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ANNEX


Action Document for the Preventing Electoral Violence and Providing Security to the Northern Border Regions of Ghana (NORPREVSEC) Programme

| 1. Title/basic act/CRIS number | Preventing Electoral Violence and Providing Security to the Northern Border Regions of Ghana (NORPREVSEC) Programme  
|                               | CRIS number: GH/FED/042-538, Financed under the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) |
| 2. Zone benefiting from the action/location | Five Northernmost Regions of Ghana (Northern, Upper West, Upper East, North East, Savannah)  
|                                           | The Management Unit will be stationed in Accra with a satellite office in Tamale. |
| 4. Sustainable Development Goals | Primary SDG: SDG 16 ‘Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’;  
|                                   | Secondary SDGs: SDG 3 ‘Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages’ and SDG 5 ‘Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls’ |
| 5. Sector of concentration/thematic area | Governance |
|                                           | DEV Assistance: YES |
| 6. Amounts concerned | Total estimated cost: EUR 5 900 000  
|                      | Total amount of EDF contribution: EUR 5 900 000 |
| 7. Aid modality and implementation modalities | Project Modality  
|                                               | 1. Indirect Management with Member State Organisations.  
|                                               | 2. Indirect Management with the Republic of Ghana. |
| 8. a) DAC code(s) | 15210 – 30%,  
|                 | 15220 – 40%,  
|                 | 15151 – 30% |
| b) Main Delivery Channel | N/A |
| 9. Markers (from CRIS DAC form) | General policy objective  
|                                   | Not targeted  
|                                   | Significant objective  
|                                   | Principal objective |
| Participation development/good governance | □  
| Aid to environment | X  
| Gender equality and Women’s and | □  

1 Official Development Assistance is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective.
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**SUMMARY**

The overall objective of the programme is to promote good and inclusive governance by contributing directly to resilience and security in Ghana, whereas the specific objectives are: to better equip key Government and non-Government actors in their joint and coordinated efforts to sustain peace; to prevent pre- and post-electoral violence, also against women and girls; to ensure peaceful electoral process and; to contain the rise of violent extremism through enhancing their capacities in early warning, conflict resolution, countering terrorism and fight against transnational organised crime, with respect to rule of law and human rights.

The action will address the root causes of inter-ethnic and communal violence in order to prevent the rise of violent extremism, as well as political and religious radicalisation, mainly among youth and predominantly in five northern regions of Ghana with a potential of nationwide impact. The outputs of this programme will aim at strengthening and supporting relevant existing peacebuilding mechanisms and structures, constructed with the purpose of soothing and/or resolving land-related, chieftaincy and farmer-herder disputes and, thus, contribute to preventing and countering violent extremism. The programme will also aim at bringing security actors closer to the population through, *inter alia*, institutional strengthening, various confidence-building activities, trainings and awareness-raising campaigns, conducted especially during a tense pre-electoral period. This should, in turn, improve the counter-terrorism (CT) and transnational organised crime (TOC)-specific intelligence-gathering and analysis capacities of law enforcement agencies and ultimately contribute to securing the border areas. A specific component will be aiming at directly supporting the institutional and structural capacities of relevant law enforcement agencies, in order to improve rule of law-based and human rights-based responses to terrorist and organised crime offences.

- Key Result Area 1 (Output 1): preventing electoral violence, ensuring peaceful electoral process itself, soothing post-electoral tensions and countering violent extremism during the 2020 elections process, with a particular focus on the north of Ghana;
- Key Result Area 2 (Output 2): strengthening of early warning, monitoring and conflict resolution mechanisms and structures with the aim of promoting peaceful co-existence and preventing violent extremism in the five northernmost border regions of Ghana;
1. Context Analysis

1.1 Context description

Ghana has been a West African model for democracy since its return to democratic rule in 1992 with three peaceful transitions of power between different political parties, despite high-tensions over the close results of several elections. It remains one of the most dynamic economies in West Africa and benefits from a stable political environment. The current Government of Ghana has a strong political agenda focused on the industrialisation of the country with private investment, development of the agricultural sector and generating employment as its key pillars, often described as ‘Ghana beyond Aid’. It recognises that Ghana's stable political and security environment are its best assets for future economic growth and institutional strengthening. The upcoming elections, scheduled for 7 December 2020, are already dominating the political agenda and will be highly scrutinised. The Elections Commission in its new composition is yet to address some of the key reforms to improve the electoral process. The Electoral Commission of Ghana also had to delay the voter registration over the risks of the COVID 19 pandemic, while this is a key initial step of the chain of electoral preparation. These elections might also be overshadowed by the unprecedented rise of political vigilantism and potential voter intimidation. The stakes are high for the contenders. The democratic political heritage of Ghana and its vibrant civil society are likely to help institutions to address these challenges. However, the deteriorating situation, especially in the northern part of the country, is of concern.

In spite of these successes, Ghana’s security has witnessed noticeable deterioration in recent years, with organised crimes rising as evidenced by a series of kidnappings, abductions and armed robberies in cities such as Accra, Takoradi and Tamale. In 2018, four girls were kidnapped in Takoradi and, in June 2019, two Canadian girls were kidnapped in Kumasi. While the Canadian girls were rescued, the police after a year of investigation confirmed the death of the four missing Takoradi girls, raising questions about the effectiveness of the police in ensuring the safety and security of their own citizens. There are also instances of increasing attacks on and killings of chiefs, police officers and journalists as well as election-related acts of violence.

In terms of violent extremism in Ghana, poverty, youth unemployment, marginalisation, corruption, politicisation of state institutions and local governance structures, social inequalities, and porous borders are commonly outlined as some of the key underlying causes of the phenomenon. Consequently, radicalisation and violent extremist tendencies continue to manifest in chieftaincy and chieftaincy-related conflicts, which are also related to land right disputes (the so-called ‘land-guardism’), political vigilantism, inter-religious tensions, intra-Islamic religious conflicts, farmer-herder competition (also known as agro-pastoralist conflicts), exploitation of resources related to mining (e.g. gold, bauxite) and felling of
rosewood. All the above challenges the capacity of law enforcement agencies, and particularly the police, in maintaining law and order. On the other hand, there have also been reports\(^2\) of abuse of force and harassment by law enforcement agents, particularly against people living with disabilities (PLWD) and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBTI) people. The 2018 EU Country Gender Profile also indicates that the judiciary system has been ‘eroding the protection and advancement of women’s rights under the law’ in Ghana. Additionally, politicisation of local conflicts, external refugee inflows, proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), among others, are leading to political radicalisation, rise of vigilantism and inter-ethnic animosity, especially in view of the upcoming, potentially very divisive December 2020 general elections.

Evidence of growing disparities across regions, particularly between the North and the South, with five northernmost regions (Upper East, Upper West, North East, Savannah and Northern) witnessing high incidences of poverty and limited access to basic services and urban infrastructure - demonstrates that Ghana has still some way to go in order to achieve its potential. Poverty still remains a major cause of conflict, radicalisation and violent extremism. Whereas the Southern regions are better developed, the Northern regions are largely poor in terms of infrastructure and job opportunities. The latest Ghana Poverty Mapping Report (2015) buttresses this point, noting that although all regions in the country face disproportionate levels of poverty, northern districts are poorer when compared to southern districts. In specific terms, the East Gonja District recorded the highest level of poverty of 84.2%, Bole (74.4%), and Kpandai (76.9%), all these now fall under Savannah Region. In Upper East, the highest incidence of poverty was observed in Builsa South District (84.4%). Although these statistics may have changed over the last four years, the five northern regions remain poor, with limited infrastructural development and job opportunities. Moreover, porous borders coupled with poor surveillance and intelligence-gathering capacities of law enforcement agencies, complement the overall picture of structural and institutional weaknesses of key security actors, that hamper the security of Ghana’s frontiers and contribute negatively to the realisation of basic human rights, from the provision of physical security to the access to health, education, or employment rights to local population in border districts.

Violent extremist and terrorist activities are still on the rise in Northern Nigeria, Niger and Mali. More recently, the deteriorating security situation in the neighbouring Burkina Faso (characterised by extremist attempted attacks in a Catholic Church in Hamile in the Upper West Region as well as communal conflicts between Fulani and Mossi ethnic groups), have particularly raised concerns for Ghana’s security relating to the infiltration of violent extremist groups into the country. It seems to be part of a wider approach shown by terrorist groups to target the coastal states of Cote d’Ivoire, Benin and Togo. In addition to these processes, there are symptoms of increasing radicalisation within Ghana, precipitated by new waves of ‘wahhabisation’ and attempts of recruitment of Ghanaian Muslim youth into global terrorist networks such as Daesh and ISIS in Libya and Syria respectively. Some recognised tertiary institutions, such as Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) and University of Professional Studies (UPS), have recently been targeted in that regard. The recruitment of 16 individuals and the dissuasion of 22 young Ghanaians who were radicalised through the internet and were due to join ISIS, raised the alarm bell for preventive and counteractive measures to be introduced.

Despite some Development Partners' (DPs) assistance from the UK and the USA, there is still a vast array of issues that may require strengthened partnership. This refers specifically to the intelligence gathering and analysis capacities, supporting the whole of the criminal justice

chain specific to counter-terrorism (CT) and transnational organised crime (TOC) offences, as well as preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) and radicalisation. The potential of insecurity and radicalisation spill-over effect from Burkina Faso also remains of grave concern for the communities in the northern regions. Whilst most of the migratory flows may be of seasonal nature, their unprecedented growth in 2019 still has the potential to create new inter-communal tensions. The noticeable rise of arms trafficking and manufacturing, coupled with local populations’ reticence to reporting to law enforcement agencies on any new movements, can further destabilise and exacerbate the already volatile security panorama in the northernmost regions.

Apart from affecting more heavily the targeted regions, this context also affects differently women, children, people living in poverty and vulnerable situations, such as minority groups. In particular, insecure electoral environments can exacerbate existing discriminations and pose further obstacles to equal participation. Conflict dynamics make many individuals and groups more vulnerable, such as persons with disabilities, elderly and children.

Electoral violence has been shown to have a disproportionate impact on women, both as candidates and as voters. Gender-based violence in elections can range from the escalation of harassment and intimidation to sexual and physical violence against women in public life. As highlighted by the abovementioned cases, women and girls also experience different vulnerabilities as victims of terrorism, particularly with respect to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and the nexus between SGBV and trafficking in the context of terrorism.

On the other hand, actions to prevent and counter violent extremism must ensure full compliance with human rights norms. In countering terrorism, states should avoid taking measures that pose human rights challenges: by engaging in torture and other ill-treatment, or by violating the international legal obligation of non-refoulement when returning persons suspected of engaging in terrorist activities to countries where they face a real risk of human rights abuse.

1.2 Policy Framework (Global, EU)

The European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2019 on building EU capacity on conflict prevention and mediation (2018/2159(INI)) 17 ‘recalls the growing need for conflict prevention in addressing the root causes of conflict and in achieving the SDGs, with a particular focus on democracy and human rights, the rule of law, judicial reform and support for civil society’.

The commitment of the EU to supporting, developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law and human rights is well grounded in the various legal instruments that govern EU structures and activities. These include the Treaty on the European Union (1992), which states that the EU ‘is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.’ Externally, support to democracy is centric to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and of the EU’s development cooperation. These objectives were further developed in 2019 in the Council Conclusions (CC) on Democracy 12699/19 - To promote the full participation of all without discrimination and, in this context, to make particular and special efforts to support a greater participation and representation of women and young persons and their interests in public and political life. The CC also emphasise the need to support and promote civic education.
Terrorism is one of the major threats facing the Union and Member States, as highlighted in the European Agenda on Security (2015)\(^3\) and in the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016)\(^4\). The Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Counterterrorism adopted in June 2017 highlighted the need to further develop cooperation with the EU’s neighbourhood and other regions on countering terrorism and violent extremism. They also laid out clear guidance on how counterterrorism and P/CVE should be embedded across EU strategies and policies. In 2005, the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted with the aim of ‘combating terrorism globally, while respecting human rights’. The strategy is based on four pillars - *prevent, protect, pursue* and *respond* - which, collectively, should reduce the risk of terrorism to a manageable level.

The basis for the EU’s work under ‘Prevent’ strand remains the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, revised in June 2017.\(^5\) The revised strategy identifies priority areas for EU action, both within and outside the EU. It calls for a joint effort between relevant stakeholders at local, regional, national and international levels to support vulnerable countries to counter terrorist recruitment and to build community resilience to radicalisation. EU work in the area of prevention is aligned with the 2016 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism of the United Nations (UN)\(^6\) Secretary-General (SG), which calls for a comprehensive approach encompassing not only essential security-based counter-terrorism measures but also systematic preventive steps to address the underlying conditions that drive individuals to radicalise and join violent extremist groups. The action also considers the fact that Ghana ratified the main human rights international conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Conventions oriented to protect specific groups, such as women, children, and PLWD\(^7\), including in situations of crisis/conflict.

In the regional context, Ghana also signed the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and ratified the Maputo Protocol.

The proposed action supports the implementation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1325 (2000), which stresses the importance of women’s equal and full participation as active agents in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace-building and peacekeeping and of UNSC resolution 2242 (2015), which addresses a number of substantive areas, including a commitment to integrate a gender analysis on the drivers and impacts of violent extremism and greater consultations with women’s organisations affected by this violence. It also contributes to the implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan II (Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU External Relations 2016-2020)\(^8\), particularly objective 9) Protection for all women and men of all ages from sexual and gender-based violence in crisis situations.

Furthermore, the action fits into the National Indicative Programme 2014-2020 and is also fully in line with the Country Strategy Paper covering the same timeframe. As such, it falls under the governance sector of concentration. Furthermore, the action has been designed as a consequence of policy and political dialogue on security conducted throughout 2019, during

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\(^3\) [electronic address](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/e-library/glossary/european-agenda-security_en)

\(^4\) [electronic address](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eups_review_web.pdf)

\(^5\) [electronic address](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al33275)

\(^6\) [electronic address](https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/plan-of-action-to-prevent-violent-extremism)


which prevention and countering violent extremism, as well as counter-terrorism, were indicated as desired areas of further EU support.

1.3 Public Policy Analysis of the Partner Country

In recognition of the effect of both the international and internal dimensions of violent extremism and terrorism on the peace and stability of Ghana, in 2019 the Ministry of National Security introduced the National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana (NAFPCVET) under the Directive of the President of the Republic. NAFPCVET, approved in January 2020, clearly outlines the principles, measures and the architecture that will guide the response to these threats. It also sets out the context, the stakeholders and duty bearers who have the responsibility of working with the NAFPCVET framework from national to community level. NAFPCVET is anchored on four pillars of preventing, pre-empting, protecting and responding to terrorism and violent extremism threats. The Ghana Anti-Terrorism Act of 2008 (Act 762), together with its subsequent amendments in 2012-2014, is the principal legislation that underpins the legal framework on Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana. Furthermore, specific policies aiming at preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism are the following: the Information Communications and Technology for Accelerated Development (ICT4AD, 2003); the Electronic Transaction Act (Act 772, 2008); the National Cyber Security Policy and Strategy; the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2008 (Act 749); and the 2010 Organised Crime Act. The Bank of Ghana (BoG) and the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) have also developed anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) guidelines for banks and non-bank financial institutions in Ghana, based on the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations, 2008 (L.I.1925). The aim of these acts is to prevent potential terrorists from accessing huge sums of funds for recruitment of personnel, training and the planning processes leading to an attack and obtained through money laundering, drug trafficking and piracy. Despite indisputable legislative and regulatory achievements this solid policy framework still awaits full implementation. NAFPCVET is perceived as an important milestone in this regard. The action will also take into consideration the National Gender Policy.

In the December 2020 general elections, the opposition leader and past president (in office from 2012 to 2016), John Dramani Mahama, will seek to be re-elected. A strong polarisation of Ghanaian society that has recently been observed remains one of key spoilers to the development of a competitive multi-party democracy in the country. This situation is further compounded by the winner-takes-all mechanism and a history of close results, which led to high tensions and supporters going out onto the street. This situation is likely to put the work of the Electoral Commission under high scrutiny. The Electoral Follow-up Mission (EFM) deployed in October 2019 reported publically that, despite initial efforts by the Electoral Commission, numerous reforms to improve the management of the process are yet to be addressed. The EFM also reported that the electoral stakeholders are preoccupied by the flare-up of violent groups of political supporters (‘vigilantes’). The nature of the relationship between these groups and political parties led to some EFM interlocutors expressing apprehension about their increasing involvement in inter- and intraparty disputes in the run-up to the 2020 general elections. Local Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) underline that political parties seem to take advantage of the 'vigilantism" system with some strong vigilante groups backing them in key regions. Attempts to disband these groups were made in 2019, inter alia, through the adoption of the Anti-Vigilantism Act, which encounters serious obstacles in its operationalisation.
1.4 Stakeholder analysis

The National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) is the constitutionally mandated institution to help develop among the citizens a culture of democracy through awareness creation, sensitisation and participation. The NCCE’s purpose is to create and sustain the understanding and commitment to democracy through civic education and inculcate in the citizenry the awareness of their rights and obligations, including the responsibility of defending the constitution against all forms of abuse and violations. Since its inception in 1993, the NCCE has been instrumental in strengthening and deepening democracy in Ghana. The Commission continues to play key roles in social and political developments by providing the requisite awareness and sensitisation, including on prevention of electoral violence, which has encouraged many citizens to exercise their civic rights and responsibilities. These areas include citizens’ participation in the electoral process, community and local development, environmental governance, women’s empowerment to participate in political and governance processes and the promotion and protection of the rights of marginalised and excluded groups, including children, women and persons with disability. Given the specificity of the Output 1 of the overall action, as well as per constitutional mandates of relevant governmental bodies, the Electoral Commission of Ghana will not be a direct beneficiary of the programme. However, close coordination between NCCE and the Electoral Commission, as per existing legal arrangements, will be ensured.

The National (NPC) and Regional Peace Councils (RPCs) contribute to the establishment of a new peace architecture that relies on non-kinetic, soft approaches in mediation and conflict prevention. The NPC was established in 2011 by the Parliamentary Act 818 as an independent state mechanism to facilitate the prevention of local conflicts. As empirical evidence in the Northern, Upper West and Upper East regions shows, the RPCs serve as an effective early warning, mediation and conflict prevention and resolution body in the country, despite shortfalls in terms of staffing and institutional capacities. Given the increasing importance of these structures, there is a need for the six regions that were newly created in 2018 to be provided with fully-fledged RPCs.

The Regional Houses of Chiefs (RHCs) are also underpinned to the relevant central-level structure – National House of Chiefs (NHC) and are central to chieftaincy-related conflict resolution and mediation. NHC was established following the provisions of 1992 Constitution (art. 271). In case of the five northernmost regions there are three RHCs present (in Northern, Upper West and Upper East regions). In the case of the Northern region, virtually all (except the ones remaining in open dispute) 60 chiefs of the Northern, Savannah and North East regions gather twice a year for a general meeting. On top of this, various committee meetings are convened, including the ad hoc ones designed for preparing dispute cases for further proceedings. In 2018, out of eight such cases, four found their resolution. Efforts are currently being made to establish three new RHCs in the recently-established regions (Savannah and North East).

West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP-GHANA) remains one of key partners for RPCs and RHCs on the ground, providing them with early warning information that is also used as a source of intelligence for the security agencies in their effort to respond by averting potential security threats. In more general terms, WANEP-GHANA has been present in the country since 2002 and seeks to facilitate the creation of a sustainable culture of non-violence, justice, peace and social reconciliation in Ghanaian communities by ensuring coordination and effectiveness among peace practitioners, in order to avoid duplication of efforts and maximise the use of resources for more effective responses to conflict situations. WANEP-GHANA is the Ghana Secretariat of WANEP and is based in Tamale, Northern Region.
Civil society remains very strong and proactive in the northernmost regions of Ghana. That refers also to governance issues and encompasses matters relating to prevention of conflicts. Virtually all CSOs active in this field (32, according to the 2019 count), are gathered in the **CSO Platform for Good Governance (PGG)**. It regularly invites NCCE, Institute for Local Governance Studies (ILGS) and local authorities for its meetings and was created before the 2016 general elections. It has since proved to be an efficient body serving, not only for information-sharing purposes, but also triggering cooperation between CSOs and government agencies at the local level. It is co-chaired on a rotational basis by one CSO and one agency and its meetings are convened quarterly. Among CSOs with a proven track record of violence reduction, mediation and conflict prevention: Community Development Alliance (CDA), Northern Patriots in Research and Advocacy (NORPRA), SAVE Ghana, Rural Initiatives for Self-Empowerment (RISE) Ghana, Northern Sector Action on Awareness Centre (NORSAAC), Action for Sustainable Development (ASUDEV), Professional Network Association (ProNet), Centre for the Alleviation of Poverty, the Environment and Child Support (CAPECS), Centre for Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies (CECOTAPS) and Regional Advisory Information and Network Systems (RAINS).

The action will also involve communities in general, and specific groups of rights-holders, ensuring their meaningful participation in achieving the objectives of the action. In that sense, it will take into consideration that women and girls can be affected differently, both by terrorism and by counter-terrorism policies and practices. Women and women’s organisations can be critical in ensuring a particular attention is given to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and its link with trafficking. They can also be key in addressing female radicalisation and recruitment, and are instrumental early warning and de-radicalisation agents in their communities and families. The action will contribute to enhancing women’s participation in law enforcement to increase the effectiveness of early warning and identification of threats, as well as improve community engagement initiatives.

Preventing radicalisation, as well as countering violent extremism and terrorism, is the responsibility of virtually all **law enforcement and intelligence agencies**, including: the **Ghana Police Service (GPS)**; the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF); the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS); Customs Division of Ghana Revenue Authority; Bureau of National Investigation (BNI); Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Financial Intelligence Centre, Research Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional integration; Financial Intelligence Unit (EOCO); National Security Council. Others include: Ghana Prisons Service; Ghana National Fire Service; The Ministry of Information; National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO); Judiciary Service/Attorney General; Ghana Education Service; Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit (DOVVSU) and; Regional, Metropolitan, Municipal and District Coordinating Councils. This mandate is provided for in section 40 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (Act 749) (2008). In line with the police mandate of maintaining law and order, and protecting life and property, it also has the responsibility for PCVE/and CT under the **Counter Terrorism Department of the GPS**. To this end, three units, namely: Special Assistant Force (SAF), Technical Support Unit (TAU) and Information and Intelligence Management Unit (IIMU) are instrumental in the areas of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) and counter terrorism (CT). The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection is responsible to ensure government policies’ responsiveness to the needs of specific groups, including women, children and persons with disabilities.

Several religious and traditional organisations also play an important role in the area of preventing and countering violent extremism. Apart from the presence of religious leaders in NPC/RPCs and chiefs in NHC/RHCs, **Ghana Muslim Student Association (GMSA)** remains
the biggest students’ organisation in the country. Actions targeting GMSA will be consulted and coordinated with the Office of the Chief Imam, the Baraka Policy Institute and Ghana Academy of Muslim Professionals. Several other youth and women’s organisations active in the North of Ghana will also be part of the programme. Where relevant, the representatives of Community Resource Management Areas (CREMAs), a collaborative and inclusive natural resources governance and management framework that was adopted to phase out exclusive conservation practices to recognise and foster local community participation and responsibility in the conservation of natural resources in Ghana, can be included into the programme activities.

Both CSOs and NCCE have positive experience in working with local media, especially with regard to sensitisation and awareness-raising campaigns. They are indispensable, with regard to the organisation of panel discussions, airing of jingles with counter-narratives and social media campaigns that should be undertaken, in order to heighten awareness on the importance of maintaining peace before, during and after the 2020 General Elections.

In the framework of a governmental bid for a more decentralised Ghana, local authorities have recently also been more implicated in the provision of security. Both regional (Regional Coordination Councils, (RCCs)) and district (Municipal and Metropolitan District Assemblies, (MMDAs)) authorities are now equipped with relevant security structures (Regional and District Security Councils, respectively) that convene regularly and gather security actors, as well as religious and traditional leaders. Their coordination capacities vary from one region to another, but they rely heavily on local early warning mechanisms that are mainly provided by RPCs and CSOs.

1.5 Problem analysis/priority areas for support

The first of three main outputs of this programme will aim at ensuring a peaceful political environment for the upcoming elections, predominantly in the northern regions of Ghana, with a potential roll-out to other regions with records of pre-electoral violence. According to recent estimations, there are over 2 million weapons in circulation in the country and over half of those weapons are held illegally. This fact is particularly worrying, in view of the upcoming and politically very divisive general elections to be held in December 2020. The NCCE and RPCs have extensive experience in engaging chiefs, clan elders, opinion leaders, blacksmiths and young people. Their networks and knowledge should serve as an efficient entry point towards the reduction of potential exposure to local violence, especially during the tense pre-electoral period. In addition to this, the NCCE has a proven record of support and collaboration with local CSOs, RPCs and the Small Arms Commission. It can effectively further this cooperation in order to undertake comprehensive public sensitisation campaigns, through various media, on the dangers of illicit acquisition, accumulation and possession of such weapons; develop videos, documentaries and radio jingles for nationwide and community education; mount awareness creation activities in conflict prone communities in the northern regions; engage youth and women’s groups on armed violence in elections in flashpoint communities in the northernmost regions of the country and engage political party leaders in a dialogue at national, regional and district/constituency levels in order to pressurise armed vigilante groups to refrain from armed violence before, during and after the elections. The action will ultimately have a nation-wide impact through the establishment of the National Dialogue on Countering Arms Proliferation, Religious Tolerance and Peaceful Elections.

The second component/output of this action will address the root causes of inter-ethnic and communal violence and will aim at preventing the rise of violent extremism, as well as political and religious radicalisation, predominantly among vulnerable youth. The stark
developmental differences between the five northernmost regions, which are largely poorer than the southern regions of the country, predispose young people in the former towards violent tendencies. Similarly in the case of ‘political vigilantism’, these issues require real solutions. In order to do so, relevant existing peacebuilding mechanisms and structures, constructed with the purpose of soothing and/or resolving land-related, chieftaincy and farmer-herder disputes, need to be strengthened and supported. The proposed programme will aim at bringing security actors closer to the population, *inter alia*, through institutional strengthening, various confidence-building activities, trainings and awareness-raising campaigns, conducted especially during a tense pre-electoral period and right after the voting takes place. In this way, the action will also improve early warning mechanisms through strengthening the role of civil society, as well as traditional and religious leaders in that regard.

Ghana's porous borders and its strategic geographic location encourage the rise of illegal trafficking, creates a favourable environment for organised crime and opens up the potential for a spill-over of terrorist groups into the Ghanaian territory.

The third component/output of this action will be aiming at improving the counter-terrorism (CT) and transnational organised crime (TOC)-specific intelligence-gathering capacities of law enforcement agencies and, ultimately, contribute to securing the border areas. This will be done by directly supporting the institutional and structural capacities of relevant law enforcement agencies (mainly GPS) in five northernmost regions, especially in terms of enhancing the whole of criminal justice chain of CT and TOC cases, in order to improve rule of law-based and human rights-based responses to terrorist and organised crime offences. Recent studies show that the police need specific skills to be able to interact with the public and effectively disseminate information on radicalisation and violent extremism. The capacity-building activities will also focus on how the police should interface with communities, so that they are not perceived as instruments of coercion and/or suppression, but an agency that prevent crime and maintain peace and security. On top of this, the police service should be given requisite knowledge in information technology to bring them up to speed in order to design appropriate information management systems.

### 2 Risks and Assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Mitigation measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low level of ownership</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>The programme has been designed in close consultation with a wide range of stakeholders to both identify what support would be most likely to be ‘owned’ and has focused support on the key functions of relevant institutions and organisations. A relatively strong civil society and presence of security actors with clear mandates effectively minimise the overall risk. However, regular policy dialogue and close monitoring of the programme should further assist in mitigating it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of political will</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Given the fact that security remains very high on the political agenda, it is very unlikely that the authorities lose interest in attaining the objectives of the programme. This may, however, be the case with some specific elements, such as the fight with vigilantism. In such case, political dialogue would need to be</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[11]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Area</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social and political consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay in key steps of the voter registration may put additional pressure on the electoral authorities to rush activities at the expense of transparency of the whole process, which increases the risk of violence. Close monitoring and political/policy dialogue of the EU Delegation with the authorities are envisaged to mitigate this risk.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low capacities of absorption</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This risk is more relevant to local CSOs than national/regional institutions. Close coordination with the Platform on Good Governance, on one hand, and NCCE, NPC and WANEP, on the other, should mitigate the potential problem.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeopardised sustainability of actions</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to intricacies of the security problem in northernmost regions of Ghana, long-term measures need to be put in place in close collaboration with other donors present in the field. Quarterly meetings of ‘like-minded’ donors active in the fields of CT and P/CVE should serve the purpose.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor coordination between various stakeholders/beneficiaries of the action</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders working on counter-terrorism and those in voter education have different tools and objectives, which will be clearly distinguished and yet coordinated. Careful setup of the Steering Committee, its regular meetings and use of local structures on the ground (CSOs Platform on Good Governance and with the Electoral Commission) should efficiently mitigate this risk.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security situation disallowing for a full roll-out of the programme</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Although this cannot be completely excluded, this risk remains relatively low given the governmental commitment and increasing security presence in the North of the country. Nevertheless, close monitoring of current situation and geographic as well as sequencing adjustments to the programme shall be considered if necessary.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU support to CT capacity building strengthens the repressive rule of police and armed forces</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With a strong focus on International Law, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law, all capacity building activities will rely on European/International norms and values.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention risk (the risk of ‘than good’ by not pursuing any action, including issues of context-specific gender awareness)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtually all available assessments and reports on the matter point at the potential of significant deterioration of security situation in five northernmost regions of Ghana, especially during a heated pre-electoral period and in the aftermath of December 2020 elections.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assumptions:
- Level of commitment of all key stakeholders remains high;
- Young people, including girls, are fully engaged in the action;
- Other programmes that aim at supporting various security actors in the North of Ghana.
(both non-EU and EU-funded) are launched as planned and progress according to their timelines;
- There are no delays in electoral calendar for the year of 2020;
- The government fulfils legal commitments and supports the roll-out of Regional Peace Councils and Regional Houses of Chiefs;
- The ‘Do No Harm’ principle is key to all EU CT and P/CVE programming. Comprehensive and rigorous needs assessment will be carried out prior to commencing any work, ensuring that implementers and recipients will be in line with this key principle.

3 LESSONS LEARNT AND COMPLEMENTARITY

3.1 Lessons learnt

Although the EU has funded a variety of governance programmes in Ghana since the early 2000s, it has not yet worked directly with Ghanaian stakeholders on security-related matters under National Indicative Programmes. Lessons learned from other DPs (most notably UK and US), are revolving around sustainability measures and the need for constant monitoring of activities. The ownership of projects and programmes, at times, remain the issue, although this particular concern does not necessarily apply to the northern regions of Ghana where civil society remains relatively strong.

Lack of an effective coordination mechanism among stakeholders (ex: Governance Working Group (GWG) unable to meet regularly since 2012) also makes it difficult for DPs to support governance in a coherent and coordinated manner. It should be underlined, however, that an informal security-dedicated sub-group began convening in late 2019 and is scheduled to meet every quarter.

Experiences of other donors working previously on P/CVE issues on a smaller scale (e.g. Canada and the Danish International Development Agency (Danida)) indicate that the capacity of absorption of local Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) may hamper effective roll-out of more robust programmes. This concern has been overcome by close engagement of stronger institutions, such as WANEP and Regional Peace Councils.

As is the case with several governmental institutions in Ghana, the decision-making processes within relevant security actors, and in particular with GPS, can be complex and time-consuming, suggesting that allocations must be kept to manageable levels and, where possible, technical assistance should be provided, in addition to funds, for activities to assist in managing such processes. Equipment and vehicles should only be provided where there is a commitment from an institution to maintain these. Many structures struggle to retain staff, given the limited salaries and GPS find it difficult to attract suitably qualified police officers willing to assume their functions in far North.

Civic education in Ghana relies on traditional methods that are not always relevant for those in urban areas and newer methods (such as social media and mobile phone based applications) need to be considered for these to be effective.

FIIAPP, as a specialised body in public technical assistance, with a mandate to mobilise European public sector expertise, has also derived numerous lessons learnt throughout its implementation of over 200 rule of law and security programmes. Most of these recommendations revolve around: the necessity for close coordination with all key stakeholders; relevance of a careful needs assessment and; application of flexibility measures allowing for adjustment of the programme to a rapidly changing environment.
3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination

The programme will be rolled out in full complementarity with other donors’ assistance in this area and has been carefully designed to avoid overlap and compliment the work of all other DPs supporting governance. This includes, in particular, the US-funded Northern Ghana Governance Programme, the Security Governance Initiative, several punctual P/CVE targeted interventions funded by Canada and Denmark, as well as the UK programmes aiming at enhancing CT capacities of relevant security actors. Donor coordination will be ensured, both through the activation of bilateral channels, as well as via the newly-created security-dedicated donor coordination sub-group that is scheduled to meet quarterly. In addition to this, and in order to improve coordination and avoid overlap, all Member States currently supporting governance in Ghana will be invited to participate in all Steering Committee meetings. Coordination on the ground will be ensured by the already existing structures, such as PGG and regular RPC executive meetings.

In more detail, assistance provided by donors (mainly US and Denmark) to the National Peace Council has supported the overall policy set-up of the institution and its administrative capacities at the central level. This programme aims at providing direct support to the existing Regional Peace Councils in three regions (Northern, Upper West and Upper East) and establishment of new ones in two other regions (Savannah and North East). The same approach, in terms of support, will be repeated in case of Regional Houses of Chiefs, which are currently not being assisted by any of DPs present in Ghana.

The support to the National Electoral Commission is a direct result of the Electoral Follow-up mission (EFM). The EFM highlighted that better implementation of the recommendations of the Electoral Observation Mission by the Electoral Commission through increased transparency, consultation of stakeholders and establishment of clear procedures to address complaints would be key to enhancing the credibility of elections. This would have been a key contribution to the project. The interest of local authorities is, however, not present.

WANEP has been receiving funding from different sources and at various levels (regional – national). The nature of such support spanned from institution-building to the provision of security assessments. Strengthening of early warning system, through deployment of monitors in close collaboration with local CSOs and RPCs (one of the key objectives of this programme) has never been a direct objective of any such intervention.

NCCE has been receiving funds from various donors since its establishment in 1993 and, thus, has substantial experience in managing grants. The EU supported NCCE at the central level in their civic education duties during the preparatory phase of two previous elections (in 2012 and 2016). In both cases, the programmes included components focusing on preventing election-related violence. Thanks to this assistance, the NCCE now boasts a solid network of regional offices and has proved to effectively cooperate with local CSOs on their awareness-raising programmes.

The action will also be conducted in full complementarity and synergy with other EU-funded activities that are yet to be rolled out in Northern Ghana, namely the Capacity Building in support for Development (CBSD) action, aiming at improving the intelligence-gathering capacities of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), as well as the Counter-Terrorism Public Spaces Protection programme, currently in its identification phase. Both programmes will be executed under Article 5 of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP).
For the purpose of ensuring complementarity, synergy and coordination, the Commission may sign or enter into joint donor coordination declarations or statements and may participate in donor coordination structures, as part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union.

4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION
4.1 Overall objective, specific objective(s), expected outputs and indicative activities

The overall objective of the programme is to promote good and inclusive governance by contributing directly to resilience and security in Ghana.

The specific objectives (SOs) of this programme are: to better equip key Government and non-Government actors in their joint and coordinated efforts to sustain peace; to prevent pre- and post-electoral violence, also against women and girls and; to contain the rise of violent extremism through enhancing their capacities in early warning, conflict resolution, countering terrorism and fight against transnational organised crime, with respect to rule of law and human rights.

The expected outputs are as follows:

Output1: The risk of political and inter-communal (including pre- and post-electoral as well as against women and girls) violence is reduced.

Output 2: Relevant peacebuilding and violence prevention mechanisms and structures, including early warning systems, are strengthened and/or constructed.

Output 3: CT and transnational organised crime (TOC)-specific intelligence-gathering capacities of law enforcement agencies are strengthened while respecting rule of law and human rights.

The main activities under Output 1 are divided into two categories and planned to include, inter alia, and not limited to:

1. Pre-electoral and electoral (short-term) activities:
   1.1. Conduct of joint civic education and awareness-raising campaigns on threats of pre-electoral violence in close cooperation with relevant Regional Peace Councils (RPCs), Regional Houses of Chiefs (RHCs) and local CSOs in more than a half of all 65 districts in Northern Ghana (selected upon careful analysis on the risk of violence), with a potential roll-out to other regions, where relevant. This activity will include: cinema van shows on the importance of peaceful elections, countering arms proliferation and acceptance of electoral outcome; TV, radio and social media engagements for panel discussions and airing of jingles with relevant counter-narratives; organisation of meetings with RPCs and RHCs in selected ‘hot-spot’ districts with high incidence of communal and chieftaincy-related violence;
   1.2. Non-violence and counter-radicalisation scheme targeted at political party youth activists in more than a half of all districts of Northern Ghana (identified upon careful analysis on the risk of violence) and some selected conflict flashpoints across the country, with the aim of improving their knowledge and attitude on the culture of tolerance and non-violence and the implementation of the Anti-Vigilantism Act (Act 999). Activity to be conducted jointly with relevant RPCs and RHCs;
1.3. Organisation of Inter-Party Dialogue Committee (IPDC) Meetings on Peace, Tolerance and Armed Violence in more than a half of all districts of Northern Ghana, selected upon careful analysis on the risk of violence;

1.4. Sensitisation campaigns at Tertiary Education Institutions on Peaceful Elections in Northern Ghana conducted jointly with local CSOs;

1.5. Engagement, sensitisation and capacity-building of party polling agents in the field on responsible management of polling stations through organisation of relevant gender-sensitive workshops and seminars in more than a half of all districts of Northern Ghana (selected upon careful analysis on the risk of violence) and some selected conflict flashpoints across the country.

2. Pre- and post-electoral (long-term) activities:

2.1. Post-electoral engagement on Peace and Tolerance in selected Districts via sensitisation and gender-sensitive awareness campaigns in selected districts where electoral tensions were the highest;

2.2. Continuation of the IPDC Meetings on peace, tolerance, acceptance of electoral outcomes and countering proliferation of arms in more than a half of all districts of Northern Ghana, selected upon careful analysis on the risk of violence;

2.3. Launch of the National Dialogue on Countering Armed Violence, as well as promoting Religious Tolerance and Peaceful Elections. As an agenda-setting platform, the NCCE will utilise ‘National Dialogues’ on thematic areas of countering Armed violence, while promoting Religious and Political Tolerance, Peace and Social Cohesion to engage, educate and empower the citizenry to actively participate in the governance process.

The main activities under Output 2 are planned to include, inter alia, and not limited to:

1. Capacity building of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), mediation and prevention capacities of Regional Peace Councils (RPCs) in the five northernmost regions, including the newly established ones in Savannah and North East region through targeted trainings and provision of technical assistance, where relevant;

2. Capacity building of the conflict resolution capacities of RHCs in five northernmost regions, including the newly established ones in Savannah and North East region, through targeted trainings and provision of technical assistance, where relevant;

3. Establishment of an efficient network of monitors deployed by WANEP and local CSOs in all districts of five northernmost regions of Ghana;

4. Implementation, promotion and conduct of trainings among relevant local officials on the Voluntary Guidelines for Responsible Governance of Tenure (VGGT) - a good governance and peacebuilding toolkit;

5. Establishment of an efficient coordination mechanism gathering together representatives of CSOs, RPCs, RHCs, local authorities and relevant Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs), on the basis of the existing CSO Platform on Good Governance (PGG);

6. Conduct of a series of CSO-led sensitisation and awareness-raising gender-sensitive campaigns aiming at countering radicalisation and political, as well as religious extremism, in all districts of five northernmost regions of Ghana. Where relevant, the Community Resource Management Areas (CREMAs), established community-based civil societies, can be used in conducting awareness-raising campaigns at the grassroots level.

The main activities under Output 3 are planned to include, inter alia, and not limited to:
1. Strengthening of the intelligence-gathering capacities of the CT Units under Regional Commands of Ghana Police Service (GPS) in five northernmost regions of Ghana through targeted trainings and provision of technical assistance, where relevant;
2. Building of the intelligence analysis capacities of the CT Units under Regional Commands of Ghana Police Service in five northernmost regions of Ghana through targeted trainings and provision of technical assistance, where relevant;
3. Creation of a network of CT focal points in all existing police stations in border areas acting as well as liaison officers responsible for maintenance of regular contacts with local communities;
4. Creation of channels of regular coordination at the district levels with other security actors, including GAF and GIS;
5. Building of GPS capacities in non-violent interventions to defuse tensions through targeted trainings on countering violent extremism.

4.2 Intervention logic

The programme will follow three complementary and mutually synergetic patterns of intervention logic, as per expected outputs:

1) Preventing electoral violence by promoting civic and voter education through awareness campaigns, as well as local political dialogue, in line with democracy support policies of the EU. All the activities that are envisioned in order to achieve this output will aim at soothing political tensions and minimising the risk of the outbreak of political violence, both of which can lead to further processes of radicalisation.

2) Strengthening of early warning, monitoring and conflict resolution mechanisms. Upon careful identification of concrete needs during the preparatory phase, the action will thus address some of the key root causes of inter-ethnic and communal violence and will aim at preventing the rise of violent extremism, as well as political and religious radicalisation, predominantly among youth. In order to do so, relevant existing peacebuilding mechanisms and structures, constructed with the purpose of soothing and/or resolving land-related, chieftaincy and farmer-herder disputes, will be strengthened and supported. Moreover, the programme will also aim at bringing law enforcement agencies closer to the population, inter alia, through institutional strengthening, various confidence-building activities, trainings and awareness-raising campaigns, conducted especially during a tense pre-electoral period.

3) A specific component will be aiming at directly supporting the institutional and structural capacities of relevant law enforcement agencies, especially in terms of enhancing the whole of criminal justice chain of CT and TOC cases, in order to improve rule of law-based and Human Rights-based responses to terrorist and organised crime offences. Through strengthening the role of security actors, civil society, as well as traditional and religious leaders, the action will also improve early warning mechanisms.

The National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana (NAFPCVET) is anchored on four pillars of prevention, pre-empting, protecting and responding to terrorism and violent extremism threats. This action will focus mainly on the first two of these pillars, whilst several other EU activities will be addressing needs under the remaining two. If conducted fully in line with NAFPCVET, the proposed actions will strengthen the operationalisation of the overall policy set-up. As a result, the level of
confidence towards the authorities, including key security actors, will be higher than it currently is.

Should all the activities be successfully implemented, the capacities to prevent violence and combat terrorism of the governmental and non-governmental institutions will be significantly strengthened. This will result in increased stability and better governance in the areas where the actions will be conducted, namely the five northernmost regions of Ghana.

4.3 Mainstreaming

The activities of this action cut across many different sectors and issues, ranging from gender equality, human rights, international humanitarian law, youth empowerment, good governance to rule of law. Activities shall thus integrate a conflict-sensitive approach into the design and implementation so that they do not cause harm or exacerbate conflict, and aim to address and mitigate potential root causes of conflict.

A clear human-rights-based approach, respectful of democratic principles, will be incorporated throughout the different stages of the project cycle (project design/formulation; monitoring of implementation; evaluation). Any potential flow-on risk with respect to human rights should be constantly monitored and mitigating measures need to be foreseen.

With regard to gender, emphasis will be put on the gender dimension and performance indicators will be, to the greatest extent possible, disaggregated by sex. All key stakeholders of the programme have mainstreamed gender in their strategic plans and assistance provided to implementation of these will eventually support gender equality. This is particularly the case with both the NCCE and local CSOs active in the northernmost regions. The NCCE has integrated gender equality and social inclusion into its systems and procedures. In the case of CSOs that will contribute to this programme, the facilitation of access to services and improved accountability that benefits both men and women in rural and urban areas have been main areas of engagement. The programme includes significant support to civic education, which will be expected to highlight the gender and human rights dimensions of any of the issues being addressed, and to training where the programme will seek to ensure that as many woman as men are trained from each of the institutions benefiting in this regard. Close engagement of RPCs, RHCs and WANEP in this endeavour will ensure that these cross-cutting measures are fully taken into account across the board.

Apart from solid policy provisions in this regard, GPS internal regulations foresee equal treatment along gender, ethnic and religious lines. Efforts have recently been made to encourage women to join service’s ranks and ensure their equal pay, as well as career perspectives. Despite the fact that numbers are still relatively low, Ghana boasts one of the highest participation rates of women in GPS, albeit mostly at lower positions than men. The programme will factor in the gender and human rights dimension into concrete activities by making sure that women will not only be its beneficiary, but will also remain among stakeholders.

Youth mainstreaming throughout will be centric to the action and treated as a democratic and demographic imperative. Young people should have a say and be involved as much as possible in the programme/project cycle and be consulted meaningfully at all stages.

4.4 Contribution to SDGs
This intervention is relevant for the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It contributes primarily to the progressive achievement of SDG 16 – ‘The promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of justice to all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels, while also contributing to SDG 3 ‘Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages’ and SDG 5 ‘Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls’.

5 IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 Financing agreement

In order to implement this action, it is foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country.

5.2 Indicative implementation period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in sections 4 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented is 48 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission’s responsible authorising officer by amending this Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

5.3 N/A

5.4 Implementation modalities

The Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures.9

5.4.1 Indirect management with a Member State organisation - Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas F.S.P. (FIIAPP) and/or another pillar-assessed Member State Organisation

A part of this action may be implemented in indirect management with the Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas F.S.P. (FIIAPP).

The implementation of the activities by FIIAPP will focus predominantly on delivering against Output 3, but may also include coordination of the entire programme, establishing and staffing a management unit, providing technical advice and assistance to all stakeholders, following up and monitoring the impact of all capacity building interventions, formulating and entering into memoranda of understanding with key stakeholders, and assisting stakeholders to implement activities. It is justified because the programme includes support to national security actors, civil society and independent constitutional bodies, it would be difficult to place the programme in the Executive, and neither the Ministry of Interior nor the Ministry of National Security (the most likely places to house the programme) have the necessary capacity, skills or experience. Given its current staffing capacities, workload and geographic location of most of the activities, the National Authorising Officer (NAO) may have difficulties to manage such a programme either.

FIIAPP has significant experience with implementing programmes on rule of law, security sector reform and counter-terrorism. As a pillar-assessed Member State Organisation, it has

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9 www.sanctionsmap.eu Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes. The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.
supported and implemented over 200 security- and rule of law-related projects in over 30 countries, including relevant programmes in the neighbouring Sahel region and the Horn of Africa. Moreover, FIIAPP is a specialised body in public technical assistance, with a mandate to mobilise European public sector expertise, which will be key during the implementation of NORPREVSEC Programme.

With regard to **Output 2 (Relevant existing peacebuilding and violence prevention mechanisms and structures, including early warning systems, are strengthened and/or constructed)** direct activity-oriented grants and subventions to WANEP, relevant Community Resource Management Areas (CREMAs), as well as local CSOs gathered in the Platform for Good Governance (PGG), may be provided. Concrete arrangements in this regard, including the selection of a **pillar-assessed entity** eligible to perform sub-granting, will be decided during the contractual phase. Such entity may enter into a multi-partner agreement with FIIAPP with a clearly defined division of budget and tasks or sign one separate contract.

The list of final beneficiaries of such sub-granting scheme may include, but will not be limited to, the CSOs that have a proven track record on working in the area of preventing violence, such as NORSAAC, CDA Ghana and CECOTAPS. In the same manner, activity-oriented sub-grants may be provided to Regional Peace Councils (RPCs) and Regional Houses of Chiefs (RHCs). The exact number of grants and subventions will be decided during the contractual phase.

**Short-term expert (STE) facility**

To increase flexibility and ensure that the programme is able to respond to an evolving environment, a STE facility managed by FIIAPP is included. The facility will be available to all of the relevant stakeholders, including the ones that are essential for achievement of the results under Output 1 as well as ‘indirect’ stakeholders (those that are recognised as key institutions in governance and that meet the broad objectives of the programme, but who will not be funded as direct stakeholders under the programme). STE facility may also be used in the **preparatory phase** where all the needs, especially with regard to Output 2 and 3 of the action, will be identified.

In case the envisaged entity would need to be replaced, the Commission’s services may select a replacement entity using the same criteria. If the entity is replaced the decision to replace it needs to be justified.

If negotiations with the above-mentioned entities fail, that part of this action may be implemented in direct management in accordance with the implementation modalities identified in section 5.4.3.

**5.4.2 Indirect Management with the Partner country**

A part of this action, with the objective of preventing electoral violence through awareness campaigns, sensitisation, political dialogue and civic education of the population during the 2020 elections electoral process (**Output 1**), may be implemented in indirect management with the Republic of Ghana according to the following modalities:

The Republic of Ghana will act as the contracting authority for the procurement and grant procedures. The Commission will control ex-ante all the procurement and grant procedures.

Payments are executed by the Commission.

The Republic of Ghana shall apply the Commission’s rules on procurement and grants. These rules will be laid down in the financing agreement to be concluded with the Republic of Ghana.
If negotiations with the above-mentioned entity fail, that part of this action may be implemented in direct management in accordance with the implementation modalities identified in section 5.4.3.

5.4.3 Changes from indirect to direct management mode due to exceptional circumstances

Should the situation require change of management mode due to exceptional circumstances, the direct management mode (direct grant) may be considered with one or more organisations that possess a proven track record and expertise in the field of countering violent extremism, conflict resolution and/or counter-terrorism. This refers predominantly, but is not limited, to activities under Output 2, which require the ability to sub-grant subventions (see point 5.4.1.). Preliminary assessments in this regard have provided identification of potential partners that are active in the region and that have successfully been conducting EU-funded P/CVE and CT programmes. However, since they are currently not present in Ghana, the roll-out of the action may take longer than previously foreseen. Similarly, the change of management mode of the activities under Output 1 (see point 5.4.2.) may also be considered under exceptional circumstances, inter alia, by taking into account the time constraints for their implementation.

5.5 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

The Commission’s authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

5.6 Indicative budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Module</th>
<th>EU contribution (in EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 3:</strong> 5.4.1 Indirect management with FIIAPP (technical assistance including short term expertise facility and coordination)</td>
<td>2 400 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2:</strong> 5.4.1 Indirect management with a Member State donor agency / multi-partner agreement with FIIAPP (sub-grants to WANEP, RPCs, RHCs and local CSOs)</td>
<td>2 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1:</strong> 5.4.2 Indirect management with the Republic of Ghana</td>
<td>1 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8 Evaluation – 5.9 Audit</td>
<td>200 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.10 Communication and visibility</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingencies</td>
<td>250 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5 900 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.7 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

Both the Steering Committee (SC) and the Coordination Unit (CU) will be centric for a successful execution of the programme. The SC will provide the overall guidance for the action and propose modifications, should it become necessary. It will be comprised of representatives of all key stakeholders of the action involved in its implementation. Full details
of the roles, functions and makeup of the SC, as well as the roles and functions of the NAO and Coordination Unit, will be included in terms of reference for the SC at the start of the programme.

Steering Committee (SC)
The Steering Committee will be made up of:
- A representative of each of the main stakeholders of the programme (NCCE, Ghana Police Service, WANEP, NPC, NHC, PGG).
- A representative of the NAO.
- A representative of the EU Delegation.
- A representative of CSOs representing key rights-holders’ groups, including women and children.

In addition, all DPs supporting governance in Ghana will be invited and encouraged to attend SC meetings to share experiences, coordinate their work and avoid overlap.

The SC will be led by the NAO and will meet quarterly. The Chairperson will be drawn from the members of the SC and will rotate every 12 months.

Coordination Unit (CU)
As dealt with in detail in 5.4.1 above, FIIAPP will be responsible for establishing a coordination unit (CU) with the responsibility for coordinating the implementation of the entire programme. The CU should be a technical-level body that gathers all experts and programme managers directly responsible for implementation of envisaged activities. It will be convened regularly and will be tasked with informing the SC on the progress of the programme.

As part of its prerogative of budget implementation, and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union, the Commission may participate in the above governance structures set up for governing the implementation of the action.

5.8 Performance monitoring and reporting
The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partner’s responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix. In particular, all monitoring and reporting shall assess how the action is improving the human rights of the people it is targeting, as well as how the action is contributing to gender equality and women’s empowerment, for which SDGs and GAP II indicators will be privileged. It will also ensure the meaningful participation of relevant stakeholders, including the targeted groups (right-holders) and respective civil society representatives.

Reports shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).
5.9 Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, mid-term and final evaluations will be carried out for this action or its components via independent consultants contracted by the Commission. During evaluations attention will be given to the human rights and gender equality issues (effects and impacts).

The mid-term evaluation will be carried out for problem solving and realignment of activities to address any changes that have occurred.

The final evaluation will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision) and to consider the possibilities of a further phase.

The Commission shall inform the implementing partner at least two months in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The implementing partner shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

Evaluation services may be contracted under a framework contract.

5.10 Audit

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

It is foreseen that audit services may be contracted under a framework contract.

5.11 Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation.

For the purpose of enhancing the visibility of the EU and its contribution to this action, the Commission may sign or enter into joint declarations or statements, as part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Requirements for European Union External Action (or any succeeding document) shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the action and the appropriate contractual obligations.
As a general rule, FIIAPP will be responsible for all communication and visibility measures for the programme, which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of Action to be elaborated before the start of implementation, supported with the budget allocated to FIIAPP in the Contribution Agreement, and implemented by the entrusted entity as stipulated in the Contribution Agreement. The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

The NCCE will be responsible for ensuring that communication and visibility measures are addressed in all activities supported by the grant. Such measures shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of Action to be elaborated before the start of implementation, supported with the grant allocated to NCCE, and implemented by the NCCE as stipulated in the grant contract. The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

Budgetary provision has been made for strategic communication services to strengthen visibility of this action and its objectives. Indicatively, one service contract shall be concluded under a framework contract or other relevant tendering procedures in the second year of the programme.
### APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY) 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results chain: Main expected results (maximum 10)</th>
<th>Indicators (at least one indicator per expected result)</th>
<th>Sources of data</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To promote good and inclusive governance by contributing directly to resilience and security in Ghana.</td>
<td>Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population, disaggregated by sex, age and cause* (SDG 16.1.2); Proportion of the population disaggregated by sex and age who have experienced a dispute in the past two years and who accessed a formal or informal dispute resolution mechanism, by type of mechanism* (SDG 16.3.3);</td>
<td>• Mo Ibrahim Index (2020 and 2024) • World Bank Governance Indicators 2020 and 2024 • AfroBarometer studies (2020 and 2024) • World Justice Project Indicators (public order and security, for 2020 and 2024) • WANEP and WACCE Assessments (2020 and 2024) • ACLED surveys (2020 and 2024)</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. To prevent electoral violence throughout the process and in particular in the north (including against women and girls); 2. To better equip key governmental and non-governmental actors in their joint and coordinated efforts to sustain peace;</td>
<td>Number of individuals directly benefiting from EU supported interventions that specifically aim to support civilian post-conflict peace-building and/or conflict prevention, disaggregated by sex and age ***(EURF 2.28/GAP 9.6) Number of state institutions and non-state actors supported on security, border management, countering violent extremism, conflict prevention, protection of civilian population and human rights ***(EURF 2.29)</td>
<td>As per Overall Objective plus: • Police (GPS) Statistics • Court statistics • Auditor General Reports • Budget statements. • Whistle-blower mechanisms. • Reports of national surveys on public perception, awareness, attitudes, and performance of security actors. • National</td>
<td>As per risk and assumptions matrix: - The security situation in five northernmost regions of Ghana allows for a full roll-out of the programme; - Level of commitment of all key stakeholders remains high; - Young people, including girls, are</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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10 Mark indicators aligned with the relevant programming document mark with "*" and indicators aligned to the EU Results Framework with "**".
3. To contain the rise of violent extremism.

Proportion of population disaggregated by sex and age that feel safe walking alone around the area they live* (SDG 16.1.4)

Development Planning Commission (NDPC) reports (2020 and 2024)
- National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE) reports fully engaged in the action;

| Outputs | 1. The risk of political and inter-communal (including pre- and post-electoral as well as against women and girls) violence is reduced; |
|         | 2. Relevant peacebuilding and violence prevention mechanisms and structures, including early warning systems, are strengthened and/or constructed; |
|         | 3. CT and transnational organised crime TOC-specific intelligence-gathering capacities of law enforcement agencies are strengthened while respecting rule of law and human rights. |

Output 1:
- 1.1. Number of individuals (disaggregated by sex and age) that have received sensitisation and awareness-raising training against electoral violence;
- 1.2. Number of polling stations officers that have received relevant gender-sensitive capacity-building trainings;
- 1.3. Number of Inter-Party Dialogue Committee (IPDC) Meetings on Peace, Tolerance and countering proliferation of arms;
- 1.4. Number of Tertiary Education Institutions where seminars and workshops on peaceful elections have taken place;
- 1.5. Number of panel discussions and counter-narrative jingles aired in local TV, radio stations and on social media platforms;
- 1.6. Number of individuals (disaggregated by sex and age) benefitting from National Dialogue on Countering Arms Proliferation, Religious Tolerance and Peaceful Elections.
- 1.7. Prevalence of incidents of sexual violence as a weapon of political and inter-communal violence (adapted from GAP II 9.1)

Output 2:
- 2.1. Number of chieftaincy-related disputes in five northernmost regions of Ghana resolved in a given calendar year;
- 2.2. Number of political vigilante groups disbanded in five northernmost regions of Ghana;
- 2.3. Number of monitors contributing to CVE early warning system present and active in five northernmost regions of Ghana;
- 2.4. Number of local officials trained on Voluntary Guidelines for Responsible Governance of Tenure;
- 2.5. Number of individuals that have received trainings on countering radicalisation, political and religious extremism;

As above plus:
- Mid-term review report;
- Reports of other DPs supporting P/CVE, CT and security-related activities;
- National Peace Council reports;
- National House of Chiefs reports;
- Steering committee reports and minutes.
- Final evaluation report.

As above plus:
- Other projects that aim at supporting various security actors in the North of Ghana (both non-EU and EU-funded) are launched as planned and progress according to their timelines;
- There are no delays in electoral calendar for the year of 2020;
- The government fulfils legal commitments and supports the roll-out of Regional Peace Councils and Regional Houses of Chiefs;
2.6. Number of meetings of an efficient coordination mechanism gathering together representatives of CSOs, RPCs, RHCs, local authorities and relevant Regional Coordinating Councils, per calendar year.

**Output 3:**

3.1. Number of CT Units officers from Regional GPS Commands that have received targeted trainings on intelligence gathering modalities;

3.2. Number of CT Units officers from Regional GPS Commands that have received targeted trainings on intelligence analysis modalities;

3.3. Number of CT focal points posted in existing police stations in border areas acting as well as liaison officers responsible for maintenance of regular contacts with local communities;

3.4. Number of situation rooms (or other types of channels of regular and effective coordination at the district levels with other security actors, including GAF and GIS) established in five northernmost regions of Ghana;

3.5. Number of GPS officers that have received trainings on non-violent interventions aiming at defusing tensions among local communities.