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**THIS ACTION IS FUNDED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**ANNEX 2**

to the Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of the annual action plan in favour of the Republic of Ghana for 2024

**Action Document for EU for a Secure Ghana**

**ANNUAL ACTION PLAN**

This document constitutes the annual work programme within the meaning of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation, within the meaning of Article 23 of the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation.

# 1 SYNOPSIS

## 1.1 Action Summary Table

<b>1. Title CRIS/OPSYS business reference Basic Act</b>	EU for a Secure Ghana OPSYS number: ACT-62570 Financed under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe)
<b>2. Team Europe Initiative</b>	No
<b>3. Zone benefiting from the action</b>	The action shall be carried out in the Republic of Ghana
<b>4. Programming document</b>	EU-Ghana Joint Programming 2021-2027
<b>5. Link with relevant MIP(s) objectives / expected results</b>	Result 3.1: ‘Conflict prevention in most vulnerable districts of Ghana is more efficient and effective’ Result 3.2: ‘Institutional and structural capacities in the areas of Counter-terrorism and Anti-Money Laundering are enhanced’ Result 3.3: ‘Security actors’ interventions in the sub-sectors of transnational organised crime, environmental criminality, cybersecurity and maritime security are effective and more streamlined’
<b>PRIORITY AREAS AND SECTOR INFORMATION</b>	
<b>6. Priority Area(s), sectors</b>	Priority area 3 – Good Governance and security 151 – Government and Civil Society 152 – Conflict, peace and security
<b>7. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)</b>	Main SDG (1 only): SDG 16 ‘Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’ Other significant SDGs (up to 9) and where appropriate, targets: SDG 5 ‘Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls’ and SDG 10.7 ‘Facilitate orderly, safe, and

	responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies’.			
<b>8 a) DAC code(s)</b>	15210 - Security system management and reform – 40% 15220 - Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution – 40% 15150 - Democratic participation and civil society – 20%			
<b>8 b) Main Delivery Channel</b>	20000 - Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society			
<b>9. Targets</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Migration <input type="checkbox"/> Climate <input type="checkbox"/> Social inclusion and Human Development <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Gender <input type="checkbox"/> Biodiversity <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Human Rights, Democracy and Governance			
<b>10. Markers (from DAC form)</b>	<b>General policy objective @</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Principal objective</b>
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Aid to environment @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Gender equality and women’s and girl’s empowerment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Disaster Risk Reduction @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Inclusion of persons with Disabilities @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Nutrition @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<b>RIO Convention markers</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Principal objective</b>
	Biological diversity @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change adaptation @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<b>Policy objectives</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Principal objective</b>
	Digitalisation @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>11. Internal markers and Tags:</b>	digital connectivity digital governance digital entrepreneurship digital skills/literacy digital services	YES <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
	Connectivity @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	digital connectivity energy transport health education and research	YES <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
	Migration @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reduction of Inequalities <sup>1</sup> @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Covid-19	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>BUDGET INFORMATION</b>				
<b>12. Amounts concerned</b>	Budget line (article, item): 14.020120 Total estimated cost: EUR 16 000 000 Total amount of EU budget contribution EUR 16 000 000			
<b>MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION</b>				
<b>13. Type of financing</b>	Direct management through <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Grants as set out in section 4.4.1</li> <li>- Procurement as set out in section 4.4.2</li> </ul> Indirect management with an entity to be selected in accordance with the criteria set out in section 4.4.3.			

## 1.2 Summary of the Action

While Ghana is one of the most stable countries in the region, and the last of the Accra Initiative members not having suffered a terrorist attack, the country, particularly its northern regions, presents a high risk of falling into instability due to under-development, under-investment, intra-religious and communal tensions. The security situation in Ghana's North continues is outlined by persistent chieftaincy conflicts, farmer-herder conflicts, political violence, proliferation of firearms, and possible infiltration by terrorist elements. As the security situation continues to deteriorate in the Sahel, the spill-over of violence and conflict from Burkina Faso, resulting in more than 16 000 asylum seekers in the Upper East and Upper West Regions of Ghana, represents a concrete threat, while the 2024 general elections are associated to an increased risk for violence.

**The proposed action will contribute to security, conflict prevention, and the fight against violent extremism, terrorism and transnational organised crime in Ghana (Overall objective/Impact).** The specific objectives (SOs) of the action are: i) Support Ghana's integrated capacity to counter violent extremism and terrorism from a human rights perspective ii) Strengthen Ghana's capacity to counter transnational organised crime, including firearms trafficking iii) Enhance relevant peacebuilding and violence prevention mechanisms and structures across national and traditional authorities, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), including women's organisations, forcibly displaced populations and their host communities.

Under this action, activities related to **SO1** will focus on delivering training and supplies to enhance the capacities of security forces in coordinating, preventing, deterring, and responding to violent extremism and terrorism, while protecting the population.

<sup>1</sup> For more information, please consult: The European Commission inequality marker - Publications Office of the EU (europa.eu) and Inequality Marker – Complementary Guidelines Application of the I-Marker to SSC fiches and Action Documents | Capacity4dev (europa.eu).

Activities related to **SO2** will focus on addressing transnational organised crime (TOC), particularly firearms trafficking, including in areas such as: border management, detection, collection, storage, marking and licensing of weapons and ammunitions; inter-institutional collaboration, legislation and regulatory frameworks. This component will also aim at strengthening CSOs in their fight against TOC by supporting, as applicable, public awareness campaigns and community-based initiatives, and the development of studies and analyses, particularly in order to shed light on the nexus between TOC and violent extremism.

Activities related to **SO3** will focus on technical and financial support aimed at strengthening Ghana's wider peace and security architecture, working with national and traditional authorities, civil society organisations, and local communities to ensure conflict prevention, peacebuilding and mediation. This will include promoting trust between communities and security agencies, and enhancing collaboration with civil society organisations. Support will be extended to CSOs conducting community engagement, awareness-raising campaigns, sensitisation workshops and mentorship programs, with a particular focus on women and youth, to foster a culture of nonviolence, and to help break down stereotypes and prejudices, leading to greater tolerance, critical thinking, and social cohesion.

The action will capitalise on achievements and lessons learned from previous and ongoing actions and projects, including the EU-funded programmes NorPrevSec<sup>2</sup>, Peace Protect<sup>3</sup>, Preventing and containing violent extremism action in the Northern Regions of Ghana<sup>4</sup>, SBS Ghana<sup>5</sup>, SECSTA<sup>6</sup>, SKBoWA<sup>7</sup>, OCWAR-T<sup>8</sup> and WAPIS<sup>9</sup>. Coordination and synergies with ongoing and future actions in the areas of security and transnational organised crime, as well as existing and possible future European Peace Facility funded actions, Common Security and Defence Policy missions, and EU Member States funded interventions, including IBSM<sup>10</sup>, SMMIG II<sup>11</sup>, CSSM<sup>12</sup> and the AU-BIC project on Arms Control in Africa<sup>13</sup> will be ensured.

This proposed action will align with Priority Area 3 of the Joint Programming Ghana 2021-2027, aiming to improve security, ensure peace, and prevent conflicts. It will contribute to the implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan III, in particular to its thematic area of engagement “integrating the women, peace and security agenda”, SDGs 5 (Gender equality), SDG 10.7 (Facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies) and 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions), the EU’s Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, the AU Agenda 2063 and its priorities on Gender Equality and women’s empowerment, Ghana National Action Plan (2020-2025) for the implementation of UNSCR1325 on Women, Peace & Security. Complementarities will be sought with the National Action Plan for Youth, Peace and Security, which is currently being developed.

### 1.3 Zone benefitting from the Action

The action shall be carried out in the Republic of Ghana, which is included in the list of ODA recipients.

<sup>2</sup> Preventing Electoral Violence and Providing Security to the Northern Border Regions of Ghana, implemented by FIIAPP, Coginta and NCCE.

<sup>3</sup> Preventing violent extremism and supporting peace in the Northern Border Regions of Ghana, implemented by COGINTA.

<sup>4</sup> Implemented by NCCE.

<sup>5</sup> Strengthening Border Security in Ghana, implemented by ICMPD.

<sup>6</sup> Multidimensional Security and Stabilisation Programme in West and Central Africa.

<sup>7</sup> Support for Cross-border territorial dynamics for stabilization and development in the cross-border areas of Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Mali, implemented by GIZ.

<sup>8</sup> Organized Crime: West African Response to trafficking, implemented by GIZ.

<sup>9</sup> West African Police Information System, implemented by Interpol.

<sup>10</sup> Integrated Border Stability Mechanism, co-funded by Germany, Italy and the UK, and implemented by IOM.

<sup>11</sup> Strengthening border and migration management in Ghana, funded by Denmark, and implemented by ICMPD.

<sup>12</sup> Coastal States Security Mechanism, funded by Germany, the Netherlands and the US, and implemented by IOM.

<sup>13</sup> Funded by Germany and implemented by the African Union Commission, in cooperation with BICC.

## 2 RATIONALE

### 2.1 Context

Ghana plays a pivotal role within ECOWAS, actively contributes to various UN peacekeeping operations, hosts the Secretariat of the Accra Initiative, and plays a key role in mediating conflicts across West Africa. Moreover, on a continental scale, Ghana holds significant importance within the African Union, serving as the host of the Secretariat of the African Continental Free Trade Area.<sup>14</sup>

Due to fiscal vulnerabilities, exacerbated by the international context, Ghana is facing a violent financial crisis since 2022, severely impacting its population, with high inflation and currency depreciation rates. In addition, youth unemployment poses a serious long-term risk. Due to the economic situation described above, but also governance challenges, Ghana is facing growing inequalities among its regions and among its population. Economic growth has led to strains on communities in Northern Ghana, resulting in North-South disparities, widening inequality gaps, and exacerbating existing tensions. There are also gender inequalities: critical gender gaps and disparities remain in fields such as employment, access to health services, education, and long-term assets or political representation (e.g. only 14.6% of seats in Parliament are held by women, a gap that hampers women participation in decision processes, and gender-sensitive policies, including on security and conflict prevention).<sup>15</sup>

The deteriorating security situation in the northern regions, exacerbated by long-standing land disputes, presents a significant challenge. Illegal gold-mining operations, known as *galamsey*, further exacerbate insecurity, particularly along the northwestern border with Côte d'Ivoire. The proximity to Burkina Faso, where Jama'at Nasrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) has conducted attacks for several years, raises fears of spillover instability, further fuelling local conflicts. Since 2023, Ghana has experienced an increasing influx of Burkinabe nationals, with over 16 000 asylum seekers estimated to have crossed the border<sup>16</sup>. This has substantially increased pressure on the already overstretched social services, caused fears of jihadist infiltration, and raised concerns about the increased risks of local conflicts triggered by agropastoral dynamics. In addition, the country has become a hub for arms and drug trafficking between the Sahel and coastal areas, contributing to insecurity, and raising concerns about the intertwining of terrorist and transnational organised crime networks. In this context, the upcoming general elections planned for 2024 may become a flashpoint for politically motivated violence<sup>17</sup>.

In Ghana, the European Union supports numerous interventions aiming at strengthening the security sector and conflict resilience, in areas ranging from the prevention and countering of violent extremism, border security and the fight against terrorism and transnational organised crime to rural development programmes whose economic and environmental benefits help address the root causes of conflicts. The action complements material support provided to the defence forces under the European Peace Facility (EPF)<sup>18</sup>, by the EU Security and Defence (CSDP) Initiative for West African countries in the Gulf of Guinea Initiative<sup>19</sup>, as well as to the ongoing Rapid Response Actions, and regional programmes on prevention of violent extremism (AAP 2022), and on demining, border management and on the criminal justice chain (AAP 2024). By aligning with and complementing existing efforts, the action aims to maximise its impact and effectiveness in supporting Ghana's security and stability objectives. The proposed action is part of a comprehensive strategy to enhance security and stability in Ghana and the broader West African region. It helps to realise the ambitions of the 2022 Strategic Compass, and it is consistent with the EU Security Union Strategy (2020), the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy

<sup>14</sup> The African Continental Free Trade Area is a flagship project of Agenda 2063.

<sup>15</sup> [USAID-Ghana-Gender-Analysis-Report.pdf \(banyanglobal.com\)](https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/108862)

<sup>16</sup> <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/108862>

<sup>17</sup> While Ghana's elections have generally been peaceful since the return of democracy in the 1990s, recent election cycles have seen an increase in politically affiliated youth vigilante groups resorting to violent tactics.

<sup>18</sup> [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2023/1440 of 10 July 2023 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Ghana Armed Forces](#); [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2023/2682 of 27 November 2023 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support military actors and navies of coastal states involved in maritime security operations in the Gulf of Guinea](#), and [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2024/1063 of 4 April 2024 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility](#).

<sup>19</sup> [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2023/1599 of 3 August 2023 on a European Union Security and Defence Initiative in support of West African countries of the Gulf of Guinea](#).

(2016), and the 2020 Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU. It also supports the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). These frameworks provide the overarching direction for EU efforts to enhance security and stability globally. Furthermore, the action is in line with the 2016 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism of the United Nations Secretary-General, demonstrating alignment with broader international efforts to address security challenges. By contributing to enhancing security and building stability, the action also supports the objectives of the Global Gateway Strategy, which seeks to promote peace through strategic investments.

At the national level, the action is fully aligned with national priorities as outlined in key policy documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Border Security Strategy, and the National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET). Additionally, it is supported by key legal frameworks including the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2008 (Act 762), the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2008 (Act 749), and the Organised Crime Act of 2010, the Arms and Ammunition Act, and the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons Act.

## 2.2 Problem Analysis

Short problem analysis:

There is a growing concern that instability in the Western Sahel could spread beyond the region. Ghana has long been praised as a beacon of stability and democracy in West Africa. However, external and internal drivers have been threatening the country's positive trajectory. While instability beyond Ghana's porous borders certainly represents a serious threat, poverty, marginalisation, and weak local governance structures are underlying threats that deserve equal attention<sup>20</sup>.

Challenges such as chieftaincy-related issues, disputes over land rights, political vigilantism, inter-religious tensions, intra-Islamic conflicts, and clashes between farmers and herders persist. These issues strain the capacity of law enforcement agencies to maintain law and order. Moreover, firearms trafficking, and the influx of people crossing the porous border from Burkina Faso into Ghana exacerbate existing tensions and present additional challenges.

**SO1.** Ghana has a decentralised security architecture comprising entities spanning national, regional, and district levels. At the national level the Ministry of National Security serves as a central coordinating body established to ensure security coordination in accordance with the Ghana National Security Strategy, expected to undergo revision in the course of 2025, and in charge of the National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana (NAFPCVET), which aims to prevent, pre-empt, protect and respond to terrorist attacks.

Recognising the imperative for synchronized action, Counter Terrorism Committees are to be established within the Regional, Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Security Councils. These committees play a pivotal role in advising the government on strategies to combat violent extremism and terrorism, advocating for a comprehensive approach that engages both governmental and societal stakeholders.

Within this framework, the primary focus of SO1 activities is to bolster the capabilities of security forces, in close cooperation with the CSDP Initiative. This entails a multifaceted approach encompassing assistance in assisting in the formulation, revision, implementation and monitoring of laws, policies, strategies and action plans, supporting in the organisation of training, procuring equipment, including in risk-prone areas, where populations have been forcibly displaced, and supporting the coordination and sharing of information among security forces. Such concerted efforts aim to enhance Ghana's security apparatus, strengthening security and fostering a more robust defence against the evolving threats posed by violent extremism and terrorism. SO1 activities will also include the coordination of the entire programme, the functioning of the Programme Steering Committee Secretariat, the provision of technical advice and assistance to all stakeholders, thus maximising complementarities across the three specific objectives.

<sup>20</sup> National Commission on Civic Education (2022). Baseline study on preventing and containing violent extremism in eight regions in the Northern part of Ghana.

**SO2.** Despite heightened awareness and attention to the risks of spill-over of violent extremism from the Sahel, the capacities of the national authorities to effectively patrol the country's porous borders need strengthening<sup>21</sup>. Border checkpoints in Ghana, apart from a few locations, are short of advanced technology and databases to monitor the entry and exit of individuals and goods. The significant movements across neighbouring countries pose challenges in terms of identifying and intercepting trafficked goods<sup>22</sup>. Additionally, the porous nature of the borders complicates the security agencies efforts, and facilitates the presence of illegal activities, including human smuggling, human trafficking, gold smuggling, and drug trafficking. If not efficiently combatted by law enforcement, there is a risk that those illegal activities may increasingly become important sources of income for organised crime groups, due to the crimes' lucrative nature.

According to the last Africa Organized Crime Index 2023 of the ENACT project, Ghana ranked 14 out of the 54 African countries in the general criminality ranking, and 11 in the criminal market ranking<sup>23</sup>. Firearms trafficking, notably of SALW (small arms and light weapons) is a particularly serious threat, both at the regional and at the national level. In the region, Ghana is perceived as a transit country and source for the trafficking of firearms destined for Burkina Faso and Mali<sup>24</sup>, plays a significant role in the production of artisanal SALW, and serves as a source of artisanal explosives used in illegal mining sites within the country and the region<sup>25</sup>. In this context, strengthening border patrolling, and the capacity of security agencies, prosecutors and judges, is of crucial importance in combating firearms trafficking.

Ghana has enacted several laws to control the unauthorized proliferation of SALW and has ratified several international agreements<sup>26</sup>. At the national level, the two main legislative frameworks are the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1972 (Act 236) and the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons Act 2007. However, there are notable gaps in Ghana's national firearms legislation, particularly concerning preventive measures and the criminalisation of firearms offenses. An amendment to the Arms and Ammunition Act, targeting many of the existing gaps, has been submitted to Cabinet.

In 2017, it was approximated that over 2 million firearms were in civilian possession in Ghana, with about 1.2 million acquired through legal means<sup>27</sup>. However, the database maintained by the Ghana National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons (NACSA) lacks the necessary depth to enable national authorities to adequately document information regarding firearm ownership and circulation. Furthermore, the database does not include data on ammunition. Additionally, there is a scarcity of reliable data and research studies regarding firearms trafficking in Ghana, and Ghana's seizure of firearms is lower than in other African countries<sup>28</sup>.

Although research and conclusive pieces of evidence on the subject are limited in the case of Ghana, transnational organised crime networks are believed to collaborate with terrorist organizations to achieve their objectives, and to receive both direct and indirect financial benefits from the provision of firearms<sup>29</sup>, while areas characterised by illegal trafficking are generally associated to increased influence of jihadist groups. The presence of firearms can

<sup>21</sup> The capacities of the national authorities to patrol the country's porous borders remain limited, both in terms of training and equipment, interagency and regional coordination need strengthening, and the use of cybertechnology and communication tools needs to be enhanced. National Border Security Strategy: Air, land and sea borders (2021). Republic of Ghana.

<sup>22</sup> Mangan, F. & Nowak, M. (2019): "The West Africa-Sahel Connection. Mapping cross-border arms trafficking". Available online: <https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-BP-West-Africa-Sahel-Connection.pdf>

<sup>23</sup> ENACT Organized Crime Index 2023: Africa. Available online: <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Africa-organised-crime-index-Increasing-criminality-growing-vulnerabilities-2023-web.pdf>

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-BP-West-Africa-Sahel-Connection.pdf>

<sup>25</sup> Research suggests that legally produced fertilizers and illegally produced explosives are trafficked from Ghana into neighbouring countries, including Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and Togo.

<sup>26</sup> Those include the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), or the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol).

<sup>27</sup> The Africa Report (2024): Ghana: Surge in small arms threatens 2024 elections.

<sup>28</sup> According to the UNODC Global Study on Firearms Trafficking (2020), Ghana is the African country (out of the 18 included in the study) that has seized fewer arms by far. UNODC Global Study on Firearms Trafficking (2020).

<sup>29</sup> The provision of firearms, and sometimes trainings, to local organisations, may be helping them strengthen alliances and gain influence and presence. Further research is needed in order to ascertain the scale of those linkages.

be facilitated by the existence of intricate, longstanding conflicts, including farmers-herder conflicts<sup>30</sup>. Weapons are procured for criminal activities or to use them in intertribal conflicts, while individuals who feel insecure, including ethnic minorities, often resort to acquiring arms illegally for self-protection<sup>31</sup>.

Taking into account the aforementioned factors, the primary objective of SO2 is to reaffirm and enhance the European Union's commitment to strengthening Ghana's border management capabilities, and the fight against cross-border trafficking, particularly of SALW. Complementarily to other planned interventions focusing on border management and trafficking of firearms<sup>32</sup>, this SO will support the Government of Ghana to strengthen border agencies' capacities to patrol the country's porous borders, including by supporting a more effective use of databases aimed at strengthening intelligence and interagency information sharing, such as WAPIS (West Africa Police Intelligence System). The main emphasis of this SO will be on effectively tackling firearms trafficking, particularly SALW, through various measures aimed at strengthening, as applicable, detection, collection, storage, marking, and licensing of weapons and ammunition, while addressing the terrorism-arms-crime nexus. Additionally, it will focus on enhancing inter-institutional collaboration, and strengthening legislation and regulatory frameworks related to firearms trafficking. Furthermore, this SO will strive to bolster the efforts of CSOs in combating Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) by supporting public gender sensitive awareness campaigns, community-based initiatives, and the development of studies and analyses. Amongst others, these efforts will aim to shed light on the connection between TOC and violent extremism.

Recognising that smuggling and trafficking activities often provide financial gains for local communities, measures to counter these illegal practices may lead to resentment towards security-focused initiatives. Therefore, efforts to address firearms trafficking will be complemented by activities aimed at promoting alternative sources of income. In this regard, awareness-raising endeavours will incorporate information about opportunities provided by other EU-funded projects.

**SO3.** While the instability of Ghana's porous borders certainly represents a serious threat, poverty, marginalisation, politicisation of state institutions and weak local governance structures<sup>33</sup> are underlying threats that deserve equal attention<sup>34</sup>. Radicalisation and violent extremist tendencies continue to manifest in chieftaincy-related conflicts, which are often related to political vigilantism,<sup>35</sup> inter-religious tensions, intra-Islamic religious conflicts, and farmer-herder competition. Land inheritance, access, and farmer-herder violence, stem in part from misunderstandings of land ownership, lack of awareness about national and local laws, particularly the Land Act 2020, and their interpretation of communal law's role in localised conflicts.

All the above challenges the capacity of law enforcement agencies in maintaining law and order. The increased pressure on resources and the instability in the Sahel are likely to further exacerbate tensions in the near future, while the increasing number of people on the move who cross the porous border from Burkina to Ghana is likely to pose additional challenges<sup>36</sup>, particularly in the arid and conflict-prone north of the country, where climate change and increasing competition for land and natural resources fragilize livelihoods and fuel conflict. Asylum seekers and host communities experience limitations in the access to documentation and basic services (wash,

<sup>30</sup> UNDP (2023): Vulnerability Assessment On The Threats Of Violent Extremism And Radicalisation In Northern Regions Of Ghana (p. 29). Available online: [https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-06/undp\\_ghana\\_violent\\_extremism\\_assessment\\_in\\_northern\\_regions\\_of\\_ghana.pdf](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-06/undp_ghana_violent_extremism_assessment_in_northern_regions_of_ghana.pdf).

<sup>31</sup> Ethnic minorities are particularly affected. The Fulani community has traditionally suffered from diverse forms of discrimination. Several of those who remain and migrate to communities in Northern Ghana feel threatened and have acquired SALWs as a way to defend themselves from potential violence.

<sup>32</sup> Notably the regional Action Document for Multidimensional Security and Stabilisation Programme in West and Central Africa (SECSTA), and based on good practices from past and ongoing interventions, such as the Strengthening Border Security (SBS) Project currently implemented in Ghana by ICMPD, and OCMAR-T.

<sup>33</sup> There are growing disparities across regions, especially between the Northern and the Southern regions of the country. For instance, the five northernmost ones experience the highest incidences of poverty.

<sup>34</sup> National Commission on Civic Education (2022). Baseline study on preventing and containing violent extremism in eight regions in the Northern part of Ghana.

<sup>35</sup> Lack of awareness about the Vigilantism and related offences Act is widely recognised.

<sup>36</sup> The northern part of Ghana shares 500 kilometres of land borders with Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire and Togo, countries that have all experienced activities of violent extremist groups. Ghana could be positioned as a safe haven for extremist groups to recruit, mobilise resources and regroup.



education, health) and to employment opportunities, with an increased pressure on already limited resources, and food systems, thus increasing the risk of conflicts. Moreover, Fulani herders, whose presence amongst the forced displacement populations exceed 70% in certain districts, experience various forms of discrimination. Media have, in some cases, become conduits for amplification of misinformation.

The stigmatisation of minority groups, including Fulani herders, has enhanced their responsiveness to the propaganda activities of terrorist organisations, exploited by international armed groups and extremists. Prominent members of civil society and security forces warn against the risks that the stigmatisation of minorities may have on the polarisation of Ghanaian society and radicalisation. However, cases of discriminatory behaviour and excessive use of force have been reported, and documented, by the media. Sensitization and education are essential to break down stereotypes and prejudices, leading to greater tolerance, critical thinking, and social cohesion.

In the past, Ghanaians have been reported to have joined terrorist organisations, namely JNIM affiliated groups<sup>37</sup>. While Ghana's Northern Regions are considered the most at risk, students from Accra based tertiary institutions have also been targeted, indicating that radicalisation is not an issue limited to the northern border. As youth unemployment rates have increased<sup>38</sup> and socio-economic marginalisation among young generations is widespread, youths are particularly exposed to radicalization risks, making them susceptible to manipulation and involvement in violent extremism. Women's involvement in violent extremism is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon. In most communities, women play multiple roles. Women living in areas affected by violent extremism are more prone to be victims of gender-based violence, including sexual violence.

Ghana can count on national authorities and traditional structures to promote mediation, peacebuilding, and prevent violent extremism. The Regional Coordinating Councils, (RCCs) have the role to coordinate all activities in the region to ensure a unity of purpose. The National and Regional Peace Councils serve as independent state mechanisms aimed at facilitating conflict prevention, resolution, and the establishment of sustainable peace, while the National Center for Coordination of Early Warning and Response Mechanism (NCCRM) is tasked with coordinating and managing early warning systems and response mechanisms.

Traditional structures, such as the National and Regional Houses of Chiefs, are at the heart of chieftaincy-related conflict resolution and mediation, and are essential to ensure security and delivering justice, particularly in rural communities. Women have recently been formally incorporated into the chieftaincy institution through the role of Queen Mothers, and their presence seems to have a significant impact on women's rights, access to land and their participation in peacebuilding and violence prevention. Religious leaders, traditional leaders, including queen mothers and chiefs, civil society representatives, community leaders, youth leaders, and women leaders play vital roles in promoting peaceful coexistence throughout the country. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies, including the Ministry of National Security (MNS), the Ghana Police Service (GPS) and the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) also bear responsibility for preventing violent extremism.

In order to foster collaboration, trust building, and communication between the police and local communities, the Ghana Police Service established the Community Policing Unit in 2002 and an ad-hoc strategy (The Ghana Police Service Enhancing Visibility and Community Policing Strategy) that was last revised in 2022. The strategy has been piloted in a limited number of areas, working closely with both police officers and communities, and is being extended to other areas, with support from the EU-funded Peace Protect Project, which will end in July 2025. Further need for support is anticipated to expand the implementation and the community policing strategy, in Ghana's Northern Regions, and densely populated areas. More generally, cooperation between law enforcement agencies and communities to prevent conflict, combat radicalism and violent extremism needs strengthening.

Building upon the aforementioned points, this third component seeks to strengthen the capabilities of diverse actors in conflict prevention, early warning systems, and peacebuilding efforts. This involves enhancing collaboration among Ghanaian authorities, traditional authorities and civil society organisations, enhance cooperation between law enforcement agencies and communities, and provide support to mediation activities in conflict-prone areas.

<sup>37</sup> Jihadist threat in Northern Ghana and Togo, p. 17. An analysis of Promediation based on data of in October 2021 estimated the number of Ghanaians who were members of JNIM at about 200.

<sup>38</sup> On average, more than three-quarters (77.4%) of the total unemployed persons in the first three quarters of 2023 comprised the youth aged 15 to 35 years (1 374 329). Between the first three quarters of 2022 and the same period in 2023, youth unemployment increased by 14.6%. Ghana Statistical Service February 2024 [https://statsghana.gov.gh/gssmain/fileUpload/pressrelease/2023\\_Quarter\\_Labour\\_Statistics\\_Bulletin\\_full\\_report.pdf](https://statsghana.gov.gh/gssmain/fileUpload/pressrelease/2023_Quarter_Labour_Statistics_Bulletin_full_report.pdf)

Additionally, support will be extended to CSOs in conducting community engagement, awareness-raising campaigns, sensitisation workshops and mentorship programs, with a particular focus on women and youth, to foster a culture of nonviolence. The media will be engaged to help break down stereotypes and prejudices, leading to greater tolerance, critical thinking, and social cohesion. As poverty and marginalisation are identified as key causes of radicalisation, particular attention will be paid to ensuring the linkage between this component and other ongoing interventions, including EU-funded interventions, that focus on creating sustainable livelihoods, thus addressing the root causes of conflict.

Identification of main stakeholders (duty bearers and right holders) and corresponding institutional and/or organisational issues (mandates, potential roles, and capacities) to be covered by the action:

The primary beneficiaries and target groups of this intervention are the state and non-state actors of Ghana, along with the Ghanaian population. The main stakeholders of the action include both state and non-state actors (NSAs) in Ghana. The ultimate beneficiaries of the action encompass all segments of the Ghanaian population and forcibly displaced populations, including women and youth.

The key stakeholders involved in the action at the strategic level consist of various governmental entities, including: the Ministry of National Security, which ensures coordination on countering and preventing VET; the Ministry of Interior, with the role of increasing collaboration and information sharing among border security agencies; the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons (NACSA), established to advise on the issue and possession of SALWs; the National Investigative Bureau (NIB), an integral part of the National Security Council in charge of overseeing matters of counter-intelligence and internal security; the National Center for Coordination of Early Warning and Response Mechanism (NCCRM); the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), a constitutionally mandated institution in charge of promoting democracy culture; the National Peace Council (NPC), an independent state peace mechanism that relies on non-kinetic, soft approaches in mediation and conflict prevention; and the National House of Chiefs (NHC), an institution central to chieftaincy-related conflict resolution and mediation, and the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection, in charge of the Ghana National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325(2000) on Women, Peace & Security.

At the operational level, the key stakeholders comprise structures such as the Terrorism Committees in the Regional Security Councils, regional border security agencies and committees in Ghana, the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), the Ghana Police Service (GPS), the Ghana Revenue Authority – Customs Division, Regional Peace Councils (RPCs), Regional Houses of Chiefs (RHCs), and Regional Coordination Councils (RCCs), which play pivotal roles in ensuring coordination across various stakeholders at the national level.

The core stakeholders at the tactical level include Municipal and Metropolitan District Assemblies (MMDAs), Terrorism Committees in the Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Security Councils, and CSOs operating in areas such as conflict prevention and firearms trafficking (e.g. IANSA, FOSDA, CDA, SAVE Ghana, RISE Ghana). Additionally, women and women's organizations, religious and traditional leaders and organizations, local media and youth organizations are vital stakeholders at this level and will also play an important role in preventing and countering violent extremism.

The other stakeholders are EU Member States, including the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) firearms, and other development partners, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, with whom the action will be closely coordinated.

### 3 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

#### 3.1 Objectives and Expected Outputs

The **Overall Objective** of this action is to contribute to security, conflict prevention, and the fight against violent extremism, terrorism and transnational organised crime in Ghana.

The **Specific Objectives** of this action are:

1. Support Ghana's integrated capacity to counter violent extremism and terrorism from a human rights perspective.
2. Strengthen Ghana's capacity to counter transnational organised crime, including firearms trafficking.
3. Enhance relevant peacebuilding and violence prevention mechanisms and structures across national and traditional authorities, CSOs including women's organisations, forcibly displaced populations and their host communities.

The **Outputs** to be delivered by this action contributing to the corresponding Specific Objectives are:

Contributing to SO1:

- 1.1 Strengthened capabilities of State actors involved in countering violent extremism and terrorism, while upholding rule of law and human rights.
- 1.2 Enhanced coordination in efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism.
- 1.3 Enhanced access to security-related supplies to strengthen State actors' capacities to counter violent extremism and terrorism.

Contributing to SO2:

- 2.1 Improved capacity of State actors to combat transnational organised crime (TOC), particularly the trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW), while upholding rule of law and human rights.
- 2.2 Enhanced ability of civil society organisations (CSOs) to contribute to the fight against TOC and SALW trafficking.

Contributing to SO3:

- 3.1 Enhanced abilities of State actors, traditional authorities, and civil society, in conflict prevention, mediation, and early response, ensuring a gender approach and the inclusion of women's organisations, forcibly displaced populations and their host communities.
- 3.2 Strengthened coordination in the prevention of violent extremism and increased gender sensitive awareness of its dangers, causes and effects.

## 3.2 Indicative Activities

### Activities relating to Output 1.1:

- 1.1.1 Support the design and delivery of training, particularly training of trainers, aimed at addressing the needs of security agencies and pertinent criminal justice entities in combating violent extremism and terrorism.
- 1.1.2 Support focal points within state security actors stationed in areas prone to crises.
- 1.1.3 Assist in the formulation, revision and operationalisation of strategies, action plans, standard operating procedures and risk analyses of security agencies.
- 1.1.4 Enhance the capabilities of security agencies in crisis-prone areas, and in their close proximity, particularly where vulnerable host communities and displaced populations are located.

### Activities relating to Output 1.2:

- 1.2.1 Support the revision of security strategies, policies, and frameworks in order to propose enhancements and promote coordination in the security sector, applying the human rights-based approach (HRBA).
- 1.2.2 Support inter-institutional coordination, facilitate information sharing, and enhance mechanisms aimed at exchanging information and assessing risks and threats, particularly related to counterterrorism (CT) and conflict and violence prevention.

1.2.3 Provide assistance in research, development, and monitoring and evaluation, pertaining to the implementation of security-related laws, strategies, policies and plans, particularly in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism.

1.2.4 Support collaboration and exchanges between security agencies and non-governmental stakeholders (such as CSOs and community leaders) to facilitate responses, and implement security strategies, particularly in counterterrorism.

**Activities relating to Output 1.3:**

1.3.1 Support the acquisition of resources and equipment to enhance the capabilities of state actors, particularly security agencies, in combating violent extremism and terrorism.

**Activities relating to Output 2.1:**

2.1.1 Enhance the capabilities and the coordinated efforts of security agencies, and pertinent criminal justice entities, to address border security management and TOC.

2.1.2 Provide assistance in developing and delivering training, on-the-job mentoring, and delivering equipment, including in the areas of illicit trafficking of SALW and explosives, collection and destruction of seized firearms, marking, stockpile management, weapons and ammunition management, and the safe destruction of ammunition.

2.1.3 Support the revision of firearm-related laws, strategies, policies, and frameworks.

2.1.4 Support the collection of information on SALW, amongst others, by supporting the functioning of a national central database system on arms and ammunition, and enhancing tracking and monitoring capabilities.

**Activities relating to Output 2.2:**

2.2.1 Provide support to enhance CSOs and community response, including of women and youth groups, in initiatives aimed at mitigating TOC and controlling cross-border SALW trafficking in Ghana.

2.2.2 Support, in coordination with CSOs, the National Commission for Small Arms and Light Weapons (NACSA), community leaders, youth groups, advocacy, including about the revision of laws, policies and strategies, and community-based initiatives on public education and awareness raising campaigns related to TOC and SALW trafficking.

2.2.3 Support the production of knowledge products, covering TOC, SALW trafficking, and the nexus between terrorism and transnational organised crime, in coordination with CSOs, women's organisations, and research institutions

**Activities relating to Output 3.1:**

3.1.1 Support the implementation of training programs and capacity-building initiatives in conflict transformation, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, early warning, and alternative dispute resolution (dialogue, negotiation, mediation, arbitration knowledge and skills), ensuring the inclusion of women, forcibly displaced populations and their host communities.

3.1.2 Provide support to mediation activities in conflict-prone areas (e.g. logistical support, conflict analysis, implementation of recommendations aimed at conflict transformation).

3.1.3 Support decision making processes in peacebuilding, mediation and conflict prevention activities that prioritise gender equality and women's empowerment, including by capacitating traditional women leaders, and support the inclusion of marginalised groups, ethnic minorities and forcibly displaced populations.

3.1.4 Build capacity and create awareness around the new Land Act for traditional leaders, local government actors, and ethnic youth associations.

#### **Activities relating to Output 3.2:**

3.2.1 Assist in strengthening coordination among state actors, CSOs, and development partners in order to foster complementarities and avoid overlaps in the implementation of actions aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism.

3.2.2 Assist state actors, in coordination with CSOs, to conduct context-based studies on the underlying causes of conflict and violent extremism, while supporting data collection, early warning, outreach efforts, and monitoring and evaluation.

3.2.3 Enhance cooperation, at the local level, especially in the most vulnerable districts of Ghana, between law enforcement agencies and communities, including youth and women, to prevent conflict, combat radicalism and violent extremism.

3.2.4 Raise awareness and organise mentoring programmes, particularly for youths, including ethnic youth associations and marginalised groups, about countering violent extremism, fostering social cohesion and collaboration for peace, as well as development, employment and TVET (technical and vocational education and training) opportunities, thus addressing the root causes of radicalisation.

3.2.5 Support state actors, CSOs, media and youth to better utilise and monitor communication channels in order to raise awareness about the dangers, effects and causes of terrorism and violent extremism.

### **3.3 Mainstreaming**

#### **Environmental Protection & Climate Change**

**Outcomes of the SEA screening** (relevant for budget support and strategic-level interventions)

The Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) screening concluded that no further action was required.

**Outcomes of the EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) screening** (relevant for projects and/or specific interventions within a project)

The EIA (Environment Impact Assessment) screening classified the action as Category C (no need for further assessment).

**Outcome of the CRA (Climate Risk Assessment) screening** (relevant for projects and/or specific interventions within a project)

The Climate Risk Assessment (CRA) screening concluded that this action is no or low risk (no need for further assessment).

However, the construction, renovation or refurbishment of infrastructure (if foreseen) will follow environmental rules and will consider a design adapted to the climate, the use of traditional architecture, the use of local materials or the use of renewable energy.

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#### **Gender equality and empowerment of women and girls**

As per the OECD Gender DAC codes identified in section 1.1, this action is labelled as G1. This implies that gender equality can be considered a significant objective of this action.

The action will apply a gender-sensitive approach, incorporate awareness raising activities focused on gender issues, and ensure equal participation and representation in training, workshops, meetings, and other gatherings to promote women's perspectives and women's empowerment. The action will also ensure that all interventions are gender-responsive. Systematic efforts will be made to incorporate women in the security domain, which has traditionally been male-dominated. Additionally, in terms of conflict prevention and mediation, the importance of the role of women will be recognised in the support given to women traditional leaders and CSOs, for which women's organisations will be particularly targeted. Indicators will be disaggregated to account for gender objectives and representation, and, when possible, other cross-cutting issues.

This Action contributes to the Gender Action Plan III (GAP III) 2021-2025<sup>39</sup>, more specifically to its thematic area of engagement “Integrating the women, peace and security agenda”, which stresses the need to understand gender inequality as a driver and root cause of conflict and fragility, and to ensure women’s participations and gender perspective in all peace and security-related contexts. The Action will also contribute to Ghana National Action Plan (2020-2025) for the implementation of UNSCR1325 on Women, Peace & Security.

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### **Human Rights**

The proposed action is fully aligned to the existing EU human rights strategies and action plans. The action will aim at striking an informed balance between engaging with the security sector and strengthening its contribution to peace and security, and holding a constructive dialogue on the importance of human rights protection for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In this sense, the action will ensure that human rights become an integral part of the training and capacity building for Ghana security personnel. It will also work towards integrating human rights issues into early warning, dialogue and mediation efforts.

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### **Disability**

As per OECD disability DAC codes identified in section 1.1, this action is labelled as D0. This implies that the action is not considered relevant for inclusion of persons with disabilities. However, the specific needs of disabled beneficiaries will be duly addressed, as applicable. In addition, stakeholders will be encouraged to take into consideration people living with disabilities as part of the activities supported by the project.

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### **Reduction of inequalities**

The action is not considered relevant for the reduction of inequalities. However, particular attention will be paid to ensuring the linkage between this component and other ongoing interventions, including EU-funded interventions, that focus on creating sustainable livelihoods, thus addressing the root causes of conflict.

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### **Democracy**

The action will take a deliberate approach aiming at supporting the law enforcement authorities of Ghana to adhere to the principles of good governance, thus contributing to democracy. As with other illicit markets, arms trafficking is enabled by corruption and a lack of accountability, one major factor leading to failings in democratic processes. Thus, awareness-raising on anti-corruption will be integrated across capacity-building efforts and advocacy activities. Similarly, terrorism threatens democracy: measures taken by States to respond to terrorist threats, in addition to the violence perpetrated by the terrorist organisations on the populations, can generate restriction to civil liberties and citizens' participation in political life. Activities proposed in this action aim at improving governance as well as combating criminal activities, thus contributing to promote the democratic functioning of societies.

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### **Conflict sensitivity, peace and resilience**

The action will adopt a conflict sensitive approach by gaining a sound understanding of the two-way interaction between activities and context, acting to minimise negative impacts (“Do No Harm” approach) and maximise positive impacts of the intervention.

A “Do No Harm” approach will be applied that relies on the understanding/analysis of the impact of aid on existing conflicts, and its interactions within the local context, with the goal to limit or prevent unintended negative effects on the social fabric, the economy and the environment. The action will adopt a deliberate approach to conflict sensitivity across all activities, including solid baseline analysis, application of good conflict sensitivity practice in the implementation of the action, monitoring of conflict sensitivity. The action will also help to resolve current conflicts and prevent future ones in several particularly sensitive areas of the country, where women, children and

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<sup>39</sup> See online: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_20\\_2184](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2184)

other vulnerable people are often the main victims. At the same time, the action will anticipate and prevent potential conflicts that could arise from the strengthening of the security apparatus in these areas.

#### Disaster Risk Reduction

The Action is not considered relevant for Disaster Risk Reduction.

### 3.4 Risks and Lessons Learnt

Category	Risks	Likelihood (High/ Medium/ Low)	Impact (High/ Medium/ Low)	Mitigating measures
External environment	Risk 1 The deterioration of the security situation disallowing full implementation of the action, particularly in border areas.	Medium	High	This inherent risk stems from the nature of the action, and will be addressed through ongoing monitoring and evaluation, which may lead to adjustments during the implementation of the action.
External environment	Risk 2 Risk of political instability (new electoral cycle)	Medium	Medium	Establishing a presence within stable administrations will guarantee ongoing support for the action. Political dialogue with new authorities will take place following the upcoming electoral cycle.
People and the organisation	Risk 3 The degradation of the relationship between local populations and security forces.	Low	Medium	The action will focus on strengthening trust, promoting dialogue and joint activities in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. Capacity building initiatives will prioritize human rights and the rule of law.
People and the organisation	Risk 4 Low capacities of absorption	Medium	Low	Close monitoring and capacity building, particularly of local CSOs.
Communication and information	Risk 5 Limited sustainability of the activities implemented	Medium	Medium	Coordination of 'like-minded' donors is present and will be further strengthened to ensure complementarities and the sustainability of this and other actions in the security sector.
Socio-cultural aspects	Risk 6 Limited commitment to gender equality and women's empowerment, the human rights-based approach on the part of	Low	Medium	The action will provide sufficient resources to work with institutions, traditional leaders and non-state actors on the importance of gender mainstreaming and the human rights-based approach.

	targeted institutions and non-state actors.			
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#### **Lessons Learnt:**

The action will build and capitalise on the achievements and lessons learned from the implementation of finalised and ongoing interventions, including the NORPREVSEC project, the Peace Protect Project, and the SBS Ghana Project. The action will also capitalise on the results of the WAPIS Programme, the Disrupting Firearms Trafficking Flows (DISRUPT) programme, the Criminal Network Disruption Global (CRIMJUST) Programme, the Organised Crime: West African Responses to Trafficking (OCWAR-T) and Organised Crime: West African Response to Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (OCWAR-M) programmes, and the Support to the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture and Operations (EPSAO). The establishment of synergies with actions within the framework of the SECSTA and the ECOWAS Peace, Security and Governance (EPSG) Programme and SKBoWA will also be sought.

Based on findings of previous and ongoing projects in the sub-regions, the following lessons can be drawn:

- Inter-agency cooperation and overall coordination are still lagging behind. They should be strengthened/promoted.
- The level of trust and cooperation between communities and the law enforcement agencies needs to be improved.
- Ensuring close coordination with other development partners is essential in order to ensure complementarities and avoid overlaps.

### 3.5 The Intervention Logic

#### **Based on**

Ghana's comprehensive approach to strengthening security and addressing the threats of violent extremism, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and illegal trafficking (particularly concerning arms trafficking)

#### **and**

the EU's vision of promoting peace, regional stability, democratic governance, and accountability while respecting principles such as sovereignty, equality, solidarity, human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as the integration of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation to enhance resilience and operational links among humanitarian, development, and peace interventions, referred to as the "triple nexus":

**The underlying logic** of this action is that:

**IF** Ghana's integrated capacity to combat violent extremism and terrorism is strengthened through the enhancement of public agencies' capacities and improved inter-institutional coordination

**IF** Ghana's capacity to combat transnational organised crime (TOC), including arms trafficking, is bolstered through the reinforcement of public agencies' capabilities and the increased involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs)

#### **and**

**IF** Ghana's peacebuilding and violence prevention mechanisms and structures across national and traditional authorities and CSOs, are enhanced through improved capacities of key State actors and non-State actors for sustaining peace, conflict prevention, and mediation

**Assuming that** Ghanaian institutions, traditional authorities and non-State actors demonstrate a commitment to efficient cooperation, and maintain a continued prioritisation of countering violent extremism, terrorism, TOC, and small arms and light weapons (SALW) trafficking as strategies for fostering economic growth, poverty reduction, and enhanced peace and security

#### **and**



**Assuming that** Ghanaian key stakeholders retain the capacity to manage the implementation of actions effectively to monitor performance

**THEN**

The capacities of Ghana to strengthen security, counter violent extremism, terrorism, transnational organised crime, and arms trafficking will be fortified, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of Ghana's peace and security architecture in enabling early response and action, and bolstering the effectiveness of non-state actors in contributing to strengthening Ghana's peace and security framework

**THUS**

Leading to an enhanced ability and performance of Ghana to promote peace, security, stability, and democracy.

### 3.6 Logical Framework Matrix

PROJECT MODALITY (3 levels of results / indicators / Source of Data / Assumptions - no activities)

Results	Results chain (@: Main expected results (maximum 10))	Indicators (@): (at least one indicator per expected result)	Baselines (values and years)	Targets (values and years)	Sources of data	Assumptions
<b>Impact</b>	To contribute to security and the fight against violent extremism, terrorism and transnational organised crime in Ghana	1. Country score in the Global Terrorism Index (OPSYS core indicator) 2. Global Peace Index – Level of violent crime 3. Organised Crime Index (ENACT) - criminality score	1. 0 (2024) 2. 1.8 (2023) 3. 5.8 (2023)	1. 0 (2028) 2. 1.75 (2028) 3. 5.0 (2028)	1. Global Terrorism Index <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/">https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/</a> 2. Global Peace Index <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf">https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf</a> 3. Organised Crime Index <a href="https://africa.ocindex.net">https://africa.ocindex.net</a>	<i>Not applicable</i>
<b>Outcome 1</b>	1. Ghana's integrated capacity to counter violent extremism and terrorism from a human rights perspective strengthened	1.1 Number of State institutions with improved capacities in countering violent extremism and terrorism 1.2 GERF 2.29 Number of government policies, strategies and frameworks developed or revised with civil society organisation participation, through EU support 1.3 Degree of collaboration between State and non-State actors in the exchange of information on security, and	1.1 Nil (2024) 1.2 Nil (2024) 1.3 TBD (2024)	1.1 TBD (2028) 1.2 TBD (2028) 1.3 Degree of collaboration increased (2028)	1.1 Relevant authorities' data and project reports of the EU funded intervention 1.2 Relevant authorities' data and project reports of the EU funded intervention 1.3 Relevant authorities' data and project reports of the EU funded intervention	- Countering violence, violent extremism and transnational organised crime and terrorism remain a priority

		violent extremism and terrorism				for all key stakeholders.
<b>Outcome 2</b>	2. Ghana's capacity to counter transnational organised crime, including firearms trafficking strengthened	<p>2.1 Number of State institutions and CSOs, involved in the fight against TOC and firearms trafficking with improved capacities, supported by the Action</p> <p>2.2 Number of laws/policies/strategies on firearms trafficking amended and/or adopted as a result of advocacy campaigns supported by the Action</p>	<p>2.1 Nil (2024)</p> <p>2.2 Nil (2024)</p>	<p>2.1 TBD (2028)</p> <p>2.2 At least 1 (2028) - indicative figure to be revised at the beginning of the implementation period (2028)</p>	<p>2.1 Relevant authorities' data and project reports of the EU funded intervention</p> <p>2.2 New and/or amended laws, policies and strategies</p>	<p>- Active collaboration between state actors, local communities, traditional authorities, and civil society organizations (CSOs) is maintained.</p> <p>- Sustainable funding mechanisms are in place to support ongoing initiatives and ensure long-term sustainability.</p>
<b>Outcome 3</b>	3. Relevant peacebuilding and violence prevention mechanisms and structures across national and traditional authorities, CSOs, including women's organisations, and forcibly displaced populations and their host communities enhanced	<p>3.1 Number of conflicts transformed through mediation activities supported by the Action</p> <p>3.2 Degree of coordination, at the local level, between state actors, CSOs, and development partners on PCVE-related interventions</p> <p>3.3 GERF 2.28 Number of grassroots civil society organisations benefitting from (or reached by) EU support</p>	<p>3.1 Nil (2024)</p> <p>3.2 Limited degree (2024)</p> <p>3.3 Nil (2024)</p>	<p>3.1 TBD (2028)</p> <p>3.2 Significant degree (2028)</p> <p>3.3 TBD (2028)</p>	<p>3.1 Relevant authorities' data, including NCCRM and NPC, and project reports of the EU funded intervention</p> <p>3.2 Project reports</p> <p>3.3 Project reports</p>	

<b>Output 1</b>  <b>relating to</b> <b>Outcome 1</b>	1.1 Strengthened capabilities of State actors involved in countering violent extremism and terrorism, while upholding rule of law and human rights	1.1.1 Number of state agencies' officials, disaggregated by sex, with increased knowledge in countering violent extremism and terrorism, trained by the Action	1.1.1 Nil (2024)  1.1.2 Nil (2024)  1.1.3 Nil (2024)	1.1.1 TBD (2028)  1.1.2 TBD (2028)  1.1.3 TBD (2028)	1.1.1 Relevant authorities' data and project reports, including training lists, pre- and post-training reports  1.1.2 Project reports on strategies, action plans, standard operating procedures and risk analyses  1.1.3 Project reports, including training lists, pre- and post-training reports, and equipment reports	- Strengthening security and countering violent extremism remains a priority for all key stakeholders.  - The commitment to strengthen and monitor current strategies, policies, action plans and operating procedures is maintained.  - The commitment to prioritise the strengthening of security agencies posts in areas where host communities and displaced populations are located, is maintained.
		1.1.2 Number of strategies, action plans, standard operating procedures, and risk analyses of security agencies revised with the support of the Action				
		1.1.3 Number of security agencies' stations/posts, situated in areas where vulnerable displaced populations are located, or in their proximity, equipped and supported by the Action.				

<b>Output 2</b>  <b>relating to Outcome 1</b>	1.2 Enhanced coordination to counter violent extremism and terrorism	1.2.1 Number of inter-institutional co-ordination mechanisms promoted and established/reinforced with the support of the Action  1.2.2 Status of research, development, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of policies and plans related to security, counterterrorism (CT) and the fight against violent extremism and terrorism  1.2.3 Number of meetings aiming at exchanging information between State actors, CSOs, and other NSAs, organised with the support of the Action	1.2.1 Nil (2024)  1.2.2 TBD (2024)  1.2.3 TBD (2024)	1.2.1 TBD (2028)  1.2.2 Research, development, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms strengthened (2028)  1.2.3 TBD (2028)	1.2.1 Relevant authorities' data and project reports, including minutes of coordination meetings  1.2.2 Relevant authorities' data and project reports of the EU funded intervention  1.2.3 Relevant authorities' data and project reports, including minutes of coordination meetings	Adequate financial and human resources to support the promotion and establishment of inter-institutional coordination mechanisms are ensured.
<b>Output 3</b>  <b>relating to Outcome 1</b>	1.3 Enhanced access to security-related supplies to strengthen State actors' capacities to counter violent extremism and terrorism	1.3.1 Level of quality and suitability of security-related supplies procured by the Action	1.3.1 Nil (2024)	1.3.1 100% delivered in line with the needs of the beneficiary institutions (2028)	1.3.1 Project reports, including equipment reports of the EU funded intervention	Partners, particularly procurement officials and technical experts of security agencies, are actively engaged in the procurement process to ensure comprehensive decision-making.

<b>Output 1</b>  <b>relating to Outcome 2</b>	2.1 Improved capacity of State actors to combat transnational organised crime (TOC), particularly the trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW), while upholding rule of law and human rights	2.1.1 Number of state agencies' officials trained and equipped by the Action to address border security management and TOC, disaggregated by sex  2.1.2 Number of relevant security agencies' officials, disaggregated by sex, with increased knowledge in areas such as illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), SALW collection, and stockpile management  2.1.3 Degree of suitability of security-related supplies procured by the Action	2.1.1 Nil (2024)  2.1.2 Nil (2024)  2.1.3 Nil (2024)	2.1.1 TBD (2028)  2.1.2 TBD (2028)  2.1.3 100% delivered in line with the needs of the beneficiary institutions (2028)	2.1.1 Project reports of the EU funded intervention, including training lists, pre- and post-training reports  2.1.2 Project reports of the EU funded intervention, including training lists, pre- and post-training reports  2.1.3 Project reports of the EU funded intervention, including equipment reports	Adequate financial and human resources to support the promotion and establishment of inter-institutional coordination mechanisms are ensured.
<b>Output 2</b>  <b>relating to Outcome 2</b>	2.2 Enhanced ability of CSOs to contribute to the fight against TOC and SALW trafficking	2.2.1 Number of public education, advocacy and awareness-raising campaigns facilitated with the support of the Action  2.2.2 Number of knowledge products related to TOC, SALW trafficking, and the nexus between TOC and CT produced with the support of the Action	2.2.1 Nil (2024)  2.2.2 Nil (2024)	2.2.1 TBD (2028)  2.2.2 TBD (2028)	2.2.1 Project reports of the EU funded intervention  2.2.2 Project reports of the EU funded intervention, including knowledge products produced	Engagement and collaboration between state actors, CSOs, community leaders, and youth groups are maintained.

<b>Output 1</b>  <b>relating to Outcome 3</b>	3.1 Enhanced abilities of State actors, traditional authorities and civil society in conflict prevention, mediation, and early response, ensuring a gender approach and the inclusion of women's organisations, civil society, forcibly displaced populations and their host communities	3.1.1 Number of individuals from national and traditional authorities, with increased knowledge in conflict transformation, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and alternative dispute resolution, disaggregated by sex		3.1.1 350 (2028) - indicative figure to be revised at the beginning of the implementation period	3.1.1 Project reports of the EU funded intervention, including training lists, pre- and post-training reports	-Commitment from beneficiaries, including key governmental actors and traditional authorities, is maintained.  -Emphasis on gender equality and social inclusion, in line with Ghana national strategies, is maintained.
		3.1.2 Number of forcibly displaced people, and individuals from host communities, with increased knowledge in conflict transformation, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and alternative dispute resolution, disaggregated by sex	3.1.1 Nil (2024)	3.1.2 TBD (2028)	3.1.2 Project reports of the EU funded intervention, including training lists, pre- and post-training reports	
		3.1.3 Number of mediation activities in conflict-prone areas supported by the Action	3.1.2 Nil (2024)	3.1.3 100 (2028) - indicative figure to be revised at the beginning of the implementation period	3.1.3 Project reports of the EU funded intervention	
		3.1.4 Number of peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities prioritising gender equality and women's empowerment supported by the Action	3.1.3 Nil (2024)	3.1.4 TBD (2028)	3.1.4 Project reports of the EU funded intervention	
			3.1.4 Nil (2024)			
<b>Output 2</b>  <b>relating to Outcome 3</b>	3.2 Strengthened coordination in the prevention of violent extremism and increased gender sensitive awareness of	3.2.1 Number of meetings supported by the Action, among State actors, CSOs, and development partners, aimed at fostering complementarities in the implementation of interventions aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism.	3.2.1 Nil (2024) 3.2.2 Nil (2024) 3.2.3 Nil (2024)	3.2.1 TBD (2028) 3.2.2 TBD (2028) 3.2.3 TBD (2028)	3.2.1 Project reports of the EU funded intervention, including training lists, pre- and post-training reports 3.2.2 Project reports of the EU funded intervention 3.2.3 Project reports of the EU funded intervention	Active collaboration between state actors, local communities, traditional authorities, and civil society organizations (CSOs), and implementing

	its dangers, causes and effects	<p>3.2.2 Number of context-based studies on the root causes of violence and extremism, and of conflict analyses conducted by state actors and CSOs, supported by the EU Action</p> <p>3.2.3 Number of people reached by mentoring programmes and awareness raising events for youths, including ethnic youth associations, about countering violent extremism, fostering social cohesion, and employment and TVET opportunities, supported by the Action</p>				partners is ensured.
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## 4 IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

### 4.1 Financing Agreement

In order to implement this action, it is envisaged to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country.

### 4.2 Indicative Implementation Period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 3 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 60 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's responsible authorising officer by amending this Financing Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

### 4.3 Implementation of the Budget Support Component

N.A.

### 4.4 Implementation Modalities

The Commission will ensure that the EU rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures<sup>40</sup>.

#### 4.4.1 Direct Management (Grants)

##### **Grants: (direct management)**

##### **(a) Purpose of the grant(s)**

The grant(s) will contribute to achieving **Specific Objective 3 (SO 3)** of the action (enhance relevant peacebuilding and violence prevention mechanisms and structures across national and traditional authorities, CSOs, including women's organisations, forcibly displaced populations and their host communities).

##### **(b) Type of applicants targeted**

Non-profit organisation/s with a sound level of technical competence, experience and expertise in the field of community security, mediation, early warning systems, peace building and conflict prevention activities in Ghana, particularly Ghana's Northern Regions and with national and regional institutions, communities, traditional and religious leaders, and NGOs.

The part of the action under the budgetary envelope reserved for grants may, partially or totally and including where an entity is designated for receiving a grant without a call for proposals, be implemented in indirect management with an entity, which will be selected by the Commission's services using the criteria defined in section 4.4.4 below.

#### 4.4.2 Direct Management (Procurement)

Procurement (services) will provide technical assistance support for activities related to **Output 1.1** (strengthened capabilities of State actors involved in countering violent extremism and terrorism, while upholding rule of law and human rights) and **Output 1.2** (enhanced coordination in efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism).

<sup>40</sup> [www.sanctionsmap.eu](http://www.sanctionsmap.eu). Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes. The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.

#### 4.4.3 Indirect Management with an entrusted entity

A part of this action may be implemented in indirect management with an entrusted entity, which will be selected by the Commission's services using the following criteria:

- Relevant expertise and experience in the areas of **Specific Objective 2 (SO 2)** (strengthen Ghana's capacity to counter transnational organised crime, including firearms trafficking) and **Output 1.3** (enhanced access to security-related supplies to strengthen State actors' capacities to counter violent extremism and terrorism).
- Sufficient operational, logistical, management, financial and good governance capacities to implement the Action.
- Presence in Ghana and the Region.
- Transparent and neutral actor.
- Capacity to provide sub-grants to NGOS and experience with procurement of supplies.
- Having an international mandate in the area of transnational organised crime would be an advantage.

The implementation by this entity entails the implementation of **Output 1.3** and **SO 2** of the action.

#### 4.4.4 Changes from indirect to direct management mode (and vice versa) due to exceptional circumstances (one alternative second option)

4.4.4.1: **Output 1.1** (strengthened capabilities of State actors involved in countering violent extremism and terrorism, while upholding rule of law and human rights) and **Output 1.2** (enhanced coordination in efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism).

If the implementation modality of direct management through procurement (4.4.2) proves impossible due to exceptional circumstances and reasons outside of the Commission's control, the following activities may be implemented under indirect management with one or more entrusted entities selected by the Commission on the basis of the following criteria:

- relevant experience and expertise in counter-terrorism in Ghana; having former experience with local actors; having the capacity to provide technical assistance on coordination, security sector reform, M&E and project management; being able to coordinate with other initiatives in targeted sectors; operational, logistical, management, financial and good governance capacities to implement the action.

4.4.4.2: **Specific Objective 3 (SO 3)** (enhance relevant peacebuilding and violence prevention mechanisms and structures across national and traditional authorities, CSOs, including women's organisations, forcibly displaced populations and their host communities)

If the implementation modality of direct management through grants (4.4.1) proves impossible due to exceptional circumstances and reasons outside of the Commission's control, the following activities may be implemented under indirect management with one or more entrusted entities selected by the Commission on the basis of the following criteria:

- relevant expertise and experience in peacebuilding, mediation, violence prevention and early warning systems; capacity to work with national and traditional authorities and CSOs; capacity to provide sub-grants to CSOs; experience working in Ghana (particularly in the Ghana's Northern Regions); on-going engagement in the sector; sufficient operational, logistical, management and financial capacities to implement the action.

4.4.4.3: **Specific Objective 2 (SO2)** (strengthen Ghana's capacity to counter transnational organised crime, including firearms trafficking) and **Output 1.3** (enhanced access to security-related supplies to strengthen State actors' capacities to counter violent extremism and terrorism)

If the implementation modality of indirect management (4.4.3) proves impossible due to exceptional circumstances and reasons beyond the Commission's control, then the following activities may be implemented under direct management as follows:

- For the implementation of **SO2** (grants):
  - a) Purpose of the grants  
Implementation of **SO 2**.
  - b) Type of applicants  
One or more specialised international NGOs on the basis of the following criteria: relevant expertise and experience in transnational organised crime, including arms trafficking; capacity to work with national authorities and CSOs in countering TOC; sufficient operational, logistical, management and financial capacities to implement the action.
- For the implementation of **Output 1.3** (procurement): the purpose of the procurement procedure would be to provide security-related materials to governmental institutions in order to counter terrorism.

#### 4.5 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of services in the markets of the countries or territories concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where application of the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult (Article 28(10) NDICI-Global Europe Regulation).

#### 4.6 Indicative Budget

Indicative Budget components	EU contribution (amount in EUR)
<b>Implementation modalities</b> – cf. section 4.4	
<b>Specific Objective 1 – Outputs 1 and 2</b>	
Procurement (direct management) – cf. section 4.4.2	2 700 000
<b>Specific Objective 1 – Output 3</b>	
Indirect management with an entrusted entity cf. section 4.4.3	1 000 000
<b>Specific Objective 2</b>	
Indirect management with an entrusted entity cf. section 4.4.3	5 000 000
<b>Specific Objective 3</b>	
Grants (direct management) – cf. Section 4.4.1	7 000 000
<b>Grants</b> – total envelope under section 4.4.1	7 000 000
<b>Procurement</b> – total envelope under section 4.4.2	2 700 000
<b>Evaluation</b> – cf. section 5.2	300 000
<b>Audit</b> – cf. section 5.3	
<b>Totals</b>	<b>16 000 000</b>

## 4.7 Organisational Set-up and Responsibilities

**The Programme Steering Committee (PSC)** will have the overall responsibility for the direction, implementation, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the action. It shall meet 2 times per year (more time if needed for strategic decisions and changes).

It will include the participation of the European Union representatives of the partner country and contributing implementing partners. It will be co-chaired by a representative of the European Union and a representative of the partner country. The PSC will also involve selected youth, women's organisations and organisations representing vulnerable populations. The exact functions of the PSC will be determined at the start of the programme and incorporated into PSC terms of reference. In situations where specific technical and expert-specific input is required, key partners will be invited on a need-by-need basis. Further meetings can be organised whenever deemed necessary. This mechanism will ensure the overall relevance of the project to the general objective as well as its compliance with beneficiaries' requirements and needs.

**A Technical Committee (TC)** will be created to facilitate discussions on technical aspects of the action's implementation. The TC will be a technical level body which will contribute to the exchange of experiences and information, guaranteeing that all activities are tailored to the identified needs and are relevant to the political and social context of the country. The TC will meet at least quarterly and will be chaired by the European Commission. The TC will gather national technical representatives and representatives of all the implementing partners. Full details of the roles and functions of the TC will be included in terms of reference for the PSC.

As part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union, the Commission may participate in the above governance structures set up for governing the implementation of the action and may sign or enter into joint declarations or statements, for the purpose of enhancing the visibility of the EU and its contribution to this action and ensuring effective coordination.

## 5 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

### 5.1 Monitoring and Reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process, and part of the implementing partners' responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partners shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (Outputs and direct Outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

Roles and responsibilities for data collection, analysis and monitoring:

The action shall ensure a systematic M&E system covering the intervention. Each implementing partner/grantee is responsible and will be in charge of the identification of baselines, data collection, monitoring and reporting of its corresponding indicators, and can allocate a reasonable part of the budget to this end. Wherever possible, efforts will be made among partners to identify shared indicators to facilitate reporting at the action document level.

At the action document level, the Commission, supported by the implementer of **Outputs 1.1 and 1.2**, will be responsible for ensuring the overall coordination and supervision of the implementation of the different components of the action. This will ensure the establishment of a unified, consistent and consolidated monitoring framework for the intervention.

Monitoring and evaluation will assess gender equality results, an impact on rights of groups living in the most vulnerable situations and the implementation of the rights based approach working principles (applying all human rights for all; meaningful and inclusive participation and access to decision-making; non-

discrimination and equality; accountability and rule of law for all; and transparency and access to information supported by disaggregated data). Monitoring and evaluation will be based on indicators that are disaggregated by sex, age, disability, as applicable.

## 5.2 Evaluation

Having regard to the importance of the action, a final evaluation may be carried out for this action or its components via independent consultants contracted by the Commission. It will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision), in particular with respect to the security situation. Therefore, the assessment will be crucial to define future actions in this sector.

The Commission shall inform the implementing partner at least 14 days in advance of the dates envisaged for the evaluation missions. The implementing partner shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities.

The evaluation reports may be shared with the partners and other key stakeholders following the best practice of evaluation dissemination. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, apply the necessary adjustments. Evaluation services may be contracted under a framework contract.

Evaluations shall assess to what extent the action is taking into account the human rights-based approach as well as how it contributes to gender equality and women's empowerment. Expertise on human rights, and gender equality will be ensured in the evaluation teams.

## 5.3 Audit and Verifications

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audit or verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

# 6 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The 2021-2027 programming cycle will adopt a new approach to pooling, programming and deploying strategic communication and public diplomacy resources.

In line with the 2022 “[Communicating and Raising EU Visibility: Guidance for External Actions](#)”, it will remain a contractual obligation for all entities implementing EU-funded external actions to inform the relevant audiences of the Union's support for their work by displaying the EU emblem and a short funding statement as appropriate on all communication materials related to the actions concerned. This obligation will continue to apply equally, regardless of whether the actions concerned are implemented by the Commission, partner countries, service providers, grant beneficiaries or entrusted or delegated entities such as UN agencies, international financial institutions and agencies of EU member states.

However, action documents for specific sector programmes are in principle no longer required to include a provision for communication and visibility actions promoting the programmes concerned. These resources will instead be consolidated in Cooperation Facilities established by support measure action documents, allowing Delegations to plan and execute multiannual strategic communication and public diplomacy actions with sufficient critical mass to be effective on a national scale.

## Appendix 1 REPORTING IN OPSYS

A Primary Intervention (project/programme) is a coherent set of activities and results structured in a logical framework aiming at delivering development change or progress. Identifying the level of the primary intervention will allow for:

Articulating Actions or Contracts according to an expected chain of results and therefore allowing them to ensure efficient monitoring and reporting of performance;

Differentiating these Actions or Contracts from those that do not produce direct reportable development results, defined as support entities (i.e. audits, evaluations);

Having a complete and exhaustive mapping of all results-bearing Actions and Contracts.

Primary Interventions are identified during the design of each action by the responsible service (Delegation or Headquarters operational Unit).

The level of the Primary Intervention chosen can be modified (directly in OPSYS) and the modification does not constitute an amendment of the action document.

The intervention level for the present Action identifies as ;

Contract level		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Single Contract 1	Indicatively: <b>direct management through procurement</b> to strengthen capabilities of State actors involved in countering violent extremism and terrorism, while upholding rule of law and human rights, and enhance coordination in efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Single Contract 2	Indicatively: <b>contribution agreement with an entrusted entity</b> to enhance access to security-related supplies to strengthen State actors' capacities to counter violent extremism and terrorism, and strengthen Ghana's capacity to counter transnational organised crime, including firearms trafficking.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Single Contract 3	Indicatively: <b>direct management through grant</b> to enhance relevant peacebuilding and violence prevention mechanisms and structures across national and traditional authorities, CSOs, including women's organisations, forcibly displaced populations and their host communities.