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Midterm evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

Accompanying the document

**REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
THE COUNCIL**

Midterm Review Report on the External Financing Instruments

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Executive summary

This Staff Working Document (SWD) is based on the results of the external mid-term evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). The evaluation covered the three components of the Instrument in line with the IcSP Regulation adopted in March 2014: (1) response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts, (2) conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness and (3) addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats.

Based on the external evaluation, the Service considers that the IcSP is fit for purpose (i.e. achieves the objectives for which the instrument was designed) in its contributions to the delivery of EU external policy objectives during the evaluation period (2014 to mid-2017). It considered that the IcSP performs a unique function of crisis response and conflict prevention, triggered by EU political priorities, contextual needs and opportunities in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Its multilateral nature, the European values it promotes (including the core value of peace), its niche role, flexibility, and ability to take risks, are seen by Member States and other donors and stakeholders as the essential attributes which are the keys to its relevance and added value. Furthermore, it successfully provided complementarities and synergies within the wider set of the EU's external financing instruments. The IcSP is considered to be aligned with the Global Strategy for foreign and security policy. It has been responsive to beneficiary needs and to new challenges that have arisen, such as the fragmentation and criminalisation of violent conflict, extremism and terrorism, and growing refugee and migrant flows.

Based on the external evaluation, the Service considers IcSP to be effective, delivering on its objectives and commitments in a politically responsive manner. Findings also suggest that important contributions to the mainstreaming of conflict prevention, democracy and good governance are being achieved; underlining that more could still be done to mainstream gender and human rights. The role of the instrument in promoting conflict sensitivity is recognised and could still be further expanded (see *Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability* chapter).

Among the challenges faced by the IcSP, is the question of how best to undertake immediate conflict prevention and how to use early-warning analysis appropriately in this context. The external evaluation cautions against an approach to conflict and crises that would focus too narrowly on EU security. However it finds that the growing prominence of legitimate security concerns is a challenge where the IcSP has so far not been able to engage meaningfully with all relevant actors in the security sector. Engagement with military actors, in particular, is often key to preventing or ending a conflict and until now the IcSP has only had very limited means for such engagement (see *Relevance* chapter and reference to proposed amendment of the instrument as regards capacity building in security and development (CBSD)).

The contribution that IcSP has made to help prevent and resolve specific conflict situations is well-documented and, in many instances, progress is adequately captured through indicators even if, particularly in the case of conflict prevention, evidence is hard to come by. The legislators deemed that aggregation of results at instrument level would not provide a tangible means of judging the performance of the IcSP and thus did not include performance level indicators in the Regulation (see *Monitoring and evaluation* chapter).

The IcSP is found to be efficient due to its defining characteristics of speed and flexibility of action, and due to its added value. It is also recognised as an important driver of EU efforts to mainstream conflict-sensitivity. It also acts as a vector to promote complementarity with other areas of EU external action, such as Common Security and Defence Policy actions in the context of the Comprehensive Approach, EU engagement in the Kimberley Process¹ and broader efforts to advance and support the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

¹ The Kimberley Process (KP) brings together governments, civil society and industry with a certification scheme to reduce the flow of conflict diamonds – i.e. rough diamonds used to finance and fuel violent conflict.

The conclusions of the evaluation are feeding into the current reflections on how to improve the implementation of the IcSP for the remaining period until 2020, and on the future set of External Financing Instruments for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

1. Introduction

Purpose of the evaluation

This Staff Working Document (SWD) presents the results of the mid-term evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)² 2014-2020. The evaluation assesses whether the IcSP is fit for purpose, based on its performance to-date, to deliver on its objectives of crisis response, conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness, and addressing global and trans-regional threats. Its purpose is to inform future work on the instrument and its actions. It is part of a set of evaluations covering all the EU External Financing Instruments (EFIs)³ that inform the Mid-Term Review Report⁴ which draws conclusions across the External Financing Instruments.

This SWD is based⁵ on an external evaluation by independent consultants (see Annex 4).

Scope of the evaluation

The temporal scope of the evaluation corresponds to the requirements for the Mid-Term Review Report set out in Article 17 of the Common Implementation Regulation (CIR), namely, it focuses on the period January 2014 to June 2017. However, due to this short implementation period, the data available from results are limited (see section 3 on Method).

The countries covered under the evaluation are those eligible under the IcSP which has a global geographic coverage.

In order to usefully feed into the Mid-Term Review Report, the evaluation is set at instrument level. In consequence it focuses, to the extent possible, on the IcSP Regulation (e.g. on its principles and flexibility) rather than on the projects that have been put in place as a result of the instrument. However, additional information from projects has also been included to be able to analyse how the instrument has been implemented (see section 4 - Implementation state of play).

In accordance with the EU Better Regulation Guidelines⁶, the following evaluation criteria were used: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and EU added value. Complementarity, synergies, sustainability, impact and leverage of the instrument were also considered.

The external evaluation included short-term non-programmable and long-term programmable components, spanning the range of intervention-types as defined in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the IcSP Regulation, namely:

2 Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014, OJ L77.

3 The Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Greenland Decision, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, the Instrument on Nuclear Safety Cooperation, the Overseas Countries and Territories Decision, the Partnership Instrument and the Common Implementing Regulation. For the purpose of this exercise, the evaluation of the Overseas Countries and Territories Decision is included within the evaluation of the 11th European Development Fund.

4 In line with Article 17 of the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR), Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action, OJ L77, p. 95

5 It also takes into account the Impact Assessment (IA) realised in 2011, SEC(2011) 1481

6 Commission Communication Better regulation for better results – An EU Agenda, COM (2015) 215, and Commission Staff Working Document Better Regulation guidelines, SWD (2015) 111.

- in a situation of crisis or emerging crisis, to contribute swiftly to stability by providing an effective response designed to help preserve, establish or re-establish the conditions essential to the proper implementation of the Union's external policies and actions in accordance with Article 21 Treaty European Union⁷ (Article 3 IcSP).
- to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and to ensuring capacity and preparedness to address pre-and post-crisis situations and build peace (Article 4 IcSP).
- to address specific global and trans-regional threats to peace, international security and stability (Article 5 IcSP).

2. Background of the initiative

Description of the initiative and its objectives

The External Financing Instruments take up a major part of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)⁸ – Heading IV Global Europe, which provides the EU with the tools necessary to reinforce its role on the world stage and to ensure that it is able to live up to its ambitions in promoting its interests and values such as democracy, human rights, peace, stability, solidarity, and poverty reduction and to help safeguard global public goods.

Adopted in early 2014, the External Financing Instruments were designed to facilitate and support policy implementation, with the intention of remaining relevant until the end of 2020, thereby enabling the EU to implement external action policy as needed within the defined principles and objectives. In particular, the IcSP is a means for the EU to respond immediately to crisis situations in third countries world-wide, to build capacity for conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness and to address global and trans-regional threats with a security or stability dimension.

With a total initial budget of EUR 2.34 billion for 2014-2020 (3.5% of the overall budget for Global Europe, Heading IV¹⁰) the IcSP operates as a subsidiary or complementary instrument, meaning that it can only be mobilised in situations where an adequate and effective response cannot be provided under other EFIs¹¹.

Such cases arise where the action required is outside the scope or mandate of other EFIs; where procedures and processes limit the ability of other EFIs to respond in a timely manner; where the essential clauses of international agreements are invoked to suspend or restrict the use of other

Heading IV ⁹ Global Europe 2014 - 2020	EUR millions
Development Cooperation Instrument	19 662
European Neighbourhood Instrument	15 433
Instrument for Pre-accession assistance	11 699
Humanitarian aid	6 622
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace	2 339
Common Foreign and Security Policy	2 339
Margin	2 286
Agencies, EU Aid Volunteers, Emergency Response Centre and others	1 396
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights	1 333
Guarantee fund for External actions	1 193
Partnership Instrument	955
Macro-financial Assistance	565
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation	225
Greenland	218
EDF	30 506

Table 1: External Financing Instruments highlighted in blue

Source:

http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/index_en.cfm

⁷ Article 21 TEU has defined common overarching principles and objectives for the external action of the Union, inter alia to “preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security and to assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters.

⁸ Council Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 1311/2013 of 2 December 2013 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020, OJ L 347/884, p. 884.

⁹ The Multi-annual Financial Framework is divided into six broad groups of expenditure called "Headings". The EFIs make up the majority of Heading IV: Global Europe.

¹⁰ The MFF 2014-20 is divided into six categories of expense ('headings') corresponding to different areas of EU activities. The heading 'Global Europe' covers all external action ('foreign policy') by the EU.

¹¹ Article 2.3 of IcSP Regulation

EFIs¹² (Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement¹³ in relation to the use of EDF) or where there is a need to assist the transition between humanitarian and developmental action. In most cases, IcSP actions remain complementary to other EFIs and ensure continuity with actions under the latter. Support for military or purely humanitarian interventions are not within its remit¹⁴.

Structure

As an EU instrument, the IcSP operates firmly within the framework of the principles and priorities of EU external action. The latter are set out under Title V, Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), where the priority described in paragraph (2) c) '*preserve peace, prevent conflict and strengthen international security*' is particularly relevant for IcSP operations. Regarding the international policy framework, the EU is committed to implement Agenda 2030 and the IcSP addresses several of its aspects, in particular Sustainable Development Goal 16¹⁵. The IcSP is essentially different from more traditional development instruments as it operates as one of the largest global funds in the area of conflict, peace and security alongside similar funds such as the UK's Conflict Stability and Security Fund.

The largest share of the IcSP budget is allocated to the crisis response component which provides for short-term, rapid, flexible and non-programmable actions in countries and regions experiencing situations of crisis or emerging crisis under Article 3 (at least 70% of the funds). Based on the Impact assessment of 2011, this component placed an increased focus on conflict prevention in comparison to its predecessor, the Instrument for Stability (IfS).

The conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness component under Article 4 (up to 9% of the funds) provides for better tailoring of longer-term assistance and responses to peace building needs worldwide. The remaining component on global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats under Article 5 (up to 21% of the funds) provides for global assistance in new areas such as cyber-crime, all forms of illicit trafficking and counter-terrorism, as well as interventions aiming at mitigating risks related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) material or agents. Actions under both of the latter two components are programmable and subject to scrutiny via comitology (a committee where every EU Member State is represented).

The IcSP focuses on peace and stability in a rapid and flexible way that no other EFI was designed to achieve. It is the key external assistance instrument that enables the EU to take a lead in helping to prevent and respond to actual or emerging crises around the world.

The intervention logic of the IcSP was reconstructed by the external evaluators during the evaluation and is presented hereafter (Figure 1). It shows the logical paths from inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes to impact. Outcomes at Instrument level are achieved in part by largely intangible processes (political engagement, confidence building, creating opportunities for dialogue, or promoting change in attitude/ awareness/ behaviour) that are difficult to quantify or capture by current monitoring systems.


¹² Article 3.1 of IcSP Regulation

¹³ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/03_01/pdf/mn3012634_en.pdf

¹⁴ Articles 2.2 and 2.5 of IcSP Regulation

¹⁵ The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a collection of 17 interrelated global goals set out by the United Nations. SDG 16 is: "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels".

INTERVENTION LOGIC OF THE INSTRUMENT CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY AND PEACE (ICSP)



* The term 'outcome' equals the term 'result' as in the new instructions from the Secretary General linked to the Better Regulation Guidelines and the development of Strategic Plans of DGs. Due to the fact that the IcSP is an external action instrument with a strong influence of OECD/DAC terminology, the term outcome is used.

** Threats including threats to law/order, to security/safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health

*** SALW = Small Arms and Light Weapons

Figure 1: IcSP reconstructed intervention logic Source: Annex 4, p.53

Baseline

At the time of the adoption of the IcSP there was no existing baseline¹⁶ against which to measure progress at instrument-level. Therefore, the external evaluators took into account: existing project and sector-evaluations (focussing mainly on the IcSP starting from 2014 and, where direct links existed, taking into account actions under the IfS); the IcSP regulatory framework; an EU-specific timeline of institutional, instrument and policy developments; and case-studies on focal themes. Contrary to other external action instruments, the IcSP Regulation contains no performance indicators as the legislators recognised the inherent difficulties involved in measuring the performance of conflict prevention and crisis response activities at aggregate level. Notwithstanding, an attempt at aggregation is made for each IcSP component (Articles 3, 4 and 5) in the relevant programme statements provided in each year's budget¹⁷.

On this basis the evaluation had sufficient action/programme-level evidence (through case studies, surveys, interviews, reports, field visits, etc) to conclude that the IcSP has made important contributions to effectively address threats to international and EU peace and security.

3. Method

The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) was in the lead for managing the external evaluation. As part of a wider set of evaluations carried out in an interlinked and co-ordinated manner, coherence of the different evaluations has been ensured by an Inter-service Steering group (ISG). The external evaluation of the IcSP involved an inception phase; a desk report (providing initial responses to evaluation questions); field visits to meet key interlocutors to obtain first-hand views in-country (Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, Georgia, Somalia/Kenya, Niger, and Colombia); a survey of EU delegations covering all instruments; an Open Public Consultation on the draft report, which comprised a specific 12 weeks online survey as well as targeted stakeholder consultation meetings with Member States, civil society organisations and implementing partners in March 2017; and a final report.

The evaluators gathered evidence using a conceptual framework and a mixed methods approach combining quantitative and qualitative data. That approach involved the application of several tools throughout the different evaluation stages, in particular: an extensive document review including technical, financial and reporting data; an assessment of a sample of actions across Articles 3, 4 and 5; surveys to gather information on the implementation of actions and perceptions of achievements; targeted interviews on an individual or group basis structured around the evaluation questions; the above mentioned field visits; and supporting studies.

Data analyses, synthesis and triangulation were also used to corroborate findings from complementary and multiple sources (such as documentation, surveys and key informant interviews). In that context, evaluators paid due attention to the different categories of stakeholders — EU delegation and Headquarters staff, Member States government and agencies, UN agencies, international organisations, private sector and civil society organisations.

¹⁶ A “baseline” is defined here as the measurement of conditions at the start of a project/instrument, against which subsequent progress can be assessed

¹⁷ Draft General Budget of the European Union for the Financial Year 2018- Working Document Part 1 - Programme Statements of operational expenditure, COM (2017) 400, May 2017 – see under Heading IV Global Europe, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, pp.543-554

Limitations — robustness of findings

The evaluation confirmed that measuring and aggregating the results of IcSP actions is complicated as a result of several factors: the actions often play a catalytic role and are not stand-alone; they are relatively small in size, vary significantly in nature, are spread around the world and place a premium on being responsive to political imperatives and timely deployment. All of these factors render the attribution of cause and effect more difficult than it already is for larger geographical or more targeted thematic instruments. Furthermore, the timing of the evaluation meant that most projects initiated under the IcSP were still ongoing when the evaluation was done, (which means that outcomes were still being delivered making it difficult to assess impact and sustainability). Other challenges encountered were:

- Measuring political (as opposed to developmental) outcomes;
- Data over-abundance in some areas and scarcity in others;
- Defining/attributing the degree to which IcSP interventions have contributed to results (causality and attribution);
- Aggregating results to delineate broader instrument impacts.
- Access: Many of the areas of the world where the instrument is active are insecure or difficult to access.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the evaluators expressed confidence in their findings, drawing on a host of project and sector evaluation findings as well as a review of best available quantitative and qualitative evidence of causality¹⁸ between actions and effected changes. Extensive use was made of stakeholders' and experts' views, field visits, case studies and, where appropriate, anecdotal evidence, informing the conclusions by the Service.

4. Implementation state of play

This section illustrates the progress in the implementation of the IcSP since 2014.

Up to June 1, 2017 the total commitments and payments for all Articles of IcSP (in EUR) and its percentage (%) compared to the total IcSP 2014-2020 MFF amount are:

Category	EUR	% of allocated
Allocated	2,338,719,000	
Decided	994,720,043	43%
Contracted	851,641,388	36%
Paid	534,788,732	23%

Source: Data Warehouse, based on operational appropriations

Crisis response component (Article 3)

Article 3 of the IcSP remains a key element of the EU's diplomatic efforts to respond to crises with many of the actions funded taking their cues directly from the political priorities agreed in the Foreign Affairs Council. Overall, in the period 2014 to mid-2017, EUR 670.5 million were committed under the crisis-response component, with over 100 financing decisions adopted and over 220 interventions implemented (closed or ongoing). These are non-

¹⁸ See annex 1 of External Evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, Final Report, June 2017 <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/key-documents/icsp-mte-final-report-annex.pdf>

programmable, short-term rapid actions (duration of up to 18 months, with possible extensions of 6+6 months). They enable timely and flexible EU responses to prevent conflict, support post-conflict political stabilisation and early recovery in situations of crisis, emerging crisis or disaster. They contribute to fostering the conditions for implementation of EU assistance and cooperation policies and programmes, when financial assistance cannot be provided through other EU financing instruments. Activities cover a wide range of sectors: mediation, dialogue and reconciliation, confidence building; support to democratic institutions, rule of law, transitional justice, security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes, infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction, employment generation, demining, counter terrorism and countering violent extremism (CT/CVE), stabilisation; and migration, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).




Figure 2: IcSP Article 3 Financial allocations (EUR million) 2014-2017 by theme




Figure 3: IcSP Article 3 Financial allocations (EUR million) 2014-2017 by region

Conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness - The “Peace-building Partnership” (Article 4)

Peace-building and conflict prevention efforts under this article¹⁹ placed increasing emphasis on early and preventive action and strengthened capacity at community level. They allowed the EU to build and strengthen its own capacity and that of its partners²⁰ to prevent conflicts, enhance resilience and build peace. Actions are set in Annual Action Programmes (AAPs)

¹⁹ in line with Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention of June 2011: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122911.pdf
²⁰ These partners as defined in Article 4.1 are international, regional, sub-regional organisations, States and civil society

which are based on specific Thematic Strategy Papers and the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2017 (adopted in August 2014).²¹ The actions address pre- and post-crisis needs including post-conflict and post-disaster recovery. Overall, in the period from 2014 to mid-2017, EUR 71 million were committed.

Overview of AAPs, number of actions fiches, total amounts decided

AAP year	Number of actions fiches	Decided amount (EUR mln)
AAP 2014	5	19,0
AAP 2015	7	25,0
AAP 2016	7	27,0
AAP 2017	7	29,0
Total	26	100,0

Assistance in addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats (Article 5)

Actions under Article 5 have been funded at either a global, trans-regional or regional level. Particular emphasis was placed on good governance and international law across the different priorities: 1) counter threats to law and order, to security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructures and to public health; and 2) mitigate and prepare against risks, whether of an intentional, accidental or natural origin, related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents.

While IcSP Article 5 activities are divided into the priorities listed above, there are naturally some interlinks. As the lines between threats such as terrorism, organised crime, maritime and cybercrime, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) related threats become blurred, the different themes also seek synergies, both within the two overall objectives as well as across them. Overall, in the period from 2014 to mid-2017, EUR 275.55 million were decided through annual financing decisions. These funds are divided between the different priorities, identified in the Thematic Strategy Paper and the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2017, and presented as follows.




Figure 4:
IcSP Article 5 Financial allocations (%) 2014-2017 by theme

²¹ Commission Implementing Decision C(2014)5607 of 11.8.2014

Monitoring and evaluation

Project/programme and sector evaluations are used to assess and measure the progress and results of IcSP actions. Limited means existed to aggregate this information to instrument level. Work is ongoing through the further elaboration of an IcSP manual of outcome indicators and the use of *Theories of change*²² to better capture performance. A new, large knowledge-sharing platform, OPSYS, will provide appropriate better means for IcSP and other instruments to advance in this regard.

The fact that IcSP actions are meant to be, and usually are, part of a comprehensive response strategy involving many EU actors, often playing a catalytic role, further complicates the task of quantifying how much value IcSP has concretely added. The legislators deemed that aggregation of results at instrument level would not provide a tangible means of judging the performance of the IcSP and thus did not include performance level indicators in the Regulation. This does not stop lessons being learnt from its implementation but it does present limitations and challenges in a context where performance-based budgeting is becoming the norm.

Lastly, the Commission's decision to create dedicated IcSP sections with a regional remit in key delegations to manage devolved actions under Articles 3 and 4 (as of September 1, 2017) will provide an additional means of ensuring more consistent monitoring of projects.

5. Answers to the evaluation questions

5.1 Relevance

To what extent do the overall objectives (IcSP Regulation) and the design of the IcSP respond to: (a) EU priorities and beneficiary needs identified at the time the Instrument was adopted (2014)? And (b) Current EU priorities and beneficiary needs, given the evolving challenges and priorities in the international context (2017)?

Overall answer: the objectives and design of the IcSP in 2014, when the Instrument was adopted, were and remain today aligned with the evolving EU priorities, strategies and external action policy²³, namely the IcSP responds to the priorities set out in Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union, it supports the Global Strategy²⁴, it takes an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, supports cooperative regional orders, and promotes global governance.

When the IcSP was adopted in 2014, it incorporated several lessons learned from its predecessor, for example by further enhancing the flexibility of the Instrument through the possibility of longer (and extendable) implementation periods.

The IcSP is also seen to have stood the test of time by accommodating important new policy developments, notably the adoption of the Global Strategy²⁵ where the principles and

²² The on-going process of reflection to explore change and how it happens. It describes how and why change happens, and what the role of actions/programmes is in that particular change process. In articulating that understanding of change, it also challenges the thinking by questioning the underlying assumptions and exploring different pathways to change. It gives the big picture, including contextual factors and actors that influence change but which can be out of the control of the project, acknowledging the complexity of change.

²³ See page 14 of Annex 4.

²⁴ "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy" (2016) (referred to as the 'Global Strategy') <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union>

²⁵ "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy" (2016) (referred to as the 'Global Strategy') <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union>

priorities for EU action on peace and security are set. IcSP actions are now aligned to support the implementation of the Global Strategy (notably in the realms of security, promoting state and societal resilience) and IcSP continues to adapt its actions in line with the needs and priorities of the specific context. The present uncertain security environment and the emergence of various new security threats and challenges underscore the political relevance of the IcSP, which provides the Union with an instrument that can promptly respond to various needs and requirements in crisis and conflict contexts, as recognised by stakeholders' replies to the Open Public Consultation (OPC)²⁶.

Article 3 actions on response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts often provide a rapid way to implement new or urgent policy priorities identified by the EU Foreign Ministers (e.g. Security and Development Strategy for the Sahel; European Agenda on Migration, etc.), and other policy frameworks agreed within broader regional or international frameworks (e.g. the EU-Africa Partnership, UN Resolutions).

Examples of IcSP actions that follow up on immediate EU political priorities:

- *In Ukraine, since 2014 the IcSP has undertaken significant investments (EUR 76 million) to support the implementation of the Minsk Agreement by bolstering the manpower and technical means of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission, addressing the needs of displaced and conflict-affected populations and complementing efforts under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to support the reform of the National Police of Ukraine.*
- *On the Syrian crisis, the IcSP has supported community resilience whilst also assisting communities and authorities in neighbouring countries to continue coping with the effects of displacement. Peace-building and dialogue initiatives are designed to complement the work of the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria while efforts to identify the victims of the conflict and to help investigate potential crimes against humanity are necessary preparations for a time when reconciliation and transitional justice may become possible. Overall contribution since 2014: over EUR 120 million.*
- *On migration, the IcSP contributed to the immediate European response to the crisis situation in the Mediterranean as well as to address root causes of migration linked to instability and conflicts. Such actions respond directly to priorities set in the European Agenda on Migration as well as in the Communication on Forced Displacement.*
- *With the increased threat of terrorism and violent extremism the IcSP contributed to the response through dedicated programmes in the Middle East and North Africa, in West Africa and the Sahel as well as in the Horn of Africa.*
- *The IcSP has mobilised over EUR 25 million in Colombia since 2015 to support the peace process between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (FARC-EP), first supporting confidence-building measures designed to buttress the peace talks in Havana, then shifting to support rapid-response projects in the run up to signature of the final peace agreement, and finally helping with its early implementation.*

²⁶ See page 36 – Annex 2.

The evaluation emphasises that more and more strategic efforts to build the capacity of those who undertake regional and multilateral conflict prevention and peace-building efforts are warranted²⁷. Furthermore, at present, none of the existing financing instruments within the field of external action explicitly allows for building the capacity of the military in partner countries in order to contribute to sustainable development, despite urgency on the ground. This shortfall affects the efficiency and sustainability of the Union's external action²⁸. Military actors, in particular, are often key to ending a conflict. A proposal to amend the regulation to address this concern is currently under discussion²⁹. Capacity-building in support of security and development (CBSD) aims to tackle this shortfall and enables the Union to enhance the capacity of the military actors in partner countries to ensure human security in their countries. This need was also recognised by the respondents to the OPC³⁰.

The IcSP conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness component (**Article 4**), has also been highly relevant to the EU's external action objectives (Title V, Article 21 TEU) and its international commitments, particularly with regard to preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security (Title V, Article 21 (2) c TEU).

Article 4 actions on conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness are designed to help prevent conflict, build peace and address pre- and post-crisis needs in close co-ordination with international, regional and sub-regional organisations, and state and civil society actors and are closely aligned with current EU conflict prevention efforts and with the priorities set in the Global Strategy. Forty Article 4 actions were launched in the period 2014-2017, addressing a variety of issues articulated around the five priority areas set out in the IcSP Regulation and in the Thematic Strategy Paper.

A variety of stakeholders (Member States, International Organisations, Civil Society organisations (CSO)) were regularly involved in the preparation and implementation of Article 4 interventions, including through a regular political dialogue.

IcSP has supported in-country civil society actors in their endeavours to prevent conflicts and build peace. A total of 40 actions were launched in almost 20 countries in the period 2014-2017 focusing on themes such as mediation and dialogue, reconciliation, women empowerment, peace and security and youth as agents for peace³¹.

- *The project European Resources for Mediation Support (ERMES) enabled the EU to support third parties' efforts in mediation processes. In 2016 alone, 25 assignments related to 12 conflicts were undertaken, assisting, for example, the members of the De-escalation and Ceasefire Committee (DCC) in Yemen; or supporting the dialogue between the Government and the main opposition group, "Renamo" in Mozambique; or providing political and technical support to the peace process between the Government and the FARC, in Colombia.*
- *The project European New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi), implemented by 12 EU governmental and non-governmental partners, helped train and prepare specialised personnel for EU Civilian Missions and other international civilian crisis management missions to undertake their often delicate tasks.*

²⁷ See page 14 - Annex 4

²⁸ Joint Staff Working Document – Impact Assessment-SWD(2016) 222 final

²⁹ See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council COM(2016)447

³⁰ See page 35 – Annex 2

³¹ See Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 2014 to 2016 Annual Activity Reports

As outlined by the evaluators³², programmes implemented under **Article 5** on addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats reflect the adaptations made in the EU's foreign and security policy in response to increasing complexity of global threats and mirror advances and activities under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as laid down under Article 21 of the TEU. Early involvement of local stakeholders (including competent national authorities and CSOs) is common practice in Article 5 programming, such as, for example, in the EU Centres of Excellence (CoE) system, which involves setting up inter-ministerial National Teams, National Focal Points (NFP) and Regional Secretariats worldwide. This is complemented by an active process of conducting national needs assessments by partner countries that in turn develop and adopt National CBRN Action Plans.

5.2 Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability

To what extent does the IcSP deliver results against the Instrument's objectives, and specific EU priorities?

Overall answer: the IcSP is effective and has delivered on Instrument objectives. IcSP actions and programmes translate EU political priorities into concrete activities. Funding allocations have been responsive to the political priorities set. Important contributions to the mainstreaming of conflict prevention, democracy and good governance were achieved; further attention on gender and human rights is recommended. With few IcSP actions and programmes concluded, it is too early to assess Instrument-level impacts and sustainability³³.

The IcSP is found to effectively deliver on its objectives, remaining closely aligned with and advancing EU political priorities. The evaluators found instances where activities under Article 3 have deepened political and policy dialogue with governments and other relevant parties. In other instances there was a trade-off between speedy delivery and in-depth engagement with stakeholders, making it imperative for projects to flexibly adapt throughout implementation. Not surprisingly, the impact of IcSP projects is noted to be greater where IcSP has remained engaged over a longer period of time or where adequate follow-up has been given through other Instruments and/or through political dialogue. This later, catalytic effect is desirable and in line with the subsidiary nature of the Instrument but renders it more difficult to capture its impact comprehensively through instrument-based evaluations (see also Coherence Report³⁴). While it is generally recognised that stabilisation and peace-building activities would often benefit from longer preparation and implementation times than the IcSP currently has, it must also be recognised that the speed and flexibility with which the Instrument can deliver is directly linked to its short-term engagement. Short time frames and relatively limited amounts of funding make it easier for the Instrument both to take and to limit risks. The circumstances in which Article 3 is mobilised often require a willingness to try new approaches and the evaluation finds the IcSP enabling in this respect.

The speed of deployment is found to be a major asset of the IcSP and requires constant monitoring and improvement. In practice, the time between adoption of decisions and contracting can vary considerably depending on the nature of the action, the local conditions on the ground or the readiness of the implementing partners. In some cases implementation may even start prior to the signing of the relevant contract in others delays occur not just as a

³² See page 15 – Annex 4

³³ See page 18 – Annex 4

³⁴ "Coherence Report: insights from the external evaluations of the external financing instruments" (July 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/coherence-report-insights-external-evaluation-external-financing-instruments_en

result of administrative hurdles but also because local contexts can change rapidly and activities need to adapt in order to remain relevant and effective.

Sustainability, based on the external evaluation, the Service finds that it is not necessarily a relevant requirement for every IcSP action as, particularly in crisis response, activities can be self-standing. For those activities requiring follow-up, either in the form of funding through other instruments/donors or through political dialogue, the question of how this will be ensured is routinely asked prior to the adoption of new actions. In some cases, the lack of perspective for adequate follow-up has stopped the IcSP from getting involved, for example in certain Security Sector Reform (SSR) or Integrated Border Management processes which are, by definition, long term. But a more common scenario is that an IcSP action starts with a prospect, but not a guarantee, of follow-up. Sustainability then needs to be gradually built during the lifetime of a project and for those aspects of it that are found to make a contribution worth preserving and carrying forward.

In terms of mainstreaming EU priorities, based on the evaluators' findings, the Service considers that important contributions to conflict prevention, democracy and good governance, calling for further attention to gender and human rights, but recognising on-going efforts in this respect.

Article 4 actions are found to enhance EU and third countries capacities for supporting conflict prevention, peace-building and addressing pre- and post-crisis needs including post-conflict and post-disaster recovery. Contrary to Article 3 interventions, those under Article 4 can undergo comprehensive consultation with all stakeholders involved and engage in the longer term.

An important portion of Article 4 funding was allocated to support "in-country civil society engagement in conflict prevention" via calls for proposals designed to specifically address the needs of pre-selected countries on a number of priorities/issues. In the field of mediation, the European Resources for Mediation Support (ERMES) has effectively supported several mediation and peace processes through rapid and ad-hoc deployment of expertise in emerging crises. The Post Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (PDNA-RPBA) projects provided expertise in post-crisis/post-disasters settings to prepare recovery plans, while strengthening the partnership in this field with the World Bank and the UN. The training initiatives for EU and third countries' staff, as well as for police and gendarmerie forces through the European Union Police Services Training Programme (EUPST) and the Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) have contributed to enhanced global knowledge, expertise and awareness of civilian stabilisation missions. The Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) has contributed to strengthen the dialogue mechanism between EU policy-makers and civil society actors to enhance EU and civil society capacities to anticipate, prevent and respond to threats to stability posed by violent conflict and crisis. Regarding natural resources and conflict, cooperation with OECD has contributed to dissemination and implementation of the due diligence standards outlined in the "OECD Due Diligence Guidance for responsible sourcing and trading of minerals from conflict affected and high risk areas".

Several of the above actions built on previous successful initiatives that started under the IfS, where long-term investment was considered necessary to obtain effectiveness and sustainability. Some of the above actions, such as for example ERMES or the PDNA-RPBA directly complement Article 3 activities. All actions contributed to mainstreaming policy priorities of the EU, in particular the programmes in the area of democracy, good governance and human rights, as well as gender equality and empowerment of women.

Article 5 programmes delivered outcomes in EU priority areas related to addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats. Implementation covered all priority areas of Article 5, including cross-cutting priorities like gender equality, human rights, and climate change. The effectiveness of the outcomes depended on a range of factors, including absorption capacity of the partner countries involved, quality of the work of the implementers and overall programme management. The regional nature of the programmes facilitated cooperation where bilateral issues complicate work in sensitive security areas. Several Article 5 projects also broke new ground (for example in relation to programmes on critical infrastructure protection and Counter Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CT/CVE). They built on long-term partnerships (essential for any type of collaboration in security-sensitive thematic areas) and context analysis.

Capacity-building contributions were at the core of Article 5 programmes. Those implemented under the Counter-Terrorism/ Organised Crime/Critical Infrastructure (CT/OC/CI) portfolio were centrally managed or delegated to implementers such as Interpol, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) or regional actors. In the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation field, equally, there is a stated intent to strengthen national and regional capacity. Recent projects in CT/OC, as well as CBRN risk mitigation, have placed more emphasis on equipment delivery combined with training.

Sustainability approaches were embedded in the programming approach for Article 5 and include the involvement of local stakeholders in the design phase as a key principle. The Centres of Excellence (CoE) system took this approach one step further and encourages partner countries to embed the activities and results into their own institutional programmes and action plans. In CT, OC and CI, projects were implemented with close involvement of the competent authorities of partner countries and this helped embed results into national systems and protocols by creating partnerships, promoting ownership and ensuring coordination with other donors / partners. For example, in the CBRN field, the CoE system³⁵ was an example of a long-term programme that creates ownership (National Team formation and partner countries setting out their strategies in national needs assessments and national action plans) and provides a platform for donors to align with these strategies using local systems.

5.3 Efficiency

To what extent is the IcSP delivering efficiently?

Administrative costs are lower than other EFIs (the percentage of administrative costs to total budget is 1%³⁶). Budget execution (time taken from commitments to payments) is satisfactory overall. Contractual procedures and direct selection of implementing partners promote efficiency³⁷.

In terms of budget execution (from commitments to payments), stakeholders consulted indicated a general level of satisfaction among implementing partners. Furthermore, speed and flexibility remained a defining characteristic of **Article 3** actions, especially when

³⁵ <http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/>

³⁶ See page 24 – Annex 4

³⁷ See page 26 – Annex 4

compared to other EU EFIs. Examples from Turkey (support to the Turkish coast guard TCG as a deliverable of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan) and Niger (Agadez-Migration (AGAMI) project in Agadez) as a deliverable of the EU Agenda on Migration) illustrated a relatively rapid follow up of EU political decisions and commitments. The IcSP Regulation enables direct award of funding in specific cases. This option contributed to ensuring rapid response in situations of crisis or urgent need. Moreover, the IcSP crisis response component included several budget reinforcements throughout the years to meet the greater need that has arisen from the larger number of crises around the world and their proximity to the EU. An internal audit performed in 2016 assessed the actual speed of the identification/ formulation and contracting phases and found that the aim of adopting most financing decisions within three months following submission to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is often met. When not, it is partly due to external factors, i.e. operating in crisis situations requires due caution and planning, which takes time, and partly to the fact that even shortened procedures, which Article 3 actions are subject to, can still be time consuming. Still, measures to further reduce the time needed to adopt decisions to avoid missing windows of opportunities have to be identified and put in place as suggested as well by respondents to the OPC³⁸.

In terms of flexibility, the external evaluation underlines that there is no facility under the IcSP to allow for small actions to be decided without a formal decision-making procedure (such as it was operationally possible under the IfS via the Policy Advice, Technical Assistance, Mediation, Reconciliation and Other Areas of Assistance (PAMF)³⁹). This was also noted by stakeholders in the OPC process, given that the absence of such a facility has negative effects on efficiency. Small actions (e.g. conflict analyses, feasibility studies, etc.) undertaken to enhance efficiency, should not require the same processes to be followed as large decisions. The re-establishment of such facility could be explored in a post 2020 context.

Long-term interventions under **Article 4** are subject to the usual contracting procedures following the adoption of Annual Action Programs. The design and adoption of AAPs ran smoothly, with their approval in the first half of each year, followed by about 45% of contracting done within the same year. The budget execution in terms of commitments for 2014, 2015 and 2016 has been close to 100%. Article 4 projects were on target to achieve their outcomes within the allocated financial resources and timeframe. Even in difficult situations, such as during or after a crisis or a natural disaster, the programmes under IcSP Article 4 allowed the mobilisation of experts to support mediation processes or to assess the needs and prepare the recovery plans.

There is evidence of some delays in project implementation for **Article 5**. However, these were not due to administrative issues in project approval to contracting, but rather to extensions of inception periods, therefore the project takes longer to be finalised. In regional projects, national needs assessments for participating partner countries were often undertaken sequentially by implementers, which create delays. There are proposals to improve the quality of these initial assessments by more strongly involving local experts, which may shorten inception periods.

5.4 EU Added Value

To what extent does the IcSP add value compared to interventions by Member states and other key donors and partners?

³⁸ See page 37 – Annex 2

³⁹ See page 28 – Annex 4

Overall answer: IcSP value added is seen at different levels. Within the EU context, and in relation to the EU's EFIs, the IcSP's speed, flexibility and capacity to adapt to evolving contexts, and political influence/leverage are valued. Its expertise/niche role, its bridging function and ability to take risks are also viewed as broadly complementary to interventions by Member States and other donors. It is also an important driver of the EU's efforts to mainstream conflict-sensitivity in other EFIs⁴⁰.

In general, the IcSP is known and valued for its speed and flexibility as substantiated in the feedback provided by respondents to the OPC41. If there is a need for a rapid first response from the EU in a situation of crisis or urgency, the IcSP is often the most appropriate tool available. It can take risks that larger or slower funding mechanisms cannot and this is often key in crisis situations. The accumulated experience of delivering rapid responses in a broad range of contexts all over the world also allows the IcSP to assess both the risks and opportunities of particular contexts, providing valuable operational feedback to political decision-makers. This then allows the EU to seize opportunities also in contexts where other donors are reluctant or constrained (e.g. the de-mining project in Colombia involving the FARC-EP alongside state actors).

A key value added of **Article 3** actions is in the policy and political dialogue they enable with relevant governments and stakeholders. Through this dialogue EU values about good governance or human rights can be conveyed in a more tangible, concrete way than through diplomatic efforts alone. The demand for actions enabling such dialogues is increasing. By contrast, the need for the IcSP to supplement the activities of other EFIs in cases where they had run out of funding has diminished with the advent of the EU Trust Funds (TFs). EU TFs are well placed and better resourced to act in the field of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD), therefore IcSP activities have diminished since 2014 in this field. In recent years, the IcSP has limited its engagement in this field to situations where EU TFs were not present or unable to intervene.

The main added value of **Article 4** programmes has been their contribution to strengthening the peace building capacities of third countries and EU partners, and to complementing actions of Member States and other donors. In addition, EU principles and values were well-integrated into programming and linkages are being created through programmes between the EU and the UN system and other international and regional organisations (OECD, OSCE, League of Arab States) which enable the promotion of EU cross-cutting priorities.

In the mediation sector Article 4 programmes have facilitated EU support to inclusive peace mediation and dialogue processes at the international, regional or local levels. Few others can provide technical assistance and training, or organise mediation events as quickly and flexibly as the EU through the IcSP. Another example of particular value added are the training initiatives for staff in civilian stabilisation missions and the support to initiatives such as the Kimberley Process and the guidance on the responsible exploitation and trade of minerals. Some funding has been made available where no other EU EFIs could be deployed because of security reasons, as was the case, for example, in Venezuela or Burundi, or in countries where important peace-building/disaster management initiatives (such as the Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA)) have been planned and implemented. Another key added value is that IcSP remained an important source of funding for many groups, in particular smaller local

40 See page 29 - Annex 4

41 See page 36 – Annex 2

civil society actors in a period of significant funding cuts to UN and European Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs).

As outlined by the evaluators⁴² and concluded by the Service, **Article 5** programmes played a unique role as a niche in non-DAC (OECD-Development Assistance Committee criteria) interventions covering Counter Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CT/CVE) and Organised Crime (OC), as well as certain programmes in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation (e.g. the EU People 2 People programme on dual use export controls, border controls, redirection of scientists, capacity for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and support to International Science and Technology Centre and the Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine). In other areas (such as critical infrastructure or Counter Terrorism in Sahel), in terms of added value the IcSP had an initial advantage by moving into geographical zones where other donors were absent. Furthermore, the external evaluation showed evidence that Article 5 interventions had significant interfaces with interventions of Member States and other stakeholders or donors⁴³.

5.5 Coherence, Consistency, Complementarity and Synergies

To what extent does the IcSP facilitate coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies both internally between its own set of objectives and programmes, and vis-à-vis other EFIs?

Overall answer: In relation to external EU initiatives and institutions, there is evidence of functional interfaces between the IcSP and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, as well as with activities of the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO). Effective synergies with the IcSP are hampered by the lack of flexibility and lengthy procedures of most other EFIs. Actions and programmes meet the Instrument's objectives, they have also been used to further promote the objectives of other EFIs, to 'gap fill', as a forerunner for interventions by other (larger) instruments, and as a funding instrument of last resort.

Coherence of **Article 3** actions with interventions of other Instruments is assured during the decision-making process through substantial consultation to coordinate and identify synergies. The subsidiary and complementary function of IcSP is useful to make sure discussions on follow-up and complementarity take place early on, sometimes well before activities are decided or started. The external evaluation showed that in 84% of all actions, complementarity with other EU EFIs was identified⁴⁴. IcSP actions have, in some cases been used deliberately to anticipate the start of activities foreseen under larger instruments. Since other EFIs and the Trust Funds increasingly address peace- and state- building, as well as security and stabilisation, further work to enhance synergies between the IcSP and other EFIs will remain necessary. For example, the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) external evaluation report recommends that more resources to cover crisis prevention are allocated to the ENI while also underlining that a balance with long-term predictability needs to be struck, suggesting that there is a continued need for the IcSP⁴⁵.

At present, there is a clear trend for the IcSP Article 3 actions to develop a greater focus on smaller, politically more sensitive projects, some of which do then lead to or complement

⁴² See page 31 – Annex 4

⁴³ See page 27 - Annex 4

⁴⁴ See page 35 – Annex 4

⁴⁵ Coherence Report –Insights from the External Evaluation of the External Financing Instruments –July 2017

larger interventions by other EFIs. Furthermore, synergies and coherence with CSDP activities have also become an important priority for Article 3 actions, some of which directly complement the work of CSDP missions in Mali, Niger and Ukraine, for example. Lastly within Article 3, there is internal coherence and examples of actions that build on and aim to consolidate effects or expand previous (IfS) actions (e.g. in South Sudan, Sudan, Niger).

IcSP **Article 4** coherence is supported by the decision-making process for its programmes. At Instrument level, complementarity between Article 4 and Article 3 is strong on issues such as mediation, early warning and conflict sensitivity⁴⁶. In addition, throughout the programming process, as well as during implementation, coherence and complementarity were sought:

a) with other EU instruments: regular consultations ensure complementarity and synergies, in particular for the interventions in favour of civil society organisations in third countries. A specific example of fruitful complementarity between IcSP and other EU external instruments is the Post Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (PDNA-RPBA) experts' mission in Central African Republic (CAR) whose conclusions have fed into the decision making process on the implementation of the Bekou Trust Fund⁴⁷.

b) with Member States' initiatives: Article 4 interventions enable synergies with EU Common Foreign Security Policy activities. Good examples were the programmes for pre-deployment training provided for staff of CSDP missions (projects such as the European New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) and European Union Police Services Training Programme). In addition, Article 4 programming involves upstream consultations with Member States and regular contacts with EU Delegations. This allows the complementarity of IcSP actions with other EFIs or other actors' interventions, avoiding eventual overlapping.

c) with other donors: several Article 4 programmes draw in other donors (such as the United States Agency for International Development in the Kimberley Process certification scheme; the World Bank and UN in Post Disaster Needs Assessment and Post-conflict Needs Assessment; the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the African Union in the ENTRi programme, and the UN in mediation support initiatives).

d) with civil society: thanks to specific project such as the Civil Society Dialogue Network, regular exchanges both on policy and programmes were held with civil society. This allows the integration of civil society's point of view in the EU policy and programmes and it also enhanced the overall coordination and complementarity between EU-led and civil society-led initiatives.

Article 5 interventions in the area of nuclear security were complementary to activities in nuclear safety under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC). There was a thematic synergy in the objectives pursued under the two instruments in a number of technical areas (CBRN Centres of Excellence covering both natural and man-made risks related to radiological and nuclear materials) and in some cases overlapping geographical coverage (e.g. uranium mining and related transport in Central Africa)⁴⁸.

Additional thematic complementarity existed on Counter-Terrorism/ Organised Crime activities and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) programmes on human rights and security sector reform. Other examples where this synergy was being developed in the area of counter-terrorism and fighting organised crime include the West Africa Police

⁴⁶ See page 36 – Annex 4

⁴⁷ "Linking relief, rehabilitation and development to make a long-term difference in a fragile situation like the Central Africa Republic crisis. The "Békou" Trust Fund will benefit the long-suffering population of the country, and will also contribute to reducing the fragility caused by this crisis in the wider region."

⁴⁸ See page 33 – Annex 4

Information System (WAPIS) in West Africa, Ameripol in Latin America and Strengthening Resilience against Violent Extremism (STRIVE) in the Horn of Africa.

There were close ties between Article 5 programmes on Counter-Terrorism/ Organised Crime and export controls with activities of Member States that implement bilateral programmes in these sectors. There was also close coordination with the United States in many thematic areas at both strategic and working levels. With regard to UN and international organisations, and in the fields of Counter-Terrorism and Organised Crime, there was coordination with (and in certain cases implementation by) organisations such as United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) or Interpol. In the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation field, the EU Centres of Excellence (CoE) provided a by-now well-accepted and effective platform that involves a number of international organisations as partners at the programming as well as implementing ends.

5.6 Leverage

To what extent has the IcSP leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement?

Overall answer: There is evidence that the IcSP has contributed to EU policy and political dialogue with beneficiary governments and stakeholders in several countries and that such dialogue has, in return, also benefitted some of the funded activities. This area of cross-fertilisation is by far the most important leverage of the instrument. A further area of leverage is in increasing the amounts of donor funds spent in a conflict-sensitive manner, either by attracting additional funding for specific actions or by helping to ensure that existing allocations take conflict relevant factors adequately into account.

Article 3 of the IcSP is instrumental for the EU to deliver on its political commitments, particularly where new or shifting priorities require for an adaptation in the EU approach. In the Syria crisis, for example, a series of IfS and IcSP interventions were mobilised. First the focus was on supporting attempts at a peaceful resolution of the conflict, then significant means were channelled to neighbouring countries, who started hosting those fleeing from the conflict, while pioneering the provision of non-humanitarian assistance to areas of the country that were not under the control of the Assad regime. More recently, support has been provided to collecting evidence about potential crimes against humanity that may hold up in court. Meanwhile, helping to trace conflict victims or their remains has, sadly, become a priority to prepare for a time when violence ends and the difficult reconciliation process can start. Perhaps the most eloquent example of how IcSP helps ensure that the EU has a capacity to actively promote peaceful solutions is the Comprehensive Syria Peace Support Initiative, which can provide financial, technical and operational support to peacebuilding processes at short notice. Each of the afore-mentioned activities provides the EU with leverage by quickly bolstering political commitments through concrete actions. In addition, many of the above activities evolved into larger, more long-term and often also more sophisticated projects through other EFIs and other donors, allowing them to plan and operate on a firmer basis. Here, the leverage derives from IcSP being a sort of 'risk-capital'.

On the migration and refugee crisis, the leverage obtained through the IcSP was particularly strong in the early phase by 'front-loading' prior to other EFIs coming in with more structural, long-term support. Thus, the support to the Turkish Coast Guard to help enhance its capacity to save lives at sea anticipated and complemented support through IPA and DG ECHO50, ensuring that the EU could swiftly point to concrete actions when some alleged that promises

49 See page 39 – Annex 4

50 Directorate General for the European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection

were not being followed up. Similarly, in Agadez (Niger) the setting up of a multi-purpose migration centre before the end of 2016 was one of the first concrete deliverables of the European Agenda on Migration and helped to quickly gather relevant experience that then led to a larger, more structural and well-rounded response from the EU Trust Fund (TF). In Colombia, the IcSP has been instrumental in supporting confidence building between the FARC and the Government of Colombia and in facilitating the peace process, thereby allowing the EU to quickly deliver on its political commitments through the offices of the EU Special Envoy. In all of the afore-mentioned examples, EU Trust Funds play an important role. In Syria and on the migration and refugee crisis, IcSP involvement was more critical while the TFs were still being set up or not fully operational. Once the TFs started to fully operate, the need for IcSP became more limited to niche issues which fell outside of the mandate of TFs or were outside their scope for political or operational reasons.

In Ukraine, with over EUR 75 million of projects, the IcSP contributed to delivering on EU political priorities and dialogue. In Iraq, the IcSP demining action is an important leverage for other EU actions, on humanitarian, security and political aspects.

There are many further examples of IcSP actions evolving into activities supported by other EFIs. And while IcSP actions are rarely designed to leverage more funding on purpose by others there frequently is a desired leverage effect in terms of greater conflict sensitivity and more solid project design in projects that follow on from IcSP activities.

The EU role in mediation and peace processes was strengthened in particular through the EU-UN partnership in the field of conflict prevention, supporting the international and insider mediation capacities in several countries and the EU programme European Resources for Mediation Support (ERMES) under **Article 4** which has allowed the EU to deploy experts playing a decisive role in the support of several peace processes. The IcSP actions have also contributed to draw in other donors in the Kimberley Process certification scheme as well as in initiatives to promote the responsible exploitation and trade of minerals. Other programmes have helped to increase the EU's influence in the tripartite partnership with World Bank and UN in the PCNA-RPBA processes.

Article 5 interventions opened opportunities for a broader political exchange and the discussion of policy objectives on key topics with institutional partners and beneficiary governments (CBRN, CT, Cybercrime, Drugs). As an example, the ISTC and STCU Centres are co-funded by the EU and other partners (US, Canada, commitments by the host countries) and implement, amongst others, partner projects funded by non-EU donors. This became an attractive way of organising scientific collaborations and for commercialisation efforts.

6. Conclusions

This SWD (based on the evidence from the external evaluation) confirms that the instrument has achieved its objectives. It also scores well with regards to coherence, consistency and complementarity, both within the EU and its various actors and with other international actors and civil society.

Article 3 crisis response measures made significant contributions to allow the EU pursuing new and urgent policy priorities swiftly. Overall, this component has delivered on its commitments, yielded important outcomes, and is responsive to a fast-evolving peace and security context. The flexibility and swiftness are the essential factors of the IcSP's Article 3 component, providing the EU with a key asset to react to unforeseen events and to be on the ground quickly with political projects that help to alleviate crisis, mitigate conflicts and open doors for dialogue and political processes.

At a policy level, the IcSP is instrumental in operationalising EU external action priorities and particularly in supporting the work of the High Representative/Vice President and of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The policy relevance of Article 3 actions is in line with the priorities of the TEU (Article 21), supports the implementation of the Global Strategy and adds value in the policy and political dialogue it enables with beneficiary governments. Furthermore, aspects of the IcSP Regulation promote efficiency including flexible management procedures to accelerate contractual procedures, and direct selection of implementing partners and timely support to critical processes, such as those funded under Article 3, can enhance the visibility and credibility of the EU thus contributing to its political leverage.

Under **Article 4** the IcSP has delivered on the Instrument's objectives translating EU political priorities into interventions and has contributed to enhancing EU capacities for supporting conflict prevention, peace-building and addressing pre- and post-crisis needs including post-conflict and post-disaster recovery. Positive feedback on the effectiveness of the IcSP Article 4 projects was given by the stakeholders involved.

Article 5 made important contributions to address threats to international and EU peace and security and address existing and emerging global threats. It has offered opportunities for a broader political exchange platform on key security policy issues with beneficiary governments and institutional partners (e.g. chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) Centres of Excellence, Counter terrorism, cybercrime, protection of critical infrastructures and illicit trafficking).

To conclude, at the mid-term of its implementation, the IcSP 2014-2020 has proven to be fit for purpose, and a key tool for the EU to underpin its diplomacy with flexible and tailor-made projects. This capacity for the EU to react speedily to the unforeseen and to address key security issues globally must be further strengthened in any future architecture of EU external relations instruments.

Annex 1. Procedural information

Consultation process

Lead DG – DEVCO; Decide reference IcSP – 2017/FPI/004

The relevant EU services have established an Inter-service Groups (ISG) to ensure appropriate oversight of the various EFI evaluations (process, content and co-ordination). The system comprised a Global EFIs ISG with overall oversight, and individual Instrument ISGs. Core members of individual Instrument ISGs were also members of the Global EFI ISG. The ISG was composed of relevant Commission departments (Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), European External Action Service (EEAS), Directorate-General for Budget (DG BUDG) and the Secretariat-General). Its first meeting was held on 14 October 2015. It discussed the evaluation roadmap and validated the terms of reference and the Commission proposal to hire a team of independent experts to undertake the evaluations through the COM 2015 FWC. The request for services was launched on 19 May 2016. The offers were evaluated and Landen Mills was selected as the winning tender, which contract started on 4 July 2016.

The external evaluation of the IcSP covered questions of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, EU added value, and coherence, complementarity, sustainability, impact, synergies and leverage. It was conducted in four phases. In the inception phase, the methodology, the evaluation questions and judgment criteria were further specified; In the ‘desk’ phase, documents were analysed, surveys were conducted, interview were held, and in the ‘field’ phase, eight partner countries were visited. An open public consultation, published on Commission’s website ‘Your Voice in Europe’, was launched and in the synthesis phase, the final report was prepared.

The report went through several revisions on the basis on inputs from the steering committee and comments from the Commission ISG. There were seven ISG meetings over the course of the IcSP external evaluation to cover initial briefing, provide feedback on inception, desk, key messages, draft Final, and Final reports. There were also four meetings (2 in September 2016, 1 in December 2016 and 1 end of March 2017) of all the consultants with all the evaluation managers, and relevant EU staff to promote understanding and exchange on complementarity and synergy between instruments under evaluation. The draft conclusions were then presented in May 2017 and the final report was approved on 16 June 2017. The report and its annexes will be published in July 2017.

Evaluation questions

Relevance

To what extent do the overall objectives (IcSP Regulation) and the design of the IcSP respond to: (a) EU priorities and beneficiary needs identified at the time the Instrument was adopted (2014)? And (b) Current EU priorities and beneficiary needs, given the evolving challenges and priorities in the international context (2017)?

Effectiveness

To what extent does the IcSP deliver results against the Instrument's objectives, and specific EU priorities?

Efficiency

To what extent is the IcSP delivering efficiently?

Added value

To what extent does the IcSP add value compared to interventions by Member States or other key donors and partners?

Coherence, Consistency, Complementarity and Synergies

To what extent does the IcSP facilitate consistency, complementarity and synergies both internally between its own set of objectives and programmes, and vis-à-vis other EFIs?

Leverage

To what extent has the IcSP leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement?

Annex 2. Synopsis report of the stakeholders' consultation

The stakeholders' consultation on the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace (IcSP) began in late 2016 till May 2017. It was carried out as part of the external evaluation on all the EFIs. The consultation strategy provided by the external consultants included three sub-fields of activities, namely:

- Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)
- Field Visits
- Thematic Case Studies
- Surveys
- Open Public Consultation

The next section outlines the approach taken for the validation of the findings including details on the process, hypotheses to be validated, KII and case studies, and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) processes.

The evaluation involved field visits to Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, Georgia, Somalia (Kenya), Niger, and Colombia from November to December 2016.

The external evaluators interviewed a range of Commission staff whose work relates to IcSP during the course of the evaluation. They sought their perspectives on the data which the evaluators had collected, and their views on the evaluation questions and hypotheses of the evaluation. The people interviewed are included in Annex 3 of the external evaluation report and the results are included throughout the external evaluation report

The following section describes the Open Public consultation, which took place between 7 February and 3 May 2017. It consisted on an online survey and targeted meetings. Hereunder is the summary, including views of Member States representatives. All key stakeholder groups have been reached.

The online survey

124 online submissions received from 71 institutions/organisations and individuals for 44 countries and territories both EU and non-EU. Participants represented research/academia, private business, CSOs and public authorities. Further details are provided in the table below. The public authorities were represented by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Latvia,

Finland, Austria, Belgium, Mexico, and the Czech Republic; the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation and the UK Department for International Development; and sub-national entities from Belgium and Morocco.

Type of Organisation	Number	Percentage
Private individuals	8	11%
Consultancies	2	3%
EU networks/association	7	10%
Business/Private Sector	8	11%
Organisations/associations	16	23%
Public authorities	25	35%
Research/academia	5	7%
Total	71	100%

2.1 Written submissions to the EU

3 written submissions were delivered by the following institutions/ organisations:

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom), “Foreign Policy Instruments Mid-Term Evaluation: United Kingdom Comments” – 3 May 2017.

Secrétariat Général Des Affaires Européennes (France), “Réponses à la consultation publique sur les instruments d’action extérieure de l’Union européenne” – 5 May 2017.

Search for Common Ground & World Vision, “Written Contribution for the Mid-Term Evaluation of the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)” – No date.

2.2 Public presentations of Consultants involved

3 public presentations were organised allowing face-to-face meetings with the Consultants in Brussels in March (see details in Section 4). These events saw interactions with 18 organisations and 8 governments representing a wide range of stakeholders (EU government/European Parliament officials; civil society organisations; member states agencies; implementing organisations).

Direct Feedback received on the IcSP Guiding Questions

The Feedback received is presented in the chapter below following each guiding question. Quantitative data from the online submissions is supplemented by qualitative responses/ narratives delivered separately in written format. As the public presentations, and subsequent Q&A sessions, did not follow a format that allows for ‘question specific results’ –minutes and notes from these sessions are given in the following section instead.

3.1 Question 1: Addressing IcSP Objectives

How well do you think the IcSP has addressed its objectives? The main assessment criteria for the evaluation are: relevance; effectiveness, impact and sustainability; efficiency; EU added value; coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies; and leverage. Feel free to comment on the findings, conclusions or recommendations for any/all of the criteria.

1. *Summary of quantitative results*

Total no. of replies	1 – Poorly	2 – Adequately	3 – Well	4 – Very well	N/A
35	2	6	16	6	5

2. *On-line survey Feedback*

The IcSP could be better and more effectively exploited in response to the emerging hybrid threats, terrorism and violent extremism.

At the same time, we see some restrictions on the use of IcSP to prevent and combat hybrid and cyber threats that are the main contemporary challenges for international security, including the EU and the Member States. Bearing in mind the growing interdependence of development and security issues, we point out the need to adapt EU instruments to improve the effectiveness of EU support and action towards partner countries. In this context, we recognise the need to implement the Capacity Building for Security and Development (CBSD) Initiative, including in the immediate vicinity of the EU, and to identify sources of funding.

We anticipate that, due to the proliferation of conventional and unconventional threats, the importance of a rapid and effective response from the EU and therefore the role of the IcSP will increase, so it is important to consider resolving problematic issues and, possibly, allocating more appropriately the budget. We are aware that this would require additional efforts, including ensuring coherence and complementarity with other external EU financial instruments.

Human security must be at the heart of EU interventions if they are to have positive and sustainable results on the ground. It is crucial to keep this in mind as today’s geopolitical challenges and security threats, such as those defined as stemming from terrorism and migration, are pushing donors to prioritise short-term and security-focused interventions over long-term and people-centred approaches.

There is a need for context-specific analysis, programming criteria and calls for proposals. There are inherent problems and contradictions in PVE/CVE thinking and practice in the Horn of Africa (HOA). Initiatives on PVE/CVE are based on theories of change (TOCs) and models derived/developed in other contexts, from what the Life and Peace Institute (LPI) has observed of such programmes/projects in Kenya and Somalia. These TOCs and models assume that a process of ‘radicalisation’ invariably precedes ‘political violence’, emphasise the ‘ideological’ aspect at the expense of context, power relations and structural dynamics, are based on a very flimsy and flawed data and evidence base. These TOCs and models are themselves based on problematic conceptual premises such as radicalisation, extremism etc. Already PVE/CVE thinking and practice are in conventional thinking in some countries of the

region associated with counter terrorism (CT) and counter insurgency (CI) thinking and imperatives.

The present uncertain security environment both in our Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods and the emergence of various new security threats and challenges underscores the political relevance of the IcSP, as it provides the Union with an instrument that can promptly respond to various needs and requirements in crisis and conflict contexts. Engagement and the ability to address these situations are crucial for our credibility, both internally with regard to our citizens as well as externally vis-à-vis our partners. The real added-value of the instrument is embedded in its speed, flexibility and adaptability, providing means for active and responsive measures in support of peace and stability. The IcSP can, and should, also complement other Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) measures (e.g. crisis management missions) within the framework of the EU's comprehensive approach.

The Instrument, however, faces challenges in its capacity to address the rise of hybrid conflicts and threats. In order for the IcSP to fulfil its tasks effectively whilst acting in harmony with both humanitarian assistance and long-term development cooperation, the IcSP needs to remain politically driven. The IcSP needs to be integrated in a political strategy, considering all instruments and actions in a specific context.

The relevance of the IcSP as a funding instrument should not be questioned in a context where funding for peace and stability has otherwise undergone major cuts. Even if its budget allocation is limited compared to other EU External Financing Instruments, the IcSP is a critical source of funding for CSOs which contribute to peacebuilding efforts in fragile and conflict-affected partner countries.

Conciliation Resources have received IcSP funding in a variety of contexts including: South Asia; the Caucasus; West Africa; CAR; and DRC. It is the instrument most closely aligned with our organisational strategic objectives. Our funded projects under IcSP have been able to contribute to some extent to stability and peace in the contexts in which they have taken place and met the assessment criteria through the projects. Programme teams have also commented that EU engagement has often been positive and that has helped to navigate politics and relationships with host governments. What we have not been able to do so effectively is to link from IcSP to other instruments for continued funding.

In a long-term perspective, the new CBSD component may set a precedent for the next MFF which could lead to the IcSP and Heading IV becoming an open house for all kinds of military funding purposes and the related risks for CSO working with the EU being perceived as parties in armed conflicts.

We welcome the flexibility of the EU staff in Headquarters and Delegations for allowing implementing partners to adapt the project based on the dynamics on the ground thus, showing understanding of the security challenges and obstacles they face. As the IcSP is a quick and responsive tool reflecting the global needs to increase investments in conflict-affected countries, it has been one of the main drivers in keeping conflict prevention on the EU's agenda in spite of the turbulent political environment. With a globally accepted and well-recognised instrument that also plays a crucial role in promoting civil society, the EU needs to leverage this role in its political discussions and diplomacy for peace and security.

3. Separate written contributions:

La gouvernance de l'instrument, la régularité et la qualité des échanges entre les gestionnaires et les partenaires de mise en œuvre est très positive. La coordination avec les agences des Etats membres peut être améliorée dans la phase de préparation sans remettre en cause la valeur ajoutée de l'instrument par la mise en place de mécanismes de prévention ou de

consultation rapides et informels. Une correspondance plus étroite avec les praticiens, notamment via le Practitioners Network et le groupe de travail Crises, Fragilité et migrations est recommandée.

Analysis of results by the external evaluation team

The evaluation team finds submissions on this question to be in line with its conclusions; that the IcSP has addressed its objectives largely well (80% of OPC online responses range from appropriate to very well).

Much feedback from online submissions center around the changing nature of conflict and new/emerged threats, and the need for the IcSP to better equip itself to respond to these. Feedback also substantiates the conclusions drawn in the evaluation on the value added of the IcSP, ranging from both its speed and flexibility, ability to take risks, as an important source of funding in a period of funding cuts, to its multilateral nature and promotion of European values. In addition, several respondents call for the IcSP to better leverage its strategic position as one of the largest dedicated funding instruments in the sector, and engage with other funds/donors on key policy issues.

Several submissions were around the CBSD. This is beyond the scope of the IcSP MTE and has not been incorporated in the MTE.

3.2 Question 2: IcSP Ability to Work

Do you think the IcSP is able in its current format to work on crisis response, address global threats to peace and to seize windows of opportunities to build peace? Please give reasons for your views.

4. Summary of quantitative results

Total no. of replies	1 – Poorly	2 – Adequately	3 – Well	4 – Very well	N/A
30	1	4	7	0	18

5. Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions)

6. On-line survey feedback

Sí es capaz de hacerlo pero sus medios son escasos por lo que necesitaría aumentar sus recursos en general y los destinados a Colombia en particular. En el momento coyuntural actual, con un acuerdo de paz con las FARC recién firmado y unas negociaciones en proceso con el ELN, es muy necesario apostar a las iniciativas de construcción de paz para reintegrar a esos grupos armados a la sociedad civil. Sin embargo, es tanto o más necesario combatir a los grupos paramilitares que representan la mayor amenaza para la paz en Colombia. La UE debe invertir a través de este instrumento en medio materiales (y no sólo técnicos) para que la justicia y la fuerza pública hagan frente de manera decidida a esta amenaza y contribuyan a consolidar la posibilidad de la paz que se abre en el país.

IcSP should work on finding ways to be more responsive and fast in administrative procedures to avoid missing windows of opportunities as well as delay implementation. EU internal coordination and communication e.g. regarding proposals should be enhanced in order to smoothen application and reporting processes. Currently it takes a significant amount

of time to turn a proposal into actual activity implementation, much due to EU administrative processes.

As recommended in the IcSP mid-term evaluation, it would be advisable to create a facility under the IcSP to fund small actions without a formal decision-making procedure. Currently even the so called rapid response instruments / tools (such as ERMES) can be rather stiff in their administration.

As demonstrated in the evaluation conflicts are increasingly fragmented, and wars have become highly localised, often involving local communities within a country. In this respect, it will be essential that the IcSP also contribute to strengthening local and regional governments' capacities as vector of stability and as peace keepers or mediators.

We believe that it has to an extent but that it could be more flexible in doing so both in its responsiveness to changing situations and in dealing with varied partners. The work we have undertaken with IcSP funding has contributed to addressing global threats to peace and to seizing windows of opportunities to build peace. This has been achieved through giving us flexibility in project implementation to take projects in the relevant direction and make the most of opportunities according to the contextual needs. Nonetheless, as an instrument, considering the slow timeframes for approving projects and the bureaucratic nature of decision-making, the instruments' current format is not conducive to supporting crisis response and seizing windows of opportunity, particularly as funding is only for a maximum of 18 months.

To better work on crisis response, address global threats to peace and seize windows of opportunities to build peace, the IcSP needs to be better coordinated with other funding streams and instruments. Currently there is a lack of strategic oversight and complementarity between the EU's thematic and geographic instruments e.g., DCI, ENI, IPAI, EIDHR, EDF and EUTFs. This limits the instrument's effectiveness and can sustainability. There is also a need for other instruments to better mainstream conflict sensitivity, with IcSP playing a role as technical consultant.

The IcSP is effective in addressing crisis response but could be expanded to seize windows of opportunities to build peace in the longer-term. By expanding the conflict prevention component and thinking of ways to mainstream conflict prevention throughout all EFIs the instrument could be even more effective.

Yes but the IcSP has to improve some content of its work, like for example a better contextual and conflict analysis.

7. Separate written contributions:

Ces dernières années, l'IcSP a permis de répondre à des problématiques nouvelles, comme l'appui à la prévention et à la lutte contre la radicalisation. Si l'IcSP n'a pas vocation à « construire la paix », il vise en revanche à favoriser les conditions permettant la stabilisation et la paix.

Par ailleurs, « l'IcSP plus » qui intégrera le concept CBSD (dans l'attente de la création d'un instrument dédié à l'horizon 2020), devra être l'occasion d'élargir, de manière ambitieuse, les projets de l'IcSP vers un soutien plus direct aux forces de sécurité des pays partenaires.

Analysis of results by the external evaluation team

This question was relatively broad; and hence there is variation in responses – with several non-applicable ones. Among those responses that looked specifically at the balance between crisis response (reactive) and seizing windows of opportunity for peace (pro-active), almost 60% felt that this balance was struck adequately or well – but not very well.

An important pre-condition for such a balance to be struck is effective context and conflict analysis; better coordination with other EFIs; continued flexibility in allowing implementing partners to adjust to contexts; and continued to work ensure speedy decision-making. There is also a recommendation to re-establish a PAMPF like facility within the IcSP.

Again, the comment on the integration of CBSD was found to be beyond the scope of the IcSP MTE. All other elements remain and have been brought forward by the evaluation team in the revised IcSP report.

3.3 Question 3: IcSP and Civil Society/ International Organisations

To what extent have the means provided by the IcSP to-date proven effective in strengthening civil society and international organisations in their capacity to contribute to global peace and security?

8. *Summary of quantitative results*

Total no. of replies	1 – Poorly	2 – Adequately	3 – Well	4 – Very well	N/A
27	3	4	7	2	11

9. *Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions)*

10. *On-line survey feedback*

As has come out of the draft mid-term review report (Landell Mills, January 2017), strengthened capacities at the regional level (e.g. OECD, OSCE, and League of Arab States) offers the EU important leverage, which in itself is an impact. The report also states that support under Article 4 to regional and UN agencies (such as UN WOMEN, UNDP and UNDP) is seen as a useful contribution to the global peace and security architecture.

Strengthening these partnerships and supporting actors at all levels will contribute to international peace and security as root causes of conflict can be local, regional or global and therefore should be addressed in such a way. Ensuring that this support is non-military and supports long-term solutions to conflict will ensure the EU places itself as a strategic ally for the long-term.

IcSP provides important opportunities to civil society and international organisations to contribute to global peace and security. Nevertheless, many funds seem to go directly to international organisations, like the UN, without giving opportunities to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to apply for certain calls for proposals. In addition, given the complex nature of EC calls and proposals, it is quite difficult for local NGOs to apply for funding.

Under the IcSP, assistance to CSO has been and will be critical. While IOs can also access other programs, particularly geographic programs, support to CSO, both national and international is paramount in the midst of funding reduction at national European level, stigmatisation of CSO globally, and systematic threats to fundamental values and rights.

The IcSP has proven effective in enabling the requisite relationship between local civil society and international organisations, for example by enabling us lead on capacity building of local organisations by providing accompaniment, exposure and mentoring to local partner organisations, in some cases allowing us to award small grants to reach out to and build the

capacities of local organisations, and by supporting a flexible approach throughout projects (such as allowing minimal visibility of the EU's support to projects which can be difficult in more sensitive contexts and providing training opportunities to civil society and international organisations). This process of skills and capacity building is key if we are to empower local civil society to lead on peacebuilding and crisis prevention efforts themselves. In a global context of increased conflict more funding is undoubtedly needed to contribute to peace and security, particularly as ICSP's budget is approximately 10% of DCI's for example. Extending the maximum grant period from 18 months to 3 years would make the instrument more effective in achieving impact and results.

Prior to the IfS and IcSP there were very few dedicated EU resources available to civil society and international organisations to respond to challenges of global peace and security and these were complicated to access. The IfS and IcSP have significantly increased the resources available, the focus of these resources and these resources have facilitated dialogue and joint working. Despite the relatively small amounts (compared to other instruments) involved to civil society organisations and certain specialized units of international organisations the IcSP is a very important tool to enable response. Even though international organisations and civil society have additional EU resources from other EFIs to work on conflict issues, the benefit of IcSP is the focus on development of capacity and the specific direction on global peace and security (rather than on humanitarian or development response). The necessity for the EU to support the long-term development of capacity and thinking of international organisations and civil society is particularly important as instruments of other donors are increasingly focused on short-term crises responses. An appropriate balance not deviating significantly from the current split should be kept between the longer and short term aspects of the IcSP as both are important and complement each other.

11. Written contributions

Le renforcement de la résilience des acteurs de la société civile est un facteur clé pour la paix et la stabilité. Des projets intéressants ont été mis en oeuvre pour renforcer les capacités des communautés à lutter contre les logiques de radicalisation. Il importe toutefois de pouvoir faire régulièrement le bilan des programmes financés, afin d'en tirer des enseignements pour l'avenir.

Outre le renforcement nécessaire des acteurs de la société civile et des organisations internationales, il importe de réfléchir à une meilleure visibilité de l'aide européenne dans le secteur de la paix et de la sécurité et de faire valoir la valeur ajoutée de l'expertise européenne en ayant recours aux agences des Etats membres et en faisant appel aux modalités existantes et futures de mise en œuvre conjointe.

Analysis of results by the external evaluation team

There is a spread among respondents on how well the IcSP has strengthened civil society and international organisations (the 'global peace and security architecture'). Continued work on this is encouraged, but respondents call for greater investments in this kind of support. There are concerns that the balance is currently tilted towards international organisations (UN and the like) at the expense of civil society organisations. Respondents confirm that the IcSP is an important source of funding for organisations working in this sector.

The evaluation team finds that a recommendation to set up a specific fund within Article 4 for core funding to civil society organisations should be considered.

3.4 Question 4: Human Rights Challenges

Responding to security concerns that affect both third countries and the EU may imply

working with authorities whose human rights approach can be challenged. Funding support to them, even after due precautions have been taken, implies certain risks. Can the EU still add value in such circumstances by the ICSP being more proactively engaged in sectors such as counter-terrorism, organised crime, and cybersecurity or should the IcSP rather limit its engagement? Please give reasons for your views.

12. *Summary of quantitative results*

Total no. of replies	1 – Don't Engage	2 – Limited Engagement	3 – Engagement – but Do no Harm	4 – Engage	N/A
26	2	5	11	4	4

13. *Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions)*

14. *Online Survey feedback*

La UE puede tener un importantísimo valor añadido en el caso de Colombia para combatir el paramilitarismo. La Unión debe ser capaz de comprometer al Estado colombiano en esta lucha y de hacer un seguimiento cercano a sus recursos desembolsados para esta tarea con el objetivo de evitar su despilfarro, su utilización para otros asuntos o su pérdida fruto de la corrupción o de la presunta complicidad de funcionarios estatales con grupos paramilitares. Por tanto, la condicionalidad de la ayuda del instrumento por parte de la UE debe ser fuerte y dirigirse a favorecer una paz verdadera y sostenible en Colombia.

A Government that is guilty of crimes against humanity and / or human rights should not benefit from the financial support of the EU or the EU risks making itself guilty of these actions by extension. However, the population that is the victim of such crimes and abuse should benefit from EU support; thus, alternative channels of support should be sought, be it through support to local civil society, international NGOs on the ground or a regional organisation that is better placed than the EU to push for policies or activities that protect civilians and prevent human rights violations. The IcSP therefore has a role to play in such circumstances through its ability to work with alternative actors. However, thorough analysis of the situation and assessing who to partner and work with and through which tool and methodology should be sought in advance of any action.

The strength of the EU is its support of norms and values. Art. 21 TEU subordinate all EU external actions to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, equality, solidarity and compliance with the UN Charter and international law. Also IcSP is subject to these standards. However, bearing in mind the dynamic changes in international security and the emergence of new threats, as well as the growing interdependence of development and security issues, we see the need for realistic EU attitudes and the adaptation of EU instruments based on conditionality to improve the speed and effectiveness of EU support and action. [...] When it comes to security, a sober, pragmatic assessment of the protection of the EU interest should be a factor as important in the decision-making process as the issue of human rights.

The problem with programmes that are designed to ‘counter terrorism’ or ‘violent extremism’, or to ‘fight’ organised crime is that they risk leading to crucial drivers of conflict being overlooked. Specifically, given the nature of these security challenges, the EU may look to build the capacity of governments regardless of whether they are responsible for creating or failing to address the conditions that have led to insecurity or instability in the first place.

However, such programmes may very well backfire if all relevant drivers of violence are not addressed, such as abuse and corrupt practices committed by the security sector. It is dangerous for the EU to be building states' coercive capacities in the absence of commitment for reform or space for public engagement. In addition, it is counter-productive to support civil society on the one hand, while providing repressive and abusive regimes with a cloak of international legitimacy at a time when more scrutiny on their domestic policies is needed. These blind spots risk in turn allowing grievances to fester, violence to grow and conflicts to escalate.

E' importante non restringere il campo di azione, trattandosi di problematiche complesse a cui concorrono vari e diversi fattori

Crisis prevention and stabilization by necessity require international actors to work with governments and non-state actors who do not necessarily live up to the EU's high standards regarding democracy and human rights. While due diligence needs to be applied the IcSP's flexibility and responsiveness must be maintained. High risk tolerance is an essential ingredient for any instrument that is meant to contribute to stabilization.

The IcSP should apply a strict a Rights Based Approach in supporting themes and countries related to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. In the current deteriorating situations, where human rights and democracy are systematically challenged, the IcSP should ensure a consistent respect of the EU fundamental values in its programming and actions.

The EU IcSP instrument would benefit from maintaining a more exclusive focus on human security and peace, and civil society capacity building, and avoid working on militarised approaches to security and stability, which could undermine the instrument's objectives and credibility. The EU should maintain its independence vis-à-vis authorities whose human rights approach can be challenged, and working with such authorities should occur within an ethical framework which recognises the importance of respect for human rights in order to support stability and peace.

A cautious approach is necessary vis-à-vis countries with poor human rights records. However IcSP has been created to address also difficult cases, when potential benefits are substantial, but associated with higher risks of not attaining the intended results. It goes without saying that those human rights deficits are addressed when working with such authorities.

IcSP should be an instrument where a degree of risk is taken in engaging relevant actors who may not share EU values or to support engagement with authorities or armed groups that may be crucial to peace processes or addressing human rights abuses. A robust 'conflict sensitive approach' when applied should assist in making appropriate decisions throughout the implementation process on whether that risk is worth taking and whether this risk is being effectively managed. Such initiatives often also need to be complemented by a robust political dialogue beyond the level of the EU institutions and also involving the EU member states with particular leverage. There also have to be a level of overall coherence between IcSP actions and those of other instruments and political dialogues where there is a high risk of human rights abuses.

Peace and security landscape is fast evolving and characterized by nearly emerged threats and trends that challenge increasingly weakened global governance structures and cooperative regional orders. It's important for the instrument to find the right balance between non-securitised and securitised actions/programmes in its contribution to EU security priorities and global commitments. We think that IcSP shouldn't rather limit its engagement: but the design of its actions and programmes need to be revisited.

15. *Written contributions*

L'ICSP s'insère dans une action extérieure de l'UE qui articule projets concrets de soutien, de formation ou de renforcement de capacités et dialogues politiques. Il doit intervenir le plus souvent possible en complément ou en soutien des autres actions de l'UE, y compris sur les sujets liés au crime-organisé, à la cybersécurité. C'est également le cas pour ce qui relève des mesures de soutien dans le domaine du contre-terrorisme : elles s'insèrent dans un cadre de coopération qui comporte un volet de dialogue technique et politique. Elles déclinent, dans le champ opérationnel, les orientations qui sont prises au niveau politique, dans le respect des valeurs défendues par l'Union. Dans ces conditions, le risque que prend l'IcSP est implicitement accepté par l'Union au nom des nécessités de la gestion de crise.

Analysis of results by the external evaluation team

The evaluators note that the topic of managing tensions between human rights commitments and engagement with countries that have a challenged human rights record received a number of comments. Overall, there is a sense among respondents that engagement on security issues in human rights challenged contexts should take place, but that there need to have safeguards in place (42%). 15% of respondents saw no need for safeguards; while 26% called for limited or no IcSP engagement in such contexts. The evaluators have opted for a line of IcSP engagement on security issues in human rights challenged context, but with safeguards.

3.5 Question 5: Dialogue between IcSP and other donors

Do you think that the focus of dialogues between the IcSP and other relevant donors has been appropriate to improve the global donor approach to stability and peace? Please give reasons for your views and/or suggestions.

16. *Summary of quantitative results*

Total replies	no. of	1 – Not effective	2 – Appropriate	3 – Effective	N/A
19		2	6	1	10

17. *Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions)*

18. *Online survey feedback*

We agree with the assessment by the authors of the IcSP evaluation report that the issue of contributing to stability and peace is a field for more intense and strategic cooperation with other global actors / donors. This should help to better communicate the EU's priorities and increase the visibility of EU support, as well as to multiply funding and better disseminate funds to fight threats to international peace and security.

The dialogue among donors has been effective to a certain extent. Coordination however should not preclude the possibility of providing funding to issues which might have been or are being already supported by another donor.

In some contexts where we work, the impact of the IcSP's dialogues with other relevant donors has contributed little to improving the regional donor approach to stability and peace. Nonetheless, this is also due to the constraints of bilateral donors / governments, which are not willing to take risks vis-à-vis working on particular contexts (and potentially

compromising relations with governments).

There is a need for improved coordination between the multitude of actors working to address peace and security issues, particularly at national level.

Analysis of results by the external evaluation team

Most respondents understood this question as a call for greater donor coordination; rather than a question about IcSP engagement at a global level on systemic peace and security challenges. Those who did interpret the question as intended supported such a greater role for the IcSP. Many respondents saw deficits at the level of in-country coordination. The evaluation team has nuanced the final report to call for IcSP strategic engagement with other funds on systemic peace and security challenges.

3.6 Final Question - Other views on the IcSP

If you have any other views on the IcSP you would like to share, they are welcome here.

19. *Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions)*

30 submissions were received on this question.

20. *Contributions*

There are limited sources of funding for mediation and conflict prevention, and the IcSP is, for the work that HD carries out, an essential and unique funding partner. (note 1: that the multilateral nature of the EU makes an EC instrument more accepted with parties to conflict) (note 2 on scale: there is more that needs to be done to seize windows of opportunity and developments such as with hybrid threats and the increasing complexity of conflicts and peace processes)

Several recommendations in the report point to sensible actions concerning concept definitions and M&E: ‘Require explicit theories of change...’ and ‘discourage over-ambitious metrics’

We also refer to the transfer of funds from ENI to IcSP. In our opinion, there is a risk that such actions may contribute indirectly to the compromise agreed by the compromise on the financing of the Eastern and Southern Neighborhood dimension and redirecting a large proportion of the Eastern funds to the Southern programs

We understand that under the proposal, EU assistance is not to be used to finance recurrent military expenditure, the procurement of arms and ammunitions, or training to improve the fighting capacity of armed forces. However, we urge the EC to continue supporting long-term peace-building efforts *stricto sensu*. It should also closely monitor how this new CBSD component will work in practice and ensure that CSOs are engaged in this exercise.

We would generally urge the EU to take into account the following recommendations:

Ensure the security-development nexus is always based on human and not state security.

Short-term and especially securitised approaches aimed simply at stemming immediate forced displacement may siphon resources from, and even harm, the long-term investment in peace and development necessary to reduce fragility and mitigate against drivers of conflict.

Prioritize long-term conflict-sensitive development and peace-building interventions. Economic resilience, social cohesion and peaceful conflict resolution are mutually reinforceable and together can address the root causes of conflict and instability.

Do not use ODA in support of military or quasi-military expenditures, or channel aid through military actors. Any misuse of aid in this area can have extremely serious consequences, both for affected people in recipient countries, but also for the credibility and public support for ODA.

La paix n'est plus seulement une question interétatique, mais un enjeu à l'échelle des territoires, notamment des territoires urbains.

The IcSP like other EFIs has to represent a balance between narrow short-term EU interests and longer-term values led actions. Yet an increased 'securitisation' to more narrow short-term EU security interests to fund engagements that are unproven in terms of impact risks undermining not only EU values by the past success of the instrument.

The evaluation should focus on how to make our external action more effective, pragmatic and coherent in the remaining part of the funding period, with more emphasis on evaluation of results of our external action. Evaluation should take into account the evolving EU policy framework, notably the implementation of the Global Strategy that sets out EU's strategic objectives. Thus mid-term and long-term future of External Financing Instruments should complement and be coherent with those goals, e.g. strengthening resilience, strategic communication, internal and external security of the EU, assist in stabilization of EU's immediate neighbourhood and regions in EU's close vicinity (neighbours of our neighbours), and rise the EU visibility in this context.

Analysis of results by the external evaluation team

The evaluation team notes concerns among some respondents related to securitised actions and programmes. These concerns are reflected in the final report; however, the evaluators see a need for the IcSP to engage in securitised sectors, albeit with adequate safeguards. Another area of controversy is around the CBSD, which is not in the scope of the MTE. There is some resistance to the transfer of funds from ENI to the IcSP; this has been noted and addressed in the final recommendations.

The targeted meetings

4.1 Session with CSOs and Implementing Agencies (21 March 2017)

The merits of flexibility, velocity and context sensitivity of this instrument was overwhelmingly praised by the audience; any measure of change in the future should be checked in as much it might have repercussions of these advantage (that goes in particular for the set-up of an overall strategic framework).

Many echoed the finding that coherence and coordination could be improved, and so is the visibility and 'marketing' that the Commission could or should do, especially implementing agencies have the feeling that results achieved at project level are not communicated widely.

The role of the IcSP for opening doors (esp. Article 3) and seizing windows of opportunity should not be underestimated, it is in fact often a unique opportunity for the Commission to enter into political dialogue with state (and non-state) actors - this can be considered as substantial leverage.

There was a call for improved interaction with CSDP mission, recognising at the same time the differences in scope and mandate.

With regard to funding activities involving military organisations under certain conditions, the tone was essentially along the lines of: not whether or not the EU/IcSP should engage with military/security forces, but how.

The CSO voiced their particular appreciation of the fact that IcSP is funded by a multi-lateral body, which helps with acceptance and adds political weight, as it would be perceived much more neutral than programmes funded by bilateral institutions (often perceived as following the political interest of the funding agent).

The IcSP is seen as very important as it enables space for CSO to engage in times where this space is shrinking.

They also emphasized the value of the direct contracting option under the IcSP. In addition, there were calls for "something like the PAMF" but with a sound legal basis.

4.2 The Policy Forum on Development (PFD) conference (23 March 2017)

The PFD was broadly representative of regional and some national CSO of beneficiary countries on a fairly global basis, with representatives from Africa, South East and Eastern Asia including the Pacific, South America, Eastern and South-eastern Europe, the Middle East and maybe other regions. The session on the MTE of all EFIs was held on the last day of the forum, and although cast as a feedback session to the evaluators was mostly an exercise of sharing information about the different MTEs, raising general issues, and for the CSO present to get feedback from the Commission about process issues concerning the OPC process (calendar, feedback opportunities etc.).

There was one specific question addressed to the IcSP, which related to the support for local CSO in Colombia during and after the peace negotiations between the government and the FARC. The other points brought up in the discussions were often addressed to the other EFI evaluation teams, some noteworthy, more general comments applying for the IcSP as well are given below:

More emphasis should be placed by the Commission/donors on gender equality issues and the role of women (relevant to crisis mitigation, confidence building and post-crisis stabilisation)

More emphasis on decentralising power and developing local infrastructure (relevant to IcSP work on such issues as migration and CVE, and also crisis mitigation and stabilisation); a related question was whether there should be a clearer separation between political actions and development actions - that may be of some relevance with regard to how do-no-harm is applied

A strong call for coherence in EU interventions across the board - the point was made with reference to human rights but it is also relevant amongst others to work in securitised sectors

A suggestion that there should be a dedicated envelope for CSO support in the instruments to support local CSO (including those lacking capacity or experience in dealing with EU admin requirements; also a suggestion to allocate some funding for larger, international NGOs in the hope that this will trickle down to local CSO and help them deal with EU admin requirements - something like this is done in Georgia under Art. 3)

The EU as a "safe haven" with regard to funding for CSO in areas where a principled approach is called for

More attention to the impact of climate change on such issues as migration, and a call that development funding in this respect should also be available to CSO (as a side remark, the

Art. 5 funding on security challenges of climate change goes to UNEP and is thus likely to end up funding, at least initially, predominantly government actors)

Evidence for development additionality, and in more general terms what should be the role of the private sector, of investment institutions, blending etc. - it was discussed in the context of human rights issues

4.3 Public Session with Member State and European Parliament Officials (27 and 28 March 2017)

1. Comments made

Importance of linkage between ICSP and human rights/gender and stronger links with EIDHR was stressed. The level of integration between the African Peace Facility (APF) and IcSP and their relationship for establishing the peace and security architecture was questioned.

The IcSP and DCI are welcomed to support the transition of a presence of the EU (politically/SSR) in Afghanistan.

The IcSP is appreciated because of its flexibility and the manner in which the three Articles complement one another.

The idea to reinforce the ICSP and its short term measures is supported.

The IcSP should contextualise its work more closely with political parallels in some areas of its work. Emphasis of the need for a stabilisation/resilience building narrative, based on a common identification of drivers of conflict in country, which should be built into the instrument.

There is a key need for stronger and closer linkages with the other instruments, which can then come in with a longer term approach.

It would be useful to better define the IcSP framework in relation to other instruments to avoid overlapping (CS support etc).

Provision of the example of the Turkish Facility for Refugees highlights that there could be synergies for the IcSP to be complementary but not part of other instruments.

It would be better to involve more Member States and MS embassies and encourage their contribution to the design of IcSP projects in country.

A number of comments provided on the need for more cooperation on the ground with Member States.

A legislative procedure for IcSP is to be achieved as soon as possible – in order to elaborate on the projects to be implemented in the field of actions for reinforcing military actors in third countries

2. Questions raised

In relation to the second recommendation question of the MTE, what would the stronger political focus for the future IcSP entail?

Intervention are mainly triggered by EUD's, is this the most effective way to use the instrument or would it be better to involve the MS embassies to a greater level on the ground?

Clarification on the selection of implementing partners for IcSP, including private sector countries and UN contractors. Are they the most effective?

Question raised as to how the APF and IcSP could be brought closer together? Also raised the question of synergies between other approaches, including CFSF, APSA etc.

Given the changing global context and the particular growth of hybrid conflicts, should the IcSP grow/change? What does the post nature of the instrument look like?

Could the double purpose/proposal of the ICSP long term and short term approaches be a problem – is this difficult to manage?

Should the IcSP consider a different direction now that the Trust Funds can react as fast or even faster than the IcSP?

Can the coordination with Embassies and Delegations on the ground be increased and made more transparent in terms of design/implementing partners?

Additional Comments submitted in written

From the above mentioned three organisations' written comments, the evaluation team notes the following:

Calls from all submitters for the continuation of the IcSP beyond 2020 and appreciation of its increased relevance

The need for greater coordination with Member States and other EFIs reiterated by governmental submitters (UK and France), including on expertise sharing and forward planning on key topics (migration, etc.).

Continued alignment and responsiveness of IcSP actions and programmes to EU strategies and policies (e.g. Global Strategy)

A pragmatic approach in rights-challenged contexts to build into actions and programmes adequate safeguards (do no harm and conflict sensitivity)

Support to the CBSD reiterated by governmental submitters

Articulation of principles to guide IcSP actions and principles (e.g. “a comprehensive approach”, greater attention to building resilience, etc.)

The need for continued learning to inform IcSP actions and programmes, particularly through the implementation of conflict analysis exercises

Consolidated analysis of the external evaluation team on the consultation

The evaluation team welcomed the wealth of feedback and questions received during the face to face meetings during public presentations. The team noted:

Calls for greater IcSP coordination with Member States and other EFIs

Affirmation of the value added of the IcSP when it comes to its speed, flexibility, multilateral nature, and promotion of EU values

Calls for a greater IcSP role in addressing global funding cuts for peace and security at the same time, an overarching strategic framework appears especially suited for the programmable actions under Articles 4 and 5

Greater need for a bolstered analytical base of IcSP funded interventions; including more strategic thinking on the implications of hybrid conflicts on IcSP actions/programmes

Better articulation of how to integrate conflict-sensitivity and do no harm approaches in actions and programmes that can have negative knock-on effects on cross-cutting priorities

The definition and concept of hybrid threat (as opposed to hybrid conflict) should be sharpened in the report

Calls for better mainstreaming of EU cross-cutting priorities within the IcSP; particularly gender and climate change

The team has reflected calls for better coordination with Member States and EFIs in the revised report, and adjusted the recommendations to be more manageable for implementation. This has meant, for example, not re-iterating in recommendations areas of work where progress is being made (e.g. mainstreaming cross-cutting priorities) and the provision of practical recommendations on measures to strengthen the value added of the instrument (e.g. the re-creation of a PAMF like facility for the IcSP). Comments related to the CBSD, however, remain outside of the scope of this MTE – and should be included in the Final IcSP evaluation instead.

OPC List of Participants and Contributing Organisations

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Chan Sotheavuth	Cambodia
Jürgen Krone, DBE Technology GmbH	Germany
Democratic Youth Foundation - DYF	Yemen
Oficina Internacional de Derechos Humanos - Acción Colombia	Belgium
Alexandru Osadci, Congress of Local Authorities from Moldova (CALM)	Republic of Moldova
LOKMIS	Lithuania
Flanders Department of Foreign Affairs	Belgium
Global Water Partnership Central and Eastern Europe	Slovakia
Union des Communes du Togo	Togo
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Debbie Ball - International Alert	United Kingdom
Katarzyna Rozeslaniec, EU Economic Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland	Poland
Saferworld	London
Ministry of Public Sector Development	Jordan
European Network of Political Foundations	Brussels

Colombe blanche pour les droits de Personnes en situation de handicap au Maroc	Maroc
Crisis Management Initiative	Finland
CEFA Onlus	Italy
Minister of Finance & Planning	Palestine
WWF European Policy Office	Belgium
Paola Amadei, Executive Director on behalf of EU-LAC Foundation	Germany
EUNIC Global	Belgium
The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation	Sweden
State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate	Lithuania
Dania Tondini, AVSI Foundation	Italy
GRS Global Research for Safety	Germany
Life & Peace Institute	Sweden
European University Association	Belgium
ENCO	Austria
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark	Denmark
Red Cross EU Office	Belgium
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Sweden
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Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development	Germany
Platforma	Belgium
Migrations & Développement	France
European Partnership for Democracy	Belgium
Flanders Investment & Trade	Belgium
Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN)	France
International Disability and Development Consortium (IDDC)	Belgium

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International Co-operative Alliance Africa (The Alliance Africa)	Kenya
CARE International	Belgium
AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD)	Belgium
Organización Nacional de Ciegos Españoles (ONCE)	España
International Trade Union Confederation-Trade Union Development Cooperation Network (ITUC-TUDCN)	Belgium
Conciliation Resources	United Kingdom
European Technical Safety Organizations Network (ETSON)	France
Dana Tjurina, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia	Latvia
AREVA	France
Arab NGO Network for Development	Lebanon
DSW	Belgium
NGO Monitor	Israel
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland	Finland
Andrea Bianchessi	Kenya
The Finnish NGDO Platform to the EU	Finland
Régions de France	France
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia	Latvia
Italian Agency for Development and Cooperation - Tirana Officer	Italy
Front Line Defenders	Ireland
European Federation of Engineering Consultancy Associations	Belgium

(EFCA)	
Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Calédonie - Service de la coopération régionale et des relations extérieures	Nouvelle-Calédonie
Austrian Federal MFA - Departments for European Development Cooperation and Southern Neighbourhood Policy	Austria
World Vision	Belgium
United Cities and Local Governments Middle East and West Asia section (UCLG-MEWA)	Turkey
British Council	London/Brussels
Fern	UK
International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims	Denmark
International Fund for Animal Welfare	Belgium
Kingdom of Belgium	Belgium
Ines	Belgium
Susan Bassett	United Kingdom
More Europe - external cultural relations	Belgium
Search for Common Ground	Belgium
Institut de Recherche pour le Développement -IRD-	France
World Vision	Belgium
World Bank Group	USA
Maeve McLynn, Climate Action Network Europe	Belgium
AVSI Brasil	Brazil

Participation in OPC events organised in Brussels (March 2017)

Country/ Institution/ Organisation	Name of Representative (if known)
Austria	MS representative
Belgium	MS representative
British Council	Axelle Basselet/Krzysz Jurek

Center for Humanitarian Dialogue	Chris Rotas
Crown Agents	James Blair
DFID (UK)	
Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF)	Silvia Laufer
EPLO	Ben Moore/Susan Wander
EUNIDA	Viv Davies
Expertise France	Anne Budai/Benjamin Hauville/Claire Lautier
FIIAAP	Cecilia Castillo
Finland	MS representative
Greece	MS representative
International Center for Transitional Justice	Santa Falasca
International Alert	Debbie Ball
International Organisation for Migration (IOM)	Jo De Backer
Romania	MS representative
RUSI	Andrew Glazard
Safer World	Kloé Tricot O'Farell
SCJS	Gary Linton/Nicholas Apps
Search for Common Ground	Fien de Baere
Spain	MS representative
UNESCO	Jan De Bisschop
UN Liaison Office	Tanya Baghy (DPA)
UN Women	Laurence Gillois/Astrid Pertuisel
UNICRI	Ludovic Dhoore
World Vision	Alexandra Matei/Pamela Thiebaut

Annex 3. Acronyms

AAP	Annual Action Programme(s)
AU	African Union
CAR	Central Africa Republic
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CC	Council Conclusion(s)
CfP	Call for Proposals
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CI	Critical Infrastructure
CIR	Common Implementing Regulation
CoE	Centre(s) of Excellence
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CSDN	Civil Society Dialogue Network
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civil Society Organisation(s)
CT	Counter-Terrorism
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Co-operation and Development
DG	Directorate General
DG ECHO Operations	Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid
DG HOME	Directorate-General Migration and Home Affairs
DG NEAR	Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
DG SANTE	Directorate-General Health and Food Safety
EC	European Commission
EAM	Exceptional Assistance Measure
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EFI	External Financing Instrument(s)
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENTRi	Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management

EP	European Parliament
EPLO	European Peace-building Liaison Office
EQ	Evaluation Question(s)
ERMES	European Resources for Mediation Support
ESF	European Security Fund
EU	European Union
EUCAP	European Conference on Antennas and Propagation
EUD	EU Delegation(s)
EUPST	European Union Police Services Training Programme
EUROPOL	European Police Office
EUTF	European Union Trust Fund
EUTM	European Training Mission
FARC	The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army
FD	Financial Decision
FPI	Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
FWC	Framework Contract
HQ	Headquarters
HR	High Representative
IA	Impact Assessment
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IfS	Instrument for Stability
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation(s)
IO	International Organisation(s)
IP	Implementing Partner(s)
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IRP	Interim Response Programme(s)
ISTC	International Science and Technology Centre
JC	Judgement Criterion/Criteria
KII	Key Informant Interview(s)
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme(s)
MS	Member State(s)
MSU	Mediation Support Unit
MTE	Midterm Evaluation
NAP	National Action Plan
NAQ	Needs Assessment Questionnaire

NFP	National Focal Point(s)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation(s)
NT	National Team
OC	Organised Crime
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPC	Open Public Consultation
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAMF	Policy Advice, Technical Assistance, Mediation, Reconciliation and Other Areas of Assistance
PBP	Peace-Building Partnership
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
PCNA	Post-conflict needs assessment
PDNA	Post-disaster needs assessment
PI	Partnership Instrument
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STCU	The Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine
STGs	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
SWD	Staff Working Document
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TOC	Theory of Change
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNSC Res	United Nations Security Council Regulation
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNICRI	United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
VP	Vice President
WHO	World Health Organization

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPS Women Peace and Security

Annex 4. External Evaluation report