasing power of those poor most affected by the latest price increases through Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT)	SOCIAL WELFARE FUND	21/02/2010	20/08/2013	€4,240,000.00	€3,816,000.00
DCI-FOOD	Food and Agriculture	19125;20458;23587	2009	201781	Ongoing	Technical Assistance in Support to the SWF-III	GOPA-GESELLSCHAFT FÜR ORGANISATIONPLANUNG UND AUSBILDUNG MBH	09/04/2009	10/02/2013	€2,259,905.00	€1,807,924.00
DCI-FOOD	Food and Agriculture	19125	2009	209900	Ongoing	start up programme estimate	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	01/04/2009	30/09/2009	€175,219.00	€175,219.00
DCI-FOOD	Food and Agriculture	21494	2009	212816	Closed	Towards the recovery of households' food production capacities, improved coping mechanisms and a mitigated impact of the rise of food prices.	TRIANGLE GENERATION HUMANITAIRE ASSOCIATION	08/12/2009	31/12/2011	€1,175,020.00	€1,175,020.00

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
DCI-FOOD	Food and Agriculture	21494	2009	225417	Closed	Optimise the agricultural production and improve nutritional behaviours in rural areas in Dhamar Governorate, Yemen	CROIX ROUGE FRANCAISE ASSOCIATION	03/12/2009	31/12/2011	€1,440,000.00	€1,440,000.00
DCI-HUM	Human Rights and Democracy	19818	2008	165090	Closed	Printing of posters	MOHIALDIN SAEED SAEED ALDUBAI	18/09/2008	31/12/2008	€483.00	€483.00
DCI-MIGR	Migration	20206	2008	153440	Ongoing	Creation of a national asylum system and enhancing protection and self-reliance of refugees in Yemen	UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES	18/12/2008	31/01/2012	€1,440,000.00	€1,295,999.00
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	19404	2008	171260	Closed	Basic Life Support and School Health in Sa'ada Governorate – Republic of Yemen	ASSOCIATION MEDECINS DU MONDE	22/12/2008	23/03/2011	€400,310.26	€400,310.26
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	19404	2008	159747	Ongoing	Strengthening Capacity of Yemeni Civil Society Organisations in Development Cooperation	ISLAMIC RELIEF WORLDWIDE	30/12/2008	01/07/2011	€377,121.75	€303,173.25
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	19404	2008	171392	Closed	Water, Sanitation and Health Project for the Empowerment of Local Actors and Women in Hajja Governorate, Yemen	VISION HOPE INTERNATIONAL EV	23/12/2008	24/12/2010	€288,377.52	€288,377.52
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	20081	2009	212344	Ongoing	Perspectives for Muhamasheen Children and Youth in Sana'a	CARE DEUTSCHLAND-LUXEMBURG EV	16/12/2009	28/02/2013	€499,500.00	€449,550.00
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	20081	2009	212302	Ongoing	Raising the health awareness among women and men about reproductive health issues	YEMENI WOMEN UNION	02/12/2009	30/06/2013	€324,000.00	€263,801.87
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	21105	2010	242857	Ongoing	Resourcing Youth Futures in Hajjah Governorate	CARE DEUTSCHLAND-LUXEMBURG EV	14/12/2010	30/06/2015	€499,662.98	€108,109.59
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	21105	2009	228743	Ongoing	HIV and AIDS in Yemen: Low Prevalence but High Vulnerability	CATHOLIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LBG	30/12/2009	30/04/2014	€304,087.00	€273,680.00
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	20081;21105	2009	228406	Ongoing	ADWER Al zahra Association Development for Women Community Empowerment and Civil Society Reinforcement	AL ZAHRA SOCIAL VOCATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR WOMAN DEVELOPMENT	20/12/2009	30/06/2012	€347,250.00	€312,525.00
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	19404	2008	171276	Closed	Improvement of the sanitary conditions of the population in 11 villages of Dhamar Governorate, Yemen	CROIX ROUGE FRANCAISE ASSOCIATION	23/12/2008	24/12/2010	€276,364.12	€276,364.12
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	21105	2010	242730	Ongoing	Strengthening of Civil Society Organisations and Youth empowerment in Yemen	DEUTSCHES ROTES KREUZ EV	14/12/2010	31/05/2014	€500,000.00	€183,197.54
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	20083	2009	207015	Closed	organising information meetings on NSA and LAs	YEMEN HOTELS AND INVESTMENT JOINT STOCK COMPANY	12/08/2009	12/09/2009	€5,419.54	€5,419.54
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	21107	2010	246326	Closed	Project Cycle Management and Proposal Writing Training for Yemeni Non-State Actors and Local Authorities	DEVELOPMENT SERVICES CENTRE JSC	05/08/2010	05/09/2010	€17,775.34	€17,775.34
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	21107	2010	233301	Closed	Information meetings and capacity building on Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development 2009/2010 Yemen	GRABUNDZIJA	23/03/2010	23/06/2010	€9,900.00	€9,900.00

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	20083	2009	212329	Closed	Reproductive health improvement programme	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	16/12/2009	31/07/2011	€172,911.60	€172,911.60
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	21107	2010	242808	Closed	Building Youth capacity in Nagrah District	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	14/12/2010	01/01/2012	€26,784.00	€26,784.00
DCI-NSAPVD	Multi	21107	2010	242851	Ongoing	Developing the youth abilities at the profitable projects and integrating minorities into societies	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	14/12/2010	31/12/2012	€205,118.00	€194,571.90
DCI-NSAPVD	Social Development	22312	2011	242751	Ongoing	Promoting Rights of People with Disabilities in Yemen	ARAB HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION	21/05/2011	31/05/2013	€300,237.30	€270,213.57
DCI-NSAPVD	Social Development	22312	2010	242805	Ongoing	Establishing a Centre for children Victims of antipersonnel landmine	SEYAJ ORGANIZATION FOR CHILDHOOD PROTECTING FOUNDATION	17/01/2011	31/12/2013	€334,151.06	€300,735.95
DCI-NSAPVD	Social Development	22941	2012	290003	Ongoing	Project for the Empowerment of People with Disabilities	KHADIJA FOUNDATION FOR DEVELOPMENT	29/11/2012	31/01/2015	€684,000.00	€430,667.56
DCI-NSAPVD	Social Development	22941	2012	290176	Ongoing	Youth voices project	STUDIES AND ECONOMIC MEDIA CENTER ASSOCIATION	13/12/2012	31/01/2015	€332,367.00	€191,287.44
DCI-NSAPVD	Social Development	23482	2012	290407	Ongoing	Enhancing Social Integration and Economic Empowerment of Marginalised Groups in Dar Saad and Sheikh Othman, Aden	DANSK FLYGTNINGEJAELEP FORENING	29/11/2012	31/07/2014	€504,000.00	€287,313.32
DCI-NSAPVD	Social Development	23482	2012	290418	Ongoing	Positive Coping – building resilience to promote peace, participation and protection for Yemeni children and young people	RED BARNET FORENING	02/11/2012	31/12/2014	€669,912.52	€288,905.43
DDH	Human Rights and Democracy	5535	2001	66855	Closed	Consolidation de l'Etat de Droit et des Institutions Démocratiques au Yémen par la Formation Déontologique des Forces de sécurité intérieure	CIVI POL CONSEIL,SOCIETE DE CONSEILET DE SERVICE DU MINISTERE DE L'INTERIEUR SA	14/12/2002	31/12/2005	€362,966.44	€362,966.44
DDH	Human Rights and Democracy	18328	2006	125512	Closed	EU Election Observation Mission to Yemen	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	22/08/2006	14/07/2007	€2,464,479.00	€2,464,479.00
DDH	Human Rights and Democracy	18328	2006	125515	Closed	Chief Observer for EU EOM Yemen 2006, Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne	BARONESS NICHOLSON OF WINTERBOURNE	11/08/2006	31/07/2007	€10,944.40	€10,944.40
DDH	Human Rights and Democracy	18012	2006	121064	Closed	ELE – EC Exploratory mission for Yemen Presidential and Local Council Elections	AGRER SA	24/05/2006	30/06/2006	€56,012.05	€56,012.05
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	19719	2009	200412	Closed	Stop early marriage and exchange marriage	CHARITABLE SOCIETY FOR SOCIAL WELFARE ASSOCIATION	03/11/2009	31/10/2011	€241,359.94	€241,359.94
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	19719	2009	200464	Closed	Armed Conflicts and Trafficking, Child Prevention program	CIVIC DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES SUPPORT FOUNDATION ASSOCIATION	29/10/2009	31/08/2011	€146,697.00	€146,697.00

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	19719	2009	200467	Closed	Eliminating early marriage awareness raising program	CIVIC DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES SUPPORT FOUNDATION ASSOCIATION	29/10/2009	31/07/2011	€160,433.62	€160,433.62
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	19719	2008	170610	Closed	Information meeting for local NGOs on EIDHR Yemen 2008	ISLAMIC RELIEF YEMEN ASSOCIATION	21/12/2008	22/01/2009	€7,770.00	€7,770.00
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	19719	2009	204153	Closed	EIDHR PCM training for Yemeni civil society organisations	KING HUSSEIN BIN TALAL FOUNDATION	29/03/2009	29/04/2009	€9,999.00	€9,999.00
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	19719	2009	200410	Closed	Enhancing human rights and democracy principles among children through short stories (our rights)	SEYAJ ORGANIZATION FOR CHILDHOOD PROTECTING FOUNDATION	28/10/2009	01/03/2011	€46,267.56	€46,267.56
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	19719	2009	200469	Closed	Yemeni Parliament Watch (YPW)	YEMEN POLLING CENTER FOUNDATION	29/10/2009	31/05/2011	€212,501.00	€212,501.00
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	19719	2009	200470	Closed	Empowering women to obtain their rights	YEMENI WOMEN UNION	01/11/2009	01/12/2010	€33,498.00	€33,498.00
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	21318	2010	254402	Ongoing	Female Inmates Capacity Enhancement (FICE) Programme	ABO MOUSA ALASHARY SOCIAL CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION	06/12/2010	31/12/2012	€218,778.05	€218,778.05
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	21318	2010	253303	Ongoing	Fighting torture of children	FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY SCHOOL	21/11/2010	31/10/2012	€220,500.00	€220,131.12
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	21318	2010	236955	Ongoing	KARAMA – DIGNITY: Law Governance Prevailing and Enhancing Anti-Torture Culture	TRANSPARENCY CENTER FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCHES ASSOCIATION	30/10/2010	30/09/2013	€79,106.04	€69,088.94
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	21318	2010	253152	Ongoing	Radio Programs for Human Rights	YEMEN MEDIA WOMEN S FORUM FOUNDATION	31/10/2010	30/04/2012	€250,000.00	€208,570.43
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	22196	2011	271049	Ongoing	White voices towards freedom of expressions and media	POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT FORUM LTD	27/11/2011	30/11/2013	€184,100.36	€165,690.32
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	22196	2011	271032	Ongoing	Young Activists team	SEYAJ ORGANIZATION FOR CHILDHOOD PROTECTING FOUNDATION	02/12/2011	31/12/2012	€99,415.04	€79,532.03
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	22196	2011	271452	Ongoing	National project for controlling an arbitrary arrestment and applying the law governance	TAIZ CENTRE FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCHES ASSOCIATION	17/12/2011	31/07/2013	€67,255.71	€60,530.14

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	22196	2011	271029	Ongoing	Civil Society Forum	YEMEN POLLING CENTER FOUNDATION	27/11/2011	31/12/2013	€199,999.96	€77,805.91
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	22810	2012	304400	Ongoing	Dummy Contract to make remaining payments on EIDHR/2010/254402	ABO MOUSA ALASHARY SOCIAL CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION	06/12/2012	31/07/2013	€90,953.47	€69,075.67
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	22810	2012	282157	Ongoing	Advocacy to Governance: Institutionalising the youth movement	RANIN AL-YEMEN FOUNDATION	13/01/2012	31/08/2013	€174,896.45	€156,946.58
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	22810	2012	291935	Ongoing	Towards Yemen's National Dialogue – general Opinions and Expectations	YEMEN POLLING CENTER FOUNDATION	28/04/2012	28/09/2012	€242,178.00	€240,746.00
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	22810; 23791	2012	308473	Ongoing	Media Freedom: Monitoring and Advocacy	FREEDOM FOUNDATION FOR MEDIA FREEDOM RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT	30/12/2012	28/02/2015	€299,820.00	€164,942.20
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	22810	2012	307830	Ongoing	Improving the lives of female detainees and their children in prison in Yemen	DANSK RODE KORS	31/12/2012	28/02/2015	€250,000.00	€112,430.76
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	19719	2009	219935	Closed	Information meeting featuring prominently the subject of death penalty in the occasion of the European Day of Death Penalty within the framework of EIDHR	YEMEN HOTELS AND INVESTMENT JOINT STOCK COMPANY	07/11/2009	07/12/2009	€4,690.35	€4,690.35
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	20103	2009	172285	Closed	ELE – Exploratory mission for possible EU EOM to Yemen Legislative elections 2009	TRANSTEC SA	21/01/2009	15/03/2009	€61,515.16	€61,515.16
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	21318	2010	231378	Closed	Information meetings and capacity building on EIDHR 2009 Yemen	GRABUNDZIJA	10/02/2010	10/05/2010	€8,560.00	€8,560.00
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	21318	2010	258023	Closed	EU Consultation meeting with Human Rights Defenders in Yemen	SABA A HOTELS COMPANY LIMITED	13/12/2010	12/01/2011	€2,500.00	€2,500.00
EIDHR	Human Rights and Democracy	22810	2012	307520	Ongoing	Strengthening CSO capacities in financial management and reporting	MOORE STEPHENS LLP	10/12/2012	14/10/2013	€112,409.00	€22,481.80
FINHCRI S			2012	283402	Provisional	ELE – EEM YEMEN 2012 – Election Expert Mission to Yemen Presidential Elections	TRANSTEC SA		31/07/2012	€99,386.00	€-
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	18049	2007	147002	Closed	Integrated food security project in Marawah district, Wadi Siham area, Hodeida Governorate, Republic of Yemen	TRIANGLE GENERATION HUMANITAIRE ASSOCIATION	20/12/2007	21/06/2011	€1,487,475.00	€1,487,475.00

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2343	2005	99734	Closed	TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR AN EVALUATION OF THE YEMEN FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMME – INFRASTRUCTURE COMPONENT AND A SUBSEQUENT FORMULATION MISSION FOR THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED UNDER THE 2005-2006 PROGRAMME	CARDNO EMERGING MARKETS (UK) LTD	04/04/2005	13/10/2005	€103,296.70	€103,296.70
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2343	2004	80080	Closed	Formulation of an Institutional Capacity Development Programme	CARDNO EMERGING MARKETS (UK) LTD	05/04/2004	31/12/2004	€36,238.02	€36,238.02
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2343	2004	80077	Closed	Technical Assistance for the Creation of a Water Users' Association of the Barquqa Irrigation Scheme	EURONET CONSULTING GEIE	19/03/2004	31/05/2005	€88,790.94	€88,790.94
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2343	2001	47270	Closed	GFA- Implementation and Monitoring of FSP	GFA CONSULTING GROUP GMBH	01/06/2002	01/06/2007	€2,525,110.00	€2,525,110.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2343	2004	89863	Closed	GOPA extra activities within the Social Welfare Fund Project	GOPA-GESELLSCHAFT FUR ORGANISATIONPLANUNG UND AUSBILDUNG MBH	02/11/2004	30/06/2006	€101,325.00	€101,325.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2343	2005	110451	Closed	Support to Social Welfare Fund: Rider 5 for a 2-month extension	GOPA-GESELLSCHAFT FUR ORGANISATIONPLANUNG UND AUSBILDUNG MBH	31/10/2005	30/06/2006	€73,569.86	€73,569.86
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2343	2003	75990	Closed	Mid-term Review of the Market Information System YEMEN	TRANSTEC SA	05/01/2004	31/12/2004	€47,131.27	€47,131.27
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2511	2000	48392	Closed	AT AGRER/VAZZANA/CN0432	AGRER SA	08/06/2001	20/02/2002	€107,368.18	€107,368.18
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2511	2000	48395	Closed	GFA -	GFA CONSULTING GROUP GMBH	01/06/2002	01/06/2007	€553,700.00	€553,700.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2511	2000	48394	Closed	GOPA – Social Welfare Fund	GOPA-GESELLSCHAFT FUR ORGANISATIONPLANUNG UND AUSBILDUNG MBH	21/05/2002	30/06/2006	€1,290,505.36	€1,290,505.36
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2511	2000	4275	Closed	Completion of the mapping exercise	NEI B.V.	19/03/2002	31/10/2002	€20,565.61	€20,565.61
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2521	1998	48481	Closed	Avenant contrat Agristudio Agricultural statistics	AGRISTUDIO SRL	23/08/2002	30/06/2005	€165,139.00	€165,139.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2521	2002	37218	Closed	Design of protection and consolidation works for the Barquqa Irrigation Scheme	EURONET CONSULTING GEIE	08/05/2003	12/07/2003	€44,353.36	€44,353.36
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2521	1998	48480	Closed	GFA TERRA SYSTEMS – B98/1132-YEM/AIDCO/1998/2178/2 – GPA MARKETING INFORMATION SYSTEM	GFA CONSULTING GROUP GMBH	11/05/2001	14/06/2005	€984,638.28	€984,638.28

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2521	2005	104892	Closed	Support to Social Welfare Fund: Rider 4 for a 3-month extension	GOPA-GESELLSCHAFT FUR ORGANISATIONPLANUNG UND AUSBILDUNG MBH	30/06/2005	31/12/2005	€192,271.72	€192,271.72
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	3022	1997	10021	Closed	Mid-Term review 1998	AGRICONSULTING EUROPE SA	18/04/2002		€61,386.03	€61,386.03
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	3022	1997	51295	Closed		AGRISTUDIO	03/04/2000	30/06/2005	€803,636.94	€803,636.94
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	16826	2009	210432	Closed	Audit of Construction of Irrigation Works at Al Khalifa Area, Hodeida	ERNST AND YOUNG BEDRIJFSREVISOREN CVBA	26/08/2009	28/02/2010	€42,327.68	€42,327.68
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	16826	2007	146199	Closed	Setting up a Food Security Information System in the Government of Hodeida	GFA CONSULTING GROUP GMBH	15/11/2007	15/11/2010	€1,025,000.00	€1,025,000.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	16826	2005	115800	Closed	Support to Social Welfare Fund: Rider 6 for a 6-month extension.	GOPA-GESELLSCHAFT FUR ORGANISATIONPLANUNG UND AUSBILDUNG MBH	30/12/2005	30/06/2006	€162,275.42	€162,275.42
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	16826	2007	146058	Closed	Mid-Term Review of the Technical Assistance to the TDA	IBF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING SA	11/01/2008	10/02/2008	€39,552.00	€39,552.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	16826	2006	122789	Closed	Upgrading of the Tihama's Development Authority Financing & Accounting System – Yemen	INVESTISSEMENT DEVELOPPEMENT CONSEIL SA	27/06/2006	15/02/2008	€117,950.58	€117,950.58
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	16826	2009	221810	Closed	Audit of Annual Work Plan – 2004-5 Biannual Food Security Programme	MAZARS SA	14/12/2009	10/05/2010	€28,455.00	€28,455.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	16826	2007	145732	Ongoing	Construction of Irrigation Works at Al Khalifa Area, Hodeida	UNITED FOR ENGINEERING PROJECTS & OILFIELDS SERVICES LIMITED LIABILITYCOMPANY	10/11/2007	11/05/2009	€935,042.39	€477,074.38
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	17670	2007	144870	Closed	Assessment of the Environmental Conditions of Al-Khalifah Command Area at Wadi Siham-Hodeida	CITCS CONSULTING CENTER LLC	21/11/2007	13/12/2007	€2,800.00	€2,800.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	17670	2007	144874	Closed	Assessment of the Socio-Economic conditions Study of Al-Khalifah Command Area at Wadi Siham – Hodeida.	CITCS CONSULTING CENTER LLC	21/11/2007	22/01/2008	€5,000.00	€5,000.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	17670	2008	164755	Closed	Supply and delivery of 4 Hydraulic Excavators, Volvo Model EC 210 blc Sweden with attachments, prescribed spare parts, and O&M manuals.	ELAGHIL TRADING CO LTD	04/09/2008	31/12/2009	€582,692.00	€582,692.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	17670	2008	164756	Closed	Supply and delivery of 2 Front loaders, Volvo Model L 110F Sweden with attachments, prescribed spare parts and O&M manuals	ELAGHIL TRADING CO LTD	04/09/2008	31/12/2009	€410,182.00	€410,182.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	17670	2006	126270	Closed	Implementation and monitoring of FSP: addendum 5	GFA CONSULTING GROUP GMBH	17/10/2006	02/06/2007	€216,099.29	€216,099.29

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	18049	2007	147050	Ongoing	Food Security project for fishermen communities in Al Mokha and Dhubbab districts	ASSOCIATION DIA	24/12/2007	25/12/2011	€1,350,000.00	€1,214,764.46
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	18512	2010	234459	Closed	Supply of computers to implement the Food Security Information System (FSIS) in Yemen	ABDULLAH MOHAMMED MUJAHED AL KHABBAS	13/06/2010	13/06/2011	€9,160.00	€9,160.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	18512	2010	234471	Closed	Supply of office equipment to implement the Food Security Information System (FSIS) in Yemen	ABDULLAH MOHAMMED MUJAHED AL KHABBAS	13/06/2010	13/06/2011	€9,994.00	€9,994.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	18512	2008	168375	Closed	Setting up a Food Security Information System in the Government of Hodeida – Rider of CTR 146-199	GFA CONSULTING GROUP GMBH	19/11/2008	17/06/2011	€199,900.00	€199,900.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	18512	2009	208373	Closed	Setting up a Food Security Information System in the Government of Hodeida – Rider 2 of CTR 146-199 (The rider1 was encoded as contract 168-375)	GFA CONSULTING GROUP GMBH	25/05/2009	25/06/2011	€354,884.96	€354,884.96
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	18512	2009	201785	Ongoing	Technical assistance in increasing water management and productivity in the Tihama	GOPA-GESELLSCHAFT FUR ORGANISATIONPLANUNG UND AUSBILDUNG MBH	18/03/2009	31/03/2013	€1,489,938.05	€1,295,349.65
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	18512	2008	160589	Closed	Dummy contract in favour of TRANSTEC for a final payment due under contract No 128-319 – Yemen: Feasibility study: Setting-up of a Food Security Info. System	TRANSTEC SA	22/06/2008	23/08/2008	€67,974.40	€67,974.40
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	16826; 17670	2006	129275	Closed	Technical assistance to Tihama Development Authority	EUROCONSULT MOTT MACDONALD BV	24/11/2006	31/12/2008	€1,354,291.46	€1,354,291.46
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	16826; 17670	2006	128189	Closed	Technical assistance to the Social Welfare Fund – Phase II	GOPA-GESELLSCHAFT FUR ORGANISATIONPLANUNG UND AUSBILDUNG MBH	09/11/2006	15/12/2008	€1,044,163.98	€1,044,163.98
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	16826; 17670	2007	146175	Closed	Supply of Ground Monitoring Equipment, Tihama Development Authority, Hodeida	SEBA HYDROMETRIE GMBH	15/11/2007	30/09/2008	€118,268.40	€118,268.40
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2511; 3022	2005	109190	Closed	Systems & financial audit of the Foreign Exchange Facility under Food Security Programmes 1998 2000 2001	MOORE STEPHENS LLP	14/03/2006	30/06/2006	€58,935.00	€58,935.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2343	2004	80856	Closed	Memorandum of Understanding 2001	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	27/09/2004	28/09/2007	€9,000,000.00	€9,000,000.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2511	2003	57297	Closed	Memorandum of Understanding 2000	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	20/04/2003	24/02/2005	€9,000,000.00	€9,000,000.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	2521	1998	48479	Closed	MINISTRY OF PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	12/06/2000		€10,000,000.00	€10,000,000.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	3022	1997	51297	Closed	FACILITE EN DEVICES	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	28/02/2000	31/12/2002	€10,000,000.00	€10,000,000.00



Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	17670	2008	157596	Ongoing	Annual Work Plan – 2004-2005 Biannual Food Security Programme	TIHAMA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY	07/05/2008	30/06/2012	€4,365,959.00	€4,332,855.22
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	17670	2008	155655	Closed	Pre-financing AWP 2008	TIHAMA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY	14/04/2008	31/12/2008	€50,000.00	€50,000.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	18512	2009	218616	Ongoing	OPE – TDA phase II – Yemen	TIHAMA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY	08/12/2009	07/03/2013	€3,000,000.00	€2,865,470.16
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	4953	2004	84272	Closed	Hajja Governorate Food Security and Women's Empowerment Project – YEMEN	CARE DEUTSCHLAND-LUXEMBURG EV	30/12/2004	31/12/2007	€896,346.00	€896,346.00
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	4953	2004	84296	Closed	Improvement of food security thorough women economic empowerment and capacity building in the Governorates of Taiz and Lahj, Republic of Yemen	COOPI – COOPERAZIONE INTERNAZIONALE FONDAZIONE	31/12/2004	31/12/2008	€898,022.14	€898,022.14
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	6190	2004	88073	Closed	Market Information Systems Phase 2 Republic of Yemen	GFA CONSULTING GROUP GMBH	27/09/2004	28/03/2007	€853,705.34	€853,705.34
FOOD	Food and Agriculture	18115	2006	128319	Closed	Yemen: Feasibility study: Setting-up of a Food Security Info. System	TRANSTEC SA	28/12/2006	31/12/2007	€101,961.60	€101,961.60
IFS-RRM	Governance	22613	2010	251272	Closed	Contribute to the Improvement of Information Sharing among Yemeni Security Agencies	CIVI POL CONSEIL SOCIETE DE CONSEIL ET DE SERVICE DU MINISTERE DE L'INTERIEUR SA	14/10/2010	15/04/2012	€5,125,000.00	€5,125,000.00
IFS-RRM	Governance	22613	2010	252651	Ongoing	Strengthening Social Cohesion in Conflict-Affected Areas in Yemen	DAR AL-SALAM ORGANIZATION FOUNDATION	27/10/2010	28/04/2012	€211,000.00	€209,600.41
IFS-RRM	Governance	22613	2010	251316	Ongoing	Citizens Empowerment in Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding Programme	ISLAMIC RELIEF YEMEN ASSOCIATION	30/10/2010	31/12/2012	€498,671.03	€448,671.03
IFS-RRM	Governance	22613	2010	251183	Ongoing	Yemen Tribal Mediation and Conflict Resolution Programme	PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGEINTERNATIONAL AISBL	01/11/2010	01/11/2012	€210,000.00	€210,000.00
IFS-RRM	Governance	22613	2010	251292	Ongoing	Promoting Moderation to Stabilise Yemen	SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND VZW	04/01/2011	31/07/2013	€1,267,786.65	€562,545.07
IFS-RRM	Governance	22613	2011	280447	Ongoing	Preventing Radicalisation: Preparing Resiliency Projects with Yemeni Civil Society	PURSUE LTD	21/12/2011	11/09/2013	€299,500.00	€149,750.00
IFS-RRM	Governance	22613	2013	320059	Provisional	Strengthening Public Participation: Local Dialogues			31/07/2014	€432,182.36	€-
IFS-RRM	Security and Justice	22458	2011	278872	Ongoing	Security Governance in Yemen – Conditions and framework for a multi-layered security network	YEMEN POLLING CENTER FOUNDATION	27/12/2011	30/09/2014	€300,000.00	€113,532.00

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
IFS-RRM	Security and Justice		2009	220714	Ongoing	Empowering Government and Civil Societies in Yemen to Address mixed migration	INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION	17/12/2009	01/07/2011	€2,000,000.00	€1,716,009.35
IFS-RRM	Security and Justice		2013	320942	Provisional	Support to the Implementation of Transitional Justice in Yemen	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME		31/10/2014	€1,000,000.00	€-
IFS-RRM	Security and Justice	22267	2010	234711	Closed	IFS 2008/05-08/024 Yemen	MACDONALD	25/01/2010	25/03/2010	€35,379.71	€35,379.71
IFS-RRM	Security and Justice	23116	2012	298252	Ongoing	Provision of Technical Assistance to Restructuring Committee of Ministry of Interior	FRANCE EXPERTISE INTERNATIONALE	19/07/2012	19/08/2013	€482,950.00	€193,180.00
IFS-RRM	Security and Justice	23116	2012	288111	Closed	Support to Joint Socio-Economic Impact Assessment	LANDELL MILLS LIMITED	13/03/2012	11/09/2012	€159,898.00	€159,898.00
IFS-RRM	Security and Justice		2013	320940	Provisional	Support to the Yemen National Dialogue and Constitutional Reform Trust Fund (YNDCRTF)			31/07/2014	€1,500,000.00	€-
MAP	Security and Justice	17969	2007	143973	Closed	Support to eliminate the impact from mines and ERW in Yemen, Phase III	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	19/09/2007	20/03/2010	€1,870,342.02	€1,870,342.02
MIGR	Migration	18381	2007	129659	Closed	Improvement of the reception conditions for asylum seekers in Yemen and enhancing the legislative and institutional framework for Somali refugees.	UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES	12/12/2007	30/06/2009	€1,095,030.00	€1,095,030.00
ONG-PVD	Social Development	1092	2003	19915	Closed	LAST CHANCE TO FREEDOM – reintegration into civil society of women, children and minors in conflict with the law, Yemen	RICERCA E COOPERAZIONE	11/03/2003	15/06/2006	€490,323.00	€490,323.00
ONG-PVD	Social Development	4562	2004	60905	Closed	WESTERN HIGHLANDS RURAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT – YEMEN	CARE DEUTSCHLAND-LUXEMBURG EV	24/05/2004	25/02/2007	€734,406.99	€734,406.99
ONG-PVD	Social Development	4562	2004	61295	Closed	COMMUNITY-BASED PRIMARY HEALTH CARE PROJECT IN HADHRAMOUT – YEMEN	OXFAM GB LBG	03/09/2004	15/03/2008	€669,489.96	€669,489.96
ONG-PVD	Social Development	18227	2007	135156	Closed	Improve the provision of primary health care in Yemen, in the governorate of Hajjah	ASSOCIATION MEDECINS DU MONDE	04/11/2007	05/11/2009	€410,373.69	€410,373.69
ONG-PVD	Social Development		1993	18282	Closed	Rural PHC support project, Yemen	CATHOLIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LBG	10/02/1993	10/02/1997	€384,688.00	€384,688.00
ONG-PVD	Social Development		1993	10398	Closed	Urban primary health care support project, Yemen	CATHOLIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LBG	10/02/1993	10/02/1996	€225,176.00	€225,176.00
ONG-PVD	Social Development		1998	10876	Closed	PRIMARY HEALTH CARE IN HODEIDAH – YEMEN	CATHOLIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LBG	19/11/1998	19/11/2001	€447,550.00	€447,550.00
ONG-PVD	Social Development		1998	10877	Closed	SUPPORT SUSTAINABLE PRIMARY HEALTH CARE IN RAYMAH – YEMEN	CATHOLIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LBG	26/11/1998	26/11/2001	€395,001.00	€395,001.00

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
ONG-PVD	Social Development		2001	11871	Closed	SOUTIEN A LA CREATION D'UN CENTRE DE REHABILITATION (SOINSKINESITHERAPEUTIQUES ET PRODUCTION D'APPAREILLAGESORTHOPEDIQUES) DANS LA VILLE D'ADEN EN FAVEUR DES PERSONNESHANDICAPEES DES GOUVERNORATS D'ADEN, LAHEJ ET ABYAN – YEMEN	HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL ASBL	19/01/2002	01/01/2006	€992,996.31	€992,996.31
ONG-PVD	Social Development		1996	10540	Closed	ORTHOPAEDIC AND PHYSIOTHERAPY ASSISTANCE TO PEOPLE WITHPHYSICAL HANDICAPS IN THE PROVINCES OF TAIZ, IBB AND LAHEJ,REPUBLIC OF YEMEN	HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL ASBL	02/01/1997	02/07/2002	€402,591.00	€402,591.00
ONG-PVD	Social Development		1996	17262	Closed	BG 96	HOMELESS INTERNATIONAL LBG	28/02/1996	28/02/1997	€75,000.00	€75,000.00
ONG-PVD	Social Development		2001	11875	Closed	A PROJECT TO IMPROVE THE HEALTH OF LOW INCOME WOMEN ATREPRODUCTIVE AGE AND THEIR FAMILIES IN THE GOVERNORATES OFADEN TAIZ HADRAMOUT AND SANA'A – YEMEN	MARIE STOPES INTERNATIONAL LBG	01/01/2002	01/01/2007	€732,496.00	€732,496.00
ONG-PVD	Social Development		1993	18208	Closed	SALAKHANEH HEALTH CENTRE AND TRAINING PROGRAMME, YEMEN	OXFAM GB LBG	21/12/1993	21/12/1994	€67,185.00	€67,185.00
ONG-PVD	Social Development		1996	16594	Closed	CONSTRUCTION OF PERMANENT CLINIC AND LITERACY CENTRE FOR THESANAA URBAN SETTLEMENTS, YEMEN	OXFAM GB LBG	21/05/1996	21/05/1997	€81,422.00	€81,422.00
ONG-PVD	Social Development		1998	15048	Closed	COMMUNITY-BASED REHABILITATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN FORCHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES – YEMEN	RADDA BARNENS RIKSFORBUND IDEELLA FORENINGAR	06/10/1998	06/10/2001	€206,862.00	€206,862.00
ONG-PVD	Social Development	1092	2003	20221	Closed	PROGRAMME D'ASSISTANCE ET D'INTEGRATION DES POPULATIONS DEFAVORISEES DE LA VILLE DE TAIZ, YEMEN	ASSOCIATION DIA	20/02/2003	01/03/2006	€614,555.00	€614,555.00
ONG-PVD	Social Development	18227	2007	135309	Ongoing	Support to the social-economical integration of the most excluded community in Yemen, the 'Akhdam' –living in Taiz city and all around	ASSOCIATION DIA	17/10/2007	18/02/2012	€700,000.00	€629,999.55
ONG-PVD	Social Development		2005	110431	Closed	Audit – Last Chance to Freedom	MOORE STEPHENS LLP	30/11/2005	31/05/2006	€11,225.00	€11,225.00

Domain	Sub-sector	Decision number	Contract year	Contract number	Status	Title	Contracting party	Contractor's signature date	Expiry date	Planned amount	Paid
ONG-PVD	Social Development		2007	131761	Closed	Financial audit in both London and Sana'a Marie Stopes International under NGO co-financing grant contract A project to improve the health of low income women of reproductive age in Aden, Taiz, Hadramout and Sana'a CRIS 11875	MOORE STEPHENS LLP	06/02/2007	01/01/2008	€39,138.00	€39,138.00
REH	Economic Development	3866	2001	54459	Closed	Water Infrastructures and Access Roads Rehabilitation in Wadi Hadramaut	TRIANGLE GENERATION HUMANITAIRE ASSOCIATION	08/03/2002	07/03/2004	€1,719,392.00	€1,719,392.00
REH	Economic Development	4078	1998	55205	Closed	Lahaj Water Supply Schemes	MOVIMENTO AFRICA 70 ASSOCIAZIONE	17/12/1999	16/06/2003	€499,803.82	€499,803.82
REH	Economic Development	3671	1998	54264	Closed	Ibb/Lahaj Water Supply System	UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND	03/08/2000	02/08/2002	€1,440,000.00	€1,440,000.00
REH	Economic Development	3778	1996	54371	Closed	Water Supply Systems in 3 Southern Governorates	UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND	12/12/1996	31/12/2003	€448,580.13	€448,580.13
REH	Health	3677	1998	54270	Closed	Lahaj Primary Health Care	ASSOCIAZIONE COOPERAZIONE INTERNAZIONALE	23/09/1999	22/09/2002	€787,178.62	€787,178.62
REH	Health	4087	1998	55214	Closed	Taiz/Lahej Health and Education	ASSOCIATION DIA	15/09/1999	15/09/2001	€2,000,000.00	€2,000,000.00
SANTE	Health	4999	1997	65936	Closed	Technical Assistance to National MCH/FP/IEC Programme	HORIZON PROJECTS	14/06/2000	31/07/2002	€824,665.03	€824,665.03
SANTE	Health	5541	1996	68191	Closed	YEM/B7-6310/96/301 – EU assistance for information, education and communication (IEC) for a population and family planning programme	AL JUMHURIYAH AL YAMANIYAH	21/07/1997	31/12/2002	€346,096.20	€346,096.20
SANTE	Health		2003	65343	Closed	Evaluation of EC assistance to RH in Yemen	BMB MOTT MACDONALD BV	25/07/2003	15/08/2003	€65,705.40	€65,705.40

## 8.6 Inventory and summary analysis of DG ECHO operations, 2002-2013

Contract number	Year	Amount (€)	Contract title	Beneficiary type	Contract type	Contract begin operation	Contract end operation
ECHO/YEM/210/2002/01001	2002	425,000	Emergency Assistance to Basic Health Services in the Tihama strip	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	31/12/2002	30/10/2003
ECHO/YEM/210/2002/01002	2002	375,000	Rehabilitating and restoring maternal and child health care services in Dhala Governorate	Women	Operation (with FPA/	31/12/2002	31/12/2003
ECHO/YEM/210/2002/01003	2002	460,000	Post-crisis reconstruction and rehabilitation operation in favour of the population of Al Mahra Governorate, victims of hurricane	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (without F	31/12/2002	30/12/2003
ECHO/YEM/210/2002/01004	2002	330,000	Emergency assistance for water supply	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	31/12/2002	30/10/2003
ECHO/YEM/210/2002/01005	2002	32,000	Extension d'un réseau d'adduction d'eau et assistance technique aux populations bénéficiaires de districts d'Al Mokha et de al Wazeiah	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	15/12/2003	28/02/2004
ECHO/YEM/210/2003/01001	2003	505,821	Strengthening of PHC services, focused on the promotion of a safe motherhood, in rural areas of Taiz and Hodeida Governorates	Women	Operation (with FPA/	01/02/2004	28/02/2005
ECHO/YEM/210/2003/01002	2003	388,000	Alimentation en eau potable et amélioration des conditions sanitaires dans le Wadi Masila, gouvernorat de Al Mahra et de l'Hadramaout	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/03/2004	28/02/2005
ECHO/YEM/210/2003/01003	2003	387,250	Emergency assistance for water supply in Al Gorafy and Al Zukeriah, district of Al Mokha (Taiz Governorate)	Children	Operation (with FPA/	01/04/2004	28/02/2005
ECHO/YEM/210/2003/01004	2003	326,000	Rehabilitation and Restoration of Health Units and Maternal and Child Healthcare services	Women	Operation (with FPA/	01/04/2004	31/03/2005
ECHO/YEM/210/2003/01005	2003	380,000	Emergency obstetric care (management of complications of pregnancy and labour) targeting women in the Governorates of Al-Mahara, Hodeida and Al-Dhale	Women	Operation (with FPA/	01/04/2004	31/03/2005
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2004/01001	2004	223,321	Basic Service Provision for marginalised communities in Sana'a	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/02/2005	30/04/2006
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2004/01002	2004	460,050	Assistance for water supply, sanitation and flood mitigation in the north western periphery of Taiz city – Taiz Governorate	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/03/2005	30/04/2006
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2004/01003	2004	262,317	Protection des enfants des rues contre les abus au Yémen	Children	Operation (with FPA/	15/03/2005	30/04/2006
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2004/01004	2004	50,000	Survey of the water and sanitation situation within vulnerable communities in Dhala, Taiz and Lahej Governorates	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/03/2005	31/05/2005
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2004/01005	2004	312,908	Increased water safety for vulnerable communities in the Yemeni Western Highlands	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/03/2005	31/03/2006
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2004/01006	2004	450,000	Construction of shelters in Kharaz Refugee Camps	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/05/2005	30/04/2006
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2004/01007	2004	771,400	Extension of water services to 4 rural population settlements in 3 districts within Amran Ibb Governorates	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/04/2005	30/04/2006
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2005/01001	2005	500,000	Implementation of Supplemental Immunization Activities (SIAs) in response to the Polio Outbreak in Yemen	Children	Operation (with FPA/	27/09/2005	26/03/2006
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2005/02001	2005	440,701	Pilot project on malaria and outbreaks controls in Tihama region	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/02/2006	28/02/2007
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2005/02002	2005	382,202	Water sanitation, health awareness and increased preparedness to natural disasters for Yemeni rural communities in the governorate of Dhamar	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/04/2006	30/04/2007
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2005/02003	2005	525,000	Water and sanitation project for vulnerable communities of the governorate of Lahej	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/01/2006	30/04/2007

Contract number	Year	Amount (€)	Contract title	Beneficiary type	Contract type	Contract begin operation	Contract end operation
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2005/02004	2005	480,000	Contribution to safe motherhood and water availability in Gehaf, Al-Hussain and Al-Shuaib Districts, Dhala Governorate	Children	Operation (with FPA/)	01/02/2006	30/04/2007
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2005/02005	2005	669,116	Emergency assistance for water supply, sanitation and health in Al-Simel and Hessay-Salem areas – Taiz Governorate	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/05/2006	30/04/2007
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2007/01001	2007	800,000	Assistance for refugees	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/05/2007	30/04/2008
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2007/01002	2007	70,012	Follow-up of emergency assistance water & sanitation projects to ensure their sustainability	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	03/05/2007	02/11/2007
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2007/01003	2007	119,988	Improvement of water and sanitation conditions in vulnerable villages of Wadi Masila and Socotra Island	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/05/2007	30/11/2007
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2008/01001	2008	1,000,000	ICRC economic security and hospital activities	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	02/05/2008	01/11/2008
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2008/02001	2008	350,000	Hadramout Flood Response in Eastern Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/11/2008	30/04/2009
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2008/02002	2008	250,000	Emergency Assistance to Flood Victims in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	25/10/2008	24/12/2008
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2008/03001	2008	500,000	Assistance to refugees and asylum seekers	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/01/2009	31/12/2009
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2009/01001	2009	1,000,000	ICRC economic security activities	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/01/2009	31/12/2009
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2009/02001	2009	750,000	Emergency Assistance to Displaced Households in North Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	02/09/2009	01/03/2010
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2009/02002	2009	600,000	Nutrition and WASH humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected communities in Northern Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	02/09/2009	28/02/2010
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2009/02003	2009	150,000	Emergency humanitarian coordination in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/11/2009	30/04/2010
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2010/01001	2010	1,150,000	Sa'ada emergency: integrated water and sanitation hygiene (WASH) response and INGOF security response	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/06/2010	31/07/2011
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2010/01002	2010	2,000,000	ICRC economic security activities in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/05/2010	31/12/2010
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2010/01003	2010	500,000	Medical support to the northern conflict-affected population, Yemen.	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/09/2010	31/07/2011
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2010/01004	2010	500,000	Humanitarian coordination and advocacy in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/05/2010	31/07/2011
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2010/01005	2010	600,000	Emergency support to the conflict-affected population of the North of Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/06/2010	30/06/2011
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2010/01006	2010	2,650,000	Humanitarian assistance and protection to refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/05/2010	31/05/2011
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2010/01007	2010	2,600,000	Humanitarian assistance to persons IDPs, returnees and persons affected by the Sa'ada conflict	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/10/2010	31/07/2011
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2011/91001	2011	700,000	Yemen Humanitarian Protection and Assistance Programme	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/04/2011	31/05/2012
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2011/91002	2011	4,000,000	ICRC water/sanitation/habitat activities in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/01/2011	31/12/2011
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2011/91003	2011	750,000	Medical and nutrition support to the conflict-affected populations, Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/)	01/08/2011	30/04/2012

Contract number	Year	Amount (€)	Contract title	Beneficiary type	Contract type	Contract begin operation	Contract end operation
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2011/91004	2011	450,000	Strengthening Humanitarian Coordination, Advocacy and Reporting in response to the humanitarian crisis in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/08/2011	30/04/2012
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2011/91005	2011	2,899,731	Emergency Integrated WASH Response and INGO Forum Safety Advisory Project in Yemen.	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/04/2011	30/04/2012
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2011/91006	2011	400,000	Introduction and piloting of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) in Yemen with the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC).	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/11/2011	31/12/2012
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2011/91007	2011	3,500,000	Humanitarian Assistance and Protection to Refugees, Asylum Seekers and IDPs in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/06/2011	31/08/2012
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2011/91008	2011	920,000	Provision of essential health and nutrition packages to the conflict-affected population and strengthening of the Nutrition Information System in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/06/2011	31/05/2012
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2011/91009	2011	6,380,000	Humanitarian assistance to IDPs, returnees, and war affected persons in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/08/2011	29/02/2012
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2011/91010	2011	5,000,269	ICRC economic security and water/sanitation/habitat activities in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/01/2012	30/09/2012
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2012/91001	2012	760,000	Integrated emergency nutrition, water, sanitation, hygiene and livelihoods interventions for crisis-affected population in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/06/2012	30/04/2013
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2012/91002	2012	800,000	Emergency assistance to most vulnerable crisis-affected populations at risk of food insecurity in Yemen, through integrated livelihoods & agriculture, and WASH activities.	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/05/2012	30/04/2013
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2012/91003	2012	1,300,000	Humanitarian Assistance to Extremely Vulnerable Crisis Affected Communities	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/04/2012	31/08/2013
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2012/91004	2012	450,000	Humanitarian coordination and advocacy in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/05/2012	31/12/2012
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2012/91005	2012	7,500,000	Provision of Humanitarian Aid to the Yemeni population affected by armed conflict, food insecurity and high levels of malnutrition.	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/05/2012	30/04/2013
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2012/91006	2012	750,000	Yemen Emergency Food Security Interventions	Children	Operation (with FPA/	01/04/2012	28/02/2013
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2012/91007	2012	8,940,155	Humanitarian assistance and protection of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced people in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/03/2012	30/04/2013
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2012/91008	2012	7,000,000	Provision of life-saving nutrition interventions	Children	Operation (with FPA/	01/07/2012	30/06/2013
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2012/91009	2012	5,000,000	WFP Yemen: Emergency Food and Nutritional Support to Conflict-affected Populations in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/03/2012	31/12/2012
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2012/91010	2012	6,000,000	ICRC economic security and water/sanitation/habitat activities in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/10/2012	30/06/2013
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2012/91011	2012	1,499,845	Emergency integrated health and nutrition approach for vulnerable populations in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/12/2012	31/12/2013
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2013/91001	2013	1,500,000	Integrated emergency nutrition, water, sanitation, hygiene and livelihoods interventions for vulnerable populations in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/05/2013	31/03/2014
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2013/91002	2013	800,000	Improve nutrition and WASH environments in Hodeidah Governorate as a means to combat acute malnutrition	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	15/07/2013	30/06/2014
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2013/91003	2013	3,000,000	ICRC economic security and water/sanitation/habitat activities in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/07/2013	31/12/2013

Contract number	Year	Amount (€)	Contract title	Beneficiary type	Contract type	Contract begin operation	Contract end operation
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2013/91005	2013	3,000,000	Protection and improvement of living conditions of vulnerable displaced, returnees, migrants and conflict-affected individuals and communities in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/04/2013	31/03/2014
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2013/91006	2013	600,000	Strengthen humanitarian coordination and advocacy in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/01/2013	31/12/2013
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2013/91007	2013	3,400,000	Provision of humanitarian aid to the Yemeni population affected by armed conflict, food insecurity and high levels of malnutrition and INGO safety advisory project 2013	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/05/2013	31/03/2014
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2013/91008	2013	1,500,000	Provision of emergency relief to extremely vulnerable migrants in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/06/2013	30/11/2013
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2013/91009	2013	5,000,000	Provision of humanitarian assistance and protection to vulnerable refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, and returnees in Yemen	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/05/2013	28/02/2014
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2013/91010	2013	3,500,000	Scaling up integrated emergency Nutrition interventions in the most affected governorates in Yemen.	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/07/2013	30/06/2014
ECHO/YEM/BUD/2013/91011	2013	7,500,000	WFP emergency food and nutrition support to food-insecure and conflict-affected people	Multi-beneficiary	Operation (with FPA/	01/01/2013	31/12/2013

#### Summary of DG ECHO operations, 2002-13

Year	Total (€)	No. operations	Average annual value per operation (€)	Average operation value	Annual value of operations
2002	1,622,000	5	324,400	2002-2009 €382,843	
2003	1,987,071	5	397,414		
2004	2,529,996	7	361,428		
2005	2,997,019	6	499,503		
2006	-	-	-		
2007	990,000	3	330,000		
2008	2,100,000	4	525,000		
2009	2,500,000	4	625,000		
2010	10,000,000	7	1,428,571		
2011	25,000,000	10	2,500,000		
2012	40,000,000	11	3,636,364		
2013	29,800,000	10	2,980,000		



**Annual statements of DG ECHO strategy in Yemen, 2002-12 (source: [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/strategy\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/strategy_en.htm))**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Yemen strategy</i>
2002	n/a
2003	n/a
2004	There are many uncovered humanitarian needs in Yemen, partly due to the lack of international assistance. These needs can be considered as forgotten in view of the low interest shown by most donors. This is particularly true for the water and health sectors in the most remote areas, the main targets in 2004.
2005	Humanitarian needs in Yemen continue to be insufficiently covered by the international community. These needs can therefore be considered as ‘forgotten’. This is particularly true for the water and health sector in remote areas, the main target of ECHO’s strategy in 2005.
2006	In Yemen, a large proportion of the population lives in great poverty and the flow of refugees from the Horn of Africa is on the rise. In 2006, DG ECHO will conduct an evaluation of its past interventions in Yemen. If it decides to intervene, DG ECHO will target the water and sanitation, and health sectors, with particular emphasis on children and refugees.
2007	In Yemen, a large proportion of the population lives in great poverty and the flow of refugees from the Horn of Africa is on the rise. In 2006, DG ECHO will conduct an evaluation of its past interventions in Yemen. If it decides to intervene, DG ECHO will target the water and sanitation, and health sectors, with particular emphasis on children and refugees.
2008	Following years of response to consequences of conflicts and natural disasters in Yemen, DG ECHO implemented an exit strategy in 2007. However, in 2008, the expected continued influx of refugees from the Horn of Africa, which was the main funding target in 2007 and the protracted internal conflict in the North may both require further funding by the humanitarian aid service of the European Commission.
2009	Yemen is currently facing two long-term humanitarian crises. In the south, the continuing flood of refugees from the Horn of Africa continued in 2008 and may increase in 2009. In the north, the armed conflict, a striking example of a forgotten crisis, which pits the Yemenite authorities against a rebellion, caused the displacement of at least 100,000 people in 2008. This has led to a humanitarian intervention by DG ECHO, in spite of the access problems, to meet the immediate needs of some of these IDPs. In view of the risk of an increasing flood of refugees in the south, the non-return of displaced persons in the north due to the vulnerability of Yemen, and of limited access to the north, it is planned to continue the assistance in 2009, particularly to the victims of the conflict in the north.
2010	The humanitarian situation in Yemen continued to deteriorate in 2009. The country’s scarce coping capacities are under severe pressure due to the war in the Northern Governorates (with access to beneficiaries being hampered by the growing insecurity, even outside the war zone) and the influx of mixed migration from the Horn of Africa. Therefore, DG ECHO will support protection and assistance actions in favour of populations affected by the internal conflict and of the refugees landing on the shores of Yemen.
2011	The humanitarian situation in Yemen deteriorated again in 2010 as the country faces a series of complex emergencies. It is estimated that, following the so called ‘sixth war’, there are now over 340,000 displaced people in the Northern Governorates. While the overall situation in parts of Southern Yemen is increasingly volatile, with continued violent demonstrations and attacks against security forces, the number of arrivals of people leaving the instability and the violence of the Horn of Africa also continues to grow, with an estimated number of 174,000 refugees in the country (of whom 165,000 are Somalis). DG ECHO will support protection and assistance actions in favour of populations affected by the internal conflict and of the refugees. LRRD will be difficult to achieve in the North until the security situation stabilises and the displaced population is able to return to their place of origin or decide to settle. Concerning the refugees actions aimed at enhancing their livelihood in urban areas will be considered.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Yemen strategy</i>
2012	<p>The humanitarian situation in Yemen has continued to deteriorate in 2011. The country has faced a series of complex emergencies and is now on the verge of fragmentation. The collapse of the State is a real threat that could lead to a major crisis. Moreover, the political instability and famine in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia, has prompted an increasing number of refugees and asylum seekers to land on Yemen's shores. As the country fragments and local fighting intensifies, internal population displacements are recurrent. With the overall economic and social situation deteriorating, and limited natural resources (notably water) the coping mechanisms of the most vulnerable people are being exhausted leading to destitution and forced economic displacement. A major humanitarian concern is the high likelihood of increasing malnutrition among a population that was already experiencing some of the world's highest malnutrition levels before the most recent crisis. Combined with the problems of access and security this makes the populations even more vulnerable.</p> <p>The number of vulnerable people significantly increased in 2011. In addition to the million people affected by the conflict in North Yemen (including over 300,000 IDPs), more than 83,000 people in Southern Yemen were forced to flee the Abyan Governorate and seek refuge in neighbouring regions. The number of refugees exceeds 200,000. These are mainly Somali, the remainder being Ethiopians, Eritreans and Iraqis. DG ECHO, through multi-sector assistance, will continue to support refugees and populations affected by the internal conflict and severe malnutrition.</p> <p>Deteriorating food and nutrition indicators, capacity limitations and the predicted support from other donors requires a rapid boost of Humanitarian Food assistance and notably programs to address acute child malnutrition.</p>

## ANNEX 9: INTERVENTION LOGIC ANALYSIS


### 9.1 Introduction

In our proposal we emphasised the importance of differentiating between intended strategy (what was planned) and realised strategy (what was actually done). In the intervention logic analysis that follows – both faithful and reconstructed – we focus initially on intended strategy. Later in the section we examine emergent strategy as the security situation in Yemen deteriorated in 2009 and EU cooperation was dramatically reframed; we then examine the extent to which strategy implementation since then has been aligned with and responsive to emergent strategy.

### 9.2 Notes on the strategic intervention logic analysis

Our overarching strategic intervention logic in Figure 2 overleaf represents a reconstruction of the totality of EU engagement in Yemen over the evaluation period, including the three key themes of the evaluation – state-building, resilience and EU responsiveness. Figure 2 analyses EU engagement in the five areas that have been the focus for development cooperation – democracy and human rights; governance; economic development; food security; and social development. Within each of these areas we identify key features of Yemen and EU **context** to which EU engagement has responded and that contribute to the **rationale for EU engagement**. The rationale in turn informs the **EU’s strategic objectives** in Yemen, to be pursued through development cooperation but also other channels such as political engagement at national and regional level. Against these objectives we set out the **inputs** available to the EU in the form of the nature of support they are able to provide (which includes but is not limited to development cooperation activities), the instruments through which support is provided, the financial commitments made and the other key donors active in this area. Against the objectives and inputs of EU support, we then elaborate some of the **key assumptions** that guided the EU’s selection of development cooperation **activities** and the formulation of **expected results**. Figure 1 below illustrates the analytical process that we undertook.

**Figure 1: Process for developing the reconstructed strategic IL analysis**



The diagrams are presented as ‘effects diagrams’ that focus on expected cumulative results. By following this approach we are able to focus much of our attention on the upstream decisions about the focus and composition of development cooperation (the ‘why’ questions) and on the assumptions that underlay the rationale for EU cooperation.

Figure 2: Reconstructed strategic Intervention Logic

	Context	Rationale for EU	EU objectives	Inputs		Assumptions	Activities	Expected results
<b>Democracy and human rights</b>	<p>Yemen has state structures, comprising the Government and democratic institutions, co-existing with a network of alliances linking the political leadership, the armed forces, tribal sheikhs, top official and business families. Declining resources means this settlement is no longer sustainable.</p> <p>The human rights situation remains worrying. Of particular concern are the situation of women and marginalised social groups, judiciary and the rule of law, illegal detentions by security agencies, and violations of freedom of expression.</p>	<p>The Government of Yemen has firmly stated its commitment to democracy, calling for people-participation in developing, implementing and reviewing policies.</p> <p>State-building is the central framework for interventions, recognising that progress in all spheres rests on this.</p> <p>EU Agenda for Change, and earlier the EU Consensus on Development, commits the EU to ‘continue supporting democratisation, free and fair elections, the functioning of institutions, media freedom and access to internet, protection of minorities, the rule of law and judicial systems in partner countries’.</p>	<p>Strengthened application of human rights principles.</p> <p>Strengthened capacity and accountability of Government to its citizens.</p> <p>Strengthened state–society relationship.</p>	<p>Nature of support:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political dialogue with Government of Yemen and regional actors (especially GCC)</li> <li>Policy dialogue through EU Delegation and regional initiatives</li> <li>Project aid</li> <li>Technical assistance and training</li> <li>Grant funding</li> </ul>	<p>Instruments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MED</li> <li>DCI-MED</li> <li>DDH</li> <li>EIDHR</li> </ul> <p>Commitments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>€21.3 million</li> </ul> <p>Other donors active in the sector:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UNDP, Denmark, Netherlands, France.</li> </ul>	<p>The Government of Yemen is genuinely committed to democracy and human rights.</p> <p>Strengthening key democratic institutions and supporting transparent elections further legitimises Yemeni state authorities in the eyes of its citizens.</p> <p>Civil society organisations and media have a key role to play as actors of change in the democratisation process and the respect of human rights.</p> <p>Divergent interests of EU Member States do not undermine the EU’s willingness and ability to robustly pursue a democracy and human rights agenda.</p> <p>EU political dialogue is effective in influencing Government of Yemen policy and actions on democracy and human rights and in leveraging GCC advocacy for the same.</p> <p>Resourcing, organisation and location of EU services are adequately matched to the ambitions of EU cooperation strategy; regular evaluation leads to adjustment of strategy and programmes.</p>	<p>Support to the Supreme Elections Committee.</p> <p>Support to civil society organisations and media.</p> <p>Support to the Parliament and political parties.</p>	<p>More effective civil society participation (especially women) in the political process.</p> <p>Strengthened capacity of members of parliament and political parties to represent citizens’ interests.</p> <p>Strengthened credibility of the 2006 election.</p> <p>Strengthened institutions and mechanisms in support of human rights, democracy and pluralism.</p>
<b>Governance</b>	<p>Weak and inefficient civilian administration and judicial system.</p> <p>Resistance of vested interests slow the pace of reforms.</p> <p>Despite reform efforts, the judiciary is severely hindered by a lack of adequate resources, inefficiency, corruption and interference from the executive.</p> <p>Local councils lack effective powers and are budget dependent on the central level.</p> <p>There are security concerns linked to terrorist threat and tribal tensions.</p>	<p>The Government of Yemen recognises the need for administrative and civil service reform – National Reform Agenda (2005, updated March 2009). Reform of the judiciary is part of this.</p> <p>EU promotes comprehensive approach, integrating interventions aimed at improving governance and at fostering economic growth and human development.</p> <p>Focus on state-building, stabilisation and poverty reduction is in line with EU Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East.</p> <p>Yemen National Decentralisation Strategy adopted 2008 with potential to improve delivery of basic services to the population.</p>	<p>Improved rule of law and protection of human rights.</p> <p>Improved security situation.</p> <p>Strengthened capacity and accountability of Government to its citizens.</p> <p>Strengthened state–society relationship.</p>	<p>Nature of support:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political dialogue with Government of Yemen and regional actors (especially GCC)</li> <li>Policy dialogue through EU Delegation and regional initiatives</li> <li>Project aid</li> <li>Financial support (IFS)</li> <li>Training of security forces</li> </ul>	<p>Instruments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MED</li> <li>DCI-MED</li> <li>IFS</li> <li>DDH</li> </ul> <p>Commitments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>€51.7 million</li> </ul> <p>Other donors active in the sector:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>World Bank (civil service reform)</li> <li>UNDP (decentralisation, justice)</li> <li>Netherlands (justice)</li> <li>France (policy forces)</li> </ul>	<p>The Government of Yemen is genuinely committed to reform the civil service and to establish a transparent, fair and accountable judiciary.</p> <p>Strengthening government relations with the EU could represent a window of opportunity to obtain the necessary support and foster the implementation, of the reform programme.</p> <p>The Government of Yemen is genuinely committed to increasing transparency and accountability.</p> <p>EU political dialogue is effective in influencing Government of Yemen policy and actions on governance reforms and in leveraging GCC advocacy for the same.</p> <p>Resourcing, organisation and location of EU services are adequately matched to the ambitions of EU cooperation strategy; regular evaluation leads to adjustment of strategy and programmes.</p>	<p>Support to public administration reform.</p> <p>Support to the judicial system.</p> <p>Support to local governance and planning.</p> <p>Support to police forces, customs and coast guards.</p>	<p>More inclusive political process.</p> <p>Greater transparency of Government institutions.</p> <p>More capable, more efficient and less corrupt judiciary.</p>
<b>Economic development</b>	<p>Oil exports are generating more than 70% of the Government’s income.</p> <p>Oil production is declining and resources are expected to be depleted within 10-12 years.</p> <p>Agriculture and fisheries contribute to the livelihoods of two thirds of the population.</p> <p>The small non-oil industrial sector is mainly involved in food processing and mixed metal products.</p> <p>The business environment is not favourable for investment.</p> <p>Unemployment is very high.</p>	<p>Building and sustaining resilience is the cornerstone of economic development and poverty reduction.</p> <p>Yemen’s future depends on the prospects for an economy after oil.</p> <p>Closer integration into the regional economy and WTO accession would represent a key lever to attract investment.</p> <p>Strengthening Yemen’s capacity to fight poverty is a prerequisite to economic development. Support to non-oil sectors (agriculture and fisheries) – and the regulatory frameworks for investment, business and trade within these sectors – is the starting point.</p>	<p>Diversified economy.</p> <p>Increased employment.</p> <p>Sustainable development of the agriculture sector and food processing industry and their export potential.</p> <p>Increased turnover, earnings and profitability in the fisheries sector.</p> <p>WTO accession.</p> <p>Improved climate for Foreign Direct Investment.</p> <p>Strengthened state–society relationship.</p>	<p>Nature of support:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political dialogue with Government of Yemen and regional actors (especially GCC)</li> <li>Project aid</li> </ul> <p>Instruments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MED</li> <li>DCI-MED</li> </ul> <p>Commitments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>€78.5 million</li> </ul>	<p>Other donors active in the sector:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>World Bank (business environment; productive infrastructure)</li> <li>Netherlands (water resources management)</li> <li>UNDP (water resources management)</li> <li>France (agriculture)</li> </ul>	<p>In the short to medium term sustainable livelihoods will have to come from the small-scale and informal economy as well as through remittances from migrant labour.</p> <p>Agriculture has a potential for faster growth provided production is combined with rational use and conservation of water.</p> <p>There is also an important potential for increasing production and developing exports of the fisheries.</p> <p>EU political dialogue is effective in influencing Government of Yemen policy and actions on economic reforms and in leveraging GCC advocacy for the same.</p> <p>Resourcing, organisation and location of EU services are adequately matched to the ambitions of EU cooperation strategy; regular evaluation leads to adjustment of strategy and programmes.</p>	<p>Business development activities.</p> <p>Business information and advisory services.</p> <p>Support to agriculture, fisheries and food processing industries.</p> <p>Support to the structures in charge of preparing WTO accession.</p>	<p>Improved provision of finance and support services for SMEs.</p> <p>Improved capacity of government, private sector organisations and community representatives in the agriculture sector and food processing industry.</p> <p>Improved fisheries resource management and export capability.</p> <p>Improved capability to engage effectively in WTO preparations and negotiations.</p>

	Context	Rationale for EU	EU objectives	Inputs	Assumptions	Activities	Expected results	
<b>Food security</b>	<p>More than one third of the population has a level of energy dietary consumption below the minimum.</p> <p>Child malnutrition rates are among the highest in the world.</p>	<p>Reducing by half the number of people suffering from hunger by 2015 is a priority for the EU and the International community enshrined in the first MDG.</p> <p>Food insecurity, particularly in the early stages of life, has significant impact on health and productive capacity throughout life.</p>	<p>Improved food security of vulnerable groups.</p> <p>Improved community management of natural resources.</p> <p>Poverty reduction.</p> <p>Strengthened state–society relationship.</p>	<p>Nature of support:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy dialogue</li> <li>• Capacity building of the institutions involved in food security interventions</li> <li>• Financing of small infrastructure projects</li> <li>• Financing of food aid and cash transfers</li> <li>•</li> </ul> <p>Instruments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MED</li> <li>• REH</li> <li>• DCI-MED</li> <li>• DCI-NSA</li> </ul> <p>Commitments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• €175.4 million</li> </ul> <p>Other donors active in the sector:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP (disaster preparedness)</li> <li>• United Kingdom (Social Fund)</li> </ul>	<p>Addressing food insecurity effectively requires the development of early warning systems.</p> <p>Food insecurity is particularly acute in rural areas.</p> <p>Higher income derived from agriculture and animal-breeding reduces food insecurity of rural populations.</p> <p>Humanitarian aid provided by the Commission creates opportunities for LRRD.</p> <p>Effective targeting of food security support helps to strengthen government legitimacy and foster state–society relations.</p> <p>EU political dialogue is effective in influencing Government of Yemen policy and actions on food security.</p> <p>Resourcing, organisation and location of EU services are adequately matched to the ambitions of EU cooperation strategy; regular evaluation leads to adjustment of strategy and programmes.</p>	<p>Institutional support.</p> <p>Support to the production of information / statistics.</p> <p>Field interventions.</p> <p>Support to the Social Welfare Fund.</p> <p>Nutrition programmes.</p> <p>Support to refugees.</p>	<p>Food security strategy and measures integrated into government policies and budget.</p> <p>Improved quality of food security investments.</p> <p>Increased access of vulnerable groups to livelihoods and food security investments.</p>	
<b>Social development</b>	<p>Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the world.</p> <p>Poor provision of basic public services.</p> <p>The Social Fund for Development has been involved since 1997 in providing services to the population in health, education and vocational training.</p> <p>Local NSAs suffer from weak organisation and administrative capacities. Their role remains marginal.</p> <p>Very high fertility rate, high population growth rate (3%), high maternal and infant mortality rates.</p> <p>Wide gender gap.</p>	<p>Poverty elimination in the context of sustainable development is the overarching objective of the EU cooperation for development.</p> <p>Principles of subsidiarity and complementarity as laid down in Article 11 of the DCI are followed through in NSA and LA development policy instrument of EU that recognises that deprivation of access to basic social services is an essential dimension of poverty.</p> <p>Government of Yemen has formulated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2002-2005</li> <li>• a health sector reform strategy (2000)</li> <li>• a National Population Policy (2004)</li> </ul>	<p>Effective and sustainable social safety net in place.</p> <p>Improved utilisation of reproductive health services.</p> <p>Poverty reduction.</p> <p>Strengthened state–society relationship.</p>	<p>Nature of support:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity building of and technical assistance to local authorities</li> <li>• Financial support to SFD and to local actors</li> </ul> <p>Instruments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MED</li> <li>• REH</li> <li>• DCI-MED</li> <li>• DCI-NSA</li> </ul> <p>Commitments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• €80.9 million</li> </ul>	<p>Other donors active in the sector:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• World Bank (health, education)</li> <li>• UNICEF (education)</li> <li>• WHO (health)</li> <li>• UNFPA (reproductive health)</li> <li>• Germany (education, health, water supply and sanitation)</li> <li>• Netherlands (gender issues)</li> </ul>	<p>The Social Fund for Development is an effective channel to support economic and social development at community level.</p> <p>Participatory approaches to identify the needs of the poorest part of the population are highly effective.</p> <p>Grassroots institutions may have a major contribution to improving rural livelihoods.</p> <p>EU political dialogue is effective in influencing Government of Yemen policy and actions on food security.</p> <p>Resourcing, organisation and location of EU services are adequately matched to the ambitions of EU cooperation strategy; regular evaluation leads to adjustment of strategy and programmes.</p>	<p>Support to the Social Fund for Development.</p> <p>Support to community development.</p> <p>Credit scheme in support of small enterprises.</p> <p>Support to health and family planning services at district level.</p> <p>Support to a multi-sectoral plan for population and reproductive health.</p>	<p>Increased access of vulnerable groups to income-generating opportunities and health services (particularly reproductive health).</p> <p>Strengthened national leadership on, and religious and public support for, reproductive health services.</p> <p>Increased understanding and use of participatory approaches to planning and management of basic services.</p> <p>Increased government capacity to target and address basic needs.</p>

### 9.3 Notes on the CSP-level effects diagram analysis

The 10-year evaluation period covers two programming periods: 2002-06 and 2007-13. Although there is a high degree of continuity and – in governance, social and economic development – similarity between the strategies of both CSPs, we found it useful to develop an effects diagram of the EU's cooperation with Yemen for each of the two intermediate periods. For these two intermediate periods, we differentiated 'faithful' and 'reconstructed' expected effects.

The 'faithful' effects (Figures 3 and 5) are based on the official documents that set out the EU's strategies in the country. These are the two CSPs for Yemen covering the periods 2002-06 and 2007-13, two NIPs, (2002-04 and 2005-06), and two MIPs (2007-10 and 2011-13). The evaluators tried to stay as close to the texts as possible, in line with the enunciated strategy.

The 'reconstructed' effects (Figures 4 and 6) reconfigure this along the global impacts targeted by the EU cooperation, exhibiting the links that relate EU activities to the overall goals of the strategy. It shows more clearly how a consistent pattern of interventions in the five broad areas mentioned above have been directed towards the overall objectives of the EU cooperation with Yemen. Figure 7 combines the 'reconstructed' effects for the two periods thus providing a presentation of the EU 'reconstructed' effects diagram in Yemen over the whole 10-year period covered by the evaluation.

The effects diagrams differentiate between four levels of expected impacts corresponding to four levels of objectives, and the intended activities for attaining the results:

- Global impacts (corresponding to global objectives, in the long term)
- Intermediate impacts (corresponding to intermediate objectives, in the medium term)
- Specific impacts (corresponding to specific objectives)
- Results (corresponding to operational objectives)
- Activities

The hierarchical links for attaining expected impacts are made explicit in the figures.

*Global impacts:* The effects diagrams present the global impacts pursued by the EU, in accordance with both CSPs. The global impacts are the long-term effects on society expected from the EU's interventions in Yemen:

- Good governance
- Sustainable economic development including gradual integration into the world economy
- Poverty alleviation

The last two global impacts correspond on the one hand to the priority objectives for the general development policy of the European Community laid down in Article 177 of the **1992 Maastricht Treaty**: (i) support for sustainable economic and social development; (ii) gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy; and (iii) fight against poverty. Another important milestone was the 2000 Joint Statement by the Council and the Commission,<sup>56</sup> which followed a Communication by the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2000) 212, requiring EU cooperation to focus primarily on the reduction and gradual eradication of poverty. These global impacts were further promoted under the '**European Consensus on Development**' signed in 2005 by the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament – COM(2005) 311.

Besides these economic and social objectives, the IL of the EU cooperation with Yemen includes among its overall goals the development of democracy, respect of human rights, and promotion of other key elements of good governance. In 2003 the European Security Strategy stated: 'The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third

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<sup>56</sup> European Community Development Policy Statement (DPS) by the Council and the Commission, 20 November 2000.

countries. Security is the first condition for development ... Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agenda.’<sup>57</sup> These objectives are both highly relevant considering the country context<sup>58</sup> and fully consistent with the later ‘Agenda for Change’ COM (2011) 1173, which underlined that ‘good governance in its political, economic, social and environmental terms is vital for inclusive and sustainable development’.

More specific details on cooperation with Asian non-MEDA countries, including Yemen, are set out in Council Regulation 443/92 of February 1992 for financial and economic cooperation with developing countries in Asia and Latin America. Here the focus is placed on human development, targeted primarily towards the poorest segments of the population and the development of rural areas. It was to include measures such as protection of environment, sustainable development, increase of women’s participation in development, manageable population growth, and good governance and respect of human rights.

An advanced and expanded cooperation agreement on commercial, development and economic cooperation came into force in July 1998. This covered the following areas of cooperation:

- Trade cooperation with a view to diversifying two-way EU-Yemen trade and improving market access for imported and exported goods based on most favoured nation status. The EC would conduct trade in the framework of WTO rules and Yemen would seek to do the same, although Yemen is not yet a member of WTO.
- Development cooperation with a focus on reducing poverty and population growth in order to establish a favourable framework for sustainable socio-economic development.
- Economic cooperation for development of a competitive and sustainable economic environment in Yemen by supporting wide-ranging measures to facilitate business and industrial manufacturing.
- Cooperation in other areas such as environment, culture, science, and social and human resource development.

The **Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East**, adopted by the June 2004 European Council, committed the EU to engage with countries in the region to further the political and economic reform process. A new financial instrument entered into force at the beginning of 2007, the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which aimed to provide support for all forms of cooperation with developing countries, including Yemen.

The EU is committed to implementing a comprehensive approach that integrates economic, social and political strategies as reiterated by the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 25 January 2010. The Instrument for Stability (IfS) was created in 2007 to deal with crisis or emerging crisis situations such as in Yemen and ‘contributes to protecting democracy, law and order, the safety of individuals, human rights and fundamental freedoms’.<sup>59</sup>

*Intermediate impact:* Intermediate impacts reflect the priority objectives set out in the two CSPs. CSP 2002-06 prioritised food security and poverty reduction and began a series of programmes that tackled human rights and good governance, as well as the facilitation of business development. CSP 2007-13 re-emphasised governance issues and integrated food security as a component of the fight against poverty. However, there is continuity between the two strategies, with the following thematic programming areas:

- Strengthening of democratic institutions
- Implementation, of the rule of law
- Protection of human rights
- Economic development
- Improvement of the food security situation of the most vulnerable groups

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<sup>57</sup> A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 13.

<sup>58</sup> See Annex 1 on the rationale of EU engagement

<sup>59</sup> Instrument for Stability (2007-2013), [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/development/general\\_development\\_framework/114171\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/114171_en.htm)

- Improvement of the living conditions of rural populations
- Improvement of the health status of mother and child
- Reduction of the fertility rate and of the population growth rate.

*Specific impacts:* Specific impacts reflect the assumptions made by the EU as regards the conditions that have to be created to achieve the targeted intermediate impacts. Thus, for instance, the EU considers that improving the living conditions of rural populations implies increased earnings in rural areas together with an improved delivery of basic services.


*Results:* Results indicate the expected developments the EU considers necessary for progress towards achieving the targeted intermediate impacts. Thus, to take the same example as above, increased earnings in rural areas are expected from job creation and from the development of income-generating activities, such as off-farm activities. Improving the supply of basic services to rural populations implies increased capacities of health and education facilities in rural areas.

*Outputs:* Outputs are the goods and services produced by EU interventions with a view to inducing the expected outcomes. Whereas the latter primarily depend on the behaviour and decisions of local actors, the EU decides on the outputs it considers necessary or useful to produce for that purpose. Thus, the provision of credit to small and micro-enterprises is considered by the EU to be an effective means to create jobs in rural areas. Income-generating activities and the improvement of health and education capacities are expected from the EU contribution to the development of communities and the enhancement of local actors' capacities.


*Activities:* Activities do not pertain to the hierarchy of objectives and expected impacts, but the operational actions envisaged in the two NIPs (2002-04 and 2005-06), and the two MIPs (2006-10 and 2011-13), complemented by actions financed through non-programmable instruments, for attaining the objectives specified in the EU's country strategy.




**Figure 3: Faithful effects diagram – CSP 2002-2006**




**Figure 4: Reconstructed effects diagram – CSP 2002-2006**




**Figure 5: Faithful effects diagram – CSP 2007-2013**



**Figure 6: Reconstructed effects diagram – CSP 2007-2013**



**Figure 7: Reconstructed effects diagram – combined CSPs 2002-2013**



#### 9.4 Comparative analysis of planned, emergent and realised strategy

Recognising 2009 as a watershed year for EU cooperation, our analysis below examines strategy as planned from 2002 to 2009, the emergent strategy that was developed in 2009, and then strategy as realised as represented by political engagement and funding approvals.

**Strategy as planned**, which framed strategy implementation through to 2009 under the 2002-06 and 2007-13 CSPs and the associated NIPs/MIPs through to 2010.

The focus of the strategy was on:

- **Good governance** through administrative reform, democratisation and improved rule of law
- **Economic development** through support to business services, agriculture, fisheries and food processing and to WTO accession
- **Poverty reduction** through improved household food security and strengthened delivery of social protection and health services

Evolutions in strategy implementation were framed by (i) the evolving EU policy framework, most notably the 1998 Cooperation Agreement with Yemen, the 2004 Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and Middle East and the 2005 European Consensus on Development; (ii) the evolving context and policy framework in Yemen, most notably Yemen's five-year plan (2001-05), the interim then full Poverty Reduction Strategy and the 2005 National Reform Agenda; and (iii) the evolving EU representation in Yemen, from Technical Assistance Office to full Delegation in 2009.

Strategy was based, both explicitly and implicitly, on a number of major assumptions, such as: Government's commitment to reform; its capability to strengthen the regulatory environment and improve basic services delivery and thereby strengthen government legitimacy; the targeting efficiency of poverty reduction intervention; the potential catalytic effects of economic development projects; and management of the security situation.

**Emergent strategy**, in the form of recommendations contained in the document *Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to Yemen*, developed in 2009 in response to the rapidly deteriorating security situation.

The focus of the recommendations was on:

- In the short term: **stabilisation** through support to the Government of Yemen in delivering its reform agenda, regional diplomacy and preparedness for crisis response on security-related and humanitarian issues.
- In the long term: **conflict resolution and state-building** through political dialogue and development cooperation.

The emergent strategy was framed most directly by increasing security concerns among Member States as expressed by the European Council and the Commission, and by the fact that the EU now had a full Delegation in Yemen led by an energetic Head of Delegation. It was also informed by recent and ongoing policy developments such as the 2007 OECD-DAC fragile states principles and preparation of the Lisbon Treaty, and by evolving thinking around the comprehensive approach. The recommendations implicitly recognised the limits of its strategy until that point, calling for 'a coherent and realistic strategic approach' that would 'focus on areas where it can realistically hope to make a substantial difference ... to address the central priorities'.

Strategy was based on recognition that what had hitherto been risks or assumptions were in fact the central priorities: galvanising government commitment to reform, engaging in conflict resolution, and crisis response. Political engagement came much more to the fore and, insofar as the flexibility of EU instruments would allow, development cooperation became more focused and responsive. Thus, although the development cooperation content of strategy remained broadly the same and consistent with the 2007-13 CSP, the framing and configuration of EU cooperation strategy as a whole changed dramatically.

**Strategy as realised** comprises the elements of planned and emergent strategy that have actually been implemented. So while strategic intentions were dramatically reframed in 2009, development cooperation continued to move at a pace dictated by procedural requirements and the security-related disruptions of 2011. The more flexible instruments such as the IfS and EIDHR have supported a more responsive approach, albeit reportedly still not quick enough to keep pace of change in 2011 and at a scale much smaller than the bilateral funding envelope. Programming under DCI-MED has inevitably moved more slowly, with many programmes approved before 2009 still ongoing and programmes approved since 2009 yet to commence implementation.

The graphs opposite track commitments by sub-sector over the evaluation period of 2002-12 under bilateral cooperation and thematic instruments and programmes.<sup>60</sup>


Under the main sectors of EU support we can draw the following broad conclusions on the extent to which strategy implementation reflected **emergent strategy**:

**Governance** – Bilateral funding from 2009 indicates a continued focus on government (80% was for capacity building within government ministries and agencies) with no discernible shift to a state-building approach. Funding under thematic instruments has reflected the change in strategic intentions, with multiple projects to engage with and give voice to various stakeholder groups on issues such as mediation, conflict resolution, the media, and so on.

**Economic development** – Here we can see a dramatic drop off in bilateral funding but a focus on programming studies during the period of 2009-11, which have led to two major new programmes being launched in 2012. So we can see efforts to align programming more closely to the emergent strategy, but we can also see the time required to undertake this realignment.

**Poverty reduction** – Bilateral funding from 2009 appears more aligned to emergent strategy, with a scaling up of support for health and food security and a significant crisis response in 2011 through

**Figure 8: Planned expenditure by contract year for bilateral and thematic instruments/programmes, 2002-12**



<sup>60</sup> It is important to note that the pattern of contract commitments by year only gives an indication of how strategy was implemented as it does not indicate what was actually spent by year, data for which was not available to us.

scaled up support to social protection. Under the thematic programmes we see a continued use of FOOD and DCI-FOOD to support food security programmes and the Social Welfare Fund, while under DCI-NSAPVD we can begin to see an increased focus on resilience.

As this analysis indicates, while the stated aims of emergent strategy were evolving to a much clearer focus on state-building and the two main pillars of the Agenda for Change (governance and growth), development cooperation has struggled to keep pace with these intentions.



## ANNEX 10: MONOGRAPHS

### Monograph 1: Evolutions in the EU’s approach to state-building


#### Introduction

In EQ3, we analyse the extent to which EU development cooperation and political dialogue have promoted and supported state-building objectives. In this case study, we offer a more detailed look at political dialogue and support to CSOs, especially from 2007 onwards.

#### EU funding and programming

The EU has invested considerable funds in democracy, governance, security and justice, and human rights in Yemen since the start of the evaluation period. Since 2002, the EU has provided direct support to the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum, and the House of Representatives. The EU has also channelled support for electoral assistance through the UN system; electoral assistance projects were carried out in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2012. Direct EU investment in democracy-related interventions started in 2006 with the EU EOM, using funds provided through the Democracy and Human Rights instrument (DDH), and election monitoring accounts for the majority of spending through this instrument during this period.

**Figure 1: Planned expenditure by type of state building-related intervention by year of commitment (€)**




The CSP 2002-2006 pledges support to administrative reform, the 2003 parliamentary elections ‘and other human rights projects’; it also states that funding will be accessible for ‘strengthening’ civil society, and for ‘more effective involvement of civil society in promoting social development’, yet no indication is given of how to advance civil society–state relations. Funding through the bilateral instrument (MED) was initially limited to very small projects to support CSOs. The NIP 2002-2005 and the NIP 2005-2006 allocated €2-3 million and €2 million respectively for the strengthening of pluralism and civil society, representing roughly 5% of total non-thematic spending across this period.

By contrast, the CSP 2007-2013 mentions ‘civil society’ no less than twenty times, in direct relation to developing ‘political participation and representation’.<sup>61</sup> The MIP 2007-10 states that the expected results of EU efforts on good governance, a priority strategic objective, ‘reinforced links between political parties and civil society’, a clear progression from the previous programming period. The MIP 2007-10 allocates €19.5 million to good governance, including €4.8m support for the electoral framework, Parliament and political parties, and €14.7 million for support to justice, the rule of law and human rights, while the MIP 2011-2013 allocates €18 million to state-building and governance, with emphasis on effective decentralisation. The combined total of €37.5 million represents 28% of bilateral commitments.

<sup>61</sup> European Union, Country Strategy Paper, Yemen 2007–2013, p. 9.

**Figure 2: Proportion of total planned expenditure by type of state building-related intervention by year of commitment**



## EU political dialogue

EU political dialogue began in 2004, through the resident Head of Delegation in Amman who visited Yemen on regular missions, and continued under the stewardship of the first resident Chargé d’Affaires. The Chargé d’Affaires, a career diplomat rather than a development specialist, oversaw the 2006 EU Election Observation Mission (EOM), which judged the presidential poll in which President Saleh was re-elected to serve another seven-year term to be an ‘open and genuine contest’. However, the final observers’ report listed a catalogue of concerns, including unfair use of state resources, the exclusion of women from participation at all levels, clear bias in the state media, detention of opposition supporters and concerns that the counting process lacked credibility.<sup>62</sup>

The EU EOM recommendations underpinned subsequent EU-Yemen dialogue on political reform, but by 2009 barely any of the suggested measures – including specific constitutional reforms and technical amendments to the election law – had been implemented.<sup>63</sup> The EU sent an exploratory mission to prepare observers for the scheduled parliamentary elections in 2009 but relations between the ruling party and the opposition coalition had degraded to such an extent that it became apparent the elections would have to be postponed. Ostensibly, postponement allowed for more time for both sides to reach an agreement over technical reforms, but the real problem ran much deeper: the elite political settlement was under increasing strain.

By this time, a new Head of Delegation was in place, replacing the first Chargé d’Affaires, and he played an active role in cross-party talks, with support from Delegation colleagues. At the end of 2009, after two years in post, the Head of Delegation was upgraded to ambassador and the Lisbon Treaty came into force, extending the scope of his mandate. However, the Head of Delegation’s Yemeni interlocutors and level of engagement stayed much the same, while the EU’s credibility as an ‘honest broker’ continued to be compromised by Yemenis’ perceptions of the EOM: the opposition coalition considered the EU to be overly favourable to the ruling party (in declaring the 2006 presidential poll to be an ‘open and genuine’ contest), while the ruling party thought the monitors’ full report gave excessive ammunition to the opposition.

The 2009 postponement deal included a commitment to hold bi-partisan dialogue in an effort to break the deadlock over the electoral framework. However, the resumption of violent protests in the south and renewed conflict in Saada later that year ruptured the necessary political conditions for fruitful talks. Furthermore, the recourse to violence by the southern separatists and the Saada rebels suggested that they (among others) had lost faith in the possibility of change by democratic means. During 2010, acute politicisation of the donor-backed reform agenda and increasing external security interventions gave President Saleh’s family a factional advantage over other elite interests, placing even greater

<sup>62</sup> European Union Election Observation Mission, Yemen 2006 Final Report.

<sup>63</sup> Democracy on Hold in Yemen, *Arab Reform Bulletin*, 13 July 2010.

strain on the crumbling elite political settlement and further stoking the parliamentary stand-off, as well as sub-national tensions.<sup>64</sup>

In January 2011, President Saleh presented a constitutional amendment that would allow him to run again in the next presidential election, scheduled for 2013, but the EU made no official statement in response to this measure; the prevailing view among diplomats in Sana'a at this time was there 'was no alternative' to President Saleh. It was not until the youth movement took to the streets at the end of the month – inspired by the 'Arab Spring' protests in Tunisia and Egypt – that the EU moved to associate itself with indigenous forces calling for change. In Sana'a, the Delegation initially reached out to youth activists to ascertain their views, later encouraging them to adopt clear, realistic demands and a common negotiating position (EQ7&8).

During the course of 2011, the office of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, Catherine Ashton, issued more than a dozen dedicated statements on Yemen, initially reiterating EU support for political and economic reform, and calling for a comprehensive national dialogue; and from March onwards, condemning the use of force against protestors in Sana'a, and later in Taiz.<sup>65</sup> On 11 May, HR/VP Ashton called for President Saleh to accept the GCC agreement: 'The solution is there. The moment is now.' On 26 May, after violence broke out between elite factions in Sana'a, she stated: 'It is time for President Saleh to transfer power now.'<sup>66</sup> On 31 May, an EU foreign relations spokesperson raised the possibility of EU sanctions for Yemen.<sup>67</sup>

In early October, in a statement to the European Parliament, HR/VP Ashton said: 'The President and his family must stop holding the country's future to ransom ... How exactly that transition goes forward is for the Yemeni parties themselves to work out. But they have long accepted the principles of the Gulf Cooperation Council's initiative. We have engaged at all levels trying to facilitate peaceful solutions among the key players in Yemen; I have been working closely with the GCC and the US to keep a strong and united front, sequencing and coordinating our messages and actions on the ground and in our capitals. We have played a key role through the UN Human Rights Council, and will now step it up through our Member States in the UN Security Council.'

On October 21, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2014,<sup>68</sup> demanding President Saleh's compliance with the GCC proposal and calling for an update within 30 days. In mid-November, President Saleh agreed to face-to-face negotiations with the UN, and on 23 November he signed the GCC deal, triggering the transfer of power to Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and the formation of a transitional power-sharing government. A week later, the EU Foreign Affairs Council drew attention to the pressing 'humanitarian, economic and security crises which now confront Yemen', adding: 'The EU strongly hopes that the transition process ... will become a solid platform for national reconciliation in Yemen. It should meet the legitimate demands and aspirations of all Yemenis from throughout the country and all parts of Yemeni society, including civic organisations, women and young people.'<sup>69</sup>

As part of their vision for a 'civil state', youth activists demanded increased political participation, and a more responsive and accountable government. On 22 December, HR/VP Ashton called President Hadi to congratulate him on his appointment as President Saleh's successor. She confirmed EU support for a 'Yemeni-led, inclusive and democratic transition process on the basis of a sustainable national consensus' and emphasised her view 'that to succeed, the transition process must be inclusive: we discussed how best to reach out to the large numbers of unemployed young people,

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<sup>64</sup> The UN Role in Yemen's Political Transition, Social Sciences Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, Ginny Hill (2013); Yemen: Corruption, Capital Flight and Global Drivers of Conflict', A Chatham House Report, Ginny Hill, Peter Salisbury, Léonie Northedge and Jane Kinninmont (2013).

<sup>65</sup> 2 February 2011; 12 March 2011; 27 April 2011; 11 May 2011; 26 May 2011; 31 May 2011; 7 July 2011; 16 September 2011; 20 September 2011; 23 September 2011; 25 September 2011; 23 November 2011; 22 December 2011.

<sup>66</sup> 26 May 2011, Brussels.

<sup>67</sup> EU considering Yemen sanctions as Arab diplomacy falters, 31.05.11, EU Observer.

<sup>68</sup> S/RES/2014 (2011).

<sup>69</sup> 1 December 2011.

the youth movements and other groups.’<sup>70</sup> Two months later, in February 2012, Hadi stood for election as a consensus candidate in a one-man ballot, winning a public mandate to serve as a two-year caretaker president, tasked with overseeing a national dialogue.

In September 2012, the Head of Delegation presented a survey analysis to President Hadi, designed to demonstrate the extent to which a participatory political approach was necessary. It highlighted the economy as a priority issue for all Yemenis, a high degree of pessimism in the south, widespread lack of confidence in party political leadership, the extent of influence exercised by religious leaders, and divided views about the benefit of international support to the national dialogue process. It was conducted by the Yemen Polling Centre,<sup>71</sup> which had carried out 5,000 face-to-face interviews throughout the country three months earlier.<sup>72</sup>

The National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was finally launched in March 2013, concluding early in 2014, with a recommendation to introduce multi-party federalism. A constitutional committee is still considering the NDC’s recommendations; the public must approve any constitutional changes before the next round of presidential elections, which will bring an end to the current ‘transitional’ period. As a result, presidential elections, initially scheduled for February 2014, have been indefinitely postponed; parliamentary elections were last held more than a decade ago, in 2003.

### **State–society relations and support to CSOs**

Prior to the first call for EIDHR proposals in 2008, the EU had limited options to work directly with local CSOs, as projects falling under the framework of bilateral cooperation required Government of Yemen approval. The consultation process itself was highly politicised, allowing the Government of Yemen to influence the terms of the call for proposals and thus to control which NGOs were likely to receive funding – ‘opposition’ NGOs were unlikely to be awarded contracts. As a result, the Government of Yemen was attempting to ‘capture’ external resources as yet another form of regime patronage. In an effort to sidestep this process, the EU initially channelled funds through INGOs as intermediaries; but subsequently, smaller projects were judged by Delegation staff to be more successful on the grounds that they were more focused and better targeted at community needs.

As we note in EQ10, programming evaluations are scarce and, with the exception of the current draft evaluation of EIDHR (see EQ9), there is barely any evaluative evidence to draw on in this sector. As a result, it is hard to judge to what extent EU support to Yemeni CSOs enhanced the endogenous processes by which the state and society attempted to reconcile their mutual expectations of one another in the years preceding the 2011 protests, and afterwards. Anecdotally, one Delegation member considers that the 2011 uprising ‘would have happened anyway, without our engagement ... we might have helped to tip the balance but we didn’t fundamentally change things’ on the grounds that EU support to CSOs was too little, too scattered and came too late to have a profound effect.

One grant recipient described EU support prior to 2011 as having a catalytic function, but it was ‘not directly politicised’. While many individuals who participated in EU-funded political leadership programmes during the Saleh era subsequently took part in the 2011 uprising, cause and effect cannot be determined. In general, the continuous effect of increasing support to CSOs over the course of a decade might be seen as having played a part in helping to establish a more diverse political culture that culminated in the NDC, where women, youth and other non-traditional actors had a chance to speak. However, CSOs continue to struggle to maintain their independence and to identify effective mechanisms for holding the Government of Yemen to account. Furthermore, structural factors arising from the terms of the GCC deal, such as Hadi’s dependency on international support and the 50/50 quota system for the power-sharing government (where jobs are based on party loyalties rather than qualifications), are counter to the aim of making institutions responsive to citizens.

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<sup>70</sup> 22 December 2011.

<sup>71</sup> Note to Mr Hans Stausboll: Request for direct award of grant contract under EIDHR CBSS 2011 in the Republic of Yemen, Brussels, 18 April 2012.

<sup>72</sup> 9 September 2012.

To date capacity building has largely been limited to helping CSOs cope with EU procedures and many CSOs have struggled to build institutional capacity beyond the enthusiasm and dedication of a single individual. While the EIDHR has provided direct support to more than fifty organisations, a large proportion of EIDHR beneficiaries have also benefited from grants under other EU instruments in recent years.<sup>73</sup> Successive Heads of Delegation have played a role in raising the profile of juvenile justice (leading to successful collaboration with UNICEF) and child marriage (contributing to the draft laws, recently adopted, on determining a minimum marriage age); both are examples of political dialogue reinforcing development cooperation. Similarly, EU technical support to the NDC and the constitution committee is credited with promoting children’s rights (notwithstanding the fact that the state’s ability to fully enforce new legislation is questionable).

## Findings and conclusion

We present four main findings here, with further detail being provided in Table 1.

**Finding 1:** EU political dialogue began in 2004. Recommendations arising from the 2006 EOM formed the basis of subsequent political dialogue but by 2009 none had been implemented. In 2009, planned parliamentary elections had to be postponed – ostensibly due to technical disagreements between political parties, but largely due to rising tension between rival elite factions that came to a head during the 2011 uprising.

**Finding 2:** In 2011, the EU quickly associated itself with the youth movement and in May, HR/VP Ashton called for President Saleh to stand down. EU support to the NDC was intended to deepen state–society relations, by allowing non-elite political constituencies to be heard. While this has indeed changed the formal political culture, it has not yet fully impacted on the underlying elite political settlement.

**Finding 3:** EU support to CSOs has grown over time from 5% of bilateral spending in 2002-2006 to nearly a third from 2007 onwards. The EIDHR provided a unique channel for direct support, independent of the Government of Yemen. EU advocacy on juvenile justice, children’s rights and child marriage have played a part in legislative reform, providing successful examples of political dialogue reinforcing development cooperation.

**Finding 4:** The EU’s approach to state-building does not yet sufficiently take into account the latest thinking on political settlements: namely, the means by which the continuous process of elite bargaining, as well as between the state and organised groups in society, affects the formal and informal distribution of power (see EQ3).<sup>74</sup>

**Table 1: Summary of findings for support to CSOs**

Indicators	Support to CSOs
Intervention logic	Applicable documentation does not provide a theory of change or intervention logic that links support to Yemeni CSOs explicitly with a state-building strategy, although the 2007-13 CSP did frame CSO support under an objective of good governance.
Monitoring	Monitoring has been undertaken by the Delegation using reports prepared by the supported CSOs. The frequency and quality of reporting has been highly variable.

<sup>73</sup> Evaluation of support under EIDHR Programmes in Yemen 2009-2013 Draft.

<sup>74</sup> DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility (2011) <http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/free/4311031e.pdf>

Indicators	Support to CSOs
Relevance	Relevance prior to 2011 was largely in relation to a broad objective to strengthen civil society capacity, to enable its engagement in local governance and for the promotion of human rights, an area in which the EU is seen to have a comparative advantage. However, this strategy was underpinned by reliance on unrealistic assumptions about government's reform intentions, so relevance in practice has been reduced. Projects have become increasingly relevant to a state-building agenda, especially from 2012 onwards.
Effectiveness	EU support to CSOs has grown over time from 5% of bilateral spending in 2002-2006 to nearly a third from 2007 onwards. The EIDHR provided a unique channel for direct support, independent of the Government of Yemen. EU advocacy on juvenile justice, children's rights and child marriage have played a part in legislative reform, providing successful examples political dialogue reinforcing development cooperation. However, CSOs continue to struggle to maintain their independence, and to identify effective mechanisms for holding the Government of Yemen to account.
Impact	Programming evaluations between 2002 and 2012 are scarce. As a result, it is hard to judge to what extent EU support to Yemeni CSOs enhanced the endogenous processes by which state and society have attempted to reconcile their mutual expectations of one another. Interviews suggest though that EU support to CSOs following the 2011 uprising was too little, too scattered and came too late to have a profound effect.
Sustainability	Notwithstanding the provision of support for NGO capacity building to improve their planning, management and technical skills, such support has not been provided within the framework of a broader strategy for national capacity development in line with principles for aid effectiveness and good engagement in fragile states.
Consistency	The focus of support has been broadly consistent with CSP objectives over the period. However, the use of management arrangements has not been consistent and this has undermined sustainability.
Value added	EU advocacy on juvenile justice, children's rights and child marriage have played a part in supporting progressive legislative reform, providing successful and well-regarded examples of political dialogue reinforcing development cooperation.
Coordination	While the EU is in general recognised for its commitment and efforts to improve coordination across its portfolio, donor coordination in Yemen remains weak. In the case of support to civil society, the EU demonstrated responsiveness and coordination in directing support towards women and youth in 2012 to increase their inclusion in the national dialogue.
Complementarity	The range of instruments has been used expediently rather than strategically. The area of human rights provides successful examples of political dialogue reinforcing development cooperation, but the absence of an overarching state-building narrative means that links between support to CSOs and other aspects of EU cooperation, particularly support to government, have been weak.
Coherence	The continuous effect of increasing support to CSOs over the course of a decade might be seen as having played a part in helping to establish a more diverse political culture that culminated in the NDC, where the EU made efforts to ensure that women, youth and other non-traditional actors were given a chance to speak.

## Monograph 2: EU contribution to resilience – the cases of the Social Welfare Fund and the Social Fund for Development

### Introduction

In EQ4 of the evaluation we analyse the extent to which EU interventions and dialogue have promoted and supported resilience through the period 2002-2012 and what successes have been achieved as a result of EU cooperation. In May 2013 the EU Council defined resilience as ‘the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to prepare for, to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks without compromising long-term development prospects’. Resilience as a term was only introduced recently in the EU strategy. By way of illustrating broader findings in the evaluation, this case study examines two major social protection institutions in Yemen, both intended to protect beneficiaries from extreme poverty and thus increase the resilience of poor individuals and households to shocks and stresses.

The Social Fund for Development (SFD) and the Social Welfare Fund (SWF) are largely complementary. The SFD focuses on communities and on the construction or rehabilitation of infrastructures with community participation and, more recently, in response to the worsening crises in Yemen since 2008, it has also been involved in ‘cash for work’ for able-bodied people from poor households in poor communities. Its cash payments are single payments to participating households averaging between US\$400 and 600. The SFD is not a humanitarian organisation, nor does it expect to have ongoing relationships with individuals or households. The SWF is intended to be the basis for the country’s social protection mechanism, primarily focusing on individuals and households who cannot work: 70% of its beneficiaries are either disabled or elderly; its cash transfers are unconditional, regular, and unlimited in time, albeit very small. Both Funds should contribute to improved resilience of the poor in the country by providing them with some basic support intended to enable them to develop their self-reliance capacity.

### Support to the Social Fund for Development

Established in 1997 by the World Bank alongside similar institutions elsewhere in the developing world, the Social Fund for Development (SFD) was originally intended as a short-term temporary mechanism to ‘compensate’ for the negative side-effects of structural adjustment policies. The SFD focuses on helping the poor to help themselves through providing income-generating activities and building community infrastructures, with capacity building of local communities as an integral part of its package of support. During the period of this evaluation the EU has provided a total of just under €35 million, which represents a small but significant contribution to the total US\$1.2 billion disbursed by the organisation between its establishment and end 2012.

**Table 1. EU contributions to the SFD (1997-2012)**

Agreement code	Euro (€) amount	Signature date	Effectiveness date
EU YEM/B7 3000	12,455,513	01/07/1998	01/01/2000
Micro finance PR	34,415	01/11/1997	01/11/1997
EU TF 53450	7,840,000	02/02/2005	02/02/2005
Health MED/2003/005-973	2,861,500	22/11/2006	01/01/2007
EU 2007/019-212	10,802,000	08/12/2008	06/07/2011
Health	2,785,000	31/12/2009	31/12/2009
European Food Crisis Rapid Response	10,425,032	18/11/2009	27/04/2010
<b>Total</b>	<b>47,193,460</b>		

Source: SFD M&E Unit 07 14

A 2003 impact evaluation<sup>75</sup> concluded that SFD targeting was effective, with 17% of SFD funds going to the poorest decile, 31% to the poorest quintile and 44% to the poorest three deciles. The impact evaluation undertaken in 2006<sup>76</sup> during the third phase of the SFD estimated that ‘close to a

<sup>75</sup> Yemen Social Fund for Development, Impact Evaluation Study, Final Report, ESA Consultores International, 2003.

<sup>76</sup> Yemen Social Fund for Development, Impact Evaluation Study, Final Report, ESA Consultores International, 2006.

half (49.9%) of SFD funds go to the poorest decile, 64% to the poorest quintile and 73% to the lowest three income deciles'. Thus SFD has been successful in reaching the most vulnerable.

The 2003 evaluation identified impacts including increased school student enrolment (particularly among girls), significantly increased access to clean water and the establishment of an emerging microfinance industry. Problems cited included elite capture, weak capacity of local authorities and local NGOs, poor-quality infrastructure and weak community participation. The 2006 survey (which had a particular focus on sustainability) concluded that the SFD had built social capital, increased girls' school enrolment and childhood vaccinations, and improved access to services for special needs groups. Overall service delivery improvements were reported as positive but modest and with sustainability challenges.

To date, the ultimate 'resilience' test for SFD beneficiaries has been their ability to cope during the crisis of 2011 and subsequently. Vulnerability increased to 45% of the population being food insecure and the SFD's ability to address these problems and continue working with the vulnerable has enabled communities benefiting from its interventions to cope far better than others; it was reported that in some cases, communities barely noticed a change in their living standards thanks to the additional income from the emergency interventions of the SFD.

In particular, the EU-funded Emergency Social Safety Net Enhancement project<sup>77</sup> demonstrated resilience and effectiveness in two ways: (a) it created a special World Bank Trust Fund to by-pass the lengthy delays that often slow down use of EU funds (because the EU insists that its own procedures be used, rather than the Operations Manual of the SFD despite the latter having been approved by the World Bank and numerous other donors, such as DFID; and (b) it provided conditional cash transfers to nearly 18,000 households through its 'workfare' programme. As these payments were 'one off' occasions of relatively substantial amounts, this helped households repay their debts, improve their diets and, in some cases, even invest in income-generating capital.

This project is funded through the EU's Food Crisis Rapid Response Facility under the Global Food Crisis Response Programme. The €10.4 million EU funding represents the EU's contribution to the SFD's Labour Intensive Works Programme (LIWP), which has a total funding of US\$220 million. The programme provides 'cash transfers' i.e. paid labour opportunities to poor community members to carry out public works and thus cope with the emergency situation brought about by the 2011 crisis, following on the 2008-9 food and fuel and financial crisis. The EU funds, administered by the World Bank, provided 18,000 households with 964,211 days labour (14.4% for women).<sup>78</sup>

The completion report for the EU funds included an evaluation of its effectiveness,<sup>79</sup> and found that:

- 74% of households in participating communities has at least one member involved in LIWP;
- due to lack of employment opportunities, participation in LIWP was more attractive than intended as originally 'wages' were set at 10-30% below local market rates;
- the maximum which was set for the number of workdays was not enforced due to the worsening situation of the participants;
- the use of piece rates rather than daily wages changed the overall income per household;
- the project added about 50 days per year to the otherwise expected overall employment per household;
- 95% of participants indicated that the programme allowed them to buy food and pay off debts, and 36% of these had the possibility of acquiring other things as well including durable goods;
- fewer people had to sell off durable goods;
- although rather too early to tell, 79% of households reported benefiting directly from the infrastructure built by the project.

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<sup>77</sup> To expedite implementation and facilitate procedures, this was implemented through a Trust Fund with the World Bank, thus allowing the SFD to use its own operational manual and accelerate implementation.

<sup>78</sup> Republic of Yemen, Social Fund for Development (June 2012) Implementation Completion Report on the European Union Grant for the emergency Social Safety Net Enhancement Project administered by the World Bank, p. 6.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., pp. 8-10.



Following DFID practice, the Implementation Completion Report also included a Value for Money (VFM) analysis that found that the targets were reached for most indicators. Achievements significantly exceeded original targets for the following:

- The number of employment days created
- The percentage of the total grant transferred to beneficiaries as wages
- The number of benefiting households

Some interventions were clearly designed to improve long-term resilience of the communities and appear to have achieved their objective: for example, the protection of agricultural land (529 ha), terrace rehabilitation, the increase in children's opportunities to enrol in school, and better access to health facilities, as well as communities taking up new initiatives on their own. At the institutional level, the SFD's own resilience was improved through the increased capacity of its staff and consultants and its improved targeting.

### Findings with regard to the SFD

**Finding 1:** Although this project was delayed and had problems due to EU procedures, thanks to the efficiency of the SFD it certainly contributed significantly to higher resilience of poor Yemeni households, as well as of the SFD as an institution.

**Finding 2:** The EU and SFD cooperated to solve the procedural problems that frequently slow down effectiveness of EU funding by establishing a trust fund managed by the World Bank, thus overcoming this problem, speeding up delivery, and demonstrating responsiveness to the urgency of the situation.

**Finding 3:** The EU contributed additional funds to a programme that was already showing promise with respect to improving resilience of the poor at a time of particularly acute crisis for the Yemeni population.

### Support to the Social Welfare Fund

The SWF was established in 1996. It is key to the Government-led social protection system in Yemen. The SWF aims 'to effectively contribute to reduce the burdens of poverty and lift suffering of the poor, especially with the lifting of the subsidies to prevent them from feeling lost and dependent on begging or deprivation'.<sup>80</sup> By 2012 it reached 1.5 million families<sup>81</sup> and its annual budget had increased from US\$4 million to US\$300 million. It originally provided YR 700<sup>82</sup> (€2.4) per month for a single person household, rising by YR 200/month (€0.69) for each additional household member, up to a ceiling of YR 1500/month. At that time, it was targeted at (a) the disabled, including handicapped and the elderly over 60 years old for males and over 55 for females, (b) orphans, (c) unsupported women, (d) households whose head had disappeared, (e) households whose head is in prison or recently released and (f) the poor and indigent. Status was a first criterion, with additional income and asset ownership tests to assess poverty and disqualify less poor households.<sup>83</sup>

Following the new Social Welfare Law passed in 2008, payments increased to YR 2000 (€6.9) for a single person household with increments of YR 400 per person to a maximum of YR 4000 per household, representing an actual decrease if inflation over the decade is taken into consideration. The target group was re-defined to give poverty as the prime criterion for participation, and to allow the inclusion of the unemployed as well as the earlier groups defined by their social status (e.g. widows, the elderly, etc.). The law also provided for a management system that would allow the less poor or the no-longer poor to 'graduate' out of the system.

Alongside the SFD, the SWF is the main recipient of EU social protection funds. Other than from the EU, the SWF receives significant support from UK's DFID, the World Bank and the Netherlands

<sup>80</sup> Government of Yemen, 2002.

<sup>81</sup> Rep of Yemen, World Bank, MENA, Social and Economic Development Unit, *Comprehensive Development Review Phase I, Poverty and social safety nets building block*, Jan 2000, p. 16.

<sup>82</sup> Euro 1 = YR 291 approximately in July 2014.

<sup>83</sup> World Bank (2000), op. cit., p. 31.

government. With respect to resilience, while it is primarily concerned with providing cash transfers to the poorest, it is clear that these transfers should help resilience of the benefiting individuals, and at the institutional level, the SWF by its very nature can be described as the Yemeni State’s resilience mechanism through its mandate of providing basic means to the poor to cope with extreme poverty.

**Table 2: Contracts and expenditure on SWF**

Decision numbers	Title	Date	Planned expenditure (€)	Actual (€)
2343	GOPA SWF additional	2004	101,325	101,325
2343	2 months’ extension	2005	73,569	73,569
2511	GOPA SWF	2002	1,290,505	1,290,505
2521	Extension 4 months	2005	192,271	192,271
16826	SWF rider for 6 months’ extension	2005	162,275	162,275
19125	SWF phase 3	2010	642,742	295,796
19125	Programme design	2009	261,834	209,467
19125	Start up	2009	175,219	175,219
19573	Emergency food security and nutrition support	2012	2,000,000	1,600,000
20458	Support to purchasing power conditional cash transfers [CCT]	2010	4,240,000	3,816,000
21709	Preventing and mitigating malnutrition in <5 and lactating mothers	2010	4,800,000	2,869,735
21709	Improvement of <5 children and women malnutrition in Central Hodeida	2012	800,000	333,063
22546	SWF monitoring mission	2011	63,933	63,933
16826 17670	TA to SWF phase 2	2006	1,044,163	1,044,163
19125 20458 23587	TA to SWF 3	2009	2,259,905	1,897,924

There is no doubt that the SWF has a number of recognised problems: the most frequently mentioned are weak targeting, the small size of the payments (which means that it is impossible for people to survive on SWF transfers), weak management and corruption. Targeting is certainly still a major problem for the SWF; this is partly due to its history and origins when selection of beneficiaries was explicitly based on patronage, and members of Parliament and other leaders were given allocations under which to nominate beneficiaries. A 2013 Department for International Development (DFID) Project Completion Report on its own support to SWF further noted that ‘there remains a general lack of knowledge about SWF and its operations among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike’. This extended to targeting, with DFID noting a reliance on local knowledge for targeting, with the concomitant risks of bias and exclusion in the application process. A detailed survey of beneficiaries carried out in 2008 focused on targeting and found that 27% of beneficiaries were not poor; following the poverty oriented selection of new beneficiaries, the ratio of non-poor among the new group was only 15%.<sup>84</sup>

A DFID-commissioned study<sup>85</sup> in 2012 found that the small size of the SWF transfer limited its effects, with transfers being inadequate to feed a family or meet other basic needs. Beneficiaries reported that the transfer has a limited but generally positive impact on household consumption, with the impact depending on the context and on household-level vulnerability. Beyond the direct purchases facilitated by the cash transfers (mostly used to pay for essential services and bills), participation in the programme also facilitates borrowing through use of the beneficiary card as a guarantee to borrow money or buy goods. In 2012 the EU commissioned an in-depth Monitoring report on the SWF. However, this focused primarily on the *modus operandi* of the Fund and M&E. It did not analyse any aspects of beneficiary selection or of impact beyond responding to basic needs.

<sup>84</sup> World Bank Background note on the SWF.

<sup>85</sup> *Transforming Cash Transfers*, Overseas Development Institute.

Institutionally, the SWF has a total of 1,810 staff in the country of whom 209 are at headquarters; overall they are described as lacking qualifications and commitment and not being transparent. This is the case despite the fact that the EU financed considerable TA for more than a decade, which appears to have had limited impact on organisational effectiveness. EU funding was first provided in 2004 and has continued up until the end of the evaluation period. Given its long track record in providing TA support to the SWF, the EU ought to have a comparative advantage in helping to strengthen SWF's targeting and impact. Indeed, the most recent phase of EU support has focused in particular on these aspects, with over 25% of funds earmarked for TA and staff. The TA contract was renewed a number of times but was finally allowed to lapse in 2013, apparently at the request of the Minister of Social Affairs due to inadequate performance. Staff suggested that the TA had not been very helpful and was of low quality, despite evidence of the continued need for TA support as demonstrated by current World Bank funding of a project dedicated to giving institutional support to the SWF, including considerable TA.<sup>86</sup>

The EU's long history of supporting the SWF appears to be coming to an end. As part of the programming process for 2014-15, the EU has decided to phase out its funding of cash transfers apparently because of continued concerns about the SWF's 'operating capacity, management structures, efficiency, and effectiveness'. This decision is somewhat surprising. In 2014 senior EU officials justified it on the basis that it is inappropriate to use external support to finance social safety net cash transfers that should be financed from routine national budgets, and backed up this position by stating that the World Bank had withdrawn its support and this endorsed the EU position. However, the World Bank financed a US\$100 million cash transfer programme for 2013-14<sup>87</sup> and continued with the ongoing project to support the SWF's institutionalisation.

The SWF should, in principle, play a significant role in improving the resilience of its beneficiaries. The 2012 ODI study addresses directly the SWF's impact on resilience, which it frames with regard to coping strategies. The positive effects cited by beneficiaries included the reliability of cash transfers,<sup>88</sup> which allows them to plan in the knowledge of some form of safety net; the dignity that comes from recognition as an SWF beneficiary and being better able to afford essential expenditures; the indirect multiplier effect of increased expenditure on the community on 'happy days' when funds arrive; and the strengthening of community cohesion that comes from community mobilisation and participation. But negative effects were also found, including the creation of a dependency culture; tensions between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries; the opportunities for corruption that SWF presents to local leaders; intra-household tensions over control of the cash; and most notably, the lack of transformative value of the transfer due to its small amount.

On the other hand, the technical assistance provided to the SWF for over a decade should really have had a deeper impact on improving the performance of its staff at HQ as well as in the field, and the failure to achieve this can, in part at least, be attributed to the fact that the EU did not take the steps necessary to replace a poorly performing TA provider. Even in 2014, there are still considerable complaints about the SWF's weaknesses. The following in particular have been mentioned in interviews: employment of incompetent staff, weak administrative, financial management, lack of transparency, and limited understanding of procedures by SWF staff. The EU could have done more to address these issues as evidenced by its failure to carry out detailed monitoring, its lack of intervention when cases of fund misuse were reported and the absence of any detailed evaluation of its investments in the Fund. According to the most recent supervision reports from the World Bank, some of these failures are being addressed under the new TA hired with World Bank support.

Findings with regard to the SWF **Finding 4.** Despite considerable investment, the EU-funded Technical Assistance to the SWF did not have the anticipated impact in improving the management and targeting performance of the institution. The EU should seriously review its selection mechanisms

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<sup>86</sup> World Bank, 2010, Project Appraisal Document on a proposed grant for US\$10 million to the Republic of Yemen for a Social Welfare Fund Institutional Support Project.

<sup>87</sup> World Bank, The Emergency Crisis Recovery Project.

<sup>88</sup> The study indicates that despite delays of some months in the delivery of cash transfers, beneficiaries felt confident that money would arrive at some point and planned accordingly.

for TA, and develop mechanisms that avoid the almost routine renewal and extension of contracts regardless of the quality of the work. It should take a much more critical approach to the quality of the services it finances.

**Finding 5.** The SWF’s ability to have a serious impact on the resilience of its beneficiaries is negatively affected by the low payments, which mean that beneficiaries are forced to find additional resources to avoid starvation and are thus prevented from focusing on different approaches to income generation; and by the lack of income-generating opportunities in most areas.

**Finding 6.** While it makes sense for the state to use its national budget to finance social protection in a situation of fragility such as that currently prevailing in Yemen, development partners should take a flexible approach to the provision of unconditional cash transfers to the most needy and provide financing for the institutions responsible for social protection.

Further detail on our findings is presented below in Table 3:

**Table 3: Summary of findings for support to the SWF and SFD**

Indicators	Social Welfare Fund	Social Fund for Development
Intervention logic	Support was based on unrealistic assumptions about government motives and capabilities. For example, the 2012 Action Fiche contains the statement ‘It is assumed that the commitment of the new governmental authorities to support the social safety net is sufficiently great to put social interests before political ones.’	Largely due to the leading role played by the World Bank, which has a strong focus on ‘quality at entry’, the intervention logic has been consistently strong.
Monitoring	The SWF has no systematic M&E mechanisms in place. As such, most M&E has been done by donors in partnership with the Government. The EU has been prominent in this process. However, security considerations mean that external monitoring is not currently possible, while SWF capacity for monitoring and financial management remains weak. The 2012 Action Fiche acknowledges that ‘Improving M&E systems capable of delivering accurate and reliable reports, and setting up an appropriate complaints and grievances mechanism should increase the credibility of SWF and should contribute to improving its transparency and effectiveness.’	Through close supervision by the World Bank and strong performance by the implementing agency, monitoring has been consistently good and has contributed to sound management and to transparency.
Relevance	Food insecurity is acute in Yemen and a social safety net is a relevant response to this. Support to government in this regard is relevant to fragile states principles of alignment and legitimacy. However, after decades of support and persistent weaknesses in SWF capacity, transparency and beneficiary targeting, relevance in practice has been severely undermined.	Food insecurity is acute in Yemen and a social safety net is a relevant response to this. Clearly the SFD has been very effective as a social safety net, but it has remained outside government structures and its relevance in relation to fragile states principles is questionable, especially with regard to legitimacy and comparisons with the SWF.

Indicators	Social Welfare Fund	Social Fund for Development
Effectiveness	Using 2005 data, a 2007 Poverty Assessment estimated that 52% of SWF transfers went to the poor, with SWF transfers collected by only 8% of those who satisfy its targeting criteria. Out of the beneficiary population, 70% were not in the intended target group, and, out of these untargeted beneficiaries, 75% were not classified as poor. An EU Monitoring Mission in 2012 concluded that targeting management shortcomings and problems remained. In the same year, the World Bank rated the performance of the SWF as unsatisfactory.	The World Bank has consistently rated the performance of the SFD as satisfactory or highly satisfactory in terms of delivery and achievement of outcomes. In 2006 the Bank described it as ‘one of the key instruments of Government of Yemen’s poverty reduction initiatives ...[and] a model agency of best practices which has positively affected the process of development in Yemen’. Beneficiary targeting has been significantly better than on the SWF and compares extremely well with similar programmes in other countries.
Impact	The 2007 Poverty Assessment concluded that the SWF scale at the time was not enough to make any sizeable impact on poverty. The 2012 monitoring mission highlighted the limitations of cash transfers. DEVCO social protection experts do not consider SWF to meet the standards required to be considered an effective social protection mechanism.	All SFD components are considered to have been successful, achieving their planned outcomes and delivering institutional and poverty impacts.
Sustainability	As the 2012 Action Fiche states, ‘The SWF’s organisational development [since the mid-1990s] remains in need of substantial support in order for it to be able to adequately respond to needs and expectations.’ Continued management weaknesses and the identified need for a ‘collaborative agenda for action to promote inclusive social protection as key to social cohesion and stability’ (ODI, 2012) strongly suggest that prospects for sustainability remain weak.	The SFD has established a track record in facilitating the cost-effective delivery of basic social services, reflecting sustainable development of institutional capacity including at local levels. Financial sustainability has been achieved through calibration of capital investment with capacity, affordable operations, and maintenance and local ownership of assets delivered by the programme.
Consistency	The EU has been consistent in its support to the SWF. However, the problems and challenges of the SWF have also remained consistent over the same period.	The EU has been consistent in its support of the SFD.
Value added	The fact that the EU has supported the SWF since 2002 but that major challenges remain, such as leakage of benefits to non-poor households and persistent management weaknesses, means that it is unclear what the added value of EU support has been.	The World Bank has played a leadership role in financing and supervising the SFD. While the EU has been a significant funder, it is unclear what added value this has brought beyond increasing the scale and scope of the programme.
Coordination	A recent ODI study (2012) notes ‘an increased tendency and efforts among donors and international NGOs to enhance coordination and joint work, including the creation of a working group on social protection in 2012 involving DFID, the Netherlands, the World Bank, UNICEF and the EU’.	The existence of a large number of donors and the Government resulted in different requirements, burdens on the SFD structure, and sometimes conflicting messages concerning the approaches used and mechanisms adopted.

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Social Welfare Fund</b>	<b>Social Fund for Development</b>
Complementarity	Support to the SWF is complementary to support to the SFD, to food security actions and to humanitarian assistance. However, complementarity against an overarching state-building agenda is not apparent.	Support to the SFD is complementary to support to the SWF, to food security actions and to humanitarian assistance. However, complementarity against an overarching state-building agenda is not apparent.
Coherence	Support to the SWF is coherent with the objective of poverty reduction and with the EU's focus on food security. However, support has not been coherent with best practice principles for social protection or concerns that the SWF has been politicised (i.e. under the 'do no harm' fragile states principle).	Support to the SFD is coherent with the objective of poverty reduction and with the EU's focus on food security.

## Monograph 3: EU responsiveness and Private Sector Development in Yemen

### Introduction

In EQ7 of the evaluation we explored how the EU’s strategic choices were reviewed and adapted as conditions changed on the ground. We looked for evidence of EU responsiveness to the changing political and development landscape in Yemen and how this translated into actual funded activities within the country portfolio. Here we take up the theme again by looking more closely at one sector – Private Sector Development (PSD) – and the storyline of the EU’s response.

Contemporary EU development policy acknowledges that ‘Effective long-term poverty reduction requires economic growth models that allow people to generate wealth and benefit from it in their own country. Both the quantity and the pattern (or ‘quality’) of economic growth determine whether the poor can benefit sustainably from this process. Promoting pro-poor, inclusive growth is a key objective of EU interventions in trade and private sector development.’<sup>89</sup> Economic deterioration in Yemen has increasingly marginalised poor communities. In turn, this has exacerbated the lack of faith in the Government to effectively address concerns of the poor; and political disenfranchisement has followed. Addressing pro-poor growth is directly linked to the extent to which PSD can facilitate the participation of the poor in economic activity – as producers (fishermen, business owners, etc.), as employees (providers of labour) and as consumers (of goods and services). PSD aims to make markets operate in an inclusive way, offering the poor the things they need – jobs, opportunities, goods, services – to increase their incomes.

The focus of our case study is on how the operational actions envisaged in the two NIPs (2002-04 and 2005-06), and the two MIPs (2006-10 and 2011-13) responded to identified needs and contributed to attaining the objectives specified in the Commission’s country strategy. We also look at how the intervention logics of PSD projects were/are consistent with higher level EC strategies and policies.

### The EU’s PSD portfolio

PSD-related projects fall mainly under the sub-sectors Economic Development and Fisheries,<sup>90</sup> and of the 21 projects in these sub-sectors, nine were not further examined because of lack of documentation; four projects are more related to infrastructure development and equipment supply than to PSD; one project concerns improving air safety, which is also not strictly speaking a PSD project; another project, although labelled a fisheries project, is actually support to the Social Fund for Development; and one project categorised under Economic Development is actually support to the Social Welfare Fund. Thus we selected five projects for review (Table 1).

**Table 1: Projects reviewed in this case study**

Sub-sector	Decision code	Project title
Fisheries	MED/2000/003-330 (CL)	Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance
Econ. Dev.	MED/2002/004-007 (EC)	Support to Yemen’s Accession to the WTO
Fisheries	DCI-MED/2010/022-236 (EC)	Yemen Fisheries Support Programme (YFSP)
Econ. Dev.	DCI-MED/2011/022-814 (EC)	Yemen Economic Support Programme (YESP)
Fisheries	MED/2006/17526	Sustainable Dev. of Fisheries Sector in Yemen (SDFS)

Two of the selected projects are fairly recent: (i) the Yemen Fisheries Support Programme (YFSP), for which an agreement was signed in July 2012; and (ii) the Economic Support Programme (YESP), which started only in December 2012. Though it is too early to evaluate the impact of these projects, we reviewed their intervention logics and compared these with the intervention logic of previous PSD projects.

<sup>89</sup> ‘European Union support for the private sector’, European Commission, 2011.

<sup>90</sup> It should be noted that a number of initiatives under the sub-sector Food and Agriculture, and even under the sub-sectors Social Development and Health, also include PSD-related activities.

## From policies to strategies and interventions

For our purpose we will base our judgement of the strategies (as reflected in CSPs, NIPs and MIPs) and interventions adopted for Yemen predominantly on contemporary EU policy documents. There is a noteworthy shift in priorities for PSD interventions presented in the CSP 2002-2006 ('Facilitation of business development and strengthening of economic institutions') to those of the CSP 2007-2013 ('Fostering private sector development through support for sustainable development in the agriculture and fisheries sector and for reforms aimed at improving the regulatory framework for investments, business and trade').

**Finding 1:** The definition of priorities for operational PSD interventions in subsequent CSPs has been insufficiently coherent and consistent.

The conversion of objectives and priorities of the CSPs into priority interventions in the subsequent NIPs and MIPs shows, in itself, a mix of four main areas of technical assistance covering the inter-related fields of trade and private sector development suggested in the CSPs:

- **Development of economic institutions**, including supporting the process to join the WTO and private sector development aiming at enhancing and advancing private sector investment and activities (NIP 2002-2004).
- **Poverty reduction and support to the Poverty Reduction Strategy**, including support to the sustainable development of the fisheries sector (NIP 2005-2006).
- **Fostering private sector development** through the sustainable development of the agriculture sector, the food processing industry and the fisheries sector (MIP 2007-2010).
- **Supporting the development of SMMEs**, including the establishment of a business-enabling environment for SMMEs and improving the climate for Foreign Direct Investment (MIP 2011-2013).

However, the CSPs and subsequent NIPs and MIPs do not present a clear vision of how EC support to PSD in Yemen should have been implemented in a balanced manner at micro-, meso- and macroeconomic level to encourage growth and benefit different sectors of the population, including the poorest. Interventions are presented in isolation and in succession without a clear explanation of how they would contribute collectively to a coherent implementation of EC support policies in the PSD interventions in Yemen. Considering that most PSD interventions aiming at organisational capacity building and governance usually take five to seven years to be effective, changing priorities for operational interventions after two or three years does not contribute to coherence or consistency.

**Finding 2:** The translation of CSPs into NIPs and MIPs do not present a clear vision of balanced, coherent and consistent EC support that encourages growth and benefits different sectors of the population, including the poorest.

There is also no explicit rationale of why and how the different projects aimed to incorporate the country in the international trade loop and how they intended to involve various economic stakeholders and take social considerations into account.

**Finding 3:** Whereas the European Commission recognises the correlation between trade openness, private sector performance, economic growth and poverty reduction, this does not become apparent in the formulation and delivery of EC policies and operational activities in the Yemen programme.

Admittedly, the EU did not have entirely clear guidelines for project identification, formulation and implementation at the time of the start of most PSD projects examined for this evaluation. However

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**Finding 4:** In spite of the initial absence of clear EC policies or operational guidelines for PSD interventions, much more use should have been made of internationally accepted guidelines and best practices in PSD and of own good judgement.

A good example is the 2001 guide ‘Business development services for small enterprises: Guiding principles for donor intervention’ of the Committee of Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development, of which the European Commission was also a member.

## **PSD projects**

The following brief overview of our chosen five projects relates project-level findings to PSD-related country policies, strategies and priorities for interventions. However, the evaluation has not focused on the performance of individual projects, but rather the cumulative impact and lessons derived from these, those illustrative of findings common to all projects.

### **Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance project (MCS)**

Taking into consideration findings from the 2010 external evaluation of this project<sup>91</sup> as well as our own interviews, we conclude the following:

- a) The excessive number and broad range of objectives and activities and unrealistic ambitions that far exceeded the allocated resources resulted in an unclear and unrealistic intervention logic for the project.
- b) Monitoring Reports over a three-year period (2005-07)<sup>92</sup> have been insufficiently used to adjust operations, improve project design (including the Logical Framework), influence PSD strategy, or bring greater ‘ownership’ by beneficiary participation in monitoring.
- c) The poor identification and design of the MSC project has significantly limited its contribution to building lasting relationships between stakeholders and improving functioning of the fisheries value chain and, consequently, did not contribute significantly to the resilience of poor fishery communities.
- d) The isolationist operation of the Project Implementation Unit has unnecessarily and substantially limited project effectiveness in terms to the contribution it could have made to the key objectives of the EU support to Yemen: economic and administrative reforms; promotion of good governance; and the fight against poverty.
- e) The lack of efficiency of project implementation in terms of costs incurred versus benefits derived obviously also becomes apparent in a lack of efficiency to contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the CSPs.
- f) The project has been inconsistent in the sense that its undue focus on the provision of training, physical infrastructure and equipment has not been sufficiently compatible with the EC policies and guidelines on intervention logic for the sustainable development of economic institutions.
- g) The project has not achieved noteworthy impact in terms of achieving the overall objectives and goals of the CSPs, NIPs and MIPs of EC support to Yemen during the evaluation period.

### **WTO accession**

This started in October 2003, with a planned duration of 5 years. The implementing Authority was the Ministry of Industry and Trade.

- a) The project’s overall objectives and purposes were consistent with the Partner Government policies.<sup>93</sup> However, applicable documentation does not provide a theory of change or

<sup>91</sup> ‘Evaluation of the Fisheries monitoring control and surveillance project-Republic of Yemen’, dated February – March 2010.

<sup>92</sup> MR-10268.01 dated 05/08/05; MR-10268.02 dated 11/08/06; and MR-10268.02 dated 11/08/06.

<sup>93</sup> ‘Mid-term review of the Support of Yemen’s Accession to WTO project’ dated 26/05/2008.

intervention logic that links support to Yemen's Accession to WTO to the fight against poverty and, thus, to increasing the resilience of the people of Yemen.

- b) Monitoring Reports<sup>94</sup> for EC support to WTO accession have been insufficiently used to: adjust operations; improve project design (including the Logical Framework); influence PSD strategy; and bring greater 'ownership' by beneficiary participation in monitoring.
- c) The project has been effective in the sense that planned beneficiaries have access to project services. However, the contribution to the overall objectives of EC support to Yemen in general and to PSD in particular could not be substantiated. Of 62 activities stipulated at the inception of the project, 23 activities remain undelivered.
- d) Coordination with the private sector has been irregular and not systematic, while coordination with other donors appears to have been more incidental than systematic.
- e) The isolationist approach of the project and its apparent focus on 'getting the job done' (rather than on institution building) has reduced opportunities for complementarity and mutually beneficial division of labour with other support initiatives for WTO accession, including those of EU Member States.
- f) We found no evidence that stakeholders, particularly private sector representative bodies, perceived that EC support to accession to the WTO has added value to private sector development in Yemen as such, in particular to SME development.

### **Yemen Fisheries Support Programme (YFSP)**

The Yemen Fisheries Support Programme is implemented through IFAD (the Fisheries Investment Project, FIP). The EU contributed 17% (US\$5.3m) of the total project costs. Although it is too early to judge effectiveness and impact, we conclude as follows:

- a) The intervention logic of this project is considerably more appropriate than that of the preceding Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance project.
- b) Preparations for this project have been far more robust and rigorous than for previous PSD projects. It is likely that this PSD project will have considerably more impact on the achievement of higher objectives, such as wealth and job creation.

### **Sustainable Development of Fisheries Sector in Yemen (SDFS)**

The Financial Agreement between EU and the Yemen Government for this was signed in 2006, initially with a termination date of June 2012 but this was extended to June 2013. The focus was on building the capacity of the Ministry of Fish Wealth (MFW) and inspection services to reinforce its quality control capacity for fishery products, as well its capacity to obtain accurate data on the fisheries sector as the basis for informing management decisions and monitoring performance of the fishery.

Taking into account the recent evaluation<sup>95</sup> and our own interviews, our key findings are as follows:

- a) SDFS partially achieved its overall objectives of supporting poverty reduction and economic growth in Yemen through increased productivity and competitiveness of the fisheries sector and sustainable management of resources. Specific fishing facilities have been rehabilitated and some capacity building of the laboratories is completed. The support to fishers, fish exporters and competent authorities, however, was not adequate.
- b) Support to sustainable fisheries development and management through informed decision making was not completed. The Ministry of Fish Wealth changed the objectives of the Fisheries Information System and as a result the SDFS withdrew support.

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<sup>94</sup> MR-10265.01, dated 05/08/05; MR-10265.02, dated 11/08/06; and MR-10265.03, dated 06/12/07.

<sup>95</sup> EPRD (2014), Final Evaluation of Financial Agreement: Sustainable Development of Fisheries Sector in Yemen and of the Fisheries Resources Management and Conservation Project, April 2014.

- c) The Project Support Centre performed well, with financial management being efficient.
- d) Significant support was provided to the MFW: capacity building and training, plus provision of hardware and equipment for inspectors in four governorates. Significant material and financial support, as well as training and technical assistance, was also provided to cooperatives and women groups in Aden and other coastal governorates of Yemen.
- e) The Fisheries Information System (FIS) did not progress beyond the installation stage and failed to support the SDFS project outcomes: to be widely used by the whole section of the relevant stakeholders in the Yemeni fisheries sector as intended; and to store and manage the data collected through the national monitoring programme, enhancing institutional capacity to inform national decision-making processes.
- f) Results on fisheries management and information were only partial. Training was completed satisfactorily, but the capacity of Yemeni fisheries staff to collect, compile, analyse and, crucially, share data and other forms of information, relating to various fisheries within the Yemeni marine waters was not strengthened by the SDFS project. The FIS has not contributed to any information management or decision making. The stock assessments produced by international TA were unused by the SDFS project.

## Conclusions

The deterioration in the political and security environment in Yemen since 2011 has caused an acute regression of the economic, financial and monetary indicators and unprecedented deterioration of the livelihood and humanitarian situations.<sup>96</sup> Even without a crisis such as this, attribution of changes in wealth and job creation to EC interventions would have been testing; it is now almost impossible.

The foregoing review highlights some major deficiencies, but many of these are already known to the EU. Indeed, the post-2012 programmes – particularly those implemented by IFAD (Yemen Economic Support Programme and Yemen Fisheries Support Programme) – have taken past shortcomings into account and adjusted accordingly. But since these were not reviewed beyond their preparatory stage, our conclusions are predominantly based on the three completed projects: Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance project, Support to Yemen's Accession to the WTO, and Sustainable Development of Fisheries Sector in Yemen. Since these were the largest and most long-lasting projects during the evaluation period, we find it justifiable to generalise these findings for overall PSD support. cursory examination of other PSD projects confirmed this belief.

For these three projects we have tabulated our findings as follows:

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<sup>96</sup> Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development (TPSD) 2012-2014.

**Table 2: Summary of findings for three projects**

Indicators	Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance project	Support of Yemen's Accession to WTO	Sustainable Development of Fisheries Sector in Yemen
Intervention logic	The excessive number and broad range of objectives and activities and unrealistic ambitions that far exceeded the allocated resources resulted in unclear and unrealistic intervention logic for the project.	The project's overall objectives and purposes were consistent with the Partner Government policies. However, applicable documentation does not provide a theory of change or intervention logic that links support to Yemen's Accession to WTO to the fight against poverty.	The design took account of lessons learned from earlier fisheries projects, but there was still inadequate stakeholder participation in the preparation phase.
Monitoring	Monitoring Reports have been insufficiently used to: adjust operations; improve project design (including the Logical Framework); influence PSD strategy; and bring greater 'ownership' by beneficiary participation in monitoring.	Monitoring Reports have been insufficiently used to: adjust operations; improve project design (including the Logical Framework); influence PSD strategy; and bring greater 'ownership' by beneficiary participation in monitoring.	Although work plans were satisfactory, there was no plan to conduct consistent M&E during project implementation. The logframe was not conducive to adaptive management, so some activities came to a standstill.
Relevance	The poor identification and design of the MSC project significantly limited its contribution to building lasting relationships between stakeholders and improving functioning of the fisheries value chain and, consequently, did not respond to or contribute significantly towards economic resilience of poor fishery communities.	The shortcomings in the intervention logic undermined the potential relevance of the WTO project.	Assistance to the fisheries sector is considered essential, being the number 2 export earner and number 1 supplier of proteins of animal origin. Despite high risks caused by insecurity the authorities did well in suspending Project implementation until the situation allowed movements again.

Indicators	Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance project	Support of Yemen's Accession to WTO	Sustainable Development of Fisheries Sector in Yemen
Effectiveness	The isolationist operation of the Project Implementation Unit has unnecessarily and substantially limited project effectiveness in terms of the contribution it could have made to the key objectives of the EU support to Yemen: economic and administrative reforms; promotion of good governance; and the fight against poverty.	The project has been effective in the sense that planned beneficiaries have access to project services. However, the contribution to the overall objectives of EC support to Yemen in general and to PSD in particular could not be substantiated. Project implementation could have been more effective if Monitoring Reports had been used more effectively.	Sufficient training was provided by SDFS. However, activities related to management could not be completed as MFW decided to deviate from the original Terms of Reference of the project, beyond the control of the PSC or Technical Assistance. Instead of reporting catches via the cooperatives at auction sites, MFW decided that fishermen should report directly to MFW. This caused the activity to stall and the outcome was unsatisfactory. The Fisheries Information System (FIS) did not progress beyond the installation stage and failed to support the SDFS project outcomes.
Impact	Impact is limited purely to immediate beneficiaries/project partners, with little discernible impact with respect to achieving the overall objectives and goals of the CSPs, NIPs and MIPs during the evaluation period.	Impact is limited purely to immediate beneficiaries/project partners, with little discernible impact with respect to achieving the overall objectives and goals of the CSPs, NIPs and MIPs during the evaluation period.	Although we could not independently verify this, it is assumed that through improved quality control of fisheries products the prices paid at auctions will eventually increase. With the improved facilities and quality control, health risks should also be reduced as unfit fisheries products will not enter the markets.
Sustainability	Poor project design; unsound project management; absence of systemic learning; and lack of commitment from the side of the MFW have left project interventions principally unsustainable.	It is unlikely that EC support to accession to the WTO has contributed to a sustainable increase in competitiveness and increased participation of Yemen in international trade.	Where training at the laboratories was completed the operations could remain sustainable. The FIS as revised by MFW is unsustainable.
Consistency	The project has been inconsistent in the sense that its undue focus on the provision of training, physical infrastructure and equipment has not been sufficiently compatible with the EC policies and guidelines on intervention logic for the sustainable development of economic institutions.	Support to succession to WTO has been consistent with the commitments taken by the European Commission as described in the Country Strategy Papers.	Support to SDFS has been consistent with the commitments taken by the European Commission as described in the Country Strategy Papers.

Indicators	Fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance project	Support of Yemen's Accession to WTO	Sustainable Development of Fisheries Sector in Yemen
Value added	There are no indications that stakeholders perceived that the distinctive contribution of EU development cooperation in Yemen to the fisheries sector has added value.	There are no indications that stakeholders, particularly private sector representative bodies, perceived that EC support to accession to the WTO has added value to private sector development in Yemen, in particular to SME development.	SDFS has added value through increased productivity and competitiveness of the fisheries sector and sustainable management of resources. Specific fishing facilities have been rehabilitated and some capacity building of the laboratories is completed. The support to fishers, fish exporters and competent authorities, however, was not adequate.
Coordination	There is no reporting of events or results of systematic coordination of the project interventions with interventions in the fisheries sector of EU Member States or other donors.	Coordination with the private sector has been irregular and not systematic, while coordination with other donors appears to have been more incidental than systematic.	The World Bank-financed Fisheries Resources Management and Conservation Project (FRMCP) and this EU-financed project were meant to complement each other during the implementation by the Ministry of Fish Wealth, but there was little cross-fertilisation of ideas and practice.
Complementarity	The isolationist approach of project implementation has prevented complementarity and/or mutual beneficial division of labour with other support initiatives for the fisheries sector.	The isolationist approach of the project and its apparent focus on 'getting the job done' (rather than on institution building) has reduced opportunities for complementarity and mutually beneficial division of labour with other support initiatives for WTO accession, including those of EU Member States.	The SDFS was a logical follow-up to earlier EDF-funded fisheries development and management projects and programmes in Yemen. During implementation of SDFS an IFAD-funded project started: Fisheries Investment Project (FIP) also supported by EU.
Coherence	The project intervention logic was not coherent with contemporaneous EC development policy on poverty reduction, integration into the global economy and sustainable development.	The project has been insufficiently coherent in the sense that the focus on WTO accession <i>per se</i> has not been appropriately compatible with the EC policies and guidelines aimed at building the capacities of key economic and institutional players.	There was coherence with other AIDCO, DG MARE, DG SANCO, DG DEV objectives in general. The objectives of the SDFS were rather specific and thus mainstreaming into the project activities of gender, climate, HIV/AIDS or other cross-cutting issues could not be determined.

The responsiveness of the EU towards the changing environment and emerging best practices in PSD has been adequate since 2011; the SDFS project in particular demonstrated a greater level of awareness and responsiveness towards the changing political landscape and the challenges inherent in working in Yemen. The differences between EC support to PSD before and after 2012 were further

apparent in the preparation and execution of new projects. These have distinctly better intervention logics and are likely to perform better in all themes and performance indicators used for the present evaluation. Moreover, we found that EU support for PSD works better where co-funding arrangements are made with other bilateral or multilateral organisations that have a competitive advantage in PSD.

