Independent Evaluation of EU Budget Support in Cambodia (2011 - 2016)

Final Evaluation Report – Volume 2 Annexes

June 2018

International Cooperation and Development

This report has been prepared by:

Consortium composed of:

DAI, Mokoro, GEOtest, ICF International, HCL, Technopolis, Europe Limited, ETI Consulting

Leader of the Consortium: DAI

Contact Person: Francesca Giordano

Team members:

Alta Fölscher (team leader) (Mokoro)
Ann Bartholomew (Mokoro)
John Patch (Mokoro)
Thanarak Ang (Mokoro)

FWC COM 2015

EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/
Multi Specific Contract
No°2016/380451

Independent Evaluation of EU Budget Support in Cambodia (2011 – 2016)

This evaluation was commissioned by the Evaluation Unit of the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (European Commission)

This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication represent the views of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.

(175008)

Cover picture credits: Charles Pieters and Douglas Jones Jr

CONTENTS

List of tables

List of boxes

List of figures

List of Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AOP	Annual Operation Plan
BS	Budget Support
BSP	Budget Support Programme
CAR	Council for Administrative Reform
CBI	Core Breakthrough Indicator
CDC	Council for Development of Cambodia
CDPF	Capacity Development Partnership Fund
CDRI	Cambodia Development Resource Institute
CFS	Child Friendly Schools
D&D	Decentralisation and Deconcentration
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DG DEVCO	EU Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development in Brussels
DGPP	Directorate General of Policy and Planning
DHS	Demographic Health Survey
DOE	District Office of Education
DP	Development Partner
DTMT	District Training and Monitoring Teams
EC	European Commission
ECCD	Early Childhood Care and Development
ECD	Early Childhood Development
ECE	Early Childhood Education
EEAS	European External Action Service
EGRA	Early Grade Reading Assessment
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EQ	Evaluation Question
EQAD	Education Quality Assurance Department
ESP	Education Strategic Plan
ESPSP	Education Sector Policy Support Programme
ESRP	Education Sector Reform Partnership
ESWG	Education Sector Working Group
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
EUR	Euro
FA	Financing Agreement
FMIS	Financial Management Information System
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GBS	General Budget Support
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross enrolment ratio
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
ITS	Interrupted time series
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JTWG	Joint Technical Working Group
LSCR	Lower Secondary Completion Rate
MDG	Millennium Development Goal

MIP	Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes
MLE	Multilingual education
MoEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MoEYS	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport
MoP	Ministry of Planning
NA	Not Applicable
NEP	NGO Education Partnership
NER	Net enrolment ratio
NFE	Non-Formal Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSDP	National Strategic Development Plan
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAF	Performance Assessment Framework
PB	Programme Budgeting
PBB	Programme-Based Budgeting
PCR	Primary Completion Rate
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PFM	Public Financial Management
PFMRP	Public Financial Management Reform Programme
PMC	Programme Management Committee
POE	Provincial Office of Education
PTR	Pupil -Teacher Ratio
RGoC	Royal Government of Cambodia
RtK	Right to Know
SBS	Sector Budget Support
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SIG	School Improvement Grant
SOB	School Operating Budget
SPRS	Staff Performance Review System
SSC	School Support Committee
TA	Technical Assistance
TOR	Terms of Reference
TPAP	Teacher Policy Action Plan
TTC	Teacher Training College
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund (formerly United Nations Fund for Population Activities)
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States dollar
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Health
WB	World Bank

Annex 1 Terms of Reference

1 MANDATE AND GENERIC OBJECTIVES

The main purposes of this evaluation is to provide evidence on the extent to which budget support operations in Cambodia have contributed to accelerate progress towards Government's goals within a specific policy and sector, the achievement of the objectives set out in the corresponding Financing Agreements (FA) and how they contributed to the general objectives of EU budget support[1].

The generic purpose of the evaluation is:

- to identify key lessons and to produce recommendations to improve current and inform on future budget support operations in Cambodia,
- to provide an overall independent assessment of budget support operations in Cambodia over the period 2011-2016.

2 EVALUATION RATIONALE AND SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

The specific rationale for undertaking this evaluation is to assess to what extent budget support in Cambodia contributed to achieve its expected results, notably through giving means to the partner government to implement the country's Education Sector Policy, and to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of policies, strategies and spending actions, thus contributing to sustainable results on growth and poverty reduction.

The evaluation should also analyse how budget support has contributed to strengthening Public Financial Management (PFM), to improving transparency within government and accountability.

The evaluation will also consider other aid modalities (basket/common funds, projects), in order to assess the complementarity and synergies with budget support operations. It should look into Monitoring and Evaluation systems (M&E) and the availability and credibility of data.

The evaluation will take stock of what has been achieved with the main purpose to allow for lessons learnt and recommendations to inform on:

- the conditions under which budget support has an effect and the possible intensity and nature (positive or negative) of such effect in Cambodia;
- the design and implementation of future budget support operations in Cambodia;
- improvements to be set up by the European Union to maximize the impact of budget support in Cambodia;
- constraints in government policies, institutional structures and administrative arrangements in Cambodia which might impede the overall effectiveness and impact on spending actions and targeted public policy, and therefore of budget support.

3 BACKGROUND

Cambodia's economic growth has been one of the fastest among Asia's developing economies in recent years. It averaged 7.0% in the last five years driven by garment exports, real estate and

[1] COM (2011)637 and European Commission, "Budget Support guidelines", Tools and Methods series, September 2012

construction. Poverty levels are projected to fall. As of 2012, the poverty headcount rate was 17.7%, almost 3 percentage points lower than in 2011. GDP per capita has increased to USD 1,228 in 2015. Gini index in Cambodia has steadily decreased until 30.8 in 2012.

Nevertheless, the standard of living in rural areas is expected to remain unchanged in the short run. Comparable consumption growth for both poor and better off households is anticipated, leaving inequality unchanged for the most part.

In 2015, ODA disbursements in Cambodia accounted for 1.34 billion, of which 83% was provided by Development Partners (DPs) funds and 17% from NGO core funds. This represents a decrease of 7% compared to 2014, probably due to Cambodia qualifying as low-mid income country. Five major development partners (China, Japan, ADB, USA and Republic of Korea) accounted for 60% of the total. European partners together provided 13% of all ODA in 2015

Long term trends indicates that the ODA/GDP ratio has decreased from 11% in 2012 to 7.4% in 2015, as GDP growth has begun to outstrip the rate of ODA increase. ODA per capita (2011-2015) has averaged around USD 97 annually. However, aid/GDP ratio been maintaining the downwards trend since 2005 when it fell below 10%. Hence, as Cambodia moves towards middle-income status, aid dependency will likely be reduced as ODA's relative share of financing national development declines
even as actual volumes of aid may be broadly unchanged.

Chart 1. Disbursements and projections 2007-2018



The overall objective of the national Public Finance Management Reform Programme (PFMRP) is to strengthen the governance of public funds in order to implement the country's development agenda, reduce poverty and improve delivery of public services as set out in the National Strategic Development Programme NSDP. The reform is articulated around a series of four sequenced platforms, implemented in stages:

Platform 1 focuses on achieving a credible budget delivering predictable resources.

Platform 2 aims at improving internal controls to hold managers to account and improved reporting, mainly through the implementation of a Financial Management Information System (FMIS).

Platform 3 focuses on improving linkages between economic and policy priorities as reflected in the NSDP and budget planning.

Platform 4 intends to deliver broad accountability through better-designed Public Financial Management processes (PFM) and performance-based management.

Since its inception in 2005, through its platform approach, the PFMRP has been recognised by all assessments and evaluations as a set of credible measures to allow Cambodia to achieve a modern and effective PFM system, operating to international standards and best practices by 2025.

The European Development Cooperation Strategy for Cambodia 2014-2018 reflects the plan of EU Member States (and Switzerland) to work in partnership with the Royal Government of Cambodia and others to ensure greater coherence, predictability, impact and transparency of European development assistance to Cambodia.

Policy dialogue with the relevant Cambodian authorities is on-going in the context of the current sector reform support programmes. The Joint Technical Working Group on Education meets on a regular basis (3/4 times per year). It is chaired by the Minister of Education, Youth and Sport (MoEYS). UNICEF is co-Chairing it, in its role of Development Partners (DPs) lead. Members include the MoEYS as well as other Ministries involved in education, and Development Partners, including civil society. A joint MoEYS-DPs sector review is also taking place on an annual basis, and the Joint Technical Working Group on Education also undertakes an annual retreat of 2/3 days. The Joint Sector Review JSR complements the MoEYS annual national education congress, reviewing the performance of the sector. The DPs meet on a monthly basis in the framework of the Education Sector Working Group (ESWG).

In the context of PFM, the PFMRP implementation has been driven and largely implemented by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) through its Reform Committee Secretariat recently upgraded to a General Secretariat. The highest MOEF policy level forum to coordinate and monitor PFM reform is the PFM Reform Steering Committee chaired by MOEF Deputy Minister, Secretary of State, and which now comprises various representatives from all line ministries.

The other main mechanisms for technical coordination, monitoring and policy dialogue are: the monthly Development Partners Committee (DPC) meetings, and the biannual PFM Technical Working Group (TWG) meetings gathering MOEF leadership and DPs, including the NGO Forum for Cambodia. The TWG-PFM is chaired by the MOEF Minister while the EU and the WB act as co-facilitators.

3.1 Budget Support in Cambodia

The EU is the only donor providing budget support in Cambodia. Over the last 6 years, budget support was provided to the education sector. Other BS interventions signed during the evaluation period, notably in 2016, are included only to assess the coherence of the design with previous programmes.

BS operations were coupled with capacity development activities in education planning, management, and monitoring for improved education service delivery, sector performance and outcomes, and strengthening capacities at national and subnational levels.

The Education Sector Policy Support Programme (ESPSP) 2011-13 (30.8M€)

Allocated 23.1M€ of budget support and 7.45M€ for a multi-donor fund managed by UNICEF, the Education Capacity Development Partnership Fund (CDPF), pooling resources from EU, Sweden and UNICEF for a total of around 14.5M$, to support capacity development in the MoEYS, especially at sub-national level.

The overall expected result of the programme was an accelerated improvement in sector performance at both national and sub-national levels in implementing policies and strategies set out in ESP 2009:

The performance indicators for the variable tranche disbursements of the budget support were focusing on ESP strategies/plans to increase budget allocations to MoEYS, improve school performance, increase school autonomy, improve public finance management, and improve planning.

The EU-Cambodia Education Sector Reform Partnership (ESRP) 2014-16,

signed in March 2014 was extended and increased in December 2015. The total budget of this programme for the period 2014-2017 is 77.3M€. The programme allocates 68.5M€ to budget support (to be disbursed in 4 annual tranches) and 7.8M€ to the phase 2 of the CDPF. Budget support indicators for the variable tranche focus on access (completion at basic education level, scholarships, multilingual education, non-formal education), quality (decreased primary repetition rates and implementation of national assessments), and more efficient budget allocation and execution (increase of Programme Budget and school operating budgets, budget execution, capital funding).

"EU support to Public Financial Management Reform Programme "

Recently signed, and thus to be taken into account only in terms of coherence of the design.

4 SCOPE

4.1 Legal scope

Budget support operations are carried in the framework of EU co-operation to development policy. All spending and non-spending activities of Budget support aid modality are covered.

Particular reference is made to:

- Communication on Budget support COM (2011)638,

- The Agenda for Change COM (2011)637

4.2 Temporal and geographic scope

The evaluation covers EU budget support operations to Cambodia from 2011 to 2016, There are several other major DPs in education, but not providing budget support. The ADB is providing a policy loan. As part of the evaluation it will be important to assess how EU coherence and complementarity to the other DPs interventions in the sector, even if these are not provided through budget support.

The field phase of the evaluation will take place in Phnom Penh as well as in a number of districts outside the capital selected on the basis of discussions with the Government of Cambodia. Field missions are a central and integral part of the evaluation.

4.3 Thematic scope

The evaluation will focus on the impact of budget support in Cambodia:

- The performance related to the areas of focus of the specific indicators selected for the variable tranche payments during the related period, as well the overall performance of the sector in key performance indicators (enrolment rates, etc.) related to Early Childhood education, Primary Education and Lower secondary education – areas of attention of the support.

Further, conclusions are expected on progress on equity issues, notably gender and inclusion of ethnic minorities.

- Public Finance Management (PFM), at the appropriate level. Most donors are involved in PFM (AUSAid, SIDA and EU through a MDTF managed by the WB) but also JICA, USAID, UNICEF.

EU Budget support operations, since 2014 explicitly foresee the improvement of PFM. However previously (2003-2014) PFM was addressed in terms of eligibility criteria.

- Budget Transparency and Oversight.

- Policy dialogue, focusing on the main policy and reform issues of the partner government, and the Capacity development assistance (either in the form of measures included in the budget support agreement or committed separately) will be assessed as part of the input package of a budget support programme. A comprehensive analysis covering the process (including structure) and substance of policy dialogue is expected together with an assessment of its role on the programme's implementation and impact.

In particular, the evaluation will cover:

i. the inputs provided through the budget support programmes over the period concerned;

ii. the performance of the budget support inputs, in terms of direct and induced outputs;

iii. the changes related to budget support (including level, quality and sustainability) which have occurred during the period under evaluation as regards the outputs, outcomes and impacts of the supported government policies, strategies and actions (including governance and reform), and the key causal factors driving those changes;

iv. the extent to which the budget support programmes have contributed to the results identified at the outcome and impact level and the sustainability of these outcomes and impacts, considering both positive contributions to public policy-making and implementation processes and any (unwanted) negative side-effects which may have arisen;

v. the overall relevance of budget support arrangements in view of the evolving context of Cambodia in general and of the education sector in particular;

vi. the efficiency of the budget support operations, considering both the process and the relation between effects (direct outputs, induced outputs and outcomes) and inputs;

vii. the EU coherence and complementarity with the other DPs interventions in the sector (even if these are not provided through budget support);

viii. the EU coherence of BS programmes with the EU strategy in the education sector;

ix. the EU added value with regard to BS programmes' design and implementation.

5 EVALUATION ISSUES AND CRITERIA:

The evaluators are required to use the standard methodology for the evaluation of budget support developed within the framework of the OECD/DAC [2]. This methodology combines a comprehensive evaluation framework discerning a) five levels of analysis within the so-called b) 'three step approach', and includes proposals for assessment of impacts.

a) The Evaluation Framework discerns five levels as follows:

Level 1: *Budget Support inputs*: funding, policy dialogue and capacity building support.

Level 2: *Direct outputs of Budget Support*: improvements in the relationships between external assistance and the national budget and policy processes.

Level 3: *Induced outputs*: expected positive changes in the quality of public policies, the strength of public sector institutions, the quality of public spending (increased allocative and operational efficiency), and consequent improvements in public service delivery.

Level 4: *Outcomes*: envisaged positive effects at the level of final beneficiaries – service users and economic actors – due to improved government policy management and service delivery.

Level 5: *Impact*: envisaged positive effects on sustainable economic growth, poverty reduction, empowerment of the poor and improvements in their real incomes, and other issues and priorities specified in the Budget Support programmes being subject of the evaluation.

b) The 'three step approach' recognises the different roles of donors and government in Budget Support processes, as well as the indirect impact of Budget Support on poverty alleviation (ie. through government policies):

- The *first step* aims at an assessment of the inputs provided by Budget Support and their effect on the relationship between external assistance and the partner country's budget and policy processes (direct outputs) as well as the induced changes in the financing and institutional framework for public spending, public policy, policy management and service delivery (induced outputs).

- The *second step* aims at an assessment of the outcomes (beneficiaries' responses) and impacts (e.g. sustainable growth, poverty reduction, improved governance, etc.) which are realised by the government policy related to the explicit aims of Budget Support.

- Finally, based on the findings in step one and two, *step three* aims at a synthesis and conclusions in which way Budget Support has contributed to changes (intended but also unintended) in the partner country. It should allow matching the results of the two previous steps and help identifying the related links, if any, thereby completing the contribution assessment on the causal relationship between GBS/SBS and the government strategy outcomes.

[2] OECD/DAC (2012), *Evaluating Budget Support. Methodological Approach*, Paris

The key issues, to be addressed by the evaluation team, are derived from the framework and the three step approach:

Step 1, Level 1	Comparison between planned Budget Support inputs and those actually provided. Relevance and appropriateness of the design of the Budget Support programme(s) and the mix of Budget Support inputs in relation to: • the political, economic and social context of the partner country; • the government's policy framework, and: • the EC development assistance strategies;
Step 1, Level 2	Contribution of Budget Support to: • increased size and share of external funding subject to the government's • budgetary process; • increased size and share of the government budget available for discretionary spending; • improved predictability of aid flows; • the establishment of an efficient and effective policy dialogue framework focussed on strategic government priorities; • the provision of well-coordinated technical assistance and capacity building activities focussed on strategic government priorities; • greater harmonisation and alignment of external assistance as a whole; • reduced transaction costs of external assistance as a whole.
Step 1, Level 3	Improvements in the areas supported through Budget Support programmes and identification of the role played by Budget Support (including thorough policy dialogue and technical assistance) in determining these changes, e.g. : • macroeconomic and budget management (revenue mobilisation and expenditure policies, inflation and debt management, monetary and foreign exchange policies; • quantity and quality of goods and services provided by the public sector • PFM and procurement systems (fiscal discipline, enhanced allocative and operational efficiency, transparency, etc.); • public policy formulation and execution processes, including strengthened public sector institutions; • fight against corruption and fraud; • improved transparency within government systems; • links between the government and oversight bodies in terms of policy formulation and approval, financial and non-financial accountability, and budget scrutiny.

Step 2, Levels 4 & 5	Assessment of expected achievements in terms of development results at outcome and impact level as defined in the Budget Support agreements, e.g.: • changes in the internal and external competitive structure of the economy (enhanced competition on the domestic market; increased competitiveness of telecommunication services, increased capacity and openness of financial services) and impact in terms of sustainable and inclusive economic growth (growth of private sector investment and production,....); • changes in income and non-income poverty for the direct beneficiaries of the supported policies; • changes in the use and resulting quality of public services and their impact on the livelihoods of the targeted population: • changes in other key issues defined in the Budget Support agreement, e.g. enhanced democratic governance, human rights, environmental protection. • Assessment of the extent to which the above-mentioned changes can be related to changes in macro-economic management, to PFM systems, to changes in other government policies or policy processes and / or to other external or internal factors

The evaluation team will consider the degree to which the issues identified in the table above fully reflect those implied by the theory of change in Cambodia. This analysis should form the basis for the evaluation team's proposed set of evaluation questions. As per the guidance provided in the OECD DAC Methodological Approach, the number of evaluation questions should not exceed 12.

The evaluation team will need to clearly identify and formulate judgement criteria (JCs) and indicators for each of the evaluation questions (EQs) to be developed. This should provide a framework for the data collection and is to be done during the inception phase of the evaluation.

Evaluators are required to follow the above mentioned approach for the evaluation of budget support.

Wherever possible, they should apply methods and techniques that allow for a rigorous assessment of the impact of budget support. In both stages (Step 1and Step 2) the evaluators shall combine qualitative analyses (building on the literature and interviews) with quantitative methods and techniques.

The analyses for step 1 will rely on interviews of key stakeholders and experts (including at headquarter level), existing evaluation reports, reviews, other official documents and academic literature, information on financial flows, micro- and macro-economic data and other indicators and Contribution Analysis is used as far as possible.

Step 2 involves a description of the translation of sector budgets into sector programmes and investment and an assessment of the impact of these investments. The sector analysis shall combine quantitative techniques with more qualitative approaches, such as interviews, focus group discussions, field visits, and a document and literature review. A statistical (econometric) analysis is required if there are no (recent) rigorous impact evaluations and these analyses will be based on administrative data and existing household surveys.

Further, in Step 3, the contribution of Budget Support as a factor of change or as a leverage for change to the attainment of the development results identified in Step 2 is to be determined.

The evaluation will take stock of existing reviews, evaluations and data. This includes the Evaluations and Studies, and any other information that the evaluators might discover during the process of the evaluation. A comprehensive list of already existing evaluations and studies shall be part of the inception report

Like all evaluations, this evaluation faces a number of risks and challenges:

- The evaluation can only be successful with the collaboration of the Government of Cambodia and especially of the relevant Ministries. It is therefore important to communicate with the partner country to clarify that the evaluation is in the interest of both the EU and the Government of Cambodia, as it seeks to contribute to an improvement of the effectiveness of Budget Support operations in Cambodia.
- The evaluation will rely to a large extent on existing data and information. The inception report will have to provide more information on the feasibility and usefulness to undertake econometric analysis in the sectors included in the scope of the evaluation.

In the inception report, the evaluation team is required to specify the main risks and challenges they identify for the successful completion of the evaluation and how they propose to manage them.

6 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION

The evaluation will be led by a *Management Group*, consisting of the Government of Cambodia represented by the Ministry of Finance, Ministry Education, Youth and Sport as well as the European Commission (chair).

The European Commission (DEVCO Evaluation Unit) is responsible for the management of the evaluation. The Evaluation manager (EM) in the DEVCO Evaluation Unit will provide a pivotal role in facilitating the evaluation process and quality assurance.

The Management Group is responsible for overseeing the evaluation process and the quality of the deliverables. This includes:

- organisation of the evaluation (including organisation of meetings and Video conferences);
- drafting and approval of the Terms of Reference;
- assist in facilitating evaluators' access to the data needed to carry out the evaluation;
- overseeing the work of the evaluation team including provision of comments on the draft reports and approval of final reports;
- maintaining regular contacts with government, the evaluation team, including the preparation of consolidated comments to the various reports prepared by the evaluation team;
- communication (on the evaluation) to immediate stakeholders and the wider development community;
- supervise and assisting in the implementation of the dissemination of the final report (including seminar) as set out in the ToR.

7 PROCESS AND DELIVERABLES

The overall guidance to be used is available on the web page of the DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit and the OECD/DAC (2012), *Evaluating Budget Support. Methodological Approach*.

The basic approach to the assignment consists of three ***main phases***. ***Deliverables*** in the form of reports should be submitted at the end of the corresponding stage

The table below summarises these phases:

Evaluation phases:	***Stages:***	***Deliverables*:***
1.Inception phase	• Inception: Structuring of the evaluation • Data collection • Analysis	*Inception report and Slide presentation*
2. Field phase	• Data collection • Verification of the hypotheses	*Slide presentation*
3. Synthesis phase	• Analysis • Judgements	*Draft final report and Slide presentation* *Final report and Executive summary into other language than the main report* *Brochure for dissemination purposes*

Following the selection of the contractor, the key deliverables expected are:

- the inception report
- a presentation of the preliminary findings (slide presentation) after the field phase
- the draft final report (including a maximum four pages Executive summary in EN and translation into Khmer)
- the final report on USB key (including a maximum four pages Executive summary in EN, translation into Khmer and minutes of the seminar).
- leaflet/brochure on the results of the evaluation.

Deliverables are expected according to the timing given under Section 9 and are subject to formal approval.

The approved draft Final Report will be presented and discussed at a dissemination seminar, gathering relevant stakeholders, to be held in Phnom Penh. Comments that will be judged relevant will still need to be taken into account in the Final report. For the seminar, **50 hard copies** of the report have to be produced and delivered to the place of the seminar. The exact delivery place will be specified by the Evaluation Manager in due time.

All documents will be written in English. The length of the final main report should not exceed 70 pages including the Executive summary. Additional information should be included in the annexes.

The Final report will be provided only on a non-editable digital version (USB key support), and will include the report the executive summary in EN and translation into Khmer and all annexes, in 50 units.

The delivery follows the phasing of the evaluation according to the timing suggested in section 9.3 of these terms of reference

The leaflet brochure to be produced for dissemination purposes shall be no longer than four pages, including any relevant visual/graphic support (the offer must be based on 200 units printed).

To present deliverables to Management group meetings and in the context of the seminar, relevant visual support will be prepared by the evaluation team.

The expected duration of the assignment is 7 months. The work to be carried out can be divided into four main phases. The details of each of these are outlined in the following sections.

The formal approval of deliverables will also include the authorisation to move the next phase.

7.1 The Inception Phase

The evaluation will start with *1/2 day meeting* of the evaluation team leader (TL) with the Management Group (Video Conference in Brussels connected to Phnom Penh):

- to discuss and clarify objectives and requirements stated in the ToR and in the technical proposal,
- check on the availability and quality of existing data,
- present the added value of each member of the team of experts. The team leader should participate to this meeting in Brussels.

The purpose of the inception phase consists of:

i. a desk-based review of documentation and the acquisition of most of the documentation available,

ii. a first mission and a workshop in Phnom Penh to inform all stakeholders with the evaluation objectives, methodological approach, timing and tasks to be carried out, and collection of whatever documentation and data is available immediately and make arrangements for the compilation/preparation of relevant data that could be made available,

iii. the identification of the main specific features to be introduced in the evaluation framework (refined theory of change of Budget Support)[1] and the ensuing presentation,

iv. discussion of and agreement with the Management Group on the evaluation framework and preliminary list of Evaluation Questions (EQs), Judgement Criteria (JCs) and indicators

v. outline the field mission activities, including tools that will be used to collect information and list of intended interviews,

vi. present the inception report to the Management group.

The mission to Cambodia should last at least one week, including *½ day workshop* in Phnom Penh, at which the team leader, the members of the Management Group and other main stakeholders involved in BS will be invited. The workshop logistics (room rental, catering etc) costs will be covered by another contract and therefore are **not** to be included in this offer.

The evaluation team, during an *Inception meeting* (Video conference Brussel Phnom Penh), will present to the Management Group the inception report; in particular the preliminary framework and a preliminary list of JCs linked to the EQs and their justifications, for discussion and validation, and the approach and tools proposed for the field phase.

The main objectives of the *inception meeting* are:

[1] See Annex 1

- to review with the Management Group the structuring of the evaluation and the key concerns to be addressed, and for the technical team to receive comments and feedback on the proposed approach;
- to make arrangements for the compilation / preparation of data in the areas where there are gaps;
- to present first findings based on data collected and econometric analysis. (This will be complemented by a qualitative analysis -interviews and focus groups- during the field phase);
- to present the intended approach and plan for the field phase, including the provinces/districts to be visited, the tools that will be used and the interviews planned.

The team leader should participate to this meeting in Brussels.

In case the field phase plan presentation will not considered sufficiently detailed, a second Video Conference may be organised with the Management group. The team leader will be required to attend the video conference in Brussels.

7.2 The Field phase

The field phase includes a mission of the evaluation team to Cambodia of two weeks. The evaluation team should spend sufficient time for visits in a number of provinces/districts. Interviews and focus groups should be organised in this framework.

At the beginning and at the end of the field phase, the evaluation team will hold a briefing and a debriefing with the EU staff in the Delegation in Phnom Penh.

At the end of this phase the evaluation team will present preliminary findings (Slide presentation) to the Management Group (Videoconference with Cambodia).

The team leader should participate to this meeting in Brussels.

7.3 The analysis and synthesis phase

Thereafter the evaluation team will carry out the overall analysis and synthesis of the collected information and prepare a draft final report. The report will be submitted to the Management Group in conformity with the structure previously agreed with the Group.

The draft final report will be presented by the evaluation team to the Management Group during *1/2 day meeting* in Brussels (Video Conference with Phnom Penh).

The Management group will be allowed two weeks to comment on the draft report, both to point out any omissions or errors and to provide feedback on the conclusions and operational recommendations.

These eventual comments will be taken into account by the evaluation team in a revised version of the draft Final report. In case the team decides not to take these comments into account, the decision must be duly justified on each aspect to the Management group

7.4 The communication/dissemination and conclusion of the final report phase

The draft Final Report (revised) is presented by the evaluation team in a *½ day Seminar* in Phnom Penh and discussed with the relevant stakeholders. The evaluators will take minutes of the seminar main

messages and will revise the draft final report, as deemed appropriate, in order to take into account these messages in the final version of the report.

These comments should be taken into consideration without compromising the independence of the evaluation team's value judgments. The evaluation team may either accept or reject the comments, but in case of rejection of the comments it must justify (in writing) the reasons for rejection (if necessary, these comments and the evaluation team's responses can be annexed to the report).

The Seminar logistics (room rental, catering etc) costs will be covered by another contract and therefore are **not** to be included in this offer.

All costs related to the experts, including presence to the Seminar (travel cost, per diem etc.) are to be covered by the offer.

The evaluators have to hand over in an appropriate electronic format all relevant data gathered during the evaluation.

The leaflet brochure will be agreed with the Evaluation manager and delivered with the Final report.

8 THE EVALUATION TEAM

The evaluation team is responsible for:

- work plan and application of the agreed methodology;
- drafting and finalizing the deliverables.

The Contractor should provide appropriate administrative and logistical support for the experts, including their travel and accommodation arrangements.

The **team leader** should have: strong experience of budget support modalities and budget support evaluation techniques, including an in-depth knowledge of the methodological approach for BS evaluations developed within the OECD/DAC framework; experience in managing complex evaluations; experience as team leader.

The **evaluation team** must have a thorough knowledge and experience with:

General qualifications:

- development cooperation in general;
- different evaluation methodologies for complex evaluations;
- development cooperation in Cambodia;
- English fluent

Within the team, thorough knowledge and experience is required with:

Adequacy for the assignment:

- budget support modalities;
- techniques for the evaluation of budget support;
- macroeconomics;
- public finance management;
- education sector;
- methods and techniques for rigorous impact evaluation.

Following experience is an advantage:

- education sector in Cambodia;
- development cooperation in Cambodia;
- ability to read and speak ***Khmer***

All members of the evaluation team shall be committed to an effective and efficient teamwork. The offer should clearly state which of the proposed team members cover which of the above qualifications.

The team composition should be justified and the team coordination and members' complementarity should be clearly described.

It is expected that the Team leader will be an expert of category Senior.

The offer should clearly state the category of each team member and which tasks the proposed team members are supposed to take responsibility for and how their qualifications relate to the tasks (if this is not self-evident from their profile). A breakdown of working days per expert must also be provided.

The team members must be independent from the programmes/projects/policies evaluated. Should a conflict of interest be identified in the course of the evaluation, it should be immediately reported to the Evaluation manager for further analysis and appropriate measures.

The team will have excellent writing and editing skills. The Contractor remains fully responsible for the quality of the report. Any report which does not meet the required quality will be rejected.

During the offers evaluation process the contracting authority reserves the right to interview by phone one or several members of the evaluation teams proposed.

9 TIMING

The implementation is due to start January 2017. The expected duration is of 7 months. As part of the technical offer, the framework contractor must fill-in the timetable in the Annex 2. This table shall not start by a precise date but by "day/week 1".

10 OFFER FOR THE ASSIGNEMENT

The financial offer will be itemised to allow the verification of the fees compliance with the Framework contract terms.

The total length of each CV may not exceed 4 pages (font minimum Times New Roman 12 or Arial, 11).

11 TECHNICAL OFFERS SELECTION CRITERIA

The selection criteria and their respective weights are:

	Maximum
Total score for Organisation and methodology	
Understanding of ToR	10
Organization of tasks including timing	10
Evaluation approach, working method, analysis	20

Experts/ Expertise	
Team leader	30
Other experts	30
Overall total score	**100**

12 ANNEXES (not included here)

The contracting authority reserves the right to modify the annexes during the FWC implementation.

ANNEX 1: BS Theory of Change (separate document but full part of these ToRs)

ANNEX 2: TIMING

ANNEX 3: INDICATIVE DOCUMENTATION TO BE CONSULTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION BY THE SELECTED CONTRACTOR

Annex 2 Methodology

2.1 The methodology for this evaluation was fully set out in the Inception Report.[2] This Annex summarises the methodology adopted. The full evaluation matrix is reproduced in Annex 4.

Evaluation guidelines and standards

2.2 The evaluation uses the OECD-DAC methodology as indicated in the Terms of Reference (TOR, Annex 1) which are based on the OECD-DAC guidelines for evaluating budget support.[3] This methodology is based on an assumed intervention logic (or theory of change) with a set of five levels of analysis and the 'three step approach' that recognises the role of donors and government in budget support processes, as well as the indirect impacts, as follows

- **Level One,** which investigates the **Inputs** of general budget support and sector budget support, including policy dialogue, capacity building inputs and fund flows.
- **Level Two,** which details the **Direct Outputs** generated by the interaction of budget support with other aid modalities and with government policies. These relate to whether support to the sector has been delivered in an aligned and harmonised way, whether this has changed over time, and how this has created new opportunities for reform (e.g. more resources, available technical assistance and the dialogue framework).
- **Level Three,** which documents the **Induced Outputs** produced by Government as a consequence of the interaction of budget support (in complement with other modalities) with the national policy, budgetary and service delivery processes and institutions.
- **Level Four,** which records the **Outcomes** of government policies and spending actions, in terms of changes in the utilisation of public services and changes in the quality of these services that impact on livelihoods.
- **Level Five,** which records the wider **Impacts** of these processes, such as economic growth, reduced income poverty, reduced social exclusion and improved health and welfare.

2.3 The methodology separates the analysis of causal links between the levels into three steps:

- **Step One** covers levels 1-3. It provides the basis for understanding how budget support inputs have been inserted into the public spending and policy making process and with what effects (outputs) on policies, strategies, institutions and interventions, given the influence of other aid modalities, internal government processes and external factors working alongside budget support.
- **Step Two** begins from an identification of the most significant outcomes and impacts related to the implementation of the Government's national and sectoral development strategies (levels 4 & 5) and then examines – through a combination of econometric and qualitative analysis – what have been the primary determinants of those outcomes and impacts.
- **Step Three** brings together the findings from Steps One and Two, identifying which of the 'induced outputs' of budget support identified in Step One also feature amongst the primary determinants of outcomes and impacts identified through Step Two. In this way, it permits an assessment of the contribution of budget support to final outcomes and impacts and an identification of the key points of weakness in the Intervention Logic. For example, is it the case that budgets are failing to induce the expected outputs or is it rather that those induced outputs have failed to generate positive changes in outcomes and impacts? Or, is it rather the case that there is evidence of positive linkages between the imputed outputs and observed positive outcomes, while at the same time there is evidence of a contribution (relative to other factors) by budget support, to the effective induced outcomes?

[2] Fölscher et al., *Evaluation of Budget Support in Cambodia 2011-2016, Final Inception Report*.July 2017.
[3] OECD DAC, 2012

2.4 Figure 2.1 below provides a generic depiction of the use of budget support intervention logic in a theory-based evaluation, and the separation of the analytical steps.

Figure 2.1 Generic budget support intervention framework and analysis of causal links



Application of the evaluation framework to the ESPSP and ESRP

2.5 Within this framework, the TOR set out a thematic scope for the evaluation, including that it should focus on performance related to the areas of focus of the specific interventions selected for the variable tranche payments, as well as the overall performance of the sector in early childhood education, primary and lower secondary education. Conclusions were expected on equity issues, notably gender and the inclusion of ethnic minorities. The evaluation also had to pay attention to progress in public financial management.

The intervention logic

2.6 Figure 2.2 below shows how the generic budget support evaluation intervention logic was adapted for the evaluation of the ESPSP and the ESRP, given the specifics of the context, the sector budget support nature of the programmes, and the policies, strategies and interventions of the MoEYS.

2.7 In the inception phase it became apparent that the specific interventions selected for the variable tranche payments were aligned with the MoEYS's own strategic priorities as set out in the sector plans. The thematic focus of the intervention logic in pillar 3 was therefore relatively easily aligned with the ESPSP and ESRP specific focuses, as well as overall sector reform priorities.

2.8 A salient difference between this intervention logic and the evaluation methodology framework for general budget support is that the evaluation considered increased flow of government funds to the sector, as an induced and not a direct output. For general budget support evaluations, change in the discretionary portion of governments' own budgets is usually considered as part of the direct outputs of budget support, as the providers of general budget support could expect to see this budget grow on account of the budget support cash transfers to the overall budget. For sector budget support, however, we have argued that changes in government's budget to the education sector cannot be considered as a direct output, as it would be equivalent to earmarking, which would make it more just programme support rather than budget support. This evaluation considered the increase in the flow of funds to the education sector as an induced output to which budget support funds and other inputs, and the direct outputs, should contribute.

Figure 2.2 Intervention logic of EU budget support in Cambodia



The evaluation questions and judgement criteria

2.9 A central task for the inception phase was the translation of the Intervention Logic into the evaluation questions (EQs) and judgement criteria/indicators to ensure that the data collected by the team and the analysis undertaken covered all aspects relevant to the context and the budget support programmes, and were appropriately focused.

2.10 We proposed a set of 12 EQs. These are presented in summary in Table 2.1 below, and in more detail in Annex 4 together with the proposed judgement criteria for each EQ, and a rationale for the question and the coverage implied by the judgement criteria.

2.11 The twelve questions were structured to align with the levels and questions of the methodology. The framework is headed by a descriptive question, aimed at ensuring that the facts of the Budget Support Programme (BSP) inputs are set out clearly in the report. The evaluative questions of the framework were set out as follows:

Step 1

- EQ1 and its sub-questions deal with Level 1 of the methodology, investigating the design and delivery of the budget support (BS) inputs, including how and to what extent gender issues and the inclusion of ethnic minorities have been facilitated through the design of the BS operations in Cambodia.
- EQ2 and its sub-questions enquire about the degree to which budget support created new opportunities for sector outputs, by contributing to more harmonised and aligned aid, and more harmonised and effective dialogue.
- EQ 3 and its sub-questions then direct the team to assess the degree to which various reforms related to early childhood education, primary and lower secondary education have occurred, and what the contribution of budget support to the reforms was. As in the intervention logic, the questions bring together the ESPSP and ESRP objectives and variable tranche indicator areas with their aligned sector priorities.

Step 2

- EQ 4 interrogates sector outcomes and progress towards impacts – particularly relating to equitable access and quality – and their main determinants. Under Step 2 the team was to pay specific attention, within the available data, to actual progress on equity issues, including relating to gender and ethnic minorities.

Step 3

- EQ5 then guides the concluding analysis on the causal links between levels 1, 2 and 3, and between levels 3 and 4.

Table 2.1 Evaluation questions

Methodology levels / steps	Evaluation Question
Descriptive questions	
Descriptive analysis	What were the budget support inputs provided over the period, planned and actual? What were the programme implementation mechanisms?
Evaluation questions	
Step 1 and Level 1: Inputs and context for Budget Support	EQ 1.1: To what extent were the budget support inputs timely/predictable, and the programme implementation mechanisms functional, efficient and transparent?
	EQ 1.2: To what extent did the design and scale of the budget support programmes, and the choice of budget support as a modality, respond to the political, economic, and social context of education in Cambodia, to Government education policy, to the education sector aid context, and the evolution of the EU/RGoC partnership?

Methodology levels / steps	Evaluation Question
Step 1 and LEVEL 2: Direct Outputs	EQ 2.1: To what extent did the budget support programme inputs contribute to improved processes, mechanisms and quality of policy dialogue between DPs and the RGoC in the education sector?
	EQ 2.2: To what extent did the budget support programme inputs contribute to improved processes, mechanisms and quality of policy dialogue between development partners and the RGoC in the education sector?
Step 1 and LEVEL 3: Induced Outputs	EQ 3.1: Did the budget support programmes contribute to an increased flow and to better distribution of government resources in the sector, including at decentralised levels?
	EQ 3.2: To what extent did the budget support programmes contribute to policy development, planning and monitoring & evaluation systems in the education sector in a decentralised context? Have they contributed to ensuring better results-based management of the sector?
	EQ 3.3: To what extent did the budget support programmes contribute to the overall improvement in the quality of PFM, both in the sector in general, and particularly related to fiscal transparency and revenue mobilisation?
	EQ 3.4: To what extent have the budget support programmes contributed to improved deployment and (results-based) management of human resources, specifically but not limited to teachers, in the sector for the delivery of equitable, quality education?
	EQ 3.5: To what extent did the budget support programmes contribute to improved formal school-based management in the early childhood education, primary and lower secondary sub-sectors?
	EQ 3.6: Have the budget support programmes contributed to the formulation and implementation of specific education delivery policies to address key aspects of poor sector outcomes in early childhood education, primary and lower secondary?
Step 2 and LEVEL 4: Outcomes LEVEL 5: Impacts	EQ 4: To what extent have sector outcomes (equitable access, quality, efficiency) improved and have the development outcomes targeted by budget support been achieved? Are improvements sustainable? What factors have been the main determinants of these achievements?
Step 3: Concluding inferential analysis on the causal links between levels 1, 2 and 3, and between levels 3 and 4.	EQ 5: To what extent have the direct or induced outputs of budget support contributed to the results identified at the outcome and impact levels?

Identified data sources

2.12 The main sets of data collected were:

- **Document/literature review.** The bibliography, now at Annex 12, was drawn from a much larger e-library of documents gathered. During the inception phase and main fieldwork the team collected studies from respondents, including from the MoEYS, other development partners and civil society.
- **Review of primary documentation.** The e-library includes a comprehensive collection of Government of Cambodia documents and EC Cambodia Budget Support Programme documents and reviews. The team collected all the payment file documentation from the EU Delegation in Cambodia, some internal documentation from the MoEYS, including technical papers and presentations on the focus reform areas, and selected meeting minutes.

- **Quantitative data:** The team collected quantitative data from the MoEYS (specifically the EMIS database, but also sector financial data), the MoEF (the distribution of the RGoC budget), the Council for the Development of Cambodia (donor data), and the National Institute of Statistics (the Demographic and Health Surveys and the Cambodia Socio Economic Survey data).
- **Key informant and stakeholder interviews and focus groups** were an important source of primary data. During the inception phase the team undertook a stakeholder analysis, which was used to identify interview targets for the main fieldwork (see Annex 6). Prior to the main fieldwork, the team developed semi-structured interview questionnaires, adapted for different sets of interview targets. Interviews were conducted with national respondents and interviews and focus groups with subnational correspondents. For the subnational focus groups the team developed the focus group guides.

  By default, interviews were treated as confidential to the team; they were systematically written up by team members using a standard template (reproduced in Table 2.2) and shared through a compendium in a confidential section of the e-library. The compendium enabled interview notes to be easily searched by topic, and facilitated triangulation of different interviewee recollections and perspectives. The MoEYS, MOEF and EU Delegation (EUD) were extremely helpful in facilitating interviews. See Annex 3 for the list of people met.

Table 2.2 Interview template

Date, Respondent, and position

Please use above format for interview title. Multiple interviews can be included in one file document (a separate file for each is not necessary). When finalised, all interview notes will be added to the Interview Compendium (allowing searches for subjects/themes etc. across interviews). Complete information in the unshaded cells in the table below.

GENERAL		
Date:	Location of Interview:	Evaluation Team Members Present:
INTERVIEWEE(S)		
Name: *[gender?]*	Designation:	Contacts: [phone / e-mail, etc.]
NOTE TAKING		
Name:	Date completed:	Recorded (Y/N): Ref #:

- **Background**

Interviewee's general background; Nature and dates of interviewee's involvement with budget support in Cambodia / nature of involvement with the education sector

- **Topics**

Record responses by topic with clear headings, not necessarily in chronological sequence of discussion. Make clear when a direct quote is recorded. Add headings and sub-headings as required and/or record against evaluation criteria.

- **Data/documents provided/recommended**

Seek full references for documents not already in evaluation team library.

- **Other proposed follow-up**

Analytical instruments

2.13 A theory of change evaluation such as this relies heavily on contribution and process analysis, to evaluate the causal links between the pillars of the intervention logic.

2.14 The approach is to infer the causality from the application of a reasoned intervention logic, verified by evidence. In evaluation contribution analysis is used to provide reasonable judgements of cause and effect when it is not practical to design an experiment. Contribution analysis aims to demonstrate whether or not the evaluated intervention is one of the causes of an observed change. It may also rank the evaluated intervention among the various causes explaining the observed change.

2.15 In the evaluation of budget support, contribution analysis was used in Step 1 to weigh and consider the influence of other factors, exogenous or complementary to the budget support programme inputs and direct outputs, to examine the contribution of the BS Programmes to observed induced outputs. In Step 2 contribution analysis was also applied to understand the contribution of the induced outputs as determining factors in the observed outcomes.

2.16 The idea of contribution analysis is that it

- is based on the intervention logic;
- is buttressed by evidence validating the intervention logic;
- is reinforced by examination of other influencing factors; and
- builds a reasonably credible case about the difference the BS Programmes have made and are making.

2.17 The key steps in the contribution analysis approach are given in Figure 2.3 below applied to the analysis of the contribution of the BS Programmes to more harmonised delivery of external assistance in the sector, a direct output. Stages 3, 4 and 5 in the figure are the kernel of the contribution analysis approach.

Figure 2.3 Contribution analysis steps



Developed from Mayne, 2009 and EuropeAid, 2013

Evaluation process

2.18 The evaluation process followed the phases set out in the TOR, namely an inception phase, a field phase and a synthesis phase.

2.19 The inception phase started with a half-day meeting of the evaluation team with the Management Group. included a week-long inception report mission to Phnom Penh, during which the team met with the MoEYS, MoEF, EU Delegation and main donors, to gather information on the central issues in education over the period and collect documentation and data. At the start of the inception fieldwork the team conducted a half-day workshop with a broad group of stakeholders in Phnom Penh, to introduce the evaluation. The fieldwork concluded with a debriefing of the EUD and the MoEYS leadership, to present the team's preliminary thoughts on the evaluation focus and approach for the main fieldwork.

2.20 Subsequent to the fieldwork the team undertook a desk review, designed the intervention logic and drew up the evaluation questions. An inception report that included the evaluation framework and the findings of the desk review against the evaluation questions was drafted. The interview and focus group instruments were also drafted, and the main fieldwork programme was designed, including the sub-national fieldwork.

2.21 Qualitative analysis undertaken during the main field mission of the evaluation was also used in order to confirm, refute or refine the main findings and hypotheses in Step 1 and Step 2 emerging from the quantitative analysis and qualitative literature documentary review. This was undertaken though field work at central, provincial and district level, involving a series of interviews (either one-to-one or through focus groups) with recipients and providers of education services to determine their views on the determinants of education results.

2.22 The synthesis phase comprised two weeks, of which seven days were spent in Phnom Penh and three at subnational level. In order to cover as much ground as possible, the team was split in three for these visits. The selection of provinces and districts to visit was based on purposive sampling, briefly set out in Box 2.1.

Box 2.1 Sampling strategy to select sub-national fieldwork locations

The aim of provincial / district field visits was to capture to the extent possible a number of dimensions around the potential contribution of EU support to improvements in service delivery, sector management and governance, and ultimately to improved educational outcomes. The evaluation was limited in the amount of time in the field, with four provinces visited over a three-day period, and two to three districts within each province. The sampling was therefore based on the following criteria:

1. One of the four provinces had to be Battambang, as the location to pilot the decentralisation of education functions.
2. Provinces / districts with low performance against key indicators, as well as provinces / districts where performance has improved and can be seen to represent good sector management. The primary completion rate was selected as the lead indicator, was this has been a key indicator for EU policy dialogue, and captures a number of aspects of education system performance, including towards the MDG of universal primary education. Other indicators to make choices between provinces were different drop-out and pupil teacher ratios, and budget execution.
3. Given the EU focus on improving equity, with a focus on specific drivers of inequality and associated interventions, at least one province had to include ethnic minority and minority language groups. It was assumed that indicators of poverty will align with this and with broader performance against education outcome indicators.
4. From the inception mission and review of recent sector analyses, it was clear that some specific challenges were being faced in areas close to borders (e.g. Bantey Meanchey, Battambang, Koh Kong) and/or factories in urban areas (e.g. Kampong Cham, Kampong Speu, Kandal), leading to drop out due to the pull of employment opportunities.
5. Analyses also show some clear differences in the challenges and performance in urban and rural areas. Much of the EU dialogue has focused on ensuring more equitable provision in rural and remote areas; the selection of districts could include a mix of urban, rural and more remote areas, to the extent feasible.

The target provinces for fieldwork, besides Battambang, which were selected and agreed with the MoEYS were **Bantey Meanchey** (relatively weak performance, border location), **Mondulkiri** (relatively weak performance, border location, includes ethnic minorities) and **Kampong Cham** (relatively better performance, more urbanised).

Within provinces districts were selected based on their relative performance on the primary completion rate and drop-out rates, and their remoteness from the provincial capital. For practical reasons, the provincial capital district was taken as the urban district, and outlying districts were selected based on how accessible they would be during the rainy season, and preference was given to districts meeting other criteria which were en route to other provinces/districts.

- Banteay Meanchey: Serei Sophoan (provincial capital) and Poipet
- Battambang: Battambang (provincial capital) and Bavel
- Mondulkiri: Sen Monorom (provincial capital) and Pichreada
- Kampong Cham: Kampong Cham (provincial capital), Stung Trang and Batheay

2.23 In the field phase the evaluation team undertook a two week-long field visit to Cambodia and to reach all the interviews targets within the available fieldwork time, the team used both face-to-face interviews and focus groups. Focus groups were conducted at the provincial, district and school level, as well as for civil society representatives in Phnom Penh. The fieldwork provided for a start-of-mission discussion with key EUD and MoEYS representatives, as well as a debriefing at the close of the field mission with each set of representatives. The schedule is in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3 Outline of main fieldwork mission

Day	Tasks	Interview / Focus Group targets
25 September[4]	Opening discussion with the EU Delegation, highlighting key investigative areas and finalizing mission scheduling issues Meetings with individual EUD respondents Meetings with development partners (if any time remaining)	Head and Deputy Head of Development Cooperation EU Focal Point Meeting with Head and Deputy Head of Development Cooperation, and the PFM attaché and new Education attaché, if in place.
26 September	Opening discussion with main counterparts in the MoEYS, highlighting key investigative areas and finalising mission scheduling issues, if required Meetings with Phnom Penh-based respondents	MoEYS BS Programme Focal Point and key respondents, such as staff from the Directorate General of Policy and Planning See next row
27-28 September	Discussion with H.E. Secretary of State on education reforms and contribution of the budget support programme Meetings / focus group discussions with Phnom Penh-based respondents Team to group and divide in accordance with the focus of the interview	Meeting with H.E Nath Bunroeun, Secretary of State Individual meetings with: EUD respondents MoEYS counterparts MOEF counterparts Other government institutions, e.g. CDC, National Institute of Statistics Development partners, including Sida, ADB, UNICEF and the World Bank
29 September	Focus group meeting with selected NGOs Meetings with Phnom Penh-based respondents	NGOs (focus group) See previous row
30 Sept – 1 October	Team consolidation of information and travel to Provinces	
2 to 4 October	Meetings in 4 Provinces and 9 districts Visits were structured as follows: POE: Introductory meeting with the POE Director, followed by meetings / groups discussion with the technical staff for primary, secondary, non-formal and early childhood education, as well as planning, financial management and monitoring and evaluation staff. DOE: Group discussion with the DOE Director and technical sub-sector staff, as well the	Selected POEs, DOEs and selected School Directors and School Support Committee members

[4] No meetings with RGoC counterparts were scheduled for the 25th of September, as most Government offices will be closed in recognition of the public holiday on the 24th of September.

Day	Tasks	Interview / Focus Group targets
	planning and financial management staff. Specific focus on members of the District Training and Monitoring Teams. School level: A focus group discussion with selected primary and lower secondary school directors, teachers and representatives from the school-support committees. All discussions were through professional interpretation.	
4 October	Morning: final meetings in districts for 2 of 3 provincial visit teams Afternoon: travel back to Phnom Penh for 2 of the 3 provincial visit teams 3rd team spends full day in 4th province, meeting POE and additional 2 districts	See above
5 October	Meetings / focus group discussions with Phnom Penh-based respondents for 3 team members 4th team member to complete 4th province meetings and travel back to Phnom Penh	Remaining respondents at central level Final meetings at district level in 4th Province.
6 October	Final meetings with outstanding Phnom Penh-based respondents Debriefing meeting with the DDG Planning Meeting with MoEYS Leadership Meeting with EU Delegation	 Meeting with the MOEYS Secretary of State, DDGs and Directors Ambassador, Head and Deputy Head of Development Cooperation, the new education attaché, and others

2.24 The fieldwork concluded with the presentation of the preliminary findings to the Management Group. This took place a month after the conclusion of the fieldwork, to allow a first set of data and econometric analysis to enrich the fieldwork findings.

2.25 During the synthesis phase, which was from early November to December, the team undertook further analysis and drafted the evaluation report, volumes 1 and 2.

2.26 After finalisation of the draft final report, the team will undertake dissemination of the report through a workshop in Phnom Penh. Any comments from this workshop will be incorporated into the final report.

Annex 3 List of persons met

Name	Position	Organisation
Royal Government of Cambodia		
H.E. Hang Chuon Naron	Minister of Education	Minister, MoEYS
H.E Nath Bunroen	Secretary of State	SoS, MoEYS
H.E. Ngoun Meas	Director General, Administration & Finance	DGAF, MoEYS
Vorng Phirum	Director and Envoy to Minister	DGAF, Department of Construction, MoEYS
Thet Praus	Deputy Director Internal Audit	DGAF, MoEYS
Tep Thyorith	Director, Finance Department	DGAF, MoEYS
Sok Sohema	Director, Internal Audit Department	DGAF, MoEYS
Near Sophan	Director of Personnel Department	DGAF, MoEYS
Por Silong	Officer, Legal Department	DGAF, MOEYS
Kann Puthy	Head Office of Administration	DGAF, MoEYS
Helen Espinar	International Financial Advisor	DGAF, MoEYS
H.E. Puth Samith	Director General, General Education	DGGE, MoEYS
H.E Chan Sopea	Director Primary Education Department	DGGE, MoEYS
Mr Ngor Penglong	Director TTD	DGGE, MoEYS
Ung Chinna	Director of EQAD	EQAD Department, MOEYS
Dr. Chhay Kim Sotheavy,	Director of the School Health Department	DGGE, MOEYS
Hang Chan Sovan	Chief of Office, NFE Department	DGGE, MoEYS
Pring Morkoath	Deputy Director, General Secondary Department	DGGE, MoEYS
Ms Sombath Eath	TTD	DGGE, MoEYS
Dr Dy Samsideth	Deputy DGGE, Chair of TPAP committee	DGGE, MoEYS
Tou Sothano	Deputy Director, EMIS Department	DGPP MoEYS
Sophea Vatey	Chief of Planning, PED Department	DGGE, MoEYS
Sok Sokhom	Chief of Planning, ECE Department	DGGE, MoEYS
H.E. Lim Sothea	Director General, Policy and Planning	DGPP, MoEYS
Sam Or Angkearoat	Deputy Director General, Policy and Planning	DGPP, MoEYS
Pong Pitin	Director, EMIS Department	DGPP, MoEYS
Dr Dy Khamboly	Director, Department of Policy	DGPP, MoEYS
Nham Sinith	Director of Department of Planning	DGPP, MoEYS
Uy Sothea	EMIS Department	DGPP, MoEYS

Name	Position	Organisation
Than Setharath	Deputy Director Planning Department	DGPP, MoEYS
H.E. Ros Seilava	Under-Secretary of State	General Secretariat, Steering Committee of the PFM Reform, Ministry of Economy and Finance
Meas Soksensan	Secretary General	Ministry of Economy and Finance
Yeth Vinel	Deputy Secretary General	General Secretariat, Steering Committee of the PFM Reform, Ministry of Economy and Finance
Chhuon Samirth	Deputy Director General,	Dept International Coop & Debt Management, Ministry of Economy and Finance
Nhim Khemara	Deputy Director General of Budget	Ministry of Economy and Finance
Houl Bonnaroth	Deputy Director, Department of Multilateral Cooperation	Ministry of Economy and Finance
Yorn Malimcheng	Budget Officer	Ministry of Economy and Finance
Chea Meng	Chief Officer	Ministry of Economy and Finance
Ouch Sophorn	M & E Officer	Ministry of Economy and Finance
Makara Ung	Specialist	Ministry of Economy and Finance
H.E. Sok Kosal & 2 others	Deputy Director General	National Institute for Statistics Cambodia
Sam Sok Sotheavuth	Deputy Director	Economic Statistics Department, National Institute of Statistics
H.E Ms Neang Lyna	Deputy Director General	General Department of Civil Service Policy, Ministry of Civil Service
H.E Kong Sophy,	Director General	General Department of Civil Service Policy, Ministry of Civil Service
Lorn Kimheng	Deputy Director	General Department of Civil Service Policy, Ministry of Civil Service
Kim Lumangbopata	Office Chief, Policy and Development,	Assistance Coordination Department, Council for the Development of Cambodia
Mov Phannith	Officer	Policy Department, Council for the Development of Cambodia
EU Representatives		
Stavros Petropoulos	Cambodia Desk EEAS, Brussels	EU Brussels
Achim Tillessen	Geo Coordinator Cambodia, DEVCO, Brussels	EU Brussels
H.E. George Edgar	Ambassador	EU Delegation

Name	Position	Organisation
Michele Crimella	Attaché, Education and Social Development	EU Delegation
Corinne Boulet	Attaché, Education, Health and Social Development	EU Delegation
Francesca Ciccomartino	Attaché, Good Governance and Human Rights	EU Delegation
Javier Castillo-Alvarez	Attaché, PFM	EU Delegation
Egbert Walter	Counsellor, Deputy Head of Cooperation	EU Delegation
Fiona Ramsey	Counsellor, Head of Co-operation	EU Delegation
Frank Viault	Minister Counsellor, Head of Cooperation	EU Delegation
Ly Sophea	Programme Officer	EU Delegation
Noeun Bou	Programme Officer Education, Health and Social Development	EU Delegation
Baptiste Mandouze	Regional Economic Adviser	EU Delegation Thailand
Christian Provoost	Former Attaché, Education, Health and Social Development	Previous post-holder, now in the EU Delegation Nepal
Vincent Vire	EU Attaché Education during ESPSP	Previous post-holder, now Head of Cooperation, EUD, Togo
Donors, Civil Society and key experts		
Sophea Mar	Senior Social Sector Officer	ADB
Alexander Winkscha	Regional Coordinator, GIZ Fit for School Program	GIZ
Marcel Siewert	WASH Adviser	GIZ
Magnus Saemundsson	First Secretary, Education	Sida
Martina Fors Mohlin	First Secretary, Public Financial Management	Sida
Santosh Khatri	Officer	UNESCO
Yinsieng Sometha	Programme Coordinator	UNESCO
Rasika Sridhar Sethi	CDPF lead	UNICEF
Erika Boak	Chief of Education	UNICEF
Channra Chum	Education Officer	UNICEF
Huot Chea	Education Officer	UNICEF
Sain Kim Long	Education Officer	UNICEF
Sokhon Nuom	Education Officer	UNICEF
John Collins and two others	Education Officer	USAID
Simeth Beng	Education Specialist	World Bank
Sokbunthoun So	Public Sector Specialist	World Bank
Socheat Lam	Head of Program	Aide et Action
Jan Noorlander	Program Director	CARE
Em Veasna	Senior Project Operations Manager	CARE
Phon Sarin	Senior Training Officer	CARE
Kurt Brendenburg	Senior Advisor	KAPE
Ouk Vannara	Deputy Executive Director	NGO Forum
Chea Vantha	Country Director	Room to Read

Name	Position	Organisation
Mitch Rakusin	Education Research Analyst	RTI
Simon King	Research Statistician	RTI
Frans van Gerwen	Team leader	CDPF Evaluation Team
Ok Amry	Team member	CDPF Evaluation Team
James Lee	Consultant	Independent Consultant
Sub-national level interviews and focus groups		
Mr. Sdoeung Tonghing	BTMC POE Director	Banteay Meanchey Province
Mr. Hout Bunthoeun	POE Financial Chief	Banteay Meanchey Province
Mr. Em Tang Sun	POE Human Resource Chief	Banteay Meanchey Province
Mr. Try Hey	POE Primary School Chief	Banteay Meanchey Province
Mr. Chhoun Phanna	POE Secondary School Chief	Banteay Meanchey Province
Mr. Teng Tangmeng	POE Human Resource Deputy Chief	Banteay Meanchey Province
Mr. Chea Khan	POE Financial Deputy Chief	Banteay Meanchey Province
Mr. Phorn Phavorn	POE Youth Chief	Banteay Meanchey Province
Ms. Y Nath	POE Illiteracy Deputy Chief	Banteay Meanchey Province
Ms. Loeum Sangoeun	POE Early Childhood Deputy Chief	Banteay Meanchey Province
Mr. Yoeun Pech	POE HR Staff	Banteay Meanchey Province
Mr. El Kitya	POE Financial Deputy Chief	Banteay Meanchey Province
Mr. Loeung Hok	DOE Head	Serey Sphorn District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Kong Navuth	DOE Deputy Head	Serey Sphorn District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Chhay Chhieng Sokpy	DOE Deputy Primary	Serey Sphorn District, Banteay Meanchey
Ms. Try Kimhouy	DOE Non-Formal Education Staff	Serey Sphorn District, Banteay Meanchey
Ms. Thuy Veasna	DOE Non-Formal Education Staff	Serey Sphorn District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Keo Dul	DOE Secondary School Staff	Serey Sphorn District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Ear Limchak	DOE Primary School Deputy Head	Serey Sphorn District, Banteay Meanchey
Ms. Loeung Nearyheab	DOE Early Childhood Staff	Serey Sphorn District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Chab Ny	Principal of Primary School	Serey Sphorn District, Banteay Meanchey, Hun Sen Primary School
Mr. Ly Mao	Vice Principal of Primary School	Serey Sphorn District, Banteay Meanchey, Hun Sen Primary School
Ms. Phorn Dary	Primary School Secretary	Serey Sphorn District, Banteay Meanchey, Hun Sen Primary School
Mr. Phon Sath	Community Chief	Serey Sphorn District, Banteay Meanchey, Hun Sen Primary School
Mr. Chem Sambo	DOE Head	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey

Name	Position	Organisation
Mr. Em Vuthorn	DOE Deputy Head	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Khorl Khon	DOE Staff	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Ms. Kim Hiek	DOE Staff	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Chhay Bandol	DOE Staff	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Hing Kasin	DOE Staff	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Heng Nout	DOE Staff	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Sinh Soeun	Principal of Paliley Primary School	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Chhay Chhorn	Community Rep	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Chen Chao	Principal of Wat Tray Primary School	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Ok Samith	Community Rep of Wat Tray	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Ear Phally	Principal of Secondary School	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Rith Mab	Accountant of O Chroy Upper Secondary School	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Chhay Chheang Hong	Community Rep at O Chroy	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Ng Samorn	Principal of O Chroy Upper Secondary School	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Ung Chim	Principal of Akphiwat Primary School	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Kim Chhay Y	Community Rep at Aphiwat	Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey
Mr. Y Song Ky	POE Deputy Director	Battambang Province
Mr. Mak Meng	POE Deputy Head of Planning	Battambang Province
Mr. Toeng Seyha	POE Deputy Head of Non-Formal Education	Battambang Province
Mr. Hout Kim Lorn	POE Deputy Head of Finance Office	Battambang Province
Ms. Ng Chetra	POE Deputy Head of Early Childhood Education	Battambang Province
Mr. Ng Sok Chu	POE Staff Of Primary School	Battambang Province
Mr. Lorn Sopheak	POE Staff of Secondary School	Battambang Province
Mr. Cheang Leab	DOE Administrative Staff of BTB Town	Battambang Town District, Battambang
Mr. Nhem Vanny	DOE Financial Staff	Battambang Town District, Battambang
Mr. Ry Sok	DOE Planning Staff	Battambang Town District, Battambang
Mr. Kong Samphors	DOE Statistic Staff	Battambang Town District, Battambang
Mr. Yan Sun Ten	Vice Principal of Pi Thhnu Primary School	Battambang Town District, Battambang
Mr. Mean Sophal	Community Chief of Pi Thhnu	Battambang Town District, Battambang
Mr. Khorn Choeun	Community Chief of Porthivong	Battambang Town District, Battambang
Ms. Norng Chheanny	Vice Principal of Porthivong Primary School	Battambang Town District, Battambang
Mr. Ork Chheat	Vice Principal of Sophy Lower Secondary School	Battambang Town District, Battambang

Name	Position	Organisation
Mr. Prak Saphal	Community Chief of Sophy	Battambang Town District, Battambang
Mr. Ork Sonthek	DOE Head	Bavel District, Battambang
Mr. Doung Sothan	DOE Financial Staff	Bavel District, Battambang
Mr. Sarik Dan	DOE Human Resource Staff	Bavel District, Battambang
Mr. Rem Ry	DOE Primary School Head	Bavel District, Battambang
Ms. Phon Sovanna	DOE Early Childhood Head	Bavel District, Battambang
Mr. Sam Chamroeun	DOE Secondary School Staff	Bavel District, Battambang
Mr. Sam Chamroeun	Principal of Prahib Primary School	Bavel District, Battambang
Mr. Chim Chea	Community Rep of Prahib	Bavel District, Battambang
Mr. Khoem Kim Heang	Principal of Prey Khpos Lower Secondary School	Bavel District, Battambang
Mr. Mornh Moeun	Principal of Stha Por Primary School	Bavel District, Battambang
Mr. Choun Chay	Community Rep of Stha Por	Bavel District, Battambang
Tem Sang Vat	Director POE	POE, Sen Monorom, Mondulkiri
Khoeun Nghim	Head of Planning Office	POE, Sen Monorom, Mondulkiri
Chea Socheat	Head of Primary & preschool office	POE, Sen Monorom, Mondulkiri
Khiev Novuth	Deputy Head Primary & Preschool	POE, Sen Monorom, Mondulkiri
Min Sam Ol	Deputy Head of Secondary	POE, Sen Monorom, Mondulkiri
Neang Chhorvy	Finance and material officer	POE, Sen Monorom, Mondulkiri
Som Simeth	Non Formal Education Officer	POE, Sen Monorom, Mondulkiri
Neth Pheap	Director DOE	DOE, Sen Monorom, Mondulkiri
Tun Kong	Deputy Director	DOE, Sen Monorom, Mondulkiri
Ho Soknoeun	Planning and Finance	DOE, Sen Monorom, Mondulkiri
Sang Ra	Principal, Sen Monorom Primary	Sen Monorom Primary school, Mondulkiri
Im Phalla	SSC Head Sen Monorom Primary	Sen Monorom Primary school, Mondulkiri
Kham Kang Thea	Principal Social Fund Primary	Sen Monorom Primary school, Mondulkiri
Ream Sam Ol	SSC head Social Fund Primary	Sen Monorom Primary school, Mondulkiri
Hem Rumnea	Principal Lower Secondary	Sen Monorom Primary school, Mondulkiri
Sap Thy	Director DOE Pichreada	Pichreada DOE
Chea Rany	Pre-school officer	Pichreada DOE
Toun Samrin	Principal Sre Kleng Primary	Pichreada DOE
Sreng Each	Chair SSC Sre Kleng	Pichreada DOE
Khoeun Vandor	Principal Chhrus Bousra Lwr Secondary	Pichreada DOE
Kleang Socheat	Principal Tbeng Chhung Primary	Pichreada DOE
Kang Sopha	Principal Pou Chel	Pichreada DOE
Deputy Director	Deputy Director POE	POE Banteay Meanchey
Head teacher	Principal, Sophie Primary School	Hun Sen Sophie Banteay Meanchey
Schools Representative	Schools Representative	DOE Poipet

Name	Position	Organisation
Chief of the District office	Chief of the District office	DOE Poipet
Ly Meng San	DPOE	Kampong Cham POE
Svay Samseda:	Head Planning	Kampong Cham POE
Kok Sijeou,	Deputy Head Planning	Kampong Cham POE
Kun Somros	Deputy Head Lower Secondary	Kampong Cham POE
Phan Sareoun,	Deputy Head Primary	Kampong Cham POE
Meiy Muniratana,	Head ECE	Kampong Cham POE
Sveybar Sovanny	Head NFE	Kampong Cham POE
Sokha Ok	Operations Officer Room to Read KC	Room to Read
Khun Sovannara,	DOE Head	Chamakar Leu District Office of Education
Chum Sok	DOE Deputy Head, Planning	Chamakar Leu District Office of Education
Chea Sopahna	Deputy of DOE Kindergarten	Chamakar Leu District Office of Education
Phin Sovannarith	DOE Officer (finances)	Chamakar Leu District Office of Education
Veit Narin	Director of Hun Sen Secondary School	Chamakar Leu District Office of Education
Phen Leng Ngoun,	School Support Committee from Hun Sen SS	Chamakar Leu District Office of Education
Hout Buntha	Director Primary Svay Lvea	Chamakar Leu District Office of Education
Sor Meng Heang	Director Primary Ta Pang	Chamakar Leu District Office of Education
Horng Phin	SSC, Svay Lvea Primary	Chamakar Leu District Office of Education
Toch Phlech	SSC from Ta Pang Primary	Chamakar Leu District Office of Education
Ek Sok Chestrha	District Director	Kampong Cham District Office of Education
Soeng Leang Chheng	District Office Official	Kampong Cham District Office of Education
Chheane Leang Chhun	District Office Official	Kampong Cham District Office of Education
Seoun Tony	Director DeiDoy Secondary School	Kampong Cham District Office
Sean Samnang	Director Toulthmor Primary School	Kampong Cham District Office
Chheang Sothorn	Director Dey Dorsch Primary	Kampong Cham District Office
Luy Channeth	Librarian at Dey Dorsch Primary	Kampong Cham District Office
Meas Navy	School support committee of Sala Thouthmor Primary	Kampong Cham District Office
Pech Savaruth	Director of Vealvong Primary	Kampong Cham District Office
Yi Songky	Deputy Director, POE	POE Battambang
School representatives	School representatives, Battambang	DOE Battambang
School representatives	School representatives, Bavel	DOE Bavel

Annex 4 Evaluation Framework

Level of Analysis	Evaluation Question	Judgement criteria / possible indicators
Descriptive Analysis	**What were the budget support inputs provided over the period, planned and actual? What were the programme implementation mechanisms?** **Rationale/Coverage:** *While a necessary set of questions for the evaluation team to answer, these questions are not evaluative in nature insofar as they require descriptive or factual rather than inferential findings and analysis. They are relevant to a number of EQs, and are therefore presented separately to provide the factual base for the inference required in the EQs and avoid duplication.*	i. Description of planned and actual BS financial inputs • *Descriptive analysis of the funds committed and disbursed, and their distribution across the performance assessment framework (PAF).* i. Description of the programme design processes for the BSPs ii. Description of assessment mechanisms • *Descriptive analysis of the PAF, its evolution over the period and relationship between the indicators and BS funds disbursed* • *Descriptive analysis of BSP assessment processes and timelines* iii. Description of capacity building inputs • *Description of capacity building inputs, their planned/actual cost & nature over the period* iv. Description of dialogue mechanisms • *Descriptive analysis of sector-wide and bilateral dialogue mechanisms, including processes, frequency, participation, agenda setting, record-keeping and content.*
STEP 1 and Level 1: **Inputs and context for Budget Support**	**EQ 1.1: To what extent were the budget support inputs timely/predictable, and the programme implementation mechanisms functional, efficient and transparent?** **Rationale/Coverage:** *The ESPSP fund disbursements occurred as planned initially, but the third payment was delayed. The ESRP completion of assessments and disbursements has been delayed for all three payments due in the evaluation period. In addition to sector-wide annual assessment processes and the RGoC's BSP assessments, the EU undertakes its own analysis annually through a consultancy. This question is aimed at assessing the functionality, efficiency and transparency of EU-specific arrangements for delivering the EU budget support inputs, and to reveal any issues at this level that may affect the degree to which the BSPs can contribute to the achievement of sector results.*	i. Disbursement of budget support was predictable in the short and medium term, and timely • *Medium term predictability: Disbursements occurred as planned, in terms of timing (disbursed in the planned year) and volume (more than 80% of funds were disbursed)* • *When delays occurred or amounts differed significantly from planned amounts, the reasons were transparent and valid, given financing agreements* • *Short term predictability: Information on the volume of funds to be disbursed was available in time for RGoC processes for the planned and actual disbursement year (transparency) and disbursements followed within two months of the disbursement decision (timeliness).* ii. Transparent, participatory, evidence-based and efficient design processes were used, including to set disbursement conditions in line with Royal Government of Cambodia (RGoC) target setting and performance measurement. • *Alignment between RGoC ESP measures and targets and ESPS and ESRP indicators and targets* • *EU, RGOC stakeholders found processes were transparent, participatory and evidence based, and RGOC has ownership of indicators and targets* iii. Assessments of the disbursement conditions were structured, transparent, fair and efficient, and aligned with RGoC processes of performance measurement • *Process was structured following a sequence that allowed decisions to be based on*

Level of Analysis	Evaluation Question	Judgement criteria / possible indicators
		verified evidence, and was predictable • *Process aligned with the RGoC annual monitoring processes* • *Partners believe the processes to be fair and efficient, and the decisions transparent* iv. Functional and efficient bilateral dialogue mechanisms established between the RGoC and the EU • *Bilateral dialogue mechanisms used by the EU are functional, aligned with RGoC processes and are non-duplicating*
	EQ 1.2: To what extent did the design and scale of the budget support programmes, and the choice of budget support as a modality, respond to the political, economic, and social context of education in Cambodia, to Government education policy, to the education sector aid context, and the evolution of the EU/RGoC partnership? **Rationale/coverage:** *The EU BS 2011-2013 and 2014-2016 was the third and fourth EU BS programme. The design of the programme evolved (i) from the two earlier support programmes to be fully in line with the EU BS guidelines and to use the CDPF for TA inputs, and (ii) between the third and fourth programme the scale and mix of inputs changed and the performance framework and dialogue moved from a more upstream process focus on building sector planning, budgeting and management institutions, to pay more attention to implementation and education outcomes. This question looks at the design of the two budget support programmes and at the way in which it has changed in response to/was relevant to the evolution of the context. While the starting point for the analysis will therefore be the financing agreements (FAs) and related technical specifications, riders will also be analysed and their contents fed into the assessment. The analysis will also look into the relevance of the choices made with regards to the mix of inputs (funds and their distribution between BS and the CDPF and between tranches and indicators,*	i. Use of budget support as a modality was relevant to the Cambodia political and public finance context, the education sector, the evolving EU/ RGoC partnership, and the overall development partnership between Cambodia and its development partners ii. Gender and equity issues were considered in the design of the BSPs • *Profile of gender and equity issues in the evolving design of the BSPs* iii. The scale and mix of financial inputs, and changes to these, were relevant given actual implementation and changing circumstances • *Changes to the scale of inputs were relevant to the context and the EU/RGoC partnership* • *Changes to the distribution of inputs were aligned to changes in the sector context* iv. Through the period, the design of the PAF and changes to it were relevant to country, RGoC, EU needs, and to evolving EU/RGoC partnership • *Quality and evolution of PAF indicators and targets were relevant to the context, the implementation of the BS programme and the evolving EU/RGoC partnership* • *The indicators and targets were specific, measurable, appropriate, relevant and time-bound, and based on sector analysis* • *Indicators and targets were aligned to government frameworks and monitoring systems* • *The targets set were strategic, i.e. realistic, while incentivising sector change* v. The choice of providing complementary TA inputs via the CDPF was relevant to the context and the EU objectives. • *The CDPF as a mechanism for TA had more potential to contribute to the objectives of the BS Programmes / was more relevant to country needs / was more aid-effective than earlier arrangements* • *EU's engagement with the CDPF as a contributing partner, facilitated the relevance of the Fund* vi. There was complementarity between the EU's use of budget support and its support for

Level of Analysis	Evaluation Question	Judgement criteria / possible indicators
	as well as a qualitative assessment of the non-financial inputs i.e. the PAF, and other technical assistance)	public financial management reform through the multi-donor trust fund • *The EU budget support complemented EU support for the PFMRP in design and management, and vice versa, enhancing the relevance of both to the Cambodia context and the EU/RGoC partnership.*
STEP 1: and LEVEL 2: Direct Outputs	**EQ 2.1: To what extent did the budget support programme inputs contribute to more and more predictable, aligned and harmonised external aid to the sector, including financial aid and technical assistance?** **Rationale/coverage:** *Over the period, particularly in the third BSP when government recurrent budget contributions did not rise, external aid was an important resource for the sector (31% of expenditure in schools and over 70% of non-wage expenditure) – its volume and how it is delivered therefore counts (is it aligned, is it harmonised, is it delivered with low transaction cost, is it predictable?). The coverage of this question is therefore two-fold: (i) did the existence of the EU BS programme co-contribute to other DPs committing more resources to the sector? (ii) what was the contribution of BS to the alignment and harmonisation of support to the sector: were donors better at coordinating aid; did they use country systems more? What about the donors that often sit somewhat outside of the sector dialogue – has the 'power' of BS brought them in, e.g. Japan, China?*	i. BS contributed to improved and more predictable external resource flows to the sector. • *Volume of external aid (in real terms) and predictability (reliability of information on the volume and timing of disbursement) of aid disbursements to sector by modality on annual and medium-term basis* ii. BS contributed to improved alignment of external aid and use of country systems • *Scale and evolution over the evaluation period of percentage of aid flows provided as SBS and making use of country systems (full or partial)* • *Indications of causal links between the EU BS, and a shift to more programmatic support and use of country systems by other development partners* iii. BS contribution to more harmonised financial aid provision from development partners • *Distribution of aid across sector objectives and specific evidence of complementarity between the financial aid support from different development partners towards sector objectives* • *Perception of stakeholders on shifts in degree of harmonisation, and contribution of BS to these shifts* iv. BS contributed to more aligned and harmonised delivery of technical assistance and capacity building inputs by donors • *The CDPF succeeded in aligning its activities to sector capacity building strategies and needs* • *The CDPF delivered harmonised capacity building support as planned* • *Increased harmonisation of TA in the sector via the CDPF*
	EQ 2.2: To what extent did the budget support programme inputs contribute to improved processes, mechanisms and quality of policy dialogue between development partners and the RGoC in the education sector? **Rationale / Coverage:** *A recurrent theme in the BS documentation and in inception period interviews is that BS has contributed to (i) sector-wide dialogue now*	i. Sector-wide dialogue was harmonised and functional • *Key RGoC actors participate regularly in sector dialogue* • *Most, if not all, development partners participate regularly in sector dialogue and have no/minimal bilateral dialogue mechanisms* • *Important non-governmental actors participate in sector dialogue* • *Links between the harmonised sector dialogue discussions and RGoC decisions can be established* i. Quality sector-wide dialogue occurred, i.e. sector dialogue was strategic, evidence-based and relevant to country needs and the RGoC priorities, and responded to changing

Level of Analysis	Evaluation Question	Judgement criteria / possible indicators
	including dialogue with the MoEF, and (ii) deeper dialogue with the MoEYS, including close consultation with the DPs on the allocation of own resources. This question will look at the nature and quality of the policy dialogue frameworks and processes, and their evolution over the evaluation period. It will also test alternative explanations of positive developments in policy dialogue, such as that they have been driven by sector-wide processes or other factors.	circumstances • *Policy dialogue focuses were aligned with the RGoC priorities and country needs over time* • *Policy dialogue in the sector was strategic, i.e. promoted common agreement on key priorities and appropriate interventions to achieve the priorities (analysis of dialogue content, perception of participants)* • *Policy dialogue in the sector balanced discussion on policy and processes, with discussion on policy implementation and results (analysis of content, perception of participants)* • *Policy dialogue in the sector contributed to the availability and use of evidence in the national and development partnership debates (analysis of content, perception of participants)* ii. The BSPs contributed to all parties to the dialogue, including the EU, all RGoC stakeholders, and other development partners, sharing a common understanding and interest to foster harmonised policy dialogue and reaching agreement on priority issues and/or interventions • *The capacity building support, EU dialogue inputs and budget support funds contributed to more harmonised, functional and effective dialogue* • *Dialogue participants perceive the choice of BS as a modality as important for the functionality of policy dialogue (as against other modalities)* iii. *The EU BSPs' inputs into sector-wide dialogue contributed to its quality: were the inputs strategic, relevant to achievement of sector priorities, and results-focused?*
Step 1 and LEVEL 3: Induced Outputs *The evaluation*	**EQ 3.1: Did the budget support programmes contribute to an increased flow and to better distribution of government resources in the sector, including at decentralised levels?** **Rationale/coverage:** *The flow of government resources to the education sector as a share of available resources*	i. The BS programmes have contributed to an increased share for the sector in the RGoC budget • *Sector resource shares over the period, all expenditure included, including unallocated expenditure;* • *Evidence of and stakeholder perceptions of whether and how the BS programmes contributed to changes in the volume of RGoC resources in the sector relative to other*

Level of Analysis	Evaluation Question	Judgement criteria / possible indicators
will test the extent to which the BS programmes have created the environment and opportunity to support and expand agreed reforms and interventions, or new innovations, in key sector governance and management areas under ESP. Key to investigate, related to budget support intervention logic, are for example whether the BSPs, including through the financial inputs, PAFs,	*has been an issue throughout the evaluation period. It was part of the PAFs, and also a key theme of dialogue. Similarly, how funds were distributed within the budget, was a key issue. While in the Intervention Logic increases in the discretionary funding from government resources are depicted as a direct output of government's complementary inputs, that this should occur is one of the targeted induced outputs of the BS Programmes, not a direct output (which would assume a direct link between a deposit to the general revenue fund, and increased resources to education). Given its importance, and the importance of how resources are distributed, it is formulated as a separate question.*	*factors* ii. The BS programmes have contributed to both an increased share of non-personnel resources to the sector, and an increased share of personnel budget expenditure[5] • *Evolution of budgets and expenditure outturns within the sector, relative to government as a whole* • *Evidence of and stakeholder perceptions of whether and how the BS programmes contributed to changes in the distribution of resources in the sector relative to other factors, including off and earmarked on-budget aid* iii. The BS programmes have contributed to a more strategic, equitable and evidence-based distribution of resources between levels of government (centre, province, district and schools), between provinces and districts, and between education objectives, given concerns about equitable access to quality education services. • *Evolution of resource shares within the sector over time between different budgeting dimensions, against ESP priorities.* • *Evidence of and stakeholder perceptions of whether and how the BS programmes contributed to changes in the distribution of resources in the sector relative to other factors*
	EQ 3.2: To what extent did the budget support programmes contribute to policy development, planning and monitoring & evaluation systems in the education sector in a decentralised context? Have they contributed to ensuring better results-based management of the sector? **Rationale/coverage:** *The Education Strategic Plans relevant to the BS Programmes target institutional strengthening for decentralisation and leadership in the sector as key objectives. Improvements in the management of the education sector for better and more equitable results were also key in the PAFs and policy*	i. The BS programmes have contributed to improved systems to manage education system planning in a decentralised context • *Evidence of coordinated and integrated central, provincial and district planning systems, linked to the ESP and evolving sector policies and strategies, particularly evidence of links between the ESP, sector review processes and the annual operational plans of provinces and district* • *Evidence of and perceptions of the BSPs' contribution, relative to other factors* ii. The BSPs have contributed to MoEYS reforms to strengthen policy development and implementation • *Evidence of reforms to strengthen and strengthened provincial and district understanding and buy-in to policies and interventions, and implementation of policies and interventions* • *Evidence of and perceptions of the BSPs' contribution, relative to other factors*

[5] The generic budgeting terms of personnel and non-personnel expenditure are used here and should be deemed to also refer to the pre-2014 programme and non-programme budget categories used in Cambodia.

Level of Analysis	Evaluation Question	Judgement criteria / possible indicators
sector dialogue and the CDPF have enabled the institutionalisation of interventions piloted through other support programmes, enabled the building of capacity for and understanding of interventions, or supported the ownership of interventions.	*dialogue of the BS Programmes. Efforts to improve these systems – in order to deliver better education services in line with reforms – occurred within the context of government-wide decentralisation of decision-making. This question focuses on the extent to which these systems and institutions improved, within this context. The question and judgement criteria are aimed at first establishing what changes were targeted and occurred, and then teasing out how the BS Programmes contributed to these changes, including through the direct outputs of policy dialogue (EU and other), the PAFs, and the CDPF.*	iii. The BS Programmes have contributed to improved results-based management of the sector. • *Improvements in the timeliness and reliability of sector data* • *Extent to which core RBM approaches are being applied in the sector to improve efficiency and effectiveness in planning, management of service delivery and associated monitoring* • *Evidence of coordination of results monitoring across central, provincial and district levels of the sector* • *Evidence of and perceptions of stakeholders of BS Programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors*
	EQ 3.3: To what extent did the budget support programmes contribute to the overall improvement in the quality of PFM, both in the sector in general, and particularly related to fiscal transparency and revenue mobilisation? **Rationale/coverage:** *An additional aspect of the institutional strengthening targeted by the ESPs is improved budgeting and public financial management in the sector. Any efforts to improve systems in this area occurred within the context of decentralisation, and the implementation of the Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PFMRP) of government. The PFMRP is structured to progress from improved budget credibility and financial controls, to improved links between policies and budgets. Related to the latter the RGoC introduced programme-based budgeting in 2014, with education as a pilot sector. This question focuses on the extent to which the Budget Support Programmes have over the period contributed to the achievement of improved budgeting and financial management in the sector given the overall PFM reform context, through its inputs and direct outputs. Furthermore, an assumption of the BSP was that the provision of budget support would enable the EU to also influence overall PFM*	i. The BS programmes have contributed to improved medium-term budget preparation in the sector within the context of sector reforms, decentralisation and the introduction of programme-based budgeting, and objectives of equitable / pro-poor distribution of resources. • *Budget credibility (change in variance) over time* • *Linkages facilitated between budgets and sector policy priorities (change in allocations relative to sector priorities; evidence of change in systems)* • *Cross-sector coordination of budget prioritization (evidence of change in systems)* • *Evidence of and perceptions of stakeholders of BS programmes contribution to changes relative to other factors, including the PFMRP* ii. The BS programmes have contributed to the improved capacity of POEs / DOEs to allocate and spend resources in line with agreed priorities and in response to local needs • *Alignment of POE budgets to sector priorities (equitable access, and quality), including through the Annual Operational Plans* • *Budget execution rates of POEs and DOEs* • *Evidence of and perceptions of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors, including the PFMRP* iii. The BS programmes have contributed to improved financial controls, accounting and reporting in the sector within the context of decentralisation and the introduction of programme-based budgeting. • *Evidence of change in systems* • *Evidence of and perceptions of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors* iv. The BS Programmes were able to influence the setting of PFM reform priorities over the

Level of Analysis	Evaluation Question	Judgement criteria / possible indicators
	improvements, with particular objectives related to transparency in the fourth support programme (2014-2016/17). While this evaluation will not be able to fully assess government's PFM reform programme it is important to assess the degree of influence the sector-linked BS enabled to impact on government's reform priorities in PFM. A particular focus for this assessment will be budget transparency	period, and implementation of priorities, particularly related to budget transparency • *Evidence of links from the BS Programmes' inputs and/or direct outputs to the RGoC overall PFM reform programme, including whether the provision of BS has strengthened the EU's voice in PFM policy dialogue, in a complementary way to the support for the PFMRP, particularly on budget transparency*
	EQ 3.4: To what extent have the budget support programmes contributed to improved deployment and (results-based) management of human resources, specifically but not limited to teachers, in the sector for the delivery of equitable, quality education? **Rationale/coverage**: *The Education Strategic Plans relevant to the BSPs targeted the development of staff capacity as a key objective. Furthermore, various aspects of human resource management featured centrally in the EU's PAF and policy dialogue over the period (including around staffing norms, performance management and professional development) and in the interventions of the CDPF.*	i. The BS programmes have contributed to improved human resource management policies, management and deployment in the sector given sector context and priorities • *Performance management systems for staff including teachers have been agreed* • *Agreed human resource policies are being implemented (including on staff norms and performance management systems)* • *Change in the number and distribution of management and administrative staff across and within levels of the system, in line with agreed norms* • *Evidence of and perceptions of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors* ii. The BS programmes have contributed to improved policies and systems for teacher deployment and development, and improved teacher capacities and deployment • *Appropriate staffing norms – given the socio-economic context of education, efficiency, quality and equity concerns and public resource availability – were agreed* • *Change in the number and distribution of teachers across provinces and districts, in line with norms / equity, efficiency and effectiveness concerns, with a particular focus on the deployment of teachers to rural schools* • *Policies and policy implementation plans for teacher development – in line with the sector's socio-economic context, resource availability and priorities, including quality and equity – have been agreed timeously and are being implemented* • *Improvements in teacher capacities and qualifications* • *Evidence of and perceptions of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors*
	EQ 3.5: To what extent did the budget support programmes contribute to improved formal school-based management in the early childhood education, primary and lower secondary sub-sectors?	i. The BS programmes have contributed to the development of better policies and implementation of these policies for the design and management of school-based financial resources (SOBs and the School Improvement Grants) over the period, relative to key sector priorities including equity, efficiency and effectiveness • *Improvements in SOB design and implementation can be observed*

Level of Analysis	Evaluation Question	Judgement criteria / possible indicators
	Rationale/coverage: *School-based management has been a key sector reform since the late 1990s. After the decentralisation of expenditure competency for some aspects of school costs through the School Operating Budgets in the early 2000s, efforts have focused on strengthening the systems to manage this funding, and efforts to improve school level planning and management of education delivery – including through community engagement and oversight, school director development, district capacity strengthening. This question will investigate these systems, and how well they focus sector systems for results based management on school improvement and contribute to improving sector outcomes. The focus will be on schools in the ECE and basic education system, i.e. more on ECE, primary and lower secondary phases of the school-based education system.*	• *Lessons from the earlier FTI SIGs and Sida SIGs (during the period) have been used to improve the design and rules for and management of government SOBs.* • *Evidence of and perception of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors.* ii. The BS programmes have contributed to strengthened policies for implementation of policies for, and actual improvement in, the role of communities, including through the School Support Committees, in school management • *School Support Committees trained, improved functioning of committees* • *Evidence of and perception of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors.* iii. The BS programmes have contributed to improvement of leadership at school level • *Policies/strategies in place and implemented for the strengthening of school directors* • *Evidence of and perception of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors.* iv. The BS programmes have contributed to improved inter-school, DOE and POE support for and oversight of schools • *Policies/strategies and institutions designed and implemented for the strengthening of district and provincial support and oversight of schools* • *Policies/strategies and institutions designed and implemented for the strengthening of support between schools* • *Evidence of and perception of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors.*
	EQ 3.6: Have the budget support programmes contributed to the formulation and implementation of specific education delivery policies to address key aspects of poor sector outcomes in early childhood education, primary and lower secondary? **Rationale/Coverage:** *Over the period MoEYS has formulated a number of specific policies with regards to more equitable access and improved teaching of and learning by various population groups and overall, to address specific outcome shortfalls. Similarly, the EU support over this period included a number of process /*	i. The BS programmes contributed to the design and delivery of specific reforms / interventions by the MoEYS (Line Departments as well as POEs and DOEs) to improve equitable access across the country, particularly for disadvantaged groups. • *Evidence of design and implementation of reforms and interventions aimed at addressing high repetition / drop-out rates and low completion rates in primary and lower secondary education (e.g. ECD expansion, Child Friendly Schools, scholarships, NFE and re-entry programmes)* • *Evidence of and perception of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors.* ii. The BS programmes contributed to the design and delivery of specific reforms / interventions by the MoEYS (outside of teacher development) to improve the quality of

Level of Analysis	Evaluation Question	Judgement criteria / possible indicators
	output indicators focusing on specific aspects of service delivery to disadvantaged areas, and (to a more limited extent) reforms to drive quality improvement in teaching and learning. This question allows investigation of the existence, coverage, focus and implementation of policies, relative to the sector concerns highlighted by government, and the contribution of the BS programmes to these policies and their implementation.	teaching and learning in schools, including for disadvantaged groups • *Evidence of design and implementation of teaching and learning reforms aimed at addressing specific teaching and learning barriers faced by disadvantaged groups (e.g. gender-sensitive measures, bilingual education, learning materials improvement and availability, assessment reforms, orientation of measures above to disadvantaged groups)* • *Evidence of and perception of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors.*
Step 2 and LEVEL 4 and 5: Outcomes and Impacts	**EQ 4: To what extent have sector outcomes (equitable access, quality, efficiency) improved and have the development outcomes targeted by budget support been achieved? Are improvements sustainable? What factors have been the main determinants of these achievements?** **Rationale/coverage:** *The Education Sector ESPs targeted equitable access to education and improvement in the quality of education as key outcomes. The EU support has focused on a limited number of outcome level indicators during this period (besides the output and process indicators dealt with in step 1, level 3 above) particularly on equitable access in the lower performing districts. Quality has not been targeted by the EU at the outcome level, but has been targeted at the process and output level.*	i. Positive achievements can be observed against key equitable access and outcome targets across the period of support (identifying variation at province / district levels) • *Change against the Core Breakthrough Indicators of outcome 2011 to 2016* • *Change against selected outcomes targeted in ECD, primary and lower-secondary sub-sector components of the ESPs, in the EU BS PAF and in policy dialogue* • *Causal analysis of trends in outcome indicators, by province and district, to identify determining factors, including contribution by induced outputs and non-school factors to improvements* • *Quantitative and qualitative analysis of countervailing factors preventing outcomes from worsening* ii. Positive progress at the outcome level is sustainable to result in growth and poverty reduction impacts • *Analysis of the sensitivity of outcome achievements to changes in context and school factors and likelihood that they will be sustained to deliver growth and poverty reduction impacts* • *The evolution of socio-economic development and poverty reduction impacts (income, income distribution, employment, and non-income poverty indicators such as utilisation of health services, health impacts, access to improved sanitation and gender equity) and qualitative analysis of the potential capacities of identified outcomes to add to the improvements of selected impacts.*
Step 3: Concluding inferential analysis on the causal links between levels 1,2	**EQ 5: To what extent have the direct or induced outputs of budget support contributed to the results identified at the outcome and impact levels?** **Rationale/coverage:** *This question seeks to establish evidence-based linkages between budget support and the outcomes observed and their potential impacts. The question and judgement criteria are aimed at guiding the*	i. The BSPs have been efficient and effective in delivering the direct outputs envisaged • *Summary conclusion drawing on findings in EQs 2.1 and 2.2* ii. As a consequence of these outputs and the response by government, the BSPs have been effective in inducing the desired sector outputs towards improved sector outcomes • *Summary conclusion drawing on findings in EQs 3.1 to 3.6* iii. Through these induced outputs the BSPs have been successful in generating important

Level of Analysis	Evaluation Question	Judgement criteria / possible indicators
and 3, and between levels 3 and 4.	*analysis undertaken in Step 3.*	sector outcomes. • *Summary conclusion drawing on findings against EQ4* iv. Positive progress against key sector policies, reforms and interventions (the induced outputs) is sustainable, and BS has contributed to this sustainability • *Evidence and perceptions of stakeholders on the sustainability of interventions, including commitment and use of government resources, evidence of improved capacity, evidence of institutionalised changed.* • *Evidence and perceptions of stakeholders on how the BS Programmes have contributed to the sustainability of the induced outputs.* v. Budget support has added value, given the analysis on the contribution of budget support to the induced outputs, and the findings in 1.1 and 1.2.

Annex 5 Matrix of responses to the Evaluation Questions

<table>
<tr><th>Judgement Criteria and Indicators</th><th>Findings</th><th>Sources</th><th>Conclusions</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">EQ 1.1: To what extent were the budget support inputs timely/predictable, and the programme implementation mechanisms functional, efficient and transparent?
Conclusion: The 2011 to 2013 BS Programme inputs were time and predictable for the most part, but in the second programme neither medium term nor short term predictability was achieved. This did not matter much in the context, as a large share of commited resources were eventually disbursed. Programme implementation mechanisms however were functional, efficient and transparent.</td></tr>
<tr><td>i. Disbursement of budget support was predictable in the short and medium term, and timely
• Medium term predictability[6]: Disbursements occurred as planned, in terms of timing (disbursed in the planned year) and volume (more than 80% of funds were disbursed)
• When delays occurred or amounts differed significantly from planned amounts, the reasons were transparent and valid, given financing agreements
• Short term predictability: Information on the volume of funds to be disbursed was available in time for RGoC processes for the planned and actual disbursement year (transparency) and disbursements followed within two months of the disbursement decision (timeliness).</td><td>ESPSP was programmed with three disbursements, but a fourth was added as an extended payment for the reassessment of the 2013 conditions; the ESRP was programmed with four disbursements by the end of 2016.
For both programmes disbursements were planned for December of the assessment year, in time for the start of the RGoC financial year in January.
The table below shows the difference between known budget support flows by December of the assessment year, for the subsequent three years, and actual flows. The table shows the amount of variance, whether positive or negative. It shows that while short term predictability was good in 2011 and 2012, it deteriorated for the subsequent two years in relation to FY1. Predictability for FY2 improved, but also deteriorated for FY3 (medium term predictability).
From 2012 the predictability of amounts for FY2 and FY3 was affected not only by lower than expected disbursements, but also by the fact that the ESRP programme was adjusted with higher disbursements.
Short term predictability was influenced by whether there were queries from the EU in the assessment process. Whenever additional documentation was requested or queries were raised, the process was not complete by the end of the assessment year, and information on the disbursement as well as the disbursement delayed into the subsequent year.
Table 5.1 Difference between planned budget support known by December, and actual flows for subsequent three years
<table>
<tr><th></th><th>In 2011 for MTEF 2012 to 2014</th><th>In 2012 for MTEF 2013-2015</th><th>In 2013 for MTEF 2014 - 2016</th><th>In 2014 for MTEF 2015-2017</th><th>In 2015 for MTEF 2016 - 2018</th></tr>
<tr><td>FY1</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>6 557 142</td><td>5 742 857</td><td>8 800 000</td></tr>
<tr><td>FY2</td><td>785 715</td><td>7 700 000</td><td>5 742 857</td><td>2 200 000</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>FY3</td><td>7 700 000</td><td>6 557 142</td><td>8 800 000</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
</table>
The figure below shows the difference between projected (by December of the year before the fiscal year) and actual disbursements for the forward three-year medium term (the column clusters), for each tranche year (the columns). It shows that short term predictability for FY1 was high for the first two years of the ESPSP (dots on the zero line for FY1). Thereafter it deteriorated, so much so that in 2013 and 2014 the disbursement expectations for FY2 was more reliable than the expectations for FY1. Medium-term predictability for the outer year, however, got worse. This is on account of disbursements that were higher than expected. In 2012 and 2013, in the absence of a signed agreement</td><td>EC-BSP 2011b; 2011f; 2012b; 2012g; 2012q; 2013b; 2013h; 2013v; 2014a; 2014f; 2014u; 2014x; 2015b; 2015g; 2015h; 2015ab; 2016b; 2016f; 2016g; 2016w; 2016x
Interviews MOEYS DGPP, EUD</td><td>Budget support was predictable in the initial years. .
In the ESPSP disbursement amounts were known in time for RGoC planning processes, and disbursement occurred in a timely manner, except for the third tranche
For the ESRP budget support was not predictable in the medium term insofar as the timing and volume of disbursements differed significantly from planned disbursements.
The ESRP was also not predictable in the short term, as information on disbursement / non-disbursement reached the MoEF late, even if disbursements were made in a timely manner, once decisions were finalized.
The reasons for differences between</td></tr>
</table>

[6] The use of the terms medium and short-term predictability draws on Lister S, Bjørnestad L, Carter R, Chiche M and Ross D, 2011, *Aid Predictability – Synthesis of Lessons and Good Practices*, Volume 1 of a Study Prepared for the DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness – Task Team on Transparency and Predictability. The OECD DAC definition is that aid is predictable when partner countries can be confident about the amounts and the timing of aid disbursements. Medium term predictability occurs when countries have reliable knowledge 2 to 4 years in advance of the amount and timing of the disbursement. Short-term predictability relates to less than two years but still in advance of the fiscal year, and in-year refers to knowledge only within the fiscal year of disbursement. Lister et al notes that predictability is therefore closely related to reliability of aid and timely transparency on disbursement. Reliability is aided too by transparency on the rules for disbursement.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	for the ESRP, disbursement amounts for 2014 and 2015 were not known. Furthermore, actual disbursements for 2013 were zero, as the ESPSP disbursement planned for end 2013 only occurred midway through 2014. **Figure 5.1 Difference between planned and actual disbursements over medium term**  Source: EU Delegation Cambodia **Planned and actual disbursements for the ESPS** For the ESPSP, 90% of funds were disbursed. Disbursements can therefore be considered to have occurred as planned in terms of volume. The first two disbursements of the ESPSP occurred on schedule by December of the planned disbursement years; the third disbursement occurred 6 months late in July 2014, on account of EU concerns about the EMIS data. This was communicated to the MoEF, but the date of communication is not known. The reassessment disbursement was predictable and on time. **Planned and actual disbursements for the ESRP** For the ESRP, 81% of funds committed up to end 2016 (1st-3rd tranches), were disbursed by May 2017, but only 51% by December 2016. The ESRP disbursement decisions were delayed beyond the start of the RGoC fiscal year, and therefore not predictable in the short-term, as by December of the year before, the disbursements amounts were not known. The 2014 assessment was completed late in 2014 and the issues with documentation communicated on the 21st of Nov 2014, late to be considered predictable in the short term. The request was received in August. The 2014 disbursement delay was because a report on budget transparency and the audit reports were outstanding. The 2015 payment was disbursed in May 2016. The RGoC submitted the tranche information on 22.09.2015. The issues on documentation were communicated on 28.09.2015 and further issues on 2.02.2016. The 2015 disbursement delay was because of outstanding documents on the implementation of the ESP and variable tranche scholarship indicators. The 2016 assessment process was completed by March 2017. The issues on documentation were communicated on the 20.12.2016, after the RGoC submission on 01.11.2016. The 2016 disbursement delay was because of outstanding documents on variable tranche indicators 2.5 and 2.6 on scholarships, and on 2.7 on multi-lingual education. Assessment processes for the ESRP were late relative to planned processes, because the ESRP's indicators involved more complicated data collection than the ESPS, and because for the ESRP the MoEF's involvement added another step in the processes, taking more time.		planned disbursements and delays were communicated and known and the rules for disbursement were clear. If assessment processes were completed in a more timely manner in the ESRP, it would still be possible to argue that it was predictable, despite the disbursed amounts differing from the planned amounts. Assessment processes ran late because of more complicated indicator data collection, and an extra loop in the process relative to the ESPS. A better process would have been to schedule payments to take into account that queries may arise.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
ii. Transparent, participatory, evidence-based and efficient design processes were used, including to set disbursement conditions in line with Royal Government of Cambodia (RGoC) target setting and performance measurement. Alignment between RGoC ESP measures and targets and ESPSP and ESRP indicators and targets Analysis of the process, perceptions of participants on quality of processes and ownership of indicators and targets	The ESPSP and ESRP were designed jointly by the EU and the RGoC, through consultative processes. The programmes and the associated performance assessment frameworks were also discussed in the sector-wide dialogue forums. Consultants contracted by the EU provided the support to processes, for the 2011-2013 and the 2014 to 2016(17) budget support programme. During the design of both programmes the consultants held meetings with the MOEYS and the MOEF, and the EUD, as well as with the partners in the CDPF. Adjustments to targets and indicators occurred through riders in both the ESPSP and the ESRP, and for the ESRP also through an exchange of letters as the original design and Financing Agreement was finalized prior to the finalization of the 2014-2016 ESP. Once the ESP was finalized its targets for the relevant indicators were used. Agreement on adjustments to indicators and targets was reached through informal and formal engagement between the EUD and the counterparts. The bi-annual review of the Budget Support Programme for the ESPSP and the semi-annual review for the ESRP were a key point in this process. Document analysis shows a high degree of alignment between the ESP and the PAFs of the ESPSP and the ESRP. Of the 10 ESPSP indicators, 2 are ESP Core Breakthrough indicators (CBIs), while the remainder are aligned at the strategy level of the various ESP programmes. Of the 12 ESRP indicators, 5 are aligned to sector objectives and are CBIs, and 7 are aligned to either priority ESP programmes, or sub-sector objectives, strategies and targets. There is ownership of the indicators, but it varies by indicator. For some there is agreement between the EU and the MoEYS to use specific indicators as a means to create good management conditions (e.g. the ESRP MoEYS budget efficiency indicator (Ind 2.11) and the capital budget indicator (Ind 2.12). However, the ministry also found some of the indicators outside of its control and/or difficult to coordinate towards the PAF targets, even if they were indicators in the ESP (e.g. the ESPSP Budget allocation indicator (Ind 1.1) and the completion rate indicators (ESPSP Ind 1.2; ERSP Ind2.2 and 2.3), and the ESPSP teacher deployment indicator (Ind 2.6)). RGoC counterparts find the use of thresholds without the option to reassess the following year in the ESRP difficult. Some indicators – e.g. the budget realisation indicator – were almost achieved in some or all of the years, but the Financing Agreement does not allow for part disbursement against process indicators. This appears not to have been fully understood in the initial ESRP assessment year.	RGoC MoEYS 2010; RGoC MoEYS 2014a; ESBSP 2011-2013; ESBSP 2014-2017; EC-BSP 2012f; 2013g; 2013j; 2014h; 2015k; 2016h Interviews with MoEYS, EUD leadership; EUD past education officers	The processes to design the ESPSP and ESRP programmes were participatory, evidence-based and efficient. Processes were aligned with the RGOC's own processes to set measures and targets for the sector There is alignment between the RGoC ESP performance framework and the Budget Support Programmes for most indicators. Good ownership of the PAF indicators suggests that design processes were participatory and transparent. Low ownership of some indicators is not on account of the design process
iii. Assessments of the disbursement conditions were structured, transparent, fair and efficient, and aligned with RGoC processes of performance measurement Process was structured following a sequence that allowed decisions to be based on verified evidence, and was predictable Process aligned with the RGoC annual monitoring processes Partners believe the processes to be fair and efficient, and the decisions transparent	The annual assessment of disbursement conditions for the ESPSP and the ESRP were predictable for all parties, using the same sequence of steps across years, respectively for each programme. For the ESPSP two changes to the process were agreed in 2012: (i) the EU proposed that the base and variable tranche assessments will be done at the same time; and (ii) the high level bilateral meeting on the ESPSP fell away as the JTWG came into place. The ESPRP process included an extra step, with the MOEF being the contractual government counterpart for the Budget Support Programme. The DGPP manages the reporting process from the MOEYS side. The early phases of the annual process are timed to dovetail with government's own annual monitoring processes, particularly the Annual Education Congress. This means that for indicators that use measures and targets from the ESP, one process is used. The measurement period however, does not necessarily align perfectly. Indicators that can be calculated on an ongoing basis (e.g. budget liquidation, ESPRP Ind 2.11) are calculated for as late as possible before submitting the funding request. After the Education Congress, a joint assessment meeting is set up between the EUD and the MOEYS – usually May/June, based on MOEYS' reports. The EU then brings in a consultancy team to validate the MOEYS reports, after which the MOEYS is given a period to achieve some indicators. The Request for disbursement is then sent to the EUD (via the MOEF for the ESRP).	EC-BSP EC-BSP 2012f; 2013g; 2013j; 2014h; 2015k; 2016h; 2014o, 2015r and 2016o Interviews with EUD and RGOC counterparts	Assessments of disbursement conditions are objective and use verifiable evidence. The process was streamlined to reduce transaction costs for RGoC and EU. The use of a contracted team of consultants to validate achievement of indicators, facilitates an evidence-based, fair and transparent process. The EU communicates its concerns about the achievement of conditions in good time to allow consideration of

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	The EUD undertakes its assessment, adding its reports to the payment file, which is then dispatched to Brussels for a decision. Issues are resolved on a one-on-one basis. Information exchanges between the RGoC and the EUD and the minutes of the annual technical review meetings of the Budget Support Programmes are documented and show discussion of reasons why disbursements can or cannot be made. The team did not find issues on the procedural fairness or transparency of the annual assessment process.		RGoC responses in decisions On balance, responses are considered in a fair manner in the final decision, given the specifics of the Financing Agreement The processes to assess the disbursement conditions are seen as transparent and fair for the most part
iv. Functional and efficient bilateral dialogue mechanisms established between the RGoC and the EU Bilateral dialogue mechanisms used by the EU are functional, aligned with RGoC processes and are non-duplicating	The ESPSP and ESRP used informal and formal mechanisms to dialogue with the MoEYS and the MOEF. These mechanisms were focused largely on issues specific to the management of the programme, e.g. the fulfilment of conditions for disbursement. The formal mechanisms for the ESPSP were two annual review meetings, one in the second quarter of the calendar year and the second in late third / early fourth quarter. For the ESRP, one meeting per year is held, undertaking both the joint assessment and reviewing current implementation. This meeting occurs in the second quarter of the calendar year. The informal engagement is at the MoEYS DPP and technical department level, and at the official level of the MOEF. This engagement can be frequent, particularly during the assessment process in the first half of the year, during validation, and after the formal request from the MOEF has been received. Over the two programmes some changes were made to the bilateral dialogue mechanisms, including undertaking the CDPF dialogue through the mechanisms set up for the CDPF (early in the first programme), doing away with a high-level Budget Support Programme dialogue and setting up one process for the base and variable tranche disbursements. The EUD and RGoC see remaining bilateral dialogue as necessary to manage the programme, and non-duplicating of sector-wide mechanisms	EC-BSP 2012a, 2012f, 2013a, 2013g, 2014h, 2015a, 2015j, 2015k, 2016p Interviews with the MOEYS DGPP and EUD	Bilateral dialogue has been pared down to one to two formal engagements per year. Formal engagements are structured to occur after the RGoCs own monitoring and review processes, and specific assessment processes. Informal bilateral engagements are numerous, but necessary for the management of the programme Both the informal and formal bilateral engagements support the joint sector dialogue mechanisms

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
EQ 1.2: To what extent did the design and scale of the budget support programmes, and the choice of budget support as a modality, respond to the political, economic, and social context of education in Cambodia, to Government education policy, to the education sector aid context, and the evolution of the EU/RGoC partnership? *Conclusion:* The use of budget support was relevant given the long history of Education Strategy development and implementation, and within the context of a credible PFM programme and stable macro-economic policies. Budget support was a highly relevant instrument to deliver support to the education sector, as it had the potential to anchor higher use of country systems by development partners, crowd in donor and government partners in the sector partnership, and potentially support increases in the MoEYS budget share, which as declining at the start of the ESPSP. Budget support was relevant to the EU, as it facilitated the absorption of increased development support budget for Cambodia, and support to a RGoC priority sector. As one of two partners providing budget support, and given the size of the programmes, it has made the EU an anchor partner in the sector with leverage to tackle policy issues. An argument can be made that budget support is not relevant to the EU fundamental values, given the Cambodia political context. However, the BS PAF's focus on disadvantaged groups and regions is relevant to the country context, given high disparities in education inputs and achievement between provinces, districts and groups. While the scale of the BS Programmes overall are therefore relevant to the context and the EU/RGoC partnership, the mix of budget support and capacity development funds would have been more strategic for sector progress, if more funding was provided to the CDPF. The ESPSP PAF indicator selection was relevant and strategic in the context, and while some aspects of the ESRP selection were also relevant and strategic, a higher focus on strategies and actions that support sector quality improvements would have been more strategic. The use of the CDPF for capacity building inputs was relevant.			
i. Use of budget support as a modality was relevant to the Cambodia political and public finance context, the education sector, the evolving EU/ RGoC partnership, and the overall development partnership between Cambodia and its development partners	The use of budget support was relevant at the technical level to the RGoC, the education sector, the education sector development partners and the EU/RGoC relationship. The use of budget support was relevant to the education sector because: **Sector resources** It linked significant discretionary resources for the MOEF to progress in the education sector, encouraging the allocation of state resources to the sector. **Use of funds fully aligned and owned by MoEYS** It targeted major challenges in the education sector on access to secondary education, on equity and quality in basic education, and on efficient sector management. It supported the ESPs, which were fully owned by the MOEYS, and had the support of the development partners. It fully uses country systems – e.g. technical MOEYS departments had to request and use funds to implement activities relevant to the BS Programmes' PAFs through the RGoC budget system. It thus strengthened these systems in the sector. It encourages more use of country systems by other development partners **Supports sustainable programme results** It facilitated greater sustainability of programme results. It has for example contributed to the government budget taking over the cost of key contributors to better access and quality in the sector, such approaches to school grants and the use of scholarships. The budget support is also relevant to RGoC policies as it has assisted the Education Minister to push through reforms, more so than a direct project would have because of dialogue support and the size of the programme. The use of the budget support modality has remained an important anchor point for the education sector dialogue, and this dialogue has been a significant factor in the successful promotion of relevant sector reforms. The use of budget support was relevant to other development partners because it brought the MOEF more strongly into sector dialogues, strengthened the incentives for the MOEYS for effective dialogue, and anchored the partnership with the MOEYS overall. The use of budget support was relevant to the RGoC/EUD development partnership, the EU, and the public financial management context in Cambodia, because it Is aligned with EU development support policies for the use of budget support. The education sector had a long history of partnership in the implementation of sector reform and development with the EU and other development partners, and an endorsed sector plan. Robust sector dialogue structures and the results achieved through these structures in the ESPSP influenced the view that a second budget support programme	Poyck 2012; EC 2012; EC BSP 2013g Interviews EUD, previous EUD post-holders; MoEYS, MOEF and development partners	Budget support is relevant to the education sector because it has strengthened the use of sector plans, sector engagement with the MOEF and development partners, strengthened sector systems, supported sustainable programme results, and provided a means for the Minister to push through focus education sector reforms. Budget support is relevant to the Cambodia public financial management context, given progress in implementing the PFM reform plan. Budget support is relevant to other development partners as it anchors dialogue in the sector and strengthens the sector partnership. The provision of budget support has supported the EU/RGoC partnership because it makes the EU a valuable partner to the

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	would be an effective way to provide support for the sector. The decision was also influenced by the strong partnership between the EU and fellow development partners such as Sida, UNICEF, the World Bank etc, and the evolving relationship between development partners and the MoEYS and MOEF. Occurred in a context of good progress in the implementation of public financial management reforms, including on budget transparency. Allowed complementarity and mutual reinforcement between EU support for public financial management reform and decentralisation, thus providing the means to promote good public financial management, besides promoting sector reform and service delivery. Strengthens the EU's position as a key development partner for the RGoC. On the other hand, because budget support is not guaranteed to bring additional discretionary resources to the education sector, it can be less relevant for the sector than earmarked modalities. For example, at the technical department level, budget support is not perceived to bring new resources for sub-sector priorities directly. This means that at this level, education sector leaders are not necessarily incentivised by budget support to undertake sector reforms, more than what they otherwise would be. However, on balance, the relevance factors at the technical level outweighs this, given the history of the implementation of the two programmes under review. The relevance of budget support to the political context in Cambodia is highly contentious. It was arguably over the implementation period not relevant to EU policies regarding the EU fundamental values. Recent developments have brought this aspect into sharper focus. The 2012 Budget Support Guidelines however, state that sector budget support can be provided if conditions for general BS are not met, because it can provide the best delivery mechanism and can provide a vector for good governance.		RGoC, and facilitated complementarity between different areas of EU support. The technical relevance of budget support as a mechanism to deliver development support is challenged by its relevance to the Cambodia political context, and the EU fundamental values. For the period under review the technical relevance still outweighed this challenge.
ii. Gender and equity issues were considered in the design of the BSPs Profile of gender and equity issues in the evolving design of the Budget Support Programmes	Increased and more equitable access to better quality education was a specific objective of the ESPSP. The ESPSP PAF included a number of indicators that were intended to achieve this result, including the specification of the primary completion rate indicator by number of districts. The EMIS reported wide disparities between districts in achieving primary completion rates. Applying rationalised staffing norms was also partly aimed at addressing geographic and other disparities between schools. The indicator relating to school operating budgets was also aimed at using transfers to schools to reduce inequality between schools. Addressing gender and other drivers of inequality such as poverty, geographical location, social exclusion, vulnerability and disability, are an explicit cross-cutting objective of the ESRP, and part of the expected results. In the rationale for the choice of indicators in Appendix 2 of Annex 2 of the Financing Agreement, issues of disadvantaged groups and locations are highlighted for most indicators. Some indicators target these disadvantages directly. At the level of induced outputs the programme improved targeting and implementation of policies for boys and girls alike; and at the outcome level targeted improvement in key indicators of service delivery, including the reduction of gender disparities with respect to increased enrolment, reduced drop-out at all levels, increased number of qualified teachers and improved literacy and numeracy skills. The variable tranche indicators in the PAF do not make explicit mention of disaggregation by sex. Some of the indicators however, such as the number of district achieving completion rates and scholarships for poor students, are explicitly aimed at addressing drivers of disparity. Furthermore, the documentation for the 2nd rider, which extended the programme length and increased the commitment, set a focus on disadvantaged groups as one of the dialogue focuses. Both programmes supported ESPs, which in turn are explicit at the objective and strategy levels about improving equity in the education system.	EC BSP 2011-2013; EC BSP 2014-2017 RGoC MOEYS 2010 and RGoC MOEYS 2014a	Addressing the drivers of disparity, including gender, is a key objective of the ESPSP and the ESRP. This is clearly stated in the programme documentation, and it is possible to trace the objective through to the PAFs. The ESRP was more explicit in targeting drivers of disparity in formulation.
iii. The scale and mix of financial inputs, and changes to these, were relevant given actual implementation and changing circumstances	The final total commitment of the ESRP is EUR83.1 million which is 2.7 times the ESPSP. Of this 89% was committed to budget support, compared to 75% of the ESPSP, despite the ESRP committing 1.14 times the CDPF funds committed in the ESPSP. The ESRP is funded through two commitments, with the second more than doubling the resources for the period 2014-2016, and adding an additional implementation year during which a further EUR24	EC BSP 2011-2013; EC BSP 2014-2017 Quinn, 2011 Interviews with EU respondents,	The scale of the ESPSP and ESRP was significant enough to provide a platform for dialogue.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
Changes to the scale of inputs were relevant to the context and the EU/RGoC partnership Changes to the distribution of inputs were aligned to changes in the sector context	million was to be disbursed. Therefore, not only did the financial inputs significantly increase from the ESPSP to the ESRP, the composition also shifted to a higher share for budget support. The ESPSP scaled up the 2008-2010 programme, from a EUR7.5 million commitment to budget support (disbursed 98.1%) and about EUR2 million to capacity development, to EUR23.1 million in budget support and EUR7.45 million in capacity development funds. The scale up of the ESPSP from the 2008 to 2010 programme was relevant to the sector as it accelerated the benefits of providing budget support. The final programme review of the 2008-2013 programme found that the budget support component allowed the sector leadership leverage to put pressure on staff at all layers of the MoEYS to perform better. The PAF of the ESPSP was more oriented to supporting sector planning and review processes, than specific policy actions. Secondly it argued that reforms put forward as tranche release triggers enjoyed a high profile, and therefore attracted political support and a profile from the MOEF. Increasing the budget support component was relevant, as it deepened these effects, in a context where commitments to the MOEYS budget as a share of government budget had been a sector and donor concern. The scale up of the Budget Support from the first to the second programme was relevant to the EU, given that it was reflective of a commensurate increase of development resources for the EU in Cambodia. It allowed the use of these resources within the capacity limits of the EUD, against a credible, comprehensive sector plan in a sector that was a priority for the RGoC, and that had a long history of successful partnership with the EU and other development partners. The scaling up of budget support was also relevant to the sector, insofar as it was based on the RGoC's commitment to reverse the decline in the budget share to education seen over the ESPSP programme. The initial increase in the first ESRP agreement, was encouraging decisions to increase the school operating budgets, the expansion of the scholarship programme and increases in teachers' salaries. The argument was that an increase in the budget support component of the budget support programme, would enhance the support to government to undertake these actions, by increasing the resources the RGoC had at its disposal while domestic revenue sources were gradually being increased. The increased commitments in the 2nd commitment, were based on the same arguments. From the ESPSP to the ESRP 2nd commitment, the increase to the budget support component was therefore premised on inducing an increase in education sector resources through an increase in the funding for the programme, and through dialogue. A strong argument however can be made that a better mix should have been achieved between the capacity development support funds in the second programme, and budget support funds, still allowing a sufficient scale up in budget support funds to achieve the objectives set out above. A key barrier to faster progress on sector reforms is technical reform capacity, and sector management and implementation capacity at all levels. Respondents at central, provincial and district level raised this consistently as a key challenge. Donor respondents also noted that across all level there were too few skilled personnel to plan, budget, manage, implement and monitor reforms. At school level the capacity of school directors and school support committees to implement the school-based management model effectively was noted by donors, civil society, POE and DOE staff, and by school respondents too. This evaluation found that the CDPF played a key role in moving forward on the design, negotiation, imbedding and implementation of sector reforms, and building capacity for sector management from the central to school levels. The CDPF component in the first programme scaled up the capacity building component of the 2008 to 2010 programme (which was about EUR2 million). However, the ESRP did not scale up the ESPSP commitment by much. In fact, in the original version it was reduced from EUR7.45 to EUR5.52 million, and only increased by a further EUR3 million on 2nd rider to the programme. It is arguable that even about a 5% shift from budget support funds (equal to EUR3 million) to the CDPF component, would have significantly increased the resources of the CDPF, allowing for more direct capacity development interventions, while reducing the Budget Support funds from EUR73 million to EUR70 million. This reduction would not have affected the contributions made by the budget support inputs to the direct outputs or	interviews with RGoC MoEYS and MoEF respondents	The increase in the volume of funds committed in the ESRP relative to the ESPSP was relevant to the EU, because it absorbed additional funds allocated to the Cambodia programme, in arguably the right sector. It was relevant to the context of the education sector, because improvement in sector outcomes was dependent on increasing resources to the sector and significantly increased budget support made it possible for Government to increase main budget resources, which the RGoC did. The change in the mix relative to the CDPF however, was not relevant to the sector, as a higher allocation to the CDPF could have enhanced the catalyst role of the fund in sector reform progress.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	induced outputs.		
iv. Through the period, the design of the PAF and changes to it were relevant to country, RGoC, EU needs, and to evolving EU/RGoC partnership Quality and evolution of PAF indicators and targets were relevant to the context, the implementation of the BS programme and the evolving EU/RGoC partnership The indicators and targets were specific, measurable, appropriate, relevant and time-bound, and based on sector analysis Indicators and targets were aligned to government frameworks and monitoring systems The targets set were strategic, i.e. realistic, while incentivising sector change	**Eligibility criteria** For the ESPSP the fixed or base tranche was disbursed against satisfactory progress in sector policy/strategy implementation, macro-economic stability and public financial management reforms. For the ESRP the requirements were defined more precisely in the PAF, to the following: Implementation of a relevant and credible stability orientated macro-economic policy The relevance, credibility and implementation of the PFMRP The relevance and credibility of the ESP and its satisfactory implementation. In addition, a budget transparency criterion was added, namely satisfactory progress with regard to the public availability of accessible, timely comprehensive and sound budgetary information, in line with the 2012 EU Budget Support Guidelines, which includes budget transparency as an eligibility criterion. Including a budget transparency criterion also complemented support to the PFMRP that did not include budget transparency and oversight, external audit and issues of corruption sufficiently comprehensively. For all six assessments against eligibility criteria for the base tranche, full payment was effected. Respondents linked progress on budget transparency to the provision of budget support, insofar as this supported dialogue on PFM reforms. Discussion on progress against the ESPs focused on progress on interventions, but noted that the core breakthrough indicators were too ambitious, required additional sector resources in line with the resource frameworks in the ESPs, and were thus inconsistently achieved, sometimes even deteriorating. **Shift to higher proportion associated with variable tranche appropriate** Shift to more equal distribution between fixed and variable tranche relevant to role of variable tranche indicators in anchoring sector dialogue, and better evaluability of variable tranche conditions, and supported by higher use of outcome and output indicators. The variable tranche indicators were seen to provide more leverage than the fixed tranche conditions, because fixed tranche indicators related to issues beyond the sector – besides the sector plan condition – and they were not as evaluable as the measurable targets of the variable tranche, and therefore much less likely not to be disbursed. **Performance assessment frameworks** The ESPSP and ESRP PAFs used a suitable mix of outcome, output, input and process indicators and a mix of quantitative and qualitative indicators, given the sector context. The design of the PAF for the ESPSP included three quantitative and eight process indicators. Of the quantitative indicators two were at the outcome level (completion and drop-out rates), and one related to the MOEYS share in the budget (input). Of the 11 indicators three used quantitative targets, while eight used the specification of process milestones. These were however specified clearly. The original PAF for the ESRP included four outcome indicators (enrolment, primary and lower secondary completion and lower secondary drop-out rates), and 6 input and process indicators (primary and lower secondary scholarships, teacher qualification, bilingual schools, national assessments, and MoEYS budget efficiency and transparency). Of the ten indicators, nine were assessed through quantitative targets. One used targets that specified process milestones. Higher use of outcome indicator was aligned with a recommendation from the MTR of the ESPSP. Indicators and targets were adjusted in the 2015 rider, which also increased the resources in the ESRP and the implementation time. Two indicators were added, both at the process level (a non-formal education re-entry programme; MoEYS capital budget processes and agreement). Of the twelve indicators five used quantitative targets for the full remaining period of the programme, three used a mix of quantitative targets and process specifications, and four used only the specification of processes as targets. Changes at the outcome level take time to achieve, given the scope and size of challenges facing the sector. Focusing the PAF in both programmes more at the induced output levels (rather than outcomes) through quantitative	EC 2012 EC BSP 2011-2013; EC BSP 2014-2017 EC BSP 2011f and g; 2012g, 2012h, 2013h, 2013k, 2014f, 2014j, 2015g, 2015l, 2016e, 2016i Pre RGOC MoEYS, EUD leadership and staff members	The PAF variable tranche indicators and targets are specific, measurable and time bound The PAFs were well understood by all parties, except for the changes in rules in the ESRP relative to the ESPS The mix of indicators in the ESPS in the ESPS was strategic and appropriate to the sector and Cambodian context, given the challenges in the education sector A greater emphasis on strategies and actions in support of quality improvements would have been more strategic in the ESRP than the higher focus on equitable access The first formulation of the ESRP formulated too many process indicators with unrealistic quantitative target thresholds, given the sector context. Initially it was not fully understood by the MOEYS that part progress on a process indicator does not count. This is now well understood, and while it creates frustration, it is also seen as a strong incentive for achieving sector priorities.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	targets on inputs and reform interventions is therefore justifiable and realistic. The move back to process targets in the rider was in response to slow progress in the processes that would have delivered the quantitative targets specified in the original programme. This was relevant to attempting to maintain a better balance between targets that allow disbursement (effectively incentivising the flow of resources to the sector) and targets that incentivise effective sector reform. The MOEYS respondents argued that more easily achievable indicators should have been set, particularly, indicators at all levels should have been more in control of the MOEYS (ie not involve other RGoC institutions, e.g. the budget share indicator was almost completely a non-MOEYS decision) and should be more clearly relatable to specific actions that will more certainly produce the desired target within the specified time period (ie not be outcome indicators). While there can be some sympathy with this view, given the consistent difficulty of achieving indicators that do not comply with these two requirements, the counter argument is that the non-use of outcome indicators would not be aligned with EU BS policies, that outcome indicators are appropriate for budget support modality as they require sector-wide progress, and that getting broader RGoC support for education sector reforms is precisely the objective of using budget support as a modality. Besides, some indicators that were routinely not achieved complied with both indicators (but required agreement across sub-sectors and technical departments). Rather, a strong argument can be made that the targets may have been too ambitious, rather than the indicators not suitable (see below). The indicators and targets were all clearly defined, specific, measurable and time-bound. The indicators were aligned to RGOC and sector plans and priorities, which is appropriate. The process indicators focused on resourcing and institutional strengthening issues in the sector, e.g. the adequacy of school budgets; the quality of financial management; human resource capacity, quality, management and distribution; and the decentralisation of education. In the ESPSP, the PAF indicators were aligned with the ESP 2009-2013 measures and interventions. Three of the core breakthrough indicators were in the ESPSP PAF. The process indicators supported RGOC's broader reforms in PFM, decentralisation and evolution and public administration. In the ESRP, the indicators were aligned with ESP 2014-2018 measures and interventions. Four of the 10 core breakthrough measures of the ESP were reflected in the PAF (ECD enrolment, primary and lower secondary completion rates, and national assessments). The indicators also supported the objectives of the ESPSP and ESRP. **Access / Equity objectives supporting indicators** The outcome indicators related to completion rates, take into account differences in performance across provinces and districts (particularly in the final targets after the revision of the ESRP). The indicator on increases to the school operating budgets (through reducing the need for school fees). The focus on scholarships, NFE and multilingual education in the ESRP selected key strategies of the MOEYS to improve equitable access to education. **Quality objectives supporting indicators** The indicators in the ESPSP related to staffing norms for teachers, and in the ESRP related to teacher qualifications. The ESPRP indicator on national assessments The ESPRP indicator on access to ECE arguably supports quality objectives **Sector efficiency and governance objectives supporting indicators** The indicators on drop-out rates in both programmes Some ESPSP process indicators focused on resourcing and institutional strengthening issues in the sector, e.g. the adequacy and design of school budgets; the quality of financial management; and the decentralisation of education. The ESRP focused on budget liquidation and the use of sector capital budgets. The focuses of the ESPSP and ESRP variable tranche PAFs were selected to be complementary to the support		

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	provided by other donors to the sector. However, the BS programme PAFs could have been more focused on quality, a key sector challenge. The education sector context analysis shows that while access to education was expanded successfully in the decade prior to the period under review, the key challenge to maintaining that access is the quality of education, and the perceived value of completing schooling. While the ESRP PAF was suitably more oriented towards education-specific change and interventions related to equitable access and quality (rather than improvement in the general management systems of government in the sector) than the ESPSP, it was oriented more towards equitable access objectives, than quality objectives. Arguably, overall for sector performance, a higher focus on sector reforms relating to quality would have been more relevant in the context. This may have included more indicators relating to teacher quality and deployment to represent a broader front of actions addressing these issues; indicators relating to curriculum improvement and the quality and availability of teaching materials; or indicators relating to classroom methodologies. All of these are also priority strategies and actions in the ESPs. Furthermore, while the PAFs (particularly for the ESPSP) may be seen to be too heavily oriented towards processes to prepare for reforms (studies, development of policies and regulatory texts) rather than implementing reforms, this was reflective of the context at the time. For example, in relation to the school operating budgets, while the MOEYS and development partners had long acknowledged that the PB budgets were too rigid, it required many years of the FTI to create conditions for addressing this with the MOEF. Also, respondents argued that the ESPSP was implemented in a different political context -- prior to the 2013 election and before the appointment of the current Minister of Education, who has a reform mandate – and that a PAF linked to budget support that supported processes to negotiate difficult reforms, was appropriate. These arguments are given credence by the fact that more implementation orientated, quantitative targets in the first formulation of the ESRP PAF were for the most part not achieved, resulting in a reversal to process indicators. This – together with the fact that reassessment was not possible and progress in process indicators was not recognized -- resulted in a decline in disbursement against commitment from 80% of the variable tranche in the last year of the ESPS, to 2% in the first year of the ESRP. Indicator targets were not always realistic, and hampered implementation of the programme. In the ESPSP analysis shows that variable tranche targets were achieved about half of the time. Targets that were often not met were on indicators related to an increased share of government resources to the MoEYS, the issuing of a revised Praka for strengthening school management, revising the internal audit manual and procedures, and the operationalization of a staff performance review system. In the ESPRP the indicators that were consistently not met related to achieving the completion rate and outcome targets, and budget efficiency targets. The indicator on national assessments were not met in its original form, but met in its revised form, realigned to the MOEYS own revised timetable for implementing the assessments. While the targets against the quantitative indicators were set at a level aligned to ESP targets (if not these targets themselves), they were too ambitious. Similarly, process indicators were arguably set too ambitiously. While teacher deployment and performance-based human resource management are strategic indicators, rethinking policies, designing regulatory aspects and implementing change are ambitious given the pace of reforms that involve multiple stakeholders and RGoC institutions in Cambodia. Furthermore, the RGoC respondents pointed out the frustration in the second programme of process indicators having to be met fully as stated, and then no option for reassessment in the following year. This did not always take into the account the high probability of delays in processes, and just missing quantitative targets often due to reasons outside of the MOEYS' control. However, respondents also noted that it provides incentives to work towards the		

<table>
<tr><th>Judgement Criteria and Indicators</th><th>Findings</th><th>Sources</th><th>Conclusions</th></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>target, that aids sector management.
There was little disagreement between the MoEYS requests for disbursement and EU assessments. At the start of the ESRP the MoEYS requested part payment against process indicators based on good progress, but this was not paid out as the Financing Agreement did not allow part payment against these indicators.</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>v. The choice of providing complementary TA inputs via the CDPF was relevant to the context and the EU objectives.
The CDPF as a mechanism for TA had more potential to contribute to the objectives of the BS Programmes / was more relevant to country needs / was more aid effective than earlier arrangements
EU's engagement with the CDPF as a contributing partner, facilitated the relevance of the Fund</td><td>Evolution of the CDPF
The CDPF started in November 2011 with co-funding from the EU, Sweden and UNICEF. The fund is managed by UNICEF, and implemented by the MoEYS. The EU co-chairs the Steering Committee of the Fund.
In the ESPS committed EUR7,450 million to the CDPF and the ESRP EUR8,520 million. The increase was to implement the EMIS strengthening programme, and in response to the RGoC request to couple increased funding for the budget support component, with increased funding for the CDPF.

Table 5.2 CDPF Budget
<table><tr><td>PHASE I</td><td colspan="2">Contribution and Currency*</td><td>USD</td></tr><tr><td>EU</td><td>7450000</td><td>EUR</td><td>10 356 496</td></tr><tr><td>Sida</td><td>21000000</td><td>SEK</td><td>3 233 982</td></tr><tr><td>UNICEF</td><td>1500000</td><td>USD</td><td>1 500 000</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">Total</td><td>15 090 478</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">EU Support Share</td><td>69%</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>PHASE II (initial and extension)</td><td colspan="2">Contribution and Currency*</td><td>USD</td></tr><tr><td>EU</td><td>8520000</td><td>EUR</td><td>10 303 451</td></tr><tr><td>Sida</td><td>45000000</td><td>SEK</td><td>5 896 392</td></tr><tr><td>UNICEF</td><td>1000000</td><td>USD</td><td>1 000 000</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">Total</td><td>17 199 843</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">EU Support Share</td><td>60%</td></tr></table>*Exchange rate from World Bank Development Indicators Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) for year of commitment
In earlier support programmes for education in Cambodia, funding was made available for capacity building support directly contracted by the EU, for evolving capacity development needs. The support through the two budget support programmes under review differ from this support in that it is through a pooled fund, managed by UNICEF, and against a medium-term capacity development plan of the MOEYS. The first version of this plan was the MoEYS Capacity Development Strategic Master Plan 2011-2015.
In 2015 the CDPF Phase II was agreed with the same partners (EU, Sida and UNICEF and the MOEYS as beneficiary) and institutional arrangements.
CDPF a relevant capacity building choice for the BS Programmes
The CDPF is a relevant mechanism to provide budget support, as it aligns capacity development support with strategic sector needs, more so as the strategic effectiveness of the Capacity Building Master Plan improved. It is a better arrangement for the budget support programmes' purposes overall, as in the previous arrangement the capacity development EU funds were used for interventions specifically targeted at achieving the EU programme PAFs, reducing ownership of results. In the CDPF this direct link is absent, as the EU funding is to a pooled fund that is committed against a master plan from the MoEYS.
The CDPF is also relevant to the EU, because as the co-chair of the Steering Committee by virtue of its contribution to the CDPF, it participates in the dialogue on capacity development choices for the sector as a whole.</td><td>EC 2011b; EC, 2014d; EC BSP 2011-2013; EC BSP 2014-2017; CDPF 2016; UNICEF 2015
Interviews EUD, CDPF Secretariat, UNICEF, RGoC
Interview with CDPF evaluation team leader and sub-national team member
The Documentary sources are credible and detailed</td><td>The choice to provide capacity building through a pooled fund modality with Sida and UNICEF was relevant as it facilitated more strategic, owned and integrated capacity development support.
The CDPF contributes to the implementation of ESP interventions / sector reforms by providing technical support for evidence-based and results-oriented policy and strategy development and for monitoring and review; by supporting training and skills development for policy and financial management as well as education development; and supporting institutional development.
The activities supported by the CDPF are driven by MOEYS needs and these needs are linked to implementing the ESP.

The EU support is the biggest component of the CDPF, making the EU an anchor partner</td></tr>
</table>

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	The link from BS to the CDPF also means that Sida and UNICEF's participate in BS Programme meetings by virtue of their partnership in the CDPF, give more weight to policy discussions in these meetings.		
vi. There was complementarity between the EU's use of budget support and its support for public financial management reform through the multi-donor trust fund The EU budget support complemented EU support for the PFMRP in design and management, and vice versa, enhancing the relevance of both to the Cambodia context and the EU/RGoC partnership.	The PFMRP has been implemented since 2005 and is now expected to run until 2025, strengthening PFM systems around a series of four sequenced platforms, namely budget credibility, financial accountability, budget policy linkages and performance accountability. The programme has been assessed as credible in the annual budget support programme assessments, against its progress reports. The ESRP added a budget transparency criterion for disbursement of the base tranche. While this relates to the eligibility criteria for Budget Support as set out in the 2012 EU Budget Support Guidelines. However, it also supports the support provided to the PFMRP, which was deemed not to include issues of budget transparency and oversight comprehensively. For example, for the 2015 disbursement the EUD used the request for additional information on performance against the variable tranche, as an opportunity to request additional information on overall budget transparency. The support for the PFMRP enables the provision of budget support. The complementary support to the PFM reforms plays an essential role in improving PFM systems, reducing opportunities for fraud and leakages. The EU's dialogue through the PFMRP also relates to the general conditions for the fixed tranche, including on overall budget transparency in the ESRP. PFM issues identified in the education sector engagement between development partners and the MoEYS, including through reviews, analysis and dialogue, are taken up via the EU participation in the PFMRP processes. The EU is a co-facilitator of the technical working group PFM. The MOEYS is a pilot ministry for implementing reforms under the PFMRP. This means that dialogue in the ESPS and the ESRP on PFM reforms was highly relevant to the implementation of the PFMRP, and vice versa. For example, when the budget preparation was shifted to programme budgeting but implementation was still on line items, the issue was raised in the dialogue with the MOEYS and the EU agreed to take it to the MOEF in the PFMRP dialogue. Preliminary interviews highlighted how key analysis could be undertaken in the EUD on the allocations to the education sector, through cooperation between the education and PFM desk officers, which was important in the dialogue with the RGoC	EC, 2015a EC BSP 2014-2017 EC-BSP 2016a, 2016h, 2015j, 2015k, 2014h, 2014i, 2013j; 2012f Poyck 2012 Interviews RGOC MOEYS and MOEF, and EUD	The PFM achievements through the PFMRP – improved macroeconomic stability, increased revenue mobilization and predictable budget execution – were key to implementing the ESPS and ESRP. The EU as an anchor partner in the PFMRP, and in the education sector dialogue enabled complementary dialogue between the two programmes The complementary nature of EU support to the PFMRP and the education sector enhanced the RGoC / EU partnership

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
EQ 2.1: To what extent did the budget support programme inputs contribute to more and more predictable, aligned and harmonised external aid to the sector, including financial aid and technical assistance? Conclusion: Aid to the Cambodia education sector increased significantly over the evaluation period, but this largely because of the increase in EU budget support. Aid was delivered in more effective ways however, with the use of country systems increasing, no project implementation units by the end of the period, and more aligned technical assistance.. Given the participation of the largest donors in sector dialogue structures, of which one function is to harmonise aid, good division of labour between donors and good alignment behind the ESP. The EU is stil the only budget support donor and one of very few that uses country systems. Similarly, the founding partners of the CDPF are stil the only partners. The budget support programmes were found to have contributed to more aligned and harmonised aid, and higher use of country systems, because budget support sends a signal that country systems can be used, by its role in establishing the CDPF (which led to more harmonised capacity development support and technical assistance) and because of the role budget support plays in crowding in donor and government partners in sector dialogue mechanisms. The size of the EU programmes was large enough to have that effect.			
i. BS contributed to improved and more predictable[7] external resource flows to the sector. Volume of external aid (in real terms) and predictability (reliability of information on the volume and timing of disbursement) of aid disbursements to sector by modality on annual and medium-term basis	According to the OECD DAC aid statistics, official development assistance commitments to the Cambodia education sector increased between 2007 and 2015. Almost four times the 2007-2009 volume of aid was committed to the sector between 2012 and 2015 in real terms. Between 2007 and 2009 bilateral and multilateral donors reported commitments of USD78 million in constant 2015 terms. Between 2012 and 2015 a total of USD305 million was reported also in constant 2015 terms. Disbursements also showed an upward trend. This is reflected in the CDC ODA database as well, although not to the same degree. See analysis in main text of aid flows.	CDC, 2017 OECD DAC, 2017 RGOC MOEYS 2016c The CDC data is very detailed, but may contain entry errors or categorisation errors. Data in the database for the education sector was corrected based on interviews and on sourcing documentation to check on objectives of programmes. Original budget data was often in the home currency of the donor. This was converted to USD using the year of commitment and the World Bank Indicators list of official exchange rates.	Improved sector dialogue has contributed to more predictable aid While aid resources are not always predictable over the medium term, stronger aid coordination mechanisms during the evaluation period have helped predictability in the short term, compared to earlier periods
ii. BS contributed to improved alignment of external aid and use of country systems Scale and evolution over the evaluation period of percentage of aid flows provided as SBS and making use of country systems (full or partial) Indications of causal links between the EU BS, and a shift to more programmatic support and use of country systems by other development partners	Only two donors provide unearmarked support to the sector: the EU and the ADB. The ADB support is provided as a policy loan, backed by earmarked capacity building support. The distribution of aid by modality changed, according to the Creditor Reporting System OECD DAC aid statistics: in 2010 55% of aid to the public sector in education was via project aid, with 22% of the remainder disbursed as technical assistance and 23% as scholarships and student costs in donor countries. By 2015 only 37% was project funding, and 39% disbursed as sector budget support and pooled and basket funding. Of the remainder 15% was to technical assistance, and 10% to scholarships and student costs. The CDC database shows a higher increase in the use of country systems in education, than for the country overall. Between 2014 and 2016 1.5 times more development cooperation commitments signalled the use of country systems in financial management, auditing or procurement, than for aid committed between 2007 and 2010. For the all cooperation to Cambodia, this was 0.78 times more. The increase is largely because of ADB, SIDA and World Bank Support. The MOEYS has noted that one of the benefits of budget support is that even if development cooperation may not use country financial management, procurement and audit systems, much more aid is planned as programme aid through the MOEYS planning systems. Compared to prior to 2011, the MOEYS now has no project implementation	CDC, 2016 OECD DAC, 2017 RGoC MOEYS 2016a Poyck 2012 The CRS data are accurate as reported, however aid as reported may not reflect the full or accurate picture	Having budget support in the sector does make it more possible for other donors to provide support in a more aligned manner. This has impacted the choices of two other major partners, the World Bank, ADB and Sida, which now provide support using country systems. More aid is delivered as programmatic support, managed through MOEYS planning systems.

[7] Cf footnote 6 for a definition of predictability in the medium and short term

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	units managing discrete projects. Donors who do not use country systems, said this was because of fiduciary risk concerns or standard operating procedures relating to Cambodia as a whole.		Other donors have been and are still reluctant to provide support through country systems, because of fiduciary risk and to retain control over project implementation
iii. BS contribution to more harmonised financial aid provision from development partners Distribution of aid across sector objectives and specific evidence of complementarity between the financial aid support from different development partners towards sector objectives Perception of stakeholders on shifts in degree of harmonisation, and contribution of BS to these shifts	OECD DAC Aid statistics show a decline in the proportion of aid that is committed to the primary education sector, and an increase in the share of budget support and other unspecified aid, as well as in the aid share of the secondary and tertiary sectors. Documentary sources refer to the joint sector dialogue forum, the JTWG, providing the necessary forums to harmonise development partner support for the sector. The documents also highlight the role that the monthly ESWG meetings play in this respect. Interviews have confirmed that the mechanisms for harmonisation are effective. While many sub-sectors and areas across sub-sectors have more than one donor, larger contributions appear to be distributed across the education sector. The GPE (implemented by the World Bank over the period under review) provides complementary support to the ESRP to improve access, equity and quality with a focus on ECE and primary. The PAF indicators were chosen to be complementary to the GPE focus areas. The World Bank has provided separate support for tertiary education. Sida has supported primary and secondary education through school improvement grants, and quality insurance and inspection. There is complementarity between Sida support and the PAF indicators, e.g. on school operating budgets. The ADB provides support to secondary education, and technical and vocational education, and support to teacher training The diagram below provides a mapping of support from the main donors to the RGoC in education, by the sub-sector of their support. Budget support programmes are in green, other modalities are blue. The size of the dots correspondents to the total resources committed between 2011-2016. Programmes are mapped to their main purposes, as recorded in the CDC database. Columns to the left are sub-sectors. Columns to the right (in light blue) refer to programmes that support an area, and where support is across more than one sub-sector.	EC-BSP 2014-2018 Cambodia Joint Sector Review, 2016 RGOC MoEYS 2016a CDC 2017 UNESCO 2016 OECD DAC 2017 The databases are credible, with reservations about the accuracy of reporting to the CRS, and entry of the CDC database. See (i) above for corrections made.	The dialogue forums, the JTWG and the ESWG, are effective to coordinate and harmonise aid flows to the MoEYS The MOEYS takes a strong lead in coordinating aid flows. The ESPS and ESRP has contributed to more harmonized aid through its contribution to make dialogue effective

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	Figure 5.2 Mapping donor support to the RGoC in education  Source: CDC 2017		
iv. BS contributed to more aligned and harmonised delivery of technical assistance and capacity building inputs by donors The CDPF succeeded in aligning its activities to sector capacity building strategies and needs in a responsive manner The CDPF delivered harmonised capacity building support as planned Increase harmonisation of TA in the sector via the CDPF	The CDPF is aligned to sector capacity building strategies and needs. It derives its workplan fully from the Capacity Development Master Plan, drafted and updated by the MoEYS. **CDPF performance and alignment** The CDPF support is provided through a variety of actions, including MoEYS-led training activities, technical assistance, study trips, the provision of supplies and partnerships with third parties such as NGOs or international training institutions. The CDPF Phase I Evaluation found the Fund to be responsive and effective in addressing the capacity building needs of the Cambodia education system, and the ESP. The CDPF was found to have positively contributed to education outcomes in terms of school participation; reduction of drop-out and quality of education; as well as coherent annual planning and information handling. The effectiveness of the CDPF Phase I was constrained because grants to implementing partners were not available in the first quarter of each year; MoEYS faced budget constraints for operational and maintenance of supplied equipment; not enough emphasis on school-based management; excessive use of workshops as a means of capacity development and training; and insufficient involvement of decentralised levels in planning for the CDPF. The MTR of the ESPS found that the design of the initial CDFP would have benefitted from a more strategic medium-term approach, based on the ESP objectives. The Master Plan, it found, seemed to have been adopted a bottom-up approach, de-linked from the ESP objectives. The Master Plan was then revised to identify the priority and strategic capacity development interventions aligned to the ESP. This revised plan was updated to reflect the ESP 2014-2018,	RGoC-MoEYS 2016a CDPF 2016; UNICEF 2015 The documentary sources are credible, particularly the CDPF Phase I evaluation. Interview evidence is preliminary and needs to be triangulated.	Harmonisation of TA directly through the CDPF has not occurred. However, it has contributed indirectly to increased harmonization, by providing an anchor for the Capacity Development Master Plan Other donors have not joined the CDPF on account of a desire to remain in control of their technical assistance funds, or because of

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	and named the 2014-2018 Capacity Development Masterplan. An evaluation or review of the CDPF Phase II was in progress at the time of the evaluation, but programme reports shows that progress against the monitoring and evaluation framework for the Fund is on track against most indicators. The CDPF II evaluation team however reported verbally that at subnational level training is still the prevalent approach to capacity development, that capacity is still weak, and that coverage of CDPFis incomplete. The team for the budget support evaluation's engagement with respondents at national, provincial and district level confirmed documentary evidence that the CDPF played a key role in providing the technical support needed to implement the ESPs, and by extension to achieve the ESPS and ESRP. For many education sector reform initiatives it provided catalytic support to prepare for reforms, design policies and regulatory texts, and undertake the capacity building required for implementation. For example, it provided the funding to undertake training related to implementing AOP and Programme-based Budgeting roll-out across the technical departments and sub-national units; the support to EMIS development for sector monitoring; the support for school-based management training; the support to develop the Teacher Policy and the TPAP. The CDPF delivers harmonised capacity building support from the three founding partners, over the period. The three founding development partners of the CDPF are still the three partners to date – no further partners have joined the pooled fund arrangement. Interviews with donors in the education sector points to two reasosn for this: (i) there are institutional barriers to channeling funds through UNICEF as a UN agency; (ii) or they preferred to stay in control of their capacity building funds through earmarking. However, the existence of a Capacity Development Master Plan, developed in view of the CDPF, is also facilitating the alignment and harmonization of capacity building inputs to the Masterplan, harmonized through the JTWG and bilateral meetings between the MoEYS and development partners. The Mid-term review of the ESP pointed to the number of technical advisors working with the MoEYS reducing.		institutional barriers to contribute to a pooled fund managed by UNICEF
EQ 2.2: To what extent did the budget support programme inputs contribute to improved processes, mechanisms and quality of policy dialogue between development partners and the RGoC in the education sector? *Conclusion:* The evaluation found that sector dialogue was already active, mature and in-depth when ESPSP started in 2011. Between 2011 and 2016, dialogue continued to occur through an effective mix of annual and in-year forums. Across these forums policy dialogue was stratified so that high level strategic/decision-oriented discussions could take place, as well as detailed technical level work. Coordination of donor and government inputs through dialogue was continuous. While the leadership by the MoEYS is the main factor in ensuring harmonised and effective dialogue, the EU support helped to crowd in donor and RGoC partners, because of its size and nature. The quality of the EU's technical inputs into dialogue processes also contributed.			
i. Sector-wide dialogue was harmonised and functional Key RGoC actors participate regularly in sector dialogue Most, if not all, development partners participate regularly in sector dialogue and have no/minimal bilateral dialogue mechanisms Important non-governmental actors participate in sector dialogue	Key dialogue structures in the education sector are the JTWG and the ESWG. Opportunities for dialogue are the quarterly JTWG meetings and more regular meetings of the technical sub-groups of the JTWG, the JTWG annual retreat, and the Joint Sector Review. In addition, the EU undertakes an annual formal review of the budget support programme. The RGOC participates in the dialogue structures, through its senior leadership and technical departments. The EUD is an active participant in dialogue structures, as are the other key partners, namely Sida, UNICEF, UNESCO, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. JTWGs and ESWGs are in place in all sectors of Cambodia, in line with country development coordination policy. The Centre for the Development of Cambodia – which is responsible for national coordination of development cooperation – confirmed that the education sector dialogue is highly mature and very active compared to other sectors in Cambodia. This view was shared by the education sector development partners. The CDC contributed this to the existence of a sector-wide approach centred on the ESPs, which in turn is enabled through the dialogue. During the ESRP implementation, the MOEF-led education sector consultation – which takes place as part of the annual budget preparation – has become a highly important additional sector dialogue opportunity, even if not formally part of the RGoC/DP coordination system. This is because discussion in this forum takes place in	EC-BSP 2011g, 2012h, 2013k, d014j, 2015l, 2016i, 2016p EC BSP 2014-2017 Cambodia Joint Sector Review, 2016 RGOC MoEYS 2016a Vire V, 2017 Interviews with the EUD, sector DPs and RGoC (MOEYS, MOEF and CDC) Interviews POEs and DOEs	The ESWG plays an important role in harmonizing dialogue messaging. Sector policy dialogue is functional: meetings occur regularly, are attended by senior representatives of both RGOC and development partners, and the decisions taken are implemented. The quarterly JTWG meetings are formulaic,

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	preparation for the MOEF education sector budget hearings, and is influential in determining the size and distribution of the MOEYS budget. The Joint Technical Working Group (JTWG) meets quarterly, is co-chaired by the Minister of Education Youth and Sport, and UNICEF. The JTWG comprises all government entities involved in education, the sector development partners and education sector NGOs. The JTWG prepares an annual action plan with topics for dialogue. The JTWG has technical sub- working groups that meet more regularly. These groups may prepare papers for the annual retreat. Sub-working groups are on PFM, decentralisation and devolution, teacher training and capacity development, among other. There are also provincial JTWGs, which support the development of provincial AOPs and budgets taking into account donor support. The ESP MTR found that the provincial JTWGs have improved their performance year-on-year, but interviews suggest that the performance is still uneven. District Offices of Education's capacity to coordinate donors active in their area is limited and uneven. Districts JTWGs are not required. In addition to its quarterly meetings, the JTWG holds an annual retreat, at which more in-depth discussions are conducted on past performance and the priorities going forward. The discussions in the annual retreat are often thematic, e.g. in 2016 the Teacher Policy Action Plan was discussed in depth. The annual retreat is chaired by the Minister. The JTWG annual retreat offers more in-depth dialogue opportunity compared to the quarterly meetings, which are more structured and formalistic, according to respondents. The Education Sector Working Group comprises the development partners active in the sector. This structure meets monthly. Agreements are reached on joint analyses of sector performance, on priorities for support and on priorities formal dialogue with the MoEYS and the MOEF. The ESWG is key to coordinate support and to reach a shared understanding of the gaps in support, and the required actions to remedy these gaps. The MOEYS also conducts an Annual Education Sector Congress. The Congress gathers over a thousand participants from all the technical departments of MoEYS and all the Provincial Offices of Education, Youth and Sport, relevant Government Ministries/ Institutions, Higher Education Institutions, development partners and other education stakeholders. The Congress reviews the current school year, identifying key issues, and discusses the objectives for the coming school year. This occurs within the framework of the Education Strategic Plan. A Congress report is prepared, which reports in detail against the objectives and indicators of the Strategic Plan. The timing of the Annual Congress is dovetailed with the Joint Sector Review, and constitutes one component of the review processes. From 2015 the RGoC and education development partners undertake a Joint Sector Review. The Review provides an opportunity for the RGOC and its partners to review progress against the ESP by sub-sector and conduct a dialogue. Field visits are also undertaken. The JSR was reinstated to complement the Education Sector Congress, which did not offer much opportunity for dialogue between the RGOC and development partners, and to avoid multiple bilateral review processes. Recommendations from the JSR are merged with Education Congress recommendations. The EUD reported that the JSR provided a very good opportunity for structured policy dialogue at sub sector level with all the relevant departments around the table and the most active DPs (including NGOs) in each sub sector. Sector partners however, are considering again merging JSR and Education Sector Congress processes.		because they are very structured with pre-determined agendas. The in-depth discussions occur at the annual retreat and the JSR, and through ongoing more informal contact. The quarterly meetings are however a necessary forum for clearing issues and complement other engagement. Most development partners engage the MoEYS on sector policy issues through sector dialogue mechanisms. Most still use bilateral structures to manage their specific projects, and this is necessary.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
ii. Quality sector-wide dialogue occurred, i.e. sector dialogue was strategic, evidence-based and relevant to country needs and the RGoC priorities, and responded to changing circumstances Policy dialogue focuses were aligned with the RGoC priorities and country needs over time Policy dialogue in the sector was strategic, i.e. promoted common agreement on key priorities and appropriate interventions to achieve the priorities (analysis of dialogue content, perception of participants) Policy dialogue in the sector balanced discussion on policy and processes, with discussion on policy implementation and results (analysis of content, perception of participants) Policy dialogue in the sector contributed to the availability and use of evidence in the national and development partnership debates (analysis of content, perception of participants) Links between the harmonised sector dialogue discussions and RGoC decisions can be established	Dialogue helped in aligning and harmonising aid. It contributed to the alignment of development cooperation with the ESP through ESWG and JTWG procedures, provided information to the RGoC on donor funding, and supported budget processes. It also helped to assure coherence of capacity development with the capacity development master plan and helped to report on aid effectiveness. The dialogue forums also provided spaces in which development partners could discuss education sector issues with the MoEYS and discuss MoEYS policies and response strategies. Discussion in dialogue forums related to MoEYS decisions to take action, e.g. the 2016 dialogue informed decisions on interventions in 2017. The areas that are discussed align with sector priorities, e.g. curriculum review and reform, education financing, PFM reform, teacher development, learning assessment and monitoring. In 2014 the retreat developed a results matrix for actions in 2015. Dialogue is both backward and forward looking. The EUD reported that joint sector review discussions on challenges and bottlenecks proved very useful to build a shared analysis of the current status and difficulties. It allowed for in depth discussions, based on recent or ongoing research/studies, on dropout, on the decreasing completion rate, etc. The JSR report for 2016 content demonstrates that dialogue balances discussion on policy and processes, with discussion on implementation and results. This is confirmed by views expressed in other reports and interviews. Respondents said that the sector dialogue is strategic and key to encouraging important change in the sector. For example, respondents said the reversal of the decline in the education sector budget share can be attributed to sector dialogue, backed by joint analysis of funding for the sector done by the sector development partners. Dialogue is supported by analyses that add to sector knowledge. The sub-working groups of the JTWG prepare papers and analysis that is used for sector decision-making. The ESWG, which facilitates dialogue between development partners, plays a key role in developing strategic, common agreements on appropriate interventions to discuss with the MoEYS through join dialogue forums. It is also a forum in which areas that require further research/analysis are identified. The work is then undertaken by one or more of the development partners and taken into the JTWG. The analysis on sector financing and school-based financing are examples.	RGOC MOEYS 2017 RGOC MoEYS 2016a EC-BSP 2016p Interviews with the MoEYS and education sector development partners	Donors provide a considerable share of MoEYS resources, particularly for non-personnel costs. Coordinating expenditure and action is therefore critical for the MoEYS. This supports meaningful and effective dialogue, or dialogue that results in decisions and actions that are implemented. Dialogue is essential to and effective in coordinating donor support for the sector – it would not be possible without the dialogue mechanisms The participation of senior MoEYS leaders is important for dialogue to be effective The work of the ESWG is critical for effective dialogue, amongst other because it identifies key analysis to be done and because it contributes to donors agreeing on issues, priorities and interventions. The technical sub-working groups are also important to generate common agreement on issues and actions to be taken Dialogue is an important mechanism to bring together evidence from implementation and forward setting of priorities and actions

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
iii. The budget support programme inputs contributed to all parties to the dialogue, including the EU, all RGoC stakeholders, and other development partners, sharing a common interest to foster harmonised policy dialogue and reaching agreement on priority issues and/or interventions The capacity building support, EU dialogue inputs and budget support funds contributed to more harmonised, functional and effective dialogue Dialogue participants perceive the choice of BS as a modality as important for the functionality of policy dialogue (as against other modalities) The EU budget support programmes' inputs into sector-wide dialogue contributed to its quality: were the inputs strategic, relevant to achievement of sector priorities, and results-focused?	Interviews suggest that the budget support programmes were and are important because they bring the MOEF fully into sector dialogue. Ongoing priorities for dialogue are the financing of the sector through the RGOC budget; the financing of schools through the school operating budgets; teacher remuneration; and PFM reforms. All of these require the MOEF as an active partner, for example on the flow of resources to the sector and to ensure that sector actions align with national frameworks and reforms, and that national frameworks and reforms take account of issues faced in the sector. Interviewees also made reference to the ESPS and ESRP playing an anchoring role in dialogue. At the same time the GPE support, UNICEF support and Sida support are also significant and important to the MoEYS. The EU's simultaneous support for PFM reform enables complementarity between the sectors. Analysis of the EU's dialogue focuses show that they are aligned with ESP priority results and identified sector issues, including on sector financing, interventions that target disadvantaged groups and locations, on quality interventions, sector transparency, and teacher pay, deployment and development. The EUD's contribution to dialogue in the education sector is critical for the value-add of dialogue, because over the evaluation period the education officer in the EUD has been highly knowledgeable, and able to pay a lead role and add value appreciated by the MoEYS. This was backed by the education officers in UNICEF, the World Bank and Sida being education specialists, and playing similar roles. The decision in the budget support programme to provide capacity building support through a pooled fund, backed by a MoEYS Capacity Development Master Plan aligned to the ESP, contributed significantly to the creation of the CDPF, which in turn was important for the creation of the Master Plan, which now is the mechanism through which all capacity building is harmonised through dialogue. Interviewees reported that dialogue linked to EU support for the CDPF (which it co-chairs), supported the use of CDPF funds for achieving priority sector targets. This is also supported by internal EUD reports	EC-BSP 2011g, 2012h, 2013k, d014j, 2015l, 2016i, 2016p Interviews with RGOC and EUD Documentary evidence reflects EU views Some support from development partners, but long history of dialogue implies contribution is more about maintenance.	Budget support as a modality is important for effective sector dialogue as it ensures the MoEF is an active partner The ESPS and ESRP is an anchor for sector dialogue, and enabled an opening up of issues that could be discussed over time Links between dialogue in the CDPF structures, ESPS and ESRP structures, and sector-wide dialogue forums are important to reinforce key messages. The EUD participates in dialogue through PFM and education sector forums: this enhances the quality of its dialogue in both sectors. Who is deployed to education desks across development partners is important for dialogue to add value to the work of the MoEYS, and therefore for effective dialogue. As a corollary, the quality of the EUD education lead is important. Dialogue will continue in the absence of the EU support, but the anchoring role played in the CDPF and through budget support is important.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions

EQ 3.1: Did the budget support programmes contribute to an increased flow and to better distribution of government resources in the sector, including at decentralised levels?

Conclusion: During the evaluation period the previous decline in MoEYS resources as a share of government budget was reversed. This was however only a small increase in discretionary spending, with the majority of expenditure linked to an increase in teacher salaries, part of a cross-government reform, with additional funding due to education being a priority and MoEYS being a well performing Ministry with the ability to spend effectively. At the same time, however, there is evidence from interview sources that the BS increased availability of funds which has given the RoGC more fiscal space to increase funding to education, although the EU BS is small relative to the overall MoEYS budget. **T**he budget support programmes, and associated analysis/dialogue, has strengthened and supported MoEYS dialogue with MoEF. However, there is little evidence that budget support programme provided EU/DPs direct leverage for direct discussions on allocations of the sector budget. Another area where budget support programme has made a contribution is in increasing non-personnel expenditure through the use of dialogue and variable tranche indicators on the SOBs, multilingual education and scholarships, amongst other. There has been less influence on the capital budget as spent, due to political factors, while budget execution rates have primarily been influenced by the implementation of PB and the introduction of bank accounts for salaries. EU variable tranche indicators have had some influence on the efficiency of the MoEYS budget through focusing on school operating budget formulas and increasing funds for school budgets, while there is limited evidence that EU participation in joint sector dialogue – and analytical inputs into dialogue – has made a contribution to changes in the MoEYS budget

i. The BS programmes have contributed to an increased share for the sector in the RGoC budget Sector resource shares over the period, all expenditure included, including unallocated expenditure; Evidence of and stakeholder perceptions of whether and how the BS programmes contributed to changes in the volume of RGoC resources in the sector relative to other factors

RGoC Real Budget Growth

- Over the evaluation period the RGoC budget grew by 57% in real terms. The RGoC fiscal tables present the budget as state expenditure through the National Treasury and non-Treasury state expenditure, with the latter mostly being on-budget donor financed expenditure. National Treasury expenditure is in turn broken down in two dimensions as recurrent and capital expenditure, and as earmarked and non-earmarked expenditure. For the analysis here the non-earmarked expenditure was taken as the more discretionary expenditure of government. Earmarked expenditure contains items such as interst and loan repayments, the road maintenance fund and VAT reimbursements which are either first call on the budget, or statutory obligations. The table below shows growth in on-Treasury expenditure, including both earmarked and non-earmarked expenditures. Non-earmarked expenditure grew by 51% in real terms.
- Our analysis however shows that actual budget support disbursements by fiscal year as a percentage of the increase in non-earmarked expenditure in that year over the previous year, remains a stable 4% from 2014, except for 2015 when it increased to 5%.

Table 5.3 RGoC budget growth

Riel million real	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Growth 2012-2016
Non-earmarked National Treasury expenditure (discretionary expenditure)	6 083 765	6 351 812	7 504 945	8 075 129	9 228 603	51%
Total National Treasury expenditure	8 383 108	8 963 909	9 957 589	11 020 007	13 167 216	57%
Total National Treasury expenditure as a share of GDP	15%	15%	15%	16%	18%	21%
Budget support disbursements as a % of the increase in discretionary expenditure over the previous year		0%	4%	5%	4%	-

Source: MOEF and EU Delegation

Table 5.4 Real growth in RGoC non-wage expenditure and the budget support disbursements

Riel million real	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Non-wage expenditure	5 057 000.	5 571 015	5 826 833	6 164 270	7 674 360
Actual budget support disbursement as a share of growth in non-wage expenditure over previous year			18.2%	8.5%	2.9%

Source: IMF 2013, 2015, 2017 and EUD

- A similar calculation on budget support disbursements relative to non-wage locally financed expenditure (as reported by the IMF), shows that real non-wage expenditure grew by more year-on-year than the budget support disbursements (table above).

MoEYS budget share

- Analysis of data provided by Figures the MoEF and the MoEYS. Other data from the UNESCO (2016) and WB (2016) data confirm these figures.
- Analysis also uses data from IMF 2913, 2015, 2017
- Exchange rates and GDP inflation rates sourced from World Development Indicators
- EU –BSP 2011g, 12h 13k,14j,15l and 2016i.
- Stakeholder interviews.

- Influential factors in the MOEYS budget increase were wage growth, ROGC viewing education as a priority sector and a well performing ministry and a reformist Education Minister.
- The BS Programmes did contribute through dialogue – supported by analytical work – but this contribution was largely to the 2013 increase.
- Also, for specific education interventions, the existence of BS funding has been important through the increased availability of funds, which has given the RoGC more fiscal space to increase funding to education. However, EU BS is a small share of the overall MoEYS budget and revenue generated from economic growth and increased tax receipts have also been a key revenue sources which have allowed the budget

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	• There has been an increased share of the RGoC budget allocated to the education sector from 13.6% in 2012 to 18.3% in 2016 and 2017. Overall the budget has more than doubled since 2012 in nominal terms. In real terms expenditure by the MoEYS has also grown fast, as is shown by the graph below. Between 2012 and 2016 actual real expenditure grew by 129%. • The graph also shows MoEYS actual expenditure as a share of actual state expenditure (i.e. minus donor financed expenditure through the budget) minus interest and loan repayments, and other 'earmarked expenditures', such as the road maintenance fund and VAT refunds. MoEYS share in this expenditure had also grown over the period. In this analysis this is taken as discretionary expenditure, in other words, those areas of expenditure over which government has choice and which are not statutory obligations or first calls on the budget. The graph shows that the MoEYS share grew between 2012 and 2014, while the rest of the social sector declined slightly, and then grew faster from 2015 to 2016. • In real terms the MoEYS share grew faster than the rest of the social sector, and any other sector. Between 2012 and 2016 the MoEYS's expenditure grew by 110% in real terms. The closest sector growth was experienced by the economics and defence, security and public order sectors, at 66 and 67% respectively. **Figure 5.3 Real growth in sector and MoEYS expenditure 2012-2016**  Source: MoEF • The increased share of the RGoC budget allocated to the education sector was mainly due to the growth in the wage bill from 2014 & the increased capital budget provision in 2016. However, interviewees also pointed out that MoEYS had an increase that was larger than other Ministries. Data verifies this with MoEYS budget allocation increasing by more than the other social sectors i.e. by 11% in 2015 which is roughly comparable to other ministries, but by 36% in 2016 and 17% in 2017, whereas health received -2%, 16% and 8% respectively and social affairs 6%, 19% and 5%. • The table below combines MoEYS data on the budget allocations by chapter between 2012 and 2017, and RGoC self-financed wage and non-wage expenditure as reported by the IMF in the Article IV reports. It shows that the share of wage expenditure of the MoEYS in RGoC wage expenditure was constant, until 2016 when it grew faster. The Ministry's share of self-financed non-wage recurrent expenditure, however, declined by about 0.5% over this period. **Table 5.5 Comparing MoEYS and RGoC wage and non-wage expenditure** Riel billion nominal | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 RGoC wage expenditure | 2 660 | 3 118 | 3 952 | 4 941 | 5 805 Wage expenditure MoEYS | 664 | 785 | 975 | 1 205 | 1 534 Locally financed non-wage expenditure | 5 057 | 5 699 | 6 061 | 6 493 | 8 363		to increase.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions

Non-wage expenditure MoEYS	245	272	285	288	362
Share of wage expenditure	*25%*	*25%*	*25%*	*24%*	*26%*
Share of non-wage	*4.84%*	*4.77%*	*4.70%*	*4.43%*	*4.33%*

- Variance between budgeted and actual expenditure in the MoEYS budget was about on par with variance for the social sector as a whole, except in 2014, when it was lower. The graph includes both recurrent and capital expenditure. It is noteworthy that the economic sector and general administration sector both spent more than their budget allocations in each of the years examined.

Figure 5.4 Variance between budget and actual expenditure by sector



The MoEYS's budget execution improved steadiy between 2010 and 2013. In 2014 the PBB was introduced, with new procedures. This temporarily halted improvements. In 2016 however, execution had recovered to just below 95% (the PAF indicator target). Recovery was faster for the POEs, as they had previous experience of implementing PB budgets (see further discussion under ii below).

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions

Figure 5.5 Budget Execution MoEYS overall and for central and POEs





Source 11a and 11b: MoEYS Department of Finance

- Documentation and initial EU interviews claim that EU dialogue was an important leverage for increasing funds to the sector with the MoEYS and MoEF and achieving an increase in the sector budget. This was confirmed in interviews with donor stakeholders, and an analysis of the JTWG minutes. This occurred in the 2011-2012 period when an EU presentation to the ESWG and the JTWG, showed that MOEYS actual allocations systematically turned out to be lower than projected in the medium-term-budget framework, and that its share of budget was declining despite growth in its budget. This was taken up by the then Minister of Education with the MOEF. The EU delegation also discussed the issue with the MOEF Secretary of State at the time, who later became education minister. A submission was made to the Minister of Finance to bring forward renegotiation of the PB Prakas, and the result was an increase in 2013 in the PB budget, including for ECE and scholarships. The decline in MoEYS budget shares reversed in 2013 already, a year before the government-wide salary increases in 2014.
- The predominant view from interviewees within the RoGC and DPs in subsequent above average increases was that MoEYS received more funding than other ministries because education was a key priority; the Minister for Education was respected as a reformer and came to education with a mandate to reform; the Minister previously had worked in the MoEF and understood how to engage the finance ministry; and the MoEYS was perceived as spending its budget relatively efficiently. Several times it was noted that 'donors do not influence budget allocations' from the RoGC.
- However, there was a view from the MOEF that EU BS was important in allowing increased funding to be allocated to education in some keys areas where there had been an opportunity to allocate more funds due to the existence of BS i.e. topping up SOB by 1m riels 2016 and 2.5 million 2017, increasing capital expenditure to build new schools, increasing the scholarships and increasing funding to reduce dropouts and financing community and pre-schools. Donors and the MOEYS added the scholarships and multilingual education to this list.
- This occurs according to Interviewees from the RoGC as activities that are included within the EU BS PAF are budgeted as part of the ROGC budget process and availability of EU funds allows increased spending on specific activities e.g. a planned new IFMIS in 2018. In this sense sector dialogue also contributed to the increase in funding to the MoEYS: ongoing discussions between the MoEYS and its partners and associated agreement of priorities, through the JTWG and its annual retreat, the Education Sector Congress, and the joint sector review all contribute to what the MOEYS put forward to be financed.
- These findings are supported by the EU variable tranche (ESPSP 2011-2013) indicator- % of annual government recurrent budget allocated to MoEYS) which was consistently missed (5 out of the 6 times it was assessed between 2011 and 2014). However, there were increases in the recurrent budget allocation in all years, but they were not big enough to translate in a percentage share increase equal to the EU target.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
ii. The BS programmes have contributed to both an increased share of non-personnel resources from government to the sector, and an increased share of personnel budget expenditure in the sector[8] Evolution of budgets and expenditure outturns within the sector, relative to government as a whole Evidence of and stakeholder perceptions of whether and how the BS programmes contributed to changes in the distribution of resources in the sector relative to other factors, including off and earmarked on-budget aid	• The increased share of the RGoC budget allocated to the education sector was due to the growth in wage bill which increased from 73% of total recurrent expenditure in 2012 to 80.8% in 2016, increased capital budget provision in 2015 onwards and that MoEYS was perceived as a well performing ministry (see I(i) above). The growth in the wage bill was due to an increase in salaries for all public employees, not as a result education policy (UNESCO 2016 and WB 2016). • In the MoEYS budget non-wage expenditure declined as a share of the current budget from 27% in 2012 to 19% in 2016. Particularly, expenditure on goods declined as a share of the MoEYS budget, as is shown in the graph on the left below. It also declined in real terms, as is reflected in the graph on the right. The share of expenditure on goods fell over the period from 15% in 2012 to 8.7% of the current budget in 2016, while expenditure on services rose from 5.5% in 2012 to 6.94% in 2016. In real terms expenditure on services increased three-fold, but from a very low base of Riel49 billion. **Figure 5.6 Distribution analysis of the MoEYS budget, by item**   • Overall, non-personnel expenditure did increase in real terms, even if it fell as a share of budget (graph on the left overleaf). The graph on the right shows the degree to which donor non-budget support disbursements to the MoEYS closes the gap between salary and non-salary expenditure. The dotted line is inclusive of both donor and RGoC non-salary expenditure, on the assumption that non-budget support contributions for the most part do not contribute directly to paying RGoC salaries. • Teacher salaries have been a long term focus of DP dialogue and advocacy; it is recognized that this may have contributed to RoGC / MoEYS reforms, but there is little hard evidence that dialogue led to increases in salaries. • Reports and interviews indicated continuous dialogue on an increase for the School Operating Budgets (SOBs), with donors, including the EU being influential. The relevant Praka (508) was revised and implemented by 2015 and the SOB will increase again in 2018. • An EU (ESP 2014-2018) indicator on capital budget efficiency and predictability focused in 2017 on chapter 21 of MoEYS budget allocation for	• Teams own budget analysis from data provided by MoEF and MoEYS. Confirmed by from the World Bank (2016) and UNESCO (2016), World Bank (forthcoming) and EC BSP 2014-2017 analysis. • EU –BSP 2011g, 12h 13k,14j,15l and 2016i. • Stakeholder interviews.	• BSP dialogue and funding did not contribute to an increase in teacher salaries, therefore the share of personnel budget expenditure through dialogue, as most of the expenditure increase was on account of RGoC policy for all sector employees and most of the additional increase was due to education being a priority sector. • The BSPs contributed to leverage for the MoEYS in its budget discussions with the MOEF through the fiscal coverage provided by the BS funds, and through the joint dialogue processes. However, the new Minister's style of engagement with the MOEF is likely to have been more influential. • BSP thus has had some contribution to the increase in some non-personnel expenditure through the use of dialogue and variable tranche indicators on the SOBs and other items. There has been less influence on the capital budget due to political

[8] The generic budgeting terms of personnel and non-personnel expenditure are used here and should be deemed to also refer to the pre-2014 programme and non-programme budget categories used in Cambodia.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	2017 agreed with the MoEF with financial allocations covering construction and rehabilitation of primary schools and water supply. Interviews indicated that this is unlikely to be met as there is insufficient funding provided in the capital budget and a weak planning process for capital expenditure which is often influenced by political factors. This is despite the fact that the EU indicator in 2016 on adopting a basic education capital investment plan was achieved. There was progress with delivering WASH facilities to schools, with flexible local procurement, money direct to schools and it is the first time schools have managed funds of this kind. **Figure 5.7 Analysis of MoEYS Budget distribution, with and without donor non-budget support expenditure**  • Budget execution has been a problem, but this initially improved with budget execution rising from 88% in 2010-2011 to 95% in 2013-2015, falling to 90.4% in 2014 and 2015 and increasing again to 93.4% in 2016. This improvement was mainly due to salary payments being made through banks for the first time and the decline due to the introduction of PB. • Excluding personnel costs, budget execution fell from 90% in 2012-2013 to 82-83% in 2014/15 due to issues with the introduction of programme based budgeting, but had increased to 90% in 2016. • Interviewees reported that budget execution was better at POE level as the introduction of PB came earlier than at central level who are facing difficulties in budget execution due to the introduction of the new system. Also, that the wage bill is often not calculated accurately by POEs due the large number of staff at provincial level, the lack of ability to shift funds between budget lines and the overall number of bureaucratic controls makes increasing budget execution further difficult. • The 2017 Education Sector Aide Memoire reports 2016 budget execution of SOB and scholarship budget execution of 98% and 97% respectively, although funds for SOB are normally received late. • A variable tranche indicator focused on improving budget efficiency was included in the ESP (2014-2018). In 2015 this focused on the PB liquidation rate and in 2016 and 2017 the MoEYS recurrent budget liquidation rate. This was narrowly missed, as the disbursement target was		factors, though the progress in establishing a capital budget and spending on WASH represents an important step forward. • Budget execution rates have primarily been influenced by the implementation of PB, the introduction of bank accounts for salaries and the difficulty of estimating personnel costs.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	95% and 94% was achieved. This was missed due to problems related to the introduction of PB.		

iii. The BS programmes have contributed to a more strategic, equitable and evidence-based distribution of resources between levels of government (centre, province, district and schools), between provinces and districts, and between education objectives, given concerns about equitable access to quality education services.
Evolution of resource shares within the sector over time between different budgeting dimensions, against ESP priorities.
Evidence of and stakeholder perceptions of whether and how the BS programmes contributed to changes in the distribution of resources in the sector relative to other factors
	• There has been a slight change in the overall allocation of the MoEYS budget between the central and provincial level with the share of the recurrent budget allocated to the central level falling from 17% in 2010 to 13% in 2016 and to the POE increasing from 83% to 87%. However, figures on actual budget expenditure indicate that this shift has in practice been slightly less at 16% at central level in 2010, falling to 14% in 2016 and for POE's it was 84% in 2010 falling to 86% in 2016. The deconcentration of education functions and financing to the POEs and DOEs predated 2010 and therefore the actual shift over the evaluation period is in range with expectation.
	• It has not been possible to gain information on the allocation of the MoEYS budget between the education sub-sectors, as data is difficult to compare due to the move to PBB in 2015. Evidence from UNESCO (2016), World Bank (2016) and Unauthored –Sida/Doc on how to align BP and budget (2016) are contradictory and analysis is not very robust or comprehensive. Document review suggests the following changes:
	  • UNESCO (2016) analysis indicates an increase in expenditure on secondary expenditure and a decrease in primary education since 2012 in line with changing ESP priorities.
	  • WB analysis (forthcoming) suggests that higher education is underemphasised in the budget and actual expenditures, compared with ESP sub-sector requirements, but other sub-sectors are reasonably aligned. The analysis also indicates that while overall expenditures have shifted to be more pro-poor, per student expenditures vary notably across provinces, and do not favor the poorer provinces.
	  • An analysis of the alignment of the MoEYS budget with the operational plan indicates that higher education and primary education have significant budgets gap (Unauthored, Jan 2016)
	• An ESPSP (2011-2013) variable tranche indicator was a new school operating budget formulas to reverse falls in value and to specifically incentivise student progression and school completion. This was met 3 out of 5 times. Evidence presented in (ii) above suggests this was an area where there was donor and EU influence.
	• An ESP (2014-2018) indicator on capital budget efficiency and predictability for 2016 focused on MoEYS adopting a medium-term education basic education capital investment plan, responding to ESP priority on ensuring equity in access to education. This was met, but as outlined in (ii) there is no evidence to date that this has impacted on the performance on the capital budget.
	• In 2014 a variable tranche indicator was included in the ESP (2014-2018) for a PB increase of at least 15% in 2014 to cover a large increase in the school-operating budget. This was not met, although the increase was 12.5%.
	• Reports and preliminary EU interviews emphasised the role analysis undertaken by the EU played in highlighting budgetary issues to the MoEYS and the MOEF, and to development partners. Analytical work is undertaken through the JTWG and its sub-groups, that support the MOEYS budget proposals. These are discussed in the dialogue forums since 2013.This was verified in interviews with stakeholders and through analysis of the JTWG minutes over the period. These also point to the role continuous engagement between the donors and the MoEYS across different dialogue forums during budget preparation and execution, play in the use of resources in the sector.
		• EC BSP, 2014-2017 and EC BSP 2011-2013 provide robust information on scoring of indicators.
		• MoEYS data
		• Stakeholder interviews
			• EU variable tranche indicators have had some influence on the efficiency of the MoEYS budget through focusing on school operating budget formulas and increasing funds for school budgets.
			• There is limited evidence that the EU's participation in joint sector dialogue – and analytical inputs into dialogue – has made a contribution to changes in the MoEYS budget over the period.
			• Indirectly however, the role of the EU in supporting the continuation of effective sector dialogue, through its continued use of the joint forums as a large donor, is important, as overall the dialogue has influence on how the MoEYS uses its budget.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
EQ 3.2: To what extent did the budget support programmes contribute to policy development, planning and monitoring & evaluation systems in the education sector in a decentralised context? Have they contributed to ensuring better results-based management of the sector? *Conclusion*: Reforming the education sector management systems to be programme and result-based is a comprehensive reform over the evaluation period, while at the same time the sector is also decentralising, with expenditure competency being transferred to the POEs and DOEs. RBM encompasses reforms in human resource management (see 3.4 below), planning and budgeting, delivery and monitoring/evaluation. The EU has provided substantial support to these processes through the CDPF which has been involved in building sub-national capacity. The BS Programme PAF in the early years of the first programme had links to AOPs at sub-national level, and sub-national annual Congresses, all reforms that have been completed. Improving planning and budgeting systems in the sector have been a constant dialogue focus between the MoEYS and its development partners, including the EU. Therefore the BS Programmes have contributed to efforts to develop these systems at sub-national level, through complementary interventions via the CDPF and the indicators in the PAF and related dialogue. However, although planning systems work well at central and provincial level, there is less capacity at district and school level.			
Figure 5.8 Timeline of selected governance reform milestones (Cf EQ3.2, EQ3.3 and EQ3.4 9ii))  			
i. The BS programmes have contributed to improved systems to manage education sector planning in a decentralised context Evidence of coordinated and integrated central, provincial and district planning systems, linked to the ESP and evolving sector policies and strategies, particularly evidence of links between the ESP, sector review	*Planning* The document review and stakeholder interviews indicate that although progress has been made towards strengthening planning since 2011, there are still weak links between planning and budget allocations. Key planning reforms and measures successfully undertaken during the evaluation period have been: • ESPSP focused on development of provincial Annual Operational Plans and strategic use / review of these; including role of provincial / national congresses in setting and monitoring outcomes, link to results oriented budgeting. In context of increasing provincial role in resource allocation / management. Two indicators related to provincial level planning processes in the ESPSP PAF; RBM reflected in provincial AOPs in 2011 and Consultative results-based performance review held in each province in 2013. These indicators were both met, and represent important progress for provincial level planning. • Introduction of the AOP process at the national and the provincial levels. This was generally perceived to be a process that was being undertaken well by interviewees at provincial, district and school levels. However, central level interviewees indicated that some plans still tend to be a wish list the case of POEs and DOEs, although they have improved over time. Interviewees noted that there was still weak / variable capacity to plan at district and school level. • AOPs represent a key step in RBM, to ensure delivery of reforms. Currently managed by departments / POE, etc. as where	• UNESCO 2016, RGoC MoEYS 2016a, MoEYS 2017, UNICEF 2015a, RGoC MoEYS 2014, RGOC MoEYS, 2016c and Poyck, 2012 • Interviews EUD and MOEYS • Interviews at sub-national level • Interviews with development	• BS has contributed to improved planning systems primarily through the activities of the CDPF, which complements EU policy dialogue and indicators in the ESPS PAF. EU process indicators may have influenced application of reform, though unclear as this was planned for in ESP. Over time, EU indicators (under ESRP) focusing on specific interventions may have had more effect on focusing

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
processes and the annual operational plans of provinces and district Evidence of and perceptions of the BS Programmes' contribution, relative to other factors	responsibility lies; this may have limited inter-departmental working to achieve joint results. The AOP has an activity focus, and is reported on at Congress, and represents response to Budget Strategic Plan (BSP), though not always clear focus on link to results. Interviewees suggest that AOP helps manage and monitor delivery processes within depts. / units. PEO needs to justify own budget plans / AOPs in discussions with MoEF, further strengthening focus on results and capacity at different levels. POE has more flexibility now to adapt to own needs, and field interviews suggest this has been positive change. A link mentioned in some discussions to EU indicators, where departments need to plan / budget for activities within subsequent year AOP in order to meet targets. • The creation of the Directorate General of Policy and Planning (DGPP), within MoEYS has been seen as a positive institutional development and can lead / drive RBM processes. The Education Strategic Plan 2014-2018 prioritising the results-based management system, budgeting and monitoring at national and sub national levels of the sector. The ESP 2014-2018 mid-term review, published in 2016, led by the DGPP and another RBM milestone, undertook a comprehensive review of progress against the ESP. Discussion meetings were held across partners within the seven sub-sectors, and progress on indicators was reported. Subnational consultative meetings were also conducted. The review scrutinised all levels of the ESP, from reform priorities through policies and strategies to programmes and activities. The review also took into account the nationalisation of the Sustainable Development Goals, which were not in place when the ESP was first drafted. The review resulted in a revised ESP, with new targets. • The JTWG, provincial JTWGs and the Annual Education Congress are important processes to integrate planning in the sector across the three levels. This is asserted in Sector Reports and corroborated in interviews. The functionality and effectiveness of provincial JTWG are however uneven, according to preliminary interviews, though it is recognised this enables provincial plans to incorporate DP funds / programmes. *Decentralisation* • The deconcentration of education functions to the provincial and school level preceded the evaluation period. Over the evaluation period the main focus of this area was on decentralising functions to lower level organs of government, such as commune councils. • Progress has been slow on decentralisation: over the period the MoEYS has consistently worked on mapping education functions, negotiating which functions will be transferred and preparing the necessary legal texts. In 2015 the MoEYS drafted a Policy Action Plan on decentralisation and deconcentration in the education sector and prepared to transfer resources for sub-sectors to Battambang Province, the pilot province, however this process has now stalled despite extensive preparations and training, due to concerns regarding the transfer of functions and funding to district level as capacity remains weak, and would put gains made in better management of resources at subnational level, at risk. • The MoEYS has also undertaken extensive training of sub-national officials on the transfer of functions and responsibilities that has been supported by the CDPF and was deemed to be useful by all those interviewed, although at district and school level the training had been limited. *CDPF* • Activities under the Master Plan for Capacity Development, supported by the CDPF, aimed at strengthening sector planning, management and monitoring for improved sector performance and outcomes, and strengthening accountability systems. • The CDPF had an outcome indicator to develop policy indicators and strategic planning. The mid-term review concluded that 'CDPF had supported capacity strengthening in regard to planning, especially annual planning, thereby enhancing coherence across levels'. • The Evaluation of the CDPF Phase I found that CDPF activities contributed to improved functioning of schools and districts. • The CDPF has supported many planning functions e.g. overall strategic planning through partnerships (including IIEP) for central planning capacity; the development of manuals such as the new audit manual to align processes with PB, school based management, school committees planning at district level, training on planning and budgeting at school level. A key area of support has been for EMIS, to develop and implement EMIS Master Plan, which plays a key role in RBM through ensuring reliable monitoring data available; current weakness identified is in the use of this data across departments.	partners	departments on specific results, which linked to their AOPs. • Planning systems have been improving at central and provincial level, though a key challenge / lesson is the need to develop improved inter-departmental and inter-ministerial planning and implementation mechanisms. There is less capacity at district and school level and there is a disconnect between planning and budgeting due to the introduction of the PB process, which is temporary until a new ESP can re-align budget and strategic plan structures. • EU focus on processes and indicators relevant to results based management have evolved over the evaluation period. While progress has been made, it is clear this represents a broad and deep shift in organisational culture. Particularly in terms of accountability for results, and focusing on delivery. The more recent focus from MoEF on results, holding MoEYS departments and POE to account for these is likely making the strongest impact.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
ii. The BS Programmes have contributed to MoEYS reforms to **strengthen policy development** Evidence of strengthened policy development capacity and processes, including the use of evidence in policy development Evidence of reforms to strengthen and strengthened provincial and district understanding and buy-in to policies and interventions, and implementation of policies and interventions Evidence of and perceptions of the BS Programmes' contribution, relative to other factors	• See above on key reforms, particularly the creation of the DGPP. • MoEYS the Master Plan for Capacity Development 2011-2015 had the objective of strengthening policy development and capacity to implement at national and sub-national levels. This work has included support through newly established Education Research Council for building evidence to inform policy, also strengthening the newly restructured DGPP in MoEYS. Interviews suggest that the ERC has started to play an important role in developing evidence based research and policy, though still at an early stage. • ESP and annual review process set out policy actions, as focus for JTWG dialogue. The JTWG now develops a monitoring framework to track actions, including on policy development. • MoEYS introduced system of provincial ESPs, Annual Operation Plans (AOP), which strengthen provincial level plans, under broad ESP priorities. Given that key policies are implemented through the POEs and DOEs, the links between AOPs and policies are key. However, Congress is focused mostly on outputs / activities, less on policy / outcomes. There is evidence that the CDPF supports provincial consultation workshops to develop sector policies, such as on decentralisation and the ESP mid-term review. • There is some evidence of successful policy development over the evaluation period – the Teacher Policy is an example. However, processes are slow. The translation of the teacher policy into a Teacher Policy Action Plan has also spanned more than a year. Other examples are lengthy processes to revise the formulas for SOBs. Both of these require coordination and agreement of other RGOC Ministries, such as the MOEF.	• UNICEFF 2014, 2015 and 2016 • UNESCO 2016 • RGoC MoEYS 2016a, MoEYS 2017 and 2015 / 16 • UNICEF 2015a • Interviews MoEYS	• BS Programme dialogue, around indicators and broader sector policy (under the ESP) has positioned the EU well to support joint DP / MoEYS dialogue around policy and policy implementation. In support of this, the CDPF has enabled the MoEYS to develop its own capacity in some key areas of policy research and development. However, the link to provincial level implementation is still relatively weak. • Despite better capacity for policy development, policy development processes are slow. This however may be related to the overall Cambodia public sector context, and difficulty to coordinate across ministries.
EQ 3.3: To what extent did the budget support programmes contribute to the overall improvement in the quality of PFM, both in the sector in general, and particularly related to fiscal transparency and revenue mobilisation? *Conclusion:* PFM has been a key priority for the MoEF, MoEYS, and the BS Programmes, with PFM reform being driven by the PFMRP. The sector has seen some positive PFM achievements e.g. the introduction of PBB and the use of bank accounts for salaries and the SOB, and an increase in sector capacity in PFM. The main contribution of the EU budget support programmes has been through the complementary support provided through the PFMRP and the CDPF which has undertaken training to support PFMRP initiatives and supported the development of various PFM manuals. The CDPF has played an important role in building the financial management capacity of the POEs and DOEs, although capacity is still weak and uneven, while EU budget support programme dialogue and through the PFMRP had some influence on PFM priorities for government.			
i. The BS programmes have contributed to improved **medium-term budget preparation** in the sector within the context of	• The main improvements in medium-term budget preparation have been the full introduction of PBB[9] in 2015, following MoEYS being designated as one of 15 pilot ministries for PBB as part of the PFMRP programme. • The EUD Budget Support assessments noted the improvements in sector budget processes stemming from the implementation of PBB, with all of the budget now on a programme basis. The PBB approach with new rules has however contributed to lower budget execution rates as it is a new and complex system (see ii above).	• We have some information on PFM reforms i.e. World Bank (2016), RGoC 2016a and the	• EU BS Programme has contributed to improved budget preparation through extensive capacity building supported by the CDPF at sub-national level.

[9] Note that the term PBB as used in this report refers to the RGOC reform from the 2015, which implemented a programme budget-based approach across government. This is distinct from the term PB, or programme budget, which is an earlier reform implemented in the late 2000s, and which moved a part of the MOEYS budget onto a programme basis. This included all the resources allocated to schools in the school operating budgets, hence the use of PB commonly as a synonym for school operating budgets.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
sector reforms, decentralisation and the introduction of programme-based budgeting, and objectives of equitable / pro-poor distribution of resources. • *Budget credibility (change in variance) over time* • *Linkages facilitated between budgets and sector policy priorities (change in allocations relative to sector priorities; evidence of change in systems)* • *Cross-sector coordination of budget prioritization (evidence of change in systems)* • *Evidence of and perceptions of stakeholders of BS programmes contribution to changes relative to other factors*	• However, the misalignment of the budget structure used for the MoEYS Budget Strategy Paper and the sub-sector format used in the ESPs makes it very difficult to correctly map expenditures in budget planning to the main strategic planning instrument, the ESP. This has been part of the dialogue between the EU and other development partners and the MoEYS and MoEF. The World Bank forthcoming public expenditure review, also reflects this as an issue. Interviewees too raised this disconnect, which means that planning and monitoring at the strategic level, cannot link directly to budgets. The AOPs however, is a link instrument as they have to identify both the budget programme and ESP sub-sector that a planned activity is linked to. • RGOC interviewees also expressed concerns about the ability to link central level policies and strategies to budgets and subnational implementation, as POEs are now budget entities. This appears to be a challenge for MOEYS planning and budgeting coordinating mechanisms. The MoEYS budget process allows for the Headquarters to review the budget submissions of all PBB budget entities and consolidated this into the MOEYS Budget Strategy Paper. • This problem of linking national and subnational budgets effectively, predates the programme budgeting reform. The budget strategy paper for submission to the MOEF prepared by the MoEYS is based on submissions from the POEs of provincial budget strategy papers. These however have never been formulated from a strategic, policy perspective and tend to be wish lists using incremental budgeting, although some interviews did report that they had improved over time. This is compounded by a lack of an effective HR system through which the numbers of staff at provincial and district level can be known. Given this, the wage bill tends to be calculated inaccurately which also leads to lower budget execution. The programme budget reform could have addressed this issue, but the misalignment between ESP sectors and the programmes makes this difficult • In recent years mechanisms to link education sector policies, plans and priorities better to budget has been an EU dialogue topic. However, the MoEF did note that MoEYS budget preparation and processes had improved as the result of the new Minister. • In the ESPS the PAF included indicators to improve capacity at sub-national level, through supporting the POEs and DOEs to develop AOPs and report against them (see Judgement criterion ii below). • The 2016 MTR of the ESP notes that the budget strategic plan and annual operational plans have not yet been reflected against the sub-sector and 15 reform priorities and it is difficult to monitor expenditures by subsector and priority reforms. • The EU ESRP (2014-2018) had a variable tranche indicator on capital budget efficiency and predictability for 2016 focused on MoEYS adopting a medium-term education basic education capital investment plan, responding to ESP priority and ensuring equity in access to education. This was met, but interviews indicated that this plan is not being effectively implemented with the process subject to political influence, which undermines quality and equity considerations. • Budget preparation processes and capacity are frequent dialogue topics in the sector, with especially subnational processes, and school level processes, under scrutiny. • Dialogue in the sector around the capital investment plan was around investment in WASH. 2015 was the first year that the MOEYS had a capital allocation. The EU and key partners such as UNICEF dialogued with the MOEYS on investment in WASH infrastructure, particularly in disadvantaged areas. This met with success in terms of being reflected in the basic education capital investment plan and some progress in delivering WASH facilities, but interviews indicated that the budget support programme targets for 2017 related to the broader construction of education infrastructure will not be met. • There has been some change in budget credibility, with more reliable execution. The reason appears to be more that teacher salaries are paid through bank accounts than improvements in budget preparation.	MoEYS 2017 Education Sector Review Aide memoire • World Bank, forthcoming • ESP 2014-2018 • Interviews	• However, capacity remains uneven for effective use of the programme-based approach, particularly at the subnational level, and the long-standing issue of effective integration of central and subnational budgets to achieve sector priorities remain.. • The joint dialogue processes have noted issues on the misalignment of the ESP and the new PBB budget structure, and assisted through analytical inputs on the issue.
ii. The BS programmes have contributed to the **improved capacity of POEs / DOEs to allocate and spend resources** in line with agreed priorities	• The development of a procedural manual for decentralised financial management and its implementation was the target of the ESPSP PAF Variable Tranche indicator 2.4, which was met in each of the ESPSP implementation years. The indicators for the 2nd and 3rd year were linked to training. By the end of 2011 a first wave of training on the draft final manual had already been conducted – partly with support from the EU programme before the ESPSP. In 2012 the final manual was distributed. The EU Assessment credited the manual with an improvement in the liquidation of the programme (or operational) budget. In 2013 refresher training was held at school, district and provincial levels. This was supported through external EU Funding, CDPF and FTI funding. • While training has been conducted on procedures, evidence also suggests that there are still gaps in capacity at sub-national level.	• UNESCO 2016, UNICEF 2014, 2015 and 2016 and World Bank, 2016 • RGOC-MOEYS 2016a	• The CDPF has played an important role in building the financial management capacity of the POEs and DOEs • In both the ESPSP and ESRP indicators in the PAF

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
and in response to local needs • *Alignment of POE budgets to sector priorities (equitable access, and quality), including through the Annual Operational Plans* • *Budget execution rates of POEs and DOEs* • *Evidence of and perceptions of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors*	Capacity is unevenly distributed across provinces and districts. The practice of incremental budgeting still continues at provincial and district level. There are delays in budget disbursements and under spending of the budget still occurs, which is linked to difficulties in transferring funds between different budget lines and number of controls and procedures still in place which hinders efficient budget processes. This leads to most funds being spent towards the end of the budget year. • Capacity at sub-national level for budget preparation and execution is mentioned as a key challenge for implementation of the PFM reform programme in education in the ESP mid-term review of 2016. This was also confirmed by interviewees at provincial, district and school level, who noted a lack of skills in budgeting, particularly accounting. • Although an education FMIS system has been installed at POE, it was reported by interviewees to still be not working correctly, despite being developed 2012. This was due to it having to be modified as it was not originally based on a double-accounting system and MoEF changes in the accounting system. The system also would not link directly to the national FMIS system, which is scheduled for roll-out in the MoEYS from 2018. • Poor execution of teacher salary appropriations in the early years of the ESPSP on account of incorrect forecasting and budgeting at the provincial level was addressed. The EU and other development partners made this a focus of dialogue, linked to increasing the share of the RGOC budget to education. A fully functioning HRMIS will be important to gather reliable data on teacher numbers. The education FMIS roll-out was linked to implementing a HRMIS at provincial level, but it is also not fully effective. • Although the new procedures linked to programme-based budgeting slowed down execution at sub-national level after 2014, this was now improved with provincial level budget execution better than at central level in 2016 at 94% for POEs and 84% for central level. This was because PBB was implemented first at provincial level and POEs have learned from experience and benefitted from training, whereas the process is newer for central level entities. • The CDPF has been focused on strengthening financial management systems (analysis and revision of school operating budgets, and timely disbursement and liquidation of school operating budgets). The Evaluation of the First Phase found that the CDPF contributed to increased capacity at the District level (and school levels) through the District Training and Monitoring Teams (DTMTs). This was also confirmed by those interviewees who had participated in training, although there was a view that substantially more training was needed.	• EU –BSP 2011g, 2012h 2013k,2014j,2015l and 2016i. • EUD and RGoC interviews • Data from MoEYS	have supported EU / joint donor dialogue on sub-national capacity for budgeting and financial management • Capacity however is still weak, and uneven

iii. The BS programmes have contributed to **improved financial controls, accounting and reporting in the sector** within the context of decentralisation and the introduction of programme-based budgeting.
• *Evidence of change in systems*
• *Evidence of and perceptions of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors.*
	• Relevant key reforms during the evaluation period were:
	  • Use of Commercial Bank accounts to pay teachers' salaries and the SOB. This was overwhelming noted to be a positive achievement by interviewees and in the case of teachers' salaries has led to salaries being disbursed on time. The SOB is however still received late, but the use of bank accounts has led to better oversight of the funding by school management boards. The use of bank accounts for salaries was a cross-government initiative rather than just MoEYS related.
	  • The development and implementation of financial management manuals. As noted above, this has assisted in strengthening the management of funds in the context of PBB and was also a ESPSP indicator 2.4 that was successfully met.
	  • Development of the MoEYS Financial Management Information system (FMIS) and installation in 36 budget entities and 25 POEs. This system was however reported to not be working well by interviewees.
	  • A costed operational and procedural plan for the provision of school improvement plans to be funded through the national budget and consistent with PBB procedures within SOB. This was ESPS Indicator 2.3 which was assessed 3 times and fully met.
	• Less success has been achieved in internal audit which was reported by interviewees to still be weak. Progress has however been slow. Preliminary interview respondents have noted that while internal audit strengthening is on the agenda for the MoEYS, there are other higher priority items. The JPFMRP TWG includes a sub-group on PFM, of which the EU is a member. The EU and other partners have emphasised the strengthening of internal audit in dialogue in the sub-group and in the main JTWG, but the issues in internal audit are confirmed by the ESP 2014-2018 MTR that notes that capacity for internal audit remains a challenge.
	  • This was despite the internal audit manual and compliance audit procedures being revised in accordance with the PBB manual being an indicator for the ESPS, which was eventually met, after being included over a long period of time. Indicator 2.5 was used five times and met 2 times. The EUD Assessment reports for 2013 and 2014 noted that while an Internal Audit Manual had been developed in
		World Bank, 2016 and RGoC MoEYS 2017
		RGoC MoEYS 2016a EC BSP 2011-2013 and Poyck 2012.
		
		EUD and RGOC interviews
			• EU BS Programme has supported the implementation of PFM reforms through dialogue, use of disbursement indicators and capacity building through the CDPF.
			• The EU has positively influenced this area through its participation in the PFMRP dialogue and there were complementarities between EU support to the PFMRP and the BS Programme.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	2013, the manual was not ratified and training against it had not taken place. While an indicator on audit was not part of the ESRP PAF, audit remained on the joint dialogue agenda after 2014. • Skills in other areas of PFM are also still weak such as accounting at provincial, district and school which was highlighted by relevant interviewees, due to a lack of trained accountants or staff with accountancy skills. • These sector PFM improvements are in the context of the PFMRP, which is managed by the MOEF, and supported through a trust fund managed by the World Bank, to which the EU is a key contributor. The EU is the joint donor chair with the World Bank of the JTWG for PFM. The mid-term review of the ESP 2011-2013 concluded that 'Progress in PFM reforms is achieved through direct support under the World Bank Trust Fund', p.vi. Reports and the interviews indicate that complementarity between dialogue processes around the PFMRP and the budget support programmes contribute to results in both sectors. This is also discussed under EQ1 judgement criterion vi. • The CDPF has also played a role in implementing training for PFM initiatives launched under the PFMRP i.e. based on the new financial management manual and managing the SOC. • Other focuses have been on increases to the programme budget (now the operational budget) as a share in the MOEYS budget, and on budget execution (See above).		
iv. The BS Programmes were able to **influence the setting of PFM reform priorities in government over the period**, and implementation of priorities, particularly related to budget transparency and revenue mobilisation • *Evidence of links from the BS Programmes' inputs and/or* direct *outputs to the RGoC overall PFM reform programme, including whether the provision of BS has strengthened the EU's voice in PFM policy dialogue particularly on budget transparency and revenue mobilisations*	• See analysis under EQ1.2 judgement criterion vi on the complementarity between the implementation of the BS Programmes and the PFMRP • There is evidence that suggests that the EU's participation in the PFMRP as a donor to the multi-donor trust fund is of benefit to the implementation of the Budget Support Programmes. This is through its participation in dialogue and because as a member of the JTWG on PFM in education, and the PFRP Steering Committee (as co-chair) it can facilitate coordination of the implementation of PFM reforms in the education sector. • This judgement criterion however, is specifically focused on whether the use of budget transparency as a fourth condition for the fixed tranche (Satisfactory progress with regard to the public availability of accessible, timely, comprehensive and sound budgetary information) has facilitated progress on this and other PFM reform priorities related to accountability. This was not confirmed by interviewees at MoEF level who perceived that initiatives on budget transparency occurred due to internal initiatives that were undertaken as part of the PFMRP, which were not seen as linked to education budget support programme disbursement criteria. • Cambodia's score in the Open Budget Index 2017, a bi-annual independent survey of countries' fiscal transparency practices, was slightly higher in 2017 (a score of 20, based on data from 2016) than in 2012 (11, based on data from 2011)10. A key reason for the low score in 2017 was that the executive budget proposal was not published in time to qualify for assessment in the Open Budget Index. • The main leverage of this condition appears to be that the EU can have access to reporting on budget transparency. E.g. during the implementation of the ESRP, in 2014, the disbursement decision and payment was delayed as the EU asked for additional reports on budget transparency. In the delay of the 2015 tranche assessment, the EU was able to request an updated report. Therefore, because of its inclusion in the fixed tranche conditions – together with the usual PFM progress indicator – at a minimum the BS Programmes provide a platform for the EU to engage the RGoC on these issues • There is however evidence that some progress on transparency has been made, including the publication of key budget documents. This was reported by interviewees and verified through document review. • There is evidence that progress was made over the period in revenue mobilisation • Revenue mobilisation by the RGoC improved from 12.94% of GDP in 2010 to 17.42% in 2016. In 2013 revenue mobilisation was at	• Document review sources include EC PFMRP, RGoC MoEYS 2010 , 2014a and 2016a. • EC-BSP 2014-2016/7 • OBI, 2018 • EUD, RGoC interviews	• EU BSP dialogue and links to the PFM reforms through the EU's support for both education and the PFMRP, had some influence on PFM priorities for government

[10] See the Open Budget Index, 2018, Cambodia results, https://www.internationalbudget.org/open-budget-survey/results-by-country/country-info/?country=kh

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	15.10%. Further improvements in revenue policy and administration is one of the areas selected from Stage 1 Platform 1 of the PFMRP, for further attention in Stage 2, from 2013. Within this framework, the RGoC has had a Revenue Mobilisation Strategy in place since 2014, focusing in promotion of taxpaying culture, strengthening civil service delivery to taxpayers, strengthening tax registration and information updates, strengthening firms auditing, anti-smuggling efforts, and modernizing tax and custom administration. • IMF Article IV reports credit strengthened tax administration with the improvement in revenue collection as a share of GDP, as well as raising the awareness of taxpayers and providing more incentives to tax collection officials. The 2015 PEFA report however, did not reflect significant improvements in the effectiveness of the collection of tax payments (Performance Indicator 15), scoring Cambodia at a D+ in both the 2015 and 2008 PEFA assessments. This partly a function of what is scored in the sub-indicators, and the rating system. The report did note an improvement in the collection ratio for tax arrears from 4.5 per cent in 2008 to 17.8 per cent by 2013, but this did not impact the sub-indicator score in the methodology. • Support for improvements to tax administration was part of the complementary EU support to public financial management, specifically to the General Department of Taxation in collaboration with the Swedish Tax Authority.		

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
EQ3.4: To what extent have the budget support programmes contributed to improved deployment and (results-based) management of human resources, specifically but not limited to teachers, in the sector for the delivery of equitable, quality education? *Conclusions:* The EU has been involved in dialogue on Teacher Policy, staffing norms and teacher development throughout the evaluation period, and under previous support programmes. Documentary evidence and field mission discussions indicate that progress has been slow. However, some important gains have been made with the approval of the Teacher Policy, increasing salaries for teachers, and the formulation of the Teacher Policy Action Plan (TPAP). Through the Budget Support Programmes, particularly through dialogue (along with other DPs) and technical support from the CDPF, the EU has contributed to policy and reform planning. Contract teachers have been used as a short-term measure to handle some of the demand for teachers and challenges around deployment to rural areas, but overall the implementation of staffing norms and other policy reforms have been very slow over the period. TPAP represents a more comprehensive approach and a critical opportunity to deliver higher quality teaching, and the EU and other DPs have responded to this during the later years of the evaluation period. As regards the performance management of human resources, the budget support programmes have contributed to the development of approaches and frameworks, but implementation has been very limited. Outside of teacher deployment, deployment to district offices appear to be inadequate. The key lessons from this area of work are around the timeframe for and complexity of teacher reforms. Without the right political and institutional environment, change has been slow and some EU support while strategically focused did not lead to real change in delivery. During the evaluation period, the environment has become more obviously ready for change; the EU has contributed short term capacity support for some of the preparatory work, but to deliver change a well-coordinated medium-term support strategy is needed for what will likely be a defining reform agenda for MoEYS over the coming 5 – 10 years.			
i. The BS programmes have contributed to improved human resource management policies, management and deployment in the sector given sector context and priorities • *Performance management systems for staff including teachers have been agreed* • *Agreed human resource policies are being implemented (including on staff norms and performance management systems)*	The ESPSP included a process indicator for staff performance management, against which more progress was made. CDPF supported Staff Performance Review System (SPRS), including guidelines, piloted and endorsed by MoEYS in 2014. Implementation started in 2016. However, field mission interviews indicate that appraisal system not being well implemented as no clear link to promotion, pay or other incentives and most staff do not have clear job descriptions / responsibilities. Needs leadership from top of departments and above. Moving to performance-based management of staff is a priority for the new Minister but it is not clear that the context and the Ministry was ready for full implementation. Some recent change in how Directors are recruited may give opportunity to include appraisal results. SPRS did not cover teacher performance which comes under EQAD/inspection work, but does include School Principals. A key issue is that the national system for example for promotion of staff is not performance based yet, and	EC BSP, 2014-2017 and EC BSP 2011-2013 RGoC MoEYS, 2010 and RGoC MoEYS 2014a RGoC MoEYS 2013-16; RGoC MoEYS 2016c and UNESCO, 2016 UNICEF, 2016 and UNICEF, 2014 World Bank 2014a World Bank (forthcoming)	The BS programmes have contributed to preparing the field for results-based management of non-teaching staff. This included contributing through the CDPF to the development of a staff performance review system. Little progress has been made in effective implementation, as nationally staff management policies are determined by the Ministry of Civil Service and leadership from senior

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
• *Change in the number and distribution of management and administrative staff across and within levels of the system, in line with agreed norms* • *Evidence of and perceptions of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors*	legally staff of the MoEYS is managed in accordance with the national system. The MOEYS has been ahead of the government-wide reforms in this regard, which is part of the National Public Administration Reform, with technical work done in 2016, and implementation just starting. CDPF provided strong technical inputs to the development of the SPRS and other personnel reforms (studies / analytical work, tools etc.), some of which taken up by MoCS in broader public sector reforms. But challenges in implementation are more institutional and systemic. Crucial support for HRMIS training and updating software/connectivity at POE level to ensure capacity to use and transfer data. A lot of progress has been made on the system, but it is not yet fully functional to support human resource management. Qualitative fieldwork indicated that differenes between pay for district and provincial officials and teachers may be a barrier to attracting to best teachers to serve at these levels. Officals also do not qualify for the same allowances as teachers. This impact was especially felt after the increases in teacher salaries. This meant that the best capacity to support teachers in all schools is not necessarily in place at district level. EU BS Programme indicators focused more on these reforms under the first phase (ESPSP), and in the second phase more on the qualifications of teachers. Qualitative fieldwork also indicated that there are not enough staff at district level to fulfil the functions that are the responsibility of District Offices. The DTMTs capability to operate is constrained by not having enough people to undertake its tasks and undertake the other functions of the Offices.	World Bank 2017b Stakeholder interviews at MoEYS, MoCS, and sub-national levels	management in MoEYS is needed to operationalise appraisal. At this level recent change has been the development of a similar system at national level (in 2016) Capacity at district level particularly is not adequate to the functions of the district level – there is a lack of staff and pay issues contribute to staff not always having the right skills to support schools.
	Figure 5.9 Timeline of selected progress milestones: supply and management of teachers (Cf EQ3.4 ii below) 		
ii. The BS programmes have contributed to improved policies and systems for teacher deployment and development, and improved teacher capacities and deployment • *Appropriate staffing norms – given the*	ESPSP included process indicators on staffing norms from 2011, building on work under previous EU budget support and TA (2008-11). Slow progress & missed targets. A staffing norms review occurred, but Ministerial approval only in 2014. CDPF TA dedicated to work with MoEYS on this. Despite long timeframe for development and approval, norms not yet being implemented. Currently MOEYS piloting new norms in 4 provinces (Kandal, Phnom Penh, Svay Rieng, Mondulkiri); originally also Battambang	EC BSP, 2014-2017 and EC BSP 2011-2013 RGoC MoEYS 2016s mid-term review of ESP and UNESCO, 2016	There has been strong technical effort (including CDPF analytical work and capacity building) to review and revise staffing norms, and strengthen policy more broadly. This has involved

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
socio-economic context of education, efficiency, quality and equity concerns and public resource availability – were agreed • *Change in the number and distribution of teachers across provinces and districts, in line with norms / equity, efficiency and effectiveness concerns, with a particular focus on the deployment of teachers to rural schools* • *Policies and policy implementation plans for teacher development – in line with the sector's socio-economic context, resource availability and priorities, including quality and equity – have been agreed timeously and are being implemented* • *Improvements in teacher capacities and qualifications* • *Evidence of and perceptions of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors*	but dropped due to challenges / understanding of norms by POE. This piloting was meant to take place in 2014, so this phase has also taken some time. From pilot, can see provinces recruit contract teachers where needed to apply norms (e.g. Kandal recruited 70 contract teachers in 2015). Initial findings from pilot indicate that provinces can apply norms with flexibility, but there is a need to ensure schools do not create small classes and increase demand for teachers. Norms policy development included increasing proportion of teaching to non-teaching hours, but no evidence of implementation. Feedback during evaluation mission indicates that very hard to enforce norms as teacher redeployment is voluntary and incentives insufficient (from HQ and Provincial / DOE discussions). Contract teachers being used in pilot and non-pilot provinces to some extent to off-set shortages / demand in some areas, though this is a short-term response, does not address over supply in urban areas, and raises questions of quality. Little has therefore changed in addressing the problem of teacher distribution, with many rural schools under-staffed, many urban schools over-staffed. National pupil teacher ratios hide these disparities. Contract teachers are used to fill the gap in disadvantaged areas. UNESCO, 2016 gives useful analysis of PTR and challenges of teacher distribution / deployment. Also highlights that HRMIS data does not distinguish between teaching / non-teaching staff. The World Bank PER found that the sector is experiencing both a shortage of teachers and a misallocation of teachers. There are some actions that are relatively easy to undertake to address issues, e.g. 43% of primary schools with a teacher shortage are within 5 km of a school with a surplus, and 28% of secondary schools. PETS (World Bank 2017); shows range of student to class, classroom and teacher ratios. When adjusted for shifts seems to indicate sample within range of norms. But does not show variation within Provinces, and between urban/rural areas. So, may not pick up the over / under supply issue in specific provinces. Does raise the issue that double shifts used in many cases to manage the demand for school places, and manage the overall lack of teacher supply (with many teachers teaching two shifts in one day, or use of contract teachers). This does not address more fundamental problems in delivering quality education. Teacher recruitment managed by Ministry of Civil Service, MoEYS makes requests annually. Currently MoCS allows around 4-5000 new teachers, but this has to off-set attrition of more than 2000 (retirees, etc.). MoCS indicates teacher recruitment is a priority, particularly better qualified and more rural. Further revision of norms planned in 2018, to include provisions for administration staff in schools, districts and provinces, needing new sub-decree from MoCS, outlining functions / structure for each unit. New Teacher Policy in 2013 includes teacher recruitment, and pre/in-service, conditions. EU focus in ESPSP on staffing norms and associated teacher policy work gave some space for dialogue and engagement in teacher policy reform. Together with development partners the EU advocated for an evidence-based policy linked to supply and demand analysis. Work supported by the EU prior to 2011 recognised that as staff salaries represent at least 70% of the MoEYS budget, this is a critical barrier to efficiency, equity and quality outcomes. As the education system expanded in the decade or more prior to this evaluation period, there has been a continual shortage of teachers, first in primary then in secondary and ECE. Staffing norms were out of date, and not well applied, this meant that challenges included the over-supply of teachers in urban areas and under-supply in rural areas. There was also a lack of data on teacher workloads and subject specialisms, and inefficient allocation of non-teaching / teaching staff across provinces. It was also recognised that there were no consistent	RGoC MoEYS, 2015, World Bank, 2014a RGoC/DPs, 2015 and RGoC MOEYS/DPs 2017 Ang, 2015 TPAP Technical Committee, 2017 Interviews MoEYS and MoCS, donors	processes within MoEYS and particularly with Council for Administrative Reform / Ministry of Civil Service for approval. Norms now in place, but has not led to change in delivery. This shows the complex institutional challenges and political economy of this reform. The potential gains are significant, but currently not realized. This raises some questions around the timeframe and process for such reform. The link to budget support tranches may have kept these reforms on the agenda. However, change is unlikely without appropriate implementation plans, and political will in place. Important that teacher salaries have been increased during period, as long-term focus of sector dialogue; concerns that this is not sufficiently linked to performance measures but some indication it has helped in more disadvantaged / rural areas. Not clear that the ESPSP and ESRP have contributed to this. Good basis for TPAP reforms, raising profile and quality of teachers. Teacher policy reform for improved quality of teaching has been slow, and few if any outcomes over the evaluation period. However, MoEYS is now giving priority to this, and increase in salaries, new Policy in 2013 and TPAP in particular represents a significant opportunity for reform. EU BS programme did not give priority to teacher quality until latter part of evaluation period, though there has been strong engagement in teacher policy reforms. Key lessons to be learned around political economy and

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	guidelines on the hours a teacher should spend teaching rather than for preparation and administration. It was anticipated then that by developing more appropriate norms, informed by data, along with guidance for implementation, significant efficiencies could be created, with more equitable deployment of teachers where most needed contributing to both equity and quality outcomes. Salaries increase for teachers in 2013 and 2015, with remote allowances. MoCS indicate that allowances for teachers serving in rural areas were increased, another driver of higher salary increases in education than elsewhere. Salaries now paid through bank transfer. Field interviews with stakeholders at central and sub-national levels consistently highlighted the impact of this salary increase in motivating teacher performance away from the main urban areas; i.e. has enabled teachers to focus on teaching and lesson preparation, where previously needed to take on other work. In urban areas where costs of living higher and more opportunities for alternative income the impact has been less significant. Ensuring the quality of teachers has also been a challenge, both in terms of recruiting teachers with appropriate qualifications and of providing appropriate pre- and in-service training to teachers to prepare and develop their pedagogical skills and content knowledge. Entry requirements were set at 12 years of school plus 2 years of teacher training (in teacher training centres), though historically it has been necessary to recruit teachers who did not have these qualifications. Entry qualifications have gradually been increasing; for example, in 2007 only around 25% of primary teachers held upper secondary qualifications, rising to over 50% in 2013.This has been driven by increasing enrolment in and completion of upper secondary. The less qualified teachers tend to be in rural areas. Teacher qualifications, professional development, remuneration and incentives to work in rural areas have therefore been part of ESP strategy and the associated policy dialogue with DPs for at least 15 years, though the EU budget support programmes only focused more directly on this with the development of the Teacher Policy Action Plan (TPAP) from 2014/15. TPAP introduced/approved in 2015 with comprehensive strategies; focused on achieving highly qualified teaching workforce over the coming 5 years; includes increase in the minimum qualifications for teachers at all levels (notably move from 12+2 to 12+4 as minimum entry qualification by 2020); TTCs upgrade to Teacher Education Colleges (TEC) and proposed diversification of teacher education provision and entry to the profession (to include HEIs); much of the policy groundwork done, but only recently starting implementation. Important that the TPAP being led by TPAP Technical Committee/Task Force (led by Deputy DG General Education), as delivery will cut across a number of departments, and will require involvement of other ministries, most notably MoCS for the Teacher Career Pathway and associated reforms. EU support only focused on teacher development / quality in later part of evaluation period (i.e. as VT indicators from 2015), though was broadly within the dialogue. During the ESRP, the policy around minimum qualifications for teachers has evolved, so the programme has adjusted indicators accordingly, moving from outcome indicators of % teachers with min qualification of 12+2, to process indicators to deliver upgrading of qualifications as well as development of INSET system. The focus on these specific indicators needs to be considered within context of broad, complex and ambitious TPAP and the early stage of its development and implementation. Discussions during the evaluation mission highlighted the important short-term role played to date by the CDPF in supporting the TPAP Technical Committee and Task Force to develop necessary plans and research. It was noted this has been particularly important as this work is not funded under any current departmental budgets (e.g. TTD, Personnel, etc.).		institutional readiness for reform of this kind, and how most effectively EU / DP support delivery. EU BSP has provided important support through CDPF. Specific VT indicators focus on key elements of TPAP reform process, however, more focus on institutional support may have been critical; while it is acknowledged MoEYS should not depend on DPs to fund TPAP, the modality and timeframe for support requires further reflection. There is no evidence that tranche indicators have had any impact on reform efforts.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	Indicators during ESRP linked to teacher qualifications / TPAP have not been met. However, TPAP Rapid MTR (June 2016) highlights some key areas of progress, including 56 teacher trainers completing Masters in Education courses; more limited number of teacher training college trainers chosen for MA study in Japan; first batch of lower secondary teachers teaching at USS taking BA-fast track at NIE, second batch of 1000 had just started during evaluation mission, and third batch planned for 2018. Preparatory work for new INSET system, including planning under new GPE programme. Teacher Career Pathway (TCP) drafted and being piloted. TPAP is complex reform, and MTR recognises a number of key challenges, including the need for MoEF and MoCS buy in and support for TCP, the need for departments across MoEYS to prioritise and support this reform, the need for political will and legal frameworks to ensure teacher re-deployment, and the significant effort needed to achieve teacher upgrading goals. Field missions highlighted emerging anecdotal evidence (from POE / DOE in three provinces visited) that teachers motivated to upgrade their qualifications, in some cases receiving POE seminars / support. POE in Mondulkiri has taken policy to recruit only from province for primary level. Increasing number of applicants with G12 passes. But still significant challenge in shortfall of qualified teachers. Discussions at POE/DOE also suggested that increased salaries are enabling teachers in rural areas to focus more on their jobs and so may have impact on teaching quality. As yet, however, there is no framework for teacher performance appraisal, though this is included under TPAP. Discussions highlighted that teacher reforms held back by established practice of teachers (limited teaching hours, fees for tuition, and second jobs); urban and rural areas both affected, with opportunities and need for alternative income generation greater in urban areas, particularly private tuition. In rural areas, teachers are more likely to be absent for farming or other business/employment. Other practices particularly prevalent in rural schools include extended school closure around public holidays. Some report that, despite salary increase, motivation still low in many cases and that school director capacity is needed to lead and support teachers. Teacher standards have been developed but not well disseminated yet, though this starting under TPAP; e.g. short courses for school directors at NIE, but not well practiced. Addressing such change is not possible just through training as relates to established practice and behaviour. A related issue raised in some discussions was around the lack of instructional time, in part due to short teaching day / use of shifts. 2015 NEP study found that 27% of the school year is lost through school closures, teacher absenteeism, and shortened teaching sessions. Overall, recognition that changing quality of teaching involved training, improved qualifications and pay, but also some complex political economy issues at each level.		

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
EQ 3.5: To what extent did the budget support programmes contribute to improved formal school-based management in the early childhood education, primary and lower secondary sub-sectors? *Conclusions*: School funding and school-based management is a long-term reform in the Cambodia education system, and has featured in the BS Programmes PAF and dialogue. There is some evidence that joint dialogue, combined with the demonstration effect of first the FTI and then the Sida SIGs, have contributed to pro-poor changes in the SOB system, even if there are concerns that the changes are not pro-poor enough. The expectation was that increased school funding would enable schools to respond to local needs, enable increased spending on school quality, and incentivise progression and completion. Some efforts to change systems have met with bureaucratic resistance and/or delays. The BS Programmes have used the CDPF to support the development of some capacity for school management, including through capacity building for the School Support Committees and the District Training and Monitoring Teams, although with limited / mixed progress to date.			
Figure 5.10 Timeline of selected milestones in school-based management reforms (Cf EQ3.5)  			
i. The BS programmes have contributed to the development of better policies and implementation of these policies for the **design and management of school-based financial resources** (SOBs and the SIGs) over the period, relative to key sector priorities including equity, efficiency and effectiveness Improvements in SOB design and implementation can be observed Lessons from the earlier FTI SIGs and Sida SIGs (during the period) have been used to improve the design and rules for and management of government SOBs. Evidence of and perception of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes	Government SOB developed over 15 years after first being established in 2001-02. There was a concern that government SOBs were insufficient for more than basic school operations; DPs funded the SIG mechanism – first through FTI support and later through Sida support -- alongside the SOB (up to 2014) commitments from government, for increased flexibility and spending on quality improvement. Several DPs involved in this, and has been a central issue in DP-MoEYS / JTWG dialogue. The introduction of school operating budgets (SOB) was a key MoEYS reform in 2000, linked to the abolition of informal fees, which contributed to a significant increase in primary school enrolment and established government funding directly to schools. MoEYS developed guidelines requiring all schools to establish a School Support Committee (SSC), which would ensure local engagement in school management and improvement planning, raising additional contributions, and monitoring the quality of teaching and learning and the broader school environment. At the start of the period under evaluation, it was recognised that while the reform had made a significant contribution to the sector, limited progress had been made in building capacity within schools and communities to perform these functions effectively. It was also recognised that while SOBs had greatly increased the availability of resources at schools for basic operations, there was a need for flexibility in spending and increased resources to drive up quality improvements, especially as the value of the SOB had declined with inflation. From 2008 the Fast Track Initiative / GPE programmes introduced School Improvement Grants (SIGs) as a parallel mechanism to top up school funds and drive	EC BSP, 2014-2017 and EC BSP 2011-2013 Itad, 2014, Itad 2015, and Itad 2016 NEP, 2013 Ung Luyna, et al, 2016; World Bank, forthcoming RGoC MoEYS 2016s mid-term review of ESP and UNESCO, 2016 UNICEF, 2016 and UNICEF, 2014 World Bank 2017 forthcoming Stakeholder interviews at MoEYS, and sub-national levels	DP joint efforts have been well coordinated in providing mix of technical and financial support and raising key concerns on SBM, particularly levels of funding, flexibility and systems for schools to manage effectively. DP support includes aim to improve focus on school quality through SIG approach. EU BS Programme as part of this may have given weight to dialogue around levels of funding to schools (through PB increases) and policy / regulations around this. Overall progress has been mixed; there has been an increase over time in funds for schools (though less than anticipated), and improved design

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
relative to other factors.	some of these improvements. At the start of the ESPSP the FTI support for the SIGs was coming to a close and Sida was in the process of designing a programme. The ESPSP PAF included an indicator on revising the guidelines for school management and community's role and responsibilities in respect to school management. The first assessment against this indicator was in 2012, to allow the FTI SIG evaluation to be completed, and lessons taken into account. The 2012 EU assessment spells out how despite discussion of the lessons, and ways to make the SOB more oriented to disadvantaged schools or pro-poor, the outturn for 2014 was much reduced increase in the SOBs and very little adjustment to take account of lessons. The Sida SIG funds were going to be used to increase funding to schools instead, but this may mean overall funding did not reach the level that would enable quality improvements anticipated. This was followed by intensified policy dialogue, amongst donors in the ESWG and with the MoEYS and the MOEF. MoEYS / RGoC Prakas 508 was approved in 2013 around increasing the SOB ceiling, including school characteristics in the formula favouring disadvantaged schools, and using school bank accounts to transfer funds. Concern that formula does not sufficiently target disadvantaged (small) schools. There is commitment to SOB / SIG alignment but not yet implemented (technical work being undertaken at time of evaluation). Concerns that Prakas 508 not fully implemented with less than expected increases in SOB (this became key indicator under ESRP which anticipated a 15% PB increase to cover significant increase in SOB). MTR confirms SOB insufficient for schools' needs, especially disadvantaged schools. Also highlights some progress in consistency between SOB/SIG, but challenges at school-level with SOB procedures. Field mission finds common response, particularly from rural schools that funds are received, but not timely and often insufficient to meet needs. Many (particularly larger) schools did highlight the benefit from increased regular school funding under SOB/SIG, including for school environment (e.g. in Kampong Cham use to stop fees, improve quality, and support weak or poor students). PETS study (draft) finds that funds are reaching schools with very low leakage, but the late disbursement is a problem, delaying purchase of supplies and/or adding to costs where schools buy on credit or borrow. SIG funds release uses different process, but also has delays. Another key finding is link between total operational funds available to a school and scores on quality index (based on survey data). Small rural schools appear disadvantaged in this context, and have insufficient operational funding for improving school environment. Limited/mixed results in terms of classroom quality across school types.		though not as pro-poor as proposed by DPs. Progress slow in integrating SIG into SOB; expected during evaluation period but still under discussion / design. This may have limited school spending to address barriers to retention and learning EU BS Programmes have facilitated stronger engagement of MoEF, which plays a key role in agreeing and implementing these reforms.
ii. The BS programmes have contributed to strengthened policies for, implementation of policies for, and actual improvement in, **the role of communities, including through the School Support Committees**, in school management School Support Committees trained, improved functioning of committees Evidence of and perception of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes	EU tranche indicator in 2011 not met (analytical paper) but SSC guidelines revised 2012; 2013 MOEYS/CDPF starts work training SSCs on guidelines, to develop SDPs, training by PED / DPs, CARE in RtK with DTMTs (some supported through CDPF). ESP MTR highlights importance of SSC and community participation, reporting mixed progress in this. CDPF school director / SSC training is linked to roll out of SIG support from Sida. The CDPF Phase I review found that the CDPF did contribute to the development of capacity at school level and DOEs through the capacity building programmes undertaken, and the development of the role of DTMTs. Field mission confirmed story of mixed capacity at SSC level across country, and highlighted lack of training for SSCs until recently (e.g. in Mondulkiri only since 2016). Before training SSC had existed on paper but	EC BSP, 2014-2017 and EC BSP 2011-2013 RGoC MoEYS 2016c UNICEF, 2016 and UNICEF, 2014 RGoC, 2013-16; Interviews MoEYS and donors	There was early recognition of need for community role in school management, linked to grants. Guidelines have existed for SSC since 2002; revised during this evaluation period. The key has not been the development of guidelines but their implementation. Process indicators in first phase of BS Programme (ESPSP) focused on revising guidelines and delivering

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
relative to other factors.	without capacity / understanding of role. Some limitations noted on training – e.g. in Kampong Cham not all members trained; or only one training for a school during the evaluation period, needed follow up training. SSC capacity varies to some extent on urban / rural lines, particularly in capacity and willingness to raise additional funds to support school operations. Where SSC and School Principal strong and work well together, can raise funds, monitor school quality, support children at risk. Also more accountability where SSC involved in school budget and spending plans. Some reports indicate that NGOs often play key role in strengthening the SSC and ensuring schools work more closely / effectively with them. In some cases, Principal still runs school with limited SSC role. Where they can, SSC play a key role in raising funds, especially for school facilities improvements. Some interesting reports where SSC is monitoring learning / teachers, in part based on training from NGOs / DTMT support. PETS 2017 collected some useful data on SSC size (average 6 members) and composition (average 20% female); but found common a lack of knowledge about membership, and very poor response during survey from SSC members. A consistent story of limited or mixed capacity and engagement. Guidelines for SSC present as ambitious and comprehensive role for the community in life of school. This is positive, but may need to be tempered with what is needed for SSC to deliver on this, and what are core essential roles. Experience developing now around this.		training for SSC; areas already supported by CDPF. The dialogue may have helped prioritization of training / support to SSC; but with limited change in capacity contribution has not been as expected. Technical support and dialogue became more effective during the ESRP support, especially the focus on this work under CDPF. Important that MOEYS has led this support under CDPF, including DTMTs. Despite progress in revising guidelines and delivering at least some training, the continued limitations of SSC capacity indicate that delivering change required a stronger and earlier focus on implementation of technical support and training to SSCs and more comprehensive change in school management, including the role played by the school principal, looking beyond training.
iii. The BS programmes have contributed to improvement of **leadership at school level** Policies/strategies in place and implemented for the strengthening of school directors More school directors are able to provide leadership at school level Evidence of and perception of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors.	2015/16 GPE developed pilot SBM / school leadership training, starting in Battambang; CDPF helped with roll out with significant training by TTD, particularly in school development planning, involving community stakeholders and improving teaching. Part of RBM systems and training at school level under D&D. MTR highlights progress putting in place programme of Education Management Capacity Development including training for school directors and linked to DTMT. Staff performance review system (set out in 3.4 above) includes guidelines and training for all school directors. However, not clear how effective this has been in improving school management. AS noted above, SPRS system does not appear to be functioning / implemented. Will require more than training. Field work indicates some training for School Directors has been undertaken, in part through CDPF as well as other DPs. School Directors highlighted the utility of this annual training, and want more. Short 16-day training in 2 lots of 8 days covering professional development and management/leadership; GPE provided books / materials, now MoEYS complete. Several respondents confirm the need for more and regular in-service professional development for School Directors and also the need for stronger recruitment / pre-service training, to ensure quality of candidates. One POE suggested School Director training would be more effective if linked to follow up monitoring on whether / how they implement and practice. Some reports that Directors not generally effective at engaging communities / SSC in their role; however, there is recognition that they are more transparent and inclusive, that the situation is slowly improving. The role and development of School Directors now within TPAP; including approval in 2016 of School	EC BSP, 2014-2017 and EC BSP 2011-2013 RGoC MoEYS 2016c UNICEF, 2016 and UNICEF, 2014 RGoC, 2013-16; TPAP Technical Committee, 2017 Interviews MoEYS and donors	BS Programme has provided some capacity building through CDPF, but the focus has been mostly on managing funds and basic operations; for results this area may have required a more comprehensive approach to reform, including recruitment, incentives, systems for in school management/ leadership of teachers and teaching and accountability of school directors. This now planned for under TPAP and some progress already in training for Directors.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	Director Standards, and development of School Directors Handbook and School Management Handbook for Directors. One POE highlighted the key role of CFS in changing mindsets around schools, with more engagement of the community.		
iv. The BS programmes have contributed to improved inter-school, DOE and POE support for and **oversight of schools** Policies/strategies and institutions designed and implemented for the strengthening of district and provincial support and oversight of schools Policies/strategies and institutions designed and implemented for the strengthening of support between schools Evidence of and perception of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors.	During evaluation period, work undertaken to improve district / provincial oversight and support to schools. DTMTs, developed from the CFS approach, play important role in support to schools / SSCs. Provincial inspectors being put in place. Cluster system in place since mid-1990s also used to provide support to teaching quality. Recent CFS evaluation questions effectiveness of DTMTs in supporting implementation of model / support to SSCs. More recently D&D reform is transferring responsibility for ECE, Primary and NFE to district/municipal administrations, but this has been too recent to have any effect on delivery and piloting in Battambang has even been further delayed. . School inspection and quality assurance systems are being strengthened (under Education Quality Assurance Department (EQAD), including the role of POE, DOE with DTMT support; internal (school self-assessment and DTM follow up)and external inspection (from POE every 2-5 years). This gets support under UNICEF / CFS work. Sida provides some technical support to external inspection, CDPF has complemented this with research and training under the National Institute for Education (NIE). MTR and recent JSRs see this as an area where some progress made but needs for capacity at District / Provincial level and now being given more priority. Field interviews suggest that limited POE / DOE funding limits the effectiveness of support, including the ability to fund regular travel to schools. Interviews indicate that DTMT can play important role in local delivery of reforms, but capacity varies and many DTMTs not effective. Training alone not enough, need for systemic change, incentives and support. DTMT / District may have had insufficient attention from DPs as entry point to deliver reforms. One suggestion from a POE during field interviews was for DTMT members to have 1 month in-service training each year during semester breaks. Primary Education Dept works with DTMTs (and to some extent school director/SSC/teacher group leader); AOP includes how many provinces / districts / schools to visit and support. This work is supported by CDPF, as well as PB. Cluster is key mechanism for schools to help with T&L resources and weekly pedagogy meetings.	RGoC MoEYS 2016c and UNESCO, 2016 Shaeffer and Heng, 2016 UNICEF, 2016 and UNICEF, 2014 Interviews MoEYS, and donors	MoEYS has revised / developed systems for school oversight, inspection and support, including through the cluster model, the DTMT/ DEO and PEO structures. The focus on provision of school operating budgets and associated school based management (as a mechanism to improve the way schools meet the needs of students, improving access and quality) linked to the D&D reforms, may have increased the priority given by MoEYS and partners to support and oversight of schools, highlighting current areas of weakness. However, there has been little direct engagement from the BSPs in school oversight and quality assurance except through the work of CDPF, e.g. in training for DTMTs. Delivering reforms needs stronger focus on local / district support mechanisms. The development of provincial JTWGs has aimed in part to better coordinate support to schools from different DPs / CSOs and other partners.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
EQ 3.6: Have the budget support programmes contributed to the formulation and implementation of specific education delivery policies to address key aspects of poor sector outcomes in early childhood education, primary and lower secondary? *Conclusions:* The BS Programmes, along with other donor programmes and support, have supported the MoEYS to implement specific interventions to address key aspects of poor sector outcomes, such as high drop-out rates, cost-barriers to schooling and barriers to re-entry, and school quality. The ESPSP (2011-13) did not prioritise specific policy / interventions of this kind (other than a focus on school funding), although these reforms were included in the ESP. ESRP gave more focus to specific reforms. Budget support has provided the MoEYS and MoEF with the financial space to bring key initiatives on-budget and expand programmes, such as the scholarships in primary and lower secondary and multi-lingual education. Early childhood education has expanded, but targets have not been met and equity remains a concern. First MoEYS budget for capital investment under Chapter 21 an important step, and has seen some progress in developing WASH facilities, though needs remain significant. Reforms focusing on quality / teaching and learning, have included improved systems for setting standards, assessment of learning and inspection; while systems are being put in place, the evidence suggests they are not yet being used to change practice in schools or inform policy / decision making at higher levels of the system. The CDPF has been used to contribute to the formulation and implementation of policies and initiatives aimed at addressing weak performance.			
Figure 5.11 Timeline of selected milestones in specific interventions aimed at improving equitable access (CF EQ3.6 (i))  			
i. The BS programmes contributed to the design and delivery of specific reforms / interventions by the MoEYS (Line Departments as well as POEs and DOEs) to improve equitable access across the country, particularly for disadvantaged groups. Evidence of design and implementation of reforms and interventions aimed at addressing high repetition / drop-out rates and low completion rates in primary and lower secondary education (e.g. ECD expansion, Child Friendly Schools, scholarships, NFE and re-entry programmes)	MoEYS has aimed to address the challenge of equitable access / flow rates through school through a number of ESP reforms across sub-sectors, linked to the expected outcomes as CBIs. The provision of school operating budgets / grants and related reforms is a key part of this (covered in 3.5 above); the EU budget support programmes explicitly anticipated this work contributing to improved student progression / completion. To support this, a range of specific reforms have been tested / started over the years by DPs (e.g. FTI / GPE, UNICEF, Japan, etc.) as projects/programmes and adopted within the ESP and in some cases government spending. CFS started by UNICEF, adopted as policy in 2007 (revised 2012) and included within ESP as part of response to challenges in equitable access, inclusive education, and quality. Scholarships started under the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR), further tested by FTI with positive evaluation results on impact. GPE initiated short 1 year pilot, which MoEYS has expanded considerably (for primary and secondary) and funded (revised Anukret 66, 21 billion riels allocated 2015). MoEYS provided over 77,000 scholarships for students in G4-6 in 2015/16 fully funded by PBB, in previous year 68,000 co-funded with GPE; Government scholarships increased the value of each scholarship from $30 under GPE to $60. During mission, Primary Education Dept (PED) reported less than 2% drop out from those receiving	EC BSP, 2014-2017 and EC BSP 2011-2013 RGoC MoEYS 2016c and UNESCO, 2016 Shaeffer and Heng, 2016 UNICEF, 2016 and UNICEF, 2014 IEG, 2014 World Bank, 2014b, GPE Project Appraisal Document RGoC MoEYS, 2010 and RGoC MoEYS 2014a RGoC MoEYS 2013-16 Interviews MoEYS and	MOEYS has adopted and made significant progress in delivering selected reforms, some of which initially supported by DPs and then incorporated into ESP, operational plans and budget. The second EU BSP (ESRP) gave stronger focus to specific initiatives of this kind, first programme more limited to dialogue or preparatory work under CDPF. EU BS Programme has provided MoEYS financial incentive / space to bring this expenditure within government budget, and helped argue the technical case for this with MoEF. This raised

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
Evidence of and perception of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors.	scholarships; PED expect to finalise analysis by end of year. POEs allocate scholarships to schools based on number of students classified as poor. The Secondary Education Department provided preliminary results which are also positive; in 2014/15 11% of scholarship students dropped out, compared with 19.2% of all students. In 2015/16 this reduced further to just over 5% compared to 17% of all students, and maintained this level in the last academic year. SED data also suggests scholarship students outperform the national average on national examination results (e.g. 96.4% pass compared to 94.5% in 2015/16). Currently Primary and Secondary scholarships not linked (i.e. a scholarship student at primary may move to secondary school with no scholarships) but departmental discussions on-going to resolve. Field interviews provided some anecdotal evidence to support contribution of scholarships to keep children in school, and that the process is fair and transparent. One school director highlighted concern that their school did not receive scholarships despite clear needs. A range of causes for drop out noted, especially poverty related, migration for work, early marriage; in some cases scholarship not sufficient to keep recipients in school but mostly interviews suggest positive effect. Interviews also suggest may move to stronger focus on merit. Number of 5-year olds enrolled in ECE has expanded by 2.5 times from 2007/8, but still relatively low proportion of population has access (66%, and lower for 3 and 4 year olds), and disparity in provision between provinces / districts, especially low in rural areas. Expansion mostly in formal pre-schools. Expansion was supported by FTI / GPE in targeted areas. Dropped as EU indicator for 2016/17 given that it is a focus of other development partners (particularly GPE). ECE however remained on the dialogue agenda, given support by other donors. The reform area continues as MOEYS priority, though interviews suggest it is not priority for MoEF. Field interviews confirm the expansion and growing demand for ECE, or recognition of its value, but limitations in funding, and the need to use primary teachers not qualified for ECE. MoEYS limited in number of ECE teachers can recruit each year (200), and focus on introducing pre-school to primary schools; work with Ministry of Interior / Communes as responsible for community pre-schools and pay incentive for teachers; Prakas in draft expected in 2018 to formalise arrangement. Progress made in government's school infrastructure programme and FTI / GPE supported expansion of primary school facilities, particularly to upgrade incomplete schools as well as ECE classrooms, often in border areas. ADB supporting secondary school infrastructure. EU has included an indicator to increase provision within budget for some capital costs, although relatively limited in the first instance, the intention was to give more scope for MoEYS to address infrastructure needs of disadvantaged areas. Interviews suggest positive progress in expansion of WASH facilities in primary schools; with provision to 436 schools over past two years. Still only a fraction of the need, but a significant step forward as government providing for first time, and new flexible systems allow simplified local procurement. Broader spending on school construction / renovation has moved forward but facing some challenges; full assessment of this not yet available but interviews suggest less than half schools planned for have been built; investment plan in place but implementation faces some challenges. Modest progress in implementing reforms in NFE, including equivalency, and re-entry (latter is a more recent indicator for EU). Salary increase for NFE contract teachers. A number of challenges remain. While not a specific EU focus, linked to the scholarships, WFP have led on school feeding programme. Discussions during mission indicate this will be phased out and a period of transition under which MoEYS /	donors	potential for scale and sustainability. The key example of this is the scholarships programme. Potentially this is happening with increased capital budget for infrastructure / facilities to complete schools and ensure minimum standards for WASH. Key lesson around lead in time and preparatory work needed to establish a reform, build technical approach, capacity and buy in for delivery. Budget support as modality may enable adoption but government need transitionary approaches. CDPF studies and training have played a role in embedding these reforms within government plans and budgets through building MoEYS own capacity and evidence base. Limited focus on specific equity interventions under ESPSP may have been a missed opportunity.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	POEs take up under PB. Sector dialogue, and specifically EU participation in sector dialogue, has emphasised reforms aimed at disadvantaged schools and groups, including bilingual education, non-formal education and scholarships. Piloting of these reforms was financed by donors – dialogue occurred throughout the period to facilitate mainstreaming the reforms and their inclusion in the RGoC budgets.		

Figure 5.12 Timeline of selected milestones: specific interventions to support quality in the education system (Cf EQ3.6 (ii))



ii. The BS programmes contributed to the design and delivery of specific reforms / interventions by the MoEYS (outside of teacher development) to improve the quality of teaching and learning in schools, including for disadvantaged groups Evidence of design and implementation of teaching and learning reforms aimed at addressing specific teaching and learning barriers faced by disadvantaged groups (e.g. gender-sensitive measures, bilingual education, learning materials improvement and availability, assessment reforms, orientation of measures above to disadvantaged groups) Evidence of and perception of stakeholders of BS programmes' contribution to changes relative to other factors.	EUD assessments highlight dialogue focus on quality, raising the need to assess learning, address issues of teaching quality (e.g. use of contract teachers in remote schools, teacher guidebooks). JTWG raised sensitive issue of government provided textbooks being sold in markets, not available in schools, and other leakages in textbook distribution. Sector performance monitoring of education quality has not had a strong focus on learning results. Some progress in establishing learning assessments as basis for this, but progress has been slow, and results not yet comparable across years. However, it is important that assessments are now in place for this in future and latest Joint Sector Review highlights new CBI around improving results. Work on establishing systems for learning assessment started in 2006 with piloting of EGRA / EGMA which has continued to develop into national assessments at Grades 3, 6 and 8. Education Quality Assurance Department established in MoEYS 2009 to lead this. Significant support under FTI / GPE for this. Results not comparable across years, though TA from WB supporting development of scale for this. EQAD has disseminated findings, particularly encouraged to do so by current minister; but results not well understood / used by technical depts.; field interviews suggest mixed knowledge of this at provincial level. EU intent was for assessment to be used more broadly for quality improvement across departments. EQAD suggest that reform has received more support in recent years under new Minister and MoEF priority focus on results, with related funding. In 2014 bold reform on Grade 12 examinations, signal importance of quality. Results further emphasise need	EC BS Programme, 2014-2017 and EC BSP 2011-2013 RGoC MoEYS, 2010 and RGoC MoEYS 2014a RGoC MoEYS 2016s mid-term review of ESP and UNESCO, 2016 RGoC/DPs, 2015 and RGoC MoEYS/DPs, 2017 RGoC MoEYS, n.d.b Columbia, 2015, MoEYS/CARE/UNICEF, 2016 UNICEF, 2016 and UNICEF, 2014 Interviews MoEYS and donors	The first BS Programme (SPSP) had less focus on specific quality improvement reforms, and somewhat more under the ESRP (through focus on assessment as well as teacher qualifications). While BS Programme dialogue and CDPF / technical support has focused on learning assessment as a basis for quality education reforms, progress has been slow and for now limited use of results across depts./actors. The dialogue may have kept focus on this as priority. Push for dissemination and use of learning results coming under new minister and MoEF focus on results. MLE reform has been adopted by MoEYS, with strong technical inputs

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	for comprehensive strategies to address learning. A QEMIS system has also been established for gathering data from school based learning assessments, which are used by DTMT during internal inspection work but which do not provide standardised data across schools. Very limited work to date on developing systems for classroom assessment. MTR highlights different MoEYS strategies to address quality at primary and secondary education. Highlights problems in primary textbook distribution especially to rural schools. In theory, SIGs should enable schools to purchase books / learning materials. Mixed reports on this; PETS 2017 indicates many schools do not have sufficient operational budget to spend significantly on learning materials or other classroom quality improvements. New primary curriculum only approved in 2016 (including phonics based approach to reading). Secondary curriculum standards developed since 2005 and revised 2015, and textbook distribution to support this. But some challenges in curriculum implementation; and disparity in distribution of textbooks. These are not areas directly supported by EU, though are included in broader DP dialogue. Other DPs provide technical support to curriculum / learning materials (GPE, Japan, etc). Multi-lingual education reform started in 1990s, CARE played key role throughout period piloting approach, UNICEF more recently. MoEYS mainstreaming; adopted policy in 2013 and plans for expansion now in ESP, and National Action Plan agreed 2015. Focus on 5 provinces. Successful approach, some level of scaling achieved. MoEYS focus is on converting schools initially owned by community to become state owned and funded, with teachers and budgets. Field interviews in Mondulkiri confirmed the general progress made, highlighted also the fact that many government schools are not MLE, so further expansion could be to apply the model in these schools, though limited by need for bilingual teachers. MTR report refers to Congress reports 2015/16 that interventions to extend coverage to disadvantaged groups (rural / remote, disabled, children in poverty, ethnic minorities) have not been comprehensive. There has been expansion, but need more info on coverage and targeting. Focus of quality education for disadvantaged groups often taken up by NGO / CSO partners, and forms a key part of CFS and other work with district (DTMT) and school management capacity (SSC).		from CARE and UNICEF; EU BS Programme has enabled / facilitated MoEYS to adopt within own budget and indicator / dialogue has maintained a focus on this reform priority for ethnic minorities. Delivery of reforms at school / district level emerging as a key area, and some reporting that where support provided at this level, more likely to deliver results (link to work of DTMT, SSC, and work around CFS). EU support through CDPF has contributed but not clear the extent to which broader BSP has enabled or prioritised this.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
EQ 4: To what extent have sector outcomes (equitable access, quality, efficiency) improved and have the development outcomes targeted by budget support been achieved? Are improvements sustainable? What factors have been the main determinants of these achievements? *Tentative findings and hypotheses:* The data shows that there has been mixed performance at the outcome level, and that short term gains might not be sustained. The Cambodia education sector has a history of successfully expanding access rapidly, but with low efficiency and quality. While access to ECD expanded, some progress in earlier years on completion rates were reversed. Existing evidence shows that a combination of school, socio-economic and individual effort factors impact on learning achievement. School factors include cost, teaching style, and most significantly, school size. Larger schools perform better. The positive correlation between teaching style and learner achievement suggest that the MoEYS interventions on child-centred education and teacher development should show an effect on quality outcomes.			
i. Positive achievements can be observed against key equitable access and outcome targets across the period of support (identifying variation at province / district levels) • *Change against the Core Breakthrough Indicators of outcome 2011 to 2016*	Equitable access CBIs • *Early childhood education is expanding, but at too slow a rate to meet the ESP ambition of 80 per cent enrolment of 5 year olds by 2018. By 2015/16 altogether 64.1 per cent of 5 year olds were enrolled. The target was also missed at the end of the ESP 2009-2013, for which it was set at 60%. An enrolment of 52.7% was reached by 2013.* • *By 2015/16 the number of districts with a primary education completion rate of at least 80% was 95. Up to 2013/14 it appeared that the MoEYS was making progress against this indicator (and indeed it exceeded the target for the ESP 2009-2013 by ten districts), but in 2014/15 and 2015/16 the number of districts declined*	• *RGoC MoEYS 2016c* • *RGoC MoEYS 2014a* • *World Bank, Forthcoming* • *EC-BSP 2009-2013 and 2014-2018* • *World Bank, 2017* • *NIS 2010-2015* • *NIS 2011*	• *While some variation in and poor outcome performance can be explained by factors that are not directly under control of the MOEYS, existing evidence suggests that school input factors are significant. However, existing analysis is around enrolment and learning*

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
• *Change at impact level* • *Change against selected outcomes targeted in ECD, primary and lower-secondary sub-sector components of the ESPs, in the EU BS PAF and in policy dialogue* • *Causal analysis of trends in outcome indicators, by province and district, to identify determining factors, including contribution by induced outputs and non-school factors to improvements* • *Quantitative and qualitative analysis of countervailing factors preventing outcomes from worsening*	*again. It looks unlikely that the target of 144 districts by 2017/18 will be met. The northern provinces of Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, Stung Treng, and Otdar Meanchey, as well Koh Kong and Pailin in the east and Kep in the south represent a key challenge with less than 70 per cent of children of the correct age reaching the last grade of primary school.* • *It also looks unlikely that the target of 17 provinces with a lower secondary education completion rate of at least 40% will be reached by 2017/18. By 2015/16 8 provinces had achieved this level. Eleven provinces were showing an overall positive trend with increasing LSCR and ten provinces a downward trend. Four provinces show limited change. Kandal, Phnom Penh and Pailin are exhibiting the greatest levels of decrease, falling by between 6.4 and 9.4 percentage points between 2013/14 and 2015/16.* Quality CBIs • *The ESP 2009 – 2013 primary education target of 4967 out of 5467 complete primary schools with a repetition rate of below 10% was almost met, at 4675 by 2013.* • *For the ESP 2014-2018, the youth literacy rate (15-24) has not shown significant movement, and was at 90.1% -- compared to a target of 97.5% -- in 2015/16.* • *For the ESP 2014-2018, the adult literacy rate (15-45) looked on track to reach the 90.5% target for 2017/18, with 87.05% achieved in 2013/14. By 2015/16 however, it had declined to 78.1% again.* • *The MoEYS had made progress towards the target for the implementation of national learning assessments at grade 3,6 and 8 for Khmer and Math subjects. By 2015/16 assessments for grade 3 and 6 was implemented and disseminated. For the ESP 2009-2013, only the target for Grade 3 assessments was met.* • *Targets for qualification at higher education level (in the ESP 2014-2018) were on track to be met by 2015/16, with 8321 teachers having Master and 971 having PhD degrees (against targets of 7311 and 1058 respectively)* Institutional and capacity development • *The ESP 2009-2013 target of 95% of the programme budget disbursed in a timely manner was almost met by 2013, at 93.72%* • *The ESP 2009-2013 target of 24 formulated sub-national Annual Operational Plans, was met by 2013.* • *For the ESP 2014-2018 the institutional and capacity development targets focused on the allocation to the programme budget (or operational) budget within the MOEYS budget, and the liquidation of this budget. With the shift to implementing programme-based budget, the ESP MTR reported a 100% share of budget to the programme budget. On face value that is correct. However, in terms of the underlying budget components the 2014 use of the phrase "programme budget" is not the same as the 2015 use of the phrase. It would be more akin to the operational budget component of the programme buget. In 2014/15 the programme budget allocation referred to in the indicator, was at 21%.* • *Liquidation of the programme budget was at 94% in 2015/16 against the target of 95%. It looks on track.* • *Having reached a peak in 2012 with near full enrolment, both net and gross enrolment rates in primary school have declined. These rates are higher for girls than boys. At lower secondary the gross enrolment rate at lower secondary was at 56.5% in 2015/16, below the ESP target of 81%. The rate was higher for*	• *NIS 2015* • *UNDP 2017* • *The documentary sources are credible. They reflect (i) the collection of data on outcomes within the sector through EMIS. These statistics are used across studies without significant qualification; (ii) the collection of data on impacts through the Cambodia Demographic and Health Surveys, and Socio Economic Surveys; and (iii) statistics as reported in the World Bank Development Indicators Databank.* • *The PER data and analysis is rigorous and convincing*	*outcomes, and not directly for efficiency indicators (drop-out, repetition and completion rates).* • *Interventions such as the scholarship programmes and increasing the SOBs (as well the SIGs) have contributed to learning outcomes, by addressing cost factors and improving the physical inputs of schools.* • *Interventions to improve the deployment and development of teachers have also contributed*

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	girls than boys. • *Internal efficiency indicators have seen some improvements over the period 2007/8–15/16. Repetition rates in primary dropped from 10.6 per cent with some fluctuations to rest at 6.7 per cent in 2015/16. There is significant provincial and district variation, with 46 districts below 4 per cent, others ranging up to 19 per cent. The repetition rate was higher for girls than boys in 2015/16, although it was lower or equal in earlier years.* • *Drop-out rates at primary have also shown an overall positive trend, down from 10.8 per cent to 6.2 per cent, with the main challenges being in the North and South West provinces. Drop-out rates at lower secondary have been stuck at around 20 per cent for a number of years, though during the inception mission respondents indicated that data for the current school year (2016/17) are showing an encouraging 2 percentage point improvement at the national level, with some provinces improving lower secondary drop-out rates by as much as 4-5 percentage points (e.g. Mondulkiri, Koh Kong), while other provinces have remained stagnant or even continued to worsen (e.g. Pailin, Kratie). The national rates are better in rural than in urban areas. These recent data are encouraging, though it is important to note from recent assessments that some of the ESP targets look to be very ambitious given overall trends. Drop-out rates are higher for boys than for girls.* • *Performance in terms of the quality of provision is harder to track, as MoEYS is only starting to gather learning data that will be able to show trends over time in coming years. However, the results of early grade reading (Khmer) and maths assessments have highlighted the low levels of learning in early grades that provide the foundational skills for children's progression through primary and into secondary. These results show geographical disparity; though they are not disaggregated by region or district they do show worse performance in rural areas. Results also show lower performance for those in lower socio-economic groups (e.g., in the Grade 6 Khmer language assessment, children from the highest / richest quintile scored 14.5 per cent higher than those in the lowest quintile). The possible barriers to learning include low attendance, loss of teaching hours, and poor pedagogical approaches.* • *The Grade 3 Khmer and mathematics assessments were repeated in 2015, with encouraging findings. Results show higher scores for the 2015 students: 45.4 percent correct in 2015 in Khmer reading common items versus 38.3 percent correct in 2006, and 41.9% versus 38.1 in mathematics.* Factors influencing outcomes • *The World Bank PER found that enrolment differences between urban and rural schools can be explained fully by differences in household wealth. In pre-primary and primary enrolment can be influenced by increasing awareness and improving incentives for attending school. Among children not in secondary, cost the largest obstacle to enrolment. However, household wealth does not explain enrolment in secondary fully. Access, or distance to schools is also important in secondary.* • *School performance is influenced by school size – smaller schools perform worse. They also have relatively worse physical inputs, such as presence of water, toilets, black boards, chairs, desks and playground space.* • *Differences in expenditure per student across provinces are also important.* • *Key school input factors that explain differences between performance of students in tests are school size and teaching style. Larger schools have better performance, while the study did not note significant*		

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	differences on account of pupil teacher ratios. Teachers who correct homework more often, use multiple choice in their teaching and get students to the blackboard have students who perform significantly better – this suggest that teacher development is a key reform area for the MOEYS. However, higher educated teachers obtain higher scores for 8th graders, while there is no significant effect from more education in the 3rd grade. • *There is however also a very strong socioeconomic component to achievement differences between students and schools, including family socio-economic status and books in the home. Students own efforts also matter: students who are absent more often have lower scores and students who do homework more often have higher scores.* • *Preliminary interview respondents have also pointed to the presence of work opportunities and household income pressure, hunger and nutrition, and school WASH factors explaining changes in outcomes and differences across groups and locations.*		
Positive progress at the outcome level is sustainable • *Analysis of the sensitivity of outcome achievements to changes in context and school factors and likelihood that they will be sustained to deliver growth, development and poverty reduction impacts* • *The evolution of socio-economic development and poverty reduction impacts (income, income distribution, employment, and non-income poverty indicators such as utilisation of health services, health impacts, access to improved sanitation and gender equity) and qualitative analysis of the potential capacities of identified outcomes to add to the improvements of selected impacts.*	• *As discussed above, outcomes show variation over years, suggesting that improvements are difficult to sustain. A key task for the evaluation main fieldwork will be to collect qualitative information on reasons for the variation in outcomes.* • *Existing evidence point to differences between urban and rural schools, differences by province and differences by school size relating to the sustainability of outcomes.* Anaysis of Impacts • *At the impact level many indicators of socio economic development and poverty improved over the period, while few fluctuated or declined.* Cambodia's Human Development Index Score improved from 0.533 in 2010 to 0.563 in 2015. Economic growth declined in the early parts of the programme, after years of rapid growth, but recovered and was sustained at about 7% per annum from 2013. Income, income distribution, consumption expenditure and employment Houshold income per capita as measured by the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey increased from 198 thousand Riels in 2011 to 370 thousand Riels in 2015, a 87% increase. While rural incomes lagged, the increase kept pace, from 162 thousand Riels in 2011 to 306 thousand riels in 2015, a 89% increase. Income distribution as reported by the Socio-Economic Surveys improved between 2011 and 2015, with the lowest 2 quintiles earning 13.1% of income per capita in 2011, increasing to 14.7% in 2015. Household consumption expenditure as reported by the World Bank Development Indicators increased from USD638 per capita in 2010 (in constant USD2010) to USD837 per capita. The growth rate however slowed down in 2012, and recovered towards the end of the period. The overall unemployment rate as reported by the World Bank Development Indicators declined from 35 to 26% between 2010 and 2016. However, for youth and women the decline was less relative to the starting point, from 27 to 21% for women overall, and from 55% to 44% for youth. The unemployment rate for male youth between 15 and 24 is the highest in both 2010 and 2016, but declines the most from 70% to 55% (source: World Bank	• *RGoC MoEYS 2016c* • *RGoC MoEYS 2014a* • *World Bank, Forthcoming* • *EC-BSP 2009-2013 and 2014-2018* • *World Bank, 2017 and 2017a* • *NIS 2010-2015* • *NIS 2011* • *NIS 2015* • *UNDP 2017* • *The documentary sources are credible. They reflect the collection of data on impacts through the Cambodia Demographic and Health Surveys, and Socio Economic Surveys; and statistics as reported in the World Bank Development Indicators Databank and the Human Development Index data portal*	• *Variation, and regression in results at outcome level may be explained by differences between schools, provinces and districts. Deteriorating results may be related to non-school factors, such as shifts in the economic and social environment, or to partial or varying implementation of education sector reforms, making it difficult for RGoC to sustain outcomes.* • *Many key impact indicators show improvement over the evaluation period.* • *Positive relationships can be identified between the selected education outcomes identified, and impact indicators such as employment when data is analysed over a longer period than the evaluation period.*

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	Development Indicators. The Demographic and Health Survey furthermore showed an improvement in the quality of employment for persons employed at all levels of schooling, and with better quality employment the higher the level of schooling. In the 2010 Survey 20% of employed persons with no schooling were in jobs that were skilled labour or higher, 33% of employed persons with primary schooling and 62% of employed persons with secondary schooling. By 2014 this percentages had increased to 27% (no schooling), 43% (primary schooling) and 68% (secondary and higher schooling) respectively. Indicators of non-income poverty The Human Development Index database includes a calculation of the headcount percentage of the population in multidimensional poverty. This includes data on household deprivations in education, health and living standards. For Cambodia the percentage declined from 46.8% in 2010 to 33.8% in 2014. The under-five infant mortality rate per 1000 live births dropped from 36.7 to 24.6 between 2010 and 2015 as reported by the World Bank Development Indicators. Health care visits however, declined from 18.1% of respondents indicating that they undertook a health care visit at least once in the 30 days before the survey in 2011, to 13%. Respondents in rural areas undertook health care visits more frequently in both years, at 18.8% in 2011 and 14.6% in 2015. A higher percentage of the population had access to improved sanitation facilities in 2015 than in 2010, altogether 26% more. The improvement particularly occurred in rural areas, with a 29% improvement from 23% accessing these facilities to 30.5%. Overall the improvement was from 33.6% to 42.4%. Adult literacy rates – which can be seen as a non-income indicator of poverty but is also an education sector outcome– also improved from 76.7% for Cambodia as a whole and 73.1% for rural respondents, to 80.5% and 76.8% respectively. Most of this improvement however was already achieved by 2013. The Human Development Report Gender Inequality index shows an improvement for Cambodia from 0.492 in 2010 to 0.479 in the 2015 Report. The index looks at three dimensions, reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market. Available, frequently collected survey data on issues such as women empowerment and community agency are not available, except for data reported for 2010 and 2014 on the World Bank Development Indicators on the percentage of women who participate in decisions on own health care, major household purchases and visiting family (% of women age 15-49). This increased marginally from 85.6% in 2010 to 86.3% in 2014.		

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
EQ 5: To what extent have the direct or induced outputs of budget support contributed to the results identified at the outcome and impact levels?			
i. The budget support programmes have been efficient and effective in	The evaluation found that sector dialogue was already active, mature and in-depth when ESPSP started in 2011. Between 2011 and 2016, dialogue continued to occur through an effective mix of annual and in-year forums. Across these forums policy dialogue was stratified so that high level strategic/decision-oriented discussions could	Sources as identified above	

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
delivering the direct outputs envisaged • *Summary conclusion drawing on findings in EQs 2.1 and 2.2*	take place, as well as detailed technical level work. Coordination of donor *and* government inputs through dialogue was continuous. While the leadership by the MoEYS is the main factor in ensuring harmonised and effective dialogue, the EU support helped to crowd in donor and RGoC partners, because of its size and nature. The quality of the EU's technical inputs into dialogue processes also contributed. Aid to the Cambodia education sector increased significantly over the evaluation period, but this largely because of the increase in EU budget support. Aid was delivered in more effective ways however, with the use of country systems increasing, no project implementation units by the end of the period, and more aligned technical assistance.. Given the participation of the largest donors in sector dialogue structures, of which one function is to harmonise aid, good division of labour between donors and good alignment behind the ESP. The EU is stil the only budget support donor and one of very few that uses country systems. Similarly, the founding partners of the CDPF are stil the only partners. The budget support programmes were found to have contributed to more aligned and harmonised aid, and higher use of country systems, because budget support sends a signal that country systems can be used, by its role in establishing the CDPF (which led to more harmonised capacity development support and technical assistance) and because of the role budget support plays in crowding in donor and government partners in sector dialogue mechanisms. The size of the EU programmes was large enough to have that effect.		
i. As a consequence of these outputs and the response by government, the budget support programmes have been effective in inducing the desired sector outputs towards improved sector outcomes Summary conclusion drawing on findings in EQs 3.1 to 3.6	**Sector financing and governance progress** During the evaluation period, the previous decline in MoEYS funding as a share of the government budget was reversed, but MoEYS non-wage expenditure did not grow in real terms. MoEYS budget growth was on account of growth in personnel expenditure, in turn due to government-wide wage increases, which were much needed in the education sector. As a result, non-wage expenditure in the MoEYS declined from a 26% share of budget in 2012 to 19% in 2016. In real terms expenditure on goods and services remained flat. This matters for sector outcomes, as the necessary expenditure on complementary inputs were underfunded. The MoEF however did agree to fund specific education interventions -- such as scholarships and multi-lingual education -- and increase the school operating budgets, preventing a bigger decline in the non-wage share. The MoEYS made progress on sector planning, budget, financial management and results-based management reforms. There was steady improvement in the principal instruments for integrated results-based planning and budgeting. The Annual Operational Plans were rolled-out to all provinces and some districts, and the MoEYS improved their coverage and structure. The plans are used to link ESP priorities and Annual Education Sector Congress decisions to the annual budget submissions to the MoEF, coordinate RGoC and donor resources, and monitor results. The MoEF's PBB budget reform was implemented in the MoEYS, providing better opportunities to link policies and plans to budgets. While this initially affected budget execution, by 2016 new procedures were better understood and execution was improving again. The sector also took a major step forward to reduce leakage and increase internal transparency by introducing bank accounts to transfer salaries and school operating budgets. Sector information systems to support planning and results-based management also progressed. Little progress however, was made on establishing effective, risk-based internal audit systems. Despite this progress, the variable and often weak technical skills for planning, budgeting, monitoring and review at central, provincial, district and school levels, is a concern for whether these reforms could optimally contribute to improved education outcomes. The district level in particular appears to be under-capacitated. Existing capacity development programmes were making positive contributions, but coverage was partial, and it was not clear that they were financed adequately, or took the right approaches.	See EQ 3.1 to 3.6 above for detailed findings and sources	The BSPs have been effective in inducing progress on sector governance reforms, for the most part. Capacity constraints however limit the degree to which these successes will translate into improved implementation of education policy and delivery reforms. The BSPs were effective in inducing progress in a number of specific educational interventions, which will over time contribute to better outcomes. Some of this progress was made however, only after 2013 and is unlikely to already have influenced sector education outcomes. In two key areas of reform however, that have great potential to improve Improvements in equitable

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
	Progress on education policies and service delivery The MoEYS also made progress on several key education reforms, although some reforms have progressed very little, or slower than expected. For example: Teacher reforms have been complex and slow, but some progress was made. Staffing norms are in place but not yet implemented. Teacher qualifications and broader quality measures are now being addressed through a comprehensive and strategic Teacher Policy Action Plan. Teacher salaries are reported to be making a difference to teacher motivation and effort in rural areas. In school-level funding and management, school operating budgets have increased, and were released to schools as allocated, but often late. The formula has been improved to be more pro-poor, but overall levels are still considered too low. School management capacity improved including in schools, but there is agreement this remains a bottleneck in delivering change. In relation to equitable access, the expansion of early childhood education since 2010/11 was an important achievement. The scholarship programme and the expansion school water and sanitation infrastructure are now partly financed by the RGoC. Progress on non-formal education re-entry programmes however, has been slower. Sector reforms to improve quality have taken many years to establish, but were progressing by 2016. Examples include the national assessment tests – now undertaken regularly – and multi-lingual education for which a policy and action plan have been adopted. A lead reform in the period, however, was the reform of the Grade 12 examinations, which served to send a signal on the government's intent to address quality in education. **Contributing factors to progress on sector reforms** EU Budget support influenced the achievement of education sector reforms as targeted in the Education Strategic Plans through facilitating additional RGoC resource allocations for specific education interventions (by providing additional discretionary resources to the MoEF); linking conditional tranche indicators to target reforms; financing harmonised capacity development and technical support for reforms via the CDPF; and maintaining a strong sector partnership which offered a platform for effective, harmonised sector dialogue, and more harmonised donor financial flows and technical support. In most of the cases examined, three to four of these 'pathways' of influence were relevant to progress being made. In many cases however, one or other pathway dominated. Budget support thus helped progress on reforms, but mostly only when reforms were also RGoC priorities. Progress on many education reforms only occurred or accelerated after 2013, when the new minister was appointed and education became an explicit priority for the RGoC, making these RGoC factors pivotal co-contributors to progress. For example, while budget support funds facilitated the on-budget financing of specific, demarcated education policy and delivery interventions, these reforms also needed to be high RGoC priorities. Budget support funds on their own were not sufficient, even when PAF indicators were in place. Similarly, the CDPF was pivotal in moving governance reforms forward, but only if these were also driven by the RGoC. Evidence of effectiveness from existing pilots helped to get RGoC financing for their roll-out. Most of the specific interventions financed had previously been piloted with support from other donors. That reforms were priority for the RGoC, was not a guarantee of fast or steady reform progress. Some reforms did not progress much, despite explicitly being high MoEYS priorities. Almost all the 'stuck' or slow reforms were either complex, multi-stakeholder reforms or had massive capacity development requirements. In the former group are the teacher supply and management reforms, and in the latter, budget execution progress and school-based management reforms.		access and quality, progress was slow. This was on account of these reforms either being very complex, or requiring significant capacity development across the system, but particularly at school and district levels. The evaluation found that while progress was low, this does not mean that the BSPs failed. There is evidence that the progress that had been made, might have been even less without capacity development inputs from the CDPF, or the support of country reform champions by the EU and other donors through joint dialogue.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
ii. Through these induced outputs the budget support programmes have been successful in generating important sector outcomes. iii. *Summary conclusion drawing on findings against EQ4*	**What outcomes were observed?** At the results level, change in education outcomes by the end of the evaluation period were variable, and fluctuated over the period. While some results lag reforms (such as completion rates), others are lead indicators and relate more closely to improvements in policies and delivery during the evaluation period. Some of these lead results remained stubbornly low, such as enrolment in lower secondary schools, and others declined, such as repetition rates. There were however, also some encouraging improvements: early childhood education enrolment improved significantly, and drop-out rates and repetition rates declined in both primary and secondary. Analysis of the standardised assessment tests, showed improvement in learning outcomes albeit very small and unequal across gender and locations. Whereas being female used to be a disadvantage in terms of access to primary and lower secondary education and attainment fifteen years ago, by the end of the period this switched to being male. Rural versus urban location remained a disadvantage, but less to by the end of the period. **What were the contributing factors?** Our quantitative and qualitative analysis has shown that non-school factors contribute to education outcomes, especially household socioeconomic circumstances, rural / urban location and learner characteristics such as gender and attitude. However, school factors are also important to explain differences in outcomes between learners and districts. These include school environment factors such as distance to and size of the school and the availability of water and sanitation facilities. But also, and importantly teacher qualifications, school leadership, access to early childhood education, correct-age entry and classroom behaviour of teachers also matter. **What contribution did the budget support programmes make to the outcomes?** There are many examples of budget supporting influencing improvements in education sector results. The Step 3 analysis revealed many positive chains of influence, for example the influence of the budget support inputs on the institutionalisation of scholarships, which assisted thousands of learners to stay in school; or the strong influence on sector governance improvements, providing the machinery through which educational improvements can be made (see Annex 10 below for a diagrammatic presentation of the influence chains). In most cases of already established chains of influence, however, either the budget support to reform success or the reform success to results influence was only moderate to weak, so that the observed change could have occurred even in the absence of the contributing factor, even if differently Progress in reform areas that have a potential for strong contribution was still disappointing by the end of 2016 and could not have contributed to results yet. Even where implementation was underway progress was often made only after 2013. While expected results at the induced outputs level were therefore not in place or not in place early enough to generate results by the end of the assessment period, this does not mean that budget support had no influence or failed. Probably the two reforms that could have been expected to have the most significant influence on results, given our analysis, were those focused on school funding and management (i.e. ensure that school directors are sufficiently skilled and schools themselves have resources and capacity to enrol and retain children, help them progress through system and ensure they learn) and teachers (ensure all schools have the teachers they need, with the required qualifications, capacity and support). The evaluation can point to progress, but it has taken much longer than expected, to implement these reforms and make them work. However, progress would most likely have been even less in the absence of the technical and training inputs of the Capacity Development Partnership Fund, or the contribution of budget support indicators and sector dialogue helping government reform champions to keep an issue alive and encourage progress. Furthermore, given that these reforms address pivotal school factors in improved access and learning, budget support influence in these areas may yet contribute in future to stronger education results.	See EQ 4 above, and Annex 11	Progress in sector outcomes was variable. Positive results however were observed in some key lead indicators. School and non-school factors affect education results. Key school factors include teacher qualifications and classroom behaviour, school size and location, and school facilities, as well as access to early childhood education and correct-age entry in grade 1. The analysis did find positive result chains from the budget support inputs to outcomes. In areas that had the greatest potential for positive contribution, though, reform progress has been slow. While a positive contribution in these areas therefore cannot be claimed as yet, if progress continues, the results may ensue in future.

Judgement Criteria and Indicators	Findings	Sources	Conclusions
iv. Positive progress against key sector policies, reforms and interventions (the induced outputs) is sustainable, and BS has contributed to this sustainability *Evidence and perceptions of stakeholders on the sustainability of interventions, including commitment and use of government resources, evidence of improved capacity, evidence of institutionalised changed. Evidence and perceptions of stakeholders on how the BS Programmes have contributed to the sustainability of the induced outputs.* and v. Budget support has added value, given the analysis on the contribution of budget support to the induced outputs, and the findings in 1.1 and 1.2.	**Sustainability** It is not clear that other support modalities would have had better results given the systemic nature of the reforms that the budget support programmes targeted. Even if better results were achieved in the short term, their sustainability would have been weaker. This is because budget support has contributed significantly to the sustainability of key reforms through facilitating increased resources to the MoEYS for key interventions and for sector-wide improvement in teacher salaries. This has facilitated reforms to move from 'being in preparation' to being financed by RGoC resources and implemented. Key examples are the scholarships and commitment to finance multi-lingual education. Thus, reforms that are being implemented with government resources, are more likely to be sustained. Budget support has also contributed by facilitating more harmonised and programmatic aid delivery by other donors, using country systems more often. This has built the planning, budgeting and monitoring and evaluation capacity of key staff in the MoEYS headquarters. The use of the Annual Operation Plans to integrate and coordinate donor and government financing is key to facilitating government ownership of remaining off-budget investment. The choice to shift to pooled funding for capacity development support rather than doing it through a technical assistance-led, EU-managed project has also increased the likelihood of capacity development results being more sustainable. For example, the support of the MoEYS to send staff to the International Institute for Education Planning contributes to shifting responsibility for technical work from technical assistance resources to MoEYS staff. Arguably, concerns about the challenges in Cambodia of inducing effective change in government policies and actions so that development impacts can be achieved, should be weighed up against potential reductions in sustainability associated with other modalities. The fact that budget support is being implemented within a functioning sector partnership, in which the MoEYS and donors can jointly address implementation challenges systemically, is also relevant to this calculation. **Value-add of budget support** Budget support has added value because it did not deliver progress through parallel efforts and systems, but instead relied on the MoEYS to implement its policies and target reform actions. The evaluation has shown that this is slow, particularly in difficult reforms that require coordination across government and engagement with powerful stakeholders and interest groups. However, even if progress is in small steps, because the nature of the issue is often systemic, any progress that is made is more likely to be sustained than progress made through inputs and outputs delivered outside of the MoEYS. Budget support has also added value over the evaluation period, by facilitating that initiatives financed by other donors through more programmatic support, are mainstreamed and financed on the RGoC budget. This makes its support highly complementary to other donors in the sector, who can then utilise their available resources to pilot initiatives, adjust them for the Cambodia context, and gather evidence on their success.	See EQ1, 2 and 3 above.	The results induced through budget support is more likely to be sustainable as it facilitates the development of MoEYS capability to implement reports. This is also one avenue through which it adds value more than other support modalities. It has also aided sustainability by facilitation of more aligned and harmonised support by other donors.. Budget support adds value because it supports the development of the means to deliver, as much as delivery. Budget support adds value because it facilitates the mainstreaming and on-budget financing of successful initiatives by other donors, which otherwise might not have been sustainable.

Annex 6 Stakeholder Analysis

Stakeholder group	Role in EU BS Programmes	Role in and implications for the evaluation	Who
European Commission			
EU delegation Phnom Penh	The Delegation staff are closely involved in the negotiation and day-to-day management of the budget support programmes. In particular, the Education Attaché plays a leading role in design of programmes (particularly Variable Tranche conditions relating to education); assessment of education disbursement conditions and compiling assessment and payment documentation; sector dialogue; one-on-one engagement with MoEYS. The Attaché is supported in PFM areas of the budget support programmes by the PFM Attaché. Overall the Head and Deputy Head of Co-operation provides support, and leadership. The Ambassador is engaged as the Head of Delegation.	Key informants (past and present staff) Key users of the evaluation (present and future staff)	The Ambassador Development cooperation staff, particularly the Head and Deputy Head of Co-operation, Education Attaché, PFM Attaché
EU Brussels: DEVCO	DEVCO staff in Brussels involved in providing advice and support to the EUD includes the Geo-coordinator as well as thematic units, such as education and budget support	Informants Users of evaluation	Geo-coordinator in DEVCO / staff in Budget Support and PFM; and Education
EU Brussels: European External Action Service	The EEAS monitors and informs the EU HQ on political developments in Cambodia, maintaining a permanent political dialogue with the RGoC. The EEAS also ensures that proposals developed by the EUD are in line with the EU's overall external relations priorities, regional and thematic priorities and EU policy orientations.	Informants Users of evaluation	Cambodia desk in EEAS Regional budget support specialist
EU Brussels: Evaluation unit	Manages evaluation process and coordinates feedback on draft reports, with support from the evaluation Management Group. Responsible for the overall dissemination and use of evaluation findings and any implications for the budget support evaluation methodology.	Users of the evaluation	Evaluation manager Task Force Knowledge, Performance and results – Unit 04.
EU Bangkok	The Bangkok Office provides regional support to development cooperation in countries. Particularly there is a desk responsible for budget support in the region.	Informant Users of the evaluation	Desk responsible for Budget Support in the region
Government of Cambodia			
MoEYS headquarters: Leadership	Leads the education engagement on Cambodia side of the partnership. Sets education policies and strategies, which provide the frame for the evaluation.	Key informants Key users of the evaluation	Minister and Secretaries of State

Stakeholder group	Role in EU BS Programmes	Role in and implications for the evaluation	Who
MoEYS headquarters units	Key in the management of the budget support programmes. The Directorate General of Policy and Planning is the contact point in MoEYS for the budget support programmes and the CDPF, coordinates management of the budget support programmes, including the annual assessments. It also undertakes planning for the sector, as well as monitoring and evaluation, which drives the budget support programmes and provides key information for assessment of the programmes. The Directorate General of Administration and Finance is key in sector financial management, budget preparation coordination, engagement with the MoEF and lead on PFM indicators. The Directorate General of General Education manages the general education departments. They are key in policy development, coordination and implementation.	Key informants Key users of the evaluation	Directorate General of Policy Planning Department of Planning EMIS Office Aid Coordination Department of Finance General education, including primary and secondary Non-formal education Teacher training Early Childhood Education
MoEYS POEs and DOEs	Education policies, strategies and plans are implemented through the POEs and DOEs. Key role in budgeting, reporting, monitoring and support to education institutions.	Key informants	All POEs and DOEs
School-level personnel	School Director, management, teachers, administrators and SSC members etc. implementing teaching and learning reforms as well as those children and families benefiting from BS.	Key informants	School-level stakeholders /end beneficiaries.
Ministry of Economy and Finance	MoEF: official counterpart for the programme (International Cooperation and Debt Management) The General Secretariat for the Steering Committee of the PFMRP important counterpart on overall PFM reform General Department of Budget and Economic Policy and Public Finance are key for programme implementation in setting and monitoring the sector budget.	Key informants Key users of the evaluation	General Department of Budget, General Department of International Cooperation and Debt Management General Department of Economic Policy and Public Finance General Secretariat for the Steering Committee of the PFMRP
Other RGoC	The Ministry of Civil Service: mandate is public administration reform and the management of State human resources; Council for the Development of Cambodia, which has the mandate to coordinate donors; and the National Institute of Statistics, which produces socio-economic surveys	Key informants	Ministry of Civil Service, National Institute of Statistics, Council for the Development of Cambodia
UNICEF Cambodia	Key partner for EU in sector, together with Sida, World Bank and ADB. Implements and contributes to the CDPF.	Key informants Key users of the evaluation	Country office management Education Team (to include TA, consultants, staff and other suppliers/organisations contracted to deliver parts of the capacity development work)

Stakeholder group	Role in EU BS Programmes	Role in and implications for the evaluation	Who
Other donors	Partners of the EU in the education sector. Co-participants in sector dialogue as members of the JTWG and the ESWG.	Key informants Users of the evaluation	Particularly Sida, World Bank (including the Global Partnership for Education), ADB, UNESCO, JICA.
Other Cambodia stakeholders	INGOs/NGOs Teacher unions		NGO Education Partnership (NEP) Implementing NGOs, such as CARE (Multilingual Education)

Annex 7 Supporting Annex on the aid context in Cambodia

7.1 Development aid to Cambodia has grown over time, delivered by at least 35 officials donors and hundreds of civil society organisation since the 1993 elections.[11] In 1992 Cambodia received USD21 per person in official development assistance (ODA). By 2000 this had increased to USD33. It peaked at almost USD55 per capita in 2012 before declining to just under USD44 by 2015. ODA from all DAC reporting donors grew by 168% in real terms between 1995 and 2015.[12] Yet, ODA flows per capita never quite reached the median[13] per capita flow for other countries in the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region (see Figure 7.1a below), and from 2002 it has also been below the average for low-income countries (LICs). At the same time, however, aid dependence decreased. By 2015 net ODA and official aid was only 5% of GNI, compared to 13% for the region and for LICs.

Figure 7.1 ODA trends in Cambodia 2000 to 2015



Source: World Bank 2017a, own calculations



Source: World Bank 2017a, own calculations

7.2 Development assistance to the social and economic infrastructure and services sectors has been in excess of 60% of total commitments throughout the period, as is shown in Figure 7.2a below. From 2006 onwards the growth in social infrastructure and services flattened out, while economic infrastructure and services has continued to grow. This long-term analysis however relies on OECD DAC data, which excludes China, a significant donor to Cambodia, as it is not a DAC reporting country. Figure 7.2b provides a sector analysis of aid disbursements including China, using 2007-2016 data from the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC) database. Social services remain the largest single aid sector.

7.3 The CDC data indeed shows that the dominant donor is China, followed by Japan and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), as is reflected in Figure 7.2c below. These three donors contributed altogether 54% of disbursements. China's contribution increased dramatically from 2010 to 2012, but declined almost as dramatically subsequently, driving Cambodia's overall aid receipts down by a fifth. Disbursements from other donors also declined, but less rapidly. In total other donors disbursed the equivalent of 92% of their 2012 disbursement in 2016.

7.4 Over time the composition of aid disbursements shifted from grants to loans. Between 2007 and 2011 almost 68% of disbursements were grants. Between 2012 and 2016 this shifted to below 55%. The shift was largely driven by the increase in support from China, almost exclusively provided as loans (see Figure 7.2d below). Other providers of loans are the ADB, Japan, Korea and the World Bank. The ten

[11] E Chanboreth, S Hach, 2008, *Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia*, Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Papers Series no 7, Wolfensohn Center for Development.
[12] Calculated from OECD DAC, 2017, Creditor Reporting System, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1, accessed 15 November 2017.
[13] The median rather than the average was calculated, as the number of small island states in the region distorts the average.

largest grant donors provide 75% of grants. The top five grant donors are Japan, the United States, Australia, the EU and the Global Fund.

Figure 7.2 Composition of ODA flows to Cambodia



Source: OECD DAC 2017, own calculations



Source: CDC 2016, own calculations



Source: CDC 2017, own calculations



Source: CDC 2017, own calculations

7.5 Aid is largely in the form of project support, as is shown in Figure 7.3a below. Between 1997 and 2015, altogether 27% of aid was disbursed as budget support, of which 41% was sector budget support. The EU is the largest provider of budget support, at just under 50% of total support. Most of this was committed as sector budget support after 2009.

7.6 According to the 2016 Monitoring Round of the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation[14] the medium term predictability of development aid in Cambodia is higher than for all countries overall. Medium term predictability occurs when countries have reliable knowledge two to four years in advance of the amount and timing of the disbursement. Short-term predictability

[14] Global Partnership, 2017, Data by Country 2016 Monitoring Round, Global Partnership for Development Cooperation, http://effectivecooperation.org/monitoring-country-progress/explore-monitoring-data/, accessed 10 November 2017.

relates to less than two years but still in advance of the fiscal year.[15] The proportion of development cooperation funding covered by indicative forward spending plans provided declined from 97.9% in 2013 to 95% in 2010. It was, however, still well above the aggregate score for all countries, at 71.3%. Nonetheless, short-term predictability has improved. According to the 2016 Monitoring Round of the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation[16] the annual predictability of development aid improved from 68.6% in 2010 to 87.2% in 2016.

7.7 Aid disbursements, however, often fell short of the original aid budgets. Figure 7.3b below measures the difference between the initial project and programme commitments by donors, spread over the programme period, and aid disbursements using CDC data.[17] It shows that as aid budgets increased (the grey bars in the figure, measured on the right hand axis), increasingly more aid than committed was disbursed (the black line for all sectors, against left axis), until 2013 when disbursements relative to original commitments started declining. On average, between 2008 and 2009, 77.6% of original aid budgets were disbursed.

7.8 The use of country financial management systems had also improved between 2010 and 2016, with 47.8% of development aid to the public sector considered to use country systems in 2016, compared to 21.6% in 2010[18]. Use of procurement systems, however, lags the use of budget execution, financial reporting and auditing systems, with only 23% of aid using country procurement systems compared to 54% and above for the other three dimensions.

Figure 7.3 Aid commitments and disbursements, and distribution by type of aid



Source: OECD DAC 2017, own calculations



Source: CDC 2017, own calculations

7.9 In summary, the EU ESPSP and ESRP were delivered against a backdrop of increasing aid to Cambodia, particularly from China, mostly delivered as loans. The EU is the 4th largest grant donor, and the most significant budget support provider. While the gap between aid budgets and disbursements is large, the spending plans provided by donors provide medium-term and short-term predictability higher than for all countries. The use of country systems increased over the period.

[15] S. Lister, L. Bjørnestad, R. Carter, M. Chiche and D. Ross, 2011, Aid Predictability – Synthesis of Lessons and Good Practices, Volume 1 of a Study Prepared for the DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness – Task Team on Transparency and Predictability.
[16] Global Partnership, *Op cit*.
[17] Figure 7.3a is based on spreading the budget of an aid commitment over the period of commitment, and comparing it to the disbursements. The graph shows the 3 year moving average trendlines, as the average duration of projects is 3 years, and to compensate for the fact that planned disbursements may not be evenly spread over the project duration.
[18] Global Partnership, *Op cit*.

Annex 8 The EU Budget Support Programmes 2011 to 2016

Programme commitments

8.1 The Education Sector Policy Support Programme (ESPSP, 2011-2013) and the Education Sector Reform Programme (ESRP, 2014-2016/2017) committed a total of EUR 113 million to the sector, of which 85% was for budget support. The ESPSP broke with previous arrangements for EU capacity development support under its sector support programmes: instead of setting aside funds for capacity building for direct implementation by the Commission it supported the MoEYS capacity building strategy through a pooled fund, the Capacity Development Partnership Fund, managed by UNICEF (see Box 8.1 for a description of the Fund). A total of EUR7.45 million committed to the Fund in the financing agreement for the ESPSP. The ESRP continued this arrangement, increasing the funds by 14% (as a share of the total budget support programme amount it decreased to 12%).

Box 8.1 The Capacity Development Partnership Fund

The CDPF was established as a multi-donor fund, managed by UNICEF, to support MoEYS in further developing and implementing its own Capacity Development Plan. This fitted closely with the third priority of the ESP, around institutional capacity development for decentralisation. The design of the CDPF under Phase 2, building on the approach under Phase 1, set out its objectives as to enable effective leadership and management of the sector, specifically:

- To strengthen MoEYS capacity in planning, monitoring, PFM, policy implementation, and management of education reforms for improved sector performance;
- To strengthen capacities at provincial and district levels to plan, manage, monitor and ensure effective implementation of policies for improved education service delivery;
- To strengthen school level capacity and accountability in relation to planning, financing and management in order to increase participation and learning.

The EU is the largest contributor to the fund. Other partners are Sida and UNICEF, which made a financial contribution of SEK51 million and US$2.25 million respectively to the CDPF. The Fund's budget in the first phase was US$13.8 million, and US$10 million in the second phase.

A Steering Committee provides strategic oversight of the CDPF, co-chaired by the Secretary of State and an EU representative, with high level representation from MoEYS, Sida and UNICEF. From the MoEYS side, the Directorate General of Policy and Planning plays a key role in driving the development of the MoEYS' Master Plan for Capacity Development. The Steering Committee is co-chaired by the EU and MoEYS Secretary of State for Education.

The approach taken by the CDPF has developed over the period under review, and it has aimed to use a broader approach to capacity development, working at the organisational and institutional level (e.g. through legislation, norms, policy frameworks) and the individual level (e.g. through coaching, mentoring, on-the-job training, external training, study visits, technical assistance (TA), equipment, and other approaches). The majority of support is provided to sub-national levels of the MoEYS.

8.2 This was not the only way in which the ESPSP represented an evolution in the budget support modality for the education sector Cambodia. The EU had been supporting the education SWAp since its inception in 2003 through budget support transfers to the MOEF. The first programme, running from 2003 to 2008 (EC Targeted Support to Pro-poor Basic Education Reforms) provided grants for direct budget support, but disbursement depended on the RGoC advancing or disbursing its own funds first, for specific purposes, before the EU released its budgets to replenish the amount advanced by Government.[19] This was not a one-on-one relationship, insofar as a dollar's worth of RGoC spending would trigger more than a dollar of EU funding.

[19] S Prasertsi, 2008, Cambodia Case Study of Government and Donor Efforts for Improved Aid Effectiveness in the Education Sector (2000-2008), Background report for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report, UNESCO.

8.3 The EC Sector Budget Support to Basic Education in Cambodia Programme (2008-2010) no longer targeted activities, but still included in the release of the fixed tranche a condition that the education share of the RGoC budget must maintain or increase in shares or volume (whichever was greatest) and that within the education budget, general education must receive at least 60% of the government budget. Furthermore, the variable tranche did not have specific policy actions attached to it but more general process conditions relating to sector planning and review processes. Conditions were the annual revision of the Policy Action Matrix attached to the sector plan, signing a Joint Aide Memoire by the leadership of the MoEYS and donors on actions agreed at the Education Congress, and that the sector plan and Matrix is submitted to the National Assembly.

8.4 In addition, it stipulated that proportionate deductions from the variable trance would occur if the MoEYS PB was not liquidated in the previous year. Carry overs were allowed into a next year of assessment. In both programmes, the capacity development portion was managed through EC procedures. Besides committing the capacity development component to a pooled fund, the ESPSP also moved away from the previous two programmes in that specific conditions beyond the eligibility criteria in the fixed tranche were dropped, allowing more predictability in fixed tranche budget support disbursement, and that the capacity development component became a pooled fund contribution against the MoEYS Strategic Plan.

8.5 The commitments to budget support, to the CDPF and to monitoring and evaluation and visibility interventions (labelled “other” in the table) are set out in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1 ESPSP and ESRP commitments 2011-2017 (EUR thousands)

Programme	Decision No	Document	Components			
			Budget Support	CDPF	Other	Total
ESPSP 2011-2013	DCI ASIE 2010/20438	2011-2013 FA	23,100	7,450	250	30,800
ESRP 2014-2016(17)	DCI ASIE 2007/19017 and 2013/24406	2014-2016 FA	37,000	5,520	580	43,100
		2014-2017 Rider 2 (additional only)	36,500	3,000	320	39,820
Total			**96,600**	**15,970**	**1,150**	**113,720**

Source: EU Delegation Cambodia

8.6 Of the budget support component, 32% of the ESPSP and 47% of the ESRP were committed to variable tranches.

8.7 The ESPSP commitments represented a significant scale up of the budget support component of the EU’s previous programme. It had committed only EUR7.5 million over three years to budget support disbursements, and EUR7.45 million to capacity building.

Table 8.2 Budget support commitments of the Sector Budget Support to Basic Education in Cambodia Programme (2008-2010

	2008	2009	2010	Total
Fixed	2 M €	2 M €	1 M €	5 M €
Variable (max)	1 M €	1 M €	0.5 M €	2.5 M €
	3 M €	3 M €	1.05 M €	7.5 M €

Source: Quinn 2011[20]

Programme disbursements

8.8 **Volume of disbursement:** By December 2016 90% of the EUR20,885,712 commitment for the budget support component of the ESPSP 2011-2013 had been disbursed (disbursed by January 2015).

[20] D. Quinn, 2011, EC Sector Budget Support to Basic Education in Cambodia 2008-10, Final Programme Report

Of the revised ESRP, with one assessment year left in the revised four-year programme, 20% had been disbursed. A disbursement for the 2016 tranche totalling EUR20.2 million occurred in May 2017, and was not considered for the table below, as it fell outside of the evaluation period.

8.9 After the 2015 rider, the tranches for the last two years of the ESRP four-year programme were more than double the tranches of the first two years. Commitments and disbursements to the fixed and variable tranches up to December 2016 are reflected in Table 8.3 below.

Table 8.3 Fixed and variable tranche commitments and disbursements 2011-2016

		Fixed tranche		Variable tranche		Total	
		Committed	**Disbursed**	**Committed**	**Disbursed**	**Committed**	**Disbursed**
ESPSP	2011	5,200,000	5,200,000	2,500,000	1,571,428	7,700,000	6,771,428
		100%		62.86%		87.94%	
	2012	5,200,000	5,200,000	2,500,000	1,714,285	7,700,000	6,914 ,285
		100%		68.57%		89.80%	
	2013	5,200,000	5,200,000	2,500,000	1,999,999[21]	7,700,000	7,199,999
		100%		80.00%		93.51%	
	Total	**15,600,000**	**15,600,000**	**7,500,000**	**5,285,712**	**23,100,000**	**20,885,712**
		100%		**70%**		**90%**	
ESRP	2014	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	100,000	10,000,000	5,100, 000
		100%		2%		51%	
	2015	5,000,000	5,000,000	6,000,000	3,800,000	11,000,000	8,800,000
		100%		63.33%		80.00%	
	2016	13,000,000	0	10,500,000	0	23,500,000	0
		100%		68.57%		85.96%	
	2017	13,000,000	-	11,000,000	-	24,000,000	-
	Total	**36,000,000**	**10,000,000**	**32,500,000**	**3,900,000**	**68,500,000**	**13,900,000**
		28%		**12%**		**20%**	
TOTAL:		51,600,000	25,600,000	40,000,000	9,185,712	91,600,000	34,785,712
		49.6%		23%		38%	

Source: EU Delegation Cambodia

8.10 Altogether 51.5% of the funds committed up to end 2016 were disbursed by December 2016. By May 2017 this had grown to 81% with the disbursement of the 2016 tranche. Note that the disbursements against the variable tranche have shown an upward trend over the ESRP.

8.11 **Timing of disbursement:** According to the Financing Agreements the annual review of performance should occur in March/April, in line with the Education Congress, followed by the MoEYS submitting its request in May, with the EU undertaking its assessment for payment by December.

8.12 Both the first and second programme experienced payment delays against this FA schedule. The table below provides information on the date of receipt of the RGoC request; the date of the EU's letter of request for clarification or seeking additional information; the date of a follow-up letter if applicable; the date of the last reply from the RGoC before the disbursement decision was taken; and the date of the disbursement decision. It also provides the date of the actual disbursement.

[21] Note that the disbursement reflected against the 2013 commitment was disbursed over two years, a first payment in 2014, with the second disbursement (of EUR 642 857) occurring in January 2015.

Table 8.4 Assessment process by year, from RGoC request to disbursement

	Date of RGoC Request	Date of 1st EUD letter	Date of 2nd letter, if applicable	Last reply from RGoC	Disbursement decision	Disbursement
2011	18.08.2011	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	22.12.2011	3.01.2012
2012	30.10.2012	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	19.11.2012	28.12.2012
2013a	8.10.2013	Not available	Not applicable	Not available	Not available	14.07.2014
2013b	5.08.2014	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	23.11.2014	05.01.2015
2014	4.08.2014	21.11.2014	Not applicable	30.12.2014	10.07.2015	16.09.2015
2015	22.09.2015	28.09.2015	2.02.2016	03.03.2016	3.04.2016	16.05.2016
2016	1.11.2016	20.12.2016	Not applicable	01.02.2017	21.04.2017	2.05.2017

8.13 The reasons for an additional round of exchanges after the MoEYS request were as follows:

- 2013: concerns about the quality of EMIS that arose after the initial disbursement decision
- 2014: audit reports outstanding, and an additional request for a report on budget transparency
- 2015: outstanding documents on the implementation of the ESP and variable tranche scholarship indicators
- 2016: outstanding documents on scholarship and multi-lingual education indicators.

Performance Assessment Framework Design

Evolution of the ESPSP (2011-2013)

8.14 The overall expected result of the programme was an accelerated improvement in sector performance at both national and sub-national levels in implementing policies and strategies set out in ESP 2009. The ESPSP was implemented against an original FA (completed and adjusted after signature in line with the ESP targets which were completed after signature) and a rider. The rider extended the execution period to the end of 2014 (making it possible to re-assess the 2013 performance indicators that were not achieved by the 2013 assessment), and adjusted six variable tranche performance indicators.

8.15 The fixed tranche was disbursed against:

- **Sectoral Policy and strategy:** Satisfactory progress in implementing the national education policy and strategy, the ESP 2009-13.
- **Macro-economic stability**: Continued stability-oriented macro-economic management, as evidenced by IMF reports.
- **Public financial management:** Satisfactory progress in implementing PFMRP through annual review of public finance reform

8.16 The performance indicators for the variable tranche disbursements of the budget support focused on ESP strategies/plans to increase budget allocations to MoEYS, improve school performance, increase school autonomy, improve public finance management, and improve planning. Table 8.5 below sets out the indicators and the original, as well as revised targets.

Table 8.5 ESPSP: Variable tranche indicators and targets

Indicator and commitment	Alignment with ESPs	Targets		
		2011	2012	2013 (And 2013 Revised)
1.1 % of annual government recurrent budget allocated to MoEYS **EUR1,500,000**	Aligned at strategy level (programme 5.7) Finance	17.6	18	18.5 **REVISION:** The revised Praka 191 is approved by the MoEF and reflected in the MoEYS Budget Expenditure Plan for 2014 approved by the MoEF
1.2 Number of Districts out of 193 achieving Primary Completion Rate >= 80% **EUR1 500 000**	Aligned at objective level, a CBI Quality	111	115	121 **REVISION:** 140
1.3 Number of Complete Schools achieving a repetition rate of less than 10% (out of 5,462) **EUR1,500,000**	Aligned at objective level, a CBI Equitable access	4,744	4,094	4,464 **REVISION:** 4,750
2.1. The Praka for strengthening of school management and community's role and responsibilities in respect to school management is revised. **EUR428,571**	Aligned at strategy level, programme 1.3 Governance	No target	Analytical paper prepared on present situation and future options for community's role and responsibilities in respect to school management	Praka is revised for the strengthening of school management and community's role and responsibilities in respect to school management
2.2. New SOB funding formulas to reverse recent falls in value and to specifically incentivise student progression and school completion is operationalised. **EUR428,571**	Related to strategy level, programme 5.7 Finance	Policy options prepared for revising school operating budgets to reverse recent falls in value and to specifically incentivise student progression and school completion	PMC decides on measures for revising SOBs, taking into consideration lessons learnt from SIGs from FTI to reverse recent falls in value and to specifically incentivise student progression/school completion	New SOB funding formulas operationalised.
2.3. A costed operational and procedural plan for the provision of school improvement plans to be funded through the national recurrent budget and consistent with national PBB procedures within SOB is developed. **EUR142,857**	Related to strategy level, programme 5.7 Governance		An analytical paper informed by SIG on options for the provision of school improvement plans to be funded through the national recurrent budget is developed and submitted	A costed operational and procedural plan for the provision of school improvement plans to be funded through the national recurrent budget and consistent with national PBB procedures within SOB is developed REVISION: Target was removed
2.4. A procedural manual for decentralized financial management and reporting for education sector programme based budgeting programme is developed **EUR428,571.00**	Aligned at strategy level, programme 5.5 Governance	A draft procedural manual for decentralized financial management and reporting for education sector programme based budgeting is developed.	The procedural manual is ratified and a training of trainers is prepared for roll-out of the system	A Comprehensive national training in new PBB procedures and manual is conducted at school, district and provincial levels as required
2.5. The Internal Audit Manual and compliance audit procedures are revised in accordance with the newly developed PBB procedural manual **EUR428,571**	Aligned at Strategy level, programme 5.6 Governance	The organisational structure IAD is revised	The IAD Manual and compliance audit procedures are drafted in accordance with the newly developed PBB procedural manual	The IAD Manual and compliance audit procedures are piloted and updated in accordance with the newly developed PBB procedural manual.

Indicator and commitment	Alignment with ESPs	Targets		
		2011	2012	2013 (And 2013 Revised)
2.6. Ministry of Education and Youth and Sport's staffing norms for schools, DEOs and PEOs are rationalised and applied **EUR,428,572**	Aligned at strategy level, programme 5.4 Quality	Consultative review on staffing norms is held	Staffing norms for the provincial offices of Education (POEs), the district offices of Education (DOEs), and schools are submitted for ratification.	Staffing norms are rationalized and applied. **REVISION:** New staffing norms approved by CAR or the implementation of new staffing norms is piloted in selected provinces/districts
2.7. Result Based Management is improved and reflected in provincial plans **EUR285,714**	Aligned at strategy level, programme 5.1 Governance	Results Based Management is reflected in provincial AOPs		Consultative results-based performance review held in each province **REVISION:** Consultative results-based performance review (Provincial Congresses) held to inform the drafting of provincial AOPs
2.8. Staff performance review system (SPRS), for mid- to high-level non-teaching management staff, including all school directors is operationalized **EUR428,573**	Aligned at strategy level, programme 5.4 Governance	A consultative review on staff performance is held	A staff performance review system (SPRS) for mid- to high-level non-teaching management staff, including all school directors is developed.	A training of mid-to high-level non-teaching management staff including all school directors, on staff performance review system (SPRS) is conducted.

The evolution of ESRP 2014-2016(17)

8.17 The overall objective of the 2014-2016 programme was to support the RGoC in achieving its vision of poverty reduction and economic and social development, as laid down in the NSDP. The ESRP specific objectives are:

- To provide better and more harmonised aid, based on high level policy dialogue, for the RGoC to deliver key reforms and tackle key governance limitations.
- To help Cambodia achieve the objectives of the ESP 2014-2018, by providing financial and technical support for the adoption and implementation of relevant policy interventions to improve equitable access, quality and the efficient management of the sector.

8.18 The Finance Agreement for the programme was signed in March 2014, but only a few indicators were assessed in 2014. In October 2014 a rider was agreed adjusting four indicator targets. A second rider was agreed in December 2015. This rider extended the programme to 2017 and increased the financing attached significantly, and added two performance indicators for the remaining period of the programme.

8.19 The Finance Agreements set out four conditions for disbursement of the fixed tranche.

- **Sector Strategy**: Satisfactory progress in the implementation of the ESP (relevant to 2014), and the relevance and credibility of the ESP 2014-2018 and satisfactory progress in its implementation.
- **Macroeconomic stability**: The implementation of a relevant and credible stability-oriented macroeconomic policy
- **Public Finance Management**: Continued relevance and credibility of the PFMRP and satisfactory progress in its implementation
- **Budget Transparency**: Satisfactory progress with regard to the public availability of accessible, timely, comprehensive and sound budgetary information.

8.20 The variable tranche indicators were aimed at improving equitable access to, the quality of, and efficient management and governance of the education system. Table 8.6 below sets out the indicators and targets of the ESRP variable tranche. It follows the numbering of the 2015 rider, which added indicators 2.8 and 2.12.

Table 8.6 ESRP Variable Tranche Indicators and Targets

Indicator and commitment	Alignment with ESP and objective	Targets			
		2014	2015	2016 (and 2016 Revised)	2017
2.1 Enrolment in Early Childhood Education (%) **EUR400,000**	Aligned at objective level, a CBI Equitable access	61% of 5-year olds are enrolled in all aspects of Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) in 2013/14, disaggregated by public, community-based, private and home-based pre-schools	66% of 5-year olds are enrolled in all aspects of ECCD in 2014/15, disaggregated	71% of 5-year olds are enrolled in all aspects of ECCD in 2015/16, disaggregated **REVISION**: Target removed	
2.2 Primary completion rate **EUR1,200,000**	Aligned at policy level, a CBI Equitable access / quality		134 of districts achieve a PCR of at least 80% in 2014/2015	134 of districts achieve a PCR of at least 80% in 2015/2016 **REVISION:** The number of districts that achieve a PCR of at least 80% in 2015/16 increases by 10 districts from 2014/15 And The aggregated PCR of the bottom quintile districts (40) reaching 60% in 2015/16	The number of districts that achieve a PCR of at least 80% in 2016/17 increases by 10 districts from 2015/16 And The aggregated PCR of the bottom quintile districts (40) reaching 62% in 2016/17
2.3 Lower secondary completion rate (LSCR) **EUR1,200,000**	Aligned at objective level, a CBI Equitable access / quality		9 provinces achieve a LSCR of at least 40% in 2014/15	12 of provinces achieve a LSCR of at least 40 Vo 1n 2015/16	15 provinces achieve a LSCR of at least 40% in 2016/17
2.4 Lower secondary dropout **EUR1,500,000**	Aligned at sub-sector objective level, is a performance indicator for secondary education Equitable access		Drop-out in lower secondary in 2013/14 is reduced to 13%	Drop-out at Lower Secondary in 2014/15 is reduced to 11% **REVISION:** Comprehensive strategy to reduce drop-out in lower secondary including proposed revised targets in terms of reduction of dropout adopted by the MoEYS	Drop-out at Lower Secondary in 2015/16 is reduced to target set in the ESP following the MTR (target to be confirmed)
2.5 Scholarships in primary **EUR7,500,000**	Aligned at sub-sector strategy level, to primary sector Equitable access	Anukret 66 for scholarship programmes at primary and secondary reviewed and approved by MoEYS and MoEF	Anukret 66 for scholarship programmes at primary and secondary reviewed and approved by MoEYS & MoEF. At least 12 bn rials (US$3mn) are allocated by Government in 2015 MoEYS PB scholarships tor primary poor students	Government continues to allocate at least 12 bn riels (US$3mn) in 2016 MoEYS PB scholarships for primary poor students. **REVISION:** At least 75 000 primary poor students receive scholarships financed by MoEYS PB for school year 2015/16	At least 75 000 primary poor students receive scholarship financed by MoEYS PB for school year 2016/17

Indicator and commitment	Alignment with ESP and objective	Targets			
		2014	2015	2016 (and 2016 Revised)	2017
2.6 Scholarships in lower secondary **EUR5,400,000**	Priority ESP programme aligned at sub-sector strategy level for secondary sector Equitable access		There Is an increase of at least 8 bn riels (US$2 mn) scholarships for lower secondary poor students in 2015 MoEYS PB compared to 2014 PB and amount of scholarships is increased.	There is an increase of at least 8 bn riels (US$2 mn) scholarships for lower secondary poor students in 2016 MoEYS PB compared to 2014 PB. **REVISION:** At least 60,000 lower secondary poor students receive scholarships financed by MoEYS PB for school year 2015/16	At least 60,000 lower secondary poor students receive scholarships financed by MoEYS PB for school year 2016/17 and Review to closely monitor the efficiency of lower secondary scholarships completed
2.7 Multilingual education (MLE) **EUR1,200,000**	Priority ESP programme at sub-sector strategy level, for primary Equitable access and quality		Action Plan on bilingual education finalized and adopted.	100% of the 43 schools in 2015/16 provided bilingual education in ethnic languages have been fully financed by Government. **REVISION:** Praka adopted on integration of the primary community MLE schools into the public school system	MLE expansion achieves its first year targets on new primary schools offering MLE and training teachers in accordance with MLE action plan (target to be confirmed)
2.8 Non-formal education re-entry programme **EUR500,000**	Aligned at sub-sector strategy level for non-formal education Equitable access	Not originally an indicator	Not originally an indicator		Plan for expansion of non-formal primary re-entry programme including revised targets on learners (staring in 2017) and PB increased allocations, adopted by the MoEYS. Plan prepared based on a review of programme implementation
2.9 Teacher qualifications **EUR3,000,000**	Aligned at sub-sector level to personnel management strategies Quality		74% of qualified teachers	77% of qualified teachers **REVISED:** Phased and costed implementation plan for accelerated training for the existing 12+2 teachers to be upgraded to BA holders (12+4) approved by MoEYS INSET needs assessment prepared and approved, including INSET delivery options and strategies	Accelerated training for the existing 12+2 teachers to be upgraded to BA holders (12+4) conducted in 2016/17 in accordance with the approved plan Comprehensive regular INSET system prepared and approved by MoEYS
2.10 National assessments **EUR1,400,000**	Aligned at ESP objective level, a CBI Quality	National assessment conducted and analysed for Grade 6	National assessment conducted for Grade 3 Analysed and disseminated the grade 8 national assessment with concerned stakeholders at national and sub-national levels.	National assessment conducted for Grade 6 Analysed and disseminated the grade 3 national assessment with concerned stakeholders at national and sub-national levels. **REVISION:** Analysed and disseminated the Grade 3 national assessment report with concerned stakeholders at national and sub-national levels	Analysed and disseminated the Grade 6 national assessment report with concerned stakeholders at national and subnational levels

Indicator and commitment	Alignment with ESP and objective	Targets			
		2014	2015	2016 (and 2016 Revised)	2017
2.11 MoEYS budget efficiency **EUR5,600,000**	Aligned at ESP objective level, a CBI Finance	PB increase of at least 15% in 2014 in accordance with the new Praka 508, notably to cover a large increase in SOBs	PB liquidation rate: 94%	PB liquidation rate: 95%	MOESY recurrent budget liquidation rate 96%
2.12 MoEYS capital budget efficiency and predictability **EUR3,600,000**	Aligned at ESP sub-sector level to sector investment management strategies Equitable access			Medium-term basic education capital investment plan adopted by the MoEYS, responding to the ESP priority on ensuring equity in access to basic education, with clear indication of projects to be domestically funded	Chapter 21 of the MoEYS budget allocation for 2017 is agreed with the MoEF with financial allocations covering at least the construction of (i) 70 incomplete primary schools, (ii) 500 water supply and 500 toilet blocks; and (iii) rehabilitating of 100 primary schools (exact number to be confirmed) The MoEYS will issue a report evaluating the implementation of the quality control measures for new school construction. Report will include action plan for further risk mitigation for poor quality construction

Implementation of the PAFs

8.21 **ESPSP 2011-2013:** Table 8.7 below provides a measure of the indicators that were difficult/easy to achieve for the performance tranche of the ESPSP. It shows that in particular indicators 1.1, 2.1, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.8 were achieved less than 50% of the time, even when reassessed against the original target for the year, a year later. These concerned the MoEYS budget allocation, a legal text (Prakas) to strengthen school management committees, internal audit, and staffing norms and staff appraisals.

Table 8.7 ESPSP: analysis of achievement of indicators

Indicator	Commitment	Original Assessments		Repeat Assessments		Total no of assessments		
		Met	Not Met	Met	Not met	Times used	Times met	Times not met
1.1 % of annual government recurrent budget allocated to MoEYS	1,500,000.00		3	1	2	6	1	**5**
1.2 Number of Districts out of 193 achieving Primary Completion Rate >= 80%	1,500,000.00	2	1		1	4	2	2
1.3 Number of Complete Schools achieving a repetition rate of less than 10% (out of 5 462)	1,500,000.00	3				3	3	0
2.1. The Praka for strengthening of school management and community's role and responsibilities in respect to school management is revised.	428,571.00	1	2	1	1	5	2	**3**
2.2. New School Operating Budget (SOB) funding formulas to reverse recent falls in value and to specifically incentivise student progression and school completion is operationalised.	428,571.00	1	2	2		5	3	2
2.3. A costed operational and procedural plan for the provision of school improvement plans to be funded through the national recurrent budget and consistent with national PBB procedures within SOB is developed.	142,857.00	1				1	1	0
2.4. A procedural manual for decentralized financial management and reporting for education sector programme-based budgeting program is developed	428,571.00	3				3	3	0
2.5. The Internal Audit Manual and compliance audit procedures are revised in accordance with the newly developed PBB procedural manual	428,571.00		3	2	1	6	2	4
2.6. Ministry of Education and Youth and Sport's staffing norms for schools, DEOs and PEOs are rationalised and applied	428,572.00	1	2		2	5	1	4
2.7. Result Based Management is improved and reflected in provincial plans	285,714.00	2				2	2	0
2.8. Staff performance review system (SPRS), for mid-to high-level non-teaching management staff, including all school directors is operationalised	428,573.00	1	2	1	1	5	2	3
Grand Total		**15**	**15**	**7**	**8**	**45**	**22**	**23**

8.22 Three of these indicators were revised in the rider (approved in 2013)[22]. These were:

- 1.1 for which in the final year, a process indicator replaced the budget targets. It was however still not met;
- 2.1, which had a condition added, namely that some committees should be trained. It was however not met.
- 2.6, which allowed for either the new staffing norms to be approved by CAR, or their implementation to be piloted. It was not met.

8.23 Other indicators that were adjusted were 1.2 (for which the target was upped for 2013, and not achieved); 1.3 (target upped, achieved); 2.3 (no target, funding moved to 1.2); and 2.7 (which targeted provincial Education Congresses, with the target met).

8.24 **ESRP 2014-2016/7:** Table 8.8 provides a measure of the indicators that were difficult/easy to achieve for the performance tranche of the ESRP, to date. It follows the numbering of the 2015 rider, which added indicators 2.8 and 2.12.

Table 8.8 ESRP: Analysis of achievement of indicators

If variable, which indicator	Commitment	Total for 2014, 2015 and 2016			
		Used	Met	Not Met	Partially met
2.1 Enrolment in Early Childhood Education (%)	400,000	2	0	1	1
2.2 Primary completion rate	1,200,000	2	0	2	0
2.3 Lower secondary completion rate	1,200,000	2	1	1	0
2.4 Lower secondary dropout	1,500,000	2	0	2	0
2.5 Scholarships in primary	7,500,000	3	2	1	0
2.6 Scholarships in lower secondary	5,400,000	2	1	0	1
2.7 Multilingual education (MLE)	1,200,000	2	1	1	0
2.8 Non-formal education re-entry programme	500,000	0	0	0	0
2.9 Teacher qualifications	3,000,000	2	0	1	1
2.10 National assessments	1,400,000	3	1	2	0
2.11 MoEYS budget efficiency	5,600,000	3	0	3	0
2.12 MoEYS capital budget efficiency and predictability	3,600,000	1	1	0	0

8.25 Indicators 2.2, 2.4 were met with difficulty, and indicator 2.11 not met at all to date. Indicator 2.10 was adjusted in 2015 to still include in each year the administration of assessment tests, but aligning the spacing of tests to the MoEYS timeline for administering and analysing the test.

8.26 The evaluation undertook an analysis of the circumstances in which PAF performance targets were met, to get a better sense of the contribution links between the PAF and induced sector outputs. It focused on the process indicators.

8.27 Of the five sector governance indicators analysed, in the two cases where targets were always met, they had strong MOEYS support, as well as support from the CDPF to undertake the activities (decentralised financial management and introduction of AOPs). In the two cases when the target was met sometimes, the MoEYS motivation to achieve the target was low, but CDPF funds were available to undertake the activities towards the target (the Internal Audit Manual and piloting and capital budget fund allocation). The one target that was never met is the budget efficiency target. This is a case where the MoEYS's motivation was high (driven by the new Minister), and where the CDPF did provide support through training. However, taking into account that the target was missed by 1 percentage point, and strong evidence that the MoEYS leadership had pushed to achieve the target, the contribution from this target followed mechanisms that are more similar to the targets in first than the second group.

[22] Cf Table 8.5

Table 8.9 Analysis of the effectiveness of process indicators

	Met / not met	Circumstances
The development of a procedural manual for decentralised financial management and its implementation	Always met (3 out of 3)	This was largely on account technical work and training financed through the CDPF. The Department of Finance was aware that the MoEYS would be a PBB first implementer and that capacity building would be needed MOEYS motivation: medium Earmarked support (from CDPF): available
The development of provincial AOPs that reflect results-based management (2011 tranche) and the holding of provincial consultative education congresses (as revised)	Always met (2 out of 2)	Rolling out results-based budgeting to the POEs and DOEs was important in context of decentralisation of education management functions. The CDPF undertook a lot of the preparatory work, by building the capacity of the POEs and some DOE staff. MOEYS motivation: high Earmarked support from CDPF: available
A third target, on internal audit, eventually was met, having been reassessed for each of the original three years, and only partially in the third year.	Rarely met (2.5 out of 6 assessments)	Internal Audit reform was reportedly not a priority for the Ministry, given other higher priorities. The development of the manual, and training for its piloting was funded through the CDPF MOEYS motivation: medium to low Earmarked support from CDPF: available
Budget Efficiency indicator	Not met (0 out of 3)	The use of this indicator coincided with a new Minister who had a budget background, and understood that efficient use of available funds is essential for sector progress MoEYS motivation: high Earmarked support from the CDPF: some CDPF intervention on PFM would have contributed to improved execution rates.
Capital budget efficiency and predictability	Met half of time (1 out of 2)	Initially the target was included because the MOEYS wanted to facilitate a RGoC capital budget allocation. The fieldwork evidence suggests that the same degree of motivation did not attach to the allocation of the funds. MoEYS motivation medium Earmarked support from the CDPF: only for the capital plan.

8.28 Table 8.10 shows the adjustments to indicators made from the original FA to the 2015 rider. Across indicators and riders, quantitative indicators were changed to process indicators five times altogether.

Table 8.10 ESRP: analysis of indicator adjustments

Indicator	Type of adjustments in 2014	Type of adjustments in 2015	Reason for adjustment
2.1 Enrolment in Early Childhood Education (%)	No adjustment	Dropped as target for 2016 and 2017	The Early Childhood Education indicator was dropped because support for ECD became a key focus of the GPE programme, and therefore already an agenda item for joint donor engagement with the MoEYS. Dropping this indicator enabled the non-formal education and capital budgeting indicator to be added. The change assisted in enabling dialogue on the new indicators, with the MoEYS and the MOEF.
2.2 Primary completion rate	No adjustment	Extended to 2017 Instead of specifying districts, a growth rate in number of districts to achieve 80% PCR, and adding a second aspect referring to the	In 2014/15 the number of districts dropped significantly from 131 in 2013/14 to 104, making the achievement of the original indicator specified as a an increasing number of districts year-on-year difficult. The new target meant that if the sector did not achieve the increase in one year, it would not put the subsequent year more

Indicator	Type of adjustments in 2014	Type of adjustments in 2015	Reason for adjustment
		bottom quintile of districts	out of reach. Despite this adjustment, the target was still not reached in the 2016 assessment. The reference to the bottom quintile was to monitor the achievement of least performing districts. Both targets however enabled dialogue on this outcome and underlying policy issues.
2.3 Lower secondary completion rate	No adjustment	No adjustment, indicator extended to 2017	No applicable
2.4 Lower secondary dropout	No adjustment	Changed 2016 from a quantitative to a process indicator, and extended quantitative indicator to 2017	The target was adjusted in recognition that the original ESP targets set – which was initially followed by the PAF – were ambitious. While dropout rates did decrease in 2012/13 from 22 to 20%, it was not as rapid as the target. Resetting the target to include the adoption of a comprehensive strategy to reduce drop-out rates, recognised that the next step for the MOEYS was a strategy, and that the ESP targets were to be revised in line with this strategy. The final tranche (4th tranche in 2017) then reverts to these revised targets.
2.5 Scholarships in primary	Legal text approval moved to 2015 from 2014, and no of students dropped, just overall amount remained	Changed to number of students, dropped the overall amount	Moving the approval of the legal text recognised that this was only done in 2015. Dropping the specification of the number of students is because the legal text specified the amount per scholarship. Given that for both primary and secondary scholarships the programme was to be partially co-financed by the GPE in the first years, specifying the amount was deemed sufficient.
2.6 Scholarships in lower secondary	No of students dropped, just overall amount remained	Changed to number of students, dropped the overall amount, and for 2017 added a review to monitor efficiency of the completed scholarships	
2.7 Multilingual education (MLE)	Changed 2015 to process indicator, extended quantitative indicator to 2016	2016 also changed to a process indicator, and extended a revised quantitative indicator to 2017	The revision of the indicator recognised that the national action plan and accompanying legal texts were necessary to fully integrate the MLE schools into the state system, with full funding. The revised quantitative indicator then specified the financing of all 43 schools by Government.
2.8 Non-formal education re-entry programme	Not applicable	Added as an indicator for 2017	The non-formal education re-entry programme is a key strategy for the MOEYS to reverse high drop-out. In

Indicator	Type of adjustments in 2014	Type of adjustments in 2015	Reason for adjustment
			2015 Government adopted a new sub-decree with provisions aimed at helping to overcome bottlenecks in the implementation of the re-enrolment programme related to teacher salaries and class sizes. It was therefore an opportune time to include the programme in the PAF, so as to enable dialogue and support the gradual expansion of the programme.
2.9 Teacher qualifications	No adjustment	Changed 2016 to process indicator Stated 2017 process indicator	The revision of the indicator recognised the approval of the Teacher Policy Action Pan in 2015. The process indicators were intended to support the implementation of this plan by recognising key milestones in the plan. The target set for 2016 and 2017 was intended to support the short term objective of upgrading all teachers and the long-term objective of continuous teacher development through reforming in-service training.
2.10 National assessments	Spaced assessments to run over two years	Extended pattern to 2017.	The extended pattern was to align with the MoEYS timetable for the administration and analysis of the tests.
2.11 MoEYS budget efficiency	Changed quantitative indicator on payment of teachers' salaries through bank accounts to Programme Budget liquidation rate	Extended to 2017 and changed to recurrent budget liquidation rate	Implementing reforms to pay all civil servants' salaries through bank accounts was faster than anticipated. The 2015 and 2016 targets were therefore revised to refer to the implementation of the PB liquidation (2015) and MOEYS recurrent budget liquidation (2016) rates. The use of this indicator is in recognition of the aligned ESP target and the renewed attention to budget execution bottlenecks by the MoEYS. The indicator uses targets set by the MoEYS.
2.12 MoEYS capital budget efficiency and predictability	No applicable	Added process indicators for 2016, quantitative indicator for 2017	The addition of this indicator recognised that the MoEYS received a capital budget allocation for the first time in 2015, and was to enable dialogue on the use of the funding between stakeholders, as it successfully did. The specification of a medium term capital investment plan was to strengthen capital expenditure institutions in the sector.

Annex 9 Supporting annex on direct outputs of budget support

Sector dialogue

9.1 Sector-wide governance mechanisms, centred on the education sector strategic plans, are in place. The functionality of these mechanisms is key to the EU budget support programmes over the evaluation period.

Regular forums

9.2 **The Joint Technical Working Group on Education**: The JTWG is the main RGoC/DP structure in education. The overall purpose of the JTWG is to promote aid effectiveness and development partnership in support of the achievement of the Education Sector Plan and the Annual Operational Plan of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MoEYS).

9.3 JTWGs are established for all sectors in terms of the aid management policy of the RGoC, which is administered by the Council for the Development of Cambodia, an entity under the Ministry of Planning. The Partnership Principles for the Education Sector acts as a guide for the education JTWG, and it reports to the Government-Development Partner Coordination Committee (GDCC).

9.4 The education JTWG is jointly chaired by the Minister of Education, and the UNICEF representative. Over the period, up to the last meeting of the JTWG in 2013, the Secretary of State acted as chair on behalf of the Minister. From that point onwards however, the meeting has been chaired by the (new) Minister himself. The JTWG also includes other Ministries involved in education and civil society representatives. Provincial JTWGs coordinate actions by sector partners at this level, and were established at the time of the start of the ESPSP.

9.5 The education JTWG meets four times a year. The meetings comprise an update on progress against selected key reform actions, an update on sector budget implementation, a focused discussion on specific areas which are determined in each meeting for the subsequent meeting; an update on new donor programmes and upcoming donor missions, and often coordination of upcoming joint events such as the Education Congress and the Annual Retreat. From time to time the donors would present on a technical area selected, bringing new analysis and/or international experience.

9.6 The JTWG has technical sub-working groups, including on PFM, textbooks and teacher development. The EU is a member of several of the technical sub-working groups. The work of the sub-groups are less formalised, and more hands-on about policy and operational issues. The JTWG from time-to-time tasks sub-groups to look further into specific issues. The sub-working groups are also the arena in which aid coordination and harmonisation at the level of programme focus areas occur, but also at the level of coordinating interventions (by sub-sector and geographically) and talking through issues of conflicting approaches and advice.

9.7 The **Education Sector Working Group** (ESWG) is a forum for the education development partners, and meets on a monthly basis. UNESCO is the Chair of the ESWG and acts as the Secretariat. The ESWG's purposes are information sharing, donor-level dialogue about sector priorities and issues arising, joint programming, and coordinating technical analysis and research to support debate in the sector.

Annual events

9.8 The MOEYS conducts an **Annual Education Sector Congress**. The Congress gathers over a thousand participants from all the technical departments of MoEYS and all the Provincial Offices of Education, Youth and Sport, relevant Government Ministries/ Institutions, Higher Education Institutions, development partners, civil society groups active in the education sector and other education stakeholders, such as teacher associations. The MOEF is a key participant. The Congress reviews the current school year, identifying key issues, and discusses the objectives for the coming school year. This occurs within the framework of the Education Strategic Plan. The discussions occur however by themes

that are proposed to the JTWG by the MoEYS, and agreed. MoEYS technical departments prepare technical papers as inputs into the congress. A Congress report is prepared, with details against the objectives and indicators of the Strategic Plan.

9.9 The **Joint Sector Review**, is undertaken by the RGoC and the education development partners to review progress in the sector against the sector strategic plan. The principle is that development partners individually should have only marginal additional monitoring processes. The review was reinstated in 2015, as a complementary process to the Annual Education Sector Congress and is timed to precede it.

9.10 In addition to the regular meetings of the JTWG and the Joint Sector Review, the MoEYS and its DP hold **an annual retreat** of two to three days, at which the key issues affecting sector performance are discussed. The agenda for the annual retreat is proposed by the ESWG chair to the JTWG, and discussed and agreed. The retreat is seen by the MoEYS and development partners as highly important, as it involves the full MoEYS leadership, including the Minister, and is the place for in-depth discussion and agreement about key issues.

9.11 From 2015 the Ministry of Economy and Finance has held an **annual education sector consultation**, as part of a reformed annual budget process under programme performance based budgeting. This consultation precedes the closed budget hearing with the MoEYS, and the purpose is and open review of the performance of the sector, with all stakeholders invited. Donor respondents highlighted this forum as a critical addition to the annual dialogue calendar. This is because the departure point for all discussion is the RGoC budget allocations to education, and the effectiveness and efficiency of its use. Since its institution this forum has provided opportunity for donors to raise issues with and on behalf of the MOEYS that are key for sector progress. The number, volume and use of scholarships, and the volume and regulation of school operating budgets, for example, have been discussed at this forum.

Bilateral and intervention-specific forums

9.12 Both the MoEYS and donors reported that formal bilateral policy discussions are not a feature of the aid coordination landscape. Bilateral meetings do occur, but these are primarily used by the MOEYS and donors to coordinate their projects. Individual interventions that are managed via the MoEYS may for example have steering committees. The MoEYS has established a Project Management Committee, which comprises top management of the MOEYS, is chaired by a Secretary of State and oversees and coordinates the implementation of the GPE programme, with the intent to progressively also oversee other development partner-financed projects. Other steering committees include the CDPF Steering Committee, which is co-chaired by the EU. This Steering Committee, because it manages the Capacity Development Master Plan of the MoEYS, also discusses and coordinates donor capacity development support, even if outside of the CDPF.

9.13 The EU utilises the joint sector dialogue and monitoring processes in the implementation of the Budget Support Programme. At the request of the MoEYS, these processes have recently been complemented by a half-yearly meeting with the Directorate Policy and Planning and other MoEYS departments relevant to the Budget Support Programme's PAF. In addition the EU undertakes the annual assessment processes for the disbursement of the fixed and variable tranches.

EU participation in sector dialogue, and dialogue focuses

9.14 The EU Delegation attends and actively participates in the dialogue forums. Over the period of the ESPSP and the ESRP, its dialogue focuses have been consistent with the objectives and expected results from the programmes. Key topics over time have been:

- **Education sector financing and PFM**: The EU is a member of the technical sub-working group on PFM. Topics included the share of MoEYS resources in government budget; budget execution; financial management, reporting and audit; and in the last two years, addressing the challenges of implementing the programme budget reform. During the ESRP it is has also pursued issues of transparency, both in the sector and with the MoEF the Joint Technical Working Group on PFM.

- **Increasing transparency and reducing opportunities for fraud and corruption**: leakages in the textbook system; quality of education statistics; and using bank accounts for teacher salaries; SOB leakages and the use of bank accounts.
- **Targeting of interventions to disadvantaged areas and populations**: biasing the SOB formulas to disadvantaged schools; establishing scholarship programme in primary education and extending the secondary scholarship programme; institutionalising initiatives and activities that are donor funded such as multi-lingual education and non-formal education.
- **Interventions to support quality**: measures to improve completion rates, the introduction of standard assessment tests and Grade 12 exit exam reform.
- **Teacher deployment and development**: development of the Teacher Policy and the Teacher Policy Action Plan; increases in teachers' salaries.

Donor coordination, sector planning, management and financing issues	Education policy, interventions and results
• *Dialogue processes and priorities*: determination of agendas for the JTWG and other joint sector forums; sector priorities. • *Sector planning processes and instruments*: ESP preparation, implementation and review; Annual Operational Plans. • *Expenditure management and issues*, including increasing the sector share of the RGoC budget; factors in poor execution rates; restructuring and increasing the School Operating Budgets; the management and use of the capital budget and investment in water, sanitation and health interventions; and implementation of programme-performance-based budgeting, • *Decentralisation and deconcentration* in the education sector, including devolving MoEYS headquarters functions to provinces, and decentralising education functions. • *Capacity Development and CDPF*, including the Capacity Development Master Plan and report back on key capacity development interventions. • *Evidence-based policy*, including the development and implementation of the EMIS Master Plan and the establishment of the Education Research Institute.	• *Repetition and Drop-out rates*, including causes and policy interventions. • *Curriculum reform and textbooks*, including textbook policies, textbook distribution and control, and the presence of not-for-sale textbooks in local markets. • *Teacher Policy and deployment*, including the development and implementation of the Teacher Policy Action Plan. • *Scholarships*, including report back on scholarship allocation processes, numbers and financing. • *ECE and early grade teaching,* including harmonisation of approaches. • *Non-formal education*, including the implementation of the equivalency programme. • *Performance appraisal, quality assurance and Inspection*, including the national learning assessments, examination reform and examination results. • *Higher Education*, including internal and external quality assurance. • Full day school programmes and teaching hours. • Child-friendly schools.

9.15 Joint sector dialogue often linked to other contributions from the budget support programmes, to induce sector outputs. Box 9.1 below presents a mini case study on how sector dialogue interacted with the PAF, capacity development inputs through the CDPF and budget support funds to induce a change in the sector.

Box 9.1. Dialogue, PAF, capacity building and budget support contribution to change in the school operating budgets

The RGoC introduced the school operating budgets in 2001/02. When programme budgeting (PB) was introduced seven years later, the school operating budget fell under the rules for managing the PB portion of the budget, including rules on using funds only for the purpose for which they were appropriated. The formula underlying the school operating budgets had a fixed component and a per pupil component to provide some compensation to smaller schools. The Fast Track Initiative, in a few provinces, provided an additional grant to top up the school operating budgets, but used parallel procedures. This support came to an end at the start of the evaluation period. From 2014 Sida has been supporting all schools with the school improvement grant, using school bank accounts, which is more flexible and includes in its formula provision for schools located in areas of disadvantage.

During the period the school operating budgets changed in terms of the volume of funding made available, the distribution by school, the management arrangements and the rules for its use at school level. This box clarifies the various strands of EU budget support and donor influence in this process.

- **Joint dialogue**: School operating budgets, their size and management were an EU and joint donor dialogue concern throughout the period. Some aspects of the formula, the adequacy of the funding, the rigidity of the PB rules and the management of transfer through bank accounts were discussed in about half of the JTWG meetings tracked.
- **Donor technical inputs**: In 2011 the ESWG prepared an analytical paper which was presented to the JTWG on the formula, the adequacy of the current amounts given increases in inflation, and the adverse effects of the rigid PB rules. The JTWG then referred the issue for further work. A joint sub-working group was formed and the issue was referred to the Education Congress (in two months' time at the time). In 2017 the World Bank with Sida support finalised a public expenditure tracking survey, which offered helpful evidence on both the success (full receipt of funds at school level) and the problems (late disbursement of both the school operating budgets and improvement grants; weak capacity for planning and reporting) of school-based financing mechanisms in Cambodia.
- **PAF**: The school operating budgets formula was a variable tranche indicator in the ESPSP. The EU raised the fact that the school operating budget indicator in the PAF was missed in 2011 in the JTWG. The ESRP included in 2014 a variable tranche indicator for a PB increase of at least 15% to cover a large increase in the school operating budget, which was not met, but there was still an increase of 12.5%.
- **CDPF**: The ministry undertook technical work through the CDPF.
- **Budget support funds:** The school operating budget was increased in 2013 and again in 2015. Respondents view this as one of the cases where the presence of budget support funds provided coverage for the MoEYS to negotiate funding from the government budget. Sida's motivation for partially using country systems to manage its contribution was also facilitated by the presence of a large budget support programme.

In 2012 the MoEYS negotiated a revised Praka with the MoEF, to change the formula, increase the budget in 2013 and change management procedures. One change was that schools no longer had to liquidate the previous budget to get a next release, but still had to provide reports for post-audit. The formula also changed to take into account disadvantage, but not to the degree the donors were proposing. In 2015 the budget increased again, and the school operating budget disbursement procedures were harmonised with school improvement grant procedures, even if budgeting was still different with the grants requiring a school improvement plan. From the third quarter of the 2014/2015 school year, school operating budgets were paid through school bank accounts. In 2017, after continued dialogue and further joint technical work, progress was made on merging the school operating grants formula and approach with the school operating budgets. This is currently in the final stages of negotiation with the MoEF. Also in 2017 the World Bank undertook a public expenditure tracking survey, which found that all funds provided through the school operating budgets reached schools.

Annex 10 Data and additional graphs

The graphs and tables in this annex provide supporting data and analysis to the chapters in the main report and are grouped under relevant chapter headings.

Chapter 2. Context

Additional graphs

Population trends Cambodia

Population estimates Figure 10.1 below is based on population estimates from the United Nations (UN). It shows that while the number of Cambodians of school-going age is still expected to increase by 7% between 2010 and 2030 (the bars on the graph), it declines as a share of the population from 42% to 36% (the top line on the graph). The lower line on the graph tracks the changing percentage share of school-age population in the South Eastern Asia region as a whole, showing the same trend. As the gap between the two lines shows, however, Cambodia has a much younger population than the region as a whole. Population growth varies across provinces, affecting the demand for education and other services. Growth is higher in the provinces along the Thailand border, where jobs are available, and in urbanised provinces.[23]

Figure 10.1 Population 0-19 2010 to 2030, and as a share of the total population



Additional tables

Table 10.1 Key education statistics 2000/01 to 2009/10

	2000/01		2005/06		2009/10	
	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female
Net Enrolment Rates						
Primary						
Primary: nationwide	83.8%	80.7%	91.3%	89.7%	94.8%	94.6%
Primary: urban area	86.4%	83.2%	91.2%	89.7%	92.2%	92.2%
Primary: rural area	84.1%	81.0%	91.7%	90.1%	95.3%	95.0%
Primary: remote area	62.3%	58.2%	83.7%	80.1%	n.a	n.a
Secondary						
Lower Secondary: nationwide	16.6%	13.7%	31.3%	30.4%	32.6%	34.6%
Lower secondary: urban area	29.5%	26.8%	50.1%	50.3%	49.1%	50.5%
Lower secondary: rural area	14.1%	11.0%	28.6%	27.4%	29.4%	31.5%
Lower Secondary: remote area	1.2%	1.0%	6.0%	6.0%	na	na

[23] UNESCO, 2016, Cambodia Rapid Education Sector Analysis, International Institute for Educational Planning, UNESCO.

	2000/01		2005/06		2009/10	
	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female
Upper secondary: nationwide	7.7%	5.4%	11.3%	9.9%	19.4%	19.4%
Teacher pupil ratios						
Primary	50.8		45		49.2	
Lower Secondary	31.7		28.5		24.4	
Upper Secondary	29.5		28.5		32.2	
Repetition Rates						
Repetition Rate Primary	28.5%	27.5%	11.0%	9.8%	8.9%	7.8%
Repetition Rate Lower secondary	17.6%	16.4%	2.5%	24.9%	2.3%	1.5%
Repetition Rate Upper secondary	15.0%	13.5%	3.3%	15.5%	2.8%	1.7%
Drop-out rates						
Drop-out Rate Primary			11.6%	11.9%	8.3%	7.9%
Drop-out Rate Lower secondary			22.8%	24.9%	18.8%	19.4%
Drop-out Rate Upper secondary			15.9%	15.5%	11.2%	10.8%

Source: RGoC MoEYS 2005, RGoC MoEYS 2010

Chapter 4. Providing new opportunities for the education sector in Cambodia: budget support direct outputs

Table 10.2 Aid to Cambodia, all donors by sector

	Sum of Total 2013 (USD)	Sum of Total 2014 (USD)	Sum of Total 2015 (USD)	Sum of Total 2016 (USD)
Agriculture & Rural Development	236,298,831.81	271,893,092.67	233,523,793.56	179,460,409.70
Aid management	16,648,410.81	15,156,138.47	7,709,357.23	8,920,107.59
Budget & BoP Support	-	-	-	-
Business & Financial Services, Trade and Industrialisation and Tourism	76,185,201.03	30,723,086.32	51,758,884.91	21,508,772.44
Community and Social Welfare	31,923,404.57	38,942,892.16	47,458,298.45	16,069,880.05
CROSS-sector	13,919,186.73	13,225,203.82	16,652,105.33	14,502,237.50
Culture, Arts & Sports	4,767,235.02	4,698,495.94	5,273,895.48	2,929,699.43
Education, Vocational Training and Skills Development	99,114,064.55	116,568,438.62	124,867,647.80	106,950,730.69
Emergency & Food Aid	22,018,111.90	24,734,162.74	14,577,000.00	876,968.00
Energy, Power & Electricity	72,592,300.47	74,052,982.16	54,344,734.24	138,468,722.97
Environment, Sustainability and Climate Change	20,579,492.73	22,175,775.78	23,954,666.34	29,833,111.43
Gender	10,661,947.86	11,114,725.84	8,456,746.74	7,988,140.03
Governance & Administration	116,096,911.37	86,784,240.77	83,402,846.32	112,125,379.72
Health	158,361,665.12	190,823,513.68	184,608,832.20	171,016,455.37
Other	-	-	-	53,863.16
Technology, Information and Communications	2,893,878.47	10,356,008.84	4,904,087.35	12,459,092.24
Transportation	389,152,256.91	315,829,558.75	287,368,669.84	160,035,947.68
Urban Planning & Management	252,045.12	6,497,229.29	7,055,709.86	5,680,800.77
Water and Sanitation	58,751,865.82	57,791,263.07	35,429,834.93	36,688,439.35
Grand Total	**1,330,216,810.29**	**1,291,366,808.91**	**1,191,347,110.58**	**1,025,568,758.11**

Source: CDC 2017

Table 10.3 Aid to Cambodia by donor

	Sum of Total 2013 (USD)	Sum of Total 2014 (USD)	Sum of Total 2015 (USD)	Sum of Total 2016 (USD)
ADB	190,361,819.00	142,640,935.00	141,830,576.00	113,886,239.08
Australia	59,264,845.16	64,945,110.07	55,941,693.81	51,850,226.37
Belgium	415,159.61	-	-	-
Canada	14,308,627.42			2,956,287.60
China	449,336,522.84	347,789,763.75	339,385,096.57	265,313,628.37
Czech Republic	43,456.33	1,167,005.96	1,231,718.33	1,291,029.16
Denmark	-	-	-	-
EU/EC	39,162,877.80	70,375,524.00	55,795,853.87	55,953,878.20
FAO	7,717,377.00	5,318,360.00	4,561,924.00	2,739,888.00
Finland	5,375,960.40	4,400,000.00	-	-
France	19,005,472.45	59,453,593.33	63,313,772.63	31,862,700.81
GAVI	10,688,273.00	5,482,593.00	18,950,849.00	10,195,825.00
Germany	37,158,396.21	32,639,575.64	29,998,676.78	52,123,414.89
Global Fund	45,430,801.00	54,592,558.00	33,347,206.00	28,193,726.84
IFAD	3,626,773.00	13,541,258.30	12,721,041.92	15,542,734.00
ILO	1,971,456.00	2,210,145.12	2,996,037.40	3,242,646.81
IMF	-	-	-	-
Ireland	2,566,943.49	733,333.33	556,379.82	631,039.06
Japan	130,758,536.27	111,420,392.41	110,363,072.71	119,678,310.25
Netherlands	-	-	-	-
New Zealand	3,229,778.50	5,974,316.03	4,896,820.95	4,015,109.78
Republic of Korea	50,930,724.83	80,325,783.00	61,713,845.00	31,913,271.00
Spain	4,105,136.40	1,567,334.67	-	-
Sweden	36,493,223.85	33,037,027.91	21,803,390.15	31,463,087.95
Switzerland	7,772,287.92	11,810,329.10	13,021,445.60	15,798,822.95
UK	13,678,051.04	71,581.93	169,115.52	1,595,635.08
UN Women	1,087,168.00	1,952,028.00	2,047,563.00	1,475,705.00
UNAIDS	233,449.00	55,899.00	130,000.00	157,000.00
UNDP	16,531,249.78	18,274,613.90	17,610,362.86	12,647,832.94
UNESCO	1,831,003.00	486,297.00	66,320.00	1,048,193.00
UNFPA	5,296,864.00	6,018,984.00	5,236,875.00	3,464,143.00
UNICEF	18,434,506.00	18,355,155.00	17,765,487.30	20,248,219.00
UNIDO	1,506,171.61	1,504,086.46	1,985,791.00	1,023,545.00
UNODC	834,600.00	300,365.00	299,500.00	-
USA	67,578,356.00	91,605,924.00	100,965,859.00	71,969,202.00
WFP	18,519,846.36	11,938,322.00	9,484,988.00	16,441,402.09
WHO	24,519,610.00	27,196,150.00	18,751,007.00	15,410,859.00
World Bank	39,834,618.67	58,359,469.00	40,651,253.95	41,435,155.88
Grand Total	**1,329,609,941.95**	**1,291,366,808.91**	**1,191,347,110.58**	**1,025,568,758.11**

Source: CDC 2017

Table 10.4 Aid by donor to the Education Sector, including all implementing agencies

	Sum of Total 2013 (USD)	Sum of Total 2014 (USD)	Sum of Total 2015 (USD)	Sum of Total 2016 (USD)
ADB	21,403,310.00	14,996,690.00	19,527,000.00	4,386,000.00
Australia	9,453,216.69	11,666,457.48	9,567,954.65	11,065,640.18
Belgium	-	-	-	-
Canada	230,198.07	45,108.72	90,595.47	162,529.36
China	-	-	4,464,345.03	3,382,493.58
Czech Republic	12,897.80	275,156.55	294,221.38	389,720.58
EU/EC	4,702,979.96	24,305,150.67	17,614,619.07	11,152,876.14
Finland	302,667.69	-	-	-
France	2,556,016.06	2,268,437.33	1,386,079.01	4,127,751.29
Japan	6,508,772.88	9,747,921.28	14,434,168.70	6,203,043.64
Netherlands	-	-	-	-
New Zealand	2,288,434.02	3,181,363.03	2,608,088.95	1,855,087.46
Republic of Korea	5,941,102.62	3,445,000.00	1,545,000.00	5,724,117.00
Spain	-	-	-	-
Sweden	13,638,093.74	12,182,448.15	8,818,360.17	13,580,897.30
UK	-	-	66,851.24	166,530.81
UNDP	-	72,214.00	1,244,345.00	995,371.00
UNESCO	683,463.00	351,657.00	20,000.00	-
UNFPA	248,626.00	222,984.00	154,266.00	90,862.00
UNICEF	7,410,512.00	6,825,062.00	6,238,676.00	7,181,612.00
USA	5,750,832.00	4,550,954.00	5,123,866.00	1,561,244.00
WFP	13,143,658.00	9,958,801.00	8,910,910.00	14,910,225.00
World Bank	4,729,284.00	12,113,175.00	17,456,884.00	16,010,746.53
Grand Total	**99,004,064.55**	**116,208,580.21**	**119,566,230.66**	**102,946,747.87**

Source: CDC 2017

Table 10.5 Aid provided to education, with RGoC as implementing agency

	Sum of Total 2013 (USD)	Sum of Total 2014 (USD)	Sum of Total 2015 (USD)	Sum of Total 2016 (USD)
ADB	21,403,310.00	14,996,690.00	19,527,000.00	4,386,000.00
Belgium	-	-	-	-
China	-	-	-	-
EU/EC	3,956,081.24	23,954,810.67	16,397,169.88	10,074,833.46
France	1,412,958.75	1,591,352.00	970,650.22	692,828.67
Japan	6,104,429.88	8,975,470.28	13,577,980.70	5,789,579.61
Republic of Korea	2,741,102.62	2,899,000.00	1,545,000.00	4,252,117.00
Sweden	7,683,638.97	7,403,109.18	6,053,443.40	7,353,508.74
UNFPA	248,626.00	222,984.00	154,266.00	90,862.00
UNICEF	7,410,512.00	6,825,062.00	6,238,676.00	7,181,612.00
WFP	13,143,658.00	9,958,801.00	8,910,910.00	14,910,225.00
World Bank	4,729,284.00	12,113,175.00	17,456,884.00	14,983,450.53
Grand Total	**68,833,601.47**	**88,940,454.12**	**90,831,980.20**	**69,715,017.00**

Source: CDC 2017

Note: This includes the MoEYS and other agencies, though predominantly MoEYS:. All projects where MoEYS is listed as the main implementing agency are included.

Table 10.6 Aid committed to education, by sub-sector and development partner

	Sum of Total 2013 (USD)	Sum of Total 2014 (USD)	Sum of Total 2015 (USD)	Sum of Total 2016 (USD)
Budget Support / Sector SWAp	**9,961,081.24**	**30,443,810.67**	**27,419,169.88**	**17,256,445.46**
ADB	6,005,000.00	6,489,000.00	11,022,000.00	-
EU/EC	3,956,081.24	23,954,810.67	16,397,169.88	10,074,833.46
UNICEF	-	-	-	7,181,612.00
World Bank	-	-	-	-
Other	**-**	**-**	**-**	**3,675,000.00**
Belgium	-	-	-	-
Republic of Korea	-	-	-	3,675,000.00
Primary Education	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**
ADB	-	-	-	-
Primary/Basic	**20,554,170.00**	**22,189,184.00**	**29,079,567.00**	**27,200,333.90**
Belgium	-	-	-	-
Republic of Korea	-	-	-	-
UNICEF	7,410,512.00	6,825,062.00	6,238,676.00	-
WFP (school feeding)	13,143,658.00	9,958,801.00	8,910,910.00	14,910,225.00
World Bank	-	5,405,321.00	13,929,981.00	12,290,108.90
School and Facilities	**16,767,565.97**	**10,942,469.18**	**14,311,108.38**	**7,761,265.74**
ADB	8,082,000.00	2,702,000.00	-	-
Japan	697,927.00	316,360.00	7,512,664.98	407,757.00
Republic of Korea	304,000.00	521,000.00	745,000.00	-
Sweden	7,683,638.97	7,403,109.18	6,053,443.40	7,353,508.74
Secondary Education	**2,210,157.72**	**5,167,546.02**	**5,277,830.98**	**6,142,743.38**
ADB	802,000.00	509,000.00	3,833,000.00	4,386,000.00
France	289,077.11	260,000.00	151,335.31	12,527.27
Japan	616,080.61	2,020,546.02	493,495.67	1,744,216.11
Republic of Korea	503,000.00	2,378,000.00	800,000.00	-
World Bank	-	-	-	-
Sector Policy	**165,690.00**	**-**	**-**	**90,862.00**
ADB	165,690.00	-	-	-
UNFPA	-	-	-	90,862.00
Teacher Training	**2,275,387.41**	**306,518.67**	**154,266.00**	**-**
France	122,761.41	83,534.67	-	-
Japan	-	-	-	-
Republic of Korea	1,904,000.00	-	-	-
UNFPA	248,626.00	222,984.00	154,266.00	-
Tertiary, Vocational and Higher	**16,899,549.12**	**19,890,925.59**	**14,590,037.97**	**7,588,366.53**
ADB	6,348,620.00	5,296,690.00	4,672,000.00	-
China	-	-	-	-
France	1,001,120.23	1,247,817.33	819,314.91	680,301.40
Japan	4,790,422.27	6,638,564.25	5,571,820.06	3,637,606.50
Republic of Korea	30,102.62	-	-	577,117.00
World Bank	4,729,284.00	6,707,854.00	3,526,903.00	2,693,341.63
Grand Total	**68,833,601.47**	**88,940,454.12**	**90,831,980.20**	**69,715,017.00**

Source: CDC 2017

Table 10.7 Budget Support to Cambodia Education Sector (USD millions)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	2016
Australia	-	13.96	-	-	-	-
EU Institutions	-	-	-	22.62	44.86	33.28
World Bank	4.74	-	-	-	-	-
IMF	-	-	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**4.74**	**13.96**	**-**	**22.62**	**44.86**	**33.28**

Source: OECD DAC Data 2010 to 2016

Chapter 5. Inducing improved education sector policies, financing and service deliver

Table 10.8 Distribution of MoEYS budget by economic item

				2013		2014	
	BUDGET (1000 Riels)	ACTUAL (1000s)	%	BUDGET (1000s)	ACTUAL (1000s)	BUDGET (1000s)	ACTUAL (1000s)
The total cost is constant (I + II)	1,010,094	908,881	89.98%	1,129,279	1,056,557	1,383	1
Total Program Budget and Non-Program	**1,010,093,900**	**908,881,158**	**89.98%**	**1,129,279,018**	**1,056,556,773**	**1,189,089**	**1,251**
Chapter 60 Goods Purchases	144,677,100	136,276,486	94.19%	159,049,600	149,447,440	153,684	128,354
Chapter 61 External Services	52,941,600	49,965,630	94.38%	59,366,700	54,331,928	80,953	69,357
Chapter 62 Social Benefits	37,234,000	31,962,933	85.84%	40,842,300	36,147,510	49,362	38,416
Chapter 64 Staff	745,361,200	663,882,880	89.07%	835,835,418	784,993,475	1,050,548	974,761
Chapter 65 Subsidies	29,653,000	26,638,913	89.84%	33,958,000	31,477,748	48,384	39,738
Chapter 63 Taxes	227,000	154,317	67.98%	227,000	158,672	482	102
Program Budget	**141,537,700**	**122,720,242**	**86.70%**	**154,842,200**	**144,088,538**	**194,519**	**175,411**
Chapter 60 Goods Purchases	67,105,500	60,596,523	90.30%	72,618,600	68,797,150	78,254,400	69,505,481
Chapter 61 External Services	12,099,700	9,526,611	78.73%	12,288,700	11,165,668	14,026,000	13,446,521
Chapter 62 Social Benefits	19,987,100	16,048,048	80.29%	21,816,300	18,436,740	27,192,100	21,758,775
Chapter 64 Staff	33,460,000	29,979,194	89.60%	36,470,200	35,117,732	60,944,798	58,389,071
Chapter 65 Subsidies	8,885,400	6,569,866	73.94%	11,648,400	10,571,248	14,101,600	12,311,122
Chapter 63 Taxes	0	0	0.00%	0	0	0	0
Non Program Budget	**868,556,200**	**786,160,917**	**90.51%**	**974,436,818**	**912,468,235**	**1,188,894,238**	**1,075,316**
Chapter 60 Goods Purchases	77,571,600	75,679,963	97.56%	86,431,000	80,650,290	75,429,880	58,848,061
Chapter 61 External Services	40,841,900	40,439,019	99.01%	47,078,000	43,166,260	66,926,800	55,910,451
Chapter 62 Social Benefits	17,246,900	15,914,885	92.28%	19,026,000	17,710,770	22,169,800	16,657,200
Chapter 64 Staff	711,901,200	633,903,686	89.04%	799,365,218	749,875,743	989,603,258	916,371,715

				2013		2014	
	BUDGET (1000 Riels)	**ACTUAL** (1000s)	**%**	**BUDGET** (1000s)	**ACTUAL** (1000s)	**BUDGET** (1000s)	**ACTUAL** (1000s)
Chapter 65 Subsidies	20,767,600	20,069,047	96.64%	22,309,600	20,906,500	34,282,800	27,426,722
Chapter 63 Taxes	227,000	154,317	67.98%	227,000	158,672	481,700	102,331

	2015		2016	
	BUDGET (1000s Riels)	**ACTUAL** (1000s)	**BUDGET** (1000s)	**ACTUAL** (1000s)
The total cost is constant (I + II)	1,650,046	1,492,381	2,029,897	1,896,734
Total Program Budget and Non-Program	**1,650,046,066**	**1,492,380,877**	**2,029,896,900**	**1,896,734,321**
Chapter 60 Goods Purchases	148,024,311	129,888,226	143,215,700	131,079,107
Chapter 61 External Services	135,906,670	103,521,387	156,093,500	136,782,760
Chapter 62 Social Benefits	72,232	53,712	102,746	94,068
Chapter 64 Staff	1,293,021	1,204,824	1,626,838	1,534,350
Chapter 65 Subsidies	546,200	323,359	440,900	311,292
Chapter 63 Taxes	316,400	112,046	462,800	143,209
Program Budget	**1,650,046,066**	**1,492,380,877**	**2,029,896,900**	**1,896,734,321**
Chapter 60 Goods Purchases	148,024,311	129,888,226	143,215,700	131,079,107
Chapter 61 External Services	135,906,670	103,521,387	156,093,500	136,782,760
Chapter 62 Social Benefits	72,231,727	53,712,225	102,745,900	94,068,022
Chapter 64 Staff	1,293,020,758	1,204,823,634	1,626,838,100	1,534,349,931
Chapter 65 Subsidies	546,200	323,359	440,900	311,292
Chapter 63 Taxes	316,400	112,046	462,800	143,209

Table 10.9 Provincial Central District Distribution

	Expenditure (million riels)						
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Central	122.5	138	165.6	187.2	198	179.9	245.1
POE	611.6	662.2	743.2	868.8	1052.7	1312.5	1651.6
Total	734.1	800.2	908.8	1056	1250.7	1492.4	1896.7
	Total recurrent budget						
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Central	136.2	159.8	178.9	204.7	245.3	248.3	290.9
POE	716.9	766	831	924.6	1138.1	1401.7	1738.9
Total	853.1	925.8	1009.9	1129.3	1383.4	1650	2029.8
	% distribution, Expenditure						
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Central	17%	17%	18%	18%	16%	12%	13%
POE	83%	83%	82%	82%	84%	88%	87%
	% distribution, Total recurrent budget						
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Central	16%	17%	18%	18%	18%	15%	14%
POE	84%	83%	82%	82%	82%	85%	86%

Table 10.10 Table for the GDP/RGOC/MoEYS

Implementation 2012		Budget law 2013		Budget law 2014		Budget law 2015		Budget law 2016		Plan 2017	
% budget	%GDP	% budget	%GDP	% budget	%GDP	% budget	%GDP	% budget	%GDP	% budget	%GDP
13.60%	1.60%	15.50%	1.82%	16.20%	1.98%	16.50%	2.03%	18.20%	2.53%	18.30%	2.68%

Chapter 6. Evolution of sector outcomes and impacts and contributing factors

Additional graphs

Figure 10.2 Provincial distribution of net enrolment in primary and lower secondary





Source: RGoC MoEYS 2017a

Figure 10.3 Provincial distribution of drop out in primary and lower secondary





Source: RGoC MoEYS 2017a

Figure 10.4 Provincial distribution of repetition rates



Source: RGoC MoEYS 2017a

Figure 10.5 Provincial distribution of completion rates





Source: RGoC MoEYS 2017a

Figure 10.6 GDP growth and change in poverty



Source: World Bank 2017a

Figure 10.7 GNI per capita and middle-income status



Source: World Bank 2017a

Figure 10.8 Unemployment (ILO estimate)



Source: World Bank 2017a

Figure 10.9 Change in income poverty / access to services



Source: World Bank 2017a

Figure 10.10 Reasons for not enrolling in school



Source: National Institute of Statistics (NIS), 2017, Cambodia Socio-Economic Surveys Data, received on 10 October 2017

Figure 10.11 Growth in demand for and supply of early childhood education



Source: RGoC MoEYS 2017a

Figure 10.12 Provincial poverty rates, and primary completion rates



Source: MoEYS 2017a and Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), 2013, Country Briefing: Cambodia. Multidimensional Poverty Index Data Bank. University of Oxford: OPHI

Supporting data tables

Table 10.11 Selected Education Statistics 2008/09 to 2015/16 by year and geographic distribution

Year	Province	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) Primary	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) L.Sec.	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) U.Sec.	Net Enrollment Ratio (Total) Primary	Net Admission Rate Total	Total enrolment Primary	Girl net enrollment Primary	No of pre-school classrooms	No of pre-school teachers	Pre-school enrolment	Dropout Rate Grade 1-6	Drop-out rate Lower Secondary	Completion rate primary	Completion rate secondary
2008/9	Whole Kingdom	120.20	61.60	28.20	94.40	91.90	2,262,834	94.03	2,722	3,092	90,036	8.85	21.77	85.58	49.05
2010/11	Whole Kingdom	115.97	58.49	32.94	95.23	92.88	2,191,192	94.64	3,035	3,549	103,315	8.73	19.56	85.31	46.80
2012/13	Whole Kingdom	123.36	53.58	27.37	96.98	94.34	2,173,384	97.03	4,029	4,152	128,257	3.72	19.97	87.35	40.62
2013/14	Whole Kingdom	116.14	53.46	24.89	95.60	95.29	2,073,811	95.80	4,437	4,537	157,288	10.46	21.20	88.94	39.55
2016/17	Whole Kingdom	108.86	55.71	25.08	93.53	91.00	2,022,061	93.88	5,453	4,888	190,148	4.65	16.97	79.87	42.57
2008/9	- Rural Area	120.60	58.10	20.60	94.70	92.50	1,822,131	94.31	2,013	2,144	65,658	8.82	24.17	86.38	44.34
2010/11	- Rural Area	116.90	54.93	25.30	95.50	92.71	1,856,420	95.09	2,313	2,567	76,797	9.12	21.99	84.25	40.77
2012/13	- Rural Area	130.46	52.21	22.35	100.16	98.64	1,840,266	100.48	3,202	3,166	98,877	3.46	21.92	93.99	37.73
2013/14	- Rural Area	120.84	51.91	20.28	98.41	97.45	1,747,994	14.55	3,605	3,459	117,592	10.93	23.18	91.70	37.21
2016/17	- Rural Area	113.22	55.75	21.44	96.51	95.70	1,690,576	96.53	4,656	3,902	155,624	4.77	17.70	81.98	41.97
2008/9	- Urban Area	116.40	85.80	69.90	94.00	93.70	340,478	93.83	641	885	22,286	7.68	14.19	91.03	79.00
2010/11	- Urban Area	111.07	76.02	68.64	93.83	93.80	334,772	92.34	722	982	26,518	6.48	11.11	90.96	60.85
2012/13	- Urban Area	92.63	59.42	47.16	83.20	76.71	333,118	81.90	827	986	29,380	5.25	12.70	79.11	51.49
2013/14	- Urban Area	96.08	59.99	42.77	83.61	86.56	325,817	30.91	832	1,078	39,696	7.82	14.27	76.89	49.03
2016/17	- Urban Area	90.98	55.53	38.62	81.29	72.76	331,485	82.91	797	986	34,524	4.03	14.11	71.03	44.97
2008/9	Banteay Meanchey	127.20	60.10	25.70	95.80	94.40	118,564	95.35	223	190	6,989	8.51	22.66	96.28	48.76
2010/11	Banteay Meanchey	117.40	65.23	28.21	94.48	96.53	106,607	92.19	228	236	6,890	10.35	26.16	93.86	50.91
2012/13	Banteay Meanchey	115.07	45.08	20.36	96.78	89.49	104,364	97.14	352	350	10,073	9.22	26.60	90.75	32.10
2013/14	Banteay Meanchey	104.71	44.93	18.14	87.99	91.58	96,870	14.14	364	385	11,163	12.87	24.60	83.37	30.48
2016/17	Banteay Meanchey	96.07	45.31	17.17	84.22	87.75	94,166	85.23	366	50	14,860	5.03	20.32	69.93	34.18
2008/9	Battambang	121.50	56.20	24.00	91.50	89.60	191,809	92.62	217	244	6,259	10.53	22.79	75.63	44.68

Year	Province	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) Primary	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) L.Sec.	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) U.Sec.	Net Enrollment Ratio (Total) Primary	Net Admission Rate Total	Total enrolment Primary	Girl net enrollment Primary	No of pre-school classrooms	No of pre-school teachers	Pre-school enrolment	Dropout Rate Grade 1-6	Drop-out rate Lower Secondary	Completion rate primary	Completion rate secondary
2010/11	Battambang	120.78	52.63	28.20	95.39	92.15	179,838	95.14	221	260	6,614	15.33	21.95	75.16	42.25
2012/13	Battambang	128.77	45.88	23.03	97.08	95.05	178,092	97.29	339	319	9,613	8.71	22.91	86.50	32.89
2013/14	Battambang	121.60	45.37	19.70	98.54	96.86	171,439	13.95	371	391	11,097	12.68	22.91	83.24	31.50
2016/17	Battambang	111.75	45.77	17.99	95.39	98.99	166,622	95.75	494	538	15,830	7.09	21.35	75.31	32.26
2008/9	Kampong Cham	118.40	46.50	17.50	94.40	92.70	298,399	94.97	243	288	9,397	11.82	24.28	71.22	31.98
2010/11	Kampong Cham	116.18	47.93	21.91	96.75	94.44	292,247	96.83	289	345	11,972	10.09	22.40	80.85	36.64
2012/13	Kampong Cham	118.09	51.96	22.56	97.66	97.42	284,295	97.56	443	434	16,060	7.61	23.69	92.77	36.49
2013/14	Kampong Cham	124.60	52.32	21.35	98.38	98.18	275,174	15.82	458	386	18,226	9.67	23.75	93.39	37.92
2016/17	Kampong Cham	116.94	60.11	28.28	97.89	94.44	141,896	96.51	317	331	14,402	4.54	17.48	83.98	45.76
2008/9	Kampong Chhnang	123.70	63.60	27.10	97.80	90.20	82,238	97.02	103	112	3,667	6.48	25.11	102.40	45.75
2010/11	Kampong Chhnang	119.04	66.17	35.89	97.11	94.74	79,590	96.19	113	122	4,172	5.19	20.44	96.09	50.97
2012/13	Kampong Chhnang	118.36	53.51	26.42	98.42	94.50	79,290	98.23	139	135	4,766	3.44	20.94	91.96	38.56
2013/14	Kampong Chhnang	110.23	53.45	23.98	93.66	93.97	74,920	18.69	137	139	5,396	8.53	22.39	87.67	38.75
2016/17	Kampong Chhnang	104.62	60.37	26.74	93.65	93.17	74,059	94.63	188	140	6,160	2.45	14.27	81.70	47.20
2008/9	Kampong Speu	129.60	59.40	16.90	95.20	91.80	135,587	94.26	130	140	4,502	7.90	26.89	104.19	41.59
2010/11	Kampong Speu	117.12	61.37	25.76	95.46	94.46	131,262	94.34	164	148	4,818	7.71	24.08	99.12	40.89
2012/13	Kampong Speu	115.28	49.03	21.14	96.10	95.88	120,037	92.95	160	164	5,527	9.18	26.47	92.67	33.32
2013/14	Kampong Speu	111.86	51.62	19.80	94.64	97.99	117,628	12.39	164	189	6,087	5.89	24.25	94.18	34.90
2016/17	Kampong Speu	104.07	55.59	21.38	92.63	92.51	112,434	92.14	241	248	8,102	4.05	18.28	80.17	41.88
2008/9	Kampong Thom	122.40	56.60	23.60	94.40	91.40	116,050	93.77	126	172	4,692	8.64	22.60	82.36	46.82
2010/11	Kampong Thom	119.00	52.20	28.84	95.07	89.07	114,461	96.15	145	181	5,210	9.19	20.44	79.63	42.13
2012/13	Kampong Thom	125.00	49.51	25.16	96.67	96.18	114,975	97.79	209	219	6,595	8.65	24.55	86.38	34.88
2013/14	Kampong	116.78	51.86	22.65	98.05	93.13	108,060	16.75	252	273	8,350	12.65	25.18	84.19	45.55

Year	Province	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) Primary	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) L.Sec.	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) U.Sec.	Net Enrollment Ratio (Total) Primary	Net Admission Rate Total	Total enrolment Primary	Girl net enrollment Primary	No of pre-school classrooms	No of pre-school teachers	Pre-school enrolment	Dropout Rate Grade 1-6	Drop-out rate Lower Secondary	Completion rate primary	Completion rate secondary
	Thom														
2016/17	Kampong Thom	107.29	53.19	23.48	92.20	95.65	100,891	93.77	220	254	8,761	5.57	16.53	78.55	39.83
2008/9	Kampot	115.20	68.60	31.00	93.50	92.30	102,625	93.74	156	167	4,679	6.98	20.44	76.75	55.37
2010/11	Kampot	114.77	46.07	35.58	97.19	94.97	99,450	93.63	160	184	4,739	7.38	19.18	80.81	50.90
2012/13	Kampot	119.17	59.33	29.95	95.54	91.85	96,445	93.89	184	184	4,807	6.71	18.87	94.17	44.82
2013/14	Kampot	111.83	58.84	27.54	94.11	97.11	90,929	19.92	194	209	5,702	8.00	20.21	93.20	43.61
2016/17	Kampot	98.93	63.44	29.62	87.03	89.84	81,811	86.88	250	238	6,759	4.24	15.40	83.13	50.42
2008/9	Kandal	117.80	75.60	35.80	98.20	93.50	181,019	98.16	292	307	10,247	6.86	20.84	101.42	65.07
2010/11	Kandal	110.25	71.66	45.49	97.03	95.14	157,052	96.13	280	315	10,394	4.60	17.80	95.23	59.73
2012/13	Kandal	111.63	61.33	34.41	98.33	97.18	155,616	98.59	325	336	11,336	4.06	17.81	100.28	51.29
2013/14	Kandal	118.27	60.06	30.29	98.50	97.16	154,592	22.83	368	385	13,554	5.19	19.59	98.23	45.42
2016/17	Kandal	114.03	60.31	27.37	99.63	96.99	155,465	99.72	429	432	13,850	1.92	16.46	82.32	46.83
2008/9	Kep	129.80	65.10	32.40	95.20	90.50	6,307	94.80	14	14	350	7.82	16.52	108.22	59.63
2010/11	Kep	124.16	69.65	43.16	96.43	98.84	6,115	100.04	18	19	466	7.26	18.12	100.55	51.38
2012/13	Kep	102.53	52.10	30.51	92.55	80.00	5,694	88.49	23	23	558	5.17	15.24	82.43	41.22
2013/14	Kep	89.92	49.99	26.15	85.25	78.02	5,165	19.20	25	25	656	9.94	20.43	84.94	38.62
2016/17	Kep	75.06	47.50	24.27	67.63	69.86	4,825	69.79	26	30	846	1.96	14.38	58.21	37.90
2008/9	Koh Kong	124.00	57.00	19.00	90.60	84.90	25,643	90.59	24	21	827	15.33	18.98	84.07	48.02
2010/11	Koh Kong	119.66	55.95	23.77	91.33	88.98	20,994	90.80	27	25	950	13.91	15.85	80.82	48.37
2012/13	Koh Kong	108.22	45.69	24.34	93.77	77.37	18,846	87.83	43	39	1,236	17.97	13.47	74.96	37.33
2013/14	Koh Kong	106.93	46.46	24.00	82.66	85.03	19,175	14.13	54	28	1,677	13.16	16.13	75.15	35.16
2016/17	Koh Kong	85.54	42.34	20.25	68.72	70.92	16,724	69.62	66	24	2,076	7.77	13.55	58.50	33.39
2008/9	Kratie	120.60	55.40	25.30	97.10	90.10	56,403	96.66	64	87	1,876	8.70	22.58	80.30	43.31
2010/11	Kratie	114.84	52.66	24.30	96.67	91.56	56,235	95.31	65	92	2,168	9.19	21.47	74.15	44.63
2012/13	Kratie	119.72	40.54	20.87	97.94	94.13	59,625	97.13	79	103	2,373	9.92	18.79	72.47	32.49
2013/14	Kratie	115.38	40.24	19.48	98.12	97.23	58,532	16.08	90	125	2,791	13.67	21.08	73.29	31.25
2016/17	Kratie	114.62	43.76	18.93	98.80	95.20	61,258	98.40	82	131	3,296	8.76	20.11	72.48	33.82
2008/9	Mondul Kiri	135.20	41.90	15.40	92.20	89.00	11,222	92.48	13	13	374	15.97	12.74	69.06	30.54
2010/11	Mondul Kiri	127.62	48.92	17.87	91.33	91.62	11,399	91.80	15	15	470	17.74	16.60	73.64	39.51
2012/13	Mondul Kiri	115.07	38.91	15.33	95.65	75.80	12,465	91.58	20	20	677	12.08	24.82	56.95	25.89
2013/14	Mondul Kiri	109.02	39.98	14.76	97.76	81.57	12,219	9.36	15	22	704	15.74	18.01	74.87	29.77
2016/17	Mondul Kiri	112.45	43.40	16.82	86.68	91.55	13,903	88.67	25	25	928	7.38	16.52	70.18	34.79
2008/9	Otdar	137.30	45.30	12.70	97.80	94.90	37,229	98.58	18	19	517	11.12	17.79	85.15	36.88

Year	Province	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) Primary	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) L.Sec.	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) U.Sec.	Net Enrollment Ratio (Total) Primary	Net Admission Rate Total	Total enrolment Primary	Girl net enrollment Primary	No of pre-school classrooms	No of pre-school teachers	Pre-school enrolment	Dropout Rate Grade 1-6	Drop-out rate Lower Secondary	Completion rate primary	Completion rate secondary
	Meanchey														
2010/11	Otdar Meanchey	127.31	48.70	19.51	96.70	93.79	37,253	97.47	26	27	863	14.07	22.85	79.72	36.97
2012/13	Otdar Meanchey	123.03	39.59	13.91	96.83	96.89	38,506	95.36	57	53	1,551	11.81	31.60	80.29	25.57
2013/14	Otdar Meanchey	115.58	41.58	12.59	92.15	95.42	37,533	8.10	70	65	1,864	12.00	24.66	80.71	26.12
2016/17	Otdar Meanchey	102.65	43.93	15.18	86.52	94.01	36,911	87.25	107	86	3,052	7.29	19.68	68.31	31.53
2008/9	Pailin	133.10	51.20	18.70	90.90	93.10	11,552	88.82	15	8	469	13.71	13.85	82.76	44.21
2010/11	Pailin	130.94	48.43	27.53	96.05	94.41	10,869	91.88	13	17	456	11.53	18.52	75.46	37.60
2012/13	Pailin	108.57	37.84	18.07	93.23	89.91	11,122	94.46	30	28	719	10.08	15.33	65.17	31.30
2013/14	Pailin	103.40	36.36	15.91	85.01	87.94	11,164	9.15	26	21	842	11.09	16.70	66.29	26.63
2016/17	Pailin	83.41	39.68	14.34	68.28	66.47	10,407	69.64	36	34	904	6.73	19.34	59.60	26.58
2008/9	Phnom Penh	109.40	90.80	77.00	93.20	95.00	113,979	92.50	165	252	5,831	7.52	13.30	86.57	85.82
2010/11	Phnom Penh	104.80	68.68	63.45	91.77	94.72	133,113	88.01	226	313	8,874	5.23	9.10	84.32	50.52
2012/13	Phnom Penh	105.65	69.29	44.82	97.98	86.28	132,566	97.43	254	310	9,123	5.53	14.88	84.60	54.87
2013/14	Phnom Penh	100.73	64.21	39.03	89.50	90.74	131,184	28.74	258	358	17,767	6.85	13.75	82.94	51.69
2016/17	Phnom Penh	94.13	56.32	34.35	86.39	69.22	135,689	88.88	228	323	10,575	3.26	13.07	76.76	45.72
2008/9	Preah Sihanouk	123.40	71.70	34.70	94.10	86.90	27,864	93.65	35	54	1,332	8.29	18.76	83.22	64.19
2010/11	Preah Sihanouk	121.07	51.20	32.68	94.96	94.79	29,911	91.05	34	56	1,150	9.15	17.79	77.98	42.98
2012/13	Preah Sihanouk	103.97	44.61	26.25	92.64	84.28	28,516	95.24	52	62	1,391	11.05	18.80	73.28	33.64
2013/14	Preah Sihanouk	93.23	43.59	24.24	77.44	78.88	26,212	18.15	60	72	1,715	13.52	18.27	72.55	31.24
2016/17	Preah Sihanouk	86.53	43.14	19.54	74.76	65.36	26,142	76.25	77	66	2,165	3.36	15.19	68.41	33.70
2008/9	Preah Vihear	138.30	50.60	20.70	96.20	89.10	35,054	96.05	24	25	852	8.08	13.04	75.04	43.33
2010/11	Preah Vihear	126.16	50.26	25.84	92.88	87.75	37,508	92.66	26	30	880	7.03	12.47	86.90	43.29
2012/13	Preah Vihear	132.25	50.00	23.70	97.44	92.22	36,914	98.51	76	70	1,782	10.14	17.86	81.03	37.21

Year	Province	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) Primary	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) L.Sec.	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) U.Sec.	Net Enrollment Ratio (Total) Primary	Net Admission Rate Total	Total enrolment Primary	Girl net enrollment Primary	No of pre-school classrooms	No of pre-school teachers	Pre-school enrolment	Dropout Rate Grade 1-6	Drop-out rate Lower Secondary	Completion rate primary	Completion rate secondary
2013/14	Preah Vihear	128.76	50.23	22.29	98.12	97.53	36,476	14.89	70	49	2,238	11.50	18.68	79.60	40.34
2016/17	Preah Vihear	126.11	56.73	24.89	98.53	94.96	37,307	99.68	90	73	3,217	6.16	17.00	86.04	42.05
2008/9	Prey Veng	117.00	59.00	20.10	95.50	94.90	179,567	95.10	151	188	4,860	7.96	28.19	93.12	42.04
2010/11	Prey Veng	114.58	64.74	27.08	95.95	92.56	169,861	96.95	175	210	4,974	6.97	23.49	85.15	49.09
2012/13	Prey Veng	132.09	57.57	25.87	97.76	96.55	170,199	98.17	202	242	6,121	6.47	24.53	93.62	40.10
2013/14	Prey Veng	121.13	58.04	23.96	97.46	97.30	156,133	16.52	245	280	7,875	11.11	24.18	94.69	41.22
2016/17	Prey Veng	115.46	63.80	26.15	97.66	95.35	149,410	95.79	431	424	13,193	2.37	17.93	88.38	47.76
2008/9	Pursat	121.40	63.30	25.00	96.00	94.60	68,188	95.05	102	112	2,990	10.04	22.60	92.02	48.59
2010/11	Pursat	116.26	57.38	31.47	95.89	95.09	67,445	96.02	107	125	3,221	9.39	18.46	84.17	45.57
2012/13	Pursat	127.97	44.81	22.90	97.83	97.41	69,841	99.20	186	159	5,222	8.75	21.40	81.21	32.24
2013/14	Pursat	118.14	45.40	20.28	96.66	98.40	65,283	14.71	199	169	5,633	14.14	21.02	82.77	33.49
2016/17	Pursat	117.92	51.33	20.51	96.37	96.79	67,739	98.02	237	170	7,386	5.46	17.32	79.04	38.71
2008/9	Ratanak Kiri	107.30	25.50	8.50	77.70	68.50	26,820	72.46	22	23	663	15.07	11.04	37.83	20.84
2010/11	Ratanak Kiri	102.80	25.26	11.34	78.50	73.95	31,417	78.71	21	22	657	13.02	13.27	46.67	21.16
2012/13	Ratanak Kiri	140.57	29.36	12.55	96.38	95.26	36,701	95.44	38	31	1,030	16.50	19.50	59.86	23.98
2013/14	Ratanak Kiri	138.90	30.18	13.44	98.57	94.52	36,969	8.24	42	46	1,277	17.91	16.69	67.55	24.41
2016/17	Ratanak Kiri	135.07	41.13	15.50	97.47	97.22	37,999	96.40	62	69	1,963	14.66	12.94	69.97	30.14
2008/9	Siemreap	128.40	58.80	26.80	95.20	91.40	171,719	94.98	221	240	7,593	10.56	19.93	89.53	46.06
2010/11	Siemreap	125.12	60.51	31.38	95.71	91.28	171,485	97.42	340	358	11,627	10.18	18.09	88.88	45.08
2012/13	Siemreap	137.18	50.67	25.45	96.56	97.41	180,059	98.00	444	391	15,166	9.72	20.38	88.41	36.96
2013/14	Siemreap	122.22	51.38	23.49	98.54	95.75	164,236	16.40	500	406	17,940	15.73	21.11	92.58	36.15
2016/17	Siemreap	112.50	56.66	25.40	96.28	91.17	161,551	98.04	566	426	21,755	4.41	16.93	80.81	42.64
2008/9	Stung Treng	113.20	42.60	20.50	89.00	93.10	20,012	90.46	20	24	543	8.66	11.86	64.97	41.09
2010/11	Stung Treng	117.79	49.80	32.44	93.30	88.50	19,607	92.04	27	28	527	12.54	11.23	73.72	41.62
2012/13	Stung Treng	109.37	36.94	21.89	97.21	86.85	19,295	96.73	25	30	575	16.84	16.82	60.11	30.81
2013/14	Stung Treng	108.60	35.72	18.61	89.71	92.80	19,544	14.11	31	37	789	10.03	18.84	59.59	31.22
2016/17	Stung Treng	124.47	36.95	18.25	97.53	91.24	23,820	97.69	27	42	1,043	10.24	12.35	71.53	28.37
2008/9	Svay Rieng	113.30	68.70	25.80	91.00	91.50	87,484	89.17	93	128	2,612	6.85	25.42	89.24	51.87
2010/11	Svay Rieng	114.69	63.87	30.63	95.79	91.36	80,142	97.60	100	141	3,212	6.30	24.56	94.42	49.72
2012/13	Svay Rieng	129.10	62.09	27.09	97.50	97.46	78,488	97.65	133	156	3,895	5.04	24.31	102.68	45.02
2013/14	Svay Rieng	120.27	62.13	24.91	98.16	93.46	73,220	16.46	148	165	4,804	9.16	23.64	100.27	44.19
2016/17	Svay Rieng	117.08	69.05	29.19	99.21	95.68	71,772	98.63	227	186	6,621	1.92	16.58	91.00	53.30

Year	Province	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) Primary	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) L.Sec.	Gross Enrollment Ratio (Total) U.Sec.	Net Enrollment Ratio (Total) Primary	Net Admission Rate Total	Total enrolment Primary	Girl net enrollment Primary	No of pre-school classrooms	No of pre-school teachers	Pre-school enrolment	Dropout Rate Grade 1-6	Drop-out rate Lower Secondary	Completion rate primary	Completion rate secondary
2008/9	Takeo	113.10	74.90	39.90	94.30	91.70	157,500	91.74	251	264	7,915	5.01	21.17	90.72	61.76
2010/11	Takeo	109.82	73.16	46.16	94.45	92.02	147,331	92.95	215	280	8,011	4.49	17.12	92.08	62.54
2012/13	Takeo	124.29	70.11	39.56	96.79	96.87	141,433	96.50	216	294	8,061	4.14	18.35	104.74	54.66
2013/14	Takeo	115.02	70.34	37.55	97.39	97.84	131,154	27.08	296	312	9,141	7.41	18.57	100.26	54.06
2016/17	Takeo	106.54	71.40	38.63	97.44	91.54	122,626	95.69	355	410	11,302	1.53	14.31	86.64	58.48
2016/17	Tbaung Khmum	118.04	51.51	17.52	97.70	95.93	116,634	99.01	306	138	11,102	7.09	21.06	85.12	36.29

Source: MOEYS, 2017a

Table 10.12 Selected Education Statistics 2009/10 to 2016/17 by year and geographic distribution

	Year	Province	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Promotion	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Repetition	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Dropout	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Promotion	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Repetition	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Dropout	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Promotion	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Repetition	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Dropout	Successful Candidates Grade 6	Successful Candidates Grade 9	Successful Candidates Grade 12
2012/13Banteay Meanchey	2012/13	Banteay Meanchey	88.3039488	2.4763686	9.21968259	72.4471119	0.95773209	26.595156	78.3705422	1.93534358	19.6941142	13035	4225	3800
2012/13Battambang	2012/13	Battambang	86.2819119	5.00504279	8.71304534	75.4022548	1.69111208	22.9066331	75.4128986	2.86163122	21.7254702	17324	7113	5232
2012/13Kampong Cham	2012/13	Kampong Cham	88.1878394	4.2062967	7.60586387	75.1739664	1.13826002	23.6877735	83.3588322	0.99445401	15.6467138	33953	11673	8147
2012/13Kampong Chhnang	2012/13	Kampong Chhnang	89.0904751	7.46692465	3.44260029	77.1395372	1.92482571	20.9356371	80.7116267	2.138343	17.1500303	9831	3803	2822
2012/13Kampong Speu	2012/13	Kampong Speu	87.169333	3.64678466	9.18388235	73.1555587	0.37046098	26.4739804	78.3755511	1.0834641	20.5409848	15306	5286	2766
2012/13Kampong Thom	2012/13	Kampong Thom	84.865467	6.48329049	8.6512425	73.8784601	1.57095132	24.5505886	85.1477715	1.40604737	13.4461812	12183	4723	4159
2012/13Kampot	2012/13	Kampot	89.7824171	3.50786844	6.70971448	79.8866751	1.24435227	18.8689727	83.5785238	1.11278763	15.3086886	12809	5671	4343
2012/13Kandal	2012/13	Kandal	91.083863	4.85275872	4.06337832	80.8710955	1.32204136	17.8068632	84.2922088	2.05361342	13.6541778	20885	10120	8792
2012/13Kep	2012/13	Kep	93.3141989	1.51950025	5.16630086	83.5032993	1.25974805	15.2369526	77.0712909	2.31213873	20.6165703	803	382	150
2012/13Koh Kong	2012/13	Koh Kong	77.8618467	4.16608286	17.9720704	84.3114603	2.2181146	13.4704251	82	2.31372549	15.6862745	1977	1066	612
2012/13Kratie	2012/13	Kratie	81.8834081	8.19866317	9.91792876	79.5443529	1.66747455	18.7881726	83.7837838	0.29079713	15.9254191	4971	2006	1503
2012/13Mondul Kiri	2012/13	Mondul Kiri	81.0799704	6.83816882	12.0818608	74.305217	0.87762067	24.8171624	73.0478589	0.62972292	26.3224181	1117	397	136
2012/13Otdar Meanchey	2012/13	Otdar Meanchey	83.0372143	5.1570534	11.8057323	66.7059864	1.695665	31.5983486	68.4247293	2.02584701	29.5494237	3448	1007	510
2012/13Pailin	2012/13	Pailin	85.2045414	4.71256082	10.0828978	83.538316	1.13528855	15.3263955	85.7946554	0.63291139	13.5724332	931	450	434
2012/13Phnom Penh	2012/13	Phnom Penh	92.0144964	2.45306321	5.53244042	82.0035981	3.11510032	14.8813016	91.9102274	0.99415454	7.09561804	19029	11766	14724
2012/13Preah Sihanouk	2012/13	Preah Sihanouk	86.5817565	2.36440424	11.0538393	79.1032719	2.10044433	18.7962838	87.4152775	1.13573915	11.4489833	3434	1755	1643
2012/13Preah Vihear	2012/13	Preah Vihear	80.4642629	9.39693682	10.1388003	81.1694891	0.9697496	17.8607613	79.0294627	2.28191797	18.6886193	3298	1393	686
2012/13Prey Veng	2012/13	Prey Veng	85.7313514	7.79416902	6.47447962	75.2248471	0.24463365	24.5305193	79.3005812	2.0068551	18.6925637	21265	7682	4319
2012/13Pursat	2012/13	Pursat	84.4902788	6.7606477	8.74907349	77.746138	0.85427493	21.3995871	76.0538022	1.99110358	21.9550943	6957	2873	2263
2012/13Ratanak Kiri	2012/13	Ratanak Kiri	79.9191794	3.58041089	16.5004098	78.8774404	1.62689805	19.4956616	86.5292096	0.41237113	13.0584192	1915	748	314
2012/13Siemreap	2012/13	Siemreap	83.8564925	6.4247778	9.71872968	77.4924125	2.13021818	20.3773693	80.6441977	1.95648927	17.399313	16915	7314	4968
2012/13Stung Treng	2012/13	Stung Treng	69.735816	13.4236693	16.8405147	81.1585723	2.0187244	16.8227033	83.0281376	2.09915141	14.872711	1208	729	560
2012/13Svay Rieng	2012/13	Svay Rieng	89.9304311	5.03293091	5.03663796	74.2256788	1.46450175	24.3098194	83.0731665	1.40402895	15.5228046	10578	3890	3069
2012/13Takeo	2012/13	Takeo	91.823878	4.03539294	4.14072906	80.2188353	1.43167308	18.3494916	85.5919789	1.62765715	12.7803639	20103	9746	8663

	Year	Province	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Promotion	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Repetition	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Dropout	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Promotion	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Repetition	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Dropout	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Promotion	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Repetition	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Dropout	Successful Candidates Grade 6	Successful Candidates Grade 9	Successful Candidates Grade 12
2012/13Whole Kingdom	2012/13	Whole Kingdom	90.9935834	5.29070602	3.71571063	78.5414136	1.48592123	19.9726652	88.2380871	1.70170533	10.0602076	253275	105818	84615
2012/13- Urban Area	2012/13	- Urban Area	91.0956655	3.65361337	5.25072113	84.6622979	2.63581251	12.7018896	99.2767149	1.69349821	-0.9702131	43785	27894	35343
2012/13- Rural Area	2012/13	- Rural Area	90.9763094	5.56772793	3.45596263	76.8996546	1.1774945	21.922851	82.5725976	1.70591757	15.7214849	209490	77924	49272
2016/17Banteay Meanchey	2016/17	Banteay Meanchey	91.0060614	3.9593175	5.03462111	78.2000331	1.47789369	20.3220732	76.1588027	2.63978383	21.2014134	11248	4449	1470
2016/17Battambang	2016/17	Battambang	86.8263185	6.08482607	7.0888554	76.1053867	2.54858484	21.3460284	72.940458	2.90076336	24.1587786	18029	6998	2148
2016/17Kampong Cham	2016/17	Kampong Cham	86.4243371	9.03908275	4.53658017	78.7169811	3.80125786	17.481761	74.0230721	2.6969445	23.2799834	16928	7730	2331
2016/17Kampong Chhnang	2016/17	Kampong Chhnang	91.0658117	6.4880189	2.44616942	83.8067684	1.92004208	14.2731896	75.8326803	2.95846395	21.2088558	10092	4805	1391
2016/17Kampong Speu	2016/17	Kampong Speu	90.7437594	5.20922364	4.04701694	80.5447349	1.17177683	18.2834883	78.7839163	1.34030729	19.8757764	15159	5918	2014
2016/17Kampong Thom	2016/17	Kampong Thom	85.9077923	8.52428332	5.56792434	80.6459217	2.82492535	16.5291529	79.5002935	1.6517146	18.847992	12003	4911	1962
2016/17Kampot	2016/17	Kampot	91.630667	4.13126039	4.23807263	82.5557115	2.04018759	15.4041009	77.8586981	2.89811547	19.2431864	12133	6101	2108
2016/17Kandal	2016/17	Kandal	89.5684564	8.5093384	1.92220522	79.8080681	3.73442182	16.4575101	74.1987383	3.53105551	22.2702062	18653	8994	3336
2016/17Kep	2016/17	Kep	94.0301591	4.00743648	1.96240446	81.703107	3.91254315	14.3843498	80.8788599	1.66270784	17.4584323	718	400	154
2016/17Koh Kong	2016/17	Koh Kong	88.6293021	3.60301147	7.76768642	84.4831436	1.96472427	13.5521322	74.5406824	2.27471566	23.1846019	1864	1049	288
2016/17Kratie	2016/17	Kratie	83.0131279	8.22558778	8.76128435	77.9817297	1.9038675	20.1144028	82.4521703	1.6457519	15.9020778	5719	2129	892
2016/17Mondul Kiri	2016/17	Mondul Kiri	86.5389003	6.08411286	7.37698684	80.1938475	3.28697851	16.519174	86.2884161	2.00945627	11.7021277	1231	430	159
2016/17Otdar Meanchey	2016/17	Otdar Meanchey	84.5735476	8.1389919	7.28746051	76.0398506	4.28393524	19.6762142	80.2218115	1.84842884	17.9297597	3709	1369	487
2016/17Pailin	2016/17	Pailin	88.6832671	4.58288926	6.73384362	77.3556231	3.30547113	19.3389058	81.2444444	4	14.7555556	1190	491	261
2016/17Phnom Penh	2016/17	Phnom Penh	93.6790876	3.05774597	3.26316642	84.4484359	2.48465799	13.0669062	82.8277939	3.97171131	13.2004948	18044	10632	7358
2016/17Preah Sihanouk	2016/17	Preah Sihanouk	93.9635145	2.67738127	3.35910424	82.170857	2.63584753	15.1932955	79.6727814	1.48735746	18.8398612	3658	1635	760
2016/17Preah Vihear	2016/17	Preah Vihear	83.7635192	10.0790247	6.15745611	82.0024722	1.00123609	16.9962917	82.2739726	1.4520548	16.2739726	3954	1584	734
2016/17Prey Veng	2016/17	Prey Veng	90.2638616	7.36292533	2.37321305	81.2276319	0.84633219	17.926036	79.0287469	2.28858499	18.6826682	20746	8465	3018
2016/17Pursat	2016/17	Pursat	86.897352	7.64396486	5.4586831	80.8706045	1.81166258	17.3177329	74.4718834	2.70752752	22.8205891	7373	3055	867
2016/17Ratanak Kiri	2016/17	Ratanak Kiri	80.5084286	4.8349504	14.656621	84.6982321	2.35724446	12.9445235	86.1386139	0.99009901	12.8712871	2440	944	401
2016/17Siemreap	2016/17	Siemreap	87.1701472	8.42213581	4.40771698	79.0419751	4.03029483	16.9277301	79.107438	2.3415978	18.5509642	17362	7717	2615
2016/17Stung Treng	2016/17	Stung Treng	78.0070931	11.7506303	10.2422766	86.4182692	1.23197115	12.3497596	85.9569649	1.69875425	12.3442809	1777	727	378

	Year	Province	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Promotion	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Repetition	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Dropout	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Promotion	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Repetition	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Dropout	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Promotion	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Repetition	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Dropout	Successful Candidates Grade 6	Successful Candidates Grade 9	Successful Candidates Grade 12
2016/17Svay Rieng	2016/17	Svay Rieng	93.1759884	4.90436625	1.91964535	81.3877998	2.03195481	16.5802454	80.7599108	1.6671513	17.5729379	10239	4713	1871
2016/17Takeo	2016/17	Takeo	92.2942121	6.17323014	1.53255772	83.74613	1.94335202	14.310518	75.1853943	3.27122153	21.5433842	18562	10562	3921
2016/17Tbaung Khmum	2016/17	Tbaung Khmum	86.2936624	6.61173156	7.09460606	75.433311	3.50368221	21.0630068	77.3472912	2.92467084	19.728038	13571	4461	1416
2016/17Whole Kingdom	2016/17	Whole Kingdom	88.7083711	6.64368566	4.64794321	80.5500296	2.47636885	16.9736015	77.8598381	2.7591277	19.3810342	246402	110269	42340
2016/17- Urban Area	2016/17	- Urban Area	91.3332711	4.63917992	4.02754899	82.8732454	3.01582114	14.1109335	81.2286126	3.23272779	15.5386596	42981	25053	16592
2016/17- Rural Area	2016/17	- Rural Area	88.1900898	7.03947142	4.77043883	79.959396	2.33922331	17.7013807	76.1175259	2.51418426	21.3682899	203421	85216	25748
2013/14Banteay Meanchey	2013/14	Banteay Meanchey	84.9154311	2.21592595	12.868643	74.221049	1.18140904	24.597542	78.3562629	2.59868717	19.0450499	12267	3939	2653
2013/14Battambang	2013/14	Battambang	82.0175365	5.29895329	12.6835102	75.3994225	1.69118658	22.9093909	79.8072487	3.18859896	17.0041524	17147	6580	5123
2013/14Kampong Cham	2013/14	Kampong Cham	86.3595631	3.9711548	9.66928212	74.8701749	1.38069189	23.7491332	82.5976957	1.64108175	15.7612226	32285	10965	7406
2013/14Kampong Chhnang	2013/14	Kampong Chhnang	84.970362	6.50271157	8.52692647	76.1022143	1.50751285	22.3902728	82.3185012	2.64441842	15.0370804	9863	3690	2679
2013/14Kampong Speu	2013/14	Kampong Speu	90.6037305	3.50808501	5.88818448	75.202503	0.54580219	24.2516948	83.0837004	1.09731678	15.8189828	16251	4881	3228
2013/14Kampong Thom	2013/14	Kampong Thom	81.5696088	5.77813429	12.6522569	73.308641	1.50912172	25.1822373	81.7862327	1.2529605	16.9608068	11463	4497	3259
2013/14Kampot	2013/14	Kampot	88.7873918	3.20804604	8.00456219	78.5238524	1.27092709	20.2052205	83.8035088	1.24210526	14.954386	12694	5724	3763
2013/14Kandal	2013/14	Kandal	90.0190212	4.79192371	5.18905511	79.3135091	1.09899714	19.5874937	83.9534313	1.23435144	14.8122173	19998	9371	7978
2013/14Kep	2013/14	Kep	88.4513509	1.60692213	9.941727	76.95962	2.6128266	20.4275534	88.6497065	0.29354207	11.0567515	791	332	317
2013/14Koh Kong	2013/14	Koh Kong	83.4841517	3.35261831	13.16323	81.2948029	2.57616488	16.1290323	89.0776699	1.13268608	9.78964401	2117	942	627
2013/14Kratie	2013/14	Kratie	79.3901438	6.94418862	13.6656675	77.2331567	1.68433005	21.0825133	87.5070238	0.1311107	12.3618655	5231	1984	1447
2013/14Mondul Kiri	2013/14	Mondul Kiri	78.7022962	5.56044484	15.737259	80.3231939	1.6634981	18.013308	76.9613948	1.24533001	21.7932752	874	396	180
2013/14Otdar Meanchey	2013/14	Otdar Meanchey	83.3037717	4.69768898	11.9985393	73.0022239	2.34247591	24.6553002	79.7107438	1.52892562	18.7603306	3541	976	603
2013/14Pailin	2013/14	Pailin	84.6430498	4.2708146	11.0861356	82.3049002	0.99818512	16.6969147	83.8550247	0.32948929	15.815486	905	527	395
2013/14Phnom Penh	2013/14	Phnom Penh	90.6851134	2.46450717	6.85037945	84.0261853	2.22849415	13.7453206	93.2470402	1.04944646	5.70351336	17012	12098	13781
2013/14Preah Sihanouk	2013/14	Preah Sihanouk	84.2790013	2.20227241	13.5187263	80.468429	1.26010136	18.2714697	89.1992551	1.30353818	9.4972067	3441	1637	1366
2013/14Preah Vihear	2013/14	Preah Vihear	79.7827383	8.72026873	11.496993	79.9156348	1.40155123	18.682814	80.5580029	0.32305433	19.1189427	3129	1443	778
2013/14Prey Veng	2013/14	Prey Veng	82.0263339	6.86431765	11.1093485	75.4688583	0.35358483	24.1775569	78.9258794	1.98387772	19.0902429	21061	7104	4300
2013/14Pursat	2013/14	Pursat	78.8637761	6.99918514	14.1370388	78.6998224	0.27708703	21.0230906	82.7214944	1.73822805	15.5402776	6937	2814	2211

	Year	Province	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Promotion	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Repetition	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Dropout	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Promotion	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Repetition	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Dropout	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Promotion	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Repetition	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Dropout	Successful Candidates Grade 6	Successful Candidates Grade 9	Successful Candidates Grade 12
2013/14Ratanak Kiri	2013/14	Ratanak Kiri	77.8725375	4.21786872	17.9095937	81.8416301	1.47020892	16.688161	86.1323155	0.63613232	13.2315522	2025	860	359
2013/14Siemreap	2013/14	Siemreap	77.9227401	6.34373441	15.7335255	75.9059087	2.98235788	21.1117334	85.0989082	1.64306562	13.2580262	17547	6744	5187
2013/14Stung Treng	2013/14	Stung Treng	77.3667029	12.6068708	10.0264262	78.9925926	2.16296296	18.8444444	76.2695313	3.125	20.6054688	1430	656	436
2013/14Svay Rieng	2013/14	Svay Rieng	86.3877281	4.45418408	9.15808786	74.737222	1.61952452	23.6432535	82.5623472	0.80195599	16.6356968	10300	3941	2780
2013/14Takeo	2013/14	Takeo	88.878126	3.71341908	7.40845489	80.2644404	1.16540238	18.5701572	85.7833164	2.12541782	12.0912658	20031	9702	7569
2013/14Whole Kingdom	2013/14	Whole Kingdom	84.7006334	4.84383391	10.4555327	77.3608898	1.4345026	21.2046076	84.3690058	1.61290882	14.0180854	248340	101803	78425
2013/14- Urban Area	2013/14	- Urban Area	88.7082617	3.47553717	7.81620114	83.4677522	2.2646683	14.2675795	90.3732393	1.32473939	8.30202131	41628	27659	32588
2013/14- Rural Area	2013/14	- Rural Area	83.9769769	5.09090692	10.9321162	75.625511	1.19859555	23.1758934	80.9913011	1.77501965	17.2336793	206712	74144	45837
2010/11Banteay Meanchey	2010/11	Banteay Meanchey	85.0333076	4.61871435	10.347978	72.0064614	1.83186692	26.1616717	83.3231563	2.61890223	14.0579415	13193	5628	3030
2010/11Battambang	2010/11	Battambang	76.5641316	8.10340439	15.332464	75.6097561	2.44131886	21.948925	86.3908792	2.47848227	11.1306386	16907	9392	4903
2010/11Kampong Cham	2010/11	Kampong Cham	84.1788196	5.72758476	10.0935957	75.7898675	1.80947392	22.4006585	85.8061895	1.22909189	12.9647186	31131	13322	6310
2010/11Kampong Chhnang	2010/11	Kampong Chhnang	85.4623921	9.34278668	5.19482121	76.7734001	2.78912461	20.4374753	80.9405729	3.6425823	15.4168448	9736	4938	2120
2010/11Kampong Speu	2010/11	Kampong Speu	86.9543114	5.33218393	7.71350471	74.9722019	0.946723	24.0810751	82.3868883	1.73130194	15.8818098	15717	6478	2538
2010/11Kampong Thom	2010/11	Kampong Thom	82.713468	8.09876027	9.18777171	77.9125572	1.64380456	20.4436383	86.7209804	1.88705522	11.3919644	11305	5518	2933
2010/11Kampot	2010/11	Kampot	87.2631877	5.35422916	7.38258312	79.2499033	1.56592344	19.1841732	84.4741337	1.90946803	13.6163982	12148	7019	3425
2010/11Kandal	2010/11	Kandal	90.2060621	5.19314387	4.600794	80.4647771	1.7347585	17.8004644	86.5319963	1.06074658	12.4072571	20464	12310	7837
2010/11Kep	2010/11	Kep	90.0295996	2.7107026	7.25969777	80.7391983	1.14523686	18.1155648	83.0682881	1.59027128	15.3414406	785	446	227
2010/11Koh Kong	2010/11	Koh Kong	77.1476571	8.94478751	13.9075554	82.1375027	2.01327908	15.8492183	84.1967784	1.56726165	14.23596	1792	927	472
2010/11Kratie	2010/11	Kratie	80.3379998	10.471506	9.19049421	76.2138008	2.31159234	21.4746069	83.8816883	0.94715852	15.1711532	4961	2391	1461
2010/11Mondul Kiri	2010/11	Mondul Kiri	75.7562882	6.50067981	17.743032	81.9600499	1.43570537	16.6042447	76.9354839	1.61290323	21.4516129	755	301	116
2010/11Otdar Meanchey	2010/11	Otdar Meanchey	76.7554981	9.17464424	14.0698577	74.7692766	2.38166121	22.8490622	72.0430108	4.60829493	23.3486943	2986	1267	270
2010/11Pailin	2010/11	Pailin	81.5099168	6.95548853	11.5345946	79.4045677	2.07993475	18.5154976	84.0182648	1.29375951	14.6879757	1016	629	250
2010/11Phnom Penh	2010/11	Phnom Penh	91.1413252	3.63295908	5.22571573	86.5870774	4.30812415	9.10479845	93.5044944	1.07371582	5.42178978	16921	16098	16661
2010/11Preah Sihanouk	2010/11	Preah Sihanouk	85.0415604	5.80852403	9.14991556	80.5210184	1.69330965	17.785672	92.456621	0.73059361	6.81278539	3145	2005	1453
2010/11Preah Vihear	2010/11	Preah Vihear	79.155784	13.8146994	7.02951667	86.545395	0.98328417	12.4713209	78.9384719	1.92697769	19.1345504	2750	1425	422

	Year	Province	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Promotion	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Repetition	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Dropout	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Promotion	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Repetition	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Dropout	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Promotion	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Repetition	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Dropout	Successful Candidates Grade 6	Successful Candidates Grade 9	Successful Candidates Grade 12
2010/11Prey Veng	2010/11	Prey Veng	83.6367981	9.39413251	6.96906935	75.5093564	0.99685205	23.4937915	81.2573822	3.28572963	15.4568882	20551	8818	3384
2010/11Pursat	2010/11	Pursat	81.840222	8.77026435	9.38951366	80.3424945	1.19753308	18.4599725	87.5917354	1.67099469	10.73727	7191	3960	2049
2010/11Ratanak Kiri	2010/11	Ratanak Kiri	76.695229	10.2859762	13.0187947	83.1313462	3.60301343	13.2656404	76.013805	4.40034513	19.5858499	1582	649	193
2010/11Siemreap	2010/11	Siemreap	81.4294679	8.39192126	10.1786109	79.4995783	2.40652235	18.0938994	85.6097164	1.72423142	12.6660522	14866	8045	4042
2010/11Stung Treng	2010/11	Stung Treng	70.959634	16.4982657	12.5421002	86.7283111	2.03970628	11.2319826	81.0842897	2.88880095	16.0269094	1437	919	556
2010/11Svay Rieng	2010/11	Svay Rieng	85.381119	8.32202946	6.29685157	74.1576108	1.27824251	24.5641467	83.2686111	0.99975213	15.7316368	10528	5062	2603
2010/11Takeo	2010/11	Takeo	90.3100544	5.2021936	4.48775196	80.9599907	1.91569388	17.1243155	88.2669997	2.54050679	9.19249351	20149	12188	7293
2010/11Whole Kingdom	2010/11	Whole Kingdom	84.2086446	7.06523267	8.72612275	78.4172305	2.02078236	19.5619871	86.421352	1.8282694	11.7503786	242016	129735	74548
2010/11- Urban Area	2010/11	- Urban Area	88.5190913	4.99909464	6.48181405	85.6061128	3.28685945	11.1070277	91.9544843	1.35272315	6.69279256	40298	35943	36377
2010/11- Rural Area	2010/11	- Rural Area	83.4457763	7.43090039	9.12332334	76.3500304	1.65671537	21.9932543	82.8422065	2.13587983	15.0219136	201718	93792	38171
2008/9Banteay Meanchey	2008/9	Banteay Meanchey	83.6	7.9	8.5	75.8	1.5	22.7	81.1	4.4	14.5	14,028	5,909	2,200
2008/9Battambang	2008/9	Battambang	79.1	10.4	10.5	74.8	2.4	22.8	81.9	3.5	14.7	18,823	8,277	3,627
2008/9Kampong Cham	2008/9	Kampong Cham	79.2	9.0	11.8	73.6	2.1	24.3	80.6	3.2	16.2	30,938	11,904	4,388
2008/9Kampong Chhnang	2008/9	Kampong Chhnang	82.8	10.7	6.5	72.2	2.7	25.1	79.3	5.7	15.0	10,986	4,498	1,126
2008/9Kampong Speu	2008/9	Kampong Speu	83.6	8.5	7.9	72.3	0.8	26.9	74.0	3.4	22.5	15,555	5,399	1,161
2008/9Kampong Thom	2008/9	Kampong Thom	82.0	9.4	8.6	76.2	1.2	22.6	84.4	2.2	13.3	11,815	5,381	2,008
2008/9Kampot	2008/9	Kampot	84.5	8.5	7.0	78.0	1.5	20.4	76.3	4.1	19.6	13,273	7,073	2,382
2008/9Kandal	2008/9	Kandal	82.9	10.3	6.9	77.5	1.7	20.8	79.2	2.5	18.4	25,544	15,085	4,602
2008/9Kep	2008/9	Kep	84.8	7.4	7.8	81.5	2.0	16.5	85.8	1.5	12.7	759	397	113
2008/9Koh Kong	2008/9	Koh Kong	73.3	11.4	15.3	79.8	1.2	19.0	85.7	1.4	12.9	2,331	888	252
2008/9Kratie	2008/9	Kratie	79.0	12.3	8.7	75.0	2.4	22.6	81.0	1.7	17.2	5,225	2,634	850
2008/9Mondul Kiri	2008/9	Mondul Kiri	70.6	13.5	16.0	85.1	2.1	12.7	80.6	3.0	16.4	599	256	66
2008/9Otdar Meanchey	2008/9	Otdar Meanchey	75.1	13.8	11.1	78.7	3.5	17.8	78.1	2.4	19.5	2,816	1,080	154
2008/9Pailin	2008/9	Pailin	73.4	12.9	13.7	84.1	2.0	13.9	82.5	1.7	15.7	921	498	98
2008/9Phnom Penh	2008/9	Phnom Penh	88.4	4.1	7.5	83.0	3.7	13.3	93.1	2.3	4.6	16,553	16,183	15,091

	Year	Province	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Promotion	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Repetition	Primary Level (Grades 1-6) Dropout	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Promotion	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Repetition	Lower Secondary Level (Grades 7-9) Dropout	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Promotion	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Repetition	Upper Secondary Level (Grades 10-12) Dropout	Successful Candidates Grade 6	Successful Candidates Grade 9	Successful Candidates Grade 12
2008/9Preah Sihanouk	2008/9	Preah Sihanouk	83.8	7.9	8.3	80.1	1.1	18.8	86.5	3.4	10.0	3,341	1,892	1,044
2008/9Preah Vihear	2008/9	Preah Vihear	75.3	16.6	8.1	86.6	0.4	13.0	80.4	1.1	18.5	2,980	1,223	309
2008/9Prey Veng	2008/9	Prey Veng	78.9	13.1	8.0	70.9	0.9	28.2	74.3	4.6	21.0	21,030	7,618	2,161
2008/9Pursat	2008/9	Pursat	80.9	9.0	10.0	76.3	1.1	22.6	83.0	3.6	13.4	8,004	3,321	1,439
2008/9Ratanak Kiri	2008/9	Ratanak Kiri	74.0	10.9	15.1	85.7	3.2	11.0	75.7	7.1	17.2	1,309	532	108
2008/9Siemreap	2008/9	Siemreap	77.9	11.6	10.6	77.9	2.2	19.9	76.0	4.6	19.5	15,097	7,157	2,543
2008/9Stung Treng	2008/9	Stung Treng	74.1	17.2	8.7	86.1	2.0	11.9	73.5	10.7	15.8	1,682	908	214
2008/9Svay Rieng	2008/9	Svay Rieng	81.2	12.0	6.9	73.2	1.4	25.4	78.6	2.7	18.7	10,926	4,670	1,632
2008/9Takeo	2008/9	Takeo	85.1	9.9	5.0	77.1	1.7	21.2	79.2	6.3	14.5	21,887	11,360	3,997
2008/9Whole Kingdom	2008/9	Whole Kingdom	81.1	10.1	8.8	76.3	1.9	21.8	82.0	3.6	14.4	256,422	124,143	51,565
2008/9- Urban Area	2008/9	- Urban Area	85.1	7.3	7.7	82.9	3.0	14.2	89.6	2.9	7.4	44,455	37,737	29,855
2008/9- Rural Area	2008/9	- Rural Area	80.9	10.3	8.8	74.2	1.6	24.2	75.8	4.1	20.1	205,831	84,778	21,638
2008/9- Remote Area	2008/9	- Remote Area	71.1	15.4	13.5	78.6	1.0	20.3	77.4	2.1	20.4	6,136	1,628	72

Source: MOEYS, 2017a

Table 10.13 Provincial performance improvement/regression in 2016/17 relative to 2008/9: Selected indicators

Province	Primary net enrolment	Lower Secondary Gross Enrolment	Primary Dropout	Lower Secondary Dropout	Primary Repetition Rates	Lower Secondary Completion Rates	Primary Completion Rate	Secondary Completion rate	Indicators with improved performance	Indicators with worse performance
Banteay Meanchey	2%	-25%	-48%	-1%	-50%	-4%	-27%	-30%	5	3
Battambang	-14%	-19%	-41%	-10%	-42%	5%	0%	-28%	3	5
Kampong Cham	-12%	29%	-33%	-6%	1%	82%	18%	43%	5	3
Kampong Chhnang	4%	-5%	-62%	-28%	-39%	-28%	-20%	3%	6	2
Kampong Speu	4%	-6%	-62%	-43%	-39%	54%	-23%	1%	5	3

Province	Primary net enrolment	Lower Secondary Gross Enrolment	Primary Dropout	Lower Secondary Dropout	Primary Repetition Rates	Lower Secondary Completion Rates	Primary Completion Rate	Secondary Completion rate	Indicators with improved performance	Indicators with worse performance
Kampong Thom	-4%	-6%	-49%	-32%	-9%	133%	-5%	-15%	3	5
Kampot	-3%	-8%	-36%	-27%	-52%	33%	8%	-9%	4	4
Kandal	-2%	-20%	-39%	-25%	-17%	119%	-19%	-28%	3	5
Kep	-7%	-27%	-72%	-21%	-46%	99%	-46%	-36%	3	5
Koh Kong	1%	-26%	-75%	-13%	-68%	61%	-30%	-30%	4	4
Kratie	-29%	-21%	-49%	-29%	-33%	-22%	-10%	-22%	4	4
Mondul Kiri	-24%	4%	1%	-11%	-55%	53%	2%	14%	5	3
Otdar Meanchey	2%	-3%	-54%	30%	-41%	23%	-20%	-15%	3	5
Pailin	-6%	-22%	-34%	11%	-64%	64%	-28%	-40%	2	6
Phnom Penh	-12%	-38%	-51%	40%	-25%	-33%	-11%	-47%	3	5
Preah Sihanouk	-25%	-40%	-57%	-2%	-66%	141%	-18%	-47%	3	5
Preah Vihear	-7%	12%	-59%	-19%	-39%	176%	15%	-3%	5	3
Prey Veng	-21%	8%	-24%	30%	-44%	-8%	-5%	14%	5	3
Pursat	2%	-19%	-70%	-36%	-15%	68%	-14%	-20%	4	4
Ratanak Kiri	2%	61%	-46%	-23%	-56%	-27%	85%	45%	8	0
Siemreap	0%	-4%	-3%	17%	-27%	82%	-10%	-7%	3	5
Stung Treng	25%	-13%	-58%	-15%	-32%	-38%	10%	-31%	6	2
Svay Rieng	1%	0%	18%	4%	-59%	47%	2%	3%	5	3
Takeo	10%	-5%	-72%	-35%	-38%	15%	-5%	-5%	4	4

Source: calculated from MoEYS 2017a

Table 10.14 Selected socio-economic indicators, Cambodia

Series Name	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)	16.92	10.13	4.95	4.60	3.37	2.17	..	..	..	..
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)	590.00	670.00	700.00	750.00	810.00	880.00	960.00	1,020.00	1,070.00	1,140.00
Income share held by lowest 20%	6.87	7.79	7.99	8.44	8.92	9.05	..	..	..	..
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	64.55	65.23	65.84	66.39	66.87	67.33	67.77	68.21	68.66	..
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)	55.80	51.50	47.30	43.10	39.30	35.80	32.90	30.60	28.70	..
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)	90.42	85.62	82.99	84.87	87.16	92.86	93.86	96.30	95.17	..
Improved water source (% of population with access)	57.40	59.70	61.90	64.20	66.50	68.80	71.10	73.40	75.50	..
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	28.40	30.10	31.90	33.60	35.40	37.20	39.00	40.80	42.40	..
GDP growth (annual %)	10.21	6.69	0.09	5.96	7.07	7.31	7.43	7.07	7.04	6.88
Access to electricity (% of population)	30.24	26.40	34.48	31.10	38.75	40.90	43.04	56.10	..	..
Access to electricity, rural (% of rural population)	21.27	13.10	25.11	18.80	29.01	30.97	32.93	49.20	..	..
Account, secondary education or more (% ages 15+) [ts]	..	..	..	..	15.54	..	..	38.92	..	..
Adolescents out of school (% of lower secondary school age)	17.17	21.89	..	16.52	28.85	27.14	..	17.47	13.62	..
Adolescents out of school, female (% of female lower secondary school age)	20.49	23.39	..	18.13	29.08	27.61	..	19.16	14.44	..
Children out of school (% of primary school age)	4.46	5.76	..	6.72	2.48	2.59	..	5.29	5.07	..
Employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%) (modeled ILO estimate)	75.79	73.39	77.89	81.38	82.14	77.38	75.46	75.46	75.43	75.39
Employment to population ratio, 15+, male (%) (modeled ILO estimate)	86.71	86.56	87.11	88.22	88.56	86.97	86.48	86.50	86.53	86.57

Series Name	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) (modeled ILO estimate)	80.96	79.63	82.27	84.63	85.20	81.96	80.72	80.73	80.73	80.74
Improved sanitation facilities, rural (% of rural population with access)	19.60	21.00	22.30	23.70	25.00	26.40	27.80	29.10	30.50	..
Improved water source, rural (% of rural population with access)	52.60	54.60	56.70	58.80	60.90	62.90	65.00	67.10	69.10	..
Labor force with basic education (% of total working-age population with basic education)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Literacy rate, youth (ages 15-24), gender parity index (GPI)	..	0.96	0.97	..	..	..	..	..	1.01	..
Literacy rate, youth total (% of people ages 15-24)	..	87.47	87.13	..	..	..	..	..	91.54	..
Persistence to last grade of primary, female (% of cohort)	57.33	..	..	62.00	68.54	..	54.64	..	..	..
Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%)	3.52	1.85	0.76	0.65	0.55	0.28	..	..	..	..
Primary completion rate, female (% of relevant age group)	90.47	85.70	83.08	85.03	87.04	92.46	90.24	96.30	95.87	..
Primary completion rate, male (% of relevant age group)	90.36	85.54	82.90	84.73	87.27	93.25	97.40	96.30	94.48	..
Unemployment, female (% of female labor force) (national estimate)	..	1.79	..	0.26	..	..	0.33	0.20	..	..
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate)	0.87	0.44	0.19	0.35	0.20	0.20	0.30	0.10	0.18	0.26
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate)	0.87	0.44	0.19	0.35	0.20	0.16	0.30	0.18	..	..
Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate)	1.30	0.67	0.29	0.55	0.31	0.32	0.48	0.17	0.30	0.44

Source: World Bank, 2017a

Chapter 7: Influence of budget support on sector policies, programmes and outcomes in education – supporting figures

Figure 10.13 Influence of budget support inputs on induced sector outputs by input



Figure 10.14 Contribution by induced outputs to sector outcomes







Annex 11 Econometric Analysis: Data, methods and results

11.1 This annex presents the econometric analysis undertaken for the evaluation. Firstly, we investigate the change in primary completion rates over time to get a sense of whether education reforms have affected educational attainment, and how this effect varies by population characteristics. We break the population down by three variables, apart from age group: sex, location and relative deprivation. Secondly, we draw on education management information system (EMIS) data to investigate which education-related factors have affected the performance of education districts. Thirdly, we take a brief look at the gender parity indexes for the five intermediate outcome variables tested.

Assessing the trend in primary school attainment, by sex, location and relative deprivation

11.2 The first questions we are assessing are: (i) whether education sector reform on the whole has an impact on education results; (ii) whether this effect has accelerated over time; and (iii) whether the effect differs by sex, location and relative deprivation.

Data used

11.3 The evaluation uses direct comparison of age groups over time and pseudo cohort analysis of the National Institute for Statistics' Demographic and Health Surveys data[24] to investigate these questions.[25] The DHS has been conducted in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2014. The surveys provide good quality data, though it is recognised that the sampling frame under-represents urban slum dwellers (see Carr-Hill, 2017). The analysis makes use of the weighted survey data, in order to yield results approximately representative of the population as a whole.

11.4 The sample sizes are large (see Table 11.1) and so it is possible to construct age-specific groups of children broken down by sex, location (rural/urban), and relative deprivation (proxied by reported access of households to an improved water source). Five-year age cohorts are still of reasonable size and can be 'followed' through by examining the same breakdowns among a cohort five years older in the next DHS survey (and four years older between 2010 and 2014). Changes can therefore be followed through for 14 years from 2000 and nine years from 2005: the change between surveys shows the development of the system over that period, and the differences in primary completion between the age cohorts in each survey year provides an indication of the effects of education sector reforms: whether they have accelerated over time, and whether these effects vary by sex, location or relative deprivation.

Table 11.1 Numbers of households, individuals and children aged 12-14 and 6-17 in Demographic and Health Surveys 2000, 2005, 2010, 2014

	Demographic and Health Surveys			
	2000	2005	2010	2014
Households	12,236	14,243	15,667	15,825
Individuals	64,274	68,894	71,581	69,471
Children 12-14	5,741	6,047	5,168	4,778
Children 6-17	23,231	21,516	19,755	18,373

Source: NIS 2017
Notes: 6-17 Compulsory School Age Range; 12-14 Age Range for Lower Secondary.

11.5 It is noticeable that, although the average household size has fallen from 5.25 in 2000 to 4.39 in 2014, the proportion of children aged 6-17 has fallen more sharply, from 36.1% to 26.4%.

[24] Cambodia National Institute of Statistics, 2000 to 2014, *National Demographic and Health Survey* 2000, 2005,2009,2014, data available from http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/dhs. All data in this section are from this source, unless stated otherwise.
[25] The Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey data was considered, but not used as a codebook was not available, making it very difficult to use.

Direct comparison across surveys

11.6 We first show the results of comparing directly across surveys. We explain why this does not give us what we need; we then explain how the construction and analysis of pseudo-cohorts goes part of the way towards answering the question.

11.7 The classic method of comparing across surveys is to do just that, namely to compare 10-14 year olds in 2000 with 10-14 year olds in 2005, 2010 and 2014. The results of this comparison are set out in Table 11.2.[26] The table shows the recorded rates of primary school completion in 2000, and the increase (or decrease) in these rates over the 2000-2005, 2005-2010 and 2010-2014 periods.

Table 11.2 Change between 2000 and 2014 DHS surveys in primary completion rates; dry season data

Age group	Sex	Residence	Water Source: Unimproved – 0 Improved – 1	Primary Completion Rate	Increase in Completion Rate		
				2000	2005	2010	2014
10-14	Male	Urban	0	0.0618	0.1183	0.0662	-0.0412
			1	0.1970	0.1387	0.0364	0.0600
			Total	0.1348	0.1549	0.0625	0.0649
		Rural	0	0.0274	0.0976	0.0459	0.0182
			1	0.0615	0.1067	0.0498	0.0704
			Total	0.0370	0.1105	0.0475	0.0507
		Total	0	0.0308	0.0991	0.0446	0.0150
			1	0.0946	0.1030	0.0519	0.0662
			Total	0.0511	0.1158	0.0492	0.0512
	Female	Urban	0	0.0455	0.1691	0.0926	-0.0112
			1	0.2361	0.1223	0.0608	0.0537
			Total	0.1493	0.1676	0.0833	0.0610
		Rural	0	0.0401	0.1325	0.0865	0.0131
			1	0.0512	0.1376	0.0858	0.0749
			Total	0.0433	0.1377	0.0858	0.0494
		Total	0	0.0406	0.1356	0.0855	0.0110
			1	0.0927	0.1258	0.0876	0.0685
			Total	0.0571	0.1422	0.0866	0.0498
	Total	Urban	0	0.0540	0.1430	0.0811	-0.0257
			1	0.2159	0.1311	0.0487	0.0576
			Total	0.1418	0.1613	0.0733	0.0636
		Rural	0	0.0339	0.1149	0.0657	0.0161
			1	0.0563	0.1222	0.0667	0.0736
			Total	0.0402	0.1241	0.0657	0.0508
		Total	0	0.0358	0.1172	0.0647	0.0134
			1	0.0936	0.1144	0.0689	0.0684
			Total	0.0541	0.1289	0.0673	0.0512
15-19	Male	Urban	0	0.5191	0.1193	0.0125	-0.1460
			1	0.7669	0.0038	0.1053	-0.0004
			Total	0.6675	0.0680	0.1071	0.0154

[26] Dry season results

Age group	Sex	Residence	Water Source: Unimproved – 0 Improved – 1	Primary Completion Rate	Increase in Completion Rate		
				2000	2005	2010	2014
		Rural	0	0.3343	0.2198	0.1012	-0.0558
			1	0.4426	0.1669	0.0999	0.0098
			Total	0.3654	0.2178	0.0999	-0.0160
		Total	0	0.3524	0.2092	0.0935	-0.0574
			1	0.5358	0.1052	0.1113	0.0030
			Total	0.4143	0.1915	0.1049	-0.0148
	Female	Urban	0	0.4114	0.1923	0.0506	0.1572
			1	0.6767	0.0475	0.0825	0.0626
			Total	0.5853	0.1137	0.0872	0.0803
		Rural	0	0.2363	0.3071	0.1148	-0.0062
			1	0.2924	0.2423	0.2123	0.0603
			Total	0.2521	0.2868	0.1675	0.0316
		Total	0	0.2555	0.2935	0.1090	-0.0026
			1	0.4360	0.1487	0.1792	0.0595
			Total	0.3200	0.2495	0.1527	0.0376
	Total	Urban	0	0.4659	0.1553	0.0314	0.0111
			1	0.7169	0.0271	0.0955	0.0329
			Total	0.6238	0.0914	0.0980	0.0492
		Rural	0	0.2888	0.2601	0.1078	-0.0318
			1	0.3740	0.1997	0.1543	0.0328
			Total	0.3131	0.2488	0.1324	0.0066
		Total	0	0.3071	0.2484	0.1009	-0.0307
			1	0.4870	0.1259	0.1452	0.0301
			Total	0.3696	0.2183	0.1284	0.0105
20-24	Male	Urban	0	0.5243	-0.0375	0.1716	0.0101
			1	0.7783	0.0195	0.0597	0.0228
			Total	0.6724	0.0654	0.0973	0.0371
		Rural	0	0.4109	0.0633	0.1194	0.0148
			1	0.4637	0.1020	0.0871	0.0688
			Total	0.4257	0.0953	0.1036	0.0460
		Total	0	0.4224	0.0528	0.1225	0.0118
			1	0.5548	0.0733	0.0913	0.0456
			Total	0.4659	0.0961	0.1091	0.0352
	Female	Urban	0	0.3608	-0.0327	0.3194	0.0501
			1	0.6092	0.0051	0.1864	0.0654
			Total	0.5118	0.0481	0.2226	0.0765
		Rural	0	0.2218	0.0732	0.1997	0.0612
			1	0.2348	0.1485	0.1955	0.1345
			Total	0.2253	0.1180	0.1956	0.1107
		Total	0	0.2357	0.0623	0.2074	0.0541
			1	0.3537	0.0894	0.2102	0.1042
			Total	0.2743	0.1103	0.2107	0.0966
	Total	Urban	0	0.4434	-0.0378	0.2472	0.0320

Age group	Sex	Residence	Water Source: Unimproved – 0 Improved – 1	Primary Completion Rate	Increase in Completion Rate		
				2000	2005	2010	2014
			1	0.6903	0.0128	0.1259	0.0437
			Total	0.5905	0.0556	0.1625	0.0565
		Rural	0	0.3165	0.0692	0.1598	0.0382
			1	0.3522	0.1171	0.1473	0.1007
			Total	0.3263	0.1037	0.1527	0.0775
		Total	0	0.3292	0.0582	0.1652	0.0333
			1	0.4548	0.0761	0.1559	0.0743
			Total	0.3704	0.1006	0.1629	0.0651
25-29	Male	Urban	0	0.5319	-0.0677	0.1649	0.0288
			1	0.8290	-0.0581	0.0563	0.0309
			Total	0.7100	-0.0091	0.1057	0.0426
		Rural	0	0.4318	-0.0449	0.0612	0.0592
			1	0.5375	-0.0502	0.0395	0.1068
			Total	0.4605	-0.0201	0.0481	0.0930
		Total	0	0.4419	-0.0477	0.0639	0.0529
			1	0.6277	-0.0735	0.0691	0.0716
			Total	0.5025	-0.0164	0.0703	0.0752
	Female	Urban	0	0.4171	-0.1603	0.1867	0.1478
			1	0.6636	-0.0847	0.1120	0.0916
			Total	0.5665	-0.0607	0.1629	0.1069
		Rural	0	0.2478	-0.0408	0.0693	0.1193
			1	0.2940	-0.0039	0.0825	0.1247
			Total	0.2610	-0.0100	0.0736	0.1335
		Total	0	0.2653	-0.0534	0.0725	0.1156
			1	0.4072	-0.0465	0.1199	0.0949
			Total	0.3138	-0.0166	0.1033	0.1193
	Total	Urban	0	0.4711	-0.1141	0.1829	0.0873
			1	0.7403	-0.0689	0.0847	0.0631
			Total	0.6334	-0.0336	0.1354	0.0763
		Rural	0	0.3360	-0.0408	0.0648	0.0933
			1	0.4060	-0.0186	0.0621	0.1142
			Total	0.3555	-0.0113	0.0612	0.1142
		Total	0	0.3497	-0.0486	0.0682	0.0880
			1	0.5088	-0.0531	0.0951	0.0828
			Total	0.4030	-0.0132	0.0873	0.0982
Total (10-29)	Male	Urban	0	0.3517	0.0633	0.1279	-0.0633
			1	0.5962	0.0570	0.1012	0.0152
			Total	0.4925	0.1012	0.1333	0.0286
		Rural	0	0.2453	0.1126	0.0942	0.0059
			1	0.3154	0.1077	0.0891	0.0560
			Total	0.2650	0.1269	0.0911	0.0376
		Total	0	0.2558	0.1071	0.0943	0.0013
			1	0.3927	0.0790	0.1065	0.0381

Age group	Sex	Residence	Water Source: Unimproved – 0 Improved – 1	Primary Completion Rate	Increase in Completion Rate		
				2000	2005	2010	2014
			Total	0.3006	0.1230	0.1037	0.0303
	Female	Urban	0	0.2762	0.0780	0.1648	0.0548
			1	0.5430	0.0349	0.1208	0.0570
			Total	0.4377	0.0890	0.1493	0.0710
		Rural	0	0.1577	0.1455	0.1111	0.0423
			1	0.1868	0.1524	0.1558	0.0787
			Total	0.1658	0.1564	0.1338	0.0687
		Total	0	0.1693	0.1385	0.1127	0.0389
			1	0.2933	0.1009	0.1601	0.0657
			Total	0.2107	0.1462	0.1420	0.0641
	Total	Urban	0	0.3144	0.0702	0.1462	-0.0026
			1	0.5683	0.0452	0.1123	0.0366
			Total	0.4644	0.0943	0.1422	0.0502
		Rural	0	0.2018	0.1290	0.1028	0.0238
			1	0.2517	0.1294	0.1227	0.0672
			Total	0.2158	0.1414	0.1126	0.0528
		Total	0	0.2129	0.1227	0.1036	0.0197
			1	0.3426	0.0898	0.1339	0.0519
			Total	0.2558	0.1344	0.1231	0.0470

11.8 For this table, data for 0-4 year olds are omitted (they have never been in primary school), as well as data for 5-9 year olds (only in rare cases would they have completed primary). This leaves the survey-to-survey changes for 10-14 year olds, 15-19 year olds, 20-24 year olds and 25-29 year olds between 2000 and 2005, 2005 and 2010 and 2010 and 2014, as evidence of education reform effects.

11.9 Overall trends for all age groups:

- In the starting year, 2000, there are consistently higher rates of completion in all age groups for urban residents and people with relatively less deprivation. The rate of completion was higher for boys in the majority of cases.
- For the younger ages and overall, the highest increases in completion rates were between 2000 and 2005. There was relatively little change between 2010 and 2014. (In interpreting these results, it should be noted that over the period reviewed, population shifts from rural to urban areas occurred, and there were increases in access to improved water sources. These shifts would tend to dampen the recorded improvements in completion rates by location or relative deprivation, and could account for recorded negative changes.)
- Across all age groups and in all three periods, the rate of increase in completion rates for women was faster than for men. However, rural and urban trends fluctuated, with initial higher gains in rural areas followed by higher gains in urban areas, followed by a comparatively slow increase between 2010 and 2014. From 2000 to 2005, those with improved water sources exhibited higher rates of improvement in school attainment, and thereafter there were somewhat more rapid improvements for those without improved water – indicating some improvement in the distribution of school improvements.

11.10 *Analysis for 10-14 year olds* (age-appropriate completion) between 2000 and 2010 (the start of the evaluation period) shows:

- The overall rate of primary school completion by 10-14 year olds in 2000 was just 5.4%. The highest rate of completion by 10-14 year olds in 2000 was 24% for girls in urban areas with improved sources of water.

  By 2005, the overall completion rate of 10-14 year olds was 13 percentage points higher than in 2000, and by 2010 the rate was a further 7 percentage points higher. The highest total completion rates in 2010 are 42% and 37% for girls and boys respectively in urban areas with improved sources of water. Completion rates increase most in 2005 (for all sub-groups), and the highest increase in this year is for girls in urban areas without an improved source of water.
- The increases in completion rates between 2005 and 2010 are lower than for the previous period, with the largest increase being 9 percentage points, again for girls in urban areas without an improved source of water.
- For 2000-2005 and 2005-2010, the 10-14 year old girls' completion rate increased faster than for boys, but boys' performance increased at a similar rate between 2010 and 2014.
- There are faster improvements in completion for urban residents.
- The increase in primary completion was only noticeably different with regard to relative deprivation in the third period, when it was 5.5 percentage points higher for those with improved water.
- The gender differences in completion rates exhibit an interesting trend. In 2000 (the first survey), girls aged 10-14 had completed primary in slightly higher proportions than boys, except for urban households with higher deprivation and rural households with lower deprivation. The data suggest that on average, as subsequent improvements in completion were higher for girls, the gap between female and male primary completion widened. This is discussed further below under the pseudo-cohort analysis.

Table 11.3 Average increase in primary completion for 10-14 year olds

	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2014
Rate of increase for all	0.1289	0.0673	0.0512
Average for girls (all)	0.1422	0.0866	0.0498
Average for boys (all)	0.1158	0.0492	0.0512
Average for urban (all)	0.1613	0.0733	0.0636
Average for rural (all)	0.1241	0.0657	0.0508
Average for improved water source (all)	0.1144	0.0689	0.0684
Average for absence of improved water source (all)	0.1172	0.0647	0.0134

11.11 *The analysis for 15-19 year* olds between 2000 and 2014 shows:

- The highest rate of primary completion in 2000 for 15-19 year olds was 77% for males in urban areas with improved source of water.
- These rates increase most between 2000 and 2005 (except for boys in urban areas with improved sources of water, which affects the overall results for those with improved sources of water). The highest increases are for girls in rural areas with unimproved water sources (contributing to the result for all girls, all those in rural areas and those with relative water deprivation).
- The increase in completion rates between 2005 and 2010 is smaller than in the earlier period (with the exceptions noted above), with the largest increases for girls in rural areas with improved sources of water.
- The rate of increase was faster for girls across all survey-to-survey periods in the 15-19 year old group. This was off a base in 2000 in which 15-19 year old boys had a higher rate of primary completion than girls in all categories.
- The trend is less clear for location and deprivation. The rate for relatively deprived respondents increased faster between 2000 and 2005, but then slower than relatively less deprived respondents between 2005 and 2010 and between 2010 and 2014. The rate for rural respondents increased faster than urban respondents for the first two periods, but slower for the third period.

- For the first two periods, completion rates on average increased faster for 15-19 year olds than for 10-14 year olds.

Table 11.4 Average increase in primary completion for 15-19 year olds

	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2014
Rate of increase for all	0.2183	0.1284	0.0105
Rate of increase for girls (all)	0.2495	0.1527	0.0376
Rate of increase for boys (all)	0.1915	0.1049	-0.0148
Rate of increase for urban (all)	0.0914	0.0980	0.0492
Rate of increase for rural (all)	0.2488	0.1324	0.0066
Rate of increase for improved water source (all)	0.1259	0.1452	0.0301
Rate of increase for absence of improved water source (all)	0.2484	0.1009	-0.0307

11.12 In interpreting the low values of the changes in completion rate from 2010 to 2014 for those in the 10-14 and 15-19 year old age groups, it is helpful to refer to trends in overall enrolment rates. Primary intake rates and gross enrolment (GER) and net enrolment (NER) ratios for Cambodia for the relevant years are reproduced below, sourced from the UNESCO Global Monitoring Report for Education.[27] These data show increases in the GER from 102 in 2000 to 127 in 2010 followed by a strong decline to 116 in 2014; and increases in the NER from 89 in 2000 to 96 in 2010 followed by a slight decline to 95 in 2014 (see Table 11.5). This suggests that the increases and subsequent declines in completion rates by age group are not necessarily a consequence of changes in the proportion of entrants who complete primary school, but might also result from changes in enrolment trends.

Table 11.5 Gross and Net Enrolment Ratios and Primary Intake Rates: 2000 to 2014

Year	Source	GIR	NIR	GER	NER
2000	GEM 2002	122	70	102	89
2005	GEM 2008	133	89	107	93
2010	GEM 2012	96	90	127	96
2014	GEM 2016			116	95

Source: UNESCO, 2017

Conclusion

11.13 This analysis shows that there were substantial improvements in the proportion of children who completed primary school within the regulation time, or by their mid-teens, between 2000 and 2005, and again by 2010. Between 2000 and 2010, a rising proportion of 10-14 and 15-19 year olds had completed primary school, including gains for both boys and girls, urban and rural communities and more or less deprived households (indicated by access to improved water sources). Past education reforms have contributed to improved outcomes in respect of primary school completion rates.

11.14 **However, it appears that the upward trend slowed down during the 2010-2014 period, associated with lower enrolment trends**. The slow increase in completion rates is evident particularly in the 15-19 year old age group. The slow down in survey-to-survey primary completion rates between 2010 and 2014 is associated with a decline in the gross enrolment ratio over this period. This is consistent with the view that earlier improvements in primary completion were at least in part a consequence of expanded access to schooling.

11.15 **Primary school completion has improved more for girls than for boys.** The survey data indicate that there has been greater progress in primary completion rates for girls in both urban and rural communities and for both deprivation groups. Whereas the 2000 survey indicates that boys born before 1985 were more likely to complete primary school, girls born between 1985 and 1990 achieved a higher rate of primary completion and the subsequent increases in completion rates were higher for girls.

[27] UNESCO, 2017

11.16 In respect of urban and rural location, and relative deprivation as indicated by access to improved water sources, improvements in primary completion rates do not follow consistent patterns. Whereas completion rates for 15-19 year olds increased faster for rural and more deprived households between 2000 and 2005, the increases were higher for less deprived households in the next period, and urban households across 2010-2014.

11.17 In interpreting these findings, it is important to note the inherent limitations of the survey data on which they rely. While the *National Demographic and Health Survey* data are of good quality, changes in the representativeness of the 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2014 surveys might in part account for the trends they indicate.

11.18 In broad terms, these results suggest that there were substantial improvements in primary school completion between 2000 and 2010 for all sub-groups, and especially for girls. There appear to have been slower increases in completion rates between 2010 and 2014.

Pseudo-cohort analysis

Method

11.19 Using the same DHS data for 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2014 analysed above, an alternative method can be applied, which goes some way to adjusting for the difficulties of the direct comparison of survey results above. In the analysis below, pseudo-cohorts were constructed for five-year age groups (0 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14 and 15-19), broken down by gender, urban/rural residence and improved water source as an indicator of deprivation. Primary school completion rates are presented in Table 11.6 below for four pseudo-cohorts. The starting age cohorts progress five years between 2000 and 2005 and between 2005 and 2010 and four years between 2010 and 2014. Table 11.6 does not include values for those who were 0 to 4 in 2000, as the only survey year in which a significant proportion of this cohort would have completed primary school is 2014, so the results are of limited interest.

11.20 The table is read as follows. For boys 5 to 9 in 2000 in urban areas, for example, by 2005 (when they were 10-14) 18% of those without an improved water source and 34% of those with an improved water source had completed primary schooling. By 2010, a further 47% of this cohort of urban boys without an improved water source had completed primary schooling.

Results

11.21 For those who were 5-9 in 2000 (our youngest age cohort), the analysis shows:

- By 2005, when this cohort was 10-14, nearly a fifth (18%) had completed primary school. The highest primary completion rates by age 10-14 were for boys (34%) and girls (36%) in urban areas with improved water sources.
- By 2010, when this cohort was aged 15-19, a further 53% had completed primary schooling, bringing the total completion rate to 72%. In all sub-groups, larger increases in primary school completion were achieved between 2005 and 2010 (when the cohort was aged 15-19) than in the earlier period.
- By age 15-19, completion rates were marginally higher for female than for male children.
- Between 2000 and 2005, substantially higher rates of primary completion were achieved in urban than in rural areas, and in households with improved water sources than in those without.
- In all sub-groups there were additional gains in primary school completion between 2005 and 2010 (between age 10-14 and 15-19) of between 43% and 56%, with the highest amongst those with an improved water source.
- The pseudo-cohort analysis indicates negative changes in primary completion between the 2010 and 2014 surveys for those aged 5-9 in 2000, suggesting declines in most sub-groups, averaging a 1% reduction for the overall cohort and nearly 2% for women. While migration of successful primary school leavers to opportunities elsewhere might account for a reduction in the survey completion rates, these results suggest that there may be sampling inconsistencies between the 2014 and earlier surveys (and perhaps an over-statement of primary completion in the 2010 survey).

11.22 For those who were 10-14 in 2000:

- The reported overall primary completion rate by age 10-14 for those who were this age in 2000 is 5.4%, which is considerably lower than the equivalent completion rate achieved by the next five-year cohort (reported above). Completion rates were highest for urban households with improved water sources.
- Between 2000 and 2005, as this cohort aged from 10-14 to 15-19, a further 53% completed primary schooling, comprising 57% of urban and 52% of rural household members. Completion rates remained higher for households with lower deprivation levels, as signalled by improved water sources. The overall completion rate by age 15-19 was 59%.
- Between 2005 and 2010, as this cohort increases in age from 15-19 to 20-24, there are further gains in primary completion, amounting to 4.6% overall, and mainly benefiting urban households with improved water sources.

11.23 For those who were 15-19 in 2000 (our oldest age cohort):

- Those who were 15-19 years old in 2000 became 20-24 in 2005, 25-29 in 2010 and 29-33 years old in 2014. We discard this last survey year, as this age group is largely outside the reach of the school system.
- The survey data indicate that this cohort achieved a primary completion rate of 37% by age 15-19, which is significantly lower than the rates of completion achieved by the equivalent age group for the next successive five-year cohorts (discussed above).

Conclusion

- Our pseudo-cohort analysis indicates a considerable improvement in primary completion rates over the period reviewed. The cohort born in the years 1981-1985 achieved a completion rate of 37% by age 15-19, whereas the next five-year cohort, born in 1986-1990, achieved a completion rate of 59% by age 15-19, and those born in 1991-1995 achieved a 72% completion rate by this age.
- The cohort born in 1986-1990 achieved a primary completion rate of just 5.4% by age 10-14, whereas those born in 1991-1995 achieved a completion rate of 18% by this age.
- Although their initial progress was slow, the analysis shows that the education system enabled many of those born in the earlier years to complete primary schooling after the normal ages of completion. Larger increases in completion rates were achieved between the 10-14 and 15-19 age levels than in earlier years.
- Our analysis shows that more boys than girls completed primary school in the cohort born in the 1986-1990 period, whereas in the younger cohort born in 1991-1995 the female completion rate by age 15-19 was higher than that of men.
- The overall rate of primary completion by age 15-19 for urban areas was consistently higher than in rural areas for all cohorts. Similarly, the gap between households with improved water sources and those without remains large.

Table 11.6 Progress of pseudo-cohorts in achieving complete primary schooling between 2000 and 2014: dry season

Sex	Residence	Improved Water Source	Completion by 2000 (age 5-9)	Increase in completion by 2005 (age 10-14)	Increase in completion by 2010 (age 15-19)	Increase in completion by 2014 (age 19-23)
Male	Urban	0	0.0000	0.1801	0.4708	-0.0755
		1	0.0000	0.3357	0.5403	0.0090
		Total	0.0000	0.2897	0.5529	0.0296
	Rural	0	0.0000	0.1250	0.5303	-0.0562
		1	0.0000	0.1682	0.5412	0.0085
		Total	0.0000	0.1475	0.5356	-0.0181
	Total	0	0.0000	0.1299	0.5252	-0.0565

		1	0.0000	0.1976	0.5547	0.0116
		Total	0.0000	0.1669	0.5438	-0.0084
Female	Urban	0	0.0000	0.2146	0.4397	0.0479
		1	0.0000	0.3584	0.4483	0.0512
		Total	0.0000	0.3169	0.4693	0.0648
	Rural	0	0.0004	0.1722	0.4856	-0.0888
		1	0.0000	0.1888	0.5582	-0.0093
		Total	0.0003	0.1807	0.5254	-0.0386
	Total	0	0.0003	0.1759	0.4818	-0.0853
		1	0.0000	0.2185	0.5454	0.0080
		Total	0.0002	0.1991	0.5229	-0.0185
Total	Urban	0	0.0000	0.1970	0.4556	-0.0094
		1	0.0000	0.3470	0.4925	0.0315
		Total	0.0000	0.3031	0.5101	0.0480
	Rural	0	0.0002	0.1486	0.5079	-0.0717
		1	0.0000	0.1785	0.5495	-0.0001
		Total	0.0001	0.1642	0.5300	-0.0279
	Total	0	0.0002	0.1528	0.5034	-0.0701
		1	0.0000	0.2080	0.5501	0.0099
		Total	0.0001	0.1829	0.5333	-0.0133

Sex	Residence	Improved Water Source	Completion by 2000 (age 10-14)	Increase in completion by 2005 (age 15-19)	Increase in completion by 2010 (age 20-24)	Increase in completion by 2014 (age 24-28)
Male	Urban	0	0.0618	0.5766	0.0200	-0.0349
		1	0.1970	0.5737	0.0868	0.0071
		Total	0.1348	0.6007	0.0996	0.0190
	Rural	0	0.0274	0.5267	0.0395	-0.0404
		1	0.0615	0.5480	0.0433	0.0103
		Total	0.0370	0.5462	0.0414	-0.0078
	Total	0	0.0308	0.5308	0.0361	-0.0430
		1	0.0946	0.5464	0.0784	-0.0032
		Total	0.0511	0.5547	0.0653	-0.0121
Female	Urban	0	0.0455	0.5582	0.0438	0.0183
		1	0.2361	0.4881	0.0765	0.0232
		Total	0.1493	0.5497	0.0835	0.0357
	Rural	0	0.0401	0.5033	-0.0487	-0.0588
		1	0.0512	0.4835	0.0441	-0.0346
		Total	0.0433	0.4956	0.0000	-0.0368
	Total	0	0.0406	0.5084	-0.0436	-0.0644
		1	0.0927	0.4920	0.0686	-0.0311
		Total	0.0571	0.5124	0.0258	-0.0309
Total	Urban	0	0.0540	0.5672	0.0316	-0.0086
		1	0.2159	0.5281	0.0850	0.0137
		Total	0.1418	0.5734	0.0934	0.0262
	Rural	0	0.0339	0.5150	-0.0034	-0.0492
		1	0.0563	0.5174	0.0429	-0.0153
		Total	0.0402	0.5217	0.0208	-0.0239
	Total	0	0.0358	0.5197	-0.0029	-0.0531
		1	0.0936	0.5193	0.0739	-0.0200
		Total	0.0541	0.5338	0.0460	-0.0233

Analysing the educational determinants of outcomes

11.24 In this section, we present the results of an investigation into the determinants of outcomes that are associated with the school system. The section seeks to answer two main questions: what over time were the educational variables associated with selected outcomes over time, and has the acceleration in education reforms observed in the qualitative analysis and additional RGOC funding for the sector after 2013/14 had a discernible effect yet on the selected results.

Data used

11.25 The analysis uses data from the MoEYS Education Management Information System (EMIS).[28] These data are much more detailed than the statistical survey data, and available from 2005-06 until 2016-17. The evaluation requested data from 2007/8 to 2015/17 (10 years of data), comprising mainly school infrastructure and teacher variables, as well as some intermediate outcome variables (like entry at correct age and repetition in first grade) and a small number of variables that can be interpreted as 'environmental' relative to the school.

11.26 The EMIS dataset includes about 300 variables. The evaluation selected variables in three groups: environmental variables, school and teacher variables, and school variables. Table 11.7 below sets out the choices and the motivation for the choices by variable.

Table 11.7 EMIS Variables used

Dependent Variables (Intermediate education outcomes)	
Primary	
Correct age entry grade 1	This was tested both as a dependent variable and as in independent variable for performance against the other dependent variables. As a dependent variable it was tested as an indicator of access.
Repetition grade 1	Repetition grade 1 was used as an indicator of the internal efficiency of the system.
Success in grade 6	Grade 6 success was adopted as a proxy variable to measure quality in the system.
Correct age entry grade 7	This was tested as an indicator of access and continuation in school.
Repetition in grade 7	Repetition in grade 7 was used as an indicator of internal efficiency of the systems.
Independent environmental variables	
Location: Rural/ Urban	More remote districts fare worse.
Availability of water and toilet facilities	Availability of water and sanitation facilities were selected as proxy indicators for deprivation. They were also understood from the sub-national fieldwork to be important factors in determining whether children come to school / drop out / do not enrol.

[28] RGoC MOEYS, 2017a, EMIS data 2007/8 to 2015/16, received from the DGPP EMIS Department on 13 October 2017. Unless stated otherwise all data in this section is from this source.

School disadvantage	Variable used in school operating budget formula to indicate schools that are at a disadvantage.
District poverty ratios	District poverty ratios were derived from NIS/WFP study.[29]
Independent director and teacher variables	
Director: age, gender, educational qualifications	Across all four provinces visited POE and DOE respondents noted that school directors were pivotal in whether a school achieved. The availability of these variables in the dataset allowed us to test this perception. While whether a director is old or young, male or female or well qualified may not in combination or singly mean that s/he is a good director as perceived by the officials, the hypothesis is that younger and better qualified directors would be associated with better performance. Furthermore, the inclusion of school director qualification also allows the evaluation to investigate whether current evidence supports the reforms undertaken towards improving school director qualifications.
Teacher qualifications and training: there are two possible variables that have been included: percent teachers without (pedagogical) training and teachers on a contract	The reason for including teacher variables is to test whether the breakthrough indicator on qualifications and progress towards achieving it are likely in future to translate into improved results. Teachers on a contract: respondents noted the use of contract teachers to address teacher deployment gaps and raised concerns about the quality of teaching when these teachers are used. The analysis therefore included it as a variable.
Independent variables on schools	
Total primary enrolment and total secondary enrolment as a proxy for the size of school	Other secondary data show that the size of school matters.[30] This variable was included in the models as a key determinant of education performance.
Size of classes	The evidence from the programme for international student assessment (PISA) and similar surveys in developed countries, and from the Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) and Latin American Laboratory for Assessment of the Quality of Education (LLECE) in Latin America is that below a certain class size, around 15-20, teachers can be more effective.
Condition of classes and schools: without a roof	Condition of classes and schools: there were a large number of variables about the quality of the buildings/ classes; for example, classes without a good floor, without good walls and without a good roof. After seeing that the inter-correlations were low with each other and not very high with the dependent variables, we decided to use classes without good roof as rain is more an impediment to learning than dust or wind.

[29] Ibid
[30] E.g. World Bank, forthcoming

Equipment in schools	Several variables were included, including classes with desks, chairs, blackboard, teacher blackboard. These variables were tested as proxies for how well equipped a school is.
Community participation: number of parent meetings	Improving school-based management and participation of school support committees in education has been a central component of donor dialogue, with investment from the RGoC in capacity development.
Sports facilities	Data are available on existence of sports facilities, availability of equipment and whether or not there is a team in the school for each of volleyball, football, basketball, climbing rope, shotput, high jump, long jump and running; we have chosen to count whether or not teams exist, demonstrating a commitment on the part of the school towards team activity.
School income: average school income	Since the early 2000s with the first school operating budget reforms, providing resources at school level has been a central part of the MoEYS reform programme. While school-level financing was stagnant for a long time, the school operating budgets increased twice in recent years, in 2013 and 2015. Note that this variable does not include the SIG.
Primary classes attached	This variable measured whether a school had any early childhood education classes attached.

Interrupted time series discontinuity analysis

11.27 The evaluation firstly looked at whether the acceleration of reforms from 2013/14 had an effect. It investigated this through interrupted series discontinuity analysis.

Method

11.28 Interrupted time series discontinuity analysis looks at whether there is a change in regression parameters, indicating a change in the relationship between independent and dependent variables, after any large-scale intervention, providing information on the possible impact of an intervention.

11.29 The interrupted time series (ITS) study design is increasingly being used for the evaluation of public sector interventions; it is particularly suited to interventions introduced at a population level over a clearly defined time period and that target population-level outcomes.

11.30 In an ITS study, a time series of a particular outcome of interest is used to establish an underlying trend, which is 'interrupted' by an intervention at a known point in time. The hypothetical scenario under which the intervention has not taken place and the trend continues unchanged (that is: the 'expected' trend, in the absence of the intervention, given the pre-existing trend) is referred to as the 'counterfactual'. This counterfactual scenario provides a comparison for the evaluation of the impact of the intervention by examining any change occurring in the post-intervention period. Annexure 1 to this Annex provides more detailed technical information on the method and when it is appropriate.

11.31 For this evaluation, the discontinuity analysis was applied to the contribution of school factors to the 5 dependent variables before 2013/14 and after 2013/14. The contribution of school factors was calculated in each case by subtracting the environment factors R squared from total R squares. These 15 series were then examined using the regression discontinuity design explained in Annexure 1 for trends over the 12 years, with the discontinuity break attached to 2013-14.

Results

11.32 The contribution of school factors has been calculated in each case by subtracting the environment R squared from total R squares. The R squared is the proportion of variance in the dependent variables (correct age entry, repetition rates and success) which can be explained by the independent variables. This is the proportion of variance in the dependent variable which can be explained by the independent variables (the list of environment and school factors). In each case the R squared is an overall measure of the strength of association and does not reflect the extent to which any particular independent variable is associated with the dependent variable. These associations are examined in the next section.

11.33 In lower secondary education, the independent variables for the multilinear regression model for environment factors were the presence of a water source, toilet facilities and location. The school factor list comprised 19 variables, adding correct age entry into Grade 7 as a factor for the repetition rates.

11.34 For primary education the environmental factors list added whether the school was disadvantaged, and the school factor list comprised 22 variables, adding correct age entry to the model for repetition rates and Grade 6 success.

11.35 Table 11.8 and Table 11.9 below reflect the R squared results for each of the intermediate outcome variables tested.

Table 11.8 R Squareds: District level primary

DEPENDENT	R SQ	05-06	06-07	07-08	08-09	09-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	16-17
Correct-age entry grade 1	Environ	0.275	0.280	0.319	0.353	0.220	0.409	0.468	0.375	Break year	0.367	0.458	0.289
	Total	**0.504**	**0.492**	**0.587**	**0.615**	**0.464**	**0.651**	**0.651**	**0.582**		**0.544**	**0.533**	**0.389**
Repetition rate grade 1	Environ	0.084	0.124	0.081	0.123	0.074	0.083	0.031	0.023		0.063	0.093	0.053
	Total	0.223	0.349	0.306	0.304	0.311	0.391	0.244	0.287		0.156	0.218	0.181
Success rate grade 6	Environ	0.143	0.092	0.139	0.070	0.181	0.222	0.186	0.244		0.273	0.119	0.240
	Total	0.397	0.378	0.280	0.339	0.367	0.464	0.339	0.587		0.441	0.535	0.351

Table 11.9 R Squareds: District level lower secondary[31]

DEPENDENT	R SQ	05-06	06-07	07-08	08-09	09-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	16-17
Correct-age in grade 7	Environ	0.067	0.141	0.169	0.146	0.261	0.168	0.187	0.206	Break year	0.200	0.212	0.102
	Total	0.365	0.441	0.571	0.557	0.624	0.628	0.513	0.556		0.526	0.428	0.374
Repetition rate grade 7	Environ	0.065		0.057	0.015		0.017	0.052	0.111		0.127	0.055	0.033
	Total	0.051		0.221	0.031		0.175	0.173	0.252		0.236	0.120	0.140

11.36 The R squares have been examined using the regression discontinuity design explained above for trends over the 12 years of EMIS statistics (see Table 11.10 below), with the discontinuity break attached to 2013-14. The results are as follows:

- In four out of the five cases, the proportion of variance accounted for by the environmental variables increases whilst in three of those four cases the break variable is negative, but none of the coefficients are statistically significant. For the dependent 'repetition in Grade 1', the coefficient on the environmental variable is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, whilst the break variable is positive (but not statistically significant);

[31] The repetition rate for 2006/7 and 2009/10 could not be examined as data for it were not included in the package of data received

- For the school R squared variable, in four out of the five cases the proportion of variance accounted for by the school variables increases, although the increases are not statistically significant; and in all five cases the break variable is negative; and strongly significant for the 'repetition in Grade 1' variable. In other words, lower repetition after the break can be explained by the combined effect of school factors.

Table 11.10 Summary table: school and environment factors before and after the discontinuity break

DEPENDENT	R SQ	Coeff on Year	Coeff on Break
Primary			
Correct-age entry grade 1	Environ	0.996	-0.782
	School	-0.494	-0.434
	Total	0.418	-1.01*
Repetition rate grade 1	Environ	-1.124*	0.904
	School	0.847	-1.436***
	Total	0.350	-1.027*
Success rate grade 6	Environ	0.810	-0.347
	School	0.189	-0.165
	Total	-0.399	0.736
Lower secondary			
Correct-age in grade 7	Environ	0.966	-0.649
	School	0.102	-0.767
	Total	0.601	-0.976
Repetition rate grade 7	Environ	0.063	0.193
	School	1.035	-0.882
	Total	0.856	-0.607

11.37 The main substantive conclusions are therefore that:

- In general, there have been small but non-significant increases in the proportion of variance in the school-level intermediate outcome variables accounted for which would reflect a slight increase in inequality (and certainly not a decrease), but this trend appears to have slightly reversed in the last three years.
- The only possible exception to these generalisations is for the repetition in Grade 1 variable, where the proportion of variance accounted for by the environmental variables does appear to have decreased significantly, although with a non-significant upturn in 2013-14; and where the proportion of variance accounted for by the school variables shows a non-significant increase but a statistically significant marked downturn in 2013-14. This is significant, as it indicates that before 2013/14 environmental factors were significant in determining school outcomes (with a negative association), but after 2013/14 it was school factors that affected Grade 1 repetition, also with a negative association, i.e. the more 'improved' the school factors, the lower the repetition).

Analysis of coefficients

11.38 In a next step the evaluation then examined the values for the individual independent variables for each intermediate outcome tested in the multivariant regression analysis for all variables (the Total Variables model of the section above). The tables below for each dependent (or intermediate outcome) variable reflect the standardised coefficients. These are the coefficients obtained having standardized all of the variables in the regression, in other words put them on the same scale, including the dependent and all the independent variables. The statistical significance is indicated by stars against the variable in

the normal convention reflected below (where P indicates the associated 2-tailed p-value of the t-statistic for the standardised coefficient of each variable):

ns	P > 0.05
*	P ≤ 0.05
**	P ≤ 0.01
***	P ≤ 0.001

11.39 The N SIG column indicates across all years how many times a variable was significant at the one star/two star/three star level. If a coefficient for a variable is 0.389*** therefore, it means that for each unit of change in the variable, 0.389 change in the intermediate outcome is predicted, holding all other variables constant, and that this relationship is statistically highly significant as the hypothesis of no relationship is highly unlikely.

11.40 It is worth noting up front that very few of the coefficients were high. Variables with coefficients closer to +1 and -1 would have strong explanatory (with opposite directionality) power, and coefficients closer to zero, low explainatory power. Furthermore, the analysis is limited by having a low number of observations (12 for most variables, 10 for Grade 7 repetition rates) on which to base the regression. The discussion below therefore pays attention to all variables that have statistical significance attached to them, even if the coefficient is closer to zero than to 1, and the significance level is moderate.

Primary education outcomes

11.41 *Correct age entry in Grade 1:* The most important factors (appearing four or more times) are:

- the percentage of schools with access to drinking water, positively associated with an increase in the percentage entering at the correct age, although this is more important with a larger and more significant coefficient in the most recent years;
- the average age of school directors, where those districts with school directors on average *older* had a higher percentage entering at the correct age, although this is only in the earlier years of the period;
- the overall pupil-teacher ratio in the district, although this only appeared to be important in the earlier years of the period;
- districts where there was a higher percentage of schools with contract teachers;
- the percentage of schools with more than one shift (showing a lower percentage of students entering at the correct age).

11.42 Apart from those, the variables appearing three times were the percentage of schools in the district with classrooms without a good roof (showing an increase in the percentage of pupils entering at the correct age); the percentage of schools with attached early childhood education (ECE) classes (showing a higher proportion of students entering at the correct age); and the average educational qualifications of the school directors being higher (showing a *lower* percentage of students entering at the correct age. Finally, apart from these eight variables, the only other variables which are statistically significant more than once in the 12 years are the disadvantage indicator (showing less disadvantaged schools have a higher proportion of students entering at the correct age); the percentage of schools with parents' meetings (showing higher percentages of students entering at the correct age); and the percentage of schools where the teacher has a blackboard (with opposite signs, so no valid interpretation).

Table 11.11 Primary education: District level correct age entry in Grade 1

INDEPENDENT	N SIG	05-06	06-07	07-08	08-09	09-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	16-17
Drinking Water Available	2/3/2	-.010	.208*	.256**	.209**	-.051	.132*	.178	.105		.309***	.245**	.421***
Toilet facility available	0/1/0	.090	.140	-.082	.142	.240*	.078	.021	.134		.012	.232**	.014
Classified as disadvantaged	1/1/0	-.072	.070	-.210**	-.052	-.032	-.124*	-.047	-.166		-.074	-.035	.127
Schools in rural areas	0/0/0	.021	.134	.074	-.061	.053	.040	-.232	.004		.031	.020	.062
Directors who	0/0/0	.040	.002	-.113	-.058	-.010	-.046	.207	-.089		.046	.037	.027

INDEPENDENT	N SIG	05-06	06-07	07-08	08-09	09-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	16-17
are women													
School Director's age	0/2/4	.251**	.316***	.412***	.535***	.263**	.398***	.227	.351		-.003	.026	.101
Class with roof	2/1/0	.022*	-.058	.127*	.014	-.030	-.029	.132	.057		.088	.186**	.069
% of schools with more than one shift	4/0/0	.161*	.037	-.035	.012	-.083	.009	-.091	-.140		-.169*	-.137*	-.162*
Average classrooms not with desks	1/0/0	.166	.090	-.074	.026	.094	-.146	.037	-.028		.223*	-.070	-.001
Average classrooms not with chair	0/0/0	.017	-.083	-.046	-.148	.047	-.004	.037	-.058		.012	-.051	.068
Average classrooms not with blackboard	1/0/0	.055	-.056	-.019	-.040	.389	-.037	-.260	.158		-.312*	.030	-.189
Average classrooms not with teacher blackboard	2/0/0	-.123	.134	.165	.187	-.434*	.186	.186	-.195		.197	.059	.225*
Average parent meetings previous year	2/0/0	.134*	.084	-.008	.123*	-.092	-.001	.053	-.066		-.070	-.068	-.076
Parent teacher ratio primary	1/4/0	-.356**	-.389**	-.335**	-.016	-.345**	-.236*	-.100	.003		-.073	.135	.189
Total primary enrolment	0/1/0	-.216**	-.100	-.047	-.122	.024	-.028	-.068	.057		-.025	.006	-.041
Average count of sorts where facilities exist	1/0/0	.054	.111	.105*	-.073	.106	.044	.070	.022		-.020	-.015	-.052
%Teachers with lower secondary + education	0/0/0	.104	.076	.098	.016	-.023	-.084	-.019	-.093		.046	.095	.133
%Teachers without pedagogical training	0/0/0	.051	-.043	-.053	.010	-.056	-.049	-.013	.007		-.108	-.045	-.063
%Teachers with special contract	2/1/1	-.015	.086	-.044	-.177*	-.030	-.154*	-.077	-.189		-.186	-.278***	-.364**
Average primary pupils per class	0/0/0	.037	-.114	-.032	-.248	-.072	.096	-.137	.013		-.020	.078	-.083
School income	0/0/0	-.077	-.061	-.060	-.108*	.002	-.012	-.034	-.062		.092	.042	.075
Average of directors with Upper Secondary	0/0/0	-.070	-.009	-.039	-.076	-.105	.007	-.029	.013		-.085	-.054	-.097
Average of Directors with graduate education	2/1/0	-.201*	-.186*	.031	-.052	-.010	-.190**	-.178	-.077		-.038	.049	-.026
ECE classes attached to primary school	3/0/0	.138	.045	-.070	-.124	.054	-.024	.063	.185		.161*	.142*	.160*

11.43 *Repetition rate Grade 1:* The most important factors (appearing four or more times) are:

- the percentage of schools with attached ECE classes (associated with a decrease in repetition rates);
- the percentage of students entering at the correct age (with higher repetition rates associated with higher percentages, although this was more important in the earlier years).

11.44 The factors appearing three times were the disadvantage variable (with less disadvantage associated with lower repetition); and the presence of a sports team (being associated with lower repetition rates. Apart from those four variables, the only factors appearing more than once were average age of school directors (with a lower age associated with lower repetition rates); districts with higher primary enrolments in their schools showing lower repetition rates; the percentage of school

directors with lower educational qualifications (associated with higher repetition rates); the percentage of teachers with higher educational qualifications (associated with lower repetition rates); and the percentage of schools in the district with classrooms without a good roof, the percentage of schools with shifts and the percentage of schools with a toilet (but all three pairs had opposite signs on their coefficients, so with no valid interpretation).

Table 11.12 Primary education: Repetition Rate Grade 1

INDEPENDENT	SIG	05-06	06-07	07-08	08-09	09-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	16-17
% Schools with drinking Water Available	1/0/0	.156	.114	.109	.239*	.092	.079	.013	-.028		-.132	-.056	.095
% Schools with toilet facility available	0/2/0	-.024	.144	.123	.061	.065	-.045	.149	.319**		.142	-.007	-.276**
% Schools classified as disadvantaged	3/0/0	.145	.147	-.065	-.178*	-.046	-.037	-.083	-.186*		-.162	-.199*	.029
% Schools in rural areas	1/0/0	.018	.034	.081	.052	.110	.009	.051	.066		.150	.217*	.036
% Grade 1 at Correct Age	4/1/0	.235*	.254**	.214*	.120	.239	.176	.290*	.104		.134	.260*	.149
% Directors who are women	0/1/0	-.008	.042	.129	.069	.028	.002	-.078	.067		.059	.082	.227**
Average School Director's age	0/2/0	.039	.008	.009	-.136	-.071	-.046	-.107	-.328**		-.104	-.216**	-.076
% Class with roof	2/0/0	-.050	-.183*	-.118	-.060	.009	-.068	.025	.178*		-.052	-.057	-.070
% of schools with more than one shift	2/0/0	.028	-.203*	.024	.013	.079	.140	.013	.039		.194*	.137	.080
Average classrooms not with desks	0/0/0	.045	.123	.185	-.205	.222	.106	-.069	.044		-.058	.048	.150
Average classrooms not with chair	1/0/0	.018	-.043	.045	.312	-.007	-.034	-.066	-.187*		-.132	.008	.020
Average classrooms not with blackboard	1/0/0	-.018	.088	.072	.034	.065	.434*	.326	.041		.202	.031	-.144
Average classrooms not with teacher blackboard	0/0/0	-.038	-.055	.008	.002	-.229	-.355	-.306	-.093		-.166	-.160	.108
Average parent meetings previous year	0/0/0	.030	-.074	-.040	.042	-.056	.058	-.020	-.083		.127	.109	-.079
Parent teacher ratio primary	0/0/0	-.049	.250	.216	.110	.101	.154	.260	.017		-.287	-.129	.188
Total primary enrolment	1/1/0	-.171	-.173	-.233*	-.257**	-.245	-.123	-.141	-.158		-.104	-.006	-.162
Average count of sports where facilities exist	3/0/0	-.069	-.046	-.086	-.055	-.005	-.108	-.163*	-.089		-.137	-.152*	-.157*
%Teachers with lower secondary+ education	0/1/1	-.301**	-.149	-.011	-.016	-.070	-.077	-.067	-.261**		-.145	-.174	-.117
%Teachers without pedagogical training	2/1/0	-.206**	-.142*	-.099	-.054	-.129	-.150*	-.122	-.115		-.030	-.038	-.044
%Teachers with special contract	1/0/0	.106	-.124	-.155	-.052	-.069	-.076	-.137	-.023		.199	.262*	-.163
Average primary pupils per class	2/0/1	.002	-.068	-.146	-.154	-.226	-.373***	-.242*	-.107		-.153	-.178	-.248*
School income	0/0/0	-.008	.010	.008	.037	-.010	.049	.089	-.017		.133	-.035	.097
Average of	2/0/0	.155*	.005	.133	.128	-.060	-.050	.068	.171*		-.079	-.041	-.072

INDEPENDENT	SIG	05-06	06-07	07-08	08-09	09-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	16-17
directors with Upper Secondary													
Average of Directors with graduate education	0/0/0	.025	.133	.149	.031	.167	.164	.183	.072		.048	.024	-.066
ECE classes attached to primary school	4/5/0	-.234*	-.234**	-.203*	-.214*	-.324	-.270**	-.245**	-.147		-.188*	-.213**	-.239**

11.45 *Success rate Grade 6*: The most important factors explaining grade 6 success (appearing four or more times) are:

- the percentage of repetition in Grades 2 to 5 (associated negatively with success of students in Grade 6);
- the percentage of school directors with limited educational qualifications (predominantly 5/6 times associated with lower success of students in Grade 6); and
- the percentage of schools with a toilet (in earlier years associated twice negatively with success in Grade 6 and in later years twice positively with success).

11.46 The variables appearing three times are the average percentage entering Grade 1 at the correct age (associated with higher rates of success in Grade 6) and the percentage of female directors, the average age of directors and the percentage of schools with shifts (but with two positive coefficients and one negative for the first case and vice versa for the second and third, so no valid interpretation). Finally, apart from these seven variables, the only other variables which are statistically significant more than once in the 12 years are the pupil-teacher ratio (associated negatively with success in Grade 6 in the first two years), the percentage of schools with a contract teacher (associated negatively with success in Grade 6) and the disadvantage variable, the percentage of schools with one or more classes with a good roof and the percentage of schools with a blackboard (all three pairs appearing with opposite signs so no valid interpretation).

Table 11.13 Primary education: success rate Grade 6

INDEPENDENT	N SIG	05-06	06-07	07-08	08-09	09-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13/4	14-15	15-16	16-17
Drinking Water Available	1/0/0	.072	.138	.079	.088	-.064	.049	.215*	.053		.154	.148	.123
Toilet facility available	2/2/0	-.061	-.017	.078	-.379**	.107	-.293**	-.134	.091		.095	.195*	.186*
Classified as disadvantaged	1/0/1	-.130	-.052	.176*	-.291***	.168*	-.126	.132	.077		.046	.096	.116
Schools in rural areas	0/0/0	.089	.088	-.009	-.044	-.007	.018	.011	-.124		-.038	.085	-.066
% of Grade 1 at correct age	0/2/1	-.092	.089	.101	.322**	.052	.385***	.143	.181		.251**	-.027	.171
Directors who are women	2/0/1	.061	.114	.167*	-.006	.045	.136*	-.018	-.287***		.033	.021	.104
School Director's age	1/0/2	.132	-.186	-.093	-.062*	.324***	.012	.187	.148		-.001	-.608***	.048
Class with roof	2/0/0	-.090	-.056	-.053	.172*	-.165*	.005	-.020	-.046		-.004	-.039	-.032
% Schools with more than one shift	1/1/1	.189*	-.252**	-.133	-.105	-.035	-.265***	-.131	.038		-.055	.034	.002
Average classrooms with desks	0/0/0	-.012	.100	.235	-.135	-.112	.195	-.047	.059		-.062	.048	-.023
Average classrooms not with chair	0/1/0	-.164	.082	-.102	-.130	.119	.039	.092	-.022		-.089	.033	-.177**
Average classrooms not with blackboard	2/0/0	.124	-.071	-.060	.119	-.343	-.386*	-.090	.313*		-.151	-.070	.000
Average classrooms not with teacher blackboard	0/0/0	.106	-.118	-.206	.003	.379	.289	.074	-.167		.252	.078	.056

INDEPENDENT	N SIG	05-06	06-07	07-08	08-09	09-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13/4	14-15	15-16	16-17
Average parent meetings previous year	0/0/0	-.023	.064	.095	-.103	.128	-.029	-.013	-.045		.033	-.048	.012
Parent teacher ratio primary	0/2/0	-.423**	-.464**	-.198	-.246	-.080	.070	-.063	.089		.157	-.119	-.133
Total primary enrolment	0/0/0	-.094	.000	.044	.005	.024	.128	.083	.101		.018	.034	-.006
Average count of sports where facilities exist	0/0/0	-.097	-.037	-.090	.072	-.068	.017	.017	.011		-.067	-.089	.012
%Teachers with lower secondary + education	0/1/0	.006	.062	-.004	-.207**	.041	.092	.001	-.062		-.049	-.055	-.131
%Teachers without pedagogical training	0/0/0	-.072	-.022	-.066	-.069	-.052	-.011	-.035	-.049		.060	-.033	-.032
%Teachers with special contract	0/2/0	-.220**	-.039	-.001	.074	-.093	-.112	-.141	-.190**		-.133	-.103	-.100
Average primary pupils per class	0/1/0	-.089	.115	.082	.262**	.011	.159	.166	.016		-.139	.125	.137
School income	0/0/0	-.043	.006	.173*	-.045	-.039	-.031	-.076	-.058		-.090	-.028	.077
Average of directors with Upper Secondary	0/6/0	-.206**	-.198**	.095	.249**	-.130	.113	-.019	-.014		-.201**	-.198**	-.194**
Average of Directors with graduate education	0/0/0/	.009	-.008	-.093	-.072	-.004	-.084	-.125	-.083		-.082	.040	-.033
ECE classes attached to primary school	0/0/0	.014	-.032	.132	-.044	.067	-.009	-.012	.088		.116	.123	.106
Repetition grade 2 to 5	3/0/4	-.234*	-.234**	-.203*	-.214*	-.324	-.270**	-.245**	-.147		-.188*	-.213**	-.239**

11.47 **Conclusion for primary:** Table 11.14 below summarises the results. The percentage indicates how often the variable was statistically significant (but not the degree and also not the level of association) and the plus and minus signs show whether the coefficient was positive or negative.

Table 11.14 Summary results across intermediate outcomes – primary education

+ positive association *- negative association* *Percentage shows the percentage of times in years tested that the variable was significant*	Before 2013/14			After 2013/14		
	Correct age entry in grade 1	Grade 1 repetition	Grade 6 success	Correct age entry in grade 1	Grade 1 repetition	Grade 6 success
% schools with drinking water available	+ 50%	+ 13%	+ 13%	+ 100%		
% schools toilet facility available	+ 13%	- 13%	- 25%	+ 33%	- 33%	+ 67%
% schools classified as disadvantaged	- 25%	- 25%	- 38%		- 33%	
% schools in rural areas					+ 33%	
% Correct age entry grade 1	x	+ 38%	+ 25%	x	+ 33%	+ 33%
% Directors who are women			- 38%		+ 33%	
Average School Director's age	+ 63%	- 13%	- 25%		- 33%	- 33%
% classes with roof	+ 13%	- 25%	- and + 25%	+ 33%		
% of schools with more than one shift		- 13%	- 25%	- 100%	- 33%	
Average classrooms not with desks				+ 33%		
Average classrooms not with chair		- 13%				- 33%
Average classrooms not with blackboard		+ 13%	- 25%	- 33%		
Average classrooms not with teacher blackboard	- 13%			- 33%		
Average parent meetings previous year	+ 13%					
Parent teacher ratio primary	- 50%		- 13%			
Total primary enrolment		- 25%				

+ positive association *- negative association* *Percentage shows the percentage of times in years tested that the variable was significant*	Before 2013/14			After 2013/14		
	Correct age entry in grade 1	Grade 1 repetition	Grade 6 success	Correct age entry in grade 1	Grade 1 repetition	Grade 6 success
Average count of sports where facilities exist	+ 13%	- 13%			- 67%	
%Teachers with lower secondary + education		- 13%	- 13%			
%Teachers without pedagogical training		- 25%				
%Teachers with special contract	- 25%		- 13%	- 67%	+ 33%	
Average primary pupils per class		- 25%	+ 13%		- 33%	
School income	- 13%		+ 13%			
Average of directors with Upper Secondary		+ 13%	- and + 25%			- 100%
Average of Directors with graduate education	- 25%					
ECE classes attached to primary school		- 63%		+ 100%	- 100%	
Repetition grade 2 to 6 (only tested for grade 6 success)	x	x	- 63%	x	x	- 100%

11.48 The following conclusions can be drawn:

Important environment factors

- While water is less significant as a source of unequal performance in the second relative to the first period, toilet facilities remained a source driving varying performance. Both are associated with better intermediate outcomes, although for Grade 6 success for earlier years the association was negative.
- Disadvantage was a more significant factor in the earlier relative to the later years, when, amongst other things it was factored into school operating budgets. It remained significant though for Grade 1 repetition in one of the three years of the later period.

School factors

- In both periods the higher the correct age entry, the higher the repetition, but also the higher the Grade 6 success rate. This can be explained by lower over-age enrolment meaning less pressure to promote children.
- Whether schools have a roof was more important in the earlier period than the later period, suggesting that it has diminished as a source of unequal performance between districts.
- The percentage of schools with more than one shift became significant more often in the second period, specifically for correct age Grade 1 entry. This suggests that school size and teacher deployment relative to demand became more important in the second period.
- For teaching facility factors, the data suggest that in the second period the presence of blackboards no longer was significant in explaining variance, except for correct age Grade 1 entry.
- Interestingly, more sports teams are associated more often in the second year with lower repetition rates.
- Teachers with lower secondary education became less of a factor in the second than the first period, but whether teachers on special contract are deployed remained significant often, associated with lower Grade 1 entry in both periods (lower access) and higher repetition in the second period (more inefficiency), but no longer with lower Grade 6 success in this period.
- The average school director age emerged as significant in both the pre-break and post-break period, associated with higher Grade 6 success rates, but with lower repetition rates.
- The coefficient for whether directors qualifications matter is relevant in all of the years of the second period for Grade 6 success. This is related to fewer directors only having upper secondary education than in the earlier years, and its becoming a driver of variance.
- Similarly, as more ECE classes were built, the more this emerged in the later years as a significant variable, but as yet only for correct-age Grade 1 entry and Grade 1 repetition.

- And a higher repetition rate is associated often in both periods with lower Grade 6 success.

Secondary education outcomes

11.49 *District lower secondary correct age entry in Grade 7*: The most important factors (appearing four or more times) are:

- the percentage of schools in urban areas (with those in urban areas having a higher percentage entering schools at the correct age);
- the average age of school directors (where those with older directors had a higher percentage entering at the correct age);
- the overall level of enrolment in lower secondary (the higher the enrolment, the higher the percentage entering at the correct age);
- the percentage of schools with shifts (associated with a higher percentage entering at the correct age); and
- the percentage of schools with one or more classrooms without a good roof (associated with a higher percentage of students entering at the correct age).

11.50 The variables appearing three times were the percentage of schools in the district with access to drinking water (associated with an increasing percentage of students entering Grade 7 at the correct age) and the percentage of female directors (associated negatively with the proportion of students entering Grade 7 at the correct age). Finally, apart from these seven variables, the only other variables which are statistically significant more than once in the 12 years are percentage of schools with a toilet (associated negatively with the proportion of students entering Grade 7 at the correct age), the percentage of schools with desks, the percentage of schools with a teacher blackboard, the percentage of teachers without training and the percentage of contract teachers (all four associated positively with the proportion of students entering at the correct age), and the percentage of disadvantaged schools (but with the coefficients having opposite signs so no valid interpretation).

Table 11.15 Secondary education: correct-age entry in Grade 7

INDEPENDENT	N SIG	05-06	06-07	07-08	08-09	09-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	16-17
Drinking Water Available	3/0/0	.009	.030	.062	.035	.113*	.131*	.079	.020		.075	.125*	.101
Toilet facility available	1/1/0	-.046	-.040	-.060	-.105	-.109*	-.165**	-.084	.007		.099	.117	.124
Schools in rural areas	1/2/8	-.206*	-.316***	-.242***	-.190**	-.277***	-.199***	-.248***	-.284***		-.200**	-.374***	-.257***
Directors who are women	2/0/1	-.053	.013	-.060	.086	.024	-.188***	-.115*	-.040		.013	-.127*	-.105
School Director's age	1/1/7	.232*	.270**	.297***	.376***	.407***	.490***	.395***	.543***		.484***	-.051	.066
Class with roof	3/1/0	.027	.154*	.143*	.235**	.040	.108	.122	.091		.046	.154*	.147*
% of schools with more than one shift	2/1/2	.018	.046	.138*	.212***	.197***	.169**	.131*	.028		-.052	-.039	-.027
Average classrooms not with desks	1/1/0	.011	-.112	-.125	-.066	.196	.225	.276*	.077		.306**	-.131	.175
Average classrooms not with chair	0/0/0	-.141	-.144	-.109	-.053	.061	-.073	-.030	-.059		.026	-.103	-.069
Average classrooms not with blackboard	1/0/0	-.043	.042	-.046	.007	-.088	-.436*	-.244	.179		-.188	.103	.101
Average classrooms not with teacher blackboard	1/0/1	.136	.197*	.355***	.001	-.179	.309	.055	-.239		-.071	.082	-.194
Classified as disadvantaged	1/0/1	.301***	.050	-.058	-.048	.056	.023	.010	-.006		.041	-.041	-.179*
Average parent	0/0/0	-.014	-.002	-.048	-.026	-.068	-.063	-.070	-.043		-.146	-.066	-.125

INDEPENDENT	N SIG	05-06	06-07	07-08	08-09	09-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	16-17
meetings previous year													
Pupil teacher ratio lower secondary	0/0/0	.011	-.040	.013	-.054	-.153	-.086	-.013	-.099		-.060	-.021	.024
Total Lower Secondary Enrolment	4/2/2	.253**	.158*	.170*	.041	.128*	.179**	.100	.143*		.143	.385***	.412***
Average count of sports where facilities exist	1/0/0	.078	-.063	.089	.148*	.081	.012	.100	-.087		-.088	-.104	-.050
%Teachers with lower secondary + education	1/0/0	-.082	-.046	-.121*	-.080	-.083	.006	-.026	.020		.063	-.060	-.068
%Teachers without pedagogical training	2/0/0	-.061	.148*	.028	.057	.041	-.035	-.007	-.083		-.109	.035	.141*
%Teachers with special contract	0/1/1	-.042	.196**	-.006	.302***	-.006	.054	.056	-.067		-.003	.020	.032
Average of directors with upper secondary	0/0/0	.020	-.069		-.072	-.053	.015	-.007	-.019		-.059	.019	.000
Average of directors with graduate education	1/0/0	-.178*	-.132	-.030	.004	.004	.020	.026	.010		.108	.071	-.025
Average of lower secondary pupils per class	??	-.066	.051	-.025	-.005							-.030	-.039

11.51 *Repetition rate Grade 7:* There are no factors appearing four or more times. The variables appearing three times are location (with urban schools having higher levels of repetition in Grade 7) and the percentage entering Grade 7 at the correct age (associated with higher rates of repetition). Apart from these two, the only other variables which are statistically significant more than once in the 12 years are the number of shifts and the Level of lower secondary enrolment (both associated with higher rates of repeaters in Grade 7).

Table 11.16 Secondary education: repetition rate Grade 7

INDEPENDENT	N SIG	05-06	07-08	08-09	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	16-17
Drinking Water Available	1/0/0	-.055	-.098	-.035	.058	-.130	-.115		-.143*	-.102	-.028
Toilet facility available	1/0/0	.167	.085	-.175	.064	-.104	-.040		.023	.194*	-.106
Schools in rural areas	1/2/0	-.141	-.138	-.150	.018	-.126	-.256**		-.216*	-.240**	-.121
Correct age entry grade 7	2/1/0	.109	.243*	.012	.223	.298	.078		.196*	.144	.266**
Directors who are women	0/1/0	.004	-.062	-.068	.076	-.001	-.195**		-.035	.137	.106
School Director's age	0/0/0	-.011	.012	.221	-.176	-.180	-.001		.068	-.048	-.044
Class with roof	0/0/0	.075	-.190*	.101	.063	-.026	-.091		.062	-.147	-.121
% of schools with more than one shift	0/1/1	.098	.011	-.007	.255**	.118	.268***		.085	.133	.037
Average classrooms not with desks	0/1/0	.008	-.108	.065	-.157	-.173	-.343**		.217	-.121	.021
Average classrooms not with chair	0/1/0	-.094	.018	-.244	.046	.035	-.097		.097	.087	.247**
Average classrooms not with blackboard	1/0/0	-.145	-.228*	.208	-.061	-.052	.054		-.089	.046	-.174
Average classrooms not with teacher blackboard	0/0/1	.212	.455***	-.102	.148	.183	.313		-.204	-.067	-.007
Classified as disadvantaged	0/0/0/	.014	.060	-.054	.056	.062	.075		.132	.074	-.063
Average parent meetings	0/0/0	-.170	-.078	-.075	.008	.045	-.065		-.038	-.048	-.109

INDEPENDENT	N SIG	05-06	07-08	08-09	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	16-17
previous year											
Pupil teacher ratio lower secondary	0/0/0	.025	.010	.005	-.166	-.136	-.254		-.006	.185	.184
Total Lower Secondary Enrolment	1/1/0	.002	-.027	.003	.317**	.248	.160		.187*	.159	.087
Average count of sports where facilities exist	0/0/0	-.098	-.069	-.007	.012	.031	-.088		.082	.071	-.014
%Teachers with lower secondary + education	0/0/0	.149	.056	-.055	.050	.046	.161		-.019	.069	.092
%Teachers without pedagogical training	0/0/0	.001	-.045	-.033	.060	-.021	-.074		-.024	.075	-.078
%Teachers with special contract	0/0/0	.027	-.020	-.010	-.007		.057			-.029	.002
Average of directors with upper secondary	1/0/0	-.080	-.016	-.071		.167*	-.036		.021	.021	.063
Average of directors with graduate education	0/0/0	-.035	.144	-.045	.041	.005	.263		-.060	.075	.097
Average of lower secondary pupils per class	1/0/0	-.092		.146	.086	.096			-.077	-.248*	-.106

11.52 **Conclusion for lower secondary:** Table 11.17 below summarises the results. The percentage indicates the percentage times the variable was statistically significant (but not the degree and also not the level of association) and the plus and minus signs whether the coefficient was positive or negative.

Table 11.17 Summary results across intermediate outcomes – lower secondary education

+ positive association - negative association Percentage shows the percentage of times in years tested that the variable was significant	Before 2013/14		After 2013/14	
	Grade 7 correct age entry	Grade 7 repetition	Grade 7 correct age entry	Grade 7 repetition
Drinking Water Available	+ 25%		+ 33%	- 33%
Toilet facility available	- 25%			+ 33%
Schools in rural areas	- 88%	- 17%	- 100%	- 67%
Directors who are women	- 25%	- 17%	- 33%	
Correct-age entry grade 7	x	+ 17%	X	+ 67%
School Director's age	+ 88%		+ 33%	
Class with roof	+ 38%	- 17%	+ 67%	
% of schools with more than one shift	+ 63%	+ 33%		
Average classrooms not with desks	+ 13%	- 17%	+ 33%	
Average classrooms not with chair				+ 33%
Average classrooms not with blackboard	- 13%	- 17%		
Average classrooms not with teacher blackboard	+ 25%	+ 17%		
Classified as disadvantaged			- 33%	
Average parent meetings previous year				
Pupil teacher ratio lower secondary				
Total Lower Secondary Enrolment	+ 63%	+ 17%	+ 67%	+ 33%
Average count of sports where facilities exist	+ 13%			
%Teachers with lower secondary + education	- 13%			
%Teachers without pedagogical training	+ 13%		+ 33%	
%Teachers with special contract	+ 25%			
Average of directors with upper secondary		+ 17%		
Average of directors with graduate education				
Average of lower secondary pupils per class				- 33%

11.53 The following conclusions can be drawn:

- Fewer variables overall are significant for Grade 7 correct age entry and Grade 7 repetition in the second period compared to the first. This suggests that fewer variables are sources of variance in the second compared to the first period.
- Few variables are significant (even if with a low coefficient and low significance) often, in either period. More frequent significance is signalled by a higher percentage value.
- Whether schools are in rural areas, is a significant determinant of access in both periods. However, the more rural the school, the lower the repetition rate in both periods.
- Similar to primary school, higher correct age entry is associated with higher repetition rates, more often in the second than the first period.
- Schools with more than one shift, is associated with higher correct age entry and higher repetition in the early period, but this is not significant in the second period.
- As can be expected, total enrolment was significant often for correct age entry in both periods.

Gender parity indexes

11.54 A final part of the econometric and data analysis was calculating gender parity indexes for each of the outcome variables in primary and secondary. These are reflected in Table 11.18 below.

11.55 In primary, there has not been much change in the gender parity indexes for the percentage at the correct age in Grade 1 and only a very slight increase in the Gender Parity index for those successful at Grade 6 over the 12 years. However, there has been a substantial change in the gender parity index for repeaters in Grade 1, with girls increasing from 0.853 to 1.117 (when the indicator is reversed to mean girls not repeating versus boys not repeating).

11.56 In secondary, the gender parity index for entering Grade 7 at correct age in the first three years (2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08) started at an average of 1.32 and during the last three years (2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-1017) was slightly lower at an average of 1.27, indicating that boys were faring slightly better relative to girls in the second period, reducing the gap.

11.57 In contrast, the gender parity index of the percent of repeaters in Grade 7 in the first three years (2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08) started at an average of 0.48 and during the last three years (2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-1017) was lower at an average of 0.45. When this is reversed it shows that girls repeat more than two times less often than boys.

Table 11.18 Gender parity indices in primary and secondary 2005-06 to 2016-17

	05-06	06-07	07-08	08-09	09-10	10-11	11-12	12-13	13-14	14-15	15-16	16-17
Primary education												
PCT Correct Age in Grade 1	1.030	1.147	1.113	1.104	1.136	1.075	1.094	1.119		1.112	1.098	1.095
PCT repeaters in Grade 1	1.173	1.115	1.114	1.110	1.052	1.076	1.032	0.9948		0.924	0.927	0.895
Inverse of Repeaters in Grade 1	0.853	0.900	0.898	0.901	0.951	0.929	0.969	1.005		1.082	1.079	1.117
PCT successful in Grade 6	1.039	1.039	1.056	1.080	1.074	1.075	1.093	1.059		1.103	1.104	1.106
Lower secondary education												
G7 Correct Age	1.28	1.35	1.34	1.42	1.40	1.39	1.41	1.34	1.33	1.31	1.26	1.25
G7 repeaters	0.48	0.47	0.51	0.51	0.57	0.49	0.50	0.44	0.48	0.44	0.42	0.45
Inverse of G7 Repeaters	2.08	2.13	1.96	1.96	1.75	2.04	2.00	2.27	2.08	2.27	2.38	2.22

Annexure 1: Interrupted time series

Step 1: is an interrupted time series design appropriate?

The first decision when considering an interrupted time series (ITS) is whether it is an appropriate design for the particular evaluation in question. This depends on the nature of both the intervention and the outcome of interest, as well as the type of data available.

The intervention

ITS requires a clear differentiation of the pre-intervention period and the post-intervention period. In some evaluations it may be difficult to define when the intervention began and to differentiate the effects of different components. This does not necessarily require the intervention to be introduced overnight but the period of implementation should be well defined so that it can be considered separately.

The outcome

Outcomes may take various forms such as counts, continuous data or binary variables. ITS works best with short-term outcomes that are expected to change either relatively quickly after an intervention is implemented or after a clearly defined lag.

Data requirements

Sequential measures of the outcome should be available both before and after the intervention. There are no fixed limits regarding the number of data points, as the power depends on various other factors including distribution of data points before and after the intervention, variability within the data, strength of effect, and the presence of confounding effects such as seasonality. Power increases with the number of time points, but it is not always preferable to have more data points where historical trends have changed substantially, as this would not provide an accurate depiction of the current underlying trends. It is therefore recommended that pre-intervention data are inspected visually. Power is also increased if the numbers of data points are equally distributed before and after the intervention, though this is often not practical. Given the requirement for a relatively long time series, routine data are often most appropriate in ITS studies. As with all study designs, it is important to assess the quality of the data in terms of their validity and reliability. With routine data it is especially important to understand the potential impact of changes to data collection or recording, particularly when these coincide with the implementation of the intervention, as this could bias results.

In an ITS study, a time series of a particular outcome of interest is used to establish an underlying trend, which is ‘interrupted’ by an intervention at a known point in time. The hypothetical scenario under which the intervention has not taken place and the trend continues unchanged (that is: the ‘expected’ trend, in the absence of the intervention, given the pre-existing trend) is referred to as the ‘counterfactual’. This counterfactual scenario provides a comparison for the evaluation of the impact of the intervention by examining any change occurring in the post-intervention period.

Step 2: proposing the impact model

Once an ITS design is chosen, the next step is to hypothesize how the intervention would impact on the outcome if it were effective, in particular whether the change will be a gradual change in the gradient of the trend, a change in the level, or both, and whether the change will follow the intervention immediately or there will be a lag period before any effect is expected. Examples of some possible impact models are illustrated in Figure 11.1. It is important that this decision is made a priori based on existing literature and knowledge of the intervention and the mechanism by which it is expected to act on the outcome. Where existing knowledge of the intervention is limited, selecting the most appropriate impact model can be difficult and may require exploratory analysis of alternative data. Relying on the outcome data to select the best impact model is discouraged as this increases the likelihood of an effect being detected due to random fluctuations or chance, and consequent artefactual conclusions on the effect of the intervention.

Figure 11.1 Possible impact models



Step 3 Regression Analysis

A minimum of three variables are required for an ITS analysis:

- *T:* the time elapsed since the start of the study in with the unit representing the frequency with which observations are taken (e.g. month or year);
- *Xt* : a dummy variable indicating the pre-intervention period (coded 0) or the post-intervention period (coded 1);
- *Yt*:: the outcome at time *t*.

In standard ITS analyses, the following segmented regression model is used:

$$Yt=\beta 0 +\beta 1T+\beta 2Xt + \beta 3TXt$$

where β0 represents the baseline level at T = 0, β1 is interpreted as the change in outcome associated with a time unit increase (representing the underlying pre-intervention trend), β2 is the level change following the intervention and β3 indicates the slope change following the intervention (using the interaction between time and intervention: TXt). The regression model above represents the impact model (c) Figure 11.1; models (a) and (b) can easily be specified by excluding the terms β3TXt or β2 Xt , respectively. Impact models (d)-(f) require slightly more complex variable specifications.[32]

[32] James Lopez Bernal , Steven Cummins , Antonio Gasparrini (2016) **Interrupted time series regression for the evaluation of public health interventions: a tutorial,** Int J Epidemiol dyw098.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ije/dyw098, 08 June 2016

Annex 12 Bibliography

Works cited in Volume I

ADB and ILO, 2015, *Cambodia, addressing the skills gap, employment diagnostics study*, Asian Development Bank.

A Bouguen, D Filmer, K Macours, S Naudeau, 2013, *Impact Evaluation of Three Types of Early Childhood Development Interventions in Cambodia*. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6540, World Bank.

D. Brent Edwards, T Zimmerman, T, C Sitha, J Williams, and Y Kitamura, 2016, The Complexity of Continuation, in Y Kita Mura, D Brent Edwards, C Sitha and J Williams *The Political Economy of Schooling in Cambodia, Issues of Quality and Equity*, Palgrave Macmillan

Cambodia National Institute of Statistics, 2014, 2012 Cambodia Socio Economic Survey

E. Chanboreth, S. Hach, 2008, *Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia*, Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Papers Series no 7, Wolfensohn Center for Development.

E Combaz and C Mcloughlin, 2014, *Voice, Empowerment and Accountability*, Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

B. Dressel, B. & J. Brumby, 2009, *Enhancing capabilities of central finance agencies: From diagnosis to action*. World Bank.

EEAS, 2016, Cambodia and the EU.

European Commission, 2002, National Indicative Programme 2002-2004;

European Commission, 2005, National Indicative Programme 2005-2006;

European Commission, 2010, Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-2013;

European Commission, 2012, Budget Support Guidelines, p13

European Commission, 2014, Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2020

Global Partnership, 2017, *Data by Country 2016 Monitoring Round*, Global Partnership for Development Cooperation, http://effectivecooperation.org/monitoring-country-progress/explore-monitoring-data/, accessed 10 November 2017.

H. Jones, 2011. *A guide to monitoring and evaluating policy influence*. London, ODI.

T. Kelsall, Khieng Sothy, Chuong Chantha and Tieng Tek Muy, 2016, *The political economy of primary education reform in Cambodia*, ESID Working Paper No 58. Effective States and Inclusive Development.

B. Leo and J. Barmeier, 2010, *Who are the MDG Trailblazers?* Center for Global Development, Working Paper 222.

S. Lister, L. Bjørnestad, R. Carter, M. Chiche and D. Ross D, 2011, *Aid Predictability – Synthesis of Lessons and Good Practices*, Volume 1 of a Study Prepared for the DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness – Task Team on Transparency and Predictability.

OBI, 2018, Cambodia Country Results, https://www.internationalbudget.org/open-budget-survey/results-by-country/country-info/?country=kh

OECD DAC, 2012, *Evaluating Budget Support – Methodological Approach,* OECD DAC Network on Development Evaluation

OECD DAC, 2017, Creditor Reporting System, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1, accessed 15 November 2017

OPHI, 2013, *Country Briefing: Cambodia. Multidimensional Poverty Index Data Bank.* University of Oxford: Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI). 2013..

G. Poyck, 2012, Mid-Term review of the EU-Cambodia Education Sector Policy Support Programme 2011-2013. Final Report.

D. Quinn, 2014, EC Sector Budget Support to Basic Education in Cambodia 2008-10, Final Programme Report

Royal Government of Cambodia, 2007, Law on Education

Royal Government of Cambodia, 2009, *National Strategic Development Plan 2009-2014*

Royal Government of Cambodia-MoEYS, 2009, Education Strategic Plan 2009-2013

Royal Government of Cambodia-MoEYS, 2010, *Education Strategic Plan 2009-2013.* Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, September 2010.

Royal Government of Cambodia, 2013, *Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency Phase III*

Royal Government of Cambodia, 2014a, *Education Strategic Plan 2014–2018.* Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, March 2014

Royal Government of Cambodia-MoEYS, 2016, *Mid-Term Review Report in 2016 of the Education Strategic Plan 2014-2018 and Projection to 2020, Cambodia Ministry* of Education, Youth and Sport, November 2016.

Royal Government of Cambodia-MoEYS, 2016b*, The 2016 Education Congress Report,* MoEYS, Phnom Penh.

Royal Government of Cambodia-MoEYS, 2016c, Results of Grade Eight Student Achievement from the National Assessment in 2014.

Royal Government of Cambodia-MoEYS, 2016d, Results of Grade Three Student Achievement from the National Assessment in 2015

Royal Government of Cambodia-MoEYS, 2016e, *Education Statistics and Indicators Private Schools 2015/16.*

Royal Government of Cambodia-MoEYS, 2017, Results of Grade Six Student Achievement from the National Assessment in 2016.

C. Sitha, D. Brent Edwards, J. Williams and Y. Kitamure, Introduction in Y Kita Mura, D. Brent Edwards, C. Sitha and J. Williams *The Political Economy of Schooling in Cambodia, Issues of Quality and Equity*, Palgrave Macmillan.

Ang Sopha, 2015, *Teaching hours in primary schools in Cambodia*, NEP, 2015.

UN, 2015, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, custom data acquired via website, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Cf Volume 2, Annex 10 Figure 10.1.

UNESCO, 2010, UNESCO National Education Support Strategy, Cambodia

UNESCO, 2015, *Education for All 2015 National Review Report: Cambodia*

UNESCO, 2016, *Cambodia Rapid Education Sector Analysis*, International Institute for Educational Planning, UNESCO

UNESCO, 2017, Global Education Monitoring Report Statistical Tables, http://en.unesco.org/gem-report/node/6

UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2017, Cambodia Country Profile, online database accessed 18 May 2017

UNICEF, 2015, *CDPF Final Phase One Progress Report*, UNICEF Cambodia

World Bank, 2011, *Cambodia: More Efficient Government Spending for Strong and Inclusive Growth, Integrated Fiduciary Assessment and Public Expenditure Review (IFAPER),* World Bank Report No. 61694-KH, November 30, 2011

World Bank, 2017, *Cambodia Economic Update*, World Bank

World Bank, 2017, *Cambodia Education Sector: Public Expenditure Tracking and Quality of Service Delivery Survey*, World Bank

World Bank, 2017, *World Bank Development Indicators data extract*

World Bank, forthcoming. Increasing Education Expenditure while expanding government stewardship, Public Expenditure Review Discussion Paper, World Bank

World Governance Indicators, 2017, Complete dataset, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home, accessed 17 November 2014

Works consulted

Short reference	Full reference
ADB, 2011	*Cambodia, Education Sector Development, Project Number 33396,* Asian Development Bank, August 2011,
ADB, 2012	*Cambodia: Second Education Sector Development Program ,ADB Completion Report, Project Number: 34388, Loan Numbers: 2121-CAM and 2122-CAM,* Asian Development Bank, June 2012
ADB, 2013	*Loan Agreement (Third Education Sector Development Program), between Kingdom of Cambodia and Asian Development Bank,* Asian Development Bank 17 January 2013.
ADB, 2014a	*Cambodia 2014–2018, ADB Country Partnership Strategy,* Asian Development Bank, November 2014.
ADB, 2014b	*Cambodia: Country Poverty Analysis 2014,* Asian Development Bank, 2014.
ADB, 2015	*Cambodia: Third Education Sector Development Program (Second Tranche), ADP Progress Report on Tranche Release, Project Number: 43260-013, Loan Number: 2888,* Asian Development Bank, October 2015.
ADB and ILO, 2015	*Cambodia, addressing the skills gap, employment diagnostics study.* ADB and ILO. Asian Development Bank, 2015.
Ang, 2015	*Teaching hours in primary schools in Cambodia,* Ang Sopha, NEP, 2015.
Boonstoppel, 2015	*Education Capacity Development Partnership Fund (CDPF) International Technical Adviser to Support the Sub-National Democratic Development Reform in the Education Sector: Final Report.* B. Boonstoppel, UNICEF, January 2015.
Bouguen et al, 2013	*Impact Evaluation of Three Types of Early Childhood Development Interventions in Cambodia.* A Bouguen, D Filmer, K Macours, S Naudeau. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6540, World Bank, 2013.
Bray et al., 2016	*The internal dynamics of privatised public education: Fee-charging supplementary tutoring provided by teachers in Cambodia*. M. Bray, M. N. Kobakhidze, J. Liu and W. Zhang. International Journal of Educational Development 49 (2016) 291–299.
Cambodia NIS, 2014	*2012 Cambodia Socio Economic Survey*, NIS, Phnom Penh
CDC, 2016	*The Cambodia ODA Database,* Reporting Year 2016, odacambodia.com, Accessed 3 March 2017
CDRI, 2011	*Fiscal Decentralisation a Review of Progress and challenges,* CDRI Working Paper Series No. 50, 2011
Chanboreth and Hach, 2008	*Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia*, E Chanboreth, S Hach, Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Papers Series no 7, Wolfensohn Center for Development, 2008.
CPDF, 2016	*Education Capacity Development Fund Progress Report*, February 2016

Short reference	Full reference
EC 2005	*National Indicative Programme 2005-2006*
EC BSP 2011-2013	*Programme document, Financial Agreement, Action Fiches and Riders; All assessment and payment documentation*
Specifically, for 2011 Tranche Assessment and Disbursement	
EC-BSP 2011a	HOD Cover letter
EC-BSP 2011b	Annex 1. Routing slip
EC-BSP 2011c	Annex 2. Checklist
EC-BSP 2011d	Annex 3. CRIS print-out
EC-BSP 2011e	Annex 4. Disbursement decision
EC-BSP 2011f	Annex 5. MoEYS Request letter
EC-BSP 2011g	Annex 6. Summary Assessment Report
EC-BSP 2011h	Annex 7. Delegation Education Report
EC-BSP 2011i	Annex 8. 2011 Congress Report
EC-BSP 2011j	Annex 9. 2011 Delegation Macro Report
EC-BSP 2011k	Annex 10 2010 IMF Article IV Report
EC-BSP 2011l	Annex 11 MoEF Macro Report
EC-BSP 2011m	Annex 12 Delegation PFM Report
EC-BSP 2011n	Annex 13 MoEF PFM Report
EC-BSP 2011o	Annex 14 MoEF Report on PFM catalyst measures
EC-BSP 2011p	Annex 17 Bank Account Confirmation
EC-BSP 2011q	Disbursement letter on the 1st base and performance tranches of the ESPSP, sent 11 December 2011
Specifically for 2012 Tranche Assessment and Disbursement	
EC-BSP 2012a	HOD Cover letter
EC-BSP 2012b	Annex 1. Routing slip
EC-BSP 2012c	Annex 2. Checklist
EC-BSP 2012d	Annex 3. CRIS print-out
EC-BSP 2012e	Annex 4. Disbursement decision
EC-BSP 2012f	Annex 5. Minutes of ESPS Technical meetings
EC-BSP 2012g	Annex 6. MoEYS Request letter
EC-BSP 2012h	Annex 7. Summary Assessment Report
EC-BSP 2012i	Annex 8. Delegation Education Report

Short reference	Full reference
EC-BSP 2012j	Annex 9. 2012 Delegation Macro Report
EC-BSP 2012k	Annex 10. Delegation PFM Report
EC-BSP 2012l	Annex 11 2012 Congress Full and Summary Reports
EC-BSP 2012m	Annex 12 Draft ESP Mid-term review report
EC-BSP 2012n	Annex 13 2011 IMF Article IV Report
EC-BSP 2012o	Annex 14 MoEF Macro Report
EC-BSP 2012p	Annex 15 MoEF PFM Report
EC-BSP 2012q	Annex 16 Receipt and exchange rate for BT1 and PT1
Specifically, for the 2013 Initial Tranche Assessment and Disbursements	
EC-BSP 2013a	HOD Cover letter
EC-BSP 2013b	Annex 1. Routing slip
EC-BSP 2013c	Annex 2. Checklist
EC-BSP 2013d	Annex 3. Explanatory Note
EC-BSP 2013e	Annex 4. CRIS print-out
EC-BSP 2013f	Annex 5. Disbursement decision
EC-BSP 2013g	Annex 5. Minutes of ESPS Technical meetings
EC-BSP 2013h	Annex 6. MoEYS Request letter
EC-BSP 2013i	Annex 7. MoEF Letters
EC-BSP 2013j	Annex 8. Minutes of the 2013 Technical review meetings
EC-BSP 2013k	Annex 9. Summary Assessment Report
EC-BSP 2013l	Annex 10. ESP Assessment Report
EC-BSP 2013m	Annex 11. Macro-economic assessment report
EC-BSP 2013n	Annex 12. PFM Assessment Report
EC-BSP 2013o	Annex 13 Risk Management Framework
EC-BSP 2013p	Annex 14 ESPSP Assessment Report
EC-BSP 2013q	Annex 15 2013 Congress Full and Summary Reports
EC-BSP 2013r	Annex 16 Draft ESP 2014-2018
EC-BSP 2013s	Annex 17 2011 IMF Article IV Report
EC-BSP 2013t	Annex 18 MoEF Macro Report
EC-BSP 2013u	Annex 19 MoEF PFM Report
EC-BSP 2013v	Annex 20 Receipt and exchange rate for BT1 and PT1

Short reference	Full reference
EC BSP 2014-2017	*Programme document, Financial Agreement, Action Fiches and Riders; All assessment and payment documentation*
EC BSCP 2013w	*Transmission letter on deposit of payment amount, from EUD to MoEYS, 23 July 2014*
Specifically, for the 2014 Tranche Assessment and Disbursement	
EC-BSP 2014a	Annex 1. Routing Slip
EC-BSP 2014b	Annex 2. Check list
EC-BSP 2014c	Annex 3. Note to File
EC-BSP 2014d	Annex 4. CRIS Print-out
EC-BSP 2014e	Annex 5. Disbursement December
EC-BSP 2014f	Annex 6. MOEF Request letter
EC-BSP 2014g	Annex 7. MOEF Letter Confirmation of General Conditions
EC-BSP 2014h	Annex 8.1 Minutes of the ESPS and ESRP Technical Review meeting
EC-BSP 2014i	Annex 8.2 Minutes of the Annual ESRP meeting
EC-BSP 2014j	Annex 9. Assessment Summary
EC-BSP 2014k	Annex 10. ESP Assessment
EC-BSP 2014l	Annex 11. Macro Assessment
EC-BSP 2014m	Annex 12. PFM Assessment
EC-BSP 2014n	Annex 13. Budget Transparency Report
EC-BSP 2014o	Annex 14. ESRP Variable Tranche assessment
EC-BSP 2014p	Annex 15A and 15B Summary and Main Education Congress Report
EC-BSP 2014q	Annex 16. Priorities for the Education Sector Reform
EC-BSP 2014r	Annex 17. Final ESP 2014-2018
EC-BSP 2014s	Annex 18. Economic Performance Assessment Report
EC-BSP 2014t	Annex 19. Report on the Performance of the Financial Management Reform Programme
EC-BSP 2014u	Annex 20. MOEF Letter 30 December 2014
EC-BSP 2014v	Annex 21. Confirmation of bank Account
EC-BSP 2014w	Annex 22. MOEF Letter 17 December 2014
EC-BSP 2014x	Annex 23. Last payment exchange rate
EC-BSP 2014y	Annex 25 Draft Note on Reduced Payment
EC-BSP 2014z	Transmission letter for disbursement of the tranche, dated 20 April 2015

Short reference	Full reference
Specifically, for the 2015 Tranche Assessment and Disbursement	
EC-BSP 2015a	HOD Cover Note
EC-BSP 2015b	Annex 1. Routing Slip
EC-BSP 2015c	Annex 2. Check list
EC-BSP 2015d	Annex 3. Note to File
EC-BSP 2015e	Annex 4. CRIS Print-out
EC-BSP 2015f	Annex 5. Disbursement December
EC-BSP 2015g	Annex 6. MOEF Request letter
EC-BSP 2015h	Annex 7.1 MOEF Letter 2 December 2015
EC-BSP 2015i	Annex 7.2 MOEF Letter 2 March 2016
EC-BSP 2015j	Annex 8.1 Minutes of the ESRP meeting
EC-BSP 2015k	Annex 8.2 Minutes of the Annual ESRP meeting
EC-BSP 2015l	Annex 9. Assessment Summary
EC-BSP 2015m	Annex 10. ESP Assessment
EC-BSP 2015n	Annex 11. Macro Assessment
EC-BSP 2015o	Annex 12.1 PFM Assessment
EC-BSP 2015p	Annex 12.2 December PFM Assessment update
EC-BSP 2015q	Annex 13. Budget Transparency Report
EC-BSP 2015r	Annex 14. ESRP Variable Tranche assessment
EC-BSP 2015s	Annex 15. Policy Dialogue in Education
EC-BSP 2015t	Annex 18. Economic Performance Report MOEF
EC-BSP 2015u	Annex 16. Priorities for the Education Sector Reform
EC-BSP 2015v	Annex 18. Final ESP 2014-2018
EC-BSP 2015w	Annex 19 and 19.1 and 19.2 Reports on the Performance of the Financial Management Reform Programme
EC-BSP 2015x	Annex 20. Budget Transparency Statement
EC-BSP 2015y	Annex 21. Article IV Mission Report October 2015
EC-BSP 2015z	Annex 22. Cambodia PEFA Assessment
EC-BSP 2015aa	Annex 23 OBS 2015
EC-BSP 2015ab	Annex 24. Confirmation of exchange rate on last payment

Short reference	Full reference
Specifically, for the 2016 Tranche Assessment and Disbursement	
EC-BSP 2016a	Note on transmission of the Budget Support Payment File
EC-BSP 2016b	Annex 3 Note to File
EC-BSP 2016c	Annex 4 CRIS print out
EC-BSP 2016d	Annex 5. Disbursement decision
EC-BSP 2016e	Annex 6. MOEF Request letter
EC-BSP 2016f	Annex 7.1 EUD Clarification letter 20 December 2016
EC-BSP 2016g	Annex 7.2 MOEF Letter 1 February 2017
EC-BSP 2016h	Annex 8. Minutes of the Annual ESRP Review Meeting
EC-BSP 2016i	Annex 9. Assessment Summary Report
EC-BSP 2016j	Annex 10. ESP Assessment
EC-BSP 2016k	Annex 11. Macro-economic Assessment
EC-BSP 2016l	Annex 12 and Annex 12.1 PFM Assessment Report and Update Report
EC-BSP 2016m	Annex 13.1 Budget Transparency Assessment
EC-BSP 2016n	Annex 13.2 Appendix to the Budget Transparency Assessment
EC-BSP 2016o	Annex 14 ESRP Variable Tranche Assessment
EC-BSP 2016p	Annex 15.1 and 15.2 Policy Dialogue in Education
EC-BSP 2016q	Annex 16. Education Congress Report
EC-BSP 2016r	Annex 17. Macro Economic Report MOEF
EC-BSP 2016s	Annex 18 PFM Progress Report MOEF
EC-BSP 2016t	Annex 19. Budget Transparency Report
EC-BSP 2016u	Annex 20. Economic Advisory Panel final Report
EC-BSP 2016v	Annex 21. Article IV Mission Report 2016
EC-BSP 2016w	Annex 24 Confirming receipt of last payment
EC-BSP 2016x	Annex 25. Confirmation of exchange rate of last payment
EC-BSP 2016y	Disbursement letter on third fixed and variable tranches
EC et al, 2015	*Joint Evaluation of Budget Support to Uganda, Final Report,* Evaluation jointly managed by the European Commission (DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit) and the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) with the Government of Uganda (Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development, and Office of the Prime Minister), Ireland (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) and the UK (DFID), May 2015.
EC MIP, 2011	*EU Identification mission* – MIP 2011-2013, Feb 2011

Short reference	Full reference
EC PFMRP	*Programme document, Action Fiches; All assessment and payment documentation*
EC, 2002	*National Indicative Programme 2002-2004*
EC, 2007	*Cambodia-European Community Strategy Paper 2007-2013*. European Commission
EC, 2010	*Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-2013 Cambodia*, European Commission undated
EC, 2011	*Action Fiche, Education Sector Policy Support Programme 2011/13* *DCI-ASIE/2010/020-438, Annexes,* European Commission, undated
EC, 2011b	*Annex 1, Description of the Action for the Capacity Development Partnership Fund no 2011 276-639*
EC, 2012	*Budget Support Guidelines: Programming, Design and Management. A modern approach to Budget support.* Tools and Methods Series. Working document. EuropeAid Development and Cooperation Directorate-General, European Commission. Brussels, September 2012
EC, 2014a	*Action Document for EU-Cambodia Education Sector Reform Partnership 2014-16 (Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2014 in favour of Cambodia to be financed from the general budget of the European Union)),* European Commission 2014
EC, 2014b	*Synthesis of Budget Support Evaluations Volume 1: Analysis of the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of seven Country Evaluations of Budget Support,* Study carried out on behalf of the European Commission, Fiscus and ADE 2014.
EC, 2014c	*Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2020 Cambodia*, European Commission
EC, 2014d	*Annex 1, Description of the Action for the Capacity Development Partnership Fund Phase II, No 2014/352-240*
EC, 2015a	*Action Document for EU support to Public Financial Management – Stage 3, (Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme of 2015 in favour of Cambodia to be financed from the general budget of the European Union),* European Commission undated (2015?)
EC, 2015b	*Synthesis of Budget Support Evaluations Volume Two: Review of Methodological Issues Emerging from 7 Country Evaluations of Budget Support.* Study carried out on behalf of the European Commission, Fiscus and ADE 2015.
EEAS, 2016	*Cambodia and the EU*
EU, 2014	*Annex 1, Description of the Action for the Education Capacity Development Partnership Fund Phase I*. Document provided by the EU Delegation in Cambodia
EuropeAid, 2013	*Cause and effect analysis: contribution or attribution*
European Partners, 2014	*European Development Cooperation Strategy for Cambodia 2014-2018,* European Partners, November 2014.

Short reference	Full reference
European Partners, 2016	*European Development Cooperation Strategy for Cambodia 2014-2018, Annual monitoring report for the period 2014-2015,* European Partners, March 2016.
Global Partnership, 2017	Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 2016, *Data by Country 2016 Monitoring Round*, http://effectivecooperation.org/monitoring-country-progress/explore-monitoring-data/, accessed 10 November 2017.
GPEDC, 2016	*Cambodia: Monitoring Profile – October 2016,* Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, http://effectivecooperation.org
Haslett et al, 2013	*Small-area Estimation of Poverty and Malnutrition in Cambodia*. Haslett, S., Jones, G., and Sefton. A. National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Royal Government of Cambodia and the United Nations World Food Programme, Cambodia, April 2013.
IIEP, 2016	*Cambodia Rapid Education Sector Analysis,* International Institute for Education Planning, UNESCO, September 2016
ILO 2013	*Cambodia Child labour Force and Child Labour Survey 2012: Labour Force Report.* ILO and Royal Government of Cambodia, National Institute of Statistics, November 2013.
IM&E, 2015	*Joint Evaluation of DCA/CA Cambodia Programme.* IM&E, 2015.
IMF 2013	*IMF Article IV Country Report*. International Monetary Fund, 2013, 2015, 2017
IMF 2015	*IMF Article IV Country Report*. International Monetary Fund, 2015
IMF 2017	*IMF Article IV Country Report,* International Monetary Fund, 2017
Itad, 2014	*School Improvement Grants: First Spot Check Mission Report, Education Sector Monitoring Team Cambodia.* Itad for Sida, September 2014.
Itad, 2015	*School Improvement Grants: Second Spot Check Mission Report, Education Sector Monitoring Team Cambodia.* Itad for Sida, June 2015.
Itad, 2016	*Integration of the School Operating Budgets (SOB) and School Improvement Grants (SIG), School Improvement Fund Financing And Budget Proposal: Technical Paper.* Itad for Sida, October 2016.
Kelsall et al., 2016	*The political economy of primary education reform in Cambodia.* ESID Working paper No. 58. Effective States and Inclusive Development T. Kelsall, S.Khieng, C. Chantha and T. T. Muy,. University of Manchester, June 2016.
Kelsall, R, S Khieng, C Chuong and T Tek Muy, 2016	*The political economy of primary education reform in Cambodia.* ESID Working Paper No 58, The University of Manchester
Kimchoen & Craig, 2008	*Accountability and Public Expenditure Management in Decentralised Cambodia*, Pak Kimchoen and David Craig, CDRI Working Paper 38, Phnom Penh, July 2008
Leo & Barmeier, 2010	*Who are the MDG Trailblazers?* B Leo and J Barmeier Center for Global Development, Working Paper 222, 2010.
Madhur, 2014	*Cambodia's Skill Gap: An Anatomy of Issues and Policy Options. CDRI Working paper Series No. 98.* S. Madhur, August 2014.

Short reference	Full reference
Mayne, 2009	*Contribution analysis: an approach to exploring cause and effect*. John Mayne, ILAC Brief 16, 2009
NEP, 2013	*Primary School Budgets in Cambodia: a Public Expenditure Tracking Survey, Romina de Jong, Leng Theavy, Gordon Conochie,* NGO Education Partnership, September 2013.
Niazi, 2011	*Deconcentration and Decentralization Reforms in Cambodia Recommendations for an Institutional Framework*. A. H. Niazi for Asian Development Bank, 2011
NIS, 2000-2014	Cambodia National Institute of Statistics, 2000 to 2014, National Demographic and Health Survey, data available from http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/dhs
NIS, 2017	*Cambodia National Institute of Statistics, 2017, Cambodia Socio-Economic Surveys Data, received on 10 October 2017*
No & Hirakawa, 2012	*Identifying causes of drop-out through longitudinal quantitative analysis in rural Cambodian basic schools.* F. No and Y. Hirakawa, Journal of International Development and Cooperation. Vol. 19, No.1, 2012, pp. 25-39.
OBI, 2018	Open Budget Index, 2018, Cambodia Country Results, https://www.internationalbudget.org/open-budget-survey/results-by-country/country-info/?country=kh
OECD DAC, 1991	*Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance,* OECD-DAC, 1991.
OECD DAC, 2010	*Quality Standards for Development Evaluation,* DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, OECD DAC 2010
OECD DAC, 2012	*Evaluating Budget Support – Methodological Approach,* OECD DAC Network on Development Evaluation, [September 2012].
OECD DAC, 2017	Creditor Reporting System Database, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1, accessed 15 May 2017
OPHI, 2013	*Country Briefing: Cambodia. Multidimensional Poverty Index Data Bank.* University of Oxford: Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI). 2013..
Particip, 2010	*Thematic global evaluation of European Commission support to the education sector in partner countries (including basic and secondary education)*. *Final Report, Vol 1.* Particip GmbH for the EC, December 2010.
Perignon et al., 2014	*Stunting, Poor Iron Status and Parasite Infection Are Significant Risk Factors for Lower Cognitive Performance in Cambodian School-Aged Children.* M. Perignon, M. Fiorentino, K. Kuong, K. Burja, M. Parker, S. Sisokhom, C. Chamnan, J. Berger and F. T. Wieringa. PLoS ONE 9)11), November 2014.
Poyck, 2012	*Mid-Term review of the EU-Cambodia Education Sector Policy Support Programme 2011-2013. Final Report.* G. Poyck (AESA/Edburgh Consultants) for the Royal Government of Cambodia and the Delegation of the European Union, August 2012.
Prasertsi, 2008	*Cambodia Case Study of Government and Donor Efforts for Improved Aid Effectiveness in the Education Sector (2000-2008*). S Prasertsi, 2008,

Short reference	Full reference
Purcell et al, 2010	*Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative, Country Case Study: Cambodia,* Ray Purcell, Abby Riddell, George Taylor and Khieu Vicheanon, Cambridge Education, Mokoro Ltd, Oxford Policy Management, February 2010.
Quinn, 2011	*EC Sector Budget Support to Basic Education in Cambodia 2008-10, Final Programme Report.* D. Quinn, 2011.
RBMG/VBNK, 2010	*Phase Two Evaluation of the Paris Declaration, Cambodia Country Case Study Report, Final Version,* VBNK and RBMG December 2010
RGOC / CARE / UNICEF 2016	*MENAP factsheet – on launch of the Multilingual Education National Action Plan*
RGoC MoEYS, 2005	*Education Strategic Plan 2006-2010.* Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, December 2005.
RGoC MoEF, 2016a	*Report on Climate Public Expenditure Review 2013–2014*. Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Economy and Finance, April 2016
RGoC MoEF, 2016b	*Cambodia Macroeconomic Monitor Mid-Year Assessment 2016.* Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Economy and Finance, August 2016.
RGoC MoEYS, 2010	*Education Strategic Plan 2009-2013.* Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, September 2010.
RGoC MoEYS, 2010-2016	*Education Statistics and Indicators.* Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, 2010/11, 2011/12, 2012/13, 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16.
RGoC MoEYS, 2013-2017	*Education Congress Reports.* Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.
RGoC MoEYS, 2014a	*Education Strategic Plan 2014–2018.* Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, March 2014
RGoC MoEYS, 2014b	*Speech by Dr. Hang Chuon Naron, Minister of Education, Youth and Sport On the Occasion of the Teachers' Day 2014*. Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, 3rd October 2014.
RGoC MoEYS, 2016a	*Mid-Term Review Report in 2016 of the Education Strategic Plan 2014-2018 and Projection to 2020,Cambodia* Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, November 2016.
RGoC MoEYS, 2016b	*Decentralisation and Deconcentration (D&D) Draft Action Plan*. Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, July 2016.
RGoC MoEYS 2016c	Results of Grade Eight Student Achievement from the National Assessment in 2014
RGoC MoEYS 2016d	Results of Grade Three Student Achievement from the National Assessment in 2015
RGoC MoEYS 2016e	*Education Statistics and Indicators Private Schools 2015/16*
RGoC MoEYS, 2017	*All CHILDREN LEARNING BY 2030. Global Initiative On Out-of-School Children Cambodia Country Study*. Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport with UNICEF and UNESCO, February 2017.

Short reference	Full reference
RGoC MoEYS, n.d.a	*Prioritise for Education Sector Reform.* Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, n.d.
RGoC MoEYS 2017a	EMIS data 2007/8 to 2015/16, received from the DGPP EMIS Department on 13 October 2017
RGoC MoEYS, 2017b	*National Assessment*. Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, 2017b
RGoC MoEYS 2017c	Results of Grade Six Student Achievement from the National Assessment in 2016
RGoC MoEYS/DPs 2017	*Cambodia, Third Joint Government Development Partners Education Sector Review Aide Memoire,* Final draft 6.4.2017
RGoC MoP, 2014	*Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey 2013.* Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Planning, National Institute of Statistics, July 2014.
RGoC MoP, 2015	*Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey 2014.* Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Planning, National Institute of Statistics, October 2015.
RGoC-MoEYS, 2016c	*The 2016 Education Congress Report,* MoEYS, Phnom Penh
RGOC-MoEYS, 2017d	TPAP Technical Committee, 2017 - TPAP*: Rapid MTR*, June 2017, internal document.
RGoC, 2003	*Education For All National Plan 2003-2015.* Royal Government of Cambodia, May 2003.
RGoC, 2005	*Strategic Framework for Decentralisation and Deconcentration,* Royal Government of Cambodia, 2005
RGoC, 2009	*National Strategic Development Plan Update 2009-2013.* Royal Government of Cambodia, November 2009.
RGoC, 2014	*National Strategic Development Plan 2014-2018. .* Royal Government of Cambodia, July 2014.
RGoC, 2015a	*The National Education For All 2015 review Report.* Royal Government of Cambodia, National Education For All Committee, 2015.
RGoC, 2015b	*Cambodia Effective Development Cooperation and Partnerships Report.* Royal Government of Cambodia, Cambodia Rehabilitation and Development board, Council for the Development of Cambodia, October 2015.
RGoC, 2015c	*Report of the Evaluation on The Public Financial Management System of Cambodia, Based on Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Methodology*, Prepared by General Secretariat of Steering Committee of the Public Financial Management Reform, Royal Government of Cambodia, 31 December 2015.
RGoC/DPs, 2015	*Joint Government–Development Partners, Cambodia Education Sector Review, Aide Memoire,* April 2015..
Rønsholt, 2014	*Review of Budget Support Evaluations,* Danida Evaluation Study 2014/1, Frans Erik Rønsholt, April 2014.
Shaeffer, S and Kreng Heng, 2016	*Joint Formative Evaluation of Child Friendly School Policy Implementation in Cambodia*

Short reference	Full reference
Sitha et al, 2016	C Sitha, D Brent Edwards, J Williams and Y Kitamure, *Introduction* in Y Kita Mura, D Brent Edwards, C Sitha and J Williams *The Political Economy of Schooling in Cambodia, Issues of Quality and Equity,* Palgrave Macmillan
Sorensen & Carneiro, 2016	*Joint Scandinavian Evaluation of Support to Capacity Development, Synthesis report.* S. Sorensen and G. Carneiro, Commissioned by the Evaluation Departments of Danida, Sida and Norad, 2016.
Sorenson, 2014	*Enhancing EU impact on education, Key Asks and Priorities.* A. Sorenson, IBIS for Alliance 2015 (Policy Brief, June 2014.
UN 2015	*World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, custom data acquired via website,* United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division
UNDP, 2014	*Curbing Private Tutoring and Informal Fees in Cambodia's Basic Education. Background paper for Cambodia Human Development Report 2015.* UNDP, May 2014.
UNDP, 2017	Human Development Reports, Data explorer, accessed 4 July 2017
UNESCO NIS, 2017	*Cambodia Country Profile,* online database accessed 18 May 2017
UNESCO, 2010	*UNESCO National Education Support Strategy, Cambodia*
UNESCO, 2011	*Education and Fragility in Cambodia*, IIEP Research Paper, UNESCO 2011.
UNESCO, 2015	*Education for All 2015 National Review Report: Cambodia*
UNESCO, 2016	*Cambodia Rapid Education Sector Analysis.* International Institute for Educational Planning, UNESCO, September 2016.
UNESCO, 2017	Global Education Monitoring Report Statistical Tables, http://en.unesco.org/gem-report/node/6
Ung Luyna, et al, 2016;	*Draft Study on School Financing and Planning Mechanism For Good Governance*
UNICEF CDPF BS	*Programme document, Financial Agreement, Action Fiches and Riders; All assessment and payment documentation.2011-2013, 2014-2016.*
UNICEF, 2014	*CDPF Phase 1*: 2013 Progress Report
UNICEF, 2015	*Evaluation of Phase One of the Cambodia Capacity Development Partnership Fund (CDPF),* UNICEF Cambodia, July 2015.
UNICEF, 2015a	*Phase One Final Progress Report, UNICEF Cambodia*
UNICEF, 2016	*Education Capacity Development Partnership Fund Phase 2:* Progress Report 2016
Vire V, 2017	*Policy Dialogue in Practice: From opportunity to structured dialogue, Structuring Policy Dialogue in the Cambodian Education Sector*, presentation provided by author
WGI, 2017	*World Governance Indicators, 2017,* Complete dataset, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home, accessed 17 November 2014.

Short reference	Full reference
Wong et al, 2015	*Evaluation of the state of multilingual education in Cambodia,* Columbia *University Teachers College, 2015*
World Bank IEG, 2014	*Independent Evaluation Group of the Word Bank*, Independent Completion Report Review of the GPE, 2014
World Bank PFM	*Cambodia PFM Modernization Project (P143774): ISRs 2015 and 2016.*
World Bank, 2011a	*Cambodia: More Efficient Government Spending for Strong and Inclusive Growth, Integrated Fiduciary Assessment and Public Expenditure Review (IFAPER),* World Bank Report No. 61694-KH, November 30, 2011
World Bank, 2011b	*Cambodia SABER Country Report, Teacher Policies.* World Bank, 2011.
World Bank, 2014a	*Educating the Next Generation: Improving Teacher Quality in Cambodia*. World Bank, March 2014.
World Bank, 2014b	*International Development Association Project Appraisal Document on a Global Partnership for Education Grant in the amount of US$38.5 million to the Kingdom of Cambodia for a Second Education Sector Support Project.* Word Bank, March 2014.
World Bank, 2016	*Public Financial Management and Accountability Project. Project Performance assessment report.* World Bank, October 2016.
World Bank, 2017	*Cambodia Economic Update,* April 2017
World Bank, 2017a	*Development Indicators data extract,* http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=KHM#, accessed 18 May 2017
World Bank, 2017b	*Cambodia Education Sector: Public Expenditure Tracking and Quality of Service Delivery Survey*, World Bank
World Bank, forthcoming	*Increasing Education Expenditure while expanding government stewardship*, Public Expenditure Review Discussion Paper, World Bank

Annex 13 Minutes of the Discussion Seminar on the Evaluation – Phnom Penh, 2 March 2018

External evaluation of EU Budget support to Cambodia (2011-2016) Discussion Seminar presenting conclusions and recommendations

Cambodiana Hotel Room Tonle Chaktomuk
Phnom Penh

2 March 2018

Draft minutes

1. Attendance

The following people were present:

Name	Institution	Title
H.E. Hang Chuon Naron	MoEYS	Minister of Education
H.E. Lim Sothea	MoEYS	Director General of Policy and Planning
H.E. Put Samith	MoEYS	Director General of General Education
H.E. Ngoun Meas	MoEYS	Director General of Administration and Finance
Dr. Sam Or Angkearoat	MoEYS	Deputy Director General of Policy and Planning
H.E. Tep Phyorith	MoEYS	Director of Finance Department
Thet Bros	MoEYS	Director of Internal Audit Department
Dr Dy Khamboly	MoEYS	Director of Policy Department
Pring Morkoath	MoEYS	Director of Secondary Education General Department
Kouch Kouloma	MoEYS	Director of Non Formal Education Department
Vorng Phirun	MoEYS	Director of Construction Department
Ngor Peng Long	MoEYS	Director of Teacher Training Department
Than Setharath	MoEYS	Deputy Director of Planning Department
You Sethano	MoEYS	Vice Chief Office, Office EMIS Department
Dr. Dy Samsideth	MoEYS	Chair of the TPAP committee and the Deputy Director General in General Edu cation.
Uin Ra	MoEYS	Deputy Director, Department not specified
Chhun Ramy	MoEYS	Deputy Director, Primary Education Department
Som Kosal	MoEYS	Officer, Department of Planning
Chea Vuth	MoEYS	Deputy director, Department of General Education
Soy Sokuo Pharoth	MoEYS	Department of Planning

Olong Proseth	MoEYS	Depuy Director Education Quality Department
Ly Sopothea	MoEYS	EMIS Department
Sip Pagnasoley	MoEYS	Deputy Director
Yong Sophang	MoEYS	Vice Chief Office Early Childhood Education Department
Sok Sokhom	MoEYS	Chief of Office, Early Childhood Education Department
H.E. Meas Soksensan	MoEF	Secretary-General of the Ministry of Economy and Finance
H.E. Veth Vinel	MoEF	Deputy Secretary-General of the Public Financial Management Reform General Secretariat
Um Youthy	MoEF	MoE Desk
Sam Sok Sotheavuth	Ministry of Planning, National Institute for Statistics	The Economic Statistics Department.
H.E. Kong Sophy	Ministry of Civil Service	Director General/General Department of Civil Service Policy
Sok Samnang	Ministry of Civil Service	Director of Department
Ros Utdom	Ministry of Civil Service	Not specified
Chun Bunnara	National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development	Deputy Director Programme Management and Support Division
Taing KimEang	Council for the Development of Cambodia	Office/Policy and Development
Sang Polrith	National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development	SNPMA
Sem Peeon	Not specified	Not specified
Franck Viault	EUD	Head of Cooperation
Javier Castillo Alvarez	EUD	Attaché PFM
Michele Crimella	EUD	Attaché Education and Social Development
Ly Sophea	EUD	Economic Programme Officer
Noeun Bou	EUD	Education and Social Development Programme Officer
Thierry Matthise	EU DEVCO	EU DEVCO Head of Unit for Evaluation
Sophea Mar	Asian Development Bank	Senior Social Sector Officer
Kurt Brandenburg	KAPE	Senior Advisor
Ouk Vannara	NGO Forum	Deputy Executive Director
Mgnus Saemundsson	Sida	First Secretary
Katheryn Bennet	UNICEF	Chief of Education
Erika Mattellone	UNICEF	Lead Evaluation Specialist
Sokhon Nuom	UNICEF	Officer
Senith Siv	VSO Cambodia	Team Leader of Programme Development and Partnership
Thavy Rin	GiZ	Not specified
Hosna Eibabili	Save the Children	Director Awards Management and Communications
David Quinn	Sida	Senior Education Policy and Planning Advisor

Bhien Dany	CARE	Education Advisor
Sun Yovra	NGO Forum	National Development Officer
Russell Craig	Sida	Consultant, Team leader ESMT
Thanarak Ang	Evaluation Team	Team member
Alta Folscher	Evaluation Team	Team leader

2. Minutes of the Discussion Seminar

2.1 Opening and Welcome Address

Mr Franck Viault, **Head of Cooperation, EU Delegation to Cambodia** opened the seminar. In his opening address Mr Viault noted that the EU has been working in partnership with the Royal Government of Cambodia since early 2000 with Budget Support to the development and reform of its education sector. He commended the Ministry of Youth Education and Sport (MoEYS) for the successful implementation of the Education Strategic Plan 2014-2018. He acknowledged the role that the MoEYS leadership played in pushing the reform agenda, with strong support from the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MoEF). He noted that education is a key sector priority for EU development assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the current period, and listed the two modalities of support, bilateral support and support to civil society organisations and local authorities through the EU thematic programmes. He referenced the role of the European partners, who are operating under joint programming. Mr Viault noted that budget support is the preferred aid delivery modality for the EU. He said that the evaluation findings were timely as the Financing Agreement for the EU-Cambodia Sector Reform Partnership in Education 2018-2021 was about to be signed, which is the largest programme ever supported by the EU in Cambodia with a total budget of Euro 100 million over four years. He mentioned the complementarity between the education and public financial management (PFM) reform support.

H.E. Dr. Hang Choun Naron, **Minister, Ministry of Education Youth and Sport**, delivered the welcome address. H.E. Dr. Naron emphasised the role of education in the economy, and the importance of global citizenship. He said that the evaluation will provide tools to strengthen monitoring and evaluation of the Ministry, which was very important for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, in turn important for education. He referenced the need to make monitoring and evaluation embedded in education, so that departments can link projects to policy and vice versa. He said the capacity of departments were not even, and that implementing programme budgets to respond to policy priorities require the capacity of technical departments to improve. H.E. Dr. Naron also noted the importance of building the capacity of teachers, by increasing their education, providing in-service training and by assessing the performance of teachers.

2.1 Presentation of the conclusions of the evaluation

Mr Thierry Mathisse, Head of Unit of the Evaluation Service, DG International Cooperation and Development, European Union, introduced the presentation of the evaluation. Mr Mathisse noted that the objective of the Seminar was to present the conclusions of the draft evaluation report, and to collect views from a larger audience. He noted that the minutes of the discussion will be annexed to the final report. He pointed out that the objectives of the evaluation were about accountability and learning. With regards to accountability, the evaluation was to provide stakeholders with an independent assessment of the extent to which budget support in Cambodia has contributed to the intended results. On learning, the objective was to identify key lessons and provide recommendations to improve the design and implementation of budget support in the future. He noted that evaluation should follow principles of independence, quality, transparency and usefulness. He communicated to the audience key aspects of how the evaluation was managed, including the composition of the management group, and that the methodology followed is the OECD DAC methodology for the evaluation of budget support.

Team leader for the evaluation, Alta Folscher gave a presentation of the main conclusions of the evaluation.

2.3 General comments, observations and questions from the floor

H.E. Dr. Naron made the following comments in response to the presentation.

- He referred to some milestones not met or partly met in the second programme under evaluation and related it to capacity in the sector. The Ministry worked on many reforms that stretched its capacity, leaving not enough people to work on others.
- H.E. Dr. Naron noted that there are benefits and disadvantages of budget support. He said that the problem with project-based financing was that projects end without institutional capacity building. But there are also strengths, such as responsiveness and flexibility. He noted that generally, projects were now incorporated into the Ministry line departments, with project staff integrating at project-end.
- He noted that the CDPF provided flexible procedures. This helped kick-start reforms.
- He noted the impact of decentralisation of financial management from the Department of Finance to the line Departments. He emphasised budget accountability, now that Departments have their own budgets. This should increase capacity, as managers become more confident.
- H.E. Dr. Naron noted the importance of shaping the culture of the Ministry and in the sector. It is important to move reforms to the school, but it is also a challenge as there are thousands of schools. Shaping the culture at school-level was important. He said the Ministry was trying to build a professional learning community, that can deliver results, to take reforms forward.
- He noted the importance of sustaining reforms. This is why the Ministry is focusing on capacity, to identify and overcome capacity gaps so that reforms are sustained.
- H.E. Dr. Naron noted the importance of reform focus, especially when reforms are complex. The Ministry has initiated reforms on a broad front. He made an example of teacher reforms, saying that initially the scale was small. Others like exam reforms more notable, but not yet systematic. He noted the importance of knowing what works, and what does not work, saying that the upcoming Education Congress in March will make those assessments, also comparing with the international education literature. Focusing on what works will be important.
- He noted that the allocation of budgets require capacity, so that budgets can be accessed from the Ministry of Finance.
- H.E. Dr. Naron pointed out that a challenge is that the Ministry may not have great influence on how staff are recruited at subnational levels, as staff appointments are decentralised to Provincial Governments. While the Ministry sets the criteria and evaluation, provincial governments may not understand what is needed.
- He noted that systematic issues like teacher performance are particularly challenging. The challenge is to not only reform salaries, but also to upgrade qualifications. This is a big challenge in terms of the quality of education. H.E. Dr. Naron noted that school-based management may be a next priority, including personnel management in schools. While the Ministry has worked on teacher-reform through upgrading teachers and in-service training, intervention at school level is important, such as building the capacity of school directors. Otherwise benefits will not be sustained. There must be a focus on the performance of teachers, and on career pathways.

In her response the team leader **Ms Folscher** thanked the Minister for the comments and noted that they reflected some of the central themes in the evaluation findings and conclusions, for example on capacity, the complexity of some important reforms, and the requirement to address issues at the school level. She noted that the final report will incorporate the comments.

Erica Mattelone, lead evaluation specialist UNICEF commented on the capacity of evaluations to assess contribution and wanted to know what the limitations in terms of the data availability, and whether there was learning about setting up monitoring and evaluation systems at the very beginning so that the impact of programmes can be measured better over time.

Ms Folscher, the team leader, responded that this was indeed a recommendation from the evaluation team for future budget support programmes, namely that evaluation should be continuous. She noted that an issue faced was that while data and document evidence was available, it was very difficult for respondents to reflect on what occurred six years ago. So getting good qualitative information from interviews to interpret the data and documentary evidence was a limitation.

2.4 Questions and comments on specific presentation slides

Slide 4



Ms Mattelone, UNICEF, noted that UNICEF is completing the evaluation of the second phase of the Capacity Development Partnership Fund which also indicated that capacity development was going to be extremely important, but that it takes time and it takes resources. She asked why resources for capacity development were not increased. She asked whether the evaluation team had any observations on what the modalities that were used for capacity development, and whether some modalities were more successful than others.

Mr Magnus Saemundsson, First Secretary Education Sida, noted that a reason for not increasing resources for capacity development was absorption capacity. It was not only about getting more money into capacity development, but also about how resources can be used wisely. He referred to the inspectorate system, that is in the process of being established. When the Ministry decided to train new inspectors, the target was to educate a large number. But when the applications came in, there were few people who could be trained. Mr Saemundsson noted a second reason, referring to how capacity development is undertaken. He used the example of training school managers throughout the country. While the Ministry could train people, the real learning occurs when people are learning on the job, performing tasks. This is when real capacity increases can be seen. This takes much longer.

Ms Folscher thanked Mr Saemundsson for the insight on absorption capacity, noting that whereas the team looked at the capacity of the CDPF to absorb funds which could not explain why resources were not increased, this is another dimension that help explains why funds were not increased.

Ms Folscher pointed out that the full report does note that a lot of training occurs, but that the contribution of training to capacity development is not guaranteed. There were some other approaches emerging, such as on the job training and mentorships. The team had only limited fieldwork time at subnational level, but from this work it seemed apparent that these approaches work better. In provinces where longer relationships were in place with agencies or NGOs that supported capacity development to schools, districts and provinces, it had a better effect than the short input cascade model of training observed in other provinces.

Slide 9



Mr Sophea Mar, Senior Social Officer, Asian Development Bank asked whether the finding on improvement in the use of country systems in the education sector referred only to the use of project implementation units, or also to other factors such as the use of procurement and public financial management systems.

In her response the team leader **Ms Folscher** noted that the graph on improved use of country systems in education was based on the use of the systems that Mr Mar referred to. It used data from the Council for the Development of Cambodia that keeps the donor data base. This data base notes which projects use these country systems and which not. The reference to a reduction in implementation units was a separate point. Ms Folscher pointed out the graph in the slide included the EU budget support, but even when that is taken out, the education sector use of country support still improved while the rest of government had declined. The data is supported by the evaluation's qualitative evidence: respondents noted the importance of increasing use of systems and reducing implementation units for developing the capacity of the Ministry to manage its own projects and programmes.

Slide 10



Mr Mar from the Asian Development Bank agreed that the increase of government funding to education was largely for increases in wages, and not to implement programmes. Mr Mar asked whether the evaluation analysed to what degree donor funding helped close the increasing gap between salary expenditure and programme funding.

The team leader, **Ms Folscher**, responded that the evaluation did not undertake that specific calculation, but that it has the data to do so and that it would be done for the final report.

Slide 15



Mr Michele Crimella, Attache Education and Social Development from the EU Delegation in Cambodia referred to slide 15 and emphasised the last point on the sustainability of results from budget support, and the likelihood that results may still ensure. He noted the breadth of the reform efforts by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport over the evaluation period. He noted that the evaluation looked at a relatively short period of time, given that results and impacts from education reforms take a long period of time to materialise. The influence of budget support on additional finance from the government budget was important to sustain reforms and interventions, so that results may be seen in future.

The team leader, **Ms Folscher**, noted in response that even although the evaluation conclusion is that there were very few strong pathways of influence from budget support through to education outcomes and impacts, this was because in areas where the result chain could have been really strong, the target reforms only took off in 2013, and for some only in 2015, so that the results were not yet visible by the end of the evaluation period. However, the potential for influence is there, as the analysis of results showed that some of these areas that the reforms are addressing, such as teacher reforms, are important to explain the difference in performance between districts, for example. And as these are systemic changes that are needed, they are good to support through budget support, which is systemic support.

Mr David Quinn, consultant, commented that budget support is more about how to facilitate and support the reform process within the Ministry, and how to provide the ammunition and leverage to the Ministry in their discussions the Ministry of Finance and Economy and with other partners, than about buying a specific result. He noted that contribution is complex, and that it is difficult to assess what might have happened without budget support. He noted the importance of budget support in providing support to the Ministry in their transition to results-based management, which is critical in the sector, and the importance of being able to look at degrees of progress.

Ms Folscher acknowledged the comments, noting that the full report specifically looked at degrees of reform progress, rather than just having a binary approach to evaluating the progress. The

evaluation used a scale of 'preparing for reform', 'committing to the reform', 'financing the reform with government funds' and 'actually implementing the reform' and mapped all the target reforms against this scale. She also noted that the recommendations included proposals on how to take results-based management forward.

2.4 Presentation of the Recommendations

The team leader, **Ms Folscher** presented the recommendations of the evaluation.

2.5 Discussion of Recommendations

Recommendation 1.2: Select outcome indicators with caution and look at intermediate outcomes as targets

Unidentified participant asked whether there is a contradiction between the recommendation to support learning outcomes, and the recommendation not to use completion rates as a variable tranche indicator. The participant also raised a concern about the recommendation that targets may need to be set at lower levels than Education Strategic Plan targets if these targets are unrealistic. This would then not comply with having a common objective between partners.

Ms Folscher responded to say that the recommendation was not about not measuring progress on learning outcomes, but to be cautious in using outcome targets in a programme of four-years duration, particularly targets for a lag indicator like completion rates. The evaluation's recommendation is that when the decision is to use outcome indicators, the targets should not be year-on-year improvements in the outcome itself. A medium-term outcome target might be set for the end of the programme, but year-on-year it would be more conducive for reforms if milestones are used as targets. The milestones would need to present real progress that relate to the specific reform actions by the Ministry towards learning outcomes.

Ms Folscher agreed with the participant that in an ideal world, budget support programme targets should be the Education Strategic Plan targets. She noted however that there is a trade-off between this ideal, and the function that the variable tranche indicators are supposed to fulfil in achieving the objectives of the budget support programmes and the sector. If targets are unrealistic and unlikely to be met, the indicators are not acting as an incentive that the Ministry and its partners can use to push for reform success. It also means that disbursement will not occur, reducing likely effect of budget support financial flows on financing for the sector from government budget. In this case, the better option may be to lower targets, even if it is at cost of harmonisation with sector targets. It would also not necessarily affect a common final understanding of objectives. Ms Folscher also noted that respondents from the Ministry of Education Youth and Sport themselves thought the Education Strategic Plan targets were unrealistic.

H.E. Nath Bunroen, Secretary of State, Ministry of Education Youth and Sport asked in response to the discussion on targets whether more flexibility around target-setting is an option. He noted that when a programme is designed, unrealistic targets can easily be set, which is only fully understood as the programme is implemented. It is therefore very difficult to get realistic targets up front, and that rolling targets may work better.

Ms Folscher responded that within the EU's policy framework for budget support there would be a limit on flexibility, and that the type of annual rolling target setting used for the Education Sector Congress would probably not be possible in a budget support programme. A more feasible option would be to look at reform progress over the last few years, and set targets realistically on that basis.

Mr Crimella (EU) supported, saying that year-on-year flexibility would not be an option. However, he pointed out that in the Education Sector Partnership Reform Programme, targest were adjusted after the mid-term review of the Education Strategic Plan.

Recommendation 3.1 Focus more on learning outcomes
Ms Katheryn Bennet, UNICEF Chief of Education, Cambodia, requested an elaboration of the rationale behind the recommendation to focus more on learning outcomes rather than equitable access.

The team leader Ms Folscher responded that the recommendation was informed by the fact that whereas access to education had made rapid progress over the last decade and a half, the quality of the education is now the major concern in the sector. The Education Sector Partnership Programme, the second programme being evaluated, paid significant attention to access for minority groups and the poor, and specific interventions in these programmes have made progress, such as the multilingual education reform and scholarships, both of which have been absorbed for funding in government budgets. The key challenge for the sector is quality, also for Cambodia to achieve its development vision over the coming decades. These factors provided the rationale for the recommendation.

Recommendation 3.4 Focus at school and district level for delivering reform and recommendation and 3.6 Continue to support AOP and PBB implementation, but focus on function rather than form
H.E Kong Sophy, Director General, General Department of Civil Service Policy, Ministry of Civil Service asked whether the recommendation on deepening the results-based public financial management tools should be broadened to include other governance reforms. He noted the programmes that the Ministry of Civil Service is undertaking to build capacity and improve performance-based management of staff, including teachers. He noted the Ministry's efforts to train school directors, and that more investment in these programmes is needed and more long-term commitment. He noted that the Government is approaching these issues step by step. He noted the Ministry of Civil Service's efforts to build capacity of school directors.

Ms Folscher thanked H.E. Kong Sophy for the intervention. She said that the evaluation team focused on PFM as a continued area of support for EU budget support as it was an area of governance reforms in which significant improvement had occurred. The rationale for the recommendation was that where there are elements of governance improvements that are already rolled out in form, it is important to ensure that they matter. As Provincial Offices of Education are already putting effort into preparing annual operational plans, if these could be transformed to be fully functional elements of results-based management, the Ministry will trigger improvements in access and learning outcomes faster. Ms Folscher noted that this was not to say that the roll-out of Deconcentration and Decentralisation reforms and of the performance management of individuals were not important, but given the complementarity with the EU's PFM reform support and the progress already made, PFM was considered to be a critical area for EU support.

Mr Saemundsson (Sida) commented in response to H.E. Kong Sophy that the quality development that is needed in the Cambodia education system requires good schools and good teachers. He noted that at 500 school directors trained per year, it would take 20 years to cover all 10 000 schools. He noted the need to address the issue in a different way. He said that for this the district level is extremely important. And that this related to the mandate of the Ministry of Civil Service, so as to ensure that more power to district levels is accompanied by having the right people at this level that can support education, schools and teachers. He noted that it is very much about the people who are recruited. The need to restructure and give better salaries to people at district level is critical, so that the best principals and teachers can be recruited to support others at this level.

Ms Folscher responded agreeing on the importance of strengthening the district level and relating it to the recommendation to focus at district and school level for delivering reforms, particularly on strengthening the capacity at this level. She referenced the Sida contribution on improving pay at district levels, and said that the subnational fieldwork qualitative evidence suggested that it is not only basic pay, but that allowances also played a role as district officers did not qualify for all the same allowances as teachers.

A further comment from the floor was on the triangular support system for teaching reform that needs to be established. This involves the flow of communication, information and support between the school, the Provincial and District Offices of Education, and Teacher Training Centres. There needs to be a simplification of procedures, and better flow of communication and support.

Ms Folscher acknowledged this comment with thanks.

2.6 Concluding Remarks

Mr Viault (EU) made the following closing remarks:
He noted that H.E. Dr. Naron, the Minister, may want to add a few words to conclude the event.
He noted the following points he is taking away from the evaluation:

- The most important is the confirmation that the EU budget support programmes are relevant, and appropriate, and represent a further incentive for the sector to progress faster, especially on selected reforms in Cambodia, so this is valid and that's why we continue.
- The contribution EU budget support provided to increase alignment in the sector, not limited to EU funding, is something the EU values highly. What makes us particularly proud is that alignment and government ownership are recognised as an important feature, also of the Capacity Development Partnership Fund, including on account of its flexibility.
- The role of budget support in sector dialogue to align development partners, the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport and the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Mr Viault noted the strong linkages with Public Administration Reform, from the comments of H.E. Kong Sophy.
- The potential positive contribution from the induced outputs delivered by the budget support to the sector outcomes, is deemed as in general sustainable.

He noted that the EU Delegation was not surprised that not everything was positive, given the size and the scope of the programmes developed. The EU takes note of all the recommendations and has already started acting on some of them related to the design of the new budget support programme and specifically of the performance assessment framework and on the focus complementary measures should have. In this regard, Mr Viault thanked the Director General for Policy and Planning of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport for coordinating the process on the new programme.

H.E. Dr. Naron, Minister, Ministry of Education Youth and Sport, made the following closing remarks. He thanked the team for the report and recommendations and made six points about the way forward.

- On results-based management he noted that systematic linking is required between result targets, activities and budgets.
- On capacity building he noted the importance of the quality of people who are recruited, and that it should be on merit. That an incentive system of payment works, and that coaching and in-service training are important to ensure sustainability. He noted these as lessons from his time at the Ministry of Education and Finance, and that they are valid for the education sector too.
- On monitoring and evaluation, he noted the importance of this area, and that progress in different sub-sectors should be checked to create a climate of competition, and improvement between provinces and departments.
- On teacher development, he noted that while the training of teachers is the principle, not all teachers want to be trained. He noted the vast number of teachers that need to be trained. Even so, training is the easy part: how to do better is the difficult. This requires commitment from teachers and principals. Training must be supported by a system for appointment and direction of teachers.
- H.E. Dr. Naron noted the importance of models. The demonstration effect should be used. Best practices must be recognised in ways that will encourage replication.
- He noted the importance of starting at the school level by starting with a number of modern schools and rolling it out. It would not be possible to improve all schools at the same time, but it is critical to start with some. Education reforms take a very long time. The focus should be on system building and making continued progress.


mokoro


DAI
Shaping a more livable world.